Ulmer (1985, p. 213) suggests that: ‘One of the chief lessons of Lacan’s discourse for a nonmagisterial pedagogy is its exploitation of linguistic and symbolic devices, addressing the class in the poetic mode of evocation as well as in the scientific mode of assertion’ (my italics), thereby drawing upon art and science to enrich the grammatical endeavour.

...
Derrida’s ‘arche-writing’ broadens the concept of writing (e.g. letters and words on paper) to include all manner of inscriptions, including thought, uttered, gestured, felt, and smelt texts. In this sense memories are texts.

Memories, as narratives, as inscriptions, as opportunities, will find this narrative inquiry (Chase, 2005). Everything suggested is composed of memories — even the narrative and spontaneous inventions constructed on the page. At this moment, right now, all have their origins in memory, and in the mounting of these fragments into new constructions as I travel forth and transform my world through ‘nomadic’ inquiry (St. Pierre, as cited in Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005). For me, no matter how partial and incomplete memories may be, they still have something very important to tell me about the world and how I move through it. Memories are ubiquitous, and inevitable, and should inform the inquiry process to give evidence: “From this perspective, any narrative [any memory, any text] is significant because itembodies — and gives us insight into — what is possible and intelligible within a specific social context” (Chase, 2005, p. 657). This way, memories are invited in, encouraged, provoked, critiqued, deconstructed, and reconsidered in the various guises (Chase, 2005).

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Bourdieu and Passeron: “Thus, all university norms, though self-constituted, prevail over the selection of students as well as the choice which governs the production of knowledge which are not simply scientific works, always tend to favour the success, at least within the institutions of a model type of man and woman defined by a double negation: intellectuality without originality and heaviness without scientific weight. Any attempt to tamper with this model must consider that it is the nature of disciplinary organization to be homogeneous to exclude any practice that does not reproduce the legitimacy of the system (Derrida, 2001, p. 77).”

Derrida (2001, p. 110): “What you need deconstruction for is to undo a number of presuppositions and prejudices and so on…”

The process ofehpe-anthing, speaking in tongues, traveling through time, questioning selves and traversing realms that quite inevitably occur over and over again even the most robust researcher (and reader). In this case, the researcher is no (and you, by implication, as artist and author, learner and teacher and subject and object of this transformation. Surely a compass is needed to prevent me (and you) from losing your way and one is provided, in each sentence, comma, full stop, word, and sign that I use or ignore, decisions framing devices, and editing choices are made at every point, consciously and unconsciously, depending on my own semantic and grammatical prejudices and preferences; in my collection of memories and understandings, too, the ‘texts’ and ‘fictions’ that have helped inform and define me, in all manner of things that have gone into putting my mental and
We cannot get ‘outside’ of language.

... physical landscape(s) together; these things guide and direct me in everything I do. They also limit me. This process is happening regardless of my conscious presence or my conscious attention; it happens through being in and of the world; it happens through language, reflection, and the activity of invention. It happens through living, dreaming, loving, and screaming.

I mean to watch this process for a time, to listen to the voices, to test the emotions and to trap some of the outcomes—like this column—which was meant to be about memory and subjectivity (i.e., prior knowledge) but which has veered off in all manner of meaning-making directions and naive understandings. I am not at this moment, somewhat startled, a little disoriented, but also excited and excited by what I may find and where I may wander. I am making my own meaning, colonizing my own conditioned, and creating my own course through the multiple discourses (cyborg narrativization, practices, cultural differences), and feelings (relief, fulfillment of mind, emotion, and etc.). I am exploring my consciousness, my white consciousness, my white unconscious, and making new meanings, new narratives, and new subjectivities from the white and green gathered on the way. I am compacting evidence that I find compelling. As Kathy Chomaran (2005, p. 529) suggests:

No qualitative method rests on pure induction—the questions we ask of the empirical world from which we draw our data. In short, we are constructing what we observe as data. Similarly, our conceptual categories arise through our interpretations of data rather than examining phenomena.

My experiences with memory, recollection, and the present moment are like Lucy’s in The Last Magician (Turner Hospital, 1995). Given that this fictional character can expand.

Arts-based Inquiry

Finley (2005) writes: "In arts-based research, paradigms for making meaning in the contextual realms of art and social science collide, coalesce, restructure to become something that is not strictly identifiable as either art or science" (p. 844).

And: “A primary concern for arts-based researchers is how to make the best use of their hybrid, boundary-crossing approaches to inquiry to bring about culturally situated, political aesthetics that are responsive to social dilemmas” (p. 651).

And: “Aspects of intertextuality form the basis for interdisciplinary identity. In the hybrid that connects ‘arts’ and ‘based’ is a textual reference to the arts as a basis for something else, something that is ‘not art.’ Connecting artistic activities in arts and research is one of the fundamental acts of intertextual reading that forms the foundation for arts-based research...” (p. 686).

But, Derrida holds, all signifying practice, all language, is structurally or systematically open to this errancy by virtue of its irrationality or iterability (Mann, On Derrida, 2002, p. 72).

Derrida disputes this hierarchy and argues that all utterances (whether written, spoken, or thought) are actually forms of "writing" in the broadest sense; they are all formations—alwaysdistorted—from an untraceable and unknowable origin—the Logos, the original Word—which permits out in an endless array of signs, meanings, and shifting contexts. All signs, in this process, are contingent on other signs and other contexts for meaning, and dispersal, which is to say that no intention (no word, no letter, no sentence, no thought, no utterance, no inscription, no text, etc.) is open this same space. Not only inscriptions, but the whole context, is always inscribed and dispersed. All signs (spoken, written, or thought) are traces (ghosts) of an absent presence, an endless series of differences and inscriptions that make no sign or are nonexistent and permanently unstable. Signs, then, stand in for the thing-they replace the thing—that is absent. They cultivate meaning through differences from each other (as Saussure might say) rather than from reference to things in the world (e.g. black can only be black in association with its contrary: white). This phenomenon of meaning-making through endless differences (between signs) and differences (of meaning and context) is summarized by the Derridean term difference—a word that can only be recognised (seen) in its written form (as difference) since the spoken form cannot distinguish between difference with an a and difference with an e (as homophones). And that’s Derrida’s point: to put speech back in its place by showing that writing, in its narrow sense, is not the servant or instrument of speech, but a meaning-making system in its own right. It generates an ‘a’ in difference that cannot be heard or uttered through speech. In that sense, something that is written means something that is spoken. If speech is a synonym for meaning, then writing is a synonym for meaning. Writing emerges from the semantic system of language, meaning-making, and meaning-making. They are all inscriptions signing the thing-in-speech. An inscription is closer to the absent thing than the real. No inscription is present or more absent. They are all equally distant from the original presence and the original logos. They all stand or fall against the ‘abuse’ presence but are not that presence (e.g. ‘Apostles’ stands in for the person [not] but is not that person). In short, they are all tools: thought-tools, speech-tools, and written-tools, with no more claims to truth and certainty...
We seem to have moved from a speech-centric world through a prose-centric world to an image-centric world to a number-centric world. Bureaucratically speaking, universities have moved from knowledge-centric institutions to number-centric economies; academically speaking, they remain prose-centric ('publish or perish' is the catchcry) but only so as to secure funding.

"No one but the tourist is so blatantly, conspicuously dissolved in numbers, interchangeable, depersonalized" (Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics*, 1993 / 1995, p. 242).

A writing that is not structurally readable—iterable—beyond the death of the addressee would not be writing" (Hahn, *On Derrida*, 2002, p. 75).

"Derrida argues that language, always involves display, deferral of meaning, ambiguity, some degree of the speaker's distance, the possibility of confusion, deception, and unreliability, all factors that Plato considered negative. Rather than lamenting these facets of language—Derrida regards them as integral to it. Without the play of these elements, there would be no language." (Deutscher, *How to Read Derrida*, 2005, pp. 13-14).
It’s a WORD becoming a Picture.

The central problem for poststructuralist education—how to deconstruct this function of imitation in the pedagogic function—

(Chomsky, 1985, p. 174).

...all writing must be capable of functioning in the radical absence of every empirically determined receiver in general


The logocentric hierarchy
1. The original Logos (the first word of God)
2. Thought (considered closer to the original Word than all other inscriptions)
3. Speech (considered a more "mediated" representation than printing since the listener is present for the utterance and therefore closer to absolute meaning and the pure source)
4. Writing (considered an instrument and extension of speech and thought and lacking immediacy and presence)

The hidden Void that permits all things and all meanings to have their day. Today Hall emerges from the depths and speaks its silent language. Today an invisible and un-encapsulated language tuberculosis to its presence and absence. Today silence and invisibility became language.

Reading in hypertext is not necessarily sequential or continuous, but discontinuous, non-linear, and associative. Because the reader is now part of the text, the act of reading becomes correspondingly "queer." ([Snyder, Hypernarrative, 1998, p. 88])

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Conceptualization:

Tedlock (2005, pp. 468-469) writes: "Paulo Freire theorized that this empowerment process, which he called conscientization, takes place whenever people recognize and act upon their own ideas rather than consuming the ideas of others. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1973), he described how the process of conscientization occurs by means of dialogue, during which people share information on institutional injustices and challenge powerless individuals so as to change their own everyday realities. Grassroots participatory research grew out of this concern and became a strategy for groups to question, resist, and empower, to achieve political empowerment."

Remember, too, that "openness to potentially meaningful observations (has) been seen as a convenient form of ventriloquist in law" (Aronson, 2003, p. 730). These testimonies are based on memory and subjective accounts, on people's perceptions. Your job, if you want or need one, is to create whether I am a trustworthy observer, a reliable witness of my own life and my own research journey, whether my position in the text sways, convinces, or touches you whether my ideologies and subjectivities adhere with or challenge your own, and whether my particular history—or mystery, as Susan Finley (2005, p. 860) and Ulmer (1988) might say: my background, upbringing,
If our data diet becomes too rich, we may starve ourselves of the emotional nutrition we get from actually being together in the same place, at the same time” (Mackay, Advance Australia Where, 2007, p. 113).

“The Medium is the Massage.”

Heaven & Hell:

In Stories of Francesco (1778) and Songs of Experience (aided in 1794), William Blake depicts the contrary states of human experience and the human soul (1952). Effectively, through these contrasting collections of poems, Blake moves from heaven and hell in one paradoxical and bewilder- ing wandering, a world where good and evil, beauty and ugliness, intelligence and experience, poverty and prosperity, city and country coexist in a short and united whole where the full spectrum of human experience is conveyed and perceived simultaneously. Within this balance, the picture would be incomplete and disjointed: a distorted and myopic fairyland that ignores much of the human story. Both states, however, are needed for meaning to occur. One without the other leaves nowhere. Love without hate is meaningless. The lamb and the tiger must exist and never altogether be for heaven and hell to appear in the abyss. Knowledge emerges through opposition and binary classifications; through difference, and each side, each extreme, bears the scars for lack of balance might pass by the other for language to occur. I cannot talk about ‘love’ without also studying ‘terror’ in its various, interact- ing form. In this sense, Blake could be described as an early practi- tioner of ‘arts-based’ inquiry (Finlay, 2005) and ‘applied grammaticology’ (Ulmer, 1985) where the medium itself generates meaning and possi- bility. Where the medium is part of the message (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967, Ulmer, 1985), where the ‘medium’ is the medium and the verbal (the image and the ideas)

Media: ‘Societies have always been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men communi- cate than by the content of the communication. … All media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in their personal, political, economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical, and social consequences that they leave no part of us untouched, unacted, unaffected.” The medium is the message. Any understanding of social and cultural change is impossible without a knowledge of the way media work as environments’ (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967, p. 1, p. 26).

‘… the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.”

Barthes

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‘The Medium is the Massage.’

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grammar involves a displacement of educational evaluations from the domain of truth to that of invention (Ulmer, 1985, p. 179).

This text then is piecing through multiple lenses and multiple filters - my own and yours (Chase, 2005). As Donnay and Yorronna Lincoln (2005a, p. 21) point out: "Any gaze is always filtered through the lenses of language, gender, social class, race, and class. There are no objective observations, only observations socially situated in the words of - and between - the observer and the observed. Your task, perhaps, is to ask such questions as: How is this "text"... this "column"... this "mystery"... this "Elian" being staged? "Who is the audience?" "How does the (artist) author draw (or civic)?" 'authority'? Does the text invoke ideology? Where is the (artist) author? 'Where am I'?; and: Who are the subjects and objects of this research?" (Richards and B. Barnes, 2005, p. 973). The list could go on. Hopefully, by witnessing this narrative performance, you feel implicated by its substance and compelled to act in some way (Jones, 2005).

Even still, as many commentators on qualitative research point out, personal accounts can and do occur (Jones, 2005), and personal empathetic texts do offer new material and new perspectives to an inquiry process previously more restrained in its scope than it's today (Donnay & Lincoln, 2005a; Ells, 1997; Ellis & Bohaner, 2001; Jones, 2005; Nunnamark, 1998). As Donnay and Lincoln (2005b, p. 30) point out:

"Exemplars, whether ways of writing transpersonal ethnographic texts are nonexistent. Critical self-awareness involving a control of conscious hegemonies, describing methodological, sociological, anthropological, and existential.
"Intentional Fallacy signifies what is claimed to be the error of interpreting and evaluating a literary work by reference to evidence, outside the text itself, for the intentions—the design and purposes—of its author" (Abrams, Glossary of Literary Terms, 2005, p. 134). In other words, we need to look only at the text to see what intentions are at play, and treat with suspicion any statements of intention by authors, who are themselves constructed through language and who have vested interests in the claims they make and the silences they protect.

Intentional Fallacy

Poststructuralists typically dismiss statements of intention by authors, since it is the text that speaks and not the author. Clearly, for a person like myself trying to make a postmodern and poststructural text, it is doubly problematic to be asked to write a statement of intention via the exegesis given that it is the reader that activates the text and a public language which speaks the text. Given, too, that I have a lot riding on this text (and PhD project) you can be sure I will say almost anything to gain the qualification of PhD. Can you therefore trust anything I say given that I'm not speaking from a place of complete 'honesty' and 'trust' but am held to ransom by the assessment process and the university institution? This is the dilemma of the exegesis and any assessment task.

But the language poststructuralism puts forward — on the basis, of course, in the first instance, of a study of language itself — is more useful in prompting the uncertainty of questions than in delivering the finality of answers (Belsey, Poststructuralism, 2002, p. 107).

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This column—as a subjective narrative rhapsody, as an act of transmission and persiflage (Fréme, 1970/’93), as a hopeful interaction between me and you—two travellers meeting on the narrative plains/plan—can also be described as a postscript. According to one definition, a postscript (also postscriptum) typically disclaims statements of intention by authors, since it is the text that speaks and not the author. Clearly, for a person like myself trying to make a postmodern and poststructural text, it is doubly problematic to be asked to write a statement of intention via the exegesis given that it is the reader that activates the text and a public language which speaks the text. Given, too, that I have a lot riding on this text (and PhD project) you can be sure I will say almost anything to gain the qualification of PhD. Can you therefore trust anything I say given that I'm not speaking from a place of complete 'honesty' and 'trust' but am held to ransom by the assessment process and the university institution? This is the dilemma of the exegesis and any assessment task.

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"One usually thinks that literature, I mean the modern concept of literature, the modern institution of literature, is a secular institution; that it is desacralised. I tried to show [in *Donner la mort*] that in fact literature keeps a secret filiation with this sacred, sacrificial situation and asks for forgiveness, that every literary text in a certain way asks for forgiveness for betraying this filiation, for betraying the sacredness from which it comes."

Dr Quincey queries: ‘What else than a natural and mighty palimpsest is the human brain? Such a palimpsest, oh reader! is yours. Evolving layers of ideas, images, feelings, have fallen upon your brain softly as light. Each succession has seemed to bring all that went before and yet, in reality, not one has been extinguished… Yes, reader, countless are the mysterious handwritings of grief or joy which have been inscribed upon the palimpsest of your brain’ (as told to me by Christine, personal communication, 2007, citing De Quincey, *The Palimpsest of the Human Brain*, 1845).

Elphíphras / Praxis

The concept of palimpsest can be added here. Although used primarily to describe a manuscript or medium on which successful texts have been written and erased to make room for other texts (applicable to this text and this method of inquiry), I wish to extend the concept to include the writing and re-writing of texts that make up the manuscript of self. These texts as mysteries, as narratives, as (potential) identities, are constantly being re-constructed, re-created, and over-taken by new ideas, practices, habits, experiences, information, events, and more. Until the notion of palimpsest the notion of elphíphras (Jones, 2000, p. 79) and we can further extend this journey-evolution-transformation metaphor. Elphíphras works ‘as meditations on others’ creative acts’ (Scott as cited in Jones, 2005, p. 769). This text, this artist, this author, me and my various selves, and you as reader and writer, will wonder and adore the creative acts and endeavors of others. We are bombarded by them, made from them, known and contained by them. We are involved, knowingly or unknowingly, in elphíphras now. Taken further, ‘elphíphras describes our attempts to translate and transmute an experience to text and text to experience’ (Ekphrasis breathes words into the mute picture, [and it makes pictures out of the suspended words of its text] (Scott as cited in Jones, 2005, p. 769). Elphíphras expresses ideas and manner of experience into representations (e.g. anecdotes, images, prose performances, gestures – touch) and how these transformed representations (back into experiences and actions (e.g. how we carry them into our lives). This text attempts to do these things. It thinks of itself as a palimpsest adventure, a form of palimpsest and recuperation, and as an example of ekphrasis and translation, where experience and representation cross back and forth from one to the other and occupy places and spaces between stories and destinations.

Characteristically, deconstruction reverses the priority or privileging of mental experience over speech and speech over writing, as it is the advent of signs that opens the possibility of any ‘mental experience’ that we would identify with thought.

Ekphrasis / Praxis

for my indoctrination through language, order, and culture has been so blood-deep and thorough as yours, and even now, in this text, in this sentence, order is imposing itself and logic is gathering, and meaning is building where anarchy was meant to universal and de-rail (not prevail). This is how thoroughly steeped in convention and conformity I am, and how vigilant and irresponsible I will need to be for Hell to speak and gesture in a way that sets its weight against the kinds of realities and kinds of texts I can possibly conceive and possibly produce. A word that brooks its ears to reason. So when the palimpsest in which the voices of Hell are shouting down their love, this need not stop me living. Let’s face it certain types of minds and certain types of thinking are revered and promoted in university and social systems, while the ‘transcendental and revelatory’ are penalised and demoted and it is these privileged ways of seeing, being, thinking, and acting that will shape the infrastructure and curricula of things to come—and therefore the ways of seeing, being, thinking, and acting in the years ahead. Unless, of course, new spaces (of mind, thought, action, and expression) are opened up for new voices to fill and new texts to occupy, for Hell to offer up its inscribed secrets and seal the mana in new directions; for Hell to be reconstituted as equal to, not below, Heaven.

For Hell to speak at all over the elevation of privated and derogated non-liberal life.

Testament: The term testament combines the forms ‘testa’ (based in the postmodern sense gestures, images, words, faces, movements, sounds, sensations, and any phenomenon that can be read, witnessed, and performed) and ‘witness’ (based in the Judeo-Christian tradition of God’s promises to the covenant peoples, promises to the ancient, prophetic, and Biblical books). ‘Testa’ and ‘witness’ are considered complimentary and oppositional terms—the old and the new—compressed to form a new word with old meanings and hybrid agendas, a marriage of heaven and earth that opens the space and the higher space. Once combined, the two words point to an apocalyptic genre, a testament: the Manifesto of Anarchy or the Scopato-rectoral awareness (hence putting the Jesus back into **Jesus**).

The Bedlam Books:
Neo-liberalism

In Sheila Slaughter’s summary of the neoliberal credo of our times, market forces that are ‘impersonal, disembodied, and inexorable’ supplant ‘national economies with a global market’, and the territorial nation-states are expected, and pressed, to free capital and corporations from regulation and allow them ‘to operate unfettered;’ the only acceptable role of the state is that of global police officer and judge, patrolling the edges of the playing field and adjudicating trading infractions and transgressions’ (Bauman, Society Under Siege, 2002, p. 232).

‘Humans are, on the whole, more irrational than rational; more driven by emotion than reason; more hormonal than cerebral. So any economic system that assumes an outcome based on rational behaviour is flawed from the start’ (Mackay, Advance Australia Where, 2007, p. 276). ‘We might … find that home renovations have not, in the end, satisfied our quest for the meaning of life’ (Mackay, 2007, p. 300).

According to McRae (1985), the ‘neutered test’ is the most complex and enlightening form of experimentation with autopoiesis. By the third test, one begins to notice that one can observe oneself observing oneself. McRae thereby ‘collapsing the distinction between teaching, research, and art’ (Ulmer, 1985, p. 21, n. (italics) and producing messy (disturbances (Marcuse, 1964).

This column has not turned out as I expected. It has undergone many revisions and additions in the 16 months I have been re-crafting it. Very few words and sentences remain from the first draft. Through successive drafts and through successive twists and turns, the text has taken on new materials now guises, and new routes while discarding, shifting, and ignoring others. It operates alongside and between other texts, columns, and articles. Now saved aside and once itself fell away, I am inventing myself as I go along. A new ‘me’ is emerging. A new path beckons. A new text evolves from earlier texts, which leave their impressions, stanzas, and whisper in the margin of spaces, as Denton might say. What this textual process is leading to and what it has been discovering and grasping with all along, is finding a voice that draws upon art and science, literature and philosophy, image and ideal, tourism and tourism-ology, experience and re-presentation, and me and the world. It has stumbled upon the messy test, the autopoiesis view, and the Postmodern Pedagogy as evocative ways of meeting this challenge and opening up possibilities in and beyond the text. It is about the self and about the world — and about the spaces in-between. It is about messy (disturbance (hybrid voices and genres), autopoiesis (personal-cultural-writings), and pedagogy (a drifting-touring-pedagogy) as suitable methods of (re)searching and learning in the postmodern age.

As the inspiration for the journey metaphor, Chambers (1966, p. 25, my emphasis) can speak again on my behalf: ‘…we might … find that home renovations have not, in the end, satisfied our quest for the meaning of life’ (Mackay, 2007, p. 300).