

EXPERIENCE AND EXPECTATION: SOCIALIZATION AND
THE DIFFERENT MOTIVATIONAL BASES OF PARTY
POLICY ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN
AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

Using hitherto private archival party records, this comparative study of campaign finance policy-making analyses the motives of party activists, officials and members of the legislature in reaching decisions on the reform of campaign finance laws during the 1970s. It develops eight case studies from Canada, Australia and Wisconsin to demonstrate, from inside the party veil, the diverse, mutable and, at times, principled motivations of partisans as they reformed campaign finance legislation. Relying on the private correspondence and actions of partisans, this thesis shows that interests, while relevant, are only part of the story of reform. Individual partisans were shaped by their experiences in their party and the expectations of those around them. In developing these understandings, this thesis moves beyond reductionist understandings focused on self-interest toward a more nuanced, and optimistic, understanding of the mixture of motives that guide parties in developing their reform agendas.

DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

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