Examining the Minilateral Security Arrangements: An Analysis of Minilateral Responses to China's Expansionism in the Indo-Pacific

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Thesis
Submitted to Flinders University
for the degree of

Master of Arts (International Relations)

College of Business, Government and Law
29th March 2022

DECLARATION

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

Melani Upeshika

29th March 2022

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Dr Maryanne Kelton, for giving me this opportunity to work under her expertise and guidance, for her patience, and valuable feedback throughout the compilation of this thesis.

To Dr Luis da Vinha, for his time, advice, and continuous support all through the two years of my degree.

To my beloved husband, Kevin, for his support, love, encouragement and for being there by my side right from the beginning till the end of this journey. I could not have done this without you.

ABSTRACT

As U.S.-China great power rivalry progresses, it challenges the stability of the Indo-Pacific region and the rules-based world order. In response the U.S. not only aims to reconnect with its allies bilaterally but also to cross-brace its Pacific alliance relationships in order to sustain its regional dominance and share the security burden. With the onset of escalating power shifts in regional strategic environment from the early 2000s, minilateral initiatives have gradually populated Indo-Pacific geopolitics. This thesis utilises Miller's (1968) analytical framework of conditions for cooperation to analyse the incentives that enhance collaboration and increase the prospects for cooperation between states in a minilateral security arrangement. Employing the case studies of the Quad, the Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Cooperation, and the AUKUS trilateral defence partnership, this thesis examines the emerging minilateral responses to: China's aggressive and coercive behaviour; to counter the China threat; and the efforts to deter China's pursuit of regional dominance. This detailed application of the framework and the analysis of the three case studies conclude that minilateral initiatives in the Indo-Pacific are effective security arrangements to deter the China threat.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADF – Australian Defence Force

ADIZ – Air Defense Identification Zone

AIF – Australian Imperial Force

AUKMIN – Australia-UK Ministerial Consultations

AUSMIN – Australia-US Ministerial Consultations

BRI – Belt and Road Initiative

BMD – Ballistic Missile Defence

CCG – Chinese Coast Guard

CPTPP – Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership

DOD – Department of Defense

DSU – Defense Strategic Update

DWP – Defense White Paper

EC – European Community

EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone

ELINT – Electronic Intelligence

FPDA – Five Power Defence Arrangement

FTA – Free Trade Agreement

FVEY – Five Eyes Partnership

GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

IN – Indian Navy

INSSG – Interim National Security Strategic Guidance

JCG – Japan Coast Guard

JGSDF – Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force

JMSDF – Japan Maritime Self Defense Force

JSDF – Japanese Self-Defense Forces

LAC – Line of Actual Control

LRASM – Long Range Anti-Ship Missile

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NORAD – North American Aerospace Defense Command

OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PLA – People's Liberation Army

RAAF – Royal Australian Air Force

RAN – Royal Australian Navy

SDCF – Security and Defense Cooperation Forum

SOSUS – Sound Surveillance System

TISA – Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement

TPP – Trans-Pacific Partnership

TSD – Trilateral Strategic Dialogue

UK – United Kingdom

UN – United Nations

UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNSC – UN Security Council

U.S. – United States

INTRODUCTION

Minilateral diplomacy is not a novel concept in international relations. It stems from multilateral security politics which dominated global governance in the twentieth century. Arguably, of today's many multilateral efforts in confronting transnational issues including regional security challenges, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and climate change, have been unsuccessful (Franck 1996; Patrick 2015, 2020). Accordingly, John Mearsheimer (1994) argues that multilateralism is becoming 'ill-suited' to a new era of international politics. Conversely, minilateralism emerges through a compelling need for a flexible, functional, and effective approach to achieve security objectives (Glosserman & Snyder 2015, p. 162; Kahler 1992, pp. 684-5; Patrick 2015, p. 116). Minilateral forums bring together the smallest possible number of states to devise the largest possible impact on issue specific matters (Naim 2009). It shifts the focus from the legally binding 'top-down' constituency of multilateralism and resonates as 'a smarter, more targeted' form of interstate cooperation (Naim 2009; Singh & Teo 2020).

In the post-war period, the U.S. sought to maintain its bilateral relations with its Pacific allies through the 'hub-and-spokes' San Francisco alliance system. In the Indo-Pacific, William Tow (2015) claims that the U.S. presence is asserted only through its alliance system. However, this asymmetrical security system has proven to be less effective in a shifting multipolar world. Meanwhile, China has risen to a level of great prominence in the region (Shambaugh 2018). The U.S. now must share the stage with China, the economic powerhouse, and rising military power. As U.S.-China great power rivalry progresses, it challenges the stability of the region and the rules-based world order (White 2012). In response the U.S. not only aims to reconnect with its allies bilaterally but also to cross-brace its alliance relationships in order to sustain its regional dominance and share the security burden (Sullivan, J 2021).

With the onset of escalating dynamism in regional strategic environment from the early 2000s, minilateral initiatives have gradually populated in Indo-Pacific geopolitics.

This study investigates the conditions for minilateralism and then examines minilateral security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific issued through the U.S. cross-bracing endeavours to counter China's great power influence in the region. These arrangements are namely: the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad); the Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Cooperation; and the AUKUS trilateral defence partnership (de Swielande Spring 2012, p. 84; Sullivan, J 2021). These timely minilateral responses to counter Chinese expansionism involve the most powerful regional players including Australia, India, Japan, the UK, and the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific. They also involve the highly developed middle powers (Australia, India, and Japan) with 'the capacity to pivot to exerting global influence' that play the 'most conspicuous' roles within the region (Schweller 2017, pp. 3-5; Waltz 1979, p. 131). The thesis does so by utilising a framework of analysis of conditions for cooperation originally devised by J. D. B. Miller (1968) to analyse the incentives that enhance collaboration and increase the prospects for cooperation between states. The analytical framework is applied using a range of primary and secondary sources. A case study methodology was selected because, case studies allow detailed investigation and analysis of the context (Yin 2009). Bennett & Elman (2007, p. 171) also emphasize that case studies are particularly helpful and advantageous in studying 'complex phenomena' as they support multiple levels of analysis. The thesis espouses the aforementioned case studies as they are apt illustrations of the current strategic environment of the region. The thesis uses Miller's framework to construct a comprehensive analysis of the fundamentals of cooperation. It then considers China's aggressive and coercive actions displayed toward other regional powers, the China threat, and the efforts made by states to deter Chin's pursuit to regional dominance.

The first chapter of this thesis studies minilateralism by identifying its prominent characteristics within the existing literature on minilateral diplomacy. Chapter One presents the analytical framework of the thesis by briefly introducing and explaining Miller's (1968) five conditions for cooperation: cultural similarity, economic equality, habits of association, sense of common danger, and great power pressure. The following chapters will analyse the strengths of these conditions and whether these conditions were present in adequate strength to encourage cooperation between the states.

Chapter Two begins the analysis of thesis. It commences by examining the perception of common danger, Miller's (1968) preeminent condition relevant to the first of minilateral security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad Security Dialogue. The thesis starts with the perception of common danger, as China's rising power provides the threat impetus for the new minilateral security arrangements. The Quad is perceived as a minilateral response initiated to deter the China threat. The chapter first studies the notions of fear, threat, power, and perception through the works of Robert A. Dahl (1957), Raymond Aron (1968), Kenneth Waltz (1979), James W. Davis (Davis 2000), and others. This chapter examines the sense of common danger as a binding factor between states that enhances cooperation. The chapter establishes that China's aggressive behaviour, coercive actions, and handling of regional border disputes threaten the peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. The chapter identifies certain factors that influence perception of threat and further studies the threat perceptions of the Quad members. The final component of this chapter assesses the Quad as an efficient minilateral security arrangement and its efforts initiated to deter the China threat.

Chapter Three examines great power pressure, Miller's (1968) fifth condition. The chapter evaluates great power pressure as a powerful incentive for cooperation between states. It studies the Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Security Cooperation as a minilateral response issued from U.S. great power influence by analysing how the existing bilateral relations

between the three states later converge into deeper trilateral cooperation. The chapter further considers the evolution of the Trilateral Security Cooperation, and its security and defence efforts to counter China. It discusses the benefits of this approach through Australia-U.S. and Japan-U.S. alliances. The chapter provides context to the strategically important 'latticework' of U.S. alliances as a form of both burden sharing and bolstering U.S. power (Sullivan, J 2021).

Chapter Four analyses Miller's (1968) other conditions: cultural similarity, economic equality, and habits of association. This chapter uses the AUKUS (Australia, UK, U.S.) case study to examine how cultural affinities, social similarities, equality of capacity (especially in the military domain), and past associations encourage cooperation between states. The chapter highlights that these are effective incentives that increase the prospects of security cooperation. In line with Miller's argument, for states with a shared identity, trust, similar value systems, and practices, cooperation is almost natural. Finally, the chapter studies the strategic culture of Australia, the UK, and the U.S., their similar world view and vision for the region through AUKUS.

1 CHAPTER ONE: CONDITIONS FOR MINILATERAL COOPERATION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter One studies minilateral diplomacy and its characteristics. Scholarly literature from Robert Keohane (1990), Miles Kahler (1992), Gerard Ruggie (1992), Moisés Naim (2009), William T. Tow (Tow 2015), and Brad Glosserman & Scott Snyder (2015), is examined to: provide definitional clarity on minilateralism; outline the distinction between multilateralism and minilateralism; analyse the principal characteristics that constitute minilateral diplomacy; and, introduce minilateralism as a developing and an emerging form of security collaboration among states in the Indo-Pacific. From the literature we can determine that minilateral responses are diplomatic efforts by three or four countries outside of traditional multilateral forums dealing with issue specific concerns that individual states fail to achieve alone. Following this review, the chapter identifies a framework of analysis initially proposed by J. D. B. Miller (1968). This framework will be used to examine the conditions for cooperation between states. Miller presented five conditions for cooperation including cultural similarity, economic equality, habit of association, sense of common danger, and greater power pressure. In his study between India, Japan, and Australia, Miller analysed whether these conditions were present in sufficient degrees to encourage cooperation between the three states. Using Miller's conditions for cooperation as an analytical framework, the subsequent chapters will examine the three case studies of the Quad, Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Cooperation, and AUKUS alliance as effective minilateral collaborations issued in the Indo-Pacific to withstand the China threat.

1.2 MINILATERAL DIPLOMACY

From the literature reviewed we can ascertain that minilateralism is intended to address a specific threat or security issue with the involvement of fewer states with a shared identity and similar interest. First, to determine the concept of minilateralism, it is essential to understand the characteristics that distinguish it from multilateralism. Minilateralism as a 'subset' of multilateralism derives many attributes of its nature, constituency, and utility from the literature of multilateralism. Kahler (1992, p. 686) asserts that 'a disguised minilateralism' furnishes the essential frame for a multilateral order. Keohane (1990, p. 731) defines multilateralism as 'the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions', and its capacity as 'broad', and 'limited to states'. The establishment of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN) in 1945, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, and later the European Community (EC) in 1957, represent the development of modern multilateralism. States and continents came together to collectively end the futile decades of war, loss of lives, and human suffering to bring forth peace and economic prosperity through international cooperation and institutionalism. According to Ruggie (1992, p. 567), multilateralism coordinates diplomatic practices not merely based on trade and security relations, but it cooperates on the basis of 'certain principles'. Ruggie (1992, p. 561) also argues that multilateralism in its current form results from the geopolitical power shift of the post-war era: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has helped stabilize the international order in the twentieth century.

The term 'minilateralism' was coined by Kahler in 1992, and it was later popularized by political journalist, Moisés Naim. Kahler (1992), in his article *Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers,* presents the critiques and scepticisms of multilateralism to distinguish it from minilateralism. Accordingly, minilateralism is voluntary rather than legally binding,

disaggregated rather than comprehensive, trans-governmental rather than intergovernmental, and regional rather than global (Kahler 1992, pp. 682-5). Further, Kahler (1992, p. 685) and Glosserman & Snyder (2015, p. 162) define minilateralism as an incentive that encourages and strengthens cooperation among states. In this section of the chapter, we analyse the defining characteristics of minilateralism vis-à-vis the distinguishing characteristics of multilateralism.

The numerical aspect of multilateralism could be one of the differentiating dimensions from other types of interstate relations such as bilateralism and trilateralism. However, the number of members, 'three or more states', place both multilateralism and minilateralism as very similar in modality. Both forms of cooperation involve an unspecified number of states: ranging from a regional multilateral organization like the ASEAN with twenty-seven members to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) involving Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom (UK). Naim (2009) in his influential article and Glosserman & Snyder (2015, pp. 162-3) in their frequently cited book, define minilateralism as a smaller group of participants compared to multilateralism. The numerical dimension discussed here relates to the qualitative aspect of minilateralism where the limited membership brings forth a sense of exclusivity to minilateral relations. Multilateralism, on the other hand, operates on the basis of indivisibility and 'generalized organizing principles' (Ruggie 1992, p. 571). The principles of multilateralism work best in a collective system. For instance, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) affirms all member states that 'an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all'. The collective 'security umbrella', the openness and the inclusive approach, thus depicts multilateralism as a generic institutional form in international relations (Ruggie 1992, p. 572). Minilateralism focusses on 'bring[ing] to the table the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem' (Naim 2009) and cooperating with 'exclusive blocs' or spheres (Ruggie 1992, p. 572).

In addition, the size of minilateral groupings may depend on the economic or security challenges at hand. Glosserman & Snyder (2015, p. 163) state that the nature of new security challenges on the international stage requires new approaches and capabilities. Naim (2009) further contributes to the same argument where he highlights that issues of global economy, climate change, nuclear proliferation, poverty, and health such as HIV/AIDS require 'a smarter, more targeted approach'. Victor Cha (2003, pp. 116-7) and William T. Tow (2018, p. 4) present minilateralism as an informal initiative deliberated to address a 'specific' threat, mostly traditional security issues with a small number of like-minded states. For instance, the Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Cooperation, the Quad, India-France-Australia Trilateral Dialogue, and AUKUS are embodiments of regional minilateral arrangements formed among a small number of states with similar interest for effective action against China's growing influence and hostility in the Indo-Pacific. Thus, following the arguments of Kahler (1992) and others, we could attest that minilateralism differs from multilateralism in both quantitative and qualitative aspects, and that minilateralism provides informal yet effective agency to regional security questions.

1.3 CONDITIONS FOR COOPERATION

Having established a deeper understanding of the distinct nature of minilateralism compared to multilateralism, the latter part of the chapter discusses the conditions that promote strategic cooperation between states in minilateral diplomacy. For Miller (1968, p. 198), cooperation means

> working together to achieve common ends….it does involve more than belonging to the same international organisations or concluding trade pacts. It presumably requires some identity of purpose in significant fields of action, together with some willingness to trust one another and some preparedness to take risks, and, in certain circumstances, to make sacrifices in support of one another.

According to his definition, greater cooperation between states is beyond bilateral ties or trade agreements. Further, Miller reiterates that these indispensable relations are based on mutual advantage, and recognition of each other's interests demonstrating an elevated commitment and deeper cooperation to attain a strategic vision or common goals. Miller's five conditions are: cultural similarity, economic equality, habits of association, the perception of common danger, and greater power pressure. Miller reviews these conditions as powerful incentives for cooperation.

First, Miller (1968) associates cooperation between states with cultural similarity: similarity of political systems, cultural connection, history, language, social systems and values (Miller 1968, p. 200). He states that the absence of similarity of cultural background makes cooperation more difficult between states and often extended with obstacles to cooperation (Miller 1968). On the contrary, according to Miller, when states with similar constitutions agree to cooperate and work together, they develop 'certain assumptions and practices' which may eventually assist in dealing with 'practical problems' in the process (Miller 1968, p. 199). He affirms that similarity of political systems is not in itself adequate and is rarely the 'prime reason for their connection'. Miller also believes in cultural differences. He highlights that 'the

existence of different cultural backgrounds gives…countries different views of the world…' (Miller 1968, p. 203). Similarly, differences in cultural values between collectivistic and individualistic societies influence perceptions toward trust building, decision making, and conflict management.

For instance, the eleven CPTPP members do not belong to the same system of governance: Canada is a full democracy, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Malaysia are constitutional monarchies with parliamentary systems, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore are presidential representative democracies, Brunei is an absolute monarchy, and Vietnam is a unitary socialist republic. Despite their cultural and political dissimilarities, the CPTPP member states have cultivated a 'common interest' in expanding their trade ties with one another. Miller reiterates that 'states which trade together develop a certain common interest in the preservation and enlargement of the trade' (Miller 1968, p. 199). Further, the eleven countries have a 'shared vision' in the Asia Pacific: to 'promote economic growth; support the creation and retention of jobs; enhance innovation, productivity and competitiveness; raise living standards; reduce poverty…; and promote transparency, good governance, and enhanced labour and environmental protections' (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade n.d.). However, according to Miller, with trade ties and investment come 'economic conditions' and could cause 'political reactions adverse to cooperation' (Miller 1968, p. 199).

This leads us to Miller's second condition for cooperation which is economic equality. Miller associates power, interests, capacity, and diplomacy with economic equality. He presumes that 'states are more likely to cooperate when there are no great disparities between them in resources' (Miller 1968, p. 201). Miller explains how 'if one state is heavily dependent on another for development funds or markets', could lead to 'an imbalance of economic strength' thus causing political tensions and manipulating the equilibrium among all member states (Miller 1968). He further highlights this condition to be a vital component for effective

security cooperation. On the other hand, Miller concedes that in an alliance, economic capability between states is unalike and if states are to cooperate then the standards of equality need to complement each other (Miller 1968). Some states may contribute with sizeable-human resources, material resources or advanced technology. Some may produce sophisticated weaponry and others may possess the capability for economic growth (Miller 1968, p. 204). The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) which brought the three countries Australia, Japan, and the United States (U.S.) together in 2002 demonstrate an alliance between states with such distinct economic capabilities as Miller describes. Although with their large economic disparities: the U.S. (USD13,820b GDP), Japan (USD4,600b GDP), and Australia (USD781,29m GDP) (International Monetary Fund 2006), each member state brought their strengths and capabilities to the table. The U.S. with strategic support, missile defence plans, updated maritime and military capabilities, Japan, and Australia with their policy influence, and the ability to contribute from their geostrategic position (White 2007, p. 105), collaborated to ensure a free, open, peaceful, stable, democratic, and prosperous Asia-Pacific (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2006). However, Miller further argues that inequality in different forms of economic capability and strength eventually leads to economic dependency, 'any system of comprehensive cooperation would mean that somebody was always dependent on somebody else for resources in a particular situation' (Miller 1968, p. 204). He terms this understanding between states with such differing economic strengths as 'equality of sacrifice' (Miller 1968).

The third of Miller's conditions is the habit of association and it is 'one of the most powerful inducements to co-operation' (Miller 1968, p. 201). Accordingly, he explains the importance and effect of past association in observing how familiarity between states, either being parties to treaties or members of the same international organization or of a former alliance, association at the government level, cooperation in the military sphere, or through

trade connections, could retrieve from their past experiences and transpose to the cooperative behaviour: 'states which have been together in past endeavours can always recall these when they wish to mobilise support for new ones'; it also means that, if the past association has been recent, purposes and procedures which applied in one set of international difficulties can form the mode of approach to new problems' (Miller 1968). Further, as Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler argue, historical experience between states construct trust and thereby develop trusting relationships with one another. Trust is a necessity for positive relationships, security communities and for sustained forms of cooperation (Booth & Wheeler 2008, pp. 197-9).

The succeeding fourth condition is sense of common danger. The most conventional and 'the most powerful incentive to cooperation' of Miller's five conditions is threat perception (Miller 1968, p. 201). He argues that a sense of common danger forces states to align closely with other states against the adversary. Threat perception has been fundamental to all theories of war, deterrence and coercion, alliances, and conflict resolution and is understood as 'the decisive intervening variable between action and reaction in international crisis' (Cohen 1978, p. 93). Threat was initially equated particularly to military power: powerful military forces, numbers of tanks, aircrafts, missiles, ships, and other arms belonging to great powers or adversary camp posed a military threat to others (Krause & Vale 1983, p. 7). However, post World Wars I and II, scholars (Cohen 1978, p. 93; Jervis 1976, p. 20; Walt 1985, pp. 8-9) focussed on the intention as a source of threat independent of military capabilities. Robert Jervis affirms that 'people differ in their perceptions of the world in general and of other actors in particular' (Jervis 1976, p. 29) and thus resembles the different perceptions of threat explained by Miller. According to Miller's study of the trilateral alliance between India, Japan, and Australia, China 'appears as a different sort of entity to each of the three' states (Miller 1968, p. 206). For instance, in the South China Sea dispute involving Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, China is perceived as a dominant power, a

disruption to regional order and a coercive force with Communist philosophy to intimidate its neighbours. To Vietnam, China's attack on Vietnamese forces in the Paracel Islands in 1974 and near Fiery Cross Reef in 1988 (Dutton 2011, p. 43), and to the Philippines with Chinese occupation of the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in 1995 and China's breach of the International Court of Arbitration 2016 ruling favouring the claims by the Philippines (The Guardian 2016), China appears as an aggressive nationalistic force disregarding the sovereign rights of others. To Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, Chinese economic leverage against them and Chinese salami-slicing provocative economic tactics demonstrate China as an errant elder brother (Glaser 2014; Wesley 2017). China believes 'its economic power provides it with the latitude to ignore others' interests and protests'(Wesley 2017). Michael Wesley (2017) in his article, *China-Australian relations: How life might be under the new hegemon,* states that China's actions in the South China Sea 'show that it is interested in probing other countries' willingness to stand up to it' through coercion and aggression. To Taiwan, China poses an imminent threat to its sovereignty: from military threats to a full-scale invasion of the island. China is the common attribute in all major South China Sea disputes involving the claimants and thus, we observe that mutual threat perceptions are difficult to align (Miller 1968, p. 201).

Miller's fifth condition for cooperation is great power pressure. He affirms that pressure from a great power is another powerful incentive which will bring states together to cooperate. Further, Miller explains how great power pressure can be manifested either in a 'strong or subtle, open or concealed' manner and in countless other ways including that of military, political, or economic pressure (Miller 1968, p. 202). At times, pressure allows to manipulate influence: a great power may assert 'substantial pressure' on an ally to achieve a compelling long-term hope or an immediate objective 'even at the cost of some unpopularity' (Miller 1968, p. 208). For instance, in April 2020, soon after Prime Minister Scott Morrison called for an independent international inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus, together with immediate

economic pressure, China swamped Australia with waves of cyberattacks on important government networks (Tarabay 2021; Williams 2020). Further, since Australia's ban on Huawei 5G networks in 2018, expressing concerns about security threats posed by the Chinese telecommunication technology, the suspected state-supported spies and hackers have disrupted the networks of government institutions and Australian businesses on repeated occasions (Inkster 2019). However, Miller argues that 'if conditions are favourable, the benevolent interest of a major power will probably consolidate co-operative arrangements between lesser states, especially if they are given concrete benefits' (Miller 1968, p. 202). For instance, Japan-U.S.-India trilateral summit in 2018 brought the three countries together as the U.S. seek assistance to counter China's aggressive expansionism to build an inclusive regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific (Bagchi 2018). This trilateral dialogue envisions strengthening cooperation in terms of maritime security and regional connectivity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2018) and has thus provided an opportunity for 'lesser states' or the major powers such as Japan and India, to enhance their strategic interests and security architecture through the collective efforts of the trilateral cooperation.

1.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter has analysed the literature on minilateralism and underpinned the distinct characteristics of minilateral diplomacy. This chapter presented Miller's (1968) conditions for cooperation as the analytical framework of this thesis and thereafter reviewed the conditions with illustrations of minilateral arrangements from the Indo-Pacific. Miller asserted that these five conditions are not exclusive, and highlighted that it is the presence of these conditions to an adequate extent vital to initiate and strengthen cooperation among states beyond 'the ordinary rule-keeping of international society' (Miller 1968, p. 202). Further, Miller ascribed that these conditions may operate in combination with one another (Miller 1968). Although

cooperation between states with different values, different world views, and differing economic strengths is achievable, Miller argued that the absence of these conditions are likely to keep states apart (Miller 1968, p. 208). In the following chapters, utilising Miller's conditions for cooperation as the framework of analysis, the thesis launches a comprehensive discussion of effective and emerging minilateral arrangements including the Quad, Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Cooperation, and AUKUS, at the onset of the current strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific.

2 CHAPTER TWO: THREAT PERCEPTION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Having discussed the nature of minilateral diplomacy and presented the analytical framework for this thesis in Chapter One, the subsequent chapters examine each of Miller's (1968) conditions in great detail beginning with threat perception. Miller (1968, p. 201) introduces a sense of common danger as 'the most powerful incentive to co-operation' and it is thus just to commence the analysis with the preeminent condition. First, in grappling with Miller's threat perception condition, this chapter analyses the notions of fear, threat, power, and perception through the definitions established in international relations literature. For states, it is the sense of danger, either present or the expectation of danger in the foreseeable future, and the disruption that fear precipitates that makes the choices governments face in the security realm intensely challenging. The latter part of the chapter studies threat perception in light of the Quad as a collective security arrangement. All four Quad partners agree that China's coercive actions and assertive behaviour are a threat to their common interests and vision of free, open, inclusive, and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. However, the threat perception of each Quad member of aggressive China is different. The chapter studies the differing threat perceptions through the illustrations of India and Japan, how China poses a direct existential threat to its bordering neighbours, as opposed to Australia and the U.S. Finally, this chapter examines the Quad's responses to counterbalance China and its efforts to restore stability in the region.

2.2 FEAR IS PRIMORDIAL

The French sociologist, Raymond Aron (1968, p. 20), wrote 'Fear needs no definition. It is a primal, and so to speak, subpolitical emotion'. Fear is the 'most human' and the 'most basic' emotion, and it is thus 'the emotion which underlines the state itself' (Aron 1968, p. 21). The emotion of fear we apprehend emanates from a sense of danger, either experiencing it in the present or in the future. Fear is measured either in terms of 'the imminence of a danger, or its scale, or the character of one's emotional reaction to a specific risk' (Booth & Wheeler 2008, pp. 62-3). Living in fear induces in us a state of alarm caused by the expectation of danger, panic, and uncertainty.

Fear has been used for political ends since the 18th century. Corey Robin defines political fear as 'a people's felt apprehension of some harm to their collective well-being—the fear of terrorism, panic over crime, anxiety about moral decay—or the intimidation wielded over men and women by governments or groups' (Robin 2004, p. 2). Robin writes, political fear 'arises from conflicts within and between societies' and accordingly, could result in unintended consequences: 'it may dictate public policy, bring new groups to power, and keep others out, create laws and overturn them' (Robin 2004). In addition, Robin's study shows that the primordial emotion of fear is felt and expressed differently, that fear is inevitably embedded in history, culture, and politics, 'wrapped in layers of intellectual assumption, some woven centuries ago, that fashion our perceptions of and responses to it' (Robin 2004, pp. 27-8). Further, Booth & Wheeler (2008, pp. 63-4) disclose that leaders do not believe it is rational to show fear, that it is not the way to bring about confidence or to intimidate the would-be aggressors. They believe 'it is rational to be tough in a war system'.

2.3 THREAT AND POWER

Fear alerts us to danger and forces us to confront threats. A threat is defined as a situation in which an actor or group possesses the capability or fosters the intention of inflicting damage, hostility or a negative effect on another actor or group (Davis 2000, p. 10). From an expansive prospect, threats can be either weighed against individuals or against a collective. International relations mainly focuses on threats against collectives. These threats can be in the form of military, economic, or cultural threats. According to Davis' definition, threats are 'effective tools' and 'signals' used as an attempt to influence the behaviour of others, necessarily to benefit the motive of the aggressor (Davis 2000, p. 2 & 10). He further explains how political leaders employ influence techniques to reward or punish other actors—rewards are offered to friends and allies based on merit, 'adversaries lack merit and are to be avoided or punished'. Thus, influencing an adversary is seen as a matter of threats (Baldwin 1971, pp. 72-3; Davis 2000, p. 13). Moreover, for a threat to prove effective at impeding an undesired action on the part of the target, both the threatened punishment and the corresponding assurance must appear credible and within the control of the aggressor (Davis 2000, p. 12). Latterly, Davis addresses the correlation between power and threats, how threats must be analysed in terms of power in order to identify and evaluate the source, cause, and influence behind any aggression (Davis 2000, p. 11).

Power can be used to threaten other states. Many early social theorists from Plato and Aristotle to Machiavelli and Hobbes, have devoted great attention to the concept of power. Dahl (1957) defines power as a relative notion: 'A has power over B to the extent that [A] can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do'. Similarly, Snyder (1960) defines political power as 'the capacity to induce others to do things or not to do things which they would not otherwise do or refrain from doing'. Power as a resource is used to influence the behaviour of others. Dahl and Snyder both acknowledge that power is relative—the power of

an actor can only be assessed relative to the other actors in the system (Dahl 1957, pp. 202-3; Snyder 1960, pp. 164-5). Dahl (1957, p. 203) states that power is a relation, and actors in a power relation involve different means, instruments, or resources such as opportunities, acts, objects etc. to exploit the power dynamics in order to influence the behaviour of the other. This relative nature of power leads many realists to view power in zero-sum terms— 'each power viewed another's loss as its own gain' (Waltz 1979, p. 70). Realists also argue that power among states is determined and measured by their combined capabilities, economic, military, and other, not by excelling in one sector or another. Waltz (1979, p. 131) writes,

> their rank depends on how they score on *all* of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence. States spend a lot of time estimating one another's capabilities, especially their abilities to do harm.

Raymond Cohen (1978, pp. 96-9) identifies three main criteria that influence a perception of threat through his case studies. First factor is geographical. Cohen argues that an impending threat often involves areas of strategic importance. The Indo-Pacific in this instance, 'the most dynamic, and the most consequential region for economic growth,…' in the world, with complex disputes and security threats to deter, is of great strategic importance to the current world order (Sullivan, J 2021). Second is 'an atmosphere of tension and mistrust in ongoing relations between the actors involved'. The existing frictions between states, suspicion, history of enmity and dispute could undoubtedly influence threat perception. The third factor is a sense of vulnerability. The vulnerability of the observer state in a particular area such as military strength, capabilities, and resistance in comparison to the opponent or would-be aggressor, could influence a state's threat perception (Cohen 1978, p. 99).

2.4 THE QUAD SENSING DANGER

Miller (1968) regards a sense of common danger as a compelling enticement, 'a powerful agent' towards cooperation. Accordingly, at a moment of serious threat, it is assumed that states forget their differences, and unite to counter the common danger (Miller 1968, pp. 201-2). Alliances are viewed as a response to threats. When entering an alliance, states come together, and ally either to counter the source of danger or they ally with the state posing the threat (Walt 1985, p. 4). Similarly, Waltz (1967) explains how in a collective-security system, when one or more states threaten others, 'some state joins one side or defect from the other to tilt the balance against the would-be aggressors' (Waltz 1967, p. 164). In reference to the Quad, an idea initiated by the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, and formed more than a decade ago in 2007, restructured in 2017, is a security arrangement between Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S., with the aim to support a 'free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017, pp. 26-7). The four states came together, despite their differences, opposing the growing influence of China, to counter Chinese expansionism, to restore balance and stability in the Indo-Pacific (Medcalf 2020a, p. 31).

Kim (2015, pp. 119-31) argues that China's attempts at seeking dominance in the Indo-Pacific is demonstrated through: China's territorial claims disguised under the 'nine-dash line'; asserting its right to the vast ninety per cent of the disputed territories, intruding into many of its neighbours' exclusive economic zones (EEZ); occupying several of the small islands and reefs including the Pratas, Paracel, and Spratly Islands violating the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provisions; demanding freedom of navigation and access to the resources of the South China Sea; and maritime expansions by constructing artificial islands and military bases in the disputed waters. Further, China's economic coercion against countries such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines, project China's coercive behaviour (Medcalf 2019, p. 111). Moreover, the following exemplify Chinese authoritative

interference in neighbouring states (Amnesty International 2020): China's threat of a military invasion of Taiwan including Chinese military encroaching on Taiwan's critical Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), hovering Chinese jet fighters over the median line of the Taiwan Strait (Grant 2020), blockade and cyber incursions (Greene 2021), and interference in Hong Kong by imposing the new national security law, use of force and suppression of human rights—freedom of expression, engagement, and political opinion, of the anti-extradition bill protesters. These illustrations project China's expansionist ambitions and assertive foreign policy as a threat to regional security and stability in the region (Kim 2015, pp. 107-8).

All four member states of the Quad agree that Chinese policies and actions under the leadership of President Xi Jinping are a threat to their collective interest in an 'open, prosperous, rules-based and inclusive' Indo-Pacific region (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019). Although they have reacted and retaliated to the coercive and assertive behaviour of China, the China threat is felt disparately by the Quad states. As Cohen (1978) argued, perceptions of an imminent threat could be affected by the presence or absence of territorial disputes with the would-be aggressor, the likelihood of retaliation by the threatening actor, and economic and military capacity that each state or as a collective possess should retaliation occur. In addition, threat perception could also be influenced by a state's strategic priorities, other national interests and threats, and vitally strategic culture (Lee 2020, pp. 7-8). Admittedly, the threat perceptions, economic and military capabilities, capacity to bear the costs of potential retaliation from China, and limitations of each state's strategic culture are acutely distinct from each member state of the Quad. The differing threat perceptions of the Quad members of China is the key focus of the latter part of this chapter.

2.4.1 INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY DISPUTE

The close geographical proximity and ongoing territorial disputes have influenced India's threat perception of neighbouring China. Not all four member states experience territorial disputes with China and not all members are caught up in severe retaliations by the Xi Jinping's regime. For instance, India and Japan are the only two Quad members engaged in territorial disputes with China. China poses a direct and existential threat to India as the two countries share a land border expanding over 3,488 km. The India–China border tensions are one of the key defining territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific and one of the most contentious areas in the world. India and China have disputed their shared border for several decades since 1947 and have fought a war in 1962 killing thousands on both sides (Grewal & Ruser 2021) . The contested border is not well-demarcated and therefore India and China have overlapping territorial claims and differing opinions as to who is controlling what part of the border, thus leading to constant border transgressions (Kondapalli 2015, p. 103). Boundary disagreements between the two have led to military clashes and standoffs from both sides.

Following border demarcation talks between the two countries since 1962, a settlement was made known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a temporary border where both sides maintain the status quo (refer Appendix A: map of the main areas of contention and LAC). However, neither India nor China completely adhered to the LAC, as neither party could agree on its location (Kondapalli 2015, pp. 100-2). Both countries violated the LAC on many occasions, in 2013, 2015, and 2017. The encounters became more frequent as China began constructing roads and infrastructure in the disputed region (Kondapalli 2015, pp. 103-4). The border confrontations turned deadly in early May 2020. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) was hindering the customary patrolling by the Indian troops in the Galwan river valley area in Ladakh. This resulted in a face-off which was addressed by the ground commanders as per the provisions of the bilateral agreements and protocols (Tarapore 2021). Subsequently, in mid-

May, the Chinese troops attempted to trespass the LAC which yet again escalated the tensions between the two states (Tarapore 2021). On 6 June 2020, both India and China agreed on a process to de-escalate and disengage along the LAC. Both sides agreed 'to respect and abide by the LAC and not undertake any activity to alter the status quo' (Ministry of External Affairs 2020). However, on 15 June 2020, according to the Official Spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs, India, the Chinese troops failed to adhere to the consensus and sought to construct structures along the LAC. Indian troops attempted to impede this effort (Ministry of External Affairs 2020). The PLA resorted to violent actions which resulted in a skirmish killing 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers (Ministry of External Affairs 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2021). These border transgressions by the PLA pose a direct threat to India's national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

China deployed thousands of troops to the Galwan Valley to show off its strength and to intimidate India. Although India and China hold the two world's largest army forces, India has less capacity to withstand a potential retaliation by China. India's vulnerability and fear of Chinese retaliations has restrained India's responses to deter and counter Chinese provocations (Lee 2020, pp. 10-1). The Galwan Valley attack by the PLA is illustrative of China's aggressive behaviour and of threatened India by China's coercive actions. The India-China boundary dispute is an important example of threat perception. India is more vulnerable to Chinese direct and indirect retaliation as the two countries share a disputed land border. This decades-long dispute demonstrates India's differing threat perception of China as opposed to other Quad members. Further, revisionist China's pursuit to unilaterally change the status quo poses a threat to the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

2.4.2 JAPAN-CHINA ISLAND DISPUTE

In line with Miller's (1968) argument of the perception of common danger, it is overt and can be observed that the China threat is perceived differently by the Quad members. However, Japan similar to India, is the only other Quad member that is engaged in a direct territorial dispute with China. Japan and China both claim a string of islands in the East China Sea known as the Senkaku Islands to the Japanese and Diaoyu Islands to the Chinese. Since the late 1960s, these overlapping territorial claims have caused a great deal of diplomatic turmoil and intense confrontations in the East China Sea. Historically, the Japanese claim to the islands is on the basis of a formal occupation when the islands were then *terra nullius,* 'no man's land' (Baldacchino 2017, p. 45). Japan later incorporated the Senkaku Islands into its territory in 1895 effected by a cabinet decision (Baldacchino 2017). Dismissing Japan's claims, China contends that the islands are an integral part of China dating its claims back to the Ming Dynasty (Baldacchino 2017, p. 46; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2012).

The long-standing rivalry over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands intensified since mid-2012 with Japan purchase of three of the Senkaku Islands including Uotsuri, Kitakojima, and Minamikojima Islands from their private owners, and transferring the ownership to the Government of Japan (Burke et al. 2018, p. 7; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016, p. 17). This development changed China's territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and infuriated the Chinese Government. Ever since, Beijing has responded by a show of force: deploying hundreds of Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and fishing vessels surrounding the islands (Szanto 2017, pp. 21-2). Violent protests evoked nationalist sentiments and anti-Japanese slogans spread through China. Under the pretext of protesting the transfer of Senkaku Islands, CCG vessels started to enter Japan's contiguous zone (24 nautical mile limit) daily, and often intruded into Japan's territorial sea (12 nautical mile limit) asserting China's claims over the

islands (Burke et al. 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016). By the end of 2012, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) reported that CCG ships had intruded into Senkaku territorial waters sixty-eight times since the transfer (Burke et al. 2018). In 2013, 188 CCG vessels have penetrated to the territorial sea (refer Appendix B: chart of the numbers of CCG and other vessels that entered Japan's contiguous zone or intruded into territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands). The unprecedented number of intrusions by the Chinese government and fishing vessels continued in the subsequent years as Beijing attempted to intimidate Japan (Burke et al. 2018, p. 9; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2022).

In addition, in December 2012, Chinese aircraft began to intrude into Japan's airspace over the Senkaku Islands and near other Japanese-claimed islands posing a direct threat to Japan's national security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016). Later in July 2013, China conducted its first military flight, and in September, its first long-range bomber flights through the strategically important Miyako Strait (Baldacchino 2017, p. 49; Burke et al. 2018, p. 13). In November 2013, China unilaterally declared an East China Sea ADIZ above the Senkaku Islands and over an extensive part of the disputed waters (Burke et al. 2018, p. 14; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2013), overlapping Japan's ADIZ established in 1969 (refer Appendix C: map of China's ADIZ). The appalling move by China was described as 'profoundly dangerous' and drew immediate comeback from Japan. The Minister for Foreign Affairs in a statement expressed 'deep concern about China's establishment of such zone and obliging its own rules within the zone'(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2013). However, China has justified the formation of the East China Sea ADIZ stating that it was established 'to defend the country's airspace' and that 'the zone does not aim at any specific country or target, nor does it constitute a threat to any country or region' (Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union 2013).

The Japan-China island dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is another illustration of differing threat perceptions between the Quad members. Both India and Japan are vulnerable to Chinese retaliations as a result of close proximity to their adversary and existing frictions with China issuing from the complex border disputes. They both face a direct threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity by China's aggressive behaviour as China seeks dominance in the Indo-Pacific.

2.4.3 CHINESE THREAT TO AUSTRALIA & THE U.S.

Australia and the U.S. are not engaged in direct territorial disputes with China; therefore, they are to a greater extent secure in their immediate environment than both India and Japan. Lee (2020, pp. 14-6) argues that the Australia-U.S. alliance acts as a protective layer against China's aggressive actions, thus providing Australia and the U.S. more capacity to deter a possible Chinese retaliation. However, indirectly, both Australia and the U.S. are often times threatened by China's coercive actions. For instance, China was discontent over the idea of a forum of Indo-Pacific democracies budding in the region against its growing regional influence. Under pressure from the Chinese Government, Australia withdrew from the Quad in 2008, afraid of impending Chinese coercive economic tactics that could affect its bilateral trade relationship with China (Medcalf 2008; Wesley 2017). Australia has experienced further economic retaliation by China; in 2018, China threatened to cut Australian wine and beef imports to China to cripple the Australian economy (Fernando 2018), and in 2020, Australia's call for COVID-19 inquiry immediately followed a China threat to boycott Australian export goods, tourism, and education (Sullivan, K 2020). Additionally, in 2018, the Fairfax Press revealed a rumour of possible talks between China and Vanuatu on building a Chinese military base on the island. Although the news has not been confirmed by any other source and China has denied such a proposition, this raised grave concerns in Australia (Dibb 2018). If China were to establish a permanent presence in Vanuatu or anywhere in the South Pacific, then China

will be entering Australia's 'backyard'. It could be argued that the close proximity to 'an unfriendly maritime power' raises an alarming threat to Australia's security, defence strategy, and freedom of navigation in the neighbouring waters (Dibb 2018; Smith 2018). Australia's 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU) reiterated that 'Australia is concerned by [China's] potential for actions, such as the establishment of military bases, which could undermine stability in the Indo-Pacific and [Australia's] immediate region'.

On the other hand, the U.S., as the most capable Quad member to withstand any Chinese retaliation in both military and economic terms does not face a direct threat to its security unlike India and Japan. However, China's pursuit of greater influence in the Indo-Pacific has questioned U.S. pre-eminence in regional affairs and in the global stage. Although the U.S. could resist Chinese economic retaliation and challenge China's coercive practices, the U.S. becomes vulnerable in the strategic competition with China (Lee 2020, pp. 17-8). The U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific is dependent on its allies, their existing bilateral relations, and partnerships. For U.S., to achieve its economic wins and strategic aims over China's economic and military might, the U.S. must strengthen its alliances. Only then the U.S. could bolster and amplify its power (President Biden Jr 2021, p. 10). Therefore, China's approach is to directly contest the U.S. allies in order to establish regional dominance, and to subsequently threaten the U.S. strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific. Further, although the U.S. maintains a military advantage over China, the intense military modernization efforts by China poses a threat to U.S. military dominance, peace and stability in the region (Lee 2020, p. 18).

2.5 THE QUAD'S REACTION TO THE CHINA THREAT

Despite the differing threat perceptions, the Quad members have successfully managed to strengthen their cooperation. The Quad, as a minilateral response formed to deter the China threat, has encouraged India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S. to engage in deeper convergences over the security dialogue. China's handling of the territorial disputes discussed above, the economic retaliations, and increasing efforts of military modernization to undermine other regional powers, depict China's coercive and hegemonic behaviour toward its neighbours in the Indo-Pacific. All Quad members are either entangled in decades-long complex conflicts with China or caught in a strategic competition with China. China's infamous border transgressions over the LAC, unauthorised intrusions into Japan's territorial sea, and dramatic increase in military, naval, and air operations in the Indo-Pacific, have tested the strengths and capabilities of all Quad members. China's growing military dominance in particular have threatened to overwhelm Indian and Japanese capabilities (Lee 2020, p. 8).

The Quad members have responded to direct and indirect threats posed by China to their sovereignty and strategic interests by implementing measures toward strengthening their own capabilities to act alone, and cooperatively with others (Lee 2020). To deter Chinese aggression and expansionism, India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S. have pushed for a minilateral arrangement between like-minded nations with a common interest to counter China, and similar vision of a 'free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017). Szanto (2017, p. 23) argues that all four Quad members refer to the rule of law in conflict resolution and thus, display a decreasing willingness to accommodate China's assertive behaviour in the region. India's successful Doklam standoff in 2017 against China's border incursions over the LAC (Tarapore 2021), Japan's measures to bolster its military capabilities with U.S. assistance, Australia opposing China's use of the disputed islands and artificial structures in the South China Sea for military purposes (2017 FPWP), Australia

deserting Victoria's Belt and Road (BRI) agreement (Varano 2021), and the U.S. addressing China as a 'revisionist' authoritative state (Department of Defense 2019), illustrate how the Quad members retaliate against the China threat.

It was China's increased dominance in the South and the East China Seas that revived interest in a formal Quad grouping and expedited the need for ministerial level meetings. All Quad meetings reiterated the need to address the challenges to regional security and to promote a strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2017b, 2018, 2019). In 2020, the Quad highlighted the importance of enhancing regional security through maritime cooperation which initiated the first Exercise MALABAR to include all four members (Department of Defence 2020b). Exercise MALABAR includes a range of 'high-end tactical training,' including specific interactions designed to enhance 'interoperability' between the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Indian Navy (IN), Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and U.S. Navy. It could be depicted as growing evidence of the Quad members seeking to increase cooperation with each other in the maritime domain to counter Chinese aggression in Indo-Pacific. This collective action to deter Chinese aggression could be perceived as a more effective mechanism for balancing against the aggressor. In a collaborative effort, an aggressor is confronted with 'preponderant,' predominant influence, 'as opposed to merely equal force' (Kupchan & Kupchan 1995, p. 54). Accumulated capabilities of all Quad members aimed at China, the aggressor, 'all against one' as opposed to 'each for his own' enable not only members that are directly threatened by the aggressor but also others that resist aggression and pledged to protecting an international order to group together under collective security (Kupchan & Kupchan 1995, pp. 54-5).

Further, the Quad announced a new infrastructure partnership which will 'map the region's infrastructure needs, and coordinate on regional needs and opportunities' providing 'high-standards infrastructure' in the Indo-Pacific (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

2021). All four Quad partners have already provided more than 48 billion USD in official finance for infrastructure in the region since 2015 (The White House 2021) . The Quad infrastructure partnership as a countereffort to China's BRI, with a view to attracting developing economies to build a counterbalancing force to deter China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific.

2.6 CONCLUSION

Miller's (1968) study of India, Japan, and Australia, asserts that China 'appears as a different sort of entity to each' of the three states. Similarly, the Quad members perceive the China threat distinctively: existing territorial disputes with the aggressor, likelihood of retaliation, economic and military capability to withstand or recover should retaliation occur, determine each state's threat perception. The four Quad members agree that China's assertiveness and coercive actions are a threat to their individual strategic interests and to their common interest of a 'free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region'. However, for India and Japan, China poses a direct and existential threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. For Australia and the U.S., China does not present a direct threat to their immediate environment. Instead, China threatens their regional role or strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific as China undermines their power against its growing regional influence. Despite divergences in threat perception, risk tolerance, and military capability, cooperation among the Quad partners is likely to deepen considering that China continues to unilaterally rewrite and challenge the status-quo in the Indo-Pacific.

This chapter defined the notions of fear, threat, and power. It analysed India's and Japan's territorial disputes with China, the direct threat of Chinese border transgressions and expanding maritime dominance in the East China Sea. China defends its territorial claims and

asserts its hegemonic power to all states in the region. China's dispute behaviour bears directly on the peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. Its handling of the territorial disputes reveals whether it is seeking status quo or revisionist foreign policies to alter the U.S-led world order. Finally, this chapter examines the effective responses of the Quad in its efforts to counter China. With deeper cooperation among the four states, with a common goal, a common strategic vision, sharing similar interests, values and threat perceptions, the Quad has a greater chance of maintaining the equilibrium in the region and preserving the democratic values and the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

3 CHAPTER THREE: GREAT POWER PRESSURE

3.1 INTRODUCTION TO GREAT POWER POLITICS

This chapter studies Miller's (1968) fifth condition for cooperation, pressure from a greater power. It does so having analysed the nature of minilateral diplomacy and, its characteristics through an extensive study of the published literature and presented Miller's conditions for cooperation as the analytical framework to understand the minilateral responses emerging against the Chinese aggressive behaviour in the region in Chapter One. It also does so, having analysed threat perception as the most powerful incentive to cooperation in light of the Quad in Chapter Two. This chapter will now evaluate how greater power pressure could persuade lesser states to cooperate especially when they could benefit from such a cooperative arrangement. It focuses, on the Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Security Cooperation. The chapter studies the security and defence cooperative efforts: the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), and the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), issued through trilateral cooperation. Further, the 'latticework'[1] of U.S. alliances is analysed as an approach to burden share and bolster U.S. power against China's growing hegemonic influence in the Indo-Pacific. It is noted however, that the great power pressure condition is by no means the only condition that promotes cooperation among states. The similarity of cultural background (as democratic states) and threat perception could also be powerful incentives to induce Australia, Japan, and the U.S. to cooperate.

Great power politics have always been at the centre of the study of international relations. Throughout history, great powers have had influence within the international system. As Waltz (1979) states '[the] theory of international politics is written in terms of the great

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[1] Network of U.S. alliances, modernizing the existing alliances and adding new partnerships to bolster U.S. power. See Sullivan, J 2021, *2021 Lowy Lecture*, Lowy Institute, Sydney.

power of an era'. Accordingly, the states with the 'greatest capability' pave the way for others and for themselves— 'the fates of all the states and of all the firms in a system are affected much more by the acts and interactions of the major ones than of the minor ones' (Waltz 1979, p. 72). Middle powers and smaller states either lack the necessary capabilities or the desire to manifest power in the international realm thus failing to seek the limelight (Chen 2013, p. 322). Waltz (1979) affirms that the focus on great powers does not imply that focus is not directed at the lesser states, it signifies that the fate of the lesser states is inevitably based on the great powers.

3.2 GREAT POWER BEHAVIOUR

Taking up Miller's argument on great power pressure as a condition for cooperation we need to first understand great power behaviour. In the Indo-Pacific, the two great powers in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. and China, are evidently engaged in a power rivalry contesting for their position in the international system (Shambaugh 2018; White 2012). As the US NSS (2017) explains, when China is prepared to use force and coercion to get what it wants, the U.S. strives to regain its supremacy and to retain a world order in compliance with the principles of sovereignty, free trade, and rule of law. Classical realists perceive states are in a perpetual 'struggle for power' among themselves, and that 'power is always the immediate aim' (Morgenthau 1949). They believe in a 'will to power' which is inherent in each state that drives all states to strive for supremacy. Hans Morgenthau in his critically acclaimed publication, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* explains that in all politics, domestic and international, states seek 'either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power'. A state whose aim is to demonstrate its power pursues 'prestige' (Morgenthau 1949, pp. 21-2). However, defensive realists do not assume that great powers are inherently in an eternal struggle to acquire power. According to them, in an anarchic system in

which the security of states is not assured, survival becomes the primary intuition— 'only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquillity, profit, and power' (Waltz 1979, p. 126).

On the contrary, offensive realists offer an alternative view on great power motives concerning security and power. They focus on the great powers because great powers create the most impact on what unfolds in international politics. The fates of all states including great powers and lesser powers alike, are determined by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability (Mearsheimer 2001). Mearsheimer asserts that 'the overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states' (Mearsheimer 2001, p. 2). In their quest for maximum power, great powers behave aggressively. Mearsheimer writes, 'survival mandates aggressive behaviour' from their part 'if they want to 'maximize their odds of survival' (Mearsheimer 2001). The analysis of great power behaviour through the reviewed literature manifest that the end goal of great powers is to assimilate more power in order to retain stature in the international system. In their pursuit of achieving this end goal, great powers use their power status to influence their allies, to persuade them to integrate and cooperate as the alliances formed bolster their power.

3.3 AMERICAN PRIMACY AND GREATER POWER PRESSURE

The U.S. pre-eminent strategic position has underpinned global and regional order since the early years of the Second World War. Political scientist Joseph Nye defines primacy as 'a country's disproportionate (and measurable) share of all three kinds of power resources: military, economic, and soft' (Nye Jr. 2015). The U.S. possesses the largest military power with a USD778b defence budget (Department of Defense 2020) and an overwhelming nuclear superiority. It is the world's largest economy with a USD20,893.750b GDP (World Bank 2020), and ranks at the top in diplomatic and cultural influence (Lowy Institute 2021). Nye predicts that the United States will retain its primacy as the most powerful and influential strategic actor at least until the first half of the present century (Nye Jr. 2015). However, the shifting balance of power and the escalating strategic competition with the rise of China has questioned the primacy of the U.S. (Shambaugh 2018). Thus, now more than ever, the U.S. expect its allies to bolster its power and to feed its withering supremacy (Sullivan, J 2021).

The U.S. perceives China as a rising power, with rapid economic development and growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. China is also a potential regional hegemon in the making, with revisionist intent. The 2019 U.S. State Department progress report titled, *A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision,* states 'Authoritarian revisionist powers seek to advance their parochial interests at others' expense', and therefore 'the United States is strengthening and deepening partnerships with countries that share our values' acknowledging the long-standing alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand (U.S. Department of State 2019, p. 5) . Further, President Joe Biden issued an Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) in March 2021, that emphasizes the importance of 'America's unmatched network of alliances and the partnerships', stating that in order for the U.S. to achieve its goals the U.S. must revitalize its alliances and partnerships. In his words,

'When we strengthen our alliances, we amplify our power and our ability to disrupt threats before they can reach our shores' (President Biden Jr 2021).

The Indo-Pacific as the most dynamic and the most disputed region in the world homes a myriad of complexities and power struggles. Australia's 2020 DSU underlines the current strategic environment stating that 'Strategic competition, primarily between the United States and China, will be the principal driver of strategic dynamics in our region. This competition is playing out across the Indo-Pacific and increasingly in our immediate region…' (2020 DSU, p. 10). Mearsheimer (2010, p. 381) argues that the U.S. has acted as a pacifier in the region. The presence of the U.S. has had a significant impact on the region and in particular on Australia and Japan as the United States' main allies. In the 2009 Defence White Paper, the Australian government articulated it as:

> Australia has been a very secure country for many decades, in large measure because the wider Asia-Pacific region has enjoyed an unprecedented era of peace and stability underwritten by US strategic primacy (Defence White Paper 2009, p. 49).

Further, Australia's 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP) asserts that the U.S. 'will continue to be Australia's most important strategic partner through [their] long-standing alliance' and reiterates that 'the active presence of the United States will continue to underpin the stability of [the Indo-Pacific region]' (2016 DWP, p. 41). Similarly, for Japan, the Japan-US Alliance is 'of paramount importance' to counter the challenges it is engulfed with in the region, particularly to deter China's unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas. Japan's 2021 Annual White Paper describes the Alliance as 'the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the region' for over six decades (Annual White Paper 2021).

3.3.1 FROM BILATERAL TO TRILATERAL COOPERATION

Considering Miller's analysis of pressure from a great power as a condition for cooperation, and its effectiveness in bringing states together, we examine how greater power pressure from the U.S. persuades its partners, Australia, and Japan, to align with its interests through cooperative arrangement. The U.S. shares strong bilateral collaborations with both Australia and Japan.

Australia is 'a vital ally, partner, and friend' of the U.S. (Department of State 2020). The alliance with the great power is key to Australia's security interests, strategic and defence planning. The former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop once stated that 'the Australia-U.S. alliance remains the cornerstone of [Australia's] national security' (Bishop 2014). The two countries maintain a comprehensive partnership underpinned by shared democratic values, common interests, and cultural similarities. The US Department of State (2020) highlights Australia-U.S. alliance as a benchmark for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Further, AUSMIN (2019) stated that they share a strong interest in conflict resolution through rule of law in the region and maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. The Australia-U.S. relationship operates beyond the defence alliance. They share other bilateral ties over exceptional economic relations including the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that entered into force in 2005. The U.S. is also Australia's largest foreign investor (Medcalf 2019, p. 110). In 2018, the U.S. direct investment in Australia (outward) amounted to USD163b (U.S. Department of State 2020).

However, despite their long-standing strategic partnership, Australia as a middle power, at times is subjected to greater power pressure emanating from the U.S. The pressure amounts on Australia as Australia attempts to balance between China, its largest trading partner and the U.S., its long-standing ally (Medcalf 2019). For instance in March 2018, following the visit of US aircraft carrier (USS Carl Vinson) to Da Nang, Vietnam, for the first time since the end of

the Vietnam war (Garamone 2018), US Ambassador Arthur Culvahouse Jr, expressed the Trump Administration's interest in having Australia on board with the freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. Pressure mounted on Australia to do more to support the U.S. strategy to contain China. Culvahouse stated that '[the U.S. will] be pushing Australia to expand its step-up from the Pacific Islands region to South-East Asia and to look north as well' (Greene 2020). Though Australia has given no prior commitment to the U.S. on its maritime engagement in the South China Sea, on 18 April 2020, amidst a global pandemic, the Royal Australian Navy warship HMAS Parramatta joined three U.S. Navy ships in a joint exercise in the disputed waters (Yeo 2020). This embarkation was executed in a low-profile manner avoiding public and global attention with minimal media coverage by the Australian Department of Defence.

Similarly, Australia fuelled the 'inflammatory rhetoric' being used by both President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on the pandemic by promptly calling for a "comprehensive, independent and impartial" investigation into the origins of the COVID 19 pandemic whilst the rest of the world was struggling to contain the virus. The infuriated Chinese Government accused Australia of launching a political attack on China and of 'pandering' to the U.S. (Dziedzic 2020). The political tensions immediately escalated to a trade war between Australia and China with China banning and imposing heavy tariffs targeting major Australian exports including iron ore, wine, beef, barley, timber, and cotton. Australia was left as a disappointed and a vexed trading partner at the end of the saga (Sullivan, K 2020). Undeniably these actions also comprised a willingness on behalf of the Morrison government to actively respond to Chinese exercise of interference in Australia, it could also be viewed as a projection of 'subtle' pressure from great power, the U.S. on middle power Australia.

In a similar vein, Romain Fathi (2021) argued that U.S. pressure led Australia to abandon the €34 billion French submarine deal in September 2021. Australia unilaterally

cancelled its contract to purchase French diesel-electric Barracuda submarines and signed up for the novel AUKUS security pact with the U.S. Thébault (2021) suggested that the action was a 'stab in the back' for France but it may also have been another manifestation of greater power pressure on a 'lesser' state. The U.S. presumably had an interest in seeing Canberra cancel its contract with France and replace it with one with Washington. It thus ensures American involvement with a fleet of submarines they, or the UK, are likely to build. As Fathi (2021) argues, it reiterates to Australia that its commitment is either to the U.S. or against the U.S. It is clear that the U.S. demands a more outright commitment from Australia beyond its diplomatic statements on regional issues in the Indo-Pacific and its behest to demonstrate support to its long-standing ally.

Likewise, since World War II, the Japan-U.S. alliance has been the foundation for Japan's national defence architecture (Annual White Paper 2021). In 1951 upon signing the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the U.S. and Japan, the Japan-U.S. alliance was formed. As Japan was under U.S. occupation, Japan did not have 'effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defence' and thus, required U.S. military protection. This Alliance allowed U.S. forces to remain on Japanese soil, and to establish military bases on the Japanese archipelago (Matsuoka 2018, p. 43). In 1960, the Treaty was revised and was renamed as U.S.-Japan Security Treaty obliging the U.S. to defend Japan in the event of an attack (Institute for Security & Development Policy 2018; Matsuoka 2018, p. 47). Thus far, the U.S. invests in military resources and capabilities to face the Alliance's present and future security challenges (Mulgan 2005). Throughout the years, there have been many security arrangements between the U.S. and Japan. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements including 55,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan, deployment of U.S. military assets such as the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan carrier strike group and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to Japan, and defence imports from the U.S. to improve the defense capability of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces

(JSDF), have bolstered Japan's self-defence capabilities, and affirmed Japan of peace and stability (U.S. Department of States 2021). Further, the comprehensive relationship between Japan and the U.S. expands to political, economic, and social cooperation. The two countries are great trading partners with over USD300b worth of goods and services exchanged each year. The U.S. is Japan's top source of direct investment, and Japan is the largest investor in the U.S. with USD644.7b invested in 2019 (U.S. Department of State 2021).

Nonetheless, in spite of their friendship and comprehensive partnership, Japan has been under U.S. pressure from time to time. Professor Aurelia Mulgan wrote in her article, *Japan's America Problem: The Japanese Response to U.S. Pressure,* that 'A pervasive feature of the relationship between the United States and Japan is the distinct and repetitive sequence of U.S. pressure followed by Japanese response'. Mulgan argues that although a perceptible manifestation of U.S. great power pressure emerges in the present relations, Japan was under U.S. pressure since World War II. During the Korean War in 1950, the U.S. pressures Japan to participate more actively militarily within the Alliance framework (Matsuoka 2018, p. 44; Mulgan 1991, p. 6). Mulgan elaborates stating that 'pressure comes in many guises: requests, demands, suggestions, even instructions'. Following the pressure comes 'the extraordinary degree of scrutiny, comment, and criticism' from the U.S. government which carry its impact forward to Japan's economy and policymaking. (Mulgan 1991, p. 5). For instance, Japan has always been ambiguous about its security relationship with Taiwan. Japan managed to retain its official ties with Beijing, while siding in favour of self-ruled Taiwan. However, in March 2021, when the U.S. Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken and the Secretary of Defence, Lloyd J. Austin III visited Tokyo, the U.S. officials have insinuated that Japan needs to make its position clear, and that Japan should take a stance on defending Taiwan's sovereignty, displaying 'subtle' and 'concealed' pressure from the U.S. (Ryall 2021; Wong 2021). Similarly, during the Trump Administration, Japan was under extensive pressure from the U.S.,

as President Trump demanded Japan spend more on defence, and to be more aggressive in countering China. This could eventually help the U.S. to maintain its military edge in the Indo-Pacific (Detsch 2020). Mulgan posits that Japan's responses to most of the U.S. compelling 'requests' are responses of 'limited compliance or partial accommodation', they are 'part yes and part no, often presented in the guise of a yes' and always responding to pressure (Mulgan 1991, p. 6). This sensitivity to the U.S. manifest the greater power pressure on Japan, thus reaffirming how U.S. uses the position of its allies to strengthen U.S. power (Kelton & Willis 2019, p. 303).

3.3.2 AUSTRALIA-JAPAN-U.S. TRILATERAL COOPERATION

There have been moments of stress and strain in both Australia-U.S. and Japan-U.S. relations. However, as the White Papers of both Australia and Japan have clearly demonstrated, the significance of having the U.S. as their long-standing ally and the importance of the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific is immeasurable. For the U.S., the existing bilateral alliances with both Australia and Japan are 'America's greatest strategic asset' (INSSG 2021, p. 10). For the U.S., to realize and defend the democratic values, to sustain the status quo, to combat threats of the twenty-first century, to retain a rules-based world order and an order that is in favour of its own interests, it needs the support of its alliances. Thus, under the U.S. influence, forging bilateral cooperation into deeper trilateral cooperation between the three allies, appears to be the next logical step in the evolution of the Alliance framework. The Trilateral Security Cooperation could also be analysed as a minilateral arrangement. Trilateralism as a minilateral variant is adaptive, issue-specific, and effective (Tow 2015, pp. 24-5). It also underpins Naim's (2009) 'magic number', the smallest number of states coming together for the largest impact in achieving security objectives.

In line with Miller's (1968) argument of greater power pressure, the U.S. 'benevolent' interest has attracted both Australia and Japan to enter into deeper cooperation with their ally. It was in early 2000s, the three allies formalized their trilateral security cooperation. In 2003, Australia and Japan joined the U.S. ballistic missile defence (BMD) programmes. They also coordinated assistance efforts following the aftermath of the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 (Taylor & Ball 2007, p. 16). The Australia, Japan, and the U.S. trilateral cooperation exemplify the U.S. alliance 'latticework', connecting its bilateral relations for deeper cooperation. At the 2021 Lowy Lecture, Jake Sullivan, National Security Adviser to President Biden, emphasized building 'a latticework of alliances and partnerships globally', in the Pacific it represents an extension to the existing hub and spokes alliance system to assist the U.S. in dealing with both 'geopolitical competition, and with the major transnational challenges' it faces in the present (Sullivan, J 2021). Further, this approach bolsters U.S. power, and intends to provide the U.S. with a strategic advantage over China.

Moreover, Miller's understanding of great power pressure includes benefits and burden sharing. According to his argument, 'lesser' states are likely to cooperate with a major power 'especially if they are given concrete benefits' (Miller 1968, p. 202). Robert O. Keohane asserts that in an asymmetric alliance, the smaller power gains a sense of security and greater benefits from its closer ties to the greater power (Keohane 1971). As much as U.S. reaping the benefits of its alliances with Australia and Japan to strengthen its power, it is also in Australia's and Japan's interests to have the U.S. bound into Indo-Pacific security. The great power pressure condition is not just about pressure, but also about benefits. The mutual benefits of Australia, Japan, and the U.S trilateral cooperation could be analysed in light of the TSD and the SDCF.

The TSD is a materialisation of the U.S. desiring greater commitment and involvement from its two long-standing allies. The Dialogue's first initiative was to support the U.S. fight against the 'war on terror' and resist nuclear proliferation. For Australia and Japan, the TSD

was an assurance of U.S. continuing commitment to the region (Lee-Brown 2018, p. 170). Upgraded to ministerial level in 2005, the first ministerial meeting of the TSD was held in 2006, with the partners emphasizing their determination to work together to promote peace and stability in the region (U.S. Department of State 2006) . In 2007, the TSD underlined the importance of closer policy coordination on regional issues including the threat of the North Korean nuclear program and the South China Sea dispute. The TSD also agreed upon deepening strategic cooperation between the three countries in defence, security, intelligence, development assistance, capacity building, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Shearer 2017, p. 83). In addition, Australia and Japan reinterpreted the TSD as an opportunity to strengthen their security and defence cooperation with each other, and to be 'more equal' allies with the U.S. (Lee-Brown 2018). Scholars and analysts regard the Australia and Japan link as 'the weakest leg of the strategic triangle' (Schoff 2015; Shearer 2017). However, the TSD encouraged the two states to sign a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation affirming collaboration in military interoperability and intelligence-sharing (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2007).

In the following years, the three allies acknowledged that the TSD has witnessed closer functional cooperation in the region through joint exercises and military operations and has proven to be an effective minilateral response in creating a free and open Indo-Pacific. For instance, in 2012, the U.S.-Japan Exercise Cope North in Guam included Australia and South Korea (McMahon 2012). In 2015, the U.S.-Australian exercise Talisman Sabre included Japan and New Zealand - demonstrating stronger trilateral security ties between the three allies (Lee-Brown 2018). Through these amphibious operations, Australia and Japan have been able to benefit from U.S. expertise to improve their own military capabilities (Shearer 2017, p. 84). The 'lessons learned' from these trainings and operations will be beneficial to both Australia and Japan in their future military endeavours. In 2016, the three countries signed a Trilateral

Information Sharing Arrangement (TISA). The TISA will expedite information sharing that will facilitate 'higher capability defense exercises and operations among the three nations, taking into account situational awareness in the region' (Department of Defence 2016b). Additionally, Australia, Japan, and the U.S. entered a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2016 with nine other countries promoting economic growth and deeper integration among states in the region. As an important recent development in the Australia, Japan, and the U.S. trilateral cooperation, the three governments announced the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific, in 2018. Here, the three allies intend to work together with the private sector 'to deliver major new infrastructure projects, enhance digital connectivity and energy infrastructure, and achieve mutual development goals in the Indo-Pacific' (Commonwealth of Australia 2018) .

Parallel to the TSD, is the SDCF, proposed by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in 2006. It is a distinguished forum dedicated to bolster trilateral security cooperation between Australia, Japan, and the U.S. (Tow 2015). The SDCF focuses on new trilateral defence opportunities, missile defence, anti-piracy, counter-proliferation, interoperability, and information sharing. China's intense military modernization, its lack of military transparency, and North Korea's nuclear threat have shaped the strategic environment of this forum and influenced the three allies to further engage in high-level security cooperation (Schoff 2015). Through the SDCF, Australia, Japan, and the U.S. have participated in joint exercises and seminars including one in 2007 on air mobility that trained the forces of the three countries to coordinate during regional disasters (Schoff 2015, p. 43). The three countries have also conducted P-3 maritime surveillance aircraft exercises together. In 2014, Australia, Japan, and the U.S. sought collaboration in development and acquisition of defence equipment (Tatsumi 2015, p. 78). However, in functional cooperation, Australia and Japan already use U.S. defence equipment and technology. For instance, Japan's undersea submarine detection system,

electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection systems, and sound surveillance system (SOSUS) used for monitoring, identifying and tracking submarine movements and surface traffic from the East China Sea and Yellow Sea to the Pacific, to counter China's rising maritime activities, have incorporated techniques developed in the U.S. while some surveillance systems are jointly operated by the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) and the U.S. Navy (Ball & Tanter 2015).

These cooperative efforts through the TSD and the SDCF further illustrate that the Australia-Japan-U.S. trilateral cooperation is much more than a minilateral response issued from greater power pressure, it is also about the benefits the trilateral cooperation brings forward to all three allies. The three states individually see the benefits and advantages from the trilateral cooperation, thus continuing to commit to a deeper and comprehensive strategic partnership with each other. However, in an asymmetric alliance, the stronger power is by default bestowed with more responsibilities and carries the larger proportion of the burden. Likewise as Hall and Heazle explain (2018, p. 21), for the two middle powers, Australia and Japan, the trilateral cooperation calls them to burden share, 'to take up more of the burden of maintaining and broadening the existing order through security networking, alliance cross-bracing', and deeper economic ties.

3.4 CONCLUSION

Great power pressure persuades lesser states to cooperate especially when there are benefits from such a cooperative arrangement. The U.S. as a great power seeks to maximize its power and secure its status in the international system against all odds. It is determined to regain U.S. primacy, restore the democratic values of peace, freedom, and tolerance it upholds, maintain a rules-based liberal order, deter common threats, fight the emerging transnational challenges, and to enhance presence, and power projection in the Indo-Pacific. David Shambaugh (2018) has also claimed China has risen to a level of unmatched prominence in the Indo-Pacific. However, amidst the shifting dynamics of world politics and the ever-changing strategic environment in the region, the U.S. calls for collective action to compel China. It needs the strength and resilience of its allies, of like-minded partners, to bolster U.S. power. From battling wars, humanitarian crises to economic disruptions and pandemics, the allies have stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S. Thus, the U.S. envisages the new latticework, where existing, enduring, and strong bilateral ties are converted into broader and deeper minilateral security arrangements.

This chapter analysed great power behaviour and the continuous struggle for power to better understand Miller's (1968) greater power pressure condition. In pursuing the end goal, great powers use the position of their allies to its advantage. The chapter examined instances in which both Australia and Japan, the 'lesser states', felt pressure emanating from the U.S. as attempts to enhance its power. Miller understands greater power pressure as another incentive to cooperation and cooperation is likely to happen between a major power and 'lesser states' if it proposes definite benefits. This argument was discussed in light of the Australia-Japan-U.S. trilateral cooperation, through the developments of the TSD and the SDCF. The Australia-U.S. alliance and Japan-U.S. alliance serve as the foundation of security architecture of both countries. The U.S. presence in the Indo-pacific reassures security and stability against China's

intimidation and coercion. The U.S. Alliance framework is also viewed as an 'insurance policy' for Australia and Japan, the U.S. always there to back them up (Wesley 2017). Furthermore, the trilateral cooperation promotes interoperability and intelligence-sharing that could help Australia and Japan to improve their own military capabilities. Thus, the benefits as opposed to U.S. great power pressure are attractive to both Australia and Japan.

4 CHAPTER FOUR: SIMILARITY, EQUALITY, AND ASSOCIATION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter One analysed minilateral diplomacy through an extensive study of the literature and identified minilateral security arrangements as the most effective form of cooperative arrangement that could sustain in the current strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific. It presented Miller's (1968) conditions for cooperation as an analytical framework to understand the minilateral responses that are emerging against the Chinese aggressive behaviour in the region. Chapter Two defined fear, threat, and power through the works of Waltz, Aron, Davis, and Booth and analysed threat perception as a powerful incentive to cooperation in light of the Quad, how threat is projected and perceived differently by each member of the Quad against China's coercive actions. Chapter Three evaluated how greater power pressure could persuade lesser states to cooperate especially when they could benefit from such an arrangement focusing on Australia, Japan, and the U.S. Trilateral Cooperation. Chapter Four now analyses Miller's other conditions for cooperation through the agency of the AUKUS pact.

For Miller (1968), cultural similarity, economic equality, and habits of association are three effective conditions for cooperation. Accordingly, similarity of political systems, cultural connection, common interests, economic compatibility, and association in past endeavours, though not exclusive, are decisive components for meaningful and sustainable interstate cooperation. This chapter analyses the AUKUS trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the U.S. as the timeliest minilateral response to the increasing assertive behaviour of China in the Indo-Pacific. There is no better exemplar than the AUKUS pact to illustrate cultural similarity, economic equality, and habits of association as favourable conditions for cooperation.

4.2 THE CULTURAL CONNECTION & SHARED IDENTITY

Miller's (1968) first 'condition for cooperation' is cultural similarity. His understanding of cultural similarity includes political systems, common language, history, shared values, and social systems. He presents the examples of Scandinavian and English-speaking countries, Latin Americans, and Arab states to illustrate that such similarities bolster cooperation among states. Miller observes too, that the absence of cultural similarity may hinder greater political cooperation between states. In his terms,

> if countries have to learn new languages, get to know one another's histories as totally new exercises, comprehend social systems quite different from their own, and take account of systems of values which at first sight do not make sense, they are obviously presented with obstacles to cooperation (Miller 1968, p. 200).

In line with Miller's understanding of similarity of cultural background, we now analyse the prospects for cooperation among the member states of the AUKUS pact in terms of their cultural affinities, collective identity, and social similarity. AUKUS is a trilateral defense partnership between Australia, the UK, and the U.S. with the aim of working together to 'preserve security and stability in the Indo-Pacific'. The security partnership was announced in September 2021 following a joint communiqué by the leaders of the three countries. The creation of AUKUS is viewed as a 'next-generation partnership' which will benefit the defense forces, technology, and industry across all sectors of the three countries (The White House 2021).

Australia, the UK, and the U.S. are all liberal democracies espousing the liberal values of individualism, tolerance, freedom, and constitutionalism. Doyle argues that liberal democracies ascribe to an international system that observes sovereignty of states, that all states are bestowed with certain 'natural rights' such as their right to non-interference in their domestic affairs, they support the market-driven economy, collective action, collective

security, and world government (Doyle 1997, p. 207). Similarly, the foundation of the AUKUS partnership is underwritten by the mutual commitment to democratic values of all three member states. Further, Miller asserts that states with similar political systems share certain assumptions and practices which will assist them in dealing with practical problems, although this in itself is not a reason for cooperation (Miller 1968, p. 199).

Further to Miller's (1968) cultural connection, Taylor and Ball (2007) identify a 'collective identity' amidst the cultural and normative factors states share in common with each other. This collective identity leads states to bear a similar view of the world. For the AUKUS members, their perceptions on regional and world issues are unlikely to differ, thus avoiding unnecessary confrontations or conflict of interest which may thwart cooperation. Australia's Prime Minister Scott Morrison in his keynote address at the virtual launch of AUKUS reiterated the significance of these shared values to the foundation of the new strategic partnership between the three countries.

> We have always seen the world through a similar lens. We have always believed in a world that favours freedom; that respects human dignity, the rule of law, the independence of sovereign states, and the peaceful fellowship of nations (Prime Minister of Australia 2021).

In addition, Australia, the UK, and the U.S. are committed to a rules-based order. It is presumed that liberal states are pacific in their international relations with other liberal states (Fukuyama 1989; Kant 1991; Reus-Smit 2005). According to Francis Fukuyama, liberal democracies have an inherent peacefulness in their relations with one another and a greater 'moral reliability' than other states in their international relations. He writes, 'the peaceful behaviour of democracies further suggests that…[democracies] have a long-term interest in preserving the sphere of democracy in the world, and in expanding it where possible and prudent' (Fukuyama 1992, pp. 279-80). In parallel to Fukuyama's assumption, the foreign

policy papers, and national security strategies of all three AUKUS member states illustrate that

they subscribe to rule of law and peaceful resolution of disputes in their international relations:

> Australia does not define its national identity by race or religion, but by shared values, including political, economic and religious freedom, liberal democracy, the rule of law, racial and gender equality and mutual respect. Our adherence to the rule of law extends beyond our borders. We advocate and seek to protect an international order in which relations between states are governed by international law and other rules and norms. — 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, Australian Government, p.11.

> As Global Britain, we are reinvesting in our relationships around the world. We are championing the rules-based system, which has served our interests as a global trading nation and is of vital importance as geopolitics becomes more contested. — 2018 National Security Capability Review, Government of the United Kingdom, p.7.

> Around the world, nations and individuals admire what America stands for. We treat people equally and value and uphold the rule of law. We have a democratic system that allows the best ideas to flourish. — 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p.37.

As illustrated above, a collective notion of 'rules-based order' is shared between Australia, the

UK, and the U.S. Their liberal democratic values and statements of practices reveal that the

three states value the rule of law and peaceful means in international relations. For instance,

former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (2020) stated that in the South China Sea dispute, both

Australia and the U.S. dismissed China's historical claims over the disputed islands declaring

those claims 'completely unlawful.' Australia rejected China's maritime claims stating that

Australia views such claims as inconsistent with the 1982 UNCLOS (Department of Foreign

Affairs and Trade 2016). Further, both Australia and the U.S. supported the 2016 South China

Sea Arbitral Tribunal ruling that favoured the Philippines and unanimously rejected China's

claims to Second Thomas Shoal and to waters determined to be part of the Philippines' EEZ

(Price 2021). These states called for Beijing to respect the ruling in accordance with its treaty

obligations under the Law of the Sea Convention, reiterated that China is legally bound to

comply with this decision, and that China should not interfere with lawful Philippine activities

in the Philippines' EEZ, concurrently emphasizing their rhetoric on the 'rules-based global order' (Strating 2020).

4.2.1 SOCIAL SIMILARITY

Miller (1968) in his study of the three states, India, Japan, and Australia, analyses the similarities between their respective societies and their distinctive characteristics to understand the influence of culture in their international relations. In terms of the social similarities between the AUKUS members, it is to be noted that the three states and their societies at large are alike: they are open, multicultural, and secular societies. As three multicultural societies, they are 'harmonious, egalitarian and enterprising' nations that embrace diversity (2017 Foreign Policy White Paper). For instance, one in four Australians were born overseas and almost half of all Australians were either born overseas or have at least one parent born overseas (2017 Foreign Policy White Paper). In the US, according to the 2020 Census, 12.1 per cent of the American population is African American, the third-largest ethnic group, and 6 per cent is Asian American. The Census' analysis concluded that two people chosen at random will be from different racial and ethnic groups (Jensen et al. 2020). Further, Volokh (2015) claims that multiculturalism in the U.S. embodies federalism, religious freedom, and religious tolerance— acceptance of different belief systems, beyond ethnic diversity. The UK, however, epitomizes a multicultural society through its distinctive union of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland nations. Each are different nations with different dialects, traditions, and languages. Furthermore, the UK's close proximity to Europe and notwithstanding Brexit, its long history of trade with other European nations and the free movement of people across the borders, and relative integration of refugees and immigrants from Asia, Africa, and other minority groups has added to the ethnic diversity of the UK (O'Brien & Potter-Collins 2015).

Moreover, as British settler-colonial states, Australia and the US share an Anglo history and common values with the UK (Kelton & Willis 2019). Past empirical evidence convinces us that liberal states, such as the three AUKUS member states, tend to be in amicable relations with other liberal states on the strength of their long history and shared democratic values. They converge in economic and political matters as they deepen their strategic partnerships and sustain friendly relations with each other (Wendt 1999, pp. 298-9). The Australia-US Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) and Australia-UK Ministerial Consultations (AUKMIN) meeting statements testify to their long history, shared values, and recognition of common interests through their paramount bilateral relationships with each other.

Similarly, Australia and the UK have a significant and comprehensive relationship 'underpinned by [their] shared heritage, common values, strong people-to-people links, closely-aligned strategic outlook' (AUKMIN 2017) . At a joint press conference held during the 2017 ministerial consultations, Julie Bishop, then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia stated that 'you could not find two more like-minded countries than Australia and the United Kingdom' further emphasizing their shared identity. Likewise, the U.S. has no closer ally than the UK, and British foreign policy strongly demonstrates its deep-rooted bilateral relations, full spectrum cooperation, shared beliefs, and democratic practices. The 2021 UK Defence Command Paper describes the US as 'UK's most important strategic ally and partner' and their alliance as 'none more valuable to British citizens than [their] relationship with the United States' (Command Paper 2021).

The cultural affinities including vision of liberal world order, the stated language, shared values and belief in democracy, rule of law and fundamental freedoms, the Anglo history, and social similarities culminating to a collective identity, suggest that cooperation is naturally bolstered between Australia, the UK, and the US through the AUKUS alliance. However, Miller (1968) concludes that cultural similarities alone cannot serve as a foundation

for cooperation between states, and that 'other things being equal', cultural commonality may encourage political cooperation.

4.3 ECONOMIC EQUALITY

Consistent with Miller's (1968) argument that cultural similarity by itself cannot sustain cooperation among states, he presents the second condition termed economic equality as a favourable incentive to bolster political cooperation. His understanding of 'economic equality' expands beyond trade and investment relations between states. Miller (1968) mainly focuses on 'equality of capacity': resources, capability, interests and the disparities between states in terms of such capacity. As discussed in Chapter Three, states are juxtaposed differently in the international system. The positioning of states 'changes with changes in their relative capabilities'. Waltz (1979) refers to combined capabilities of a state in order to serve its interests. He further posits that states are ranked according to 'size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence' (Waltz 1979, p. 131).

Miller (1968) identifies economic equality or lack of inequality as a positive prospect for cooperation between states. An imbalance of economic strength in an alliance may lead 'small states' to economically depend on 'big states'. However, Miller commits greater emphasis to military resources, including naval, land, and air capacities of the three countries in his study and their 'capacity to produce substantial manpower' (Miller 1968, p. 204). Equity of resources is a vital constituent for successful security cooperation, and as Miller argues essential in a joint operation between states in a collective security arrangement. In light of Miller's analysis, we now evaluate the said capacities of Australia, the US, and the UK and

their prospective contribution to a military operation in the Indo-Pacific by means of the newly formed AUKUS alliance.

According to the 2021 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, *The World Economic Outlook*, the three AUKUS members are categorized under 'advanced economies', out of which the US and the UK are 'major advanced economies' or often referred to as members of the Group of Seven (G7) (International Monetary Fund 2021, pp. 87-9). The composite data shown in Table 4.1 shows the respective economic size of each state and the extensive economic disparity between the US (USD20,893.750b GDP) and both the UK (USD2,709.678b GDP) and Australia (USD1,359.372b GDP). Despite their economic divergences, all three states contribute to build an open, dynamic, competitive, and resilient economic environment in the Indo-Pacific region and to promote global economic growth.

Table 4.1 GDP (current USD) - Australia, the UK, and the US

Country	Subject Descriptor	Units	Scale	Country/Series-specific Notes	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Australia	Gross domestic product, current prices	U.S. dollars	Billions	ⓘ	1,421.194	1,392.328	1,359.372	1,610.556	1,677.451
United Kingdom	Gross domestic product, current prices	U.S. dollars	Billions	ⓘ	2,860.982	2,833.301	2,709.678	3,108.416	3,442.205
United States	Gross domestic product, current prices	U.S. dollars	Billions	ⓘ	20,527.150	21,372.600	20,893.750	22,939.580	24,796.076

Source: International Monetary Fund October 2021, World Economic Outlook Database, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2021/10/12/world-economic-outlook-october-2021.

Further, a state's economic strength provides it with the potential to develop and modernize its armed forces (Kelton & Willis 2019, p. 296). Thus, government revenue and defence spending are considered in evaluating equality in military capabilities of states in a minilateral security arrangement.

In terms of their military resources, Australia, the US, and the UK share certain compatibilities. The armed forces of the three states are relatively interoperable (Taylor & Ball 2007, p. 14). The US remains dominant in numbers with 1,336,513 active personnel in 2021 and in terms of military assets (DMDC 2021) . The UK with 159,000 full-time UK Armed

Forces in 2021 (Harding 2022, p. 8) and Australia with 58,476 Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel as of 2019 at their disposal stand as comparable middle powers (Department of Defence 2019). Table 4.2 reveal that while the US defence budget of USD778b prevail over its two allies amounting close to half of the world's military expenditure, the UK and Australia strive to enhance their military resources with their military spending capacity of USD59,238b and USD27,536b respectively. The gap further widens, however, as a result of existing economic inequalities between the three states.

Table 4.2 Military expenditure (current USD)- Australia, the UK, and the US

Country	^	Most Recent Year	Most Recent Value (Thousands)	
Australia		2020	27,536,235.38	
United Kingdom		2020	59,238,462.25	
United States		2020	778,232,200.00	

Source: The World Bank 2020, Military expenditure (current USD), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?end=2020&locations=US-GB-AU&start=1991.

However, as promised in the 2016 DWP and subsequent 2020 DSU, the Australian Government is committed to grow its defence budget with a total funding of $575b over the decade including $270b in capacity investment (DSU 2020, p. 53-4) . The Government intend to invest in Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) development, research and development of high-speed, long-range weapons, including hypersonic weapons, a high-tech sensor underwater surveillance system, fighter aircrafts, expanding combat power, drones and long-range rocket artillery, cyber and information warfare, and satellite network to improve space-based defence capabilities (Hellyer 2021; Macmillan & Greene 2020). Table 4.3 presents the Government's long-term defence funding model for the ADF.

Table 4.3 Total Defence Funding Profile 2020-21 to 2029-30

	2020-21 $m	2021-22 $m	2022-23 $m	2023-24 $m	2024-25 $m	2025-26 $m	2026-27 $m	2027-28 $m	2028-29 $m	2029-30 $m	Total Decade 2020-21 to 2029-30 $m
Defence Funding (including ASD)	42,151	46,037	50,170	53,318	55,567	58,175	61,239	64,639	69,986	73,687	574,969

Source: Commonwealth of Australia 2020, 2020 Defence White Paper, https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/2020_Defence_Strategic_Update.pdf.

Similarly, the UK Government has committed to increase the defence budget for 2021-22 with a £4b in funding as the government identifies defence as 'a central pillar of the government's ambitions to safeguard the UK's interests and values, strengthen its global influence, and work with allies to defend free and open societies' making the UK the largest European spender on defence in NATO (Spending Review 2020, p. 7) . The funding will focus on new investments in shipbuilding, offensive cyber, AI, drones, space, and new generations of warfighting platforms (Chalmers 2021, p. 14). The increase in military expenditure demonstrates that the three AUKUS members are at present seeking military modernisation against the rising strategic competition and uncertainty as China's coercive behaviour continues in the Indo-Pacific.

To a greater extent, the inequalities that exist within the AUKUS alliance have not constrained comprehensive and strategic cooperation between the three states. On the contrary, it has enhanced unprecedented cooperative activity. Through the AUKUS partnership, Australia, the UK, and the US aim to foster deeper integration of security and defence-related science, technology, industries, and supply chains. President Joe Biden in his address emphasized that the AUKUS trilateral defence partnership is about 'making sure that each [member] has a modern capability — the most modern capabilities we need — to manoeuvre and defend against rapidly evolving threats' (Biden Jr 2021). The first initiative of AUKUS

will be to deliver a nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia. According to Miller (1968, p. 204), 'any system of comprehensive co-operation would mean that somebody was always dependent on somebody else for resources in a particular situation'. In this instance, Australia as the weakest of the three, deeply depends on the advanced technology from the US and the expertise the UK acquired over 60 years ago in launching the Royal Navy's first nuclear submarine (Johnson 2021).

Furthermore, Miller asserts the need for 'equality of sacrifice', meaning fairness or economic parity in contribution by all member states in a cooperative arrangement, whether in terms of human and material power, resources, technology, capacity for economic growth or military capabilities (Miller 1968, p. 204). What does Australia have to offer to its partners? Australian cyber security capabilities could add to the existing pool of expertise of the two allies— the Global Cybersecurity Index 2020 (GCI) ranked the US and the UK in the top two and Australia tied the twelfth position (refer Appendix D: GCI results: scores and rankings) . Integrated defensive cyberspace operations could be a prospective contribution in defending against grey zone threats in a joint operation between the three AUKUS members. Australia also contributes to intelligence gathering and sharing under the UKUSA Treaty as well as niche Special Operations forces that have contributed to recent deployments.

Additionally, a state's ability to contribute is also derived from its geostrategic position (Kelton & Willis 2019, p. 297). Some foreign and defence policy analysts believe that Australia's geographical location is its greatest strategic asset (Holmes 2013; Kapetas 2021). Unlike its AUKUS partners, the US located far into the Pacific, with the UK's presence in its administered territory of Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean, Australia lies between the Pacific and Indian Oceans with northern Australia in close proximity to the contested South China Sea. As such it can secure 'some of the Indo-Pacific's most valuable geopolitical real estate' (Kapetas 2021). Its East Asian maritime geography and 'defence in depth' ports and

airfields, contribute geostrategically to the AUKUS partners. There is great distance between US military bases in the Pacific and UK's naval forces in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean (Brooke-Holland 2021, p. 8). From a basing perspective, in a prospective AUKUS joint operation in the region, Australia's location would permit swift deployments in both directions, thus strengthening Australia's position in the trilateral security arrangement (Kapetas 2021). Though not equal economic entities in the AUKUS partnership, each member state brings its strengths and capabilities to the table for successful cooperation.

4.4 HABITS OF ASSOCIATION

Having discussed the other conditions identified by Miller related to cultural similarity and economic equity, the next condition he presents is habits of association. He identifies habits of association as a powerful incentive for co-operation (Miller 1968, p. 201). It underpins trust, familiarity between states, and their strategic culture. Historical experiences between states demonstrate that in a cooperative arrangement states depend on each other, they integrate across domains, and they rely on each other's capabilities. Booth and Wheeler (2008) define trust in functional cooperation where:

> Trust exists when two or more actors, based on the mutual interpretation of each other's attitudes and behaviour, believe that the other(s) now and in the future, can be relied upon to desist from acting in ways that will be injurious to their interests and values (Booth & Wheeler 2008, p. 230).

Miller in his case study focuses on habits of association in the military domain and thus, in line with his analysis, we now examine the past associations between the three AUKUS members.

The UK-Australia relationship is strong and enduring. Great Britain has administered assistance to Australia under the Commonwealth from the early nineteenth century up until World War II. Although Australia was not under direct threat or closer to the battlefield of

Belgium and France during the Great War, Australia was committed to deploy over 400,000 national troops to the Gallipoli peninsula to fight under the British empire testifying to its imperial loyalty (Beaumont 2014, pp. 397-8). Likewise, during the Second World War, after Great Britain declared war on Germany in 1939, Australia mobilized the Second Australian Imperial Force (AIF) to support Britain. In addition, the Australian government sent Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aircrews and several Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ships to fight for Britain (Department of Veterans' Affairs 2021). They have fought many wars together since then including the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and the Indonesian Confrontation (1963-1966). Further, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), a series of regional security agreements signed in 1971 involving Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore to consult in the event of an attack on Malaysia or Singapore, exemplify the commitment of the two counties in the military domain (Thayer 2007, p. 79). The FPDA commemorated its Golden Jubilee in 2021, 'retaining its relevance in an increasingly complex contemporary security environment' and reassuring its devotion to regional security (Department of Defence 2021; Graham 2020; Mishra & Wang 2021).

The past endeavours and continued military cooperation between Australia and the UK have eventually led to the creation of new defence arrangements in the twenty-first century. For instance, at the AUKMIN 2017, the two countries agreed to establish a ministerial defence industry and capability dialogue, supported by a joint senior Defence forum 'to elevate Australian and United Kingdom materiel, industry, and innovation collaboration' (Department of Defence 2017b). In 2018, Australia and the UK entered a significant new chapter in their long history of military cooperation with the awarding of a USD35b shipbuilding contract between BAE Systems and the Australian Government for nine new Hunter-class anti-submarine warfare frigates for the Australian Navy, renewing their relationship which will last for decades to come (Department of Defence 2018; Shoebridge 2018).

Similarly, the US-Australia partnership has witnessed myriad of milestones along the journey. The two states first fought together at the Battle of Hamel in France in 1918. The Battle commemorated '100 Years of Mateship' between the two allies in 2018 (Department of State 2020). They fought side-by-side in every significant conflict since World War I. In 2017, the US and Australia marked the 75th anniversary of several key World War II battles, including the Battles of the Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal (AUSMIN 2017). Australia's security alliance with the US formalized under the ANZUS Treaty in 1951, is marked as the momentous outcome of this long-standing friendship and binding trust (Millar 1964, p. 149). The Alliance is the foundation of Australia's security and defence planning (2016 DWP). The two long-standing allies work closely together now more than ever. More than 60 years into the Alliance, the US and Australia signed the U.S.-Australia Force Posture Agreement at the annual AUSMIN in 2014 and in 2015, the defence agencies of the two countries signed a Joint Statement on Defense Cooperation to serve as 'a guide for future cooperation' (AUSMIN 2015) . In 2017, the US and Australia participated in the seventh TALISMAN SABRE bilateral joint military exercise demonstrating the interoperability of their defense forces and their commitment to strategic cooperation (Department of State 2020).

The UK-U.S. relationship is also of military significance to highlight past associations as a powerful inducement to cooperation. The UK's alliance with the US during both World Wars, in the Korean War, in the Persian Gulf War, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in Afghanistan manifestly demonstrates that the two countries remain close allies and have established diplomatic relations for over two centuries (Dumbrell 2004; Foerster & Raymond 2017). Since World War II, the US and Britain have been in a 'special relationship' attesting to the long-standing historical, political, economic, defence and cultural ties between the two countries (Foerster & Raymond 2017, p. 2). Both the US and the UK are among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), are founding members of the NATO, and

belong to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Their role as members of these institutions, leaders of the international order with a shared commitment and values, and their overarching partnership shows their continuous dedication to strengthening cooperation. Further, UK-U.S. relations fuelled by past associations in the military domain entered an extensive cooperation agreement in July 2021. Amidst high-level talks on a range of shared security challenges and discussing the UK-US defence partnership, the two countries agreed to enhance cooperation on aircraft carrier operations where UK and US forces will engage in a series of over 70 engagements, joint exercises, and operations as part of the UK-led Carrier Strike Group (CSG21) (Ministry of Defence 2021).

4.5 AUKUS - RETURN TO THE ANGLOSPHERE

As we analysed, the past associations between Australia and the UK, Australia and the US, and UK-US relations, it is perceivable that throughout history the three allies have had each other's backs. Similar to their historical bilateral relationships with each other, the three states have cooperated together in the military domain in the past. For instance, the three states have fought together side-by-side in the Korean War (1950-1953) —Australia and the UK sent forces to assist the US backed Republic of Korea, in the Gulf War (1990-1991), War in Afghanistan (2001-2021), the Iraq War (2003-2011), and War against ISIS (2014-present). Equally, they have been involved in many peacekeeping missions together. Their past associations point to the 'strategic culture' of the three states: their 'traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force' (Booth 1990, p. 121). Booth writes,

> The strategic culture of a nation derives from its history, geography and political culture, and it represents the aggregation of the attitudes and patterns of behaviour of the most influential voices; these may be, depending on the nation, the political elite, the military establishment and/or public opinion (Booth 1990).

He further explains that strategic culture is defined by states' behaviour on war and peace issues. Scholars and theorists assert that past associations shape the strategic preferences of states (Alagappa 1998; Booth 1990).

Throughout history, there have been several representations of cooperative arrangements within the Anglosphere. The Anglo-American 'special relationship', the ANZUS treaty, UKUSA, Five Eyes partnership (FVEY), North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) exemplify the persistent close political, diplomatic, and military cooperation among this network of anglophone countries (Vucetic 2011). The special relationships between the US, the UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 'constitute a core of a distinct international, transnational, civilizational, and imperial entity within the global society' known as the 'Anglosphere'. Vucetic (2011, p. 2) observed that Winston Churchill described the 'English-speaking peoples' with great pride whilst he identified the Anglophone countries as nations 'winning wars, expanding trade, and promoting freedom, security, and welfare' attesting to their liberal political culture and democratic values they share and uphold. In his famous 'Iron Curtain' speech delivered in 1946, Churchill dictates,

> If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to that of the United States with all that such co-operation implies in the air, on the sea, all over the globe and in science and in industry, and in moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary, there will be an overwhelming assurance of security... If we are together, nothing is impossible (Churchill 1946).

The historical experiences between the three allies, Australia, the UK, and the US, have persuaded them to form new alliances to approach new problems such as challenges to the stability of the rules-based world order, to territorial integrity and sovereignty, geopolitical

competition, threat of terrorism, and complex transnational threats of the present (2020 DSU). The AUKUS pact reunites the Anglosphere as they have been together in their past endeavours. In Prime Minister Morrison's words, 'And while we've always looked to each other to do what we believe is right, we have never left at — each other. Always together. Never alone' (Morrison 2021). Miller posits that 'if the past association has been recent, purposes and procedures which applied in one set of international difficulties can form the mode of approach to new problems' (Miller 1968, p. 201). In a similar vein, for the AUKUS members, their historical experiences will assist them to navigate through the complex challenges of the region. All three member states reiterate their strategic interest in the Indo-Pacific through their White Papers and have always been committed to preserve security and stability in the region. President Biden stated that the formation of AUKUS is about investing in their alliances that is their 'greatest source of strength' and about 'updating them to better meet the threats of today and tomorrow' (Biden Jr 2021). The current strategic environment in the region persuades the Indo-Pacific powers to invest in their capabilities and enhance their collective ability to defend the evolving threats in the region. Thus, the AUKUS members have resorted to military modernisation through advanced technology, modern capability, interoperability of their military forces and intelligence cooperation to withstand Chinese aggression, control, and coercion.

4.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has analysed Miller's (1968) first three listed conditions for cooperation, similarity of cultural background, economic equality, and habit of association in light of the AUKUS partnership. Miller presents cultural similarity as a broader concept that includes similarity in political systems, common language, history, shared values, social systems, and collective identity. The three AUKUS member states are liberal democracies aiming to uphold the liberal values of individualism, tolerance, and freedom. Their shared identity assigns them a similar perspective of the world. The chapter studied the respective policy papers of Australia, the UK, and the US to understand their commitment to a rules-based global order and observed their statements to resort to peaceful means in international relations. Similarly, the three states share many social similarities as open, multicultural, and secular societies. Miller's next condition favourable for cooperation is termed 'economic equality'. He focuses on relative capabilities of states in terms of military strength and power. He asserts that in a collective security arrangement, there should be 'equality of sacrifice'. To determine whether the AUKUS members are equal entities, the chapter analysed each government's military expenditure and compared the interpretability of their forces. Third, Miller identifies habit of association as one of the most powerful amongst the five conditions. States which have had experiences together in the past, Miller states, are most likely to cooperate in the future to contest new challenges that come their way. The AUKUS members share a deep-rooted Anglo history and have cooperated in the military domain at numerous occasions in the past. Lastly, the chapter has examined AUKUS as a rejuvenation of the Anglosphere highlighting the continuous commitment of the three countries to preserve security and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has used the scholarly literature, to contribute to the understandings of minilateral diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific and as examined through some of the regions minilateral security responses. Minilateral security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific are perceived as an attractive alternative to bilateral and multilateral approaches. They extend beyond the homogenising bilateral ties and surpass the inadequacies of existing regional multilateral forums. Following the contextual examination of the changing power dynamics in the region resulting from China's aim to alter to alter the status-quo, the U.S. and its allies are seeking to deter Chinese efforts and promote the liberal international rules-based order. This thesis applied the Miller (1968) framework to study the minilateral arrangements in the Indo-Pacific namely, the Quad, the Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Cooperation, and the AUKUS trilateral security pact. The thesis concludes that minilateral initiatives in the Indo-Pacific are both a tool enhancing cross-bracing and bolstering U.S. power through strengthening its alliance system, and an effective security arrangement to deter the China threat. The analysis of the three case studies and of their recent developments in the international realm is a useful contribution to the existing literature.

Chapter One studied minilateralism and its characteristics. It reviewed minilateralism as a 'subset' of multilateralism, the 'new multilateralism'. Arguably, the declining post-war institutions testify to the ineffectiveness of multilateralism. Its broad, formal and legally binding approach to security cooperation fail to withstand the transnational threats of the twenty-first century. The chapter emphasized that minilateralism through its expeditious decision making, flexibility, and efficiency has emerged as the preferred mode of security cooperation among regional powers (Naim 2009; Patrick 2015; Tow 2015, 2018). Chapter One presented the analytical framework of the thesis. Miller's (1968) framework of conditions for cooperation is used to investigate the strengths and limitations of the identified minilateral

arrangements in the Indo-Pacific and to investigate the prospects of further enhanced deeper cooperation between states.

Chapter Two analysed the perception of common danger, the preeminent condition in light of the Quad Security Dialogue. It defined the notions of fear, threat, power, and perception. The possibility of an impending threat, the fear of a possible retaliation from a would-be aggressor or an act of intimidation by a threatening actor could induce states to confide in collective security arrangements (Cohen 1978). This chapter identified China as a threat to other regional powers' sovereignty, territorial integrity, and to the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. Denny Roy (1996), John Ikenberry (2008), Hugh White (2012), Rory Medcalf (2014, 2019, 2020b), and Michael Wesley (2017) have depicted China as a source of threat to its neighbouring states and other regional powers. China's malign behaviour in the international system with its aggressive and assertive international relations has inflated regional threat perceptions. Chapter Two further examined the differing threat perceptions of each Quad member and the factors that influenced their perceptions of China. Cohen (1978) identifies close proximity, existing tensions and mistrust, and vulnerability as variables that could affect the perception of threat. China's handling of the border dispute with India, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, and economic retaliation against Australia are illustrative of China's aggressive behaviour. The case study revealed that China poses a direct existential threat to its bordering neighbours, India and Japan, as opposed to Australia and the U.S. Finally, the chapter reviewed the Quad's responses to counterbalance China and its efforts to promote a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region. Exercise MALABAR, marked the four Quad members efforts to enhance interoperability and to strengthen maritime cooperation to counter China's expanding maritime presence in East and South China Seas.

Chapter Three of this thesis presented the great power pressure condition. The chapter first studied great power behaviour in the international system. Mearsheimer (2001) asserts that

great powers behave aggressively in their pursuit to maximize power. Great powers strive to retain their primacy or stature in the international system, and thus focus all their efforts on achieving this ultimate goal. The U.S. with the largest military power and largest economy holds a preeminent strategic position. However, the escalating strategic competition with China and the shifting power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, have prompted the U.S. to reassess its grand strategy. The U.S. presence in the region is dependent on its alliances. Chapter Three evaluated the Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Security Cooperation as the next minilateral arrangement of the analysis. It underpins Miller's (1968) argument of pressure from a great power persuading states to cooperate. The chapter considered the existing bilateral relations between Australia, Japan, and the U.S. particularly focussing on Australia-U.S. and Japan-U.S. alliances. The chapter reviewed both Australia and Japan Defence White Papers and inferred the significance of U.S. assistance to each member's defence strategy, and the importance of U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific for peace and stability. The chapter analysed the evolution of the Trilateral Cooperation as an initiative to deter the China threat, which is perceived as its attempts to unilaterally change the regional status quo and to reshape the existing U.S.-led liberal order through coercive political, economic, and military activities. The U.S. approach to the China threat is to compel and compete (President Biden Jr 2021). The U.S. is focussed on improving the resilience of its partnerships with allies (White House 2020). The chapter presented Miller's understanding of great power pressure; however, it is not just about pressure, but also about benefits. The TSD has encouraged joint exercises and military operations between the three allies including U.S.-Japan Exercise Cope North in Guam and the U.S.-Australian exercise Talisman Sabre. The SDCF has proposed trilateral defence opportunities, missile defence programmes, and interoperability exercises to further strengthening cooperation between the three. Finally, Chapter Three analysed the strategically important 'latticework' of U.S. alliances as a form of both burden sharing and bolstering U.S. power.

Chapter Four reviewed Miller's (1968) other conditions: cultural similarity, economic equality, and habits of association. The chapter related the analysis of these three conditions to the novel AUKUS trilateral security pact. Australia, the UK, and the U.S. share many cultural and social similarities. They are all liberal democracies promoting open, multicultural, and secular societies. Their collective identity leads the three allies to accept a similar world view. For the AUKUS members, their perceptions on regional and world issues are alike. All three members are committed to support and protect a rules-based regional order. The information deduced from the policy documents attest that all three AUKUS members resort to the peaceful resolution of disputes in their international relations. Australia and the U.S. dismiss China's claims in the South China Sea as unlawful and all three states denounce China's salami-slicing tactics and coercive actions targeted to intimidate other claimant states. These approaches illustrate their similar stance on regional issues. Chapter Four further analysed the equality of military capacity as an incentive for cooperation. The chapter examined the economic strength, military capacity in terms of defence spending and military resources of the U.S., the UK, and Australia. The retrieved data shows clear disparities between the three allies, with the U.S. face outpacing the UK and Australia on defence spending and capacity. However, the inequalities have not disrupted the prospects of deeper cooperation among them. The chapter outlined the importance of 'equality of sacrifice' in a collective security arrangement. While the U.S. and the UK possess greater economic and military capacity, Australia's geographical location remains the greatest strategic asset in this security arrangement. Chapter Four studied the past associations of the three allies in great detail. The habits of association develop trust and mateship over time and is thus a favourable condition that insinuates cooperation between states. Lastly, the chapter contextualises the AUKUS pact in the Anglosphere by incorporating the cultural affinities, social similarities, economic inequalities and past experiences as the

foundation of AUKUS. The chapter viewed AUKUS as a timely minilateral response to counter China's growing influence in the region.

This thesis provides a useful basis for further study on minilateral diplomacy and minilateral security arrangements. Minilateralism as an approach for cooperation and governance is not popularly acknowledged, nonetheless, the emerging security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific to counter Chinese expansionism and to deter the China threat seemingly constitute such characteristics of minilateral diplomacy. The U.S. has purposefully adopted minilateral arrangements to strengthen the latticework of its alliances. Similarly, other regional powers including Australia, India, Japan, and the UK have utilised minilateral responses to counteract China's revisionist goals, whilst engaging in deeper cooperation between each other.

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
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
Main areas of contention in the India-China border dispute and the Line of Actual Control

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Source: Council on Foreign Relations 2020, 'The China-India Border Dispute: What to Know,' https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/china-india-border-dispute-what-know.

APPENDIX B
Chart of the numbers of China Coast Guard and other vessels that entered Japan's contiguous zone or intruded into territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands

Figure removed due to copyright restriction

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2022, 'Trends in China Coast Guard and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan's Response', https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000465486.pdf.

APPENDIX C
Map of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone

Figure removed due to copyright restriction

Sources: Burke et al. 2018, 'China's Military Activities in the East China Sea: Implications for Japan's Air Self-Defense Force', RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2500/RR2574/RAND_RR2574.pdf; Ministry of Defense of Japan n.d., Airspace Surrounding Japan, https://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/English_page/roles/role03/index.html.

APPENDIX D
GCI results: scores and rankings

Figure removed due to copyright restriction

Source: ITU 2022, Global Cybersecurity Index 2020, ITU Publications, Geneva, https://www.itu.int/epublications/publication/D-STR-GCI.01-2021-HTM-E/.