

Ulmer (1985, p. 213) suggests that: 'One of the chief lessons of Lacan's discourse for a nonmagisterial pedagogy is its exploitation of linguistic and symbolic devices, addressing the class in the poetic mode of evocation as well as in the scientific mode of assertion' (my italics), thereby drawing upon art and science to enrich the grammatical endeavour.

"The 'author' of a text is ... as intertextual ... as the text itself" (Snyder, *Hyper-text*, 1998, p. 63).

For me, there is much to be learned from the new forms of 'arts-based' inquiry on offer: of crossing over from 'science' to 'art' (and vice versa) into new paradigms and contextual realms (Finley, 2005, p. 684).⁸ For Norman Denzin (as cited in Finley, 2005, p. 689), such hybridity enables 'guerrilla warfare' against oppressive social structures. "Science is one lens, and creative arts is another" (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005, p. 964). For Stacy Holman Jones (2005) and Ulmer (1985) new spaces are opening up between 'disciplines' and 'binaries' on a continuum that spans from science to art and beyond. New performances and new ways of being and thinking can be staged in-between: between the personal and the social, the private and the public, the author and the reader, witnesses and jurors, narratives and experiences, inventions and interpretations, subjectivities and objectivities, reflections and actions, fictions and facts, possibilities and conclusions, and form and content—"spaces of hope" (Jones, 2005, p. 783). The inquirer, in turn, can position themselves anywhere on the continuum depending on the purposes and audiences of their research and art. Depending, too, on whether their research peers approve or disapprove of their chosen location.

This may leave you, the reader, with a sense of vertigo and dread – for you may feel that I am shirking the issue, taking flight, and seeking refuge in a subjective void between worlds and between disciplines. Alternatively, it may inspire you to leave the (perceived) safety of your home and the normalising discourses and practices that shape and define you, to challenge long held practices and beliefs and to transform your world and your 'self' from places and perspectives beyond maps, in the disputed territories (Chambers, 1995), between binaries (Jones, 2005), across borders (Anzaldúa, 1987), in alter-

limits of its movement, from the experience of transit, a surplus, an excess, leading to an unforeseen and unknown possibility."

⁸ Tedlock (2005, p. 469) writes: "Performance is everywhere in life: from simple gestures to melodramas and macrodramas." Performance, then, comes to refer to both human behaviour(s) and human interaction(s) in local and global contexts.

⁹ Affirmative deconstruction is not simply about undoing or destroying cultural and historical assumptions, hierarchies, and myths. It is also about their reconstruction and transformation. In fact, as Derrida (2001, p. 61) suggests, deconstruction "is an act of love, an act of faithfulness. There is no break [with the past] there, but an act of inheriting, a way of inheriting the past."

⁸ According to Finley (2005, p. 685): "Making art is a passionate visceral activity that creates opportunities for communion among participants, researchers, and the various audiences who encounter the research text. Arts-based research crosses the boundaries of art and research as defined by conventions formed in historically, culturally bounded contexts of the international art market and in the knowledge market dominated by higher education."

"The post-modern reply to the modern consists of recognising that the past, since it cannot really be destroyed, because its destruction leads to silence, must be revisited: but with irony, not innocently" (Eco, *Reflections on 'The Name of The Rose'*, 1985, p. 17).

10

Uncertainty



RE
Searching

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"We are all
hypertexts –
made up of
codes within a
centreless
net-
work" (Snyder,
Hypertext,
1998, p. 64).

Derrida's 'arche-writing'
broadens the concept
of writing (e.g. letters
and words on paper) to
include all manner of
inscriptions, including
thought, uttered, ges-
tured, felt, and smelt
texts. In this sense
'memories' are texts.

native spaces and cross-disciplinary encounters (Ulmer, 1985). After all, the sites of subjectivity are no more escapable than the dirt at our feet and the skin we live in – if we acknowledge it. It is who we are and what we are made of. It is in every text and every representation. Rather than pretend that objective reality can be captured in one grand, all-conquering narrative, we can instead view the world as composed of multiple realities, multiple epistemologies, multiple representations, billions of narratives, billions of texts, and billions of worlds. We live in vast galaxies right here on earth, in our own towns, in our own bodies.

In the *logosphere* of life (Barthes, 1973/1990): the *docu-verse* of space (Nelson, as cited in Snyder, 1998, p. 49).

Memories, as narratives, as inscriptions, as opportunities, will fuel this narrative inquiry (Chase, 2005).⁹ Everything suggested is composed of memories – even the reflexive and spontaneous inventions constructed on the page, at this moment, right now, all have their origins in memory, and in the moulding of these fragments into new constructions as I travel forth and transform my world through 'nomadic' ¹⁰ inquiry (St. Pierre, as cited in Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005). For me, no matter how partial and incomplete memories may be, they still have something very important to tell me about the world and how I move through it. Memories are ubiquitous, and inevitable, and should inform the inquiry process: to give evidence. "From this perspective, any narrative [any memory, any text] is significant because it embodies – and gives us insight into – what is possible and intelligible within a specific social context" (Chase, 2005, p. 667). This way, memories are invited in, encouraged, provoked, critiqued, deconstructed, and reconsidered in the various guises (narra-

⁹ There's a particular type of narrative inquiry that I have under-explored in this column. *Autoethnography* permits the 'self' to be the focus of the researcher's gaze. This term came to me by word and mouth in late 2005, from Barbara Kameniar, and settled curiously in my mind, and then hatched in a new burst of growth, awareness, and transformation. I am grateful for the arrival of this word and the new territories of thought and experience it has opened up. This is how the impossible 'Other' arrives: unexpected and beyond anticipation, from the Abyss (Derrida, 2001).

Chase (2005, p. 660) writes: "A fifth approach to narrative inquiry is found in *autoethnography*, where researchers also turn the analytic lens on themselves and their interaction with others, but here researchers write, interpret, and/or perform their own narratives about culturally significant experiences. ... Autoethnographers often present their work in alternative textual forms such as layered accounts and many have experimented with performing their narratives as plays, as poems, or in various forms. Sometimes autoethnographers resist analysis altogether, leaving interpretation up to the audiences of their performances. The goal of autoethnography, and of many performance narratives, is to *show* rather than *tell* and, thus, to disrupt the politics of traditional research relationships, traditional forms of representation, and traditional social science orientations and audiences."

Mishka: 'He was solitary. He did not know what to say to fellow students. He did not know how to be with them. He had quietly accustomed himself to the knowledge that the three people he loved were peculiar and perhaps quite mad in a harmless kind of way, and he felt an immense protectiveness and tenderness for them. He thought that very likely he too was crazy and therefore it was important to conceal his condition. For one thing, there was the matter of shame. For another, it was possible that madness was infectious and therefore he had a moral obligation to keep his distance from other people. It was important to be crazy as discreetly and privately as possible, and this seemed to him not so difficult since the strange and beautiful house of his childhood existed outside of ordinary time and ordinary space. He himself continued to live in this limbo of not-here and not-now, and for this reason he knew it might never be possible for him to be certain of what was real and what was not' (p. 182).

(Turner Hospital, *Orpheus Lost*, 2007)

Bourdieu and Passeron: 'Thus, all university norms, those which preside over the selection of students or the co-option of colleagues as well as those which govern the production of lectures, theses and even purportedly scientific works, always tend to favour the success, at least within the institution, of a model type of man and work, defined by a double negation, i.e. brilliance without originality and heaviness without scientific weight... Any attempt to tamper with this model must consider that it is the nature of disciplinary and specialist organization to be homogeneous – to exclude any practice that does not reproduce the legitimacy of the system' (Ulmer, 1985, p. 171). This makes this text problematic.

tives and texts) they arrive in. They are sent back, recalled, refashioned, and resituated to see what other inflections may come of them. They are respected and recorded. They speak out. They open up new subjective territories and dominions which influence what I see, hear, smell, say, touch, feel, and sense today, tomorrow, yesterday, and beyond. As Chambers (1995, p. 3) suggests: "History is harvested and collected, to be assembled, made to speak, re-membered, re-read and re-written, and language comes alive in transit, in interpretation." And Derrida (2001, p. 77) adds:

When we inherit, we don't simply passively receive something. We choose, we select, we reaffirm. So at the heart of the experience of inheritance you have a decision to reaffirm, to select, to filter and to interpret. There is no inheritance without some interpretation and some choice, which means that you never inherit passively everything which is given to you.

This process of shape-shifting, speaking in tongues, travelling through time, questioning selves, and traversing realms (all quite inevitable) could overwhelm and disorientate even the most robust researcher (and reader). In this case, the researcher is *me* (and you, by implication), as artist and author, learner and teacher, and subject and object of this transformation. Surely a compass is needed to prevent me (and you) from losing my (our) way – and one is provided, in each sentence, comma, full stop, word, and 'sign' that I use or ignore; decisions, framing devices, and editing choices are made at every point, consciously and unconsciously, depending on my own semantic and grammatical prejudices and preferences; in my collection of memories and understandings too, the 'facts' and 'texts' that have helped inform and define me; in all manner of things that have gone into putting my mental and

¹⁹ Nomadic inquiry, according to St. Pierre (as cited in Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005, p. 967), is where "writing is thinking, writing is analysis, [and] writing is indeed a seductive and tangled *method* of discovery."

3

Logocentrism Hegemonies & Hierarchies

Logocentrism: & power

Power refers to people's ability to exert influence over others, either deliberately or not. Members of one group can often exert influence (even unconsciously) over members of another group due to socially constructed differences between them. Literary texts can be examined and judged in terms of whether they reproduce or disrupt power relations.

(Moon, 2004, p. 114)

The term **Logocentrism** plays on the term **ethnocentrism**. It is a neologism coined by Jacques Derrida to disturb the common sense of philosophy. Ethnocentrism is "the belief that one's own nation, culture, or group is intrinsically superior" to other nations, cultures, or groups (*Collins Australian Dictionary*, 2005, pp. 268-269). As a term, then, logocentrism attempts to expose the

'centrism' of philosophy by *deconstructing* its historical foundations and unconscious prejudices and by showing it *what it doesn't actually know about itself*. Put simply, philosophy places 'thought' before 'speech' and 'speech' before 'writing' in the scheme of its common sense (its *doxa*) to indicate the proximity of each 'utterance' to the original Word (*the Logos*) and the origins of Meaning (Derrida, 1967/1976; 1967/2005).¹ Writing, in this hierarchy, *stands in for*, but never really replaces, thought and speech in their absence (which replace thinkers and speakers in their absence). Writing has no meaning-making capacity of its own. It doesn't speak for *itself* but for the *other*. It is the surrogate of speech

Derrida (2001, p. 110): "What you need deconstruction for is to undo a number of presuppositions, prejudices and so on..."

'The new pedagogy, then, must attempt to do away with the undesirable pedagogical effect of discipleship precisely because it generates disciplines and authorities' (Ulmer, 1985, p. 173).

We cannot get 'outside' of language.

physical landscape(s) together: these things guide and direct me in everything I do. *They also limit me.* This process is happening regardless of my conscious presence or my conscious attention; it happens through being *in* and of the world; it happens through language, reflection, and the activity of invention. It happens through living, dreaming, loving, and screaming.

I mean to 'watch' this process for a time, to 'listen' to the voices, to 'feel' the emotions, and to 'map' some of the outcomes – like this *column*, which was meant to be about memory and subjectivity (i.e. prior knowledge) but which has veered off in all manner of meaning-making directions and ludic understandings. But I have let this happen, somewhat alarmed, a little disconcerted, but also *scared and excited by what I may find and where I may end up. I am making my own meaning, deconstructing my own conditioning, and plotting my own course through the multiple discourses (voices, narratives), practices (methods, approaches), and feelings (emotions, intuitions) of mind, memory, and life. I am exposing my 'conscious' gaze to the sub-conscious swell, and making new memories, new narratives, and new subjectivities from the flotsam and jetsam gathered on the way. I am compiling evidence that I find compelling.* As Kathy Charmaz (2005, p. 509) suggests:

No qualitative method rests on pure induction – the questions we ask of the empirical world frame what we know of it. In short, we share in constructing what we desire as data. Similarly, our conceptual categories arise through our interpretations of data rather than emanating from them...

My experiences with memory, recollection, and the present moment are like Lucy's in *The Last Magician* (Turner Hospital, 1995). Given that this fictional character can ex-

Arts-based Inquiry:

Finley (2005) writes: "In arts-based research, paradigms for making meaning in the contextual realms of art and social science collide, coalesce, and restructure to become something that is not strictly identifiable as either art or science" (p. 684).

And: "A primary concern for arts-based researchers is how to make the best use of their hybrid, boundary-crossing approaches to inquiry to bring about culturally situated, political aesthetics that are responsive to social dilemmas" (p. 686).

And: "Aspects of intertextuality form the basis for arts-based inquiry. In the hyphen that connects 'arts' and 'based' is a textual reference to the arts as a basis for something else, something that is 'not art.' Connecting activist movements in art and research is one of the fundamental acts of intertextual reading that forms the foundation for arts-based research..." (p. 686).

but not the equal of speech.

Derrida disputes this hierarchy and argues that *all* 'utterances' (whether written, spoken, or thought) are actually forms of 'Writing' in the broadest sense: they are all *iterations* (not *re-iterations*) stemming from an untraceable and unknowable origin—the *Logos*, the *original Word*—which permeates out in an endless array of signs, meanings, and shifting contexts. All signs, in this sense, are contingent on other signs and other contexts for meaning and dispersal, which is to say that no iteration (no word, no letter, no sentence, no thought, no utterance, no inscription, no text, etc) is ever the same twice. Nor ever independent. All signs (whether spoken, written, or thought) are 'traces' (ghosts) of an *absent* presence: an endless series of differences and deferrals that make *all* signs 'undecidable' and permanently unstable. Signs, then, *stand in for* the 'thing' they replace—the 'thing' that is absent. They cultivate meaning through *differences* from each other (as Saussure might say) rather than from *reference* to things in the world (e.g. black can only be black in association with its contrary: white). This phenomenon of meaning-making through endless 'differences' (between signs) and 'defer-

rals' (of meaning and context) is summarised by the Derridean term *différance*—a word that can only be recognised (seen) in its 'written' form (as *différance*) since the 'spoken' form cannot distinguish between *différance* with an *a* and *difference* with an *e* (as homophones). And that's Derrida's point: to put speech *back in its place* by showing that 'writing' (in the narrow sense) is *not* the servant or instrument of speech, but a meaning-making system in its own right. It generates an 'a' in *différance* that cannot be heard or uttered through speech. It has done something that philosophy said it could not do: *it spoke*. All three inscriptions (thought, speech, and writing) emerge from the selfsame system of iteration, meaning-making, and meaning-dispersal. They are *all* inscriptions signifying the *thing-in-its-absence*. No inscription is closer to this absent 'thing' than the next. No inscription is more *present* or more *absent*. They are all equally *distant* from the original presence and the original *Logos*. They all *stand in for* and *replace* the 'absent' presence but are not that presence (e.g. 'Andrew' stands in for the person [me] but is not that person). In short, they are *all* texts: thought-texts, speech-texts, and written-texts, with no more claims to truth and certainty

"Such is the strange 'being' of the sign: half of it always 'not there' and the other half always 'not that.' The structure of the sign is determined by the trace or track of that other which is forever absent" (Spivak, 'Preface,' *Of Grammatology*, 1967/1976, p. xvii).

'But, Derrida holds, all signifying practice, all *language*, is structurally or systematically open to this errancy by virtue of its citationality or iterability' (Hahn, *On Derrida*, 2002, p. 72).

'Derrida argues that language always involves delay, deferral of meaning, ambiguity, some degree of the speaker's 'distance', the possibility of confusion, deception and unreliability, all factors that Plato considers negative. Rather than lamenting ... these facets of language ... Derrida regards them as integral to it. Without the play of these elements, there would be no language' (Deutscher, *How to Read Derrida*, 2005, pp. 13-14).

press my sentiments succinctly, I will use her voice to describe my experiences with memory and perception. She says (on my behalf):

Is this happening now or was it a long time ago? I have difficulty with that question, you see. I do not find it a simple question. I find that the past lies in wait, just ahead, around every corner. "You need a particular blinkered angle of vision," Charlie said, "in order to sustain belief in linear time." Linear time, he said, was a film-maker's gimmick, an inferior film-maker's gimmick, and before that a gimmick of nineteenth century novelists.

(Turner Hospital, *The Last Magician*, 1995, p. 106)

Lucy is right: time travel happens every other moment. I'm doing it now. I'm vacillating between an imagined future and a meddlesome and discontinuous past (i.e. simultaneity). I am gathering selves and assembling data. I'm listening to the voices in my head. This time, another character, Sarah, adds to the meaning I'm making about memory. She says (and I recall):

"It's the details, isn't it? Details that get stuck in the mind, they're so potent, they're like concentrated essence of the past. One drop, and the whole era mushrooms out, all these sensations you'd forgotten—"

"Yes," Vi says, excited. "Yes. That's exactly how it is."

"Yes," I say. "It's like how the smell of patchouli oil takes me back to the summer of 2004, to a quiet night, when we embraced on a broken couch." Patchouli oil has no other association for me now. It reminds me of her, and delivers me back to her kiss. Just like that. In an instant. And I'm there.]

(Turner Hospital, *Oyster*, 1997, p. 144)

And then there's another character, a physicist, Koenig, who says something about memory I suspected all along. It was on the tip of my tongue. I just didn't have the words

Arts-based 'Guerrilla Warfare':

Finley (2005) writes: "Denzin (1999) urged a new movement in qualitative inquiry in which researchers take up their pens (and their cameras, paintbrushes, bodies, and voices) so that we might 'conduct our own ground level guerrilla warfare against the oppressive structures of our everyday lives'" (p. 689).

And: "Art, in any of its various forms, provides media for self-reflection, self-expression, and communication between and among creators and audiences. Performing social change begins with artful ways of seeing and knowing ourselves and the world in which we live" (p. 692).

We seem to have moved from a speech-centric world through a prose-centric world to an image-centric world to a number-centric world. Bureaucratically speaking, universities have moved from knowledge-centric institutions to number-centric economies; academically speaking, they remain prose-centric ('publish or perish' is the catchcry) but only so as to secure funding.

than any other texts. Derrida makes this point, not to reverse the logocentric hierarchy, but to level it out (Ulmer, 1985): TO LET WRITING HAVE ITS SAY WHILE SHOWING PHILOSOPHY WHAT IT DOESN'T ACTUALLY KNOW ABOUT ITSELF. Its doxa.

Capital 'L' 'Logos' means 'divine Word' and small 'l' 'logos' means 'the rational principle expressed in words and things' considered 'the source of order in the universe' (Collins, n.d., p. 903). We have moved, it seems, from a *logocentric* world to a *number-centric* world. 'Market Logic' has replaced the 'Word of God / the Logos' as the defining discourse of humanity, and the *number-ordered world* (i.e. the disorderly and morally-bankrupt world of economic rationalism) has replaced the *word-ordered world* (i.e. the orderly and morally-dogmatic world of scholarly rationalism). The *fluid* world of post-modernity has swamped the *solid* world of modernity (Bauman, 2002). Whether the 'spoken' or 'written' word is closer to the original Logos is now beside the point. *Numbers rule the world*. Stock exchanges and shopping malls are the true temples of consumer culture, while economies, not governments, rule people (Bauman, 2002). Written signs, spoken signs, gestured signs, or

thought signs are all subservient to the logic of numbers: to 'market forces' and the 'profit motive.' To \$\$\$\$ signs.

Changing tact now and the term logocentrism can also signal a broader counter-hegemonic agenda (as evidenced in this *EiseJesus*).² Logocentrism can become a generic term that indicates an overriding distrust and suspicion of *all* hegemonic power structures, such as the privileging of words over images or books over blogs in school and university systems. Such a term becomes an awareness-raising means to expose and undermine the hegemonic structures that dominate all levels of language and textuality (including, for instance, the 'hidden' codes and settings that operate below the level of the text in this Word document: the margins, textboxes, fonts, columns, colours, layouts, watermarks, etc). Ordinarily, these codes remain hidden in the infrastructure and common sense of the text, out of sight and out of mind. They are the silent signs, the slave signs, that permit other signs to speak and perform. Today, some of these 'marks' are brought to the surface, along with the space that gives them expression. Today that space is black, not white, to signify its presence (and absence): to signify

'No one but the tourist is so blatantly, conspicuously dissolved in numbers, interchangeable, depersonalized' (Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics*, 1993 / 1995, p. 242).

'A writing that is not structurally readable—iterable—beyond the death of the addressee would not be writing' (Hahn, *On Derrida*, 2002, p. 75).

'The central problem for poststructuralist education – how to deconstruct the function of imitation in the pedagogic effect...' (Ulmer, 1985, p. 174).

Reading in hypertext is not necessarily sequential or continuous, but discontinuous, non-linear, and associative, like thinking. "Because the reader is now part of the text, the act of reading becomes correspondingly more conscious" (Snyder, *Hypertext*, 1998, p. 69).

or the training to articulate my suspicions as Koenig can. He says (and I listen):

"Yes," Koenig interrupts, "memory's holographic, that's pretty well established now. Distributed, not localised. Touch any bioelectric splinter and the entire thing can stage a replay. ... So there's no certain way of knowing if this is happening now." He draws a question mark, lightly between [Charade's] breasts. "Or then," he says.

(Turner Hospital, *Charades*, 1989, pp. 191-192)

Memories, then, as texts, as the *only* texts, will play a vital (and inevitable) role in this nomadic, arts-based, narrative inquiry (what I call *The Postmodern Pedagogage*). They are part of 'me' and part of my ongoing 'making.' I will not try to hide them. I am a *process*, after all, not a final product or destination (Chambers, 1995); I am struggling towards my own *conscientisation*, as Paulo Freire (as cited in Tedlock, 2005, p. 468) might say, of becoming more fully human, of filling in the gaps, always adding to the sum total of 'me,' but of course *never* nearing completion or fully arriving (Chambers, 1995; Smyth et al., 2000, p. 80). As Derrida (2001, p. 112) suggests: "*We are not human enough, we are never human enough*" (my italics). Remember, too, that "eyewitness testimony from trustworthy observers [has] been seen as a convincing form of verification in law" (Angrosino, 2005, p. 730). These testimonies are based on memories and subjective accounts, on people's perceptions. Your job, if you want or need one, is to decide whether I am a trustworthy observer, a reliable witness, of my own life and my own research journey; whether my position in the text sways, convinces, or touches you; whether my ideologies and subjectivities adhere with or challenge your own; and whether my particular history—or *mystory*, as Susan Finley (2005, p. 690) and Ulmer (1989) might say: my background, upbringing,

Conscientisation:

Tedlock (2005, pp. 468-469) writes: "Paulo Freire theorized that this empowerment process, which he called *conscientization*, takes place whenever people recognize and act upon their own ideas rather than consuming the ideas of others. In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1973), he described how the process of *conscientization* occurs by means of dialogue, during which people share information on institutional injustices and challenge powerful interests so as to change their own everyday realities. Grass-roots participatory research grew out of this environment and became a strategy for groups lacking resources and power to work together to achieve political empowerment."

15

the hidden Void that permits all things and all meanings to have their day. Today Hell emerges from the depths and speaks its silent language. Today an invisible and unsayable agony testifies to its presence and absence. Today silence and invisibility become language.

Logocentrism, then, exposes and undermines all such hierarchies (where possible / where visible) and endeavours to bring them back to the level of consciousness. It does so for meaning-making and meaning-destroying purposes. This challenges the 'prose-privileging' university system and its prose economies (i.e. essays, theses, exegeses, tuto papers, etc) and reinstates non-verbal textualities into the meaning-making fold. Logocentrism is a call to critical arms and a shorthand reminder of the tyranny at the heart of all textual systems (including this one).

¹ The logocentric hierarchy

1. **The original Logos** (the first Word / of God)
2. **Thought** (considered closer to the original Word than all other inscriptions)

3. **Speech** (considered a more immediate representation than writing since the listener is present for the utterance and therefore closer to absolute meaning and the pure source)

4. **Writing** (considered an instrument and extension of speech and thought and lacking immediacy and presence)

² The term '**EiseJesus**' itself learns from Derrida's use of the term 'différance' by being homophonically identical to the term 'eisegesis' and therefore beyond the ability of the voice to distinguish it from its namesake. The speaker is forced to pronounce '**EiseJesus**' as it would 'eisegesis.' They cannot pronounce the 'red,' 'black,' or 'grey' in '**EiseJesus**' or articulate its monstrous qualities: they can only see these monstrosities in print. The term '**EiseJesus**' takes Derrida's notion further by adding colour and emphasis to different parts of the word to further emphasise its allegiance to 'writing' over 'speaking' and to further problematise the logocentric hierarchy of speech-over-writing, etc. It transcends the word-making boundaries of the traditional 'neologism' by using the sculptural and grotesque qualities of the 'neographism' (Spivak, as cited in Derrida, 1976, p. xliii). It's not just a word – it's a visual sculpture. It's a word attempting to become a MONSTER. It's a word attempting to become a hieroglyph. It's a word attempting to become a PICTURE!

And why not?

It's a WORD becoming a Picture.

43

'... all writing must ... be capable of functioning in the radical absence of every empirically determined receiver in general' (Hahn, *On Derrida*, 2002, p. 75).

The Medium is the Massage.

'If our data diet becomes too rich, we may starve ourselves of the emotional nutrition we get from actually being together in the same place, at the same time' (Mackay, *Advance Australia Where*, 2007, p. 113).

gender, race, privilege, voice, ideology, education, age, class, and so on—has anything relevant and meaningful to say to you, the reader.¹¹

[One final thought on memory and reality. *If I am standing in the middle of Main South Road facing Flinders University, but my memory is so vividly snagged on one particular night in my childhood, in the Riverland, near Blanchetown, that I am unaware of the cars around me and am hit, run over, and killed: am I more truly in Adelaide in 2007 or Blanchetown in 1974 when I die* (Turner Hospital, *Charades*, 1989, p. 191)?¹² / ¹³ Can I still die alongside my mother in 1974?

This question troubles me, and I think I know the answer...

Given, also, that "we can no longer treat words as if they are deeply and essentially *meaningful*" (St. Pierre, as cited in Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005, p. 968), and that "the words [themselves] don't give a fuck" (Derrida, 1986, p. 233), *you*, as interpreter, have to "assume the burden of meaning-making" (St. Pierre, as cited in Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005, pp. 968-969). A word that means one thing to me may mean another or nothing to you. I, too, pick and choose among the words I use and the worlds I explore: the 'evidence' I overlook, emphasise, discard, and omit. As Bochner (as cited in Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 747) points out: "Whether we apply language to ourselves [through narrative or autobiography] or to the world [through detached, anonymous, 'scientific' prose] there is always slippage, inexactness, indeterminacy [from the writer and the reader]." *Différance*, as Derrida might say.¹⁴ In other words, whether we write from an openly subjective position or write as *if* from a completely objective and

¹² The original quote goes like this: "If a woman stands in the middle of Massachusetts Avenue facing MIT, but her memory is so vividly snagged on one particular day of her childhood in the village of Le Raincy that she is unaware ... that she is *oblivious* to the cars around her and so is hit, run over, killed ... Is she more truly in Boston or in France when she dies?" (Turner Hospital, *Charades*, 1989, p. 191).



¹³ My mum before I was born – some time in the 1960s. I was on my way, not yet alive, still dead, but being planned, being imagined, between the woman in the slide and my dad, who didn't yet know he was walking into a life of tragedy and horror: *of absences the likes of which no physical battery or tangible object could ever shift or compare*. Absences, always absences. And memories. Mum-memories. Memories from 1974. That day. That impossible day. That day the world wobbled and our hearts broke. That day that won't end...

16

Heaven & Hell: letting hell speak

In *Songs of Innocence* (1789) and *Songs of Experience* (added in 1794), William Blake depicts the contrary states of human experience and the human soul (1992). Effectively, through these contrasting collections of poems, Blake marries 'heaven' and 'hell' in one paradoxical and bewildering worldview, a world where good and evil, beauty and ugliness, innocence and experience, and divinity and bestiality coexist in a stark and unified whole: where the full spectrum of human experience flourishes and perishes simultaneously. Without this balance, the picture would be incomplete and lopsided; a distorted and myopic fairytale that ignores much of the human story. Both states, it seems, are needed for meaning to occur. One without the other leads nowhere. Love without hate is meaningless. The 'lamb' and the 'tiger' must bleat and roar side-by-side for heaven and hell to appear in the abyss. Knowledge emerges through opposition and binary classifications; through juxtapositions; through *différance*; and each side, each extreme, bears the scars (or *traces*, as Derrida might say) of the 'other' for language to occur. I cannot

talk about 'love' without also alluding to 'hate.' It is there, beneath love, in the basement: a parallel universe, an alternate dimension, an echo from Hell. *The Antonym*.

The *anti-Christ*: the 'Other' of God. 'Infant Joy' and 'Infant Sorrow.'

Blake's texts and textual strategies also revel in contra(dicto)ry discourses and practices: in fiction and fact; art and science; image and word; paint and print; writing and publishing; symbolism and verbalism, *all* converging in the hand-painted, hand-etched, and hand-stitched book, *at once* (Abrams, 1993, p. 19). Blake, then, occupies both sides of the textual and meta-physical divide. He is both artist *and* writer, dreamer *and* researcher, inventor *and* technician, preacher *and* philosopher, believer *and* critic, myth-maker *and* historian, iconoclast *and* producer, and poet *and* publisher, *simultaneously*. In this sense, Blake could be described as an early practitioner of 'arts-based' inquiry (Finley, 2005) and 'applied grammatology' (Ulmer, 1985) – where the medium itself generates meaning and possibility. Where the medium *is* (part of) the message (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967; Ulmer, 1985). Where the 'visual' and the 'verbal' (the image and the idiom)

Difference: Ferdinand de Saussure claims that language works on differences between signs rather than references to extra-linguistic things. "If objects or ideas were knowable outside the signifiers that distinguished them from each other, Saussure argued, terms would have exact equivalents from one language to another, but since translation is so often a quest for approximations, meaning must depend on difference, not reference to things or concepts" (Belsey, *Poststructuralism*, 2002, pp. 8-13). In other words, "language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system" (ibid).

Media: 'Societies have always been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men communicate than by the content of the communication. ... All media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in their personal, political, economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical, and social consequences that they leave no part of us untouched, unaffected, unaltered. The medium is the message. Any understanding of social and cultural change is impossible without a knowledge of the way media work as environments' (McLuhan & Fiore, *The Medium is the Massage*, 1967, p. 1, p. 26).

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"'Iterability' is a key to the deconstructive view that utterances as repetitions (of the same) are always different and differing from other instances (of the same)" (Hahn, *On Derrida*, 2002, p. 77).

All media work us over completely.

'...grammatology involves a displacement of educational transmissions from the domain of truth to that of invention' (Ulmer, 1985, p. 179).

neutral position, everything we write (or perform or make into narrative) is *fiction* (Ellis, as cited in Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 755).

This text, then, is passing through multiple lenses and multiple filters – my own and yours (Chase, 2005). As Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (2005a, p. 21) point out: "Any gaze is always filtered through the lenses of language, gender, social class, race, and ethnicity. There are no objective observations, only observations socially situated in the worlds of – and between – the observer and the observed." Your task, perhaps, is to ask such questions as: 'How is this "text" ... this "column" ... this "mystory" ... this "EiseJesus" being staged?'; 'Who is the audience?'; 'How does the [artist] author claim (or disclaim) "authority"?'; 'Does the text inscribe ideology?'; 'Where is the [artist] author?'; 'Where am "I"?'; and 'Who are the subjects and objects of this research?' (Richardson, as cited in Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005, p. 973). The list could go on. Hopefully, by witnessing this narrative performance, you feel *implicated* by its substance and compelled to act in some way (Jones, 2005).

Even still, as many commentators on qualitative research point out, 'personal accounts *can* and *do* count' (Jones, 2005), and personal ethnographic texts *do* offer new material and new perspectives to an inquiry process previously more restricted in its scope than it is today (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005a; Ellis, 1997; Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Jones, 2005; Neumann, 1996). As Denzin and Lincoln (2005b, p. x) point out:

Experimental, reflexive ways of writing first-person ethnographic texts are now commonplace. Critical personal narratives have become a central feature of counter hegemonic, decolonizing methodologies. Sociologists, anthropologists, and educators con-

¹³ Finley (2005, p. 690) writes: "Mystory performances are personal cultural texts (e.g. narratives, paintings, poetry, music) that contextualize important personal experiences and problems within the institutional settings and historical moments where their authors (e.g. painters, collagists, dramatists) find themselves. They attempt to make sense of seemingly senseless moments in life, to capture frustrations and turmoil and open them for critical critique. They open a liminal space, and create an open and dialogic text, where a diverse group of people can be brought to collective understanding of the sites of power, of conflicts between the empowered and the powerless, and from this point of understanding can begin to address the need for social change."

¹⁴ The term '*différance*' combines 'the French for 'difference' and 'deferral'. It is used [by Derrida] to suggest both the Saussurean emphasis on meaning as the function of *differences* or contrasts within a network of terms, and also the endless *deferral* of any final fixed point or privileged, meaning-determining relationship with the extralinguistic world" (Blackburn, 2005, p. 100, my emphasis).

coalesce into a *picto-ideo-phonographic* Writing (Ulmer, 1985, p. 98), of a sort. And it is for this reason, 180 years after his death, that Blake appears in this text(ament) as a paragon of innovation and text production. The artist-pedagogue / the artist-researcher / the textographer *par excellence*.

William Blake (1757–1827)

In 1788, [Blake] began to experiment with relief etching, a method that he called "illuminated printing" and used to produce most of his books of poems. ... The pages printed from such plates were colored and stitched together to make up a volume. This process was laborious and time consuming, and Blake printed very few copies of his books; for example, of *Songs of Innocence and of Experience* twenty-eight copies (some of them incomplete) are known to exist...

It must be remembered that to read Blake's poem in a printed text is to see only an abstraction from an integral and mutually enlightening combination of words and design. ...

Since the mid-1920s, Blake has finally come into his own, both in poetry and painting, as one of the most dedicated, intellectually challenging, and astonishingly original of artists.

(Abrams, 1993, p. 19)

My objective as a text- and idea-producer, in something like the spirit of William Blake and Jacques Derrida, is to use both *bands* and both *sides* of

the human divide to create texts and pedagogical possibilities, not to negate and banish the previously privileged discourses of *rationalism* and *logic* (for instance), but to put them back in their place (as Derrida and Ulmer might say), shoulder-to-shoulder with the previously banished discourses of *irrationality* and *illogicality*. This doesn't so much reverse the (logocentric) hierarchy of 'order' over 'disorder' in the scholarly text, as invite *disorder* back into the textual and pedagogical fold – to wreak havoc as it may: to stir the commonsense and dislocate the commonplace. The learned professional makes way for the wily amateur, the once hidden *other-self* of the human psyche. The self banished to the home or left in the dream. The displaced self, buried beneath the 'signature' of others: *Levi Strauss*, *Calvin Klein*, *Nike*, *Bolle*, and *Sacchi*, etc.

The modernist project of banishing disorder, death, and uncertainty to the fringes, a 300 year crusade of war and indoctrination to domesticate and tame the beast (i.e. the psychopath within), can now be abandoned in the post-modern blur and consumer rat-race (Bauman, 1995). The exiled discourses can return to the blemished Promised Land (to dystopia), to up-set and disturb the previously established

"Professionalism is environmental. Amateurism is anti-environmental. Professionalism merges the individual into patterns of total environment. Amateurism seeks the development of the total awareness of the individual and the critical awareness of the groundrules of society. The amateur can afford to lose. The professional tends to classify and to specialize, to accept uncritically the groundrules of the environment. The groundrules provided by the mass response of his colleagues serve as a pervasive environment of which he is contentedly unaware. The 'expert' is the man who stays put" (McLuhan & Fiore, *The Medium is the Massage*, 1967, p. 93).

Poststructuralism is more useful in prompting the uncertainty

tinue to explore new ways of composing ethnography, writing fiction, drama, performance texts, and ethnographic poetry...

[And some of us choose to write in multiple columns and through multiple entries, using something akin to a picto-ideo-phonographic writing which includes multiple inscriptions and multiple textualities; where learning and research are as messy and provisional as the textual worlds they inhabit.]

This column—as a subjective narrative sidetrack, as an act of transformation and praxis (Freire, 1970/1996), as a hopeful interaction between me and you: two travellers meeting on the narrative plain/plane—can also be described as *picaresque*. According to one definition, ‘picaresque’ relates to ‘a type of fiction [appropriate here] in which the hero, a rogue [I can pass as the latter], goes through a series of episodic adventures [like this *EiseJe-sus*]’ (Collins *Australian Compact Dictionary*, 2003, p. 682). The main character is a *pizaro* or *pizaroon*. The *pizaroon* is a nomad, wayfarer, and stranger, lost and found in the chaos of day-to-day life, like me, as guide, passenger, subject, object, narrator, interpreter, and *bricoleur* (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005a, p. 4; Lévi-Strauss, 1966) of this textual adventure. However, unlike the *pizaro*, who usually remains emotionally and morally detached and superior during and following encounters, this ‘artist-researcher’ and ‘artist-pedagogue’ welcomes such encounters and the conversations, transformations, and emotions evoked at the time. I will endeavour to interrupt and challenge my own sense of moral superiority, my own authority and dogma, and let my (de)evolution take place. I will surrender to the inevitability of this metamorphosis and the uncertainty of travel per se. *I will run headfirst towards the Abyss*.

The PICARO is not dissimilar to Bauman’s postmodern TOURIST who floats moral responsibility by seeing the world and its people in AESTHETIC and EPI-SODIC terms.

Bricoleur & Bricolage

Denzin and Lincoln (2005a) write: “A *bricoleur* makes by ‘adapting the bricoles of the world’. *Bricolage* is ‘the poetic making do’ with ‘such bricoles’ – the odds and ends, the bits left over. The *bricoleur* is a ‘Jack of all trades, a kind of professional do-it-yourself.’ In their work, *bricoleurs* define and extend themselves. Indeed, the *bricoleur*’s life story, or biography, ‘may be thought of as a *bricolage*’” (p. 4).

And: “The interpretive *bricoleur* understands that research is an interactive process shaped by his or her own personal history, biography, gender, social class, race, and ethnicity, and by those of the people in the setting” (p. 6).

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Intentional Fallacy: Poststructuralists typically dismiss statements of intention by authors, since it is the text that speaks and not the author. Clearly, for a person like myself trying to make a post-modern and poststructural text, it is doubly problematic to be asked to write a statement of intention via the exegesis given that it is the reader that activates the text and a public language which speaks the text. Given, too, that I have a lot riding on this text (and PhD project) you can be sure I will say almost anything to gain the qualification of PhD. Can you therefore trust anything I say given that I’m not speaking from a place of complete ‘honesty’ and ‘trust’ but am held to ransom by the assessment process and the university institution? This is the dilemma of the exegesis and any assessment task.

order-machine (the positivist paradise). Natural anarchy is freed from the unconscious abyss from whence it was stowed (Bauman, 1995). And we stare once again, wide-eyed and aghast, full-face, at the terror of *non-existence* and *uncertainty*, knowing full well that **we will die** and that **we are mad**. In the glass, the face of insanity stares back, unmasked. S-k-e-l-e-t-a-l.

Without Coca Cola to rot our teeth and give us life, *we are nothing*.

This text, then, will not set out to banish the discourses that modernism and contemporary consumer-capitalism set out to obliterate (Bauman, 1995). It will not build a structured argument over empty foundations. It will not present a coherent argument to stave off entropy. It will not pretend to speak from one point in time (i.e. the textual moment), or from one cogent and confident perspective (i.e. the cohesive me). *It will not set out to answer any question at all*. No. But it will set out to generate possibilities and to explore curiosities that appear in the texts themselves; to rummage through the bric-a-brac of postmodern life for useful pedagogical and textual scraps, for odds-and-sods that may help the vagabondage (the *pedagondage*) to come. *Not* for answers, *not* for certain-

ties, but for *possibilities*, for *openings*, for gaps in reason. For another way through. Another perspective.

That being the case, I intend, where possible, to privilege *disorder* over *order*; *irrationality* over *rationality*; *unconsciousness* over *consciousness*; *form* over *content*; *affection* over *cognition*; *creation* over *reproduction*; *spontaneity* over *predictability*; *frames* over *structures*; *ambiguity* over *authority*; *dilettantism* over *expertise*; *constructivism* over *transmission*; *amateur* over *professional*; *lay knowledge* over *academic knowledge*; *critical* over *uncritical*; *art* over *science*; *disunity* over *unity*; the *polyglot* over the *specialist*; the *poetic* over the *prosaic*; *chaos* over *order*; *ambivalence* over *certainty*; *possibility* over *impossibility*; *madness* over *sanity*; *surrealism* over *realism*; *incoherence* over *coherence*; *knock-offs* over *masterpieces*; *emotion* over *logic*; *borders* over *centres*; *fear* over *bravery*; *spiritual* over *commercial*; *anarchy* over *polity*; *artist* over *author*; *immature* over *mature*; *silly* over *serious*; *fun* over *monotony*; *idiocy* over *sensibility*; *garage* over *corporate*; *grunge* over *design* (and so on); the *ridiculous*, *absurd*, *stupid*, *droll*, and *unthinkable*. OUT-LOUD.

But rest assured: *this will not be easy*.

‘But the language poststructuralism puts forward – on the basis, of course, in the first instance, of a study of language itself – is more useful in prompting the uncertainty of questions than in delivering the finality of answers’ (Belsey, *Poststructuralism*, 2002, p. 107).

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“Intentional Fallacy signifies what is claimed to be the error of interpreting and evaluating a literary work by reference to evidence, outside the text itself, for the intention—the design and purposes—of its author” (Abrams, *Glossary of Literary Terms*, 2005, p. 134). In other words, we need to look only at the text to see what intentions are at play, and treat with suspicion any statements of intention by authors, who are themselves constructed through language and who have vested interests in the claims they make and the silences they protect.

‘[Derrida expresses reservations] about strategies of reversal which aim only to make high what was low; to raise the status of what has been devalued. His aim is to disrupt [such] ideals ... rather than fix them’ (Deutscher, *How to Read Derrida*, 2005, p. 47).


of questions than in delivering the finality of answers.

“Characteristically, deconstruction reverses the priority or privileging of mental experience over speech and speech over writing, as it is the advent of signs that opens the possibility of any ‘mental experience’ that we would identify with thought:

Learning is palimpsest,
is bricolage.

Dr Quincey queries: ‘What else than a natural and mighty palimpsest is the human brain? Such a palimpsest, oh reader! is yours. Everlasting layers of ideas, images, feelings, have fallen upon your brain softly as light. Each succession has seemed to bring all that went before. And yet, in reality, not one has been extinguished... Yes, reader, countless are the mysterious handwritings of grief or joy which have been inscribed upon the palimpsest of your brain’ (as told to me by Christine, personal communication, 2007, citing De Quincey, ‘The Palimpsest of the Human Brain,’ 1845).

The concept of *palimpsest* can be added here. Although used primarily to describe a manuscript or medium on which successive texts have been written and erased to make room for other texts (applicable to this text and this method of inquiry), I wish to extend the concept to include the writing and re-writing of texts that make up the ‘manuscript’ of self. These texts, as mystories, as narratives, as (potential) identities, are constantly being re-constructed, re-created, and over-lain by new ideas, practices, habits, experiences, obsessions, interests, and emotions. Add to the notion of palimpsest the notion of *ekphrasis* (Jones, 2005, p. 769) and we can further extend the journey-evolution-transformation metaphor. Ekphrastic works “are meditations on others’ creative acts” (Scott, as cited in Jones, 2005, p. 769). This text, this artist, this author, me and my various selves, and you as reader and witness, all ponder and absorb the creative acts and endeavours of others. We are bombarded by them, made from them, liberated and contained by them. We are involved, knowingly or unknowingly, in ekphrasis now. Taken further, “ekphrasis describes our attempts to translate and transmute an experience to text and text to experience[.] Ekphrasis ‘breathes words into the mute picture; [and] it makes pictures out of the suspended words of its text’” (Scott, as cited in Jones, 2005, p. 769). Basically, ekphrasis is about how we translate experiences into representations (e.g. anecdotes, images, prose, performances, gestures – *texts*) and how we translate representations (back) into experiences and actions (e.g. how we carry them into our lives). This text attempts to do these things. It thinks of itself as a *picaresque* adventure, a form of *palimpsest* and (re)creation, and as an example of *ekphrasis* and translation, where experience and representation cross back and forth from one to the other and occupy places and spaces between binaries and destinations,



Ekphrasis / Praxis

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for my indoctrination through language, order, and culture has been as blood-deep and thorough as yours, and even now, in this text, in this sentence, order is imposing itself and logic is gathering, and meaning is building where anarchy was meant to un-ravel and de-rail (not prevail). This is how thoroughly steeped in convention and conformity I am, and how vigilant and irresponsible I will need to be for Hell to speak and gesture in a world that sets its weight against the kinds of realities and kinds of texts I can possibly conceive and possibly produce. A world that blocks its ears to unreason. So even while consciously privileging the voices of Hell, the voices of Heaven are shouting down their foes, but this needn’t stop me trying. Let’s face it: certain types of minds and certain types of thinking are rewarded and promoted in university and social systems, while the ‘obscene’ and ‘revolting’ are penalised and demoted: and it is these privileged ways of seeing, being, thinking, and acting that will shape the infrastructure and curricula of things to come—and therefore the shape of seeing, being, thinking, and acting in the years ahead. Unless, of course, new spaces (of mind, thought, action, and expression) are opened up for new voices to fill and new texts to occupy; for Hell to offer up its malign

secrets and extend the mess in new directions; for Hell to be recast as equal to, not below, Heaven.

For Hell to speak at all over the elevator-music of privatised and deregulated neo-liberal life.

Textament: The term textament combines the terms ‘text’ (used in the postmodern sense: gestures, images, words, faces, movements, sounds, settings, landscapes, and any phenomenon that can be *read, witnessed, or interpreted*) and ‘testament’ (used in the biblical sense: tablets, fragments, commandments, testimonies, proofs, and Biblical books). ‘Text’ and ‘testament’ are considered complementary and oppositional terms—the old and the new—compressed to form a new word with old meanings and hybrid agendas; a marriage of heaven and hell where *Hell speaks and the tiger roars*. Once combined, the two words point to an oxymoronic genre: a textament: a *Manifesto of Anarchy*; or the *Scripto-Biblical Manifesto* (hence putting the **Jesus** back into ‘eise**Jesus**’).

The Bedlam Books.

The Muddy-Water Scrolls.

He(II)aven.

Derrida (2001, p. 115): “One usually thinks that literature, I mean the modern concept of literature, the modern institution of literature, is a secular institution, that it is desacralised. I tried to show [in *Donner la mort*] that in fact literature keeps a secret filiation with this sacred, sacrificial situation and asks for forgiveness, that every literary text in a certain way asks for forgiveness for betraying this filiation, for betraying the sacredness from which it comes.”

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Without signs (‘writing’ or ‘speech’) there is ... no possibility of the appearance of ‘self-presence’ because the presence in self-presence is that of a ‘speaking subject’ to itself requiring the ‘supplementation’ of language...” (Hahn, *On Derrida*, 2002, pp. 85-86).

Applied
grammatol-
ogy collapses
the distinc-
tion (opposi-
tion /
hierarchy)
between
critical-
theoretical
reflection and
creative prac-
tice (Ulmer,
1985, p. 225).

thereby "collapsing the distinction between *teaching*, *re-search*, and *art*" (Ulmer, 1985, p. 27, my italics) and producing 'messy' textualities (Marcus, 1998).

This column has not turned out as I expected. It has undergone many revisions and additions in the 18 months I have been re-drafting it. Very few words and sentences remain from the first draft. Through successive drafts and through successive twists and turns, the text has taken on new materials, new guises, and new routes, while discarding, shedding, and ignoring others. It operates alongside and in-between other texts, columns, and entries. New selves arise and old ones fall away. I am inventing myself as I go along. A new 'me' is emerging. A new path beckons. A new text evolves from earlier texts, which leave their impressions, stains, and whispers in the margins: or *traces*, as Derrida might say. What this textual process is leading to and what it has been discovering and grappling with all along, is finding a voice that draws upon art and science, literature and philosophy, image and idiom, touring and vagabondage, experience and representation, and me and the world. It has stumbled upon the *messy text*, the *autoethnographic voice*, and *The Postmodern Pedagogdage* as evocative ways of meeting this challenge and opening up possibilities in and beyond the text. It is about the *self* and about the *world* – and about the *spaces* in-between. It is about *messy textualities* (hybrid voices and genres), *autoethnography* (personal-cultural-writings), and *pedagondage* (a drifting-touring-pedagogy) as suitable methods of (re)searching and learning in the postmodern age.

As the inspiration for the journey metaphor, Chambers (1995, p. 25, my emphasis) ¹⁹ can speak again on my behalf:

Messy texts:

According to Marcus (1998), the 'messy' text is "the most complex and interesting form of experimentation with ethnographic writing now being produced" (p. 187). "Messy texts are messy because they insist on their own open-endedness, incompleteness, and uncertainty about how to draw a text / analysis to a close. Such open-endedness often marks a concern with an ethics of dialogue and partial knowledge, a sense that a work is incomplete without critical, and differently positioned, responses to it by its (ideally) varied readers" (p. 189). "I find them interesting as *symptoms* of a struggle to produce, within the given formats and practices of analytic writing, unexpected connections and thus new descriptions of old realities and, in so doing, to critically displace sets of representations that no longer seem to account for the worlds we thought we knew, or at least could name" (p. 189).

Autoethnography:

Tedlock (2005, p. 467) writes: "Authors working in the genre [of autoethnography] attempted to heal the split between public and private realms by connecting the autobiographical impulse (the gaze inward) with the ethnographic impulse (the gaze outward). Autoethnography at its best is a cultural performance that transcends self-referentiality by engaging with cultural forms that are directly involved in the creation of culture. The issue becomes not so much distance, objectivity, and neutrality as closeness, subjectivity, and engagement. This change in approach emphasizes relational over autonomous patterns, interconnectedness over independence, translucence over transparency, and dialogue and performance over monologue and reading."

20

Neo-liberalism

"In Sheila Slaughter's summary of the neoliberal credo of our times, market forces that are 'impersonal, disembodied, and inexorable' supplant 'national economies with a global market', and the territorial nation-states are expected, and pressed, to free capital and corporations from regulation and allow them 'to operate unfettered'; 'the only acceptable role of the state is that of global police officer and judge, patrolling the edges of the playing field and adjudicating trading infractions and transgressions'" (Bauman, *Society Under Siege*, 2002, p. 232).

RATIONALISM

'And what do you want to be when you grow up, Johnny?' asks the old man.

'That's easy: an *executive*!' cries the boy. 'Executives don't have to worry about moral responsibility. In fact, moral responsibility is very bad for business. It's a lot easier to live in the *absence* of moral responsibility than with it. My dad says so,' says the boy, almost by rote, looking up seriously into the eyes of his inquisitor.

'That's the spirit,' says Prime Minister Howard with a friendly pat on the boy's shoulder, and smiling at the flashing cameras. 'It's your bottom line you need to worry about: *that's* what makes people happy.'

The Prime Minister takes the opportunity to survey the classroom of little bodies (the people-in-waiting, the children of tomorrow's service industries, the poor mainly), to let the cameras do their work.

But the boy hasn't finished; he remains standing before the king, ready to impress him. He clears his little mechanical throat and continues:

'My dad says it has very little to do with the people, sir, or happiness; not for the poor, at least. It's only the top third that have any fun, if crushing people and destroying the planet is considered fun, sir, and that's why my

dad loves it so much. He says the rich deserve to rape the poor, and that it's economically right—*rational*—for him to screw over my mum and not pay child support. He says it's to your credit that you are hell bent on crushing the poor, sir.'

But the Prime Minister is far too busy for this line of praise, and has already bolted to another corner of the room, where he scoops up a little girl, a future pole-dancer, and kisses her with all the might of someone who really cares; and the little boy's industrious speech is left in his wake, lost on deaf ears.

But the boy will have his revenge, he suddenly decides, one day, when the miserable old toad is little more than an exotic dinosaur in a history book, condemned as a madman and pirate (not like Robin Hood). And the boy plans to write this book. To show that the tiger-dressed-as-a-lamb is still a tiger, a predator, blood-thirsty and mean, no matter how earnest the spin and how well acted the part.

The Prime Minister, he thinks, is a man with blood on his hands (like Lady Macbeth). A man who uses all the discourses of Heaven to justify Hell on earth.

He wonders: 'Did he who made the Lamb make thee?' (Blake, 'The Tyger,' 1794/1992).

'We might ... find that home renovations have not, in the end, satisfied our quest for the meaning of life' (Mackay, 2007, p. 300).

48

'Humans are, on the whole, more irrational than rational; more driven by emotion than reason; more hormonal than cerebral. So any economic system that assumes an outcome based on rational behaviour is flawed from the start' (Mackay, *Advance Australia Where*, 2007, p. 276).

ADIAPHORIZATION