HISTORIANS AT WAR

COLD WAR INFLUENCES ON ANGLO-AMERICAN REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

Darryl Anthony Burrowes
BA Hons (First Class)
Dip Tchg

August 2016

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
CONTENTS

Abstract iii
Declaration v
Acknowledgements vi
List of Abbreviations viii

INTRODUCTION

- Terminology, Parameters, and Aims 2
- Historiography 4
- Approach and Methodology 19
- Structure 25

CHAPTER ONE – Homage to Catalonia: George Orwell’s Spanish Civil War

- Introduction 28
- Issues of Mythologization 31
- Orwell in Spain: Involvement and Disillusionment 33
- Homage to Catalonia: Representations of the PCE and USSR in the Spanish Civil War 44
- Appropriation 55
- Conclusion 67

CHAPTER TWO – Gerald Brenan: From The Spanish Labyrinth to South From Granada

- Introduction 69
- The 1950s: ‘The Winds of Change’ 73
- The Spanish Labyrinth: Genesis and Significance 76
- Historiography: Issues of Misrepresentation and Romanticisation 77
- Brenan in Spain 83
- Brenan Politicized 90
- The Spanish Labyrinth: Researching, Writing, Reception 93
- Brenan’s Change of Heart, and Cold War Pragmatism 100
- Conclusion 111

CHAPTER THREE – Burnett Bolloten: Dedicated Scholar Unravelling a ‘Grand Camouflage’ or Obsessed Cold War Warrior?

- Introduction 115
- Setting the Scene: Background to the Historiographical War 119
- Bolloten – the Historian: Trials and Tribulations 123
- Early Life and Influences – 1909 to 1935 126
- War Correspondent and Communist Engagement – 1936 129
CHAPTER FOUR – Herbert Rutledge Southworth: Defender of the Spanish Republic from Cold War Revisionism.

- Introduction 185
- Catching the Spanish Bug: In the Service of the Republic 197
- World War II: Getting Down to Business 199
- The Historian Takes Shape 203
- The Southworth Corpus 208
- The Southworth Reputation: Reality and Myth 212
- Cold War Political Pressure 221
- Southworth: Historian at Work 222
- Conclusion 229

CONCLUSION 232

BIBLIOGRAPHY 241
ABSTRACT

This thesis, entitled ‘Historians at War: Cold War constraints and influences on Anglo-American representations of the Spanish Civil War’, is an exploration of the way the political climate of a period influences the writing of history. In specific terms, it is an examination of the widely held view that the Cold War impacted on Spanish Civil War historiography. There is consensus among Anglo-American historians that the rabid anti-communist climate generated by the Cold War affected historical analysis of the Second Spanish Republic and Civil War, especially in the roles played by the Spanish Communist Party and the USSR. This is because historians accept that they do not live in a vacuum, and that they cannot detach themselves from the environment in which they write their history, no matter how hard they may try. The assertion that the Cold War affected Civil War historiography is seldom, however, illustrated with concrete examples. This thesis will address that shortcoming.

The primary aim of this thesis therefore is to test the validity of the premise that the writing of history is shaped by its political climate. This thesis does so in relation to the historiography of the Spanish Civil War, undertaking biographical case studies of four Anglo-American ‘writer-historians’, all of whom are widely accepted as having made major contributions to Civil War historiography. The case studies are biographical because this writer accepts as axiomatic that the history that is written cannot be detached from the moral compass, life values and expectations of the historians writing it, as well as the circumstances in which they research, write and publish.

To this end the thesis examines the life and work of George Orwell, Gerald Brenan, Burnett Bolloten, and Herbert Southworth. These four writer-historians became participants in the cultural politics of the Cold War. Their writing on the Spanish Civil War was either written, published, or was most influential during the Cold War years. Aspects of their works will be scrutinized, in conjunction with the biographical context in which it was written, to determine to what extent it was affected by the Cold War’s Zeitgeist. The biographical case studies will identify the writer-historians’ friendship and knowledge networks and determine their career aspirations. The thesis uses a plethora of primary sources including personal correspondence garnered from archives located in five countries, as well as interviews with friends and
acquaintances of the four protagonists. Some of this correspondence has been made available for the first time.

A particular point of focus is the relationship between Southworth and Bolloten, both of whom were driven by a single-minded passion to promulgate their truth of the Spanish Civil War – a war to which both men dedicated the greater part of their long lives. For both, the search for truth led them down a path of meticulous and seemingly endless research, and participation in a very personal and acrimonious ‘history war’ with each other. The two men personify a deep historiographical divide in the interpretation of the role of the communists and the USSR in the Spanish Civil War – a divide which was oxygenated and nurtured by the politics of the Cold War.
DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The idea of writing a thesis on how the Cold War’s political climate affected Spanish Civil War historiography was first suggested to me by Professor Paul Preston, whom I had made contact with while writing my Honours thesis. Professor Preston, in reply to my request for suggestions for a PhD thesis on the Spanish Civil War which could be tackled from Adelaide, drew my attention to the activities of the CIA-sponsored Congress for Cultural Freedom and the role it played in Anglo-American historiography of the Civil War. I am indebted to the Professor for his initial suggestion, and ongoing advice during the early phase of this thesis, but hasten to add that the development and approach taken in the thesis are mine alone.

I acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Flinders University for recognizing the worth of this thesis, and granting me an Australian Postgraduate Award – a scholarship which enabled me to pursue the project free from financial stress. The university also provided me with generous funding to carry out research in archives in the USA, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. I hope that the scholarship system from which this project benefitted continues in these financially straitened times so that future students are not unduly burdened with debt.

Many people have helped me with advice and support during the years spent researching and writing this thesis, however, time and space permits only a few of them to be acknowledged here. I would like to thank my principal supervisor, Professor Peter Monteath, and my associate supervisor, Associate Professor Andrekos Varnava, who have offered me wise counsel, stimulating discussion, and friendship during my candidature. Other staff at Flinders University were helpful in a myriad of different ways. I am grateful to Associate Professor Matt Fitzpatrick, Associate Professor David Lockwood, Doctor Prudence Flowers and Doctor Carol Fort, who at various times during the project offered support and encouragement. I am also grateful to Tony Giorgio, the former History Liaison Librarian at Flinders University, who warrants a special mention as he was always supportive of requests that the library purchase books that I deemed to be essential to the project. The Document Delivery staff at Flinders provided me with an excellent service, ensuring that the numerous books and articles that I requested during the candidature were obtained promptly. Many of my fellow post-graduate students at Flinders University have provided me with generous support. I am grateful to Iliya Marovich-Old for his friendship and support and especially for his technological help.
I am grateful to many scholars outside Australia who generously responded to my many email questions, especially in the early stages of the project. I owe a debt of gratitude to Günther Schmigalle who shared with me not only his memories of Herbert Southworth, but also his personal correspondence with him. Günther’s insightful analysis, generosity and humour were much appreciated. Professor Gabriel Jackson was an inspiration to me, and my weekend spent with him at his home in the USA, talking Spanish Civil War history, was a highlight of the research phase of this project. During my month at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University I made contact with Emeritus Professor Peter Stansky who generously shared his experiences on researching and writing about George Orwell. Associate Professor George Esenwein, in many emails over a number of years, shared with me his experiences and memories of working with Burnett Bolloten. I am grateful to George for the advice and resources he has offered me. Professor Sebastiaan Faber also provided me with helpful advice on which archives to consult.

I am also appreciative of the help and advice offered by the archivists at the Hoover Institution (Stanford), Edinburgh University, University College London, Reading University, the International Institute of Social History (Amsterdam), The Fundación Pablo Iglesias at Alcalá de Henares, Guernica Museum, The National Historical Archive in Madrid, and The Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Archives at New York University.

Lastly, but most importantly, I want to thank my wife Paddy, who supported this project in two vital ways. During my four month research trip which included accessing the archives mentioned above, Paddy took on the role of an amanuensis, enabling me to access more material than I would have otherwise been able to do. Moreover, she has been invaluable during the editing phase of this thesis reading my work with both a perceptive and critical eye.
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALBA</td>
<td>Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Congress for Cultural Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNT</td>
<td>Confederación Nacional del Trabajo – anarcho-syndicalist trade union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cominform</td>
<td>Communist Information Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comintern</td>
<td>Communist International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPGB</td>
<td>Communist Party of Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAI</td>
<td>Federación Anarquista Ibérica (Spain) – Iberian anarchist movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPU</td>
<td>Soviet Secret Police – renamed NKVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUAC</td>
<td>The House Un-American Activities Committee (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILP</td>
<td>Independent Labour Party (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRD</td>
<td>Information Research Department (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSU</td>
<td>Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas – United Socialist Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Committee for State Security (USSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI5</td>
<td>Security Service (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI6</td>
<td>Secret Intelligence Service, see SIS (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKVD</td>
<td>Soviet Secret Police – formerly the OGPU or GPU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPC</td>
<td>Office of Policy Coordination (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE</td>
<td>Partido Comunista de España (Spain) – pro-USSR Spanish Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POUM</td>
<td>Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista – Marxist Workers’ Party (Spain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Obrera Español – The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSUC</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Unificado de Cataluña</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>Secret Intelligence Service, see MI6 (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>Special Operations Executive (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGT</td>
<td>Unión General de Trabajadores – Socialist trade union federation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIS</td>
<td>United States Information Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

In 1942, in contemplative mood, George Orwell told his friend, the writer Arthur Koestler: ‘History stopped in 1936’. ¹ Orwell was ‘thinking of totalitarianism in general, but more particularly of the Spanish Civil War’, a conflict of which he had first-hand experience. Orwell ostensibly went to Spain with the sole intention of observing and writing about the conflict, but when he arrived in Barcelona in December 1936 he quickly decided to take up arms in support of the Republic. ² This participation in the conflict spawned Homage to Catalonia (hereafter Homage) and was destined to have ramifications for both contemporaneous and future writers in their interpretations of the roles played by the Partido Comunista de España (hereafter PCE) ³ and the USSR in the Civil War.

The polarizing climate generated by the Cold War in the decades following the Spanish Civil War fuelled historiographical disputes about the conduct of the PCE and the USSR in the Republican zone during the Civil War. The Congress of Cultural Freedom (hereafter CCF) became the democratic West’s key institutional weapon in its cultural cold war with the Soviet Union – a war which aimed to maintain and win heart and minds. Behind the CCF-funded magazines, musical concerts, art exhibitions, Congress get-togethers, and other cultural events, were the hands of the intelligence agencies of the major democracies, pre-eminent among which was the American Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter CIA). The CIA funded the operations of the CCF, supposedly unbeknownst to those intelligentsia who benefitted from their largesse. This raises the question as to what extent the success of various intellectuals was due, or at least helped along the way, by CIA funding. Furthermore, it begs the question, as to what extent the subject matter that intellectuals undertook, pursued, or explored, was influenced by the purse strings of the CIA or other agencies. Was Spanish Civil War historiography, written the Cold War years, prey to intelligence agency manoeuvrings behind the scene or was it immune from such manipulation?

³ Spanish Communist Party
TERMINOLOGY, PARAMETERS, AND AIMS

Most Civil War historians accept the premise that the Cold War impacted on the writing of Civil War history, yet they seldom explain how this happened. ‘Historians at War’ addresses this deficiency in the historiography by examining in-depth the work and lives of four Anglo-American ‘writer-historians’ – George Orwell, Gerald Brenan, Burnett Bolloten, and Herbert Southworth. The term ‘writer-historian’ is used throughout the thesis to refer to these men. This acknowledges the fact that Orwell and Brenan were not, and did not regard themselves, primarily as historians, although each contributed in a very substantial way to Spanish Civil War historiography.

‘Cold War political climate’ is another key term frequently used throughout the thesis. In general it refers to the fear, distrust and rabid hatred that was generated by politicians, military leaders, and writers from both sides of the communist-capitalist ideological divide. However, for the most part the term is used to specifically refer to the anti-communism that prevailed in the West to various degrees of intensity during the Cold War years.

At the outset of this project decisions had to be made about its parameters. In its embryonic form the thesis set out to examine the extent that distortion and misrepresentation, both intentional and unintentional, had filtered into Spanish Civil War historiography as a result of the Cold War. Such a sweeping objective could include the historiography emanating from the USSR, East and West Germany, France, Latin America, and even from Franco or post-Franco Spain. One historian whom I consulted early in the piece referred to the project as a ‘mind-boggling undertaking’, and another admired my ‘sense of adventure’. It was apparent that the scope of the project had to be confined. To keep the thesis to manageable proportions I decided to focus on four writer-historians and examine their writing on Spain in the context of their personal and professional development. This decision stemmed from my commitment to the view, that to fully understand the history, one has to know the historian.

Four criteria determined the selection of the writer-historians. Firstly, they are all Anglo-Americans, coming from a similar cultural tradition. Secondly, they all participated in some way or other in the Spanish Civil War. Thirdly, they each produced a work or had a work published during the Cold War that has been recognized as significant or seminal. Lastly, they were chosen

---

4 Email correspondence David Wingeate Pike-Darryl Burrowes, dated 26/04/2016.
5 Email correspondence Angel Viñas-Darryl Burrowes, dated 26/04/2016.
because there is a wealth of documentary material, much of which has never been used before, to enable an examination of how each man experienced and reacted to the Cold War’s Zeitgeist.

In life, Orwell never aspired to being an historian, and never intended *Homage* to be a work of documented history. He became an honorary historian in death. During the Cold War, *Homage* was given the status of a history book, and lauded as a most reliable account of communist power play during the Civil War.\(^6\) The extent to which Orwell has gained acceptance as an historian of the Civil War is evident from Roy Johnson’s advice to readers in 2011: ‘For a comprehensive account of the War, see Anthony Beevor’s *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939*, George Orwell’s *Homage to Catalonia*, and Sir Raymond Carr’s *The Spanish Tragedy*’.\(^7\) This thesis will ascertain, in view of the most recent research, to what extent the publishing success of *Homage*, was due to the Cold War.

Brenan, unlike Orwell, wrote a *bona fide* work of history – *The Spanish Labyrinth* (hereafter *Labyrinth*), which was published on the cusp of the Cold War, becoming popular during the 1950s and 1960s, when it was reprinted five times. However, it is the transformation of Brenan in the early Cold War years after his decision to return to live in Franco Spain\(^8\) from an anti-Francoist to a Franco-neutral position that is of special interest to this thesis. The factors that led to his change of heart, and the way it was done are key questions that will be determined.

The history credentials of neither Bolloten nor Southworth are in doubt. Both men dedicated the greater part of their lives to writing about the Civil War. They engaged in a bitter, decades-long, interpretative dispute on the roles of the PCE and the USSR in Civil War Spain; a dispute which became a divisive history war. An in-depth review of the Bolloten-Southworth history war is long overdue, and is another key focus of this thesis.

This thesis is concerned with how the cultural cold war impacted on Spanish Civil War historiography, and the extent to which it fundamentally framed the writing of the Civil War by


\(^{7}\) R. Johnson, *The Spanish Labyrinth*, [http://www.mantex.co.uk/2011/09/10/the-spanish-labyrinth/](http://www.mantex.co.uk/2011/09/10/the-spanish-labyrinth/), accessed 28/01/2016. Dr Roy Johnson wrote these comments in a review Gerald Brenan’s *The Spanish Labyrinth*. He pointed out that Brenan’s book was about the causes and not the course of the Civil War. He suggested readers consult the three books to find out about the course of the war. At the time of writing Johnson is the director of Mantex Information Design, formed in 1996 as a result of a merger between Clifton Press, a specialist company in printed books and software related to writing and study skills, and Turbotext, a company specializing in business documentation and training. Mantex focuses on online learning materials and eLearning course design services. It is based in Manchester and Malaga.

\(^{8}\) Franco Spain is used throughout this thesis, instead of the more grammatically correct Francoist Spain or Franco’s Spain, to refer to Spain under the control of a Franco-led government. The term is regularly used by scholars.
driving revisionist interpretations, especially as to the role the PCE and the USSR played in Spain during the conflict. It will do this by undertaking a detailed study of the four selected writer-historians which will determine how their works on Spain, and the reception these works received, were influenced or constrained by the Cold War’s political climate. Furthermore, it will gauge to what degree the writer-historians’ own personal values, careers and life ambitions were affected by the political climate, and contributed to their analysis of Spanish Civil War history.

All translations in this thesis are by the author who has chosen to include original Spanish text in the footnotes. All translations are problematic because of their subjectivity. In a thesis dealing with distortion and misrepresentation it is important to avoid the possibility of the same in translations.

**HISTORIOGRAPHY**

The Spanish Civil War has spawned thousands upon thousands of books and articles, many of which are partisan because they are based on newspapers, pamphlets, magazines and memoirs produced by the ‘nearly 1,000’ foreign correspondents who went to Spain during the conflict, and who wrote the war’s ‘first draft’ of history. Many, if not all of these foreign correspondents were influenced by the international context in which the war was fought, and as a result they took sides. They saw the Civil War primarily as a war between the great ideologies of the time; the peculiarly Spanish reasons for the conflict were of secondary importance, ignored, or not understood. George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert sum up the situation well when they write: ‘Most contemporary accounts of events in Spain tended to be two-dimensional, reflecting the real, even lethal, ideological differences that were then framing the boundaries of international politics.’

Early on in the war many of the foreign correspondents progressed from merely filing newspaper reports to writing memoirs and reportage of their experiences. Orwell’s *Homage* is of course the most famous and enduring of these works. However, at the time other works were of equal or greater interest, such as Geoffrey Cox’s pro-Republic work, *Defence of Madrid*.

---


Harold Cardozo’s pro-rebel book, *The March of a Nation: My Year of Spain’s Civil War*, and Arnold Lunn’s rabid anti-communist and anti-Republic publication, *Spanish Rehearsal*. The American war correspondent Martha Gellhorn expressed a commonly held sentiment among the war correspondents when she cruelly admitted that she had ‘no time for that objectivity shit’. Another first drafter, the American Frank Hanighen, believed that: ‘Almost every journalist assigned to Spain became a different man ... a participant in, rather than an observer of, the horror, tragedy and adventure which constitutes war’.

Comments such as those made by Gellhorn and Hanighen led later historians such as Raymond Carr to observe that ‘almost every writer of significance sympathised with the Republic’, a conclusion with which Preston concurs when he writes ‘... as a result of what they [the journalists] saw, even some of those who arrived without commitment came to embrace the cause of the beleaguered Spanish Republic’. Hugo García in his path-breaking book *The Truth About Spain* (2010) suggests the partisanship of the war correspondents may have had less to do with an incipient predisposition towards the Republic, or a ‘road to Damascus conversion’ in the light of what they saw in Spain, and more to do with the Republic’s initial control of the main state administration centres and communications infrastructure, including ‘the national telephone company (*Telefónica*), the major newspapers, the Fabra news agency, *Transradio* (the radio company that owned the country’s principal radio transmitter)’, and the ‘big film production companies’. In contrast, during the early days of the war, the rebel zone was a politically fragmented ‘polyarchy’ organized around the commands of three generals ‘who acted as

---

14 A. Lunn, *Spanish Rehearsal*, Hutchinson & Co., London, 1937. In the first part of the book Lunn recounts the ‘three memorable days’ that he spent driving around the rebel zone in 1937, getting to know the truth of the situation, in the company of a retired army officer, Captain Aguilera – the Count of Alba de Yeltes. Episode one of the BBC Radio 4 series (2012), ‘War of Words’ produced by Neil Rosser <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00x17fy> Accessed on 16/02/2016. Martha Gelhorn (1908-98) reported on wars and conflicts for fifty years. She also wrote seven novels and four collections of short stories. She was married to Ernest Hemingway from 1940 to 1946.
17 P. Preston, *We Saw Spain Die*, 16.
“vicerroys” in the areas they controlled’. This lack of central control made it difficult for the rebels to put ‘into operation an efficient propaganda apparatus’. 20

As the Civil War progressed, both sides in the conflict set up foreign press offices to vet the reports that foreign journalists in their respective zones filed. As early as 1938, the Duchess of Atholl 21 highlighted the role played by ‘propaganda and press censorship’ in interpreting the Civil War. 22 In an important essay in 1982 John Romeiser noted the role that editors played in perpetuating early partisanship, by regularly withholding, or adulterating their journalists’ dispatches. 23 Moreover, because so many of the war correspondents wrote memoirs of the conflict, partisan publishing houses became influential. For example, Victor Gollancz Ltd. promoted works on the Left, whereas Eyre and Spottiswoode became synonymous with the Right.

As a result of the early partisan accounts of the war historians became preoccupied with verifying the sources; a task made difficult by the fact that much documentation was either accidentally or intentionally destroyed during the conflict, and that which remained was difficult to access. During Franco’s forty year reign, Civil War archives were firmly shut to all but a favoured few. 24 This condition applied especially to foreign researchers, as their resulting books and articles could not be vetted by the regime. This led Francisco Romero Salvadó to conclude in 2005 that: ‘It was only abroad that the Spanish tragedy could be analysed with a degree of objectivity.’ 25 Even after Franco’s death the situation did not immediately improve. A ‘pacto de silencio’ operated for many years, whereby Spanish scholars conformed to a self-censorship ‘understanding’ and avoided research into the Spanish Civil War for fear of opening up old wounds. It was not until 1985, ten years after Franco’s death, ‘that the Spanish government

20 Ibid.
Emilio Mola governed the northern zone from Burgos, Francisco Franco ruled in Salamanca, and Gonzalo Queipo de Llano in Seville.
21 The Duchess of Atholl was a Conservative MP, a resolute imperialist and anti-communist. She took a pro-Republican stance that ultimately destroyed her parliamentary career, because she dreaded the consequences of a Franco victory, whereby Spain would be a client state of Germany and Italy and threaten France, North Africa and above all Gibraltar and British imperial interests in the Mediterranean. She went to Spain in 1937 to ascertain the facts but was unable to gain entry to the rebel zone. Her Penguin paperback, Searchlight on Spain (1938), resulted from this visit.
began to take belated and hesitant action to protect the nation’s archival resources’, but ‘millions of documents were lost’ by that time.  

The heated and acrimonious nature of Spanish Civil War historiography has not dissipated over time. In recent years populist Spanish historians, such as Pío Moa,27 have disturbed some Anglo-American Civil War scholars with their revisionist interpretations. British historian Helen Graham believes Moa’s *Los mitos de la Guerra Civil* (*The Myths of the Civil War*) is a dangerous work because it ‘is not an unravelling of myths through the complicated business of historical analysis, but rather a crude repackaging of Francoist propaganda.’ She claims that Moa rejects ‘the basic rules of evidence that are the foundation of professional historiography.’28 Chris Ealham agrees that populist historians have set in motion a pro-Franco revisionism in Civil War studies.29 He points out that Stanley Payne was ‘one of the first academic historians to endorse publically the revisionist Moa’ and in a footnote he repeats a Spanish scholar’s claim that the renowned British scholar Nigel Townson30 ‘is part of “the revisionist front”’.31

While accusations of political bias apply almost universally in the historiography of the Spanish Civil War, the political content to be explored in this thesis is that which was produced during the cultural cold war.

26 P. Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust*, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 2012, xvi. It should be noted that Preston was referring to documents that related to his research on extra-judicial killings by the Franco regime, but there is no reason to believe that the ‘deliberate destruction’ and ‘inadvertent losses’ of documentation were exclusively related to Preston’s area of research. The town councils that he notes, ‘sold their archives by the ton as waste paper for recycling’ presumably did not sift through the tons of documents and exclusively discharge only those related to extra-judicial killings.


28 H. Graham, ‘New Myths for Old’, *Times Literary Supplement*, No. 5232, 11 July 2003, 7. Graham compared Moa’s book to the works of West German right-wing historians in the 1980s, who initiated an *Historikerstreit* (historians’ quarrel), in order to ‘rehabilitate a conservative brand of nationalism by presenting Nazism as an aberration or wrong turning in German history.’ The worst aspect of Moa’s book for Graham is that its ‘refutation of the mainstream consensus among professional historians’ on the civil War’s causes and consequences has reached a wide popular audience. It is now in its tenth edition and has sold well over 100,000 copies.


30 Townson graduated from Cambridge University. He is professor at the Complutense University of Madrid. He has edited a general history of Spanish republicanism and written a three-volume work on Arturo Barea. In 2007 he edited *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–1975 and, Is Spain Different?: A Comparative Look at the 19th and 20th Centuries*.

31 C. Ealham, ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes’ 197, 196, n. 10.
For both the West and the Soviet Union the cultural cold war was a war of hearts and minds. For Western governments a key objective was to convince their intellectual opinion-formers of the superiority of their side’s social, political and economic systems. The historian and journalist David Caute highlighted this imperative for the USA when he points out, that even though Stalinism was guilty of ‘extravagant cruelties’, many Western intellectuals ‘stubbornly refused to believe the reports of false trials, forced labour, and mass deportations in the USSR – or excused them as transitional responses to “capitalist encirclement” and fascist aggression’.32

The CIA took up the call to cultural cold war arms and masterminded and funded the covert recruitment of Western intellectuals. The extent of this operation was revealed in a raft of CIA exposé memoirs or ‘whistleblower’ books in the early 1970s. Former agents, Victor Marchetti and John Marks, claim that the CIA did not even know how many people worked for it because of ‘inordinate secrecy’, ‘sloppy record-keeping – often deliberate on the part of the operators.’ They reveal that there were ‘one-time agents hired for specific missions as well as contract agents who spen[t] their entire working lives secretly employed by the CIA’, who were known only to their case officers, and that hundreds of professors and administrators on over a hundred campuses were under secret contract to the CIA.33 Even more interesting was their revelation that when CIA Director Richard Helms asked his staff in 1967 for the numbers of university personnel under contract to the CIA, he was told that the answer could not be found.34

Scholarly examination of the cultural cold war, despite archival obstructions,35 has grown steadily since the mid-1960s when Ramparts magazine and the New York Times broke the story

---


33 V. Marchetti & J. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1974, 58.

Marchetti became involved in intelligence in the early years of the Cold War and was assigned to duties on the East-West German border while serving with the US army. He believed that he was keeping the world safe for democracy as part of the first line of defence against the spread of communism. He was recruited into the CIA in September 1955. Marks worked at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research which liaised between the State Department and the rest of the intelligence community and was able to observe the worldwide network of American spying.

34 V. Marchetti & J. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, 59.

35 Stonor Saunders recounts that she naively expected to benefit from America’s Freedom of Information Act in retrieving documentation from the CIA. However, her initial request to the CIA in 1992 was still unanswered when her book was published in 1999. A subsequent application was acknowledged, but she ‘was warned the total cost for supplying the records requested would be in the region of $30,000’, and that the chances of her ‘application being successfully processed were virtually nil’. See Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, viii. Peter Coleman concurs. He applied for records covering the years 1950 to 1967 and all he received was a clipping from the New York Times and the statement: ‘No other records responsive to your request were located.’ See P. Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe, New York, The Free Press, 1989, xii. Although the American Freedom of Information Act may not always work in researchers’ favour, it has given, as James Smith points out in his 2013 book, British Writers and MI5 Surveillance 1930-1960, ‘at
of the CIA-intelligentsia collusion through the CCF and other conduits. Many of the works that have been published as a result of these investigations are preoccupied with the revelations of the secret funding of favoured people and groups to promote American cultural and economic hegemony, and to demonize the USSR and communism. Scholars and writers are divided as to the efficacy of secretly funding the intelligentsia. The American cultural historian Christopher Lasch highlights the incongruity of an ‘open society’ resorting to covert funding by the CIA to defend itself. Lasch observed that for ‘for twenty years Americans [were] told that communist peoples live in slavery. Now it appears that the very men [intelligentsia] that were most active in spreading this gospel were themselves the servants of the secret police.’  

Richard Valcourt argues to the contrary, pointing out that the CIA was necessary for the financial survival of the CCF which ‘needed a boost’ because ‘money was not plentiful’. Whereas, the CCF’s ‘organizational opponents found adequate revenue, seemingly from Eastern European and domestic sources’.  

The first in-depth book on the CCF’s role in the cultural Cold War was written by the former journalist and Australian Liberal Party politician Peter Coleman, who for twenty years edited the CCF-funded Australian literary magazine Quadrant. He claims that when the story of CIA manipulation of writers and intellectuals broke, he was motivated to seek the truth for himself, because CCF sponsored-magazines had helped him to form his view of the world. Coleman agrees that the CCF, ‘was America’s principal attempt to win over the world’s intellectuals to the liberal cause’ to counter the ‘Kremlin’s sustained assault on liberal democratic values’, but he is adamant that during his stewardship of Quadrant, no ‘editorial decisions had ever been influenced by outside pressures, least of all by any American agency such as the CIA’. This claim remains uncorroborated because no detailed study of the editorial policy of Quadrant has yet been published. Coleman became editor of Quadrant in 1967, when the links between the CIA and CCF were well-known, and he continued in the role until 1988; least give some leverage to access files held by [security] agencies. Unlike in the UK, where ‘for most of the twentieth century the actual existence of Britain’s intelligence agencies was not officially acknowledged and their records exempt from public release.’ Moreover, UK Official Secrets Act of 1911 has ‘ensured that most memoirs or media reports on the activity of Britain’s covert agencies fell under [its] purview’. See J. Smith, British Writers and MI5 Surveillance, 1930-1960, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, viii.


Coleman was a Liberal member of the NSW State Legislative Assembly and served as cabinet Minister and Leader of the Opposition.

P. Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy, xi-xii.

Ibid., xi.
his book can be seen as an apologia for a tainted system. Lasch describes it as ‘a highly sympathetic account of the congress’s activities’ which accepts the view that ‘the communists might well have won’ the war for hearts and minds ‘except for the vigorous opposition mounted by the Congress of Cultural Freedom’. Lasch’s criticism is supported by Karl Miller, a co-founding editor of London Review of Books, who believes that Coleman’s book is ‘too often hagiographic … of Congress activities’.

The British television film-maker, writer and ‘amateur’ historian Frances Stonor Saunders, popularized cultural cold war studies with her 1999 publication Who Paid the Piper?: The CIA and the Cultural Cold War. She identified many of the intellectuals that the CIA recruited to produce their ‘vast arsenal of cultural weapons’ in the form of ‘journals, books, conferences, seminars, art exhibitions, concerts, awards’. She describes how the CIA penetrated and influenced philanthropic organizations like the Ford and Rockefeller organizations, to the extent that ‘at times, it seemed as if the Ford Foundation was simply an extension of government in the area of international propaganda’. These bona fide philanthropic organizations and foundations were the preferred method by which the CIA was able ‘to pass large sums of money to Agency projects without alerting the recipients to their source’, because their records of previous community and cultural involvement provided a plausible cover. She asserts that ‘there were few writers, poets, artists, historians, scientists or critics in post-war Europe whose names were not in some way linked to this covert enterprise. Stonor Saunders’ details are not in dispute. Even the CIA on its own website does not deny the substance of her assertions in a review of her book. However, Andrew Defty points out that many scholars believe that Stonor Saunders overstates the importance and influence of the CIA and have questioned her ‘tendency to

43 It was later published in the USA in 2000 as The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Letters.
44 F. Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 2.
45 F. Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 139.
46 F. Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 134.
48 James Smith’s recent book British Writers and MI5 Surveillance, provides evidence of this (149).
attribute every development in the cultural and intellectual arena to the guiding hand of CIA paymasters.\textsuperscript{50}

In 2003 Hugh Wilford with his book, \textit{The CIA, The British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?} took over the mantle from Stonor Saunders as the pre-eminent cultural cold war scholar. Wilford echoes ideas that had been posited twenty-five years earlier in Richard Fletcher’s essay, ‘How CIA money took the teeth out of British Socialism’, which claims that the ‘CIA’s Cold War campaign in Britain was immensely successful’, and ideologically subjugated the British Left to the USA.\textsuperscript{51} Wilford also questions Stonor Saunders’ ‘recruited’ intellectuals bought by ‘American gold’ thesis, and suggests that many intellectuals were willing participants acting out of ‘genuine conviction’.\textsuperscript{52} He argues that this was the case with ‘the British left [who] positively welcomed the US intervention’ because of ‘shared values and goals’, \textsuperscript{53} and likens the process to concepts of ‘self-colonization’, and ‘empire by invitation’, respectively conceived by Reinhold Wagnleitner in his 1994 book, \textit{Coca-Colonization and the Cold War},\textsuperscript{54} and by Geir Lundestad’ in his essay, ‘Empire by invitation: The United States and Western Europe, 1945-52’.\textsuperscript{55} In 2008 Wilford consolidated his position as pre-eminent cultural Cold War scholar with the publication of \textit{The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America}.\textsuperscript{56}

Few Anglo-American scholars working on the cultural Cold War refer to the Spanish Civil War directly. Stonor Saunders, Wilford, Defty, \textit{et alia}, do not even refer to Spain in their books, and except for Orwell, do not identify any Spanish Civil War writer-historians who materially benefitted from the political climate of the Cold War. The little that has been written on the impact of the cultural Cold War on the writing of Civil War history has come from the pen of Spanish Civil War specialists, and at the time of writing no major work has yet been published which specifically deals with this impact.

\textsuperscript{52} H. Wilford, \textit{The CIA, The British Left and the Cold War – Calling the Tune?} Frank Cass, London, 2003, 2. Wilford has taught at California State University Long Beach since 2006. He previously taught at the University of Sheffield (UK). For further biographical information see CSULB website. <http://www.cla.csulb.edu/departments/history/faculty/wilford/>
\textsuperscript{53} H. Wilford, \textit{The CIA, The British Left and the Cold War}, 2.
Southworth was the first Anglo-American writer to examine this subject, albeit briefly and tentatively, in his 1963 book – *El mito de la cruzada de Franco* (hereafter *El mito*). Without referring to the Cold War, Southworth implied something odd was at play that caused Burnett Bolloten in *The Grand Camouflage: The Communist Conspiracy in the Spanish Civil War* (1961), to write an anti-communist conclusion, inconsistent with the pro-Republic stance that he had taken throughout the book. In his 1996 essay ‘*The Grand Camouflage*: Julián Gorkin, Burnett Bolloten and the Spanish Civil War’ Southworth was more emphatic and suggested Bolloten’s work was suspicious because he had used CIA-sponsored sources, and he questioned Bolloten’s motives in writing the book. Southworth renewed his attack on Bolloten in his last book, *Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War: The Brainwashing of Francisco Franco* (2002).

However, Southworth’s work is not a broad examination of the impact of the Cold War on Civil War historiography. This task has been taken up by George Esenwein from the University of Florida.

Esenwein has published several articles which deal specifically and indirectly with the subject. He is driven by a desire to show that Bolloten, like Orwell, has been ‘unfairly criticized’ as a result of ‘a Cold War mindset’, which interpreted every communist and Soviet action as bad. In his most recent essay on the subject, the ‘Introduction to the 2015 Edition’ of Bolloten’s *The Spanish Civil War*, Esenwein restates arguments, especially regarding the Bolloten-Southworth history war, which he has made elsewhere. In an essay, published in 2008, Esenwein argued that the revisionism in Soviet history that had taken place in the mid-eighties, instigated by a group of young and mostly left-wing European and American scholars, was emulated by an equally young, left-wing group of Spanish Civil War scholars. The Soviet history


revisionists rejected the depiction by ‘conservative and liberal conservative academics such as Richard Pipes and Robert Conquest’ that ‘Soviet communism [was] one of the greatest tragedies in modern history.’ Although the revisionists ‘recognized that communist rule was at times repressive and harsh [they] argued that many of the excesses committed during these periods were exaggerated by Cold War historians’. Esenwein drew parallels with Spanish Civil War revisionists, whom he labels as ‘Popular Front’ historians, who attempted to dismantle the ‘Cold War interpretative paradigm’ in Civil War history.

Esenwein accepts that the Cold War’s ‘anti-communist mind-set’ polarized the ‘Western intellectual world’, validating ‘histories that interpreted the Spanish Civil War as a Manichean struggle between good and evil’. However, he claims that the influence was limited, and that Civil War historiography remained ‘dominated’ by liberal and leftist ‘Popular Front’ historians, ‘who were either sympathetic to or not particularly hostile towards the communists’. Furthermore, he claims that the ‘Popular Front’ historians, led by Helen Graham, attributed a progressive role to the PCE and the USSR in Spain, downplaying their influence on political events. Esenwein accuses the ‘Popular Front’ historians of too willingly dismissing anti-communist evidence found in the ‘so-called’ Cold War literature; especially in the memoirs of ex-communists such as Julián Gorkín and Walter Krivitsky. Esenwein asserts that new evidence from the archives, opened up after the collapse of the USSR, confirms that the communists played a dominant role in Republican affairs during the last year and a half of the war, employing both subversive and coercive tactics. To some extent Gerald Howson in his 1998 book *Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War*, had already eroded the case in favour of Soviet altruism in Spain, when he revealed that the Soviets sold the Republic out-of-date guns, in insufficient numbers, and systematically defrauded her by ‘cooking the books on exchange rates’.

---

61 Ibid., 188, Fn.1,
62 Ibid.
65 Ibid., 4, Fn.1,
In 2001 the neoconservative historian Ronald Radosh, together with Mary Habeck and Grigory Sevostianov, using documents from the newly opened Russian archives, set out to discredit decisively the ‘Popular Front’ view of Stalin’s involvement in Spain. In their jointly edited book, *Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War*, they argued that Stalin and the PCE, instead of wanting to save the democratic Republic, intended to transform it into a satellite state of the USSR. Radosh and his fellow editors claim that ‘the significance of the new material cannot be overstated’ because it provides ‘hard evidence that proves … Stalin sought from the very beginning to control events in Spain and to manage or prevent the spread of actual social revolution.’

In 2014 Paul Corthorn of Queen’s University, Belfast, claimed to offer ‘the first sustained examination of how the changing tides of the Cold War washed a series of differing interpretations of the Spanish conflict on to British shores’. Corthorn argues that in the early Cold War years, the Spanish Civil War ‘became a reference point for judging responses to international conflicts’, and provided anti-communist and anti-Soviet writers with a blueprint of what to expect from the USSR in Eastern Europe. For these writers the USSR used its initial benevolent role in Spain to ensure that an ineffectual leader, who was unable to follow a line of action independent of the Kremlin, was put in place. However, Corthorn observes that ‘as Cold War tensions eased during the 1950s and early 1960s, important arguments were put forward which rejected the anti-communist interpretation of the Civil War’. This reflected Khrushchev’s “peaceful co-existence” between capitalism and communism as well as reduced fear in Western Europe of a Soviet invasion ‘after Soviet troops were withdrawn from Austria after the signing of a treaty guaranteeing the state’s neutrality’. Corthorn identifies another Cold War interpretative shift among popular writers after 1960, when the Spanish Civil War provided an ‘historical analogy to criticize US foreign policy comparing it to German policy in the 1930s’. British author Graham Greene exemplified this in 1961 when he states that the Vietnam War

---

Radosh’s uncle, an Abraham Lincoln Brigader, fought and died in Spain. Radosh believes his uncle died in vain because in reality the Civil War was not a good fight to save Spanish democracy.
69 R. Radosh, M. Habeck & G. Sevostianov (Eds), *Spain betrayed*, xvi.
70 Ibid., xviii.
72 Ibid., 680.
73 Ibid., 684.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 687.
‘painfully reminded [him] of the Spanish Civil War [because] America has taken on the role played then by Germany and Italy’.  

All four writer-historians examined in this thesis have been viewed as participants in the cultural politics of the Cold War. The volume of literature published about them is understandably weighted in favour of Orwell; much of it is well-known and will not be revisited here, where discussion will be mainly confined to more recent publications and interpretative trends regarding Orwell’s Cold War appropriation.

D. J. Taylor coined the phrase ‘The Orwell Wars’, to describe the fractious nature of the literature surrounding Orwell’s life and legacy. To some extent the fractiousness of the literature stems from the decision of Orwell’s wife, Sonia, to attempt to uphold Orwell’s wish to have no biography of his life ever published. Throughout the fifties, sixties and early seventies Sonia Orwell obstructed the publication of biographies by preventing would-be biographers from accessing Orwell’s papers, or denying them permission to quote from his works; Many writers circumvented Sonia Orwell by camouflaging their biographies as literary reviews; John Atkins’ George Orwell: a Literary Study, and Laurence Brander’s George Orwell fit into this category. Eventually Sonia Orwell conceded defeat and commissioned the political scientist Bernard Crick to write Orwell’s biography, and George Orwell: A Life was duly published in 1980. Three more significant biographies followed; Michael Sheldon’s Orwell: The Authorised Biography, Jeffrey Meyers’ Orwell: Wintry Conscience of a Generation; and Gordon Bowker’s George Orwell.

Since the turn of this century literature on Orwell has been preoccupied with Orwell’s relations with the intelligence services, and a significant amount of material has sought to determine if the popularity of Orwell’s so called Spanish trilogy – Homage to Catalonia, Animal Farm, Nineteen Eighty-Four – was due to the Cold War. In 1999 Stoner Saunders claimed that

---

76 Quoted in P. Corthorn, ‘Cold War politics in Britain…’, 688.
77 D. J. Taylor, ‘The Orwell Wars’, New Statesman, 12-25 April 2013. Taylor’s article was focused on the dispute between Kingsley Martin and Orwell.
79 B. Crick, George Orwell: A Life, Penguin, London, 1980, 437. Sonia Orwell disapproved of Crick’s book but was unable to prevent its publication. She subsequently commissioned Michael Sheldon to write an authorized biography.
81 Robert Stradling in his essay ‘Orwell and the Spanish Civil War: A Historical Critique’ in C. Norris (Ed.), Inside the Myth: Views from the left, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1984, 103, coins the term ‘Orwell’s Spanish curriculum vitae’ and offers a more precise compilation of Orwell’s Spanish writings, which he identifies as comprising ‘a full-scale book, Homage to Catalonia, four discrete articles of varying length, and reviews of eleven books on Spain which appeared in the three years following his return from service in the Republican forces.’ Orwell’s reviews are
Orwell connived with British and American intelligence agencies in the anti-communist and anti-Soviet ‘campaigns of the cultural cold war.’ A few years later historian Tony Shaw argued that Orwell’s work was ‘plundered by official Cold War propagandists’. Shaw saw great benefits in Orwell’s premature death, which ‘boosted the sales and authority of his works’ and enabled propaganda boffins in London and Washington to ‘appropriate his name and work without fear of contradiction from the man himself.’ However, Shaw believes it would be ‘absurd’ to ‘attribute’ the success of *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* in the post-1945 world ‘largely to the promotional efforts of Washington and London’ through ‘official propaganda’. In 2005 Scott Lucas added to the debate by introducing the concept of a ‘state-private network’. Lucas claims that Orwell was ‘re-created and mobilized by others – especially by the ‘state-private network in the US and UK in the cultural battle against Soviet communism in the Cold War’. Lucas identifies direct connections between Orwell and British intelligence in Orwell’s list of notable ‘crypto-communist’ writers, and in his close relationship with CIA-sponsored intellectuals like Koestler. Recently James Smith in *British Writers and MI5 Surveillance 1930-1960*, which claims to benefit from the newly released MI5 personal files, confirms much of what was already suspected and known about Orwell’s relations with the Security Service – that the IRD were ‘major facilitators of the worldwide distribution, translation, and adaptation of *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. One of Smith’s more contentious conclusions is that some of the Information Research Department [hereafter IRD] available in S. Orwell & I. Angus (Eds), *CEIL*, Vol. 1, 309-452. The ‘four discrete articles’ are, ‘Looking Back on the Spanish Civil War’, ‘Inside the Whale’, ‘The Lion and the Unicorn’, and ‘Spilling the Spanish Beans’.

83 Tony Shaw, ‘“Some Writers are More Equal than Others”, George Orwell, the State and Cold War Privilege’, *Cold War History*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2003, 143-170.
84 Ibid., 163.
85 Ibid., 163.
87 Ibid., 137.
88 The Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government led to a change of attitude on the part of the British government towards opening up security agency records. It has resulted in a progressive release of Security Service (MI5) files since 1997. However, James notes that although this change of attitude has seen the National Archives receive some 5000 redacted folders of documents ‘covering the period from the official founding of the Secret Service Bureau in 1909 through to…the early 1960s’ it is still only the tip of the iceberg, because it has been ‘alleged that … MI5 held two million personal files.’ The 5000 files referred to were received by 2012. See J. Smith, *British Writers and MI5 Surveillance, 1930-1960*, viii.
involvement in distribution ‘occurred in Orwell’s lifetime and indeed with his knowledge.’ Interestingly, Smith relies on an earlier work by Andrew Defty, and not any new information that he had gleaned from the recently released security files to state: ‘It was assessed that Orwell himself and subsequently his widow Sonia and the publisher Frederic Warburg had been “most cooperative” in granting the IRD overseas rights to Orwell’s work.’ In reality Smith’s comments do not add much to what Stonor Saunders had already revealed in 1999.

Gerald Brenan, unlike Orwell, is not a controversial figure, and his life and work are only beginning to be put under the microscope. As a result Brenan himself has influenced the examination of his life and works through his two autobiographical volumes, A Life of One’s Own (1962) and Personal Record (1975). A Life of One’s Own deals with the years of Brenan’s childhood and youth and Personal Record with his post-First World Wars years up to his return to live in Spain in 1953, and as Ronald Fraser aptly puts it, ‘with a final few pages devoted to the following twenty years’. Brenan’s two travelogue-memoirs, The Face of Spain (1950) and South From Granada (1957) have also contributed a great deal of biographical information. In 1994 Jonathan Gathorne-Hardy, who knew and liked Brenan, published the one and only Brenan biography in English entitled, Gerald Brenan: The Interior Castle (1994). A biography had been published in Spanish seven years earlier by a Spanish scholar of English literature, Juan Antonio Díaz López. Diaz López has also written a chapter which discusses all of Brenan’s books for a multi-volumed work entitled, Spanish Perspectives on English and American Literature, Communication and Culture. Recently Sebastiaan Faber has included a biographical chapter on Brenan in his book, Anglo-American Hispanists and the Spanish Civil

91 J. Smith, 149.
92 See F. Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 298-299.
War. Gathorne-Hardy’s biography gives a valuable insight into Brenan’s decision to go and live in Franco Spain during the Cold War. However, it should be kept in mind that Gathorne-Hardy knew Brenan, and, on his own admission, liked him. Faber’s chapter draws heavily on Gathorne-Hardy’s biography. In 2015 Andrew Walsh of the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid wrote a short article which set out to critically ‘re-read’ The Face of Spain, in order to determine what Brenan actually said. Walsh believes that Brenan’s ‘prestige in the Spanish literary and political world’ is unwarranted and he concludes that this ‘appreciation is based on an entirely uncritical reading’ of Brenan’s work. While Walsh’s conclusions are sound, he fails to explain why this process happened, and fails to locate The Face of Spain in the Cold War context in which it was written.

Burnett Bolloten, unlike Brenan, published no memoirs and to date there is no published biography. However, seven months before his death from prostate cancer, he recorded a conversation for a radio broadcast with his friend and mentor the Stanford University Professor Ronald Hilton, in which he recounted his life story. Unfortunately, Hilton did not act as a rigorous interviewer and never challenged Bolloten’s recollections. Hilton subsequently wrote a brief biography of Bolloten which he posted on the WAIS [World Association of International Studies] website in 1999, mainly focused on the Southworth-Bolloten stoush. Esenwein provides snippets of personal recollections of Bolloten in several of his articles and essays, driven by his desire to restore Bolloten’s reputation as an historian. A good example of this is Esenwein’s Introduction to his 2005 book, The Spanish Civil War: A Modern Tragedy. In 2015 Esenwein offered a more substantial biographical and analytical sketch of some twenty-four pages in his introduction to the 2015 Edition of Bolloten’s The Spanish Civil War.

As with Bolloten, there is not much published material available on Herbert Southworth. There is no dedicated biography, but Southworth wrote a fifty-seven page memoir, ‘A modo de

---

99 Faber’s chapter is entitled, “Spain is My Country, Revolution or No Revolution” – Love and Politics in Gerald Brenan’.  
101 Ibid., 1-2.  
102 Ronald Hilton was founder and director of Stanford University’s Institute of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies.  
103 The World Association of International Studies was founded by Ronald Hilton of Stanford University to promote international fellowship among scholars. It has become an on-line discussion forum. Contributors must be nominated for membership, although the general public can read the forum discussions <http://wais.stanford.edu/Spain/spain_bbnhs.html>  
prólogo’ (‘A Type of Prologue’), which he published in 1986, as part of a reissue of El mito. Southworth’s memoir has influenced several biographical sketches written by Paul Preston, such as the seven page ‘Prologue’ for Southworth’s last book, Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War. Preston has also included a larger Southworth chapter of thirteen pages, entitled, ‘A Lifetime’s Struggle: Herbert Rutledge Southworth and the Undermining of the Franco Regime’ in his book, We Saw Spain Die: Foreign Correspondents in the Spanish Civil War. Southworth has also received attention from Sebastiaan Faber who included a Southworth chapter in his 2008 work Anglo-American Hispanists & the Spanish Civil War: Hispanophilia, Commitment, and Discipline with the somewhat misleading title, ‘Herbert R. Southworth: The Rebirth of the “Amateur” Hispanist.’

**APPROACH and METHODOLOGY**

In 2005 Geoff Eley pointed out:

> The relationship of history to politics is not simple. History is more than either an instrument or a mirror. But the scholarly debates of historians are inseparable from politics in the widest sense of the term – all the partially visible philosophical, socio-cultural, and strictly political baggage historians bring with them into the scholarly area: the wider contentiousness implied by their position-taking within institutions and the public sphere; and the broader political issues and controversies that shadow their concerns. All these factors helped frame history’s purpose during the past three decades.

Eley’s observations are an evolution of what earlier historians have written. In 1931 Carl Becker, the then President of the American Historical Society, argued that historians were not neutral readers of texts but interpreters of the past through the lens of the present. In 1961 E. H. Carr advised readers of history to ‘study the historian before you study the facts.’ Gabriel Jackson observed in 1989 that ‘historians [do] not live in a vacuum. The selection and interpretation of data, the relative weight given to different phases of the subject, will inevitability be influenced by the context of the historian’s life’. Richard Evans agreed in his 1997 work, In Defence of History, and wrote that ‘history books, like the people who write them, are products of their own

---

106 Southworth is one of four scholars Faber selected as representative of Anglo-American Hispanists, in order to explore the essence of their ‘Hispanophilia’ through a close-up look of their lives and work. The other three are Gerald Brenan, Allison Peers and Paul Rogers.


time, bringing particular ideas and ideologies to bear on the past.\textsuperscript{111} A postmodernist consensus emerged during the twentieth century that acknowledged the inevitable relationship between the historian and his/her history, which supplanted the romantic nineteenth century notion of objective detachment that had been championed by the German scholar, Leopold von Ranke, and epitomized in his famous philosophical canon, \textit{wie es eigentlich gewesen} (as it actually was).\textsuperscript{112}

The consensus position that historians cannot detach themselves completely from national, cultural, institutional, personal and financial factors permeates this thesis. Even though historians may aspire to being dispassionate, subjectivity plays a role in their writing of history. The most easily identifiable drivers of subjectivity are nationality, cultural factors, place of birth and place of education. But, there are important institutional factors which include; where historians work and do their research; who funds their research; and who publishes their research. These institutional factors are often difficult to uncover. Faber points out that the academic institution \textquote{provides scholars with the space, means, and authority to conduct their inquiry}, and \textquote{provides the infrastructure for socialization}, such as departments, journals and professional organizations.\textsuperscript{113} These factors influence historians positively and negatively. On the positive side the institution provides \textquote{initial training and induction} into the academic fraternity, but on the negative side it functions \textquote{as a permanent bod[y] of surveillance} that can punish as well as reward \textquote{the individual scholar\textquotesingle s adherence to, or transgression of, the changing rules of the discipline}.\textsuperscript{114} Key questions for this thesis are: What role if any, did institutional frameworks play in the writing of the writer-historians? What role did friends and knowledge networks play? What role did the pursuit of careers play?

This thesis is also concerned with the manipulation and fabrication of evidence that took place during the Civil War and how such tainted evidence was used by subsequent historians to write their history in light of the prevailing political climate. It aims to draw conclusions as to how the process worked. To some extent the thesis is a case study of how history is produced. The time-honoured maxim that the further the distance from events the closer one gets to truth, does not hold water with Civil War historiography, and the thesis will argue that a key factor preventing this from happening was the distorting prism of the Cold War.

\textsuperscript{111} R. Evans, \textit{In Defence of History} (1\textsuperscript{st} pub. 1997), W.W. Norton, New York, 2000 ed., 2.
\textsuperscript{112} Quoted in Andreas Boldt, \textquote{Perception, Depiction and Description of European History: Leopold von Ranke and his Development and Understanding of Modern Historical Writing}, \textit{eSharp}, 10, 2007, 12.
\textsuperscript{113} S. Faber, \textit{Anglo-American Hispanists}, 13.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 13.
Four coherent, although by no means exhaustive, biographical case studies form the centrepiece of this thesis. The main focus is to move beyond the generic statement that the Cold War impacted on the writing of history and to explore how the Cold War directly and indirectly affected the writings of the four writer-historians. In order to do this a biographical approach that probes into their personal lives has been adopted. In the main the biographical examination is confined to the political aspects of the writer-historians lives, but not exclusively so. This writer agrees with Orwell’s conclusion that one cannot ‘assess a writer's motives without knowing something of his early development’. Historians cannot, no matter how hard they try, detach themselves from their own life experience when writing history. Therefore it is vital to understand a little of how the writer-historians developed and ascertain their life ambitions and motivations. Knowledge of these aspects enables the writer to determine the mindset of the writer-historians when they were writing their histories. Biography facilitates this understanding because mindsets are ‘conditioned by a whole range of influences – family background and social environment, upbringing and education, personality and temperament, and all the experiences of daily life’. The biographical portraits in this thesis are written as dispassionately as possible. However, as Doug Munro has recently posited, ‘it is unrealistic to expect biographers (or historians) to divest themselves of feelings and values when dealing with the crooked timber of humanity’.

As well as biographical case studies several other methodologies have been used to achieve the goals of this thesis; archival research, oral history, email correspondence, and exegesis of the works written by the writer-historians.

Archival research was carried out in repositories in the USA, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, providing a cornucopia of primary sources. The most useful repositories were in the United States – at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University and the Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives at New York University. At the Hoover Institution the papers of Burnett Bolloten, Joaquin Maurin, Peter Stansky, James Burnham and Bertram Wolfe, and others, were consulted. The Bolloten Collection was the most important; it includes Bolloten’s extensive correspondence, carried out over four decades with several hundred ‘participants’ in the Spanish Civil War, including former members of the Republic’s governments, former volunteers in the International Brigades, as well as correspondence with contemporaneous and later scholars and historians. Stanley Payne

estimates that Bolloten wrote and received more than ‘twenty thousand letters’.\textsuperscript{118} Included in the correspondence were letters to and from, Luis Araquistain, Jordi Arquer, Arturo and Ilsa Barea, Ralph Bates, Melvin Lasky, Francisco Ferrandiz Alborz, Julian Gorkin, Edward Malefakis and George Weller, to name a few. This correspondence is a mine of information from which it is possible to recreate Bolloten’s state of mind during the years of his research and writing. Bolloten’s correspondence not only reveals his own perceptions of his shortcomings, strengths, work ethic and health issues, but it also provides evidence of his anxieties. Moreover, it provides a clear picture of his friends, enemies and acquaintances, and, most useful to this thesis, also evidence of how the political climate of the Cold War influenced his work on the history of the Spanish Civil War.

At the Tamiment Library the Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archives (hereafter ALBA) Collections were accessed. ALBA contains correspondence between the American Committee for Cultural Freedom and the Paris based Congress of Cultural Freedom, as well as papers and correspondence concerning Spanish Civil War participants, Fredericka Martin, Robert Colodny, Arthur Landis, as well as correspondence involving Irving Kristol, the co-editor of \textit{Encounter} magazine from 1953-8, Herbert Southworth, and many more. All proved to be useful in providing historical context. This correspondence revealed the extent of the passion and rage that some American Brigaders, mainly members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, felt through the period of the Cold War, and their efforts to protect the legacy of ‘their’ Spanish Civil War. For them defeat had not sullied the righteousness of the cause. In the rabid anti-communist climate of the Cold War years this was an increasingly difficult position to maintain. The extent of political pressure to revise the history of American involvement in the international brigades in Spain can be gauged from the comments made at a press conference by President Reagan in 1985 when he said that most Americans believed that their fellow Americans who fought with the Loyalist forces were on the wrong side.\textsuperscript{119}

The four Spanish archives that were accessed varied in their usefulness. Gabriel Jackson’s uncatalogued papers held at Institut Universitari d’Història Jaume Vicens i Vives in Barcelona were of interest because of notes Jackson made revealing his thoughts on \textit{Homage}. The Jackson papers include Jackson’s extensive correspondence with Carmen Negrín about her grandfather, Juan Negrín, whom Jackson was researching for a biography which was published in 2010, and


\textsuperscript{119} \url{http://www.nytimes.com/1985/05/10/world/remark-by-reagan-on-lincoln-brigade-prompts-ire-in-spain.html} Accessed 20/05/2015
will prove invaluable to any researcher who wants to determine how Jackson wrote his history.\textsuperscript{120} My biggest disappointment in Spain was my inability to access the later personal correspondence of Southworth which is held at the Guernica Museum. The museum purchased this correspondence, together with Southworth’s second collection of books on Spain, after his death. Unfortunately, the correspondence remains uncatalogued and I was denied access to it. However, the Museum relented, in a minor way, two years after I first approached them, and kindly made available the personal correspondence between Southworth and his friend the newspaper man, Jay Allen, which dates from 27 December 1963 until Allen’s death on 20 December 1972. This correspondence has been crucial in charting Southworth’s development as an historian during an important phase of the Cold War, as these letters between two longstanding and trusted friends are open and unguarded, expressing genuine beliefs and feelings. The National Historical Archive in Madrid was of limited use, although it did contain a few letters written by Brenan. The archives of the Fundación Pablo Iglesias, which are located in the University of Alcalá at Alcalá de Henares were very useful because they hold a collection of letters to and from Julián Gorkin, which included correspondence with Bolloten and Valentín González (El Campesino).

The International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam was useful because it holds the records of the Ruedo Ibérico, the left-wing Spanish publishing house that operated in exile in Paris during the fifties, sixties and seventies, and which published all of Southworth’s books. The correspondence between Ruedo Ibérico’s director, José Martínez Guerricabeitia and Southworth, and between Martínez Guerricabeitia and Preston was particularly useful in understanding Southworth’s politics and personality.

In the United Kingdom, archives were consulted at Edinburgh, London, and Reading Universities. The Koestler Papers at the University of Edinburgh, and George Orwell’s correspondence at University College London provided supporting documentation rather than new information to what was already available in the public arena.\textsuperscript{121} The archives of the British publishers, who published the works of the writer-historians, which are held at Reading University proved to be disappointing. My expectations were high that material here would provide a rich vein of previously untapped material. I had been led to believe that this would be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} G. Jackson, \textit{Juan Negrín: Spanish Republican War Leader}, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{121} It should be noted that most of the Orwell correspondence at UCL is now available online, or in Peter Davison’s twenty volume set \textit{The Complete Works of George Orwell}, and other publications. The Koestler Papers on the other hand, although not revealing anything of significance for this thesis, as they only refer to the Spanish Civil War in passing, are a cornucopia of information for those researchers who want to investigate Koestler’s role in Cold War politics because Koestler was scrupulous in retaining correspondence and materials.
\end{itemize}
the case by Gordon Johnson’s 2001 article, ‘Writing and Publishing the Cold War: John Berger and Secker & Warburg’, which had touted the opportunities publishers’ archives offered researchers. Johnson had examined the claim made by Berger, the author of the novel, A Painter of Our Time (1958), that publication of his book was “suppressed” for political reasons by Secker & Warburg and investigated the links between Secker & Warburg and the CCF and ‘the publishing activities’ of the firm from 1936 to the late 1950s. However, it proved to be a time-consuming and ultimately unrewarding business accessing the materials at Reading.

Archival research has been augmented with oral interviews and email correspondence with Paul Preston, Gabriel Jackson and Peter Stansky, all of whom were personally acquainted with one or more of the writer-historians. Preston, Jackson and Stansky were interviewed at their homes, respectively in London, Ashland (Oregon) and Stanford. Preston knew both Southworth and Bolloten but was particularly insightful on Southworth because of their long and close friendship. Jackson also offered insight into Southworth because of their close, although on-again, off-again friendship. Stansky was a very fruitful source. He was acquainted with Bolloten, Esenwein, and Hilton while at Stanford University. During the 1960s, when he was researching for his first book on Orwell, he met Sonia Orwell, Richard Rees, Cyril Connolly, as well as Orwell’s sister Avril and her husband, and Mrs Vaughn Wilkes, who was headmistress at Orwell’s prep school St. Cyprians.

The thesis has also used email correspondence between the author and Paul Preston, George Esenwein, Günther Schmigalle, Stanley Payne, David Wingeate Pike, Adrian Shubert and Angel Viñas. The correspondence with Esenwein and Schmigalle was invaluable because one was a close friend of Bolloten, and the other, of Southworth. Schmigalle

---

122 G. Johnson, ‘Writing and Publishing the Cold War: John Berger and Secker & Warburg’ in Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 12, No. 4. 2001, 433. Gordon Johnston is the Head of School of Cultural Studies at Leeds Metropolitan University. His focus is the Cold War years in Europe. He is on the editorial board of Social History and acts as a peer reviewer for a number of politics and history journals.

123 This was because in the first instance I had to get the written permission of the author, or if the author was deceased, permission from the literary estate, whose correspondence I wished to access. In several cases authors or literary estates ignored my requests. In two cases I was thwarted by two notable historians – Hugh Thomas and Gertrude Himmelfarb. Thomas denied access to read the correspondence between himself and Eyre & Spottiswoode, the first publisher of his book, The Spanish Civil War. Himmelfarb, the American Professor Emerita at the Graduate School of the City University of New York and the widow of Irving Kristol denied my request to read correspondence between Kristol and Secker & Warburg, the publisher of Encounter. These rejections were disappointing because the correspondence that I wanted to access was not of a personal nature and was located in the fifties and sixties, and could have provided insight into factors driving the publication of their works during the Cold War. Also, such denials arouse suspicions of what they have to hide.

124 Jackson also met Brenan, but only once, when Brenan was quite old, and therefore was not able to offer any personal insight into him.

125 The Unknown Orwell which was co-authored with William Abrahams. See D. Burrowes, ‘Peter Stansky, historian and writer, in conversation: George Orwell and the Spanish Civil War’ in Writers in Conversation, Vol. 1 No. 1, February 2014, 17.
generously made his ten year personal correspondence with Southworth available. This is the first time this correspondence has been viewed by a researcher. The thesis has also used email correspondence provided by a reputable Spanish Civil War historian who wishes to remain anonymous. I acknowledge that it is not an ideal situation to quote anonymously, but I do so because it offers another perspective on Southworth and his politics.\textsuperscript{126}

Through a close reading of these sources relating to all four chosen writer-historians, and through a careful consideration of the historical contexts in which all four of them researched, wrote and published, the thesis will be able to show how the Cold War framed and influenced historical representations of the Spanish Civil War.

**STRUCTURE**

Each of the four chapters of ‘Historians at War’ is a biographical case study and can stand alone as a distinct entity in its own right. The chapters are not of uniform size; the Orwell chapter is shorter, reflecting the fact that so much has already been written about him. Compared to Orwell, the personal life and motivations of Brenan are not well-known, therefore Brenan is allocated more space. This chapter offers a new perspective on how the Cold War impacted on his writing. The longer size of the Bolloten and Southworth chapters reflects the importance the thesis places on the Bolloten-Southworth history war in Spanish Civil War historiography.

It must be stressed that each case study, although highly biographical for the reasons discussed above, is by no means a complete biography of any of the writer-historians. Full biographies are outside the scope of this thesis, and the writer has had to restrain himself from including biographical detail which may be very interesting but which is not relevant to the protagonist’s involvement in the Spanish Civil War or his contribution to Civil War historiography. This would have been an easy trap to fall into, because all four protagonists led exciting, unconventional, and, with the exception of Orwell, long lives. Although there is no definitive template as to what each case study should include, there are three core areas of interest that are common to each chapter. Firstly each chapter includes biographical information appertaining to the protagonist’s development as a Spanish Civil War historian. Secondly, the writer-historians’ friendship networks at the time they were developing their interest in the Civil War and writing and publishing their history are identified. It is only by examining these two areas that it is possible to determine the writer-historian’s psychological profile and see how they

\textsuperscript{126} In the thesis this scholar will be referred to as the anonymous historian.
could have been open to, and influenced by, ideas prevalent at the time. Lastly, each chapter discusses how the protagonist’s contributions to Civil War historiography were received contemporaneously and in the years that followed.

Chapter One, entitled ‘*Homage to Catalonia: George Orwell’s Spanish Civil War*’, discusses Orwell’s involvement, disillusionment and radicalization in Spain. It revisits the reasons why he went to Spain and the epiphanies he experienced there which led to his disillusionment with the left. It explains why Orwell became controversial in Civil War historiography, and shows that the reception of *Homage* changed radically from when it was first published in 1938, to when it was reissued, after Orwell’s death, during the Cold War. It argues that these different responses were due to changed political climates. The chapter will determine to what extent *Homage* was appropriated for use as a Cold War propaganda weapon by British and American intelligence agencies, and assess whether Orwell was a willing participant in this process during the last years of his life. The chapter utilizes Orwell’s published works, especially *Homage*, and draws on his correspondence, the memoirs of friends and acquaintances, as well as the perspectives of scholars past and present in their reviews, books and articles to achieve these objectives. The chapter offers a new perspective with its discussion of the ‘non-biographies’ of Orwell, and on the appropriation of his books and personal reputation.

The title of Chapter Two, ‘*Gerald Brenan: From The Spanish Labyrinth to South From Granada*’ refers to two of Brenan’s books which feature in the chapter. These works conveniently bookend the years during which Brenan changed from a forthright pro-Spanish Republic and anti-Francoist position held during the 1930s and 1940s, to a less adamant and vociferous anti-Franco position in the 1950s, after he returned to live in Spain. *The Spanish Labyrinth* was written in the late 1930s and published in 1943 and *South From Granada* was published in 1957. This chapter explores the reasons for Brenan’s transformation during these years and determines the extent to which the political climate of the Cold War was a factor in the process.

‘*Burnett Bolloten: Dedicated Scholar unravelling a “Grand Camouflage” or obsessed Cold War Warrior*’ is the title for Chapter Three. The chapter traces Bolloten’s involvement in the Spanish Civil War and shows how this involvement became an obsession leading to bouts of serious illness. Bolloten’s early life and influences are investigated and his path to becoming an historian is traced. The chapter examines the way Bolloten wrote his history and discusses why his method was so controversial to some. The factors that led to Bolloten’s change of heart
towards the Spanish Republic and his adoption of a decidedly more negative view of communist and Soviet involvement in the Spanish arena are investigated. The Bolloten-Southworth stoush is important in Spanish Civil War historiography because it represents a major historical divide in the interpretation of the role of the communists and the USSR in Spanish Civil War historiography and is therefore examined here in some detail. The chapter explores if there is any validity to the accusations that Bolloten was a recipient of CIA largesse – Bolloten’s financial situation is therefore examined in some detail. It draws on the extensive correspondence that Bolloten engaged in for more than thirty years, as well as his books, and reviews of his books in order to achieve these objectives.

Chapter Four is entitled ‘Herbert Rutledge Southworth: Defender of the Spanish Republic from Cold War Revisionism’, and the title indicates the line of argument that the chapter takes. Southworth’s interest in Spain is traced. The extent of his transformation from a blatant propagandist for the Spanish Republic during the Civil War, into a Spanish Civil War historian later in life is investigated. The chapter determines if Southworth ever totally relinquished his role as an advocate for the Spanish Republic in his writing. It suggests that the anti-communist and anti-Soviet climate generated in the West during the Cold War turned Southworth into a Cold War warrior in reverse. This is manifested in his forensic investigative methodology. This methodology has been lauded as a major contribution to Civil War historiography and the validity of this claim is examined. Extensive use is made of Southworth’s correspondence with Jay Allen, as well as the email correspondence that this writer engaged in with Southworth’s contemporaries especially with Gunther Schmigalle and to a lesser extent, Paul Preston, Gabriel Jackson and Ángel Viñas.

The conclusion of this thesis examines the several themes that have emerged regarding the production of history – the role of the political climate on the production of history in general, and specifically in relationship to the Cold War; the role institutional frameworks play; the part played by the personal history of the historian; the role of friendship groups and knowledge networks; and finally the role of the historian’s personality.
CHAPTER ONE

HOMAGE TO CATALONIA: GEORGE ORWELL’S SPANISH CIVIL WAR

INTRODUCTION

George Orwell’s Spanish Civil War was a bittersweet experience. His initial response to the revolution that greeted him on his arrival in Barcelona in December 1936 was one of elation; the working class were ‘in the saddle’,¹ but elation had turned to disillusionment and despair by June the following year, when he happened to be in Barcelona on leave from his Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (hereafter POUM) militia unit,² and witnessed the Soviet-backed Republican government’s crackdown against the revolution. The Barcelona May Days of 1937, and the subsequent events in June that ended with his clandestine escape to France, ‘with police panting on [his] heels’,³ inspired his political memoir, Homage to Catalonia (hereafter Homage).

When Homage was first published in April 1938 it sold ‘damn all’ copies and appeared doomed to oblivion.⁴ Fredric Warburg, the book’s initial publisher, recalls that: ‘1,500 copies’ were printed, of which 683 were sold ‘in the first six months … thereafter its annual sale was less than fifty copies’.⁵ However, after 1950 the remaining copies of Homage ‘sold rapidly’, and it was hailed ‘as a lost classic’.⁶ This led Warburg to remark: ‘Twelve years after its publication, Homage to Catalonia attracted the readers it had been so long without.’⁷

² The POUM (United Marxist Workers Party) was formed in 1935 by the merger of anti-Stalinist Communist dissidents and Trotskyists, although it was not Trotskyist. It was led by Andreu Nin (Trotsky’s former secretary) and Joaquín Maurín. The POUM has been variously labelled by scholars as; ‘Revolutionary – i.e., anti-Stalinist-Communists’ (Hugh Thomas); ‘a Bolshevik vanguard party’ (Paul Preston); a ‘dissident Communist Party’ (Helen Graham).
⁷ F. Warburg, An Occupation for Gentlemen, 238.
Why did Homage initially not sell well? Orwell’s previous book, The Road to Wigan Pier, published in March 1937, although controversial, had consolidated his reputation as an up-and-coming writer of the Left, and had won him “more readers than he had ever had before – close to 50,000.” One could have expected that a book about his wartime experiences in Spain would have attracted a similar readership. The reason why it did not has been attributed to the belief that ‘the prevailing political climate’ was unfavourable. Orwell himself drew this conclusion, and it remains the standard interpretation today.

The initially unpopular and unread Homage experienced a Lazarus-like resurrection after Orwell’s death in January 1950. It was reprinted six times between 1951 and 1980, and then published in a complete edition of Orwell’s works in 1986-87. There is consensus among scholars that the sales of Homage took off dramatically as a result of the Cold War; a time when Orwell’s reputation, along with his two Spanish Civil War-inspired novels, Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, were being appropriated by British and American intelligence agencies for use in their intense cultural propaganda war with the USSR. However, there is no consensus on the exact nature of this cultural appropriation. In the 1950s and 1960s negative attitudes towards communism were at the heart of the political agenda, attitudes that had been in abeyance during the titanic struggle waged by the combined forces of the Western democracies and the USSR to defeat the Axis Powers. The

---

8 The Road to Wigan Pier consisted of two parts – Part I describes the social conditions Orwell found in Wigan, and Part II is a biographical political treatise. It was Part II that proved controversial for the Left. The British Communist leader Harry Pollitt, called Part II ‘a travesty that tried to shift the reader’s attention from the really important social problems to the insignificant life of “a disillusioned little middle-class boy…”’. Gollancz published Part I as a separate edition so the Left could use it for propaganda and not be embarrassed by the personal comments of the second part. See Michael Sheldon, Orwell: The Authorised Biography, Minerva, 1992, 253.


12 Orwell’s experiences of communism in operation in Spain spawned a small corpus of work which includes, as well as Homage, the novels Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, more than a dozen reviews of books on Spain and three major articles. Orwell reviewed; Storm Over Spain (Mairin Mitchell), Spanish Rehearsal (Arnold Lunn), Catalonia Infelix (E. Allison Peers), Spanish Testament (Arthur Koestler), The Spanish Cockpit (Franz Borkenau), Volunteer in Spain (John Somerfield), Red Spanish Notebook (Mary Low & Juan Brea), Heroes of the Alcazar (R. Timmermans), The Civil War in Spain (Frank Jellinek), Searchlight on Spain (Duchess of Atholl), The Last Days of Madrid (Colonel S. Casado). The articles are, ‘Spilling the Spanish Beans’, ‘Looking Back on the Spanish Civil War’, and ‘Eye-Witness in Barcelona’.
fledgling post-1945 *pax Americana* was based not only on American military ascendancy but also on American ability to contain both the geographical and ideological spread of communism. An essential part of the Anglo-American anti-communist containment strategy was the influencing of hearts and minds through the promotion of anti-communist works, and seemingly unlimited funds were available to achieve this objective. Orwell’s revelations in *Homage* of how the Partido Comunista de España (hereafter PCE)\(^{13}\) and the USSR had behaved in Spain struck a particular chord when the Cold War heated up in Korea during the 1950s, and when it appeared an ultimate conflagration was likely over Cuban missiles in the 1960s. *Homage* demonstrated the perfidy of communism in the Spanish Civil War context. It was re-read with fresh eyes to see if Orwell’s accounts of communist and Soviet manoeuvrings and tactics in Spain offered warnings and lessons for the post-1945 Cold War world. *Homage* became accepted by many, not as one man’s worm’s eye of the Spanish Civil War, as Orwell himself believed it to be, as he had ‘seen only one corner of events’,\(^{14}\) but as an historic document that portrayed the reality of communist deception and betrayal. The selective account of communism that Orwell gave in *Homage* filtered into Spanish Civil War historiography. Orwell’s positive acceptance of communist and Soviet strategies and methods for winning the Civil War against a well-resourced enemy tended to be ignored during the 1950s and 1960s, when commentators ‘cherry-picked’ *Homage* to suit their own anti-communist agendas.

*Homage* was written well before the Cold War era began. This is not to say that its content had not been influenced by a political climate; *Homage* was Orwell’s reaction to the uncritical pro-communist and pro-Stalinist political climate that permeated much of the British Left during the thirties. Significantly, it was first published in the USA in 1952, and was almost immediately accorded seminal status and in Spanish Civil War historiography. The well-known and well-connected New York intellectual and literary critic, Lionel Trilling,\(^{15}\) proclaimed in the very first sentence of his ‘Introduction’ to the American edition of *Homage*: ‘This book is one of the important documents of our time.’\(^{16}\) Twenty years later, in 1971, Raymond Carr claimed Orwell’s influence was deep and ongoing because *Homage* was ‘the prime source for our knowledge’ of ‘the civil war within the Civil War’, and he

---

13 Spanish Communist Party
asserted its influence had ‘filtered into every subsequent history book’.\textsuperscript{17} Trilling’s and Carr’s conclusions highlight the resurrection \textit{Homage} underwent – from being ignored to being attributed seminal status. The question arises as to the validity of the seminal status that \textit{Homage} received.

This chapter will examine the two contradictory waves of political pressure that \textit{Homage} underwent pre and post-1945, and will show why and how this happened. It will undertake an historiographical review of Orwell’s motives in going to Spain and his political epiphanies there that led him to write, that ‘every line of serious work’ in the years post-1936, was written ‘directly or indirectly, against totalitarianism and for democratic socialism,’ as he understood it to be.\textsuperscript{18} A biographical approach will be used because Orwell’s persona has been mythologized – especially during the Cold War years. In the words of Richard Rees, who knew Orwell well, ‘…the account of an event in which one participated must inevitably be based largely on personal impressions, and it is only fair to give the reader a clue to the person’s state of mind at the time’.\textsuperscript{19} Through a close textual analysis of \textit{Homage}, this chapter will reveal Orwell’s key descriptions and interpretations of the PCE’s and the USSR’s activities in Spain and will examine how commentators viewed \textit{Homage} before and after the onset of the Cold War. Furthermore, it will show some of the ways \textit{Homage} was resurrected and appropriated by the Right and the non-communist Left, an appropriation made easier by Orwell’s premature death.

\textbf{ISSUES OF MYTHOLOGIZATION}

The mythologization that Orwell underwent during the Cold War was facilitated by the intersection of three factors. Firstly, Orwell’s premature death meant he did not have a character and personality already indelibly entrenched in the public consciousness. Secondly, the lack of Orwell diaries and journals facilitated scholarly invention. Orwell’s second wife, Sonia, points out that Orwell was not given to keeping notebooks, diaries, sketches or outlines of projected books or work-in-progress and threw away the drafts and manuscripts of his books when they were redundant. In fact he left very few of those “papers” which writers always seem to leave, providing such marvellous hunting-grounds for critics or biographers.

\textsuperscript{17} R. Carr, ‘Orwell and the Spanish Civil War’, 71.
He left no personal papers: there is nothing either concealed or spectacularly revealed in his letters.20

The third factor was Sonia Orwell herself, who together with Richard Rees administered Orwell’s literary estate after his death.21 American scholar John Rodden suggests Sonia Orwell’s ‘determination to carry out her late husband’s last request to have no biography written about him’, led to her refusal to allow budding biographers permission to quote from copyrighted material, including published and unpublished letters, for some thirty years. During this critical vacuum: ‘Orwell myths were allowed to grow and persist which might have been quashed if a biography had appeared in the fifties.’22 As a result of Sonia Orwell’s dogged commitment to police her husband’s no ‘biography stipulation’, several books that can be described as ‘non-biographies’ were published in the 1950s and 1960s. These were mainly written by Orwell’s friends and acquaintances who described them as works of literary criticism, to circumvent Sonia Orwell’s vigilant enforcement of the no Orwell biography stipulation, but to all intents and purposes they were biographies.23 The ‘non-biographers’ tended to paint Orwell in glowing terms as a dedicated skilful writer and a reliable witness and recorder of events.

Sonia Orwell’s determination to prevent biographies is evident in the way she dealt with two young American historians who were researching Orwell in the sixties. Peter Stansky and William Abrahams fell foul of Sonia Orwell when she accused them of being too biographical in intent. Although they denied the charge, she refused them permission to cite

---

20 Sonia Orwell, ‘Introduction’ in Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (Eds), The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell (hereafter CEJL), Vol. 1 An Age Like This 1920-1940, xvi.
22 J. Rodden, ‘Personal Behaviour…’, 190.
23 The following fit the description ‘non-biography’: John Atkins, George Orwell: A Literary Study, John Calder, London, 1954; Christopher Hollis, A Study of Orwell: The Man and his Works, Hollis and Carter, London, 1956; Laurence Brander, George Orwell, Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, London, 1954; Richard Rees, George Orwell: Fugitive from the Camp of Victory (1961). These books paid lip service to Orwell’s no biography stipulation in his will. Whether Orwell’s aversion to biography was due to natural reticence or an abhorrence of psychological interpretation is not known. Perhaps he believed that all that could be said about himself had already been written. As Sonia Orwell explains: ‘Apart from Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, all his novels contain straight descriptions of himself or his experiences in one guise or another and a whole chapter of The Road to Wigan Pier suddenly turns into straight autobiography. See Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (Eds), CEJL, Vol. 1, xix. According to Hilary Spurling, the friend and biographer of Sonia Orwell, George’s objection to biography lies elsewhere: ‘George had been so infuriated by a life of Joseph Conrad written by his widow that he hurled it across the room, saying to Sonia (who was mystified): “Never do that to me.”’ See H. Spurling, The Girl from the Fiction Department: A Portrait of Sonia Orwell, Counterpoint, New York, 2003, 149-50.
from Orwell’s papers. Stansky claims that if Sonia Orwell had been less vindictive, their book *The Unknown Orwell* might have been less biographical. The extent to which Sonia obstructed Stansky and Abrahams is obvious from a letter written by Bill Javanovich (Orwell’s American publisher) to Fredric Warburg (Orwell’s British publisher) on 11 October 1966:

There is absolutely no substance in the rumour that Sonia has authorized Stansky or Abrahams, or both, to write a biography. In fact, she says she would do all she could to stop such a work. Sonia talked with these men several years ago at a time when they wanted to write about not only Cornford and Bell but also Spender and Orwell as participants in the Spanish Civil War. She says she disliked these authors intensely, and when she saw that they were moving in the direction of writing about personalities rather than ‘history,’ she cut off correspondence with them.

**ORWELL IN SPAIN: INVOLVEMENT AND DISILLUSIONMENT**

Orwell was born Eric Arthur Blair in India in 1903, where his father held a post in the Opium Department. His formal education was in the middle class tradition, but the straitened financial situation of his family meant that he had to rely on scholarships for his primary and secondary education and was unable to afford the fees for university. He spent six years at St Cyprian’s Preparatory school followed by one term at Wellington, then four and a half years at Eton. After he finished his education Orwell went to Burma and joined the Imperial Police Service. As a result of his time spent in Burma he came to reject ‘the unthinking imperialism that had been his family’s meal ticket’, and he saw the exploitation of colonies as an indictment on Britain. His rejection of the aspirations and values of his

---

25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 17 (n.4).
28 Orwell’s annual fees at St. Cyprian’s were reduced from £180 to £90. ‘This was still a considerable sum, about the average wage annual wage for a clerk or skilled labourer.’ See J. Meyers, *Orwell: Wintry Conscience of a Generation*, 16. Christopher Hollis, refutes that lack of money was the reason Orwell did not go to university and claims he could have won a scholarship, ‘and if the emoluments of a scholarship were not sufficient, Eton … was generous in making up scholarships to a figure that would make it possible for a poor boy to go to university.’. See J. Meyers, *Orwell: Wintry Conscience of a Generation*, 44.
‘lower upper middle class’ upbringing was ongoing, but it was his experience in Spain which crystallized his political views and converted him to socialism.30

Orwell arrived in Barcelona six months after the outbreak of the Civil War. The repercussions of his arrival and his decision to enlist in a POUM militia unit have been contentious issues ever since for scholars, who have sought to ascertain his motives for going to Spain and the effects of the two epiphanies he experienced there. Did Orwell’s unusual decision to enlist in a POUM militia unit rather than the communist-led International Brigade indicate that he harboured an anti-communist bias before his arrival in Spain, and a predisposition to produce anti-communist writing? There is no doubt that Orwell had had a frosty meeting with Harry Pollitt, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain, prior to his departure for Spain.31 Pollitt oversaw the transit of English volunteers to the International Brigades, and Orwell visited him for information and advice.32 Orwell later claimed that because of this meeting Pollitt categorized him as ‘politically unreliable’ and refused to help him. Pollitt had asked him if he would join the International Brigade, and Orwell had replied that he ‘could not undertake to join anything until [he] had seen what was happening’. Orwell claims that Pollitt even ‘tried to frighten [him] out of going by talking a lot about anarchist terrorism’.33 However, the truth probably lies elsewhere, and it is more likely that Pollitt’s perspective of Orwell as ‘a disillusioned little middle-class boy’ had been formed before this meeting, and had more to do with the impending publication of The Road to Wigan Pier – which Pollitt viewed as an attack on the Left.34 Bernard Crick, the first Orwell biographer to be granted unrestricted access to all of Orwell’s papers, points out that Pollitt and Victor Gollancz (Wigan Pier’s publisher) were at the time embroiled in a row ‘about how or [even] whether to publish’ Wigan Pier.35 The Orwell-Pollitt exchange, as

30 Christopher Hitchens thinks, as does this writer, of Orwell’s politicization in terms of three epiphanies – the first in Burma followed by two in Catalonia. Other scholars see Orwell’s decision to experience the condition of the poor in Paris and London in 1932 as the turning point, and yet others identify the adoption of a pseudonym for the publication of the book that documented these experiences – Down and Out in Paris and London – as the significant step, especially when he began to sign his correspondence George or George Orwell, retaining Eric or Eric Blair for only very old friends and acquaintances. See C. Hitchens, Why Orwell Matters, 3.
31 Harry Pollitt (1890-1960) was a Lancashire boiler-maker and founder-member of the British Communist Party in 1920. He was appointed General Secretary of the party in 1929.
33 This information was found with other notes among Orwell’s papers after his death. They are undated, but Ian Angus and Sonia Orwell believe they were written some time in 1939. Peter Davison agrees because ‘the watermark of the paper’ is the same as that of Orwell letters dated early 1939. See G. Orwell, ‘Notes on the Spanish Militsias’ in Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus (Eds), CEIL, Vol. 1, 317.
34 Quoted in M. Sheldon, Orwell, 253. This quotation comes from Pollitt’s book review of The Road to Wigan Pier in the Daily Worker of 17 March 1937.
35 B. Crick, George Orwell: A Life, 314.
recounted by Orwell, is not in itself plausible evidence that he went to Spain with an anti-communist agenda.

The British historian Tom Buchanan points out that ‘there is little direct evidence’ of what Orwell thought about the Civil War before going to Spain, or ‘of what he hoped to achieve in Spain’. In *Homage* Orwell implies he was politically naïve when he went to Spain. He ‘knew there was a war on’, but claims that he ‘had no notion of what kind of war’ and that ‘for some time afterwards, [he] was not only uninterested in the political situation but unaware of it’. Orwell’s claim is anecdotally supported by his friend Rayner Heppenstall, who in 1956 recalled that he and Orwell had ‘an animated evening in a pub’ sometime in August 1936, but has no recollection of Spain ever being mentioned, ‘even though the conflict had been raging several weeks.’ Harry Milton, a New Yorker, who was one of Orwell’s comrades in arms in the POUM, supported the view that Orwell was ignorant of Spanish politics. Milton considered Orwell ‘politically naïve, quite unaware of the political tensions existing within the Republican side, and not appreciating the part the communists were playing in in the International brigade.’ Yet it seems inconceivable that Orwell was as politically naïve as he would have us believe in *Homage*, and that his admission of naivety has more to do with creating the literary effect of a political innocent undergoing radicalization in the Spanish labyrinth.

After his meeting with Pollitt, Orwell’s problem was how to get to Spain, and he turned to the Independent Labour Party (hereafter ILP). The ILP had been founded in 1873 by the

---


40 Orwell joined the ILP in June 1938. In the *New Leader* of 24 June 1938 he explained that he joined the ILP because at the time he believed it was the only party that came close to his view of socialism. He had not lost
Scottish labour leader and MP, Keir Hardy. It was affiliated with the Labour Party and ‘refused to ally itself with the communists or join the Comintern’. Crick describes the ILP in the thirties as ‘left-wing, egalitarian, a strange mixture of secularised evangelism and non-communist Marxism’. The ILP accredited Orwell as their journalist in Barcelona and provided him with letters of introduction to the POUM, ‘its closest ally in Spain’. It is the ILP’s close links with the POUM and the advice he received from John McNair that there was really no difference between the International Brigade and the POUM, that explains why Orwell joined up with the POUM and not any desire on Orwell’s part to join an anti-communist outfit.

Orwell’s motives in going to Spain have been relentlessly examined and indicate the level of misinformation that surrounds the Orwell persona. Criticism has ranged from the sensible to the absurd, with one scholar criticizing Orwell for arriving ‘at the Spanish war late, after the fighting had been on for nearly half a year’. Much debate has centred on whether Orwell went to Spain to fight or to write – a debate the historian British Robert Stradling dismisses as ‘otiose’ because ‘one was meaningless without the other’. Stradling’s dismissal is ill-judged; during the cultural Cold War, Orwell’s motives for going to Spain, as well as his experiences there, underwent mythologization. It is important to determine Orwell’s mindset when he went to Spain in order to test the veracity of his Spanish epiphanies.

all faith in the Labour Party but he was worried that the party might not be able to resist ‘the terrible temptation of the present moment … to fling every principle overboard to prepare for an imperialist war’. He believed ‘that the ILP [was] the only party which [was] likely to take the right line against imperialist war or against Fascism when it appears in its British form’. For Orwell it was the only party that would never lead him ‘up the garden path in the name of capitalist democracy’. See G. Orwell, ‘Why I joined the Independent Labour Party’ in Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus (Eds), CEJL, Vol. 1, An Age Like This 1920-1940, Secker & Warburg, London, 1968, 336-8.

41 J. Meyers, Orwell: Wintry Conscience of a Generation, 141.
42 Quoted in J. Meyers, Orwell: Wintry Conscience of a Generation, 141.
44 John McNair (1887-1968) was a lifelong socialist. He was born at Tyneside but lived in France for twenty-five years working as a leather merchant and lecturing on English poets at the Sorbonne. On his return to England in 1936 he joined the ILP and was its General Secretary from 1939 -1955. He was ILP representative in Barcelona from August 1936 to June 1937. McNair fled Spain by train to France with Eileen and George Orwell, and Stafford Cottman on 23 June 1937. He was a regular contributor to ILP’s weekly paper, The New Leader (which later became The Socialist Leader). See ‘Escape From Spain’, in P. Davison (Ed.) CWGO, Vol 11, Secker & Warburg, London, 30-32.
45 G. Bowker, George Orwell, 208.
46 John Rodden, Every Intellectual’s Big Brother: Orwell’s Literary Siblings, University of Texas Press, Austin, 2006, 21.
Orwell himself does not help when it comes to determining his reasons for going to Spain, because he said, or is claimed to have said, different things at different times. Many scholars take Orwell at his word in *Homage* when he says he went to Spain ‘with some notion of writing newspaper articles’, and they accept that his first Spanish epiphany was his change of mind to fight for the revolutionary state that he observed ‘in full swing’ – a state that was ‘worth fighting for’. He was attracted to the revolutionary Republic’s egalitarianism and energized by what he saw – buildings draped with red flags or anarchist red and black flags, walls graffitied with the hammer and sickle, shops and cafes collectivized, churches gutted and their religious images burnt. He believed he was witnessing an anarchist controlled revolutionary state where ‘nobody said “Señor” or “Don” or even “Usted”’ and ‘everyone called everyone else “Comrade” and “Thou”’. Orwell’s appreciation of the ephemeral or superficial here shows more naivety, and again this could well be a literary device where Orwell deliberately sets himself up as politically callow in order to be converted to the revolutionary Republic’s cause.

Orwell’s naivety did not make him oblivious to the revolutionary state’s early failings, especially its economic shortcomings and its inability to make supply and meet demand. He points out that ‘the town had a gaunt untidy look, roads and buildings were in poor repair’ and ‘the shops were mostly shabby and half-empty’. Moreover, ‘meat was scarce and milk practically unobtainable, there was a shortage of coal, sugar and petrol, and a really serious shortage of bread’. There were bread-queues but ‘no beggars except for gipsies’, but overall Orwell was convinced ‘there was a belief in the revolution and the future’ because there was ‘no unemployment’ and an extremely low cost of living.

In *Homage* Orwell would have the reader believe his initial and paramount reason for taking up arms in Spain was less to do with helping the Spanish and more to do with the inroads Fascism was making in Europe, which ‘had won all the victories’ since 1930. Orwell

49 Ibid., 5.
50 Orwell was not the only writer to be intoxicated by Barcelona’s Anarchist ‘Spring’. The American war correspondent Martha Gellhorn writes with similar enthusiasm: ‘Barcelona was bright with sun and gay with red banners, and the taxi driver refused money; apparently everything was free. Apparently everyone was everyone else’s brother too. Since few people have lived in such an atmosphere, even for a minute, I can report that it is the loveliest atmosphere going.’ M. Gellhorn, *The Face of War*, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1988, 15.
51 Although Orwell acknowledges that this would not be the case to ‘anyone who had been there since the beginning who would probably now see the revolutionary period as ending’. See *Homage* 4.
52 G. Orwell, *Homage*, 4-5. One must assume that Orwell is referring to the informal use of the pronoun Tú.
thought ‘it was time they got a beating,’ and interestingly posits, ‘it hardly mattered from whom’. Is Orwell downplaying the contemporaneous debate that was raging as to how the Republic should fight the war and the role that the PCE and the USSR were playing? Orwell claims it was vital to ‘drive Franco and his foreign mercenaries into the sea’ because ‘it might make an immense improvement in the world situation even if Spain itself emerged with a stifling dictatorship and all its best men in jail’.54 One could interpret Orwell here as seeming to accept the Soviet and PCE-inspired crack down because it would lead to the most efficient way of fighting the war. Orwell initially seems to have seen the Civil War in Manichean terms. It was the ‘good fight’ that ‘drew a line in the sand’ to halt the relentless and successful advance of fascism in Europe. In this he was no different to the majority of volunteers who went to Spain and fought for the Republic.55 However, some years after Homage was published, Orwell confirmed that he had gone to Spain ‘to gather materials for newspaper articles’, and that he also had ‘some vague idea of fighting if it seemed worthwhile’, although he was doubtful about this possibility owing to his ‘poor health and comparatively small military experience’.56 But his doubts quickly dissipated ‘after one glimpse of the troops’, and he realized that he ‘had relatively a lot of training as a soldier’ and decided to fight.57

Orwell’s second publisher, Fredric Warburg, adds misinformation to the motive debate in his autobiography, An Occupation for Gentlemen, when he describes his first meeting with Orwell. He claims Orwell came to see him in December 1936, just prior to his departure, ‘to discuss a visit to Spain and a book on the Spanish Civil War.’ Instead of providing a reliable insight into Orwell’s motivation Warburg’s recollection provides an example of historical fabrication, because according to Crick no such meeting took place.58 Warburg writes that his first meeting with Orwell was

54 Ibid., 128.
56 G. Orwell, ‘Notes on the Spanish Militias’ in Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus (Eds), CEJL, Vol. 1, 316. These notes written by Orwell were discovered among his papers after his death. They are undated but Ian Angus and Sonia Orwell believe they were written some time in 1939. Peter Davison agrees because ‘the watermark of the paper’ is the same as that of Orwell letters dated early 1939. See P. Davison (Ed.) CWGO, Vol 11, 135.
57 G. Orwell, ‘Notes on the Spanish Militias’, 318. We can assume Orwell’s ‘training’ was related to his five years of service in the Indian Imperial Police based in Burma. He underwent initial training at the Provincial Police Training School at Mandalay. See M. Sheldon, Orwell: The Authorised Biography, Chapter Five, ‘Lost in Mandalay’.
58 See B. Crick, George Orwell, 339, n.
...short, business-like, and highly undramatic. ‘I want to go to Spain and have a look at the fighting,’ he said, ‘write a book about it. Good chaps, those Spaniards, can’t let them down. Can probably give you the book a month or two after I get back.’ Some such words as these were the prelude to the signature of a contract which was the most important in my whole career.59

Warburg depicts a decisive and driven Orwell who is committed to writing a quick book after a brief Spanish interlude. To ‘have a look’ and then ‘write a book’ sounds plausible because it was a modus operandi Orwell had used to write two previous books.60 His memoir, Down and Out in Paris and London, had emerged from his own time spent in poverty in both cities, and the reportage, The Road to Wigan Pier, set in a Lancashire working-class town in the north of England, was written after Orwell spent four months immersing himself in Wigan and its working class culture. Warburg also depicts a callow Orwell in his attitude to and knowledge of Spain, who sees the Spanish as ‘good chaps’ who ‘can’t’ be let down, although such language could also simply reflect the fact that Orwell was using the conversational language of the British establishment. The Warburg depiction sees Orwell through a publisher’s lens. Warburg’s new publishing house, Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd. was only a few months old. Warburg and his partner, Richard Senhouse, had taken over the failed business of Martin Secker Ltd. However, they were undercapitalized and were in danger of failing themselves and were on the look-out for new authors. Warburg admits he does not remember much of the initial Orwell meeting, and what he does remember is what one would expect a struggling new publisher to remember – that there was going to be a quickly written book. The Warburg fabrication may not have been done with malicious intent and may well merely be the result of confused recollections. It is the knowledge that Warburg was an active participant in the cultural Cold War that arouses suspicion and will be discussed later in this chapter.

Jeffrey Meyers in his Orwell biography, published in 2000, offers a more plausible explanation and suggests that Orwell’s claim that he went to write was merely a smokescreen ‘to reassure his wife, family and friends’ and that ‘he always intended to fight’,61 but Tom Buchanan is most convincing when he concludes, ‘there seems little doubt that [Orwell]

intended both to fight, if the opportunity arose, and to write about his experiences in book or article form’.  

Events in Spain convinced Orwell to take an anti-communist stance. Sonia Orwell confirms that the war turned him into ‘a political activist … a journalist, pamphleteer and polemicist’. She writes Orwell had gone to Spain ‘with a strong but undefined feeling of anti-fascism’ but had returned

a committed Socialist and a dedicated anti-communist, knowing that he had witnessed an injustice which, if he could not right, he must use his ability as a writer to record so that justice should at least be done to the memory of his comrades and their vision of Revolution.  

Spain convinced Orwell that fascism and communism were both dehumanizing totalitarian systems that so deformed their citizens that overthrowing them became impossible. He was angry and disillusioned at the way the British Left portrayed both the Spanish Communist Party and the Soviet Union in the crushing of Spain’s revolution, and the role they continued to play in managing the Republic’s war machine. Crick points out that part of Orwell’s ‘anger against the communists was not only that they were despots who squandered human life and despised liberty, but [that they] also discredited democratic Socialism’. As a result, the essays Orwell wrote in the forties are preoccupied with ‘worries about the Sovietisation of Europe but also with the infection of totalitarian thinking of life outside the Soviet sphere’.  

In 1943, in his essay, ‘Looking Back on the Spanish Civil War’, Orwell elaborated on his disillusionment with the lack of objectivity of journalist eye-witnesses who wrote ‘newspaper reports which did not bear any relation to the facts’ – a disillusionment that was exacerbated by the gullibility of people to accept these accounts. He had seen ‘great battles reported where there had been no fighting, and complete silence where hundreds of men had been killed’ and he had also seen ‘troops who had fought bravely denounced as cowards and traitors, and others who had never seen a shot fired hailed as the heroes of imaginary victories’. This led him to conclude Spain’s sinister legacy was the death of History,
because ‘history [was] being written not in terms of what happened but of what ought to have happened according to various “party lines”’.  

Yet in the same paragraph where Orwell expresses this disillusionment, he also reveals a political pragmatism which is an important part of his political persona. He writes, ‘horrible as all this was, it was unimportant’ because these were ‘secondary issues’ concerning, ‘the struggle for power’ between the Comintern and Spanish left-wing parties, and the Spanish Government ‘was not untruthful’ in ‘the broad picture of the war which it presented to the world’.

Anger also drove Orwell to write *Homage* – a book that he thought was his best to date. He was angry that ‘very few people in England had been allowed to know that innocent men [had been] falsely accused’; men such as Georges Kopp, his POUM commanding officer and friend. In *Homage* he redressed this ‘silence’ and described the arrest and incarceration of Kopp at length. He also recounted his own entreaties made at the War Department offices in Barcelona, to an ‘aide-de-camp or secretary’, to get Kopp freed, and how this ‘little slip of an officer in smart uniform, with large and squinting eyes’ was initially sympathetic to Orwell’s case that Kopp ‘had been arrested by mistake’ until Orwell told him that Kopp was serving in the POUM militia at which point the officer’s voice revealed ‘shocked alarm’. However, Orwell found such a reaction understandable considering ‘how the POUM was regarded at that moment’. The spy-scare that labelled the POUMistas (POUM members) as fascist agents was at its height, and it was to be expected that ‘all good Republicans did believe for a day or two that the POUM was a huge spying organization in German pay’.

Orwell returned to England from Catalonia in June 1937 to write his ‘political book’. He hoped to influence public opinion on the war. The type of book *Homage* turned out to be had its genesis in Barcelona’s early May Days of 1937, when Orwell helped guard the

---

68 G. Orwell, ‘Looking Back on the Spanish Civil War’, 234. Peter Davison points out that it is both difficult to date when this essay was written and when it was first published. He suggests a version of it was probably first published in July 1944. See G. Orwell, *Orwell in Spain: The Full text of Homage to Catalonia with Associated Articles, Reviews and Letters*, edited by Peter Davison, Penguin, London, 2001, 343.
POUM’s headquarters against an expected attack from the ‘Communists and Socialists’, and in the calculated campaign of deception in the press which followed, by people who knew better, who willingly allowed themselves to be deceived by Communism, who rolled ‘over on their backs, all four paws in the air, begging to be tickled by Uncle Joe’. 

On 9 May Orwell wrote to his then publisher, Victor Gollancz, informing him that he intended to return to England in August and write an exposé of what he had seen earlier in the month; to counteract ‘the stuff appearing in the English papers’, which he considered to be ‘largely the most appalling lies’. But the type of overtly political book that Homage eventually became is to be found in the Republican government’s June offensive to crush the Spanish revolution, in which Orwell through a strange twist of fate became embroiled. While at the front Orwell had had the misfortune to receive a bullet through the neck, which almost killed him, just missing his carotid artery by ‘about a millimetre’. The wound ended his active service. He was sent to convalesce at a sanatorium on the outskirts of Barcelona, but while there he became involved in the ultimate phase of the Republic’s crack-down on the POUM while visiting his wife who was in Barcelona. In Homage he describes the ‘evil feeling in the air’ that then pervaded Barcelona. This was in direct contrast to the exhilaration he had experienced when he had first arrived there five months earlier, when he found ‘a workers’ State’ that was ‘worth fighting for’. Barcelona had changed for the worse, the workers’ state worth fighting for was gone, and Barcelona was now shrouded in ‘an atmosphere of suspicion, fear, uncertainty, and veiled hatred’. Orwell felt compelled to reveal increased communist duplicity and left-wing collusion in covering up the truth. ‘The

74 G. Orwell, Homage to Catalonia, 151.
75 K. Gessen’s, Introduction in G. Orwell’s All Art is Propaganda, xxv-xxvi.
77 Orwell-Gollancz letter, dated Barcelona 9 May 1937, in Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (Eds), CEJL, Vol. 1, 267. Orwell also told Gollancz in the same letter, that he had some regrets that he was fighting with a POUM militia unit and not the International Brigade because it meant he never saw the Madrid Front, but the POUM unit had brought him ‘into contact with Spaniards rather than Englishmen and especially with genuine revolutionaries’. Orwell later told Rayner Heppenstall, that Gollancz must have foreseen the likelihood a break with him over his Spanish work, because prior to Orwell’s departure for Spain Gollancz had drawn up a contract undertaking to publish Orwell’s ‘fiction but not other books’. See Orwell – Rayner Heppenstall letter dated 31 July 1937 in P. Davison (Ed.) CWGO, 53.
78 M. Sheldon, Orwell, 293. Bernard Crick makes the point that Orwell was lucky to be hit ‘by a high velocity modern rifle from fairly close range’ because ‘the speed and heat of the bullet left a clean and cauterized wound’, with ‘little haemorrhaging’. See B. Crick, George Orwell, 9. Orwell was told by the doctors ‘that if the bullet had been but a millimetre to the left he would have been dead’. ‘They also told him, quite wrongly, that the vocal cord was broken and that he would never speak normally again.’ But, with the help of electrotherapy Orwell recovered his voice although, ‘he had a lasting, flat tonelessness of speech’. (Ibid., 335)
79 G. Orwell, Homage, 195.
80 Ibid.
Communist Party, with Soviet Russia behind it, had thrown its whole weight against the revolution’ because revolution would prevent the USSR achieving its main objective – an anti-fascist alliance with the Western democracies against the Axis states.81 Now the conspiracy to cover up the dismantling of the revolution was added to the list that Orwell was determined to expose.

Victor Gollancz was not moved by Orwell’s letter and proved to be obstructive informing Orwell on 5 July 1937, before a line of the book had been written, that he would not publish a book ‘which could harm the fight against fascism’.82 Orwell confided to Heppenstall that ‘Gollancz is of course part of the communist-racket’.83 He was convinced the ‘political policy’ that had influenced Gollancz’s decision not to publish Homage also contributed to its poor sales.84

In addition to writing Homage Orwell was driven to tell his story in whatever literary forms were available to him – newspaper articles, essays in magazines and book reviews – for the rest of the years of the Civil War and for the years that followed.

His essays, ‘Spilling the Spanish Beans’ and ‘Eye-Witness in Barcelona’ were his quick response to redress the lies and the manipulation and distortion of the events that he had witnessed in Catalonia and were his ‘first major assault on communism’.85 However, his preferred outlet for the essays, the New Statesman rejected them, further fuelling Orwell’s belief that a conspiracy to camouflage the truth was afoot – part of the cover up by the Communist Left. ‘Spilling the Spanish Beans’ was eventually published by New English Weekly86 and ‘Eye-Witness in Barcelona’ by Controversy: the Socialist Forum.87 Orwell was also convinced politics was the key factor in the refusal of New Statesman and Nation to publish his review of Franz Borkenau’s The Spanish Cockpit in early 1938.88

81 Ibid., 51.
84 P. Davidson (Ed.), Orwell in Spain, 28.
86 The New Statesman, like the New English Weekly, was published weekly but was the more prestigious of the two in left-wing circles. It had been founded in 1913 and was supported by George Bernard Shaw and the Fabians. Although it had a heritage of radical politics it had gradually moved to embrace a centre-left perspective. The New English Weekly had only been founded in 1932 and had a more literary and less political content. Orwell took his article’s rejection personally and blamed Kingsley Martin, editor from 1930-60.
87 See P. Davison (Ed.) GWGO, Vol 11, 54.
88 M. Sheldon gives a good account of this refusal in Orwell: The Authorised Biography, 304-5. T. Buchanan describes another clash between Gollancz and one of his authors over Spain. On this occasion it was with
HOMAGE TO CATALONIA: REPRESENTATIONS OF THE PCE AND USSR IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

We have seen that Homage was largely shunned when it was first published, but was successfully resurrected during the Cold War. The reasons for this are to be found in Orwell’s depictions of the PCE and the USSR, and in his anti-communist sentiments that were now in tune with the prevailing political climate of the Cold War.

Homage was written during the second half of 1937 and was published on 25 April 1938. There had been talk of its being published by Secker and Warburg under the title ‘Barcelona Tragedy’, as part of a collection of books that would reflect the political philosophy of the ILP and counteract the influence of the British Communist Party whose books were published by the Left Book Club. Homage does have Barcelona’s May Days at its core, but it is more than a reportage of the events of May; it is a memoir of the hardship and dangers that militia men experienced at the front, and (although Orwell only uses the term ‘totalitarian’ once in the book)89 it is, or at least became, a political treatise on the perils of totalitarianism, and an exposé of the way in which totalitarianism cynically uses propaganda, lies and exaggeration to manipulate the facts. In Homage and in subsequent Spanish Civil War-inspired articles and book reviews, Orwell drew attention to the political climate of the late 1930s which ‘fostered intellectual dishonesty’ and ‘the subservience of European Left intellectuals to the Communist “line”’.90 He vented his fury at the anti-fascist press outside Spain which downplayed or obscured the Spanish revolution and painted the war in the narrow terms of fascism versus democracy – something he himself was guilty of when he first went to Spain. The English press came in for particular criticism because it was ‘more centralized and the public more easily deceived’. Orwell believed that in England only two versions of the war had been portrayed, ‘…the Right-wing version of Christian patriots

---

89 Orwell used the term in a highly romanticized, if not patronizing, portrayal of the Spanish character. He writes: ‘They [the Spanish people] have, there is no doubt, a generosity, a species of nobility that do not really belong to the twentieth century. It is this that makes one hope that in Spain even fascism may take a comparatively loose and bearable form. Few Spaniards possess the damnable efficiency and consistency that a modern totalitarian state needs.’ See G. Orwell, Homage to Catalonia, 223.

90 R. Carr, ‘Orwell and the Spanish Civil War’, 64.
versus Bolsheviks dripping with blood, and the Left-wing version of gentlemanly republicans quelling a military revolt\textsuperscript{91}, with the central issue of the revolution being successfully covered up.\textsuperscript{91} Orwell attributed this state of affairs to the determination of most of the world, especially ‘the [Spanish] Communist Party, with Soviet Russia behind it’ to crush revolution in Spain, because of the belief ‘that revolution at this stage would be fatal. What was to be aimed at in Spain was not workers’ control, but bourgeois democracy. It was felt that a Red Spain propped up by the USSR would never have been acceptable to France and Great Britain, and the aim of the USSR at this time was to procure the support of the western democracies for an anti-fascist alliance.\textsuperscript{92}

Against this unpropitious political background Orwell did his best to enlist his literary friends to promote \emph{Homage}. He was more than happy to use tried and tested methods of friendship networks. John Atkins, who was acquainted with Orwell at Eton, observes that while at the school Orwell ‘made valuable friends such as Richard Rees and John Strachey’.\textsuperscript{93} Orwell biographer Jeffrey Meyers concurs that Orwell’s Etonian friendships were crucial to his progress as a writer and adds to the list Anthony Powell, Christopher Hollis as well as David Astor (owner of the \emph{Observer}). Meyers also notes that the novelist L. H. Myers, the publishers Roger Senhouse and John Lehmann and the philosopher A. J. Ayer also played significant roles.\textsuperscript{94} Orwell wrote to his former school friend, Cyril Connolly, who was by then a writer, critic and editor of the influential literary magazine \emph{Horizon}:

\begin{quote}
I see from the N.S. & N. [The New Statesman and Nation] list that you have a book coming out sometime this spring [\emph{Enemies of Promise}]. If you manage to get a copy sent to me I’ll review it for the \emph{New English [Weekly]}, possibly also \emph{Time & Tide}. I arranged for Warburg to send you a copy of my Spanish book (next month) hoping you may be able to review it. You scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours.\textsuperscript{95}
\end{quote}

Tom Buchanan describes \emph{Homage}’s initial reception as ‘mixed and muted’, and points out ‘that Orwell believed that it had been “boycotted a bit” in the press’.\textsuperscript{96} Clearly \emph{Homage}’s

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} G. Orwell, \emph{Homage}, 50-1.
\item \textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 51
\item \textsuperscript{93} John Atkins, \emph{George Orwell: A Literary Study}, John Calder, London, 1954, 42.
\item \textsuperscript{94} J. Meyers, \emph{Orwell: Winter’s Conscience of a Generation}, 46.
\item \textsuperscript{95} Orwell - Cyril Connolly letter, dated 14 March 1938 in P. Davison (Ed.) \emph{CWGO, Vol 11}, 127. Connolly did not review \emph{Homage} although Orwell did review \emph{Enemies of Promise}.
\item \textsuperscript{96} T. Buchanan, ‘Three Lives of Homage to Catalonia’, 304.
\end{itemize}
detractors were more powerful and prevented wide dissemination of the book. They saw it as a blatant attack on the USSR, who together with Mexico were the only two states who had come to the Republic’s defence, and of the two, it was the USSR that provided the bulk of the war matériel and expertise, leaving aside the fact that we now know such help came at a very high price. Many contemporaneous commentators believed that the USSR’s commitment to the Republic deserved loyalty not criticism. Poor sales figures were a \textit{fait accompli} after Gollancz refused to publish, because \textit{Homage} was denied the forty thousand plus readership that Gollancz’s Left Book Club imprint offered, and from which Orwell’s previous book \textit{The Road to Wigan Pier} had benefitted. In his correspondence with friends Orwell now regularly referred to Gollancz in disparaging terms. He wrote to Jack Common in October 1937 that he had to change his publisher because Gollancz would not have any more to do with him as he was now considered to be a ‘Trotskyist’. A few months later he wrote to Common again denigrating Gollancz as ‘not too bright intellectually’. By 1945 Orwell wanted to make a clean break with Gollancz, and he told his agent, Leonard Moore, that it was ‘unsatisfactory to be tied to a publisher who accepts or refuses books partly on political grounds and whose political views are constantly changing’, and he pointed out that ‘with Warburg these difficulties don’t arise. He is less interested in propaganda, and … his views are near enough to mine to prevent serious disagreement’. How wrong Orwell turned out to be. We now know Warburg became immersed in propaganda for the Congress of Cultural Freedom (hereafter CCF) and published the CCF funded British literary magazine \textit{Encounter}.

John McNair, the ILP representative in Barcelona during Orwell’s time in Spain, reviewed \textit{Homage} for the \textit{New Leader} on 6 May 1938. Not unexpectedly McNair waxed lyrical, describing Orwell’s chapters on the May Days as the ‘best in the book’ because of their ‘impartiality’. Another friend, the social anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer, foreshadowing Trilling’s 1952 accolade in the ‘Introduction’ to the American edition of

98 Orwell-Common letter, dated October 1937 in P. Davison (Ed.) \textit{CWGO}, Vol 11, 93. Common and Orwell met when they both worked for \textit{Adephi} magazine in 1930. Common was a working-class writer employed by the magazine to sell subscriptions. Orwell wrote reviews and poems for the magazine. Common did not immediately warm to Orwell and could not figure him out. Was Orwell ‘a rebel pretending to be a gentleman? Or vice versa?’ See M. Sheldon, \textit{Orwell: The Authorised Biography}, 149.
100 Quoted in F. Warburg, \textit{All Authors Are Equal}, 50.
Homage, proclaimed Homage to be ‘a political document of the greatest importance’.\textsuperscript{103} Furthermore, Gorer predicted in his review in Time and Tide of 30 April 1938 that Homage would be ‘distorted or ignored in the greater part of the press’ and would ‘probably be abused both by conservatives and communists’ and advised that ‘anyone interested in the political situation or in literature would be foolish to neglect it’.\textsuperscript{104} Not all Orwell’s friends and acquaintances reviewed Homage favourably. The writer and hispanist, V. S. Pritchett, wrote in the New Statesman and Nation of the 30 April 1938: ‘There are many strong arguments for keeping creative writers out of politics, and Mr George Orwell is one of them.’\textsuperscript{105} Although Pritchett praised Orwell’s day-to-day accounts of the war, he found his description of the political context ‘perverse’.\textsuperscript{106}

Even during the early Cold War decades when Homage and Orwell’s other works were very popular and experiencing large sales, significant voices stood out against his interpretations in Homage. Herbert Lionel Matthews, a man whom Paul Preston has described as ‘meticulously honest’,\textsuperscript{107} was a journalist for the New York Times and had been its Civil War correspondent in Spain. On 27 December 1952, the American left-of-centre weekly magazine The Nation,\textsuperscript{108} published Matthews’ review of the American edition of Homage, entitled ‘Homage to Orwell’. Readers would have been justified in thinking that they were in for another dose of Orwell-mania that was commonplace in both the UK and USA in the early fifties. However, the Matthews article went against the trend. Matthews conceded that ‘anything George Orwell wrote is worth reprinting’ but warned ‘the resurrection of buried literary works is not without its dangers’ and that ‘the danger in this case is that Orwell was writing in a white heat about a confused, unimportant, and obscure incident in the Spanish Civil War’.\textsuperscript{109} Matthews pointed out that Orwell readers all too often fell into the trap of taking him too ‘literally’ and assuming ‘that because he was in one corner of Spain for a small part of the war he must have known everything about it, and that his story of the betrayal of the social revolution must have been true’.\textsuperscript{110} Matthews thought this was a pity because Homage was ‘an honest, vivid, personal account of one man’s bitter

\textsuperscript{103} Quoted in J. Meyers (Ed.), George Orwell: The Critical Heritage, 123.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} P. Preston, We Saw Spain Die, Skyhorse Publishing, New York, 2009, 19
\textsuperscript{108} Founded in 1865, The Nation is reputed to be America’s oldest continuously published weekly magazine.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
experience in the Spanish Civil War’ and ‘if people read it for its literary value, they [would] have a rewarding experience’ but ‘if they read it as history, they will be either misled or confused’.\textsuperscript{111} Much later, in a memoir written in 1971, Matthews took a harder line and claimed \textit{Homage} ‘did more to blacken the Loyalist [Republican] cause than any work written by enemies of the Second Republic’.\textsuperscript{112} The former American International Brigader and American Communist Party Member, Arthur Landis, took a similar line and dismissed \textit{Homage} as the perspective of ‘a young man who spent a few brief months on an inactive war front, witnessed the clash of ideologies on the streets of Barcelona, and then retired – knowing as little when he left as when he came’.\textsuperscript{113} It would be fair to say that Landis’ view represented that of many \textit{brigadistas} who never doubted that they had participated in a ‘noble cause’ and who would never countenance that they may have been merely pawns in ‘Stalin’s strategy to dominate the political and military spheres of Republican Spain’.\textsuperscript{114}

Two British professional historians writing Civil War histories during the sixties and early seventies, Hugh Thomas and Raymond Carr, demonstrate that \textit{Homage} was divisive at the highest levels of historical scholarship. Thomas dismissed \textit{Homage} with a footnote in his 1961 tome, \textit{The Spanish Civil War}, as ‘marvellously written’ but ‘a better book about war itself than about the Spanish war’.\textsuperscript{115} Carr took a contrary view:

\begin{quote}
The Spanish Civil War produced a spate of bad literature. \textit{Homage to Catalonia} is one of few exceptions and the reason is simple. Orwell was determined to set down the truth as he saw it. This was something many writers of the Left in 1936-1939 could not bring themselves to do.\textsuperscript{116}
\end{quote}

Although Carr could not endorse \textit{Homage} in its entirety, and concedes that Orwell was ‘unfair and unbalanced in his insistence that the flight of left intellectuals from truth’, was motivated by their attraction to the power of the USSR, rather than their genuine belief that in Spain the USSR was doing something good and worthy. Carr notes that for many ‘Stalin was a lesser evil than Hitler’.\textsuperscript{117} It was the early sections of \textit{Homage}, the ‘descriptions of militia

\begin{footnotes}
\item [111] Ibid.
\item [115] H. Thomas, \textit{The Spanish Civil War}, The Modern Library edition, New York, 2001, 635, fn2. Hugh Thomas’ \textit{The Spanish Civil War} was first published in 1961. It was translated into several languages including Spanish and has been revised several times.
\item [116] Raymond Carr, ‘Orwell and the Spanish Civil War’, 64.
\item [117] Ibid., 66.
\end{footnotes}
life from the inside’, that Carr believed were of great value to the historian. However, Carr saw Orwell’s belief that the communist inspired Popular Army, was no ‘better than the militia it displaced’ as naïve because ‘only the Popular Army could have fought actions like Teruel or the Ebro’, and only a respectable Republic had any hope of weapons from the capitalist West. Carr’s claim that Homage was ‘the prime source for our knowledge’ of ‘the civil war within the Civil War’ was correct at the time. Three factors accounted for this state of affairs. Firstly, Francisco Franco was in power for thirty-six years after the Civil War had ended and kept Spanish archives which related to it off limits to both foreign and Spanish scholars. Secondly, the relevant archives in the USSR that related to Soviet involvement in Spain were also firmly closed to foreign researchers. Such inaccessibility to archival material hindered, although did not preclude, new investigation into ‘the civil war within the Civil War’. The work of Burnett Bolloten attests to this. Thirdly the Cold War Zeitgeist presented its own nebulous constraints. These three factors undoubtedly prolonged the life of Homage to Catalonia as a source which demonstrated the perfidy of Communism and the USSR.

Bill Alexander, a communist and former commander of the British Battalion of the International Brigades believed Orwell’s impact to be significant in the British education system where: ‘Every school student taking O or A Level examinations in modern History is told to read George Orwell’s Homage in order to gain an understanding of the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939.’ For Alexander: ‘This is as useful as studying the Second World from the story of a small group of soldiers in some quiet corner, far from the main fronts of El Alamein, Stalingrad or Normandy’. Stradling agreed with Alexander that by 1984 Orwell’s works were ‘a staple of the academic syllabus in Anglophone countries’. For the most part, Orwell’s overt proselytizing is confined to two chapters, a total of 54 out of 232 pages – just over 20% of the book. Laurence Brander, whose non-biography of Orwell will be discussed later in this chapter, believes ‘the shape of [Homage] is marred by [these] two interpolated chapters on communist propaganda' and he draws attention to Orwell’s suggestion to his readers in the second paragraph of Chapter Five, that if they ‘are not interested in the horrors of party politics’ to skip the chapter. The relocation of these

118 Ibid.
119 Ibid., 67-8.
120 Bill Alexander, ‘George Orwell and Spain’ in Christopher Norris (Ed.), Inside the Myth – Orwell: Views From the Left, 85.
121 R. Stradling, History & Legend: Writing the International Brigades, UWP, Cardiff, 2003, 50.
two chapters was the subject of an angry article in the politically conservative literary magazine, *New Criterion*, by American journalist Stephen Schwartz, who took issue with Peter Davison, the editor of the twenty volume *The Complete Works of George Orwell* (hereafter *CWGO*). Schwartz called Davison a ‘pedant’ who had misappropriated and mutilated George Orwell’s works. Schwartz was upset with Davison’s ‘editorial meddling’, in a new edition of *Homage* in which he “‘rearranged’ the textual order ... removing two chapters (originally numbered V and XI) to the end of the book…” to become appendices. Davison was revising all of Orwell’s works, which he claimed had all ‘been mutilated to a greater or lesser extent’ over the years. Davison’s new ‘authoritative’ editions claimed to incorporate ‘all Orwell’s many textual changes as well as restoring his original intention where the hands of others have intervened.’ Schwartz believed such claims were ‘great humbug’, and challenged Davison’s qualifications for the task, asking ‘what distinction in the field of Orwell studies brought the honour of this responsibility upon Peter Davidson’.

Schwartz believed Davidson was unqualified for the task because he had been merely ‘a professional bibliographer’ and ‘proof-reader’. At the heart of the Schwartz attack was the belief that Davison’s changes diluted *Homage’s* anti-Stalinism. The Schwartz attack was blinkered because the changes Davison had effected had been suggested by Orwell himself in a letter dated 13 January 1947 concerning the impending French publication of *Homage*. Orwell writes that

...it would be better to take out two chapters and put them at the end of the book in the form of an appendix. These are chapters V and XI. They deal with the internal politics of the Spanish Revolution and I feel the ordinary reader would find them tedious. But at the same time they do have historical value, especially chapter XI and it would be a

---

123 *New Criterion* was founded in 1982 by the right-wing art journalist Hilton Kramer (1928-2012) when he resigned as art critic for the *New York Times* because he felt it was too left-wing. He had been a ‘moderate lefty’ but by the mid-1960s had become a ‘self-professed neocon’. In *New Criterion* he continued the battles of the McCarthy years and raged against those on Hollywood’s “blacklist”. From 1988-2001 he was the curator of painting at New York’s Museum of Modern Art. See Michael McNay, ‘Kramer Obituary’, *Guardian*, Sunday 1 April 2012.

124 Schwartz is executive director of the Centre for Islamic Pluralism located in Washington. The Centre is a ‘think-tank’ to promote moderate Islam in the USA and counteract the trend to Islamic militancy. He was born a ‘red diaper baby’ (his phrase) to a communist mother and fellow-traveller father. His political leanings remain to the Left and much of his writing has focused on Marxism, communism and anarchism.

125 *The CWGO* were published in two batches – Vols 1-9 in 1986-7 and Vols 10-20 in 1998.


127 Words to this effect are found before the title page in each volume of *CWGO*.


129 Ibid.

130 Davidson clearly made the case for all the editorial changes in his notes on the text, which can be found on pages 251-3 in *CWGO* Vol 6 *Homage to Catalonia*. 
pity to cut them out altogether. In writing the book I tried to concentrate my political remarks in these two chapters, and they can go at the end without interrupting the narrative.131

The Schwartz article demonstrates two things: – the extent to which Orwell’s book had become for some a Cold War document which should not be tampered with under any circumstances, and that sixty years after the Spanish conflict had ended, the role of the communists and the USSR in Spain could still generate heated polemics. For Schwartz the chapters dealing with ‘the internal dialectic of the Spanish left’ were ‘the most important parts of the book’.132 It was so important in fact that he was not prepared to countenance, even by Orwell himself, posthumously effecting changes. Schwartz was over-reacting. After all, the only reason these changes were not made in Orwell’s lifetime was because the book was a sales flop and no reprint was made.

In the original Chapter XI of Homage Orwell attributed the immediate cause of friction in early May to ‘the Government’s order to surrender all private weapons’ which ‘coincided with the decision to build up a heavily-armed “non-political” police force from which trade union members were to be excluded’.133 It was obvious to all and sundry that ‘the next move would be the taking over of some of the key industries controlled by the anarcho-syndicalist trades union the CNT’ (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo) and there was ‘a general vague feeling that the revolution had been sabotaged’.134 Orwell points out that the crisis was not unexpected:

For months past there had been a long series of armed clashes between communists and anarchists in various parts of Spain. Catalonia and especially Barcelona was in a state of tension that had already led to street affrays, assassinations, and so forth.135 Yet he remained in a state of denial and could not bring himself to believe that what he witnessed in early May was either an anarchist coup against the Republic or a communist plan to ‘smash the power of the CNT at one blow’.136 Although he admits his analysis was

133 G. Orwell, Homage, 150.
134 National Confederation of Workers.
135 G. Orwell, Homage, 158.
136 Ibid., 156. Peter Davison concurs and writes: ‘Despite his well-founded suspicions, Orwell, in Homage to Catalonia, could not bring himself to believe that anyone had deliberately planned the May events.’ See P. Davison (Ed.) CWGO, Vol 11, 32.
based on ‘little data’ and derived from what he had seen with his ‘own eyes and what he had learned from other eye-witnesses whom [he] believed to be reliable’.\(^{137}\)

It was the Catalan government’s attack on Barcelona’s CNT-operated Telephone Exchange on 3 May 1937 that sparked the fighting – ‘It was alleged it was badly run and that official calls were tapped.’ The belief spread ‘that this was the signal for a general attack on the CNT by the Civil Guards and the PSUC\(^{138}\) (Communists and Socialists)’.\(^{139}\) A General Strike and six days of street fighting ensued, during which time about five hundred people were killed, one and a half thousand were wounded and over two hundred were arrested.\(^{140}\)

At first Orwell attempted to rationalize his feelings of disillusionment as being commonplace in Spain, where it was unlikely that anyone who had spent more than a few weeks could not be anything other than ‘in some degree disillusioned’.\(^{141}\) But disillusionment turned to anger when he saw the central government employ terror, lies and propaganda to reassert its power. Orwell was sickened by the communists’ labelling of the \textit{POUMistas} as fascist agents, who plotted to overthrow the government in order to help Franco; his revulsion was exacerbated by how British newspapers such as \textit{News Chronicle} reported the May Days as a Trotskyist Revolt and simply accepted the communist line.\(^{142}\)

The Barcelona ‘May Days’ sealed the fate of Prime Minister Largo Caballero who was replaced by Juan Negrín. For Orwell, this heralded the beginning of communist domination of the Republican government; he had not grasped that the process of communist infiltration of the levers of power and the implementation of an anti-POUM agenda lay in events outside Barcelona – in the siege of Madrid, when the Republican government had retreated to Valencia, and left Madrid in the hands of a Defence Council which excluded the POUM.\(^{143}\) The Madrid Defence Council subsequently suppressed the POUM’s Madrid newspapers and journals, shut down its radio station and Red Aid organization as well as refusing arms to its militias.\(^{144}\) The Communists’ three virtues for the successful pursuit of the Civil War – ‘Discipline, Hierarchy, and Organization’ – did not sit easily with the structure and ideology

\(^{137}\) G. Orwell, \textit{Homage}, 150.

\(^{138}\) \textit{Partido Socialista Unificado de Cataluña} (United Socialist Party of Catalonia).

\(^{139}\) G. Orwell, \textit{Homage}, 151.


\(^{141}\) G. Orwell, \textit{Homage}, 180.

\(^{142}\) G. Orwell, \textit{Homage}, 160.

\(^{143}\) The siege of Madrid begun in November 1936.

\(^{144}\) C. Hall, ‘In Spain with Orwell’, 52.
of the POUM. Largo Caballero and the communists ultimately fell out over military policy. After the May Days fighting was over, Largo Caballero refused communist demands to dissolve the POUM and was forced to resign.

Orwell wrote in *Homage* that after the demise of Largo Caballero he feared the communists would ‘smash their political rivals as soon as they got a quarter of a chance’. On 28 May the POUM’s masthead Barcelona newspaper, *La Batalla*, was banned. *La Batalla* had been a relentless critic of Soviet manoeuvrings in Spain. Moreover, the Moscow show trials overlapped the Spanish conflict and *La Batalla* often featured articles denouncing ‘Stalin’s domestic tyranny’. In November 1936 it condemned the USSR for using military aid as a lever to stall the revolution. Such criticism risked destroying the Soviet promoted ‘image of a Liberal-Socialist-Communist alliance in defence of bourgeois freedom’.

When Orwell returned to Barcelona in late May 1937 to convalesce from a gunshot wound at a sanatorium on the slopes of Mount Tibidabo, he was taken aback by the counter-revolution he witnessed, and it took him some time to grasp the political changes underway. He was not unsympathetic to the communists’ criticism that CNT and POUM militias lacked discipline, and he agreed the communists had a point when they claimed that maintaining the militias and collectivization at that time hindered the war against fascism. However, he could not tolerate the ‘dull blind spite’ of the communist vendetta against the POUM and their determination to snuff out the revolution in order to safeguard the continued supply of Soviet arms.

The suppression of the POUM began in earnest on 16 June 1937 when POUM leader Andrés Nin and other leaders were apprehended, and the party itself was proscribed. Nin was subsequently tortured and murdered and Orwell’s comrade in arms, Bob Smillie, died in

---

146 Ibid., 111.
148 According to Christopher Hall *La Batalla* had a print run of 20,000. See C. Hall, ‘*In Spain with Orwell*’, 47.
149 C. Hall in ‘*In Spain with Orwell*’, 52.
153 In *Homage* Orwell used the phrase ‘dull blind spite’ to describe the factors that led to Bob Smillie’s death in jail. See *Homage*, 217.
suspicious circumstances in a prison in Valencia. Georges Kopp, who was Orwell’s commanding officer and friend, was also arrested. Orwell believed that his wife, who worked in the ILP’s Barcelona office, was under surveillance ‘and being used as a decoy duck’ in order to entrap Orwell himself. Orwell describes how he arrived at his wife’s Barcelona hotel to be greeted by her anxious warning to ‘get out of here at once’. The warning was reinforced by a POUM member whom he met on the stairs of the hotel saying: ‘The POUM’s been suppressed. They’ve sealed all the buildings. Practically everyone’s in prison. And they say they’re shooting people already.’ One can imagine the anger and fear that Orwell must have felt when his wife told him that their hotel room had been searched ‘in the small hours of the morning’ by six plain-clothes police who ‘seized every scrap of paper’ — diaries, books, war souvenirs and letters. He became a man on the run and had to spend days and nights hiding and lying low in the streets of Barcelona until escape to France could be arranged. The irony of the suppression of the POUM was not lost on Orwell, and he wrote to Heppenstall when safely back in England: ‘We started off by being heroic defenders of democracy and ended by slipping over the border with police panting on our heels.’ A document surfaced in 1989, of which Orwell would never have been aware, which vindicated his clandestine and dramatic departure from Spain. The document in question was a list of charges, drawn up by the Spanish Republic’s Tribunal for Espionage and High Treason, against Orwell and his wife three weeks after they had escaped from Spain. It charged them

---

154 M. Sheldon, *Orwell*, 294-5. Bob Smillie was twenty-two when he died of peritonitis in a prison in Valencia. He came from a ‘highly politicised family’ — his grandfather had been a coal mining trade union leader and then a Labour Party MP. His father was chair of the Scottish ILP. Smillie gave up studying at university and went to Spain in October 1936. He spent some time working for John McNair at the ILP office in Barcelona. In January 1937 when the ILP Contingent arrived in Barcelona he volunteered to fight with them in a POUM unit. Like Orwell he ended up defending the POUM headquarters during the May Days. He was arrested at the Spanish-French border on 11 May for not having the correct documentation and under suspicion of being a deserter. When he was arrested he ‘was carrying a report of the ‘May Days’ events written by McNair (which he managed to destroy), letters from ILP volunteers, and an article written by Orwell.’ Controversy has raged as to whether Smillie was murdered in custody. Many at the time believed that Smillie was murdered. In *Homage* Orwell writes: ‘I assumed … that Smillie had been shot. It was what everyone believed at the time, but I have since thought that I may have been wrong’. This was because he later heard from a released prisoner ‘that Smillie had certainly been ill in prison’. (*Homage*, 216). It has been argued that Smillie’s death was due to ‘criminal negligence’ and that his treatment in prison was ‘politically motivated’. See C. Hall, *In Spain with Orwell*, 206-211.


156 G. Orwell, *Homage*, 204.

157 Ibid., 205.

158 Ibid., 210.

with ‘rabid’ Trotskyism on the basis of correspondence – presumably the correspondence seized during the search of their hotel room.\textsuperscript{160}

However, it must be kept in mind that Orwell’s disillusionment with the turn of events and the lack of truth in the reporting of the May Days did not lead to his full-scale rejection of the Republic, and he writes, ‘it did not follow that the Government [of the Republic] was not worth fighting for as against the more naked and developed fascism of Franco and Hitler’. Within a short time he reconciled himself to the new communist-backed Negrín government that had come to power during the May Days: ‘I now think much more highly of the Negrín government than I did when it came to office. It has kept up the difficult fight with splendid courage, and has shown more political tolerance than anyone expected.’\textsuperscript{161}

**APPROPRIATION**

In the view of many on the official Left, he [Orwell] committed the ultimate sin of ‘giving ammunition to the enemy’. Not only did he do this in the 30s, when the cause of anti-fascism supposedly necessitated a closing of ranks, but he repeated the offence in the opening years of the Cold War and thus … became an ally of the forces of conservatism.\textsuperscript{162}

It is difficult to ascertain exactly the role the cultural Cold War played in Orwell’s posthumous rise to fame because of the lack of documentary evidence. The CIA has a history of obstructing scholars in their efforts to access material through freedom of information laws, as well as through prohibitive fees and charges.\textsuperscript{163} Publishers’ archives should offer, as suggested by Gordon Johnston, a potential cornucopia of untapped documentary material, but the cornucopia is extremely hard to access, as authors or executors of literary estates are reluctant to give their approval.\textsuperscript{164} An account of this writer’s failed efforts to access publishers’ archives of Spanish Civil War historians has been given in the Introduction to this thesis.\textsuperscript{165} Moreover, many publishers do not have archives which are accessible for scholars, or do not employ a full-time professional archivist because of the financial straits that

\textsuperscript{161} G. Orwell, *Homage*, 181-2.
\textsuperscript{163} See ‘Introduction’ to this thesis p.8, fn. 34 for account of Stonor Saunders’ failed attempts to obtain information from the CIA.
\textsuperscript{165} See main ‘Introduction’ to this thesis, p.24, fn. 123.
publishing houses now find themselves in. As a result of these obstacles there is no direct
evidence of involvement by British or American intelligence agencies in the publication or
promotion of *Homage to Catalonia*, and we are left to draw conclusions based on
circumstantial evidence. However, there is ample evidence that British and American
intelligence agencies promoted *Animal Farm* (1945) and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949) in
their propaganda war with the Soviet Union, and there is considerable agreement among
scholars that the IRD and the CIA played an important role in raising Orwell’s status from
minor novelist and essayist to the most influential and widely read political novelist of his
generation. In this context it seems highly unlikely that *Homage*, with its anti-communist
message, would not also have received similar help and support from intelligence agencies.\(^\text{166}\)

When *Homage* was first published in the USA, fourteen years after it first appeared in
the United Kingdom, it appeared with a front cover which announced after the title: ‘Orwell’s
personal story of the Spanish Civil War & the Communist Betrayal.’ This description is in
sharp contrast to the modest and bland ‘Author of the Road to Wigan Pier’ appended to the
original UK publication, and suggests political appropriation of both Orwell’s work and
reputation. The first American edition of *Homage* included an ‘Introduction’ by Lionel
Trilling, marking an important stage in the transformation of *Homage* from Orwell’s
eyewitness account of what happened in ‘one little corner of Spain’,\(^\text{167}\) to a Cold War
document that definitively demonstrated the duplicity of communists and the USSR in Spain.
It is not known who suggested that *Homage* be published at this time, but the fact that the
renowned New York intellectual and literary critic Lionel Trilling was commissioned by the
publisher to write the introduction is indicative of possible intelligence agency involvement.
A cursory glance at Trilling’s *curriculum vitae* shows that he had the pedigree to produce an
introduction that would highlight and complement the anti-communism of Orwell in
*Homage*, and that he would do it in a subtle way. It is even plausible that Trilling may have
been the driving force behind the American publication. He was well-connected with the
New York intellectual fraternity who were then designing the America’s strategies and
responses to the Kremlin’s developing propaganda war of the post-1945 years. Frances
Stonor Saunders points out that his friendship and social network included the apostate

---

\(^{166}\) The IRD was set up by British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevan in February 1948, as a section of the Foreign

Marxist political scientist, James Burnham,\textsuperscript{168} the anti-communist political writer, Arnold Beichmann,\textsuperscript{169} the neo-conservative historian Peter Viereck, the art critic and former Trotskyite, Clement Greenberg, the editor of \textit{Commentary}\textsuperscript{170} and unofficial adviser on communism to executives at the Luce publications [\textit{Time-Life}] Elliott Cohen.\textsuperscript{171} Trilling had been a communist ‘fellow-traveller’ in the early thirties\textsuperscript{172} but changed his allegiances in light of the revelations of Stalinist repression, and from 1937 regularly contributed to the Marxist, but anti-Stalinist, \textit{Partisan Review}.\textsuperscript{173} Trilling and his wife Diana, although not directly involved in the inauguration of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom,\textsuperscript{174} which had been set up in 1951, were sympathetic to its key object of conducting and promulgating ‘activities designed to further the democratic way of life in all spheres of culture’;\textsuperscript{175} Diana Trilling eventually served on its executive committee. Even before the American Committee had been formally incorporated, like-minded New York intellectuals and literati, of whom the Trillings were part, met informally to develop strategies to counteract the venomous propaganda war that they believed the USSR was waging against the West – a propaganda war that challenged the basic values of American society.\textsuperscript{176}

With this background it is no surprise Trilling heralded \textit{Homage} in the very first sentence of his ‘Introduction’ as ‘one of the important documents of our time’ and ‘a testimony to the nature of modern political life’, written by a ‘virtuous man’ who knew what communism was ‘from first-hand experience’.\textsuperscript{177} For Trilling, Orwell’s analysis of Spanish affairs was ‘the truly revolutionary one’.\textsuperscript{178} Trilling’s enthusiastic praise of both Orwell and \textit{Homage} in his ‘Introduction’ is important because it demonstrates how Trilling appropriated

\textsuperscript{168} Burnham was connected to Frank Wisner, the boss of the OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) which spawned the CIA. According to Stonor Saunders Burnham was ‘the vital liaison between the intelligentsia and Wisner’s office’. See F. Stonor Saunders, \textit{The Cultural Cold War}, 87.

\textsuperscript{169} John Podhoretz, an editor of \textit{Commentary}, described Arnold Beichmann as ‘a leading figure in the world of American anti-communism’ who advocated ‘that in no way, shape or form could communist regimes be negotiated with effectively, be accommodated, humoured or brought into the community of nations’. See Obituary, ‘Arnold Beichman, Political Analyst, Dies at 96’ by Dennis Hevesi in \textit{New York Times}, 4 March 2010.

\textsuperscript{170} \textit{Commentary} is a conservative monthly magazine of politics and current affairs.

\textsuperscript{171} F. Stonor Saunders, \textit{The Cultural Cold War}, 158. Peter Viereck wrote \textit{Conservatism Revisited: The Revolt Against Revolt} (1949).


\textsuperscript{173} F. Stonor Saunders, \textit{The Cultural Cold War}, 160. \textit{Partisan Review} had begun its life with a pro-communist bias in the 1930s but changed tact with the signing of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and took an anti-Stalinist line; it aimed to ‘redefine radicalism in a non-Communist context’, (160).

\textsuperscript{174} The American committee was later to be affiliated with the Congress of Cultural Freedom.

\textsuperscript{175} Sidney Hook, \textit{Out of Step}, 420-1.

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 421.

\textsuperscript{177} G. Orwell, \textit{Homage}, v & xvi.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., xviii.
Homage from a Civil War memoir and turned it into a Cold War polemic. Trilling used Orwell’s depiction of communist and Soviet duplicity in the Spanish Civil War to exemplify and highlight Soviet methods of control and influence since the end of World War Two. So for Trilling, the significance of Homage was its relevance to ‘the present moment and for the years to come’.179

In his ‘Introduction’ Trilling traces the start of Orwell’s anti-communism to his time in Spain, and not earlier. When Orwell enlisted to fight he believed that the Communist Party offered the best approach to winning the war; his experience fighting in his POUM militia unit led him to conclude ‘the whole militia-system had serious faults’,180 and ‘he looked forward to an eventual transfer to a communist unit’.181 Trilling wrote that it would have been natural for Orwell to favour the communists’ approach to fighting the war, because they proposed fighting an apolitical war, ‘without any reference to any particular idea beyond the defence of democracy from a fascist ally’.182 The communists believed that the time for effecting the social and political revolution was after the war had been won, because any internal upheaval during the Civil War ‘could only weaken the front against Franco’. Trilling emphasised that ‘Orwell’s disaffection with the Communist Party was not the result of a difference of opinion over whether the revolution should be instituted during the war or after it’, but the realization that the communists had no intention of allowing revolution, and that the USSR would withhold military supplies if the Republican government pursued a policy of revolution before defeating the rebels.183 Trilling believes that Orwell strengthens his already powerful argument with his revelation of the big lie used by the communists to justify their suppression of anarchist CNT and POUM militias – that these organizations ‘had for a long time been secreting great stores of arms with a view to an uprising that would force upon the government their premature desire for collectivization’.184 Orwell was equally condemnatory about the behaviour of the intelligentsia in New York and London who were prepared to collude with the lie. Trilling claims that Orwell’s great service to history was his recording of what has come to be ‘accepted as the essential truth by everyone whose judgement is worth

179 Ibid., v.
180 Ibid., 11.
181 Ibid., xix.
182 Ibid., xix.
183 G. Orwell, Homage, xx.
regarding’ that ‘there were no great stores of arms cached by the anarchists and the POUM’.185

Introductions or Prefaces written by a hand other than that of the author of the work are commonplace in academic publications, but are problematic. They can enlighten the reader by adding context but they can also interpret and analyse, as has been seen in the case of Trilling, to such an extent that the reader’s response is heavily influenced. Trilling’s ‘Introduction’ enticed the readers to view the book through his own Cold War lens. Trilling, a highly respected literary critic felt entitled in his ‘Introduction’ to go beyond merely setting the scene, and provided a compelling anti-communist interpretation and analysis that would have resonated with his readers – readers, who in 1952 were regularly subjected to newspaper reports on the activities of both Senator Joseph McCarthy’s Government Operations Committee, and the House Committee on Un-American Activities; for these readers Trilling’s ‘Introduction’ would have confirmed their fears of ‘reds under the beds’.

Four years later, in 1956, C. M. Woodhouse wrote an introduction to Animal Farm that appropriated the words of Orwell for his own political purposes, not as in the case of Trilling by clever analysis, but by the much more heinous method that has plagued history from time immemorial – the selective quotation. John Rodden highlights Woodhouse’s use of ‘ellipsis’ to deliberately misquote from Orwell’s essay ‘Why I Write’, in order to “rectify” Orwell into a Cold War Warrior’. Woodhouse used ellipsis to delete the phrase, ‘and for democratic socialism, as I understand it’ from the end of Orwell’s sentence: ‘Every line I have written since 1936 has been against totalitarianism…’.186 Woodhouse deleted the phrase to facilitate his appropriation of Orwell, because the deleted phrase confirmed Orwell’s radicalism, and would have muddied the anti-totalitarian and anti-Soviet message that Woodhouse was promoting. As in all history, a basic knowledge of a writer’s life is vital to determining the reliability and intention of his/her writing. Woodhouse’s background provides plausible, though circumstantial evidence that he intended with his ‘Introduction’ to position Orwell as an early Cold Warrior. Woodhouse had been ‘a chief cultural officer’ for British intelligence and ‘worked for both the Secret Intelligence Service and the IRD in the early Cold War years, during which time he coordinated joint projects with the CIA’.187 According to Rodden, and as confirmed by Stonor Saunders, Woodhouse oversaw Britain’s clandestine involvement in

185 Ibid., xxi.
186 J. Rodden, Every Intellectual’s Big Brother, 242, fn.12.
187 Ibid., 243.
both the CCF and its masthead magazine, *Encounter*. Moreover, he also arranged for Orwell’s publishing house, Secker & Warburg, to distribute the magazine.\(^{188}\)

Laurence Brander’s 1954 ‘non-biography’ *George Orwell*, exemplifies another method of Cold War appropriation. This method can be referred to as transposition. This occurs when a prestigious author’s ideas that were expounded and written during one specific historical context are transposed to another context. Brander’s chapter on *Homage* is laden with anti-communist Cold War rhetoric, and *Homage* is interpreted as a more anti-communist document than Orwell intended. It was common for those who appropriated *Homage* to ignore the sections of the book which saw any worth or logic in the communist approach to fighting the Civil War. Again, the key to understanding this appropriation, as in the case of Trilling and Woodhouse above, is knowing something of the background of the author, and there is no better starting point than the author’s acknowledgements.

In his ‘Acknowledgements’ Brander thanked, together with four others, Christopher Hollis, for ‘advice and encouragement’, and we can only guess as to what form this took. Christopher Hollis was the elder brother of Roger Hollis, the Director General of MI5 from 1956 to 1965.\(^{189}\) He was a onetime Conservative MP, a convert to Catholicism, and publisher, who published his own ‘non-biography’ of Orwell in 1956.\(^{190}\) During World War II he was involved in intelligence work with the Royal Air force. We also know Hollis played a role, although, seemingly a minor one in the CCF. Stonor Saunders claims he was one of the British delegates to the inaugural Congress at Berlin in 1950 and as such had his trip ‘funded covertly by the Foreign Office, through the Information Research Department’.\(^{191}\) Brander’s acknowledgement of Hollis suggests that Brander’s book may have been encouraged by British intelligence.

Brander’s background is intriguing, made all the more so by Orwell’s authorised biographer, Michael Sheldon, referring to him as an ‘intelligence officer’, without explaining why.\(^{192}\) Was Sheldon merely alluding to Hollis’ intelligence work with the RAF or something more? We know that Brander became acquainted with Orwell during the Second World War,

\(^{188}\) Ibid., 242, fn.12, & F. Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, 169.
\(^{191}\) F. Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, 76.
sometime in 1942, when they both worked at the BBC. Brander freely admits in the ‘Introduction’ to his book that his job was to assess the effectiveness of the BBC’s broadcasts to the East, and it was in this role that he met Orwell, who worked for the India Section of the BBC’s Empire Service. Orwell’s job was to help retain Indian loyalty to Britain by counteracting the effects of German propaganda, which was constantly broadcast to the subcontinent ‘to undermine British rule’. Orwell selected speakers and topics for broadcast and wrote pieces himself. It is interesting to note that in his work at the India Section Orwell preferred to use his real name, Eric Blair, rather than his literary pseudonym; but he came under pressure from his superiors to use the name George Orwell, because ‘it might attract more listeners’. According to Sheldon, ‘Orwell was reluctant to do this’ because he did not want the ‘integrity’ of the pseudonym ‘compromised’. Nevertheless, as a foretaste of what was to happen during the early Cold War years, Orwell compromised his own values and ‘did eventually use his pseudonym on the air’. Orwell’s acquiescence in this early appropriation of his name while he was still living, although somewhat reluctantly, suggests that Orwell was prepared to go along with appropriation of his name and reputation to help further a cause to which he adhered.

After the war Brander turned his hand to literary criticism and wrote several critiques on well-known British authors, including Aldous Huxley and E. M. Forster, who were published by the British Council, which had been set up in 1934 with the task of ‘cultural promotion’. In 1943 the British Council became more closely directed by the Foreign Office, which set up ‘a small section’ to give the Council more ‘political direction’. This ‘small section’ became the Cultural Relations Department (hereafter CRD) in early 1945. This

---

194 M. Sheldon, *Orwell*, 371. Through its broadcasts the India Service aimed to subtly convince Indians, that their security was closely intertwined with that of Britain. Sheldon likens these BBC broadcasts to ‘a kind of cultural imperialism’ which dealt with English politics, history, literature, science and customs. When Brander completed his review, he informed Orwell that ‘very few Indians listen[ed] to the broadcasts aimed at them from London’ and that this was probably due to the fact that not many Indians possessed shortwave sets.
195 M. Sheldon, *Orwell*, 371. Maintaining Indian loyalty was imperative because India had an army of over two million men.
196 The job was not without moral dilemmas for Orwell, who had to work under a censorship regime, and he eventually resigned in September 1943 from the post he had taken up in August 1941.
198 Ibid.
199 According to Sheldon, Orwell told the director of the Eastern Service, ‘I am as it were selling my literary reputation.’ See M. Sheldon, *Orwell*, 376.
200 Ibid.
201 Richard J. Aldridge, ‘Putting Culture into the Cold War: The Cultural Relations Department (CRD) and British Covert Information Warfare’ in Giles Scott-Smith & Hans Krabbendam (Eds), *The Cultural Cold War in Western*
poses the question as to whether Brander’s post-war literary writing was at the behest of British Intelligence, as part of their endeavour to show the virtues and superiority of a system that produced writers of such literary quality. Brander’s links with the CRD after World War II do not preclude the possibility that his Orwell ‘non-biography’ was influenced by another British intelligence agency – the IRD. Lashmar and Oliver show the IRD was determined to promote Orwell’s Spanish Civil War inspired books because they suited its anti-communist agenda. Although Brander is not personally mentioned in their chapter entitled, ‘Spreading the Word: IRD Publishes’, it is conceivable that he was an IRD- sponsored writer because as Lashmar and Oliver point out, it is often hard to distinguish between government propagandists and journalists and writers because ‘in many cases, individuals were both at the same time or changing hats effortlessly at the same time’.

In his book Brander uses Orwell to support his own anti-totalitarian and anti-communist message. Very early on in the book Brander justifies the process and writes:

> Every liberal writer today is aware of the inherent danger of totalitarianism in human government. This danger appears most obviously in the modern arrangements for spreading information to the people. Everyone is reached by one or more of the mass media for distributing information: the press, the radio, television and film. The media are affecting people all the time. This is the age of propaganda, whether we like it or not; it is an age of politics, whether we like it or not. But all the people cannot be told all the truth; selection must be made, and the danger appears at once.

Orwell would most likely have agreed with the first part of Brander’s philosophising but would certainly have objected to the statement on selective truth.

> ‘Totalitarian’ is a pivotal word in the section of the book concerned with Homage and is repeated time and again. As mentioned above, Orwell himself used the word only once in Homage, and then in reference to fascism and not communism. Brander determinedly hammers his anti-totalitarian message, and on one page he variously describes the Spanish conflict as ‘the first fight for democracy against the totalitarians’; ‘the first stand against the totalitarians’; ‘the press were distorting truth to help the totalitarians’. Brander claims that Orwell saw ‘the totalitarian moves of the Russians in Spain against the democratic Spanish

---

202 P. Lashmar & J. Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War, 95-103.
203 Ibid., 117.
204 L. Brander, George Orwell, 26.
government and ‘from the moment he came up against totalitarian methods of propaganda in Spain his [Orwell’s] whole energies were ranged against this monstrous falsification of human values’ Brander selects quotations and phrases from Homage that highlight the book’s anti-communism, such as, Orwell ‘found communism out...’ He uses the kudos of the Orwell name, just as the BBC had done in their broadcasts to India, to give credence to his own political perspectives:

For communism is selfish in that it forces every man to be secret in himself, whereupon the self atrophies. Communism which at many stages seems to be generous and friendly, always seems to get to a stage where generosity and that welling up of human feeling, which is the prime mordant in all human society, completely disappears.

In his epilogue Brander proclaims what he believes to be Orwell’s legacy:

He [Orwell] is therefore a model, as he would have wished to be; for the fight which he fought will be continued for a long time. So long as totalitarianism exists anywhere, free government is under threat and every man is in danger. Orwell concentrated his energies on making people more conscious of this danger.

Orwell to some extent could be said to have pre-empted his own Cold War appropriation. In the latter years of his life he certainly mixed with people who were involved with British and US intelligence, notably Arthur Koestler and his publisher Fredric Warburg, who were actively involved in events and organizations that were deeply implicated in the cultural Cold War, such as the International Rescue Committee. Moreover, Koestler and Warburg had links to the CIA through the CCF. This poses the question of whether Orwell was involved in or sympathetic to the activities of these organizations. Orwell’s choice of subject matter and his association with Koestler and Warburg imply the three men shared a similar political philosophy, but this is not conclusive evidence of collusion.

Hugh Wilford asserts, however, that by the early 1940s Orwell was at ‘the centre of a reasonably distinct community of non-communist left literati in Britain’ which consisted of

---

205 Ibid., 7, 26.
206 Ibid., 129.
207 Ibid., 128.
208 Ibid., 141.
209 L. Brander, George Orwell, 205.
210 The International Rescue Committee (hereafter IRC) was founded in 1933 at the suggestion of Albert Einstein, to help the victims of Nazism. During the Cold War it helped refugees from the communist states. Sara Diamond, a specialist on American right-wing politics writes: ‘The IRC offered humanitarian aid to refugees from Eastern bloc countries and also used the refugees’ plight as grist for the anti-communist propaganda mill.’ See S. Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States, The Guildford Press, New York, 1995, 42.
Warburg, Koestler, and journalist Tosco Fyvel.\textsuperscript{211} By July 1945 Orwell had become Vice-Chairman of the Freedom Defence Committee. This was the brainchild of such leading lights of the non-communist left as Harold Laski, Cyril Connolly and Bertrand Russell. According to its constitution it aimed ‘to defend those who are persecuted for exercising their rights of freedom of speech, writing and action’.\textsuperscript{212} It would be plausible to conclude from its membership that the Freedom Defence Committee had an anti-communist agenda. Orwell eventually perceived that the Freedom Defence Committee’s focus was too narrow and he and Koestler worked to set up a new universal human rights organization. Orwell was so enthusiastic for this concept that he wrote a draft manifesto for it.\textsuperscript{213} The involvement of Orwell in the above initiatives confirm that he was continuing the anti-communist trajectory he had taken since the Spanish Civil War.

For those already mentioned and many other intellectuals communism was ‘the god that failed’ and had to be opposed.\textsuperscript{214} Orwell had no scruples about liaising with British intelligence, and he willingly, although covertly, collaborated with the IRD in the latter years of his life because they shared the same anti-communist and anti-fascist philosophy. Lashmar and Oliver point out that Orwell would have been well aware the IRD ‘had clear links’ to the security service MI5'.\textsuperscript{215} He was not coerced and there is no evidence to suggest he was bribed by the prospect of burgeoning royalties that increased sales of his books would bring.

Although Orwell was dead by the time the CCF was inaugurated in Berlin on Monday 26 June 1950, it does not mean his literary estate was not the beneficiary of its largesse. Stonor Saunders asserts that Orwell’s work benefitted by the changing political climate of the post-1945 years, and her assertions reiterate the earlier conclusions of Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, who claimed: ‘Orwell’s works were among the many sought by IRD’ because ‘the department recognized the importance of the book in getting across its anti-communist message’.\textsuperscript{216} Orwell became part of the British government’s post-war operation to disabuse the public of the perception that they had been fed of ‘Good Old Uncle Joe’ during the

\textsuperscript{212} Quoted in H. Wilford, \textit{The CIA, The British Left}, 28.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid., 28-9.
\textsuperscript{215} P. Lashmar & J. Oliver, \textit{Britain’s Secret Propaganda War}, 97.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 98.
wartime alliance. Stonor Saunders recounts that the IRD deputy chief Adam Watson told her: ‘During the war, we had built up this man [Stalin] though we knew he was terrible, because he was an ally. Now the question was, “How to get rid of the Good Old Uncle Joe myth built up during the war.”’ Over time Homage’s anti-communism became part of the curriculum in British and American high school and university curricula. Tom Buchanan claims it became the staple of ‘university reading lists’.

After Orwell’s death his wife became the target of CIA interest and manoeuvrings. Stonor Saunders recounts how shortly after Orwell’s death, the CIA operative Howard Hunt, who led the CIA’s Psychological Warfare Workshop, dispatched two of his undercover agents Carleton Alsop and Finis Farr, who normally operated around the Hollywood movie studios, to meet Sonia Orwell and get her to sign over the movie rights to Animal Farm. They succeeded in their mission, but only after Sonia Orwell ‘first secured their promise that they would arrange for her to meet her hero Clark Gable’. A cartoon of Animal Farm was eventually made with an injection of CIA funds. It was the most lavish animation film of its time, and Warburg visited the film studio in an advisory role while a new edition of the book was published by his publishing house using stills from the cartoon production.

The timing of the publication of Orwell’s essay ‘Looking Back on the Spanish Civil War’ also arouses suspicion of intelligence agency involvement. It was probably written in 1942 but was not published in its entirety until 1953 – three years after Orwell’s death and during the Cold War’s formative years. It was published in England in a collection of essays entitled England Your England by Secker & Warburg and in the USA in Such, Such Were the Joys by Harcourt Brace. Was the publication of the essay at this time at the behest of British or US intelligence? There is no evidence currently available to definitively answer this question, but the timing of the publication and the choice of publisher in England, Secker & Warburg, lends weight to the idea of British intelligence involvement. Orwell’s essay would certainly have been attractive to those committed to demonstrating the perils of Soviet communism. As already mentioned, Warburg’s publishing house was closely associated with and profited directly from the CCF because it published and distributed Encounter. This magazine was the brainchild of Stephen Spender, Irving Kristol, Michael Josselson and

217 F. Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 5.
220 F. Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 294.
Melvin Lasky, who were directly paid by the CIA. Warburg, Malcolm Muggeridge and Tosco Fyvel, who had all been closely associated with Orwell, were also involved in the CCF’s initial planning and inauguration in Berlin in 1950.221 Such an arrangement profited the fledging magazine, and it gained prestige by being associated with the company that published Orwell. Josselson wrote to Warburg and confirmed that the CCF would assume ‘full responsibility for the prompt payment of all bills presented in connection with the production and distribution of Encounter’, and full liability for libel. Josselson made it clear to Warburg that ‘neither he nor his firm is to have any influence whatsoever over the editorial side of the magazine’.222 Stonor Saunders is adamant that Warburg knew that the CIA funded the operation.223

In recent years Scott Lucas,224 a specialist in British and American foreign policy, has extensively researched Orwell’s involvement with British intelligence as well as on other aspects of Orwell.225 The English literary theorist and critic, Terry Eagleton, has described Lucas’s work on Orwell as ‘a resolute hatchet job’ done ‘with remarkable efficiency’.226 Lucas posits that Orwell became ‘a vital part of a “state-private network” developed to fight a total campaign for hearts and minds’.227 In this conclusion he is supported by Hugh Wilford:

The Information Research Department, the secret anti-communist ‘publicity’ unit in the British Foreign Office, had already exploited the Cold War propaganda potential of Orwell’s fable [Animal Farm], sponsoring the publication of several foreign-language translations

221 See Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 173; P. Lashmar & J. Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War, 128.
Stephen Dorril points out that Tosco Fyvel worked with Richard Crossman in the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) during the war. Afterwards he worked as a reader for Warburg’s publishing house, and was recruited into the IRD in 1951. See S. Dorril, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations, Fourth Estate, London, 2000, 478-80.
223 F. Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 394.
224 Scott Lucas is Professor of American Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK. He has written and edited nine books, including Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis; Freedom’s War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union, 1945-56 and the New American Century, and published more than 30 major articles. He is the Editor of the Journal of American Studies and is the founder and editor of EA WorldView, [Enduring America] a news and analysis site on US foreign policy and international affairs, especially in the Middle East and Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
and even producing a cartoon-strip version for dissemination in South America, Asia and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{228}

The most damming evidence that suggests Orwell could rightly be labelled an early Cold War warrior through his own actions and not due to any Cold War appropriation was the revelation that surfaced in 1996, that in 1949 he handed over a list of names of writers and artists to Celia Kirwan, the sister in-law of Arthur Koestler, who worked for the IRD. The list exposed thirty-five people as fellow travellers and included such people as Kingsley Martin, who went on to become the longest serving editor of the \textit{New Statesman}, from 1930 to 1960, and whom Orwell annotated on this list as ‘Decayed liberal. Very dishonest’. Hitchens, however, believes too much has been made of this ‘relatively trivial episode’, because the IRD was ‘not interested or involved in domestic surveillance and wanted only to recruit staunch socialists and Social Democrats’ and that ‘nobody could have suffered from Orwell’s personal opinion’.\textsuperscript{229} Hitchens also believes that ‘one can eliminate the mercenary motive’ for Orwell’s action, although he concedes that ‘some of those who worked with the IRD were later paid’ albeit ‘modestly’.\textsuperscript{230} Nevertheless, the revelations have tarnished Orwell’s reputation by implying that he supported a type of British McCarthyism.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

During the Spanish Civil War Orwell became committed to radical non-communist socialism. He told Cyril Connolly that in Spain he had seen ‘wonderful things’ that made him ‘at last really believe in Socialism’.\textsuperscript{231} His conversion was not of the ‘Road to Damascus’ variety, but the culmination of a process that had begun much earlier when he began to question the aspirations and values of his ‘lower upper middle class’ upbringing. The manifestation of, and political testament to, his conversion was his reportage \textit{Homage to Catalonia}. Orwell had initially intended \textit{Homage} to be an eyewitness account of how he became caught up in Barcelona’s ‘May Days’, but the events of later May and June 1937 led him to write a more political book, in which he painted the communists as aggressors. \textit{Homage} included two discrete chapters which were a polemic against the Communist Party. This anti-communist stance was out of step with large sections of the political Left when it was initially published in 1938. The United Kingdom’s main Left-wing publishing house,

\textsuperscript{228} H. Wilford, \textit{The Mighty Wurlitzer}, 118.
\textsuperscript{229} C. Hitchens, \textit{Why Orwell Matters}, 166.
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid., 168.
\textsuperscript{231} Quoted in J. Meyers, \textit{Orwell: Wintry Conscience of a Generation}, 143.
Victor Gollancz Ltd, refused to publish it. This meant it was denied the 40,000 plus readership that Gollancz’s Left Book Club could generate.

However, in 1952, fourteen years after its British release, *Homage* was published in the USA and reprinted in the UK. Even though *Homage* was written before the Cold War, its unambiguous anti-communist message resonated strongly with a public hungry for proof of communist perfidy. It became an important Cold War propaganda weapon in the battle for hearts and minds. The anti-communist content of *Homage* explains why it was at first ignored but later became extremely popular. It was largely ignored from the time of its publication until the end of World War II, because Orwell’s anti-communist stance was considered inappropriate at a time when left-minded intellectuals and opinion makers were advocating the creation of a Soviet-Anglo-American alliance against the fascist states. As the wartime Grand Alliance of the USSR, USA and Great Britain gradually disintegrated in the post-1945 years, *Homage*’s anti-communist perspectives reflected the American and British capitalist political establishments’ reversion to the anti-communist and anti-Soviet positions they had earlier held. During this period the two Anglo powers and USSR became locked in a cultural Cold War, in which both sides had no hesitation in utilizing their intelligence agencies, albeit covertly.

*Homage* was exceptional among Orwell’s works because of the two distinct periods of political pressure it underwent which impacted on the book’s sales. However, it did not follow that political circumstances alone in these two distinct periods entirely determined the book’s reception. Political pressure was constrained by the American and British liberal democratic tradition of freedom of expression. There is no direct evidence currently available that conclusively links the success of *Homage* in the Cold War years to either financial or logistical support from British and American intelligence agencies, but there is plausible circumstantial evidence to imply this was the case.
CHAPTER TWO

GERALD BRENAN: From THE SPANISH LABYRINTH to SOUTH FROM GRANADA

INTRODUCTION

Gerald and Gamel Brenan returned to Spain in February 1949 for a two month visit, ostensibly for Gerald to collect material for a new book, which would eventually be published in 1950 as *The Face of Spain*, but there was another reason for the trip. The Brenans had not been in Spain since their hasty evacuation from Malaga to Gibraltar aboard an American destroyer soon after the start of the Spanish Civil War.¹ Brenan, an acknowledged anti-Francoist, whose 1943 book *The Spanish Labyrinth: An account of the social and political background of the Civil War* (hereafter *Labyrinth*) had made him the most celebrated contemporary Anglo-American historian of Spain, wanted to know if it was possible for him to return to live and work in Franco Spain. He had become depressed with the greyness and austerity of post-war England and longed to escape ‘its doll’s house scenery’.² Encouraged by the success of their visit, the Brenans returned to live permanently in Spain in January 1953.

Brenan’s decision to make his home in Spain raises three key questions. Firstly, why did the Franco regime permit a well-known anti-Francoist and former Spanish Republic supporter to return at this time? Brenan’s attitude to the Franco regime is clearly exemplified in his letter to the editor of *The Times* in 1945, entitled ‘Spain in the Doldrums’, in which he asks:

… how many Englishmen would care to live in a country that … has been morally occupied by the Germans? In a country where not the faintest ghost of civil liberty exists? Where the censorship is the most severe ever known in any European State? Where the fear of ‘dangerous thoughts’ reaches such fantastic lengths that the greatest

---

¹ The Brenans were among the last expatriates to leave Malaga on 7 September 1936. See J. Gathorne-Hardy, *Gerald Brenan: The Interior Castle*, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1994, 311 (n.).
medieval poet of Spain, the archpriest of Hita, cannot be published because he made fun of monks …

Brenan ends his letter with the condemnation: ‘Such a regime is not merely a parody of a great nation; it is bound, so long as it lasts, to be a permanent source of discord and infection in Western Europe’. The highly political nature of Brenan’s writing at this time leads to the second key question. As a condition of his being allowed to return to Spain, did the Franco regime impose restrictions on his political writing? If not, did Brenan himself assume that he would not be welcome if his writing was seen to be critical, and therefore toned down his more extreme views to ensure he and his wife could live a comfortable life in Spain? The third key question inevitably stems from the research of Frances Stonor Saunders, Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, who have shown that neither the criteria for selection nor the sales success of books published during the Cold War years was always due to merit alone, as some books were helped along the way by intelligence agencies. Stonor Saunders asserts that during the cultural Cold War the CIA pumped ‘tens of millions of dollars’ into anti-communist ‘projects’, including book publication and promotion. She asks: ‘Were reputations secured or enhanced by membership of the CIA’s cultural consortium? How many of those writers and thinkers who acquired an international audience for their ideas were really second-raters?’ In Britain’s Secret Propaganda War, Paul Lashmar and James Oliver reveal that British intelligence agencies, albeit on a smaller scale, were also involved in book promotion. They point out, for example, that ‘the IRD [Information Research Department] made great efforts to maximize the international political impact of George Orwell’s work’ by distributing his books ‘wherever they were not readily available’. Lashmar and Oliver make it clear that the IRD did not stop with Orwell and that it was involved in the promotion of other authors. The revelations by Stonor Saunders, and Lashmar and Oliver, have cast suspicion over all works of a political nature published in the UK and the USA during the first two decades of the Cold War era and lead to the third key question which this chapter will address – was Brenan or his work the recipient of CIA or IRD largesse?

---

3 According to the website ‘Spanish Art’, the Archpriest of Hita was Juan Ruiz, who lived in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, and who studied in Toledo where he was imprisoned for a long time by Gil de Albornoz, the Archbishop of Toledo. He wrote the autobiographical Libro de Buen Amor (The Book of Good Love). See <http://www.spanisharts.info/arcipreste-hita.php> Accessed 20/08/2014.


5 F. Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 5.

6 Ibid.


8 Ibid., 96-7.
This is not to accuse Brenan of being a ‘second-rater’ and undeserving of his iconic status in Spanish Civil War historiography, but the fact that *Labyrinth* achieved its seminal status and publishing success during the Cold War cannot be overlooked and must inevitably mean its provenance should be scrutinized. Trying to ascertain whether and how a book was helped by an intelligence agency is no easy task. Intelligence agencies are by their very nature covert and unwilling to release information. The Cold War specialist Raymond Garthoff claims that in the USA ‘the declassification of intelligence materials continues to be limited by the CIA’s interpretation of its statutory requirement to protect intelligence sources and methods’.  

Elke van Cassel drew similar conclusions with her research into the Cold War magazine, *The Reporter*. She claims that since the 1970s the CIA ‘has become even more adept at suppressing information about its own activities’, and ‘as a result access to CIA files has become very limited’.  

The publishing history of *Labyrinth* in England indicates that it was not an immediate success in terms of sales. A second edition was not printed until 1950 – some seven years after it was first published. Sales picked up after publication of the first paperback edition in 1960, and there were thirteen reprints between 1962 and 1988. The first Canto edition was published in 1990, and in late 2014 *Labyrinth* was reissued in the Canto Classics series. To date no documentary evidence has come to light that explains why Cambridge University Press published *Labyrinth* in 1943. Brenan’s biographer Jonathan Gathorne-Hardy suggests the impetus to publish may have come from J. B. Trend, the British Hispanist and first Professor of Spanish at Cambridge University. Brenan and Trend had met shortly after Brenan’s return to England in 1936, and Trend in his review of one of Brenan’s books

---

9 Raymond Garthoff, ‘Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War’, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2004, 23. Garthoff is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who specializes on arms control, intelligence, the Cold War, NATO, and the former Soviet Union. He was US Ambassador to Bulgaria and an advisor to the US State Department. See, <http://www.brookings.edu/experts/garthoffr>  
11 Canto editions are paperbacks, selected from Cambridge University Press’ most successful titles. There were eight Canto printings of *Labyrinth* up to 2009, when it became a print on-demand title. The term edition here can be misleading. There are in fact only two editions – 1943 and 1950. All subsequent editions are with a lower-case *e* and refer to the format in which they were printed rather than a reflection of the content. This information was provided by Anna Bond, Assistant Editor, Literature, Cambridge University Press, in an email to Darryl Burrowes dated 20/08/2014.  
13 Ibid., 314.
demonstrated his admiration of Brenan’s writing. My own request to Cambridge University Press for information as to why they published *Labyrinth* proved fruitless because their files are not kept for that length of time.

This chapter will identify Brenan’s friendship networks and certain events which suggest that Brenan may have benefitted from financial largesse bestowed by British or US intelligence agencies during the Cold War years. Moreover, it will examine the circumstantial evidence that connects Brenan’s 1957 book *South From Granada* with the CIA. As with Orwell a biographical approach will be adopted which will determine the context in which Brenan wrote *The Spanish Labyrinth, The Face of Spain*, and *South From Granada*, as well as his mindset, and moral and ethical compass at the time. This will be achieved by examining Brenan’s motives for going to Spain and his continued desire to live there. It is important to ascertain the facts about Brenan in Spain because ignorance and confusion over basic biographical details abound, and this has led to his romanticisation. Inaccurate biographical detail surfaced early and has unfortunately continued to a greater or lesser extent. An example of this is Hugh Trevor-Roper’s frank admission in February 1954 to the art historian Bernard Berenson that he knew nothing of Brenan’s origin. Nevertheless, Trevor-Roper still lavished iconic praise on Brenan, referring to him as his ‘hero’ and to *Labyrinth* as an ‘astonishing’ work of ‘monumental learning’, rich in ‘historical knowledge’ and ‘heroic intellectual integrity’, with a ‘burning lucidity of style’ which ‘made everything else written on Spain seem pitifully shoddy’. Trevor-Roper’s ignorance is palpable when he claims that Brenan had ‘farmed in the uplands near Granada’ – an error that one assumes he picked up from the erroneous promotional blurb that appeared on the cover of the first edition of *The Face of Spain*. This chapter will show how, and suggest why, romanticized and heroic perspectives of Brenan have filtered into the historiography. It will attempt to ascertain if

---

14 Gathorne-Hardy claims that Brenan and Trend met at a public meeting in support of the Republic sometime between 1936 and 1937, and corresponded over tactics on how to support Republic. See Gathorne-Hardy, *Gerald Brenan*, 329 & 340. When *Brenan’s Literature of the Spanish People: From Roman Times to the Present Day* was published by Cambridge University Press in 1951, Trend came to Brenan’s rescue and counteracted Edgar Allison Peers’ negative reviews of the book in the *Times Literary Supplement, Manchester Guardian*, and the *Spectator* with his own glowing review in the *Listener*, in which he concludes that Brenan’s *Literature of the Spanish People* was ‘the best account of early lyric poetry in the Peninsular which has yet been written’. See Gathorne-Hardy, *Gerald Brenan*, 393-94.

15 Email correspondence between Anna Bond, (Assistant Editor (Literature), Cambridge University Press and Darryl Burrows, dated 20 August 2014.


Brenan’s reputation, like Orwell’s, was appropriated during the Cold War. This begs the question whether the publishing success of *Labyrinth* during the cultural Cold War was helped by the manoeuvrings of Cold War politics and the moves to rehabilitate Franco Spain. The 1950s was a time when US and UK policy makers were slowly attempting to reshape Franco’s image. Franco’s duplicitous behaviour during World War Two was still very much alive in the memory of the British and American publics. Ideally the UK and the USA would have preferred to have ousted the Franco regime in favour of ‘constitutional monarchy or a parliamentary republic’, however, as historian David Dunthorn points out, ‘the need for stability in the Iberian Peninsula’ took precedence over a liberal democratic replacement for Franco, and the UK and USA were loath to use any form of ‘direct action to remove Franco, whether military, economic or even diplomatic’, because of the risk of ‘destabilizing the whole Iberian Peninsula at a moment when the northern Mediterranean littoral from France to the Balkans was already unstable and a prey to communist subversion’.  

**THE 1950s: ‘THE WINDS OF CHANGE’**

Gathorne-Hardy claims Brenan was ‘nervous’, that as a result of pro-Republic sentiments expressed in *Labyrinth* he would not be allowed to return to live in Spain, even though his friend Julian Pitt-Rivers had told him that this was unlikely. Gathorne-Hardy does not explain how Pitt-Rivers, the social anthropologist, knew that Brenan’s return to Spain would not be blocked. Pitt-Rivers may have been informed by contacts in the regime that he had met while doing his PhD fieldwork in Grazalema, Andalusia. Brenan was right to be nervous. In *Labyrinth* he had emphasized that it was the Spanish ruling classes, championed by Franco, who were ‘the most important single cause of the Spanish Civil War’, because of their refusal ‘to institute social reform programmes, particularly of an agrarian nature’. Moreover, Brenan had highlighted ‘the heroism of the working classes’ for their

---

19 Ibid.
20 J. Gathorne-Hardy, *Gerald Brenan*, 390 (n.).
21 ‘Julian Pitt-Rivers Obiturary’ in *The Guardian*, 14 September 2001. [http://www.theguardian.com/news/2001/sep/14/guardianobituaries.socialsciences](http://www.theguardian.com/news/2001/sep/14/guardianobituaries.socialsciences) Accessed 30/01/2016. It is possible that Julian Pitt-Rivers’ father’s reputation as a ‘Mosleyite eugenicist, [who] was interned by the Home Secretary between 1940 and 1942’ may have meant that Julian may have had some influence with the Spanish authorities. However, there is no evidence to support this. Pitt-Rivers’ dissertation was eventually published in 1954 as *The People of the Sierra*.
initial success in obstructing the generals’ coup.\textsuperscript{23} Brenan portrayed a pre-Civil War Spain of absentee landlords who were uninterested in modernizing or developing their estates, or improving the lot of their agricultural workers; of an out-of-date and top-heavy military harking back to past glories and obstructive of reform; of a Catholic Church resentful to any encroachment on its monopoly of education;\textsuperscript{24} and of a bourgeoisie, growing in power, but imbued with ‘meanness’, ‘philistinism’ and ‘insufferable self-righteousness’.\textsuperscript{25} For Brenan, the anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists were morally earnest, if occasionally fanatical, and all too often attracted ‘stupid’ and ‘violent police repressions’.\textsuperscript{26} The anti-conservative and pro-leftist nature of \textit{Labyrinth} led to it being banned in Spain when it was first published in 1943, which prevented Brenan’s return to Spain for the foreseeable future. However, by the late forties and early fifties the political climate had noticeably changed. Cold War politics had forged a \textit{rapprochement} between the West and the Franco regime. The West wanted Spain onside in its Cold War with the USSR, and the Franco regime was keen to take advantage of the financial aid that \textit{rapprochement} promised in order to prop up its failing economy.

A CIA briefing paper dated 5 November 1947, entitled, ‘The Current Situation in Spain’, which was compiled with the help of ‘the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Forces’, reveals US thinking behind the drive for \textit{rapprochement}. The very first sentence of the six page report highlights the importance of Spain:

Because of its geographical position, Spain might become the last bastion in Europe against communism or a prospective beachhead for the recovery of Western Europe, in case of a war in which Soviet forces expanded their control over the remainder of the Continent.\textsuperscript{27}

The report further states that: ‘The Franco government seeks US friendship on the grounds of its conspicuous opposition to communism’, and that ‘Spain under Franco would be a potential ally of the US in the event of conflict with the USSR’. It draws attention to the ‘widespread poverty’ endemic throughout the country, and warns that the ‘political

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 87-130 (Landlords and agriculture); 57-58 (The military); 37-56 (The Church).
\item \textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 162.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Available in The Spanish Civil War-Southworth Collection (57 microfilm reels), Flinders University, and also online <http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000256626.pdf> Accessed 19/01/2016.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
discontent’ which poverty has generated could lead to ‘the underground growth of communism’. Furthermore, the report stated that ‘the Spanish government claims that the Communist Party in Spain has 150,000 members’, although it acknowledged that this could be an exaggeration on the part of the Spanish to solicit financial aid. The link between poverty and communism could explain why Brenan’s books, especially *The Face of Spain*, would have been attractive to US and UK policy makers who needed to justify to their puzzled publics, who had spent years fighting to crush fascism, why it was now necessary to prop it up in Spain. In *The Face of Spain* Brenan graphically portrays the economic plight of a post-war Spain excluded from the benefits of the Marshall Plan. As Gathorne-Hardy points out, Brenan ‘did not mince his words’ in his description of the ‘appalling poverty’ he found in Spain and recommended Marshall Aid. Brenan knew he was on safe ground here; the Franco regime would hardly take offence at the famous former anti-Franco author now virtually supporting the regime with his advocacy of Marshall Aid.

By the early 1950s *Labyrinth* was ripe for reinterpretation and appropriation, in a similar fashion to Orwell’s *Homage to Catalonia*, as an anti-communist document. *Labyrinth* could be seen as the portrayal of a chaotic Republic betrayed by communist and Soviet perfidy. This fitted the new Cold War narrative that was being trumpeted by British and American policy-makers that Spain in the 1930s was socially and culturally not ready for democracy, and that Francoism was a necessary interregnum to prevent Soviet tyranny in the Iberian Peninsula. This narrative was forged by Britain and the USA who were determined to ‘sanitize’ Franco in order to pave the way for their Cold War *rapprochement* with regime. Brenan himself helped the reinterpreting of *Labyrinth* when he writes in the Preface to the 1950 Edition:

> On rereading this book today, nine years after it was finished, I naturally find some things in it that I would like to change ... The chapter I am least satisfied with is that which deals with the struggle between the Liberals and the Church.

The Franco regime may have been prepared to ignore the anti-conservative and pro-leftist tenor of *Labyrinth* and allow its celebrated author to return to live in Spain; however, it

---


Accessed 19/01/2016.

29 J. Gathorne-Hardy, *Gerald Brenan*, 390 (n.).


baulked at lifting its ban on *Labyrinth*, refusing distribution of the 1962 Spanish translation by the Paris-based publishing house Ruedo Ibérico – copies were, however, smuggled into Spain.\(^\text{32}\) *Labyrinth*’s publication in Spain would have to wait until after March 1974, when the censor lifted the ban on the works of Marx, Lenin and Brenan.\(^\text{33}\)

1950 was a pivotal year for Brenan, his changing attitudes towards the Franco regime becoming increasingly apparent. For a second time that year he used a Preface to publicly amend his unrelentingly harsh view of the regime. In the first paragraph of the Preface to the 1950 edition of *The Face of Spain*, Brenan set the scene for his change of heart. He writes that a thirteen year absence from Spain was a long time, ‘enough to make one wonder if one knows or remembers anything’. He claims to be ‘tired of politics – especially of the hopeless politics of the peninsula’, and he now takes solace in the belief that regimes ‘come and go’ and that the Franco regime had changed.\(^\text{34}\) It was no longer ‘a harsh and oppressive dictatorship of a fascist kind’, but was much ‘milder’. He strangely attributes this softening by the Franco regime not only to ‘the Allied victory’ but also to a change of heart by the falangists ‘who are ashamed’ because they ‘allowed themselves to be corrupted by the rewards of participation in the black market’.\(^\text{35}\)

**THE SPANISH LABYRINTH: GENESIS AND SIGNIFICANCE**

Unlike Orwell, Brenan was not by nature overtly political. However, he reveals in *Labyrinth* that within days of the start of the Civil War, and primarily as a result of his observations from his house at Churriana in the hills overlooking Malaga, he ‘had taken sides in the war in support of the Republic’.\(^\text{36}\) From Churriana he had listened to broadcasts by the rebel general Queipo de Llano, threatening horrific reprisals on the pro-Republican population, and had watched rebel bombs falling on Malaga.\(^\text{37}\) He had experienced anxiety and sleep deprivation because of the lorries passing his home in the night. Some years later,
in his only known correspondence with Orwell, he writes that: ‘It took me months, and a long stay in Morocco to get over what I saw in Malaga and Gibraltar.’

When the now politically mobilized Brenan finally arrived in England, he did what he did best to support the Spanish Republic – he took to his pen. The main product of his endeavours was *Labyrinth*, his one and only history book. Brenan’s perspectives on Spain struck a chord with both scholars and the public in general. According to Faber the book was almost universally accepted in ‘positive terms’. Among those bestowing accolades was the aforementioned J.B. Trend, who called *Labyrinth* a ‘learned and penetrating book’, while the former International Brigader and writer Ralph Bates deemed it to be ‘an absolutely essential work’. However, not all thought highly of the book. Ramón Silva, a regular contributor to the *Bulletin of Spanish Studies*, called it an ‘uneven work’ with a ‘rather illogical framework’ in which ‘the author jumps erratically from sociology to history and back again’, giving rein to his ‘political and anti-clerical bias’.

**HISTORIOGRAPHY: ISSUES OF MISREPRESENTATION AND ROMANTICISATION**

The limited historiography dedicated to Brenan is imbued with misrepresentation and romanticism. Several factors account for this, not the least of which was the role Brenan himself played in creating his own public image through his two volumes of autobiography, *A Life of One’s Own* (1962) and *Personal Record* (1975), and his two travelogue-memoirs, *The Face of Spain* (1950) and *South From Granada* (1957). All these books, barring *The Face of Spain*, were written while Brenan was living in Franco Spain, and were therefore subject to the constraints that living under that regime imposed. Even *The Face of Spain* was not free from Franco regime constraints, because Brenan had made the decision to return to Spain while writing the book and was anxious not to write something that might thwart this objective, and he refrained from attacking Franco overtly in the book. Clearly, not upsetting the Franco regime was at the forefront of Brenan’s thinking at this time. Gathorne-Hardy emphasizes this and points out that Brenan ‘would not let VSP [V.S. Pritchett] publish

---

38 Brenan-Orwell letter, dated 2 March 1939, George Orwell Archives, University College London.
40 The *Bulletin of Spanish Studies* was founded in 1923 by the British Hispanist E. Allison Peers (Professor in Hispanic Studies at the University of Liverpool). From 1949 to 2001 it was known as the *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies*.
42 The blurb on the back page of Jeremy Treglown’s biography *V.S. Pritchett: A Working Life* claims that Pritchett ‘was the finest British short story writer of the twentieth century ... His friends over the years ranged from Sean O’Casey to Gerald Brenan, Graham Greene, George Orwell and Stephen Spender...’ Pritchett for a
extracts, either of his letters at the time or from [The Face of Spain] in the New Statesman’ because he felt the magazine to be ‘far too left-wing’. 43

A Life of One’s Own is Brenan’s account of his childhood, adolescence and early adulthood up to the age of twenty-five, when he first went to Spain. Personal Record is important to this thesis, because Brenan describes his post-First World Wars years up to his return to live in Spain in 1953, with, in the words of historian Ronald Fraser, 44 ‘a final few pages devoted to the following twenty years’. 45 Brenan claims to have written Personal Record for his ‘own satisfaction … without any idea of publishing’ it, in an attempt to fend off ‘the real tragedy of life’ – ‘forgetfulness’. 46 Whether Brenan is truthful here is debatable. Few authors write solely for their own amusement. In a letter Brenan wrote to his life-long friend Ralph Partridge he certainly suggests that he had a readership in mind when he was writing the first volume of autobiography:

My autobiography depresses me a lot. One third of it is quite appalling … I can’t see that it amounts to much or that anyone will want to read it. I am completely bored by the whole subject and would much prefer not to publish it. However, I shall plug on… 47

Personal Record was written when Brenan was in his seventies. He fleshes out the vagaries of memory, especially for the years 1925 to 1932, with letters, ‘totalling some 400,000 words’, as well as his journal. 48 However, when it came to dealing with the post-1932 period Brenan claims there was ‘much less material’ available – ‘chiefly small pocket diaries recording social engagements … and a diary of [his] experiences during the first two months of the Spanish Civil War’. 49 This lack of later documentary material goes some way to explaining why Personal Record deals so briefly with Brenan’s later life. Part of the
explanation for this may also lie, however, in the particular circumstances of living and writing under the Franco regime, albeit during its dying days, in which Brenan appears keen to show political neutrality.\(^{50}\) He was only too well aware that his continued residence in Spain was contingent on his not upsetting the regime. Brenan seems to adhere to a self-imposed censorship which manifests itself in deliberate vagueness, contradictions, and lack of detail when he writes on things political. For this reason an examination of the correspondence that he wrote to friends – especially Partridge – during this period is often a more reliable way of determining Brenan’s mindset at the onset of the Civil War. Some of this correspondence is found in *Best of Friends* (1986), a small compendium of letters between Brenan and Partridge, edited by another friend, Xan Fielding.\(^{51}\)

Fraser believes that although Brenan was ‘an extremely honest autobiographer’ he did not ‘fully reveal’ many things about himself and others.\(^{52}\) Gathorne-Hardy points out that Brenan was also prone to embellishment in his published memoirs, and ‘he sometimes altered things for (quite) legitimate artistic reasons’ from what he had written in his contemporaneous ‘letters and detailed notes’.\(^{53}\) Brenan admired Lytton Strachey’s style of biography, in particular Strachey’s *Eminent Victorians*, the reading of which Brenan likened to ‘walking through a magnificently designed house where everything necessary is there and nothing else’.\(^{54}\) Brenan believed ‘Lytton’s great contribution to biography was his sense for what to leave out’.\(^{55}\) This may have led Brenan to try to emulate Strachey, whose influence can clearly be seen in the preface Brenan wrote for *A Life of One’s Own*, when he compares his life to a train journey:\(^{56}\)

There is scenery that rolls by outside and there are incidents that take place in the carriage. I saw at once I must confine myself to the carriage. That is to say, I must write upon the things that had closely

---

\(^{50}\) Franco died on 20 November 1975.

\(^{51}\) Interestingly, Xan Fielding had been involved with British intelligence. He worked for the Special Operations Executive (hereafter SOE) during World War Two in Crete. SOE was a wartime agency set up ‘to coordinate subversion and sabotage against the enemy overseas’. It was also involved in propaganda activities. See Paul Lashmar & James Oliver, *Britain’s Secret Propaganda War*, 12. After the war Fielding spent six months with the American Special Intelligence Service in Germany. See ‘Xan Fielding Obituary’ in the *Daily Telegraph*, 20 August 1991. Accessed 15/07/2016 <https://patrickleighfermor.org/2010/05/09/xan-fielding-obituary/>

\(^{52}\) Fraser, Ronald, ‘Did he or didn’t he?’

\(^{53}\) J. Gathorne-Hardy, *Gerald Brenan*, 141.


\(^{55}\) Ibid.

\(^{56}\) J. Gathorne-Hardy, *Gerald Brenan*, xi.
concerned myself and say little of the rest, which in any case I did not remember so closely.\footnote{Quoted in J. Gathorne-Hardy, \textit{Gerald Brenan}, xi.}

Brenan’s aim expressed in this quotation, to confine his autobiographical writing to that which ‘closely concerned’ himself and ‘say little of the rest’ reflects the constraints that he self-imposed on his writing in order to continue living in Franco Spain.

The work of five scholars provides insight into Brenan’s life. The most important is Gathorne-Hardy’s warts and all biography \textit{Gerald Brenan: The Interior Castle} (1994). Gathorne-Hardy, who had known Brenan for over thirty years and was ‘very fond of him’,\footnote{Ibid., xii. Gathorne-Hardy first met Brenan while on holiday in Spain in 1955. Brenan was sixty-one and Gathorne-Hardy was twenty-two. They ‘got on well immediately’. Gathorne-Hardy was ‘fascinated’ by Brenan’s conversation, liveliness and energy. See \textit{Gerald Brenan}, 419 (n.). Ronald Fraser identified ‘slip ups on some elementary facts’ in his review of the book of Gathorne-Hardy’s book. See Ronald Fraser, ‘Did he or didn’t he?’} builds on Brenan’s autobiographies by drawing on Brenan’s huge private correspondence – ‘at a rough estimate’ some ‘three to four million words’.\footnote{J. Gathorne-Hardy, \textit{Gerald Brenan}, xi.} Sebastiaan Faber in an essay pen-portrait intriguingly entitled, ‘“Spain is My Country, Revolution or No Revolution” – Love and Politics in Gerald Brenan’, offers a focused exegesis of \textit{Labyrinth} and discusses Brenan’s other works, placing them in a biographical context. Raquel Piles’ article ‘Gerald Brenan’s concept of anarchism as the “most Hispanic thing south of the Pyrenees”’ is also an important but not well known addition to Brenan historiography.\footnote{Raquel Piles, ‘Gerald Brenan’s concept of anarchism as the “most Hispanic thing south of the Pyrenees”’, \textit{Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research}, Vol. 12, No 1, 2006, 23-50. Also, ‘The most Hispanic thing an analysis of key texts on Spanish anarchism’, unpublished Honours Thesis, Flinders University, 2000; ‘The anarchist struggle for ideological and strategic control of the CNT Spain 1907-1936’, unpublished PhD Thesis, Flinders University, 2008.} A Spanish scholar of English literature, Juan Antonio Díaz López has written a chapter which discusses all of Brenan’s books for a multi-volumed work entitled, \textit{Spanish Perspectives on English and American Literature, Communication and Culture}.\footnote{Juan Antonio Díaz López, ‘Gerald Brenan (1894-1987)’ in Wallhead, Celia M. (Ed.), \textit{Spanish Perspectives on English and American Literature, Communication and Culture}, Vol. 7: Writers of the Spanish Civil War, Peter Lang, 2011. Díaz López also wrote (in Spanish) the first biography of Brenan in 1987 entitled, \textit{Gerald Brenan: Hispanista Angloandaluz}, published by Ediciones TAT of Granada in 1987.} The most recent contributor to Brenan historiography is Andrew Walsh, whose essay ‘re-reads’ \textit{The Face of Spain}.\footnote{Andrew Walsh, ‘Gerald Brenan: Hispanophile or Hispanophobe? A Critical Re-Reading of \textit{The Face of Spain’}, \textit{Bulletin of Spanish Studies}, published online 7 January 2015.} Like Piles, Walsh concludes that Brenan’s literary reputation is unwarranted and derived from uncritical
reading of Brenan’s work. While Walsh’s conclusions cannot be faulted, he fails to locate *The Face of Spain* in the Cold War context in which it was written.

It is easy to find basic biographical errors of misrepresentation and romanticization in Brenan historiography, such as the description of Brenan as a farmer in Andalusia appearing on the back cover of *The Face of Spain*. This type of error is the result of casual editing and shoddy scholarship. However, there are two other factors that may be even more important – Brenan’s iconic status in Spanish Civil War historiography, and his longevity. With the exception of Gathorne-Hardy, scholars have not delved deeply into Brenan’s personal life, seemingly loath to muddy his biographical waters. The seminal status that *Labyrinth* achieved soon after publication, and which it has continued to enjoy, transformed Brenan into the quintessential if not dispassionate scholar of Spain. It is a challenging prospect for scholars to probe an iconic writer who has been lauded by such eminent historians as Raymond Carr and Hugh Trevor-Roper. Moreover, as Brenan did not die until 1987 at the age of ninety-two, he reached the status of ‘living legend’, which further delayed the process of re-evaluation. In 2003 the biographical movie of Brenan’s early years in Spain – ‘South From Granada’ – was released, further romanticising the Brenan persona as the trail-blazing Englishman who went to live in a remote area of the Spanish Sierra Nevada for many years, communing with the locals. The reality was quite different; before the Civil War Brenan spent only a few years in Spain, primarily mixing with the expatriate community, and relating to the local Spanish in the terms of master to servant.

In her analysis of Brenan’s concept of anarchism Piles writes that, ‘…many scholars have uncritically accepted his romantic and impressionistic interpretation, thus perpetuating some of the more questionable premises and conclusions of his work’. This lack of rigorous scrutiny has contributed to a romanticized or even a heroic persona, which ignores Brenan’s idiosyncratic morality and values. Despite Gathorne-Hardy’s biography, Brenan’s moral code remains generally unknown or rarely mentioned by scholars. Many would argue that such discussion is irrelevant to ‘Brenan – the historian’. But Brenan’s morals and values are crucial to understanding him as an historian. His self-interested pragmatism allowed him to easily move from the pro-Spanish Republic position which he had held for thirteen years, to what could be described as an apologist pro-Franco position during the Cold War. Faber’s essay-portrait of Brenan only partly lives up to the promise of its subtitle, ‘Love and Politics

---

63 Ibid., 1-2.
64 Raquel Piles, ‘Gerald Brenan’s concept of anarchism, 23.
in Gerald Brenan’, as Brenan’s illegal sexual relations with a minor were simply brushed aside with the sentence: ‘In 1931, Brenan had a daughter by his maid Juliana, and later he boasted of having slept with all his maids at least once.’ Díaz López is even less specific when he writes that Brenan ‘began an amorous relationship with a local girl, Juliana, with whom he had a daughter’. Faber’s and Díaz López’s failure to mention that Juliana Pelegrina was only fifteen years old and Brenan forty-three when they embarked on a sexual relationship is not due to ignorance. Both would, or should, have been aware of Brenan’s predatory sexual life and self-serving morality, but they seem to have decided that they did not impinge on ‘Brenan – the historian’. According to Gathorne-Hardy, even Brenan’s friend, Ralph Partridge viewed his campaign to buy, woo, and ‘finally seduce’ Juliana Pelegrina as unsavoury and referred to it as ‘machiavellian’.

Brenan’s relationship with the poet and writer Gamel Woolsey provides another example of biographical misinformation. The website of the Harry Ransom Center, which houses the Brenan papers, asserts that Brenan married Woolsey in 1930. Faber and Díaz López agree they married, although Faber is vague about the date, and Díaz López refers to it as ‘an unorthodox ceremony’. Readers would expect marriage at this time to mean a legal union. However, this was not the case. When Brenan met Woolsey in July 1930 she was still married to a New Zealand journalist, Rex Hunter. Although the marriage was in its death throes, no divorce was ever obtained because it would have involved a trip to the USA, where the marriage had taken place, which Gerald and Gamel could ill afford at the time. The Brenan marriage was in fact a ‘pseudo-marriage’, a lie which Woolsey helped perpetuate by changing her name to Brenan by deed-poll. Moreover, they pretended a divorce had taken place, by putting, on Rex Hunter’s advice, an advertisement to this effect in some American papers. For some reason Gathorne-Hardy uses the term ‘pseudo-marriage’ only in the index of his Brenan biography, and in the main text prefers to describe the union as

---

65 S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 166. Incidentally, Gathorne-Hardy believes it highly unlikely that Brenan slept with all his maids. He suggests it has to do with romanticizing and fantasizing about droit du seigneur. See The Interior Castle, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1994, 292 (n.).
67 J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 237.
68 See the biographical sketch of Gerald Brenan for the inventory of his papers, at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center on the Harry Ransom Center University of Texas website. <http://norman.hrc.utexas.edu/fasearch/findingAid.cfm?eadid=00017> Accessed 13 March 2014.
70 According to Gathorne-Hardy, Hunter was a ‘drinker, a bad poet’ but ‘good-looking and charming’ (249).
71 G. Brenan, Personal Record, 232.
72 J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 261 (n.).
‘convention-defying – but not entirely true’.

There is no doubt that Brenan and Woolsey carried out a mock ceremony at the Church of Santa Maria d’Aracoeli on the Capitoline Hill in Rome in April 1931, which to their mind constituted a marriage because it was ‘made in the heart’, and they held hands before the altar and exchanged rings and vows. Seventeen years later, on 25 August 1947, the deception became criminal when Brenan and Woolsey married bigamously at the Hampstead Registry office. Needless to say, Personal Record is silent on this marriage. Regardless of how the Brenans viewed their union, it was not a legal marriage and they became bigamists.

BRENAN IN SPAIN

In Personal Record Brenan clearly states that he set up home in the Andalusian pueblo of Yegen on 13 January 1920 at the age of twenty-five. He had arrived in Spain ‘for the first time’ a few months earlier, in September 1919, after being demobilized, ‘looking for a house where [he] could live for as long as possible on [his] officer’s bounty.’ He did not choose Spain out of ‘any special feeling’ for it, and initially he spoke little Spanish, but he soon became fluent because ‘every day [he] spent an hour or two in the kitchen talking’ to his servants ‘and to any other people who happened to come in’. His reasons for going to Spain were purely pecuniary; it was somewhere ‘cheap to live’, and it enabled him to escape

---

73 Ibid., 266.
75 J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 265.
76 Ibid., 369. According to Gathorne-Hardy this ‘was so that Gamel could acquire British nationality’, and ‘to facilitate Miranda’s [Gerald’s illegitimate daughter to his fifteen year old Yegen maid, Juliana Martin Pelegrina] naturalisation, which took place in July 1948 (369).
77 G. Brenan, Personal Record, 13. Gerald Brenan was born in Malta in 1894 and christened with his grandfather’s names, Edward Fitzgerald. His father was an English army officer. Brenan spent his earliest years in India and South Africa before being sent to England for his formal education – first at Radley College and then at the Military Academy at Sandhurst. He studied art, poetry, and philosophy on his own with the help of John Hope-Johnstone. When he was eighteen he, and Hope-Johnstone, travelled through France, Italy, and Dalmatia. In 1914 Brenan joined the 5th Gloucesters and saw action in the Ypres salient, on the Somme, and in the second battle of the Marne. In 1918 he was awarded the Military Cross and the Croix de Guerre.
78 Brenan was officially demobilised in May 1919. But, his war had really ended in June 1918 when he had contracted Spanish flu and was sent to convalesce in Paris. J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 125.
79 G. Brenan, South From Granada, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1957, 1. Xan Fielding in Best of Friends (3), claims Brenan was moneyless at this time ‘apart from his army gratuity of £250’ even though he came from a well-to-do army family he was ‘at loggerheads with his father as to what he should do with himself.’ In Personal Record, Brenan writes he ‘had spent almost half of this [gratuity] on buying books and was left with only £160’ (£7448 in 2016) when he moved to Yegen (17).
80 G. Brenan, Personal Record, 16.
81 G. Brenan, South From Granada, 1. The often perilous state of Brenan’s finances is further discussed later in the chapter. See pp. 113-14.
‘from a British society for which he had little time’ or inclination to be part of.\textsuperscript{82} In \textit{A Life of One's Own} Brenan reveals his ‘need’ to escape from the ‘ultra-conventional world’ in which he had been raised.\textsuperscript{83} He wrote to George Orwell that he had spent his youth struggling against a destiny in the Indian police that his parents had mapped out for him.\textsuperscript{84}

Yegen had not been his first choice. He had wanted to live in ‘a village within an hour’s ride of Granada’ where he hoped ‘to make friends in University circles’, but there was no suitable house available.\textsuperscript{85} He told Partridge that finding a place had been difficult and he had faced ‘endless walking, acute dysentery, bugs, horrible food, and a perpetual fear that [his] money would give out’.\textsuperscript{86} In the end he settled on Yegen, even though it was remote and some seventy miles from Granada. The remoteness of Yegen did not, however, mean a life of isolation. He ‘made long and frequent trips back to England’,\textsuperscript{87} his parents,\textsuperscript{88} and a steady stream of friends and acquaintances visited from England. Lytton Strachey, Dora Carrington, Ralph Partridge, Leonard and Virginia Woolf of the ‘Bloomsbury Set’, of which Brenan was a peripheral ‘member’, made the long and arduous journey to Yegen.\textsuperscript{89}

Spain enabled Brenan to educate himself ‘before making up [his] mind’ what to do with his life.\textsuperscript{90} In \textit{South From Granada} he explains that: ‘Four years [at] a public school followed by four years spent in the war had left [him] very ignorant about many things [he] wished to know’. He ‘felt ashamed of being twenty-five and of having read nothing but a few novels and some poetry’.\textsuperscript{91} He therefore shipped to Spain ‘more than two thousand books’; as soon

\textsuperscript{84} Brenan to Orwell letter dated 2 March 1939, George Orwell Archives, University College London.
\textsuperscript{85} G. Brenan, \textit{Personal Record}, 15. See Brenan-Partridge letter, dated 10 November 1919, in X. Fielding, \textit{Best of Friends}, 4. Brenan writes he had decided to live in the Ugíjar area and will chose between ‘three or four’ houses there. In fn. 1, Fielding writes Brenan chose ‘a large rambling house in the village of Yegen, which he rented for 120 pesetas (£6 – £279 in 2016) a year’.
\textsuperscript{87} S. Faber, \textit{Anglo-American Hispanists}, 166.
\textsuperscript{88} His parents visited him in May 1923 and stayed a week. They ‘were so impressed by the order and civilization Gerald had introduced into his remote mountain home’ that his father offered him an allowance of £100 a year (£5,127 in 2016). ‘So his days of real poverty were over.’ Xan Fielding (Ed.) \textit{Best of Friends}, fn. 4, 48.
\textsuperscript{89} G. Brenan, \textit{South From Granada}, 27-37. Brenan had been introduced into Bloomsbury by John Hope-Johnstone and Ralph Partridge. The ménage of Partridge, Carrington, and Strachey were the first to visit him at Yegen in April 1920. Leonard and Virginia Woolf followed in the spring of 1923. Brenan chose to remain peripheral to Bloomsbury because he had an aversion to groups and reacted ‘violently’ if he felt himself ‘imprisoned in any set’. See Brenan-Frances Partridge letter, dated 9 August 1965, quoted in J. Gathorne-Hardy, \textit{Gerald Brenan}, 215.
\textsuperscript{90} G. Brenan, \textit{South From Granada}, 1.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 9.
as the books arrived, he ‘settled down, like a mouse that has got into a warehouse full of cheese, to work [his] way through them’. 92

How long Brenan lived in Yegen before the Spanish Civil War is another clear example of widespread confusion among scholars. As Raquel Piles observes: ‘Most people thought that Brenan had lived in Spain for much longer than he actually had before he wrote The Spanish Labyrinth’. 93 Gabriel Jackson believes that Brenan lived ‘in an Andalusian village for the better part of fifteen years preceding the outbreak of the Civil War’. 94 Members of Brenan’s own circle of friends and acquaintances, such as the literary critic and writer Cyril Connolly, and the Dutch anarchist historian Arthur Lehning (who helped him with Labyrinth), offered widely different estimates; Connolly thought it to be ten years, Lehning sixteen, and Paul Preston was under the impression it was ‘well over twenty years’. 95 Ann Timoney Jenkin writing in Quadrant, asserts Yegen ‘was to be his home for the next fifteen years’. 96 Xan Fielding claims that Brenan spent ‘five years of self-imposed exile’ at Yegen before deciding to go back to England. 97 Brenan himself adds to the misinformation and writes that he ‘lived there for some six or seven years between 1920 and 1934’. 98 Gathorne-Hardy’s ‘three and a quarter years’ is probably closer to the mark, because he based his estimate on a close study of Brenan’s correspondence. 99 Some of the misinformation stems from the fact that Brenan lived in two Alpujarra pueblos between 1920 and 1936, Yegen and Churriana. For both Brenan’s contemporaneous friends and later historians the time Brenan spent at Churriana after his marriage has merged with the time spent as a single man at Yegen, and this goes some way to explaining the confusion. However, as Faber points

92 Brenan writes that the cases ‘included such bulky sets as the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the full edition of Frazer’s Golden Bough, and – an old but now very dated favourite – Reclus’ Geography of the World in forty large tomes. Rather more than half the total collection was made up of English and French poets and prose writers with a sprinkling of Germans and Italians and a small batch of Latin and Greek classical authors. There were also books on philosophy, psychology, anthropology, popular science, Christianity and Oriental religions, history, and a fairly complete set of travel books on Central Asia and Arabia. See G. Brenan, Personal Record, 15-16. For a comprehensive description of the books Brenan shipped to Spain see Appendix B in J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 612-13.
95 J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 196.
96 Ann Timoney Jenkin, ‘Yegen: A Spanish Pilgrimage’, Quadrant, July-August 2001, 50. Quadrant is an Australian conservative literary magazine. It was founded in 1956 and was initially funded by the CIA through the Congress of Cultural Freedom.
97 Xan Fielding (Ed.), Best of Friends, 67.
98 G. Brenan, South From Granada, xi. In his earlier travelogue-memoir, The Face of Spain (1950), Brenan is similarly vague: ‘In my youth I had spent some six or seven years in Andalusia’ (7).
99 J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 196.
out, the total time physically spent in Spain during this time was no more than eight years. Brenan was probably the beneficiary of this ignorance; the longer his sojourn in Spain the greater his reputation as a commentator with a detailed knowledge of Spain and its people became. As Piles suggests: ‘It might well be that The Spanish Labyrinth was credited with a greater authority than it deserved largely because Brenan had lived in Spain and was assumed to have first-hand knowledge.’

Not long after the Brenans’ pseudo-marriage took place in April 1931 they made the decision to live in Spain, and even considered buying the Yegen house that Gerald had rented, but that was not possible. They settled instead on a house in Churriana, another small Alpujarran village about ‘a mile inland off the coast road from Malaga to Torremolinos’. Brenan wrote to Partridge on 3 June 1934 with the news that they had bought an ‘extraordinarily lovely, early 18th-century’ house, with ‘views of mountains and sea from every upstairs window’, and with a ‘magnificent garden’, for £1120. Gathorne-Hardy points out that Brenan still ‘had no interest in Spain...except as somewhere cheap to live’, and still showed no interest in Spanish politics:

> There is no evidence that he [Brenan] read a newspaper, or had the faintest idea what was going on politically, except that he had noticed with pleasure that the Republic had resulted in a mass of erotic and pornographic writing (he gives all the prices).

However, by March 1936, after two years living back in Spain with Gamel, Brenan’s attitude to Spain changed. This was reflected in his correspondence with Partridge. His letter of 20 March 1936 revealed a man now interested in Spanish politics. Brenan urged Partridge to continue with his plans to visit Churriana in April, and ‘not to pay any attention to the reports of riots in the English papers’ as a result of the election of the Popular Front government. In the same letter he tells Partridge, ‘you may meet Señor Largo Caballero, the expective [sic] Lenin of Spain; we have a common friend and he expects to be taking a

---

100 S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 166. Faber asserts that Brenan only spent ‘about half of the sixteen years between 1920 and 1936 physically in Spain’. He has sourced this from Ian Gibson, ‘Gerald Brenan, vividor impenitente’, in La imagen de Andalucía en los viajeros románticos y homenaje a Gerald Brenan, 171-80, Málaga, Diputación Provincial, 1984.


102 G. Brenan, Personal Record, 256. The area is now an international airport.


104 J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 276, (n.).

105 Xan Fielding (Ed.), Best of Friends, 133.
holiday here in April’. The ‘common friend’ was the famous American newspaperman Jay Allen who lived at Torremolinos, whom Brenan found to be a ‘warm, generous-minded man with a taste for adventure’, who was a staunch supporter of the Spanish Republic, a ‘socialist who spoke fluent Spanish’, a ‘confidant of Largo Caballero and Alvarez del Vayo’, who divulged ‘a good deal about them and their revolutionary plans’. Brenan’s newly found interest in Spanish politics was probably attributable to Allen as well as to his own natural pragmatism, and he told Partridge, ‘it is a good policy to make up to the man who has the power to cut off your head’. Brenan ended his letter by demonstrating his political pragmatism: ‘Spain is my country, revolution or no revolution, and if it goes red I must try and change my colour too’.

As already mentioned, the Brenans witnessed the early salvos of the Civil War from their home at Churriana. In Personal Record, published thirty-one years after Labyrinth, Brenan revealed his thoughts and ‘political orientation’ at the time the Civil War was brewing. His experience in the Great War had convinced him that prevention of future war was vital; he ‘supported the League of Nations until it became evident it was only a paper League’. He was anti-colonial and disliked the British upper classes of the time who had acquired a ‘false sense of racial superiority ... by bossing Orientals’. But he was not a socialist. He believed state ownership of all the means of production would lead to a tyrannical system as had happened in Russia. He acknowledged the insidious ‘greed’ inherent in capitalism but believed ‘it provided a counterweight to the power of the state’. He opposed the concept of revolution to effect change; the ‘word had no charms’ for him, because he ‘hated violence’ and ‘believed the French and Russian revolutions had done more harm than good’. On 12 June 1936 Brenan informed Partridge that he had ‘been reading W.H. Chamberlin’s History of the Russian Revolution’ which he found ‘painful reading, but extraordinarily interesting’. He reveals that although he was ‘sympathetic’ to the aims of

---

106 Ibid., 134. Francisco Largo Caballero (1869-1946) was a trade unionist politician. He was one of leaders of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and of the Workers’ General Union (UGT). He was labelled the ‘Spanish Lenin’ because he was seen as ‘an uncompromising critic of the bourgeois Republic, who would lead a working class revolution’. He served as Prime Minister during 1936-37. See G. Esenwein, The Spanish Civil War: A Modern Tragedy, Routledge, New York, 2005, 17. During the Civil War Julio Álvarez del Vayo served as the Republic’s Foreign Minister.  
107 G. Brenan, Personal Record, 274.  
108 Xan Fielding (Ed.), Best of Friends, 134.  
109 Ibid.  
110 G. Brenan, Personal Record, 274-5.  
111 Brenan is referring to The Russian Revolution (two volumes) published by Macmillan in 1935. Chamberlin had been the Russian correspondent for The Christian Monitor from 1922-1933.
communism, and although he would ‘prefer to live in a world where work and property were fairly equally shared, their [communist] methods, beliefs and frame of mind generally are abhorrent to [him].’\(^{112}\) For Brenan, parliamentary democracy as manifested in England with its ‘silly play-acting’ was preferable because it eventually led to new governments, new policies and improved standards of living.\(^{113}\)

In the weeks before the Generals’ coup that ignited the Civil War, Brenan’s interest in Spanish politics became more apparent. Self-interest could well have played a part in this, as he made plans on how best to protect himself and Gamel, and their personal possessions, in the face of the growing violence. He listened intently to the speculation proffered by friends and acquaintances from both the political left and the right. He wrote to Partridge that Jay Allen had told him that the socialists were

... hell-bent on having a terror [and] ... for a month or two workers will have carte blanche to murder whom they please and burn churches and houses. Then when the middle and upper classes have been liquidated, the government will take control of the situation again.\(^{114}\)

In another letter to Partridge in early May he outlined a possible escape strategy: ‘Our plan now is to settle in Jamaica’, and ‘I shall send out a lorry load of books and furniture when the arming of the workers begins’.\(^{115}\) On the eve of the Civil War, 4 July 1936, he described to Partridge a meeting with three landowners in Malaga. One of them whispered to him: ‘Don’t be afraid; all this canalla [swine]\(^{116}\) will be put down [and] in two weeks Calvo Sotelo will be King of Spain.’\(^{117}\) Another of the men told Brenan: ‘There is to be an army rising before the 15\(^{th}\), in which the air force will take the lead. The government will be overturned and the right will form a dictatorship’.\(^{118}\)

Brenan’s landowner contact was close to the mark – the Civil War ignited on 17 July. The Brenans did not leave immediately, unlike most of the other Anglo-American expatriates

\(^{112}\) Xan Fielding (Ed.), *Best of Friends*, 138.
\(^{113}\) G. Brenan, *Personal Record*, 275.
\(^{114}\) Brenan-Partridge letter dated Churriana, 8 May 1936, in Xan Fielding (Ed.) *Best of Friends*, 136-37.
\(^{115}\) Ibid., 137.
\(^{116}\) This is referring to Anarchist, Communists and the Left in general.
\(^{117}\) Xan Fielding (Ed.) *Best of Friends*, 138. Paul Preston refers to José Calvo Sotelo as a charismatic politician of the extreme right. Calvo Sotelo was kidnapped and shot by members of Republican assault guards in the early hours of 13 July 1936. As Preston points out, ‘the discovery of Calvo Sotelo’s body ... played neatly into the hands of the military plotters [and] provided graphic justification for their contention that Spain needed military intervention to save her from anarchy’. See P Preston in *The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution & Revenge*, W. W. Norton, N Y, 2007, 98-99.
\(^{118}\) Ibid.
who lived in the area. Brenan became a correspondent reporting on the war for the *Manchester Guardian*. As discussed above, Brenan was affected by what he saw; Gathorne-Hardy even suggests he exhibited signs of paranoia because he thought it was due to his *Manchester Guardian* articles that ‘evil’ General Queipo de Llano was out to get him personally, by planes dropping seventy bombs within 300 yards of his Churriana house on 29 August. Not long after this bombing the Brenans decided it was untenable for them to stay, and on 7 September 1936 they fled to Gibraltar.

Interestingly, in *Personal Record* Brenan gives a purely pecuniary explanation for leaving: ‘The time had now come for us to leave Malaga. My account in the bank was almost exhausted and I had no way of getting money in from England.’ Brenan intentionally downplayed his political motives for leaving Spain in *Personal Record*. Even though it was published in 1975 – the year of Franco’s demise – Spain was still not a democracy and Brenan still had to be careful not to upset the regime.

In his Brenan portrait Faber writes:

> A curious pair of exiles from Spain arrived at Plymouth on October 22, 1936. Like most of the hundreds of thousands of refugees that would end up leaving wartime Spain, these two [Gerald and Gamel Brenan] had been expelled from their home by violence and fear. Forced to abandon their possessions, they were overcome with anxiety and nostalgia, and did not know when they might return, if ever.

Faber is guilty of ‘gilding the lily’ somewhat in this description. He omits to say what the Brenans did in the weeks between leaving Malaga and arriving in England. Anxious and nostalgic they may have been, but they also had a rather exciting time of it, which Brenan describes in *Personal Record* and Gathorne-Hardy elaborates on in his Brenan biography. After fleeing from Malaga in the relative comfort and security of an American destroyer – an escape very different from the real danger experienced by the Orwells during their flight from Barcelona by train into France, chased by Soviet agents brandishing arrest warrants – the Brenans met up with Jay Allen. Allen asked Brenan ‘to go to Tangier and take his place there as a correspondent for the *News Chronicle*’ and on the way to stop off at ‘Lisbon to

---

119 Brenan got this job with the help of his friend Bertrand Russell. See S. Faber, *Anglo-American Hispanists*, 156-57.
120 J. Gathorne-Hardy, *Gerald Brenan*, 310.
122 J. Gathorne-Hardy, *Gerald Brenan*, 302 (n.).
investigate the mutiny in the Portuguese fleet which had just broken out and been suppressed’. But were the Brenans as ‘overcome with anxiety’ as Faber suggests? In *Personal Record* Brenan claims it was an adventure and he writes that Gamel, ‘seemed to be enjoying this life of adventures [and] insisted on’ tagging along. The truth of the matter may lay somewhere between anxiety and excitement, because some years later Brenan wrote to Orwell that ‘it took months, and a long stay in Morocco to get over what [he] saw in Malaga and Gibraltar’. By early October Brenan felt he had achieved all he could as a correspondent for the *News Chronicle* in Tangier. He resigned, ‘and left with Gamel on a sightseeing trip for Fez, Marrakesh and Taroudant’ and ‘by the end of the month’ they were back in Gibraltar and finally embarked for Plymouth. The only anxiety Brenan implies in *Personal Record* stemmed from lack of money and ‘no winter clothes’, which meant they ‘landed in England wearing long flowing djellabs’. Moreover, far from abandoning their possessions as Faber claimed, the Brenans left them in the hands of their two paid and trusted servants, Rosario and Antonio, to whom they gave as much money as they could. When the Brenans returned to Spain for a visit in February 1949 they found ‘everything was safe’ and ‘all their possessions piled neatly in the *mirador* (enclosed balcony).

**BRENAN POLITICIZED**

Brenan was not apolitical, although one could perhaps be forgiven for thinking he was from his comments to Partridge in 1920, explaining that he did not fight in the Great War for any principles or ideals but ‘because it was fun’ and ‘because [he] couldn’t do anything else’. In this he was no different from countless others of his generation. Faber labels

---

126 Ibid.
127 Ibid., 318-9. A *djellaba* is a loose hooded woollen robe, traditionally worn by Arabs.
129 Ibid., 376.
130 Brenan-Partridge letter, dated Yegen 7 November 1920, in Xan Fielding (Ed.) *Best of Friends*, 13. Brenan once expressed an extreme solution to the Irish question in a letter to Partridge: ‘...the stupidest government in the world is governing the most hysterical people in the world’ and advocated two solutions – ‘independence’ or ‘extermination’. However, ‘the former [was] too impracticable’ and he had ‘thought of writing a leaflet recommending the second’ in which he would advise the Government ‘to kill every man, woman and child that lived in Ireland...’ (See Brenan-Partridge letter, 7 November 1920 in Xan Fielding (Ed.) *Best of Friends*, 13) In reply, Partridge wrote that their friends, ‘including Lytton [Strachey] and Virginia Woolf’, had ‘good words’ for his Irish solution, and they had endeavoured ‘to induce Allen & Unwin to publish it’ but were unsuccessful. (See Partridge-Brenan letter dated 31 December 1920 in Xan Fielding (Ed.), *Best of Friends*, 17). Brenan must have breathed a big sigh of relief when he received Partridge’s reply, because he had turned cool on the publication idea. He was now ‘too ashamed of the leaflet, or at least of a large part of it, to wish it to be seen by anyone’. Moreover, he now felt his ideas lacked any real insight into the Irish situation, ‘and were ‘too superficially grounded, too crude. (See Brenan-Partridge letter dated Yegen, 21 January 1921, in Xan Fielding (Ed.), *Best of Friends*, 19).
him a ‘moderate liberal’. He often held strong political opinions but was rarely motivated to act on them. Faber points out that Brenan did not catch ‘the political bug’ for Spanish politics until after the Popular Front victory of 1936, but once he got the bug he became obsessed.

After his arrival in London Brenan busied himself working on ‘cosas de España’ (things Spanish), and helped to create propaganda in support of the Spanish Republic. He made contact with the Duchess of Atholl, the so-called ‘red’ Duchess because of her left-wing sympathies, who had been the Scottish Unionist Member of Parliament for Kinross and West Perthshire since 1923. She went to Spain in 1937 on a fact-finding mission. On her return, she quickly wrote and published her pro-Republic bestseller, Searchlight on Spain (hereafter Searchlight). Brenan saw merit in Atholl’s endeavours and helped her with Searchlight. He is cited as a source on five occasions, possibly the first Brenan citations recorded. Brenan also helped Atholl advance the case for British rearmament after she resigned from her parliamentary seat of West Perthshire in protest against Prime Minister Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement, and his ‘not re-arming fast enough nor creating a Ministry of Supply’. She recontested the seat as an Independent, to stimulate interest and support for rearmament. Brenan went to Scotland and canvassed for her. In a letter to Partridge, he describes the alarm he felt when he ‘first saw the posters announcing that Captain Brenan would speak on Spain’, but he nevertheless managed to blunder through his speeches, ‘with no notes [and] no real preparation without any stage-fright’.

‘After a particularly dreary speech’ the campaign organizers took Brenan off speech making, and put him to work at ‘organizing the local committees’ which he found to be ‘very interesting and amusing, and enlightening too’.

---

132 S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 7.
133 Ibid., 156. Faber has sourced this information from J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 302 (n.).
134 J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 314.
137 J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 324.
139 Ibid.
Their experiences in Spain motivated both Brenan and Orwell to write and work in defence of the Republic. One would have expected that with their common interest in the Spanish Civil War, and with ‘friends in common’, such as V.S. Pritchett, Cyril Connolly, and Franz Borkenau, they would have met up when they were living in England.\(^{140}\) However, there is no record of them ever doing so, though this was not for want of trying on Brenan’s part, who wrote to Orwell on 2 March 1939 eager to arrange a meeting. Brenan told Orwell he felt a ‘secret link’ with him, because he too had had to fend off parental pressure and expectation to join the Indian police force. Brenan had taken up the cudgels ‘to help bolster the Republican cause’\(^{141}\) to a greater extent than Orwell, whose main concern was the defeat of fascism, and who saw Spain as the place to draw a line in the sand and stop the fascist momentum. Brenan did not see the conflict in Manichean terms as Orwell tended to do. This is evident from the subtitle – *An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil War* – which he gave *Labyrinth*. For Brenan the Spanish Civil War was neither a ‘sideshow’ to the contemporaneous events unfolding in Europe nor ‘harbinger of World War II but a conflict in its own right with its own underlying causes’.\(^{142}\) Moreover, Brenan’s help to Athol would not have endeared Brenan to Orwell. Orwell had made his feelings clear both about the Duchess and her book in two reviews. On 16 July 1938 in *Time and Tide*, Orwell wrote that *Searchlight on Spain*’s ‘chief fault is the fault of virtually all books on the Spanish War – political partisanship’. Furthermore, ‘The Duchess … follows the communist “line” throughout…’\(^{143}\) A few days later in his *New English Weekly* review he was even more dismissive: ‘There is nothing surprising nowadays in a pro-communist Duchess. Nearly all moneyed people who enter the left-wing movement follow the Stalinist line’, and Orwell suggested the book, ‘with the excision of not very many sentences could pass as having been written by a communist’.\(^{144}\) Interestingly, Brenan is rather subdued in his letter to Orwell.

\(^{140}\) According to Gathorne-Hardy, Brenan and Pritchett became acquainted at a Christmas party at the Spanish Embassy in London in 1936 and became the closest of friends. Brenan first met Connolly in 1927 and he regularly met and corresponded with Borkenau while writing *The Spanish Labyrinth*. See J. Gathorne-Hardy, *Gerald Brenan*, 224, 317, 318 & 342.

\(^{141}\) S. Faber, *Anglo-American Hispanists*, 159.

\(^{142}\) María Jesús González Hernández, (translator, Nigel Griffin), *Raymond Carr: The Curiosity of the Fox*, 135.


\(^{144}\) Review of *Searchlight on Spain, Time and Tide*. See *Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, Vol. 1 An Age Like This 1920-1940*, Secker & Warburg, London, 1968, 344. Interestingly, Orwell’s criticism may have been unwarranted, given that the Duchess essentially declared that she was anti-Soviet in her 1931 publication *The Conscription of People*. 

92
regarding *Homage to Catalonia*, merely writing that it is ‘a very good book’. He goes on to say:

I regret only one thing about your book – that you never joined up in the FAI militia. The anarchists are the most interesting people, because they are the most Spanish. I am far from being an anarchist myself – I am one of those war hating, revolution hating bourgeois of whom you write so disparagingly – but I have a deep respect and liking for the anarchists all the same, and a certain regret at not being one.\(^{145}\)

In England the Brenans rented a cottage at Aldbourne called Bell Court, which they eventually bought. Aldbourne had the benefit of being both close to Ham Spray where the Partridges lived, and to London where Brenan researched in the British Museum.\(^{146}\) Brenan started writing his book sometime in 1937 with a great fury, at times ‘reading and writing ten or eleven hours a day’.\(^{147}\) He, like Orwell, had planned to write a quick book, an eyewitness account,\(^{148}\) to be published while the war was still in progress.\(^{149}\) This plan was soon aborted. It was unsuited to Brenan’s ‘compulsive need to explore any subject in its totality’,\(^{150}\) and he embarked on a work of more substance that would give ‘a better idea of how the war had come about’, but which was not published until 1943.\(^{151}\)

During the Second World War Brenan remained intensely involved with the Republican cause, socializing with Spanish politicians in exile, writing letters to newspapers, and lobbying the British government.\(^{152}\) Furthermore, he was part of the BBC’s propaganda operation, *Voz de Londres* and wrote ‘some twenty-three radio columns in Spanish ... to subtly encourage sympathy for Britain’ amongst Spaniards.\(^{153}\)

THE SPANISH LABYRINTH: RESEARCHING, WRITING, RECEPTION

*The Spanish Labyrinth* was Brenan’s third book, but as Gathorne-Hardy points out, ‘as far as the world went’ it was his first.\(^{154}\) Xan Fielding claims that Franz Borkenau, the author

\(^{145}\) George Orwell Archives, University College, London.

\(^{146}\) Xan Fielding (Ed.), *Best of Friends*, 140.

\(^{147}\) J. Gathorne-Hardy, *Gerald Brenan*, 315.

\(^{148}\) Ibid., 302.

\(^{149}\) Ibid., 315.

\(^{150}\) Ibid., 315.

\(^{151}\) G. Brenan, *Personal Record*, 328.

\(^{152}\) S. Faber, *Anglo-American Hispanists*, 168.

\(^{153}\) Ibid.

\(^{154}\) J. Gathorne-Hardy, *Gerald Brenan*, 344. Brenan’s first published work was the 1933 fictional autobiography of a tramp, *Jack Robinson*. It was published under the pseudonym George Beaton. Brenan was thirty-nine and
of The Spanish Cockpit, who lived conveniently close to the Brenans’ Aldbourne house, was influential in Brenan’s decision to write a substantial book on the causes of the Spanish War. Borkenau was influential in Brenan’s decision to write a substantial book on the causes of the Spanish War. Borkenau was influential in Brenan’s decision to write a substantial book on the causes of the Spanish War. Borkenau was influential in Brenan’s decision to write a substantial book on the causes of the Spanish War.

Gathorne-Hardy, while agreeing that Borkenau certainly encouraged Brenan, claims that the evidence from the unpublished manuscript of Personal Record shows that Brenan had begun Labyrinth ‘long before he met or read Borkenau.’ However, even if Brenan had started writing the book before meeting Borkenau, it is clear after contact had been made Borkenau was consulted regularly, and Borkenau’s letters to Brenan ‘have the ring of a teacher to a pupil.’ It was through Borkenau that Brenan made contact with Arthur Lehning, who at that time was the librarian at the International Institute for Social History at Amsterdam. Lehning proved useful and supplied Brenan ‘with papers and books on the agrarian problem and anarcho-syndicalism he couldn’t get elsewhere’ and later read and commented on the full manuscript of The Spanish Labyrinth.

It was not clear how long Brenan took to complete the book. He was by nature a slow and meticulous writer. He once wrote to Partridge, while working on his novel Jack Robinson, that ‘five weeks of constant effort and almost continual solitude has added six indifferent pages to my book.’ Gamel Brenan thought that her husband would probably not finish Labyrinth because of his ‘compulsive need to explore any subject in its totality’. In Personal Record Brenan claims he took ‘just three years’ to write the book, but Gathorne-

had been writing the book for fourteen years. The proceeds from the book were virtually his first earnings since the Great War. Brenan’s friend, Virginia Woolf, wrote in her diary: ‘Gerald Brenan’s book is unmitigated trash – a sickly slab of plum cake iced with pink fly-blown sugar.’ See Gathorne-Hardy, 279. When he met up with Woolf in 1935 he apologised for Jack Robinson to which she scorned: ‘It is fatal to try to excuse one’s work.’ Brenan was pleased he had used the ‘disguise’ of pseudonym because ‘in the end he almost loathed’ the book. His second published work, Dr Partidge’s Almanack for 1935, was also published under George Beaton in 1936. See Gathorne-Hardy, 278, 281, 220.

Xan Fielding (Ed.), Best of Friends, 144. The Spanish Cockpit was published in 1937. It is an eyewitness recollection of the first six or seven months of the war. Borkenau was a sociologist who had been a member of the German Communist Party for eight years and for a period was a Comintern official. He rejected communism and Stalinism and eventually broke with the party.


J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 315.

Ibid., 318.

Ibid., 322

It was not clear how long Brenan took to complete the book. He was by nature a slow and meticulous writer. He once wrote to Partridge, while working on his novel Jack Robinson, that ‘five weeks of constant effort and almost continual solitude has added six indifferent pages to my book.’ Gamel Brenan thought that her husband would probably not finish Labyrinth because of his ‘compulsive need to explore any subject in its totality’. In Personal Record Brenan claims he took ‘just three years’ to write the book, but Gathorne-

had been writing the book for fourteen years. The proceeds from the book were virtually his first earnings since the Great War. Brenan’s friend, Virginia Woolf, wrote in her diary: ‘Gerald Brenan’s book is unmitigated trash – a sickly slab of plum cake iced with pink fly-blown sugar.’ See Gathorne-Hardy, 279. When he met up with Woolf in 1935 he apologised for Jack Robinson to which she scorned: ‘It is fatal to try to excuse one’s work.’ Brenan was pleased he had used the ‘disguise’ of pseudonym because ‘in the end he almost loathed’ the book. His second published work, Dr Partidge’s Almanack for 1935, was also published under George Beaton in 1936. See Gathorne-Hardy, 278, 281, 220.

Xan Fielding (Ed.), Best of Friends, 144. The Spanish Cockpit was published in 1937. It is an eyewitness recollection of the first six or seven months of the war. Borkenau was a sociologist who had been a member of the German Communist Party for eight years and for a period was a Comintern official. He rejected communism and Stalinism and eventually broke with the party.


J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 315.

Ibid., 318.

Ibid., 322

Brenan-Partridge letter, dated 17 November 1929 in Xan Fielding (Ed.) Best of Friends, 90.

J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 315.

G. Brenan, Personal Record, 345.
Hardy believes it was closer to five, and more when it is taken into consideration that Brenan ‘had been studying [Spain] intensely, if intermittently, since 1919’.\textsuperscript{163}

At his wife’s suggestion the book was initially entitled \textit{The Reason of Unreason: A History of the Struggle in Spain, Past, Present and Future}.\textsuperscript{164} One wonders whether the book would have attained the same level of popularity if this title had been retained. The first draft was finished in early 1938, but Brenan was unhappy with it, and ‘for a while seriously thought of giving up entirely, and was going to burn the manuscript’.\textsuperscript{165} He found the process of writing footnoted history both difficult and arduous. He relied heavily on the memoirs of Spanish members of the Republican government as well as those of outside observers who were usually antagonistic to the government.\textsuperscript{166} Not only was it difficult to get the material he needed, but ‘still more difficult in the heated atmosphere of Spanish politics, to rely on what [he] got’.\textsuperscript{167} Brenan told Raymond Carr that ‘he’d practically killed himself doing \textit{The Spanish Labyrinth}',\textsuperscript{168} and had decided to never write history again, although it was not for want of being asked. In 1953 Brenan rejected the entreaties of the editors Alan Bullock and Bill Deaken of the new ‘Oxford History of Modern Europe’ series to write another Spanish history.\textsuperscript{169} Bullock and Deaken had dispatched Carr to Churriana, where Brenan was once again living,\textsuperscript{170} in a last ditch attempt to personally persuade him to write the Spanish volume. Brenan was not swayed by the fact that prestigious scholars A. J. P. Taylor and Isaiah Berlin had already been signed up, and was adamant that he was not up to it.\textsuperscript{171} Moreover, Brenan was not convinced of the efficacy of history and revealed to Carr, ‘you

\textsuperscript{163} J. Gathorne-Hardy, \textit{Gerald Brenan}, 345.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 322
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{166} Brenan identifies in his bibliography the sources he used for each of his chapters. He often annotates the source with a political persuasion. For example, underneath ‘M. Fernández Almago, \textit{Historia del Reinado de Alfonso XIII}, Barcelona, 1933’ Brenan writes: ‘Written from a conservative point of view’. Similarly with Manuel Ciges Aparicio’s \textit{España bajo la Dinastía de los Borbones}, Brenan writes: ‘A readable book written by a Republican’. At times Brenan gives more detail. For example, after ‘Allison Peers, \textit{The Spanish Tragedy}, 1936’. he writes: ‘This book gives a lucid account of the Dictatorship [of General Primo de Rivera] and Republic as seen through the eyes of the Catalan bourgeoisie, but shows little understanding of the deeper causes of discontent in Spain or of the aims and organizations of the great working class parties’.
\textsuperscript{167} G. Brenan, \textit{The Spanish Labyrinth}, vii.
\textsuperscript{168} J. Gathorne-Hardy, \textit{Gerald Brenan}, 356.
\textsuperscript{169} The new series was the brainchild of Alan Bullock, who had just published his \textit{Hitler: a study in tyranny} (1952) and Bill Deaken, formerly Churchill’s literary research assistant. See María Jesús González Hernández, (trans. Nigel Griffin), \textit{Raymond Carr: The Curiosity of the Fox}, XVII. Brenan suggested to Carr that he write the book himself, which Carr subsequently did, and, \textit{Spain: 1808-1939} was ultimately published in 1966.
\textsuperscript{170} Brenan had returned to live in Spain in 1953.
\textsuperscript{171} María Jesús González Hernández, 126.
can’t get to the truth by writing history. Truth is to be found only in novels’ when the ‘unfettered creative imagination of the novelist comes into play’. 172

One scholar has claimed that 1943, the year Labyrinth was first published, brought the Cold War’s ‘first icy gust’. 173 This is not to suggest that Labyrinth’s publication was in any way influenced by early Cold War developments, and for that matter, there is no evidence to suggest that the book’s regular reprints in the 1950s and 1960s, during the cultural Cold War, were at the behest of any intelligence agency. However, as already discussed, the book would not have been an unwelcome addition in the West’s anti-communist propaganda war. According to Gathorne-Hardy, 1943 was an opportune year for publication. The Spanish Civil War was still of public interest, and was regarded as a precursor to World War II that was then raging. 174 During World War II Franco oscillated between policies of neutrality and non-belligerency, but he was generally perceived to be aiding and abetting the Axis powers, 175 and his regime exhibited all the trappings of a fascist state. Readers were eager to understand the background to Franco Spain. 176 Gathorne-Hardy suggests that the World War II provided an unusual stimulus to Labyrinth’s success, because it had brought about a ‘dearth of good books, and a hunger for culture – as sustenance, as escape, as paradigm [sic] of what the country was fighting for’. 177 Labyrinth was seen to offer a balanced less partisan


173 Chapman Pincher, Treachery – Betrayals, Blunders and Cover-ups: Six Decades of Espionage Against America and Great Britain, Random House, New York, 2009, 6. Pincher’s ‘first gust’ of Cold War is located in the ‘prickly and suspicious’ mood Stalin had at the Tehran Conference in November 1943. Stalin’s mood was attributable to the information courtesy of his intelligence network that on 19 August 1943 Churchill and Roosevelt had signed a secret agreement (the Quebec Agreement) to collaborate on the production of an atom bomb, without any information being given to their ally – the USSR. It was not only his allies’ perfidy over the development of the atom bomb that Stalin ‘deeply resented’ but also knowledge that Britain and the USA had agreed at Quebec not to open a second front at Normandy until the spring of 1944 (4). As Pincher points out: ‘To this day, Russian writers regard it as an inexcusable British-American “dirty trick” on a gallant ally that had absorbed the impact of the German savagery with tremendous loses.’ (6). For further discussion as to Cold War parameters see Alan Nadel, Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age, Duke University Press, London, 1995. Nadel writes, that ‘some date the beginnings of the Cold War to Churchill’s iron curtain speech, an unusual way influenced by circumstances, and that gives the Cold War its unique qualities is the atomic bomb’ (13).

174 J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 344.

175 See P. Preston, ‘Franco’s Foreign Policy’ in C. Leitz & D. Dunthorn (Eds), Spain in an International Context, 1939-1959, Berghahn books, Oxford, 1999. In mid-June 1940 the Franco regime moved from ‘official neutrality to the much more pro-Axis position of non-belligerency ... Franco permitted German submarines to be provisioned in Spanish ports, German reconnaissance aircraft to fly with Spanish markings, a radio station in La Coruña to operate for the Luftwaffe, and German destroyers to be secretly refuelled at night in bays on Spain’s northern coast’ (6). Moreover, the Spanish press which was government controlled ‘frequently attacked Britain and the United States and glorified the achievements of German arms.’ (11).

176 J. Gathorne-Hardy, Gerald Brenan, 344-5.

177 Ibid., 344.
account of the Civil War than readers had hitherto been used to, and ‘nearly all the leading national dailies and weeklies made [it] their main book’ to review, with the result that more or less overnight Brenan became ‘one of the foremost historians of Spain then writing’.\(^{178}\)

For Gabriel Jackson, writing in 1985, *Labyrinth* provided an explanation of ‘the tragic breakdown of Spanish *convivencia* [coexistence] which led to the Civil War’; it searched for answers in Spain’s agricultural systems, parliaments and cabinets, and in the roles played by ‘the army and the Church, the Carlists, the Socialists, the Marxist and anarcho-syndicalist trade unions’.\(^{179}\) In adopting a social and economic methodology Brenan foreshadowed and pioneered approaches that became commonplace in the ‘new history’ of the 1960s and 1970s. The systemic dysfunction and breakdown of trust that Brenan described between the various state organizations and institutions, which resulted in the conflagration of civil war, may go some way to explaining the positive reception *Labyrinth* received on publication and its continued popularity. Systemic dysfunction in the Spanish body politic was used in the early Cold War years, when the UK and USA were rebranding Franco into an acceptable Cold War ally, to argue that the Franco regime was a necessary interregnum to fully fledged democracy. Brenan’s description of Spain in the thirties and the preceding decades proved the Spanish were not ready for democracy in the thirties, forties, or fifties. Franco willingly embraced this role. First and foremost he saw it as the only guarantee of his survival in the post-1945 world in which strutting dictators were unwelcome.\(^{180}\)

Brenan chronicled the events of the Civil War only briefly in his final chapter, because he believed the Civil War years required a ‘volume to themselves’, and because it was too early to make ‘an objective survey’.\(^{181}\) In a fifteen-page epilogue Brenan discussed ‘the political developments brought about by the war’ and commented on the manoeuvrings of the communists and the Soviet Union in Spain where

\[
\text{… things did not quite follow the lines that might have been expected.}
\]

After a period of violent social revolution the ‘Reds’ or ‘loyalists’ as the parties supporting the Republic were variously called, began to move more and more to the Right, taking as their slogans ‘Respect the

\(^{178}\) Ibid.

\(^{179}\) G. Jackson, ‘Gerald Brenan as Historian: An Appreciation of *The Spanish Labyrinth*’, 289.

\(^{180}\) By autumn of 1942 Franco had begun to consider the eventuality of an *Axis* defeat and softened his pro-*Axis* stance. He instructed ‘his ambassador in London to start a *rapprochement* with the Western Allies’. See P. Preston, ‘Franco’s Foreign Policy’, 12-13.

property of the peasant’, ‘No interference with the small business man’ and ‘No socialization of industry’.\footnote{182} Brenan found it strange that ‘the numerically feeble’ but ‘very influential Communist Party’ was the chief advocate of this policy. As the war progressed communist influence increased over the forces of law and order in the Republic and they used this influence to round up ‘dissident members of the Left’ as often as fascist sympathisers.\footnote{183} Brenan points out that the anarchists ‘believed that the war could only be waged successfully if it was accompanied by social revolution behind the lines’.\footnote{184} For them the final victory would go to the side which showed the most self-sacrifice and devotion. The workers would only do this if they were given ‘tangible proof that a new and better world lay in store for them’.\footnote{185} For this reason all large and many small industries were collectivized by the anarchists in Catalonia.

Brenan claims that the large industrial collectives in Barcelona and the Catalan countryside ‘worked admirably’ but had limited success in Andalusia where ‘there was almost a complete lack of the necessary farm machinery’.\footnote{186} He argues that the initial success of the collectives was short-lived because they were undermined by ‘the Central government, and especially the communist and socialist members of it, [who] desired to bring them under the direct control of the State’. The collectives were subsequently starved of ‘the credit required for buying raw materials’. Although Brenan was attracted to the passion of the anarchists, he concludes that the Republic’s and communists’ reassertion of centralized control was necessary because: ‘No government ... could afford to allow the heavy industries of the country to rule themselves.’\footnote{187} Brenan acknowledged that the decisive factor in the war was foreign intervention. Stalin saw to it ‘that the arms which he supplied and the International Brigades which he organized should secure the predominance of the Communist Party’.\footnote{188} Brenan’s conclusion here easily fits into an anti-communist paradigm of the Cold War.

*Labyrinth* not only educated its contemporary readers but also influenced many subsequent writers. Hugh Trevor-Roper admits that he was profoundly influenced by the book, which ‘kindled’ his interest in Spain and that he developed ‘an enormous intellectual
respect’ for Brenan who became his ‘ideal historian’, because he saw ‘the past in the present, and the present in the past’,189 and was ‘the ever-fresh fountain of understanding in that difficult land [Spain]’.190 Paul Preston believes *Labyrinth* laid ‘the foundations of all modern scholarship on the Spanish Republic and Civil War’ by rejecting ‘the simplistic notion that the Spanish war was a battle between fascism and communism’, and perceiving it as ‘a fundamentally Spanish affair, rooted in the agrarian question and comprehensible only in terms of the previous hundred years of Spanish development’.191 For Preston *Labyrinth* is ‘unsurpassed for its sympathetic feel’, and ‘Brenan’s analysis of the divisions of the left and of regional nationalism combines shrewd reflection with the immediacy of an eye-witness account’.192 For Gabriel Jackson, it ‘is one of the most original, thought-provoking, and permanently valuable studies of pre-Civil War Spain produced in any language’.193 Faber attributes a ‘paradigm shift’ in Anglo-American historiography of Spain to *Labyrinth*, which broke the ‘straitjacket’ influence of ‘national character’ as the dominant explanatory model.194 The former Czechoslovakian diplomat and historian Vlastimil Kybal, in a review for *The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, writes: ‘Mr. Brenan’s book may be considered one of the most solid analyses that have been made of the social and political conditions in Spain during the last fifty years’, although Kybal felt that Brenan’s analysis of the agrarian problem was too rooted in Andalusia which made it ‘not well balanced’.195 The Spanish scholar, María Jesús González Hernández writes that Brenan’s assessment of Spain ‘paved the way for a whole succession of professional British researchers who would construct their own accounts of the country around the Spanish Civil

---

189 A. Sisman, *Hugh Trevor-Roper*, 213. Brenan also liked Trevor-Roper who he describes as a ‘very intelligent man’ with ‘a touch of snobbery ... not a great deal of imagination, but an absolutely first-rate mind which he applies to everything that crops up.’ See Brenan-Partridge letter, dated 19 December 1949, in Xan Fielding (Ed.) *Best of Friends*, 209.


194 S. Faber, *Anglo-American Hispanists*, 159-60.

195 Vlastimil Kybal, Review in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1944, No 231, 174-75. The Register of the Vlastimil Kybal Papers at the Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University states that Kybal (1880-1958) received a PhD from the University of Prague in 1904. During the years from 1920 to the German takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1939 he was at various times the Czechoslovak ambassador to Italy (1920-25), to Brazil and Argentina (1925-27), to Spain and Portugal (1927-33), and to Mexico and Central America (1939-35). From 1939 to 1942 he lectured at University of California, and from 1944 to 1948 he was a research fellow at Yale. He remained an exile in the USA after the complete communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. <http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt5r29p6sr/entire_text/> Accessed 28/10/2014.
War, the reasons for it, and its consequences’, but González Hernández has some reservations because Brenan saw everything Spanish, ““from dance to theatre” as superior to its British counterpart’.196 The prolific Franco regime historian Ricardo de la Cierva y de Hoces viewed Brenan’s book as lacking in fairness and thought it injudicious in its use of evidence.197

**BRENAN’S CHANGE OF HEART AND COLD WAR PRAGMATISM**

Brenan expressed different perspectives on Franco Spain after his decision to return to live in Spain in 1953, from those that he had held during his almost sixteen years living in England.198 Were his revised views based on genuine reflection and distance from the events? Were they based on new evidence that had come to light? Or were they merely pragmatic positions reflecting the constraints of his living in Franco Spain? There was no new documentary evidence to justify his change of heart, because the archives in Spain and the USSR were firmly closed.

Faber has attempted to answer some of these questions. He asserts that Brenan wrote the travelogue *The Face of Spain*, published in December 1950, with ‘a particular agenda in mind’ – his determination to return to live in Spain. Faber does not claim that Brenan was attempting to ingratiate himself with the Franco regime, but he suggests that Brenan was distancing himself from his previous anti-Francoism. Faber draws attention to the American novelist and historian, Waldo Frank, who in his 1951 review of *The Face of Spain* highlighted that Brenan ‘had adopted the [Franco] regime’s ideologically charged designations for the two camps in the Civil War’ and time and again referred to the opposing sides as the ‘Rights and the Reds’.199 Frank was probably the first commentator to notice, or at least publicly remark on, Brenan’s turn from ‘a calm friend of the Republic’, to one who now ‘wishes to avoid politics’. In his review Frank referred to Brenan’s *The Face of Spain* as ‘a political pamphlet’, because it chronicles the complaints of the men and women Brenan met on his two month journey in the centre and south of Spain, who ‘speak of practically

---

197 Ibid., 162. Ricardo de la Cierva worked in a special department, Sección de Estudios la Guerra de España, in the Ministry of Information. His role was to modernise the Franco regime’s historiography of the Civil War. In 1966 de la Cierva published a bibliographical book, *Cien Libros Basicos Sobre La Guerra De España*, which included discussion of *Labyrinth*.
198 The Brenans arrived in England as refugees from the Spanish Civil War on 22 October 1936. They left England to return to Spain on 2 January 1953, arriving at Churriana five days later. See J. Gathorne-Hardy, *Gerald Brenan*, 312, 403 & 407.
nothing but hunger and the [Franco] regime’s stupidity and corruption…’. 201 Faber suggests that this approach is a device that Brenan used to protect himself from any repercussions from Franco’s Regime, and ‘that throughout the book, [Brenan] is careful to make sure that the most explicit political statements are expressed by his interlocutors rather than by the author’ and that ‘the generalissimo … is almost completely sheltered from criticism’. 201 Frank accuses Brenan of shallowness and selectivity in The Face of Spain because he ‘has no contact with the industrial workers; he meets his peasants on the road and his bourgeois in the cafes; in fact his encounters seldom exceed those of an intelligent tourist’. 202 Frank takes umbrage with Brenan’s statement: ‘Everyone [in Madrid] either has money or is pretending to have it’, which for Frank exemplifies Brenan’s superficiality. Frank asks: ‘Surely, he [Brenan] knows the huge poor sections of Madrid whose misery, when Galdós described it at the turn of the century, was purgatorial and today must be infernal’. 204 However, Brenan’s worse sin in Frank’s eyes was his use of the word ‘Reds’:

He [Brenan] must know that for the English and American reader today, red means communist … and he must know that when the military counter-revolution started, the great population which defended the Republic was liberal-democratic, Basque Catholic, Socialist (of various shades), Syndicalist and Anarcho-Syndicalist – with a mere communist fraction that I have heard estimated, at the war’s outbreak at about 35,000 for the entire country. 205

Frank realized that Brenan was having a change of heart, but when he wrote his review in December 1951, he did not know that Brenan was planning to return to live permanently in Spain. If he had, it is likely that his criticism of Brenan and his book would have been even more pointed.

With hindsight it is clear that Brenan signals his future change of heart toward Franco’s regime in the Preface to the 1950 edition of The Face of Spain: ‘We have been calling it [Franco Spain] names in Parliament and in the press for many years, but few English people have any idea what it feels like to live in.’ 206 There is the inference here that if people were more informed about Franco’s regime they might well soften their attitudes towards it. In an undated letter to Partridge, probably written sometime during his 1949 visit to Spain to garner

201 S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 172.
203 Frank is referring here to the Spanish realist novelist, Benito Pérez Galdós (1843-1920), who published 31 novels and 23 plays.
204 Waldo Frank, ‘Our Crime Against Spain’, 19.
205 Ibid., 20.
material for the book, Brenan revealed his softening attitude to the regime. This could well be attributed to the social conditions he saw in Spain. The country was in the grip of a severe drought. This not only brought hardship in the agricultural areas but also in the industrial areas where factory production relied on hydro-electric power. Factories were forced to operate only one day a week. Brenan observed hunger everywhere with ‘women and children begging’. He estimated ‘a third of the population’ had ‘given up washing’ and ‘half naked bodies with rags pinned round them, coated with dirt, and with expressions of despair and hatred on their faces’ were commonplace. Brenan informs Partridge that he is going to ‘urge that Spain be given Marshall Aid’ and canvass for the restoration of ‘a complete British Embassy in Madrid’.

Was empathy for the plight of the Spanish the real motive for Brenan’s decision to solicit help and support for his former enemy? Or does the real reason lie in the last sentence of his letter to Partridge: ‘And we have decided to come and live in Spain’.

Brenan reveals the extent of his rekindled love for Spain in a letter to Partridge, dated Churriana, 14 March 1949: ‘I can’t tell you how happy I am to be back. It seems as if these last twelve years I had not lived at all.’ This is a real change of heart for Brenan, who had told Trevor-Roper around this time that he had finished with Spain and was never going back there. Unfortunately Trevor-Roper is vague as to the date Brenan told him this, but this does not detract from the fact that Brenan made a monumental decision to live in Franco’s Spain.

Brenan’s volte-face regarding Franco had its genesis earlier than his 1949 visit to Spain. In articles Brenan wrote in 1945 and 1946 there is no change of heart towards the Franco regime, but there is a sense that he is beginning to think that a republican form of government may not be the only alternative to replace the Franco regime. This thinking predates his decision to return to Spain. In The Spectator on 16 November 1945 Brenan crystal-gazed in his article entitled, ‘Spain and its Future’. As to be expected, Brenan savaged
Franco’s Regime, which he describes as ‘broken down’ in all areas except for ‘the police, the army [and] the penal system’. He writes that the ‘all-powerful’ Falange Party that was in control was ‘a gang of self-seekers, living solely to suck as much money as possible out of the country’. But, he also criticizes the Republic, asserting that it ‘failed partly through its own mistakes (its attack on the Church was one of these)’. Nonetheless he still thinks that the Republicans offer the best solution to replace Franco: ‘Of all Spanish political groups today, the Republicans are in my opinion, the most apt for steering Spain to better days.’ However, he acknowledges ‘the monarchy [of Don Juan] is another alternative regime for Spain’. Seven months later, in an article entitled ‘Spanish Scene’, written for the magazine *Current Affairs*, he summarized the causes and consequences of the Civil War for his readers and looked to Spain’s future. He informs his readers that after his victory in the Civil War, Franco was in a position to rally ‘the whole of war-weary Spain on to his side’, but instead of doing this, ‘he let loose a reign of terror against the Republicans’, executing and imprisoning thousands. In the section of the article sub-titled ‘Possible Alternatives to Franco’, there are the beginnings of his change of heart. He states it is obvious that the Franco regime is ‘undesirable’: ‘But would it be right to take action to get rid of him? And, if so, what sort of action would be needed? And who would take his place if he went?’ Brenan points out that the governments of both the UK and the USA believe ‘that no pressure short of war could make Franco leave and hand over power to the Republicans’, and they are not willing to go to war. In this article Brenan further explores the idea of monarchical succession to Franco and seems to suggest that Don Juan, the son of Alfonso XIII, could be a suitable replacement. After all Don Juan had been educated at Dartmouth Naval College, and his mother was English. Moreover, he ‘has taken as his chief adviser a Liberal and is said to have progressive ideas’.

According to Faber, *The Face of Spain* is a clever piece of writing on Brenan’s part, by which he ‘skillfully depoliticized his own image’, claiming he ‘was tired of politics – especially the hopeless politics of the Peninsula’. The book probably helped Brenan achieve his objective of returning to live in Spain, by demonstrating that he was prepared to change his opinions. But, he was just critical enough of the Regime to retain his integrity. The success of Brenan’s strategy, to criticize Franco just enough to avoid the appearance of a

215 Ibid., 15.
216 Ibid., 16.
complete volte-face, can perhaps be gauged by the reaction of an upset employee at the Spanish tourist Office in London which Partridge experienced early in 1953. Partridge wrote to Brenan that he had dropped by the tourist office and the man on the desk – a ‘little toothbrushed-moustached Francophile’ – had ‘broke out in an indignant protest’ against The Face of Spain on discovering I intended visiting you. The employee claims the book was ‘so unfair; it should have been “One Face of Spain”’.  

Signs of Brenan’s turn are evident not only in The Face of Spain, but also in Personal Record. Faber notes that Brenan distanced himself from the position he had taken in Labyrinth regarding the spoliation of churches by workers. In Labyrinth he characterizes the spoliation as an understandable reaction ‘to the church’s long-term complicity’ to repress the Spanish people. In The Face of Spain he interpreted the workers’ actions as culturally impoverishing the country and undermining their cause and writes that the destruction of ‘great works put up by other men in the past’ is tantamount to ‘attacking the spirit of humanity’ and a proclamation of ‘their own unfitness to win’. Personal Record provides many examples of Brenan’s turn, but one of the oddest must surely be his assertion that the Republic failed ‘because it had no social programme, and by its attacks on the Church it had given the landowners a powerful ally and enormously increased the bitterness of feeling in the country’. His claim that the Republic had ‘no social programme’ is inconsistent with the ‘social programme’ he describes in Labyrinth:

> The Provisional Government passed a number of decrees for remedying the distressing situation in the country districts: wages were nearly doubled: landlords were compelled to cultivate all their land: tenant farmers were given the right to appeal against an increase of rents and were protected against capricious eviction: an eight hour day was established.

On the surface, Brenan’s second travelogue memoir South From Granada (1957), published four years after his return to Spain, is non-political. However, in the Preface Brenan makes an acknowledgement which links himself and his book to the CIA and the cultural Cold War when he writes:

---

218 In this context ‘Franophile’ is used to describe an admirer of General Franco and not France.
220 Quoted in S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 172.
221 G. Brenan, Personal Record, 275.
223 The same Preface remains intact in the 2008 Penguin ed.
Some of the early chapters have appeared in Der Monat, published in Berlin, and in the Anchor Review, published by Doubleday in New York, both of them under the editorship of Melvin J. Lasky.  

His acknowledgement of Lasky links Brenan to the Cold War manoeuvrings of the CIA. Lasky had shot to prominence in October 1947 at the Cominform-sponsored East Berlin Writers’ Congress, when ‘he grabbed the microphone and spoke for thirty-five minutes in flawless German praising those writers who spoke up against Hitler and exposed the similarities between the Nazi regime and the Soviet state’. Lasky had initially gone to Berlin as a ‘combat historian with the US 7th Army, and he had stayed on after his demobilization working as the German correspondent for the New Leader and Partisan Review.’ Lasky made the case for a cultural Cold War – ‘to win the educated and cultured classes’ who would in the long run, provide moral and political leadership in the community, and promote the American cause. His actions resulted in Der Monat – a monthly magazine designed to construct an ideological bridge between American and German intellectuals – being set up with the blessing of General Lucius Clay, who in March 1947 had replaced Eisenhower as the Military Governor of occupied Germany; it was initially funded through confidential funds of the Marshall Plan and then later by the CIA through the Ford Foundation. According to Stonor Saunders, sometime in 1953 the Ford Foundation had given Lasky ‘a grant of $275,000 to publish books under Der Monat’s auspices’. Could Brenan’s books have been beneficiaries of this money?

Brenan mentioned his initial dealings with Der Monat to Partridge in a letter dated January 1954:

A new American publication starring Lionel Trilling and other big shots has asked me to contribute to their first number. They offer from 150 to 200 dollars for a short article, which Der Monat of Berlin will also take at half the same price.

By early June 1954 Brenan told Partridge that South From Granada was half finished, and that he had sold the first two chapters for $450 ($11,334 in 2016) and that the buyers were

---

226 Ibid., 28.
227 Ibid., 29. On page 140 Stonor Saunders writes that Der Monat was set up in October 1948 and financed by the ‘Confidential Fund’ of the American High Commission.
228 Ibid., 217.
229 Presumably The Reporter.
interested in more chapters. Brenan also told Partridge that he was ‘reviewing a book on Spain for The Reporter at a high rate of pay’ – £60 ($1,511 in 2016) and he had ‘a New Yorker article on the stocks’.

The book that Brenan was referring to in this letter to Partridge could only have been Claude Bowers’ pro-Republic memoir My Mission to Spain which recounted the author’s time as US ambassador to the Spanish Republic. Brenan’s review was published in The Reporter on 7 October 1954. Faber points out that the extent of Brenan’s turn can be gauged by this review, which manifestly reveals that Brenan had moved from a pro-Republican stance to ‘an increasingly pragmatic view of the Franco regime’ and ‘skepticism about the possibility’ of restoring democracy to Spain.

Faber points out that Brenan labels Bowers’ book as anachronistic; it ‘had hardly evolved from the simplistic representation [of the Civil War] that was current among Loyalist supporters – including Brenan himself – while the fighting was still ongoing’. Furthermore, in his review Brenan alluded to the lessons that Civil War Spain had for the Cold War world. Brenan defended Bowers’ right to bias and partiality and writes, ‘that the ambassador of a democracy ought to favour those parties which believe in democratic institutions whenever they are attacked and undermined by others which are totalitarian’. He continues: ‘This was especially necessary when the world was as gravely menaced by the Nazi and Fascist nations as it is by the Communist ones today.’

Der Monat, The Reporter and New Yorker, which Brenan mentions in this letter to Partridge, were all connected with the Congress of Cultural Freedom. This links Brenan to the CIA by association. In a recent essay Dutch scholar Elke van Cassel claims there is ‘substantial’ circumstantial evidence to conclude that ‘The Reporter was bankrolled by the CIA’.

She points out that The Reporter and Der Monat were founded at almost exactly the same time and that they ‘both originated with the same network of former Strategic Services and War Information Office employees … around the time this informal network was

---

231 Brenan-Partridge letter, Churriana, 3 June 1954, in Xan Fielding (Ed.), Best of Friends, 201.
232 S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 177.
233 Ibid.
235 See Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 358.
reinforced by the formation of the CIA’. Van Cassel finds it strange that The Reporter’s archives, unlike those of Partisan Review and New Leader... do not contain any information about the magazine’s business side. Circulation figures, subscription lists, information about advertising and, most importantly, financial records are all missing.

Max Ascoli, an Italian professor of political philosophy and law, and exile from Mussolini’s Italy, was the principal founder and publisher of The Reporter. Van Cassel’s suspicions are aroused by the claim by Ascoli’s financial advisor, Nathan Levin, that The Reporter was initially funded by Ascoli’s wife, Marion Ascoli, and then ‘subsequently sustained by the acquisition of a number of companies’. Van Cassel notes that although the magazine consistently lost money throughout its nineteen year history, ‘Max and Marion Ascoli eventually broke even’.

The eventual publisher of South From Granada in 1957 was Hamish Hamilton who had been proactive in publishing the anti-communist work The God That Failed. Stonor Saunders asserts that Hamilton was ‘himself closely tied to intelligence’ and claims that the ‘Foreign Office purchased and distributed 50,000 copies’ of The God That Failed in 1948 – an unfortunate typographical error on Stonor Saunders’ part since the book was not published until 1949 in the USA, and 1950 in the UK. Apparently, Hamilton had come up with the idea of publishing a book of ‘autobiographical sketches’ by prominent former communist or fellow-traveller intellectuals recounting why they became disillusioned with communism. He had suggested the title Lost Illusions, but The God That Failed was eventually settled on. Stonor Saunders asserts that ‘all but one of the articles in The God That Failed were original contributions to Der Monat or articles for which the magazine negotiated the copyright. By issue 25, Der Monat had completed publication of all the essays’. In the USA The God That Failed was published by Cass Canfield, who Stonor Saunders asserts, ‘enjoyed prolific links to the world of intelligence, both as a former psychological warfare officer, and as a close personal friend of Allen Dulles’ who was Director of the CIA in the 1950s and early

237 Ibid., 136.
238 According to Van Cassel the archives of Partisan Review and New Leader contain ‘evidence of money changing hands and funding through foundations that have been revealed as CIA conduits’. (135).
240 Ibid., 135.
241 Ibid.
242 F. Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?, 60.
243 Ibid., 64.
Stonor Saunders concludes that ‘The God That Failed was as much a product of intelligence as it was the work of the intelligentsia’. It should be noted that as well as South From Granada, Hamish Hamilton went on to publish three more of Brenan’s books in the sixties – two novels and the first volume of his autobiography. Obviously, the relationship was of mutual benefit to both parties.

The New Yorker had been helped financially by Julius (Junkie) Fleischman a millionaire, the first President of the CIA funded Farfield Foundation, and according to Stonor Saunders, the ‘CIA’s most significant front-man’. Brenan wrote articles for The New Yorker. This begs the question was Brenan’s career benefitting from CIA approval?

Brenan’s volte-face parallels the changing political outlooks of the USA and the UK in the late 1940s. The priority of the USA and UK was to rehabilitate Franco ‘from a fierce Fascist thug into a moderate Christian statesman’ – a position which was endorsed by the western media. Franco himself was not ‘a passive pawn’ in this process. In 1947 he gave interviews to US and UK newspapers in which he cultivated the demeanour of the moderate, modest ruler. These media interviews were accompanied by ‘a generously funded lobby campaign’ in the USA. Public relations firms were hired to fete senators, journalists and political powerbrokers. In an interview in 1948 for The New York Times, Franco explained why Spain was necessary to the embryonic Atlantic alliance: ‘This alliance is, without Spain, like an omelette without eggs … Where but in Spain could the USA find bases and safe storage in case of war in Europe?’ The USA not only desired a rapprochement with Spain because of their own strategic needs; they had also come to the realization that Franco was there to stay, ‘and they preferred accommodation to risking the dangers of a forceful political transition.’ For these reasons the USA made every effort to find Franco’s ‘political and human virtues’, to raise his prestige and turn him into the ‘good’ dictator. Franco facilitated this transition by reshuffling his cabinet to enable new ministers to introduce ‘mild economic reforms that corrected some of the most untenable policies of the autarkic

1960s. Stonor Saunders concludes that ‘The God That Failed was as much a product of intelligence as it was the work of the intelligentsia’. It should be noted that as well as South From Granada, Hamish Hamilton went on to publish three more of Brenan’s books in the sixties – two novels and the first volume of his autobiography. Obviously, the relationship was of mutual benefit to both parties.

The New Yorker had been helped financially by Julius (Junkie) Fleischman a millionaire, the first President of the CIA funded Farfield Foundation, and according to Stonor Saunders, the ‘CIA’s most significant front-man’. Brenan wrote articles for The New Yorker. This begs the question was Brenan’s career benefitting from CIA approval?

Brenan’s volte-face parallels the changing political outlooks of the USA and the UK in the late 1940s. The priority of the USA and UK was to rehabilitate Franco ‘from a fierce Fascist thug into a moderate Christian statesman’ – a position which was endorsed by the western media. Franco himself was not ‘a passive pawn’ in this process. In 1947 he gave interviews to US and UK newspapers in which he cultivated the demeanour of the moderate, modest ruler. These media interviews were accompanied by ‘a generously funded lobby campaign’ in the USA. Public relations firms were hired to fete senators, journalists and political powerbrokers. In an interview in 1948 for The New York Times, Franco explained why Spain was necessary to the embryonic Atlantic alliance: ‘This alliance is, without Spain, like an omelette without eggs … Where but in Spain could the USA find bases and safe storage in case of war in Europe?’ The USA not only desired a rapprochement with Spain because of their own strategic needs; they had also come to the realization that Franco was there to stay, ‘and they preferred accommodation to risking the dangers of a forceful political transition.’ For these reasons the USA made every effort to find Franco’s ‘political and human virtues’, to raise his prestige and turn him into the ‘good’ dictator. Franco facilitated this transition by reshuffling his cabinet to enable new ministers to introduce ‘mild economic reforms that corrected some of the most untenable policies of the autarkic

245 F. Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?, 136. Cass Canfield was also ‘a trustee of the Farfield Foundation, and director of Grosset and Dunlap, Bantam books, and director of the editorial board of Harper Brothers’. (136).
250 Quoted in Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, Franco: The Biography of a Myth, 146.
251 Ibid., 147.
252 Ibid.
system'. In 1953 the USA and Spain signed defence and cooperation agreements and in exchange for military and economic aid Franco ceded several military bases to the USA. As the Canadian-Spanish scholar Carzorla Sánchez points out, by this time ‘friendly coverage’ of Franco’s Regime ‘was already the norm in the American media’. In a CBS broadcast in early 1953 a former US Assistant Secretary of State, Adolf A. Berle, told Americans that:

…the Spanish people undoubtedly want to be protected against, to have defence against Russian aggression either direct by an army or by reason of a packaged revolution exported to them. We have a common interest in having them protected … To that extent therefore and up to that point, the Spanish people and the American people have a common interest.

Sánchez identified a new tendency in US diplomatic circles to emphasize that Spain, ‘lying on the periphery of Europe’, had developed its nationhood differently to the USA and most of Western Europe and refers to the briefing notes used by the US Ambassador to the 10th UNO General Assembly in December 1955, which drew attention to the fact that not only was Spain ‘occupied for several hundred years by African peoples’, it was ‘only slightly influenced’ by three ‘fundamental’ democracy drivers; the ‘Protestant Reformation, the ideas of 18th century nationalism and the French Revolution, and the 19th century Industrial Revolution’. This interpretation and historical analysis provided US policy makers with the theoretical justification for a rapprochement with the Spanish dictatorship based on common interests rather than democratic brotherhood. It did not follow then, that because Spain was not ready or suited to democracy, Spain and the USA did not share special interests. One of these was the containment of communism, which did not preclude Spain and the USA forming alliances on the basis of these shared interests. The US media willingly accepted the new political paradigm as evidenced in a Universal Newsreel from 1956, which proclaimed that Spain’s Armed Forces were ‘significantly strengthened’ by ‘American-made tanks’ and other ‘modern war matériel’ and heralded that ‘America fulfils its part of the bargain, tanks for bases to bar the spread of Red Aggression’. In 1957 the US media demonstrated their willingness to distort history and trumpet a partisan interpretation of Spain’s recent past, when CBS news reported the Francoist Victory Parade as a celebration of ‘the 18th

---

253 Ibid., 148.
254 Ibid., 151.
255 Quoted in Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, *Franco*, 151.
256 Ibid., 151-52.
257 Ibid., 152.
anniversary of the termination of the Spanish revolution and victory over communism. Spain’s admission to the UNO in 1955 was a key indicator of the Franco regime’s rehabilitation in international affairs, but the pinnacle was reached in December 1959 when President Eisenhower visited Madrid and pictures were flashed around the world of the Eisenhower-Franco embrace. Carzorla Sánchez believes the sympathetic reporting of the Spanish regime by US media organization came at a price, and ‘in January 1956, the vice-President of United Press presented Franco a memorandum requesting permission to increase their presence in Spain’. The political acceptance of Franco Spain had its echo in the popular imagination with the growth of mass tourism. In 1951, one and a quarter million tourists went to Spain, and by 1960 this had grown to six million.

Why the Brenans went to Spain when they did for ten weeks in 1949 is problematic for historians. Faber highlights this and writes that ‘the circumstances of the trip’ and the resulting book – The Face of Spain – ‘are curiously obscure’ and points out that ‘Brenan barely mentions them’ in Personal Record. Faber poses the question how ‘a known sympathizer of the Republic whose books were banned from the Peninsula, managed so quickly to obtain permission for his visit from Spanish authorities’. Faber turns to José Ruiz Más’ findings in his 1999 essay for answers. Ruiz Más is of the opinion that Brenan, because he was always short of cash, may have ‘been tempted to accept the sponsorship of “some entity or individual(s) interested in publicizing a very particular image of the country” – specifically the Monarchist lobby’. Ruiz Más believes this could also account for why the Spanish edition of the book was quickly published in Buenos Aires within a year of the English edition. Ruiz Más sees evidence for this perspective in the ‘two very specific political positions’ taken in the book – ‘that Spain should receive international financial aid and that its only hope lay in the restoration of the monarchy’. Ruiz Más may be over-emphasising the extent of Brenan’s money worries at this time. Brenan’s father had died in July 1947 and

---

258 Ibid.
259 Ibid., 155.
260 Ibid., 153.
261 Ibid., 155.
262 S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 171.
263 José Ruiz Más’ ‘The Face of Spain by Gerald Brenan: Libro de viajes propaganda a favor de Don Juan de Bourbón’ (a propaganda travel book in support of Don Juan de Bourbón) in Grove, Working Papers on English Studies, No.6, 1999, 161-76.
264 Quoted in S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 171.
265 S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 171.
left him about £9500.²⁶⁶ Gathorne-Hardy believes that Brenan’s income was then about £1100 per annum and that he had sufficient capital ‘for emergencies’ and ‘for trips’.²⁶⁷ There is no doubt that Brenan often felt that he was desperately short of money in the years after his demobilization and throughout the 1920s. His father was reasonably wealthy but was loath to support Brenan unless it was in some endeavour he approved of, nevertheless he gave Gerald a small allowance.²⁶⁸ Another source of income for Brenan was his Great-aunt Tiz (Baroness Von Roeder) who ‘gave him £50 pa but frequently added little cheques’.²⁶⁹ Tiz died in July 1929, and the following year Brenan inherited from her estate £6570 (approximately £368,352 at 2016 values).²⁷⁰ Gathorne-Hardy believes that for Brenan ‘acute poverty was over’ and that he now had an annual income from his various sources in the realm of £350 (£19,841) per year.²⁷¹

CONCLUSION

_The Spanish Labyrinth_, arguably Brenan’s finest work, continues to be recognized by historians as the first significant examination of the causes of the Spanish Civil War. _Labyrinth_ had its genesis in Brenan’s decision to live in Spanish Andalusia in the aftermath of the Great War. During the sixteen years from 1920 to the start of the Spanish Civil War Brenan lived in two worlds – an ex-pat life in rural Spain, and a literati life associated with the Bloomsbury Set in England. Misconception and exaggeration about the amount of time that Brenan spent in Spain, and romanticisation of his life in Andalusia before the Civil War have helped to shape his image as a reliable commentator on Spanish affairs. It is important however, to separate the man from the myth, to reveal the very human compromises and accommodations that Brenan made to pursue his life and work in Spain. Elements of Brenan’s biography gave rise to one of the most romantic stereotypes of the Englishman abroad – that of the rugged individualist who chooses to live a simple life amongst foreigners, learning their language, adopting their customs and ultimately using his knowledge to improve the conditions under which they lived. This image was so appealing and so powerful that Brenan’s life was eventually dramatized in a film – an honour shared by few historians.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 128 & 198.
Romanticisation has spawned Brenan’s reputation in Spain as an ‘amigo de España’ and ‘an unequalled analyst of the Spanish soul’.²⁷² Hugh Trevor-Roper illustrates the extent of Brenan’s romanticisation among Anglo-American scholars, when he describes Brenan as one who understood Spain ‘as no foreigner seems ... to have known it’.²⁷³ These are extraordinary accolades for a man, as the writer and translator Martin Beagles points out, who ‘had really no contact with any Spanish people who were not servants, cleaners, etc’. For Beagles, Brenan epitomized the British hispanist and travel writer of the twentieth century, who rarely spoke to or met Spanish thinkers and writers.²⁷⁴

Overlaid on this myth of the Englishman abroad was the image of a left-leaning bohemian intellectual who counted Ralph and Frances Partridge, Virginia and Leonard Woolf, Dora Carrington, V.S. Pritchett and Lytton Strachey amongst his friends.

Initially Brenan chose to live in Spain not because of a love of things Spanish, but because it was a place where he could live cheaply, sexually liberate and educate himself, but most importantly of all, where he could perfect his craft as writer. It was his desire to be a writer that was his main driving force throughout his life.

Brenan is a hard figure to pin down politically because of the degree of romanticisation and misrepresentation that his persona has undergone. His connection with the Bloomsbury Set, where he mixed with left-thinking people, implies that he too was a progressive thinker. On the other hand, the extreme reactionary views that he expressed early on in life regarding the Irish question suggest the contrary. He expressed political views, but was rarely motivated to act on them. He never had a burning desire to change the world for the better. Political activism was not his natural state; it was an aberration. It took the brutality of the Spanish Civil War, which he witnessed from his house near Malaga, to politicize him into championing the cause of the Spanish Republic. His politically active phase lasted thirteen years, from the start of the Civil War in 1936 until his 1949 decision to return to Franco Spain – a relatively short period for a man who lived ninety-three years. During his politically active phase he addressed rallies, spoke to politicians and wrote letters to the press, but most importantly he researched and wrote Labyrinth. The publication and success of Labyrinth

²⁷² S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 181.
²⁷³ Quoted in María Jesús González Hernández, Raymond Carr, 135.
²⁷⁴ Quoted in Jeremy Treglown, V.S. Pritchett: A Working Life, Pimlico, London, 2005, 268, n.31. Faber concurs with Beagles, and writes Brenan’s ‘Spanish relations were limited to his servants and fellow villagers.’ See S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 156.
marks the pinnacle of his politicization. It was accorded seminal status, and Brenan was elevated from obscurity to the most celebrated Anglo-American hispanist of his time.

Like George Orwell, Brenan’s writing and personal reputation were dependent on the ideas of the prevailing political climate; *Labyrinth*’s publishing success during the Cold War years was probably not achieved through merit alone. As with Orwell’s *Homage to Catalonia* contemporaneous politics contributed to the book’s popularity. The exact impact that this had on Brenan’s career and the publishing success of his books cannot currently be determined through documentary evidence. As has been discussed in this chapter, security agencies are by their very nature furtive, and loath to authorize the release of documents that may incriminate them in manipulative undercover actions. However, the circumstances driving the Franco regime’s decision to allow a very well-known anti-Franco campaigner, and the author of a celebrated history, which located the blame for the Civil War fairly and squarely on the very conservative interest groups which the Franco regime championed, are ripe for speculation. The decision to allow Brenan to return to live and write in Franco Spain, without obvious restrictions, cannot be detached from the *realpolitik* of the developing *rapprochement* between Spain and the West during the early Cold War years. The Franco regime wanted both American military hardware, and American financial assistance. The USA and the UK wanted a politically stable Spain as a bulwark against communist or Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean. Brenan’s reconciliation with Franco Spain was a very small step in the process by which the USA and the UK rebranded Franco as a worthwhile ally in the struggle against communism. The Franco regime, by allowing former opponents to return to Spain showcased that the regime was no longer tarred with a fascist brush.

Brenan’s appropriation was very different to Orwell’s. In Orwell’s case the process mainly took place after his death. Brenan’s took place in his lifetime, and Brenan was happy to collude in it in order to return to live in Spain. There is no evidence that the Franco regime imposed special conditions on his research, subject matter and writing after he returned to live permanently in Spain in 1953, although his books remained banned until 1974. However, his literary actions after his return to Spain indicate a degree of self-censorship, and he refrained from writing critically about the regime. His reputation as a knowledgeable recorder of things Hispanic was appropriated by the intelligence agencies. Although no definitive evidence exists that proves this was the case, the circumstantial evidence of chapters from *South From Granada* being paid for in advance by the anti-communist publisher Hamish Hamilton, as well as Brenan’s links with undercover CIA agent and literary editor Melvin
Lasky, strongly suggests that this was the likely scenario. Such financial advances not only helped Brenan financially but also further enhanced his reputation, as well as promoting future sales of *South From Granada*. In his correspondence with Partridge and others Brenan never mentions the CIA, or any other intelligence agency, and it may be that at the time he was unaware of receiving any largesse at their hands. In any case, he probably would not have been troubled at the prospect. By this stage of his life he had moved on from the Spanish Civil War and anti-Francoism and had reverted to his natural non-politically active position. Moreover, he was never one to turn up his nose at the prospect of money, and he had over the years developed a pragmatic moral compass when it came to matters of self-interest. If he was ignorant of receiving intelligence agency largesse at the time, it is unlikely that he would not have made the connection later on, after the revelations of the process in the sixties and seventies, and the disclosure that Melvin Lasky was a key player in the process. However, there is no documentary evidence that this was the case. Brenan was appropriated not because of any anti-communist content that the *Labyrinth* contained, but because of his personal status and standing as the most well-known hispanist of his time. It was his reputation as an unbiased witness of things Spanish that was used by both the West and the Franco regime. The fact that a former opponent to Franco could live safely in Spain helped the regime gain respectability.
CHAPTER THREE

BURNETT BOLLOTEN: DEDICATED SCHOLAR

UNRAVELLING A ‘GRAND CAMOUFLAGE’ OR

OBSESSED COLD WAR WARRIOR?

INTRODUCTION

On 2 October 1978 Burnett Bolloten informed his friend Professor Edward Malefakis that he would be thanking him and others, in the preface of his forthcoming book, *The Spanish Revolution.* Bolloten explained that this was in appreciation of their support and encouragement, at a time when he most needed it – when ‘revolting creatures like Herbert Southworth’ were making allegations that the CIA had funded him. The extent to which Southworth had forced Bolloten onto the defensive to explain how he was able to live, research, and write for some sixteen years from 1937 to 1953 without paid employment, is evident from Bolloten’s disclosure of his personal financial details to George Weller, who was advising him on how best to promote *The Spanish Revolution.* Eight years later Bolloten showed he was still irked by the innuendo, when, in a recorded conversation about his life and work, he again disclosed his financial details, explaining that he did so because of the questions that had been raised.

This chapter assesses the validity of Southworth’s allegation that Bolloten’s anti-communist and anti-Soviet interpretations were the product of Cold War politics, and it addresses the insinuation that Bolloten benefitted materially from such interpretations – an insinuation Southworth articulated to another Bolloten critic, Robert Colodny.

---

1 Malefakis was in esteemed company. The ‘others’ Bolloten thanked were Raymond Carr, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Noam Chomsky, Joan Connolly Ullman, Stanley Payne, Ronald Hilton, Bertram and Ella Wolfe, Juan Linz, and David Wingate Pike. It should be noted that Malefakis also acknowledged Bolloten in the preface of his own book, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain* (1970).

2 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 2 October 1978, Bolloten Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 6, Folder 25.

3 Weller-Bolloten letter dated 30 November 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27. Bolloten wrote to Weller: ‘This information [personal financial details] I am giving you because of the insinuations that the CIA funded me.’

4 ‘Rough Draft’ (transcript) of the Hilton-Bolloten conversation recorded in April 1987, Bolloten Collection, Box 115, 45. Bolloten does not elaborate as to who ‘raised’ the questions in the conversation.

5 Colodny was a Lincoln brigader who became a history professor at Pittsburg State University. He also engaged in a public polemic with Bolloten.
When he [Bolloten] went to Mexico in 1938 and at least until January 1940, he was at least a ‘fellow-traveller.’ What happened to make him become paranoically anti-Stalinist? Anti-Negrínista? How was a man, certainly identified by US Immigration officers, able to become a citizen of the US? Probably by reneging on his political past. This is normal for the course but why does he remain silent about it? 6

The chapter also explains ‘another mystery’ that perturbed Southworth – the circumstances surrounding the publication of the first Spanish edition of *The Grand Camouflage* in Franco Spain in June 1961. It was published within three months of the English edition, entitled *El gran engaño* (*The Grand Deception*), 7 and ‘endowed with a laudatory introduction written by Manuel Fraga Iribarne, then director of the state-run Institute of Political Studies’, 8 and later, Franco’s Minister for Information and Tourism (1962-1969). Southworth asks Colodny: ‘Who called it [*The Grand Camouflage*] to the attention of the Spanish publisher? How did Fraga get involved in the matter?’ 9

The following key questions are addressed. Were Bolloten’s monumental efforts in collecting and processing data driven by the desire to flesh out a preconceived interpretation of events? Was Bolloten guilty of confirmation bias or illusory confirmation in the accumulation and selection of documentary evidence? 10 Did his anti-communist position become entrenched as the early Cold War years intersected with the years he was completing *The Grand Camouflage*? Bolloten lived in the vicinity of Stanford University from 1949 onwards and worked at the Hoover Institution in an honorary capacity. Did the conservative nature of this institution, and the people he came into contact with there, influence him? Did he, during the long difficult years of writing his books, deliberately select his evidence to fit the world view

---


10 Confirmation bias is the process of gathering or remembering information selectively and/or interpreting it in a biased way; it leads to attitude or belief polarization. Illusory confirmation takes place when an association between two events or situations is falsely perceived. Psychologists describe this as the tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms one’s preconceptions. In other words, it means to actively seek out and assign more weight to evidence that confirms the hypothesis, and ignore or under-weigh evidence that could disconfirm the hypothesis. As such, it can be thought of as a form of selection bias in collecting evidence. Confirmation bias has implications when ambiguous evidence is encountered. It results in interpreting this ambiguous evidence in support of the existing attitude. It is one of the effects of confirmation bias: the tendency of people to search for and interpret evidence selectively, to reinforce their current beliefs or attitudes. When people encounter ambiguous evidence, this bias can potentially result in each of them interpreting it as in support of their existing attitudes, widening rather than narrowing the disagreement between them.
that had crystalized during his years in Mexico? Was he directly influenced by the intellectuals of the American right or by the CIA?

To achieve these objectives a biographical, historiographical and empirical methodology is employed. The conversation which Bolloten recorded in April 1987 with Ronald Hilton (hereafter the ‘Hilton Conversation’) is a key source.\(^\text{11}\) The conversation was probably instigated by Hilton, with an eye to Bolloten’s historiographical legacy, as the two men were close. Southworth claimed that Hilton influenced Bolloten’s historical judgements.\(^\text{12}\) Bolloten himself implied this in *The Spanish Revolution*: ‘I owe a special debt of gratitude to Professor Ronald Hilton … who constantly encouraged me and prodded me [and] allowed me to draw upon his unparalleled knowledge of Spanish language and culture’.\(^\text{13}\) Bolloten recounts his life story in the conversation, although he does not reveal the full extent of the trials and tribulations he experienced getting his books written and published as he does in his correspondence.\(^\text{14}\) There are inconsistencies of detail in the conversation which this chapter will identify. Of special interest are Bolloten’s accounts of his initial engagement with and subsequent disengagement from the Communists.

The correspondence which Bolloten initiated during the fourteen years he researched and wrote *The Grand Camouflage* is a vital resource for this chapter. The correspondence consists of more than twenty thousand letters to former members of republican governments, international brigaders, and contemporaneous as well as later historians.\(^\text{15}\) Bolloten continued

\(^{11}\) Ronald Hilton was the founder and the director of Stanford University’s Institute of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies.


\(^{13}\) B. Bolloten, *The Spanish Revolution: The Left and the Struggle For Power During The Civil War*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1979, xvi-xvii. Bolloten’s second wife, Betty, also acknowledged the importance of Hilton to Bolloten. She wrote to Hilton after Burnett’s death, emphasising that Hilton’s friendship ‘had been very instrumental in the continuation of [her husband’s] work.’ See Bolloten Collection, Box 1, Folder 1.

\(^{14}\) The conversation was the first of a series of in interviews Hilton planned to have with scholars affiliated with the California Institute of International Studies.


In the course of research for *The Grand Camouflage* Bolloten consulted, ‘more than one hundred thousand newspapers and periodicals, approximately two thousand books and pamphlets, hundreds of unpublished documents’. Much of this material is now housed in the archives of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University in a collection of some 96.2 linear feet, in 117 manuscript boxes. The collection also includes Bolloten’s newspaper clippings and copies of speeches.
His correspondence with Antonio Villanueva, George Weller, Julián Gorkin, Edward Malefakis, and Angel Viñas is particularly useful in answering the questions posed in this chapter. Villanueva was a former member of the Valencia CNT and lived in exile in Mexico for some of the time that Bolloten resided there. He was Bolloten’s erstwhile researcher, particularly on CNT and FAI matters, as well as a conduit of resources – especially back-copies of newspapers such as the socialist Adelante and the FAI organ Tierra y Libertad. This correspondence sheds light on Southworth’s assertion that Bolloten was biased in his selection of sources, and reveals whether Bolloten relied too heavily on Villanueva to garner information from his contacts among Republican Spain’s Mexican diaspora of exiles. The correspondence with George Weller took place from 1979 to 1981 – at a time when Bolloten was experiencing great difficulty getting The Spanish Revolution published and promoted. Weller became a trusted friend and mentor, and masterminded a campaign to promote the book. This correspondence reveals the extent to which Bolloten was prepared to go to get his book sold and read, and also reveals his changing friendship network during this period.

The correspondence with Julián Gorkin is scrutinized to establish the truth of Southworth’s claim that ‘Gorkin seems to have been the person who most influenced the thinking and writings of Burnett Bolloten.’ During the Civil War Gorkin was a POUMista, and in the fifties and sixties he was in the pay of the CIA as editor of Cuadernos, the monthly Spanish language journal, sponsored by the Congress of Cultural Freedom (hereafter CCF). If Southworth’s claim is correct, it could vindicate his attacks on Bolloten’s integrity as a researcher and scholar. Malefakis initiated a correspondence with Bolloten shortly after the publication of the

---

16 The Spanish Revolution (1979) and The Spanish Civil War (posthumously published 1991). Bolloten died before he had put ‘the finishing touches’ to the preface of The Spanish Civil War although according to George Esenwein, he left ‘both written and oral instructions to be followed.’ See B. Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1991, xi.

17 Weller won a Pulitzer Prize in 1943 for a story about an emergency appendectomy performed on a US submarine in enemy waters. He graduated from Harvard in 1929. He reported for The New York Times from Greece during the 1930s. He later joined The Chicago Daily News, reporting from the main theatres of World War Two. After the war he based himself in Rome, responsible for stories from the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa. He held this position until his retirement from the newspaper in 1975. Weller died in Italy in December 2002, aged 95. His fictional works include; Not to Eat, Not for Love (1933) – a novel of Harvard undergraduate life; Clutch and Differential (1936); The Promised Land (1937); The Crack in the Column (1949) – a novel of wartime Greece. His non-fictional titles include; The Ecstatic Hedy Lamarr (1939); The Belgian Campaign in Ethiopia (1941); Singapore is Silent (1943); First Into Nagasaki: The Censored Eyewitness Dispatches on Post-Atomic Japan and Its Prisoners of War (2006); Weller’s War: A Legendary Foreign Correspondent’s Saga of World War II on Five Continents (2009)


The Grand Camouflage, when he was ‘a Columbia University graduate student in Spain working on his doctoral dissertation entitled “Land concentration, agrarian reform and peasant revolution in modern Spain”’ and sought help from Bolloten. The two men became friends and corresponded until 1980. Over the years the correspondence reveals that a role reversal took place; the former student now became a Professor and mentored Bolloten as he struggled to get The Spanish Revolution published. The correspondence gives further insight into Bolloten’s friendship and knowledge networks. It reveals that Malefakis had reservations about aspects of Bolloten’s analysis and even attempted to get Bolloten to modify his interpretations. Angel Viñas initiated a correspondence with Bolloten in January 1977 which continued until December 1982. This correspondence is significant because Viñas became a major critic of Bolloten. The correspondence was always formal in tone and rooted in historical discourse. It reveals why Bolloten, who espoused great respect for Viñas and his work, finally broke with him.

The chapter treads new ground by using Bolloten’s correspondence in conjunction with the ‘Hilton Conversation’ as an empirical base to reconstruct Bolloten’s biographical portrait, as well as being the means to examine how he wrote his history. It identifies people and events that helped shape his life with special attention to their effect on his motivations, ambitions, ethics, and work methods. This is achieved by synthesizing and cross referencing the information given in the public sources, the recorded conversation, and the biographical snippets found in forewords, introductions and reviews by Bolloten’s friends and opponents. The result is a more comprehensive biographical portrait than is currently in the public domain and is a test of Bolloten’s veracity and consistency in his recounting of events important in his life. Until now biographical sketches have been in the hands of enthusiastic supporters such as Hilton and Esenwein, or critics such as Southworth and Colodny.

SETTING THE SCENE: BACKGROUND TO THE HISTORIOGRAPHIC WAR

When the first of Bolloten’s three books, The Grand Camouflage, was published in 1961, eight years after it was finished, Cold War tension and anti-communist feeling in the West were

---

20 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 14 November 1961, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
21 Malefakis’ thesis was published in 1970 as, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain. It was awarded the American Historical Association’s Herbert Baxter Adams’ prize for best book on any aspect of European history published in 1970. In his book Malefakis acknowledged Bolloten, but only in passing in the Preface, and The Grand Camouflage is included in the bibliography. Malefakis reserved his effusive acknowledgement to Juan Linz whom he had ‘spent so many fruitful hours [with] discussing the problems of Spain’ that he now scarcely knew where Linz’s thoughts ended and his began.
high. The newly inaugurated President Kennedy was confronted with civil war in Laos and the possibility of it escalating into something more, while in Europe the Soviet Union had upped the ante and signed off on East Germany’s plan to erect the Berlin Wall. In this context Bolloten could have expected that it was a propitious time for the release of his anti-communist book, subtitled *The Communist Conspiracy in the Spanish Civil War*.22

The essential theme of *The Grand Camouflage* – which imbues Bolloten’s subsequent books – is that the military coup of July 1936 provoked a ‘far-reaching social revolution … more profound in some respects than the Bolshevik Revolution in its early stages’, which replaced the bourgeois institutions of the Popular Front government with revolutionary committees and councils.23 As a result, the Soviet Union initiated a counterrevolution in favour of a democratic bourgeois republic, in order to present a non-revolutionary façade to the world, and thereby convince Britain and France to support the Republic in the Civil War. In the process the Soviet-controlled PCE overthrew the prime-ministership of Largo Caballero and asserted control over the Republic by undermining the Socialist Party, infiltrating the police and the army, and betraying and crushing the CNT, FAI,24 and POUM; all of this was done with the collusion of Juan Negrín and Julio Álvarez del Vayo.25 Also central to Bolloten’s thesis was his claim that the Republic attempted to camouflage ‘the true nature and scope’ of the Spanish Revolution in order to keep ‘millions of discerning people outside Spain in ignorance … of its existence, by virtue of a policy of duplicity and dissimulation of which there is no parallel in history,’26 and that this was done at the behest of the Soviet Union and the PCE, ‘with the acquiescence or active support’ of other left-wing elements in Spain.27

*The Grand Camouflage* attracted reputable supporters. Raymond Carr wrote in the *Observer*: ‘Mr Bolloten has written what is by far the most scholarly study of the Civil War that I have seen.’28 Stanley Payne initially had reservations about the book and thought Bolloten ‘was exaggerating about the left’, but he ‘later found out that this was mostly not the

22 The subtitle was suggested by his British Catholic publisher Hollis and Carter. See B. Bolloten, *The Spanish Civil War*, xiv.
24 Federación Anarquista Ibérica (Iberian Anarchist Federation).
26 Ibid., 17.
Bolloten’s thesis was ‘a red rag to a bull’ to many scholars and historians like Colodny; it contradicted the sacrosanct interpretation that the Soviet Union played an essentially positive role in Spain and was instrumental in the formation of the united force considered necessary to fight the war.
28 R. Carr, in the *Observer* quoted on page 7, ‘Reviews of The Grand Camouflage’ – a compilation of excerpts of positive reviews made available to D. Burrowes by Peter Stansky from his private papers.
case’. In 1991 Payne revealed the extent of his conversion to Bolloten’s interpretations when he wrote in the foreword to Bolloten’s posthumously published last book *The Spanish Civil War*: ‘The legacy of Burnett Bolloten is truly an enduring one.’ *The Grand Camouflage* also attracted support from scholars who were yet to make their mark in Civil War historiography. The aforementioned Malefakis told Bolloten:

> Your acquaintance with the situation is far more complete than that of any other writer I have encountered, and your familiarity with local newspaper sources is especially astonishing. It is a remarkable achievement, one which I feel sure will stand for many years to come.

Interestingly, adverse criticism came from an unexpected quarter with philosophy Professor J.M. Cameron’s review in *Blackfriars*, a Catholic monthly journal edited by English Dominicans. Cameron unfavourably compared *The Grand Camouflage* to Hugh Thomas’s *The Spanish Civil War*, published the same year. One would have expected a Catholic journal to have supported a book which uncovered communist duplicity in Spain. Instead, Cameron heralded Thomas’s book as a ‘timely’ and ‘admirably objective … definitive history’, whereas *The Grand Camouflage* reveals that its author ‘is a little simple-minded’. Moreover, Cameron asserted the book was the product of the contemporaneous political climate, and that Bolloten was ‘the prisoner of the American dogma, that to work with the communists in any circumstances is to be wicked, and a tool of the communists.’ *The Grand Camouflage* also attracted qualified praise, perhaps unwelcome, from Luis Bolín, Franco’s former press director responsible for foreign press correspondents in the rebel zone during the Civil War, who described it as ‘well-documented … which no student of Spanish affairs should miss’.

Although Bolín did take issue with Bolloten’s conclusion that the communists had not conspired to set up a Soviet regime in Spain in the summer of 1936, because such a move would have counteracted Stalin’s goal of an alliance with the western democracies against the Fascist states.

---

29 Email correspondence S. Payne-D. Burrowes, dated 21 September 2012.
31 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 14 November 1961, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
32 Cameron was a Professor of Philosophy at Leeds University 1960 -1967, at Kent University from 1967 -1971, and at St Michael’s College, Toronto, from 1971 until his retirement.
34 Before the coup Bolín arranged an aircraft to transport Franco from the Canary Islands to Morocco.
Bolloten had foreseen that his book would aggravate the ‘sectarian animosity’ that already imbued Civil War historiography, and he anticipated that he personally would come under intense examination, but he could not have expected the ten page forensic scrutiny that Southworth subjected *The Grand Camouflage* to in his anti-Franco book, *El mito de la cruzada de Franco* (hereafter *El mito*). Much to Southworth’s chagrin Bolloten did not respond publicly to what can now be seen as Southworth’s first salvo in what was to become an historiographical war of attrition with Bolloten. The reasons for Bolloten’s lack of response may have lain in his tendency to avoid the limelight. Esenwein claims that:

> Bolloten coveted his intellectual independence (and personal anonymity) so highly that he tended to shun formal political associations – especially those that were vying for the public spotlight – as well as ties to academia… he believed that writing history mattered more than engaging in doctrinal polemics. 

For Southworth, Bolloten’s silence had less to do with ‘intellectual independence (and personal anonymity)’ and more to do with avoiding scrutiny and trying to ‘conceal’ his past. Southworth eventually provoked a reaction from Bolloten in 1978 with his *Times Literary Supplement* (**TLS**) review of *La Révolution espagnol* – the French edition of Bolloten’s second book – when he asserted:

> Bolloten’s book cannot be dissociated from the Cold War, above all because of his sources. Many of these are confessions of ex-members of the Spanish Communist Party or Russian *transfuges* [renegades]. It would be of historiographical interest someday to pin down exactly which of these volumes were in reality inspired by secret funds from certain United States agencies.

---

36 Bolloten used this phrase in a letter to Francisco Ferrándiz Alborz dated 20 March 1950, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 7. Bolloten wrote to the veteran socialist of the Second Spanish Republic, ‘...there is no more complex subject than the Spanish Civil War ... the historian must look below the billowing surface of sectarian animosity ... no historian, however conscientious and thorough he may be, can hope to secure all the facts or interpret them correctly by his own unaided efforts.’

37 Barea-Bolloten letter dated 15 July 1950, Bolloten Collection, Box 5, Folder 10.


39 See H. Southworth, ‘*The Grand Camouflage*: Julián Gorkin, Burnett Bolloten ...’ 295. Southworth writes: ‘Bolloten ignored for many years what I had written about him ...’ Bolloten referred to Southworth’s criticism sixteen years later in a cursory footnote in *The Spanish Revolution*: ‘Herbert R. Southworth ridicules my thesis that there was an attempt at concealment.’ (155, n. 66).


A heated debate in the pages of the TLS was the result. David Wingeate Pike, a close friend to both men, claims the war of words was relished by Southworth, but not by Bolloten. In Southworth’s opinion, Bolloten ‘doubtlessly considered that he could not disregard an indignity of that nature’. Southworth denigrated Bolloten’s scholarship, off and on, for the next thirty years. For Southworth it became personal. As Faber pointed out, ‘people who questioned [Southworth’s] claims, or otherwise disagreed with him, were his enemies’. In 1996 Southworth elaborated on his objections to Bolloten’s book in his long essay, ‘The Grand Camouflage: Julián Gorkin, Burnett Bolloten and the Spanish Civil War’. His first sentence set the tone: ‘There are books, the text and notes of which should be read and analysed like the fine print of an insurance policy’, and he advised this methodology should be applied to Bolloten’s works. In Southworth’s last book, Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War Southworth labelled Bolloten as ‘another enemy of the Republic (a fact which he tried carefully to hide)’, who ‘throughout his career, had always chosen a selective bibliography’.

BOLLOTEN – THE HISTORIAN: TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS

Bolloten’s correspondence reveals a complex man, prone to personality swings, displaying different personality traits to different correspondents. Sometimes he was arrogant, self-righteous, self-centred, and conceited to the extent that he used paper headed: ‘FROM THE DESK OF BURNETT BOLLOTEN’[sic]. At other times, he was self-effacing, modest and insecure. This is evident when he wrote to Malefakis: ‘I have felt wretched this week … because of my inability to strengthen my thinking out on the question of Spanish gold in order to make essential changes in the typescript.’ On some occasions he played the martyr: ‘My whole life has been shaped by the Spanish Civil War, much to my personal sacrifice.’ At other times he exhibited jealousy and envy:

43 Email correspondence David Wingeate Pike-Darryl Burrowes, dated 26 April 2012. Pike has written extensively on Spain and Latin America. He is Professor Emeritus of Contemporary History and Politics at The American University of Paris. Bolloten acknowledged Pike for ‘his support and help’ in the Preface (xvii) in The Spanish Revolution.
45 S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 90.
47 H. Southworth, Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War, 85.
48 This letterhead is found on letters to Malefakis dated 12 September 1971 & 12 June 1971, Malefakis-Bolloten Correspondence, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
49 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 15 April 1977, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25. Bolloten is referring to his typescript of his The Spanish Revolution to which he had to make ‘drastic’ and ‘essential’ changes because of the publication Angel Viñas’ 600 page El oro español en la Guerra civil.
50 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 31 March 1978, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
Today I hear that Thomas’s book *The Spanish Civil War* is to be reprinted by Harper … I must confess such news distresses me … No books of my original work *The Grand Camouflage* are available for sale anywhere and many, many libraries do not even have a single copy.\(^{51}\)

His correspondence with Malefakis also reveals a predisposition to speculation, bordering on the malicious. On 7 April 1977, Malefakis attempted to cheer up a despondent Bolloten, who was not only having difficulty getting *The Grand Camouflage* reprinted but could not find a publisher for *The Spanish Revolution*. Malefakis urged Bolloten not to let himself ‘be tortured by the discrepancy between the popular success of Thomas’ book and the much more limited distribution’ of *The Grand Camouflage*. Malefakis elaborated that ‘people don’t want (or are incapable of) to tax their minds overmuch [sic], they usually prefer popularized, journalistically written, cliché-ridden accounts to more profound efforts.’\(^{52}\) Malefakis aired his own grievance about the possibility of his prize-winning book *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain* ever being reprinted or brought out in paperback. He compared it to Gabriel Jackson’s *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War 1931-39*, that had outsold his own book by ‘at least 20 to 1’ and was reprinted in paperback. Malefakis concluded: ‘There is no justice in all of this, obviously, since my book is far greater than Jackson’s just as yours is that Thomas’ [sic].’\(^{53}\) A week later Bolloten replied that he had met Jackson a year or so before and had praised the merits of Malefakis’s book to him, only to receive an unfavourable response:

> I had a feeling (this is strictly confidential) that he was jealous of the solid research you have done and even went so far as to attempt to downgrade it using as his “argument” the alleged unreliability of the tables!!!\(^{54}\)

In letter after letter Bolloten openly discussed his health issues and anxieties, as well as his own shortcomings and strengths. He revealed his inability to say “enough is enough”, in his search for new sources:

> I seem to have entered a period when writing (in any case terribly difficult for me) has become more than the usual strain with the result

---

\(^{51}\) Ibid. Bolloten is referring to Hugh Thomas’s book *The Spanish Civil War* which was published the same year as *The Grand Camouflage* (1961) and which was a publishing success.

\(^{52}\) Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 7 April 1977, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.

\(^{53}\) Ibid.

\(^{54}\) Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 15 April 1977, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25. Jackson is referring to Malefakis’ cliometric methodology with the inclusion of more than forty tables in his *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain*, which showed the distribution of medium, small and large holdings in Spain, distribution of cultivated land in various types of holdings, average taxable income, to name a few. For a full list see *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970, x-xii.
that my spirits are at a low ebb. To make matters worse I have at least one hundred books to read, all received from Spain during the past year, and from simply scanning them I can see that I cannot publish *The Spanish Revolution* without taking at least some of them into account.  

He knew that his search for new material was an obsession, and that he exhibited ‘maniacal characteristics – of having to see and study everything before [he] can write anything “definitive”’.  

Bolloten’s ambition to write ‘a definitive history’ reflects the fact that his ideas and methods were not that of the professional, university-trained, historian. Few professional historians would countenance the possibility of producing ‘a definitive history’. Most would concur with Herbert Butterfield, that ‘all histories [are] interim reports’ or with the Oxford scholar J. H. Elliott that: ‘All historical enterprises are in fact work in progress … a form of collaboration across the generations.’

In order ‘to write the most seriously documented book’ on the role of the communists in the Spanish Civil War, ‘no possible source of information [would be] neglected’. This grandiose ambition led Bolloten to describe his methodology in hyperbolic language, such as, ‘everything humanly possible’, ‘checked and rechecked data’, ‘the most important libraries and institutions in Europe and America’, ‘interviewed hundreds of refugees’, ‘thousands of letters’. He regularly claimed that he was ‘guided solely by the desire to reveal the truth’ – a claim which Southworth dismissed as ‘breast-beating’.  

Bolloten believed he achieved what other participants in debates about the Civil War had not – impartiality and objectivity, brought about by rigorously controlling his own emotions and convictions. Furthermore, he felt he maintained ‘the highest possible standards of scrupulosity’, by ignoring ‘the political susceptibilities of friends and acquaintances who provided [him] so generously with personal testimony and documentary material’.  

Ironically, Bolloten’s claim that he ignored the ‘susceptibilities of friends and acquaintances’ was unwittingly supported by his two fiercest critics – Colodny and Southworth. Colodny was in Mexico City at the same time as Bolloten and claims to have

---

55 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 15 April 1977, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.  
56 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 18 March 1978, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.  
58 J. H. Elliott, *History in the Making*, 100. Elliott’s attitude here is reflective of Butterworth his former doctorate supervisor.  
59 Antonio Villanueva–Bolloten letter, dated 30 June 1949, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 25.  
…talked to many of the same Republican exiles… who had shared confidences with Bolloten … [who] were appalled by the use that [he] had made of the materials given to him.\textsuperscript{63}

Eleven years later Southworth, perhaps influenced by Colodny, with whom he occasionally corresponded, expressed similar sentiments:

There were Spanish refugees in Mexico and elsewhere who, on reading \textit{The Grand Camouflage}, were convinced that the Bolloten who had talked with them, seeking information about the Civil War, had died and that other persons had published the book.\textsuperscript{64}

\section*{EARLY LIFE AND INFLUENCES – 1909 to 1935}

Bolloten was born in Bangor, Wales, on 24 June 1909.\textsuperscript{65} His parents, Joseph Bolloten and Betty Cohen, were Russian Jews who had migrated to the United Kingdom at the turn of the century. He had two older siblings – Lilian, born in 1898, and Michael, in 1907 – who seem to have played no part in Bolloten’s adult life.\textsuperscript{66} Joseph Bolloten’s strong work ethic brought him financial success. From peddling shoelaces to Welsh miners he progressed to selling musical instruments and clothes, and shortly before the outbreak of the Great War he went into the diamond business. Business success came at a cost to family harmony. It accentuated Joseph Bolloten’s domineering personality and every day brought a ‘volcanic eruption’.\textsuperscript{67} Bolloten told Hilton that his ‘whole childhood was very unhappy’, and that his brother’s and mother’s lives were also ‘ones of total sorrow’.\textsuperscript{68} Bolloten was undoubtedly scarred by his father’s brutality, but it contributed to his own personal drive:

I am pretty sure that in my case fifty per cent of the drive is neurotic (the battered-child syndrome, the desire for self-redeemption, the pulverized child ego craving recognition, the hatred of bullies and despots, the hypocrites, liars, and frauds, whom I quickly learned to detest as a youth)…\textsuperscript{69}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{65} ‘Rough Draft’, 1.
\bibitem{67} ‘Rough Draft’, 2.
\bibitem{68} Ibid., 1.
\bibitem{69} George Weller–Bolloten letter dated 31 January 1980, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.
\end{thebibliography}
Nevertheless, in 1928, aged nineteen, Bolloten went into the family business and his father gave him ‘full authority’ to go to Amsterdam and Antwerp to buy diamonds.\textsuperscript{70} It was on his business trips that Bolloten believes he developed an empathy for the underdog – spawned by the wretched conditions he saw people living under. He was particularly shocked that ‘chambermaids would work for sixteen hours a day’.\textsuperscript{71} This led to his interest in Marxism, which was nurtured by his friendship with Bob Ellis, a communist thirteen years his senior, who edited the Miner’s Federation paper, \textit{The Miner}.\textsuperscript{72} Bolloten found that working for his father was impossible. He ‘felt crushed and depersonalized by [his] father’s imperious manner and violent outbursts’, and he decided to strike out on his own. ‘Quite frankly’, he wrote to Weller, ‘I would have been happier in business. That was something that came naturally to me, whereas writing never has and never will. Still I had to get away from home and from his business.’ \textsuperscript{73}

In 1930 Bolloten left home. With his savings and the jobs he obtained while abroad, he spent almost three years away, visiting countries in Europe and North Africa and working where he could.\textsuperscript{74} He ended up in Beirut, where work was scarce. However, a shipping magnate, who also acted as British Vice-Consul in the port of Alexandretta on the Turkish border, promised him a job if he learnt English and French shorthand, a feat he achieved by virtually locking himself in his room and living ‘on goat’s milk and raw eggs for six weeks until [he] could think of nothing else but shorthand’.\textsuperscript{75} After eight months in Alexandretta he moved to Cairo and worked for nine months as the confidential secretary to the commanding officer of the Royal Air Force in Ismailia. During his spare time he taught himself German and Spanish. Bolloten told Hilton that in August 1932 he decided to go to Germany where things were happening and he wanted to see for himself ‘what was going on’.\textsuperscript{76} In the ‘Hilton Conversation’ Bolloten claims to have stayed four months ‘in Germany, actually in Munich all

\textsuperscript{70}‘Rough Draft’, 3.
\textsuperscript{71}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72}‘Rough Draft’, 5. Ellis tutored Bolloten on Bolshevism and Marxism. Years later Bolloten told Weller that it was natural for young men like himself ‘to gravitate towards the communists, or anarchists for that matter, whose philosophies promised the end of all oppression.’ See George Weller–Bolloten letter dated 30 November 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.
\textsuperscript{73}George Weller–Bolloten letter dated 30 November 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.
\textsuperscript{74}‘Rough Draft’, 6-7. First, Bolloten briefly visited Spain, then he went to Corsica, where he worked as a bookkeeper/receptionist at a tourist hotel in Bastia. After Corsica he went to Tunis and worked for a Jewish attorney and landowner for four months. Next, there was a boat trip through the Mediterranean to visit Greece, before going through the Dardanelles to Constantinople.
\textsuperscript{75}Ibid., 7-8. The shorthand skills acquired at this time morphed into Bolloten’s own idiosyncratic shorthand which he used to annotate research documents and newspapers.
\textsuperscript{76}‘Rough Draft’, 10.
the time,’ reading Nazi, socialist, and communist newspapers in libraries. While in Germany, he claims to have ‘witnessed the Reichstag fire, then the last elections . . . that were held in March [1933], when the Nazis won by a majority’ [sic], and in April he decided to return to England because he ‘had run out of funds’. Bolloten’s chronology is flawed. If he went to Germany in August 1932 he would have had to have spent more like nine months than four in Germany, to have ‘witnessed’ these events. Moreover, he could not have physically ‘witnessed’ the Reichstag fire as he was in Munich the entire time, but perhaps he used ‘witnessed’ in the sense of being present in Germany and not in the sense of eyewitness. In her 1940 autobiography In Place of Splendour, Constancia de la Mora, a former director of the Republic’s Foreign Press Office in Valencia, described Bolloten as ‘most absent-minded’. Absent-mindedness may explain some of the chronological inaccuracies in Bolloten’s accounts of his early travels and later events. It should also be kept in mind that Bolloten was seventy-eight when he recorded the ‘Hilton Conversation’ and dying from prostate cancer, which may also have impacted on his recollection of events. Whatever the truth of the matter, these early years abroad undoubtedly provided him with the skills for his future career as a journalist and historian.

Bolloten returned to England to find that Ellis had left the Communist Party, disillusioned with Harry Pollitt’s ‘nepotism’ and the party’s ‘blind subservience’ to the Kremlin. Ellis warned Bolloten not to join the party, and he never did, although the promises of the Russian Revolution and communism continued to have a strong ‘emotional and

---

77 Ibid., 11.
78 Bolloten’s history as well as his chronology is flawed here. The Nazis were 128 seats shy of a majority.
79 Bolloten’s ‘Rough Draft’, 10.
80 Constancia de la Mora was a great granddaughter of the five times Spanish Prime Minister, Antonio Maura. According to Soledad Fox in, A Spanish Woman in Love and War, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 2011, De la Mora came from a middle class background with some minor aristocratic links (Fox, 7). The aristocratic background seems to have been exaggerated and was ‘fuelled’ by her own hand in her 1940 autobiography, In Place of Splendour (Fox, 196, n.). She became Director of the Republican Press Office (Fox, 34). Her second husband was the communist, Ignacio Hidalgo de Cisneros who became Commander in Chief of the Republic’s air force (Fox, 34–5). Hidalgo and De la Mora became communists ‘quite early in the war because of its [Communist Party’s] discipline and efficiency and the help received from the USSR.’ (Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War, 307) these were the reasons they both gave to Bolloten when he interviewed them in Mexico in 1940 (Bolloten, 838 n.18; Fox, 39).
82 When one listens to the recording, as opposed to reading the ‘rough draft’ (transcript) of the conversation there is not an inordinate amount of faltering or stumbling evident; it is the ‘rough draft’ of the conversation that gives this impression.
83 The nepotism assertion stems from Ellis’ claim that Pollitt gave his wife a sinecure in the party. ‘Rough Draft’, 11.
intellectual appeal’ for him. He says that his ‘enthusiasm was always tempered by the disturbing stories that were beginning to come out about the true state of affairs in the Soviet Union and its exploitation of foreign communist parties for its own ends’.

Back in England he unsuccessfully attempted to get into journalism and was unemployed for over a year. Eventually he landed a job with a London firm of stockbrokers, and a few months later he took a second job with United Press (UP) working at night. UP had expanded its night staff at the start of the Second Italo-Abyssinian War in October 1935 in order to deal with the increased number of calls from Addis Ababa and other European capitals. Bolloten told Hilton that he was interviewed by the celebrated journalist Webb Miller, who offered him a night-time job because of his knowledge of English and French shorthand.

**WAR CORRESPONDENT AND COMMunist ENGAGEMENT – 1936**

In July 1936 Bolloten headed to Spain for a two week summer holiday. He told Hilton that he arrived in Barcelona on the evening of Saturday 18 July 1936 by train from Paris, and went directly to a small backstreet hotel near the Rambla, unaware of the rebellion that had broken out in Spanish Morocco on 17 July, and in Seville, Madrid, and other mainland cities on the day of his arrival in Spain. He recalls waking up on 19 July to what he thought was the heavy beating of carpets, but which turned out to be the firing of machine guns. His hotel was occupied by CNT and FAI anarchists who advised him to stay indoors for his own safety, until the street fighting had subsided. On 20 July, he left his hotel to find churches burnt or burning, and convents sacked. He realized that he ‘was faced with a revolutionary situation, the sort of thing that [he] had read about and never imagined [he’d] ever find himself immersed in’.

Bolloten emphasizes that his presence in Barcelona that July was entirely fortuitous and that he went to Spain on holiday because of happy memories of his brief visit there in 1930. Bolloten’s account is plausible and fits the known facts. There would have been no newspaper

---

84 George Weller–Bolloten letter dated 30 November 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.
85 Ibid.,
86 ‘Rough Draft’, 11.
87 ‘Rough Draft’, 11. In his letter to Weller eight years earlier his story was different. Here, he ‘was interviewed and hired by Clifford L. Day, the London Bureau Manager of United Press and by Harry Flory, European News Manager’ although he adds, Webb Miller also interviewed him.
88 ‘Rough Draft’, 14-15. Bolloten’s hotel must have been out of earshot of the factory sirens of the Poble Nou working class district near the Rambla, because he makes no mention of hearing the sirens that wailed out warnings of the military uprising before any gunshots were fired that Ronald Fraser describes in his Blood of Spain: The Experience of Civil War 1936-1939, Allen Lane, London, 1979, 62.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
billsboards or newspaper headlines screaming out news of the rebellion to catch his eye when he arrived in Barcelona. The Madrid government had banned the reporting of the uprising, and had lied in two press communiques on 18 July, by asserting ‘that “nobody, absolutely nobody” on the mainland had joined the uprising’. It is true that there was no street fighting in Barcelona until 19 July, the day Bolloten says he heard shots and was confined to his hotel. Although CNT militants had seized weapons from isolated armouries during the night of 18 July, the rebel uprising in Barcelona was essentially fought out and crushed on 19 July when the Republican air force ‘bombed and strafed the artillery barracks’, prompting General Goded, the rebel leader in Barcelona, to broadcast an acknowledgement of defeat.

Bolloten told Weller, ‘not in my wildest dreams did I imagine that I would arrive in Barcelona the day before the military rebellion in that city.’ This was a piece of luck which he turned to his advantage; he cabled UP of his whereabouts, and of his willingness to go anywhere to report on the war. UP accepted his offer, and on 21 July 1936 he was dispatched to the Aragón Front. According to Bolloten, UP was so pleased with his dispatches during his three week holiday stint as a journalist, that it gave him the job permanently.

On 6 November 1936 UP ordered Bolloten to leave Madrid and go to Valencia, where the Republican Government had relocated: Madrid was under heavy bombardment and in danger of falling to the rebels. It was then that Bolloten started collecting and reading

---

91 Ronald Fraser, Blood of Spain, 49 & 53.
92 Antony Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939, Penguin, New York, 2006, 67. It is unlikely that Bolloten would have been aware of these seizures.
93 Ronald Fraser, Blood of Spain, 64 & 69. Bolloten’s account, although plausible, is not always compatible with other accounts. In Blood of Spain Fraser writes that as night fell on 19 July there was a ‘euphoria of victory [which] turned into a festival of the masses in the streets of the city’, but Bolloten does not mention this public outpouring of emotion in the streets. Were the CNT anarchists occupying his hotel not aware of these events? If they were aware of the events why did they not inform Bolloten? After all, he was on friendly terms with them, and claims to have conversed in depth on anarchism with one ‘fascinating’, ‘voluble’ and ‘literate’ guard. Bolloten’s claim that he just happened to be in Barcelona on holiday also is strange. In the months leading up to the military coup Bolloten’s night job at UP, which involved taking stories over the phone in shorthand from foreign correspondents and transcribing them, makes it likely that he would have had wind of the crisis brewing in Spain in the weeks prior to his holiday there. He admits as much in a letter to Weller: ‘From my reading of Spanish daily newspapers it seemed obvious to me that the country was headed toward civil war’. Bolloten’s claim to have read Spanish newspapers at this time is also strange. He did not mention this in his conversation with Hilton, and gave no explanation to Weller as to why he read them. Was it because he had got wind of the looming Spanish crisis through his night job, and was his Spanish holiday really a fact-finding mission to garner information in order to impress UP with the hope that it would commission him to write an article? It is likely that over time Bolloten embellished the coincidence of his arrival in Barcelona at the start of the uprising. It not only made a good story to tell his friends and acquaintances but also provided a romantic yarn with which to promote his books.
94 George Weller–Bolloten letter dated 30 November 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.
95 ‘Rough Draft’, 13. Bolloten is not exactly sure of the date. It may have been on the 22 July.
96 Ibid., 16. Bolloten’s initial two weeks holiday was extended by an extra week.
newspapers from the Republican zone’s main cities. He explained that unlike the other foreign journalists he valued Spanish newspapers, because they represented and reflected people’s political views, and they also gave him ‘an advantage over’ other journalists who ‘knew nothing of the intricacies of Spanish politics’, and who ‘were surprised when he told them there was antagonism between Largo Caballero and the communists’. 97 Bolloten told Hilton, ‘from the moment I arrived in Spain I felt that this was an experience that I should record in every possible detail so I took voluminous notes of my own experiences’. 98 Unfortunately no diaries or note books of this period have yet come to light to corroborate his claim. Bolloten’s early recording of events suggests he had mapped out a future agenda for himself.

Bolloten stressed that his strong work ethic differed from other journalists who regularly ‘disappeared into bars and other places’. He ‘was the last one to leave the censor’s office (Foreign Press Office), always around three o’clock in the morning, and the first one to be up, at somewhere around six’. 99 Constancia de la Mora corroborates that Bolloten was ‘a hard-working, very keen, honest reporter, head and shoulders above the men who afterwards replaced him in the same bureau when he was transferred’. 100

Bolloten claims that it was during his time spent in Valencia, that he learnt the value of connections. He became close to De la Mora, and made contact with a Tass news agency representative called Mirova, ‘an enormous woman, elephantine in size’, 101 who sought Bolloten out because of his pro-communist leanings and who introduced him to GPU (State Political Directorate) agents. 102 The communist journalists proved useful to him because they had cars, and Mirova even had her own chauffeur. 103 Through Mirova, Bolloten met a GPU agent called Irma, who told him: ‘You know, we’d like to work with you and exchange information.’ 104 Bolloten had no objections. He told Hilton that in June 1937 Irma approached him with a scoop, and showed him a typewritten document in Spanish from the Director-
General of Security which revealed a POUM plot to undermine the Republic by passing information to Hitler and Mussolini.\textsuperscript{105} It stated that three hundred \textit{POUMistas} had been arrested. Bolloten was instructed to break the story, without acknowledging his source. He told Hilton that ‘even though he was pro-communist at the time, it seemed awfully fishy’,\textsuperscript{106} and he disliked being given directions by Irma, and especially not being able to name his source. Although he suspected the accusation was mendacious, he felt there was a real news item in the mass arrests of \textit{POUMistas}. He was ‘anxious to make a name for [him]self’, so he reached a compromise with Irma whereby he could frame his dispatch with words such as, ‘it has been officially reported that …’\textsuperscript{107} Bolloten also described his collusion with Irma in \textit{The Spanish Civil War}, but in this version he was introduced to Irma by Alexander Orlov, who was in charge of NKVD operations in Spain.\textsuperscript{108} Bolloten’s admission of an early association with Orlov is of interest because of Orlov’s later defection to the USA in 1938, where he wrote newspaper articles and books that exposed communist and Soviet manoeuvrings in Spain.\textsuperscript{109} Boris Volodarsky, a former Russian military officer and now a specialist historian on Soviet intelligence,\textsuperscript{110} posits that ‘for several decades our knowledge of clandestine Soviet operations in Spain during the Civil War was based on books and articles’ written by Orlov and another defector, Walter Krivitsky.\textsuperscript{111} Volodarsky’s recent expressions of concern about the reliability

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 24 & 25.
\item \textsuperscript{109} According to Paul Preston, Orlov became ‘one of the most famous defectors of all time’. P. Preston, ‘Foreword’ in Boris Volodarsky, \textit{Stalin’s Agent: The Life and Death of Alexander Orlov}, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, xxvi.
\item \textsuperscript{110} John Eipper posted the following biographical details on the WAIS (World Association of International Studies) website on 31/10/05. <http://waisworld.org/go.jsp?id=02a&objectType=post&o=7742&objectTypeld=1992&topicId=1> Boris Volodarsky was born in Russia in August 1955 and ‘graduated from the Linguistic University with a degree in foreign languages, and at the same time he received a diploma with distinction as a Soviet Military Intelligence officer. In 1983, he started special training as a Spetsnaz DRG (diversionno-razvedyvatelnaya gruppa - reconnaissance and sabotage group) leader for deep illegal penetration behind the enemy lines. This highly specialised and sophisticated training continued for four years and was interrupted by perestroika , which allowed him to flee with his family to the West, where he started a new career as a journalist and scholar.’ His PhD dissertation on Soviet intelligence was supervised by Paul Preston.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Boris Volodarsky, \textit{Stalin’s Agent: The Life and Death of Alexander Orlov}, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, 462.
\end{itemize}

Krivitsky was a Soviet intelligence officer who defected just prior to the outbreak of World War Two. His defection was precipitated by a purge of Red Army general staff Moscow. He wrote a tell-all book, published in the USA in November 1939 as \textit{In Stalin’s Secret Service}, and in the UK as, \textit{I Was Stalin’s Agent}. The book was contentious and attacked by the Left. Krivitsky was vindicated when the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, that he had predicted, was signed in August 1939. He was found dead in a small hotel in Washington DC on 10 February 1941 with three suicide notes by his bed. The official cause of death was given as suicide, but many suspect that he was murdered by Soviet agents.
of Krivitsky and Orlov as sources are not new. Hugh Thomas expressed similar concerns in his 1961 book, *The Spanish Civil War*. Bolloten alluded to this in his own book of the same name, and wrote, Thomas warned that ‘Krivitsky’s evidence must be regarded as tainted unless corroborated’, although Thomas watered down the warning in subsequent editions of the book to: ‘Krivitsky’s evidence can generally be accepted, though his details are sometimes wrong.’ According to Volodarsky, Orlov embellished the importance of his role and position in Spain; that he was not the ‘high-ranking Soviet intelligence officer’, nor ‘the senior personal representative of Stalin and the Politburo in Spain’, that he portrayed himself to be in his books *The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes* and *Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare*, and which some writers, such as his friend and biographer Edward Gazur, have accepted and perpetuated. For Volodarsky, Orlov ‘was a mediocre intelligence officer’.

Southworth, too expressed reservations about Orlov’s works, believing they were influenced by Cold War politics, and he accused Bolloten of relying on them too heavily. In his book *The Spanish Civil War*, Bolloten justified his use of Orlov’s works, and denied that it had anything to do with him knowing Orlov in Spain. He explained that he only became aware that the person who introduced him to Irma was Orlov, after Orlov’s death in 1973, when the official US Government Printing Office published a booklet which included a photograph of Orlov taken in 1933. The US Government Printing Office booklet, entitled *The Legacy of Alexander Orlov*, heralded Orlov as ‘the highest ranking officer of the Soviet State Security ever to come over to the side of the Free World’. This government publication, as well as comments by Senator James O. Eastland, that Orlov had left behind ‘a priceless legacy’ of information ‘about the inner workings and objectives of the communist conspiracy and about

---

116 Boris Volodarsky, *Stalin’s Agent*, 471.
In both *The Spanish Revolution* and *The Spanish Civil War* Bolloten explained that he had in fact ‘met Orlov and another high-ranking operative of the NKVD ... in the Spring of 1937’, but that Orlov used a different name which he did not recall. See B. Bolloten, *The Spanish Revolution*, 344, & *The Spanish Civil War*,363. Boris Volodarsky points out that Bolloten described his contacts with Orlov and his people in *The Spanish Civil War* but: ‘Lamentablemente, el señor Bolloten nunca explicó cómo se le presentó Orlov (¿Cómo jefe de la estación del NKVD en España?), y Orlov nunca mencionó haber conocido a Burnett Bolloten en ninguno de sus textos o testimonios.’ ‘Unfortunately, Mr Bolloten never explained how Orlov was introduced to him. (As the head of NKVD operations in Spain?) and Orlov never mentioned having known Burnett Bolloten in any of his texts or accounts.’ See El caso Orlov: Los servicios secretos soviéticos en la Guerra española, Crítica, Barcelona, 2013, 272.
the activities of the Communist apparatus in the related fields of espionage and subversion’,
certainly gave the impression that Orlov’s writings had official blessing.\textsuperscript{119} Volodarsky finds it
unfortunate that Bolloten never fully explained in \textit{The Spanish Civil War} how and why he met
the head of the NKVD in Spain and notes that Orlov never mentioned having met Bolloten in
any of his books or articles.\textsuperscript{120}

It should be noted that in the ‘Hilton Conversation’ Bolloten contradicted what he had
previously written about the POUM scoop Irma had offered him. In a footnote in \textit{The Spanish
Civil War} he wrote that the document handed to him by Irma was undoubtedly also given to
Lawrence Fernsworth of \textit{The Times} and Herbert Matthews of the \textit{New York Times} – confirmed
by the dispatches published in their newspapers on 19 June 1937.\textsuperscript{121} He embellished the story in
the account he gave Hilton claiming Irma had offered him a scoop.

**THE MOVE TO MEXICO – 1937**

Bolloten told Hilton of his loneliness in Spain, never mentioning any friendships with
fellow journalists. He explained that loneliness motivated him to convert a long-term friendship
with Gladys Green into something more. Green was ‘a promising young actress’ and ‘close
friend of Alec Guiness’, with the stage name Eve Robere.\textsuperscript{122} Bolloten telephoned her regularly
and the relationship blossomed. She visited him in Spain for a month, and in August 1937 they
married in London. For a short time Gladys lived with Bolloten in Valencia, then she returned
to her acting career in London.\textsuperscript{123}

Bolloten’s long working hours eventually led to exhaustion and trouble sleeping – a
problem which was to bedevil him for decades.\textsuperscript{124} In March 1938 he went to London to discuss
with Gladys this problem and their life together. They decided that Bolloten should leave Spain
for six months, during which time he would write a short account of his Spanish experiences.
Gladys was happy to give up her acting career to become his devoted assistant. Bolloten told
Hilton, probably in response to Southworth’s innuendos about funding, that money was not a

\textsuperscript{119} Quoted in P. Preston, ‘Foreword’ in Boris Volodarsky, \textit{Stalin’s Agent: The Life and Death of Alexander Orlov},

\textsuperscript{120} Boris Volodarsky, \textit{El caso Orlov}, 272.

\textsuperscript{121} B. Bolloten, \textit{The Spanish Civil War}, 887, n. 16.

\textsuperscript{122} Gladys Green appeared in Thomas Dekker’s play, ‘The Witch of Edmonton’ at the Old Vic during its 1936/7
season.

\textsuperscript{123} ‘Rough Draft’, 29-30.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 29.
problem because UP had paid him well, so he had ‘a sizeable sum of money’ in savings (£800). Moreover, Gladys had a regular income of £3 per month.\textsuperscript{125}

In May 1938 the Bollotens decided to move to beautiful and inexpensive Mexico.\textsuperscript{126} In later years Bolloten took pride in telling his friends that he had retired from being a frontline reporter to devote his life ‘exclusively’ to writing a history of the Spanish Civil War, and that he had not contacted any publishing house because he ‘did not want to be obligated … by accepting any advance payment’.\textsuperscript{127} However, this claim is an example of later-life embellishment of an event. Bolloten did not have such grandiose plans when he first arrived in Mexico. He intended to write a short book on one incident in the Civil War – the Villalba episode.\textsuperscript{128}

**WRITING THE VILLALBA EPISODE**

Bolloten told Hilton that he had initially intended to write about the fall of Málaga in order to vindicate Colonel José Villalba, a ‘so-called geographical Republican’,\textsuperscript{129} who had helped him ‘out of a very difficult scrap’ with the Anarchists on the Aragón front. Unfortunately Bolloten did not elaborate further on the ‘scrap’, and Hilton did not press him to do so. Apparently, Bolloten and Villalba had met by chance in Valencia after the fall of Málaga in early February 1937. Villalba told Bolloten that he had been posted to Málaga a few days before its fall by José Asensio, the Under Secretary of War, who he believed intended to make him a scapegoat for the imminent fall of Málaga.\textsuperscript{130} Villalba showed Bolloten some letters that he had written exposing the Republic’s ill-prepared defence of Málaga and its chaotic evacuation. Bolloten had copies of these letters, and he told Hilton that he had intended to use them as the basis for his short book. However, the Málaga book never eventuated; during his research Bolloten realized that ‘there were much larger things at stake and much larger aspects of the war than just the Málaga disaster’ – such as ‘the story of the POUM and the communists

---


\textsuperscript{126} ‘Rough Draft’, 31.

\textsuperscript{127} Ferrándiz Alborz-Bolloten letter dated 20 March 1950, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 7.

\textsuperscript{128} ‘Rough Draft’, 31.

\textsuperscript{129} This term describes the men and women who had accidentally found themselves on the Republican side when the Civil War started. It does not mean they were necessarily anti-Republic but rather they were not actively pro-Republic when the Civil War started.

\textsuperscript{130} ‘Rough Draft’, 31.
and the struggle in Catalonia’, which would eventually become *The Grand Camouflage*.\(^\text{131}\) The switch of subject can be seen as the beginning of Bolloten’s anti-communist crusade; he realized that the struggle in Catalonia would reveal Republican ineptitude and communist duplicity more convincingly than the Villalba episode. Yet Bolloten did not forget Villalba, and recounted the episode in a long, undeniably anti-communist and anti-Republican, endnote in *The Grand Camouflage*. This endnote showed that Bolloten was prepared to accept information from a reluctant Republican colonel at face value, and it adds weight to Southworth’s claim that Bolloten was an ‘enemy of the Republic’ who used ‘selective’ sources.\(^\text{132}\) In the endnote Bolloten described Villalba as ‘a professional officer with no party ties’, who had written a detailed exposé of the disastrous loss of Málaga, revealing ‘the absence of military discipline and organization on the Málaga sector … the inordinate proselytizing efforts of the Communist Party, the appointment of an excessive number of communist political commissars …’\(^\text{133}\)

When Bolloten’s second book *The Spanish Revolution* was published, the Villalba footnote was inserted into the main text, which suggested that he was now confidently committed to an anti-communist line of interpretation,\(^\text{134}\) and gives credence to Southworth’s claim, that Bolloten became more conservative during the course of writing his books.\(^\text{135}\) In his third book, *The Spanish Civil War*, Bolloten included two new pieces of evidence to support the Villalba scapegoat thesis. Firstly, he cites the 1977 memoir, *Trayectoria: memorias de un militar republica*n (*Career: Memories of a Republican Soldier*) by Antonio Cordón, an apostate Communist, and former head of the technical secretariat at the War Ministry,\(^\text{136}\) who was present when General Asensio signed Villalba’s order to defend Málaga, and who claimed that Asensio told him: ‘Don’t worry. He’ll [Villalba] never return from there!’\(^\text{137}\) Secondly, Bolloten

\(^{131}\) Ibid., 32.


\(^{133}\) B. Bolloten, *The Grand Camouflage*, 269-70. In the footnote also Bolloten writes:

‘One of the most unlucky figures in the disaster was Villalba himself, who was assigned to the Málaga sector after enemy forces had pierced the eastern defences ... and when everything was fusing into disaster. Undoubtedly selected by the War Ministry as a scapegoat, he was arrested and imprisoned. After more than eighteen months’ internment, however, he was exculpated from any blame for the disaster and rehabilitated.’

\(^{134}\) B. Bolloten, *The Spanish Revolution*, 323-4.

\(^{135}\) H. Southworth, *Conspiracy and the Spanish*, 60.


In footnote 10, page 228 of *The Grand Camouflage*, 1968 ed., Pall Mall Press, London, Bolloten elaborates that the technical secretariat ‘controlled the personnel, materiel, army pay, audit, co-ordination, court-martial, engineering, and supply departments as well as the war experiments committee.’

\(^{137}\) B. Bolloten, *The Spanish Revolution*, 344.

In a footnote in *The Grand Camouflage* Bolloten points out that José Martín Blázquez, a Republican officer in the War Ministry, claimed in his 1939 memoir, *I Helped to Build an Army*, Secker & Warburg, London, 1939 that
quoted from ‘a transcript of shorthand notes taken by a telephone operator shortly after midnight on 8 February [1937] of a “heated exchange” between Villalba and Asensio’,\(^1\)

which had first appeared in the 1937 book, *Málaga: sangre y fuego* (*Málaga: Blood and Fire*), written by the pro-Francoist propagandists Angel Gollonet and José Morales.\(^2\) Although Bolloten was aware of the book’s bias, he judged the transcript to be genuine ‘in the light of [the] several interviews [he] had with Villalba in Valencia’.\(^3\)

According to the transcript, Villalba and Asensio argued about whether Villalba should return to Málaga. Asensio told Villalba that he ‘should not have left Málaga alive’ and ‘should have remained there as instructed’. Villalba then accused Asensio of wanting the rebels to capture him, but Asensio insisted that Villalba must return with his troops. To this Villalba retorted: ‘With what troops? I no longer have any troops, they are just rabble … how can I return to Málaga if the Fascists are already there?’ ‘The Fascists are not there…’ insisted Asensio. Finally, Villalba agreed to return, but asked if this was another dirty trick Asensio was playing on him.\(^4\)

The Villalba episode as recounted and documented by Bolloten leaves him open to the charge of writing a preconceived interpretation of events using selective evidence to support it. An important element in the ‘heated exchange’ between Villalba and Asensio was whether Málaga had already fallen when Villalba was told to return there on 8 February 1937. Bolloten knew of the existence of a letter written by the Republic’s Foreign Minister, Alvarez del Vayo,\(^5\) to the Republic’s Ambassador to France, Luis Araquistáin, dated 11 February 1937, that could explain why Asensio argued so adamantly that Málaga had not fallen. In the letter del Vayo writes

\[
\text{… that at 7am on the eighth [February 1937], Negrín [at this time the Republic’s Finance Minister] sent several trucks to Málaga to collect}
\]

---

\(^{1}\) B. Bolloten, *The Spanish Revolution*, 344.


\(^{3}\) B. Bolloten, *The Spanish Revolution*, 344.


\(^{5}\) Alvarez del Vayo was a left socialist who served as the Republic’s Foreign Minister twice, from 4/9/1936 to 17/5/1937 under Largo Caballero, and from 5/4/1938 to 31/3/1939 under Juan Negrín. In *The Grand Camouflage* Bolloten notes that Del Vayo was regarded by leading figures of the Socialist Party, such as Caballero and Araquistáin, ‘as a Communist at heart’ (120). See ‘Rough Draft’, 19.
the silver believed to be there and that the trucks entered Málaga and did as they pleased without seeing the enemy anywhere.\textsuperscript{143}

However, Bolloten relegated reference to this letter to an endnote; he distrusted the evidence of del Vayo, who, he regularly reminded his readers, was a communist at heart, and preferred instead to accept an uncorroborated transcript, trumpeted by Francoist propagandists, in his main text.

In 2002 Helen Graham offered a different perspective of Villalba in \textit{The Spanish Republic at War 1936-1939}. Graham, unlike Bolloten, saw professional soldier status as a liability in a commanding officer charged with defending Málaga at that time. Graham found Villalba to be ‘far too inflexible in [his] understanding of what constitutes “troops and strategy” to be able to respond effectively’, and that he ‘did not understand his troops and they did not trust him’\textsuperscript{144} Graham also pointed out – as Bolloten failed to do – that Villalba left Málaga ‘more than twelve hours before the rebels arrived’, which gave ‘a seriously negative impression.’\textsuperscript{145} Graham claimed that Villalba had been pro-Nationalist in July 1936 and decided ‘not to join the uprising at the last moment’. This may explain why Asensio considered him to be expendable. Furthermore, according to Graham, Villalba ‘was apparently allowed back into the Francoist army reserve after the war’, and could retrospectively be considered a fifth columnist.\textsuperscript{146} Graham’s claim that Villalba became a Francoist army reservist is sourced from Michael Alpert’s \textit{El ejército republicano en la Guerra civil (The Republican Army in the Civil War)}\textsuperscript{147} and contrasts with Bolloten’s uncorroborated claim, that Villalba ‘like most of the other people who were in Catalonia at the time escaped to France [and] just disappeared with thousands’.\textsuperscript{148}

\textbf{MEXICAN YEARS: COMMUNIST DISENGAGEMENT – 1937 to 1940}

After the Civil War, 40,000 Republican refugees, many of whom had played leading roles in the war, poured into Mexico.\textsuperscript{149} Bolloten was again in the right place at the right time. He spent two years interviewing the refugees ‘in droves’ and taking ‘down their testimony in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{143}] B. Bolloten, \textit{The Spanish Revolution}, n. 7, 846.
\item[\textsuperscript{144}] H. Graham, \textit{The Spanish Republic at War 1936-1939}, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge, 2002, 207. Graham posits that: ‘The tragedy of Málaga was that the resources the military commanders wanted were simply not available, while those they had on hand they proved unable or unwilling to use.’
\item[\textsuperscript{145}] Ibid. 209.
\item[\textsuperscript{146}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{147}] Ibid. Alpert, \textit{El ejército republicano en la Guerra civil}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edn, Siglo XXI, Madrid, 1989, 387-8. See
\item[\textsuperscript{148}] ‘Rough Draft’, 32.
\item[\textsuperscript{149}] Ibid., 34.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
His apartment became a meeting point for many of the prominent refugees such as the head of the Republic’s airforce, Hidalgo de Cisneros, General Sebastián Pozas, and General José Mija. Republican communists, anarchists and socialists all helped him with his research because he appeared uncommitted to any group. Bolloten told Hilton that he ‘certainly didn’t proclaim openly… that [he] had been friendly to the communists or still was’. Vittorio Vidali, the Spanish communists’ leader in Mexico, who was ‘a sort of watchdog for Moscow among the communist refugees’, read the draft of Bolloten’s book, which would eventually become The Grand Camouflage, and was delighted because Bolloten, who had got as far as the beginning of the ‘May Days’, was following the Communist anti-POUM line. Bolloten emphasized to Hilton that his pro-Communist analysis was not because he had been ordered to do it, but because ‘that was the way the propaganda had affected [his] thinking’. However, when Vidali read his chapter on the May Days he was far from delighted, as it included a detailed analysis of the differences between the POUM and the official Trotskyists, a distinction that was anathema to Moscow, which refused to recognize differences among anti-Stalinists. Vidali told Gladys: ‘You know I think Burnett needs a rest.’ Bolloten interpreted this outwardly innocuous comment as a warning about not following the communist line. He felt ‘under pressure … the same type of pressure [he had] felt with Irma, the NKVD agent who had given [him] the scoop’ in Valencia. Bolloten did not explain to Hilton why his account of the ‘May Days’ was written with an anti-communist perspective. Was it written out of ignorance of the communists’ perspective? If so, why did the communist propaganda that affected his thinking when he wrote his earlier chapters fail to affect his thinking on the May
Days? Or was Bolloten striving to be neutral and unbiased? Unfortunately, no draft of these early chapters has come to light. So it is not possible to corroborate this account of events.

Bolloten told Hilton that by April 1940 he felt he had to leave Mexico City and free himself from the communist influence he was under there. However, there was no clean break, more a gradual disengagement. So as not to arouse Vidali’s suspicions, the Bollotens moved to Guadalajara, claiming that Mexico City’s high altitude aggravated Bolloten’s insomnia.158 The move was an important step in Bolloten’s communist disengagement. It was ‘physical’ and not ‘a total break in the sense of denouncing the party’. He told Hilton that he ‘certainly didn’t want to do that at the moment of writing, or attempting to write, what [he] felt might be an important history.’159 It would take him another ‘two or three years … to disembarrass [him]self of [communist] propaganda’.160 Bolloten’s admission to Hilton that he ‘certainly didn’t want’ a definitive break ‘at the moment of writing’ suggests that his engagement with communism in both Spain and Mexico may have been driven by self-interest and opportunism, rather than a sincere ideological commitment.

Not long after the move to Guadalajara, Constancia de la Mora, then living in Mexico, informed Bolloten that Harvard University was looking for Spanish Civil War materials. Acting on this information Bolloten sold ‘several thousand Civil War newspapers and some eight hundred pamphlets for $1,875, which according to Bolloten enabled him to live for another two years in Mexico.161 His ‘mania’ for collecting continued. He advertised for materials in Spanish provincial newspapers, ‘and received collections from seventeen different provinces’, and even after the outbreak of World War Two he was still able to ‘get complete sets of newspapers’ from Germany, Italy and the Vatican.162 Scanning the newspapers was a ‘type of drudgery’; Bolloten usually worked seven days a week, from 3am to 3pm, followed by a session from late afternoon to 10pm. He told Weller:

158 Ibid.
159 Ibid., 40.
162 ‘Rough Draft’, 38.
There wasn’t a newspaper, or periodical that I didn’t try to get hold of ... 99.9999999% of this material may have been useless, but you didn’t know where you would find a nugget and that meant digging and digging.\footnote{163}{George Weller-Bolloten letter dated 30 November 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.}

The mountain of research grew bigger and bigger, but little progress was made on the writing of his book.

In May 1940, five months after moving to Guadalajara, Bolloten received another letter from De la Mora, who he now believed was an active Soviet GPU agent.\footnote{164}{Soviet secret police which were renamed the NKVD.} De la Mora asked him if Tina Modotti could stay with him. Modotti was the \textit{compañera} (lover) of Vidali, who Bolloten believed masterminded the failed first attempt on Trotsky’s life in Mexico City on 24 May 1940.\footnote{165}{About twenty Stalinists attacked Trotsky’s house in Mexico City with grenades and machine guns. Trotsky received only scratches to the face from flying glass. See Joseph Hansen, ‘The Attempted Assassination of Leon Trotsky’, \textit{Fourth International}, Vol.1, No. 4, August 1940, 85-91.} Bolloten feared that he ‘would become somehow involved in the attempted assassination’, and ‘had to think of some excuse for getting away, because [he] couldn’t say no’.\footnote{166}{‘Rough Draft’, 40.} Why ‘couldn’t he say no’? Presumably, he feared for his life. Interestingly, Bolloten revealed to Paul Preston, but not to Hilton, an even more important factor; he claimed that the Trotsky assassins asked him if he would drive the getaway car.\footnote{167}{D. Burrowes interview with Paul Preston, which took place at Preston’s London house on 4 July 2013. Preston met Bolloten at a three day conference on the Spanish Civil War sometime in the 1980s.} Unfortunately there is no evidence to corroborate Bolloten’s version of events. Bolloten’s father, who was now living at Long Beach, California, and dying from prostate cancer, provided a plausible excuse to avoid sheltering Modotti. Bolloten claimed that he was about to visit his father. As the Bollotens did not have a visa for the USA they, with all their belongings, went to Nogales, Sonora, a small town near the US border, where they spent eight or nine months.\footnote{168}{‘Rough Draft’, 41-2.}

Bolloten’s father died on 24 September 1940 and Bolloten inherited $10,000 – ‘a small fortune’ at that time.\footnote{169}{In 2016 this would be $169,225. \url{http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/} Accessed 05/03/2016. ‘Rough Draft’, 42.} In February 1941 the Bollotens were on the move again. They left the ‘scorpion infested rat hole’ of Nogales, and returned ‘surreptitiously’ to Guadalajara. They used the inheritance to buy a house and invest in a grocery business.\footnote{170}{Ibid. The house cost $1600 ($27,455 in 2016). Bolloten does not explain why he chose a grocery business to invest in, but he does make it clear that he did not sell groceries himself. He financed, and facilitated by writing letters, the import of grocery items from the USA.} Why Bolloten now felt safe enough to leave his Nogales refuge, some 2,154 kilometres distant from Mexico City and return
to Guadalajara which was only 530 kilometres away, and which he had been so desperate to leave only nine months earlier, is not explained, and Hilton never asked Bolloten in the conversation. What had changed with Vidali and the communists? Hilton’s lack of searching questions reinforces the impression that the recorded conversation was really an image-making exercise rather than a search for truth.

The return to Guadalajara brought changes in Bolloten’s friendship network, reflecting further communist disengagement. He told Hilton: ‘I’d had my dose of the communists, I received everything I could from them.’ Bolloten was referring to the ‘dozens and dozens and dozens of interviews’ he had carried out with communist leaders. These comments further support the view that Bolloten’s connection with communism was always tinged with opportunism.

In Guadalajara he mixed with Spanish anarchist exiles, members of the POUM, ‘and people who were anti-communists’. However, Bolloten was worried that there would be personal repercussions from his break with the communists, evidenced by the panic that he says he felt in Guadalajara, when one day he encountered José Duque, a communist whom he had known in Spain, and worried that news of his association with anti-communists would ‘get back to the people [communists] in Mexico City’.172

Volodarsky’s research suggests that Bolloten may have been even more embroiled with the communists when he was a UP correspondent in Valencia than he divulged to either Hilton or Weller, which would explain why his break with them was difficult and dangerous, and the move from Mexico City essential. Volodarsky used KGB dispatches that were declassified in the early 1990s to delve into ‘intelligence operations (real or bogus) conducted or planned by the NKVD in Spain’ between January 1937 and July 1938.173 He identified an abortive NKVD plan, first alluded to by John Costello and Oleg Tsarev in their 1993 work, Deadly Illusions.174 Volodarsky claims the plan was ‘possibly’ hatched ‘but almost certainly not executed by Orlov’ to send English journalists into rebel Spain as spies.175 The dispatch was written sometime in May 1937 by an unidentified female NKVD agent, with the code name Karo, who claimed that she

171 Ibid., 43.
172 Ibid.
173 Boris Volodarsky, Stalin’s Agent, 235.
175 Boris Volodarsky, Stalin’s Agent, 237.
...communicated the assignment to the Englishman B----E---- [unidentified] to select several reliable journalists in London for sending to the other side. B----E---- had been recommended to us by our source [emphasis added], an English journalist B, a representative of the United Press (American).  

Volodarsky believes ‘our source’ was Bolloten, as he was the only English UP journalist in Spain at the time.  

In his earlier book El caso Orlov: Los servicios secretos soviéticos en la guerra civil Española, Volodarsky observed that sooner or later NKVD recruiters would have become aware of Bolloten, because he exhibited all the prerequisites they required in an agent.  

According to Volodarsky, during the Civil War the NKVD recruited agents and informants who were sympathetic to the Republican cause, hated Fascism and had a personal interest in communism. Other factors were also taken into account such as fear, personal ambition, vanity and non-traditional sexual orientation. Bolloten fulfilled all these requirements except the last, to a greater or lesser extent. Volodarsky claims that Orlov was well informed about Bolloten’s Communist sympathies and his predisposition to help the cause of the party.

Bolloten told both Weller and Hilton that it was after his move from Mexico City that he realized the extent to which he had been brainwashed by communist propaganda, and that ‘this meant scrapping everything [he] had written’ between 1938 and 1940 because it was too

---

176 Quoted in Boris Volodarsky, Stalin’s Agent, 237. The dispatch is sourced from ASVRR (Arkhi Sluzhby Vneshnei Razedki Rossii) – Archives of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, formerly the PGU arkiv, the archive of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB.

177 Boris Volodarsky, Stalin’s Agent, 237 & 473. Volodarsky also mentions that Paul Preston, Volodarsky’s former PhD supervisor, ‘discussed this problem with Bolloten’ and that Bolloten had told Preston that ‘NKVD approached him in Mexico.’

178 Boris Volodarsky, El caso Orlov, 270.

179 Ibid. Volodarsky uses Vasilii Mitrokhin (Ed.), KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officer’s Handbook, Frank Cass, London, 2002, 17-20, to source the prerequisites the KGB recruiters took into account. Mitrokhin identified fifteen ways the KGB recruited their agents. Several methods of verbovka (recruitment) could have been used on Bolloten. Gradual involvement was a method that drew the prospective agent in ‘through the establishment of confidential relations between him and an intelligence officer (a recruiter), exerting political, psychological, material or other influence on him and systematically giving him increasingly complicated intelligence assignments’. (17) Other methods that could have been applied to Bolloten were ‘recruitment by means of direct proposal’; ‘recruitment on a material basis’ – where the prospective agent’s ‘material interests’ are exploited (18); ‘recruitment on a moral and psychological basis’ – where ‘psychological pressure’ is exerted by exploiting ‘foibles, vanity, envy, jealousy, vengefulness and personal sympathies’ (18).

180 Boris Volodarsky, El caso Orlov, 271.

Volodarsky discussed Orlov with Stanley Payne, who had interviewed him. Payne told Volodarsky that his conversation with Orlov was long and interesting, and riddled with obvious and transparent lies and dezinformatsiya. See El caso Orlov, 468, fn 66.

181 George Weller-Bolloten letter dated 30 November 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.
biased and propagandistic.\textsuperscript{182} Bolloten may have exaggerated the extent of scrapping he actually did.

One of the major criticisms Southworth levelled at \textit{The Grand Camouflage} was that its conclusions were inconsistent with the arguments made throughout the book. Southworth first articulated this in 1963 in \textit{El mito}, and continued to do so in his subsequent works. In \textit{El mito} Southworth accused Bolloten of what could appropriately be described as “Jekyll and Hyde” scholarship:

\textit{The Grand Camouflage} is an unsatisfactory book ... One could think that the book is unsatisfactory because the facts presented are pro-Republican and the conclusion pro-Francoist. One could even doubt that the same man wrote both parts of the book.\textsuperscript{183}

Southworth later claimed that he ‘was less harsh with Bolloten’ in \textit{El mito} than he should have been, because he was ‘influenced’ out of respect for Constancia de la Mora, who had praised Bolloten’s work during a conversation he had had with her some years earlier.\textsuperscript{184} In ‘\textit{The Grand Camouflage}: Julián Gorkin, Burnett Bolloten and the Spanish Civil War’ Southworth wrote:

Bolloten’s research was carried out before 1952 and [...] the conclusions of the book were written by another Bolloten, nine years older, a Bolloten who had perhaps, in the meantime, changed his convictions?\textsuperscript{185}

Southworth reiterated the claim in his last book \textit{Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War}: ‘Bolloten began to write with a vision of the Civil War favourable to Juan Negrín, but his finished manuscript speaks well of no Republican leader.’\textsuperscript{186} As time went on, Southworth attributed the reason for this inconsistency to the politics of the Cold War and the replacement of anti-fascism with anti-communist as the prevailing political dogma.

There is no doubt that Southworth’s criticisms, if valid, would make sense in the context of Bolloten’s gradual anti-communist turn. But was Southworth’s criticism of inconsistency in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{182}‘Rough Draft’, Box 115, 39.
\item \textsuperscript{183}H. Southworth, \textit{El mito de la cruzada de Franco}, Debolsillo, Barcelona, 2011 edition, 471. ‘\textit{El Grand Camouflage} es uno libro poco satisfactorio ... Puede pensarse que el libro no resulta satisfactorio porque los hechos presentados son prorrrepucanos y la conclusión profranquista. Puede incluso dudarse de que haya sido el mismo hombre quien haya escrito las dos partes de este libro.’
\item \textsuperscript{184}Southworth believed that De la Mora’s praise for Bolloten’s work was based on seven draft chapters that Bolloten showed her when he was her houseguest in Mexico City in early January 1940. Southworth posits that it is ‘evident’ that these were not the chapters that were eventually published. See H. Southworth, ‘The Grand Camouflage’: Julián Gorkin, Burnett Bolloten and the Spanish Civil War’ in P. Preston & A. Mackenzie (Eds), \textit{The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain 1936-1939}, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1996, 274 & 294.
\item \textsuperscript{185}Ibid., 294-5.
\item \textsuperscript{186}H. Southworth, \textit{Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War}, 59.
\end{itemize}
The Grand Camouflage correct? The arguments and the conclusion were really not as inconsistent as Southworth would have us believe. Bolloten made it absolutely clear to his readers in his first chapter (of only one page) that his book would address issues of communist ‘duplicity and dissimulation’ in their rise to power. In the early pages of the book Bolloten is sympathetic to Prime Minister Largo Caballero, whom he describes as ‘the most influential and popular left-wing leader’, and whose overthrow by the communists marked their ‘greatest triumph in their rise to power’.  

The tenor of Bolloten’s correspondence in the years after World War Two suggests that disengagement from the communists was complete. He became preoccupied with determining the extent to which the communists had infiltrated the Republic’s levers of power during the Civil War. His letters to Luis Araquistain, a former socialist adviser and friend to Caballero and the Republic’s Foreign Minister to Paris (September 1936 - May 1937), illustrate that Bolloten wanted to pinpoint early communist manoeuvres to power. He asked Araquistain if he had ‘any reliable information’ as to the extent of communist infiltration ‘in the field of public order’, and whether Caballero, as was commonly stated, was opposed to the affiliation of the Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas (JSU) to the Young Communist International’. In an effort to ascertain if Caballero was attempting to out-maneuver the communists, Bolloten pressed Araquistain to confirm or deny the rumour that Araquistain himself had masterminded a plan in 1937 to get the U.G.T and C.N.T. to support the formation of a new government with ‘Caballero as Premier and Defence Minister’, and which would have excluded the communists. Araquistain replied that it was ‘out of the question’ that ‘Caballero intended to form a new government at that time with the predominance of the U.G.T and C.N.T. in it’, and told Bolloten that it was only when the two communist ministers resigned that Caballero proposed a new government without communists. Bolloten asked Araquistain to confirm that Caballero wanted Spanish officers in charge of the International Brigades, as opposed to André Marty, the French communist executive committee member of the Comintern, who ‘wanted

---

188 Araquistain was also the Republic’s ambassador to France from September 1936 to May 1937, during which time he attempted to rationalize the purchase of desperately needed war matériel for the Republican army. Bolloten initiated the correspondence of thirteen letters over eighteen months in July 1947. The correspondence was not always cordial. On one occasion Araquistain curtly replied to a Bolloten query that he was ‘too busy with other matters’ and ‘in fact [he] had nothing new to say on the points’ to which Bolloten had inquired. See Bolloten-Araquistain letter dated 4 August 1948, Bolloten Collection, Box 5, Folder 5.
189 Bolloten-Araquistain letter dated 5 July 1947, Bolloten Collection, Box 5, Folder 5.
190 Bolloten-Araquistain letter dated 18 October 1947, Bolloten Collection, Box 5, Folder 5.
191 Bolloten-Araquistain letter dated 27 October 1947, Bolloten Collection, Box 5, Folder 5.
them to remain completely independent of the War Ministry’. Bolloten sought information about ‘the political affiliation of Pablo de Azcárate [a former Spanish ambassador to London] before the outbreak of the Civil War, his political sympathies during the Largo Caballero government and during the first and second Negrín Governments’. When Araquistain replied, he asked Bolloten to keep his comments about Azcárate confidential, and wrote that he did not know if Azcárate ever belonged to any political party, although he had ‘a son who belonged to the Communist Party when Azcárate was Ambassador in London and who had great political influence on him’. Araquistain added that Azcárate supported Negrín and Del Vayo, and ‘always collaborated closely with the Russians and their friends’.

Bolloten made good use of his correspondence with Araquistain and cited him in The Grand Camouflage on no less than fifteen occasions, mostly in the footnotes. Furthermore, Bolloten asserted that Araquistain’s ‘intimate relations with Caballero invest his words with superior authority.’ Bolloten’s account of the merger of the JSU with the Young Communist International, which was planned in Alvarez del Vayo’s Madrid apartment, included a quote from a particularly partisan passage in Araquistain’s 1939 work, El comunismo y la guerra de España:

I [Araquistain] lived in Madrid, one floor above him [Del Vayo], and witnessed the daily visits paid to him by young socialist leaders… It was there that a voyage to the Muscovite Mecca was organized for them; it was there that it was agreed to deliver the socialist youth, the new working-class generation of Spain, to communism.

This quotation, with its apocalyptic and religious overtones of delivering Spain’s youth up to communism, sets the tone for Bolloten’s discussion of the merger. Bolloten points out that

192 Bolloten-Araquistain letter dated 6 April 1948, Bolloten Collection, Box 5, Folder 5.
193 Bolloten-Araquistain letter dated 4 August 1948, Bolloten Collection, Box 5, Folder 5.
194 Bolloten-Araquistain letter dated 23 January 1949, Bolloten Collection, Box 5, Folder 5.
195 Helen Graham in The Spanish Republic at War 1936 -1939 identifies a lack of trust between Araquistain and Prime Minister Juan Negrín. It should be noted here that Graham declares her allegiances and dedicated this book to the memory of Herbert Rutledge Southworth, ‘for his passionate belief in the transformative power of forensic history and for the monument to it which he has left us in his own work’ (xiv). Graham claims that the Araquistain-Negrín antagonism was ‘the product of pre-existing political and personal antagonisms’ which were rooted in the decision of Araquistain’s socialist-left political grouping to block the promotion of Prieto to the prime ministership during the cabinet crisis during May 1936 (156). This antagonism turned into something more serious during Negrín’s stint as Minister of Finance (September 1936-May 1937) in the Largo Caballero government and during Negrín’s own Prime Ministership (May 1937 to the end of the war). According to Graham, Negrín had accepted the post of finance minister reluctantly and only at the behest of Indalecio Prieto. Negrín’s policy of centralizing the Republic’s military procurements directly impinged on Luis Araquistain’s Paris based procurement committee. Araquistain had been appointed the Republic’s ambassador to Paris by Negrín’s predecessor, Largo Caballero.
197 Ibid., 115.
Caballero supported the merger because he thought he could control the newly merged movement as the young socialists were numerically superior; the Young Communists had a membership of three thousand compared to the JSU’s fifty thousand. However, JSU leaders secretly joined the Communist Party and quickly worked to transform the merged JSU into a communist prop. Bolloten highlights

…the skill of the Communists in using artifice and subterfuge, in playing one hostile faction against another, in packing pivotal positions with secret party members or with fellow travellers, in bestowing patronage and exerting pressure upon anyone who joined their ranks or served their interests…

CALIFORNIA BOUND: THE GLADYS FACTOR, HEALTH AND WEALTH ISSUES – 1946 to 1949

Bolloten made distressingly slow progress on his book. The daily drudgery of his rigid work regime led to regular and serious bouts of illness, and eventually to a complete physical breakdown. In 1946 he and Gladys moved to Ensenada in the hope that its sea level location would improve his health. The move also helped the Bollotens’ financial situation, because they made a large profit on the sale of their Guadalajara house. However, Ensenada proved to be dull, boring and dusty, and sometime ‘in 1948 or 1949’ they decided to move to the USA.

Bolloten told Villanueva that ‘the need for constant medical attention which [they] could not find in Ensenada’, and their frequent medical trips to the USA were proving to be too costly.

---

197 Ibid., 118-119.  
198 Bolloten describes himself as: ‘A plodding, conscientious researcher but not a writer by any means and no amount of protests by some of my friends will convince me otherwise. I alone am aware of the pain and suffering every line and sometimes every word in [unreadable] the more I suffer the more I realize my inadequacies as a writer.’ See Verle Johnson – Bolloten letter dated 1 December 1976, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 18.  
Bolloten told Hilton: ‘By 1946 I’d already broken down as far as sleep was concerned ... [I] woke up at three o’clock in the morning regularly, but I found I couldn’t sleep at night, and I tried a thousand different ways to get me to sleep – first I would try beer and then wine, and I found after I had tried that for a time it didn’t work, so then I had to go into sleeping pills... But I developed the most ghastly headaches, and of course now I put the whole thing down to physical inactivity, because all I did was to sit in a chair with wheels on it and wheel myself around this tiled floor...’  
200 ‘Rough Draft’, 44.  
201 Ibid.  
202 Antonio Villanueva–Bolloten letter dated 28 September 1949, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 25.
Moreover, Bolloten wanted easy access to the US libraries that had ‘valuable materials on the Spanish Civil War, which they would not send out of the country.’

In his essay ‘The Grand Camouflage: Julián Gorkin, Burnett Bolloten and the Spanish Civil War’, Southworth voiced his suspicions about the move and wondered how Bolloten was able to obtain an immigrant visa to the USA, ‘at a time [1949] when it was extremely difficult, nay impossible, for a foreigner with his reputation of sympathy for the Spanish Republic to obtain a one-day visitor’s pass’. Southworth insinuated that Bolloten’s desire to obtain a visa may have fuelled his increasingly anti-communist perspectives. In a footnote Southworth revealed how he had unsuccessfully attempted to corroborate his innuendo:

The FBI most certainly has a file on Bolloten dating back to the time when he was a refugee in Mexico, known for his interest in the Spanish Civil War, and on his entry in [sic] the United States and his naturalization. The Bureau refuses even to admit that it has ever heard of him, let alone that it has a file on him.

Southworth’s footnote implies conspiracy and intrigue on the part of the FBI, but is this a case of jumping to conclusions? There is no evidence that links US intelligence with the Bollotens’ move to the USA. It could well be that the Bureau was genuinely not interested in Bolloten.

Bolloten told Hilton that Gladys’s parents had immigrated to the USA in 1938, and that her father was a well-connected, ‘very wealthy man’, and that her brother was an English graduate from Stanford University. It may well be that the Bollotens’ successful visa application to the USA had more to do with Gladys’s family being reputable, wealthy US citizens who were able to vouch for his good character, than to Southworth’s ‘conspiracy theory’. If Southworth knew about Gladys’s family’s wealth he made no mention of it. Moreover, it should be noted that it was not until after the start of the Korean War in June 1950, when Bolloten was already living in the USA, that the Internal Security Act, which barred communists and fellow travellers from entry to the USA, was passed by Congress. This makes Southworth’s claim that it was ‘nay impossible, for a foreigner with [a] reputation of sympathy for the Spanish Republic to obtain a one-day visitor’s pass’, a less than accurate

---

203 Ibid.
205 Gladys’s parents had immigrated to the USA in 1938. Bolloten does not say how they earnt their living, although he implies they were well-connected. Bolloten specifically mentioned Gladys’s father was a friend of Leslie Lipson (1912-2000), an expert in political theory and comparative government at Berkeley University.
206 ‘Rough Draft’, 45.
assessment of the situation at that time. Whatever the truth of the matter, in September 1949 the Bollotens relocated to San Diego, where Gladys’s parents lived, with its ‘good zoological gardens, art gallery and park’. 208

According to Bolloten there were financial benefits from moving as Gladys’s family purchased a house for them to live in rent-free and gave Gladys $5,000. 209 However, when Gladys wrote to Villanueva on 14 September 1949 about the move, there is no mention of her parents buying them a house. On the contrary, Gladys writes:

Our new house is very, very small, and very expensive for us, but we had no choice but to move and although the cost of living is very much higher than in Mexico, life in the USA has great compensations for us… 210

It is possible that Gladys felt embarrassed to admit to receiving financial help from her parents, as well as a house to live in ‘rent-free’. However, it is more likely that when Gladys wrote to Villanueva, they were not yet living in the house her parents bought them. This would be consistent with what Bolloten told Hilton:

We arrived sometime in 1949 and we lived in San Diego … First we lived in an apartment house and then later we lived in the house which my in-laws had been kind enough to purchase for us and allow us to live in rent-free. 211

Bolloten also told Hilton that they had received good returns, although he does not say how much, from the investment in the Guadalajara grocery business, and mentions in passing that he sold ‘some materials to the Hoover Institution’ in 1946. 212 Unfortunately, how the sale came about and how much he received from the Hoover Institution is not mentioned. 213 Esenwein believes the amount was in the region of ‘$2,500’, although Esenwein does ‘not have the documents recording the transaction and exact figures’. 214 Bolloten claimed that the profits form the grocery business, together with the money from the Hoover Institution, and the $5,000

208 Antonio Villanueva-Gladys Bolloten letter dated 14 September 1949, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 25.
210 Antonio Villanueva-Gladys Bolloten letter dated 14 September 1949, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 25.
211 ‘Rough Draft’, 45.
212 Ibid. In his introduction to 2015 Edition of B. Bolloten, Spanish Civil War (xxxix), Esenwein claims that the head of the Hoover Institution and Library, the liberal historian H.H. Fisher, arranged the sale.
213 My attempts to access Hoover Institution records and correspondence appertaining to the purchase of Bolloten’s materials were unsuccessful. The university is a private institution and does not make this material available to researchers – at least not to this one.
214 Email correspondence Esenwein-Burrowes, dated 13/01/2016. ‘$2,500’ equates to $34,000 in 2016.
from Gladys’ parents amounted to some $15,000.\textsuperscript{215} Unfortunately they had this money in Mexican pesos, and just before transferring the funds to the USA and departing for San Diego, the Mexican peso was devalued.\textsuperscript{216} Bolloten told Hilton that their funds were ‘cut in half’.\textsuperscript{217} The extent of the Bollotens’ straitened circumstances at this time is evident from Bolloten’s letter to Villanueva, dated 30 June 1949:

If I can afford it, I hope to make a trip to Mexico D.F. to see a few refugees before putting the finishing touches to the book, but unfortunately it is such an expensive journey that I fear I will have to leave Gladys behind.\textsuperscript{218}

Letters written by the Bollotens to Villanueva at this time demonstrate that their break with communism was now complete and that they were now committed anti-communists.\textsuperscript{219} The Villanueva correspondence also reveals some of Gladys’s political views, which suggests that she may have influenced the direction of Bolloten’s research and interpretation. Certainly Bolloten implied this when he dedicated The Grand Camouflage: ‘To Gladys whose unremitting labours and self-sacrifice made this book possible’, and in his foreword to the book:

But more than to anyone else I owe special gratitude to my former wife, Gladys Bolloten. Her devoted assistance, encouragement, sympathy, enthusiasm, good judgement, suggestions, and hard work for nearly fifteen years helped to make this book possible.\textsuperscript{220}

Near the end of 1950 Gladys had taken over responsibility for the correspondence, because Bolloten under medical advice had ‘to give up all work for a short period of time’.\textsuperscript{221} Gladys was not immune to the effects of overwork herself. She had helped organise and collate a ‘huge mass of data’ for over a decade and was ‘under constant medical attention.’\textsuperscript{222} The demands of the book (The Grand Camouflage), which was finally completed in 1952,
eventually destroyed the marriage; it had turned Gladys from a loyal research assistant into a drudge. Bolloten even had tantrums when Gladys’s family came to visit her because they distracted her from her work on the book. They divorced in 1955. Although Bolloten dedicated his second book, *The Spanish Revolution*, to his second wife Betty and their son Gregory, he retained his acknowledgement of Gladys, and added that Gladys ‘helped to provide the foundation for this new book’.

Within months of the Bollotens relocating to California the Korean War started. A letter to Villanueva written by Gladys on 8 September 1950 revealed that Cold War events affected the way she viewed the Spanish Civil War. Gladys alluded to the Korean War and observed that Americans followed it

… anxiously … in the hope not only of victory for the democracies, but that some signs of Russia’s eventual intentions will be seen. Nobody knows whether she wants world war, whatever its cost, or whether her belligerence is mainly bluff.

Gladys drew parallels to the Soviet Union’s actions in Spain:

As in the Spanish Civil War, Russia is not being too generous in supplying North Korea with arms. But what a terrible thing to plunge the sick and tired world into another war so soon after the last one. How the Soviet Union resembles Nazi Germany in every possible way!

Gladys also broached culturally contentious issues. She told Villanueva that on a recent visit to Tijuana she had attended a bullfight and was ‘disgusted at the brutality’ and had hoped that the ‘bull would kill the picadores, the banderilleros and the matador, because he was far more noble and worthy than those sadistic “men”’. She felt the sufferings of the bull symbolized the sufferings of the Spanish people and wrote: ‘The innocent bull is attacked by the picadores, the landlord, the banderilleros, the church, and it is finally killed after putting up a brave fight by the matador, the army.’ Bolloten expressed his own anxiety about the Korean War: ‘The international situation is getting more serious hourly. We are certainly on the edge of catastrophe, and it is impossible to see where it will end.’ Such views beg the question as to

---

223 Rough Draft’, 46.
226 Antonio Villanueva-Gladys Bolloten letter dated 8 September 1950, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 25.
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
229 Ibid.
230 Antonio Villanueva-Bolloten letter dated 1 December 1950, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 25.
the influence contemporaneous events had on Bolloten’s writing. Did these events confirm him in his anti-communist perspectives?

Villanueva, the former anarchist, collected newspapers for Bolloten and became a source of information on UGT (General Union of Workers) and CNT (National Confederation of Labour) collectivisations. 231 Bolloten’s questions to Villanueva confirm that an important direction of his research was to ascertain the extent of Spain’s revolution. He sought information ‘regarding the divergencies [sic] between the CNT and UGT in the Central Zone, particularly on the matter of economic problems’. 232 He wanted to know if the ‘principal transport, electric light and power companies in Madrid, and principal railway companies in the Central Zone … were collectivized at the outbreak of the Civil War by the UGT and CNT and operated by workers’ committees’. 233 Bolloten revealed his determination to ascertain the extent of communist manoeuvrings in events:

Do you know why Angel González Gil Roldán, subcomisario general del ejercito de tierra, a member of CNT, was replaced by Miguel González Inestal in October 1937? Did he play the game of the communists? 234

Bolloten asked loaded questions, yet cautioned Villanueva about the need to ensure that the persons he consulted for information were reliable. 235

Bolloten made use of Villanueva’s research, but not excessively. Villanueva is cited on three occasions in Bolloten’s discussion of collectivization in The Grand Camouflage, in a chapter simply entitled ‘The Revolution’; reference to him by name however, is kept to footnotes. Villanueva, ‘secretary at one time of the CNT metal workers’ union of Valencia’, 236 is credited with providing ‘reliable information’, as to which factories and businesses were taken over by his union. In one footnote Bolloten writes: ‘Antonio Villanueva … stated that the premises and equipment of nearly all the printers, cabinet-makers, tailors, dressmakers, barbers, beauticians, bootmakers, and other leather goods producers were taken over by the unions of that city.’ 237 Bolloten retained all references to Villanueva in his subsequent two books, although for some unknown reason, possibly at the behest of his publisher, Villanueva was

231 The UGT was a left-wing movement and was led by Largo Caballero. The CNT was Anarchist-orientated and was influenced by the FAI.
232 Antonio Villanueva-Bolloten letter dated 30 June 1949, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 25.
233 Ibid.
234 Ibid.
235 Ibid.
dropped from the index. Of more significance, however, is the interpretative shift evident by the renaming of the chapter in which the Villanueva references are located. In The Grand Camouflage the chapter is simply entitled ‘The Revolution’, but in Bolloten’s last book, The Spanish Revolution, published thirty years later, the chapter title was revised to ‘The Revolution and the Rise of the Third Republic’.238 This suggests Bolloten had shifted from an impartial perspective to an anti-communist perspective. No ‘Third Republic’ is mentioned in the chapter, and no ‘Third Republic’ has ever existed. By using the term Bolloten was implying that the era of the democratic Second Republic had ended and that a new Spanish state was in the making – one modelled on the Soviet Union.

GETTING PUBLISHED: CONTINUED MONEY PROBLEMS

By December 1950 Bolloten had resumed writing his own correspondence. He wrote to the veteran anti-Communist socialist Francisco Ferrándiz Alborz about his difficulty in finding a publisher.239 In 1946 Martin Secker and Warburg, the publisher of Orwell’s Spanish Civil War inspired books,240 had expressed an interest ‘in publishing a complex and documented history’ such as he had undertaken, but for reasons unknown, the expression of interest came to nothing.241 Gladys, in an earlier letter to Ferrándiz, dated 28 October 1950, had expressed her suspicion that the political climate was impacting on publishing decisions:

The new developments in the American attitude toward Spain may, or may not, affect the probabilities of publication. Let us hope that some publisher will consider it about time to counteract a little of the pro-Franco atmosphere which is growing even in liberal circles owing to the terrible menace of Soviet Russia in Europe. What is there to choose between Franco and Tito they say?242

Bolloten was not as pessimistic as Gladys. He informed Ferrándiz in a letter dated 23 February 1951, ‘the political climate was not particularly propitious at the moment, but that is not reason why some firm of publishers should not decide to take my work’.243 Bolloten

239 Ferrándiz Alborz published a memoir entitled La bestia contra España in 1951.
240 Homage to Catalonia, Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four.
241 Arthur Lehning-Bolloten letter, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 7.
242 Ferrándiz Alborz-Gladys Bolloten letter dated 28 October 1950, Bolloten Collection, Hoover Institute Archives, Box 6, Folder 7.
243 Ferrándiz Alborz-Bolloten letter dated 23 February 1951, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 7. Bolloten was referring to the difficulty of getting Ferrándiz Alborz’ book published in the USA. He had sent the manuscript to Simon and Schuster. In a letter dated 4 April 1951 he wrote that there was still no word from the publisher even though he had prodded them for a decision.
believed publishers were deterred both by the complexity of his book’s subject matter and the cost of publishing such a sizable work with copious footnotes. Extensive explanatory footnotes had become integral to his style of writing because of the ‘highly controversial’ subject he was dealing with, and the tendency of writers ‘to falsify and distort even the most elementary fact connected with the Spanish Civil War’. Bolloten felt he had to ‘substantiate almost every important point’ in his exposition.\(^{244}\) As a result, footnotes in *The Grand Camouflage* often cover more than three quarters of the page,\(^{245}\) and *The Spanish Civil War*, a tome of one thousand and seventy-four pages, has almost thirty percent (three hundred and thirty-one pages) in endnotes, bibliography and index. Faber attributed Bolloten’s need ‘to substantiate’ so excessively to professional insecurity stemming from his ‘amateur’ Hispanist status, ‘without institutional credentials’ and ‘institutional authority’.\(^{246}\) Southworth certainly believed Bolloten’s ‘inferiority complex [was] everywhere evident’, and he found Bolloten’s ‘habit of appealing to well-known professors to bolster his work’ in the prefaces and forewords of his books ‘a bit embarrassing’.\(^{247}\) Southworth ridiculed Bolloten to José Martínez Guerricabeitia, the founder of the publishing house Ruedo Iberico, in an imaginary dictionary entry: ‘Bolloten. Noun, an illogical argument surrounded by footnotes.’\(^{248}\) However, complexity and lengthy footnotes do not fully explain the reasons as to why *The Grand Camouflage* was not picked up by publishers, as Bolloten was well aware. He told Hilton that the University of California had forwarded the rejection reports from its two readers, who said he was too harsh on Alvarez del Vayo and Juan Negrín. Bolloten dismissed the readers’ criticism as being the work of communists.\(^{249}\)

By 1953 the money Bolloten had received from his father and from Gladys’s family was running out. He was forty-three years old and realized that he would have to get a job. He worked as an encyclopaedia salesman for Sears, Roebuck and Co. for five years, his first paid job since being a journalist in Spain. Bolloten told Weller that he became the top salesman,

\(^{244}\) B. Bolloten, *The Grand Camouflage*, 10.

\(^{245}\) For examples see B. Bolloten, *The Grand Camouflage*, 97, 98, 99, 141, 252.

\(^{246}\) S. Faber, *Anglo-American Hispanists*, 223.


\(^{248}\) Quoted in S. Faber, *Anglo-American Hispanists*, 90. Ruedo Iberico published both Southworth’s and Bolloten’s books in Spanish or French editions. This was a strange jibe from Southworth who also wrote extensive explanatory footnotes and endnotes; Faber described Southworth’s *Antifalange: Estudio critico de ‘Falange en la guerra de España: la Unification Y Hedilla’ de Maximiano García Venero* (1967), as ‘a fifty-page introduction followed by two hundred pages of notes.’ S. Faber, *Anglo-American Hispanists*, 82.

\(^{249}\) Rough Draft’, 47.
earning $24,000 a year – ‘a fortune in the early fifties’.  

In 1960 Sears, Roebuck and Co. closed down their encyclopaedia division. Bolloten moved into real estate, where he prospered in a small way.  

He told Weller and Hilton that he retired in 1969 at the age of sixty. However, it seems Bolloten may have been exaggerating his success as a realtor, probably in response to questions raised about his finances, because he wrote to Malefakis on 12 September 1971 that he had ‘embarked on a real estate project, which if successful should solve [his] financial problems for a decade and make it possible for [him] to rely totally on [his] own resources.’  

Clearly Bolloten had not retired. On 11 December 1972 he updated Malefakis with the news that he had not ‘yet made the real estate “killing”’ he had hoped for. Bolloten’s finances were still not sufficiently secure in October 1974; he considered applying, on Malefakis’ suggestion, for a Guggenheim grant to supplement his income, which would enable him to work for an estimated three years on ‘a volume covering the entire war’.  

Bolloten wrote:

I might be glad to get some extra money, for this galloping inflation may upset my financial plans. Income I expected to receive over a period of ten years is slowly evaporating as some clients find they cannot afford to pay for the property they purchased. In any case the income itself is worth less and less in goods and services.

During the years between 1952 and 1969 Bolloten did not write much, but he kept up his interest in the Civil War. From 1962 to 1965, at the invitation of Hilton, he taught courses on the Civil War and Revolution at Stanford University on an honorary basis; he referred to it as ‘his labour of love’. He continued relentlessly researching until 1969 when he started work on The Spanish Revolution.

---

252 George Weller-Bolloten letter dated 30 November 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.
253 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 12 September 1971, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
254 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 11 December 1972, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
255 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 24 October 1974, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
256 Bolloten is referring to the economic stagflation that prevailed in the seventies and which ended the post-World War economic boom.
257 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 24 October 1974, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
258 Obituary – ‘Burnett Bolloten, Spanish Civil War Scholar, Dies, Bolloten Collection, Box 1, Folder 1.
259 George Weller-Bolloten letter dated 30 November 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.
GEORGE WELLER TO THE RESCUE: THE VALUE OF NETWORKING

The publication of *The Spanish Revolution* in 1979 did not bring Bolloten peace of mind. At $29 a copy, sales were slow.\(^\text{260}\) Bolloten discovered that the publisher was ‘not an aggressive promoter’; on contacting the bookshops of the twelve universities in California he discovered that none of them had heard of the book. He realized sales would not improve as the publisher, the University of North Carolina Press, had ‘a very limited advertising budget and employ[ed] no outside salesmen’.\(^\text{261}\) Help arrived in the form of the aforementioned George Weller, the American novelist, playwright, and Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who resided in Rome.\(^\text{262}\) The two men met in October 1979 at a dinner arranged by Bertram Wolfe’s widow, Ella.\(^\text{263}\) The Wolfes had become trusted friends and mentors of Bolloten after his move to the Stanford-Palo Alto area in 1949. Bolloten expressed his ‘deep gratitude’ to them in the Preface to *The Spanish Revolution* ‘for reading the manuscript, for providing [him] with material, and … generous support’.\(^\text{264}\) The Wolfes’ involvement in Bolloten’s book makes it likely that Ella had organized the dinner with the intention of recruiting Weller to help resurrect the fortunes of *The Spanish Revolution*.

Friendship with the Wolfes further demonstrates the anti-communist direction Bolloten had taken. The Wolfes had been founding members of the American Communist Party, but Bertram Wolfe quickly became disillusioned with communism, and in 1929 he was expelled from the party for refusing to accept Comintern pre-eminence over the American Communist Party. He became a Sovietologist writing extensively on the Russian Revolution, Marxism, Lenin and Stalin. In 1937 he had published a short book, *Civil War in Spain*,\(^\text{265}\) which trumpeted the advances made in revolutionary Spain by the anarchists and POUM, and described their proscription by the Republican government. According to Southworth, Wolfe was probably ‘among those who militated for the *POUMistas* when they were arrested in 1937 and while they were imprisoned’.\(^\text{266}\) The Wolfes were no strangers to the intelligence community or to the propaganda war. During the 1950s Bertram had been an advisor to the US State Department’s International Broadcasting Office, which was responsible for operating

---


\(^{261}\) George Weller-Bolloten letter dated 25 October 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.

\(^{262}\) See fn. 17

\(^{263}\) George Weller-Bolloten letter dated 8 October 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27. Bertam Wolfe had died on 21 February 1977, aged eighty-one, from burns he suffered when his bathrobe caught fire.

\(^{264}\) B. Bolloten, *The Spanish Revolution*, xvii.


\(^{266}\) H. Southworth, ‘*The Grand Camouflage*: Julián Gorkin, Burnett Bolloten …’ 270.
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.\textsuperscript{267} Radio Free Europe was identified by the CIA whistleblower Philip Agee in his 1975 exposé, \textit{Inside the Company: CIA Diary}, as CIA controlled or influenced.\textsuperscript{268} Victor Marchetti and John Marks, who had worked in US intelligence agencies, made similar revelations in their book, and also pointed out that the CIA had a CA (Covert Action) unit/wing which employed ‘socialists, historians, and media specialists’ to clandestinely fund the publication of books.\textsuperscript{269} There is no evidence to conclude that Bertram Wolfe was a CA historian, although his career at the International Broadcasting Office certainly does not preclude the possibility. His job with Radio Free Europe would certainly have brought him into contact with CIA operatives. Peter Coleman, the Australian author and former editor of \textit{Quadrant},\textsuperscript{270} the Australian literary magazine funded by the CIA,\textsuperscript{271} identified Wolfe in his book \textit{The Liberal Conspiracy} as a writer ‘associated with the Congress of Cultural Freedom’.\textsuperscript{272} Bolloten’s close association with the Wolfes does not prove Southworth’s allegation ‘that Bolloten had let himself be drawn into the cold war machinations of the CIA’.\textsuperscript{273} However, it shows that after his move to California in 1949, he mixed in circles with CIA connections. Moreover, Bolloten appears not to be too concerned about CIA manoeuvrings; he wrote to Malefakis: ‘Another thing that rather disgusted me was his [Gabriel Jackson’s] readiness to accept KGB espionage but not that of the CIA.’\textsuperscript{274}

Weller, with his background in journalism was well-known, well-connected and well-respected in the publishing world. Ella’s dinner party had achieved its purpose, because shortly after Weller returned to his home in Rome he received from Bolloten a letter which included the documents Weller would need to plan a marketing strategy for \textit{The Spanish Revolution}; copies of Hugh Trevor-Roper’s Introduction to the second printing of \textit{The Grand Camouflage}, a list of the people and publishers to whom copies of \textit{The Spanish Revolution} had already been

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{267} Victor Marchetti and John Marks in their 1974 ‘whistleblower’ book, \textit{The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence}, pp. 134-35 write: ‘The CIA’s best-known proprietaries were Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, both established in the 1950s. Each functioned under cover provided by a board of directors made up of prominent Americans ... But CIA officers in the key management positions at the stations made all the important decisions regarding the programming and operations.’
\item \textsuperscript{268} P. Agee, \textit{Inside the Company: CIA Diary}, Allen Lane, London, 1975, 692.
\item \textsuperscript{269} V. Marchetti & J. Marks, \textit{The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence}, 162. For discussion of why and how CA went about funding books See Stonor Saunders, \textit{The Cultural Cold War}, 245.
\item \textsuperscript{270} This was the Australian equivalent to the UK’s \textit{Encounter} magazine which was also funded by the CIA.
\item \textsuperscript{271} This was done through its parent organisation the Congress of Cultural Freedom. See Stonor Saunders, \textit{The Cultural Cold War}, 215.
\item \textsuperscript{272} P. Coleman, \textit{The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe}, The Free Press, New York, 1989, 60. In the later years of his life Wolfe worked at the Hoover Institution library as a Senior Fellow in Slavic Studies, and in 1966 he became a Senior Research Fellow.
\item \textsuperscript{273} S. Faber, \textit{Anglo-American Hispanists},90.
\item \textsuperscript{274} Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 15 April 1977, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
\end{itemize}
sent, a copy of Gabriel Jackson’s Prologue to the Spanish edition of the book, and some reviews of the book. So began a correspondence of some thirty-three letters, during the course of which Bolloten willingly accepted Weller’s ‘marketing’ ideas. Weller urged Bolloten to get friends like himself to offer to review the book for magazines and ‘egghead quarterlies’, and he sent Bolloten a copy of his letter of 8 October 1979 to Nieman Reports as an example of how to do it.

Dear Jim [Thompson]:

I have been sent for review a most unusual book on the Spanish Civil War by Burnett Bolloten, published by the University of North Carolina Press.

It’s called The Spanish Revolution, and its length is 665 pages and its price a trifling $29. What makes it extraordinary is that it was written by a United Press reporter who covered it. Bolloten became so helplessly hooked on the contest that he gave most of the rest of his working life to digging into sources. The book has proved too big, so far, for the N.Y. Times to handle. Would the Reports be interested in a review by me, and at what length?

Best Regards,

George Weller

George Weller-Bolloten letter dated 26 September 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27. Bolloten considered it to be a significant coup to have Trevor-Roper on side, whose scholarly reputation stemming from his Last Days of Hitler (1947) and his introductory essay on ‘The Mind of Adolf Hitler’ in Hitler’s Table Talk 1941-1944 (1953) had not yet been tarnished by his poor judgement in authorizing as genuine, the fake Hitler Diaries in 1983. Trevor-Roper’s support of The Grand Camouflage was welcome because he could not be considered a rabid post-war anti-communist. Stonor Saunders points out however, that Trevor-Roper was one of ‘the recipients of secret benefaction’ to attend the CCF’s inaugural Berlin Conference in 1950, and writes that his presence at the conference was ‘funded covertly by the Foreign Office, through the Information Research Department’. However, Trevor-Roper was ‘appalled by the provocative tone’ of some speakers at the conference, and he came away feeling that the ‘baying voices of approval’ that he heard from the huge audiences for anti-communist speeches were probably from the same people who bayed at ‘similar German denunciations of communism coming from Dr Goebbels in the Sports Palast’. See Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 76, 78-9.

Weller-Bolloten letter dated 25 October 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.

The Nieman Reports is a quarterly journal dealing with journalism issues published by the Nieman Foundation for Journalism at Harvard University.

Jim Thomson was curator of the Nieman Foundation from 1972-1984. During his tenure, he broadened the program to include more minorities, women and journalists from small news organizations and broadcasting. Weller-Bolloten letter dated 8 October 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27. On 16 October 1979, Kettee Boling (Assistant to Thompson) responded to this letter and offered to publish Weller’s book review in the Nieman Reports, in the Spring issue 1980, and Weller was given leeway, because of the size of the Bolloten tome to write a longer review than the normal 500-1000 word limit. See Weller-Bolloten letter dated 16 October 1979.

158
Why Weller decided to go out of his way to help Bolloten is not clear. There is no evidence that links Weller to the US intelligence community or the Congress for Cultural Freedom. He seems to have been genuinely intrigued by Bolloten’s own personal story, and Bolloten’s ‘sense of duty to history, not to let it be deformed’. 279 Weller encouraged Bolloten to think of himself as, ‘the possessor of certain facts that were challenging’, and that he had ‘a responsibility to history’, and while ‘Hemingway in FWTBT [For Whom the Bell Tolls] did 5 percent of his duty; you were trying to do 100%.’ 280 However, Weller did question Bolloten as to why other correspondents in Spain never asked the questions he did, 281 and asked why he was ‘out on a limb’ with his ‘camouflage’ thesis:

Didn’t anyone but you say to himself ‘I was had and I’m going to say so.’ Was it the view that ‘Okay, but the fascists were worse’ that silenced them? Or did WWII suffuse them in thunder? Are there any pre-Bollotens? 282

Bolloten replied that the correspondents were ‘an unsophisticated bunch’ 283 and that those he had met did not understand the complexity of the political struggle and saw the war in simple terms – a war between democracy and fascism, good and evil. Furthermore, the foreign journalists were preoccupied with military operations, especially ‘the heroic and the dramatic’ – the struggle for Madrid in 1936 and 1937, the Battle of Teruel in 1937-1938, the Ebro crossing in late 1938 and the loss of Catalonia in 1939. He was not aware of any other journalists who ‘read all [sic] the major newspapers of the various factions published in Madrid, Valencia and Barcelona, as well as in other cities’. 284 He pointed out that those were the days of the Popular Front, which the famous correspondents like Jay Allen and Herbert Matthews supported and which he believed in as well, and ‘it would have been “disloyal” to tell the facts behind that Front ... and playing into the hands of Franco, Hitler, and Mussolini’. 285 It was this closing of ranks that kept the world ignorant of the real struggle that

279 Weller-Bolloten letter dated 20 December 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.
280 Ibid.
281 Weller-Bolloten letter dated 16 October 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.
282 Weller-Bolloten letter dated 20 December 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.
283 Bolloten excluded the ‘phony’ correspondents from this category, ‘such as Arthur Koestler, Louis Fischer, Michael Koltzov, Frank Pitcairn (Claude Cockburn), Georges Soria, and many others who worked secretly for the Comintern’.
284 Weller-Bolloten letter dated 30 November 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.
285 Ibid.
took place. Bolloten told Weller even he was confined ‘to very superficial reporting’ because the republican press censorship was controlled by the communists.  

Under Weller’s tutelage a reinvigorated and more proactive Bolloten emerged, who was prepared to actively engage in ‘marketing’ *The Spanish Revolution*. He wrote to Weller, ‘I appreciate no end your efforts on behalf of the book and I shall certainly see what I can do alongside lines you suggest’.

Bolloten’s letter to Stanford History Professor Peter Stansky, dated 17 May 1980, provides an example of mobilizing his friends and acquaintances as Weller had suggested. In it Bolloten attempted to discredit Robert Colodny’s antagonistic review of *The Spanish Revolution* in *International and Working Class History*:

> Since you head the Department of History at Stanford and probably receive the journal, *International Labor and Working Class History*, you may have read Robert Colodny’s shameful review of my book … so I am enclosing a copy of my reply… Colodny was a Stalinist in the thirties and he doesn’t seem to have evolved since then. In case you have not read his review, I am enclosing a copy, but you might appreciate the depths of mendacity and intellectual depravity to which some people committed to certain causes manage to sink if you read my reply first, since the falsities are not immediately apparent in the review.

The last sentence highlights the problem Bolloten faced with Colodny’s review. Its arguments appeared convincing and its ‘falsities [were] not immediately apparent’.

Bolloten demonstrating his ‘new’ Weller-inspired proactivity, asked Professor David Montgomery, the editor of *International and Working Class History*, to publish his reply to Colodny’s review. He told both Stansky and Weller that Montgomery was ‘a friend of

---

286 Bolloten briefly corresponded with Arturo Barea and his wife Ilsa in 1950, to ascertain the extent of communist influence over press censorship office in Madrid; Bolloten asked Barea, who had worked in the Madrid Censorship office in the early days of the war, if the Russian General Goriev, ‘trató de impedir el envío de noticias y artículos sobre las incautaciones, colectivizaciones, etc. en Madrid, por temor a la opinion internacional’. (Bolloten-Arturo Barea dated 10 June 1950). Ilsa Barea replied on behalf of her husband that ‘during these months it was – or seemed to us – good propaganda to tell the outside world about those collective ventures in the making, particularly as earlier reports had often been frightening and misleading. So this was not a range of subjects which ever led to differences between our censorship and Goriev.’ (Ilsa Barea-Bolloten letter dated 20 June 1950). Ilsa Barea also supported Bolloten’s view of foreign journalists: ‘Most of the correspondents came and went meteor-like, seeing much but with obvious limitations. Visiting writers (great or not-so-great) were inclined to note what they meant to note, or were meant to note.’ See Bolloten-Barea letter dated 20 June 1950, Bolloten Collection, Box 5, Folder 10

287 Weller-Bolloten letter dated 25 October 1979, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.


289 Weller-Bolloten letter dated 10 May 1980, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 27.

290 Ibid.
Colodny’s review criticized the structure of *The Spanish Revolution* claiming it was ‘truncated in time’ because it ended with the demise of Largo Caballero in 1937, and it omitted ‘any detailed account of the political history’ of the Republic from its inauguration in 1931 onwards, which gave a distorted perspective by depriving ‘any linkage with the deeper currents of Spanish social and political life.’ Colodny belittled Bolloten’s efforts and asked: ‘Why after forty years of research, does the author now publish this fragmentary study?’ He resurrected old controversies surrounding the publication of *The Grand Camouflage* eighteen years earlier, and wrote: ‘It is curious that before [*The Grand Camouflage*] appeared in English, it was published in Franco’s Spain under the title, *El Gran Engaño* which literally means the Great Deception.’ In his reply Bolloten accused Colodny of attempting ‘to convey the impression that the book was pro-Franco’ in order to undermine his credibility, and pointed out that it was actually published in England first, in March 1961, ‘and then, three months later in Spain by Luis Caralt, who made a hurried and bowdlerized translation without a contract’.

Even Esenwein, albeit in an endnote, begrudgingly accepted that the Caralt publication gave Bolloten’s contemporaries valid grounds to suspect Bolloten was colluding with the Franco regime’s attempts to rebrand itself as an important anti-communist ally for the West. Esenwein writes:

---

291 Ibid.
296 Ibid.
The fact that an unscrupulous Spanish publisher managed to bring out an unauthorized expurgated edition of *The Grand Camouflage* that was put to propagandist use inside Franco’s Spain further reinforced the false notion that Bolloten was a Cold War ideologue.  

Bolloten elaborated on the Caralt publication in the ‘Hilton Conversation’. He explained that he had received a letter from his UK literary agent John Farquharson, that the Spanish Institute for Political Studies, headed by Manuel Fraga Iribarne had requested permission for a Spanish edition and ‘were offering an advance of $1500, which in those days was unknown ($500 was what was normally given’). Bolloten claims that he told Farquharson that under no circumstances should it be published in Spain, because he knew the book would provide ammunition to his enemies. However, Farquharson sent off the contract, ‘in spite of his insistence’, and the book was translated and published in Spain. There is no documentary evidence currently available that supports Bolloten’s claims. Interestingly, Bolloten did not mention in the ‘Hilton Conversation’, if he ever received any of the advance on the publication of the book or any royalties from the sales, and unfortunately Hilton did not ask him. A letter Bolloten wrote to Malefakis 24 October 1974 implies that some sort of arrangement was eventually reached with Caralt. Bolloten told Malefakis that ‘after several years’ he forced Caralt ‘to publish an authorized translation’, and that ‘an appreciable number of sales’ were made each year. Although he had no way of checking the exact number, and doubted the figures Caralt gave his London agent, Bolloten told Malefakis that he suspected Caralt ‘receives subsidies from the government’, and that it was likely that the Spanish Institute for Political Studies paid him something when Iribarne wrote the introduction to *El gran engaño*.  

*El gran engaño* was denounced as Francoist, and the anti-Francoists found the use of *los rojos* (the reds) to describe all left wing groups particularly invidious. Unfortunately for Bolloten’s reputation, some anti-Franco material was omitted from this unauthorized edition. *El gran engaño* became branded as a political pamphlet in support of the Franco regime. Bolloten referred to this unauthorized edition as the greatest crisis in his life. He was unable to get the books recalled, and to add insult to injury the book sold well. Bolloten then tried to find a publisher for an authorized Spanish edition. Eventually, in 1962 a revised Spanish edition was

---

299 ‘Rough Draft’, 49.
300 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 24 October 1974, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
301 Ibid.
302 Esenwein discusses how *El gran engaño* was received in ‘Confronting Spain’s Troubled Past: Burnett Bolloten’s Legacy as a Civil War Scholar’ in Introduction to 2015 ed. of B. Bolloten, *Spanish Civil War*, xl.
published by the Mexican Catholic publisher, Editorial Jus. This edition also proved to be problematic, because Editorial Jus was pro-Franco ‘and the book appeared with doves of peace, [and] domes on the back, and volumes of Catholic publications listed on the cover’. Bolloten says he got three hundred copies sent over from Mexico and tore the covers off. He did not elaborate on what he then did with them. Eventually, Hilton’s Institute of Hispanic and Latin American Studies at Stanford came to the rescue and published a Spanish edition.

These problems however do not detract from the logic of Colodny’s argument. Colodny pointed out that Bolloten’s ‘meticulous array of indisputable factual data destroyed two myths’ which had previously been central tenets of Francoism – ‘that the generals had risen only to frustrate a planned communist coup d’état and that the Frente Popular parties had rigged the election of February, 1936’. Colodny asked why the Franco regime liked Bolloten’s book to the extent that it was prepared to ditch its ‘most cherished propaganda about the genesis and nature of the Spanish Conflict’.

For Colodny the answer obviously lay in Bolloten’s central thesis that the Spanish revolution was crushed and camouflaged by the Republican government ‘abetted’ by the small Spanish Communist Party at the behest of the Russians.

FROM STOUSH TO HISTORY WAR: TAKING SIDES & COLD WAR ISSUES

Colodny was one of many historians who took sides during the history war that resulted from the Bolloten-Southworth TLS stoush. Bolloten and Southworth came to personify two opposed camps fighting for acceptance of their interpretation – albeit with blurred boundaries – of the roles played by the communists and the Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War; historians took sides, either actively, or by their silence. Friendships came under stress and were either temporarily interrupted or permanently destroyed. Gabriel Jackson exemplified the former case; his ‘refusal to express enthusiasm for Herbert’s personal condemnations of Bolloten…led to the interruption of [their] friendship for about five years’. David Wingeate Pike exemplifies the latter case. He says that he ‘was in the very unusual (unique?) position of being a close friend of both’, but ‘ultimately [he] had to choose between them’. He permanently severed communications with Southworth. The history war was undoubtedly

304 Ibid., 52.
305 Ibid.
307 Ibid.
308 Email correspondence between Gabriel Jackson and Darryl Burrowes dated 3 May 2012.
309 Email correspondence between David Wingeate Pike and Darryl Burrowes dated 26 April 2012.
exacerbated by the revelations in the sixties and seventies that Western intelligence agencies (notably the CIA and IRD) had engaged in a cultural war by covertly funding anti-communist intellectuals, writers, artists and publishing houses.\(^ {310}\) These revelations of unnamed recipients of largesse created an atmosphere of uncertainty and suspicion that unleashed a torrent of innuendo and accusation.

In his TLS review of 9 June 1978 Southworth described Bolloten’s five hundred and sixty-four page, \textit{La révolution espagnole, vol 1: La Gauche et la lutte pour le pouvoir}, as a minimally-updated version of \textit{The Grand Camouflage}, that merely added some footnotes and grafted others into the main text. Southworth claimed that Bolloten added only ‘sixty-eight pages of new text on revolutionary Catalonia and Barcelona’s events of May 1937’, with another ‘twenty-three new pages on the end of the revolution and of the war’.\(^ {311}\) However, Southworth’s most damming criticism was that ‘Bolloten’s book cannot be dissociated from the Cold War … because of his sources’.\(^ {312}\) This must have been devastating for Bolloten, a man who had prided himself on a lifetime of scrupulous scholarship. Bolloten said he would ‘have preferred to have dismissed Southworth’s misrepresentations and innuendos … as unworthy of response’ – but engaged in a public polemic by writing two letters of reply which were duly published in the TLS.\(^ {313}\) Bolloten inveighed against Southworth’s slapdash arithmetic: ‘The French edition contains 564 pages, whereas its predecessor, \textit{The Grand Camouflage}, comprises 350 pages with fewer words per page. But why argue this silly point? It is the content, the truth that disturbs him [Southworth].’\(^ {314}\)

The ‘content’ certainly did disturb Southworth, who believed Bolloten not only took inconsistent positions, but used unreliable sources to support these positions. Southworth argued that Bolloten presented ‘a sympathetic exposition of the problems of Soviet intervention in Spain’, when he argued that Soviet policy was driven by the fear of a war with Italy and Germany, and that the USSR limited its aid to the Republic to a minimum necessary for ‘bolstering the resistance of the anti-Franco forces’, until Britain and France came to their senses and realized that their interests in the Mediterranean were best served by abandoning

\(^ {310}\) In his footnote 102 on page 305 of ‘\textit{The Grand Camouflage: Julián Gorkin, Burnett Bolloten …’}, Southworth shows that he was aware of the revelations of CIA involvement in the promotion and publication of favoured authors and was sure Bolloten would have been as well.


\(^ {313}\) Bolloten letter published in TLS on 17 November 1978

\(^ {314}\) Ibid.
their non-intervention policy. Southworth also pointed out that Bolloten was sympathetic to the Soviet Union when he wrote that it was ‘careful not to throw [its] influence on the side of the left wing of the revolution or to identify herself with it’, because this would have alienated ‘the very classes whose support the Comintern was seeking’. For Southworth this analysis was ‘a fair presentation of the Soviet (PCE) position’, but one that was irreconcilable with Bolloten’s conclusions, which always ‘constitute[d] a denunciation of the activities of the Spanish Communist Party’. Southworth identified further inconsistency in Bolloten’s criticism of the PCE ‘for opposing the social revolution of the anarcho-syndicalists and the left socialists (and the POUM)’, and plotting to overthrow Largo Caballero, and yet he failed to defend the Anarchists’ revolutionary policies or the policies of Caballero anywhere in the book.

Unbeknownst to Southworth, Bolloten had already received private criticism from Malefakis about the extent of his revisions in the English version of The Spanish Revolution, as well as its anti-communist tenor. Malefakis had become an important mentor to Bolloten; he was not only advising him on how to get the book published, but also on aspects of the book’s structure. Malefakis went a step further when, with very doubtful professional propriety, in early 1977 he agreed to read Bolloten’s manuscript for Princeton University Press, who were considering publishing it. Malefakis wrote to Bolloten on 5 December 1976:

The likelihood of Princeton’s accepting the ms. would have been good in any case, but the chances are even better now as they have called me up the other day and asked if I would serve as reader for it (maybe this is supposed to be confidential, so you should probably act as though you don’t know it). There will be another reader as well, I’m sure, but I doubt if she or he would be hostile… It might take some time for the acceptation [sic] to go through. I won’t actually get your ms. for another week or so, and then won’t be able to read it until late January…

On 5 March 1977 Malefakis forwarded a copy of the report he had written for Princeton University Press to Bolloten, but advised him that, ‘… it is probably best that the fact that you have seen the whole thing, and know that it is written by me, be kept between us, lest they unjustly suspect us of collusion’. Malefakis told Bolloten that he ‘was a little disappointed that the new text was not, except for the 120 pages on May 1937, as major a revision of the old

316 Ibid.
317 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 5 December 1976, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
318 Malefakis-Bolloten Correspondence, letter dated 5 March 1977, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
as I had expected’. More importantly, as a foretaste of criticisms to come from Southworth and others, Malefakis wrote:

…”in my opinion, you do remain too unrelievedly hostile to the CP and do base yourself too heavily on the writings of ex-communists like Hernandez and El Campesino. I know that this is an essential part of your thought patterns and is, indeed, the main conclusion and purpose of your book. But to the extent you can do so, it would be useful if you could start to argue against yourself and ask was everything the CP did part of the conspiracy, and were they always led to do what they did out of a de facto lust for control rather than out of lack of what they considered to be more effective alternatives for winning the war? In short were they always and entirely devils …

Malefakis advised Bolloten that he should expand the epilogue to include discussion of some of these points, as well as consider whether the war was ‘run all that much more brutally and unsuccessfully by the CP after May 1937 (or April 1938) than it would have been had other groups remained in control?’ Boloten had asked Malefakis in an earlier letter whether it would be appropriate to end his book with a quotation from El Campesino. His preference was to do so, ‘if it doesn’t look too propagandistic?’ Malefakis replied that the El Campesino quote was ‘extremely powerful’ but it would be ‘much better … to end with a few pages of your own expressed in your own words.

Bolloten accepted most of Malefakis’ criticism positively; he deleted the El Campesino quotation and agreed with Malefakis’ suggestions about the epilogue and wrote: ‘… in the long run, you have no doubt done me a great service in being as honest as you have.’ However, Bolloten did not back down on his belief that the Communist Party was run by ‘unconscionable/power-hungry fanatics’. Princeton University Press eventually sent Bolloten a ‘brusque letter’ of outright rejection, which shocked Bolloten and surprised Malefakis, because Bolloten was not offered the option of expanding the epilogue along the lines Malefakis had suggested in his report.

In his own way Malefakis had identified in Bolloten’s draft manuscript some of the issues that Southworth was to pick up and elaborate on in his review of La révolution

319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
321 Ibid.
322 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 17 December 1976, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
323 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 5 March 1977, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
324 Malefakis-Bolloten letter dated 18 March 1977, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
325 Ibid.
326 Malefakis-Bolloten letters dated 31 March 1977 & 7 April 1977, Bolloten Collection, Box 6, Folder 25.
espagnole – the biased tone, problematic sources, and lack of substantially new content. Southworth of course went much further in his criticism, when he suggested that the sources Bolloten used were tainted and showed signs of indirect CIA involvement.327

When Bolloten replied to Southworth’s review in the TLS on 25 August 1978 he addressed Southworth’s innuendo that his book was ‘inspired by the secret funds from certain United States agencies’, and noted that it is rather ‘convenient to identify dissenters from Soviet policy with the CIA’.328 He challenged Southworth to reveal which sources had inspired his innuendo and pointed out that although The Grand Camouflage was finished in 1952/3, he was unable to find a publisher until 1961 and asked, if the book had been ‘inspired by secret funds’ why would it have taken so long to find a publisher. Bolloten wrote:

What appears to bother Mr Southworth is that the Communist Party and its allies in the Socialist Party, such as Alvarez del Vayo and Negrín fare rather badly under the pitiless light of truth … Clearly what Mr Southworth raises is a question of conscience: should the historian conceal or manipulate facts in order to favour one faction or another? This I did not choose to do.329

In his letter of reply of 13 October 1978 Southworth identified those Bolloten sources which he considered were tailored to fit the prevailing political climate of the Cold War. They were the writings of the former NKVD agent in Spain, Alexander Orlov, and the ‘confessions of various Spanish communists published during the Cold War, especially those connected with the propaganda outlets of the associations for “Freedom of Culture”’.330 Above all, he distrusted ‘the book attributed to Valentin González [El Campesino], the former communist military leader, which was originally published in 1950 in French as La Vie et la mort en URSS (1939-1949)’.331 Southworth emphasised that this book was ‘transcribed’ or ghost written by Julian Gorkin, whose links with the ‘Freedom of Culture’ groups was undeniable, and that the introduction to the book was written and signed by Gorkin himself. Southworth further noted, that in the English and German editions of the book, Gorkin’s introduction became integrated

327 Bolloten made this claim himself in a letter published by the Times Literary Supplement dated 25 August 1978. He writes: ‘Mr Southworth asserts that the book [La Révolution espagnole] “cannot be dissociated from the Cold War” and throws out an innuendo that it was “inspired by secret funds from certain United States agencies”, by which of course he means the CIA …’
329 Ibid.
330 Southworth was referring to the associations of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Southworth letter published in TLS on 13 October 1978.
into the main text that was supposedly written by “El Campesino”.\footnote{332}{Ibid.} For Southworth this evident ‘manipulation of the text of a book should have caused Bolloten to use [La Vie et la mort en URSS] with caution’\footnote{333}{Ibid.} but instead Southworth claims that Bolloten used it, together with In Stalin’s Secret Service, written by another former NKVD agent, Walter Krivitsky, to formulate his position on Negrín’s decision to ship Spanish gold to Moscow in 1936. Bolloten certainly did include anti-communist quotations from El Campesino’s works in The Grand Camouflage and in his two later titles, such as:

\begin{quote}
I sincerely believed, writes Valentín González, more commonly known as El Campesino … that the Kremlin sent us its arms, its military and political advisers, and the International Brigades under its control, as proof of its revolutionary solidarity… Only later did I realize that the Kremlin does not serve the interests of the peoples of the world, but makes them serve its own interests; that with a treachery and hypocrisy without parallel, it makes use of the international working class as a mere pawn in its political intrigues, and that, on the pretext of fomenting world revolution, it consolidates its own totalitarian counter-revolution and prepares for world domination.\footnote{334}{Quoted from Solidaridad Obrero, Paris, 11 March 1951, in B. Bolloten, The Grand Camouflage, 144.}
\end{quote}

This El Campesino quotation may well have been the one that Malefakis had advised Bolloten to remove from the epilogue of his draft manuscript, discussed above. In any case it certainly smacks of propaganda. Bolloten responded to Southworth with a second letter of reply to the TLS, published on 17 November 1978. He asserted that he ‘examined the circumstances of the editing and publishing of González’ work with the utmost care’, and was of course aware that one cannot ‘accept unreservedly everything that González, or any other single witness, says on particular matters’, and pointed out that even in his French edition, he had questioned ‘the accuracy of Gonzalez’s account of the gold shipment from Madrid to Cartegena’.\footnote{335}{Bolloten letter published in TLS on 17 November 1978.}

Bolloten continued to remain convinced of the value of El Campesino as a source. In an endnote he later wrote in The Spanish Civil War (1991) he accepted, ‘that El Campesino’s articles and books were ghost-written by Julián Gorkin’, but he saw nothing wrong with that, because ‘El Campesino was to all intents and purposes an illiterate and incapable of giving literary expression to his thoughts and experiences.’\footnote{336}{B. Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War, 810 n. 48.} For Bolloten there was nothing sinister about it. It was obvious that El Campesino would require help in getting pen to paper.
In his TLS review Southworth asserted that there was only one authoritative study of the Spanish gold problem – Angel Viñas’ 1976 book *El oro español en la guerra civil* (hereafter *El oro español*).\(^{337}\) He criticized Bolloten for only including Viñas’ book in his bibliography and not quoting from it in the main text.\(^{338}\) Southworth suggested that Bolloten’s motive for doing this was because Viñas had ignored ‘El Campesino’ completely in *El oro español*, and dismissed Krivitsky’s and Orlov’s accounts as ‘debatable consistency’.\(^{339}\) Bolloten refuted Southworth’s accusation of ignoring Viñas’ important work in his letter to the TLS published on 17 November 1978. He referred Southworth, and TLS readers to page 179, note 65, of *La révolution espagnole*, where he had explained that Viñas’ book had reached him too late to make any changes in the French edition, but that this was not the case with the forthcoming American edition, in which *El oro español*, and the manuscript of a new yet to be published Viñas work on Spanish gold, are both cited.\(^{340}\)

When Southworth attacked Bolloten for his failure to cite Viñas, he was obviously not aware that Viñas and Bolloten had been corresponding with each other since January 1977. The contact had been initiated by Viñas, at the instigation of David Pike, who had told Viñas that Bolloten was writing a new edition of *The Grand Camouflage* and would most certainly appreciate reading *El oro español en la guerra civil*. Viñas explained to Bolloten that *El oro español en la guerra civil* had been withdrawn from bookshops in Spain by the post-Franco Spanish government, which was in the process of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, and which deemed Viñas’ conclusions to be ‘contrary to official policy at the time’.\(^{341}\) Viñas told Bolloten that he would send him a copy.\(^{342}\) In a letter dated 8 February 1977 Bolloten expressed his regret to Viñas that the copy had arrived too late for him to cite it in the French edition of his latest book, but he pointed out that he would do so in the forthcoming Spanish, English and American editions.\(^{343}\) Bolloten told Viñas that when he started reading his 600

\(^{337}\) *El oro español en la guerra civil*, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid, 1976.
\(^{340}\) Bolloten letter published in TLS on 17 November 1978.

In the bibliography of *The Spanish Civil War*, Bolloten refers to this manuscript as, ‘Manuscript on Spanish gold to be published by Ediciones Grijalbo in the fall of 1978. Title, as yet undecided.’ It is most likely that this manuscript was published as *El oro de Moscú* by Grijalbo in 1979. Bolloten pointed out that Viñas made the manuscript available to him.

\(^{341}\) ‘Contrario a la política oficialmente mantenida hasta el momento’ in Viñas-Bolloten letter, 3 January 1977, Bolloten Collection, Hoover Institute Archives, Stanford University, Box 7, Folder 7.26.
\(^{343}\) Bolloten-Gorkin letter dated 14 December 1977, Bolloten-Gorkin Correspondence, AJGG-558-17, Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Alcalá de Henares.
page book he found it ‘so fascinating that [he] was impelled to read it all the way through without stopping…’ and that ‘it made a profound impression upon [him]’.

However, Bolloten and Viñas eventually fell out. Interestingly, Bolloten explained the reasons for the falling out in a letter to none other than Julián Gorkin, who became part of Bolloten’s friendship and knowledge networks, as is evident from the copious correspondence between the two men housed in the archives of the Fundación Pablo Iglesias at Alcalá de Henares, in which Bolloten would address Gorkin as, ‘Dear friend’ or ‘I cordially greet you as your good friend’. Bolloten told Gorkin that Viñas’ book El oro español was a model of meticulous research, but now unfortunately Viñas had identified himself with the detractors of Largo Caballero’s memoir Mis recuerdos: Cartas de un amigo (My Memories: Letters From a Friend). Bolloten valued and trusted Caballero’s memoir as a reliable source. He pointed out in a letter to Gorkin dated 13 October 1977 that when Mis recuerdos was published almost thirty years before, nobody doubted the authenticity of material, but now there were people ‘who will stop at nothing to attack its authenticity in their efforts to gild the reputations of Negrín and Vayo, men denounced by Caballero … as committed “body and soul” to the communist party’.

During the Bolloten-Southworth TLS stoush, one of the first to align themselves with Bolloten was Robert Conquest, a former member of the Information Research Department (IRD) from 1948 to 1956, who became a specialist in Russian history. Conquest wrote a letter to the TLS in support of Bolloten, published on 17 November 1978. Support from Conquest is of interest because of his association with the IRD, which was set up by the British government to help wage its anti-communist cultural war. Timothy Garton Ash assessed that its role

...was mainly to collect and summarize reliable information about soviet and communist misdoings, to disseminate it to friendly

---

345 Author’s translation of ‘Mi estimado amigo’, ‘le saludo muy cordialmente su buen amigo’.
Bolloten-Gorkin letter dated 14 November 1977, Bolloten-Gorkin Correspondence, AJGG-558-17, Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Alcalá de Henares.
346 Largo Caballero, Mis recuerdos: Cartas de un amigo, Alianza, Mexico City, 1954. See Bolloten-Gorkin letter dated 13 October 1977, Bolloten-Gorkin Correspondence, AJGG-558-17, Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
347 Ibid.
348 http://spartacus-educational.com/HISconquest.htm Accessed 06/02/2015. In 1981 Conquest moved to California to be Senior Research Fellow at Hoover where he would have come into contact Bolloten.
journalists, politicians, and trade unionists, and to support, financially and otherwise, anti-communist publications.\(^{349}\)

During his years at the IRD Conquest evolved from a writer of propaganda to a writer of history. He seems to have been helped in his transformation to historian by the IRD. Scot Macdonald claims (unfortunately without any corroborative reference) in his 2007 book that ‘Robert Conquest’s *The Great Terror* drew heavily from IRD files’.\(^{350}\) If this was the case then Conquest must have been given special access. Conquest does not try to conceal his partiality and wrote in the Preface of *The Great Terror*: ‘The present writer cannot conceal that he has views on these ethical and political matters.’\(^{351}\) Conquest edited eight volumes of work produced by the IRD, published in London by Bodley Head, as the ‘Soviet Studies Series’; and in the United States republished by Frederick Praeger as, ‘The Contemporary Soviet Union Series’. Macdonald claims that ‘the IRD teamed up with Bodley Head to distribute its books… blurring the line for profit and propaganda’.\(^{352}\)

Conquest’s *TLS* letter posited that Southworth was very choosy about evidence and ruled out ‘everything written by ex-communists,’ or those ‘connected with Western organizations thought to have been involved in the Cold War’. Conquest further noted that ‘everybody knows that some defector material is false (as all official Soviet and pro-Soviet material is false), when it comes to disputed issues’, and any real historian must pick his way very carefully. Conquest supported Bolloten’s use of ‘Southworth’s bugbears, Krivitsky and Orlov,’ who ‘have stood up very well to every critical test’, and also ridiculed ‘Southworth’s new rule that a writer must quote every book in his bibliography – yet another sign of Southworth’s inability to understand what history is for or about’.\(^{353}\) As it happens Conquest’s letter turned out to be the last volley in the Bolloten-Southworth *TLS* polemic, because the *Times* newspapers were hit with a series of strikes for several months and the letter writing was not resumed when the strike ended.\(^{354}\) The battlelines however had been drawn, and the history war continued in later historical writing.


\(^{353}\) Conquest letter published in *TLS* on 17 November 1978.

\(^{354}\) H. Southworth, ‘*The Grand Camouflage*: Julián Gorkin, Burnett Bolloten …’ 264.
George Esenwein became connected with Bolloten around the time of the TLS skirmish and since then has become the most loyal supporter of Bolloten and his legacy. The two men developed a ‘close relationship over an eight year period’ when Esenwein worked as Bolloten’s research assistant. In the preface to *The Spanish Civil War*, Bolloten acknowledged Esenwein’s ‘valuable assistance’ over the years, especially for transporting ‘hundreds of books and articles’ back and forth from Stanford University library and the Hoover Institution Archives to Bolloten’s house*. The two men respected each other’s historical judgement, and would have ‘long discussions’ during which Bolloten solidified his ‘thoughts and convictions on several intricate and extremely controversial topics’. Esenwein was also responsible for writing many of the long endnotes in *The Spanish Civil War*.356

Southworth believed Esenwein was part of a ‘maladroit’ plot hatched by Bolloten to seek revenge for his TLS attacks. Southworth claimed that Bolloten ‘commissioned a young friend, George Esenwein, to dig into [his] past’.357 It is evident that Southworth resented this Bolloten-Esenwein investigation. Southworth was quick to justify his own digging into Bolloten’s past as something which was ‘necessary in order to explain the contradictions and incoherencies in [Bolloten’s] successive works’,358 but when Bolloten and Esenwein reciprocated, and dug into his past, ‘in order to understand [Southworth’s] steadfastly loyal and … uncritical support of Negrín’,359 it was a waste of effort because he, Herbert Southworth, had always been upfront about the period he spent during 1938 and 1939 working as a propagandist for the Spanish Republic, the details of which he claimed, ‘could have been found in any good university library’.360 Obviously, in Southworth’s eyes what was good for the gander was not good for the goose. Even though Southworth claimed that he did ‘not resent Bolloten writing about’ him, his subsequent actions suggest the opposite was the case.361 In his essay ‘The Grand Camouflage’, in true Southworthesque style, he ridiculed Bolloten’s and Esenwein’s revelations:

Bolloten’s 1991 comments [in *The Spanish Civil War*] concerning myself are swollen to 107 lines in three notes: on pp. 789-90, there are ten lines; on pp. 881-82, there are 49 lines, and on pp. 916-17, there are 47 lines. … in what is a remarkable example of poor editing for a

355 Email correspondence between George Esenwein and Darryl Burrowes dated 9 May 2012.
358 Ibid.
361 Ibid.
Esenwein promoted, and continues to promote Bolloten’s work and reputation in acknowledgements, introductions, endnotes and citations in his own works. One of the earliest examples is in the book he co-authored with Adrian Shubert, *Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context 1931-1939.* The collaboration between Esenwein and Shubert demonstrates that scholars from different sides of the Bolloten-Southworth divide could still work together cooperatively on a project. Shubert was not and is not in the Bolloten camp. He had argued in a review of Bolloten’s *The Spanish Civil War*, three years before his co-authored book with Esenwein was published, that ‘Bolloten’s histories [were] fatally flawed’ because Bolloten ‘held tight to a single interpretive line’, that the Spanish Civil War is the story ‘of how, in the interests of Soviet foreign policy, the Spanish Communist Party and the agents of the Comintern killed the social revolution’. According to Shubert, ‘Bolloten’s obsession with the communists [led] him to tell a story in which only the communists act and the other political forces are passive or, at best, react – always ineffectively – to communist initiatives.’ For Shubert a critique of the communists’ role in Spain ‘must be firmly located within the context of events, in this case the fact that the Republic was fighting a war against the Nationalists and their foreign, fascist supporters’. In this perspective Shubert echoed his former Ph.D supervisor, Paul Preston, who eight years earlier had written:

Bolloten’s account of the Communist Party’s suppression of revolution in the interests of a conventional war effort and of Soviet foreign policy is based on tenacious scholarship but tends to be developed within an

---

362 Ibid., 296.
363 The book was Shubert’s idea. Shubert and Esenwein met at Stanford where Shubert held a postdoctoral position and Esenwein was finishing his dissertation. The co-authors started working on the book in 1985. (Email correspondence between Adrian Shubert and Darryl Burrowes, 10 September 2013). Adrian Shubert is currently Professor of History at York University in Canada. His PhD thesis, at the University of London, was on the coal miners of the Asturias 1860 – 1934 and was published in both English and Spanish and was supervised by Paul Preston. His published works include, *The West and the World: Contacts, Conflicts, Connections; Death and Money in the Afternoon: A History of Spanish Bullfighting; “Bullfighting” in Iberia and the Americas: Culture, Politics and History; The Land and People of Spain*. He was Guggenheim Fellow from 1997-1998, and in 1999 was made a Commander of the Order of Civil Merit by King Juan Carlos of Spain. See <http://international.yorku.ca/about/adrian.htm> accessed 4/9/13.
365 Ibid.
366 Ibid.
Shubert believes differences of opinion over Bolloten did not produce any particular stresses and strains in the co-authorship with Esenwein. This was probably made easier because the co-authors wrote independently. They each completed designated chapters before passing them on to the other. Shubert ran his chapters by Preston; Esenwein consulted Bolloten, Noam Chomsky and Stanley Payne about his chapters. Although Shubert does not recall any strains in the co-authorship, the separate acknowledgements to the book suggest a different tale. Esenwein wrote a twenty-four line acknowledgement, eleven of which were devoted to Bolloten, who he maintains was ‘a warm and generous person’, with ‘an abiding passion for telling the truth’, and a ‘profound respect for accuracy’. Shubert did not indulge in Bolloten adulation in his small four line acknowledgement, merely thanking his colleagues at the History Department at York, Canada, and his students who ‘compelled’ him ‘to think more clearly about the Second Republic and the Spanish Civil War’.

Another example of Esenwein’s defence of Bolloten’s reputation can be found in the Introduction to his 2005 book, *The Spanish Civil War: A Modern Tragedy*. Esenwein acknowledged that, ‘the polarized intellectual climate of the Cold War era had impacted on Civil War historiography’, but argued that Bolloten was immune and not affected by it for two reasons. Firstly, he ‘began writing his history in 1937-38’ before the beginning of the Cold War, and finished it in 1953; secondly, Esenwein claims Bolloten’s account was ‘shaped more by … oral testimonies and primary sources [that] he gathered during the immediate post-Civil War period than by the highly charged ideological debates and discussions that swirled around the Cold War’. This defence fails to take into account the fact that Bolloten continually reviewed and rewrote his work in the light of new material being made available, a process that

---


368 Email correspondence between Adrian Shubert and Darryl Burrowes, 10 September 2013.


370 Ibid.

continued right up to the time of publication. For example, the US Department of State published volumes of documents from the ‘secret archives of the German Foreign Ministry’ in 1950. Bolloten believed the volume, *Germany and the Spanish Civil War 1936-1939* was ‘one of the most fascinating books to appear on the Spanish Civil War’, but it meant he had to spend ‘at least a month’ making alterations to his book.\(^{372}\) Furthermore, Bolloten wrote and received much of his correspondence after 1945 in the developing Cold War era.

Southworth’s negative opinion of Bolloten’s work worsened as the Cold War progressed. He was ignorant of Bolloten’s professional and personal development. Perhaps if he had been aware that Bolloten’s approach to his work so closely mirrored his own he would have been less condemnatory. Bolloten, possibly inspired by the publication of Southworth’s fifty-seven page autobiography in 1986,\(^{373}\) put his own life story in the public arena in the last months of his life in 1987, when he recorded the conversation with Hilton. Of course this conversation came too late to influence Southworth’s assessment of Bolloten. Preston believes it was ‘a tragedy’ that ‘the two great icons of Spanish Civil War historiography’ never met. Southworth refused to agree to such a meeting, despite being urged to do so by both Preston and David Pike.\(^{374}\) Perhaps Southworth did not want to question his prejudices regarding Bolloten.

For Southworth:

> One of the consequences of the Cold War was the successful dissemination of the idea that it was Stalinist repression which led to Franco’s victory. In the historiography of the Spanish Civil War sponsored by the CIA-funded Congress for Cultural Freedom, minor episodes of the internecine struggles within the Republican zone are allowed to dwarf the wider issues of the war. The success of that historiography has obscured the fact that Hitler, Mussolini, Franco and Chamberlain were responsible for that victory, not Stalin.\(^{375}\)

Southworth had no doubts that Bolloten’s over-reliance on suspicious sources made his books vulnerable to CIA sponsored revisionism of the role the USSR had played in the Civil War.

**THE POLITICS OF PUBLICATION**

Critics of *The Grand Camouflage*, who believed that Bolloten exhibited a right wing bias, would have felt vindicated with his choice of publishers. After seven years of publisher

\(^{372}\) Antonio Villanueva-Bolloten letter dated 1 December 1950, Bolloten Collection, Box 7, Folder 25.

\(^{373}\) Southworth published ‘A modo de prólogo’ in 1986 ed. of *El mito de la cruzada de Franco*.

\(^{374}\) Preston interview with D. Burrowes on 4 July 2013.

rejections, Bolloten, at the end of his tether to get *The Grand Camouflage* published, and on the suggestion of Salvador de Madariaga, approached the British Catholic publisher Hollis and Carter. This approach was successful; Hollis and Carter published the book in the United Kingdom, and arranged for Frederick Praeger to publish it in the USA. Praeger had founded the publishing house in 1950. He had worked in intelligence and in the military government in Europe during and after World War II. Praeger actively sought out and published the works of anti-communist dissidents from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary during the Cold War, because they showed the realities of communism to the Western reading public. Bolloten claims he was initially unaware Hollis and Carter were Catholic publishers, though he admitted to Hilton that Hollis and Carter used the book for their own political purpose and chose a contentious anti-communist cover – a map of Spain coloured red with a hammer and sickle imposed on it. According to Esenwein, ‘Bolloten objected to the subtitle (and provocative cover) – which he thought sensationalized the subject matter.’ However, relief at having his book finally in print after so many years seems to have overcome any ideas he may have had of preventing the publication.

Madariaga, like El Campesino and Gorkin, foregrounds the issue of credibility of sources which lies at the heart of the Bolloten-Southworth stoush. Bolloten cited Madariaga positively in his books; Southworth mistrusted him. Southworth did not claim that Madariaga was associated with the CIA or other intelligence agencies, although Stonor Saunders did; she pointed out that Madariaga was heavily involved with the early Congress of Cultural Freedom activities and its ‘honorary patron’, who benefitted from CIA largesse through the Ford Foundation. Southworth criticized Bolloten for citing from two of Madariaga’s books – *Spain: A Modern History* (1958) and *Españoles de mi tiempo* (*Spaniards of My Time*).

---

376 Madariaga (1886-1978) at various times was a politician, propagandist, Minister and Ambassador for the Republican government, a Professor and author. He left Spain at the start of the Civil War to work for the defeat of the rebels in exile. During the Great War he had been employed in the propaganda section of the British Foreign Office to maintain Spanish neutrality in the war, in the face of a pro-Central Powers Spanish monarchy. He was a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1937 and 1952. See P. Preston, *Salvador De Madariaga and the Quest for Liberty in Spain*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, 1-30.


378 ‘Rough Draft’, 52.


Southworth dismissed Madariaga as ‘an easy to read narrative writer of historical events, but never a research historian’, who ‘frequently adopted contradictory positions’, and who was quoted in Franco propaganda publications, such as ¿Qué pasa en España? El problema del socialismo español (What happened in Spain? The problem of the Spanish socialism) (1959), and Madariaga versus Madariaga: Extractos de Anarquía o Jerarquía. (Madariaga versus Madariaga: Extracts of anarchy or hierarchy) (1955). Southworth pointed out that Madariaga was also a popular source for the English pro-Franco and anti-Republic historians Arthur Loveday, Arnold Lunn and Brian Crozier. He felt that Bolloten had initially ‘used Madariaga with caution’ in The Grand Camouflage, but eighteen years later in The Spanish Revolution Madariaga had become Bolloten’s handy quotation ‘hatchetman’, in order ‘to denigrate Pablo de Azcárate, [the Republic’s former ambassador in London and a fervent Negrín supporter] in a particularly disgusting and unscholarly manner’. Southworth asserted that:

Madariaga’s affirmations concerning historical events are to be treated with considerable caution. It was the reliability of Madariaga that Bolloten should have questioned and not that of Azcárate, but Bolloten never distrusts a witness against the Spanish Republic.

The choice of Frederick Praeger as Bolloten’s American publisher is an intriguing one. Praeger had also published Madariaga’s Spain: A Modern History in the USA. Stonor Saunders is adamant that Praeger was ‘a propagandist for the American military government in post-war Germany’, and ‘published between twenty and twenty-five volumes in which the CIA had an interest, either in the writing, the production itself, or the distribution.’ Could The Grand Camouflage have been one of these books? If Bolloten was a CIA-sponsored author Melvin Lasky, the CIA’s publishing man in Europe and one of the organizers of the Congress of Cultural Freedom, seems not to have known about it. On 19 April 1979 Bolloten, on the advice

382 H. Southworth, Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War, 87.
383 Ibid., 84.
386 Pablo de Azcárate worked in the League of Nations for fourteen prior to taking up the London post.
387 H. Southworth, Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War, 85.
388 Ibid., 218, n. 298.
389 F. Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 244. Praegar claims that the CIA, 'either reimbursed him for the expenses of publication, or guaranteed, usually through a foundation, the purchase of enough copies to make it worthwhile.’ (244-5)
of Bertram Wolfe, had written to Lasky, the then editor of the CIA-funded *Encounter* magazine, asking if he could recommend German publishers for *The Spanish Revolution* and advising him that North Carolina Press had sent him a review copy. Some eight months later, after receiving no response, Bolloten wrote again (8 December 1979) expressing his concern that, ‘*Encounter*, which had received a copy [of *The Spanish Revolution*] … has totally ignored the book, much to the surprise of my many friends in and outside of the academic world.’ Bolloten’s letter, again, went unanswered. He wrote a third time on 10 May 1980, stating he was ‘rather perplexed’ not to have received a reply. Was Bolloten perplexed because he was a CIA-favoured author and felt aggrieved that Lasky treated him with disdain. There is no record in the Bolloten Collection of Lasky ever replying to Bolloten’s request for recommendations of German publishers. Bolloten wrote a further four letters. The letters became more acrimonious as time passed, and not what one would expect of a CIA operative and a CIA-favoured author. Bolloten suggested Lasky exhibited ‘a propensity for selecting contributors [for *Encounter*] who excel in shoddy research’. On 8 September 1980 Bolloten finally wrote a letter which elicited a response:

I really should not waste my valuable time or even a stamp in writing to you, but I must let you know that I consider your failure to respond to any of my numerous letters a mark of poor breeding. I have often heard of your arrogance and vanity, of your superficiality and innate mediocrity, but I have no way of knowing how true these judgements are. However, I do know that you are rude, uncouth, and totally lacking in elementary courtesy.

On 15 September 1980 Lasky replied: ‘If it is any consolation to you, your letter …which attempts to be rude and insulting takes one of our annual prizes for literary inadequacy’ and he urged Bolloten, to ‘try harder next time’. Lasky also informed Bolloten that *Encounter* would publish his ‘letter to the editor’ although, ‘it was simple-minded’, it ‘made an arguable point’. Lasky does not elaborate on the ‘arguable point’. Could it be a late-discovered
realization on Lasky’s part that his irascible correspondent, Bolloten, was as anti-communist as himself?

‘BIRDS OF A FEATHER FLOCK TOGETHER’: THE PAUL SEABURY EULOGY

Bolloten’s friendship with Paul Seabury links him to an important member of the American political and neoconservative right, and adds further credence to Southworth’s claim that Bolloten moved further to the right after his move to California.

The internet website ‘Right Web’, an organ of the left-leaning ‘Institute for Policy Studies’, highlights Seabury’s importance – if membership of committees is anything to go by. ‘Right Web’ posts that Seabury was a political science professor at the University of Berkeley, ‘an intelligence adviser to President Reagan, and a former CIA chief of station in Turkey’. ‘Right Web’ also states that Seabury served on the boards of the ‘Committee on the Present Danger’, and the ‘Coalition for a Democratic Majority’, as well as being a member of the advisory board of the ‘American Initiatives Project’, which was affiliated to the ‘World Without War Council’ (WWWC), and a member of the ‘Consortium for the Study of Intelligence’. If the claim that Seabury was a former CIA chief is true, it connects Bolloten to the CIA through association. However, ‘Right Web’ does not substantiate its claim with evidence, and it is unlikely to be true, as it would have been difficult for Seabury to have developed a career in intelligence and academia at the same time. Nevertheless, Seabury

---

396 <rightweb.irc-online.org> Accessed 10/04/2015. ‘Right Web’ claims to assess the work of prominent organizations and individuals who promote militarist US foreign and defence policies.

397 According to ‘Right Web’, Seabury was for a time a member of President Reagan’s ‘Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board’ (PFIAB), on the board of advisors to the ‘Institute on Religion and Democracy’, and on the boards of the ‘Committee on the Present Danger and the Coalition for a Democratic Majority’. ‘Right Web’ also stated that Seabury was a member of the advisory board of the American Initiatives Project which was affiliated to the ‘World Without War Council’ (WWWC), a national group that purports to find non-military ways to resolve conflict. Seabury was also a member of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, a project of the military-strategy think tank the ‘National Strategy Information Centre’. See <rightweb.irc-online.org> Accessed 10/04/2015

undoubtedly had close connections with the CIA, considering the various influential government bodies and committees he served on.\textsuperscript{399} An indication of his political significance is the letterhead on the three page ‘rough typed eulogy’ that he wrote on hearing of Bolloten’s death. The header reads: ‘United States Institute of Peace’ (USIP), 730 Jackson Place, Washington DC’. According to ‘Right Web’, USIP was established by Act of Congress in 1984, with the objective of unravelling ‘the complexities of world politics’, and effecting ‘a more peaceful international order’, by providing information to ‘its prime audience [who] are members of Congress, congressional staff, policy-makers, scholars and diplomats and journalists: students and teachers in colleges and high schools’.\textsuperscript{400} Was Bolloten earmarked as one of the scholars that USIP provided with information?

It is evident from the contents of the eulogy that Seabury and Bolloten were very close. Seabury even forwarded the eulogy to Hilton, authorizing him to use it in any way he saw fit.\textsuperscript{401} The eulogy reveals that Bolloten respected Seabury’s opinion to such an extent that he rang him in July 1987 and asked him to read the draft of his almost completed history \textit{The Spanish Civil War}.\textsuperscript{402} Seabury recounts in the eulogy:

I awaited his work with growing impatience because of my own keen interest in his subject. Like many others, who depend upon narrative political history for an understanding of our contemporary situation, the Spanish Civil War has been an event of fundamental importance, and has been poorly misunderstood by many.\textsuperscript{403}

Furthermore, Seabury writes that the book


\textsuperscript{400} <rightweb.irc-online.org> Accessed 23/07/2013. The USIP board of directors was appointed by the US President with the proviso that they were to be ‘precluded from assuming a direct role in foreign-policy making or mediating international disputes.’ In its ‘mission statement’ USIP was expected to be, ‘non-partisan, non-ideological, and rooted in the highest standards of scholarly and professional integrity.’ However, ‘Right Web’ says that USIP has been criticised since its inception as being merely a research arm of the government, distributing largess to favoured groups and organisations. One of the groups receiving multiple or large grants between 1987 and 1989 included the ‘Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace’ also the ‘World Without War Council’. <rightweb.irc-online.org/articles/display/united_states_institute_of_peace> Accessed 23/07/2013.

\textsuperscript{401} ‘Clippings, letters, and eulogies, 1987’, Bolloten Collection, Box 1, Folder 1. The correspondence is dated, 23 October 1987, four days before Bolloten’s death. The date may be an error or it could suggest Hilton rang Seabury to advise him of Bolloten’s impending death.

\textsuperscript{402} ‘Clippings, letters, and eulogies, 1987’, Bolloten Collection, Box 1, Folder 1.

\textsuperscript{403} Ibid.
is more than a definitive history ... It is a work of profound architectonic form and content ... in the tradition of all great histories ... [with] an intimacy of human understanding, and a clear judgement as to the inter-weavings of political forces.\textsuperscript{404}

Seabury went on to claim that the Spanish Civil War ‘was harbinger of later battles and wars, which beleaguer our own times’ and suggested that ‘the struggle in Central America today [1987] owes much of its origins to the battles waged in Madrid, Valencia, Catalonia and Málaga’.\textsuperscript{405} Such a claim demonstrates how the American neo-conservatives viewed the Spanish Civil War. For them the war could be used to show communist duplicity and as such had lessons for the present. Was this the reason why Seabury was so interested in Bolloten’s book, because it provided a blueprint to show the way the Soviet Union asserted control and influence over an independent state? ‘The Seabury eulogy’ links Bolloten indirectly to the CIA, and casts doubt on Bolloten’s assertion that he ‘constantly strove to maintain his independence from any organization or institution that could possibly compromise the objectivity of his historical investigations’? \textsuperscript{406} Interestingly, Bolloten made no attempt to conceal his relationship with Seabury, as Seabury is one of seven, who are extended ‘special thanks’, in the Preface of \textit{The Spanish Revolution}.\textsuperscript{407} for ‘consent[ing] to read and make useful comments on a rather unwieldy manuscript of some two thousand pages’.\textsuperscript{408}

CONCLUSION

In the foreword to Bolloten’s \textit{The Spanish Revolution}, Raymond Carr writes:

\begin{quote}
It is Mr. Bolloten’s extensive quotation from primary sources which will make his book a mine that will be worked over by subsequent historians. They may not accept all his judgements, but they will remain in his debt.\textsuperscript{409}
\end{quote}

Carr’s ‘mine’ of ‘primary sources’ has indeed been ‘worked over by subsequent historians’, but for Southworth and other prominent historians the ‘mine’ was tainted by the false gold of

\textsuperscript{404} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{405} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{406} G. Esenwein, ‘Burnett Bolloten, Spanish Civil War Scholar, Dies’, nd., 3, Bolloten Collection, Box 1, Folder 1.
\textsuperscript{408} B. Bolloten, \textit{The Spanish Civil War}, xvii.
\textsuperscript{409} Ibid., xiii.

181
corrupt sources. Southworth’s relentless investigation of Bolloten’s written history, combined with his insinuations that Bolloten was involved with the CIA, have ensured that Bolloten’s works are treated with caution by historians today.

In response to Southworth’s relentless attacks on his reputation, Bolloten created his own public biographical portrait through the accounts he gave to Weller and Hilton. For the most part he gives a convincing account of an intellectual journey that was similar to that of many of his European and American contemporaries – that of the well-trodden path from idealistic left-wing supporter to disillusioned anti-communist. He was a man fascinated by ideas, an observer, who became a recorder and interpreter of events. He was not at any stage of his life a political activist or even a joiner. Above all he was a man who in his early life relished new challenges and took advantage of the many opportunities that opened up for him.

His time spent in Spain was a personal watershed and set the pattern for a life that would be dedicated to writing about the Spanish Civil War; writing that would lead to his subsequent excoriation by Southworth. His claims to be a reporter who took infinite pains to record events as accurately as possible are refuted by historians such as Boris Volodarsky, who suggest he was open to communist manipulation, although Bolloten would claim that it was he himself who was manipulating the communists.

Between 1938 and 1949 Bolloten’s political volte-face that had begun in Spain was cemented. He rejected communism and began to ascribe the defeat of the Republic to the machinations of the Soviet controlled PCE. The seeds of his ‘camouflage’ meta-narrative of communist manipulation were sown in Valencia where he observed the Republic’s foreign press office censors, Rubio Hidalgo and Constancia de la Mora’s refusal to ‘allow any reference to the revolution to pass over the wires’. Further evidence of his early anti-communism was his determination to write about Vallalba and expose the Republic’s rout at Málaga and the communists’ role in the rout.

In light of Bolloten’s developing anti-communism it is easy to understand why, as Southworth asserted, Bolloten accepted unquestionably the testimony of witnesses such as Orlov, El Campesino and Gorkin, all of whom had established CIA connections. This careless approach to scrupulous analysis seems to put the lie to Bolloten’s claim of being an assiduous

---

410 Bolloten-Barea letter dated 20 June 1950, Bolloten Collection, Box 5, Folder 10.
researcher who delivered unbiased interpretation, and leaves him open to charges of confirmation bias and illusory confirmation in his selection of evidence.

Southworth insinuated that there may even have been a financial incentive for Bolloten to bend his views to the conservative orthodoxy prevalent in the USA. If this was the case, and it seems unlikely, there is no record of any payment or any unexplained wealth. Bolloten was never rich, and the money he had, either came from family sources or a variety of jobs – in fact one of the people best placed to help him out financially, the CIA’s man – Melvin Lasky, seemed to go out of his way to snub him. Bolloten does not seem to have received money directly from any dubious sources, however, he may have been influenced by his lack of remuneration for his years of researching and writing history, into accepting the services of the right-wing UK Catholic publisher, Hollis and Carter, whom in other circumstances he would not have chosen. Although Bolloten seems to have had no part in the choice of Praeger as the American publisher of The Grand Camouflage, the decision does give Southworth’s claim of financial help from the CIA a degree of credibility. Frederick Praeger by his own admission accepted CIA money to publish books. Currently no evidence exists that proves that Praeger used CIA funds to publish The Grand Camouflage.

A more convincing reason for Bolloten’s increasingly right-wing interpretations in his books is to be found by looking at the company he kept and the political climate in the USA during the Cold War. His move to California certainly led to his becoming firmly embedded in conservative networks based around Bertram and Ella Wolfe, and later Paul Seabury. The Wolfes, who themselves were former communists, had no difficulty with accepting Orlov, El Campesino and Gorkín as reliable witnesses. The Seabury eulogy demonstrates the extent to which Bolloten had become an acceptable historian for the Right, whose historical writing was in tune with the Cold War anti-communist political climate.

Bolloten was not, of course, a political polemicist but a serious historian who dedicated his whole life to one subject. His burning ambition was to write the definitive history of the Spanish Civil War and to receive the recognition that that would bring. His ‘camouflage’ thesis of communist and Soviet duplicity in Spain dovetailed with the national mood of the USA at that time, and would therefore help him to get published. But his ambition came at a price. Perhaps it is possible that the long years of research which included many, many nights of insomnia and days of self-doubt and mental anguish had made it impossible for him to stand back from his own research and see what others like Southworth and Malefakis had seen – that
some of his conclusions in his books were incompatible with his evidence. However, contemporary Civil War historians remain in Bolloten’s debt for the massive collection of correspondence, contemporaneous newspapers and other documents that he collected over four decades that are now housed at the Hoover Institution.
CHAPTER FOUR

HERBERT RUTLEDGE SOUTHWORTH: DEFENDER OF THE SPANISH REPUBLIC FROM COLD WAR REVISIONISM

INTRODUCTION

From 28 to 29 April 2000 a symposium was held at Guernica Museum ‘to pay tribute’ to Herbert Southworth, who had died six months earlier on 30 October 1999, aged 91.¹ The book published as a result of the symposium, entitled *Herbert R. Southworth: Vida y Obra (Bizitzeta eta Lana)*,² provides some indication as to how some of Southworth’s contemporaries viewed his contribution to Spanish Civil War historiography. Of the ten contributors to the book only two were not of Spanish descent.³ Undoubtedly the occasion, organizers, and location of the conference would have had an enormous bearing on the content of the presentations, and attendance would have consisted of Southworthphiles. However, the fact that the symposium took place, and a book subsequently published, does indicate the high level of respect and appreciation that many in Spain had for Southworth.

Herbert Rutledge Southworth was fifty-five years old in 1963 when he published his first book *El mito de la cruzada de Franco* (hereafter *El mito*).⁴ Initially published in Spanish and then in French, but never in English, it sent an unequivocal message to Francoist historians, and to historians outside Spain whom Southworth deemed to be Franco supporters, that the sources they used to construct their history needed to be verifiable.⁵ At the heart of Southworth’s approach was his premise that ‘text and notes’ written by some Civil War scholars ‘should be

---

² *Herbert R. Southworth: Life and Work*.
³ Among the presenters of Spanish descent were Professor Josu Chueca of the University of the Basque Country, Angel Viñas of Complutense University, Jesús Alonso Carballés of École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (Paris); those of non-Spanish descent were Walther Bernecker of University of Erlangen-Nuremberg (Germany) and Paul Preston of London School of Economics.
⁴ The Myth of Franco’s Crusade
read and analysed like the fine print of an insurance policy’. As already discussed, Burnett Bolloten was one Anglo-American scholar whose book, *The Grand Camouflage*, Southworth subjected ‘to an inquisitorial-like examination’ in *El mito*. Southworth went on to write three more major works and two substantive essays on the Civil War. All of these works followed the same ‘inquisitorial’ and polemical method that he had established in *El mito*. It was this method that established his reputation, and made him a doyen to many in Civil War historiography.

As with all the writer-historians who feature in this thesis, a biographical methodology will be used to determine Southworth’s inner life and mindset when he wrote his history. The emergence of Southworth the historian so late in life followed an incubation period that was much longer than for most. The biographical portrait presented here will make extensive use of Southworth’s personal correspondence which is held at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the Tamiment Library at New York University, and the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam (IISH), as well as the Fundación Museo de la Paz de Gernika. Unfortunately, at the time of writing it was impossible to access all of the personal correspondence which the Fundación Museo de la Paz de Gernika acquired shortly after Southworth’s death, and which still remains uncatalogued. However, the Museo kindly made available the personal correspondence between Southworth and Jay Allen, which dates from 27 December 1963 until Allen’s death on 20 December 1972. This correspondence has been crucial in determining the development of Southworth as an historian, as letters between two longstanding and trusted friends are very likely to express genuine beliefs and feelings. This correspondence covers the period when Southworth was attempting to get *El mito* distributed as widely as possible, and reveals the trials and tribulations of this process. Further sources of information that have been made available for the first time are the unpublished letters between Southworth and the German literary scholar Günther Schmigalle, who had contacted Southworth in 1976 after reading *El mito*, seeking advice about his dissertation on André Malraux. Schmigalle and Southworth continued to exchange letters until September 1987. During the course of the correspondence the two men met five or six times – twice at Southworth’s Château de Roche, near Concrémiers; once at his fifteenth century home at Saint-Benoît-du-Sault; once at Santander, where Southworth and Preston were offering lectures at the Summer University; and

---


8. Email correspondence Ana Teresa Núñez Monasterio (Guernica Museum) - D. Burrowes dated 15 May 2015. The reason given for this was the ‘economic crisis’.
once at a conference on Spanish Fascism at Bad Homburg, organized by a German historian, Walther L. Bernecker.9 Over this time Schmigalle came to admire Southworth ‘as a researcher, a writer, an antifascist and as a human being’.10 The respect was mutual, evident from the fact that Southworth called on Schmigalle to help him with some research, which he duly acknowledged in an endnote in his last book.11

The Southworth-Allen and the Southworth-Schmigalle correspondence is used extensively as it provides new perspectives on Southworth the man, and Southworth the historian. The thesis also benefits from the recollections of others who knew Southworth personally – Paul Preston, Gabriel Jackson, Stanley Payne and David Wingate Pike – who shared their thoughts on Southworth with the author in interviews and email correspondence. Another reputable scholar who wishes to remain anonymous has also contributed recollections. This scholar is included here because of the negative and unflattering critique offered of Southworth. This chapter will also draw on biographical chapters of Southworth written by Sebastiaan Faber and Paul Preston, in books they published in 2008, and will also extensively refer to Southworth’s own brief, thirty-three page memoir, ‘A modo de prólogo’, which he published in 1986.

In early May 1971, Southworth confided to his close friend, the newspaperman Jay Allen:12

People say I am destructive and ill-tempered and never say a good word about anybody, but somebody has to say who are the sons of bitches and the good guys. In the academic world, all is politeness and you scratch my back and turn around. I like to think of myself as a fresh current of air.13

9 Günther Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence dated 03/05/2015. During the forty years that the Southworths lived in France they purchased two Châteaus to house Southworth’s book collection. The first, the dilapidated Château de Puy in Villedieu sur Indre, was purchased in 1960; ten years later they moved into the run-down Château de Roche, located in the centre of France. See P. Preston, We Saw Spain Die, Skyhorse Publishing, New York, 2009, 358.

10 Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence dated 2 May 2012.

11 Southworth asked Schmigalle’s help to locate some documents: ‘I have not been able to consult a file of this publication. However, a German friend, Günther Schmigalle, who is the author of a doctoral dissertation entitled André Malraux und der Spanische Bürgerkrieg, and now works in the Karlsruhe Library, has studied the files of the Anti-Comintern periodicals and has found nothing on the “documents”’. H. Southworth, ‘The Grand Camouflage’: Julián Gorkin, Burnett Bolloten …’, 222, Note 433.

12 The closeness of the relationship is evident from the comment Southworth wrote to Allen on 2 January 1964: ‘I am not given to great expressions, but I hope that you could see … the affection and admiration I have always felt for you.’ Uncatalogued correspondence, Southworth Collection, Dokumentazio Zentruko Arduraduna, Gernikako Bakearen Museoa Fundazioa.

Two weeks later Southworth wrote in a similar soul-searching vein in answer to a letter he had received from Fredericka Martin, a former head nurse of an American Hospital in Spain during the Civil War:

I was delighted to get your letter. So many people think I am unpleasant and ill-mannered, it is a pleasure to hear from somebody who does not object to seeing a fraud hit over the head verbally.  

It is clear from these two quotations that Southworth saw himself as playing an important, but combative role, in Spanish Civil War historiography. Why Southworth adopted this role is the key question this chapter will address.

Martin had contacted Southworth to congratulate him on his recently published essay, “Los bibliófobos: Ricardo de la Cierva y sus colaboradores”, which had harshly criticized the up-and-coming young neo-Francoist historian Ricardo de la Cierva y de Hoces’s recently published book, Bibliografía sobre la Guerra de España (1936-1939) y sus antecedentes históricos. Southworth described the book as ‘mediocre’, and ‘prepared with indifference’. He went so far as to claim: ‘Never in the history of scholarship has a catalogue been published with so much erroneous information.’ In her letter Martin thanked Southworth ‘for spitting poor, mentally marasmic Ricardo so neatly, for roasting him so deservedly for his blatant offences’, and ‘for standing up for Spain and scholarship’. Martin ended her letter with the warning: ‘Be careful if you go to Spain.’

---

14 Southworth-Martin letter dated 22 June 1971, Fredericka Martin Papers, ALBA 001, Box 21.
15 H. Southworth, “Los bibliófobos; Ricardo de la Cierva y sus colaboradores”, Cuadernos de Ruedo Ibérico, 1970-1971. Author’s translation - “Book-haters; Ricardo de la Cierva and his Collaborators”. According to Javier Díaz-Martínez, Spanish Department, Flinders University: ‘En ese contexto, Southworth está llamando a de La Cierva y sus colaboradores bibliófobos en el sentido opuesto a bibliófilos, o sea, que de La Cierva odia los libros: buscarlos, leerlos, citarlos. Se trata de una alusión a una supuesta falta de interés por parte de de la Cierva para leer toda la bibliografía correspondiente a un tema histórico. En otras palabras: lo está llamando vago y falto de rigor.’ Javier Díaz-Burrowes email correspondence dated 22/03/2012. Author’s translation – ‘In this context, Southworth is calling de la Cierva and his collaborators book-haters in the opposite sense to book-lovers. That is to say that de la Cierva hates books: investigating them, reading them, citing them. It is about an allusion and an alleged lack of interest on the part of de la Cierva to read the bibliography corresponding to the subject. In other words: Southworth is calling de la Cierva and his collaborators lazy and their work lacking in rigor.
17 Quoted in S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 90.
19 Ibid.

Martin collected documents and materials concerning medical matters during the Civil War ‘for future historians to work with’. Her papers provide a comprehensive record on the role of medical volunteers in Spain, and include
Martin’s warning would have touched a raw nerve. Southworth had been anxious about visiting Spain ever since the publication of *El mito*. He had heard from a friend in Madrid that there was quite a demand for the book given that the police were ‘quite active against it’. According to Paul Preston, 3000 copies of the banned *El mito* filtered into Spain through the Canary Islands where the customs officials were ‘slack’. Preston claims the book had so successfully dismantled ‘the structure of lies that the Franco regime had erected to justify its existence’, that it was driven to rethink its approach to Civil War history. Preston even claims that the regime ‘denominated’ Southworth as their ‘public enemy number one’, and recognizing a threat, set up a new department within the Ministry of Information – the Sección de Estudios sobre la Guerra de España. This Sección (Department) under de la Cierva’s direction was entrusted with bringing the regime’s official historiography ‘up to date’. Southworth himself ‘strongly’ believed that the Sección was founded because of *El mito*. Others, however, think that the publication of Hugh Thomas’s *The Spanish Civil War* in 1961, and Gabriel Jackson’s *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War 1931-1939* in 1965, also influenced the regime’s decision. Thomas’s book took out the prestigious Somerset Maugham Award in 1962 and established him as a key figure in Spanish Civil War historiography.

In 1965 Southworth revisited Spain, and de la Cierva invited him to dine with him. De la Cierva had earlier written to Southworth telling him that *El mito* was flawed, and that if he ‘were to eliminate all the passion and prejudice that is found in [his] pages, [his] work would achieve the status it deserves’. However, at the dinner de la Cierva admitted to obtaining confiscated copies when the opportunity arose to distribute to his friends. Nevertheless, Southworth came...
away from the dinner feeling distinctly less safe in Spain, and ‘feared that in future visits he could be arrested’. Allen also believed Southworth had grounds to be afraid and suggested that the CIA might be involved:

You were wise to keep out of Madrid. The Spanish might well begin to see you more clearly. And don’t forget that the woods are full of agents of the CIA and other cosy little groups…They get paid and my guess is they do their best to earn their money. Take care.

The correspondence between Southworth and Allen reveals that both men were well aware of the anti-communist cultural Cold War that the CIA was engaged in. It was not unusual for them to express and voice their mutual and unsubstantiated suspicions about the CIA. On 5 January 1965 Allen told Southworth that Ronald Hilton

…got the heave-ho some weeks ago [as the Director of the Institute of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies at Stanford University] by the trustees. Nobody has given any clear indication as to why. I suspect, but only that, pressure by the CIA. You may remember that Hilton blew the whistle on the preparations for invading Cuba weeks before the Bay of Pigs. And from what young Pike told me … CIA efforts to plant a man in the Institute failed.

Allen’s references to the CIA reflects the perception held by leftists during the sixties and seventies that the CIA was actively engaged in activities, both at home and abroad, to promote anti-communism. There was a growing suspicion that academic staff may have been appointed because of their anti-leftist and anti-communist credentials. American universities had already experienced McCarthyism in the fifties, which had marginalized ‘Marxism and its practitioners’, if not completely banishing them from the academy. Moreover, a sense of patriotism increasingly permeated the psyche of some American scholars as the Cold War developed, diminishing the importance of academic freedom. This was evident when the new President of the American Historical Association (hereafter AHA), Conyers Read, in his 1949 address to the AHA declared: ‘Total war, whether it be hot or cold, enlists everyone and calls upon everyone to

30 David Pike-Burrowes email correspondence dated 26 April 2012. Pike is Professor Emeritus of Contemporary History and Politics at The American University of Paris. Pike had at one time been on very good terms with both Southworth and Bolloten but ultimately broke with Southworth over the latter’s stoush with Bolloten.
31 Allen-Southworth letter dated 9 November 1967, uncatalogued correspondence, Southworth Collection.
32 Refers to David Wingeate Pike, the future Professor of History at The American University of Paris.
33 Allen-Southworth letter dated 5 January 1965, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
34 Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence dated 7 May 2012.
35 Ellen Schrecker, quoted in Howard Zinn, ‘The Politics of History in the Era of the Cold War’, in The Cold War & The University, The New Press, New York, 1997, 43. Schrecker points out: ‘The full extent to which American scholars censored themselves is hard to gauge’ because ‘there is no way to measure the books that were not written.’
assume his part...[W]e can never be altogether free agents, even with our tongue and our pen,' 

The 1961 AHA President, the diplomatic historian, Samuel Flagg Bemis was ‘equally blunt in his address: ‘Too much self-study, too much self-criticism is weakening to a people...A great people’s culture...begins to decay when it commences to examine itself.’ 

In France and West Germany it became apparent that the anti-communist climate allowed former fascist collaborators and ex-nazis to hold onto, or to be appointed to academic posts. The perception of CIA manipulation of academic institutions and scholars was regularly fuelled by the publication of books and articles, often by former CIA operatives.

During the developing Cold War Southworth became obsessed with collecting books and pamphlets on the Spanish Republic and the Civil War. He frequently travelled to Spain to hunt out materials. His collecting obsession continued until he eventually accumulated the largest private library on the Spanish Republic and Civil War in the world. He used his library to write sustained critical attacks on those scholars he felt were influenced in their interpretations of the Spanish Civil War by the anti-communist Cold War climate.

At the end of World War Two, Southworth, like most people, believed that the Franco regime was doomed. It was ‘branded as a menace to world peace’ and was excluded from the new world order ushered in by the founding of the United Nations Organization. President Truman and his predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt ‘made no secret’ of their antipathy to Franco. The then chairman of the US Foreign Relations Committee, the Democratic Senator Tom Connolly, had argued for Spain’s exclusion from the UNO on the grounds that the ‘Franco fascist government, which was imposed by force upon the Spanish people with the aid of the Axis powers in war, does not represent the Spanish people.’ In 1946 the UNO adopted a resolution condemning the Franco government and calling for member nations to end their

37 Ibid.
40 P. Preston, ‘Prologue’ in H. Southworth, Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War, xii.
41 S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 15.
43 Ibid.
diplomatic representation in Madrid. However, in the following four years of the burgeoning Cold War the USA changed tack and ‘mounted a campaign for relaxation of the hostility and suspicion with which Franco was universally regarded’. By 1950 the UNO’s anti-Spain resolution was revoked and in 1955 Spain was admitted to the UNO. In the interests of its anti-communist and anti-USSR agenda, President Truman’s former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained: ‘Spain is of strategic importance to the general defence of Western Europe.’ In 1953 the USA and Spain signed the Pact of Madrid. This ten year agreement poured US economic and military aid into Spain in return for military and naval bases. Southworth believed that with little effort the victors of World War Two could easily have terminated the regime. In 1948 he told Allen: ‘I really think that a little blockade would topple Franco in three weeks if not sooner.’ Southworth came to realize, in the words of Preston, that ‘one of the consequences of the Cold War was the successful dissemination of the idea that it was the Stalinist repression which led to Franco’s victory.’

The rebranding and legitimization of the regime stung Southworth into action. For the next forty years he would again ‘fight the good fight’ – this time as an historian of the Spanish Civil War. He would do his best to ensure that the Spanish Republic and its role in the Civil War were not besmirched for political ends by the pen of neo-Francoist historians, led by de la Cierva. Southworth feared that neo-Francoist apologists were all too readily accepted by some Anglo-American scholars and institutions, reflecting the Cold War rapprochement between the Western democracies and Franco Spain. The Oxford don Raymond Carr was certainly one scholar of whom Southworth was suspicious. Southworth sarcastically voiced his concerns to Martin when he told her that ‘the doors of the American and English universities are wide open to [de la Cierva’s] brilliant scholarship’. He elaborated that de la Cierva had ‘recently contributed an essay’ to a collection on the Spanish Civil War edited by Raymond Carr, and that in June 1971 de la Cierva was ‘chief invitee, “Senior Research Scholar”, to a powwow’ on the Spanish Civil War at Madison, Wisconsin organized by Stanley Payne’. Recently the Spanish scholar María

44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
48 D. Dunthorn, Britain and the Spanish Anti-Franco Opposition 1940-1950, 165.
Jesús González Hernández echoed Southworth’s reservations and criticisms of Carr for including essays written by Spaniards close to the Franco regime, not only by de la Cierva, but also by Ramón Salas Larrazábal – a former Colonel in the Spanish Air Force; it ‘meant that the book represented a clear departure from what had hitherto been a consensus sympathetic to the Republican cause that can be traced back to Brenan.’ Carr’s career does seem to have benefitted from the book, which made him so popular with the Franco regime ‘that he was invited to Spain time and time again to lecture.’ Carr himself admits that at one of the lectures he addressed his ‘largest audience’ ever.

Bolloten was another scholar whom Southworth suspected had succumbed to the nebulous but real pressure that the Cold War exerted for his own material gain. Southworth had initially become suspicious of Bolloten because of a letter Constancia de la Mora, the former communist head of the Republic’s Foreign Press Office in Valencia, had written to Allen on 14 January 1940. At the time de la Mora was in exile in Mexico and was in contact with Bolloten, who was also residing there. De la Mora told Allen that Bolloten had been with her for three days and had showed her ‘seven chapters of his book’ which she described as ‘simply marvellous … ALL from our side … it is a most fascinating political as well as historical and military study of the war.’

The book that Bolloten eventually published, The Grand Camouflage: The Communist Conspiracy in the Spanish Civil War, did not fit de la Mora’s description, and Southworth suspected that Bolloten had changed the book for material gain. He insinuated to Allen that the Bolloten that de la Mora had hosted in 1940 would never have been able to become an American citizen or be associated with the Hoover Institution during the Cold War.

Southworth was not alone among his contemporaries in his belief that the Cold War impacted on Civil War historiography. His on-off friend, Gabriel Jackson, harboured similar views:

I have preferred not to make the compromises that Payne-Malefakis-Linz etc. have made on the grounds that being published in some form in

Preface to the book, Carr justified his selection of contributors: ‘The history of the Second Republic and the Civil War is still a highly controversial topic. Not everybody will agree with all the conclusions of these essays; the editor does not, nor has he suppressed the contradictions between them.’

Maria Jesús González Hernández, Raymond Carr, 320.

Ibid., 321.

Ibid.

Letter by Constancia de la Mora to Allen (although the name has been out) dated 14 January, presumably 1940 (this date has been added later by Allen). Allen told Southworth that it had to be 1940. This letter was attached to a letter that Allen wrote to Southworth on 9 May 1964.
Spain is more important than the fact that changes might have to be made or things toned down.\textsuperscript{54}


Once upon a time there were three big, bad Fascists – Mussolini, Hitler and Franco. We fought a World War to kill two of them and to destroy all they stood for; now we have made an ally of the third … Spain became a member of the United Nations and a number of affiliated organisations. Franco Spain is no longer a pariah among nations of the world, and for this United States support and policy behind it are largely responsible.\textsuperscript{55}

Southworth’s perception that Cold War politics influenced the way scholars wrote their history drove him to adopt his abrasive combative approach, which involved forensic interrogation of the historians themselves, as well as the history they wrote. In 1964 Allen told Southworth that his own continuing involvement in the Spanish Civil War was to ensure ‘that the historians do not pass on the big lies, debunked largely where Hitler and Mussolini were concerned but not Franco’.\textsuperscript{56} In this objective, Southworth was at one with his friend.

Although Southworth was never a member of any Communist Party,\textsuperscript{57} he believed Stalin’s material support of arms and food to the Spanish Republic was an undeniably ‘good thing’,\textsuperscript{58} it drew a line in the sand against the string of territorial successes fascism had made in Europe since the end of the Great War. During his lifetime Southworth never wavered in this conviction, or from his anti-fascist and pro-Spanish Republic views. He reaffirmed his anti-fascist views to Allen in 1964: ‘There are not many of us [anti-fascists] left in the world.’\textsuperscript{59} In the same letter, Southworth showed an early insight into the way the anti-communist propaganda war was being fought by the West:

The big wheel in the Spanish anti-Franco propaganda here [France]\textsuperscript{60} is the Committee for Intellectual Liberty or some such name, headed by

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{54} Gabriel Jackson-José Martínez letter dated 22 August 1974, Ruedo Ibérico correspondence, IISH, Amsterdam.
\bibitem{56} Allen-Southworth letter dated 16 November 1964, Southworth Collection, Dokumentazio Zentruko Arduraduna.
\bibitem{57} Conversation between Paul Preston and Darryl Burrowes that took place at Preston’s London home on 4 July 2013. Also S. Faber, \textit{Anglo-American Hispanists & the Spanish Civil War}, 77.
\bibitem{58} Paul Preston and Darryl Burrowes conversation that took place at Preston’s London home on 4 July 2013.
\bibitem{59} Southworth-Allen letter dated 2 January 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
\bibitem{60} After World War Two Southworth lived in France.
\end{thebibliography}
Madariaga, Gorkin, etc. They have scads of money, but their anti-Franquismo must also be anti-communist.\textsuperscript{61}

The committee to whom Southworth referred was actually the Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF), and the ‘scads of money’ were provided covertly by the CIA.\textsuperscript{62} Southworth would have to wait until 1966, when the California-based magazine \textit{Ramparts} revealed the way the CIA covertly funded the CCF, to learn how close to the mark he was.\textsuperscript{63}

Southworth’s strong anti-fascist views had developed in the thirties, when he worked at the Library of Congress in Washington and observed with dismay the rise of fascism in Europe. His pro-Spanish Republic views were reinforced later in New York, when he worked closely with Allen at the Spanish Information Bureau – the Spanish Republic’s mouthpiece in the USA\textsuperscript{64} – writing propaganda which aimed to persuade the American people and its government to change policy, and abandon its Spanish non-intervention policy. Southworth believed that this policy, by prohibiting the sale of oil and arms to Spain, was doing more to bring about the Republic’s defeat than Franco’s armies, which were being decisively aided by Mussolini’s ground forces and Hitler’s \textit{Luftwaffe}.

Southworth’s anti-fascist and pro-Spanish Republic sentiments became entrenched in the months and years immediately after Franco’s victory over the Republic; he continued to champion the defeated Republic and worked with Allen to promote the cause of the Negrín government in exile, as well as to help the thousands of Republican refugees that had poured into France. For Southworth, the Republic’s defeat was tantamount to a ‘personal tragedy’.\textsuperscript{65}

Both Southworth’s corpus of work and his pugnacious polemics with scholars such as Bolloten and Hugh Thomas, were partly a response to his perception that some Anglo-American scholars were hostage to Cold War revisionism, which saw the Spanish Republic as a deeply flawed and failed institution that was given a temporary lifeline by a self-interested Stalin, who plundered its gold reserves. For Southworth, his books were his ‘small way to reclaim a bit of honour and glory for the Spanish Republic’ in the Cold War world.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{61} Southworth-Allen letter dated 2 January 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
\textsuperscript{63} F. Stonor Saunders, \textit{The Cultural Cold War}, 381.
\textsuperscript{64} Soledad Fox, \textit{A Spanish Woman in Love and War: Constancia de la Mora}, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 2011, 175.
\textsuperscript{65} María Jesús González Hernández, \textit{Raymond Carr}, 156.
\textsuperscript{66} Southworth-Allen letter dated 2 January 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
But was Southworth the ‘fresh current of air’ in Spanish historiography that he professed, or was he, as claimed by the conservative writer Nigel Jones, a ‘Communist propagandist and Stalinist stooge’, who ‘perpetuated’ and ‘reinforced’ myths about the Spanish Republic? Jones’s strident claims are supported by the prominent Civil War historian who wishes to remain anonymous, already quoted in the previous chapter, who asserts that Southworth perpetrated a ‘highly partisan view of republican politics [with] vitriolic and ill-informed attacks … full of misconceptions, distorting comments, and falsehoods’ which was ‘characteristic of all of [his] writings’.

As with Bolloten there is no dedicated biography of Southworth yet published, but Southworth’s biography is better known and more accessible than Bolloten’s. Southworth published a fifty-seven page autobiographical sketch entitled, ‘A modo de prólogo’, which was included in the 1986 edition of El mito. Paul Preston, in his capacity as General Editor of the Cañada Blanch / Sussex Academic Studies on Contemporary Spain, which published Southworth’s last book, Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War, wrote a seven page biographical ‘Prologue’ for the book. Preston and Sebastiaan Faber both included small biographical chapters on Southworth in books they published in 2008. Preston’s brief chapter (13 of 436 pages), called ‘A Lifetime’s Struggle: Herbert Rutledge Southworth and the Undermining of the Franco Regime’, is a strange inclusion in a book entitled We Saw Spain Die: Foreign Correspondents in the Spanish Civil War. All the other writers featured – Ernest Hemingway, John Dos Passos, Louis Fischer, George Steer, Jay Allen, Henry Buckley and Mikhail Koltsov – actually reported on the Civil War from Spain, whereas Southworth remained in the USA during the Civil War, never reporting on the war. Faber’s chapter (22 of 278 pages) in Anglo-American Hispanists & the Spanish Civil War had the misleading title, ‘Herbert R. Southworth: The

---

67 Jones has written books on The Great War, the rise of the Nazis, Oswald Mosley, Rupert Brooke and the Tower of London. At the time of writing, his latest book is entitled, Peace and War: Britain in 1914 (2014). In May 2015 he contested the seat of Eastbourne for UKIP (UK Independence Party). He was not elected but attained 11.6% of the vote.
69 Email correspondence between D. Burrowes and the anonymous historian dated 09/05/2012.
70 It is likely that this situation will change in the not too distant future. In an email to D. Burrowes, dated 9 January 2014, Preston disclosed that he harboured thoughts of writing a proper biography of Herbert Southworth someday.
71 Preston-Burrowes email correspondence dated 13/04/2012. For a brief background of The Cañada Blanch Centre for Contemporary Spanish Studies see Preston’s brief account in Gabriel Jackson’s Juan Negrín, Sussex Academic Press, Eastbourne, 2010, viii-ix.
Rebirth of the “Amateur” Hispanist.” Can a man who wrote four well-respected history books be considered an amateur? It is evident from the Southworth-Allen correspondence that lack of institutional and academic status is something that bothered Southworth, and may also have contributed to his zealously inquisitorial methodological style.

**CATCHING THE SPANISH BUG: IN THE SERVICE OF THE REPUBLIC**

When the Spanish Civil War erupted, the twenty-eight year old Southworth was ‘extremely happy’ in a ‘very minor job’ in the Document Department of the Library of Congress in Washington, where he had worked since 1934, on a salary ‘that barely allowed him to eat’.

Years later, aged seventy-five, he reminisced: ‘I have always felt a twinge of regret that the chances that determine life have not permitted me to finish my life in a library.' However, he told Schmigalle that he ‘never regretted’ leaving the library ‘in order to work for the Spanish Republic’.

The Spanish Republic’s Ambassador to the United States, Fernando de los Rios, became aware of Southworth’s anti-fascist and pro-Republican *Washington Post* articles, and engaged him to write propaganda articles on behalf of the Republic’s New York Information Bureau.

Although Southworth never attempted to cover up this propaganda work, he often portrayed it in sympathetic language: ‘I left the Library of Congress in 1938 for political journalism and historical research.’ He worked for the Bureau until it was ‘forced to close down … in the summer of 1941’. It was at this time that he met and became Jay Allen’s ‘research assistant’.

In a letter to Holman Hamilton in 1964, Allen described Southworth’s mindset during the thirties and forties as going ‘along with the CP [Communist Party] as long as they were going our way but not after the Pact [Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939]’. However, it seems that Allen’s interpretation of Southworth’s view of the Nazi-Soviet Pact was wrong.

---

72 Southworth is one of four scholars Faber selected as representative of Anglo-American Hispanists, in order to explore the essence of their ‘Hispanophilia’ through a close-up look of their lives and work. The other three are Gerald Brenan, Allison Peers and Paul Rogers.
74 Southworth to G. J. Wijebtinge letter, 9 November 1983, Southworth-Schmigalle correspondence.
75 Southworth to Schmigalle letter, 8 January 1985.
76 P. Preston, *We Saw Spain Die*, 355.
78 P. Preston, *We Saw Spain Die* 357.
80 Holman Hamilton worked as a reporter and later editor of the Fort Wayne, Indiana, *Journal-Gazette*. He changed careers in the 1950s and became an historian, eventually becoming Professor of History at the University of Kentucky.
Southworth wrote to Allen on 21 December 1965: ‘I could think of many reasons for leaving the CP [Communist Party of the USA], but I always thought the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 [was] the only possible answer to Munich.’\(^{82}\) In his support of the Communist Party Southworth was no different to the many others of his generation who sympathized with and worked for the Republican cause. The American historian Ellen Schrecker identified this group in her 1986 work *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism & The Universities*. She pointed out that most of the men and women in this demographic ‘had to work with the Communist Party’, if they ‘wanted to help the Loyalists’ because ‘its international connections gave it an edge in making the clandestine arrangements necessary for getting American volunteers and medical supplies to Spain’.

The contentious polemical and forensic methodology which Southworth utilized in his history has its genesis in his early writing for the *Washington Post* and the Spanish Information Bureau. Between January 1937 and January 1938 he reviewed seven books on the Spanish Civil War.\(^{84}\) Preston believes these reviews ‘foreshadowed both the sardonic humour and the hawk-eyed critical acuity that were the hallmarks of his later writing’.\(^{85}\) In his reviews Southworth made no attempt to be impartial; he was so ‘emotionally affected by the struggle between fascism and anti-fascism’ that he became a ‘crusading left-wing journalist’.\(^{86}\) Later, he wrote that he never hid from his ‘firm commitment to the cause of the Spanish Republic’ and was ‘proud to have striven, to the best of [his] modest talents, to defend’ the Republic’s record.\(^{87}\) In ‘A modo de prólogo’ he identifies the Civil War as a personal watershed:

---

\(^{82}\) Southworth-Allen letter dated 21 December 1965, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence. Southworth was referring to membership of the Communist Party in general terms as Southworth was never a member of any CP.


\(^{85}\) P. Preston, *We Saw Spain Die*, 355.

\(^{86}\) Ibid. Also, P. Preston, ‘Prologue’ in H. Southworth, *Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War*, x.

I became emotionally embroiled in the fight between fascism and anti-fascism... and today it seems to me that the trajectory of my life, far from being the inexplicable career of an eccentric object, follows a nearly straight line from my earliest memories up to this moment.\textsuperscript{88}

Southworth’s early writing blends passionate partisanship with forensic analysis. This technique is evident in his review of Major Geoffrey McNeill-Moss’s 1936 pro-Nationalist book \textit{The Siege of Alcazar}.\textsuperscript{89} McNeill-Moss describes the two month siege of the medieval Toledo Alcazar, when Nationalists held out against sustained attacks from Republican forces. Eventually Franco’s Moroccan army relieved the Nationalists holed up in the Alcazar, and the story of their resistance became a powerful source of nationalist propaganda.\textsuperscript{90} In his review Southworth implied that McNeill-Moss’s book could only be a work of propaganda, because it was written with the help of Franco’s high command, coupled with Nationalist survivors’ accounts.\textsuperscript{91} Southworth acknowledged that the Alcazar defenders may have been brave and ‘disciplined’, but in the end, ‘they were traitors, not only to the government of the Spanish Republic, but to the flow of history’. Southworth used his review as his own propaganda platform, and promoted the Republican cause by portraying the Alcazar’s defenders as reactionary ‘traditionalists’, who longed ‘for the good old times’ when ‘a strong federal police force [kept] the peasant in line while he toiled from sun-up to sun-down, so that his aristocratic master who owned the land might buzz his Fiat through the south of France’.\textsuperscript{92}

\textbf{WORLD WAR II: GETTING DOWN TO BUSINESS}

During the Second World War Southworth’s skills as an anti-fascist propagandist were recognized and harnessed by the burgeoning US intelligence service. However, exactly what part of the intelligence service Southworth worked for in the summer of 1941 is not clear. Faber claims, without a source, that it was the Office of Strategic Services (hereafter OSS) – the precursor of the CIA.\textsuperscript{93} Preston states, also without a reference note, that it was the US Office of

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{88} Author’s translation of ‘… quedé atrapado emocionalmente por la lucha que se desarrollaba entre el fascismo y el antifascismo ... Y hoy me parece que la trayectoria de mi vida, lejos de ser la inexplicable carrera de un excéntrico objeto, sigue una línea casi recta desde mis más tempranos recuerdos hasta este momento.’ H. Southworth, ‘A modo de prólogo’, 41.
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{The Siege of Alcazar: A history of the siege of the Toledo Alcazar}, A. A. Knopf, New York, 1936. McNeill-Moss became a major in the British army during the Great War. He wrote unmemorable historical fiction after the war, such as \textit{Sweet Pepper} (1925), set in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
\textsuperscript{90} A. Beevor, \textit{The Battle for Spain}, Penguin, 2006, 121.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} S. Faber, \textit{Anglo-American Hispanists & the Spanish Civil War}, 77.
\end{footnotes}
War Information (hereafter OWI).\textsuperscript{94} In ‘A modo de prólogo’ Southworth is vague on the matter. He writes: ‘I began to work in an organization whose name I do not remember, but after the entry of the USA into the war it became the Office of War Information (hereafter OWI).’\textsuperscript{95} Nevertheless, Faber, Preston and Southworth all agree, that in the spring of 1943 Southworth was sent to North Africa and worked in Algeria and Morocco.\textsuperscript{96} In Algeria he worked for the US Office of Psychological Warfare, a division staffed from the OSS and the OWI, and in Rabat, Morocco, he was involved in coordinating broadcasts to Franco Spain. These broadcasts informed the Spanish people of the Allied victories, including daily updates of the battles being waged on the Russian front by the Red Army against the Wehrmacht, and were not ostensibly anti-Franco, as that would have contravened orders.\textsuperscript{97}

After the war Southworth left his job with the US government, unfortunately the precise circumstances of his departure are unclear. In ‘A modo de prólogo’ Southworth claims that he left (abandoné) because of the political climate of the Cold War: ‘At the start of the Cold War, my anti-fascism was a disadvantage and I stopped working for the US Government.’\textsuperscript{98} However, ‘A modo de prólogo’ was written for inclusion in the 1986 edition of El mito, so the perspectives presented there would have been influenced by years of revelations on how the Cold War had affected careers. Preston, on the other hand, believes the decision was not Southworth’s, and states that he was ‘fired’.\textsuperscript{99} Preston bases this claim on Southworth’s letter to Allen dated 25 May 1946:

I am told by a friend inside that I have been placed on a State Department blacklist and will never be employed by the Department. This is a bit bothersome for a man of 38 whose greatest claim to employment is the five years he has spent in American information work.\textsuperscript{100}

Faber also accepts this perspective and writes that Southworth’s ‘leftist credentials would be a major career obstacle in a political climate ready to resume the rabid anti-communism of the pre-

\textsuperscript{94} P. Preston, ‘Prologue’ in H. Southworth, Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War, xii.
\textsuperscript{95} Author’s translation of ‘empecé a trabajar en una organización cuyo nombre no recuerdo, pero que, después de entrar Estados Unidos en la Guerra, se convirtió en la Oficina de Información de la Guerra.’ H. Southworth, ‘A modo de prólogo’, 54.
\textsuperscript{96} P. Preston, ‘Prologue’ in H. Southworth, Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War, xii; Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 77; H. Southworth, ‘A modo de prólogo’, 55.
\textsuperscript{98} Author’s translation of ‘Al comienzo de la Guerra Fría, mi propio antifascista era una desventaja y abandoné el servicio del gobierno de Estados Unidos.’ H. Southworth, ‘A modo de prólogo’, 55.
\textsuperscript{99} P. Preston, We Saw Spain Die, 357.
\textsuperscript{100} Southworth-Jay Allen letter dated 25 May 1946, quoted in P. Preston, We Saw Spain Die, 357.
war years.’ It is possible that the departure had nothing to do with the anti-communism of the Cold War at all. In May 1946 Southworth attributed his departure to his rabid anti-Catholicism, believing it was payback by the powerful Catholic lobby exerting pressure on the powers that be to get rid of him. He told Allen, ‘the basis of the charges against me lies not in my pro-Spanish Republicanism, nor in my lack of anti-Soviet feeling, but in my activity against the political manoeuvres of the Roman Church.’ This explanation is plausible. Southworth was blatantly anti-Catholic when he wrote for the Spanish Republic’s Information Bureau. His pamphlet, ‘Franco’s “Mein Kampf”: The Fascist State in Rebel Spain – An Official Blueprint’, published in January 1939, is a particularly strident example of this, with a front cover photograph of Catholic bishops standing behind Franco on a podium with their arms raised in fascist salute. In the pamphlet Southworth linked Catholicism to the military rebels, with phrases such as ‘military-religious hierarchy’ and ‘Fascist-Catholic State’, and he asserted that the rebel objective was to create ‘a state church with religion serving the political ends of the state.’ Southworth’s anti-Catholicism was further evident in his review of Mervin K. Hart’s America – Look at Spain, published by ‘one of New York’s leading Catholic publishers’ on 10 June 1939. Southworth wrote: ‘Mr Hart’s Spanish “facts” are the patented inventions of Franco’s American Catholic apologists’, and that ‘the greater part of American Catholic officialdom…was propagandizing desperately for Franco – and this includes most of the Catholic press and schools – to misrepresent the truth about the war in Spain …’ Another, pointedly anti-Catholic article was published in The Nation on 16 December 1939, entitled, ‘The Catholic Press.’ Here Southworth highlighted the American Catholic Church’s publishing influence and political clout in the USA. He accused the Catholic Press of trying ‘to bring American foreign policy into line with international Catholic policy even where that policy favoured the fascist powers.’ Whatever the truth of the matter was, Southworth came to consider his departure from US

101 S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 77.
102 Southworth-Jay Allen letter dated 25 May 1946, quoted in P. Preston, We Saw Spain Die, 357.
103 According to the inside front cover of ‘Franco’s “Mein Kampf” the Spanish-Catholic Hierarchy were giving the Fascist salute at Santiago de Compostela in 1937 are the Archbishop of Santiago, the Bishops of Lugo and Madrid, and the Canon of Santiago.
108 Southworth quoted circulation figures given by Charles H. Ridder, the then President of the Catholic Press Association, that the Church controlled ‘139 newspapers, with a circulation of 2, 639,165, and 197 magazines, with a circulation of 4,604,141, besides more than 4,000 local publications.’ See H. Southworth, ‘The Catholic Press’, The Nation, 16 December 1939, 675.
government service as one of the more fortunate changes in his life.\textsuperscript{110} He ended up living in Tangier for the next fourteen years and six months.\textsuperscript{111} It was here that he met his second wife-to-be, ‘the strikingly handsome and powerfully intelligent French lawyer, Suzanne Maury’.\textsuperscript{112} According to Preston, ‘Suzanne advised him to buy a quantity of US Army surplus radio equipment with which he founded Radio Tangier.’\textsuperscript{113}

During these business years Southworth described himself as the conventional ‘hard-headed businessman’ who joined the Rotary Club and International Chamber of Commerce.\textsuperscript{114} However, his conventionality was superficial, because during those years he continued his interest in the Spanish Civil War. He told Allen: ‘All through these years I have been collecting books on the war, and I now have more than a hundred meters [sic] of shelving for them.’\textsuperscript{115} Moreover, he even began the ‘long and tiresome job’ of compiling a bibliography ‘on and around the post-[civil]war era’. Ironically, Southworth applied to the Ford Foundation for a grant for a year’s secretarial work.\textsuperscript{116} Fortunately for him no grant was forthcoming, and his academic independence was not compromised by the later revelations of the role the Ford Foundation played in clandestinely funding anti-communist intellectuals at the behest of the CIA.\textsuperscript{117} This episode shows how easy it could be for scholars to be compromised. Moreover, the failure of Southworth’s grant application may reflect that he was considered too left-wing for the CIA.

The library that Southworth collected during these years, which was paid for by his business profits, was to prove a crucial element in shaping Southworth the historian. It gave him the confidence and resources to become the ‘fresh current of air’ in Spanish Civil War scholarship. Even his avowed enemy de la Cierva acknowledged that Southworth probably had read all the works in the collection, and with his ‘tremendous photographic memory’ would know ‘all the important information and key interpretations of these books’.\textsuperscript{118} Southworth

\textsuperscript{111} H. Southworth, ‘A modo de prólogo’, 56.
\textsuperscript{112} P. Preston, \textit{We Saw Spain Die}, 357. Southworth’s first wife was Camelia Colón a Puerto Rican woman. They married when he was in New York. It was an unhappy marriage. P. Preston, \textit{We Saw Spain Die}, 356.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 357.
\textsuperscript{114} Southworth-Allen letter dated 2 January 1965, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Frances Stonor Saunders, \textit{The Cultural Cold War}, 135.
\textsuperscript{118} Author’s translation of ‘tremenda memoria fotográfica’; ‘todas los datos importantes y todas las relaciones mutuas de esos libros.’ Ricardo de la Cierva de Hoces, \textit{Cien Libros Basicos Sobre La Guerra de España}, Publicaciones Españolas, Madrid, 1966, 40.
acknowledged how fundamentally important his library was to his self-confidence as an historian:

I was the only person who possessed the essential collection of books in order to write [El mito]. The key to El mito and to all my other works is the bibliography, that is to say in this [his book] collection.  

At the age of fifty-two Southworth’s life changed direction again. The Moroccan Government nationalized Radio Tangier on 31 December 1960, and the Southworths, together with their library, relocated to France. Southworth did not consider returning to the USA. Not only was his wife French, but as Preston points out: ‘The anti-fascist qualifications that had secured him his original employment were a serious disadvantage in the context of the Cold War.’ Moreover, Southworth was only too well aware, ‘that he would have never been able to do the kind of work’ he now envisaged, by ‘working in an American university’. In ‘A modo de prólogo’ he explained that he never felt comfortable in American universities and ‘never believed that the truth could be found in them’.  

Southworth informed Allen: ‘I got out with enough money to write for a year or two.’ Schmigalle suggests that the indemnity Southworth received through the nationalization may have been larger and refers to it as a ‘fortune’. He believes that this money enabled the Southworths to buy, at various times, two chateaux and ‘finally the fifteenth-century house’. 

THE HISTORIAN TAKES SHAPE

All too often Southworth is referred to as an amateur historian. For a number of reasons this is an inappropriate label. After the publication of El mito he achieved minor celebrity status and many came to visit and interview him in Château de Roche at Concrémiers – Hugh Thomas (on two occasions), Julio Álvarez del Vayo, Gabriel Jackson, Paul Preston, Angel Viñas, Robert S. Thornberry, Günther Schmigalle, and many others including young Spanish historians. Schmigalle describes the Southworths as ‘perfect hosts’ who made their guests ‘feel at home and gave them nourishment (physical and intellectual) and encouragement’ and ‘many of them

---

119 Author’s translation of: ‘Yo era la única persona que poseía la biblioteca imprescindible para la elaboración del libro [‘El mito’]. La clave de ‘El mito’ y de todas las demás obras que he escrito reside en la bibliografía, es decir, en esa biblioteca.’ H. Southworth, ‘A modo de prólogo’, 41–2.

120 P. Preston, We Saw Spain Die, 357.

121 S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 224.

122 H. Southworth, quoted in S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 224.

123 Southworth-Allen letter dated 2 January 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.

124 Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence dated 6 May 2012

125 Both Sebastiaan Faber and Hugh Thomas refer to Southworth as an amateur.

126 Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence dated 12 May 2012.
became friends and/or disciples’. The endless pilgrimages of scholars, present and future, to the Southworth château led Preston to quip ‘Herbert didn’t need to have made a university career, as he had founded his own university.’ Thomas colourfully immortalized these pilgrimages in his review article, ‘Heinkels Over Guernica’:

Down to the château at Indre trooped a succession of scholars and bibliophiles. The hooting owls, old oaks and crumbling farm buildings formed an inappropriate backdrop to the polemical discussions and the minute textual analysis which characterized Mr Southworth’s method.

Southworth did have academic qualifications in history. He had attended the Texas Technological College in Lubbock, Texas, where he majored in History, with a minor in Spanish. In the late 1930s he did a Master’s degree at Columbia University, and later, in 1942, he enrolled in a postgraduate course there with Professor José Antonio de Aguirre, the then President of the Basque Republic in exile. However, the course was cancelled as Southworth was the sole student, although not before he and Aguirre had spent many hours discussing the Civil War. In 1975 Southworth garnered another academic honour when he was awarded a PhD from the Sorbonne. The way this came about reveals that Southworth used his connections to further his new career. In his chapter, ‘A Lifetime’s Struggle: Herbert Rutledge Southworth and the Undermining of the Franco Regime’, Preston writes that Pierre Vilar advised Southworth to submit the manuscript of *Guernica! Guernica! A Study of Journalism, Diplomacy, Propaganda, and History*, to the Sorbonne, where Vilar taught, for consideration as a doctoral thesis. Southworth gave the same version in ‘A modo de prólogo’: ‘It was the advice of the great French historian in Spain, Pierre Vilar, who encouraged me to submit my manuscript on Guernica to a jury at the Sorbonne. However, the Southworth-Allen correspondence reveals that when Southworth first met Vilar in Paris in 1965, he was working on a bibliography of the Spanish Civil War and its consequences. The two men hit it off, despite Southworth initially describing Vilar to Allen, as ‘a Marxist professor who had done a monumental work on

---

127 Ibid.
128 Quoted in Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence 11 May 2012.
130 P. Preston, *We Saw Spain Die*, 354.
131 Ibid., 356.
135 Author’s translation of: ‘Fueron los consejos del gran historiador francés en España, Pierre Vilar, los que me animaron a someter mi manuscrito sobre Guernica a un jurado de la Sorbona.’ H. Southworth, ‘A modo de prólogo’, 65.
Catalonia, so monumental that nobody can read it”. At their first meeting Vilar had told Southworth that, ‘he would accept Southworth’s bibliography as a “thèse d’université”,’ and he even arranged for it to be published. The bibliographical thesis never eventuated. Southworth explained to Allen that although he had worked ‘on a thesis for the Sorbonne for three years’, he had ‘got bogged down in research on the bombardment and destruction of Guernica’, and, as a result of the English opening up their archives for 1937, he now had ‘enough interesting material’ to change his thesis to ‘the destruction and resultant controversy of Guernica’. Preston also acknowledges that Southworth and Vilar had had earlier conversations about a PhD before Guernica! Guernica! was on the agenda, but does not go into the details of the collusion. Preston simply notes that Vilar persuaded Southworth ‘of the utility of presenting a doctoral thesis at the Sorbonne’ and that Southworth ‘had planned to do so with a complete annotated bibliography’ of the Civil War. Southworth’s letter suggests that Guernica! Guernica! had started out as a thesis before it became a book and not the other way around. Moreover, it shows that Vilar, as a Professor of History at the Sorbonne, had a very significant early influence on the shaping of Southworth the historian. The thesis duly passed with the comment ‘très bien’ from the examiners.

Another reason for the inappropriateness of the label ‘amateur’ is Southworth’s book-collecting. In ‘A modo de prólogo’ Southworth explains his obsession for collecting books stems from his childhood fascination with his father’s fifty-volume set of Harvard Classics: ‘It was then when I unconsciously started to calculate the value of material possessions of a person by the number of books in his library.’ Preston pinpoints Southworth’s collecting obsession to his ‘purchase of the magnificent library on the Spanish Civil War, built up over many years by the Italian journalist, Cesare Gullino, who had originally been sent to Spain by Mussolini’. Southworth’s book-collecting produced the extensive library that provided him with the means

\[136\] Southworth-Allen letter dated 21 December 1965, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
\[137\] Ibid.
\[138\] Southworth-Allen letter dated 12 December 1968, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
\[139\] P. Preston, We Saw Spain Die: 360.
\[140\] Ibid., 361. Also José Martínez-Preston letter dated 19 March 1975, Paul Preston-Ruedo Ibérico correspondence, IISH, Amsterdam.
\[141\] Author’s translation of: ‘Fue por entonces cuando inconscientemente empecé a calcular el valor de las posesiones materiales de una persona por la cantidad de libros de su biblioteca.’ H. Southworth, ‘A modo de prólogo’, 43. Southworth describes how his heart was broken at the age of twelve when a volume was stolen by one of the employees of the bank that his father owned in Oklahoma and which was never replaced. Preston suggests that this theft affected him ‘so deeply that it was perhaps the beginning of his obsessive book-collecting. (See P. Preston, We Saw Spain Die, 354). Others suggest a psychoanalytical reason, and identify his childlessness with his book obsession; his books became child substitutes. (See Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence dated 2 May 2012).
\[142\] P. Preston, ‘Prologue’ in H. Southworth, Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War, x, 352.
to write his own books: ‘My books could not have been written without my library.’

His library gave him ‘the freedom to write what [he] liked without having to deal with a head of department or government censorship.’ Furthermore, Southworth proudly claims: ‘I wrote these books without any subsidies from institutions or governments, except for a scholarship at UCSD [University of California, San Diego] to copy the manuscript of Guernica! Guernica!’

Even de la Cierva acknowledged the extent and importance of the collection in 1966: ‘His library about our war is the best private collection in the world: more than 7000 titles.’ Eventualty, because of money problems, Southworth was forced to sell the collection to the University of California (negotiated by Gabriel Jackson) because he was spending more on collecting new works than he earned. In 1965 he told Allen that he had been writing for more than three years, and although the French edition of El mito had ‘sold a thousand copies more or less’, he had ‘not earned a single centime, a new or old franc’. Furthermore, ‘he had not even recovered the money’ that he had ‘advanced’ to Ruedo Ibérico to publish El mito in Spanish.

As already mentioned El mito was smuggled into Spain. This meant it was an exorbitant price, ‘at least double’ the cost of the book in France: ‘60% of the original price’ went to the publisher and the rest to the ‘smuggler and bookseller’.

Southworth had also funded the publication of Antifalange and had helped Ruedo Ibérico out financially on some other unspecified occasions. Albert Forment in his biography José Martínez: La epopeya de Ruedo Ibérico claims that Southworth’s financial support helped

---

144 Author’s translation of ‘…la libertad para escribir lo que quisiera sin tener que responder ante un jefe de departamento o la censura de un gobierno.’ H. Southworth, ‘A Modo de prólogo’, 65.
145 Author’s translation of: ‘Escribí estos libros sin ninguna subvención de instituciones ni gobiernos, salvo una beca de la UCSD [University of California, San Diego] para copiar el manuscrito del “Guernica! Guernica!”’ ‘I wrote these books without any subsidies from institutions or Governments, except for a scholarship at UCSD to copy the manuscript of “Guernica! Guernica!”’ H. Southworth, ‘A Modo de prólogo’, 65.
146 Author’s translation of: ‘Su biblioteca sobre nuestra Guerra es la primera del mundo entre las privadas: más de siete mil títulos.’ ‘His library about our war is the best private collection in the world: more than 7000 titles.’ Ricardo de la Cierva de Hoces, Cien Libros Basicos Sobre La Guerra de España, Publicaciones Españolas, Madrid, 1966, 40.
147 Gabriel Jackson-Burrowes email correspondence dated 3 May 2012.
149 Ibid. In ‘A modo de prólogo’ Southworth says he also advanced money to Ruedo Ibérico.
150 Southworth-Allen letter dated 9 January 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
151 In ‘A modo de prólogo’ Southworth writes: ‘Como he dicho, adelanté dinero para la publicación de El mito. También adelanté para publicar Antifalange y en algunas otras ocasiones’. Author’s translation: ‘As I have said, I advanced money for the publication of El mito. I also funded the publication of Antifalange and helped out financially on some other occasions.’ H. Southworth, ‘A Modo de prólogo’, 61.
152 José Martínez: the story of Ruedo Ibérico.
keep Ruedo Ibérico afloat.\footnote{Quoted in P. Preston, \textit{We Saw Spain Die}, 353.} He was not always the donor to Ruedo Ibérico and at least on one occasion he was the recipient of financial help from the company.\footnote{A. Forment, \textit{José Martínez: la epopeya de Ruedo Ibérico}, Editorial Anagrama, Barcelona, 2000, 401} The company’s Director, José Martínez Guerricabeitia, lent Southworth money to cover extensive repairs to Château de Roche, which the Southworths had purchased in September 1970.\footnote{This was the Southworths’ second château. They had bought their first, the Château de Puy, in Villedieu sur Indre, in 1962. However, the area was not to their liking and they sold it early in 1964 and returned to live in Paris. See P. Preston, ‘Prologue’ in H. Southworth, \textit{Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War}, xii. Also, Southworth-Allen letter dated 16 March 1964.} It seems that Southworth’s financial woes at this time had been exacerbated by the failure of a potato crisp business he had set up some years earlier, when he had first moved to France.\footnote{P. Preston, ‘Prologue’ in H. Southworth, \textit{Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War}, xii.} It was probably this loan that led Southworth to write in ‘A modo de prólogo’: ‘I believe that, in the end we [Ruedo Ibérico and I] were financially even.’\footnote{Author’s translation of: Creo que, al fin, nuestras cuentas estaban más o menos igualadas’. H. Southworth, ‘A Modo de prólogo’, 61.}

Southworth asked for $75,000 for his book collection, about ‘$10 a title’, and he felt that ‘in view of the catalogue prices, this is not exorbitant’.\footnote{Southworth-Allen letter dated 6 March 1966, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.} However, it does appear to be to be a generous amount.\footnote{According to \url{http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/} $75 was the equivalent of $571,990 on 22/06/2016 and $10 equalled $76.} He was ambivalent about the sale; he hated separating himself ‘from the souvenirs of a lifetime’, but he told Allen: ‘I have done what I wanted to do; spit in the face of the Franquistas.’\footnote{Southworth-Allen letter dated 6 March 1966, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.} A few months later, when the books were packed up and being dispatched, he wrote: ‘I feel a certain loss in seeing them depart, but they have become too much of a burden. An ill-kept library is worse than none at all.’\footnote{Southworth-Allen letter, 13 August 1966, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.} However, once sold, Southworth began collecting afresh and this second collection was purchased by Gernika Museum after his death, much to the disappointment of Preston who had been led to expect that he would inherit it.\footnote{Conversation between Preston and the author recorded at Preston’s London residence 04/07/2013.}

The only possible justification to label Southworth an ‘amateur’ is the fact that he was never on the payroll of an academic institution for any length of time. However he did serve as Regents’ Professor at the University of California in San Diego during the winter quarter of 1974,\footnote{Southworth-Schmigalle letter dated 20 January 1986.} where he proved to be ‘immensely popular with the graduate students’.\footnote{Gabriel Jackson-José Martinez letter dated February 1974, Ruedo Ibérico correspondence, IISH, Amsterdam.}
Southworth was sixty-three years old when in 1971 he referred to himself as a ‘fresh current of air’; two of his four books were already published – *El mito* in 1963, *Antifalange: Estudio crítico de ‘Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla’ de Maximiano García Venero* in 1967.\(^{165}\) *Guernica! Guernica!* was published in 1975. His last book, *Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War: The Brainwashing of Francisco Franco*, was completed a mere three days before his death at the age of ninety-one on 30 October 1999, and was published posthumously in 2002.\(^{166}\) Southworth also wrote three major essays, “‘The Grand Camouflage’: Julián Gorkin, Burnett Bolloten and the Spanish Civil War’ (1996),\(^{167}\) ‘The Falange: An Analysis of Spain’s Fascist Heritage’ (1976),\(^{168}\) and ‘Los bibliofóbos; Ricardo de la Cierva y sus colaboradores’, (1970/71).\(^{169}\)

The publication of *El mito* in 1963 struck the world of Civil War scholarship like a minor earthquake, not only because of the content, which dismantled the ideological justification for the Franco regime, but also because of its methodology of ‘rigorous bibliographical criticism’ and ‘extensive historical detective work’. Faber believes the approach that Southworth ‘hit on’ in *El mito*, ‘inform[ed] all of his subsequent work’, and enabled him to reconstruct not only the historical events themselves, ‘but also the history of their representation [sic]’; he even likened Southworth to a ‘skilled judoka’ who was ‘provoked’ to write ‘by other texts’, and who knew ‘how to take full advantage of his opponents’ momentum by using it against them’.\(^{170}\) Schmigalle believes that ‘anger and indignation’ were essential to Southworth’s creative process.\(^{171}\)

In 1976 Southworth ‘staked [his] reputation as a political analyst’ on his essay ‘The Falange: An Analysis of Spain’s Fascist Heritage’, which was published in *Spain in Crisis*, and edited by Paul Preston.\(^{172}\) He believed he offered a ‘new definition of fascism in general and of

---

\(^{165}\) *Anti-Falange: A critique of ‘The Falange in the Spanish Civil War: The Unification and Hedilla’ by Maximiano García Venero.*

\(^{166}\) P. Preston, *We Saw Spain Die*, 363.

\(^{167}\) Published in P. Preston & A. Mackenzie (Eds), *The Republic Besieged; Civil War in Spain 1936-1939.*


\(^{171}\) Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence dated 3 May 2012.

Spanish fascism in particular’, he planned to defend his definition at a colloquium to be held at the University of Montreal in October 1976, and ‘elsewhere in the USA and Canada’. Southworth felt his essay was a necessary addition to the literature currently available, and he told Schmigalle that Stanley Payne’s 1961 book, *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism* was ‘useless in great part because he did not begin at the beginning’ with ‘a definition of fascism’. He expressed similar sentiments, although in more circumspect language, in his essay: ‘most studies of fascism in Spain are marred by the failures to furnish the reader with a clear, general idea of what is meant by fascism’. This essay reveals that Southworth had not completely made the transition from propagandist to historian, was still ‘fighting the good fight’, and would indulge, when the opportunity arose, in propagandizing reminiscent of his earlier writing. This is evident when he writes that no determined effort was

... ever attempted from without, unless we so assess the pious, ambiguous utterances at times heard from the conquerors of the war against fascism. Neither the 1945 declaration of Potsdam concerning Spain, nor the statement of 4 April 1946, of Paris, London and Washington, condemning the Franco Government, nor the resolution of December 1946, did more than leave in the hands of the unarmed Spanish People the formidable task of demolishing the solidly entrenched totalitarian (authoritarian?) regime.

For Southworth’s friends and supporters, his corpus of work demonstrates that he had successfully made the transition from partisan propagandist for the Republic during the Civil War, to the ferocious, but objective, defender of the Republic’s legacy during the Cold War. Vilar explained that Southworth’s defence of the Republic was not synonymous with exaltation of the Republic *per se*, but was epitomized by scrutinizing ‘the theses of its enemies’, for ‘systematic distortions’ and ‘organized silences’ in their presentation of events. Vilar heralded Southworth’s ‘passionate objectivity’ which stood out as a ‘salutary beacon in a field in which

173 Southworth-Schmigalle letter dated 1 April 1976.
176 Southworth-Schmigalle letter dated 31 July 1976. The dates given here for the Montreal Colloquium were either incorrect or were changed. In a letter dated 25 November Southworth wrote that a few days before he was due to depart for the colloquium on 22-24 October it was postponed to 24-26 March 1977. See Southworth-Schmigalle letter dated 25 November 1976.
178 Ibid., 20.
truth has consistently been a casualty’. In 2002 Preston proclaimed him to be ‘a major figure in the historiography’, whose ‘books would be quarried by the most serious specialists on the Spanish Civil War’, and even claimed *Guernica!* ‘would be one of the three or four most important of the many thousands of volumes written on the conflict’. As recently as 2013 Ben Edwards in his book, *With God on Our Side: British Christian Responses to the Spanish Civil War* refers to Southworth’s *Guernica!* as a thorough analysis of the destruction wrought on the town.

For Southworth’s opponents and critics there was no such successful transition. Charles Halstead of Washington College, conceded in his review of *Guernica!* that Southworth had ‘unearthed significant and fresh information, and skilfully knitted together the many tangled threads of evidence’ on the bombing of Guernica, but pointed out the book had ‘flaws’. Not only was it ‘somewhat repetitious in theme and turn of phrase’, it was based on inadequate research, because Southworth ‘did not seek out all the accessible German sources’. Halstead pointed out that Southworth was incorrect to claim, ‘that most of the Condor Legion records were destroyed (p.504)’, because ‘scholars familiar with the Bundesarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau assert that the bulk of Legion records are there’.

Southworth’s first two books were initially published in French, then in Spanish, but not in English. Preston urged Southworth to get an English publisher for *El mito*. This would have been around 1974, because Preston first met Southworth in 1973. However, by this time Southworth was ‘ambivalent … because he had already started a project to expand *El mito* bit by

---

The extent of the high esteem Preston had for Southworth is evident in acknowledgement in, *We Saw Spain Die* (ix): ‘I want to thank … my friend Herbert Southworth, who was a participant in much of what follows. Many years of correspondence with him taught me much about the Spanish Civil War in general and in particular about the correspondents with whom he worked. The book is dedicated to him with deep gratitude for his friendship and example.’
185 Ibid.
bit’ and bring it up-to-date.\footnote{Preston-Burrowes email correspondence dated 10 April 2012.} This ‘project’ eventually became subsumed by his research for \textit{Guernica Guernica!} Moreover, Southworth may well have been fed up with the process of attempting to get \textit{El mito} published in English. Hugh Thomas had made overtures to British publishers on his behalf in 1964 but had ‘got the answer that it was too specialized’.\footnote{Southworth-Allen letter dated 10 November 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.} Furthermore, the Southworth-Allen correspondence shows that the two had discussed the prospect of an American edition on several occasions during the mid-1960s, and that Southworth was happy for Allen to use his literary connections to achieve this end.\footnote{Allen-Southworth letters dated 27 December 1963 and 17 January 1964.} In May 1966 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press considered but rejected publishing \textit{El mito}.\footnote{Robert Colodny was asked by William B. Watson on behalf of MIT Press for his opinion on the reliability and scholarship of \textit{El mito} in a letter dated 28 May 1966. ALBA Collection, Robert Colodny Papers, Taminent Library, Box 2, Folder 1.}

Not long before his death Southworth asked Preston to ensure his gravestone was inscribed: ‘HIS WRITINGS WERE NOT HOLY WRIT / BUT NEITHER WERE THEY WHOLLY SHIT’.\footnote{P. Preston, \textit{We Saw Spain Die}, 362.} This request may have exemplified Southworth’s ‘wonderful sense of the absurd’, but it was far removed from what he really believed and wanted. He wrote to Schmigalle: ‘I like to think that my books have had some influence in Spain.’\footnote{Southworth-Schmigalle letter dated 5 February 1976.} In was due to his desire ‘to reach the Spanish people’ that he paid for the first edition of \textit{El mito} in Spanish.\footnote{Southworth-Schmigalle letter dated 25 November 1976.}

As already discussed, the sale of Southworth’s books did not bring him much in the way of financial remuneration. The lack of earnings from sales and the fact that he had no academic institution to support him meant that his savings, as well as the money he had received for his book collection, became depleted. Eventually, in order to make ends meet, he was forced to sell his château. On the 15 April 1980 he told Schmigalle:

\begin{quote}
Our house is in the process of being in part rebuilt. I had to sell the château. It cost too much to keep it up, but I regret the large rooms and the space for everything. And the large park and the trees and the river. Moving was also extremely tiring. But I was running out of ready cash, which is always irritating.\footnote{Southworth-Schmigalle letter dated 15 April 1980.}
\end{quote}

The French editions of Southworth’s books sold badly, and the reception \textit{Guernica!} \textit{Guernica!} received was ‘of considerable disappointment’ to him. He told Schmigalle that ‘only one Paris daily, [the Communist paper] \textit{L’Humanité}, mentioned it. Nothing in \textit{Le Monde}; no
review in *Le Nouvel Observateur*. No daily in the Basque country talked about it.’  

Southworth had to get used to disappointment with the sales of his books: ‘I always feel a bit let-down when I see that almost 2 years after the publication of my book on Guernica, it is unknown in Germany.’

However, in 1985, at the age of 77, the prospects of his receiving remuneration for his books improved. He now had a literary agent and *El mito* was going to be published that Spring in Barcelona. Moreover, he wrote to Schmigalle: ‘I have even been given an advance.’

**THE SOUTHWORTH REPUTATION: REALITY AND MYTH**

It is evident from Southworth’s comments to both Allen and Martin above that his pugnacious reputation troubled him. How accurate was this reputation? Was it deserved? His critics saw his inquisitorial and pugnacious writing style as representative of his personality in general. However, Schmigalle realized during their first meeting that that there was a difference: ‘Herbert, as a person, was something else than the personification of his books.’ Faber, who never knew Southworth, sees him as a man with ‘a low tolerance for disagreement’ and ‘extremely distrustful’ of other historians’ motives – ‘sometimes to the point of paranoia’. Faber’s Southworth is a paranoid bully who ‘took scholarly disputes extremely personally’. If people ‘questioned his claims, or otherwise disagreed with him’ they became ‘his enemies’ who were ‘out to get him’; this justified Southworth making ‘their lives as difficult as possible’. Southworth’s friends reject this image of an aggressive man prone to ranting. This is evident from the responses given by Preston, Schmigalle, and Gabriel Jackson when asked if Southworth was prone to ranting about issues he felt strongly about, and where it would be difficult for his interlocutors to get a word in. All three reject ‘ranter’ as an appropriate description. Schmigalle concedes that Southworth was ‘inspired by’ and ‘enjoyed’ polemics, but insists that he ‘never fell into monologues about anything [and] was always very much aware of whom

---

198 Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence dated 12 May 2012.
199 S. Faber, *Anglo-American Hispanists*, 89.
200 Ibid., 89–90.
201 The author asked three of Southworth’s friends and colleagues Paul Preston, Günther Schmigalle, and Gabriel Jackson: ‘Could one fairly describe [Southworth] as a ‘ranter’? You are sitting down with him in his kitchen or whatever. Maybe a glass of wine or two has been consumed. (Did he drink?) Would he have a tendency in such a setting to go into rants about issues he felt strongly about and where it would be difficult for his listener to intervene?’
202 Email correspondence Burrowes-Preston, Burrowes-Schmigalle, and Burrowes-Jackson dated 24 October 2013.
203 Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence dated 3 May 2012.
he was talking to and skilful and tactful about keeping the other person(s) involved in the conversation’. Jackson observes that Southworth ‘never shouted or indeed acted angry’, but was

… very firm in his opinions, so much so that my non-acceptance of some of his pro-Soviet opinions estranged us for a few years. He simply was very dogmatic in his own views, and (in my own opinion untractably expressed to him), I thought he made false political accusations against Bolloten and Hugh Thomas.  

Although Jackson and Southworth had become friends after they first met in Paris in 1950, Jackson ‘always felt a little uncomfortable with [Southworth’s] belligerent defences of Soviet foreign policy, and of every aspect of Soviet actions on behalf of the Spanish Republic during the Civil War’. Their friendship was interrupted for five years because of Jackson’s ‘refusal to express enthusiasm for Herbert’s personal condemnations of Bolloten, and also his uncomplimentary remarks about Hugh Thomas’. For Preston, Southworth was

… the very opposite of a ranter. He was warm and full of humour. He liked a drink – his favourite tipple being ‘bourbon and branch’ (i.e. with plain water). Even talking about his bugbears like Bolloten, he did so in his slow drawl. In all the years, I never saw him angry. His anger, which was all about the Francoists and their supporters, witting or otherwise, went into his writing.

Schmigalle also describes Southworth as ‘very kind, generous, and completely unpretentious’. This side to Southworth is evident in his personal correspondence when he tells Martin:

Give me the exact title, or working title, of what you are doing, and if I can suggest anything to help you, I shall certainly do so. In 1964 I published a book in Spanish entitled El mito de la cruzada de Franco. If you do not know it I will send you a copy.

Helpfulness, as well as politeness, are revealed in his initial letter to Schmigalle, when he apologizes for being ‘so slow in answering’ and hopes that his tardiness has not held up

204 Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence dated 24 October 2013.
205 Jackson-Burrowes email correspondence dated 24 October 2013.
206 Jackson-Burrowes email correspondence dated 3 May 2012.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
210 Southworth-Martin letter dated 22 June 1971, Fredericka Martin Papers, ALBA 001, Box 21.
Schmigalle’s work; he helpfully puts Schmigalle ‘in touch’ with Viñas, Preston and Robert Thornberry so they can advise Schmigalle on his dissertation.\textsuperscript{211}

However, the Southworth-Schmigalle correspondence also reveals his critical nature, a \textit{penchant} for gossip, a sense of bitterness and resentment, and his tendency to berate others. He told Schmigalle that James W. Cortada’s \textit{Historical Dictionary of the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939} published in 1982 was ‘a miserable production’, and he asked: ‘Why is it that the persons without any competence always find the money to bring out books?’\textsuperscript{212} Is Southworth suggesting that there was something sinister in the publishing selection process?

The anonymous scholar opines that Southworth ‘demanded complete loyalty from his friends and acquaintances’. He cites Southworth’s falling out with David Wingate Pike, simply because Pike had thanked both Bolloten and Southworth ‘in the acknowledgements to one of his books’, as evidence of this, claiming that Southworth saw this as a ‘betrayal’.\textsuperscript{213} However, Pike offers a different explanation for the end of the friendship stemming from issues Pike had with Vilar. Pike had criticized Vilar in his book, \textit{Jours de gloire, jours de honte} (1984) for his Stalinist perspectives. Pike believes ‘it was the pressure of Vilar’, who was Southworth’s mentor, which caused the rift: ‘It then became a choice for Herbert. I don’t think he and his wife Suzanne ever wanted to end our friendship.’\textsuperscript{214} In another place Pike claims he was the one who ‘ultimately’ ended the friendship and not Southworth, but confirms Vilar was at the root of it: ‘Ultimately I had to choose between them. My problem was Pierre Vilar.’\textsuperscript{215} Interestingly, Pike links the resurrection in the eighties of the ideological contestation that characterized the early

\textsuperscript{211} Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence dated 3 May 2012. Thornberry was a Canadian scholar, who had asked Southworth to read his PhD typescript, entitled \textit{André Malraux et l’Espagne}, which was published in 1977.

\textsuperscript{212} Southworth-Schmigalle letter dated 8 December 1983. James W. Cortada edited \textit{the Historical Dictionary of the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939} which was published by Greenwood Press.

\textsuperscript{213} Anonymous critic-Burrowes email correspondence dated 4 April 2014.


\textsuperscript{215} Pike-Burrowes email correspondence dated 24 April 2012.

Pike had first contacted Southworth sometime in October / November 1964, on the advice of the Stanford University hispanist, Professor Ronald Hilton, to ask Southworth to suggest a PhD thesis for him. Southworth suggested the history of the POUM, which at that point had not been done. However, Pike did not take Southworth’s advice, because ‘in 1964 this was not academically acceptable for a \textit{thèse de doctorat}’. (Pike-Burrowes email correspondence dated 26 April 2012). Pike’s thesis was ultimately on \textit{Conjecture, Propaganda, and Deceit and the Spanish Civil War: The International Crisis Over Spain, 1936-1939, as seen in the French Press}. Pike went to France on a scholarship from Stanford University. He was based in Toulouse and visited Southworth, and shared information and gossip with him about Bolloten, Hilton and ‘other university people’. It was through Pike that Southworth learnt, ‘that Hilton only had $28,000 a year on which to run the Institute, including his own salary’, and that Bolloten was ‘a wealthy real estate wheeler and dealer and received nothing for his lecturing’ at Stanford. The friendship seems to have blossomed, despite Southworth confiding to Allen that he found Pike ‘difficult to classify or to understand’. See Southworth-Allen letter dated 10 November 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
Cold War years, as a contextual factor in the break up, when he alludes to the political climate as ‘Cold War II’ and writes: ‘I think it was the pressure of Vilar (in that short period of the early 1980s that seemed like Cold War II) that brought it [the friendship] to a close.’ The anonymous scholar describes how another of Southworth’s friends, the Bakunin expert Arthur Lehning, felt so intimidated by Southworth during the Southworth-Bolloten stoush that Lehning asked him (the anonymous scholar) to send him a copy of Bolloten’s *Spanish Civil War* because ‘he did not want Herbert to find out about it as this would have incurred his wrath’.

There is consensus among Southworth’s friends and foes that he held grudges. The Bolloten chapter has shown the extent to which this was the case in the stoush with Bolloten. Hugh Thomas was another to experience Southworth’s grudge-bearing tendency. Southworth and Thomas had initially been on good terms. Thomas visited Southworth at Concrémiers twice, and in 1964 Thomas asked Southworth to ‘look over the proofs’ of his new expanded Penguin edition of *The Spanish Civil War*. However, the Southworth-Allen correspondence indicates that a future falling out was a distinct possibility. Southworth told Allen that Thomas was ‘a nice fellow, but a professional writer and not of our generation [who] wants to make money, which is quite all right, but he does not want to take sides, even in an old story like that of Spain’. On another occasion he wrote: ‘Thomas is really a bit timid about his knowledge and quite willing to change. But, every time I look deeply into a story in his book, some facts are wrong.’ Allen fuelled Southworth’s concerns and replied that he found ‘Thomas terribly fuzzy about a lot of things.’ By December 1965 Southworth’s attitude had hardened towards Thomas. Southworth told Allen: ‘Of course he [Thomas] does not feel passionately about the Spanish Civil War. He does not even feel politically about it. He is essentially a “writer” and not a historian.’

---

< http://waisworld.org/go.jsp?id=02a&objectType=post&o=71841&objectTypeld=64609&topicld=123 >


217 Anonymous scholar-Burrowes email correspondence dated 04/04/2014.

218 Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence dated 12 May 2012: ‘Your impression that [Southworth] bears grudges with those he feels have crossed him is certainly true.’

219 Southworth-Allen letter dated 16 March 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence. The Penguin edition was ‘about 25%’ larger than the original.

220 Southworth-Allen letter dated 16 March 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.

221 Southworth-Allen letter dated 2 January 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.

222 Allen-Southworth letter dated 6 January 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.

223 Southworth-Allen letter dated 21 December 1965, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
The public break with Thomas came in 1975 when Thomas reviewed the French edition of Southworth’s book on Guernica for the *Times Literary Supplement.*

Some of Mr Southworth’s mud splashes almost everyone who has written about modern Spain. Friendship has not stood in the way of scholarship. I, for example, am described as capricious, in my changes in estimate of those killed at Guernica; Raymond Carr is seen as the leader of a neo-Franquist [sic] conspiracy, with Stanley Payne, because of a suggestion that the faults of the Spanish left between 1931 and 1936 justified the military rising of the latter year. So look to your swords, and off we go to the Château de Roche.

Thomas may not have been that far off the mark with his comment that ‘Southworth’s mud splashes almost everyone who has written about modern Spain’. González Hernández recounts how Southworth accused Carr ‘of being “the leader of a neo-Francoist conspiracy” in cahoots with conservative expert on the Falange, Stanley Payne’. Southworth held Payne’s scholarship in even less esteem than that of Thomas. He told Allen that ‘Payne is completely off in what he says’ in *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism,* because he was ‘brain washed by pro-falangists in Madrid’. Furthermore, he claimed that Payne ‘even got all the dates wrong’ in his US edition, something that Thomas ‘had at least got right in his first edition’.

Nevertheless, Southworth was enraged at being called a mud thrower by Thomas. He believed that it was Thomas who bore a grudge because he had described Thomas’s drastic scaling down of the Guernica death toll in his 1965 revised edition of *The Spanish Civil War* as ‘capricious’. In the original 1961 edition Thomas had claimed that there were 1,654 dead, but in the 1965 edition the figure became one hundred. Southworth had highlighted Thomas’s change of heart in *Guernica! Guernica!* and questioned Thomas’s scholarship: ‘Unfortunately, Thomas gives no authority for either figure.’ Such unreferenced revisions upset Southworth;

---

224 *La destruction de Guernica: journalisme, diplomatie, propagande et histoire.*
227 Southworth-Allen letter dated 21 December 1965, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence. Southworth recounts how Thomas changed the dates in his Penguin edition ‘to agree with Payne’, who ‘in the meantime’ had changed the dates in his French and Spanish editions ‘to agree more or less to what Thomas had had to start with’. See Southworth-Allen letter dated 21 December 1965, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
228 Ibid.
229 In the Spanish edition Southworth wrote ‘¿Pero por qué capricho, cuando revisó su libro en 1965, desmintió esas cifras y escribió en una nota a pie de página...’ [By what whim did he revise the casualty figures and put them in a footnote... See *La destrucción de Guernica,* Edición de Ángel Viñas, Editorial Comares, Granada, 2013, 519.
he would have seen this as mitigating the extent of Francoist barbarity and colluding with the Cold War legitimization of the Franco regime.

In his letter of reply to Thomas’s review which the TLS duly published, Southworth offered to ‘withdraw’ ‘capricious’ if Thomas revealed ‘the sources he used to arrive at the figure of only 100 dead’. Furthermore, he pontificates:

I know people who think that Mr Thomas was throwing ‘mud’ at the dead when he eliminated them from the history of the Spanish Civil War. And there are, I am sure thousands of Spaniards who feel that, far from throwing ‘mud’ in my book on Guernica and in my previous works. I have been clearing away the ‘mud’ that others have thrown at the Spanish Republic and at the Spanish people.

Southworth also highlighted the many shortcomings of the biographical sketch given of himself; Thomas had written that Southworth had made himself a socialist in the mid-1930s by studying in the evenings when he worked at the Library of Congress and that after the war he ‘became the general manager of Radio Tangier and in the end owned it’. Southworth pointed out that he had ‘always insisted that [he] was educated at the Carnegie Public Library at Abilene, Texas’ and that ‘it was while reading there, in 1925, that [he] became a socialist’. Furthermore: ‘It is inexact to say that I ever “owned” Radio Tangier. Although I was the largest stockholder, there were many others.’

Southworth’s intention was to imply that such errors were symptomatic of Thomas’s research. Although not made public in the TLS stoush, Southworth believed that Thomas’s ‘book was really a group project’, because he had heard that Thomas paid ‘someone to make short resumes of certain books’.

Southworth’s letters to Schmigalle, in the years following the TLS polemic with Thomas, confirm Faber’s conclusion that he took disputes personally. Southworth told Schmigalle, that Thomas was ‘a small little person’ because he had recently reviewed another work on Guernica for the TLS ‘without even mentioning my book’. The work to which Southworth referred to was the oral history The Day Guernica Died, by Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan-Witts. It may

---

233 Ibid.
236 Southworth-Allen letter dated 2 January 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
well be that Southworth was also irritated with Gordon Thomas and Morgan-Witts, who included *El mito* and *La Destruction de Guernica* in their bibliography, but did not deem the books worthy of special mention in their introduction to the bibliography:

To our knowledge, there are two books worthy of special mention that deal with the destruction of Guernica. The first, published in 1938, is the account by George Steer, special correspondent of *The New York Times* and *The Times of London*. The second, by Vicente Talón, first published in 1970…

Furthermore, Gordon Thomas and Morgan-Witts’ heralding of Hugh Thomas’s *The Spanish Civil War*, as ‘the standard work’ on the entire war would have been galling to Southworth.

Southworth continued to regularly ridicule Thomas to Schmigalle. In February 1978 he writes:

I thought Hugh Thomas’s intellectual deduction that Franco was mentally incapable of dealing with the Falange crisis and Guernica at the same time more an example of Hugh Thomas’s mental decrepitude than of Franco’s. Probably Thomas wanted to make a new contribution to historical knowledge and this was all he could come up with.

By August 1978 Southworth was making delusional comments: ‘I never made any effort to influence’ Thomas, ‘for I thought him without interest, despite the undoubted influence he has in England’.

Such an assertion is at odds with his correspondence with Allen before the TLS polemic, which shows he did attempt to influence Thomas. One such occasion was when he wrote to Thomas to tell him to contact Allen about the events that took place at Badajoz.

Moreover, Southworth still had enough interest in Thomas in 1978 to tell Schmigalle that Thomas gave ‘a reception at his home in London for Serrano Suñer’, Franco’s brother-in-law.

Southworth’s interest in Suñer reflects his mission, even though Franco was now dead and Spain was transitioning to democracy, to bring Francoists and their apologists to account. Suñer had

---

239 Gordon Thomas & Max Morgan-Witts, *The Day Guernica Died*, 305. Southworth had reservations about Vicente Talón’s book, *Arde Guernica* (San Martin, 1970), because it was a neo-Franquist work, and described it as ‘uneven in documentation and in argumentation’. Southworth was also suspicious of the book because of the way de La Cierva, the leading contemporaneous neo-Franquist historian, had heralded Talón’s book as ‘the definitive work on the subject’ by a ‘young and brilliant journalist’. See H. Southworth, *Guernica! Guernica!,* 297 & 284.


243 Allen-Southworth letter dated 21 March 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.

244 Southworth-Schmigalle letter dated 3 August 1978. Serrano Suñer was Franco’s brother-in-law (nicknamed *Cuñadísimo*). From 1938 to 1942 he was either the Interior Minister or Foreign Affairs Minister. During these years he had the reputation for being pro-Nazi and he supported the sending of the Blue Division to fight along with the Wehrmacht on the Russian front.
been Franco’s Interior Minister and his pro-Nazi Foreign Minister between 1938 and 1942; he had sent Spain’s Blue Division to fight alongside the Wehrmacht on the Russian front. For Southworth any attempt to rehabilitate Suñer and his role in Franco Spain had to be exposed. Southworth would have believed that Thomas was selling himself to ‘the devil’ through association with Suñer.

Southworth also revealed the gossipy side to his nature as well as sour grapes in his correspondence. He told Schmigalle that ‘the incredible success’ Thomas’s The Spanish Civil War ‘was made possible by marrying the Honourable Vanessa Jebb, daughter of Lord Gladwyn’. He did not elaborate how, but the implication was that being connected through marriage to the eminent diplomat and politician had enhanced sales.

Southworth’s penchant for gossip is also evident in his correspondence with Allen about the ‘Hoover crowd at Stanford’. This was the group of people associated with the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University and the Institute of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies (located in Bolivar House at Stanford), although the gossip mainly revolved around Hilton, Bolloten and Pike. The ‘Hoover crowd’ were of particular interest to Southworth, not only because of Bolloten, but because Allen was attempting to get the Hoover Institution to publish Southworth’s books or buy his book collection. Southworth, showing a pragmatic side, did not allow his differences with Bolloten, or his disdain for the Hoover Institution’s reputation as being ‘in the very first ranks of the Cold War combatants’, to prevent Allen’s supplications on his behalf.

The Hoover crowd at Stanford have shown a certain bias. But they do finance various studies. My information however is that unless you are a PhD or a White Russian or an ex-Marxist of one of the various breeds, you (I mean “one”) wouldn’t appeal to them.

On 9 May 1964 Allen excitedly informed Southworth that at the end of the month he was going to Stanford to attend a seminar conducted by the Hispanic America Society, and that he

---

245 Southworth-Schmigalle letter dated 3 August 1978. Lord Gladwyn was Hubert Miles Gladwyn Jebb, 1st Baron Gladwyn. At various times he served as a civil servant, diplomat and Liberal Party politician as well as the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations from October 1945 to February 1946 until the appointment of the first Secretary-General Trygve Lie.

246 Allen-Southworth letter dated 28 February 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.

247 On the 18 November 1964 Southworth wrote to Allen and suggested he ask Hilton if he would publish El mito. On 23 December Allen wrote to a Mr Morris informing him ‘that the Hoover Institution at Stanford is attempting to obtain Southworth’s library’. See uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence, Southworth Collection.

248 Southworth-Allen letter dated 18 November 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.

249 Allen-Southworth letter dated 28 February 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
had been assured that Bolloten would be present. Allen wrote: ‘I can hardly wait.’

Three weeks later Allen shared his impressions of his Stanford visit to Southworth who was ‘all aquiver with curiosity to know about Bolloten et al’.

Entre nous, Hilton is a bit of an old lady … I was mildly intrigued myself by the relationship. Bolloten is a darkly handsome guy, very intense. And, I should imagine, clever and devious. There seemed to be a personal bond by which I don’t mean anything nasty. Sometimes one encounters that kind of thing between men of different, complimentary natures. Not that I see B- as a Svengali but … I did catch slight overtones of something like obsequiousness in his treatment of Hilton.

Southworth also had a falling out with José Martínez Guerricabeitia, one of the founders of the Paris based anti-francoist publishing house Ruedo Ibérico. Founded in 1961, Ruedo Ibérico became the pre-eminent outlet for authors of Spanish history during the sixties and seventies. It published most of Southworth’s books as well as works by other prominent Anglo-American writers of Spanish history including: Gabriel Jackson, Robert Colodny, Michael Alpert, Stanley Payne, Ian Gibson, David Pike and Hugh Thomas. José Martínez was an Anarcho-syndicalist. In ‘A modo de prólogo’ Southworth recalls that ‘there were persistent rumours that at one time he [José Martínez] flirted with Communism’. The falling out was over delays in the publication of Guernica! Guernica! However, Southworth was probably at the end of his tether with Ruedo Ibérico, who had botched the publication of the first edition of El mito. Southworth derided the edition as taking the ‘world’s record for misprints and errors’. He ‘was very angry and insisted that the whole edition be thrown away and that the book was completely reset and carefully proof-read’. Moreover, Southworth was irritated that Martínez made no effort to solicit reviews for his books in literary magazines and newspapers. On 19 October 1974 Martínez wrote to Vilar that his relations with Southworth ‘have been deteriorating progressively’. Five months later relations had still not improved. Martínez wrote to Preston: ‘My relations with Southworth have worsened since last summer, and seem irrevocably

---

250 Allen-Southworth letter dated 9 May 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
251 Southworth-Allen letter dated 9 June 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
252 Allen-Southworth letter dated 26 May 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
254 José Martínez -Gabriel Jackson letter dated 23 July 1975, Ruedo Ibérico correspondence, IISH, Amsterdam.
255 Southworth-Allen letter dated 2 January 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
256 Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence dated 7 May 2012.
Martínez was so concerned with the situation that he looked for a new distributor for Southworth’s book on Guernica, ‘to avoid fresh problems with the author’. Preston was also concerned:

I feel it [the falling out] even more for being a friend of both of you, a friendship I appreciate. It goes without saying that if I can do something to repair your relations, you only have to say.

However, the breakdown in relations did not prove terminal, and by August 1977 Martínez and Southworth patched up their differences.

**COLD WAR POLITICAL PRESSURE**

The pressure that the Cold War exerted on Spanish Civil War scholarship may have appeared nebulous but it was real. Anglo-American scholars of Spanish history were not immune from pressure to toe the line and repudiate ‘Marxist or class-based historiography’, and reflect the strategic interests of the USA. Joan Ramon Resina, formerly Professor of Romance Studies and Comparative Literature at Cornell University, identified these strategic interests in relationship to Franco Spain to be a ‘pragmatic strategy’ of ‘cool tolerance and a minimum but decisive support’.

Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan-Witts are two scholars who claimed to have experienced contemporaneous political pressures when they researched and wrote their 1975 book, *The Day Guernica Died*. They pointed out that getting at the truth of what happened at Guernica proved to be ‘difficult’, because it was a ‘source of embarrassment’ to the West German and Spanish governments, as well as to the French and British who were anxious not ‘to be reminded of their countries’ roles in the Spanish cockpit’. They recount being told in the

---

259 José Martínez-Preston letter dated 19 March 1975. Author’s translation: ‘Mis relaciones con Southworth, malísimas desde el verano pasado, dan la impresión de haberse definitivamente rota’.
260 José Martínez-Preston letter dated 19 March 1975. Author’s translation of ‘para evitar nuevos problemas con el autor’.
261 Preston-José Martínez letter dated 10 April 1975. Author’s translation: ‘Lo siento más todavía por ser amigo de los dos, por apreciar esta amistad. Ya sabes que si puedo hacer algo para reparar vuestras relaciones, no tienes que hacer más que decírmelo.’
262 Martínez wrote to Preston on 2 August 1977; ‘My relations with Southworth have entered into a more positive phase.’ ‘Mis relaciones con Southworth han entrado en una fase más positive.’ Preston-Ruedo Ibérico Correspondence, International Institute of Social History (IISH) Amsterdam.
265 Ibid., 72.
266 Gordon Thomas & Max Morgan-Witts, *The Day Guernica Died*, 300.
summer of 1974 by ‘a State Department source in Washington that the “truth about Guernica could rock the boat. It could make people wonder why we have bases in Spain, where such a thing like Guernica happened. And Franco would get mad at any reopening of the Guernica episode.”’

A very personal example of Cold War contemporaneous political pressure at work was witnessed by Schmigalle at a symposium that took place at Bad Homburg in June 1981. This was a time of heightened Cold War tension. Ronald Reagan, the newly installed President, had ramped up anti-Soviet rhetoric, and some of this heightened Cold War tension and rhetoric seems to have permeated the symposium. The general theme of the conference was ‘Social Change and Power in Franco Spain’. Schmigalle attended as an observer to listen to Southworth present a paper. The symposium was an intimate, although high-powered affair, with about thirty official participants who came from the USA, Spain, Switzerland, Germany and England. Schmigalle’s recollection of events reveals the intensity of feeling that had developed among some hispanist scholars towards Southworth and his methodology. Upon arriving at the symposium Schmigalle ‘noticed there was a strange, almost poisonous atmosphere’, and he heard Juan Linz, the political scientist from Yale University, talking to a group about Southworth ‘behind his back’. Linz said that Southworth ‘was not an historian but a propaganda specialist and that what he had written wasn’t history but “journalism with a little Marxism”’. He heard Linz mockingly correct himself, ‘BAD journalism with a little Marxism’, and apologize ‘for wasting time by talking about such an insignificant figure’ as Southworth. Schmigalle then recalls Linz giving him ‘a sideline glance’ and saying ‘that there were some young and inexperienced people present who might, if not forewarned in time, be seduced by Herbert’s theories’.

SOUTHWORTH: HISTORIAN AT WORK

As mentioned above, Southworth detractors such as Nigel Jones accused him of Stalinist bias in his writing. However, even though Southworth believed that Stalin did some good in the

---

267 Ibid.
268 Southworth-Schmigalle letter dated 6 April 1981. The symposium took place from 4-6 June 1981.
269 The symposium was organized by Professors Peter Waldmann and Walther Bernecker from the University of Augsburg. Participants included; the sociologist, Professor Peter Heintz from Zurich University; the sociologist and political scientist Professor Juan Linz from Yale University; the political scientist Professor Carlos Alba from the University of Laguna, the Catalan sociologist Professor Salvador Giner from Brunel University; Professor Paul Preston from the University of London and Angel Viñas from Complutense University of Madrid.
270 Schmigalle-Burrowes email correspondence dated 12/05/2012.
271 Ibid.
Spanish Civil War, this belief is not reflected in explicit pro-communist bias in his books and articles. In ‘A modo de prólogo’ Southworth claims an ambivalence towards the USSR and communism. He writes that he was never ‘an unconditional sympathizer of the USSR or of the communist parties in the countries in which he lived, but neither had he been their unconditional enemy’.

However, he believed that Stalin’s material support of the Spanish Republic was a ‘good thing’. Like Bolloten, Southworth was on good terms with leading communists of the Republic such as Constancia de la Mora (former head of the Republic’s Foreign Press Office in Valencia). He was also on good terms with fellow travellers such as Alvarez del Vayo (former Republican Foreign Minister). Unlike Bolloten, he did not embrace anti-communism during the Cold War. He was therefore puzzled when both French and Spanish communists expressed hostility to his first books. He had personally left a copy of the French edition of El mito at the Paris office of the French Communist Party’s newspaper L’Humanité, expecting that it would be reviewed. However, the paper’s literary editor, André Stil, told him that he did not like his book and would not review it.

Southworth initially attributed Stil’s decision to his dislike of the book’s publisher Ruedo Ibérico and its anarcho-syndicalist director José Martínez Guerricabeitia rather than to issues with the content. However, Southworth later concluded that the reason for communist hostility was due to his American nationality.

Southworth’s texts are all polemical responses to what others had written. He was a reactive writer. Anti-Francoism was the overarching and recurrent theme that permeated all his work. One reviewer aptly described his writing as ‘pages bursting with exasperation at the longevity of the [Franco] regime’. It was the polemical nature of his writing that made him both a doyen and a divisive figure in Civil War historiography. Scholars who relied on texts that Southworth identified as Francoist propaganda, or who neglected to refer to works that he considered essential to the topic under discussion were liable to be singled out and labelled shoddy scholars.

Bolloten was an obvious case in point. In a sub-section in El mito entitled

---

272 H. Southworth, ‘A modo de prólogo’, 64. ‘Yo nunca he sido un simpatizante incondicional de la Unión Soviética, ni de los partidos comunistas de los países donde he vivido; tampoco he sido su enemigo incondicional.’

273 Conversation between Paul Preston and Darryl Burrowes that took place at Preston’s London home on 4 July 2013.

274 After the defeat of the Republic, De la Mora lived for a short time in New York. It was here Southworth came into contact with her through Jay Allen.

275 See Gabriel Jackson, Juan Negrín: Spanish Republican War Leader, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 2010, 141. Jackson writes that Del Vayo was a ‘full-time fellow traveller’.


277 Ibid., 61.


‘The Mystery of Bolloten’, Southworth accused Bolloten of conveniently ignoring sources that did not suit his argument. He referred to two books written by the Soviet expert David T. Cattell and published by the University of California Press – *Communism and the Spanish Civil War* (1955) and *Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War* (1957). Southworth believed that these two texts intersected with Bolloten’s themes in *The Grand Camouflage*, and that Bolloten should have consulted them extensively. In *El mito* he observed that Bolloten referred to Cattell’s first book only in passing and ignored the second completely. Southworth attributed this neglect to the fact that Cattell’s conclusions were at odds with Bolloten’s thesis. 280

Southworth had been provoked into writing *El mito* by the publication in Spain of two historiographies. The works in question were Rafael Calvo Serer’s *La literatura universal sobre la Guerra de España* (1962) and Vicente Marrero’s *La guerra española y el trust de cerebros* (1961). 281 These two Francoist-inspired historiographies were in part a response to the changing political and economic circumstances taking place in Spain in the late fifties and early sixties that were being driven by the expansion of foreign tourism. Sasha Pack in *Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe’s Peaceful Invasion of Spain* (2008) points out that between 1957 and 1962 foreign tourism to Spain had expanded ‘most rapidly in quantitative and economic terms’. 282 In 1954, some 993,100 foreign tourists visited Spain and spent US$90,000,000. However, by 1962 this had risen to 6,390,369 visitors and a revenue of US$513,000,000. 283 According to Pack such rapid change ‘began to make an imprint on the national consciousness as well.’ 284 Unfortunately Pack does not elaborate as to what form this ‘imprint on the national consciousness’ took. Faber is more helpful when he writes, ‘the rise of tourism would inevitably undermine the strict censorship and intellectual isolation that had long allowed the regime to get away with blatant lies’. 285 Faber suggests that Serer’s and Marrero’s historiographies ‘were little more than hasty attempts to soften the blow by predigesting two decades of foreign public opinion on

---

280 In the 1963 edition of *El mito* (156) Southworth wrote: ‘Es extraño que a pesar de la estrecha relación que une a estos trabajos con la tema central del libro de Bolloten, este haga solamente una ligera alusión al primero e ignore completamente al segundo. Puede haber una explicación de ello: los estudios de Cattell no apoyan su tesis.’ Author’s translation: ‘It is strange that despite the close relationship between these works and the central theme in Bolloten’s book, only a slight reference is made to the first and the second is completely ignored. There may be an explanation for this: Cattell’s studies do not support his thesis.

281 Literally translated as *The Universal Literature on the War in Spain* (1962) and *The Spanish War and the Brains Trust* (1963) respectively. Calvo Serer was an early member of Opus Dei. In 1946, at the age of thirty, he became the first Professor of History of Spanish Philosophy and Philosophy of History at the University of Madrid. He was awarded the National Prize for Literature in 1949 for his book *España sin problema*.


283 Ibid., 86.

284 Ibid., 83.

Spain.\textsuperscript{286} The two historiographies attempted to summarize the trends and perspectives that had taken place in Spanish Civil War scholarship outside Spain during the past twenty years.\textsuperscript{287}

At first glance the historiographies appeared to herald a relaxation of the strict censorship the Regime had imposed since winning the Civil War. However, for Southworth, this was merely illusionary deception on the part of the Regime. As Faber points out:

Having spent several decades closely scrutinizing Francoist propaganda, Southworth’s ears were well attuned to the subtle shifts in emphasis reflecting the Regime’s opportunistic reactions to international developments.\textsuperscript{288}

The historiographies did not really aim to enlighten Spaniards as to what foreign writers said about their Civil War, but rather to consolidate and perpetuate the same old Francoist myths of the past, using the works of foreign writers as support. Southworth highlighted these myths in \textit{El mito}, especially the Regime’s primary myth, which was well-suited to the West’s anti-communist Cold War paradigm, that ‘the Civil War was a crusade against communism, a war fought not only for Spain and Christian civilization, but on behalf of all the West’.\textsuperscript{289} Southworth was also determined to expose several associated myths, such as: Franco Spain was never really committed to the fascist powers, and that Spanish relations with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were purely circumstantial; the Civil War was not a prelude to the Second World War but rather the first battle of the Third World War – the anti-communist war.\textsuperscript{290}

Southworth’s objective in \textit{El mito} was to clearly demonstrate that these historiographies were propagandistic distortions of the historical record. He pointed out that most of the works discussed or mentioned were not freely available in Spain which made it difficult, nay, ...

\textsuperscript{286} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{288} S. Faber, \textit{Anglo-American Hispanists}, 79.
\textsuperscript{289} ‘... \textit{la guerra civil fue una cruzada contra el comunismo, una guerra llevada a cabo no solo por España y la civilización cristiana, sino a favor de todo el Occidente’}. See H. Southworth, \textit{El mito ...}, 85.
\textsuperscript{290} H. Southworth, \textit{El mito ...}, 86.
impossible for the reader to challenge the accuracy of Serer’s and Marrero’s comments, which Southworth believed were plagiarized in any case. He described Serer and Marrero as ‘reprehensible because they betrayed the trust of their readers and all too often analysed books that they had not bothered to read’. Southworth concluded that: ‘A situation like this not only distorts the critic and reader relations, but also relations between the critic, reader and author.’

As Faber points out, Southworth’s books and articles were ‘fundamentally reactive in nature’, and at times they were highly polemical. They were not historical monographs of the Spanish Republic and Civil War that the likes of Gabriel Jackson, Hugh Thomas and Paul Preston produced and therefore did not provide him with a vehicle to explicitly reveal his feelings about the role of the communists and USSR in Spain. We know he felt the Soviet Union did good work in Spain not from his writing, but from his comments to friends and colleagues. However, it is possible to draw implicit conclusions as to what Southworth felt by examining his reaction to what others wrote.

This process is most obvious is his essay “The Grand Camouflage”: Julián Gorkin, Burnett Bolloten and the Spanish Civil War’, which was published in a compendium edited by Paul Preston and Ann Mackenzie in 1996. With this essay Southworth consolidated a niche for himself in Spanish Civil historiography as a bloodhound scholar sniffing out Cold War-inspired manipulation of historic documents. He identified Julián Gorkin, the former POUMista, who became editor of the CIA funded magazine Cuadernos, as the main villain of the piece. He told Paul Preston this, and Gabriel Jackson broke with him for some years because of Southworth’s strong support of Stalin and the USSR.

Although Ann Mackenzie is credited with being a co-editor of the compendium the reality is rather different. Preston ‘had been invited to edit a special issue of the Bulletin of Hispanic Studies on the Spanish Civil War and commissioned a number of articles. At a late stage, Ann Mackenzie, the editor of the journal, became embroiled in a major legal battle over its ownership. At that point, it was decided that so as not to lose the work that had gone into it, it should be published as a book and Mackenzie arranged for Edinburgh University Press to take it. [Preston] commissioned a couple of additional articles and [Mackenzie] added one. Hence the book came out as edited by Paul Preston and Ann L. Mackenzie. However, when it was translated into Spanish, the one article that she had commissioned was removed (since it was not really relevant) and [Preston] commissioned another and the book was published as solely edited by [him].’ Email correspondence Preston-Burrowes dated 10/04/2012.

F. Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 213. Stonor Saunders claims that Gorkín ‘founded the Communist Party of Valencia in 1921 and worked in an underground network for the Comintern, learning, amongst other things, how to forge passports’, and that he broke with communism and Moscow in 1929 because ‘the soviets had
believed Gorkin duped a willing Bolloten into accepting the memoirs of Valentín González (often referred to as El Campesino), the former communist military commander in Spain, as a reliable source.\textsuperscript{299} In this essay Southworth took on the role of a Cold War warrior in reverse. His concern was not to root out communists and fellow travellers, but Cold War warriors and their sympathizers. Southworth reiterated what he had said twenty years earlier in his \textit{Times Literary Supplement} review of Bolloten’s book, that ‘Bolloten’s book cannot be dissociated from the Cold War.’\textsuperscript{300} His objective was to discredit Bolloten’s theses by linking him to disillusioned former communists, such as Gorkín, El Campesino, Jesús Hernández (a former member of the PCE executive), and Enrique Castro Delgado (a commander of the Communist Quinto Regimiento).\textsuperscript{301} According to Southworth, Gorkín did more than his attributed transcribing of the reputedly illiterate El Campesino’s book \textit{La Vie et la mort en URSS}, he ghost-wrote it.\textsuperscript{302} Moreover, Southworth links both Gorkín and El Campesino to Willy Brandt, the future German Chancellor, and leading figure in the Congress of Cultural Freedom.\textsuperscript{303} Southworth quoted from a letter Gorkín had written to Bolloten dated 18 October 1984 which dealt with his relations with El Campesino. In the letter Gorkín told Bolloten that he had helped El Campesino after his escape from the USSR in 1949 to get to Frankfurt. This had been made possible ‘thanks to the financial support of some North American friends’.\textsuperscript{304} Furthermore, Gorkín wrote: ‘I was a great friend of Willy Brandt, who among others helped us enormously…’\textsuperscript{305}

As well as linking El Campesino’s book to Gorkín’s manipulations, Southworth did the same with Hernández and claimed that Gorkín had signalled to Hernández what he would have to include in his book \textit{Yo fui un ministro de Stalin} (\textit{I Was A Minister of Stalin}), in order to get it published. Southworth claims that Hernández duly followed Gorkín’s instructions on what to include in the section of the book which dealt ‘with the torture and assassination of Andrés

\textsuperscript{300} Ibid. Southworth’s review was published in the TLS on 9 June 1978.
\textsuperscript{301} Ibid., 267.
\textsuperscript{302} Bolloten writes that ‘this is true’, because ‘El Campesino was to all intents and purposes an illiterate and incapable of giving literary expression to his thoughts and experiences’. B. Bolloten, \textit{The Spanish Civil War}, 810, endnote 48.
\textsuperscript{305} Ibid.
Southworth resorted to gossip to justify his view on Gorkín’s role in the publication of these books and wrote: ‘It was common knowledge among the Spanish groups in Paris that Gorkín could help to publish anti-communist books’.  

Interestingly, Southworth’s claim in his essay that Gorkín was a trusted source for Bolloten finds support in the Bolloten-Gorkín correspondence. Bolloten demonstrated his trust of Gorkín in a letter he wrote to him on 27 January 1986 in which he included a copy of his article on Negrín. He told Gorkín: ‘It is necessary to counteract a little the enormous influence of Juan Marichal, Angel Viñas, Tuñon de Lara, Southworth, Vilar and so many others who are trying to resuscitate the figure of Negrín’. There is no doubt that Southworth objected to Bolloten’s interpretation of Negrín as a willing accomplice to Communist and Soviet manipulation of the Spanish Republic. He criticized Bolloten in El mito for claiming that Negrín allowed the Republic to become more communist controlled. In Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War Southworth went further and claimed that in The Grand Camouflage Bolloten’s ‘essential purpose, [was] an all-out attack on the Spanish Republic and its leaders, on all its leaders, but especially on Juan Negrín’. There is also no doubt that Southworth wanted to protect Negrín’s reputation. In an endnote in his book Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War Southworth quotes from a letter he sent to the Editor of El País which was published on 9 January 1986:

1989 is the centenary of Dr. Juan Negrín’s birth. In democratic Spain there is no street, no monument or anything in his name. He did not write sonnets to the glory of Hitler, Mussolini or Franco’s reconciliation, he professed no admiration for the duce, the führer or the caudillo. He was an honourable man who fought against fascism, who did his duty for his country and who has been granted complete oblivion. Perhaps this is the price to pay for national reconciliation, but this reconciliation is far too expensive if we have to deny the historic truth.

Recently George Esenwein has restated his criticism of Southworth’s Gorkín-Bolloten essay, claiming it to be a blatant attempt to conflate Bolloten’s views with those of Gorkín.
Esenwein labels the essay a ‘diatribe’ full of ‘highly subjective and shaky reasoning’. 313 He also criticizes the editorial judgement of Paul Preston for authorizing and thereby legitimizing the views of Southworth:

It is a pity that Southworth was allowed in the context of a scholarly publication to follow up his previous indictments of Bolloten after he was no longer around to defend himself. No less disappointing was the fact that, in view of the ad hominem nature of this extended essay, the editors treated his contribution as though it was worthy of an academic imprimatur. 314

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that Southworth was deeply affected by the replacement of anti-fascism by anti-communism as the dominant political paradigm of the democracies during the Cold War. The re-emergence of the anti-Soviet narrative, which had been in abeyance during the war against the Axis powers, led Southworth to suspect the motives behind revisionist interpretations of the Spanish Republic and the Civil War. He believed that some scholars’ interpretation of events were shaped more by career advancement than a concern for historical truth. The survival of Franco Spain, and its rehabilitation and rebranding during the early Cold War years as an anti-communist bastion of the West, profoundly upset him. 315

The political climate of the Cold War was moving Spanish Civil War historiography in a direction he did not like. There was no neutrality for Southworth when it came to the Spanish Republic and Civil War. He did not waver from his early commitment to the Spanish Republic. Southworth was a librarian ‘at heart’ who became an historian by default during the Cold War. 316 He did not strive for positions of power and influence in academic institutions. His transformation into an historian came too late in life for an academic career to be an option. His love of books and his love of the Second Spanish Republic intersected to produce the largest private collection of books on the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath. This library enabled him to redress the revisionism and Franco’s rebranding in Spanish Civil War historiography that he perceived to be taking place as a result of the Cold War. Southworth was suspicious of the

314 Ibid., l.
315 S. Faber, Anglo-American Hispanists, 224.
316 Southworth-Allen letter dated 29 June 1964, uncatalogued Southworth Correspondence.
motivations and intentions of other scholars of the Spanish Civil War – overly so. His suspicions were exacerbated by his relative isolation living in châteaux in rural France and his distance both physical and mental from academia.

There is no evidence to suggest that Southworth was ever in danger from the CIA. Mention of the CIA in the correspondence consulted for this chapter is based on frivolous innuendo and gossip. This does not mean that Southworth was not affected by Cold War gossip and innuendo. It made him more entrenched in his suspicions that historians were being influenced in their interpretations of the Spanish Civil War for ideological reasons, or out of loyalty for their side in the propaganda war between communism and capitalist democracy.

Southworth was not a nuanced personality. He suffered from a strange blend of inferiority complex and the resentful arrogance of one who believed he had all the answers. His aggressive and pugnacious reputation was deserved. He bullied friends and foes alike; he intentionally inflicted on his foes aggressive polemics and unintentionally intimidated his friends with the dogmatic strength of his personality. His professional arrogance grew over time in response to the reception he and his books received from some Anglo-American scholars. He became more vindictively inquisitive and obsessive over time, but he had enduring qualities to which his friends only too readily will attest.

For Southworth there was no ‘burying the hatchet’ when it came to protecting the historiographical interests of the Spanish Republic. His stouthes with Thomas, Bolloten, Carr, et alia attest to this. Southworth’s critique of Bolloten’s work in El mito was a provocative act on his part, because El mito was primarily concerned with unravelling misrepresentation and distortion perpetuated by Francoist apologists Rafael Calvo Serer and Vicente Marrero, whose histories Southworth condemned as sloppy, lacking in logic, rigor and imbued with Francoist lies. Southworth never gave up the ‘good fight’ that he had embarked on in 1937, and recommitted to when he started writing history in 1960. His historiographical mission continued to be the bringing of Spanish Francoists and their apologists to account through his writing and his polemics.

In the end, he probably was the ‘fresh current of air’ that was required to keep Cold War historians of the Spanish Civil War on their toes. As for Nigel Jones’ criticism of Southworth as a ‘Communist propagandist and Stalinist stooge’, the verdict is not clear cut. He was certainly no ‘stooge’, but he was not an impartial scholar. For Southworth the anti-communism and anti-
Stalinism generated during various phases of the Cold War years masked and distorted the real history of communism and Stalin’s intervention in the Spanish Civil War.
CONCLUSION

The overarching objective of ‘Historians at War’ was to exemplify the oft-repeated claim that the political climate generated by the Cold War impacted on the writing of history – a premise supported by the research and revelations of a chorus of cultural Cold War scholars such as Christopher Lasch, Francis Stonor Saunders, Hugh Wilford, Paul Lashmar and James Oliver; as well as by specialist Spanish Civil War historians, Paul Preston, Angel Viñas, Adrian Shubert, and George Esenwein. This thesis intended to do more than merely join this scholarly chorus by reiterating the ‘Cold War influence premise’. It sought to illustrate the premise by examining selected Spanish Civil War history books written or published by Anglo-Americans during the Cold War, as well as the circumstances in which those books were written, published and received.

The Cold War generated rabid anti-communist fervour in the USA and UK – a fervour that successive British and American governments fuelled by directing their intelligence agencies to launch anti-communist propaganda campaigns.\(^1\) Gabriel Jackson suggests that ‘perhaps one had to live in the USA’ during this period ‘to understand how obsessed people of all political persuasions were about who was, or was not, a communist’.\(^2\) In this political climate it seemed likely that if evidence of Cold War influence on the writing of Spanish Civil War history was to be found, it would be in the works written by Anglo-American writers who had examined the roles played by the PCE (Spanish Communist Party) and the Soviet Union during the Civil War. It is not unusual for governments to conjure up lessons from the past to justify their contemporary political agendas. It seemed reasonable to assume that works that showed communist duplicity in Republican Spain would be welcomed by Anglo-American policy-makers who were hell-bent on extinguishing any lingering admiration that their citizens held for Soviet communism. A detailed analysis of the appropriation by British and American Cold War warriors of George Orwell’s *Homage to Catalonia* for use as a weapon in their anti-communist propaganda war confirms this assumption. *Homage* was viewed as not just one more memoir, but a revelation of PCE and Soviet duplicity in Civil War Spain. The value of *Homage* as a book from which to learn the lessons of the past is obvious from the very first sentence of Lionel Trilling’s ‘Introduction’ to the book’s first American edition in 1952, some fourteen years after it was published in the


\(^{2}\) Email correspondence Jackson-Burrowes dated 28 October 2013.
UK. Trilling, himself involved in Congress of Cultural Freedom activities,³ heralded the book as ‘one of the important documents of our time’.⁴

On one level this thesis sought to determine whether the covert practices of political influence which cultural Cold War scholars had exposed as being widespread in western intellectual scholarship were also to be found in Spanish Civil War scholarship. The most covert of these practices was the distribution by the CIA and IRD of financial largesse, either directly or indirectly, to favoured intellectuals whose writing supported the ideological, philosophical, or socio-cultural perspectives of the government. Herbert Southworth was arguably the first historian to document cases of this happening in Spanish Civil War historiography. He claimed: ‘There are books, the text and notes of which should be read and analysed like the fine print of an insurance policy’,⁵ and posited that the CIA manipulated Civil War history by promoting works written by Julián Gorkin and Valentín González (also known as El Campesino).⁶ He pointed out that Gorkin was virtually on the CIA’s payroll through his directorship of the CIA-funded magazine Cuadernos del Congreso por la Libertad de la Cultura.⁷ On another level the thesis sought to exemplify how the Cold War impacted on the writing of history through less sensational and conspiratorial means – through friendship and knowledge networks, institutional frameworks, and personal ambition, and, on yet another level, the thesis sought to explore how the historians’ own life experiences influenced their writing. This is something Geoff Eley alluded to in A Crooked Line when he referred to the ‘political baggage’ historians brought with them to their scholarly pursuits, by which he meant the influences that shaped them, such as early upbringing, family life, and education.⁸

To confine the task to manageable proportions the thesis focused on four Anglo-American writer-historians who are widely accepted as having made significant contributions to Civil War historiography during the Cold War era. A biographical methodology was

⁴ G. Orwell, Homage to Catalonia, Harcourt, Orlando, 1952, iii.
⁶ Ibid., 262.
⁷ Ibid., 301.
adopted because this writer accepts the advice proffered by E. H. Carr, who urged his readers to study ‘the historian before you begin to study the facts’. Biography offered the best way to determine the writer-historians’ mindsets, their personal and professional ambitions at the time they were writing and/or publishing their works, as well as ascertaining their receptivity to intelligence agency largesse or any of the other practices of influence identified above. Finally, where possible, the thesis aimed to establish how the writer-historians interpreted the roles played by the PCE and the Soviet Union in Republican and Civil War Spain. This had been a contentious area of interpretation for early commentators and historians, and it continued to be so during the Cold War, when US and UK policy-makers were re-evaluating their countries’ positions towards the Franco regime.

Spain’s geographical location and relative political stability, together with Franco’s proven anti-communist track record, meant Spain could provide a reliable bulwark against Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean. The USA and UK were prepared to abandon the political isolation and economic ostracism that they had imposed on Franco Spain as a result of its pro-Axis allegiance during World War II. However, the process of successfully enlisting Franco into the anti-communist Cold War fold could be better facilitated if his regime were accorded a level of legitimacy. Franco had undeniably crushed the legally elected Second Spanish Republic, and in the post-war years he remained an unpopular fascist figure for many in the UK and the USA, who lobbied for his removal – Gerald Brenan being a case in point. The legitimization of the Franco regime did not sit well with many in the democratic West. The challenge for US and UK policy makers was to effect a rapprochement with the Franco regime and also to defuse the West’s vocal anti-Franco intelligentsia who opposed the process. It was the decision by the USA and UK to maintain the Franco regime that provided a reason for revisionism in Civil War historiography. As Paul Preston points out, the Spanish Republic was ‘the last remaining jewel in the communist crown’. Therefore, it seemed logical to assume that it would be an obvious area for Cold War

---

11 Preston-Burrowes email correspondence dated 12 September 2011. Preston claims that the ‘CIA-sponsored Congress for Cultural Freedom ... set out to besmirch the Spanish Republic for the simple reason that the Spanish Civil War was, post-1945, the last remaining jewel in the Communist crown. Through its [CCF] Spanish branch, major sources were invented, re-written and/or distorted.’
manipulation of history. The task of US-UK reconciliation with Franco Spain could be made easier if the Second Republic could be shown to be a Soviet puppet, and if Franco was re-interpreted from being a destroyer of a fledgling progressive democracy to being a bastion against Soviet communist expansion. The political climate driving US and UK rapprochement with Franco Spain created a motive for CIA and IRD manipulation of Civil War historiography in regards to the interpretation of the roles played by the USSR and PCE in Spain. Key questions for this thesis were to determine if its featured writer-historians were influenced by either the CIA or the IRD to portray communist and Soviet interplay in Republican Spain in a destructive light, and to determine if the publication and distribution of their books was helped by the anti-communist stance they posited.

Some conclusions in this thesis have had to be drawn on the grounds of what was most likely, based on circumstantial evidence. Access to intelligence agency archives proved to be impossible, and use of the USA’s ‘Freedom of Information Act’ (hereafter FOIA) to obtain information was beyond the financial scope of this thesis. In any case, if the experiences of Stonor Saunders and Peter Coleman are anything to go by, any requests for information relating to intelligence agency actions under the FOIA would have more than likely ended in expensive failure. After all, intelligence agencies by their very nature are not in the business of openness and disclosure. As Tennent Bagley, a former deputy chief of the CIA’s Soviet Bloc Division, observes: ‘Secrets are, after all meant to be kept secret … and “To Be Preserved Forever” in locked vaults, not in history books.’ However, the thesis has been well-served by a surfeit of published and unpublished correspondence undertaken by the writer-historians – correspondence, which in some cases, is in the public domain for the first time. This material has provided a window into the writer-historians’ mindsets, their ideological perspectives, as well as providing valuable physical, and financial timelines when they were writing or publishing their books.

Each chapter has shown that the anti-communist political climate generated by the Cold War impacted heavily on the writer-historians, although each man was affected according to their own personal values, ambitions and agendas. The Cold War’s Zeitgeist did not impose a rigid template of acceptable anti-communist responses on them; it did not

12 Tennent H. Bagley, quoted in the ‘Foreword’ of Boris Volodarsky, Stalin’s Agent: The Life and Death of Alexander Orlov, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, XXIV.
coerce any of them into writing an anti-communist narrative of Civil War events against their wishes. Only in the case of Brenan is a hint of coercion evident; his anti-Franco outspokenness was severely curtailed. This was not, however, as a result of outside pressure but due to self-interested self-censorship; he willingly constrained his writing on Spanish politics in order to achieve his wish to return to live in Spain. However, it was no hardship for Brenan to step back from political involvement, as by nature he was not a political activist; besides, he was ‘tired’ of Spanish politics.\textsuperscript{13} Although Brenan’s politically active phase was an aberration, albeit a thirteen year one, there is no doubt that at the time his was a genuine commitment to the Republican and anti-Franco cause. He, like many of his generation, was swept up by the justice of the Republic’s fight. However, in the end, reining in his criticism of the Franco regime was a small price to pay for being able to revert to his former expat life in Spain.

Overall, Brenan benefitted from the Cold War. It enhanced his literary reputation both in and outside Spain, as the most eminent contemporary hispanist of his time. It suited both the Franco regime and US and UK policy-makers to have a well-known former anti-Francoist reconciled to Franco Spain. Brenan personified the very reconciliation process that the US and UK were engaged in with Franco Spain at the geopolitical level. Brenan’s reputation was aided by the regular reprints of \textit{The Spanish Labyrinth} – a book published on the cusp of the Cold War, which sought to explain why the Civil War broke out. Like \textit{Homage}, \textit{Labyrinth} gained its seminal status during the Cold War, however, the reasons for this are different. \textit{Labyrinth} does not portray the communists and Soviets as duplicitous in Spain; it does not provide Cold War warriors with a lesson from the past to use in their anti-communist propaganda war. The book focuses on the causes of the conflict, and attributes the blame to the conservative forces which Franco championed. Anglo-American Cold War warriors valued \textit{Labyrinth} because of the status that it brought Brenan as the most significant analyst of Spanish affairs. They could use Brenan’s personal \textit{rapprochement} to demonstrate that the Franco regime was changing, becoming more open, evident from the fact that it allowed the anti-Franco Brenan to return to live in Spain. Brenan’s reputation was also enhanced during the developing Cold War years by the publication of chapters of his yet to be published book

\footnote{Gerald Brenan, \textit{The Face of Spain}, Sherif, London, 2010 ed. (1\textsuperscript{st} pub. 1950), 7.}
on Spain,\textsuperscript{14} and articles in magazines. Was it a coincidence that these magazines were funded by the CIA? Was it coincidental that the books that Brenan wrote after he returned to live in Franco Spain were published by Hamish Hamilton – a man ‘closely tied to intelligence’, who had been a driving force behind the anti-communist book \textit{The God That Failed}?\textsuperscript{15} The answer to this question is probably not. Brenan’s biography reveals a man with a pragmatic moral compass, a man who lived on the financial edge for the first half of his life – relying on handouts from family and friends to keep himself financially above water. The Cold War thrust him into a limelight that he would not otherwise have had. He was not the great writer that he aspired to be. His friend Virginia Woolf described one of his books as ‘unmitigated trash – a sickly slab of plum cake iced with pink fly-blown sugar’.\textsuperscript{16} Stonor Saunders suggests that the reputations of many writers and thinkers were ‘enhanced’ by the CIA when they were really ‘second-raters’.\textsuperscript{17} The evidence is not sufficiently conclusive to claim that Brenan fits Stonor Saunders’ bill, but it certainly gives grounds for suspicion.

This thesis concurs with scholars such as Stonor Saunders and Scott Lucas, who claim that British and American Cold War warriors appropriated Orwell’s reputation as an outspoken, honest and reliable social commentator on politics and current affairs for use in the cultural Cold War. Orwell’s Spanish Civil War-inspired books and articles were promoted because they illustrated the deceitful manoeuvres that totalitarian communism resorted to in order to achieve its goal of world communism. As Lashmar and Oliver write: Orwell’s Civil War-inspired books ‘were widely taken up by anti-communists as metaphors for the evils of the communist system’.\textsuperscript{18} Cold War warriors such as Lionel Trilling and Laurence Brander used Orwell’s reputation to support their Cold War anti-communist agendas – Trilling through his \textit{Homage} ‘Introduction’ and Brander through his Orwell non-biography. There is no evidence to show that Orwell himself was the direct beneficiary of intelligence agency largesse. However, after his death in 1950, when the real appropriation of his work and reputation took place, the evidence shows that his estate benefitted by both the

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{The Face of Spain}.
\textsuperscript{15} F. Stonor Saunders, \textit{The Cultural Cold War}, 60, 64. The books in question are \textit{The Face of Spain} (1957 & 1965 eds, \textit{South From Granada} (1957), \textit{A Holiday by the Sea} (1961), \textit{A Life of One’s Own} (1962), \textit{The Lighthouse Always Says Yes} (1966).
\textsuperscript{16} Woolf was referring to \textit{Jack Robinson} (1933). See Chapter Two, ‘Gerald Brenan: from \textit{The Spanish Labyrinth} to \textit{South From Granada}’, fn. 153.
\textsuperscript{17} F. Stonor Saunders, \textit{The Cultural Cold War}, 5.
\textsuperscript{18} P. Lashmar, & J. Oliver, \textit{Britain’s Secret Propaganda War}, 95.
IRD and the CIA discreetly supporting his work – two prime examples being the funding of foreign language editions of Orwell’s books, and the bankrolling of the Hollywood cartoon of *Animal Farm*. Moreover, it seems reasonable to conclude that Orwell would not have been too perturbed by his posthumous appropriation, considering that he willingly cooperated in IRD endeavours to identify politically unreliable writers by handing over a list of names of unreliable writers to the IRD. The circumstantial evidence supports the conclusion that the Cold War resurrected *Homage’s* fortunes, and that it was published in the USA in 1952 because of its anti-communist and anti-Soviet content.

Hebert Southworth and his close colleagues claimed or insinuated that Burnett Bolloten was in the pay of the CIA. However, there is no definitive evidence that proves Bolloten was either in the pay of, or that any of his books were funded or promoted by, the CIA. Nevertheless, his monumental narrative history of the Spanish Civil War, published in three-parts, which clearly highlighted PCE and USSR duplicity in Civil War Spain would seem to be a work of interest to Cold War warriors. Certainly the publication of *The Grand Camouflage* in 1961 in the USA by Frederick A. Praeger, who has admitted to books on his publishing list being funded by the CIA, looks suspicious. The book’s British publisher, the Catholic firm Hollis and Carter, also provides grounds for suspicion. Hollis and Carter blatantly politicised the book by supplying the partisan subtitle – *The Communist Conspiracy in the Spanish Civil War* – and the provocative book cover of a map of Spain painted red and imprinted with a hammer and sickle. Moreover, the fact that *The Grand Camouflage* was published in Spain as *El Gran Engaño (The Great Deceit)* with a foreword written by a Franco government minister, within weeks of its UK publication also aroused suspicion amongst Bolloten’s contemporaries. Southworth asked why the book was allowed to be published in Franco Spain where censorship was notoriously harsh? This was a good question, because in Franco Spain the Spanish Civil War was virtually a taboo subject, and very few Anglo-American scholars were ever accorded the right to distribute or publish their books. The reality was *El Gran Engaño* suited the Franco regime’s new Cold War paradigm of *rapprochement* with the USA and UK. By publishing the book the regime was showing a new openness, as it did by allowing Breinan to return to live and work, but more importantly the central theme of communist and Soviet duplicity fitted easily with the regime’s own narrative. The above circumstances suggest that factors other than merit eventually contributed to the publication of *The Grand Camouflage*, after all it had been rejected by
publishers for over a decade. However, the evidence seems to suggest it was unlikely that Bolloten directly benefitted from CIA largesse, although it is understandable why Southworth, Colodny and others drew these conclusions in the sixties and seventies. These were the years of revelations about covert funding of selected intellectual opinion-formers, publishing houses, books, magazines, and a myriad of other cultural activities by British and American intelligence agencies – revelations that fuelled suspicion and conspiracy theories. The Cold War turned Southworth into a Cold War warrior in reverse. Always a partisan supporter of the Spanish Republic, he became obsessed with uncovering agents of cultural Cold War manipulation in Spanish Civil War historiography. A prime target of his obsession was Bolloten. Several aspects about Bolloten’s life, career and books gave grounds for suspicion, because Bolloten did occasionally give contradictory, as well as chronologically inaccurate, accounts of events in his life. These errors are not sufficient to prove he was duplicitous. Southworth criticized The Grand Camouflage for conclusions inconsistent with the arguments outlined, and he deduced that Bolloten had an anti-communist volte-face because of the cultural Cold War. Moreover, he implied that Bolloten’s turn was somehow driven by his desire to live in the USA, and by financial inducements. However, Bolloten’s camouflage thesis had its genesis in his own observations as a journalist in Valencia in 1937, when he became intellectually engaged by the Villalba incident. Bolloten did not give vent to his camouflage thesis immediately. After he left Civil War Spain he lived in pro-republican Mexico, where he was soon joined by thousands of its refugees from Republican Spain. In Mexico he mixed in pro-Republic and pro-communist circles. He used these contacts to garner material for his book, and his camouflage thesis remained nascent until the conditions were right. Bolloten’s move from Mexico City took him out of the orbit of the communist leaders, and he began to mix in anti-communist circles. His move to the USA in 1949 coincided with the onset of Cold War. In the USA Bolloten gave vent to his anti-communism. He now moved in conservative and neo-conservative circles and struck up close relationships with apostate American communists, who reflected the perspectives he now felt confident to reveal. This was the new context in which he completed his first book and wrote his next two.

The life and works of writer-historians featured in this thesis were all affected to a greater or lesser extent by the Cold War. The reputations of both Orwell and Brenan, as reliable witnesses of events, were enhanced; this in turn contributed to improved sales and distribution of their books. Without the intervention of Cold War politics Orwell and Brenan
would most likely not have received the readership or personal exposure that they did. Evidence shows in the case of Orwell, and strongly suggests in the case of Brenan, that both men benefitted indirectly from intelligence agency largesse which facilitated the publication and distribution of their books. The effects of the Cold War on Bolloten were both negative and positive. The anti-communist climate gave him the confidence to openly champion his ‘grand camouflage’ thesis, however, it also contributed to his ill health and intellectual insecurity. He was driven to overwork owing to his insatiable need to check every source and read every relevant newspaper and publication, to ensure his work would stand up to the rigorous scrutiny of his fellow historians. The Cold War was a major influence on Southworth and his approach to history, leading him to launch a divisive war of words against Bolloten. His forensic methodology became entrenched, and the *modus operandi* for all his books, as he sought to uncover Cold War-inspired manipulation in Civil War historiography. The Cold War probably led Southworth to condemn his fellow Civil War historians too readily.

History, as Pieter Geyl put it, ‘is an argument without end’. The heatedness of the arguments about the history of the Spanish Civil War, and above all about the role of the communists in it, is almost legendary. This is not to suggest that in the cases of the four writer-historians examined here that their arguments were made in bad faith. On the contrary, all of them produced works of great value and dedication, important and influential in their own times and beyond. However, as this thesis has shown, even the works of writers dedicated to their craft and to an accurate rendering of the historical record can never be beyond dispute. They are as much products of their times as the events they describe.

---

BIBLIOGRAPHY

UNPUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES

Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Alcalá de Henares
Julián Gorkin Papers

Günther Schmigalle Correspondence with Herbert Southworth

Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University
Burnett Bolloten Papers, 1923-1991

The Tamiment Library & Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New York
American Committee for Cultural Freedom Papers
Robert Colodny Papers
Arthur Landis Papers
ALBA (Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archives) Collection
Fredericka Martin Papers
Steve Nelson Papers
Albert Prago papers

PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES

Published documents, Reports, Diaries and Memoirs


McCullagh, Captain Francis, In Franco’s Spain: Being the experiences of an Irish war-correspondent during the Great Civil War which began in 1936, Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd, London, 1937.

Marchetti, Victor & Marks, John, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1974.


Orwell, George, Homage to Catalonia, Harcourt, Orlando, 1952.


SECONDARY SOURCES

Books and Theses


Hoskins, Katherine, Today the Struggle: Literature and Politics in England During the Spanish Civil War, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1969.


Lasswell, Harold; Casey, Ralph; Lannes Smith, Bruce (Eds), *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated bibliography*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1969, 1st pub 1935.


251


**Articles Published In Periodicals**


Bolloten, Burnett, ‘The Strange Case of Dr. Juan Negrín: Moscow’s Man of Confidence?’, *Journal of Contemporary Studies*, Fall/Winter, 1985, 73-91.


Coleman, Peter, ‘How I wrote The Liberal Conspiracy: Is It time to Revive the Congress For Cultural Freedom in the War Against Terror?’, *Quadrant*, April, 2005, 38-42.


260


261


Shaw, Tony, “‘Some Writers are More Equal than Others”, George Orwell, the State and Cold War Privilege’, Cold War History, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2003, 143-70.


Southworth, Herbert, ‘America – Look at Spain’, The Nation, 10 June 1939, 677-78.


Chapters in Edited Books


Keene, J. ‘Fighting for God, for Franco and (most of all) for Themselves: Right-wing volunteers in the Spanish Civil War’ in Kruger, C & Levsen S. (Eds), War Volunteering in Modern Times: From the French Revolution to the Second World War, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011.


**Other Sources**
