The Precarious Endurance of Multiculturalism:
Comparing Policy Approaches in Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands and South Australia

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College of Medicine and Public Health
16 February 2021
DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis:

1. Does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and
2. To the best of my knowledge and belief, does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Adam Ridley
16 February 2021
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>Australian Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHRC</td>
<td>Australian Human Rights Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIMA</td>
<td>Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMAC</td>
<td>Australian Multicultural Advisory Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPG</td>
<td>All Party Parliamentary Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAME</td>
<td>Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIMPR</td>
<td>Australian Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALD</td>
<td>Culturally and linguistically diverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td><em>Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek</em> (Statistics Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERD</td>
<td>UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGB</td>
<td><em>Commissie Gelijke Behandeling</em> (Dutch Equal Treatment Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>Coronavirus disease 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRE</td>
<td>British Commission for Racial Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRM</td>
<td><em>College voor de Rechten van de Mens</em> (Netherlands Institute for Human Rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSI</td>
<td>South Australian Department for Communities and Social Inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAC</td>
<td>Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIBP</td>
<td>Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMIA</td>
<td>Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>South Australian Department of the Premier and Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Australian Commonwealth Department of Social Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td><em>Democraten 66</em> (Dutch Democrats 66 Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECNI</td>
<td>Equality Commission for Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHRC</td>
<td>British Equality and Human Rights Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>equality impact assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIGE</td>
<td>European Institute for Gender Equality</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female genital mutilation</td>
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<td>FPÖ</td>
<td><em>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</em> (Freedom Party of Austria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRI</td>
<td>Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender</td>
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<td>MCP Index</td>
<td>Multiculturalism Policy Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>MmD</td>
<td><em>Malmö mot Diskriminering</em> (lit. Malmö against Discrimination)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-government organisation</td>
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<td>NHRI</td>
<td>National human rights institution</td>
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NIHRC  Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
ODIHR  Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OMA  Australian Office of Multicultural Affairs
ONS  British Office for National Statistics
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PvdA  Partij van de Arbeid (Dutch Labour Party)
PVV  Partij voor de Vrijheid (Dutch Party for Freedom)
REC Framework  Operationalised policy ‘objectives’ of multiculturalism: (R) reduce racial discrimination; (E) provide equal opportunity; (C) facilitate mutual cultural accommodation. Developed and discussed in Chapter 3.
RET  Rotterdamse Elektriche Tram (Rotterdam Electric Tram)
SA  South Australia
SAEOC  South Australian Equal Opportunity Commission
SAMEAC  South Australian Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs Commission
SCB  Statistika centralbyrå (Statistics Sweden)
SCP  Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (Netherlands Institute for Social Research)
SD  Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats)
SFI  Svenskundervisning för invandrare (Swedish for immigrants)
SOU  Statens Offentliga Utredningar (Swedish Government Official Reports)
SP  Socialistische Partij (Dutch Socialist Party)
SPÖ  Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party of Austria)
SZW  Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment)
UK  United Kingdom
UKIP  United Kingdom Independence Party
UN  United Nations
US  United States
VVD  Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy)
WGEA  Australian Workplace Gender Equality Agency
WRR  Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy)
ABSTRACT

In light of the backlash against multiculturalism, it is important to understand the features of successful policy approaches promoting multiculturalism. This thesis compares and evaluates the policy success of immigrant multiculturalism from 2007-2017 in four case studies: Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands and South Australia. The way multiculturalism is normatively understood and operationalised into public policy is examined for each case. Following this, the thesis considers factors that contribute to, or undermine, policy success. This study situates itself within scholarly debates about multiculturalism by developing the ‘REC Framework’, which disaggregates and operationalises the policy objectives of multiculturalism: reducing racial discrimination (R), providing equal opportunity (E) and facilitating mutual cultural accommodation (C). The ‘REC Framework’ is innovatively integrated with Marsh and McConnell’s (2010) three-dimensions heuristic for assessing policy success: political, programmatic and process success. The comparative case study draws upon qualitative data from semi-structured elite interviews with policy actors, and triangulates this data against material including policy documentation, reports, political speeches and grey literature. By combining this evidence with the REC Framework and the three-dimensions heuristic, this thesis presents a unique mechanism for making proximate judgements about the policy success of multiculturalism in each case.

The findings from the Swedish case challenge a common media trope that Sweden has become a ‘multicultural dystopia’. Instead, Sweden remains committed to multicultural principles embedded in the Swedish constitution. In the UK, the analysis found that the issue of race equality has slipped down the policymaking agenda. However, a commitment to multiculturalism through the innovative equality duty does remain. In contrast, it seems that multiculturalism and ‘two-way integration’ have been abandoned in the Netherlands, supplanted by assimilation masquerading as integration. Finally, South Australian policy efforts can be characterised as ‘quiet multiculturalism’, due to a longstanding bipartisan commitment entrenching multiculturalism as the political norm. However, concerns arise about the impact of mainstreaming multiple ‘diversities’ together, such as gender or disability with cultural background.

The thesis presents five key findings that help explain the level of policy success for multiculturalism. First, a common characteristic of political success was tacit and explicit bipartisanship between major political parties. Second, the impact of radical-right parties on multiculturalism varied from case to case, ranging from the electorally popular Sweden Democrats and Dutch Party for Freedom, to the limited parliamentary power of Australia’s
One Nation and the United Kingdom Independence Party. Third, *programmatic success* did not require explicit justifications framed by the rhetoric of multiculturalism, which has been largely abandoned in the European cases. Fourth, consolidated efforts to combat racial discrimination are best undertaken through explicit strategies in supportive institutional and legislative contexts. For example, the UK has the proactive equality duty, in contrast to the reliance upon reactive, complaint-based mechanisms in other cases. While Sweden lacks a national human rights institution, protections against racial discrimination are constitutionally enshrined. Fifth, the mainstreaming of governance and polices promoting multiculturalism and integration poses a potential barrier to *process success*. The thesis concludes with a series of practical recommendations for policy actors.

*Key words: multiculturalism, integration, immigration, comparative politics, policy success, cultural rights, access and equity*
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION AND THESIS OVERVIEW

1.1 Introduction

The steady rise of multiculturalism as a political project across many liberal democracies in the late 20th century was followed by an emphatic backlash that began in the early 2000s. Multiculturalism appeared to fall from grace as political rhetoric soured. Despite the shift in discourse, policies promoting multiculturalism have demonstrated remarkable resilience. However, the effectiveness and success of these policies is not well understood, highlighting a gap in empirical knowledge. In response, this thesis offers a comparative study of the impact and effectiveness of policies supporting multiculturalism, with a focus on elite perspectives in four cases from 2007-2017: Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands and South Australia.

Overall, this comparative study addresses two main research questions:

R1. How has multiculturalism been understood and operationalised into public policy in the four case studies?
R2. What factors contribute to, or undermine, the policy success of multiculturalism in the four case studies?

This introductory chapter begins with an overview of multiculturalism as a set of political ideas, before exploring how these ideas can be operationalised as public policy. The chapter also introduces the Multiculturalism Policy Index Project (MCP Index), a metric that has been used to measure and track the presence of multicultural policies in liberal democracies over the last four decades. Although the MCP Index is a leading metric for comparing multiculturalism in different countries, the chapter highlights a knowledge gap regarding the evaluation of multicultural policy ‘success’. The aim and research questions for this thesis are then justified, followed by an outline of the thesis’ structure that demonstrates how the research questions are answered.

1.1.1 Multiculturalism as a philosophical rationale and framework for policy

The political project of multiculturalism is one of the approaches taken by governments and societies in response to cultural diversity. Berry and Ward (2016: 441) observe multiculturalism is a term often used both descriptively and normatively. This frequently leads to confusion because multiculturalism occupies a crowded conceptual space in public media and academic literature, especially regarding normative debates about its merits. Li
suggests that multiculturalism is a contested concept because it has been defined or interpreted with multiple different meanings. Crowder (2013: 7) provides a comprehensive, three-part conceptualisation. Firstly, he argues that the foundation of multiculturalism is that most contemporary societies already contain multiple cultures. He then also contends that in contrast to traditional liberal toleration, cultural minorities deserve to be acknowledged as living valuable and worthwhile ways of life. Crowder also argues that this acceptance and positive valuation of cultural diversity should culminate in recognition through "the public policy and public institutions of the society" (2013: 7). This approach is consistent with liberal multicultural theory, as will be explored in Chapter 2.

In Chapter 3, the approach of the thesis is situated within the broader debates about operationalising and analysing the institutional drivers of multiculturalism. A key benchmark for the analysis and discussion in this thesis is the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP Index). The MCP Index is the leading cross-national comparative index of its kind, as it rates the presence and evolution of multicultural policies in 21 liberal democracies (MCP Index Project 2016). Due to its scope, the Index only takes snapshots at intervals of ten years (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010).1 Thus, this thesis takes the opportunity to present and analyse updated qualitative data.

Two of the principal researchers behind the project also highlight that the Index only rates the presence of policies. The MCP Index does not measure how effective or ‘successful’ these policies have been, and so they have called for additional research to evaluate policies that promote multiculturalism (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 593). In response, a novel operationalisation and disaggregation of the normative conceptions of multiculturalism is presented in Chapter 3 that is subsequently used to evaluate these policies.

Consistent with Crowder’s conceptualisation of multiculturalism above, it is argued throughout this thesis that there are three overarching policy objectives of multiculturalism:

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1 I must acknowledge the recent work of Daniel Westlake who has developed a new annualised dataset for the Multiculturalism Policy Index. In these updates, he identifies the precise year a country adopted or removed specific policies from 1960-2011, including the early developments in Canada and Australia pre-1980 (Westlake, 2020). However, my thesis also presents recent and unique empirical data from post-2011.
- (R) - reduce discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnicity or cultural background
- (E) - provide an equal opportunity for diverse cultural groups to fully participate in society
- (C) - facilitate a mutual cultural accommodation between immigrant groups, the state, and broader society without forced assimilation

Throughout this thesis, these objectives are referred to by the acronym 'REC'. The REC Framework represents the consolidation of a wide array of policy goals, and these are implemented by different types of institutional actors in each case study. The purpose of this framework is to provide a mechanism to effectively compare and evaluate the policy 'success' of multiculturalism across differing cases.

It is important to note that multiculturalism can be applied to different types of cultural and linguistic diversity such as indigenous First Nations minorities, subnational minorities like the Scots, Quebecois, Basques or Catalans, as well as immigrant minority groups (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 581). The primary focus of this thesis is immigrant multiculturalism, due to the very different types of rights claimed by indigenous and subnational minorities over matters including sovereignty, self-determination or colonial dispossession (Kymlicka 1995: 76-79). This separation is also reaffirmed by public policy approaches. For example, in Australia there is significant institutional separation between Indigenous Affairs policy and multicultural policy for immigrants. More detail on the justification for this caveat is provided later in Chapter 2.

1.1.2 Key developments in the implementation of multiculturalism
Just as there is a great degree of variation in the understandings of multiculturalism, the development and implementation of multicultural policy also did not take place in a uniform manner. The driving force behind these policy developments in Western liberal democracies was large-scale immigration following the Second World War. Castles and Miller argue there are three categories of countries whose immigration programs share common characteristics: ‘classical immigration’ countries, Western European countries that previously held sizable colonial possessions, and European countries that adopted ‘guest-worker’ programs (2009: 250-251).

The first are the so-called ‘classical immigration’ countries, including Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada. These countries have historically promoted permanent settlement for most new arrivals with a clear pathway towards citizenship.
Family reunion has been a key element in encouraging migrants to come. Sweden also sits within this group even though its political history and geographic location is anomalous.

The second group is made up of Western European countries that held sizable colonial possessions prior to 1945, including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France. In many cases, migrants from the former colonies were considered citizens and were able to bring their families to settle permanently. Immigrants were also permitted from countries that were not former colonies, with most of these also having the right to permanent settlement and ultimately citizenship.

The third group consists of countries that adopted firm policies of ‘guest-worker’ migration, including Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Gastarbeiter programs insisted upon temporary residency, limited access to family reunion, and limited political rights. However, these countries found it difficult to return ‘temporary’ migrants following the end of the ‘Long Boom’ in the early 1970s. This led to large groups of disenfranchised migrants, many of whom subsequently had children who also had no access to citizenship.

Post-war immigration led to significantly increased cultural diversity. Policies promoting multiculturalism emerged in Western liberal democracies as a response to policies of assimilation and an increasing level of inequality between majority and minority populations. Unlike the mutual cultural accommodation proposed by multiculturalism, assimilationist policies expected cultural homogeneity. Migrants were often required to abandon their cultural and linguistic diversity to “become indistinguishable from the majority population”, at least in the public domain (Castles and Miller 2009: 247). In the first two groups of countries listed above, waves of post-war immigrants were initially expected to assimilate into their new societies and become indistinguishable from the dominant culture.\(^2\) This expectation gradually became untenable due to the persistence of migrant languages, as well as the strong presence of ethnic minority organisations and residential communities (Castles and Miller 2009: 247; Soutphommasane 2012: 9). Policies of assimilation were further criticised as it became clear that migrants were experiencing significant social exclusion and disadvantage, with a close correlation between class status and ethnic background (Castles and Miller 2009: 247). In addition, Crowder argues that policymakers in the 1960s and 1970s saw forced assimilation as no longer being desirable, necessary, or even feasible given that newer waves of migrants came from cultures too

\(^2\) In contrast, guest-workers in the third group of countries had a different experience due to the intended ‘temporary’ nature of their stay. Castles and Miller (2009: 247) describe this as ‘differential exclusion’: incorporation in some aspects of society (i.e. the labour market) but were excluded from others (i.e. political rights, citizenship). Unlike the desired homogeneity of assimilation, guest-worker programs intentionally kept immigrants ‘separate’ from the majority culture.
dissimilar to their new societies (2013: 2-3). At the grassroots level, immigrant minorities and their allies built upon the discourse of civil rights in the 1960s to argue for equitable participation in society without the requirement of giving up their cultural identity through processes of assimilation (Southommasane 2012: 10; Kymlicka 2010: 35-36). The culmination of this thinking and action across Western liberal democracies led to the policy frameworks now collectively known as multiculturalism. This has meant that multiculturalism plays out differently in different settings.

Since its inception in the 1960s and 1970s, multiculturalism has been contested and has had no shortage of critics and political opponents (e.g. Powell 1968 [2007]; Thatcher 1978; Blainey 1984). However, from the 1990s onwards this opposition consolidated to become what is now known as the ‘backlash against multiculturalism’ (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 1-31). There was a shift in rhetoric towards multiculturalism in national political discourse across Western liberal democracies during the 1990s and 2000s (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). The backlash intensified during the late 2000s before high profile European politicians like British Prime Minister David Cameron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel declaring the failure of multiculturalism (Cameron 2011; Weaver 2010; Daily Mail 2008). The most recent MCP Index dataset up to 2010 suggests that the so-called ‘backlash against multiculturalism’ has been principally rhetorical, focusing primarily on the ideological component of multiculturalism. With the only major exception being the Netherlands, multiculturalism did not retreat in public policy terms during the 2000s because all other countries examined by the Index either maintained or strengthened their multicultural policies (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 579, 584; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 21). The extent to which the backlash and ‘death’ of multiculturalism in Western liberal democracies has been largely rhetorical rather than substantive is examined in this thesis.

Throughout this same period, many Western liberal democracies saw the emergence of new radical right-wing populist parties espousing intense views opposing immigration and multiculturalism. These parties, such as the Sweden Democrats, the Dutch Party for Freedom or One Nation in Australia, differed from previous radical-right or neo-Nazi groups. As Wolin noted in the late 1990s, new radical-right parties “come outfitted in Italian suits rather than jackboots and brownshirts” and garner a steady increase in support by presenting “finely honed and ‘modernized’ political programs that have considerable

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3 In the case of Germany though, it is difficult to say that multiculturalism has failed when the state only considered multiculturalism in terms of ‘cultural diversity’ but never incorporated ‘equitable participation’ into the policy equation. See Castles and Miller (2009) for further information.
contemporary appeal” (1998: 49). Resulting from the intense scrutiny and polarising debate, multiculturalism has been tainted in some instances (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 592). The term ‘multiculturalism’ is often no longer politically palatable in many countries that had previously formally endorsed multiculturalism and established extensive public policy initiatives. A key gap in knowledge addressed by this thesis how these policy settings are being implemented in the post-backlash era. Overall, this study explores how well policies promoting multiculturalism play out, even if some governments refrain from explicitly referring to multiculturalism.

1.2 Aim and research questions

This section sets out the aims of the research and the guiding research questions. The aim of this thesis is to compare and evaluate the ‘success’ of different policy approaches to multiculturalism. To this end, the thesis presents and compares four case studies: Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands and South Australia. A detailed justification for case study selection is provided later in Chapter 4, including a rationale for including South Australia as a subnational case. The thesis draws upon themes emerging from semi-structured elite interviews with policy actors to assess elite commitments to policy approaches promoting multiculturalism, as well as elite perceptions of policy impact and effectiveness. This qualitative data is then triangulated with case-study specific literature. The thesis is principally concerned with the decade from 2007-2017, encapsulating key events including the Global Financial Crisis, specific national elections, and the impact of the 2015-16 migrant ‘crisis’ on the European cases. This is a ‘soft’ temporal bounding given that policymaking during this decade did not occur in a political vacuum, but instead draws upon historical developments throughout the latter part of the 20th century.

As noted above, two major research questions frame the research in this thesis. R1 seeks to map the policy approaches promoting multiculturalism in each case. In other words, the question compares the detail of how each case study has implemented multiculturalism, including how each case has responded to the discursive backlash. In contrast, R2 is evaluative in nature, seeking to explain how well each case has implemented policy approaches promoting multiculturalism.

Policy success is a contested concept. In order to address R2 about how ‘successful’ the multicultural policy approaches have been in the four cases, the thesis uses the work of

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4 As is explored in subsequent chapters, countries’ aversion to the term ‘multiculturalism’ made it necessary to use a broad definition of ‘two-way integration’ based on mutual accommodation as a proxy for policies that promote multiculturalism.
Marsh and McConnell (2010). In this work, they argue that policy success has three main dimensions: political success, programmatic success and process success. Their heuristic is discussed in Chapter 3 in greater detail. This thesis makes a distinctive contribution to the literature by integrating the three-dimensions heuristic of policy success with the REC policy objectives outlined above. Overlaying these two frameworks in this innovative manner enables a unique comparative analysis of how multicultural policy has fared in each of the case studies. Separating policy success into political success, programmatic success and process success provides a useful mechanism for more precisely evaluating each of the three REC objectives on a case-specific level. After considering each case study individually, the process of comparative analysis then provides space for themes and trends to emerge, adding a further degree of depth in responding to the research questions. It should be noted that in this thesis, the conception of success is elite-driven and considered from the perspective of policymaker, rather than an investigation of how migrant groups have experienced multicultural policies. This distinction is explored further in Chapter 4.

1.3 Overview and structure of the thesis

In this section, the aims and structure of the thesis are set out. In Chapter 2, a theoretical and ideological overview of multiculturalism is presented by drawing on the work of liberal multicultural theorists who apply a framework of positive liberty and human rights to cultural diversity and immigration. The chapter also provides an overview of the main debates about multiculturalism, including the so-called ‘civic turn’ of integration policy. The chapter concludes with the argument that although ‘integration’ has supplanted the language of multiculturalism, civic integration does not need to be viewed as incompatible with multiculturalism. Contrasting with the largely theoretical material considered in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 draws upon literature from policy studies to operationalise multicultural theory. This is so that the policy initiatives in each case study can be considered and compared in a coherent manner. The chapter consolidates the work of other scholars to present three policy objectives that underpin multiculturalism: eliminating racial discrimination, promoting equal opportunity and facilitating mutual cultural accommodation (the REC Framework). Furthermore, the chapter establishes the ‘three-dimensions’ heuristic of policy success (political, programmatic and process) as an appropriate framework for making proximate judgements of success about multiculturalism.

In Chapter 4 the methodological approach is outlined, as well as the specific research design and methods used for the thesis. It is explained how the thesis draws on normative
theory, new institutionalism and critical realism in order to understand structures influencing the institutions responsible for implementing policies promoting multiculturalism. The research questions especially highlight the inquiry into how these policymaking structures interact with normative and subjective understandings of multiculturalism. Furthermore, this approach seeks to identify underlying generative mechanisms amidst the web of each case’s unique institutional settings. The chapter also details the multiple case study method in the tradition of comparative politics. The thesis incorporates the ‘most similar systems design’ approach, with some deliberately contrasting elements within these ‘similar systems’ located in the Netherlands and South Australia. In the chapter it is discussed how the qualitative data from semi-structured elite interviews, policy documentation, political speeches and other grey literature is analysed using the Framework Approach to thematic analysis. Chapter 4 also provides reflexive commentary where I position myself as the researcher as an active and subjective participant in the research process.

Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 make up the bulk of the empirical part of the thesis, with each chapter presenting the data and analysis for one individual case study. To achieve comparability between each case, the chapters are organised in a common format. Each chapter begins with a short contextual background and a summary of how each case performs in the Multiculturalism Policy Index. The chapters then present themes emerging from the interview data with respect to the REC policy objectives. This is followed by an evaluation of policy success, broken into the three dimensions introduced above: political success, programmatic success and process success. In Chapter 5, I challenge a common media trope that Sweden has become a ‘multicultural dystopia’. Instead, Sweden remains committed to multicultural principles embedded in the Swedish constitution. In Chapter 6, I question whether the issues of race and race equality have slipped down the policymaking agenda in a supposedly ‘post-racial’ Britain under Conservative governments. However, a commitment to multiculturalism through the innovative public sector equality duty does remain. As a point of contrast, in Chapter 7 I examine the extent to which multiculturalism and ‘two-way integration’ have been abandoned in the Netherlands, only to be replaced by assimilation masquerading as integration. Finally, Chapter 8 fills a significant gap in Australian scholarship by focussing on the story of South Australian multiculturalism. I characterise South Australian policy efforts as ‘quiet multiculturalism’, due to a longstanding bipartisan commitment entrenching multiculturalism as the political norm without significant political contention or excessive fanfare. However, there are concerns
about the impact of mainstreaming multiple 'diversities' together such as gender or disability along with cultural background.

In Chapter 9, I directly address the research questions by synthesising the evaluations together to compare the three dimensions of policy success across all of the cases. In terms of mapping how multiculturalism has been understood and operationalised, it is explained in Chapter 9 why the language of multiculturalism has been abandoned or rejected by some cases. The chapter goes on to evaluate and discuss the factors contributing to or undermining policy success. Five key findings emerge from the comparative evaluation, forming the principal findings of this thesis:

1) A common theme for political success was tacit and explicit bipartisanship between major political parties.
2) Radical-right parties have had a varied impact when comparing the four cases.
3) Programmatic success did not require explicit justifications framed by multiculturalism.
4) Consolidated efforts to combat racial discrimination are best undertaken through explicit strategies in supportive institutional and legislative contexts.
5) Mainstreaming governance and policies promoting multiculturalism and integration were a potential barrier to process success.

In the final chapter, I draw together the discussion and lines of argument to explain why multiculturalism is in a state of ‘precarious endurance’ in three of the four cases. In addition, I also potential highlight avenues for future research efforts and implications for practice.
CHAPTER 2 – MULTICULTURALISM: THEORY AND IDEOLOGY

2.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide an outline of how multiculturalism has been theorised and conceptualised in Western liberal democracies. The chapter explores the theoretical links between multiculturalism and liberalism. The key reason for the focus on these ideological debates, and the relevance for this thesis, is to understand and evaluate how multicultural policy has played out in liberal-democratic political systems. Although illiberal democracies or authoritarian regimes may have culturally diverse populations, only liberal-democratic political systems can facilitate real multiculturalism, as per Crowder’s definition (2013: 7) outlined in Chapter 1. As this chapter will highlight, multiculturalism relies upon liberal norms that are not fully present in illiberal or authoritarian political systems. This chapter also sets out the normative debates and tensions in order to provide the foundation for constructing an operational definition of multiculturalism in Chapter 3. Operationalising the policy objectives of multiculturalism is essential for making proximate judgements about its ‘success’ in later chapters.

The chapter is structured in the following way. First, the central ideas of liberal multiculturalism are presented: positive liberty, individual rights, toleration, individual autonomy and state neutrality. The chapter then explores the normative critique that multiculturalism protects illiberal cultural practices, before detailing the liberal response. Following this, the chapter introduces and responds to four conservative criticisms of multiculturalism:

1. multiculturalism undermines equality before the law
2. some cultures are incompatible with each other or with liberal democracy
3. multiculturalism reinforces ethnic inequalities
4. multiculturalism fosters poor social cohesion

5  By the term ‘Western liberal democracies’, I refer to countries that uphold the values of representative and participatory principles of democracy, and of individual political liberties and protections espoused by liberal political thinking. Geographically speaking, these countries have tended to be concentrated in North America and Europe, with Australia and New Zealand also falling into this category. The term ‘Western’ is contested, especially in the realm of development studies. However, despite its limitations, the term best describes this group of nation-states with similar political institutions and systems.
The final section of the chapter introduces the so-called 'backlash' against multiculturalism in political rhetoric and concludes by addressing civic integration which is often touted as an alternative to multiculturalism.

2.2 The central ideas of liberal multiculturalism

The purpose of this section is to critically examine literature defining multiculturalism from a liberal perspective to establish a robust, working understanding of the concept for the remainder of the thesis. Chapter 1 already introduced Crowder's (2013: 7) three-part definition of multiculturalism which serves as the foundation for the approach adopted in this thesis. He argues that the premise of multiculturalism is that most contemporary societies are already 'multicultural' because they contain multiple cultures. In response to this reality, multiculturalism proposes that cultural diversity should be approved of, rather than tolerated or outright opposed. However, mere approval of cultural diversity is insufficient for multiculturalism. Instead, what makes multiculturalism distinctive is that public policy and public institutions should provide a positive recognition and valuation of cultural diversity within the society.

Whilst Crowder's conceptualisation forms the foundation for the rest of the thesis, there are also alternative accounts of multiculturalism. For example, Modood (2009: 351-352) describes multiculturalism at its most fundamental level as "the political accommodation by the state and/or a dominant group of all minority cultures defined first and foremost by reference to race or ethnicity; and also by reference to nationality, aboriginality, or religion". Multiculturalism rejects the cultural subordination of minorities as this leads to injustice in economic distribution, and instead seeks to overcome barriers that prevent immigrants, subnational minorities and indigenous peoples from participating as equals in all spheres of society (Modood 2009: 352). Therefore, multiculturalism stands in contrast to assimilation which expects cultural homogeneity within society and requires ethnic minorities to abandon their cultural and linguistic diversity at least in the public sphere (Castles and Miller 2009: 247). The normative argument presented in this thesis concurs with this view that assimilation is fundamentally incompatible with multiculturalism.

When considering variants of multiculturalism, there are distinctions made between First Nations indigenous minorities, and separately, 'subnational' minorities and immigrant minorities. In particular, this recognises that First Nations indigenous minorities have been

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6 Examples of First Nations indigenous minorities include the Sami in northern Scandinavia, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in Australia, and the Māori in New Zealand. Subnational
incorporated into modern nation-states due to conquest and colonialism, and thus have a unique experience which must be taken into consideration (Kymlicka 1995: 76-79). As such, Kymlicka argues that different groups may claim different kinds of cultural rights depending on the nature of the relationship between majority and minority culture. As noted in the previous chapter, this thesis will only focus on policy approaches that promote multiculturalism for immigrant minorities, due to the unique types of rights claimed by First Nations and subnational minorities such as sovereignty.

Stephen Castles and Mark Miller identify two main variants of multiculturalism in Western liberal democracies. In the first, the state intervenes into civil society, with explicit public policy instruments and tools to secure equal rights for culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) groups. In the second, the state takes a more passive approach. Whilst the state formally recognises and accepts CALD communities, it does not actively intervene because the state is not considered to be responsible for ensuring social equality (2009: 248-249). Whereas these two approaches describe different understandings between jurisdictions, subnational jurisdictions may interpret or understand multiculturalism in different ways. For example, Australia’s federal government steadily shifted the rhetoric and rationale informing policy away from explicit multiculturalism under the Howard Coalition government (1996-2007), yet most state and territory governments continued their policy approaches promoting multiculturalism (Jupp and Clyne 2011a). Likewise, the policy approaches of some municipal governments in Europe differ greatly from the multiculturalism agenda, or lack thereof, at the national level (Rogers and Tillie 2001).

Although multiculturalism incorporates a broad church of ideas, the paradigm of political liberalism can provide a common theoretical foundation. There are strong links between multiculturalism and liberal theory, with liberalism providing the dominant normative justification in the scholarly literature. These liberal accounts of multiculturalism provide a more direct link to multiculturalism in liberal-democratic political systems. Furthermore, these dominant liberal accounts are the central points for critique, particularly from conservative opponents. Accordingly, the next sections in this chapter outline the liberal perspective on multiculturalism before canvassing the main conservative critiques.

minorities include the Québécois in Canada, the Welsh and Scots in the UK, the Basques and Catalans in Spain, and the Roma and Jewish diasporas.
2.2.1 Multiculturalism, liberalism and rights

This section explains how liberalism has developed a coherent justification for multiculturalism through the principles of positive freedom, toleration and liberal rights. Whilst the initial policy development for multiculturalism in liberal democracies began in the 1970s, Kymlicka (2015: 209) suggests there was a significant lag until political theorists began to analyse this shift in policymaking. It was only in the early 1990s, some 20 years later, that scholars began to formulate normative theory for multiculturalism and articulate how it might fit within the framework of liberal democracy (Kymlicka 2015: 209). The following describes how some of the key political philosophers of multiculturalism bind their arguments to a theoretical narrative of liberalism, growing out of the liberal tradition of human rights.

Social liberal foundations

There are two main traditions in liberalism: ‘classical’ and ‘social’ liberalism. This divide revolved around liberals’ differing conceptions of freedom and whether governments should intervene to address socio-economic inequalities. TH Green, an early social liberal scholar, articulates the distinction between what he describes as ‘negative freedom’ and ‘positive freedom’ (1881 [1891]). On the one hand, classical liberals emphasised negative freedom, arguing that individuals ought to be free from government interference. On the other hand, positive freedom goes further than this. Crowder explains that “real liberty is not merely ‘negative’ non-interference but also a ‘positive’ (or effective) capacity to act” (2013: 40). Social liberalism recognises that the ‘playing field’ of life is not even for everybody. In order for individuals to be able to achieve such ‘positive capacity’, the state should actively reduce obstacles that hamper individuals from fully participating in society.

The logic of positive liberty can also apply to matters of cultural and linguistic diversity. Social liberal multiculturalists argue that the state should also actively reduce obstacles for minority and immigrant groups, through measures such as affirmative action for disadvantaged groups. The goal here is to promote an equality of opportunity for all individuals to participate fully in society. Treating people equally does not necessarily equate to treating them identically, but instead ensuring that all individuals are given equal moral concern and respect (Dworkin 1977: 180). For example, Sikhs in the UK are not required to wear motorcycle helmets due to the religious requirement of wearing a turban (Crowder 2013: 43).

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7 The term ‘social liberalism’ is reasonably interchangeable with ‘egalitarian liberalism’, ‘reform liberalism’ or ‘welfare liberalism’. To avoid confusion, ‘social liberalism’ will be the primary term.
To put the principles of social liberal multiculturalism into a more tangible policy setting, Soutphommasane contextualises the development of multicultural policies in Australia. Using the example of the 1975 Henderson Poverty Inquiry, Soutphommasane argues that "multiculturalism was a response to the social and economic disadvantages immigrants were experiencing, especially in work, education and health" (2012: 11). Such an active government approach targeting socio-economic disadvantage fits neatly within the framework of social liberalism, even if the late 1970s and 1980s are often characterised by a resurgent neoclassical, market liberalism in the area of economics. Still, the application of positive freedom to cultural diversity policy did not simply materialise from a political vacuum. Policies implemented by governments in the 1970s that moved to formally root out discrimination, racism and racial hierarchies can be linked to broader international trends. Normative shifts in international society as seen in developments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights coincided with a number of significant global political phenomena. These included the waves of decolonisation across the world that occurred as the European powers retreated from their former colonial possessions; powerful civil rights movements that championed equality between cultural groups in liberal-democratic societies; and staunch political lobbying that advocated for an end to oppressive policies targeting cultural minorities. These factors coalesce within a liberal narrative of human rights that led to the development of multicultural policies (Soutphommasane 2012: 10; Kymlicka 2010: 35-36).

**Kymlicka: cultural rights**

Kymlicka marries together liberalism, human rights and multiculturalism in works spanning three decades. Just as social liberals advocate state intervention to remediate undeserved economic disadvantage, Kymlicka suggests that the state should remediate cultural disadvantage also (1989). For instance, if the state were to be ‘colour-blind’ and not publicly recognise cultural diversity within its population, this would further disadvantage cultural minorities (1989: 151). A social liberal variant of multiculturalism fundamentally rejects the notion that the state can be ‘colour-blind’ and provide true equality without acknowledging and accommodating cultural diversity (Modood 2009: 351-352).

This argument is justified by Kymlicka’s understanding of culture within the lens of liberal rights. Cultural heritage, including language, history and group membership, is a mechanism for individuals to navigate and pursue their own autonomous conception of the ‘good life’. For Kymlicka, cultural heritage enshrines an essential self-respect. If liberals believe that individuals flourish best when free to navigate society within their own cultural heritage, then the state ought to facilitate this rather than imposing a regime of assimilation.
(Kymlicka 1989, 1995). However, a distinction arises when comparing the experiences of members from a majority culture to those from a minority culture. Kymlicka argues that majority-members get their ‘culture’ for free because it is enshrined in the institutions and the society around them (1989: 187-193). As Crowder puts it, minority-members on the other hand must “swim against the tide”, in order to simply survive as a cultural group (2013: 48). Cultural minorities can only achieve this by spending scarce resources to maintain and develop their culture. This cultural disadvantage compares directly to economic disadvantage as described by social liberals because the disadvantage is not a result of poor choices, but simply by birth.

**Toleration**

Whilst the value of positive freedom is especially useful in justifying multicultural policies, so too is the liberal conception of toleration. Following the aftermath of the European Wars of Religion, the idea of tolerance on matters of religion gained significant traction. The works of political philosophers such as Locke (1689 [1991]), Milton (1644), and Bayle (1702 [1991]) argued that on matters where there is likely to be reasonable disagreement, such as religious affiliation, the state should allow individuals to make up their own mind. The practical application of toleration was that Catholics and Protestants should be able to live peacefully within the same society. Toleration is therefore one element of a broader distinction between the ‘public sphere’, where the state can legitimately make and enforce laws, and the ‘private sphere’, where the state ought to refrain from interfering.

The principle of toleration was later extended beyond questions of religion to other areas of morality where reasonable disagreement might be expected, with JS Mill arguing that the state ought not to interfere with the actions of individuals unless these actions caused ‘harm’ to others (1859 [1974]: ch. 1). In particular, Crowder points out that Mill “defended a ‘sphere of liberty’, including freedoms of thought, expression and association, as entitled to absolute protection” (2013: 41). Barry (2001: 24-32) extends this ‘sphere of liberty’ to treat matters of culture in a similar regard. He refers to the notion of the ‘private sphere’ as described by 17th and 18th century liberals, arguing that the principle of toleration can be validly applied to culture and thus allowing minorities to practice languages, beliefs or values without fear of government interference. At the core of this thinking is the classical liberal conception of negative freedom.

**State neutrality**

Tolerance alone though is insufficient for the normative requirements of multiculturalism. A political system that merely ‘tolerates’ multiple cultures does not meet the criteria of the
definition cited earlier: multiculturalism requires ‘political accommodation’ for cultural minorities. Modood explains that ‘political accommodation’ means that cultural minorities ought to have equal right to express culture in the public sphere (Modood 2009: 351). This goes further than toleration that bounds culture to the private sphere only. Therefore, multiculturalism must build upon a foundation where multiple cultures are tolerated within a single society under the principle of non-interference, to a level where multiple cultures are positively valued, promoted, accommodated and publicly recognised within society (Crowder 2013: 146). One liberal principle supporting this position is ‘state neutrality’.

Crowder traces much of the development of state neutrality to the prominent social liberal theorist John Rawls, who argued that “the merits of rival conceptions of the good [life] are reasonably disputed by different groups” and as such the state ought to refrain from imposing one particular view upon its citizens (Crowder 2013: 42). As a nuanced contrast to state colour-blindness, state neutrality has become an important element of multiculturalism because it establishes the ‘framework of rules’ that governs society, but then provides negative freedom for individuals to pursue their own cultural conception of ‘the good’. Writing from an Australian context, a number of writers justify this approach by advocating for an Australian culture that is pluralistic and open (Jupp and Clyne 2011a: xxiii; Soutphommasane 2012: 14).

Soutphommasane argues that prior to the advent of multiculturalism in the 1970s, Australian nationhood had been characterised by “racial and cultural homogeneity” (Soutphommasane 2012: 7). Yet to achieve cultural equality in Australian society, early multiculturalist policymakers needed to differentiate an Australian ‘civic culture’ from the dominant ‘Anglo-Celtic culture’. This was done by applying the principle of liberal neutrality where the state instead establishes the framework of rules to allow peaceful coexistence of multiple cultures. Australian multiculturalism thus echoes the language and policy of nation-building whereby cultural diversity is actively and inclusively incorporated into the nation, rather than just focussing on combating prejudice or facilitating immigrant settlement (Jupp and Clyne 2011b: 198; Soutphommasane 2012: 22, 76, 160). In this way,

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8 This section focuses on the liberal account of state toleration of religious and cultural groups. As in the case of the European Wars of Religion, toleration can also apply to relations ‘between groups’ within societies. Groups may disagree on matters of conscience such as religion and culture, but liberals would argue that these groups ought to ‘tolerate’ each other in order to co-exist peacefully within a society.

9 It is important to recognise that state neutrality can cut both ways. Whilst neutrality means that the state should not enforce or uphold a single dominant culture, it can also mean that the state may absolve itself from interfering in matters of culture entirely. As Kymlicka (1989, 1995) argues, multiculturalism certainly does promote particular conceptions of the good life through the intrinsic value of cultural membership.
multicultural nationalism is a re-making of the national identity so that all citizens, irrespective of their cultural heritage, can find belonging (Modood 2019: 233). However, Banting and Kymlicka (2017: 8-9) identify that redistributive policy in the form the welfare state is often linked to conceptions of social membership. As such, the task for multiculturalism is to actively include and integrate immigrants into the nation. Ultimately, this reflects the debate between advocates for civic-based forms of nationalism, over ethnically-based (and often exclusionary) variants of nationalism. Civic nationalism neatly complements multiculturalism because it provides immigrants the opportunity to have a sense of belonging within the national identity whilst also being able to publicly express their cultural diversity.

2.2.2 The critique of liberal variants of multiculturalism

The previous section examined the normative justification provided by liberal political theorists for multiculturalism in liberal democracies. In particular, liberal multiculturalists draw upon four principles to support their account:

- positive freedom for addressing disadvantages experienced by cultural minorities
- recognition of cultural identity as an intrinsic good for the well-being of all citizens
- tolerance for facilitating the peaceful co-existence of different cultural groups
- state neutrality informed by negative freedom for encouraging individuals to explore culture in pursuit of ‘the good life’

However, an ongoing critical question for social liberal variants of multiculturalism is whether policies of multiculturalism may protect illiberal practices. There has been considerable attention given to this issue in both academic and non-academic literature. Some critics argue that although multiculturalism may sit comfortably beneath some liberal principles as discussed earlier, it may conflict with other important liberal principles, notably those of human rights and individual autonomy (Crowder 2013: 56). Therefore, multiculturalism in liberal democracies is constrained by a framework of liberal rights and the rule of law.¹⁰

¹⁰ One critique of liberalism is whether liberal principles including rights and autonomous self-direction are legitimately universal. Crowder (2013) brings together liberal and value pluralist ideas to justify support for state neutrality on matters of culture with a heavy emphasis on liberal autonomy for individuals to navigate matters of culture. However, this thesis is not seeking to advance or innovate the theoretical and normative debates about multiculturalism. Instead, the liberal account is accepted in this thesis as the normative basis for multicultural policies.
First, one major criticism often made is that multiculturalism supports ‘reprehensible practices’, with multiculturalism taking a position of cultural relativism that views all cultures as morally equal and valuable\textsuperscript{11}. Proponents of this critique allege multicultural liberal democracies protect illiberal practices on the grounds of culture, such as “[the] unequal treatment of women, forced marriages, honour killings and female genital mutilation [FGM]” (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 9; Okin 1999; Cliteur 2001; Daily Express 2007; Phillips 2005a, 2006). Liberal multiculturalists reject these claims, instead asserting that multiculturalism in liberal democracies is constrained by a liberal framework. Soutphommasane (2012: 94-96) argues that multiculturalism is certainly not a blanket cover to use ‘culture’ as an excuse for certain behaviours or beliefs. For example, in all four case studies examined in this thesis, multiculturalism does not permit FGM on the grounds of ‘culture’ because the practice is illegal under Swedish, British, Dutch and Australian law (EIGE 2013c; EIGE 2013b; EIGE 2013a; DSS 2019). Crucially, in a progressive social liberal variant of multiculturalism, discussions about culture are ongoing and dialogic between the state and immigrant communities (Soutphommasane 2012: 97; 2013; Parekh 2006: 266, 271-273; Benhabib 2002: 11). This leads to a civic culture that is continually evolving.

Similarly, Kymlicka argues that the liberal-democratic state must take a transformative role when addressing the illiberal practices of cultural minorities (1995: 95). A multicultural state does not give rights to minority groups to uphold such practices on the token of ‘cultural preservation’. He also notes that when considering the relationship between the liberal state and cultural minorities in these circumstances, there is a clear difference between cultural change and cultural destruction (Kymlicka 1989: 168, 196). Considering the practice of FGM once more, liberal multiculturalists would argue that immigrants from cultures promoting FGM must reform their cultural practices to abide by the rule of law. Kymlicka (1995: 40) points out that cultural rights are not designed to reinforce pre-existing power hierarchies within cultural groups. Individuals within minority groups should be able to dissent to cultural practices or even formally leave a certain cultural group if they so choose in line with the liberal principle of individual autonomy. This recognises and enshrines the fact that cultures are not static entities existing in a vacuum, but instead are complex and dynamic social entities that interact with external and internal forces. These interactions can lead to transformative changes to cultural practices and values. In terms of FGM, cultural reform or transformation does not

\textsuperscript{11} The issue of cultural relativism is tangential here. For a full critique of this charge in relation to multiculturalism, see Chapter 1 of \textit{Theories of Multiculturalism} (Crowder 2013).
destroy minority culture but instead “allows it to change in accordance with the desires of its members” in line with the liberal expectations of the state (Kymlicka 1989: 196).

There is disagreement between liberals regarding vulnerable internal groups and internal dissenting voices. Kukathas (1992: 107) emphasises the ‘right of exit’ as the best response to illiberal groups within liberal democracies, by employing the liberal principle of freedom of association. Barry (2001: 150) agrees that the ‘right of exit’ provides a useful recourse, but he provides some significant qualifications. In particular, he argues that the negative freedom provided by the state for individuals to leave an oppressive and illiberal group is inadequate, especially since those affected are vulnerable to exploitative practices such as FGM (Barry 2001: 150). In contrast, Okin provides a liberal feminist critique of multiculturalism arguing that special accommodations granted to cultural or religious groups tend to be patriarchal in nature, relegating women to subservient positions (1999: 13, 16). Responding to Kukathas ‘right of exit’, Okin suggests that women are less likely to be able to exercise this autonomy and that even if they can, alienation from one’s own cultural group is not necessarily a desirable outcome compared to cultural reform (Okin 2002). In sum, there is disagreement between liberals on this matter. However, following the lead of scholars like Kymlicka and Soutphommasane, these criticisms of multiculturalism can be defended as it is constrained by a framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights.

2.3 Normative criticisms of multiculturalism

In the previous section, an outline of some of the internal divisions within the liberal tradition was examined in how multiculturalism is a contested idea. The purpose of this section is to outline and critically analyse some of the prominent objections to multiculturalism from the conservative political tradition. There are four main areas of critique levelled against multiculturalism: (1) it undermines equality before the law and state colour-blindness; (2) it ignores incompatibility between some cultures; (3) it reinforces cultural and ethnic inequalities; and (4) it fosters poor social cohesion and stratification.

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12 This section will be interrogating the mainstream academic and scholarly debates about multiculturalism. There are of course a number of key interventions and debates in each jurisdiction, such as Scheffer (2000, 2011) in the Netherlands. However, the aim is not to map or highlight them all here. Instead, the section sets out the broad context of scholarly critique and uses some instructive examples from the UK and elsewhere to do this.
2.3.1 Hitchens: equality before the law and state colour-blindness

Hitchens’ critique of multiculturalism

In The Cameron Delusion, conservative British scholar Peter Hitchens presents a nuanced case arguing against multiculturalism for contemporary Britain on the basis that all individuals in a society ought to be equal before the law regardless of ethnicity. That is, the state ought to maintain the principle of ‘colour-blindness’ to ensure true equality. On the issue of multiculturalism, he begins by identifying racial discrimination present in the London Metropolitan Police during the 1960s. Hitchens unequivocally denounces racial discrimination in any form because it is fundamentally ‘irrational’ in a liberal democracy: it wastes talent, it impedes social cohesion, it rests upon the unstable foundation of “easily disproved prejudice”, and as a result racial discrimination denies hope to individuals in society (Hitchens 2009: 90). Central to Hitchens’ argument is that all members of society ought to be equal before the law, and that racial discrimination amounts to a denial of justice.

In light of this, Hitchens turns his attention to the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993. Lawrence was an eighteen year-old black British man who was murdered in a racially-motivated attack whilst waiting for a bus in South London (BBC 1997). For further detail, see also the British case study in Chapter 6. Police initially laid charges against five suspects, but later dropped them. Because authorities were unable to secure a conviction, the then Labour government commissioned an inquiry, with its findings reported in 2000. The Macpherson Inquiry found that the initial investigation of the Metropolitan Police Service was marred by ‘institutional racism’ (Macpherson 1999: 46.41). Hitchens argues that the Macpherson Inquiry found no specific instance of racial discrimination in the Lawrence case. Instead, the recommendations of the report relied upon findings of ‘institutional racism’, accepting an earlier definition provided by the Scarman Report: "[practices] adopted by public bodies as well as private individuals which are unwittingly discriminatory against black people" (Scarman 1981: 11). Hitchens’ main concern is that he believes the findings of institutional racism to be exceptionally vague, and therefore it is difficult to pinpoint exact occurrences (2009: 93).

In addition, the Inquiry called for an end to ‘colour-blind policing’ (Macpherson 1999: 45.24). Hitchens takes issue with what he describes as "special treatment for ethnic minorities" (2009: 91). ‘Special treatment’ is simply a cover for ‘positive discrimination’ that

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13 A conviction against two of the five original suspects was later recorded in 2012 (Dod d and Laville 2012).
14 The Macpherson Inquiry also highlighted “professional incompetence” and a “failure of leadership by senior officers” as other primary problems with the initial investigation (Macpherson 1999: 46.1).
Hitchens views as equally problematic as 'negative discrimination' because both abrogate the liberal principle that all individuals are equal before the law. Since equality before the law is of paramount importance to Hitchens, ‘special treatment’ of cultural minorities is unacceptable.

With this in mind, Hitchens argues that anti-racists are too swift to decry ‘racism’ against those who oppose multiculturalism. He suggests that anyone who believes that “culture, rather than race, is a defining characteristic of peoples” is smeared as a ‘racist’ (Hitchens 2009: 94). This charge is laid even though people with such views, whom Hitchens labels as ‘culturists’, fundamentally oppose the bigotry of racism and racial discrimination on two counts. First, ‘culturists’ oppose the debunked ‘scientific racism’ commonly associated with Social Darwinism and National Socialism, and second, ‘culturists’ oppose racial discrimination and segregation on the grounds of equality before the law (Hitchens 2009: 94). Anti-racists are therefore perpetuating racial discrimination because they are reinforcing divisions between cultural groups through multiculturalism. This is troubling for Hitchens because multiculturalism is seen to be undermining the “just and laudable campaigns for integration and equality” in Western liberal democracies during the 1960s and 1970s (2009: 99). Hitchens believes that the only mechanism to defeat racism is a “powerful monoculture”, and that the cultural divisions established by multiculturalism are antithetical to the true integration of minorities: “maintaining and encouraging many cultures in a society is likely to frustrate integration and perpetuate division – especially if those many cultures are based on ethnic groups” (2009: 95). However, by arguing multiculturalism perpetuates racial discrimination, Hitchens appears to contradict himself because he himself has drawn a distinction between racism and ‘culturalism’. Even if multiculturalism were to reinforce cultural divisions as he claims, these are not necessarily racial divisions.

According to Hitchens (2009: 95), his use of the term ‘monoculture’ is also a victim of being labelled ‘racist’, even though he is not advocating a monoculture based on ethnic terms. Instead, his argument is implicitly defending a national identity that is welcoming to people of other ethnic groups, so long as they conform to the British ‘monoculture’. British culture is valuable in its own right and ought to be preserved, not neglected, ignored or overrun because of multiculturalism (Hitchens 2009: 93).

A liberal response to Hitchens

Liberals would disagree with Hitchens’ in response to many of his other assertions. The matter of equality before the law is not a problem for liberal multiculturalism. As mentioned earlier, Dworkin (1977: 180) argues that equal treatment does not necessarily equate to
identical treatment. Instead, equal treatment emphasises that all individuals are given equal moral concern and respect. In terms of equality before the law, the same law applies to all people in society but may affect different groups in different ways. Therefore, British reforms to counter institutional racism by ending colour-blind policing are completely justifiable.

Furthermore, other liberals would respond to Hitchens by arguing that positive liberty enshrined in cultural rights is essential for overcoming the systemic disadvantages experienced by cultural minorities in Western liberal democracies. In examining cultural diversity in France, Simon and Sala Pala (2010: 92-94) describe notions of multiculturalism as being anathema in the context of French republicanism. As national unity centres on republican citizenship, integration is an individual process that pivots on the rights and duties of citizenship. Simon and Sala Pala explain that the ‘colour-blindness’ of the French state severely hampers the ability to delve deeply into the causes of discrimination, and thus hampers the ability to implement anti-discrimination policies (2010: 97). As Soutphommasane articulates, “colour blindness is a luxury unavailable to those who experience racism” (2018: 49). Policies premised on identical, colour-blind treatment struggle to adequately respond to institutional racism or structural discrimination.

Additionally, Hitchens' proposed 'strong monoculture' experiences troubles under scrutiny due to the difficulty of maintaining both ethnic diversity and cultural homogeneity. Such an ambition is just assimilation, and the noted failure of assimilation to adequately manage diversity in the 1960s was a major contributing factor to the development of multiculturalism in the first place (Castles and Miller 2009: 247; Crowder 2013: 2-3; Soutphommasane 2012: 9).

**2.3.2 Liberal multiculturalism and cultural incompatibility**

*Huntington’s clash of civilisations*

Another prominent line of conservative argument against multiculturalism centres on incompatibility and conflict between cultures, especially as evinced through the work of Samuel P. Huntington (1993, 1996). Huntington argues that the world of the post-Cold War era is divided into eight major ‘civilisations’: Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic (or Confucian), Hindu, Orthodox and Japanese (1996: 45-47). He contends that future conflicts will be fought along these civilisational and cultural fault-lines. The collapse of Yugoslavia and a resurgent nationalism in the Balkans is given as an example of such a conflict (1993: 29, 31). He also foreshadowed seemingly ‘inevitable’ conflicts between the Western and Islamic civilisations (1993: 48), later linked to the September 2001 al-Qaeda
attacks on the United States (Scruton 2002: vii). Whilst the world may be multicultural at a global level, Huntington argues that such multiculturalism at a domestic level is dangerous and detrimental to society because history shows what happens to what he deems ‘multi-civilisational’ states (1993: 42; 1996: 308). Accordingly, he argues that Western liberal democracies ought to abandon the multiculturalist project in favour of reasserting a core Western cultural identity (1996: 311).

The ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis has been critiqued on many different grounds, including that from a statistical point of view, military conflicts between states of different ‘civilisations’ are no more likely conflicts between states which share a ‘civilisation’ (Russett 2010: 105). Other critics argue that Huntington overstates the role of culture, and that his thesis purports cultural reductionism by incorrectly assuming diverse cultural groups are homogenous. (Parekh 2008: 156; Crowder 2013: 173). Similarly, Huntington’s narrative implies that ‘civilisations’ are monolithic entities. The reductionism of his theory leads to an oversimplification in his understanding of culture. Both Crowder and Parekh show that ‘civilisations’ and cultures more generally are never internally homogenous: there are always dissidents, reformers, conservatives and apologists (Crowder 2013: 162; Parekh 2006). Scholars have further rebuffed Huntington’s argument by showing that liberal-democratic principles of toleration, autonomy and representation are not exclusive to Western philosophical traditions (Sen 2006: 50, 53; Kymlicka 1995: 94; Crowder 2013: 119-120, 173, 207).

There are implications for domestic multiculturalism policy arising from Huntington’s thesis. Firstly, the relative success and ongoing political stability of “multiculturalist states such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand” (Crowder 2013: 173) defies Huntington’s logic that such states, like former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, are “candidates for dismemberment” (Huntington 1993: 42). Secondly, in spite of Huntington’s assertions to the contrary, Crowder reviews the work of a range of authors who argue that Islam and ‘Asian Values’ need not be considered incompatible with liberalism (2013: 176-190). Instead, liberal democracies that adopt multicultural policies can positively accommodate non-Western cultures domestically, and still participate in constructive dialogue and cooperation internationally.

Despite these problems with Huntington’s argument, his work does provide a useful lens to examine a critical element within multiculturalism: conflict between cultural or

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15 Similarly, Huntington suggested that the Catholic/Uniate-Orthodox division between western and eastern Ukraine could be a potential flashpoint for civilizational conflict (1996: 37). Whether the current situation in Ukraine reflects Huntington’s predictions and ‘civilisational’ model is a matter of debate for international relations scholars, but it nonetheless demonstrates a level of plausibility.
ethnic groups. One such example of how inter-ethnic conflict between migrants can cause problems in liberal democracies was a brawl between Croatian and Serbian young people at the Australian Open tennis match in 2007 (Sydney Morning Herald 2007). Likewise, the paradigm of cultural conflict and incompatibility provided by Huntington embodies the fears and anxieties present in some sections of liberal-democratic societies. In the case of Australia, the radical-right One Nation movement courted these fears and anxieties during the mid-1990s in the population of the Australian hinterland (Soutphommasane 2012: 42). There are also similar examples in the UK (Barrow and Sims 2009). Kymlicka posits that liberal multiculturalism relies upon the passive acquiescence from majority cultural groups, rather than the active support (Kymlicka 2007: 121). The hypothesis suggests passive acquiescence from the majority can only be sustained if multiculturalism does not pose “considerable costs and risks” to the majority group (Borevi 2013: 139). The political developments in Australia and the UK described above may have arisen because the majority had come to fear that immigrant groups posed significant economic or security risks.

In addition, Huntington identifies a direct challenge to multiculturalism from rising immigration. As subsequent waves of migrants have entered the United States, Huntington argues that immigration has watered down the country’s Anglo-Protestant cultural identity. If non-European immigration is eroding traditional American culture and values, Huntington (2004) then suggests that Western models of citizenship found in core Enlightenment principles are also eroding, including individual freedom, democratic citizenship and universal human rights.

Scruton and Hitchens: conflict between Islam and the West
Roger Scruton, in a similar vein to Huntington, identifies potential inter-civilisational conflict and incompatibility, but specifically applies it to Islam. For Scruton, Islam is fundamentally anti-liberal and thus Islam and the West are diametrically opposed (2002). In the aftermath of the attacks on the United States in September 2001, the global stage was set for confrontation. In the context of this conflict, globalisation has accelerated flows of migration allowing individuals that are hostile to Western values to mount attacks from within. Scruton argues that multiculturalism is providing conditions that place state security at risk, and should therefore be abandoned (2002: 62-64). In his account, Scruton suggests that this conflict is inescapable, as Islam is unable to reconcile or come to a compromise with the West because the Islamic faith does not have the capacity to separate the powers of religion and state (2002: 102). This is a very stark contrast to the liberal principle of limiting state interference in the private sphere. In response, Crowder (2013:}
highlights that Scruton sees this as being potentially very dangerous for the West because “the certainties and absolutes of Islam offer, especially for Muslim immigrants to the West, ‘an unrivalled ability to compensate for what is lacking in modern experience’” (Scruton 2002: 102). There is also overlap between Scruton and Hitchens’ ideas about the incompatibility of the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’ (Hitchens 2009: 95-100).

Upon closer inspection, some significant limitations appear in the arguments of both Scruton and Hitchens. For Scruton, whilst Islam may not have its own variant of the ‘Two Kingdoms’ doctrine, Islam can still accommodate a separation of spiritual and temporal powers. This is evident in many societies with Islamic majority populations but a secular state such as Indonesia, Turkey, Algeria, Malaysia, Egypt, Bangladesh and Pakistan (Crowder 2013: 181). For Hitchens, his argument overreaches in his claim that Islam is fundamentally oppressive to women. This is an oversimplification as it ignores the importance and relevance of Islamic feminism both in predominantly Islamic countries and in the West (Moghadam 2002). In both cases, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im’s work, *Toward an Islamic Reformation* (1990), provides a useful counterargument to those who suggest that Islam and the West are incompatible and therefore must be in perpetual conflict. An-Na’im argues that by examining the context of some key passages from the Qur’an, Islam and *sharia* need not be opposed to liberal constitutionalism, including principles of gender equality, equal citizenship and freedom of religion (1990: 44). This alternative viewpoint offers a counter to the adversarial and oppressive accounts of Islam provided by Scruton and Hitchens.

### 2.3.3 Multiculturalism reinforces ethnic inequalities and poor social cohesion

This section explores two further conservative critiques of liberal variants of multiculturalism: (1) it fosters ethnic inequality; and (2) it undermines social cohesion. Australian scholar Frank Salter argues that multiculturalism fails to resolve socio-economic inequalities between ethnic groups, and instead has led to increased ethnic socio-economic stratification as the “population becomes more diverse” (2013: 4). He cites examples including high rates of crime and lack of labour market integration for some ethnic groups, and that Asian students are over-represented in elite schools and universities causing “many white Australians [to lose] out to competition from immigrants” (Salter 2013: 3-4). Similarly, these sentiments can be found in the work of Dutch writer Paul Scheffer in which he argues that under Dutch multiculturalism, members of ethnic

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16 This view is also shared by liberal scholar Brian Barry in his book *Culture and Equality* (2001).
minorities are statistically overrepresented in the areas of criminality, unemployment, poverty and school drop-outs (Scheffer 2000; 2011: 28, 30, 40-41). Such inequality and disadvantage is troubling for advocates of multiculturalism. It is especially troubling because one of the chief justifications for multiculturalism is that it ought to mitigate against the disadvantages faced by cultural minorities, in line with the principle of positive freedom. The types of arguments presented by scholars such as Salter and Scheffer directly challenge the efficacy and effectiveness of multiculturalism.

The second point, that multiculturalism inhibits positive social cohesion, flows directly from the first theme. If multiculturalism is contributing to socio-economic inequalities, then this in turn will breed division, competition and conflict between cultural groups. One of the early opponents of Australian multiculturalism was Geoffrey Blainey, and in his 1984 book *All for Australia*, he presents a case that criticises the direction of Australian immigration and multicultural policies. He raises concern about Australia’s immigration program of the early 1980s in the context of the difficult economic circumstances of the time, and that placing "so many new immigrants from diverse cultures in the areas of high unemployment . . . gives rise to cultural tensions" (Blainey 1984: 165). In contrast to the immigration program of the 1950s that was set in a context of full employment due to the economic long boom, times of economic adversity exacerbate the competition over scarce resources. In Blainey’s view, this competition takes place along ethnic fault-lines which undermines social cohesion and societal stability (1984: 169). This is a position that had been earlier presented by Knopfelmacher who saw disadvantage for first-generation ethnic minorities as being unavoidable, and that using multiculturalism as a ‘cure’ undermines social cohesion in uncertain times (1982: 62-64).

Despite these criticisms, others argue that Blainey’s concerns oversimplify the dynamics of the labour market. The policy reality is not a zero-sum game where the solution to unemployment is the cessation of labour migration. The labour market is complex and uneven, with excess supply in some sectors and regions, but with high levels of demand in others. Furthermore, there is a well-established connection between an increase in xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment correlating with economic recession and high unemployment (Bali 2005: 185). This has been repeated again in Europe with the recent financial crisis and subsequent austerity measures leading to a rise in popularity for radical-right parties (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2015; Gutteridge 2015). This is not a sudden emergence but has been a steady rise in recent times. Looking further back to the 1990s and early 2000s, it is clear that a range of reactionary groups espousing views of anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism have garnered significant political traction in liberal
democracies (Lentin 2004; D’Amato 2010; Hedetoft 2010; Simon and Sala Pala 2010; Soutphommasane 2012). Even Blainey’s own argument acknowledges that immigration in hard economic times is especially unpopular. Still, the solution presented by Blainey is to enact a very selective immigration program to maintain an ‘ethnic balance’, and that the sense of cohesion in the community is preserved.

Scholars describe what Blainey suggested in 1984 as ‘new racism’ or ‘cultural racism’. This is rooted in the idea that certain cultural groups are incompatible with a “mainstream way of life or national identity”, and motivated by a fear that incorporating immigrants into a society will lead to a loss of culture for the majority group (Soutphommasane 2012: 87). Related to this are several significant corollary issues of “prejudice, bigotry and discrimination against people on the basis of their ethnic, cultural and religious identities [despite the fact that] the motivating factor behind such behaviour is less likely to be a belief in racial superiority than it is fear of difference or anxiety about change” (Soutphommasane 2012: 87). Whilst Blainey and Soutphommasane are writing in the Australian context, this is not unique to Australia. Across Western liberal democracies, the right has repositioned its anti-immigration platform in terms of preserving culture and identity (Taguieff 1991; Lentin 2004: 89). Central to this repositioning is the ascription of “negative stereotypes based on perceived [essential and unchangeable] cultural traits” (Soutphommasane 2012: 88) to physical characteristics in a sort of ‘pseudo-biological’ manner (Modood 2007: 45). Lentin summarises this quite well by arguing that cultural racism has become a “commonsense argument” adopted by a resurgent right (Lentin 2004: 93).

2.4 The 'backlash' against multiculturalism: rhetoric and civic integration

Previous sections have provided a critical examination of how key writers have sought to critique liberal variants of multiculturalism. This section turns the attention to the so-called political ‘backlash’ against multiculturalism that consolidated following the turn of the 21st century. The section then outlines one of the main alternative paradigms to multiculturalism: ‘civic integration’.

2.4.1 The backlash in political rhetoric

This section explores how empirical political discourse reflects the normative political arguments described above. Policies of multiculturalism have experienced opposition since their formal inception in the 1970s, but by the year 2000 “sporadic critical voices seemingly became harmonised into a chorus” (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 4). Within a few short
years, high profile European politicians like British Prime Minister David Cameron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel had declared the failure and death of multiculturalism (Cameron 2011; Weaver 2010; Daily Mail 2008). The section examines linkages between recent backlash rhetoric and the four main conservative objections to multiculturalism detailed above. To do this, it is important to bear in mind specific events that influence a given political context. Key events often act as the bridge between normative theory and the rhetoric found in political speeches and other public discourse. This section provides some illustrative examples here, but there is more evidence of the backlash in each of the four case study chapters.

**Outliers before the backlash**

There are some outliers who opposed multiculturalism prior to the consolidated backlash at the turn of the 21st century. Enoch Powell’s so-called ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech delivered in 1968 is a foundational moment for the backlash against multiculturalism, even though it occurred prior to the formal development of multicultural policy anywhere in the world. In this speech, he recounts the fear, as articulated by one of his constituents, that immigrants would dominate the UK at the expense of ethnic Britons. According to Powell, the constituent said “If I had the money to go, I wouldn’t stay in this country . . . In this country in 15 or 20 years’ time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man” (Powell 1968 [2007]). Powell’s conclusion goes on to foreshadow a UK wracked by ethnic conflict.

Margaret Thatcher is another outlier. In a television interview, Thatcher empathised with the fears of ethnic Britons:

... people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture ... [and] the British character has done so much for democracy, for law and done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in. (Thatcher 1978)

Her solution for good ethnic relations was that the British government needed to “allay peoples’ fears on numbers ... [and maintain] the prospect of an end to immigration” (Thatcher 1978). Thatcher’s position is more ambivalent than that of Powell, but her comments articulated the fears of working people in an unstable economic climate. In doing so, she gave tacit approval to these fears. Through comments such as these, Thatcher was able to position the Conservative Party as a viable alternative to voters considering the far-right British National Front due to fears about immigration (Thatcher 1978). It is instructive that the statements made by Powell and Thatcher reflect very closely the fears and anxieties described by Huntington and Blainey. In the same way, Powell and Thatcher infer that there
is a level of incompatibility between people from different cultural groups, and that immigration inevitably establishes an adversarial social climate.

The conservative backlash against multiculturalism also took root outside of the UK. For most of the 1980s, multiculturalism in Australia shared strong bipartisan support but this was broken by the Liberal-National opposition under John Howard in its 1988 'One Australia' policy (Jupp 2011a: 49). Through his defence of 'One Australia', Howard rejected the ideals of multiculturalism because it unnecessarily bred cultural division between Australians who ought to be united under common values. Howard stated, "The objection I have to multiculturalism is that multiculturalism is in effect saying that it is impossible to have an Australian ethos, that it is impossible to have a common Australian culture" (Markus 2001: 85-89). One of Howard's central concerns was that Asian immigration was detrimental to social cohesion in Australia claiming that "it would be in our immediate term interest and supportive of social cohesion if [Asian immigration] were slowed down a little" (Mares 2002: 113). The Shadow Minister for Finance, John Stone, agreed: "Asian immigration has to be slowed. It's no use dancing around the bushes" (Mares 2002: 113). Other Australian conservative voices shared similar views and suggested that huge amounts of money were being wastefully spent for the benefit of migrants at the expense of 'Australians' through multicultural policies (Jupp 2011a: 49). Whilst the attitudes of Powell, Thatcher and Howard are considered outliers from the consolidated backlash against multiculturalism following the turn of the century (Modood 2009: 351), their views are reflective of the conservative normative critique of multiculturalism outlined earlier in the chapter. Likewise, there are similar links between the recent backlash and the conservative critique.

The consolidated backlash and its critique of multiculturalism

One theme within the backlash discourse is that multiculturalism fosters ethnic stratification that leads to the development of parallel societies or separateness. The 2001 Cantle Report, which investigated a number of racially motivated riots in the UK, found that "many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives [and that] these lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges" (Cantle 2001: 9). This problem was deepened when the 2001 UK Census results were published in February 2003, which showed the emergence of stark socio-economic inequalities between ethnic groups (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 5). Such concerns led the chair of the UK Commission for Racial Equality, Trevor Phillips, to call for the dismantling of multiculturalism because Britain was "sleepwalking to segregation" (The Guardian 2005; Baldwin and Rozenberg 2004). The notion that Britain had become a series...
of ‘parallel societies’ has been espoused by British politicians from both persuasions (Daily Telegraph 2005; Daily Mail 2006, 2008). Likewise, the backlash against multiculturalism in Germany has centred on the development of Parallelgesellschaften (‘parallel societies’) which have intentionally remained separate from mainstream German society (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 8). For example, the Mayor of Neukölln in Berlin, Heinz Buschkowsky, claimed that multiculturalism had clouded the vision of German politicians, and was causing ethnic separatism (Focus 2004). These examples all demonstrate rising concern in rhetoric about how multiculturalism reinforces divisions and separation, rather than promoting positive social cohesion.

The second theme discussed earlier was that multiculturalism is ignorant of the inescapability of inter-ethnic conflict and that some cultures are incompatible with liberal-democratic society. This theme is especially prevalent within the backlash discourse. For instance, in the aftermath of the terror attacks on the United States in September 2001, Spain in March 2004, and the UK in July 2005, multiculturalism was accused of providing a ‘haven for terrorists’ (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 11). The divisions and ‘separateness’ established by multiculturalism had allegedly provided the conditions for Islamic extremism to fester. Dominic Grieve, the Conservative Shadow Home Secretary said that multiculturalism had created a “vacuum that has been filled by extremists from across the political spectrum” leaving long-term inhabitants fearful (Watt and Glover 2008).

In the Netherlands, only months after the September 2001 attacks on the United States, the populist Pim Fortyn entered the political scene with a brazen opposition to Islamic immigration, arguing that Muslims were unable to assimilate into Dutch society, and labelling Islam a ‘backward culture’ (De Volksrant 2002). Shortly afterward in 2004, Theo van Gogh was murdered by a Dutch-Moroccan man after making a film considered blasphemous towards Islam (Prins and Saharso 2010). This reignited debate about free speech and intolerant Muslim minorities, and again called into question whether Islam was compatible with Dutch society. In 2006, similar rhetoric expressing explicit opposition to Islam came from Geert Wilders’ newly formed radical-right Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid) (Prins and Saharso 2010: 85-86).

In Germany, some elements of the left have espoused similar views. Thillo Sarrazin, a member of the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) published his book Germany is abolishing itself, claiming that Muslims in Germany were extremely reluctant to integrate into mainstream society (Sarrazin 2010). This anti-Islamic rhetoric hearkens back to the thinking of Huntington, Scruton and Hitchens who question the compatibility of Islam with Western liberal democracy. Huntington in particular might
go so far as to say that relations between Islam and the West typify ‘civilisational’ confrontation and conflict. By welcoming Muslims through multiculturalism, these authors might suggest that multiculturalism is dangerous because it undermines the stability of the state.

There were also ‘backlash’ concerns that multiculturalism undermines the principle of equality before the law. In 2008, the British opposition leader David Cameron said that the introduction of *sharia* law for British Muslims was the “logical endpoint of the now discredited doctrine of state multiculturalism” (Daily Mail 2008). He justified this by arguing that multiculturalism sought to institute “a legal apartheid to entrench what is the cultural apartheid in too many parts of our country” (Daily Mail 2008). Once again, this echoes the anti-multicultural sentiments of Commission for Race Equality chair, Trevor Phillips, who had earlier said that there should only be one set of laws in Britain, applying to all individuals residing in Britain. If Muslims wanted to include *sharia* in the British legal system, Phillips said that they ought to leave (Bowcott 2006). In Sweden, the radical-right Sweden Democrats political party (*Sverigedemokraterna*) argues that the Swedish state should not have granted the indigenous Sami people their own devolved Parliament and should not have granted the Sami special rights to reindeer husbandry. The Sweden Democrats argue that these sort of special cultural rights leaves non-Sami Swedes as second-class citizens, and therefore are treated differently before the law (Holmström 2008).

*“A crisis of perception”: only a limited retreat away from multiculturalism*

The ‘backlash’ arguments are critical context for this thesis, as a number of authors have argued that there has been a retreat from multiculturalism policies in liberal democracies (Back et al. 2002; Hansen 2007; Joppke 2004, 2008; Levrau and Loobuyck 2013). Despite such ardent and vocal criticism, other authors argue that there has been little substantive change when it comes to the policy detail. For example, Vertovec and Wessendorf suggest there has simply been a “crisis of perception” (2010: 21). Similarly, Levey argues that the alleged retreat from multiculturalism was just a change in rhetoric in most cases (2012: 18-20). Many politicians have distanced themselves from the language of multiculturalism, instead preferring terms like ‘diversity policies’ as a new label for a very similar suite of policy approaches (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 578). In light of this, it might be more accurate to suggest that the backlash against multiculturalism has been one of rhetoric, rather than one of substance. In a four-decade longitudinal review of the presence of multicultural policies in 21 liberal democracies, the Multiculturalism Policy Index Project, Banting and Kymlicka show that only the Netherlands wound back multicultural policy
during the backlash of the 2000s (2013: 579). A key aim of this thesis is to help fill this knowledge gap by addressing whether or not the backlash has taken place in the four chosen case studies.

At the same time though, Banting and Kymlicka question European debates that suggest multiculturalism has been displaced by policies of ‘civic integration’ (2013). Similarly, Jupp suggests that by the late 1990s the emphasis in Australian federal government policy had shifted away from multiculturalism towards ‘integration’ (2011a: 50), in stark contrast to “most [Australian] State and Territory governments [having continued] their programmes unchanged” (Jupp and Clyne 2011a: xvi). Whilst the interpretation of the current state of multicultural policy is strongly contested (Meer et al. 2015: 703), Banting and Kymlicka go to considerable lengths to challenge this narrative by arguing that ‘civic integration’ is not necessarily incompatible with multiculturalism. The following section will show that civic principles can be viewed as amendments to multiculturalism, rather than replacements.

2.4.2 Civic integration as an amendment to multiculturalism

Civic integration is a framework for diversity policy that has gained significant prominence in policy discourse over the past two decades, fuelled in part by opposition to multiculturalism. Likewise, it has become a major arena of debate between scholars. This section defines civic integration vis-à-vis multiculturalism, since governments often use both terms interchangeably in their press releases. The section then assesses the extent to which integration is compatible with a policy approach that promotes multiculturalism, given that Banting and Kymlicka believe this to be the case (2013). In their view, civic integration does not need to be viewed as an affront to multiculturalism. Even in *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995), Kymlicka presents ‘polyethnic rights’ for immigrants as an approach that facilitates integration, through which immigrant minorities can find a distinctive place within society. More recently, Modood (2019: 234) argues that multiculturalism is a “mode of integration”, with governments using policy instruments to address unfavourable treatment of immigrants in society.

The European Union’s Justice and Home Affairs Council define integration as:

“a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all migrants and residents of Member States [of the European Union]. Such a process requires efforts from both migrants and receiving societies and is critical for tapping into the potential of migration and for enhancing social cohesion”. (EU Justice and Home Affairs Council 2014: 2)
This understanding reaffirms the Common Basic Principles for immigrant integration policy in the European Union, as established in 2004. This consistency spans a decade, which demonstrates a longevity in the conceptual understanding by European policymakers. Banting and Kymlicka assert that civic integration emphasises “the importance of immigrants integrating more fully into the mainstream of society”, with a focus on four key areas: access to employment, respect for liberal-democratic values, knowledge of the language, history and institutions of the new society, and laws to protect immigrants and minorities from discrimination (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 586-587).

In terms of the ‘civic’ in civic integration, Sara Goodman explains that central to this approach is a set of “‘civic hardware’, including integration contracts, classes, tests and ceremonies” for immigrants (2010: 754). Other measures include loyalty oaths, language acquisition requirements, and an insistence that immigrants are familiar with the “history, norms and institutions” of their new society (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 578). On the face of it, these principles do not contradict the fundamental principles of multiculturalism. There is a strong degree of coalescence between integration and the understanding of multiculturalism established earlier: “multiculturalism rejects the cultural subordination of minorities as this leads to injustice in material injustice, and instead seeks to overcome barriers which prevent immigrants, subnational minorities and indigenous peoples from participating as equals in all spheres of society” (Modood 2009: 352). Two notable differences are evident though: first, integration focuses solely upon migrants and not subnational and indigenous minorities; and second, integration places a stronger emphasis on the process as a ‘two-way process’.

Despite the apparent complementarity between with multiculturalism and civic integration, the ‘backlash discourse’ has adopted the paradigm of integration. Vertovec and Wessendorf observe that the term ‘multiculturalism’ has been largely supplanted by ‘integration’ in political rhetoric (2010: 18). In order to address the perceived shortcomings of multiculturalism, cultural diversity policy has undergone a process described as a ‘civic turn’ (Mouritsen 2008). Likewise, Christian Joppke, one of the most ardent academic supporters of civic integration, directly linked the apparent ‘retreat’ from multiculturalism to this ‘civic turn’ (2004, 2008). Banting and Kymlicka make the apt observation that the rhetoric surrounding civic integration suggests that it is fundamentally incompatible with multiculturalism policy because it is consistently presented as an ‘alternative’ to multiculturalism (2013: 578). Meer and Modood go further in response to Joppke’s assertions by arguing that he has constructed a false dichotomy between civic integration and multiculturalism by “[placing] the two in a zero-sum equation that ignores the extent
to which they could just as plausibly be synthesized in a potential outgrowth of one another” (2009: 475).

There are two reasons that serve to justify Meer and Modood’s argument. The first is that despite the change in political and policy rhetoric retreating away from multiculturalism, there is a notable lack of substantive policy change, as established earlier (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Jupp and Clyne 2011a; Banting and Kymlicka 2013). If the content of ‘former’ multicultural policies is largely unchanged despite the ‘civic turn’, why must it follow that multiculturalism and civic integration are mutually exclusive? The second reason can be found in the historical development of multiculturalism in the cases of Canada and Australia. Banting and Kymlicka argue that the ‘hardware’ of civic integration as outlined above has been central to Canadian and Australian multiculturalism since inception in the 1970s, and go so far as to say that “any argument that…[multiculturalism] is by definition incompatible with integration is simply at odds with history” (2013: 587-588). In line with principles of social liberalism, both countries have demonstrated continual support for multiculturalist policies and programs that aid ethnic minorities to overcome disadvantage. At the same time though, both countries couple multiculturalism with an expectation of immigrant integration through mechanisms such as the testing of language competency and cultural understanding prior to the granting of citizenship. Additionally, liberal principles including the rule of law, equality before the law and human rights are enshrined in robust legislation to ensure that whilst cultural diversity is tolerated, accommodated and celebrated, the ‘reprehensible practices’ described by critics of multiculturalism are not accepted (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 587-588). The Canadian and Australian cases demonstrate that principles of civic integration and multiculturalism can indeed co-exist within a common policy framework.

Whilst civic integration embedded within multiculturalism has been generally politically stable over the long term in Canada and Australia, there is no shared or converging model of civic integration in Europe (Banting 2014: 81). There is an element of conformity between member states of the European Union as shown in the ‘Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy’. However, it is left up to each state to interpret and apply the Principles to “judge and assess their own efforts” (EU Justice and Home Affairs Council 2014: 2). As a result, there are a variety of models of civic integration. Generally speaking, these can be grouped along two lines of thought: (1) “the level of pressure brought to bear on immigrants”; and (2) “the openness of the national identity of the country to diversity” (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 589).
First, the level of pressure on immigrants for European policymakers is framed by a balance between rights and duties (Borevi 2010: 22; Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 589). An emphasis on the ‘right to integrate’ may include the development of supportive programs aimed at achieving integration through voluntary means. One example could be the provision of a voluntary language education service where migrants can gain competency in an official language. In contrast, an emphasis on the ‘duty’ of migrants to integrate may entail “mandatory programmes . . . [or] denying immigrants access to social rights or residency renewals if they fail to pass certain thresholds of integration” (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 589). As Koning (2019: 18-20) articulates, immigrant-excluding welfare reforms are sometimes justified on the basis of migrants’ failure to meet government-imposed integration responsibilities such as language or civics education.

A second area of contention for implementing civic integration is the contested debates about 'national identity'. Banting and Kymlicka (2013: 590) argue that across the EU, there is a spectrum ranging from ‘open’ to ‘closed’ conceptions of national identity, and in turn this leads to a variety of policy responses. An open national identity, as presented by Miller (1995) or Soutphommasane (2005, 2012), can celebrate and incorporate multiple cultural identities within the nation. For example, Soutphommasane argues that multicultural citizenship in Canada and Australia is fundamentally integrative in nature, relying upon an open political and civic culture (2005: 405-406). However, a closed national identity sees this as a zero-sum relationship: integration is merely code for assimilation. The balance between an ‘open’ or a ‘closed’ national identity is evident in a number of ways, including: the extent to which language proficiency and cultural understanding is measured prior to granting naturalisation; whether dual citizenship is permitted; and whether immigrants are expected to fully assimilate (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 590). The capacity for immigrants to naturalise is therefore inextricably tied to the requirements for attaining citizenship. A key question is whether states grant citizenship to migrants at the end of their integration pathway, or if the acquisition of citizenship is a part of the integration process.

As Banting (2014: 84) argues, the compatibility of multiculturalism with civic integration can become problematic when the state takes a particularly coercive (rather than voluntary and supportive) view of immigrants’ responsibility to integrate into society. The compatibility is also jeopardised by setting extraordinarily high requirements for new arrivals to meet before they can join the broader national identity. That is, if policies are too illiberal on either variable, multiculturalism can become incompatible with civic integration. Given that liberal multiculturalism is built upon a liberal, rights-based foundation, it is hard to envision a multiculturalist state that focuses solely upon the duties
of immigrants to integrate but without providing any support. Likewise, if the requirements for joining the national identity are excessively high, this diminishes the liberal notion of the state tolerating and accommodating multiple cultures. However, as the experiences of Australia and Canada show, this does not necessarily need to be the case. There is a significant capacity to incorporate multiculturalism and civic integration into one policy framework, and there is a high degree of policy nuance where the two interact.

2.5 Summary

One of the guiding research questions for this thesis focuses on mapping the understanding of multiculturalism and its operationalisation into public policy in four case studies. However, the term ‘multiculturalism’ is contested and often used without clear definition in political discourse. The fact that the concept is so hotly contested demonstrates the importance of clearly articulating a normative foundation before proceeding to consider case-study specific understandings. This chapter has provided a suitable base by showing that how multiculturalism can be justified by political liberalism. The work of Crowder (2013) highlights the predominance of liberal multiculturalism but also acknowledges that the liberal account is not unchallenged. For example, the so-called ‘Bristol school of multiculturalism’ provides an alternative paradigm based primarily in British intellectual developments (Uberoi and Modood 2019). This approach seeks to address blind spots in liberal multiculturalism, notably the underplaying of religion and the voices of minorities reflecting on their experience of racism, exclusion and identity formation (Uberoi and Modood 2019: 962-963). That being said, the purpose of this thesis is not to make a direct theoretical or normative innovation. Instead, this thesis contributes to the normative debates with new empirical work based upon a new innovative framework that operationalises multiculturalism by disaggregating its key elements.

Of course, there are also those who oppose or criticise multiculturalism, and it is important to acknowledge the significance of such views as they challenge the broader multicultural ‘project’. Such opposition claims that multiculturalism undermines equality before the law, is ignorant of inevitable conflict and incompatibility between cultures, and fosters inequality between ethnic groups leading to poor social cohesion. The backlash consolidated and increased during the 2000s, but policy approaches promoting multiculturalism appear to have been resilient despite the language of multiculturalism fading from public discourse. From this theoretical foundation, the next step is to develop a framework that operationalises the theoretical principles of multiculturalism, enabling a systematic analysis of multiculturalism in practice. To do this, Chapter 3 explores
generalised policy objectives and goals of multiculturalism in liberal democracies before applying these objectives to a heuristic for evaluating policy success in later chapters.
CHAPTER 3 – OPERATIONALISING MULTICULTURALISM AND EVALUATING ITS POLICY SUCCESS

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, many of the normative and theoretical debates about multiculturalism were outlined. As we have seen, multiculturalism is a contested concept, with many competing interpretations. The aim of this chapter is to draw upon these wider theoretical debates to establish a framework which operationalises the concept of ‘multiculturalism’. This operational framework of multiculturalism then enables a systematic analysis of multicultural policies in practice. The operational framework is a crucial conceptual ‘bridge’ between understanding the theoretical dimensions of multiculturalism and analysing how these policies play out in practice.

The chapter begins by reviewing previous attempts to operationalise multiculturalism, drawing attention to their strengths and weaknesses. Following this review, and also drawing upon the wider theoretical literature, the chapter presents a framework that operationalises the analysis of policies that promote multiculturalism. Following this, it is then argued that there is a need to develop a parsimonious framework of the policy objectives for multiculturalism. My framework for operationalising multiculturalism focuses on these three main objectives:

- (R) - reduce discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnicity or cultural background
- (E) - provide an equal opportunity for diverse cultural groups to fully participate in society
- (C) - facilitate a mutual cultural accommodation between immigrant groups, the state, and broader society without forced assimilation

17 Up until this point the term ‘multicultural policies’ has been frequently used. Banting and Kymlicka use the acronym ‘MCP’ in lieu of the full ‘multiculturalism policy’ (2013: 578). However, ‘multiculturalism policy’ is an example of quite clumsy terminology, though it does link a systematic set of ideas and values with practical policy outputs. There is some discussion about the difference between the discursive uses of ‘multicultural’ and ‘multiculturalism’ as descriptors, as ‘multicultural’ tends to denote a weaker form of the key conceptual ideas (Crowder 2013: 2; Jupp and Clyne 2011: xiii; Jupp 2011: 41). Despite this debate, the phrase ‘policies promoting multiculturalism’ will be used hereon to represent the term ‘multiculturalism policy’.
In this framework, multiculturalism has three broad goals: improving racial discrimination, equal opportunity and mutual cultural accommodation (REC). In the REC Framework developed in this chapter, the core elements of multiculturalism are disaggregated and operationalised. This enables us to examine the extent to which each jurisdiction develops policies which meet one, some or all the three main areas. However, in order to make evaluative judgements about the relative ‘success’ or not of how these policies have played out, the REC Framework needs to be integrated with a more explicitly evaluative set of criteria.

To do this, the next section presents the work of Marsh and McConnell (2010) who describe a three-dimensional heuristic for understanding policy success: political success, programmatic success and process success. This distinction is useful for separating different components of success that might otherwise be conflated together. Since this heuristic provides a greater level of nuance for drawing conclusions about levels of policy success, it is useful as a comparative mechanism to systematically evaluate the policy objectives in each case study. In other words, the REC Framework is a tool for identifying and describing the core policy goals of multiculturalism, and the three-dimensions heuristic of policy success provides a mechanism for making proximate judgements about success. The chapter then concludes by explaining some of the practical detail about how these different theoretical frameworks are applied in the case studies. Examples are provided to show how the policy success of the REC objectives is rated for each case study as exhibiting a high, moderate or low degree of success. Together, these elements serve as the operational framework for evaluating multiculturalism throughout the remainder of the thesis.

3.2 The objectives of multiculturalism: creating the REC Framework

3.2.1 Review of some existing frameworks

The purpose of this section is to discuss the operationalisation of multiculturalism as a series of policy objectives. As Freeman (2004: 946) argues, no state anywhere in the world can claim to have one single and ‘coherent’ policy model for the incorporation of cultural minorities. It is quite fitting then to suggest that policy approaches promoting multiculturalism intersect with many different areas of government activity and should not be relegated to one single ‘issue area’. Therefore, the operationalising of multiculturalism considers a range of policy measures across different areas of government responsibility.

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18 The acronym ‘REC’ takes the first letter from the central concept of each objective: R (racial discrimination), E (equal opportunity) and C (mutual cultural accommodation).
The two main frameworks discussed in this section are drawn from the Multiculturalism Policy Index Project (MCP Index Project 2016; Banting and Kymlicka 2013, 2006) and the work of Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010). There are other scholars who have taken different approaches to evaluating multiculturalism. For example, Bloemraad and Wright (2014), Koopmans (2010) and Hooghe et al. (2007) use quantitative empirical data to compare attitudes of citizens and immigrants as a way to evaluate multiculturalism more broadly, rather than examining case-specific institutional and policy contexts. There are also many single-case evaluations of multiculturalism (e.g. Borevi 2013; Soutphommasane 2012; Meer and Modood 2009). In acknowledging these approaches however, there are strong benefits to be gained by primarily drawing upon operational frameworks that have been specifically developed for a comparative, qualitative perspective.

One of the most prominent comparative frameworks that operationalises multiculturalism is the MCP Index. It is a tool that aggregates these policies from 21 Western democracies to facilitate accurate comparative evaluation (MCP Index Project 2016; Banting and Kymlicka 2013, 2006). The eight types of policy measures included are detailed in Table 1.

Table 1 The eight policy measures assessed by the MCP Index Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of the policy measure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism, at the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>central and/or regional municipal levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>media licensing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Exemptions from dress codes, either by statute or by court cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Allowing of dual citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(MCP Index Project 2016: 4-6)

Banting and Kymlicka suggest that these policy measures tend to focus on at least one of the following categories: the recognition, accommodation or support of cultural minorities (2013: 584). However, the MCP Index does not strongly emphasise the role of

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19 Crowder (2013: 3) acknowledges Banting and Kymlicka’s list, but includes an additional category addressing indigenous peoples by drawing upon the work of Ivison, Patton and Sanders (2000). Chapter 2 acknowledges that multiculturalism affords different rights to indigenous and subnational minorities than immigrants but also explains the scope of this thesis is immigrant multiculturalism.
policy efforts to combat racism and discrimination as being central to multiculturalism. Similarly, the reform of public service provision to ensure equitable access for cultural minorities is downplayed. Given that Berry et al. (1977: 1) argue that equitable participation is a key element of multiculturalism, it is necessary to consider other approaches to operationalisation.

**Table 2** Vertovec and Wessendorf’s five policy objectives of multiculturalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of the policy objective</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Reduce discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Promote equal opportunity and overcome barriers to full participation in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Allow unconstrained access to public services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Recognize cultural identities (not assimilation), open up public spaces for their representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Foster acceptance of ethnic pluralism and cultural understanding across all groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 4)

Similar to the MCP Index, Vertovec and Wessendorf in *The Multiculturalism Backlash* (2010: 3) identify eight different realms in which multicultural policies can be implemented: public recognition, education, social services, public materials, law, religious accommodation, food, and the media. Comparing this list to the eight types of policy measure included in the MCP Index reveals significant similarities. However, Vertovec and Wessendorf acknowledge that policies in the eight realms they identified have not been guided by a clearly articulated singular set of policy objectives (2010: 3). Nevertheless, they argue that by analysing comparable policy frameworks from Western liberal democracies, policy approaches since the 1960s have tended to meet a series of common objectives (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 4). These objectives are listed in Table 2.

Although this list of five objectives is quite broad, the next section shows that some of Vertovec and Wessendorf’s policy objectives can be conceptually consolidated. As Dye (2013: 31) reminds us, the purpose of models in politics is to order and simplify reality in a way that clarifies our understanding. Models should not be so complex that they become unmanageable. Parsimony is especially important in studies where there is detailed qualitative analysis across many cases, as is the case for this thesis.

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20 For example, information for public services available in multiple languages.
21 For example, proscribed foods including halal, kosher or vegetarian options available in public institutions.
22 For example, broadcasting regulation to prevent racial stereotyping and discrimination.
3.2.2 An overview of the REC Framework

Given that there is still a broad degree of similarity between some of the objectives detailed by Vertovec and Wessendorf above, for the sake of parsimony the list can be further condensed into three categories of policy objective. These are depicted in Table 3. To summarise the table, policy approaches promoting multiculturalism seek to improve outcomes in the areas of racial discrimination, equal opportunity and mutual cultural accommodation (REC).23

Table 3 The REC Framework describing the policy objectives of multiculturalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of the policy objective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>R</strong> Reduce discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnicity or cultural background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E</strong> Provide an equal opportunity for diverse cultural groups to fully participate in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong> Facilitate a mutual cultural accommodation between immigrant groups, the state, and broader society without forced assimilation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Vertovec and Wessenforf’s (2010: 4) list of objectives in Table 2 is consolidated into the REC Framework by merging Objectives 2 and 3 together under the category of ‘equal opportunity’, and merging Objectives 4 and 5 together under ‘mutual cultural accommodation’. The first objective, ‘reduce discrimination’, is left unchanged.

‘Equal opportunity’ (E) under the REC Framework primarily incorporates two of Vertovec and Wessendorf’s objectives: “promote equality of opportunity and overcome barriers to full participation in society”; and “allow unconstrained access to public services” (2010: 4). The objective of equal opportunity draws upon the principles of social liberalism discussed in the previous chapter, with the state taking an active role in reducing disadvantages faced by migrant groups. Likewise, ‘equal opportunity’ includes the notion of having unconstrained access to public services. This is because for an individual to be able to participate fully in society, the individual must also have equitable access to public services in an unconstrained manner.

There is also a subtle connection between ‘equal opportunity’ and Vertovec and Wessendorf’s fourth objective which highlights the importance of public recognition for minority cultures. Public recognition and representation of minority groups helps to facilitate formal government consultation with these groups. Through consultation,

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23 The acronym 'REC' takes the first letter from the central concept of each objective: R (racial discrimination), E (equal opportunity) and C (mutual cultural accommodation).
governments are able to listen and learn about barriers faced by minority groups and can address these with appropriate policy measures. Therefore, if such barriers or obstacles can be minimised through policy, this leads to an improved equality of opportunity for full participation in society.

‘Mutual cultural accommodation’ (C) under the REC Framework also incorporates two objectives articulated by Vertovec and Wessendorf: "recognize cultural identities (as opposed to assimilation) and open up public spaces for their representation"; and "foster acceptance of ethnic pluralism and cultural understanding across all groups" (2010: 4). The objective of mutual cultural accommodation describes an ongoing, two-way process of dialogue and cultural change as immigrant groups interact with the state and broader society. Within this accommodation, public recognition of cultural identities is critically important and can take several forms. These could include: the formation and public support of ethnic societies, associations or representative bodies; the sponsoring of activities directly linked to these organisations; and public consultation with these organisations on matters of particular interest (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 3). These options allow governments to foster improved relations between dominant and minority cultural groups. Similarly, these organisations facilitate participation in society by giving a formal voice to minority groups and promoting their interests which may otherwise be unheard in the public arena. This objective is critical because governments could address racial discrimination and equal opportunity without actually adopting multiculturalism, such as in cases like France (Castles and Miller 2009).

The inclusion of mutual cultural accommodation acknowledges the theoretical understanding that cultures are dynamic, not static entities because they change as they interact with each other or are reformed from within (Kymlicka 1989: 196). States promoting multiculturalism embrace their cultural diversity and positively value it through policy measures. These include the media regulations about representing cultural diversity, multiculturalism being included in the school curriculum, public affirmations of multiculturalism and financial support for representative or advocacy organisations for cultural minority groups (MCP Index Project 2016: 4-6). By describing the cultural accommodation as ‘mutual’, this accounts for the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs Council definition of integration as being a "dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all migrants and residents of Member States [of the European Union]". (EU Justice and Home Affairs Council 2014: 2). This aligns with the work of Banting and Kymlicka (2013) who argue that policies promoting multiculturalism and policies promoting civic integration can be compatible, rather than being considered mutually exclusive.
The REC Framework serves as a useful and innovative tool for disaggregating and operationalising multiculturalism. As this section has shown, the framework builds upon and consolidates pre-existing typologies that have articulated the policy objectives of multiculturalism.

3.3 The REC Framework in detail

The purpose of this section is to provide detailed definitions and justifications for each of the REC objectives. In addition, each section describes indicators that can be used for making proximate judgements about the success of policies, ranging from access to the housing market, hate crime, or the use of ‘stop-and-search’ powers by police. This section, and indeed the thesis, does not aim to conduct a full mapping of every potential indicator in every case.

3.3.1 REC Objective 1: To reduce racial discrimination

Shirin Rai in *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics* defines discrimination as “differentiation between people on grounds [including] … colour … [or] ethnicity” (2009: 155). However, this definition and explanation is somewhat narrow because it does not acknowledge the power differential that underlies discrimination on the basis of race. Krieger (2003: 195) offers an alternative definition that does recognise the centrality of power:

[R]acism refers to institutions and individual practices that create and reinforce oppressive systems of race relations whereby people and institutions engaging in discrimination adversely restrict, by judgement and action, the lives of those against whom they discriminate.

There are a few important observations to be made about Krieger’s definition. First, racism and racial discrimination can be used to refer to the same concept: unequal or differential treatment of people on the basis of race or ethnicity. Liat Ayalon also pairs ethnic (or racial) discrimination together with racism (2014: 500), citing research that shows the detrimental consequences racial discrimination has on educational, employment, socio-economic and health outcomes for cultural minority groups (Williams and Collins 1995; Williams 1999). Other more recent research supports this body of evidence (Williams and Mohammed 2009; Fozdar and Torezani 2008; Larson et al. 2007; Paradies et al. 2008). As
such, the terms racism and racial discrimination will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis.\textsuperscript{24}

Second, Krieger identifies that there are different types of racism or racial discrimination by distinguishing between the actions of individuals and institutions. Pincus (1996) describes the differences between ‘individual’,\textsuperscript{25} ‘institutional’\textsuperscript{26} and ‘structural’ discrimination, and Pyke (2010) adds an additional layer of ‘internalised’ racial oppression. Each of these will be defined below as a reference point for subsequent discussion in the thesis.

According to Pincus, “individual discrimination refers to the behavior of individual members of one [racial] group that is intended to have a differential and/or harmful effect on the members of another [racial] group” (1996: 186). Using an example from Chapter 2, the racially motivated murder of black British teenager Stephen Lawrence by a group of white young people is an example of individual discrimination. In contrast, institutional discrimination “refers to the policies of the dominant [racial group’s] institutions and the behavior of individuals who control these institutions and implement policies that are intended to have a differential and/or harmful effect on minority [racial] groups” (Pincus 1996: 186). Institutional discrimination therefore operates at a higher level. Given that dominant groups tend to also control key social and political institutions, these institutions are used to perpetuate oppressive systems. Keeping with the same example, the Macpherson Report (1999: 46.41) found the Metropolitan Police to be institutionally racist (or institutionally discriminatory) as the investigation into Lawrence’s murder was mismanaged because he was black.

Structural discrimination also happens at the institutional level, however it refers to the policies of institutions controlled by the dominant racial group that may be “[racially] neutral in intent but which have a differential and/or harmful effect on minority [racial] groups” (Pincus 1996: 186). Pincus goes on to say that the key distinction between institutional and structural discrimination is the intent (1996: 190), and then uses an

\textsuperscript{24} Pincus (1996: 190) notes there are some differences between the terms ‘racism’ and ‘racial discrimination’, particularly in the context of the United States where racism is often defined “as a system of beliefs, policies, and practices designed to maintain White superiority”. However, Pincus argues this definition implies that black people cannot be racist because black people “lack power and are the victims of racism”. Further complicating this debate is the fact that the different case studies in this thesis use both terms to varying extents. ‘Racial discrimination’ is certainly more commonplace in all four cases, but British interview participants and institutions in particular regularly refer to institutional racism.

\textsuperscript{25} ‘Individual discrimination’ is sometimes referred to as ‘interpersonal discrimination’ or ‘interpersonal racism’.

\textsuperscript{26} ‘Institutional discrimination’ or ‘institutional racism’ is sometimes referred to as ‘organisational discrimination’ or ‘organisational racism’.
example of seniority when retrenching workers. Accepting the premise that minority workers tend to be the last hired, employers retrenching workers on the basis of seniority is therefore structural discrimination. Even though the intent of the employer’s policy is race-neutral, it has a disproportionate effect on racial minority workers (Pincus 1996: 191).

In contrast to these other forms of racial discrimination, Pyke identifies internalised racism as the “internalization of racial oppression by the racially subordinated” (2010: 551). This oppression refers to the way members of subordinate groups may accept and internalise racist “stereotypes, values, images and ideologies” that have been established, promoted and perpetuated by the dominant group (Pyke 2010: 553). This highlights the significant social and psychological harm that racial oppression causes, demonstrating the complexity of defining racism and racial discrimination. Soutphommasane takes a similar view, arguing that incidences of racism and discrimination are a form of social oppression which devalues and degrades the position of cultural minorities in a society by causing “civic harm” to make its victims “feel like a second-class citizen” (2012: 91).

Notwithstanding the different types of discrimination defined above, this thesis uses the term racial discrimination to incorporate discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, nationality or cultural background (Karlsen and Nazroo 2017: 45). The term racial discrimination is chosen for the sake of brevity, even though the full list covers a more comprehensive range of characteristics. As acknowledged above, racial discrimination is used as the chosen term because of its greater applicability in the four cases being examined. The term is also used with an awareness of broader debates around race as a socially constructed category produced by the process of racism to oppress subordinate groups, and also the overlap between discrimination on the basis of race and religion (Castles and Miller 2009: 36; Törngren 2011; Jupp 2011b; Karlsen and Nazroo 2017). The definitions and explanations in this section inform the way the thesis understands the objective of ‘reducing racial discrimination’. This is paramount for identifying potential types of indicators to evaluate the success of policies seeking to reduce discrimination.

Examples of indicators for assessing racial discrimination might include non-violent hate crimes, incidences of racist violence, and discrimination relating to policing or the criminal justice system (Pettit and Western 2004; Haney-López 2010; Weitzer and Tuch

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27 A hate crime constitutes racial discrimination when the bias motivating a violent or non-violent criminal act is based upon racial, ethnic or national characteristics (ODIHR, n.d.). Other bias motivations which could constitute racial discrimination are linguistic or religious characteristics. However, the specific nuances about these characteristics in the context give rise to a tangential debate. See the work of Every and Perry (2014) for more information.
Another type of indicator can be labour market integration, where immigrants over time have a similar labour market profile to the native population (Lemaître 2007: 10). This intersects with racial discrimination when there is a divergence between employment outcomes achieved by immigrant minorities compared with the native-born population. Hiring, firing and wage discrimination on the basis of ethnicity are key indicators (Carlsson and Rooth 2007; Krause et al. 2012), as is occupational mismatch arising from institutional discrimination (Aleksynska and Tritah 2013). Similarly, housing is an important type of indicator because racial discrimination against migrant groups has a damaging impact on their access to housing (MacDonald et al. 2016). Physical segregation can lead to racial disparities in health outcomes, especially where segregation is a determinant of socioeconomic status (Williams and Collins 2001). Another potential indicator is discrimination or misrepresentation of cultural minorities in the media (Jakubowicz et al. 1994).

There is also significant overlap between the indicators of labour market integration, housing, education and health, and the policy objective of equal opportunity (Soutphommasane 2012: 91). This demonstrates the interdependent nature of the three REC objectives when considering multiculturalism more broadly.

### 3.3.2 REC Objective 2: To promote equal opportunity

‘Equal opportunity’ is quite an ambiguous term, despite an obvious appeal to egalitarian values. The term’s vague and somewhat ‘flexible’ nature is important to explain, as this belies several interconnected layers of meaning. At a basic level, equal opportunity "requires that persons should be equally placed with respect to opportunities to compete for a good" (Reeve 2009: 155). For liberal theorists, the debate around what type of equality is most suitable for society becomes apparent. As discussed in Chapter 2, social liberals like Green (1881 [1891]) argue that formal equality is often insufficient, instead insisting that substantive equality ought to be the goal. In this respect, equal opportunity can be understood as equality of access. In other words, the state should intervene to minimise disadvantages that some individuals face by removing barriers that inhibit their capacity to access opportunities such as education, healthcare or employment. Returning to the initial definition of multiculturalism in Chapter 1, Berry et al. (1977: 1) argue that one of the core elements of multiculturalism is the access to equitable participation for culturally diverse

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28 This encompasses immigrants themselves, and those of the second generation who may also experience discrimination in the labour market.

29 The intersection between labour market integration and institutional discrimination can be found in occupational mismatch, especially when migrants are overeducated for their specific employment due to the labour market institutions of their destination country.
persons. Furthermore, the implication is that for individuals to have an equality of opportunity, they need to also be free from all forms of discrimination.

Equality of opportunity via state intervention in society is therefore a form of distributive or redistributive justice. If the state recognises that there is material disadvantage faced by a cultural or ethnic group in society, social liberals would argue that the state has an obligation to mitigate this. The overarching principle here is that individuals should have an equality of opportunity to reach their potential. Castles and Miller quite clearly position the principle of equal opportunity in the economic realm. In describing a shift away from equal opportunity and anti-poverty policy measures by the US government in the 1980s, they cite a corresponding increase in inequality and impoverishment for cultural minorities (Castles and Miller 2009: 249).

In terms of multiculturalism, there is a tension between the roles of redistribution and recognition for addressing disadvantage between cultural groups. Brian Barry argues that since the fall of communism, multiculturalism has become an obstacle to economic conceptions of social justice within the tradition of social liberalism (2001: 3). In Barry’s mind, socio-economic disadvantage ought to be the focus of social liberals, not multiculturalists. Whilst culture itself is not the problem, Barry argues that redistributive multiculturalism splits society into opposing cultural groups to compete for scarce state resources (Barry 2001: 324). Others such as Axel Honneth promote the importance that public recognition of a group to maintain its cultural identity provides group members equal opportunity to fully participate in broader society (Fraser and Honneth 2003).

Irrespective of this broader debate on how multiculturalism serves or does not serve the provision of equal opportunity to cultural minorities, Crowder argues that ‘equal treatment’ of groups is not necessarily ‘identical treatment’. Non-identical treatment of a certain group is justifiable when there is good reason to do so (Crowder 2013: 44). In the case of socio-economic disadvantage amongst ethnic minorities, the state can justifiably intervene in the market address this unfair disadvantage. In doing so, this fosters equal opportunity, equitable access to services and ultimately equitable participation in society.

Examples of equal opportunity indicators primarily tend to be socio-economic because equal opportunity in the form of redistributive justice is an essential component for multicultural policies informed by social liberal values. Labour market integration indicators primarily relate to human capital in the form of education and language proficiency. Incomplete primary or secondary education makes it difficult for migrants to

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30 See discussion on Kymlicka’s account of cultural rights in Chapter 2 for a justification of this position.
find work in high-skill, service-based economies (Hartog and Zorlu 2007; Hugo 2014). Additionally, qualifications from foreign tertiary institutions are not necessarily recognised (Hawthorne 2015; Sumption 2013; Sumption et al. 2013). These barriers are further complicated by language proficiency, especially if the dominant language is not widely spoken abroad, such as Dutch or Swedish. Equitable access to public services is another potential indicator, highlighting the need for governments to respond to barriers such as language proficiency that impede people from accessing public services and government information (Thompson and Dunn 2002). As new immigrants become established, there is also concern about the geographical concentration of people from cultural minority groups due to housing segregation leading to other negative socio-economic outcomes and health outcomes (Karlsen and Nazroo 2017: 58; Williams and Collins 2001; Modood et al. 1997: 184-223). In addition, the indicator of inter-generational social mobility considers whether the children of migrants are better off than their parents as a marker of socio-economic integration (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau 2016; Hugo 2014; Reeves 2016). Though second and third generation migrants often still face barriers such as discrimination, the capacity for young people to achieve upward social mobility is a strong indicator that a state is fostering equal opportunity.

### 3.3.3 REC Objective 3: To facilitate mutual cultural accommodation

Mutual cultural accommodation is best described as part of the integration process between migrants and their host societies. In Chapter 2, the European Union’s definition of integration was introduced as being:

> “a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all migrants and residents of Member States [of the European Union]. Such a process requires efforts from both migrants and receiving societies and is critical for tapping into the potential of migration and for enhancing social cohesion”. (EU Justice and Home Affairs Council 2014: 2)

Essential to this understanding of integration is the ‘two-way process’ where both migrants and their host societies must adapt to each other. Furthermore, the goal for this mutual cultural accommodation is to ‘enhance social cohesion.’ Although there is no definitive or universal understanding of social cohesion, Markus (2015: 12) suggests that most definitions incorporate three common themes: 1) that there is a shared vision within a community underpinned by “universal values, mutual respect and common aspirations or identity”; 2) that social cohesion is a characteristic of a well-functioning group or society, including a spirit of co-operation between constituent members; and 3) that social cohesion is an ongoing process, not an achievable ‘end-point’ or outcome. In the context of
multiculturalism, the third point is particularly poignant. The social cohesion for which multiculturalism strives cannot ever be ‘attained’, but continuously requires work and effort on the part of community members, policymakers and the wider society. It is these efforts that can be described as mutual cultural accommodation.

The second point is mirrored elsewhere, with social cohesion expecting a level of inter-group co-operation, along with a common identity shared by group members (Chan et al. 2006: 289; Hooghe et al. 2007; Hooghe 2007; Lopez 2013). This coalesces with the nation-building capacity of multiculturalism articulated by Soutphommasane and Modood in the previous chapter (Soutphommasane 2012: 22, 76, 160; Modood 2019: 243). When coupled with an inclusive, civic-oriented national identity, multicultural policies can foster mutual cultural accommodation and social cohesion. They do this by drawing together aspirational members of society irrespective of whether they have a migrant background. What is especially important is that there are institutions in place to foster norms of dialogue, co-operation and non-violence in the context of cultural or ethnic diversity, and simultaneously minimise discrimination (Varshney 2001: 15-16; Soutphommasane 2017). Indeed, Hooghe (2007) challenges the preconception that cultural or ethnic diversity degrades social cohesion. Instead, it is suggested that that policy settings can promote ‘thin’ norms of reciprocity between cultural groups to maintain social order and harmony, without relying on ‘thick’ norms such as generalised trust between community members as developed by cultural homogeneity (Hooghe 2007: 727-728).

Markus also identifies several points of cleavage between different definitions of social cohesion and mutual accommodation, notably centred around economic, political and socio-cultural factors (2015: 12). Of these three, economic factors are especially important given that the role of government economic intervention is a principal point of contention between the left and right of liberal democracies. Continually up for debate is the extent to which government should respond to concerns of socio-economic disadvantage and inequality, especially if this disparity occurs along ethnic lines. Thus, by combining an inclusive common identity with targeted redistributive policies, multiculturalism has the capacity to foster positive social cohesion through a process of mutual cultural accommodation.

One potential type of indicator is accommodation by the state, which could implement policies supporting migrants to integrate ‘as they are’ without undue pressure to assimilate (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 586-594). These could include provision for settlement services for new arrivals, regulatory reforms for the media to better represent cultural minorities, provision for funding mother-tongue instruction, and flexibility for dress
codes. In this thesis, the significant role that political parties play in shaping both the direction of public policy and the tone of public debate is also recognised. Another indicator is accommodation by immigrants, where the state encourages or mandates certain activities for new arrivals. Examples could include the extent of language acquisition, participation in civil society, seeking employment or education, and adapting to the host society’s rule of law and values (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 588-589). Indicators of accommodation by society include the acceptance and toleration of cultural diversity or changes in behaviour such as eliminating discriminatory practices. Again, this process can be encouraged or mandated by the state itself. The case studies consider the extent to which government policies might promote or impede toleration and acceptance. Similarly, the cases explore how migrants are described by governments and policymakers in public debate. For example, whether cultural diversity is positively promoted or if migrants are described as cultural threats or security risks.

31 As described earlier in the chapter, the eight policy areas assessed by the Multiculturalism Policy Index are all demonstrative of the state’s accommodation of immigrants (MCP Index Project, 2016).
3.3.4 Summarising the REC Framework: overlapping objectives

This section has developed a framework to operationalise and disaggregate the concept of multiculturalism. This framework is based on three key principles: reducing discrimination, facilitating equal opportunity and fostering mutual cultural accommodation. As the discussion above has highlighted, the three REC objectives are interdependent. There is also a degree of overlap between the objectives akin to a Venn diagram, as depicted in Figure 1. As will become clear throughout the remainder of the thesis, multicultural policies often address multiple objectives at the same time. As Berry and Ward (2016: 441) explain, multicultural policies ought to maintain a balance between two key elements: equitable participation and cultural diversity. For example, efforts to promote equal opportunity in the labour market might also look to address structural discrimination as it is a significant barrier for equitable participation. Similarly, mutual cultural accommodation may involve the state changing the delivery model of public services to ensure equitable access for people with a migrant background. Not only does this incorporate the objective of equal opportunity, but such efforts also seek to eliminate structural discrimination by public service providers. Although these artificial boundaries exist across the overlapping

**Figure 1 Examples of overlap in the REC Framework**

- **Reduce racial discrimination**
  - Example: the state mitigates structural discrimination to reduce barriers that impede equal opportunity

- **Facilitate equal opportunity**
  - Example: the state educates wider society about anti-discrimination law to establish acceptable norms that recognise cultural diversity

- **Mutual cultural accommodation**
  - Example: the state adapts the delivery of public services to help immigrant minorities overcome unique barriers that impede equitable participation in society
concepts, the REC Framework is useful device for minimising this overlap and also maintaining parsimony and brevity. Ultimately, the purpose of the REC Framework is to enable the analysis of multiculturalism in practice. The framework breaks down the concept into manageable parts that can then be operationalised for analysis and evaluation.32

3.4 Policy evaluation and policy ‘success’

The purpose of this section is to describe an approach for evaluating the policy success of multiculturalism. Before this, it is worth considering some of the previous evaluations and metrics that have been used to assess multiculturalism and multicultural policy. There are already a small number of cross-national aggregates which measure the presence and prevalence of multicultural policy, such as the Multiculturalism Policy Index (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 2013; MCP Index Project 2016) and the ‘Cultural Difference’ subset of the Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI; Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans et al. 2012). Alternative empirical approaches, such as ICRI, do provide useful insights, but they either do not comprehensively cover all elements of multiculturalism contained within the REC Framework, or do not cover all four case studies selected for this thesis. As a result, the discussion throughout this thesis primarily refers back to the MCP Index data.

There is also criticism of these model-based indices, with concerns about ‘construct validity’ especially given the marked qualitative differences and complexities between contexts (Duyvendak et al. 2013). However, Banting and Kymlicka recognise that the MCP Index does not measure the effectiveness of multicultural policies. Instead, they call for future research to investigate the effectiveness of multicultural policy in the context of the ongoing rhetorical backlash against multiculturalism (2013: 593). Furthermore, Duyvendak et al. suggest that model-based indices should instead give way to what Tilly (1984) describes as ‘individualised comparisons’. This style of comparative case study research ought to identify “what is unusual, what is particular, what is unique and what is immanent to a context through juxtaposition with other cases” (Duyvendak et al. 2013: 616). It here that this thesis contributes to the understanding of how policy approaches promoting multiculturalism are playing out by comparing only four cases – Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands and South Australia – but conducting the evaluations in greater depth.

One of the main reasons for evaluating public policies is to determine whether they are successfully achieving their objectives. Public policy is created to achieve certain outcomes

32 There is one caveat relating to the British case study in Chapter 6. Policy efforts to counter racial discrimination and promote equal opportunity are very closely intertwined as ‘race equality’. In response, the discussion in Chapter 6 considers these two overlapping objectives together, though the assessment of success is still able to be disaggregated.
or reach certain targets. Accordingly, it should be evaluated to ensure that the desired effect is taking place. However, the case studies will later demonstrate that multiculturalism is rarely codified as a single policy with clearly stated objectives. Some policies relevant to multiculturalism may also have objectives that do not align with the key principles of multiculturalism. Instead, policy approaches promoting multiculturalism are complex and multi-faceted. Therefore, the REC Framework is a useful tool for operationalising and disaggregating multiculturalism for evaluation. Althaus et al. explain that policy evaluation serves three purposes: to determine whether a policy is meeting its aims; to ensure the accountability of policymakers; and to provide “important clues for future policy making” (2013: 191). Whilst this understanding of policy evaluation may be targeted towards evaluations conducted within the public service, the first and third purposes align well with the research of this thesis. First and foremost, the thesis is concerned with establishing how well policies promoting multiculturalism in the four case studies achieve the objectives of multiculturalism as per the REC Framework. This type of evaluation focuses on what Althaus et al. (2013: 195) describes as ‘effectiveness’. Simultaneously, the comparative nature of this thesis aims to inform debates about the relationship between normative multiculturalism and public policy by exploring and evaluating different policy avenues taken in comparable jurisdictions. It is worth noting here that this thesis is considering suites of policies that promote multiculturalism, not just evaluating one specific policy initiative. This is done to provide a broader overview of multiculturalism in each case.

3.4.1 An overview of Marsh and McConnell’s heuristic of policy success

One way of conceptualising the effectiveness of public policy is to use the lens of policy ‘success’. David Marsh and Allan McConnell present a heuristic for evaluating policy success that draws together the literature on both measuring public sector improvement and also policy evaluation (2010; McConnell 2010). In acknowledging some epistemological concerns for objectively measuring policy success due to the contested nature of political decision-making and the implicit values, they state their approach is to be used as a heuristic but not a model or theory. Instead, their intention is to provide a structured and thorough way “to discuss and assess policy success” (Marsh and McConnell 2010: 571). The heuristic splits policy success into three dimensions:

- political success
- programmatic success
- process success
Clearly delineating the different dimensions of success provides researchers and policymakers with a far greater level of nuance when drawing conclusions about policy success or comparing policy success across multiple case studies. Their heuristic has been adapted and summarised in Table 4.

**Table 4** An adaptation of Marsh and McConnell’s heuristic of policy success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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| **Political success** | - *Government popularity*: is the policy politically popular? Did it help secure or boost government credibility?  
- *Political durability*: does the policy enjoy cross-party support? Would a change of government lead to a dismantling of the policy? |
| **Programmatic success** | - *Operational*: was the policy implemented as per its objectives?  
- *Outcome*: did the policy achieve its intended outcomes?  
- *Resource*: was the policy an efficient use of resources?  
- *Actor/interest*: did the policy or its implementation benefit a particular group? |
| **Process success** | - *Legitimacy*: was the policy formed through adequate due process? Was there sufficient and broad consultation?  
- *Legislation*: what is the nature of any amendments made to the policy? How many amendments? Did the amendments fundamentally change the policy?  
- *Sustainability*: what is the nature of the support from key stakeholders? Is there a sufficient coalition of support from interest groups and the public?  
- *Innovation and influence*: was the policy designed specifically for the local context? Or has it been ‘transferred’ in from other jurisdictions? |

Derived and adapted from a similar table in Marsh and McConnell (2010: 571).

**Political success** is defined primarily by Marsh and McConnell from the perspective of the government or ruling party: a policy is politically successful if it provides a positive political impact (2010: 575). Indicators of this success include whether the policy is politically popular, whether the policy helps to improve government credibility or whether it supports a governing party’s bid at re-election. Potential sources of evidence include opinion poll data, election results and media commentary (Marsh and McConnell 2010: 571). However, Marsh and McConnell’s description is a relatively narrow view of what constitutes political success. By taking a broader interpretation, indicators could also
include the degree of political durability for a policy or piece of legislation. This could include the level of cross-party support or bipartisanship that the policy or set of policies receives. In other words, whether a change of government would lead to a dismantling of the policy. In contrast, major political parties might also collectively oppose policy approaches that promote multiculturalism.

The dimension of programmatic success is perhaps what is most commonly referred to when evaluating policy success: whether a policy achieves what it set out to do. However, Marsh and McConnell argue there is more depth to programmatic success that should be taken into consideration. Indicators of this success fit within four categories: whether the policy was implemented as per its original objectives (operational); whether the policy achieved its intended outcomes (outcome); whether the policy was an efficient use of resources (resource); and whether the policy or its implementation benefited a particular group (actor/interest) (2010: 573-574).

The third dimension of process success can be defined in terms of how “the stages of policy-making in which issues emerge and are framed, options are explored, interests are consulted and decisions made” (Marsh and McConnell 2010: 572). Key considerations include: the legitimacy in the formation of choices through due process and accountability; the passage of appropriate legislation with limited amendments; the level of support from key stakeholders and interest groups to provide enduring sustainability of the policy; and whether a policy is built from new innovation or if it has been ‘imported’ from other jurisdictions through a process of policy transfer (Marsh and McConnell 2010: 571-573).

Some scholars have formulated different typologies for evaluating policy success (Bovens et al. 2002; Bovens 2010). In contrast, others have focused on evaluating policy failures instead (Howlett 2012; Howlett et al. 2015; Bovens and ‘t Hart 2016). In Chapter 4, some critiques and limitations of Marsh and McConnell’s heuristic will be addressed in more detail, as well as further acknowledgement of alternative approaches. Nonetheless, the three-dimensions heuristic is still well-suited for this thesis. As will also be explained in Chapter 4, it is a widely used approach, and it allows for comparative analysis in a parsimonious format.
3.4.2 Integrating ‘success’ criteria into the REC Framework

This section integrates Marsh and McConnell’s heuristic for evaluating policy success with the REC Framework. Using a heuristic such as this to evaluate and compare policy success is beneficial because each dimension is separated, and each can therefore be addressed in turn. From a comparative perspective, separating each dimension also allows for clear and discrete policy comparisons across multiple cases. An innovation of this thesis is the overlaying of the REC Framework of multicultural policy objectives on to Marsh and McConnell’s heuristic in a comparative case study. Table 5 is an exemplar that outlines how their success criteria will be deployed with the REC Framework.33

| Table 5 Exemplar assessment table of political success for the REC Framework |
|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **REC Framework** | **Racial discrimination** | **Equal opportunity** | **Cultural accommodation** |
| **Political success** | - Summary of the key themes and indicators of success emerging from the case study relating to the political success of policies that seek to reduce racial discrimination | - Summary of key themes for equal opportunity | - Summary of key themes for mutual cultural accommodation |
| **Source of evidence** | - List of the sources of evidence for these indicators, including interview data, peer-reviewed literature, grey literature etc | - Sources of evidence | - Sources of evidence |
| **Rating** | - Rating: high, moderate or low | - Rating | - Rating |

Each case study contains three of these templates in the discussion: one each for political success, programmatic success and process success. The overall framework separates each of the three dimensions of policy success to then consider the REC Framework in a systematic and disaggregated manner. The table provides a qualitative summary of the key themes and indicators of success, along with a list of the evidence cited to support these findings. In the bottom row of each table, a rating is given to each objective in the REC Framework: high, moderate or low. This rating is a proximate judgement of success and provides a useful summary of reported performance for each of the REC Framework objectives in each dimension of success. There are also some limitations to this approach that are described later in Chapter 4.

33 Table 5 is only a partial example because it only includes one dimension of policy success (i.e. political success). In each case study, there will also be a similar table for programmatic success and process success.
However, the core findings of this thesis are the qualitative case study material, not the success ratings. The success assessment tables, such as the exemplar in Table 5 above, form part of an inductive analysis process. As is described further in Chapter 4, the analysis draws on empirical data to assess elites’ commitment to policy approaches promoting multiculturalism and their perspectives on policy effectiveness. In contrast, the rating system is a shorthand mechanism for describing proximate judgements of success for the purpose of making comparisons between the case studies in a straightforward manner. A similar system is also employed in the Multiculturalism Policy Index which rates the presence of policies as either ‘1’, ‘0.5’, or ‘0’ (2016: 4-6).

With that said, a rating of high, moderate or low success can be assessed on the basis of ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’. First, ‘quantity’ refers to how much policy activity is taking place within a case study. Althaus et al. (2013: 180-185) identify a number of factors that may impede successful policy implementation. For instance, new problems may arise to distract politicians or public servants from addressing previously identified problems. The choice of policy instrument also should be appropriate and adequately suit the policy objectives. For successful implementation, policies also require adequate funding including administrative resources. Therefore, when evaluating success it is important to consider how much political attention is dedicated to addressing a policy issue, the number and type of programs implemented in response, and then also the amount of resources dedicated to those programs.

Second, the concept of ‘quality’ refers to how good or effective this policy activity is. For instance, every municipality in a jurisdiction might be required to have an anti-discrimination policy. However, if these are not supported by political will from municipalities to actually transform behaviour or structures, then these policies are of lower quality. Likewise, a higher quality policy would be supported by clear communication and cooperation between government agencies and the relevant clients Althaus et al. (2013: 185).

Turning attention now to how the ratings of high, moderate and low success are assessed. A rating of ‘high’ is given if a case study is performing well for a given REC objective in a particular dimension of success. For example, in Chapter 5 it is explained that Sweden demonstrates a high degree of programmatic success for promoting equal opportunity through a strong social democratic welfare state mitigating socio-economic disadvantage for immigrants. Likewise, in Chapter 8 it is argued that South Australia also exhibits a high degree of programmatic success for equal opportunity. Based on the interview data and the data from the Multiculturalism Policy Index, it is argued that the
policy of ‘access and equity’ is implemented across many aspects of the public sector. The policy is comprehensive in the way it mitigates barriers faced by migrants in accessing public services. Furthermore, the frequent dialogue between the South Australian Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs Commission (SAMEAC) and migrant community groups serves as a strong bridge for accessing government and providing advice on any relevant issues that arise.

A rating of ‘moderate’ is given if there are a few factors that detract from a case study’s performance in a given area. In the UK, there is a moderate degree of process success for reducing racial discrimination. In Chapter 6, this mixed result is explained by detailing the dramatic and transformational policy response to institutional racism following the Stephen Lawrence inquiry. However, this is contrasted against inadequate consultation with cultural minority communities for the anti-radicalisation program, Prevent. Another example is a rating of moderate political success for reducing racial discrimination in Sweden. It is argued in Chapter 5 that there is a degree of political consensus across all major parties about the importance of eradicating discrimination. Furthermore, most interview participants also expressed views supporting the belief that discrimination is a significant impediment for migrant integration into Swedish society. However, it is also discussed in Chapter 5 that the removal of the term ‘race’ from the official political lexicon masks underlying issues. For example, it becomes difficult for policy actors address racism if the terminology no longer exists. This is especially problematic in light of the political rise of the radical-right Sweden Democrats party who have demonstrated themselves to be sophisticated in masking their xenophobic ideology within anti-racist rhetoric.

A rating of ‘low’ is given if there are only very few indicators, if any at all, that a case study is achieving success for a given REC objective. In fact, some cases have policies that actively undermine the aims and principles of multiculturalism. For example, the Netherlands demonstrates a low degree of political success for mutual cultural accommodation. In Chapter 7, it is argued that the pressure from the radical-right Party for Freedom has led mainstream political parties to take assimilationist policy views that pressure people with a migrant background to adopt ‘Dutch norms and values’. In Chapter 6, it is argued that the UK also exhibits a low degree of political success for equal opportunity. This is attributable mainly due to austerity. Government-led austerity cuts to public sector funding seems to disregard the principle of equal opportunity. In particular, the disproportionately high cuts to the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) have a disproportionately adverse effect on people with Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) backgrounds. Due to inadequate resourcing, the EHRC has needed to introduce tribunal fees
and reduce its capacity to support discrimination cases. This has meant that the most vulnerable members of society are at times unable to access their legal rights afforded to them by the state.

### 3.5 Summary

It is through the implementation of public policy that the normative principles of multiculturalism can bear fruit in society. The purpose of this chapter has been to operationalise multiculturalism by linking the principles of multiculturalism discussed in Chapter 2 with a schema of tangible policy objectives: the REC Framework. The remainder of this thesis will integrate this framework with three dimensions of policy success: *political success, programmatic success* and *process success*, to compare and assess the effectiveness of the policy strategies promoting multiculturalism in each case study, with a focus on elite perspectives.

Although the Multiculturalism Policy Index Project rates the relative presence of policies promoting multiculturalism in 21 liberal democracies, this thesis takes up Banting and Kymlicka's call for localised, detailed evaluations of the effectiveness of these policies (2013: 593). In other words, the thesis seeks to explain how these policies are embedded and playing out in each case. Further, this research recognises the limitations of large-scale index-based evaluations criticised by Duyvendak et al., and aims to supplement richer detail to the work of the Multiculturalism Index Project by exploring "what is unusual, what is particular, what is unique and what is immanent to a context through juxtaposition with other cases" (2013: 616). This thesis innovates by applying the three-dimensions of policy success to evaluate the objectives in the REC Framework in four cases, and then comparing the similarities and differences between them. Comparing the cases in this way yields unique and updated findings as to how multiculturalism is currently playing out in some Western liberal democracies. The next chapter will explain the research design and methodological approach used in the thesis.
CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1 Introduction

This chapter establishes the methodological approach used in the thesis. The chapter outlines the research design and justifies how the chosen methods are used to answer the research questions. As introduced in Chapter 1, the aim of the thesis is to compare and evaluate the success of different policy approaches promoting multiculturalism and integration in four case studies: Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands, and South Australia. As noted in Chapter 1, two major research questions frame the research in this thesis:

R1. How has multiculturalism been understood and operationalised into public policy in the four case studies?
R2. What factors contribute to, or undermine, the policy success of multiculturalism in the four case studies?

The chapter is structured in the following way. The first section establishes the theoretical approach of the thesis, drawing upon the paradigms of normative theory, ‘new institutionalism’ and critical realism. The chapter then goes on to justify the decision to conduct a multiple case study in the tradition of comparative politics. The thesis incorporates the ‘most similar systems design’ approach (Anckar 2008), with the Dutch and South Australian cases deliberately included to provide some contrasting elements within these ‘similar systems’. A rationale is also provided to justify the inclusion of South Australia as a subnational case. Following this, the chapter builds upon the discussion from Chapter 3 by considering methodological issues for making judgements about assessing policy success. The final section sets out the research design, justifying the use of semi-structured elite interviews triangulated against policy documentation and grey literature, before providing a rationale for thematic analysis of this material. The section also explains the ethical considerations made, along with a description of how I position myself as a researcher in relation to the research questions, the research participants, the data, its analysis and the subsequent findings.
4.2 Theoretical approach

4.2.1 Normative theory

The following sections outline the theoretical approach of this research. The theoretical literature discussed in Chapter 2 demonstrates that multiculturalism poses many normative questions about what constitutes the 'good society' from the perspectives of immigrants and receiving communities. Normative theory can be defined as a set of philosophical debates about 'what is the best way to live' that are used to develop approaches to organising societal organisation and acceptable conduct (Buckler 2010: 156). Questions such as these mean that studies of multiculturalism must inherently grapple with normative political theory. Debates over multiculturalism are intrinsically linked to the longstanding debates over what Buckler describes as the grand normative themes: liberty, equality and community (2010: 157). In some ways, it is impossible to separate an investigation into multiculturalism from these perennial issues. In Chapter 2, the theoretical and normative debates about multiculturalism were explored, and in Chapter 3 multiculturalism was operationalised with a framework to help evaluate policy success. Likewise, later chapters will continue this discussion by exploring how each case study has developed unique policy responses to these normative challenges.

Normative theory does not occupy a single ontological space, as List and Valentini observe that “different normative theories disagree about which normative world is actual: which encodes the ‘true’ or ‘correct’ set of normative facts” (2020: 195). That being said, they argue that normative political ontology is thinner than moral ontology because “some normative questions on which we tend to assume the existence of facts at the moral level are indeterminate at the political level” (List and Valentini 2020: 187). Although there is a diversity of ontological positions in normative theory, this thesis uses this approach with a foundationalist ontological understanding: there is a real and observable world that exists independently of our understanding of it (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 190). Furthermore, normative theory can be positioned within epistemological realism, where the normative work of Karl Marx is also situated (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 204). This is because realist epistemology “[emphasises] the role that theory plays in any interpretation of the causal power of any structure/institution in that real world; so the real world effect on actions is mediated by ideas” (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 190). Nevertheless, even those predisposed to other ontological traditions such as anti-realism or post-structuralism can gain insights from the empirical work presented by this thesis.
4.2.2 New institutionalism

In addition to being grounded in normative theory, this thesis also draws upon the theoretical approach of institutionalism, a longstanding methodological tradition in political science. ‘Traditional’ institutionalism is a methodology that is characterised by Peters as “an intelligent observer attempting to describe and understand the political world around him or her in non-abstract terms” (1999: 2). Lowndes explains that traditional institutionalism was relatively unreflective and silent on matters of theory and methods, instead taking observations and ‘facts’ for granted as political science ‘common sense’ (2010: 62). In response to the broad critique, a ‘new institutionalism’ emerged that vigorously defended the role and agency of political institutions. The pioneers of new institutionalism, March and Olsen, put it this way:

The bureaucratic agency, the legislative committee, the appellate court are arenas for contending social forces, but they are also collections of standards, operating procedures and structures that define and defend interests. They are political actors in their own right. (March and Olsen 1984: 738)

Therefore, political institutions are worthy of study in their own right because they should not only be viewed as political organisations. Instead, institutions can be defined in a broader sense to mean “stable, recurring pattern[s] of behaviour” (Goodin 1996: 22). Lowndes explains that new institutionalists explore how institutions embody norms, values and power relationships, as well as considering “formal constitutions and organizational structures” (2010: 61). Furthermore, new institutionalism expands upon the traditional approach in the way it focuses upon the relationship between institutions and individuals. Whereas traditional institutionalism was preoccupied with the effects that institutions have on individuals, new institutionalism also considers the interactions between institutions and individuals (Lowndes 2010: 61). Most importantly, new institutionalism has adopted what Lowndes describes as a “value-critical stance”, trending away from the previously unreflective, “submerged values” approach (2010: 69). In line with this, Pierre posits that “the structure of governance – the inclusion or exclusion of different actors and the selection of instruments – is not value neutral but embedded in and sustains political values” (1999: 390). Therefore, new institutionalism provides scope for engaging in robust normative debates about the promotion or suppression of values and principles. At the same time, there is also a critical element to new institutionalism that refuses to accept institutional actors as being objective or neutral parties.

Consistent with the approach to normative theory highlighted above, new institutionalism takes a foundationalist ontological position by accepting that there is an
observable reality that exists independently to our knowledge of it. The key elements of new institutionalism are political institutions and their relationships with individuals. Likewise, new institutionalism also takes a realist epistemological position by recognising that these institutions, relevant individuals and researchers are not value-neutral but have their own partialities, biases and agendas. Accordingly, this is in keeping with realist epistemology which promotes a “more limited understanding of truth and [epistemological] positivists” (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 190).

In Chapters 5 to 8, each case study incorporates the new institutional approach by mapping the relationships between institutions relevant to the operationalising of multiculturalism into public policy. For example, the UK case study centres around the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) as a leading actor in the development and implementation of race equality policy. It is a statutory agency responsible for promoting and upholding race equality in England, Scotland and Wales, but must also collaborate with devolved agencies such as the Scottish Human Rights Commission. As Chapter 5 highlights, both agencies have a shared responsibility for policy implementation in this sector. Likewise, each case study also explores how individuals interact with these institutional settings. For instance, some case studies explore the way prominent policymakers, politicians or other public figures have shaped the direction of future policymaking. In others, the discussion considers how both immigrant and non-immigrant members of the public interact with the policies and initiatives established by political institutions.

### 4.2.3 Critical realism

In conjunction with normative theory and new institutionalism, the thesis also draws upon the approach of critical realism and its application in the disciplines of political science and international relations. As noted above, the research seeks to understand and explain the structures that inform institutions and policies that promote the objectives of multiculturalism. Critical realism is perhaps most notably associated with the works of Roy Bhaskar who poses an ontological question as the starting point for social research: “what properties do societies and people possess that might make them possible objects for knowledge?” (Bhaskar 1978: 13). In response to this question, Danermark and colleagues (2005: 5) identify that the point of departure for critical realism is that “the world is structured, differentiated, stratified and changing”. Their reasoning concludes that if researchers are to understand causal mechanisms, then these mechanisms ought to be the object of inquiry. Relying upon the analysis of empirically observable events alone is therefore an inadequate methodological approach (Danermark et al. 2005: 5; Dowding
2016: 24-25). In other words, reality is independent of our knowledge of it. According to Joseph (2017), “critical realism regards knowledge as meaningful precisely because of its relation to something out there in the world”. At the same time though, critical realists are sceptical of truth-claims made about knowledge, recognising that underlying structures or mechanisms may render these claims false (Dowding 2016: 24-25). Epistemologically, critical realists reject the causal claims of positivism in favour of a strong realist view that “theoretical entities are just as real (if not more real) than the surface properties of social life” (Dowding 2016: 24). Therefore, critical realism drives the research questions for this thesis because they rest upon key assumptions about investigating political phenomena that intersect with both normative and subjective dimensions. In addition, Dowding (2016: 25-26) writes that critical realism is explicitly committed to the emancipation of those who are exploited, dominated or otherwise experiencing socio-economic disadvantage. As explained in Chapter 2, multiculturalism can be theoretically justified in terms of social liberalism through the provision of positive liberty in order to mitigate the unique disadvantages that migrants face.

Critical realism also highlights the limited ability of social science disciplines to demonstrate strict causality and subsequently provide accurate real-world predictions (Danermark et al. 2005: 52-53). Given the thesis is comparing four unique country case studies, it is imperative to note that there are a multitude of complex social and political variables in each case. As such, the thesis does not seek to develop strict causal relationships because comparative generalisations simply cannot be made in the same way as positivist research in the natural sciences. Instead, the advice of Milja Kurki (2008) is heeded. She argues that since there are different types of ‘causality’, seeking simplistic empirical outcomes is inadequate. Instead, this thesis seeks to identify underlying generative mechanisms leading to certain policymaking directions amidst the web of each country’s unique institutional settings. Following the prior example of the UK’s Equality and Human Rights Commission, the EHRC was formed out of an amalgamation of several pre-existing equality commissions. As explained in Chapter 6, new legislation codified the newly amalgamated agencies, changing the nature of race equality policy. Race equality was no longer a standalone policy issue, but instead became one of a series of protected characteristics. Although the inability to make concrete causal generalisations about the success of multiculturalism and its expression as public policy is a limitation, the thesis instead offers rich descriptive and explanatory data for each case study. This body of work sheds light on how and why certain policymaking directions have been pursued, before providing proximate judgements of success (Dowding 2016: 50-55).
A strength of critical realism is that it also provides a pluralistic approach to the choice of methods (Joseph 2017; Danermark et al. 2005: 150-176). There is an overlap here with methodological pragmatism: the researcher may choose the methods that have the greatest utility for answering the research questions. However, critical realism can provide an explicit justification for taking a pluralistic approach. As Joseph (2017: 3) neatly summarises, “the unobservable character of social structures and generative mechanisms means that theoretical abstraction and conceptual analysis are also essential parts of the scientific process”. Accordingly, he argues that the methods chosen must be congruent with the conceptual framework for understanding the processes that are the objects of study. In the case of this thesis, using qualitative interview data is helpful for explaining how multiculturalism has been operationalised. This approach combines the subjective experiences and views of the interview participants with the independent and objective phenomena of an institutionally constructed framework of multicultural policies. However, the same data would not be appropriate for drawing generalised causal conclusions about whether policies promoting multiculturalism conclusively lead to a reduced rate of hate crime in a country. Positivist or interpretivist approaches might yield different insights with different degrees of certainty regarding causation. However, findings emerging from these approaches would be complementary in nature, not necessarily competing or conflicting.

In summary, normative theory is an essential guiding paradigm for providing a theoretical foundation of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is an inherently value-laden and contested term, and normative theory provides the opportunity to answer the first research question. This can be done by considering understanding of multiculturalism in each case study and by investigating the extent to which each of the individual REC objectives are emphasised. Subsequent to this, new institutionalism provides a lens for critically examining the role that institutional actors perform in the development and implementation of multicultural policies. This leads to the operationalisation of multiculturalism, as considered by the first research question, but also provides scope to consider how institutional factors may contribute to policy success or failure. The recognition that institutions are not value-neutral is complementary to the approach taken by critical realism. Instead, institutions have their own agendas in shaping the development of multiculturalism which plays out in the contested political realm. By considering these three approaches in concert, the thesis provides a unique set of insights that answer the research questions.
4.3 Justifying a comparative multiple case study framework

4.3.1 Methodological rationale

The purpose of this section is to outline the methodological rationale for a comparative multiple case study. Yin defines the purpose of case study research as "[investigating] a contemporary phenomenon (the 'case') in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident" (2014: 16). Typically, the objects of case study research tend to have more variables than data points. This leads the researcher to rely upon multiple, converging sources of evidence. Evidence needs to converge so that the researcher can triangulate data with respect to the given phenomenon. Triangulation enables the researcher to derive sound analysis and conclusions, which in turn rely upon the guidance of sound theoretical propositions (Yin 2014: 17). A multiple case study extends these principles further, to comparison between multiple objects of study to then make generalisations about the phenomenon.

For this thesis, a multiple case study is appropriate for testing theoretical propositions (i.e. the REC Framework for understanding the objectives of multicultural policies, as detailed in Chapter 3) against complex political and policy realities (i.e. the four case studies). Hopkin explains that a comparison between case studies is an ideal choice in the discipline of political science (2010: 286). Put simply, it is impossible to set up controlled experiments due to the inextricable links between the complex phenomena of the REC Framework and the social context of multiculturalism operationalised as public policy. In political science, the principle of *ceteris paribus* (lit. 'all other things being equal') is very difficult to achieve when comparing the immense complexity of multiple social and political systems (Hopkin 2010: 292). This is further complicated by the unique historical contexts and subsequent political environments of each case study country in which policies are developed and implemented. Yet, an investigation into these contexts and environments is precisely the aim of this research. As Yin's core justification for case study research highlights, case studies provide a very useful methodological tool because they are specifically designed to address the inseparability of the phenomenon being studied and its context (2014: 16). Comparing multiple case studies provides the opportunity to evaluate and discuss generalised findings that emerge from the four cases.

In addition, Hague and Harrop (2007) identify some other key strengths of comparative case study research: it enables researchers to contextualise knowledge; to strengthen classification systems; and to create and test hypotheses. Comparative research is a recognised and widely-used approach in the discipline of political science with other
notable comparative works by Bymes et al. (2009: 44-72) and Almond and Verba (1963) legitimising my methodology.

One limitation of comparative political research is that case studies often have too many variables that cannot be controlled and therefore no meaningful generalisations can be made (Burnham et al. 2008: 83). One solution to this problem is to use the ‘most similar systems design’. The purpose of this design is to limit the choice of case studies to the ‘most similar systems’, such as Western liberal democracies with highly advanced industrial economies. This keeps constant as many potentially explanatory variables as possible so that reliable conclusions can be drawn from the case study analysis (Anckar 2008: 389-390). For a multiple case study to be robust, certain logic replication requirements must be met. Yin explains that a multiple case study must demonstrate either a literal replication which observes a direct replication of a phenomenon in each case; or a theoretical replication which observes diverging data across each case yet can be explained using the theoretical propositions (2014: 57). A most similar systems design provides scope for analysis via theoretical replication logic precisely because many of the potential explanatory variables are inherently controlled.

It is fair to say the explanations that can be drawn from a comparative case study may be weaker than those drawn from an experimental study. The inability of the researcher to control the research environment leads to the fundamental problem of causal inference, meaning that it is impossible to make conclusions with complete certainty. However, the richness of the case-specific data and the narrative is still of prime interest and is the overarching strength of this methodological approach. Descriptive analysis is still a worthwhile endeavour as “good description is better than bad explanation” (King et al. 1994: 75). As Dowding expounds, critical relationships can be uncovered through descriptive analysis.

[These relationships] are used as part of causal explanations. That is one of the reasons why we should not disparage careful description in political science, because careful description can help us think about identity as well as causal relationships. (Dowding 2016: 136)

Similarly, Dowding makes the point that not all explanation needs to be fitted "into the straitjacket of causation" (2016: 57). Explanation of political phenomena is useful for contributing to understanding, but not all explanation needs to take on a predictive function. Spiekermann extends Dowding's rationale by arguing that "not all explanations serve as good predictions . . . [and that] prediction is not sufficient and perhaps not even necessary for explanation" (2017: 2).
Furthermore, studying a phenomenon in specific cases enables the researcher to formulate conclusions about the phenomenon in generalised terms (Burnham et al. 2008: 71-73). For example, the data contained in the Multiculturalism Policy Index (2016) is certainly a useful metric for comparing across a large range of cases. However, the Index does not provide a large degree of detail about how policies were formed in each case or make any comment on the success of these policies. To address this gap in knowledge, a deeper comparative approach is needed using methods such as elite interviews as detailed later in the chapter. As Vromen notes, researchers can focus on a small number of cases when using qualitative methods and analysis to “gain an in-depth understanding of their research subjects” (2010: 255). This is one of the greatest strengths of qualitative small-n comparative case studies. Therefore, this reinforces the validity of the approach taken in this thesis.

4.3.2 Case selection

In addition to justifying the comparative case study approach, the choice of case studies themselves must also be justified. The cases chosen are Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands and South Australia, with some basic details for comparison provided in Table 6 below. During the last quarter of the 20th century, each of these cases has developed policies promoting or supporting multiculturalism. Sweden was chosen as an outlier among Nordic countries due to its longstanding commitment to objectives of multiculturalism and relatively high rate of cultural and linguistic diversity. Although multiculturalism tends to not be explicitly mentioned, the integration of migrants is embedded within the broader framework of the social democratic welfare state and this is clearly is informed by the values of multiculturalism (Parliament of Sweden 2016, Chapter 1, Article 2: 65; MCP Index Project 2016: 99; Statistiska centralbyrån 2018b).

The UK was chosen for its unique legislative and regulatory approach to race equality, with a comparatively strong statutory and institutional settings seemingly under threat due to austerity and more recently Brexit (MCP Index Project 2016: 114; Meer and Modood 2013: 83; Worley 2005: 487; Ahmed 2007: 590-592).

The Netherlands is a country that also has been described as having a historical commitment to multiculturalism (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1983: 10; Scholten and Holzhacker 2009: 90). However, according to the Multiculturalism Index Project the Netherlands is the sole outlier having abruptly retrenched policies promoting multiculturalism in recent years (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 579, 584). This raises interesting questions about how successful the remaining policy infrastructure has been in
meeting the objectives of multiculturalism. Methodologically, the Netherlands still fits within a most similar systems design because the Dutch institutional framework is still based upon liberal-democratic principles and a policy legacy of multiculturalism.

**Table 6** The four case studies’ political systems at a glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>South Australia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>population born abroad</td>
<td></td>
<td>Scotland: 7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N Ireland: 4.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official language</td>
<td>Swedish</td>
<td>English (de facto)</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>English (de facto)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitary or</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>Quasi-federal,</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>Federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>federal system</td>
<td></td>
<td>devolved powers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Unicameral</td>
<td>Bicameral</td>
<td>Bicameral</td>
<td>AU &amp; SA:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrangements</td>
<td>parliament</td>
<td>parliament, weak upper house</td>
<td>parliament, weaker upper house</td>
<td>bicameral parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party system</td>
<td>Plurality; multi-party system</td>
<td>Majoritarian, 2 party system</td>
<td>Plurality; multi-party system</td>
<td>AU &amp; SA: majoritarian, 2/2.5 party system 34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: data derived from Statistics Sweden (Statistika centralbyrån; SCB 2018b, 2018a, 2020); the Office for National Statistics (ONS 2015, 2018, 2020) and The Migration Observatory (Krausova and Vargas-Silva 2013, 2014); Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek; CBS 2018b, 2018a, 2017a, 2020); and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 2020, 2017c, 2017b, 2017a).*

**Rationale for selecting South Australia as a subnational case**

The subnational case of South Australia has been included in contrast to the national European cases. Unlike the other three cases, Australia has a federal political structure rather than unitary or devolved systems. As a federal state, it has significant autonomy to set the direction for policies that promote, or neglect, multiculturalism (Department for

34 Australian politics is characterised by two major parties: Liberal and Labor. However, Australia’s party system can be considered a two-and-a-half party system due to the influential role of the National Party as the longstanding junior partner in the Liberal-National Coalition. See Botterill and Fenna (2014: 145) for further information.
Communities and Social Inclusion 2016a, 2017; Department of the Premier and Cabinet 2011). The other Australian states also possess similar independence and responsibilities (MCP Index Project 2016: 9), so trying to encapsulate the variations across the federation in a single case study is an unwieldy prospect. Instead, this thesis considers South Australia on its own whilst remaining cognisant of the broader policymaking initiatives at the federal Commonwealth level.

Regional and municipal variations were also found in other cases. For example, municipal authorities in Sweden exercise some policymaking independence that is constitutionally enshrined (Emilsson 2016: 29). Dutch municipalities have previously had similar autonomy regarding migrant integration, although this has subsequently diminished (van Breugel and Scholten 2017: 519-520). In light of the localised policy variations alluded to in Chapters 5-7, the inclusion of South Australia is not as asymmetric as it may initially appear. This is further pronounced when considering the greater degree of political autonomy given to South Australia as a state in a federal political system.

The South Australian case was partly designed to serve an exploratory purpose. The case was initially developed to test out the research propositions and methods before conducting fieldwork in the other European cases (Yin 2014: 30, 215). My supervision team and I were already familiar with the network of South Australian policy actors and could readily access key individuals for elite interviews. The process of preparing and conducting the initial South Australian interviews informed subsequent decisions about recruiting and interviewing participants abroad.

Although the South Australian case was initially conducted in this exploratory approach, it has been placed last in the order of case study chapters. Useful insights can still be gleaned by comparing the three European national cases with South Australia. However, there is still some degree of inherent asymmetry that needed to be recognised and acknowledged within the structure of this thesis.

Setting the issue of comparability between cases to one side, there is also a lack of published literature that assesses policy approaches promoting multiculturalism in South Australia. This is expanded upon further in Chapter 8, but does highlight the merit of including the case. In brief, previous studies into Australian multiculturalism have neglected policy developments in South Australia in favour of policies at the national level or in the more populous states (e.g. Soutphommasane 2012; Jupp 2011a; Jakubowicz and Ho 2014). The few studies expressly examining South Australia have tended to focus on multiculturalism in the context of other policy domains such as health, education or
community languages (e.g. Baum et al. 2014; Liddicoat 2009; Muenstermann 1998; Clyne et al. 2004; Clyne 2011). Therefore, South Australia is a case worthy of further investigation.

**Further case-specific considerations**

Each of the case studies use different terminology when describing cultural minorities, and the discussion in these case studies also focuses on different types of immigrant groups. These nuances are explicitly acknowledged in Chapters 5-8. For example, British policy is explicitly framed in racial terms, exploring the impact of policies on people from Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) backgrounds. BAME is an official, UK-specific term that encapsulates established minority communities as well as recent arrivals. In contrast, the Netherlands uses the term ‘people with a migrant background’ when someone or their parents are born abroad. Swedish policy actors did not use race-based terminology, but also used terms like ‘cultural minorities’ or ‘people with a migrant background’. The Swedish case also places greater focus on asylum seekers, given the 2015-16 European migrant crisis had a disproportionately high effect on Sweden. In South Australia, the main term refers to people from culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) backgrounds. Similar to the term ‘BAME’ in the UK, ‘CALD’ captures both recent migrants in addition to more well-established immigrant communities.

There were also other worthy candidates for investigation such as Canada, Finland or Germany, but the limited time and resources allocated for a PhD thesis precluded these. Although Canada is considered one of the birthplaces of multiculturalism, adding a case on a third continent was not logistically feasible. That being said, Canada would be an excellent case to explore in future research efforts.

### 4.4 Assessing and evaluating policy success

The purpose of this section is to discuss additional considerations regarding the use of Marsh and McConnell’s (2010) three-dimensions heuristic for evaluating policy success, and the development of what is now the REC Framework of multicultural policy objectives. As previously detailed in Chapter 3, Marsh and McConnell distil the concept of ‘policy success’ into three dimensions: *political success, programmatic success* and *process success*. However, they are quick to emphasise that this approach is a “heuristic, not a model, let alone a theory” (2010: 571). This means their approach is a useful lens to systematically discuss, evaluate and compare the different components of success, but there is a limitation on strength of certainty for conclusions. The previous section already highlighted how comparative case study approaches ought to manage the fundamental problem of causal inference by tempering the weight given to conclusions and generalisations. In doing so,
Chapters 5-8 will provide only make proximate judgements of success for each of the REC objectives.

**Issues arising from assessing success within the REC Framework**

The rating system for assessing success described earlier in Chapter 3 is used throughout the case studies in Chapters 5-8 as well as in Chapter 9 for the comparative discussion. If the REC elements receive different ratings, an ‘average’ of the ratings is given. For example, in the UK there is a moderate degree of *programmatic success* for racial discrimination and equal opportunity, but a low degree of *programmatic success* for mutual cultural accommodation. Therefore, the UK has exhibited a generally moderate degree of *programmatic success* overall. Using a simple qualitative system such as this is useful for making proximate judgements about policy success so that these evaluations can be easily compared between the four cases.

There are also some limitations to this approach. For instance, one limitation relates to the potentially uneven nature of evidence for assessing success across the four case studies. To mitigate this, the tables summarising the proximate judgements of success have a line that details the sources used to make the evaluations. Another limitation is that interview participants from the case studies do not necessarily frame their policies in terms of the REC objectives. This is to be expected, given that the REC Framework has been developed to disaggregate a wide variety of policy goals, connected by the normative principles of multiculturalism. Therefore, there is also a need to consider how well each case study's policies meet their own stated objectives, in addition to the REC objectives. This becomes especially important when evaluating *programmatic success*. However, it will become clear through later chapters that the REC Framework is quite closely aligned to the overarching policy agenda in most cases.

In Chapter 3, it was explained that the success rating system is intended as a shorthand tool to facilitate clear comparisons between the case studies. The principal findings of the thesis are located within the rich qualitative material, that are then expressed in a summarised manner as proximate judgements of success. Some further limitations arise from using this approach. For example, the success ratings only provide an assessment for a single snapshot in time. Similarly, the ratings are largely based upon a limited number of elite perspectives. As will be discussed later in the chapter, these limitations are mitigated by triangulating the interview data with other scholarly research, grey literature, policy documents, government reports and political speeches.

Furthermore, a rating system with only three tiers (low, moderate, high) does necessarily obfuscate some of the nuance. A more granular system with additional rating
tiers does provide more detail, but also adds complexity. An earlier iteration of the case studies used a rating system with five tiers but justifying the subtler distinctions between tiers was difficult and distracted from the findings emerging from the case study material. As such, the weaknesses of using a simpler system are outweighed by the strengths.

One example that highlights this is the finding of generally moderate programmatic success in the Netherlands. As will be argued in Chapter 7, there has been a strong shift away from policy approaches promoting multiculturalism in favour of assimilation. Under the three-tier rating system, two ‘moderate’ ratings plus one ‘low’ rating are averaged together as ‘generally moderate’. This assessment could be considered surprising, given the assimilationist turn in Dutch policy. However, it arises because the shift towards assimilation is primarily reflected in the category of mutual cultural accommodation. These points are clarified in the prose and argument of Chapter 7, but the success ratings rely upon the contextual nuance provided by the rich qualitative case study data.

**Issues arising from adapting Marsh and McConnell’s heuristic**

Marsh and McConnell also provide a list of “critical choices to be made in assessing policy success” (2010: 580). Some of these are worthy of discussion here in relation to this thesis.35 The reference point for assessment is particularly important because this entails the standard by which success is measured. As Chapter 3 mentioned, the reference points for this thesis are the REC objectives. A critical choice relates to whether there is adequate credible information to evaluate the extent of success for the three dimensions. To address this, the data collected includes semi-structured interviews conducted with a range of different policymakers and policy actors in each case. The interview data was also triangulated against some secondary sources of information including the Multiculturalism Policy Index (2016), government reports and other grey literature. The specific details for the research methods used is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Policy isolation is another factor that must also be taken into consideration when assessing policy success. Marsh and McConnell define policy isolation as the “degree of certainty and credibility [to which] it is possible to isolate and assess the impact of a policy from other factors such as other policies or media influences” (2010: 580). In other words, the researcher needs to distinguish between the impacts of one policy from other factors or policies. The breakdown of multicultural policy objectives into the REC Framework goes some way to separating the distinctive policy areas relating to multiculturalism for closer scrutiny. Since multiculturalism is not operationalised within one single policy, this

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35 Others have already been mentioned elsewhere, such as the forms of success being evaluated (political, programmatic and process) and the timeframe of study (2007-2016).
provides flexibility to consider the broader impacts of each REC objective without needing to be rigidly bounded to a single policymaking institution or initiative. In this way, this thesis is extending Marsh and McConnell’s heuristic by applying it to a policy framework (i.e. policies promoting and supporting multiculturalism). This has the benefit of encapsulating a much broader political phenomenon rather than a single narrow policy initiative. At the same time however, this makes the object of study (multiculturalism) more elusive because there is no single policy that can be easily compared and contrasted across the four cases.

Similarly, there is also a need to account for potential conflicts or ambiguities when assessing success. This is partly managed by not aggregating the success of the dimensions together as a combined total ‘score’. Political success, programmatic success and process success are considered separately both at the case-specific level in Chapters 5-8 and at the comparative level in Chapter 9. Furthermore, the thesis only provides proximate judgements of success, recognising that it is not realistic to be able to interview every relevant policy actor, or even to address all regional policy variations. The findings of this thesis are instead conditional insights into the policy development and implementation of multiculturalism in each case study. This is a tried and tested approach in political science, with other scholars also using or adapting Marsh and McConnell’s policy success heuristic (Clune and Smith 2012; Luetjens et al. 2019; Gibb 2015; Vince 2015; Howlett 2012). However, there is a wider debate about the merits of Marsh and McConnell’s heuristic and there are alternative approaches for considering this issue (Bovens 2010; Howlett et al. 2015). Nonetheless, the heuristic is foundational and well-situated to serve as an evaluative framework for this thesis.

As the chapter has demonstrated so far, this thesis uses recognised theoretical and methodological approaches. The innovation is found in overlaying the REC Framework of multicultural policy objectives onto the three dimensions heuristic to evaluate policy success to better understand how the multidimensional elements of multicultural policy can play out in different policy settings.

4.5 Research design and methods

This section outlines the research design and the methods chosen to answer the research questions. It begins by describing the data collection process, followed by a discussion of ethical considerations. The Framework Approach for thematic analysis that is used to interpret the data is then described. Finally, the section addresses some additional limitations relating to the research.
4.5.1 Data collection

Semi-structured elite interviews and justifying the research subject

The thesis centres on a series of semi-structured elite interviews with policymakers from each of the case study countries. 44 participants were interviewed across the four countries over a period of eight months in 2016-2017. I conducted four interviews via Skype or Skype-to-telephone connections, with the remainder conducted in person during my South Australian and international fieldwork (where I had a base at the Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare at Malmö University in Sweden). Interviews ranged in time from approximately 30 to 80 minutes, depending on the availability of the participant. The key details of the participants are broken down as follows:

- 25 participants were women, 19 are men
- 17 were from a migrant background, or were a member of an ethnic minority group
- 28 were current or former senior public servants or statutory officers
- 6 were current or former politicians at national, state or municipal levels
- 17 were senior or executive-level employees (in policy or executive roles) affiliated with non-government organisations, or were members of civil society
  - 9 out of these 17 were prominent migrant or ethnic minority leaders
- Some participants were interviewed for their historical involvement in the policy sector, and some sat in multiple categories reflecting occupational mobility and transience

This thesis is a comparative study of policies promoting multiculturalism in four case studies, with a focus on elite perspectives. These elite perspectives are then supplemented and triangulated against other supporting evidence. An examination of ‘top-down’, elite-driven perspectives is an accepted research approach for investigating multiculturalism and integration. For example, Westlake (2020) explores similar subject material in his study of the influence that political parties wield over policies promoting multiculturalism. His study examines the role of political parties as key political actors in shaping policy direction. Furthermore, he too builds upon the Multiculturalism Policy Index as a primary benchmark. Similarly, Scuzzarello (2015) compares how policy actors in two municipal case studies construct narratives about migrants’ integration. She also draws on similar research methods to those in this thesis. Her study is based upon semi-structured elite interviews that are triangulated against grey literature including policy documentation, as well as other scholarly literature.
From these two examples, it is clear that there is academic merit in considering and examining multiculturalism from the perspective of policy elites. Institutional actors such as governments and political parties play a very significant role in shaping policy direction. As a methodology, new institutionalism places prime focus upon institutions, broadly defined. Therefore, it is also fitting to consider how successful policy actors’ efforts are in these terms. Interviewing principal decisionmakers as well as prominent members of civil society is an effective way to glean insight into the commitment of policy actors to multicultural policies. Likewise, considering elite perspectives on the effectiveness of policy initiatives is an invaluable resource for discussing and assessing success of these policies. With this in mind, Marsh and McConnell’s three-dimensional heuristic of evaluating policy success (2010) is a suitable mechanism for scrutinising this complex policy issue from the perspective of policy elites.

A ‘top-down’ approach such as this is only one way of evaluating policies promoting multiculturalism. An elite-driven approach differs from other studies examining multiculturalism that rely upon grassroots qualitative evaluations (Wise and Velayutham 2009), or comparative research based upon large quantitative datasets (Bloemraad and Wright 2014; Koopmans 2010; Hooghe et al. 2007). Alternative research approaches could also consider the policy success of multiculturalism from broader social perspectives. For example, a study could measure the extent to which migrants or members of ethnic minority groups are able to access policy actors in government circles. This could be done through recruiting participants from community groups for interviews or focus groups. Another different approach could be to consider the relative success of multiculturalism from a gendered perspective. Researchers such as Okin (1999, 2002) have asked questions like whether multiculturalism is “bad for women”.

In contrast, this thesis does not seek to evaluate the impact of policy approaches promoting multiculturalism on the wellbeing of immigrants or measure the effectiveness of these approaches in societal terms. Such a task in four international case studies is well beyond the scope of a PhD and would require many more interviews with immigrant and ethnic minority leaders. Furthermore, this thesis does not seek to directly investigate the extent to which immigrant voices are embedded in the policymaking process or participate in policy co-design. As is later highlighted in Chapter 10, these alternative approaches are areas for future research.

**Interview participant recruitment**
Participants were recruited through two phases. Initially, I identified relevant individuals or organisations through discussions with academics at Flinders University and Malmö
University. These individuals or organisations were then contacted via email with an invitation to participate in a research interview. After the initial recruitment, I asked participants to identify other individuals or organisations within their professional networks who may be interested and whose work would be relevant for the study. This snowball sampling addressed the deficiencies in my own professional networks, given my relatively limited prior interactions with the policy communities for the four respective cases.

The process of snowball sampling provided unique opportunities to interview participants important in their sector that I may have otherwise not been able to identify or access. This is a strength of this particular sampling approach. As a researcher, I could gain access to key individuals, but at the same time leverage the pre-existing knowledge and connections within these policy communities. However, the process is certainly not systematic with some interviews being secured by ‘happenstance’, but some others not proceeding due to unavailability.

Furthermore, some prospective participants were unwilling to be interviewed, despite having potentially rich and unique insights into the policymaking process. This can be attributed, in part, to the highly controversial nature of multiculturalism. Based upon the tone in some emails declining the offer of an interview, I suspect that some of the high-profile figures I wanted to interview were not willing to trust a postgraduate student with such a sensitive topic or did not believe a research interview with a postgraduate student warranted their time.

**Defining the ‘policy actor’**

For this research, I have taken broader and inclusive understanding of what it means to be a ‘policy actor’ (Cairney 2013: 4) in the multicultural policy sector. During the recruitment phase, I targeted senior figures who were responsible for implementing policy or who had significant influence over the direction of policy development. Of course, the public service is a crucial vehicle for the enactment of government demands through the development of public policy. Likewise, politicians are also of critical importance as the leaders of legislative and executive policy actions. However, I only had a limited level of access to ministers and other high-ranking members of government or opposition parties at all tiers of government. I attribute this to my comparatively low level of importance as a doctoral candidate, given the competing time-consuming pressures and demands placed on politicians. As reflected in the breakdown of details for participants listed above, I was able to secure interviews with some political figures, however there was not an even spread across all cases, all political parties, or all tiers of government.
Whilst I identified that public servants and politicians were of significant importance in the development of policy frameworks, principles of new public management highlight that government and the public sector is not, and should not be, considered as the sole agents in this space (McLaughlin et al. 2002; Stewart 2010). Although bureaucratic and political figures certainly provide crucial insights into the development of public policy, new public management places a strong emphasis on the role of the non-government sector in implementing government policies and programs. Accordingly, I widened my recruitment scope to include the NGO sector and members of civil society. This broader assortment of individuals and groups play an important role of advising government about current issues facing policy development and, in many cases, may also be directly responsible for implementing programs and service delivery efforts. In light of this, I recruited policy actors on the basis that they are agents who are actively engaged with the policy development and implementation process (Cairney 2013: 4). This approach is supported by the Advocacy Coalition Framework, which argues “officials from all levels of government, consultants, scientists, and members of the media” are all important subsystem actors who participate in policymaking and policy change (Weible et al. 2009: 122).

Responding to discursive differences between the cases

I noticed from an early stage of my European fieldwork that I had embedded Australian discourses of multiculturalism and multicultural policies in my research documentation. This was problematic because the same language was not necessarily transferable to the European cases. Rather than being useful as a conduit of communication for shared understanding, the explicit language of multiculturalism in the recruitment emails and throughout the interviews struck a chord of dissonance and discomfort. I discuss this further in later chapters, explaining how multiculturalism has become a tainted term in the three European cases. Accordingly, I recognised a need to adjust my language so that I could gain access to participants and quickly build rapport with them through the interview process.

For example, I shifted the language of multiculturalism into language about integration and cultural diversity policy in the European cases. I aimed to focus more on the constituent objectives of multiculturalism (i.e. the REC Framework) rather than multiculturalism itself which had hindered access and often put participants in a defensive mindset. This of course links in which the discussion in Chapter 2, demonstrating first-hand the backlash and retreat from the rhetoric of multiculturalism, even if the policy frameworks themselves are still in place. The term may now be toxic, or as some have argued, irretrievable (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 592).
Interview structure and data triangulation

The interviews were semi-structured around a framework of questions included in Appendix 1. The initial section of the interview focused on the background and role of the participant, giving them the opportunity to explore and describe their work in their own words. The contributions given during this section tended to frame the remainder of the interview. I invited participants to reflect on the terminology and understandings of multiculturalism and integration, and to describe and reflect on policy initiatives. I also probed participants to discuss the influence of contemporary events such as the UK’s referendum to leave the European Union, the Swedish experience of the 2015-16 migrant crisis, and the influence of radical-right political parties on the policy process. Depending on the content discussed, I also asked probing questions about how the REC objectives of multiculturalism are reflected in their country’s institutional settings. Unlike survey interviewing where standardisation is the fundamental principle, standardising the format of elite interviews can actually impede access to high quality data from the participants (Burnham et al. 2008: 232).

Elite interviews provide a unique and detailed insight into the workings of multicultural policymaking. However, there is only a limited capacity for the researcher to interpret and draw conclusions about the policy setting from this isolated dataset. As Burnham et al. (2008: 232) also acknowledge, the one golden rule for using elite interviews as a research method is to not base the project solely upon the elite interview data. In accordance with the framework for case study research design as outlined by Yin, the data contained in each of the interview transcriptions was triangulated against interviews with other participants, and other sources (Yin 2014: 17). Throughout the recruitment and interview process, I collected and collated various documents of different types including government and non-government research reports, policy documents, position statements, news articles and political speeches. During the analysis process, I evaluated the interview data to check for consistency and reliability in relation to these other documents. For the Swedish and Dutch cases, only some of this material was accessible in English either in full-text or with English summaries. As explained later in the chapter, the language barrier is a limitation of the study.

The purpose for doing this triangulation is to mitigate some of the methodical limitations of using the interview dataset in isolation. Firstly, there is a degree of ‘unevenness’ between the interview participants, because each holds a different position of employment at a different level in their respective organisations. As such, the equivalence of the different participants’ positions and contributions is a significant concern because it...
can lead to what Marsh and McConnell describe as conflicts and ambiguities (2010: 580). For example, some participants chaired statutory agencies, others were CEOs of public sector agencies or civil society organisations, and others were public servants of varying seniority. The insights of a CEO will clearly differ compared to the contributions made by a policy officer or a political staffer. Likewise, my ability to access participants at a high level with consistency was dependent upon the availability and interest of each individual, representing a significant imbalance of power between the researcher and the participant (Burnham et al. 2008: 235-238). Similarly, it was difficult to maintain an equivalence of participants across the four different case studies. In response to these limitations, the interview data in the case study chapters is triangulated against policy documents, reports and political speeches to compensate for potential unevenness.

**The comparative study trade-off: level of detail versus range of cases**

Another concern is the relatively small number of interviews that were conducted in each case. The contributions of 44 interview participants across four countries will naturally yield less detail for each individual case study, than interviewing 44 participants in only one country. For a project using elite interviews as the primary research method, 20-30 interviews is usually a reasonable target (Burnham et al. 2008: 234). However, the comparative nature of this thesis is a complicating factor. Having a relatively small number of interviews per case is a trade-off that was made to broaden the scope for comparison between cases, and ultimately comes down to a question of feasibility for resources and time. Being able to cover a wider group of countries allows for the inclusion of a rich narrative of comparison, even if the depth of detail is reduced.

Nonetheless, the thesis did not require the range of interviews to fully represent a case, as participants were selected for their expertise and strategic insights instead. In addition, I found instances of data saturation when comparing interviews within each case because only a few or no new themes emerged. The interviews conducted at the end of the data collection period tended to cover similar material as the earlier interviews.

I also ensured good institutional coverage of my interviewees to mitigate against the small number of participants. This was relatively straightforward because the multicultural policy sector tends to be relatively small. In each case there are only a few public or statutory bodies along with a small range of NGOs. Still, the process of triangulation and the inclusion of additional supporting data also mitigates against this limitation, allowing for a sufficient baseline of detail to adequately investigate the nuances of each case.
4.5.2 Data analysis and interpretation

The interview data was analysed and interpreted using a form of thematic analysis known as the ‘Framework Approach’ (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). This approach was developed in the UK for applied qualitative social and public policy research, meaning that the approach lends itself well for the research of this thesis. The benefit of thematic analysis is that “a large quantity of . . . [material] can be analysed in a precise and systematic way” (Burnham et al. 2008: 264). In line with the theoretical underpinnings provided by new institutionalism and critical realism, the Framework Approach acknowledges that institutions are not value-neutral, suggesting there is an inherent recognition that interview participants have a subjective bias because they are active participants in the policy realm (Ritchie and Spencer 1994: 306-308).

Ritchie and Spencer detail five stages of thematic analysis in the Framework Approach that were followed for this thesis (1994: 312-328). The first stage is familiarisation, where I listened to the recorded interviews whilst reading the transcripts. I checked for accuracy in the transcripts and made notes regarding key ideas and recurrent themes. This was especially important because a third-party organisation transcribed the interviews and there were some errors with spelling foreign words or jargon. The second stage is to identify a thematic framework by developing a coded index of the emergent themes. I applied this initial coding system to several transcripts whilst simultaneously making dynamic adjustments to the index framework. The index can be found in Appendix 2. Once the index framework was refined and established, I systematically interpreted and coded each passage of interview data using the software, Nvivo. Ritchie and Spencer argue that this process is “not a routine exercise as it involves making numerous judgements as to the meaning and significance of the data . . . [This process] is subjective, and open to differing interpretations” (1994: 316). To mitigate variations in interpretation, both of my supervisors and two other PhD candidates co-coded de-identified interview transcripts to check for consistency, which indicated a high convergence in coding.

The next stage was charting. Once indexed, the data was then sorted and placed into charts corresponding with the index codes. I sorted the data by case study for the sake of consistency, summarising and charting the contributions made by each participant relating to each of the indexed themes. The final stage is then mapping and interpretation. I condensed all the charted material into four summary ‘mapping’ tables, one for each case study. These then served as the basis for answering the research questions for each case in Chapters 5-8. This analysis enabled me to examine how multiculturalism was understood and operationalised in each case, find associations or disagreements between participants.
and then provide explanations as to how successful multicultural policies have been in each case. From here, I was able to compare the assessments of success between the different cases and then in Chapter 9 discuss the emergent comparative themes to answer the research questions.

Another general limitation of thematic analysis is that the importance of a theme tends to be associated with the frequency of its appearance in the source material (Burnham et al. 2008: 264). Themes that only appear briefly in one interview might be overlooked in favour of themes that regularly occur in multiple data sources. To mitigate this, I opened each interview with questions inviting broad contextual reflections to supplement my previous background reading about each case.

### 4.5.3 Ethical and other considerations

As Chapter 2 indicates, multiculturalism is a highly contested topic. As such, there are some ethical considerations that should be addressed regarding the participation of policymakers and policy actors in this sector. The study was given approval by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee, under Project Number 7328. Most importantly, the thesis has maintained confidentiality of all participants' involvement in the research. Names have been removed so that participants are completely de-identified in the case study chapters except for their gender. Initially, I tried to conduct the interviews at a neutral location other than the participant's workplace. The rationale was to conceal their participation from their employer and colleagues. However, many participants preferred to meet at their workplace and were happy to be open about their participation with their employer. I chose not to directly approach organisations, so that employers could not direct staff to agree to an interview because this would breach the confidentiality of the participant's involvement. Instead, all participants were approached individually via personal email or phone call. Interview participants were not offered anonymity though, because I needed to know their identities to be able to conduct the interviews. The audio of each interview was recorded and transcribed by a third-party Australian transcription service that provided signed confidentiality agreements. All interview audio files, transcriptions and participant details are securely stored on a password-protected server to protect the identities of the participants.

Additionally, the risk of participants having their comments misrepresented was addressed by verbally checking understanding throughout the interview, along with an offer for participants to review their transcript to clarify understanding. However, no-one took up the offer. Participants were not given the provision to amend or edit their
transcription so that they could not veto useful data once the transcription was completed during the period after the interview.

As part of the ethical considerations of conducting this research, it is important to acknowledge the need to position myself in relation to the research. In a similar vein of thinking to new institutionalism, I too recognise that I am not value-neutral or an objective observer. I am a white, middle-class, millennial male with a tertiary education. I acknowledge that these characteristics provide privilege and advantage. Although I am not a member of a visible minority group, my Australian-born mother and my New Zealand-born father have both been trans-Tasman immigrants. I am now an immigrant too, having migrated indefinitely from Australia to Sweden in March 2020. This background provides a perspective through which I examine the immigration experience.

Furthermore, I also acknowledge that I am an active participant in the research process. My mere presence and my characteristics shaped my ability to build rapport with the interview participants. This in turn shaped the contributions that they shared. Additionally, I acknowledge the potential for unconscious bias in my interpretation of data. As the use of normative theory is an inherently value-laden exercise, I recognise that I position myself in favour of a liberal justification of multiculturalism. However, this is mitigated in part by using an established and acknowledged process for thematic data analysis, the Framework Approach (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). As mentioned earlier, selected samples of de-identified interview data were also co-coded by my supervisors and other PhD candidates at Flinders University to check for consistency in interpretation.

Language barriers are also a limiting factor for this research. For some of the participants, English was only their second, third or even fourth language. This means that some participants may not have been able to express their views as clearly or accurately as they would otherwise be able to do in their first language. That being said, the benefit of using English as the language for all interviews without interpreters provides consistency for the analysis and interpretation of the interview data. In addition, some Swedish or Dutch language documents do not have English translations or may have been interpreted by other researchers with no way for me to check the accuracy of translation. For example, one Dutch participant stated that Prime Minister Mark Rutte said that ‘migrants needed to fight harder to overcome labour market discrimination’. As part of the triangulation process, I needed to verify the original source of these comments, but I could not find any English language media or research that mentioned them. Eventually, I found a translated version of the interview excerpt in an English language blog that could be potentially unreliable, along with information linking me to the original Dutch newspaper article. Clearly, my non-
existent Dutch language proficiency and very weak Swedish language proficiency were inhibiting factors for me as the sole researcher on this project.

Another limitation arises from the use of statistical data relating to immigrants and their origins, as highlighted by Jacobs et al. (2009). In brief, the issue arises because European countries do not use the same criteria for defining an ‘immigrant’ or an immigrant’s ethnicity. Some countries only distinguish between ‘nationals’ and ‘non-nationals’ in their statistical data, which becomes problematic when there isn’t a uniform process for acquiring citizenship across European cases. When it comes to the background of immigrants, some countries consider country-of-birth, others consider nationality, whereas others use indicators such as race or ethnicity to account for second or third generation migrants. Obviously, comparing statistical data across the four cases is fraught with potential difficulty. The conclusions of this thesis are not strongly reliant to comparative statistics, so this limitation is relatively small. However, I have endeavoured to provide clear descriptions about all statistics to minimise confusion or uncertainty. Similarly, the thesis does not systematically differentiate between migrant community groups within cases. This is a limitation of comparative research seeking to make proximate judgements of policy success. There will inevitably be localised differences within cases that will not be picked up. However, these distinctions at the micro-level are not the primary objective of this research.

4.6 Summary

This thesis makes use of valid, pre-existing theoretical and methodological approaches when it comes to qualitative research design. The thesis draws upon normative theory, new institutionalism and critical realism to shape a multiple case study. The innovation comes from applying the three-dimensions heuristic for evaluating policy success to my own REC Framework of multicultural policy objectives. The thesis uses the well-established methods of semi-structured elite interviews, thematic analysis using the Framework Approach, with the findings triangulated by document analysis. It is acknowledged that the researcher, the interview participants and their institutions are not value-neutral, objective or passive observers. Both the researcher and the participants play an active, subjective role in interpreting and discussing the policymaking process. Similarly, policymaking institutions have their own political agendas by exerting power to prioritise some values and suppress others. The chapter acknowledges there are limitations to this research design but there are also strategies in place to mitigate against these. This thesis makes use of a well-established methodological approach that enables the researcher to make a strong contribution with
new case material by addressing a clear gap in the knowledge about the policy success of multiculturalism. Up to this point, the theoretical foundations of liberal multiculturalism have been established, the operational framework has been detailed, and the research design and methods have been laid out. In the next chapters, the focus of the thesis is shifted to the empirical work in the four case studies.
CHAPTER 5 – SWEDEN: A MULTICULTURAL DYSTOPIA?

5.1 Introduction

This chapter evaluates Swedish multicultural policymaking since the election of the centre-right Alliance Reinfeldt cabinet in late 2006, until May 2017. The European migrant crisis of 2015-16 presented profound and systemic challenges for immigration and integration in Sweden, serving as a flashpoint for criticism both at home and abroad. Some critics have argued that Sweden has become a multicultural dystopia. Proponents of what can be labelled as a ‘dystopic narrative’ suggest that excessive immigration has led to increased levels of crime, violence and a weakened welfare state (Lifvendahl 2016; Neuding 2018). A range of international media outlets have promoted this view. For example, Australian News Corp writer Debbie Schipp argues that “Sweden has . . . become a victim of its own generosity”, because some new arrivals are a risk to social harmony due to a propensity for violence (Schipp 2016). A report entitled ‘Smearing Sweden’ by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and the London School of Economics identified a “consistent and concerning information campaign” about immigration from dubious reporting by foreign right-wing news networks (2018: 2). Krzyżanowski argues that the electoral success of the radical-right Sweden Democrats party (Sverigedemokraterna) has led to the normalisation of radical right-wing views on immigration in Sweden (2018: 99). This has been reinforced in the Swedish public sphere through the dissemination of anti-immigrant content via online ‘immigration critical alternative media’ (Kaati et al. 2016). Those who purport this anti-immigrant narrative in Sweden have been “particularly eager to utilize widely read, right-wing web platforms to disseminate and even further radicalise the anti-immigration messages including via often outright racist and discriminatory discourse” (Krzyżanowski 2018: 99; see also Ekman 2014; Krzyżanowski and Ledin 2017).

In contrast, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter indicates there is a counter-veiling set of views that reject the radical-right characterisation of Sweden as a multicultural dystopia. By and large, these opponents of the ‘dystopic narrative’ suggest that Sweden’s integration challenges arise from institutional limitations, rather than blaming immigrants with parochial or jingoistic rhetoric. These views can be characterised as being more constructive, with proponents applying multicultural principles to guide policy responses in an attempt to rectify these institutional limitations. In the context of the rapid influx of 163,000 asylum seekers in 2015 (Migrationsverket 2016), institutional capacity to
process asylum claims was stretched to a point of ‘system collapse’.\textsuperscript{36} This chapter highlights that policy actors who espouse this counter-veiling approach suggest that difficulties in facilitating the integration of so many new arrivals can be attributed to institutional deficiencies.

The chapter has a strong focus on the southern city of Malmö, in part because of the link to Denmark by the Öresund Bridge. The close proximity meant Malmö was the epicentre for the bulk of the asylum seekers who arrived in the autumn of 2015.

\textbf{5.1.1 Overview of the chapter}

The chapter is structured in three parts. The first part presents contextual information, including a timeline of important events, an overview of some recent developments, and then a description of the institutional settings responsible for developing policies promoting multiculturalism and integration.

The second part then presents the research findings from the Swedish case, by first detailing the Swedish data in the Multiculturalism Policy (MCP) Index Project which scored Sweden 7.0 out of 8.0. This suggests Sweden has been very successful in developing and incorporating multicultural policies. However, this high score obscures the more complex story of competing policymaking narratives that emerged from the semi-structured elite interviews conducted with policymakers and policy stakeholders. These findings are analysed through the lens of the REC Framework of multicultural policy objectives and triangulated with related policy documentation. Although the dystopic view of policies promoting multiculturalism has become prevalent in some elements of Swedish political discourse, the chapter refutes this narrative as exaggerating and overstating the segregation arising from cultural diversity.

The final part of the chapter interprets these empirical findings to evaluate the success of Swedish policy approaches promoting multiculturalism through the lens of Marsh and McConnell’s (2010) ‘three-dimensions’ model of policy success. Firstly, Swedish policy approaches exhibit a moderate degree of political success. To a large extent, multicultural principles have remained embedded in Swedish policy even though public discourse has retreated away from the term ‘multiculturalism’. As the MCP Index (2016) data indicates, there has not been a retreat away from policy substance. Although the radical-right Sweden Democrats have garnered significant electoral support on a platform of anti-immigration,\textsuperscript{36} In contrast to the other cases, the main focus in the Swedish interviews was people seeking asylum. In some instances, the focus was broader and framed by terminology such as ‘people with a migrant background’.\textsuperscript{36}
the two mainstream party blocs have maintained a so-called *cordon sanitaire* around the Sweden Democrats to limit their influence on policymaking (Heinze 2017: 298-299).

Secondly, there appears to be a generally high degree of *programmatic success*. Swedish policy approaches promoting multiculturalism operate within a comprehensive social democratic welfare system where the state has a very active role in supporting residents and citizens. It was clear from the interview data that policymakers across the political spectrum were proactively addressing barriers to equal opportunity. In particular, the state has developed programs to improve language proficiency and education so that people with a migrant background can more effectively integrate into a predominantly service-based, high-skill economy. This success is qualified by the need to further improve policy responses that mitigate structural discrimination as a barrier to integration. Nonetheless, some policymakers were proactively ensuring that the state is accommodating and adapting for people with a migrant background in order to improve integration outcomes.

Finally, the discussion contends that there is a moderate degree of *process success* for multiculturalism in Sweden. The extreme circumstances arising from the European migrant crisis in 2015-16 stretched Swedish institutional capacity for processing and supporting asylum seekers, and lead to what many interview participants described as a 'system collapse'. Whilst there was a high degree of collaboration and co-ordination between institutional bodies and NGO stakeholders, there were concerns expressed about people falling between so-called 'institutional gaps' such as the gap between integration service providers at the municipal level, and the national Swedish Public Employment Service, *Arbetsförmedlingen*. This concern was then further exacerbated by the large numbers of newly arrived asylum seekers.

### 5.2 Contextual background

This section provides the background information for the Swedish research findings. As detailed in Chapter 4, Sweden is a small country of approximately 10 million people with 19 per cent of the population born abroad (Statistiska centralbyrån; SCB 2018b, 2018a, 2020). Sweden has a unitary political system, and its unicameral parliament is characterised by a multi-party system. The section begins with a short historical overview of how policies promoting multiculturalism and integration were introduced. Following this, the section summarises two recent developments: the *cordon sanitaire* around the populist radical-right Sweden Democrats party, and the impact of the 2015-16 European migrant crisis. Finally, the section presents an overview of the important institutional settings and actors in this policy sector to serve as context for the discussion of the findings later in the chapter.
Given the high number of asylum seekers arriving in 2015-16, much of the discussion in this chapter relates to new arrivals rather than established communities.

### 5.2.1 History of Swedish policy approaches promoting multiculturalism

This section gives a brief overview of key events and important government policy responses promoting multiculturalism in Sweden in the latter half of the 20th century by expanding upon Table 7 below. When Sweden first implemented policies promoting multiculturalism in the 1970s, policymakers did not base Swedish national identity in terms of ethnicity (Borevi 2011: 50). In this way, cultural heterogeneity was welcomed through the legislation of the first comprehensive ‘immigrant and minority policy’ in 1975 (Emilsson 2016: 22). This policy was based on multicultural principles of equality, freedom of choice, and partnership. Borevi argues that the underlying rationale was fundamentally integrative. This is because positive valuation, accommodation and promotion of minority cultures by the state was interwoven with the Swedish welfare state, establishing “standardized institutional arrangements and rules that applied equally to all recipients” (Borevi 2013: 144). One result from the marriage between social democratic welfare and cultural pluralism was the strong affirmation of ethno-cultural identities within the broader Swedish national identity.

From the mid-1980s though, the state retreated from this strong form of multiculturalism. The state chose to no longer hold the responsibility to preserve immigrant cultures, instead transferring the responsibility to migrant communities themselves (Borevi 2011: 50). Consequently, immigrants’ cultural rights were diminished and were no longer classified as being ethnic minorities with unique constitutional entitlements (Emilsson 2016: 23). In this way, Borevi argues that Sweden pioneered the so-called ‘retreat’ from multiculturalism experienced by other European states in the 1990s and 2000s (2011: 50). However, she later explains that whilst the 1986 shift from ‘immigrant and minority policy’ to ‘immigrant policy’ saw a retreat from traditional expressions of multiculturalism, most policy measures remained intact (Borevi 2013: 147). Thus, the fundamental change was the justification informing these policy measures, not a shift in policy substance.
The policy reforms of the 1980s and 1990s culminated in 1997 with the introduction of a new integration policy under the Social Democratic Prime Minister Göran Persson: *Sweden, the future and diversity: from immigrant policy to integration policy* (Government of Sweden, Bill 1997/98:16). The new policy enshrined and clarified previous policy movements towards on individual rights and equality, rather than rights owed to cultural

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Legislation of the first comprehensive ‘immigrant and minority policy’, based on multicultural principles of equality, freedom of choice and partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Election of Prime Minister Olof Palme’s Social Democrat government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Reorientation of immigrant policy away from traditional multiculturalism, with immigrants receiving reduced minority cultural rights compared with other national minorities, Creation of the <em>Act against discrimination</em> 1986 and the office of Ombudsman for Ethnic Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1980s-mid 1990s</td>
<td>Decentralisation of responsibility for integration, with municipalities taking a greater role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Election of Prime Minister Carl Bildt’s centre-right Alliance government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Election of Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson’s Social Democrat minority government, <em>Act against discrimination</em> 1986 replaced by legislation that solely focused on labour market ethnic discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Sweden joins the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>New integration policy implemented: <em>Sweden, the Future and Diversity: From Immigrant Policy to Integration Policy</em>, emphasis on individual rights and equality rather than the rights of cultural groups, Establishment of the Integration Board (<em>Integrationsverket</em>) to support municipalities’ responsibility for integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Comprehensive anti-ethnic discrimination legislation introduced, expanding definition of ethnic discrimination to include direct and indirect forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Election of Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt’s centre-right Alliance government</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>Abolition of the Integration Board as part of a push to fully mainstream integration policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Previous anti-ethnic discrimination replaced by new <em>Discrimination Act</em> 2009, incorporating numerous other pieces of legislation and protected characteristics to be enforced by the new Equality Ombudsman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Parliamentary breakthrough of the populist right-wing Sweden Democrats (<em>Sverigedemokraterna</em>), led by Jimmie Åkesson, winning 20 seats in the general election, Rejection of compulsory civic integration education as being contrary to democratic principles of equal and indiscriminate treatment of citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Election of Prime Minister Stefan Löfven’s Social Democrat-Green coalition government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>European migrant crisis; introduction of identity checks at the Danish border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Result of the 2018 general election eventually leads to the re-election of Prime Minister Stefan Löfven and a Social Democrat-Green coalition government</td>
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| Table 7 Timeline of selected key events in Sweden |
groups. As of 2016, the 1997 Bill was still in place as the integration policy framework for Sweden, having not been abolished or dismantled.

The late 1990s and 2000s brought debates in Swedish public discourse about the so-called ‘civic turn’ in integration policy, as seen elsewhere in Europe (Joppke 2004, 2007). These included suggestions of Swedish language testing and civic integration education as part of the naturalisation process. Successive Swedish governments have rejected these proposals as being contrary to democratic principles of equal and indiscriminate treatment of citizens (Borevi 2013: 152-153). For the most part, centre-right political parties advocating for civic integration reforms have retreated from ideas such as language testing and civic integration education (Borevi 2013: 154). One reason for this backdown could be the parliamentary breakthrough of the populist radical-right Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), led by Jimmie Åkesson, which won 20 seats in the 2010 general election. The Sweden Democrats have become the most outspoken champions of increased civic integration measures, including assessment of language proficiency and some sort of citizenship test requiring knowledge about Swedish history and society. Borevi (2013: 154) argues that the fear of association with the Sweden Democrats has become a powerful motivator for mainstream political parties to soften their views on adding more stringent integration requirements for new arrivals.

5.2.2 Recent developments

The cordon sanitaire around the populist right-wing Sweden Democrats party is an important political development. Historically, the Swedish political system has been dominated by two blocs. Since their parliamentary breakthrough in 2010, the Sweden Democrats have continued to rise in electoral popularity. In 2014, they won 49 seats, and in the 2018 election winning 62 seats (Aylott and Bolin 2019: 1-3). This positions the Sweden Democrats as the third-largest party with almost 18 per cent of MPs. However, the two blocs have formed a cordon sanitaire around the Sweden Democrats, refusing to cooperate with a party with a legacy of racism and historical links to neo-Nazi groups (Aylott and Bolin 2019: 2, 10-11). Whilst this arrangement cut off the Sweden Democrats from direct policymaking influence, “it was as if the parliamentary arena was to be truncated, with seven parties acting as if the eighth was not there” (Aylott and Bolin 2019: 2). One consequence of maintaining the cordon sanitaire around a party holding 18 per cent of the seats is the sheer difficulty in being able to form government with a parliamentary majority. The two blocs hold 144 and 143 seats respectively, and so the current Red-Green Cabinet under the Social
Democratic Prime Minister Stefan Löfven was only confirmed following the 2018 election because the Centre, Liberal and Left Parties abstained (Aylott and Bolin 2019: 8-10).

Furthermore, the 2015-16 European migrant crisis posed the most significant challenge to Swedish immigration and integration policymaking in recent times. During the crisis, 162,877 people sought asylum in Sweden (Migrationsverket 2016: 1). This figure consisted of 12.4 per cent of all asylum applications received in the European Union during the crisis and was over six times larger than the European Union per capita average (Eurostat 2016: 2). The strain on Swedish institutions during this period ultimately led to identity checks at the Danish border between 24 November 2015 and 11 May 2017 (SOU 2017: 18-19). The prohibition of travelling across the Öresund Strait without identity documentation rapidly reduced the numbers of asylum seekers entering Sweden, but it did not end the crisis. As many of the interview participants explained, the rapid spike in arrivals placed the asylum processing system under significant strain. Likewise, municipalities had a responsibility to place some 32,500 unaccompanied minors (Eurostat 2016: 2) in a family home as quickly as possible. With so many people entering southern Sweden through the city of Malmö, which only had a population of about 300,000 people, the Migration Board (Migrationsverket) needed to create temporary camps due to the acute housing shortage. Sweden’s humanitarian entrant processing regime simply was not capable of managing such a rapid increase in arrivals in such a short space of time.

5.2.3 Institutional settings

The governance of Swedish policy efforts promoting multiculturalism and integration are characterised by a partnership between the national government and devolved responsibilities held by individual municipalities. The relationships connecting these key institutions are depicted in Figure 5.1. Under the Swedish constitution, municipalities have an enshrined right to local and independent self-government (Emilsson 2016: 29), though the national government does retain some responsibilities. Since the passing of the Introduction Act 2010, the Swedish Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen) has taken over municipalities’ responsibility for the ‘introduction program’ for new humanitarian arrivals (Dekker et al. 2015: 646). The purpose of changing the law was to centralise the coordination of socio-economic integration efforts for newly arrived refugees to help them “learn Swedish, get work and earn their living in the country as quickly as possible” (Arbetsförmedlingen 2016: 1). However, there still remains a partnership

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37 This measure was quite radical for Sweden due to its freedom of movement obligations within the European Union, and was a temporary measure that concluded on 11 May 2017.
between the Swedish Public Employment Service and the local municipality which retains responsibility “for [initial] reception, provision of housing, Swedish language courses, civic orientation and other adult education, school, child care, and activities in the social area” (Arbetsförmedlingen 2016: 4).

There are other agencies that also collaborate on the introduction program but are not included in Figure 2. This is because their involvement is somewhat tangential to the area of multicultural policymaking. First, the county administrative boards which coordinate and support municipalities to receive new arrivals. Second, the Migration Board which provides initial support for asylum seekers upon arrival and allocates national government grants to municipalities and counties for accommodating asylum seekers and refugees. Third, the Social Insurance Agency which pays the introduction welfare benefit and determines if supplementary benefits are applicable (Arbetsförmedlingen 2016: 4).
Sweden does not have a single agency solely responsible for overseeing or coordinating integration policy. This is because the Integration Board was abolished in 2007 in favour of mainstreaming and decentralising integration policy. Whilst the national Ministry of Employment is broadly responsible for integration, policymaking responsibility has instead been embedded into all government authorities, including the institutions depicted in Figure 2 (Dekker et al. 2015: 646).

Another notable absence from Figure 5.1 is the lack of a national human rights institution overseeing efforts for combatting racial discrimination, receiving and responding to complaints of discrimination or advocating for equal opportunity (Raoul Wallenberg Institute 2016). Instead, Sweden relies upon a network of ‘ombudsmän’ including the national Equality Ombudsman (Diskrimineringsombudsmannen) which is charged by the Swedish parliament and government to “promote equal rights and opportunities, and to combat discrimination” (Diskrimineringsombudsmannen 2019). There are also municipal anti-discrimination bodies such as the independent ‘Malmö against Discrimination’ (Malmö mot Diskriminering) which also have public funding to receive complaints of discrimination, provide free legal advice, and file legal proceedings (Malmö mot Diskriminering 2019). While some organisations have voiced active concerns about the lack of a national human rights institution (Raoul Wallenberg Institute 2016), on 31 March 2017 the Swedish government also agreed that “a national human rights institution in accordance with the Paris Principles ought to be established in Sweden” (Government of Sweden 2017: 23). During consultation, a majority of the stakeholder organisations “rejected or were doubtful about the . . . proposal to establish the national institution for human rights in the form of a new, independent government agency” (Government of Sweden 2017: 23). Despite this, the stakeholders largely supported the premise of a national institution and so the Swedish government recommended further investigation about a potential model so that Sweden could more fully uphold its international obligations (Government of Sweden 2017: 32).

5.3 Findings: Swedish multicultural policymaking from 2006 to 2017

This section narrows the focus to assess Sweden's policy approaches promoting multiculturalism from 2006 to 2017, by discussing findings from the semi-structured elite interviews with policymakers and policy stakeholders, supplemented by policy and other document analysis. Following a summary of secondary data from the Multiculturalism Policy Index, the discussion of empirical findings is structured using the REC Framework.
Unlike the other case studies, Swedish interview participants primarily discussed the integration of recent humanitarian migrants including asylum seekers and refugees. This is because the impact of the extraordinary number of arrivals to Sweden during the European migrant crisis of 2015-16 was still being felt in the autumn of 2016, as these immigrants were still being processed and entering into initial integration programs.

5.3.1 Policy presence: secondary data from the Multiculturalism Policy Index

The Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP Index) measures the presence and evolution of multicultural policies in 21 democracies, including Sweden (Banting and Kymlicka 2013; MCP Index Project 2016). The MCP Index data is the leading cross-national comparative index of its kind.

As described in Chapter 3, the Immigrant Minority Policy subset is divided into 8 indicators and each country is given a score of 1 (if a policy is present), 0.5 (if the policy is partially present), and 0 (if the policy is not present) (MCP Index Project 2016: 4-6). From a total possible score of 8 points, Sweden has received scores of 3.0 (1980), 3.5 (1990), 5.0 (2000) and 7.0 (2010), indicating a gradual increase in the establishment of policies promoting multiculturalism. A summary of Sweden's scores is included below in Table 8.

The mean score for 2010 across all 21 democracies measured was approximately 3.6. Sweden rated in the top third of countries, with Finland and New Zealand receiving a rating of 6.0, and Canada a rating of 7.5. Australia received a score of 8.0, the UK a score of 5.5, and the Netherlands a score of 2.0. Sweden’s 2010 score of 7.0 suggests it is doing very well in developing policies that promote multiculturalism, compared to most other countries included in the Index. This does challenge the 'dystopic narrative' of Swedish decline due to immigration and the supposed lack of integration. As Table 8 indicates, Sweden has historically performed very well in the areas of 'Affirmation', 'Funding Ethnic Groups' and 'Bilingual Education'. These three areas have been central pillars of Swedish multiculturalism since the introduction of the 1975 immigrant and minority policy described earlier. More recently, there have been policy additions in the areas of 'School Curriculum', 'Media', Exemptions' and 'Dual Citizenship'. However, Sweden consistently scores 0 for ‘Affirmative Action’ because attempts to implement affirmative action programs have been found to contravene legislation regarding anti-discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin (MCP Index Project 2016: 102-103).

38 For a more detailed explanation of the 'Decision Rules' used to measure the presence of multicultural policies, see (Multiculturalism Policy Index Project 2016: 4-6).
The MCP Index Project only describes the presence and evolution of multicultural policy across 21 democracies. It does not, however, seek to evaluate the impact or effectiveness of these policies. The MCP Index data is also not disaggregated by municipality. In the Swedish context, there are substantial localised policy differences due to a relatively high level of devolved authority for municipal politics. Furthermore, the purpose of this thesis is to expand upon the Index by providing rich qualitative data that sheds light on the implementation and effectiveness of multicultural policy. Since the Index only measures the presence of policies in eight categories across 21 countries, it loses some of the depth and

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**Table 8** Sweden’s scores from the MCP Index (Immigrant Minority Policy)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation(^{39})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Curriculum(^{40})</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Media(^{41})</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exemptions(^{42})</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dual Citizenship(^{43})</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funding Ethnic Groups(^{44})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bilingual Education(^{45})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Affirmative Action(^{46})</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL SCORE</strong></td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
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*Source: MCP Index Project (2016: 99)*

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\(^{39}\) ‘Affirmation’ is defined by the MCP Index as “constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal levels and the existence of a government ministry, secretariat or advisory board to implement this policy in consultation with ethnic communities” (2016: 4).

\(^{40}\) ‘School Curriculum’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum” (2016: 4).

\(^{41}\) ‘Media’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing” (2016: 5).

\(^{42}\) ‘Exemptions’ is defined by the MCP Index as “exemptions from dress codes (either by statute or court cases)” (2016: 5).

\(^{43}\) ‘Dual Citizenship’ is defined by the MCP Index as whether immigrants and their offspring “may retain their original citizenship even after acquiring the citizenship of the host country” (2016: 5).

\(^{44}\) ‘Funding Ethnic Groups’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the funding of ethnic group organizations or activities” (2016: 5).

\(^{45}\) ‘Bilingual Education’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction” (2016: 5).

\(^{46}\) ‘Affirmative Action’ is defined by the MCP Index as whether the “country has an affirmative action policy that targets [disadvantaged] immigrant minorities” in either the public sector, the private sector or both. Such action must extend beyond human rights policies to include “target action aimed at removing barriers or more positive action measures such as quotas or preferential hiring” (2016: 6).
complexities from each case. This is the premise of the discussion below which explores Sweden in more detail through the lens of the REC Framework.

5.3.2 The migrant crisis in Sweden: challenges to equal opportunity

The next sections primarily draw upon new empirical research, with the findings analysed using the REC Framework. As detailed in Chapter 3, the REC Framework is a tool for operationalising the policy objectives of multiculturalism. These objectives are:

- (R) - reduce discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnicity or cultural background
- (E) - provide an equal opportunity for diverse cultural groups to fully participate in society
- (C) - facilitate a mutual cultural accommodation between immigrant groups, the state, and broader society without forced assimilation

This section explores how the European migrant crisis of 2015-16 challenged Swedish integration policymaking and affected equal opportunity for new arrivals. The three subsequent sections are dedicated to the three components of the REC Framework. The empirical findings are based on 8 semi-structured interviews with 10 policy actors. 4 participants were public servants, 4 participants were politicians or political advisors, and 2 participants were from civil society. 1 participant was also a prominent ethnic minority leader. In addition to the interview data, this section also draws upon government reports, political speeches and scholarly literature to triangulate the findings.

Unlike the other cases examined in this thesis, Sweden was disproportionately affected by very large numbers of people seeking asylum, receiving six times more applications than the European Union's per capita average (Eurostat 2016: 2). This section describes two diverging perspectives on integration and multiculturalism in Sweden that emerged during the interviews conducted in late 2016, one year after the height of the European migrant crisis. Primarily, the key debates related to the policy objective of equal opportunity. Proponents of the ‘dystopic narrative’ argued that Sweden’s policies are leading to the decay of the welfare system because new arrivals are self-segregating and not finding employment to contribute tax. In contrast, there are a counter-veiling set of views that reject this argument. Policy actors ascribing to this counter-veiling perspective have argued the cause of these social problems could be found in deficiencies within institutional structures. Furthermore, they purported that policy responses to extremely difficult social challenges
arising from the crisis were informed by multicultural principles. The two competing approaches form the basis of a profound polarisation in Swedish politics around the immigration and integration of new arrivals. As such, each interview participant can be broadly categorised within either of the two camps.

**The ‘dystopic narrative’: immigrants cause social problems**

The ‘dystopic narrative’ was largely espoused by anti-immigrant groups and the radical-right populist party, the Sweden Democrats. According to interviews with their representatives, the Sweden Democrats advocated the closing of the border with Denmark at the outset of the crisis. Unwillingly, the centre-left Löfven government instituted border controls and identity checks in order to prevent a so-called ‘system collapse’ due to the rapid increase in arrivals of people seeking asylum. Participant S05m, a representative from the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*), described this seismic policy shift:

> A lot of different parties have also adapted [Sweden Democrat] policies. We've seen how the government started with . . . border controls. That's what [the Sweden Democrats] wanted to have for many years. . . . The open borders caused everything to collapse. . . . [The government] didn’t want to do it, but they didn’t have a choice. – Participant S05m, politician

This decision caused significant anguish within the ruling parties, with the Deputy Prime Minister Åsa Romson holding back tears during the televised policy announcement on 24 November 2015 (The Guardian 2015). The border controls rapidly reduced the rate of asylum seekers attempting to enter the Swedish city of Malmö from the Danish capital Copenhagen via the Öresund Bridge (Migrationsverket 2017).

The principal concern articulated by proponents of the ‘dystopic narrative’ was that, in their view, refugees and asylum seekers tend to stagnate due to welfare dependency and are therefore unable or unwilling to integrate into Swedish society. Participant S04m is another representative from the Sweden Democrats:

> The people who live outside of society, I mean people who live in Sweden . . . but they don’t have a job, they don’t even know Swedish, and they may never ever get a job . . . That means that they are an economic burden. . . . I love that we are welfare society, but the welfare society only works if all the people at least are trying to get a job . . . otherwise I don’t think that we will have a welfare society left. – Participant S04m, political advisor

In this vein of thought, asylum seekers and refugees are explicitly considered to be economic and social burdens. There is evidence suggesting that many refugees struggle to find employment in Sweden. For refugees arriving between 1997 and 1999, 35 per cent were unemployed ten years after they initially arrived (Delmi 2015; Irastorza and Bevelander 2016). Participant S05m later argued that the weight of this burden is especially
felt by local municipalities who do not receive sufficient financial support to resettle and integrate these new arrivals.

Both Participants S05m and S04m presented a very stark view of Sweden's immigration and integration system by arguing that authorities are unable to properly integrate new arrivals and asylum seekers due to under-resourcing. They also suggested that migrants are unwilling or incapable of taking responsibility for learning Swedish and finding work. In particular, Participant S05m repeatedly returned to the same point: the best thing to do to improve integration outcomes for those already in Sweden would be to close the border to all prospective asylum seekers.

Although he opposed the dystopic narrative, Participant S06m acknowledged its impact on political debate. One change was an 'awakening' in the discourse surrounding immigration and integration. He suggested people now feel more freely able to debate immigration and integration without the fear of breaking social taboos or being labelled as a racist:

> There has been a shift in how we talk about immigration issues. There has been a very dramatic shift in how we talk about people with a different ethnic background than Swedish. A lot more problematisation than there was before. . . . [But] there are some good effects [too] . . . Suddenly we are able to talk about things that we were perhaps pretending were not there to talk about before. – Participant S06m, politician

Given the magnitude of the crisis, every participant made observations about the emergence of the dystopic narrative. Even if they disagreed with the dystopic account, they collectively stressed the point that the tone of political debate about immigration and integration was being shaped by these hostile views. Furthermore, the dystopic narrative about immigrants in Sweden is also reinforced by scholars who argue that anti-immigrant rhetoric has been normalised in Swedish political discourse (Krzyżanowski 2018; Kaati et al. 2016; Krzyżanowski and Ledin 2017).

**Countering the dystopian view**

In contrast, policy actors rejecting the ‘dystopic narrative’ acknowledged the extreme pressures faced by Sweden's integration and welfare systems due to the migrant crisis. However, they saw these pressures as solvable institutional problems rather than placing blame on migrants themselves. For example, Participant S06m raised concern that the time between submission of an asylum application and the determination of refugee status was too long:
[Asylum seekers] don’t get a [work] permit until they get . . . [their] residence permit. . . . [The process] should take three months . . . [but] in actuality it takes up to two years to get a decision. . . . [The migrant crisis] . . . makes the time it takes to come to a decision even longer . . . so we need to get those numbers down. – Participant S06m, politician

This long delay without access to work rights was identified by some policymakers as one of the significant barriers to integration and equal opportunity for asylum seekers. At the time of interview, Participant S06m explained that a possible exemption for asylum seekers to hold a work permit before being eligible to seek employment was under development. This exemption has since been enacted for asylum seekers who meet identity requirements (Migrationsverket 2018).

Another point of concern for municipal policymakers was the imposition of refugee quotas for municipalities set by the national parliament. Participant S09m described that although this policy change arose from the massive influx of arrivals during the migrant crisis, it potentially breached local authorities’ rights to independence from Stockholm.

There was new legislation [on asylum seeker quotas] . . . a lot of local authorities said that it’s a violation of local authorities’ [rights]. . . . But [during the crisis] there was a majority in the parliament saying that we need a quota system to distribute newcomers in a different way. – Participant S09m, politician

Emilsson explains that the state’s justification for redistributing asylum seekers was because the vast number of new arrivals led to a shortage of available housing, which was in turn compounded by many asylum seekers lacking the capacity to secure housing in a timely manner (2016: 29-30). However, the conflict arises because the municipalities have a constitutionally enshrined right to independent, local self-government.

Irrespective of the debate over municipal independence, some municipalities have recognised that they cannot ‘go it alone’ when it comes to supporting and integrating new arrivals. Participant S08fc is a municipal public servant who works on a collaborative migrant inclusion project with a non-government organisation and other settlement service providers in response to the migrant crisis.

[Our organisation] is a well-known organisation. It has a high amount of trust . . . and [it is] spread all over the country. . . . I think that is a strength as well when it comes to working with [people’s] attitudes and hostility. . . . That’s something we can’t do in the same way as a municipality. . . . I can try to make way for [the inclusion project] to happen, to try to connect the decision makers. – Participant S08fc, public servant

In addition, Participant S08fa argued that the inclusion project aims to resolve some of the institutional inadequacies that were laid bare during the migrant crisis and ultimately led to the so-called ‘system collapse’.
[The inclusion project]... was started to fulfil the problem... [that arose in] Sweden... like a system collapse... The whole system just started to work less and less [effectively]. The problem is not the migrants. It’s the system, and that collapse would have come sooner or later anyway. – Participant S08fa, civil society

This quote exemplifies how policy actors who broadly fit within this counter-veiling set of views interpreted Sweden’s institutional response to the migrant crisis. Several interview participants from within Sweden’s political institutions and civil society organisations were highly self-critical, implicating themselves for failing to adequately meet the needs of the new arrivals. Rather than blaming the immigrants for disrupting the welfare system and social order, these individuals interpreted the problems to be an institutional and policy-based deficiency. In light of this context, the next three sections apply the REC Framework to the Swedish case study.

5.3.3 Racial discrimination: political common ground

The purpose of this section is to describe the perspectives of policy actors on efforts to combat racial discrimination. In addition to the interview data, the section also draws upon the MCP Index, legislation, government reports, news articles and scholarly literature to triangulate the findings. The political responses to the European migrant crisis and the exclusion of the Sweden Democrats by the mainstream political blocs are indicative of significant party-political divisions in Swedish politics on the issues of immigration and integration policy. Despite this however, it is accepted across the political spectrum that principles of anti-discrimination should be enshrined in legislation and supported by government institutions. However, Sweden does not have a dedicated national human rights institution to oversee anti-discrimination policy efforts. As mentioned earlier, the ‘Instrument of Government’ in the Swedish Constitution prohibits discrimination on the grounds of colour, nationality, ethnicity, language or religion. Accordingly, this mechanism charges public institutions with the responsibility to combat discrimination in Swedish society (Parliament of Sweden 2016, Chapter 1, Article 2: 65) Further to this, in 2008 the centre-right Reinfeldt Cabinet passed the Anti-Discrimination Act, which was not repealed by the subsequent ‘Red-Green’ Löfven Cabinet during its 2014–18 term (MCP Index Project 2016: 102).

In addition to the two mainline Swedish political party blocs, the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats also maintain a commitment to oppose discrimination as Participant S05m explained:
We don’t tolerate any form of discrimination. It doesn’t matter if it’s based on religion, background, ethnicity. . . . We believe that the [current] legislation is good enough. Right now, [the Equality Ombudsman process] doesn’t really . . . work. So we do need to look after how we deal with this. But of course, we’re against all forms of discrimination. – Participant S05m, politician

Similarly, the party’s leader Jimmie Åkesson has transformed the Sweden Democrats through an agenda of zero-tolerance for racism in the party’s ranks, and expelling those who espouse Nazi sentiments (BBC 2018). On the one hand, this account of ‘cleaning up’ appears to align the Sweden Democrats with the mainstream party blocs with regards to anti-discrimination. However, this neglects the subversive ‘cultural racism’ that is embedded within the attitudes, policy platform, and ideological foundation of the party (Mulinari and Neergaard 2014: 45-46; Hellström et al. 2012: 190). Nonetheless, there is at least a tacit consensus across Swedish politics that the state has a central role to play in combatting discrimination.

With this context in mind, several interview participants directly attributed discrimination as a causal factor of poor integration outcomes for new arrivals. One commonly mentioned indicator was comparative unemployment: in 2017 the unemployment rate for the Swedish-born population was approximately 4 per cent, compared with foreign-born population at 15 per cent (Arbetsförmedlingen 2018: 10-11).

For example, Participant S07m believed the disparity in these statistics arose from discrimination in the Swedish labour market, although he found it difficult to access evidence to support this claim:

There is [discrimination], but it’s difficult to have statistics which show how big . . . the discrimination [gap] between the foreigners [and Swedish-born is], in order to find a job. We don’t have the means to count that. – Participant S07m, public servant

Similarly, Participant S08fa suggested that structural discrimination in Sweden’s integration policy framework acts as a barrier to social inclusion:

That’s one of the flaws in the system right now, that it is discriminating and that’s one of the things that we want to get around so…society can include everyone. And at least for me, when you say ‘include’, then you mean ‘not discriminate’. – Participant S08fa, civil society

In explaining the structural discrimination, Participant S08fa later argued that some people fall into the gaps between settlement services and programs, thus leading to poor integration outcomes. To resolve these gaps at a municipal level, the city of Malmö’s integration efforts have sought to address discrimination:
In that integration program, [Malmö municipality] talked about anti-discrimination and how to work within anti-discrimination issues, both in the labour market and the housing market. And we also try to get anti-discriminating clauses in our procurement [procedures]. – Participant S09m, politician

In this quote, Malmö’s policy measures are framed in a constructive, positive light in contrast to the pessimism from proponents of the dystopic narrative. This more constructive outlook was also reflected by Participant S06m:

Well you can’t have integration if you’re discriminating [against] people . . . Now we have . . . very strict antidiscrimination policies in our own work, in our staff, our employees in the Malmö [municipality], and high-set goals for how we should work. I think we are good at it. – Participant S06m, politician

In his interview, Participant S06m claimed that the reason for Malmö’s success in combating discrimination is the prominent role of the independent NGO, Malmö mot Diskriminering (MmD; lit. ‘Malmö against Discrimination’). MmD receives funding from the municipality to provide legal aid to victims of discrimination, including those who are discriminated against by the municipality. Participant S06m explained how this process improves policymaking:

[MmD is] an external organisation for the specific purpose of being able to help people win discrimination cases against us. . . . Other cities look at us and think ‘why are you paying them to bash you?’ But we think if we need a good bashing, then we will become better for it. They have access to the judicial system in the same way as any other lawyer would have and they are winning actual cases. – Participant S06m, politician

Whilst MmD is an NGO that operates at a municipal level, similar work is conducted at the national level by the statutory Equality Ombudsman. The principal task for the Equality Ombudsman is to “observe and identify discrimination, including structural discrimination . . . to prevent discriminatory practices covered under the related legislation” (Raoul Wallenberg Institute 2016: 6). To that end, the Equality Ombudsman can conduct investigations into private and public organisations (Raoul Wallenberg Institute 2016: 6). Although the Equality Ombudsman has the power to take discrimination complaints to court, this rarely occurs, leading to concerns being raised about the organisation’s effectiveness by Participant S06m. Similar views were also expressed by Participant S05m who argued that whilst Sweden’s anti-discrimination legislation is sufficient, the office of the Equality Ombudsman “doesn’t work” effectively. As mentioned earlier in the institutional settings section, Sweden does not have a national human rights institution. As the Raoul Wallenberg Institute roundtable report concludes, a statutory body of this type could serve to coordinate other organisations in Sweden’s “fragmented human rights
landscape . . . and carry out strategic litigation to achieve broader systemic change” (2016: 9).

It is also worth noting that some of the interview participants suggested that discrimination directly impedes the integration of new arrivals. However, this view was not necessarily shared by all. In particular, the Sweden Democrat participants argued that new arrivals don’t integrate well into Swedish society because Swedish institutions were unable to cope with high numbers of asylum seekers and thus unable to ‘impose’ assimilation policies:

There’s also a number issue. . . . But as long as the borders are open in this way . . . then it’s pretty much impossible to do anything about the [integration] situation because people [keep] coming . . . . [After closing the borders.] we could try to get people involved in the community and to impose our assimilation policies to actually put pressure on people that come here to adapt into our society. – Participant S05m, politician

The next section on equal opportunity examines some of the assumptions behind Participant S05m’s claims that new migrants are not integrating into Swedish society. Although there are some stark statistics, particularly the unemployment rate for people born outside of Sweden, the interview participants suggested there are complex reasons for this.

In summary, the analysis suggests that Swedish policy responses to racial discrimination have been characterised in the following ways. There is a political consensus across all major parties on eradicating discrimination, even from the radical-right Sweden Democrats. However, the Sweden Democrats demonstrate a sophisticated ability to mask their xenophobic ideological roots within anti-racist rhetoric. In addition, there are some policy initiatives tackling the issue of structural discrimination, although some policy actors appeared to dispute the extent of the problem. The interview material also indicates some progress on improving the recognition and validation of foreign qualifications with national and the Malmö municipal governments collaborating with the Swedish Public employment service to develop solutions. However, the lack of a national human rights institution (NHRI) in Sweden limits the capacity for the state to coordinate anti-discrimination measures at a national level.

5.3.4 Equal opportunity: barriers and integration policy solutions

Central to the REC Framework is the development of public policy which fosters equality of opportunity for people with a culturally diverse background. The purpose of this section is firstly to highlight barriers to equal opportunity in Sweden that were identified by some policy actors. The section then provides an overview of how some policy actors see Swedish
policy responding to these barriers. A common theme from the interviews was that the state has a strong centralised responsibility for integration but needs to increasingly collaborate with other institutions and organisations to improve the integration process. In addition to the interview data, this section draws upon government reports, scholarly literature and grey literature to triangulate the findings.

**Barriers to equal opportunity: language proficiency and education**

Integration policy is practically implemented through the provision of settlement services by national and local organisations. A common theme expressed by most interview participants was that new migrants arriving in Sweden face considerable difficulties in accessing the labour market due to poor Swedish language proficiency and inadequate education. The rate of unemployment is significantly higher amongst the foreign-born population, especially refugees (Delmi 2015; Irastorza and Bevelander 2016). In the wake of the European migrant crisis, the implications of these figures will continue to be pertinent. First and foremost, participants recognised that knowledge of the Swedish language is of paramount importance to the integration of new arrivals into Swedish society, as Participant S07m surmised:

> The main barrier [to integration] is the language. The Swedish people are very proud about the language and it’s difficult for the newcomers who don’t speak Swedish . . . to find a job, even [if] the newcomer has a very good education. – Participant S07m, public servant

Participant S09m extended this argument further by explaining how the ‘small language phenomenon’ affects new arrivals in Sweden:

> One [barrier to equal opportunity], is talking about Swedish language and that we know from international studies that . . . it’s tougher when it comes to countries with small languages to learn the language in a way that gets accepted. In Britain, you can find a lot of ways of talking English and they are accepted. – Participant S09m, politician

The implication here then is that since new arrivals often struggle to master the Swedish language to a level that is ‘acceptable’ to the Swedish-born population, this has flow-on effects for hiring practices in the labour market. In other words, speaking imperfect Swedish can evoke a negative response or lead prospective employers to make assumptions about a candidate’s suitability based upon underlying prejudices. Alternatively, new arrivals may also not be suitable for positions that require a significantly high level of Swedish proficiency.

Concurrently, a lack of adequate education or skills is considered a priority issue for new arrivals struggling to break into the labour market, particularly among humanitarian
entrants who may not have completed secondary or primary school. Several interview participants highlighted that Sweden's transition to a service-based economy has led to a significant reduction in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs. Notwithstanding the language barrier, many new arrivals find it difficult to secure employment in an economy dominated by high-skilled jobs, as Participant S06m explained:

[As for] the job market in Malmö, we have more jobs here now than we ever had... but the citizens [primarily] in Eastern Malmö have not got the right education to get those jobs because there are really high demands on education for the jobs that are here... [in] the medical sectors, IT sectors... and the financial sector. – Participant S06m, politician

Participant S09m highlighted the importance of class for considering barriers to equal opportunity faced by new arrivals. He cited the overlap between class and national origin as an alternate explanation for the socio-economic divide between eastern and western Malmö:

There are very big differences... both in health [and] employment rates... but that doesn't have to do with nationality. It's much more about... class [and] education. ... From our policy point of view... we know that [for people] with [a] very short formal education, it's very tough to find ways into the labour market because a lot of those jobs went away in the '90s during [deindustrialisation]. – Participant S09m, politician

This view is also found in the discussions of socio-economic integration by other Malmö policymakers interviewed in another study. Scuzzarello (2015: 62-64) argues that the Malmö municipality approaches socio-economic integration policy with the view that employment leads to autonomy, economic self-sufficiency and social wellbeing for new arrivals. Scuzzarello contends that these beliefs have been used by policymakers in Malmö since the start of the 21st century to justify a range of educational programs that support migrants to attain the human capital needed to gain employment (2015: 63). These findings support the view expressed by interview participants for this thesis that Swedish language training and adult education are essential for overcoming barriers to equal opportunity. The path to independence and socio-economic integration for migrants in Sweden relies upon policy measures such as these, scaffolded by a comprehensive welfare system.

Promoting equal opportunity through integration: state centrality, collaborative partnerships

This section explores how interview participants view and understand the role for the state in developing policy that facilitates socio-economic integration.

Firstly, a common theme emerging from the interviews was that the Swedish state has a responsibility to ameliorate barriers to equal opportunity faced by people with a migrant
background through the provision of public services. As discussed above, insufficient education and unrecognised qualifications have been identified by participants as significant barriers to employment. Participant S06m explains that the Swedish state has a responsibility to match people’s education with opportunities in the labour market. Alternatively, the state needs to provide adult education classes so that new arrivals can attain the necessary education or qualifications:

[Together] with Arbetsförmedlingen, . . . [municipalities] match unemployed peoples’ education with what the job market requires. . . . The challenge . . . is convincing adult people that they need to re-educate. – Participant S06m, politician

Comparing this account to the disproportionately higher unemployment rate for people born outside Sweden (Delmi 2015; Irastorza and Bevelander 2016), the barriers to equal opportunity are significant and profound. Although there are job opportunities in a service-based economy, linguistic and educational barriers are not easily remedied. In conjunction with these long-term policy efforts, the state has recognised a need to promote the importance of social participation among newly arrived groups. Participant S02f coordinated social workers to work with families through the children to help develop independence and social engagement:

[We work on] getting people to be a part of society in different ways, and we try very hard to work through the children, . . . [We help] parents to understand that it’s important for the kids to go to school, and how the parents show the children by being in something themselves during daytime . . . [like a job, study or volunteering because] Sweden is built upon . . . [being socially] active. – Participant S02f, public servant

The Sweden Democrats in Malmö also agreed with mainstream parties that the Swedish state has the responsibility to reduce barriers to equal opportunity. In 2016, the party wanted the Malmö municipality to allocate additional funds for integration, beyond what the Social Democrat and Green Party municipal government put forward in the budget. The Sweden Democrats proposed an additional 14 million kronor for the Swedish language program, ‘Swedish for Immigrants’ (SFI), an additional 27 million kronor for primary and secondary adult education programs, and an additional 5 million kronor for community orientation programs (Sverigedemokraterna Malmö 2016: 16). Participant S04m spoke to the proposals in this document:

In [our ‘budget-in-reply’], we put more money than the Social Democrats on SFI . . . and more money to adults’ education, so we can take people who don’t have an education, help them to be more educated, and get a job and . . . to fix this problem. – Participant S04m, political advisor
This suggests that Sweden’s radical-right populist party recognises that language proficiency and inadequate education are indeed profound barriers to employment and social integration in Malmö. Furthermore, it shows that the Sweden Democrats in Malmö believe that the municipality and the state ought to use social policy expenditure to improve integration outcomes for people with a migrant background. Despite their xenophobic rhetoric, there appears to be some common ground between the Sweden Democrats and mainstream political parties on this issue. However, given the Sweden Democrats’ ideological foundations described earlier, it is unlikely that this agreement extends to giving the state a more proactive role in eliminating discriminatory barriers or structures which impede equal opportunity.

However, there also appeared to be significant dissonance between the Malmö Sweden Democrats and their counterparts at the national level. In the same year, the national Sweden Democrats’ budget-in-reply proposed a cut of over 50 per cent to national expenditure in the area of integration and equality (Sverigedemokraterna 2016: 10-12, 106). As such, the Sweden Democrats demonstrate mixed responses to the challenge of supporting and integrating new arrivals depending on the political context.

Emerging from several of the interviews was the importance of collaborative learning relationships between institutions to improve integration outcomes. Examples cited by participants included collaborations between public bodies and civil society organisations, relationships between local authorities and their national counterparts, and even relationships between local and international bodies (Pedersen and Stothard 2015; European Commission 2019). One municipal politician explained why it was important to improve communication between the Malmö municipality and the Swedish Public Employment Service, Arbetsförmedlingen:

[Communication] is a challenge for both Malmö and Arbetsförmedlingen and we need to be better at [matching people with appropriate jobs] because Arbetsförmedlingen is a state organisation not a municipal organisation. . . . When people go on social welfare here in Malmö, they often don’t have any contact with Arbetsförmedlingen anymore. – Participant S06m, politician

In this example, Participant S06m identified a need to bridge the gap between the municipal and national systems. This is particularly important because the Swedish Public Employment Service is one of the key actors in the integration policy framework by helping new arrivals find employment opportunities. Similarly, Participant S07m explained that public authorities also have the responsibility to develop new integration projects based on innovative methods learned from other agencies and other countries. One such example is an occupational language program called Dual Vocational Training (Dubbel
**Yrkesutbildning**, focused on teaching Swedish language to new arrivals in the workplace (Näringslivskontoret Malmö 2017, 2019). The project is principally funded by the European Social Fund, with support from the Malmö municipality, Skåne Regional Council, and the Swedish Public Employment Service.

We help the newcomers during their first two years . . . to place them in their working place . . . We [combine] the work and the education [by sending] the teachers . . . [to their workplaces] . . . [We] get them to learn the Swedish language . . . according to what kind of work they are doing there. – *Participant S07m, public servant*

Projects such as this are examples of collaboration between public agencies and the private sector to provide an opportunity for people with a migrant background to learn Swedish on the job and gain a qualification to improve their employment prospects at the conclusion of the program. This type of approach highlighted the importance of inter-organisational collaboration in developing innovative methods for improving integration outcomes and thus promoting equal opportunity.

In sum, policy responses to the issue of equal opportunity in Sweden can be described in the following ways. Most participants stressed the importance of programs for improving language proficiency and education, as these are both profound barriers to integration. In particular, Sweden’s comprehensive welfare state plays a central role in addressing the socio-economic disadvantages faced by new arrivals. All migrants with a residence permit are fully included within the welfare state, so long as they are expecting to stay in Sweden for more than one year (Koning 2019: 70). It is slightly more complicated for asylum seekers awaiting their determinations, but Koning argues that the general trajectory of recent welfare policy developments has been inclusionary (2019: 71). However, there have been mixed messages from the Sweden Democrats. The Malmö Sweden Democrats expressed a desire to boost funding for these types of policy efforts, unlike their national counterparts who wanted to halve funding for 'Integration and Equality'. In addition, the European migrant crisis had an unprecedented impact on the capacity for the state to process asylum claims. Some knock-on effects included delays in refugee status determinations, with asylum seekers being left in limbo without the right to work or access language classes. The interview material did suggest that some local authorities such as Malmö municipality were using their autonomous powers to give some asylum seekers the right to Swedish language education and the right to seek employment without a residence permit. In addition, some participants suggested that the network of NGOs and public agencies responsible for integration services was at times inefficient or ineffective. These participants suggested that
an overhaul was needed so that people would no longer fall through gaps in service provision coverage.

5.3.5 Mutual cultural accommodation: debating the extent of state adaptation

This section presents findings from the study in relation to mutual cultural accommodation. This discussion begins by considering the extent to which participants felt Swedish society should change for new migrants. Following this, the section explores how policy actors believe Swedish multiculturalism can fulfil the transformative function by ensuring migrants uphold Swedish law. In addition to the interview data, this section draws upon government reports and scholarly literature to triangulate the findings.

*Multiculturalism under fire: whether Swedish society should have to adapt*

Almost all interview participants identified mutual cultural accommodation as one of the major contentious debates in Swedish politics, and amongst policymakers. The overarching question is the extent to which Swedish society should be adapting or changing to accommodate cultural minorities. Leading the critique against cultural accommodation are the Sweden Democrats who argued that the focus of the Swedish state should be to promote Swedish culture, not promote cultures of migrants:

People have all their rights to retain their culture...[and] of course we accept that people celebrate their own holidays...but we don't want the Swedish state [and] Swedish municipalities...to help them to retain their own culture. They can do that [privately].... The Swedish state should focus on Swedish culture. – Participant S04m, political advisor

Participant S05m also expressed frustration that Swedish society is actively adapting to immigrant cultures rather than forcing immigrants to adapt to Swedish culture. The crux of his argument was that since migrants willingly chose to move to Sweden, they should adapt to Swedish customs and lifestyles. In taking this position, both Participants S04m and S05m reject the notion of ‘two-way integration’ that underpins mutual cultural accommodation.

The Sweden Democrat participants also described Sweden as a political climate with scarce resources. They expressed concern that taxpayers are reluctant to pay for increasing welfare expenditure for new migrants:

Sweden is a welfare state and that's one of the reasons why people choose to come here. We believe that this is unfair... because taxpayers here are the ones that have to pay for this. And we've seen how tensions rise within our society, how different groups collide. – Participant S05m, politician
In contrast to the opposition to mutual cultural accommodation espoused by the Sweden Democrats and others, some participants came to the defence of this element of multiculturalism. For example, Participant S07m explained that intercultural understanding is critical for societal harmony. This is because people need to understand the differences of others to be able to include them into Swedish society. Similarly, Participant S01m argued that inclusion is a critical and ongoing task for government and society. It is a process of continually redefining the ‘we’, so that differences can be welcomed and so that democratic participation is fostered within a multicultural society:

But from the beginning of this [department], we focused also to create a new "we"... . . [We must] challenge . . . our own understanding of ourselves [and] our understanding of the other . . . [constantly asking]: who is not part of this society? Who is not included? Who is excluded? . . . In this process of creating a new "we" . . . we have to question ourselves and our institutions: who is the "other" according to these institutions. – Participant S01m, public servant

Two-way integration as mutual cultural accommodation: transformative multiculturalism

As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, the premise of integration policy in European Union Member States is that integration is a two-way process of mutual accommodation (EU Justice and Home Affairs Council 2014: 2). So far, this chapter has primarily focused on debates amongst policymakers about the extent to which Swedish society ought to accommodate new arrivals and cultural minorities. Since in this view of integration both sides have a responsibility to adapt, this section focuses on how policymakers believe people with a migrant background ought to take up this responsibility. In this way, multiculturalism can have a transformative function, otherwise it is degraded into a crude cultural relativism (Crowder 2013: 21-32, 54; Kymlicka 1995: 168-169). All of the interview participants agreed, to varying extents, that there is a tension when the cultural practices of people with a migrant background clash with the laws or societal norms of Swedish society. It is in this tension where policies promoting multiculturalism need to assume their transformative function. Participant S02f encapsulates this point by arguing that although integration policy should allow people to keep their own culture and be supported to participate in society, there are still expectations for respecting the law of the land.

You have to be in the context where you are... You have to accept and respect the laws . . . [and] abide by them. So sometimes culture and integration clash, . . . but overall, I think it’s possible to unite them. – Participant S02f, public servant

In her work, Participant S02f explains that she and her staff often have to teach new arrivals about societal expectations in Sweden. For example, parents are not allowed to hit their children in Sweden. However, given the tension that can arise when cultural practices
don’t align with the law, this teaching needs to be done in a way to foster mutual respect. In a similar vein, Participant S06m explained the Malmö municipality is particularly concerned about ‘honour structures’ and ‘honour crimes’ in some communities:

In the worst case . . . [an honour structure] can lead to murder, but it is putting a limit on the freedom of women and LGBT boys. You can’t go where you want, talk to who you want, wear what you want, and you are checked out by your brothers, your relatives, friends of the relatives and so on. It’s a communal thing [to] control women, mostly women, but there are boys too. – Participant S06m, politician

In the eyes of some members of the Malmö municipal government, these structures of control within some migrant and refugee communities form a barrier to equal opportunity and therefore need to be addressed in some way. However, this not so easy to do given that the structures arise from deeply embedded cultural values. Participant S06m acknowledged that all mainstream parties support policies which address honour structures by transforming cultural practices through instruction, dialogue and education. However, the Left Party opposed these policy efforts. This opposition, and the other parties’ response, is instructive in demonstrating multiculturalism’s transformative function:

So far only the Left Party has protested . . . on the grounds that if we do these things we are pointing out immigrants as a problem . . . Of course [the Left Party] have a point but the other parties, including mine, don’t feel we have the luxury. We can’t, because we are not paying: it’s the girls that are paying for our ‘goodness’ if we are trying to protect the immigrants from racism. – Participant S06m, politician

This example supports a view that multiculturalism is not synonymous with cultural relativism, as some critics might claim. Instead, there is a common framework under the law to which all citizens and residents must adhere. From these interview excerpts, it appears that Swedish multiculturalism does not permit or endorse illiberal or reprehensible practices, but instead places expectations of cultural transformation on minority communities. This in turn suggests a two-way process of mutual cultural accommodation in line with the first of the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration in the European Union (EU Justice and Home Affairs Council 2004). As such, this two-way process ought to involve all members of a society, not just the new arrivals or cultural minorities. Those espousing the ‘dystopic narrative’, including the Sweden Democrats and their supporters, certainly oppose this notion at a fundamental level (Krzyżanowski 2018; Kaati et al. 2016). However, the interview data from the policy actors presenting a counter-veiling set of views, suggests that the two-way process of mutual accommodation is firmly embedded in Swedish policymaking. Participant S09m encapsulates this very well by saying:
Integration is something that is a discussion for everyone living in Malmö. Not [just] about newcomers getting integrated with those who’d been there for a long time, but because integration issues [affect] all the citizens of Malmö. – Participant S09m, politician

In summary, mutual cultural accommodation is very politically contentious in Sweden. The Sweden Democrats strongly argued that Sweden should not have to adapt because doing so encourages migrants to undermine ‘Swedish’ national identity. This conflict between the Sweden Democrats and mainstream parties has framed debates about immigration and integration. However, the *cordon sanitaire* around the Sweden Democrats remains unbroken, limiting their influence on policy decision-making processes. There was also no official expectation of cultural assimilation and no coercion to learn Swedish prior to naturalisation. The MCP Index also provides significant evidence of accommodation by the state and society. Examples included the provision for mother-tongue instruction, dress-code exemptions, the funding of ethnic organisations, the embedding of multiculturalism in school curriculum and the positive valuation of cultural diversity. These measures were also strongly affirmed by some interview participants, indicating a stark divide between Sweden Democrats and other mainstream policy actors.

### 5.3.6 Summary of REC Framework findings

Analysis using the REC Framework has yielded several insights. Debates about Swedish policies promoting multiculturalism can be categorised into two competing camps. Proponents of a ‘dystopic narrative’ have argued that excessive immigration by people who have failed to integrate has led to crime, violence and a weakening of the welfare state. In contrast, policy actors espousing a range of nuanced views rejecting the ‘dystopic narrative’ have used multicultural principles to provide constructive policy solutions for structural discrimination and barriers to employment such as language proficiency or education. The evidence collected does also indicate some concern due to the lack of a national human rights institution for coordinating policy efforts to tackle discrimination in a more comprehensive manner. Moreover, the issue of mutual cultural accommodation is a key flashpoint in Swedish politics. Despite the strong rhetoric from Sweden Democrats and others, Swedish policies continue to ensure that the state and society adapt to new arrivals. The remainder of the chapter uses these findings to help assess the degree of Swedish policy success.
5.4 Policy success of multiculturalism in Sweden

The previous section described and characterised Swedish multicultural policy in terms of the REC Framework by providing evidence from policymakers, policy stakeholders and relevant policy documentation. The following discussion uses this evidence and draws on Marsh and McConnell’s (2010) ‘three-dimensions’ model for evaluating of policy success to assess and evaluate Swedish policy in a more succinct and systematic manner. It was apparent from the recruitment and interview process that Swedish political discourse no longer formally refers to multiculturalism. However, policymakers clearly continue to incorporate multicultural principles into integration policy. Although the radical-right Sweden Democrats present a significant ideological challenge to multiculturalism, there is a steadfast commitment from both major party blocs to limit the influence of this challenge to policy direction. Tables 9, 10 and 11 below provide a summary of the main pieces of evidence for the findings described in the previous section, and as such the conclusions articulated draw upon these tables as a basis.

5.4.1 Political success

Firstly, Swedish policy approaches promoting multiculturalism have achieved a moderate degree of political success. For the most part, the REC objectives have enjoyed support from across the mainstream political spectrum. This is most strongly evident in parties’ commitments to anti-racism (Hübinette 2014: 73). This view is also shared by the Sweden Democrats, as the interview data and their policies demonstrate. Furthermore, most of the policymakers and policy stakeholders interviewed expressed the view that discrimination is a significant impediment to the integration and inclusion of people from culturally diverse backgrounds. However, in 2001 the Swedish parliament voted to abolish the term ‘race’ from all official documentation, because the term was deemed to be an irrelevant and obsolete category for Swedish society (Hübinette and Lundström 2011: 45). This vote received the support of all elected parliamentary parties in 2001 under the auspices of colour-blind anti-racism (Hübinette 2014: 71). Irrespective of intentions, the removal of ‘race’ from the political lexicon complicates efforts to discuss racism and its impact upon people in Swedish society.

The interview data also indicates there is agreement across political divides that language proficiency and inadequate education are significant and profound barriers to equal opportunity in social and economic participation. As discussed earlier, these concerns are reflected in a broad consensus that the state has a central leadership role to play in mitigating these structural barriers. Curiously, the interview material indicates that the
Malmö Sweden Democrats want to boost funding for Swedish language training and adult education courses for migrants beyond the funding provided by the Red-Green Malmö municipal government (Sverigedemokraterna Malmö 2016: 16). This is despite proposed cuts to these services advocated by the Sweden Democrats at the national level (Sverigedemokraterna 2016: 10-12, 106). In conjunction with their stated policy to close Sweden’s borders to asylum seekers, the Sweden Democrats’ are seeking to fix the ‘failed’ policy status quo with new arrivals unwilling or unable to integrate.

Table 9 Swedish multicultural policy success in the political domain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REC Framework</th>
<th>Racial discrimination</th>
<th>Equal opportunity</th>
<th>Cultural accommodation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political success</td>
<td>- Political consensus across all major parties on eradicating discrimination. - Removal of the term ‘race’ from political discourse masks problems. - Most interviewees believe discrimination to be a significant impediment for integration. - Sweden Democrats are sophisticated in masking their xenophobic ideology within anti-racist rhetoric.</td>
<td>- Most interviewees stressed the importance of programs to improve language proficiency and education. Broad acknowledgement that these are profound barriers to integration. - Malmö Sweden Democrats want to boost funding for Swedish language training and adult education for migrants in exchange for civic integration. However, the national Sweden Democrats wanted to halve for ‘Integration and Equality’.</td>
<td>- MCP Index: funding provided for mother-tongue instruction, dress-code exemptions, funding of ethnic organisations, multiculturalism embedded in curriculum. - Sweden Democrats have laid battlelines on this issue, arguing Sweden should not adapt for minorities because migrants undermine ‘Swedish’ identity. - This conflict has framed the immigration debate, but the cordon sanitaire around the Sweden Democrats is unbroken.</td>
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</tbody>
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Source of evidence

- Interview data
- Hübinette (2014)
- Krzyzanowski (2018)

Rating

- Moderate success
It is in the area of mutual cultural accommodation where the Sweden Democrats present the strongest challenge to the political establishment. Most notably, Sweden Democrat policy takes a strongly assimilationist position informed by the belief that Sweden should not have to adapt to incorporate cultural minorities, as explained in their 2017 budget-in-reply (Sverigedemokraterna 2016: 10-12). In fiscal terms, the Sweden Democrats ideological position is evident in the proposed funding cut of more than 50 per cent in the area of integration and equality for 2017 (Sverigedemokraterna 2016: 115). There does appear to be an inconsistency of logic between the positions of the national and Malmö party organisations, given the Malmö Sweden Democrats advocate for an expanded Swedish language training and adult education regime (Sverigedemokraterna Malmö 2016: 16). Such a proposal, by definition, requires an accommodation by the state to the needs of new arrivals. Nevertheless, the core of the Sweden Democrats’ anti-immigration appeal since the European migrant crisis rests on the premise that accommodating asylum seekers undermines cohesion and so-called ‘Swedish’ identity.

The electoral success of the Sweden Democrats could be interpreted as a low degree of political success or even a political failing. However, the response from the two major party blocs has been to maintain a cordon sanitaire around the Sweden Democrat challenge to mainstream immigration and integration policy (Heinze 2017: 298-299). For the most part, this has been successful in isolating the Sweden Democrats from political decision-making. However, the recent 2018 general election initially resulted in an extended stalemate with neither bloc able to negotiate a majority coalition because both blocs refused to negotiate with the Sweden Democrats (The Local 2019).

5.4.2 Programmatic success

Secondly, policy approaches promoting multiculturalism in Sweden exhibit a generally high degree of programmatic success in two elements of the REC Framework. Multiculturalism and integration are scaffolded by a comprehensive social-democratic welfare system for legal residents, with the state playing a central role in mitigating structural barriers to equal opportunity (Koning 2019: 68-73; Borevi 2014: 710-712; Esping-Andersen 1990). Policymakers have identified problems of linguistic barriers and a lack of adequate education facing new arrivals including a large contingent of asylum seekers, for a predominantly service-based high-skill economy. However, scholars such as Schall (2016: 186) argue that Sweden’s previously ‘miraculous’ welfare system is shifting towards a focus on individualism and the generation of economic capital rather than human wellbeing. Some policymakers in Malmö argue divisions in the city’s education system and economy
can be explained to some extent in terms of class or socio-economic status, not just migrant background. This rationale is then used to justify the municipalities’ range of educational and training programs to help improve migrants’ employment outcomes (Scuzzarello 2015: 62-64). Furthermore, the interview data suggests a prominent recognition that structural discrimination is a significant barrier to integration for people with a migrant background.
However, this success is qualified by suggestions that colour-blind anti-racism makes it difficult to identify the presence or extent of structural discrimination in Sweden. For example, Fekete (2014: 5) argues that there is “a closed circuit of thought and a strong tendency in Swedish governmental circles to deny the existence of structural racism”. This reflects previous findings of a Swedish government inquiry into structural discrimination due to ethnicity and religion (Lappalainen 2005). As Hübinette (2014: 73) argues, Swedish national identity is built upon a self-perception of anti-racism, with the default position that other Swedes are also anti-racist.

As the interviews indicate, some policymakers are proactively encouraging the role of the state to accommodate and adapt Swedish society in order to improve outcomes for migrant communities. There is evidence from the interviews that some policymakers are using their access and influence to develop educational partnerships with public institutions such as the national police service to counter prejudice and structural discrimination. However, Sweden’s lack of a national human rights institution does limit the potential for nationally coordinated proactive measures to combat discrimination.

Additionally, there is a general agreement by many mainstream policymakers that foreign cultures are welcome in Sweden, exemplified by the provision of funding for mother-tongue instruction (MCP Index Project 2016: 102). There is limited coercion for new arrivals to learn Swedish prior to naturalisation, aside from the pragmatic consideration that residents in Sweden will struggle to find employment without a high degree of Swedish language proficiency.

The consolidation of the Sweden Democrats as an anti-establishment political alternative is leading policymakers to express significant concerns about the stigmatisation of migrants as ‘problems’ in public discourse as described by Krzyżanowski (2018: 99). Should these views gain traction within mainstream policymaking in the context of high numbers of recent asylum seekers trying to integrate, there is concern that programmatic outcomes may suffer. In practical terms, the structural barriers that Swedish policy seeks to mitigate could become reinforced if prejudices are hardened. This also threatens widely accepted norms of tolerance, acceptance of cultural diversity and anti-racism. Some studies have shown that the proportion of Swedes who hold intolerant and negative attitudes towards migrants is as low as 4.9 per cent of the population (Huddleston et al. 2011; Mella et al. 2011).47

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47 Hübinette (2014) qualifies this very low rating of intolerance and negative attitudinal scores. He argues that Swedish self-perception of being anti-racist impairs the ability to identify and call out racism and structural discrimination in society.
Furthermore, the participants that were interviewed were based in the inner-city districts of Malmö and Stockholm. Sweden’s political system incorporates a very high degree of political autonomy and decision-making authority for municipal governments (Emilsson 2016: 29-30). Thus, the high degree of programmatic success may differ when considering different jurisdictions within Sweden. This caveat of course applies in each case study, but the highly localised differentiation between Swedish municipalities accentuates the difficulty in making generalised conclusions about the extent of programmatic success in Sweden. Ascertaining the degree of variation is beyond the scope of this comparative multi-case study but is a potential avenue for future research.

5.4.3 Process success

Finally, Sweden demonstrates a generally moderate degree of process success for multicultural policymaking in two elements of the REC Framework. On the one hand, there is a sophisticated web of collaboration and consultation between institutional bodies to improve integration outcomes. For example, some municipal governments are working with the private sector to persuade businesses about the benefits and opportunities arising from the specific cultural knowledge possessed by members of a highly culturally diverse workforce. At a municipal level, projects such as on-the-job language training (Dubbel Yrkesutbildning) and Vägen In bring together policy stakeholders to redesign integration service provision models to align with client-centred thinking. Similarly, there is ongoing dialogue between Swedish governments and the Swedish Public Employment Service about improving the recognition and validation of foreign qualifications held by people trying to enter the Swedish labour market. Furthermore, the interviews indicate that there is significant recognition by some prominent policymakers that Swedish society ought to adapt itself to new arrivals. This view suggests the problems that arise in the integration process are a result of inadequate policies and structures, rather than deficiencies in individual migrants. Alongside this self-critical process introspection, there interview data suggests that mainstream policymakers appreciate that integration ought to be a two-way process of mutual accommodation between society and the individual. Having this belief well-established enables institutional partners to more readily co-operate without needing to manage fundamental political disagreements.

Whilst there is a high degree of co-operation between public authorities, non-government organisations and other stakeholders in integration service provision, some interview participants believe this network is inefficient with concerns about people falling between institutional gaps. In addition, there are also concerns about the mainstreaming of
Table 11 Swedish multicultural policy success in the process domain

<table>
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<tr>
<th>REC Framework</th>
<th>Racial discrimination</th>
<th>Equal opportunity</th>
<th>Cultural accommodation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process success</td>
<td>- Some progress on improving recognition and validation of foreign qualifications. Governments collaborate with the Swedish Public Employment Service to develop solutions. - No national human rights institution to coordinate obligations under the Paris Principles.</td>
<td>- European migrant crisis limited processing capacity for asylum claims. Inability to work or learn language can cause stagnation. - Malmö municipality giving right to Swedish language education for asylum seekers, and right to seek employment without residence permit. - Network of NGOs working on integration is inefficient, leading to significant gaps. - Integration policy has been mainstreamed since the abolition of the Integration Board in 2007. - Collaboration between some governments and chambers of commerce to highlight benefits of specific cultural knowledge by having a culturally diverse workforce.</td>
<td>- Some interviewees affirmed Swedish society should adapt to new arrivals, and that problems arise in policy and structures, not in individual migrants. - Strong appreciation by most interviewees that integration is a two-way process of mutual accommodation. - Cordon sanitaire limits influence of the Sweden Democrats on policy decision-making process.</td>
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| Rating | - Moderate success | - Moderate success | - High success |

integration policy into other institutions since the abolition of Swedish Integration Board in 2007. These concerns rest on which authorities are principally responsible for oversight and evaluating of Sweden's loose framework of policy approaches promoting multiculturalism. The above concerns are then further exacerbated by large numbers of recent humanitarian entrants during the 2015-16 European migrant crisis. The extreme circumstances during this period significantly stretched institutional capacity, leading to what many described as a 'system collapse'. More specifically, the vast numbers of arrivals limited the capacity of authorities to process asylum claims. This precludes asylum seekers
from working or receiving support to learn the Swedish language, which in turn can lead to social stagnation and segregation for asylum seekers awaiting their status determination. Furthermore, Sweden's lack of a national human rights institution limits the potential for nationally coordinated proactive measures to combat discrimination. Instead, Sweden has to rely upon a network of anti-discrimination ombudsmän and other NGOs to investigate and respond to discrimination complaints (Raoul Wallenberg Institute 2016). As reflected in the interview data, the effects of the Migrant Crisis on Sweden's immigration and integration system are profound and far-reaching, especially when considering the dimension of process success.

5.5 Summary

The evidence and main findings from this chapter indicate that Sweden is not the multicultural dystopia that the Sweden Democrats and other critics would suggest. Although the Sweden Democrats have become firmly entrenched as the third largest political party, their extreme views and legacy of racism have led to their political isolation in the Riksdag. However, the political cost of maintaining this cordon sanitaire is high, with the bipolar bloc system experiencing heavy strain. Swedish politics has experienced significant upheaval with the emergence of the Sweden Democrats as an anti-immigrant, anti-establishment alternative to traditional bloc politics that has attracted significant electoral support. Swedish multicultural policy process was also certainly stretched almost to breaking point with the disproportionate impact of the 2015-16 European migrant crisis. Yet despite these challenges, Swedish policies promoting multiculturalism have not been unwound or dismantled. Instead, Sweden maintains a high degree of programmatic success with a comprehensive welfare system supporting new arrivals to find housing, learn the Swedish language, receive any necessary education, and find employment. It is fair to say that the nuanced set of views rejecting the dystopic characterisation is the more persuasive account for the state of Swedish multiculturalism.

On the face of it, the MCP Index Project concurs with this view having most recently given Sweden a score of 7.0 out of 8.0 in 2010. However, the high score and its justification misses the nuance of the debates outlined in this chapter. Much has changed in Swedish politics and policymaking since 2010 with the rise and consolidation of the Sweden Democrats and the European migrant crisis. The MCP Index Project data belies an optimism about Swedish multiculturalism that has clearly experienced significant challenges in recent years. The 2020 snapshot may reflect these challenges in its assessment, though this chapter suggests that Swedish multicultural policy remains firmly established as the status quo.
despite the hostile political rhetoric and vocal opposition in public discourse. However, as seen through the interview material, this hostility has to a large extent been fixated on the large numbers of asylum seekers and refugees that have been changing Sweden’s demography. Other culturally diverse immigrant groups do not appear to have borne the brunt of this hostility and continue to benefit from Sweden’s multicultural policies as articulated in the MCP Index Project data. Instead, the main thrust of the dystopic narrative is that policy approaches promoting multiculturalism disincentivise new arrivals from assimilating into Swedish society. However, this assimilation is diametrically at odds with the principles and objectives of multiculturalism.
CHAPTER 6 – UNITED KINGDOM: RACE EQUALITY IS SLIPPING DOWN THE AGENDA

6.1 Introduction

This chapter assesses the success of policy approaches promoting multiculturalism in the United Kingdom since 2007 when the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was established, until the outcome of the Brexit referendum in 2016. Whilst multiculturalism is not officially endorsed under a ‘Multicultural Act’ or ‘Charter’ in the UK, efforts to counter racial barriers that impede equal opportunity have been institutionalised through legislation and policymaking over several decades (Meer and Modood 2013: 83-85). The public sector race equality duty that requires public authorities to proactively promote race equality was lauded as an innovative approach, rather than relying on complaints of discrimination to drive organisational change (Worley 2005: 487; Grillo 2010: 52). This institutionalisation of rights and state-sponsored race equality has been coupled with government initiatives to improve race relations, amounting to what Meer and Modood argue is the British approach to multiculturalism (2013: 84-85).

However, this approach appears to be under threat, given that former Prime Minister David Cameron declared ‘state multiculturalism’ to have failed because it encouraged separateness (2011). This argument suggests mutual cultural accommodation has lacked the ‘mutual’ component, and that the British state and British society have been too accommodating of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) communities. There are those suggesting that multiculturalism has been retreating for some time in the UK (Joppke 2004, 2009; Kepel 2005; Appleyard 2006). This is contested by others who argue that the backlash has been largely rhetorical and unsuccessful in attempts to dismantle multicultural policymaking (Mathieu 2018; Meer et al. 2015; Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Grillo 2010; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Nevertheless, it is highlighted throughout the chapter that austerity cuts have affected the EHRC’s capacity to effectively implement race equality policy. It is also discussed how the ‘hostile environment for illegal immigrants’ led to significant harm for cultural minorities, epitomised by the Windrush scandal. Despite having strong legislative and institutional settings, this suggests that race equality is slipping down the British policy agenda.

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48 BAME is an official, UK-specific term used to describe racial minorities.
6.1.1 Overview of the chapter

The chapter is organised in three sections. The first section provides contextual information, including a timeline of important events and an overview of some recent developments. The section concludes with a description of the institutional settings related to the development and implementation of race equality and race relations.

The second section then presents the UK study findings, beginning with the UK data from the Multiculturalism Policy (MCP) Index Project which scores the UK 5.5 out of 8.0. This suggests the UK has been quite successful in developing policies that promote multiculturalism and race equality. However, this score does indicate there is scope for improvement. This is confirmed by the thematic findings from the semi-structured elite interviews conducted with policymakers and policy stakeholders. These findings are then analysed using the REC Framework of policy objectives49 and triangulated with related policy documentation and other supporting evidence.

The final section interprets these empirical findings to evaluate the success of British multiculturalism by utilising Marsh and McConnell’s (2010) ‘three-dimensions’ heuristic of policy success. First, the discussion of findings suggests that there has been a relatively low degree of political success for multiculturalism in the UK. Since the formation of the EHRC in 2007, race equality appears to have slipped down the policy agenda under austerity and successive Conservative-led governments. Severe budgetary cuts to the EHRC give the impression that policymakers are disregarding the importance of equal opportunity for people with a BAME background. The interview material suggests that this was more a case of neglect rather than an explicit dismantling, given the legislative framework for race equality was still intact. In addition, the radical-right United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) wielded significant political influence in the years before the Brexit referendum in 2016. The findings of the chapter indicate that UKIP rhetoric stoked anti-immigrant sentiments in their effort to withdraw the UK from the European Union.

Second, the UK has achieved a moderate degree of programmatic success, owing to efforts countering structural discrimination and improving equal opportunity through the innovative race equality duty. For example, there have been significant reductions in police use of the ‘stop-and-search’ power, as well as a decrease in its race disproportionality (EHRC 2010b). However, there are concerns about rising racial inequality due to austerity, and consequences arising from the Immigration Act 2016 and the Prevent anti-radicalisation

49 As detailed in Chapter 3, the REC Framework is a tool for operationalising the policy objectives of multiculturalism. These are: reducing racial discrimination (R); facilitating equal opportunity (E); and promoting mutual cultural accommodation (C).
initiative. Although the Windrush scandal broke after the time period considered in this chapter, the significant problems outlined by the Windrush Lessons Learned Review (2020) were foreshadowed by many of the interview participants.

Finally, it is contended that UK policy exhibits a moderate degree of process success also, attributable to the creation of policy instruments to counteract structural discrimination and the wide consultation process for the shaping of a future social integration strategy. This success is limited though. The UK does not have a department or central authority that coordinates the integration of new arrivals, meaning local authorities have to respond at short notice with extremely limited resources and expertise (All Party Parliamentary Group on Social Integration 2017). During the development and implementation of Prevent, there was inadequate consultation with BAME communities. There is also a large divide between established BAME communities and new arrivals, resulting in new arrivals not accessing their rights under the race equality duty (McCarvill 2011). In addition, austerity cuts to race equality charities has led to a fragmentation and dispersal of the race equality NGO sector.

6.2 Contextual background

This section outlines the context for the British research findings. As detailed in Chapter 4, the UK is the most populous case study with 67 million people. In 2011, 13 per cent of the population in England and Wales was born abroad. In Scotland, this figure is 7 per cent and in Northern Ireland the figure is smaller again at 4.5 per cent (ONS 2015, 2018, 2020). The UK has a devolved political system and its bicameral parliament is characterised by a two-party system. The section begins with a short overview of how policies promoting multiculturalism were introduced in the UK. The section then summarises some recent developments since 2007. Following this, the section presents the principal institutional settings for race equality and multiculturalism in the UK to serve as context for the discussion of the findings later in the chapter. Most of the discussion in this chapter relates to well-established BAME migrant communities originating from Britain’s former colonies. This includes second and third generation migrants, though there is also some discussion that compares these groups with recent labour migrants from the EU or asylum seekers.

At the time of data collection between October 2016 and March 2017, all interview participants referred to the enormous policy uncertainty surrounding the Brexit negotiations. Accordingly, this chapter will not seek to discuss policy developments that have arisen since the interviews were conducted. In addition, the discussion primarily focuses on the UK as a whole, rather than policy differences between each of the devolved nations.
6.2.1 History of British policy approaches promoting multiculturalism

This section provides a brief overview of important government policy responses and initiatives in relation British race equality and cohesion policy in the latter half of the 20th century by expanding upon Table 12 below. Since the end of the Second World War, the UK’s demography has been shaped by a marked increase in immigration flows. The British Nationality Act granted citizenship to all people in Commonwealth countries, sparking the ‘Windrush Generation’ of Afro-Caribbean immigration (Castles and Miller 2009: 102; Grillo 2010: 51). Between 1950 and 1975, the UK’s ethnic minority population increased from just under 1.6 million to just under 4.2 million people (Castles and Miller 2009: 101). These demographic changes were largely driven by a demand for labour from former British colonial territories, including Ireland and the New Commonwealth.

Since the mid-1960s, successive British governments have enacted legislation to reduce and eliminate discrimination. The Race Relations Act 1976 built upon its 1965 and 1968 predecessors by making both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’
\(^{50}\) discrimination unlawful in the private and public sectors. The Race Relations Act 1976 also established the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) with the responsibility to combat racial discrimination and promote race equality.

The racially motivated murder of the teenager Stephen Lawrence in 1993 was one of the pivotal events that transformed the policy approach to race equality and multiculturalism in the UK. The Macpherson Report into Lawrence’s murder and the resulting police investigation identified institutional racism in the Metropolitan Police Service as a contributing factor in the mismanagement of the initial investigation (Macpherson 1999: 2.10, 12.11, 16.39; Meer et al. 2015: 711). Following the release of the Macpherson Report, New Labour passed the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000. The Act introduced the ground-breaking statutory race equality duty with the goal of eliminating institutional racism in the public sector (Back et al. 2002: 446). The race equality duty mandated all public authorities to promote race equality, to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination, and to promote equal opportunity and good relations between people of diverse racial backgrounds (MCP Index Project 2016: 114; Meer and Modood 2013: 83).

That same year, the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain released the Parekh Report into the political and cultural implications of ethnic diversity for the UK (2000). It systematically documented the inequalities and disadvantages faced by cultural

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\(^{50}\) The Equality Act 2010 defines indirect discrimination as a provision, criteria or practice which has the effect of disadvantaging people sharing a protected characteristic. Such provisions, criteria or practices must not cause a differential effect without sufficient justification.
minorities and argued that the British people needed to reframe their national identity to be inclusive of all fellow citizens (Modood 2019: 237). Two thirds of its policy recommendations were adopted by government, having the effect of a gradual move towards a more culturally pluralist Britain (Grillo 2010: 51-52).

Table 12 Timeline of selected key events in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>British Nationality Act gives British citizenship to all people in Commonwealth countries, sparking the ‘Windrush Generation’ of Afro-Caribbean immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Legislation of the Race Relations Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Creation of the Race Relations Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Expansion of the Race Relations Act to include indirect discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>The Brixton and Toxteth riots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Racially motivated murder of Black British teenager, Stephen Lawrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Election of New Labour, under Tony Blair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Release of the Macpherson Report into the murder of Stephen Lawrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Legislation of the Race Relations Amendment Act, establishing the general duty for public agencies to promote race equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Release of the Cantle Report into the Oldham, Burnley and Bradford disturbances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Accession of 10 eastern and central European states to EU; UK (along with Sweden and Ireland) does not restrict immigration from these new member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7 July, London bombings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-09</td>
<td>Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society: Government strategy to improve race equality and cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Creation of Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), subsuming the CRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Government introduces austerity measures in response to Global Financial Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Election of the Coalition Government under David Cameron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Prime Minister David Cameron declares that state multiculturalism has failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Riots across England, sparked by the police shooting of Mark Duggan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Passage of the Immigration Act 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Release of Report into Integration of Immigrants by APPG on Social Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Windrush scandal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soon afterward in 2001, a series of race riots occurred in three northern municipalities, Bradford, Oldham and Burnley. The Cantle Report into the so-called ‘northern disturbances’ described a deep societal segregation, finding that “many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives” (Cantle 2001: 9). In the years that followed, British
multiculturalism experienced something akin to an identity crisis with many commentators at the time questioning its validity and appropriateness (Meer and Modood 2013: 77). This was further exacerbated by the 2005 London terrorist bombings perpetrated by young men born or raised in the UK. The newly formed Department of Communities and Local Government swiftly created the ‘Commission on Integration and Cohesion’ to help build bridges between people of different racial backgrounds and promote community cohesion (Grillo 2010: 54).

6.2.2 Recent developments

The latter years of the New Labour Government saw the introduction of fiscal austerity measures in response to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. As will be discussed in the findings section later in the chapter, austerity cuts and red tape reduction disproportionately affected the public sector working on race equality issues. Policy instruments were dismantled, the workforce was reduced, and budgets were significantly cut.

The 2010 election led to the formation of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government under Prime Minister David Cameron. Soon afterward David Cameron echoed the earlier concerns about segregation and separateness by the declaring ‘state multiculturalism’ to have failed (2011). The Conservative Government has since introduced the Immigration Act 2016 as part of the ‘hostile environment’ for people with irregular migration status. The new legislation has created sanctions for illegal workers their employers, prevents illegal migrants from accessing government services, and institutes new enforcement and deportation powers (UK Government 2016).

In 2017, media stories began to emerge with members of the Windrush generation being affected by the ‘hostile environment’. Because the British Government had not provided sufficient residency or citizenship documentation when they arrived, some were unable to prove that they had the right of abode. 51 The Windrush Lessons Learned Review (Williams 2020: 7-8) found British policy denied lawful residents with access to work, housing and services. Others were detained, deported or denied re-entry into the UK.

Brexit and the impact of the United Kingdom Independence Party

The outcome of the June 2016 referendum to leave the European Union (EU) is possibly the most fundamental change in British politics in recent decades. The decision to leave the EU has deep-reaching ramifications for British society, and issues of race equality, immigration

51 These stories culminated in what later became called the ‘Windrush scandal’. Despite being legal residents, some members of the Windrush generation could not prove they had the right to live in the UK. In response to the scandal, Home Secretary Amber Rudd resigned in April 2018.
and multiculturalism are an integral part of that story. The clamour and furore that targeted immigrants and ethnic minorities in the leadup to the referendum culminated in a spike of racial vilification and hate crime in the days and weeks that followed (Burnett 2017: 86). A key actor in the lead-up to the referendum was the Eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). In the 2004 European Parliamentary elections, UKIP emerged with 16 per cent of the vote (Evans and Mellon 2019: 76). This coincided with concerns about the free movement of people from the A8 countries\textsuperscript{52} from central and eastern Europe that acceded to the EU in 2004. By 2013, UKIP achieved 27 per cent of the vote for the European Parliament under leader Nigel Farage, to become the largest British Party (Evans and Mellon 2019: 76). However, this surge in popularity was not translated to Westminster due to the majoritarian electoral system. At the 2015 general election, UKIP only received one seat despite 13 per cent of the total vote (Evans and Mellon 2019: 76).

Tournier-Sol (2020: 3) argues that Prime Minister David Cameron’s 2013 pledge to hold a referendum on EU membership can be at least partly explained by the disruptive impact of the UKIP insurgency. However, UKIP was one of the primary agents capable of defining and framing debates on Europe and European immigration. This caused a contagion effect that led other British mainstream parties to radicalise their discourse on immigration and the broader European integration project, and ultimately making the referendum possible (Tournier-Sol 2020: 3). Although the UK did not face an immigration crisis to the same scale of Sweden in 2015-16, UKIP was instrumental increasing the volatility of debates about immigration.

6.2.3 Institutional settings

The relationships connecting the governance and implementation of policy approaches promoting multiculturalism are depicted in Figure 3. The principal institutional actor for implementing what can be loosely termed ‘multicultural policy’ in the UK is the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC). The EHRC was formed in 2007 as an amalgamation of several smaller commissions, including the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). The EHRC, and its predecessor the CRE, have the responsibility to uphold the statutory race equality duty, now enshrined in the \textit{Equality Act 2010}. The duty was designed in such a way to prevent cases of discrimination and harassment from occurring, and sought to “shift the onus from individuals to [public] organisations, placing for the first time an obligation on public authorities to positively promote [race] equality, not merely to avoid discrimination”

\textsuperscript{52}The A8 countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Two other countries also acceded in 2004: Cyprus and Malta.
(EHRC 2017a). The Act covers nine 'protected characteristics', including race, and religion or belief. The former statutory race equality duty, initially established in the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, has now been combined with other equality duties for the other protected characteristics. It is formally referred to as the public sector equality duty and came into force in April 2011. The EHRC (2017a) summarises the functions of the duty as follows:

[Public organisations] subject to the equality duty must, in the exercise of their functions, have due regard to the need to:

- Eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation and other conduct prohibited by the Act.
- Advance equality of opportunity between people who share a protected characteristic and those who do not.
- Foster good relations between people who share a protected characteristic and those who do not.

Figure 3 Relationships between key institutions relevant to British multicultural policymaking
Each of these three elements above reflect the three elements of the REC framework of multicultural policy objectives. That is, the elimination of racial discrimination, and the promotion of equal opportunity, and the fostering of mutual cultural accommodation.

The EHRC is the statutory authority responsible for upholding the Act in England, Scotland and Wales. The Scottish Human Rights Commission fulfils a similar role under devolved legislation and works in partnership with the EHRC as outlined by a joint Memorandum of Understanding (EHRC and SHRC 2016). Northern Ireland does not fall under the jurisdiction of the British EHRC. Instead, human rights and race equality come under the remit of the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland (ECNI) and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement.53

There are other institutions that also have some policymaking responsibilities. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government provides input for community cohesion and race equality. The Government Equalities Office within the Department for Education does not develop race equality policy per se, but instead provides advice about race equality to other parts of the public sector. The Home Office has responsibility for tackling hate crime, as well as integration. However, the discussion of findings later in the chapter indicates that there is a no comprehensive or coherent national integration strategy. Further to this, the UK does not have a single agency solely responsible for overseeing or coordinating integration policy.

6.3 Findings: British multicultural policymaking from 2007 to 2016

This section narrows the focus to assess British policy approach to multiculturalism from 2007 to 2016, by discussing the findings from the semi-structured elite interviews with policymakers and policy stakeholders, supplemented by policy and other document analysis. After presenting secondary data from the Multiculturalism Policy Index, the chapter discusses empirical findings that are structured according to the REC Framework. The section considers anti-discrimination and equal opportunity concurrently, as the race equality policy in the UK addresses these issues together.

53 The purpose of this research is to examine the development and implementation of general multicultural policy in the UK, and so will not be exploring differences between policy the devolved nations. Given that politics and policymaking in Northern Ireland is subject to the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland will be excluded from discussion even though the term 'UK' technically incorporates Northern Ireland also.
6.3.1 Policy presence: secondary data from the Multiculturalism Policy Index

The Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP Index) measures the presence and evolution of multicultural policies in 21 democracies, including the UK (Banting and Kymlicka 2013; MCP Index Project 2016). The MCP Index data is the leading cross-national comparative index of its kind.

As described in Chapter 3, the Immigrant Minority Policy subset is divided into 8 indicators and each country is given a score of 1 (if a policy is present), 0.5 (if the policy is partially present), and 0 (if the policy is not present) (MCP Index Project 2016: 4-6). From a total possible score of 8 points, the UK has received scores of 2.5 (1980), 5.0 (1990), 5.0 (2000) and 5.5 (2010). A summary of the UK’s scores is included below in Table 13.

The mean score for 2010 across all 21 democracies measured was approximately 3.6. The UK rated in the top third of countries and along with Belgium received a score of 5.0. By way of comparison, Finland and New Zealand both scored 6.0. Australia scored 8.0, Sweden scored 7.0 and the Netherlands scored 2.0. The UK’s 2010 score of 5.5 suggests a relatively strong performance in its development of policies that promote multiculturalism, compared to most other countries included in the Index. Similar scores over the last 30 years also indicate a degree of long-term consistency and stability. As Table 13 indicates, the UK has historically performed very well in the areas of ‘Media’, ‘Exemptions’, ‘Dual Citizenship’ and ‘Funding Ethnic Groups’. The Index notes a recent improvement for ‘Affirmative Action’. This is attributed to the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, and its incorporation into the general Equality Act 2010, requiring public bodies to promote race equality by developing positive measures that go beyond anti-discrimination initiatives (MCP Index Project 2016: 114).

The MCP Index (2016: 110) acknowledges efforts to incorporate multiculturalism and race equality into the school curriculum under New Labour, but points to several studies showing these efforts to be insufficient (Fry et al. 2008; Olssen 2004; Osler 2000; Tomlinson 2005). In addition, the MCP Index gave a rating of 0 for ‘Affirmation’ and ‘Bilingual Education’. The Index found that the UK does not formally affirm or recognise multiculturalism “in any constitutional, legislative or parliamentary sense” (2016: 109). Whilst multiculturalism is recognised as a descriptor of Britain’s societal demographics, both public discourse and policymaking tend to focus on ‘cohesion’ or ‘integration’. Likewise, there is no substantive funding for complementary language schools outside the

\[54\] For a more detailed explanation of the 'Decision Rules' used to measure the presence of multicultural policies, see (Multiculturalism Policy Index Project 2016: 4-6).
mainstream education system. The teaching of mother-tongue language and culture is not seen as a responsibility of the state (MCP Index Project 2016: 113).

Table 13 The UK’s scores from the MCP Index (Immigrant Minority Policy)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation$^{55}$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Curriculum$^{56}$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media$^{57}$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemptions$^{58}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Citizenship$^{59}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Ethnic Groups$^{60}$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingual Education$^{61}$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative Action$^{62}$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL SCORE</strong></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MCP Index Project (2016: 109)

The MCP Index Project only claims to describe the presence and evolution of multicultural policy across 21 democracies. It does not, however, seek to evaluate the impact or effectiveness of these policies. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the MCP Index Project is limited in some ways. The MCP Index data isn’t disaggregated by municipality or region. In the UK, there are localised policy differences due to a high degree of devolved authority.

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$^{55}$ ‘Affirmation’ is defined by the MCP Index as “constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal levels and the existence of a government ministry, secretariat or advisory board to implement this policy in consultation with ethnic communities” (2016: 4).

$^{56}$ ‘School Curriculum’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum” (2016: 4).

$^{57}$ ‘Media’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing” (2016: 5).

$^{58}$ ‘Exemptions’ is defined by the MCP Index as “exemptions from dress codes (either by statute or court cases)” (2016: 5).

$^{59}$ ‘Dual Citizenship’ is defined by the MCP Index as whether immigrants and their offspring “may retain their original citizenship even after acquiring the citizenship of the host country” (2016: 5).

$^{60}$ ‘Funding Ethnic Groups’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the funding of ethnic group organizations or activities” (2016: 5).

$^{61}$ ‘Bilingual Education’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction” (2016: 6).

$^{62}$ ‘Affirmative Action’ is defined by the MCP Index as whether the “country has an affirmative action policy that targets [disadvantaged] immigrant minorities” in either the public sector, the private sector or both. Such action must extend beyond human rights policies to include “target action aimed at removing barriers or more positive action measures such as quotas or preferential hiring” (2016: 6).
for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Furthermore, the purpose of this thesis is to expand upon the Index by providing rich qualitative data that sheds light on the implementation and effectiveness of multicultural policy. Since the Index only measures the presence of policies in eight categories across a wide range of countries, it loses some of the depth and complexities from each case. The Index suggests that multiculturalism is relatively well established in the UK, however there are gaps arising from recent developments such as the impact of austerity and the ‘hostile environment’ for illegal immigrants. This is the premise of the discussion below which explores the UK in more detail through the lens of the REC Framework of policy objectives for multiculturalism.

6.3.2 Racial discrimination and equal opportunity: converging objectives in race equality policy

The next two sections primarily draw upon new empirical research, with the findings analysed using the REC Framework. As detailed in Chapter 3, the REC Framework is a tool for operationalising the policy objectives of multiculturalism. These objectives are:

- (R) - reduce discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnicity or cultural background
- (E) - provide an equal opportunity for diverse cultural groups to fully participate in society
- (C) - facilitate a mutual cultural accommodation between immigrant groups, the state, and broader society without forced assimilation

The purpose of this section is to apply the anti-discrimination and equal opportunity objectives from the REC Framework to the British case study. This section describes the perspectives of policy actors on efforts to combat racial discrimination and promote equal opportunity and how they see these objectives playing out. The empirical findings are based on 10 semi-structured interviews with 11 policy actors. 6 participants were former or current public servants or statutory officers, 1 participant was a former politician, and 4 participants were from civil society. 3 of the participants from civil society were also prominent migrant or ethnic minority leaders. In addition to the interview data, this section also draws upon government or statutory agency reports, other grey literature and scholarly literature to triangulate the findings.

Unlike the Swedish case in Chapter 5, British race equality policy considers anti-discrimination and equal opportunity to be much more closely aligned. The interview data revealed a significant overlap between these two objectives for British policymaking
because of the public sector equality duty. As such, this chapter merges together the discussion of these two objectives. Similar to the other case studies, it is still possible to disaggregate and provide a proximate judgement of success for anti-discrimination and equal opportunity as Section 6.4 will later show. This section explores the centrality of the public sector race equality duty, before considering the consequences of austerity and the creation of the EHRC. The section concludes with a discussion of the anti-radicalisation program ‘Prevent’ and the ‘hostile environment’ as enacted by the Immigration Act 2016.

*Legacy of Stephen Lawrence and the Macpherson Report: the public sector race equality duty*

The purpose of this section is to unpack the policy shift resulting from the 1999 release of the Macpherson Report into the racially motivated murder of Stephen Lawrence. In response to the report, the new *Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000* placed a positive statutory duty on all public agencies to promote race equality (Worley 2005: 487; Ahmed 2007: 590-591). Ahmed explains that the new race equality duty set the bar higher than simply making racial discrimination unlawful because prior anti-discrimination legislation had “failed to deliver equality” (2007: 592). Participant B04f, a former statutory officer, explained what she saw as the importance and rationale of this change:

> [Fear of discrimination complaints] is not a very effective model of change, which we recognised in legislation in 2000 that put a duty on the employers and service providers in the public sector . . . The idea was that [the duty] would mainstream equality thinking into the governance and policy making processes of the public sector. – Participant B04f, former statutory officer

The new duty required all public agencies and organisations to develop race equality policies and action plans, going well beyond complaint-based responses to discrimination found in the other case studies in this thesis (Ahmed 2007: 590). Almost all of the 11 interview participants referred directly to the public sector race equality duty, highlighting its significance in shaping the policy landscape. Another former senior statutory officer, Participant B03f, described the implementation and function of the duty:

> Every organisation had to develop a race equality scheme and that had to set out what they were planning to do. It was almost like a race equality business plan. They had to be evidence-based; it had to identify what they were going to do with the next year, two years, three years. It had to be monitored; [and] there had to be consultation. – Participant B03f, former statutory officer

The elimination of institutional and structural discrimination through the public sector race equality duty became a central policy focus, overseen by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE; until 2007), and the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC; 2007 to present). Participant B03f highlighted tools such as ‘equality impact assessments’ that were
introduced for public bodies to reduce structural discrimination with the establishment of the race equality duty:

[Impact assessments] meant they had to think through the impact of [policies, procedures or activities] before they did it, and then take steps to mitigate any negative impact that was identified . . . [Impact assessments are a] way of making everybody think about race. – Participant B03f, former statutory officer

An implementation review of the general equality duty in 2012 found that only one in two public authorities met the requirement to publish equality information about their workforce and service users (EHRC 2012: 5-6). This is indicative of a gap between the legislated intention of the policy and how well it is actually implemented in practice.

Although the new race equality duty radically reoriented British policy efforts, mechanisms that predate the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 such as thematic investigations and ethnic data monitoring have also been used to tackle structural discrimination. Thematic investigations conducted by the former CRE and EHRC are pieces of research into one segment of the public sector, designed to uncover widespread structural discrimination. Another former statutory officer, Participant B01m, described the function and benefits with the CRE/EHRC’s power to mount thematic investigations:

You can’t tackle discrimination just with the individual cases. You’ve got to have the power to mount thematic investigations to look at whole patterns of discrimination. . . . There was a really good investigation [in the 1980s by the CRE] into the allocation of social housing, which found discriminatory patterns in town hamlets which never would have come out of one individual case. – Participant B01m, former statutory officer

Several participants explained that this information and data is then used to develop strategic policy responses with the parties concerned, so that future discrimination is reduced. The collection, monitoring and publishing of data on the basis of ethnic background is one such tool useful for measuring and tracking structural discrimination. When questioned about the strengths about British anti-discrimination policy, Participant B05f, a member of civil society, responded:

[The public sector is] required to keep ethnic data. We’re required to monitor it . . . it’s built into the system that we do have to monitor things and we do know what discrimination is. – Participant B05f, civil society

Similarly, several other participants explicitly expressed strong support for ethnic data collection and monitoring. Participant B06m, a member of civil society, put it this way:
In France, they’re not allowed to do any [ethnic data monitoring]. Sweden also is not allowed to . . . In terms of public policy at least we’ve got some mechanisms for finding out what the hell’s going on and doing something to ameliorate some of the differences and discontinuities that are occurring. In large parts of Europe this is just inherently impossible. – Participant B06m, civil society

Several interview participants drew attention to the police power of ‘stop-and-search’ as an example of both indirect and structural discrimination. The Macpherson Report highlighted that stop-and-search was being disproportionately applied to the BAME population. It then recommended an overhaul of ethnic data monitoring for the stop-and-search power. The Home Secretary approved this recommendation in 2002, and substantial improvements including an increased depth of detail and self-defined ethnic identity were phased in (Shantz 2010: 50). The most recent figures for 2015-16 indicate that in England and Wales, people from a minority ethnic background are three times more likely to be stop-and-searched than white people, and that black people are more than six times more likely to be stop-and-searched than white people (Home Office 2017b). The EHRC likewise found a significant variation in the race disproportionality in stop-and-search rates (EHRC 2010b). Whilst this disproportionality has not yet been eliminated, some interview participants highlighted how both thematic investigations and ethnic data monitoring have led to positive improvements. Not only are policymakers more aware of the extent of the racial disproportionality, as Participant B06m said in the quote above, but substantive reforms have been implemented to reduce racism and discrimination in the police service.

After firmly linking the collection and publication of ethnic data regarding the stop-and-search power to the recommendations of the Macpherson Report, Participant B01m elucidated the purpose for focusing on stop-and-search as a key indicator of racial discrimination in the police service:

It was only [after the release of the Macpherson Report] . . . that we knew for sure what black people have been saying for a long time: ‘we get stopped and searched all the time’. . . .

The issue also is that only in about 13 to 14% of [cases] is something incriminating found. . . . Of the people the police choose to stop-and-search . . . the black [individuals] are no more criminally inclined than the white [individuals]. – Participant B01m, former statutory officer

Participant B01m explained that the EHRC took the position that if the police services “stop-and-search proportionally more black or Asian people [without justification]”, the differential racial effect equates to indirect discrimination under British law. Five of the police forces with the biggest race disproportionality, including the London Metropolitan Police Service, undertook voluntary agreements with the EHRC to reduce the rate of discrimination. The EHRC oversaw reforms including training for officers to consider other
alternatives before proceeding to the statutory stop-and-search. These alternatives included using surveillance or having voluntary conversations with persons of interest, known as 'stop-and-account'. Participant B01m described the results of the reforms:

[All five police areas] cut their use of the power a lot between a third and a half. And they cut their race differences quite significantly . . .

We hadn't foreseen that there would be a drop in the use of the power. We were [only] aiming to get a drop in the race difference. . . . As far as we could tell it was because officers were thinking more carefully before they used the power. – Participant B01m, former statutory officer

Although this one small example of how thematic investigations and ethnic data monitoring can influence programmatic outcomes, it highlights the legacy of the Macpherson Inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence. Furthermore, it demonstrates an effective policy technique for investigating, monitoring and reducing indirect and structural discrimination.

*Race equality has slipped down the agenda: the creation of the EHRC and the impact of austerity*

This section explores a common theme emerging from most of the interviews: race equality has slipped down the policy agenda over the past decade. Participants attributed this to two main factors. The first was the merging of the former CRE into the EHRC in 2007. The second was sustained pressures of austerity starting in the latter years of New Labour and continuing under the Tories.

The Labour Government created the EHRC in 2007 by merging the existing CRE with the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Disability Rights Commission. The EHRC was given expanded responsibilities under the *Equality Act 2010*, including the protected characteristics of race, religion or belief, along with seven others. However, the ultimate concern from several interview participants was that the merger would dilute the race equality agenda. Participant B01m described the way the government increased the level of responsibility without increasing the funding:

The government [said] . . . “we're going to scrap these three commissions and we'll create one super commission called the [EHRC]. It will be responsible for the three existing areas and the [new areas] . . .”

Doing it that way, nobody dared object because . . . everybody [was] a bit scared for their jobs, nobody would like to object to the fact that the government was actually pulling a fast one by getting twice as much for its money. – Participant B01m, former statutory officer

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63 The head of the CRE, Trevor Phillips (2003-2006) initially opposed the merger plans. However, upon creation of the EHRC he was appointed as the new chairman (Dodd, 2006).
The austerity response to the Global Financial Crisis began soon after the merger, with the Conservative-led Coalition Government establishing very dramatic cuts to the EHRC. Participant B01m explained that “when the government changed in 2010, the [EHRC workforce] was required to be reduced under the [new] austerity policy”. Its workforce was reduced from 517 full-time equivalent staff in 2009-10, to 203 in 2016-17 (EHRC 2010a: 42; 2017b: 60). Over the same period, the EHRC’s budget was cut from £52 million to £18 million excluding inflation (EHRC 2010a: 108; 2017b: 68). In the 2016 NGO Shadow Report to the UK’s examination by the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Runnymede Trust argued that these austerity cuts were excessive and disproportionate. This is because ‘unprotected’ departments were slated to receive austerity cuts averaging 20% between 2010-15, whereas the cut to the EHRC was far higher at approximately 67% (Runnymede Trust 2016: 80). Participant B07f, a member of civil society, presented a very disparaging view of the EHRC’s capacity to fulfil its mandate under conditions of austerity:

The EHRC: there’s been cuts [that have] effectively slaughtered their budget . . . . The budget they will have, if these additional cuts are made, will be less than one of the single [pre-EHRC commissions] . . . There will be three [race equality] case workers for the whole of the UK. – Participant B07f, civil society

Participant B08m, a prominent member of civil society, was similarly scathing of the consequences arising from the cuts to the EHRC:

The government amputated [the EHRC] at the knees . . . You never hear that the [EHRC] has taken action . . . [aside from some rare] headline cases . . . . It’s only when aggrieved individuals have recourse to the law or take an employer to the Employment Tribunal . . . that lawyers then begin to apply the legislation. But there is no government watchdog that is actually keeping a check on how people are implementing the legislation by gathering the evidence of it. – Participant B08m, civil society

These sentiments are echoed by other participants who argued that austerity and red-tape reduction adversely affects the BAME population in a disproportionate manner. Participant B01m raised concerns about the EHRC’s reduced capacity to pick up on the differential effect caused by austerity:

There’s a lot of cuts in the civil service for example at the lower level. It appears very likely that it’s going to have a disproportionate effect on [BAME] people and women. But none of those things are picked up anymore. – Participant B01m, former statutory officer

Participant B01m also explained that a similar effect can be seen in the dismantling of the ‘equality impact assessment’ tool, justified by red-tape reduction in 2012:
Equality impact assessments were reduced to being absurd. They were just ridiculously saying that there would be no adverse effect [on BAME people] when common sense indicated that perhaps there might be... [By] 2012, the requirement to produce an equality impact assessment was done away with completely. – Participant B01m, former statutory officer

Participant B04f, another former statutory officer, raised some concerning implications arising from the changes made by the Coalition Government. She wondered whether the public sector equality duty could even be considered a reality any longer, given the procedural requirements had been so significantly watered down. Whilst the legal framework for race equality is still intact, vulnerable people now have a reduced access to their rights. In turn, this undermined the capacity for British policies to address discrimination and facilitate equal opportunity. Participant B01m used the example of under-resourcing of complaints caseworkers to demonstrate this very point:

[Under-resourcing] was a mistake because individual cases assisted by the Commission had a [50%] chance of succeeding, but...[unassisted cases] had a very low chance of success... Our lawyers had the expertise in how to win those cases, and [complaints] officers... dug out a lot of evidence... A lot of people didn’t get justice individually because the Commission wasn’t there to pick up their case. – Participant B01m, former statutory officer

Both Participants B01m and B03f mentioned that under-resourced complaint support was coupled with an increase in tribunal fees. The implication arising from this was that people who faced financial difficulties were unable to fully and successfully access their legal rights. Instead, it appears that race equality has been hollowed out because it has slipped down the policy agenda due to austerity. Accordingly, the formerly thriving and co-ordinated race equality NGO sector has fragmented and dispersed. Participant B05f, a former statutory officer and now a member of civil society, lamented this fact:

Most of the race charities' funding have been cut so badly that they now no longer exist. – Participant B05f, civil society

The same sentiment was echoed by Participant B03f who said that the funding for the race equality NGO sector had completely dried up. A consequence of this shift is a reduction in the concerted pressure on government to maintain and strengthen race equality.

Implications of Prevent, and the Immigration Act 2016
The purpose of this section is to consider the implications of two recent policy developments on racial discrimination and equal opportunity in the UK. In addition to the sentiment that race equality has slipped down the policy agenda, some participants also argued that some recent policies have actually exacerbated race inequality. The first of these...
is the Prevent, which forms one part of the UK Government's broader counter-terrorism strategy (Home Office 2017a: 5). Under Prevent, public agencies have a statutory duty “to include in their day-to-day work consideration of the need to safeguard people from being drawn into terrorism” (Home Office 2017a: 5). This statutory duty extends to schools, and thus draws classroom teachers into the realm of anti-radicalisation. However, some interview participants reported that the statutory requirement to report potential radicalisation is in many ways counterproductive and unfairly targets Muslim families. Participant B05f, formerly a statutory officer but now a member of civil society, gave this example:

A Muslim child of four [years old] who was in a nursery, and his father had been peeling a cucumber, and [the child] was drawing it . . . [The nursery practitioner] said “What's that?” and he said something [that] . . . sounded like a 'cooker-bomb', and so she took the issue up and thought this child is being radicalised . . . [The Prevent training process, it's very simplistic . . . and it [was] inadequate in identifying this child with a cucumber. – Participant B05f, civil society

Participant B05f highlighted an area of significant concern here. The example indicated that Muslim children have been inappropriately targeted because Prevent has created an atmosphere of fear and suspicion. She then continued by describing the detrimental effect that Prevent is having on children’s education:

All the teachers’ unions are disagreeing with [Prevent], and they say it's not the teacher's responsibility to monitor children's radicalisation. It's interfering with the trust relationships [between] the child and the teacher. – Participant B05f, civil society

Prevent is also deeply unpopular amongst BAME communities because of its divisive approach. Participant B03f, another former senior statutory officer who is now a member of civil society, emphasised this very strongly:

[Prevent is] hugely criticised by Muslim communities and non-Muslim communities and, in fact . . . the Muslim Council of Britain has just announced yesterday or last week it was going to introduce its own [alternative] Prevent strategy because [the government’s] just wasn’t working. It was all about demonising people, as opposed to getting them engaged and preventing radicalisation. – Participant B03f, civil society

One NGO called the Open Society Justice Initiative, released a report in October 2016 evaluating Prevent. They came to similar conclusions, suggesting that Prevent creates “a serious risk of human rights violations. The program is flawed in both its design and application rendering it not only unjust but also counterproductive” (Open Society Justice Initiative 2016: 15). To this end, Participant B05f argued that Prevent was also undermining good race relations as stipulated by the Equality Act 2010:
The other thing [the Government is] meant to do is to, [through] the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act, is . . . foster good relations. There are three aspects: counter discrimination; promote equality of opportunity; and foster good relations between the different groups. [The latter] is a key one in terms of Prevent . . . the government should have thought about the implications on the Muslim community. – Participant B05f, civil society

In stark contrast with the innovative race equality duty introduced by New Labour, the Tory Government appears to not always be acting as a vanguard for advancing race equality. The problems associated with Prevent indicate a neglect of the Government’s legislated responsibilities to protect the rights of its citizens.

There is a similar pattern to be seen in implications and consequences arising from the Immigration Act 2016. Under the Act, new measures include sanctions on employers who employ migrants without a valid visa. Other measures also prevent migrants from accessing public services unless they can demonstrate that their residence in the UK is lawful. Participant B06m, a member of civil society, explained the consequences of this approach:

Access to public services is now going to be determined by whether or not you can produce evidence . . . your immigration status is okay. . . . Proving that you have the right to a public service in Britain is not easy. There are about 50 different documents you can produce . . . and most landlords for example are going to say, “Well I’ll take the white [person] because . . . [I know] he or she is almost certainly going to be a bona fide citizen”. – Participant B06m, civil society

Participant B07f, a member of civil society, expressed very similar concerns about increased discrimination for second and third generation migrants because landlords now have responsibility to check immigration status or face fines themselves. However, she also said that some rogue landlords are demanding sexual favours from people with a BAME background:

The other side of it is that they could exploit those migrants . . . [Another pilot study] found that particularly women were being exploited, being asked by landlords for sexual favours to keep quiet or they’ll ship them to the Home Office because of their immigration status. – Participant B07f, civil society

In the same interview, Participant B07m, a former politician and now a member of civil society, expanded further on the exploitation arising from the power imbalance between tenant and landlord:

The landlords just put the rent up and say, “Well, you’re black. I don’t believe you about your status. I’m not really bothered, so if you give me an extra two grand I’ll keep quiet” . . . [But] usually what [then] happens is that the landlord will keep their passports . . . as a part of [their] licence agreement . . . and then you end up with people in bloody slave economies and you get this growth of a black market. – Participant B07m, former politician, civil society
The increased capacity for exploitation enabled by substantially increasing the power of landlords is highly concerning, running in complete contradiction to the principle of improving race equality. These interviews were conducted in late 2016 prior to the Windrush scandal breaking into the media. Multiple participants foreshadowed the scandal, predicting that the ‘hostile environment’ codified by the Immigration Act 2016 was leading to discrimination and extraordinary hardship for members of the Windrush generation\textsuperscript{64} and their children. Inadequate government record-keeping and the lack of sufficient residency documentation dating back decades coincided with the ‘hostile environment’ policy. Many of the participants interviewed had already identified the precursors of the scandal. After her interview concluded, Participant B07f even cited a case of a woman who had been deported to Jamaica because the British government hadn’t issued her with the appropriate documentation when she originally migrated as part of the Windrush cohort. As a result, this woman could not prove her right to residency in the UK. Ultimately, it took a concerted effort of media attention in 2017 and 2018 to force the British state to respond. The independent Windrush Lessons Learned Review was published in early 2020 with damning findings against the Home Office including “a culture of disbelief and carelessness … made worse by the status of the Windrush generation, who were failed when they needed help most” (Williams 2020: 7). The review could not definitively demonstrate that the systemic failings amounted to institutional discrimination. However, Williams did find an “institutional ignorance and thoughtlessness towards the issue of race [in the Home Office] … consistent with some elements of the definition of institutional racism” (2020: 7).

In summary, the analysis suggests that British policy responses to racial discrimination and equal opportunity have been characterised in the following ways. The principle of race equality is central to British multiculturalism and has been entrenched since the establishment of the public sector race equality duty in 2000. The duty goes beyond complaint-based responses to discrimination, instead providing a framework for public bodies to ensure equitable access to services. Through the lens of the race equality duty, there have been substantial reforms to the stop-and-search police power. However, structural discrimination was acknowledged as still being prevalent, requiring further attention from policy actors. Furthermore, the merging of the CRE into the EHRC on top of significant austerity cuts to funding undermined the effectiveness of the race equality duty. Moreover, the dismantling of equality impact assessments under red-tape reduction schemes was emblematic of the neglect with race equality slipping down the policy agenda.

\textsuperscript{64}The ‘Windrush generation’ refers to the wave of Afro-Caribbean immigration to the UK from 1948-1970.
Taken together, austerity measures have had an adverse and disproportionate impact on the UK’s BAME population by limiting access to their rights under the law. Likewise, both Prevent and the Immigration Act 2016 exemplify the degradation and diffusion of the race equality policy agenda over the last decade by facilitating racial discrimination and undermining equal opportunity for BAME communities. Prevent directly led to cases of discrimination against Muslims in the UK. Similarly, the 'hostile environment' for illegal immigrants enshrined in the Immigration Act 2016 led to the disproportionate and unintended consequences for the members of the Windrush generation.

6.3.3 Mutual cultural accommodation: limited British state involvement

This section presents the perspectives of policy actors on the REC objective of mutual cultural accommodation. Unlike the other case studies, British participants did not frame their responses in these terms. A two-way process of accommodation between culturally diverse communities and the British state was not explicitly identified as a policy priority by the interview participants. This was reflected in three themes emerging from the interviews. The first was a tendency towards a hands-off policy approach to multiculturalism. The second was the UK's lack of a national integration strategy leading to significant policy shortfalls. The third theme was the ongoing problematisation of multiculturalism in public and policy discourse. In addition to the interview data, this section draws upon political speeches, parliamentary reports, scholarly literature and other grey literature to support and triangulate the findings.

'Laissez-faire multiculturalism'

One passage in the interview with Participant B02f, a member of civil society, very neatly typified a theme common to several other interviews. She described how the British state has tended to take a limited, hands-off approach to multicultural policy:

Multiculturalism has traditionally been associated with a ‘laissez-faire attitude’... There was something wrong with the fact that there was no support provided, not to the communities, not to the migrants who were arriving here. Migrants were just arriving to the country and the multiculturalist approach in the UK assumed that people would just be fine. – Participant B02f, civil society

This 'laissez-faire' approach to multicultural policy can be traced back to the 1960s. There are strong conceptual links between this approach and the principle of liberal toleration discussed in Chapter 2. Participants B01m and B07m both described multiculturalism as historically characterised by 'letting a thousand flowers bloom' and linking this to former Home Secretary Roy Jenkins' foundational speech on race relations in 1966:
I do not regard [integration] as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this country a 'melting pot', which will turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone’s misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishman . . . I define integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.

Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, 1966 (quoted in Manning 2011: 33)

Multicultural integration therefore gave permission for a plurality of cultural identities in British society. Participant B01m, a former statutory officer, explained that the Jenkins definition enabled people to culturally identify as “British Hindu, British Muslim, British Caribbean”. However, Participant B07m, a former politician and now a member of civil society, argued that the rationale for multicultural (or ethno-specific) public services arose from the mainstream sector being unable to provide culturally appropriate services. He used the example of ethno-specific aged care facilities to demonstrate this point:

What you people call ‘multicultural policy’ is actually black people in the 70s and 80s who were being excluded from mainstream service provisions. . . . The compromise was, "Look, we’ll give you money to open your own [facility]" . . . because of the failure of mainstream to broaden its provision in a way that could provide a truly inclusive multicultural service. – Participant B07m, former politician, civil society

Under austerity, Participant B07m described funding cuts to ethno-specific services in the name of ending ‘cultural separation’ as being ironic:

When we had [ethno-specific services], those were the things that came under attack from the right-wing, saying "Look, they want to be separate. Why have we got a black girls club? Why have we got a Bangladeshi girls swimming club? In the age of a post-racist society we should all be integrated," . . . Separate provision has been slashed and there’s been no further integration [for] black people in terms of multicultural provision in public services. – Participant B07m, former politician, civil society

Rather than facilitate a more robust regime of multicultural service delivery premised on mutual cultural accommodation, the laissez-faire approach appears to have taken the path of least resistance.

Similarly, around half of the participants interviewed mentioned that there is no formal social integration strategy for new arrivals, except for some underfunded programs for refugees. To give some examples, Participant B02f, a member of civil society, described the lack of integration policy framework in this way:

There is no equivalent [integration program] for [non-refugee] migrants in England . . . especially not for the European migrants. It was assumed a lot of the time that people will just naturally [integrate]. – Participant B02f, civil society
Participant B04f, a former statutory officer and now a member of civil society put it quite bluntly and described small, decentralised integration efforts struggling in the context of a national policy vacuum:

There is just a complete lack of a national [integration policy] framework . . . the government doesn’t want a top-down interventionist strategy, not least because it doesn’t want to have to pay for it . . . There is a lack of communication and coordination, which means that each local authority feels it’s out there on its own . . . There isn’t a national source of expertise that [local authorities] can go to for advice. – Participant B04f, civil society

She later pointed out that part of the problem was the absence of any department or public agency responsible for integration in the UK. In contrast to some of the other case studies, there is very limited government acknowledgement that multiculturalism or integration require centralised or coordinated oversight. These sentiments are echoed by Participant B06m, a member of civil society, who also drew comparisons with other jurisdictions:

[Unlike] you in Australia and . . . Sweden definitely, is that [in the UK] actually a lot of this work is done by default rather than by design. . . . There was a sort of unspoken multicultural strategy which comes [from the Roy Jenkins approach] . . . [but] compared to our European counterparts . . . we’ve never had [an integration strategy] and it has therefore, increasingly in times of austerity, become more and more like benign neglect actually. – Participant B06m, civil society

As several of the interview participants mentioned, the lack of a national integration policy framework makes it very difficult for authorities to identify barriers that inhibit social integration between new arrivals and the wider society. As such, ‘laissez-faire multiculturalism’ is not very conducive for government to play an active role in promoting mutual cultural accommodation (Alibhai-Brown et al. 2006: 2; Crowder 2013: 7).

Consequences arising from the lack of a national integration strategy

This section expands upon the issue of ‘laissez-faire multiculturalism’ by examining interviewees’ concerns about the UK not directing policy attention to integration. Some participants attributed the inability to address mutual cultural accommodation with the system of open European immigration because the government only had a limited capacity to direct migrant flows. These participants suggested that this was further exacerbated by poor communication between Westminster and the local government authorities receiving migrants, leading to sudden service-provision deficits in education or housing. Participant B03f, a former senior statutory officer and now a member of civil society, highlighted this problem across the UK:
When we knew that there were going to be a lot of Polish workers . . . with the expansion of the EU, why didn't someone say, “. . . How are we going to manage what the implications of this are?” . . . Who did enough to educate people who run the health sector and how to address the particular needs of newcomers or other communities? I don't think that happened at all. – Participant B03f, civil society

When asked about how British policymakers responded to increased migrant flows from eastern Europe after the accession of the A8 to the EU in 2004, Participant B07m, a former politician, was scathing:

Britain didn't [have an integration strategy], so basically [the government] found some slum landlord in the north of the country who's got 50 [cheap] houses to sell. . . . informed the local authorities and say, "You've got 50 Kosovans coming your way tomorrow," in that little area which would be inevitably the poorest, most deprived area. . . . [Locals could] literally see their area transforming right in front of their eyes. – Participant B07m, former politician

Participant B07m then went on to link this rapid, unmanaged social transformation to anti-migrant resentment in northern England that overflowed with the Brexit vote. In contrast, Participant B02f, a member of civil society described how the major parties are viewing Brexit-related changes to immigration policy as an opportunity to improve the management and integration of migrants:

[Both parties have suggested] a ‘migrant impact fund’ . . . directing money towards areas that are high migration areas. . . . We can’t deny the fact that migration does impact a lot of services because . . . suddenly you have more people at your local GP and you have more people in your local school. This does not have to cause problems if you address it in time and you predict it. – Participant B02f, civil society

Although many of the interviewees noted that the UK poorly manages integration and service provision for new arrivals, Participant B02f was encouraged by the acknowledgement of the problem by the major parties.

Furthermore, some participants noted that there is only very limited co-ordination between the more established BAME communities and more recent arrivals. Indirectly, these participants were describing Putnam’s notion of 'bonding social capital' where ethnic groups might be inward-looking by necessity (2000: 22). For example, Participant B06m described the separation between these two large groups:

There are these two completely separate worlds who by-and-large don't really speak to each other: . . . [First,] the Windrush generation and their progeny . . . [who] were systematically excluded and discriminated against but nevertheless had a right to remain. . . . Then there's the more recent migrant group . . . including people from eastern Europe . . . South America or . . . as refugees, and the two worlds don't talk to each other at all. – Participant B06m, civil society

Later in the interview, Participant B06m suggested that significant suspicions and divisions have arisen between these two ‘worlds’. Participant B04f, a former statutory
officer and now a member of civil society, reported similar divisions within the policymaking community. In particular, she said that the race equality legislation is not really applied to the integration of new migrants:

[The UK's race equality legislation is] not generally thought to have anything to do with integration. It's nothing to do with migrants. It's a completely separate policy field. The people who work in the equality field wouldn't say that they had anything to do with migrant integration or refugee integration... The legislation is not somewhere that migrants would be directed to... [or] see as relevant to them. – Participant B04f, civil society

Participant B04f cited a report for the ‘Equality and Diversity Forum’ which found that public bodies were not including migrants and refugees in their strategies for the statutory race equality duty. The study found that “while refugees and migrants are often among the most disadvantaged and marginalised members of society, equality measures have not tended to be seen – by public bodies or NGOs – as part of the solution” (McCarvill 2011: 1).

Such a finding is particularly worrying, especially given the current lack of a national integration policy framework. This lack of strategy has been identified by policymakers, particularly those involved with the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Social Integration. At the time the interviews were conducted in October 2016, the APPG had not yet released its recommendations. However, the final report, Integration Not Demonisation (APPG 2017), was released in August 2017 and made four core recommendations: first, that immigration policy powers should be devolved to create “a regionally-led immigration system”; second, that the government ought to implement a “comprehensive and proactive strategy” for migrant integration; third, migrants should be viewed as future citizens rather than as threats; and fourth, English language proficiency should be promoted as an essential right, irrespective of background or socio-economic status (APPG 2017: 10-12).

The problematisation of multiculturalism

Another significant barrier to supporting mutual cultural accommodation is that multiculturalism has been problematised in the UK policy community and in public discourse. Prominent figures such as the former Prime Minister David Cameron declared that ‘multiculturalism has failed’ (2011), and the former chair of the CRE and EHRC Trevor Phillips argued that multiculturalism was causing the UK to ‘sleepwalk to segregation’ (2005b). These comments by powerful political figures frame and shape the policy direction, and as a result there has been limited rhetorical space for the positive valuation, celebration and accommodation of cultural diversity in the public sphere. Many interview participants referred to these comments as key moments that initiated and symbolised subsequent policy changes. In particular, participants expressed that these types of
argument implied there had been too much accommodation from the state, but not enough from new arrivals and established BAME communities. The perception then was that this imbalance was encouraging separateness, parallel lives, and poor cohesion between people of different backgrounds. Participant B04f, a former statutory officer, described the way ‘cohesion’ policy was developed to rectify problems attributed to multiculturalism:

We’ve had cohesion policies since the early 2000s, when we had disturbances in northern towns. It was judged that second, third generation people from ethnic minority communities were to an extent living parallel lives, and steps needed to be taken to bring people together, build bridges across communities. Multiculturalism was blamed as the villain of the piece, for which cohesion was the solution. – Participant B04f, civil society

Furthermore, several participants highlighted the instrumental role that Trevor Phillips had in steering UK policy away from multiculturalism towards ‘cohesion’ to combat what he saw as being the drift towards segregation. Participant B01m, a former statutory officer, described the shifts in policy trends under Phillips’ tenure:

When Trevor Phillips became chair [in 2003], he was anxious to change a number of policies . . . I think what he said to a certain extent had some mileage, in that multiculturalism could go too far into separate development and even into corruption where particular councillors were giving money to members of their own group . . . But I think probably he took it too far and [multiculturalism has since] probably settled back to where it should be. – Participant B01m, statutory officer

Participant B03f, a former statutory officer and now a member of civil society, was more critical of Phillips’ comments, including his critique of multiculturalism encapsulated by ‘sleepwalking to segregation’. She argued that the rhetoric used by right-wing opponents of multiculturalism like UKIP could be traced back to Phillips statements:

The dislike of the increase in immigration, the changing face of communities, the lack of response in terms of integration strategies. . . . Individuals now will say things and do things that they never would have done before. Add to that, the rhetoric that comes out of UKIP. . . . The conversations from people like Trevor Phillips [about multiculturalism] . . . they’re failing, in my view, to realise is that [opponents] pick up on that and they use it to say, “Well, look, I told you so and . . . Phillips is saying this [too]”. – Participant B03f, civil society

Participant B03f’s comments indicate that the anti-multiculturalist rhetoric, irrespective of political persuasion, creates public division and impedes efforts to create a policy environment which fosters mutual cultural accommodation.

Furthermore, this section has shown that ‘laissez-faire multiculturalism’ led to a policy vacuum for the integration of new migrants. In turn, the lack of centralised coordination meant that local government authorities struggled to provide adequate services to support their rapidly changing communities. By framing multiculturalism as the source of the social problem, British policy has been unable to facilitate the mutual cultural accommodation
required for multicultural integration. That being said, the previous section did make it clear that the UK recognises the need for some degree of accommodation by the state and society. Even if race equality has recently slipped down the policy agenda, the need for accommodation is evident in the legislated public sector race equality duty. Similarly, race equality policy provides the mechanism for redressing structural barriers and discrimination that impede equal opportunity.

In sum, mutual cultural accommodation has been given a lower priority by policymakers compared to the focus on race equality. A recurrent theme was that the UK did not have a national social integration strategy, with no department or central authority responsible for coordinating the integration of new arrivals. The 'laissez-faire' approach to multiculturalism appears to have led to a mistrust of BAME communities, especially during periods of economic difficulty. Rhetoric about ‘failed multiculturalism’ and ‘sleepwalking to segregation’ portrays cultural accommodation as being a social problem. In particular, this has come to the forefront of the public eye during the lead-up to the referendum on leaving the EU. Polarising debates about immigration brought out strong anti-immigrant sentiments. This was especially prominent in northern England where many migrants from eastern Europe had settled following the accession of the A8 countries to the EU in 2004. In recognition of these difficulties, the All Party Parliamentary Group on Social Integration (2017) consulted widely across party divisions in an effort to identify a strategy for social integration for a post-Brexit UK.

6.3.4 Summary of REC Framework Findings

Applying the REC Framework to analyse British policymaking has led to findings that show race equality has slipped down the policy agenda in the UK. There were strong legislative and institutional settings in place, such as the public sector race equality duty. However, austerity cuts and the restructuring of the CRE within the EHRC have had significant impacts on the ability of people with BAME backgrounds to access their rights under the law. Race equality has been hollowed out to some extent because of these measures. This was been seen most notably in the Prevent anti-radicalisation scheme and the Windrush scandal. Additionally, Prevent has undermined good race relations by creating an aura of fear and suspicion around Muslims in the UK. Likewise, the findings indicated an element of neglect regarding the limited state involvement in facilitating integration and mutual cultural accommodation. There was no national agency responsible for coordinating social integration of new arrivals, with this issue not being given an adequate level of priority by policymakers. As such, local authorities had inadequate resources to manage the flows of
new arrivals since the accession of the A8 countries from central and eastern Europe in 2004. The remainder of the chapter uses these findings to help assess the degree of British multicultural policy success.

6.4 Policy success of multiculturalism in the UK

The previous section provided evidence from policy actors that helps to describe and characterise British policy approaches to multiculturalism in terms of the REC Framework. The following discussion assesses and evaluates UK policy in a more succinct and systematic manner, using Marsh and McConnell's (2010) 'three-dimensions' heuristic for evaluating of policy success. Although the UK has developed the unique and innovative race equality duty, there are some significant concerns about the under-prioritisation of race equality in an era of austerity by Westminster. Tables 14, 15 and 16 below summarise the main pieces of evidence for the findings described earlier, and as such the conclusions made draw upon these tables as a basis.

6.4.1 Political success

Firstly, the findings drawn from the data indicate a low degree of political success of multicultural policy in the UK since 2007. The statutory race equality duty to ensure that public authorities were proactive in their efforts to promote race equality and combat direct, indirect and structural discrimination was remarkable (Worley 2005: 487). However, policies of austerity have had a profound and detrimental effect on such efforts. As described earlier, the sentiments from many of the interview participants was that the issue of race equality has slipped down the political agenda. As argued by the Runnymede Trust (2016), frequent, deep and disproportionate budgetary cuts to the EHRC have undermined the effectiveness of the race equality duty. The introduction of tribunal fees and the reduced capacity of the EHRC to support discrimination cases has resulted in the most vulnerable members of society being unable to access their rights under the Equality Act 2010 (EHRC 2010a, 2017b). Furthermore, efforts to reduce red-tape and bureaucratic burden through shifts towards agency 'self-regulation' without EHRC oversight and accountability suggest that the Conservative Government may not be approaching race equality policy with sufficient rigour.
Additionally, multiple participants acknowledged that the UK has lacked a substantive integration strategy for new arrivals. The All Party Parliamentary Group on Social Integration (2017) collaborated across party divisions to provide recommendations to government on how to initiate the development of a new and comprehensive approach in the post-Brexit era. Still, the current lack of strategy is symptomatic of a ‘laissez-faire’ approach to multiculturalism that, as one participant put it, verges on benign neglect.

Furthermore, when political rhetoric declares that ‘radical multicultural ideology’ should be abandoned, mutual cultural accommodation is seen as the root of the problem (Kymlicka 2012: 14). Multiculturalism has been criticised as having forced the British state and society to accommodate cultural minorities without applying any pressure on them to integrate. With this kind of rhetoric tainting political discourse, it is difficult for the state to justify mutual cultural accommodation and simultaneously celebrate and promote the benefits of cultural diversity. Likewise, it is even harder for policymakers to shift beyond the rhetoric of ‘migrants-as-threat’ to truly facilitate a mutual cultural accommodation between new arrivals, established communities, and society more generally (Erel 2018: 179). This was

| Table 14 British multicultural policy success in the political domain |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| **REC Framework** | **Racial discrimination** | **Equal opportunity** | **Cultural accommodation** |
| **Political success** | Race equality duty established and entrenched since 2000 | - Government-led austerity cuts to public sector disregards principle of equal opportunity | - ‘Multiculturalism has failed’, ‘sleepwalking to segregation’: rhetoric portrays cultural accommodation as a social problem |
| | Race equality has slipped down the agenda, with austerity cuts undermining race equality duty | - Disproportionate cuts to the EHRC adversely affects BAME population | - APPG on social integration, wide consultation across party divisions |
| | Brexit referendum ‘Leave’ campaign, including UKIP, incorporated anti-immigrant sentiments | | - Brexit debates brought out strong anti-immigrant sentiments |
| | Brexit referendum led to spike in hate crime; UK not a ‘post-racial’ society as previously perceived | | - Laissez-faire approach leads to mistrust of ‘others’ during periods of economic difficulty |
| **Source of evidence** | Interview data | Interview data | Interview data |
| **Rating** | Low success | Low success | Low success |
most evident in the efforts from the ‘Leave’ campaign in the leadup to the Brexit referendum which sought to place blame for the UK’s economic position on migrants as scapegoats. These attitudes then contributed to a spike in hate crime after the result was announced (Schilter 2020).

Although the UK’s decision to leave the European Union is one of the biggest political shifts since the Second World War, it was not the main area of focus for the interview participants. One possible reason for this is because the interviews were conducted in October and November 2016, only a few months after the referendum in June. When participants did discuss Brexit, they mainly expressed confusion and uncertainty about the implications of the vote which seemed to have opened a Pandora’s box. Comprehensive research analysing why a majority of British voters decided to leave the EU had yet to be conducted. However, all of the participants expressed dismay at the tone and voracity of anti-immigrant rhetoric that had surfaced from supporters of the ‘Leave’ campaign. In particular, there was a sense that UKIP had tapped into a groundswell of anti-immigrant sentiment in a Britain that was supposed to be a ‘post-racial society’.

Since then, studies have traced and explained the profound impact that UKIP had on British politics (Tournier-Sol 2020; Evans and Mellon 2019). Despite very limited electoral success in Westminster, UKIP’s ascent to become the largest British party in the European Parliament in 2013 demonstrated the party’s capacity to influence and frame political debate. Their opposition to the European project and free movement of labour migrants entering the UK shook and polarised Britain’s political establishment. This ultimately led David Cameron to call for a referendum to put the issue to rest (Tournier-Sol 2020: 3). Likewise, Labour also recognised the risks of ignoring the challenge from the radical-right on immigration, most notably after it lost the general election in 2010 (Bale et al. 2010: 422-423; Bale 2014: 297-301). All this goes to show that getting ‘tough on immigration’ exemplifies the shifting political and policy landscape in the UK. There are broader debates here about party competition and electoral strategy, but these are beyond the scope of this thesis.

The overarching Euroscepticism that is central to UKIP’s political platform does complicate the comparison with other radical-right populist parties in Sweden, the Netherlands and South Australia. However, the anti-immigrant sentiments expressed by

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65 According a survey by Opinium, prior to the referendum in January 2016, 58 per cent of people from ethnic minorities reported facing racial discrimination. By early 2019, this had risen to 71 per cent (Booth 2019).
this complex and powerful political phenomenon are congruent with the rating of low political success.

6.4.2 Programmatic success

Secondly, UK policy has achieved a generally moderate degree of programmatic success. Despite the so-called multiculturalism backlash, the MCP Index shows a slight strengthening of policy between 2000 and 2010 through a score increase from 5.0 to 5.5. The additional 0.5 improvement under ‘Affirmative Action’ is attributed to the introduction of the statutory race equality duty. Although the creation of the duty signified a seismic shift in the direction of race equality policy, the nature of the MCP Index’s criteria constrain and underemphasise the duty’s impact. Nonetheless, the analysis from Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010: 18-22) and Banting and Kymlicka (2013) aligns with the UK’s MCP Index data to indicate that whilst there may have been a rhetorical retreat away from multiculturalism in a general sense, there had not necessarily been a retreat in policy substance by 2010. For example, the public sector equality duty goes beyond complaint-based discrimination response measures found in other jurisdictions to place responsibility on public bodies to take positive steps to promote race equality and combat discrimination (Ahmed 2007: 590-592). Similarly, reforms to reduce structural discrimination in the criminal justice sector have led to improvements. The evidence presented in this chapter indicates the stop-and-search power is now used in a more considered and targeted way, however there is still a significant racial disproportionality that must continue to be addressed (EHRC 2010b). Furthermore, the provision in the Equality Act 2010 for so-called ‘positive action’ measures allows employers to improve BAME representation in the labour market.

However, these elements of programmatic success are tempered by a series of concerns. Multiple participants argued that the dismantling of equality impact assessments through David Cameron’s red-tape reduction program (Cameron 2012) led to a race-blindness for policy decision makers. The tool had forced decision makers to consider how policies and programs would affect people with a BAME background. Similarly, the introduction of discrimination tribunal fees and the reduction in EHRC caseworker support for individual cases has meant that vulnerable people were restricted in their ability to access their rights (Runnymede Trust 2016). This undermined the race equality duty, diminishing its capacity for societal reform. Likewise, the Immigration Act 2016 led to worsening individual and structural discrimination because service providers, employers and landlords were required to determine lawful immigration status. As demonstrated by the Windrush scandal
which was on the cusp of emerging at the time of interviews, this policy measure has actively exacerbated racial inequality (Williams 2020).

**Table 15** British multicultural policy success in the programmatic domain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REC Framework</th>
<th>Racial discrimination</th>
<th>Equal opportunity</th>
<th>Cultural accommodation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic success</td>
<td>- Public sector equality duty goes beyond complaint-based discrimination response - Stop-and-search reforms have led to improvements, although structural discrimination still present - Unintended consequences of Immigration Act led to Windrush scandal - Prevent leads to discrimination against Muslims</td>
<td>- Affirmative action is unlawful, but positive action measures are permitted to improve opportunity - Race equality duty provides framework for public bodies to ensure equitable access to public services - Austerity cuts adversely affects BAME population in a disproportionate manner, limiting access to rights - Equality impact assessments dismantled under red-tape reduction</td>
<td>- No formal social integration strategy for new arrivals - Prevent undermines good race relations, creating aura of fear and suspicion around Muslims</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


| Rating | - Moderate success | - Moderate success | - Low success |

Aside from the programmatic elements of anti-discrimination and equal opportunity policy, there are also concerns that centre on the role of government in advancing mutual cultural accommodation. One example mentioned earlier is Prevent, which in many instances has actively undermined good race relations. This has occurred because the policy settings have encouraged, unintentionally or otherwise, racial profiling and the victimisation of BAME Muslims. Rather than entering into a partnership with communities to reduce the risk of radicalisation for what is a very small minority of the population, Prevent casts aspersions of fear and suspicion on the population as a whole (Open Society Justice Initiative 2016). Additionally, the distinct lack of a formal and comprehensive social integration strategy for new arrivals impedes mutual cultural accommodation by not breaking down barriers between people of different cultural backgrounds. As multiple
participants reiterated, local authorities are often not prepared, resourced or equipped to respond and provide adequate services or provisions arising due to new arrivals settling in their respective jurisdictions. This was subsequently confirmed by the findings in the final report of the APPG on Social Integration (2017).

6.4.3 Process success

Finally, there also appears to be a generally moderate degree of process success for UK multicultural policy. Although the policy response to structural racism following the inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence took place prior to 2007, its impact was dramatic with deep ramifications for race equality through the introduction of the race equality duty in 2000 (Ahmed 2007: 590-592; Worley 2005: 487). In conjunction with the race equality duty, methods including ethnic data monitoring and thematic investigations enable policymakers to receive detailed data about the scope of structural discrimination, and then implement targeted and specific responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REC Framework</th>
<th>Racial discrimination</th>
<th>Equal opportunity</th>
<th>Cultural accommodation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Process success | - Dramatic policy response to structural racism following Stephen Lawrence inquiry  
- Thematic investigations and ethnic data monitoring enable strategic targeting of widespread structural discrimination  
- BAME communities not adequately consulted for anti-radicalisation program, Prevent | - Limited co-ordination between established BAME communities and new arrivals  
- New arrivals not accessing race equality duty not seen as applicable  
- Formerly thriving and race equality NGO sector suffered enormous austerity cuts, reducing pressure on government  
- Significant failings in Home Office led to Windrush scandal | - APPG on social integration, wide consultation across party divisions  
- No department or central authority coordinating integration of new arrivals |
| Source of evidence | - Interview data  
- Worley (2005)  
- Ahmed (2007)  
- Open Society Justice Initiative (2016) | - Interview data  
- McCarvill (2011)  
- CEMVO (2010)  
- Williams (2020) | - Interview data  
- APPG on Social Integration (2017) |
| Rating | - Moderate success | - Low success | - Moderate success |
Aside from the issue of race equality, the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Social Integration not only received support across party divisions, it also consulted widely with communities, local authorities, experts and international contacts to shape a future social integration strategy (APPG on Social Integration 2017). Such a wide-ranging consultation process is crucial for establishing legitimacy for any future strategy, and a level of bipartisanship that could yield political success further down the road.

In contrast though, inadequate consultation and partnership with BAME communities regarding Prevent has led to the introduction of a program that has had serious negative consequences for BAME Muslims, including profiling and inappropriate victimisation of children in schools (Open Society Justice Initiative 2016: 15). The proposal of an Islamic community-led alternative to Prevent signifies the disconnect between the state and these communities. Similarly, there has been a substantial disconnect between the BAME communities that have been established in the UK for many decades and groups of migrants who arrived more recently. There is limited co-ordination between these two groups with new arrivals not accessing their rights under the race equality duty because it is not seen as being applicable or relevant to their specific circumstances (McCarvill 2011: 1). There is an opportunity to bridge the chasm between race equality and the social integration needs of new arrivals by developing a comprehensive social integration framework at the national level that incorporates an expanded settlement service regime. Lastly, process success is inhibited in the UK because a formerly thriving and co-ordinated race equality NGO sector has dispersed and fragmented due to austerity cuts. A 2010 report found that 45 per cent of 173 BAME NGOs surveyed experienced funding cuts from local authorities and other sources, despite a 77 per cent increase in demand for their services (Council of Ethnic Minority Voluntary Sector Organisations 2010). Because NGOs were starved for resources, they were unable to keep pressure on government to maintain or strengthen race equality measures.

6.5 Summary

The findings presented in this chapter suggest that the issue of race equality has slipped down the British policy agenda with significant consequences for BAME communities and individuals. The statutory public sector race equality duty establishes a strong foundation, as indicated by a score of 5.5 out of 8.0 on the MCP Index in 2010. However, the chapter has shown that austerity cuts to the public sector and the EHRC exacerbated racial inequalities. People with a BAME background were less able to access their rights under the law due to inadequate funding for the EHRC. Similarly, the ‘hostile environment for illegal immigrants’
policy was enshrined in the *Immigration Act 2016*. Shifting the responsibility for determining residency status to service providers or landlords led to individual and structural discrimination against people with a BAME background. This culminated in the appalling treatment, detention, or deportation of legal residents later during the Windrush scandal. Furthermore, the interview data highlighted the absence of a national integration strategy for new arrivals, with no central coordinating authority to provide expertise or advice to local authorities. Additionally, new migrants appeared to be disconnected from the race equality duty which might otherwise have been extremely beneficial. The duty requires public authorities to facilitate equal opportunity through redistributive justice that mitigates socio-economic disadvantage and promote good relations between all ethnic groups.

However, multiculturalism seems to have instead been scapegoated as the cause of segregation and inter-ethnic conflict. The core elements of the race equality duty suggest this is a misdiagnosis. A laissez-faire attitude to multiculturalism led to an expectation that established BAME communities and new arrivals would somehow automatically integrate. Yet this attitude failed to emphasise the ‘mutual’ responsibility for cultural accommodation. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that ethno-specific and ‘multicultural’ service provision was often developed by necessity, rather than by deliberate design. Mainstream providers were unable to adequately incorporate and accommodate cultural diversity. In sum, findings of this chapter highlight that the UK has had strong policy and institutional settings promoting multiculturalism. However, these appear to be under threat, especially due to inadequate funding. A lingering concern though is that without concerted political will, the institutional settings may atrophy further.

There are two final notes to make. First, the Windrush scandal illustrates the extent to which race equality has slipped down the policy agenda. Although the scathing findings from the *Windrush Lessons Learned Review* were published well after the data collection, they confirm that the issue of race equality has been neglected over time (Williams 2020: 84-87). Second, the issue of Brexit occupies a complicated position for this thesis. Although the referendum to leave the EU took place several months prior to the interviews, the participants expressed significant uncertainty about what the vote meant for race equality and British politics more broadly. Instead, they primarily focused on the public sector equality duty, austerity and foreshadowed what would later become the Windrush scandal. That being said, the impact of the UK’s ultimate exit from the EU will be acute for the issue of race equality as it slips down the policy agenda. The corrosive influence of actors expressing xenophobic views, such as UKIP, the Brexit Party and the Leave Campaign, on
the governing Conservative Party is a question worthy of further investigation. Likewise, this political movement appears to have wielded significant influence in shaping the nature of British exit negotiations with the EU.
CHAPTER 7 – THE NETHERLANDS: FROM MULTICULTURALISM TO ASSIMILATION

7.1 Introduction

This chapter evaluates the success of policy approaches promoting multiculturalism in the Netherlands since the formation of the grand coalition Fourth Balkenende cabinet in 2007, until the March 2017 general election. As previous chapters have highlighted, many countries have experienced the backlash against multiculturalism since the start of the 21st century. The backlash in public and political discourse in the Netherlands has centred around the supposed failures of policies supporting multiculturalism. Each subsequent ‘post-multicultural’ policy since the late 1990s has tried to build upon the previous ‘failed’ policy model (Scholten 2013: 106; van Reekum and Duyvendak 2012: 446). Veldhuis and van der Maas (2011: 30) argue that the backlash in Dutch political rhetoric was not initially reflected in changes to policy. However, in contrast to the UK and Sweden, more recent studies indicate that the rhetorical retreat in the Netherlands has also translated into a substantive policy retreat. The findings presented in this chapter, along with the existing scholarly research, suggest that multicultural policy approaches in the Netherlands are being replaced by a paradigm of civic integration with undertones of assimilation (Berger et al. 2016: 1124; Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 579; Entzinger 2014: 693-694). Simultaneously, mainstream parties in the Netherlands have cooperated by enacting welfare policies that restrict or exclude immigrants with little fear of an electoral pushback (Koning 2019: 196).

By 2013 the Dutch government had fully abolished group-specific policy approaches to multiculturalism in line with the shift towards the so-called ‘migrants’ own responsibility’ to integrate (van Breugel and Scholten 2017: 518-520; Gebhardt 2016: 747-748). In contrast with the other case studies, the findings in this chapter suggest that the backlash against multiculturalism in the Netherlands has led to both a rhetorical and a substantive policy shift.

7.1.1 Overview of the chapter

The chapter is organised into three parts. The first presents contextual background information, including a timeline of important key events that have been influential in shaping Dutch integration policy, and a description of the prominent institutional settings related to the development and implementation of integration and anti-discrimination policy.
The second part of the chapter goes on to present the research findings from the Dutch case study, detailing the data from the Multiculturalism Policy (MCP) Index Project which scores the Netherlands 2.0 in 2010, down from 4.0 in 2000. This is indicative of the retreat away from policy approaches promoting multiculturalism. The section then presents thematic findings drawn from the semi-structured elite interviews with policy actors. These findings are analysed through the REC Framework of multicultural policy objectives, and triangulated with policy documentation and other research to show how the retreat from multiculturalism has played out in the Netherlands.

The third part of the chapter interprets the empirical findings to evaluate the success of Dutch policy approaches promoting multiculturalism. There are three clear findings related to each of the three dimensions of policy success laid out by Marsh and McConnell’s (2010) heuristic. First, there is a low degree of political success for policies supporting multiculturalism in the Netherlands. Most significantly, mainstream Dutch politics has rejected the notion of two-way integration premised on mutual accommodation. Instead, policy discourse has tended towards promoting assimilationism through the assertion of Dutch values and the importance of national unity. Furthermore, prominent political figures including Prime Minister Mark Rutte have articulated views that diminish the role of the state in facilitating integration and addressing discrimination faced by people with a migrant background.

Second, Dutch policy exhibits a moderate degree of programmatic success. The government in the Netherlands is no longer trying to formally embrace the principles of multiculturalism in its policymaking. The ‘assimilationist turn’ in Dutch policy has radically reshaped the relationship between the state and people with a migrant background. Despite recent rhetoric suggesting the dismal failure of multicultural policies, recent evaluations have found that the Netherlands has achieved significant outcomes, particularly in the domain of socio-economic integration. There has been a socio-economic convergence between each successive generation of people with a migrant background and the population with a Dutch background, though this has not necessarily led to improved equal opportunity in the labour market.

Finally, there appears to be a relatively low degree of process success. Whilst there are some good collaborative and research relationships between NGOs, municipalities and public authorities, the defunding of minority advocacy organisations as part of the policy

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66 As detailed in Chapter 3, the REC Framework is a tool for operationalising the policy objectives of multiculturalism. These are: reducing racial discrimination (R); facilitating equal opportunity (E); and promoting mutual cultural accommodation (C).
The ‘mainstreaming’ phenomenon has severely limited the ability for consultation and formal
dialogue about the impact of policies on people with a migrant background.

Given the rhetoric surrounding the so-called ‘failed multicultural society’, the concept
of integration is used as a policy proxy for multiculturalism in this chapter because
integration was the paradigm used by all of the interview participants.

7.2 Contextual background

The purpose of this section is to outline the context for the Dutch research findings. As
detailed in Chapter 4, the Netherlands has a population of almost 17.5 million people, with
11 per cent of the population born abroad (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek; CBS 2018b,
2018a, 2017a, 2020). The Netherlands has a unitary political system and its bicameral
parliament is characterised by a multi-party system similar to Sweden. The section begins
by providing a short overview of how policies promoting multiculturalism and integration
were developed in the Netherlands. The section then summarises some recent
developments since 2007. The final part of the section then presents the key institutional
settings for integration policy in the Netherlands to serve as context for the discussion of
the findings later in the chapter. Much of the discussion in this chapter relates to the
integration of new arrivals. Policy actors also frequently discussed the well-established
migrant communities from Turkey and Morocco, the former Dutch colony of Suriname and
the Dutch Caribbean possessions formerly known as the Netherlands Antilles.

7.2.1 History of Dutch policy approaches promoting multiculturalism and
integration

This section gives a brief overview of key events and important government policy
responses relating to multiculturalism in the Netherlands in the latter half of the 20th
century by expanding upon Table 17 below. By the late 1970s, academic research and policy
advisory reports frequently claimed that the Netherlands had become a de facto
multicultural society, reinforced by the perception that Dutch society was a "community of
minorities" (Scholten and Holzhacker 2009: 89). These views were epitomised in a report
by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor
het Regeringsbeleid; WRR; 1979) which in turn contributed to a change in political
discourse, culminating in the development of the 1983 Minorities Policy. The theoretical
premise rested on the interaction between promoting bonding and bridging social capital
for people with a migrant background, where ‘bonding’ within minority groups was an
essential precondition for ‘bridging’ across cultural boundaries (Scholten and Holzhacker
2009: 89-90). The goal of the policy was to “achieve ‘a society in which the minorities that
live in the Netherlands, as individuals and as a group, can have an equal place and full opportunities for development’, by means of promoting emancipation and socio-economic participation and combating discrimination” (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1983: 10).

Table 17 Timeline of selected key events in the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Indonesia gains independence, wave of migration from Dutch East Indies to the Netherlands begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Surinam gains independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Expiry of immigration treaty leads to large wave of migrants from Surinam arriving in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Minorities Policy introduced, formally acknowledging the Netherlands as a country of immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>’National minorities debate’ initiated by Frits Bolkestein, positioning European civilisation and liberalism against the Islamic world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>First version of civic integration and language courses (inburgering) for non-EU foreigners implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Social democrat Paul Scheffer challenges Dutch pillarisation and tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Pim Fortuyn elected as leader of Livable Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6 May, assassination of Pim Fortuyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Theo van Gogh release controversial film Submission, Part I about the difficulties faced by Islamic women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 November, Theo van Gogh is murdered in response to the film</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>The newly formed populist rightwing Party for Freedom (PVV; Partij voor de Vrijheid), led by Geert Wilders, wins 9 seats in the Dutch election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>New Civic Integration Act, obliges all non-EU foreigners to undertake civic integration and language courses (inburgering)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Election of centre-right coalition led by Prime Minister Mark Rutte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles into ‘special municipalities’ and ‘constituent countries’</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Rutte’s government explicitly distances itself from multiculturalism</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>Election of Grand Coalition led by Prime Minister Mark Rutte</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Changes to inburgering: state no longer financially supports immigrant integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>The PVV becomes the second largest party in the Dutch parliament, winning 20 seats</td>
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In 2000, Paul Scheffer from the Labour Party (PvdA; Partij van de Arbeid) sparked debate over integration policy through his essay The Multicultural Drama (Het multiculturele drama) by challenging Dutch tolerance and the pillarisation model. The crux of his argument was that pillarisation, which will be explained in the next section, led policymakers to turn a blind eye to anti-Western values and practices despite the 1983 Minorities Policy emphatically rejecting cultural relativism in favour of a multicultural approach (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1983: 107; Scholten and Holzhacker 2009: 164).
At the same time, Scheffer argued that the Dutch left had become indifferent to widening inequality between the mostly autochtoon majority, and the allochtoon minority which seemed to have become ‘stuck’ in a situation of socio-economic deprivation (Prins and Saharso 2010: 76-78). From 2002, integration policy began to incorporate assimilationist attitudes under Rita Verdonk, the Minister of Immigration and Integration from 2003 to 2007. Her so-called ‘Integration Policy New Style’ shifted the focus from the socio-economic domain to the socio-cultural, with “cultural differences . . . now framed as problematic cultural distances” (Scholten 2013: 104).

This shift occurred within a tumultuous time in Dutch integration politics, with the assassinations of the controversial populist politician, Pim Fortuyn on the 6th of May 2002, and of filmmaker Theo van Gogh on the 4th of November 2004. Fortuyn had been outspoken against multiculturalism and the incompatibility of Islam with Dutch society. Similarly, van Gogh’s film Submission, Part I featured Ayaan Hirsi Ali who also was highly critical of the treatment of Islamic women (Prins and Saharso 2010: 77-81). Fortuyn challenged Dutch taboos and radically transformed Dutch political discourse under a mantra of free speech known as ‘new realism’. The murder of Fortuyn in particular brought about a populist revolt against the mainstream establishment, with arguments in favour of multiculturalism flipped on their head, and proponents silenced as being ‘politically incorrect’ (Prins and Saharso 2010: 78). This populism eventually settled around the personality of Geert Wilders, whose newly formed populist radical-right Party for Freedom (PVV; Partij voor de Vrijheid), won nine seats in the 2006 election. Wilders has continued to be a dominant force in Dutch politics, with the PVV now the second largest party after the 2017 election, following the spectacular decline of the PvdA (van Holsteyn 2018: 1364-1365).

7.2.2 Recent developments

As mentioned earlier, the legacy of Rita Verdonk as Minister for Immigration and Integration has been significant. The focus on socio-cultural integration during Verdonk’s tenure culminated in the 2007 Civic Integration Act (Wet Inburgering). The legislation obliges all non-EU foreigners to undertake civic integration and language courses. Through the inburgering process, people are expected to have an understanding of Dutch language

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The Dutch term allochtoon literally translates as ‘from another soil’, and autochtoon translates as ‘from this soil’. These terms were previously used to differentiate between immigrants and their descendants, and the native-born ethnic Dutch population. However, in 2016 the WRR and the CBS abandoned use of the terms due to stigmatisation. Instead, the proposed replacement terminology is ‘people with a migrant background’ and ‘people with a Dutch background’ (Nederlandse Omroep Stichting 2016). This chapter will predominantly use the preferred terminology instead of ‘ethnic minority’, ‘cultural minority’, or ‘immigrant’ where appropriate. This preferred terminology was also used by the interview participants also.
and society. *Inburgering* participants also learn about Dutch values including adhering to Dutch laws, speaking the Dutch language, and respecting individual rights including gender equality and LGBT emancipation (Scholten 2013: 105). Through the legislation, permanent residency status was also tied to successfully completing a civic integration test. Through Verdonk’s ‘Integration Policy New Style’, ethnic minority associations began to have stricter conditions in order receive government funding, with ethno-specific projects falling out of favour (Meer et al. 2015: 709). This foreshadows one of the arguments made by multiple interview participants: group-specific integration approaches have been all but abandoned in favour of mainstreamed policy (Gebhardt 2016: 747-748; van Breugel and Scholten 2017: 518-520).

Following the election of Rutte’s centre-right coalition in 2010, the government explicitly abandoned multiculturalism in 2011 in response to the multicultural backlash (van Breugel and Scholten 2017: 519). This declaration was one more step in the path toward an approach focusing on assimilation. Similarly, Rutte’s second cabinet formed by a grand coalition changed the funding model of *inburgering* in 2013. Instead of financially supporting immigrants to take the compulsory courses, the government introduced a system of interest-bearing loans (Gebhardt 2016: 747-748). This policy change codified what is now called ‘migrant’s own responsibility’ to integrate (Meer et al. 2015: 709). Given the formal retreat from multiculturalism, the chapter instead focuses on integration as a proxy for policies which may also partially promote multiculturalism. This is explained in greater detail in Chapter 4.

### 7.2.3 Institutional settings

The relationships connecting the governance and implementation of policy approaches promoting integration are depicted in Figure 4. In the Netherlands, there is no single agency that provides centralised and coordinated oversight of integration. As van Breugel and Scholten (2017: 519-520) describe, the Netherlands has mainstreamed immigrant integration policies into other generic frameworks such as education, employment or housing. This withdrawal is representative of the Dutch state’s expectation of individual responsibility and self-reliance. Similar to Sweden, responsibility for many of these mainstreamed policy areas is devolved to municipal governments. However, it is difficult for municipalities to implement integration policies that contradict the national approach of migrant self-responsibility.

According to the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (*College voor de Rechten van de Mens; CRM*), human rights policy in the Netherlands is predicated on the principle of non-
discrimination and equal treatment (CRM 2017: 11). Protection from discrimination is a constitutionally entrenched right, with Article 1 of the first chapter in the Dutch constitution declaring that (2008: 5):

All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted.

The CRM is the statutory agency responsible for the oversight of human rights and anti-discrimination in the Netherlands. It was established by the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights Act 2011 (CRM 2018: 9), and replaced the former Dutch Equal Treatment Commission (Commissie Gelijke Behandeling; CGB). The CRM’s (2018) primary tasks are to provide opinion on discrimination cases, conduct research into human rights issues, educate the public and advise government.

There are also a range of independent NGOs that have been engaged by municipalities to provide anti-discrimination services in line with national anti-discrimination legislation, such as RADAR, Art.1 and IDEM Rotterdam. The services provided range from receiving
discrimination complaints, taking legal action against discriminatory organisations, delivering preventative and educative programs, and consulting with organisations about how to reduce structural discrimination (RADAR 2018; Art.1 2018; IDEM Rotterdam 2018). Other NGOs, such as the Dutch Council for Refugees (VluchtelingenWerk Nederland), provide integration support services for new arrivals. However, the ethno-specific organisations have been largely defunded in recent years in the move towards policy mainstreaming. This is a prominent theme that is explored later in the chapter.

Additionally, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid; SZW) has some policy responsibility for monitoring the socio-economic integration of people with a migrant background. Likewise, statutory organisations such as the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau; SCP) and the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid; WRR) provides research, policy options and policy evaluations for government and public agencies, including in the areas of discrimination and the integration of people with a migrant background (SCP 2018; WRR 2018).

The ‘pillarisation’ of Dutch society is an important institutional framework, and is often discussed alongside with Dutch policy approaches for integrating migrants (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 73-74; Koopmans 2006; Prins and Saharso 2010). Dutch pillarisation historically involved the establishment of four so-called ‘religious-ideological pillars’ of Protestantism, Catholicism, Socialism and Liberalism, each of which maintained separated organisations including political parties, unions, news media, schools and universities (Lijphart 1976). It has been argued that this arrangement of ‘consociational democracy’ was then informally expanded to include a pillar for new migrants, with migrants claiming their rights under the Dutch constitution to establish their own ‘’self-organisations’ and participatory boards’, along with their own religious schools as a means of emancipation (Prins and Saharso 2010: 73-74). Due to the informal nature of the additional pillar for new migrants, this account of directly linking multicultural policies with pillarisation in the Netherlands is contested. For example, some scholars have argued that Dutch society was already de-pillarising in the 1960s and 1970s (Maussen 2006; Duyvendak and Scholten 2011; Vink 2007). Others suggest that integration policy was never explicitly framed in terms of pillarised arrangements (Scholten 2013; Duyvendak and Scholten 2009), or that pillarisation may have been an unsuitable model for integrating migrants (Koopmans 2006: 5). Duyvendak and Scholten (2010: 42) argue that multiculturalism and pillarisation were not adopted as normative ideals in the Netherlands but instead were principally used as
pragmatic policy solutions. Nonetheless, the informal additional pillar claimed by migrants emerged frequently as a theme from the interview participants as a model for migrant emancipation through policies promoting multiculturalism.

7.3 Findings: Dutch multicultural policymaking from 2007 to 2017

The purpose of this section is to assess Dutch policy approaches supporting multiculturalism from 2007 to 2017. The section begins by summarising data from the Multiculturalism Policy Index which shows that the Netherlands is one of the only countries that has retreated from multiculturalism. The section then discusses empirical findings from semi-structured elite interviews with policy actors, triangulated with supplementary documentation and scholarly literature, and is structured according to the REC Framework. It appears that the Dutch state was reluctant in its responses to racial discrimination. Likewise, group-specific policy approaches in the area of equal opportunity have been abandoned in favour of mainstreaming. The rejection of multiculturalism by the Dutch government is most notable when considering mutual cultural accommodation. Migrants and people with a migrant background are expected to take responsibility for their own integration, with the state providing very limited support.

7.3.1 Policy presence: secondary data from the Multiculturalism Policy Index

The Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP Index) measures the presence and evolution of multicultural policies in 21 democracies, including the Netherlands (Banting and Kymlicka 2013; MCP Index Project 2016). The MCP Index data is the leading cross-national comparative index of its kind.

As described in Chapter 3, the Immigrant Minority Policy subset is divided into 8 indicators and each country is given a score of 1 (if a policy is present), 0.5 (if the policy is partially present), and 0 (if the policy is not present) (MCP Index Project 2016: 4-6). From a total possible score of 8 points, the Netherlands has received scores of 2.5 (1980), 3.0 (1990), 4.0 (2000) and 2.0 (2010). A summary of the Netherlands’ scores is included in Table 18 below.

The mean score for 2010 across all 21 democracies measured was approximately 3.6. The Netherlands rated in the lowest third of countries, with Austria and Italy receiving a rating of 1.5, France a rating of 2.0, and Germany and Greece a rating of 2.5. Australia scored

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68 For a more detailed explanation of the ‘Decision Rules’ used to measure the presence of multicultural policies, see (Multiculturalism Policy Index Project 2016: 4-6).
8.0, Sweden scored 7.0 and the UK scored 5.5. The Netherlands’ 2010 score of 2.0 indicates a relatively poor performance in its development of policies promoting multiculturalism, compared to most other countries in the Index. As Table 18 indicates, the Netherlands has reversed some of its policies following a peak score of 4.0 in 2000. By 2010, no single indicator received a full score. Instead, multicultural policies are only partially present in the areas of ‘Media’, ‘Exemptions’, ‘Dual Citizenship’ and ‘Funding Ethnic Groups’. The Netherlands’ 2010 score is now the lowest it has ever been since 1980.

Table 18 The Netherlands’ scores from the MCP Index (Immigrant Minority Policy)

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<tr>
<td>Affirmation*69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Curriculum*70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media*71</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemptions*72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Citizenship*73</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Ethnic Groups*74</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingual Education*75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative Action*76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL SCORE</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
</tr>
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*Source: MCP Index Project (2016: 72)*

*Affirmation’ is defined by the MCP Index as “constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal levels and the existence of a government ministry, secretariat or advisory board to implement this policy in consultation with ethnic communities” (2016: 4).

*School Curriculum’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum” (2016: 4).

*Media’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing” (2016: 5).

*Exemptions’ is defined by the MCP Index as “exemptions from dress codes (either by statute or court cases)” (2016: 5).

*Dual Citizenship’ is defined by the MCP Index as whether immigrants and their offspring “may retain their original citizenship even after acquiring the citizenship of the host country” (2016: 5).

*Funding Ethnic Groups’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the funding of ethnic group organizations or activities” (2016: 5).

*Bilingual Education’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction” (2016: 6).

*Affirmative Action’ is defined by the MCP Index as whether the “country has an affirmative action policy that targets [disadvantaged] immigrant minorities” in either the public sector, the private sector or both. Such action must extend beyond human rights policies to include “target action aimed at removing barriers or more positive action measures such as quotas or preferential hiring” (2016: 6).
Between 2000 and 2010, Dutch policy reversed in three MCP Index categories: ‘Affirmation’, ‘Media’ and ‘Affirmative Action’. Although the MCP Index found that the Netherlands’ does retain some vestiges of multiculturalism, there has been a significant shift in policy focus towards assimilation. Furthermore, Dutch integration policy does not make “any explicit affirmation of multiculturalism nor any separate ministry or agency to implement the policy” (2016: 72-73). For ‘Media’, the public broadcasting system and media licencers are not required to include ethnic representation or cultural sensitivity in their mandates (MCP Index Project 2016: 74). However, the Index does show that some accommodations are made for cultural and religious minorities. Finally, for ‘Affirmative Action’, the Act on the promotion of Minority Groups in the Labour Market was legislated in 1994 and required employers to report to government on how well immigrant minorities were represented in their workplaces. However, formal quotas were not required and many employers chose not to submit reports. The law was subsequently repealed in 2004 (Entzinger 2006: 191).

The MCP Index Project shows a reversal and a decline of policies promoting multiculturalism in the Netherlands between 2000 and 2010. However, the Index only claims to describe the presence and evolution of multicultural policy across 21 democracies. It does not seek to evaluate the impact or effectiveness of these policies. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the MCP Index Project is limited in some ways. In particular, the data isn’t disaggregated by municipality. There is some evidence of municipal autonomy in the Netherlands, although this decentralisation largely came to an end in 2013 when the state abolished financial support for immigrant integration (van Breugel and Scholten 2017: 518-520; Gebhardt 2016: 747-748). Since the Index only measures the presence of policies in eight categories across a wide range of countries, it loses some of the depth and complexities form individual cases.

Some previous studies evaluating immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands have suggested that the multicultural approach had a detrimental effect on socio-cultural and socio-economic integration outcomes (Koopmans and Statham 2001: 13-56; Ireland 2004: 24-26, 116-162; Joppke 2004: 248). The premise of the following discussion is to expand upon the MCP Index and these earlier studies by providing rich qualitative data from Dutch policy actors. The discussion is structured using the REC Framework of policy objectives for multiculturalism.
7.3.2 Racial discrimination: state reluctance

In light of the policy retreat indicated by the data from the MCP Index above, the next three sections primarily draw upon new empirical research, with the findings analysed using the REC Framework. As detailed in Chapter 3, the REC Framework is a tool for operationalising the policy objectives of multiculturalism. These objectives are:

- **(R)** - reduce discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnicity or cultural background
- **(E)** - provide an equal opportunity for diverse cultural groups to fully participate in society
- **(C)** - facilitate a mutual cultural accommodation between immigrant groups, the state, and broader society without forced assimilation

The purpose of this section is to describe the perspectives of policy actors on efforts to combat racial discrimination. The empirical findings are based on 7 semi-structured interviews with 8 policy actors. 3 participants were public servants, 3 participants were statutory officers, and 2 participants were members of civil society. 2 participants were also prominent migrant or ethnic minority leaders. In addition to the interview data, the section also draws upon political speeches, government or statutory agency reports, other grey literature and scholarly literature to triangulate the findings. The section begins by unpacking the competing narratives over the issue of discrimination and the apparent reluctance by the Rutte government to tackle the problem. The section later explores the example of positive action in the Dutch police force as a way to address ethnic profiling and its consequences.

*Conflicting approaches to constitutional prohibition on discrimination*

Although there is important and profound symbolism in the entrenched right to be free from discrimination in Article 1 of the Dutch constitution, this has not been reflected in national government priorities. In a 2015 interview for the newspaper Metro, the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte argued that the Dutch Government could not prevent discrimination from occurring in the labour market (Umar 2015; translated in Aidyn 2015):
Discrimination is still very common in the Netherlands and that whether your name is Mohammed or Jan still matters, when it comes to a job interview... [However] discrimination is something that I cannot solve. How paradoxical it may seem, the solution lies within Mohammed himself. I cannot tell people to please stop discriminating and to stop judging someone by their character and knowledge. But when discrimination does occur, Mohammed has a choice: he can stop applying for job interviews due to the fact that he is hurt or insulted, or he can move on. People who are new to this country always had to adapt and deal with prejudices and discrimination. You have to fight your way in.

His remarks downplayed the role of the state, and instead instructed people with a migrant background to take more personal responsibility and push harder to get into employment. This is one example of the phrase which was repeated by many of the interview participants: Dutch policy expects that ‘it is the migrant’s own responsibility to integrate.’ In response to Rutte’s remarks in the Metro interview, Participant N03fa described the Government’s position:

[Discrimination] is your own problem and [therefore] your own responsibility. ‘Your own responsibility’: that is a core concept, that it’s all individual and your own responsibility. – Participant N03fa, statutory officer

When asked about whether Prime Minister Rutte’s rhetoric is matched in policy terms, Participant N03fb expanded on the implications of the transfer of responsibility from state to individual:

I think [the expectation that migrants need to fight harder is] in the policies nowadays because there is more emphasis on your own responsibility, and [the Government] facilitates less. Access to integration like language courses ... is troubled because [people with a migrant background] have to pay a lot. – Participant N03fb, statutory officer

From a slightly different perspective, Participant N07f expressed her disappointment in Prime Minister Rutte’s remarks, explaining that the government’s discourse is “really ignoring what [racism and discrimination] means, and especially when it’s the second and third generation”. She argued that in the Metro interview, Rutte equated people with foreign-sounding names as being newcomers, and that his comments appeared to lack recognition for the discrimination and prejudice faced by people who are well integrated in Dutch society, but whose parents or grandparents were migrants.

Participant N03fa also suggested that there has been a growing acceptance of discrimination that targets people with a migrant background:

You see a kind of ‘codification of discrimination’... On the level of legislation, for instance, there is a legislation on a ban on the burka... In terms of discrimination, the religious freedom to express yourself in public spaces has been diminished. – Participant N03fa, statutory officer
Likewise, there are implications for hyper-diverse populations in cities because equal treatment law is not necessarily translating effectively into everyday life. Although equal treatment law is supposed to protect people from experiencing racial discrimination, one participant argued that many people are reluctant to make reports and complaints.

At a local level, we try to tell people if [they] have been experiencing discrimination ... that they can report this. But it's something that is not in our DNA ... [because] people have the feeling that they are judged. – Participant N06f, civil society

Because the Dutch government relies so heavily on the reactive complaint-based legislative mechanism, people may not be gaining adequate recourse when racial discrimination occurs. According to Participant N06f at least, victims of discrimination are less likely to be coming forward if they don’t feel safe or comfortable to exercise their rights. This is further exacerbated by the assimilationist political climate, where political elites like Wilders and the PVV have significant influence over the policy platforms that other parties take to elections. This will be explored further in the section on mutual cultural accommodation.

The view that the Dutch government is unable to resolve discrimination is not uniformly held. Participant N05f recognised dual competing narratives from within the Second Rutte Cabinet, made up of a grand coalition between Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s centre-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD; Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie) and the Labour Party (PvdA; Partij van de Arbeid). On the one hand, she acknowledged the sentiments placing responsibility on ethnic minorities as represented by Rutte from the VVD: that people with a migrant background ought to fight harder themselves to overcome discrimination. She also highlighted the strong anti-discrimination rhetoric from the Deputy Prime Minister Lodewijk Asscher from the PvdA who proposed companies convicted of discrimination should be barred from government procurement contracts.

Participant N05f did also acknowledge the criticism levelled at Asscher by other opposition MPs for not doing enough to counter discrimination. In 2016, Sadet Karabulut from the Socialist Party (SP; Socialistische Partij) claimed that despite good intentions, there has been little action or enforcement (Pieters 2016). Similarly, Steven van Weyenberg from the Democrats 66 party (D66; Democraten 66) criticised the apparently toothless rhetoric, because no companies found to be guilty of discrimination had been fined, taken to court, or excluded from government procurement (Pieters 2016). In light of this critique, Participant N05f suggested that Asscher’s measures had more of a norm-shaping objective:
The criticism . . . is that companies don’t often get convicted for discrimination . . . so in that sense, it’s more of a signal . . . [or] a warning . . . to companies: like "we are very serious about this, and we’re not going to give you a contract or a tender if you’re guilty of [discrimination]". – Participant N05f, public servant

Although dual narratives on anti-discrimination could reasonably be expected from both sides of a broad centre-left and centre-right coalition government, Participant N05f identified a renewed focus by some policymakers on state-led interventions addressing discrimination. She argued the prevailing view had been that existing anti-discrimination and equal treatment legislation was sufficient protection, but recently there had been a realisation that the state can, and ought to, play a more active role. Up to the time of interviewing in 2016, Participant N04m’s view was that the Dutch government had become increasingly open to changing its approach:

There’s a lot of pressure on the issue of labour market discrimination. . . . [The] Dutch government has not been very forward in making new regulations or forcing companies to act upon this. But [now] . . . as [high] as of the [Social and Economic Council; Sociaal-Economische Raad] . . . they’ve published a report which is called Discrimination doesn’t work! and there’s an enormous focus on that companies have to act and to comply on principles of diversity. – Participant N04m, civil society

Participant N03fa has also observed two of the predominant attitudes about why some people with a migrant background experience labour market inequality. For the first view, she identified that some government policymakers place the blame for the inequality on the individuals themselves for making poor choices about their education. In contrast, she also described an opposing view that suggests discrimination is a significant barrier to the labour market:

There is the other view that [labour market inequality] is . . . [because people with a migrant background] have also to deal with discrimination. It’s not only . . . their accent, [but] people don’t want them even if they are speaking perfectly Dutch. So there is a difference in problem diagnosis. – Participant N03fa, statutory officer

In sum, opinion was divided about the causes of racial discrimination and the appropriate role for government, particularly in the case of the labour market. This serves as an important premise for considering interview participants’ individual reflections on policy responses to discrimination and equal opportunity later in the chapter.

Reimagining multiculturalism: police responses to ethnic profiling

Despite reluctance from the Rutte government for tackling discrimination, a different narrative emerged in relation to the Dutch Police Organisation. Ethnic profiling attracted significant attention in 2016 following news stories about police pulling over national football player Kenneth Vermer and the rapper Typhoon, allegedly because they were
driving expensive cars (BBC 2016). Similarly, some concerns had emerged about racist attitudes and stereotyping expressed by police officers (Nieuwenhuis 2015). Due to the concerns about ethnic profiling by the police, policymakers decided to act. Participant N04m referred to the reform process within the national Police Organisation to highlight how multiculturalism had been reinterpreted in the Netherlands:

[Multiculturalism] is no longer a goal and a concept which is embraced by broad political movements anymore. . . . [However,] the Police Organisation [released a document] called, "De Kracht van het Verschil", "The Power of Difference" . . . with targets like 25% of all the people in leading positions inside the organisation, with all new vacancies have to be filled with people with another ethnic background. They don't call it positive action, but . . . it's almost a quota arrangement which goes much further than positive action. – Participant N04m, civil society

Positive action to boost cultural diversity in the police was viewed as a solution to improve relations between police and minority communities. Participant N04m later described the Police Organisation's successful positive action campaign in the 1990s to boost representation by women and people with a migrant background. Boogaard and Roggeband suggest that women and ethnic minorities in the Dutch Police Organisation are sometimes notably positively recognised for bringing "valuable competences into the organization", and challenge structural inequalities (Boogaard and Roggeband 2010: 71-72). More recently though, the number of police employees with a non-Western migrant background has fallen from 6.8 per cent in 2009 to 6 per cent in 2018. This is despite an increase in non-Western migration from 11 to 13 per cent over the same period (CBS 2019; Janssen 2019; Pieters 2019). In response, a spokesperson from the Police Organisation claimed that the underlying cause of this decrease was because of cabinet policy under Prime Minister Rutte. As a result, the police did not have active policy measures to increase the number of police officers from non-Dutch backgrounds between 2010 and 2015 (Janssen 2019; Pieters 2019). Participant N04m linked the slippage from these previous successes to contemporary social problems in some locations like The Hague:

Diversity inside the Police Organisation has gone down last 5 years . . . On the issue of ethnic profiling, there's a lot of commotion . . . [and] we almost had real race riots in certain parts of The Hague [in 2015]. So there's a great need to involve more people with another ethnic background inside Police Organisation, because for example the old west part of Rotterdam has a population which is 70% ethnic and minority background. – Participant N04m, civil society

In other words, this quote suggests that a lack of cultural diversity can reinforce ethnic profiling, in turn leading to tensions and conflict. He also drew comparison with racism in other countries' police services, highlighting that the Netherlands is learning from
international counterparts as a basis for its ‘The Power of Difference’ positive action measures:

If you look at the examples in the UK or in France with riots between ethnic youngsters and police, it’s always things like [ethnic profiling that] . . . are trigger events. . . . It’s a professional interest to involve more people with ethnic minority background inside [the] Police Organisation. . . . It’s acknowledged also by the government and also by the Police Organisation. – Participant N04m, civil society

Although improved representation for cultural minorities within the Dutch police force is unlikely to be a panacea for ethnic profiling and its consequences, this example does provide some contrast to the stark tone from Prime Minister Rutte. Positive action measures undertaken by the Dutch police suggest a willingness to draw upon multiculturalism for policy solutions despite the state’s rejection of the concept. For example, new positive action measures were introduced in 2016, including a target that "25 per cent of new operational employees" should come from a culturally diverse background. This target was achieved by 2017, one year ahead of schedule (Janssen 2019; Pieters 2019). This aligns with the findings from the MCP Index Project that indicate the influence and legacy of multiculturalism still remains in the Netherlands (2016: 73). There is a clear understanding from the leadership of the Police Organisation about the importance of maintaining a workforce that is representative of cultural diversity in the Netherlands. By extension, these benefits could help to curb ethnic profiling and improve relationships between police and communities of people with a migrant background.

In summary, the findings above suggest that Dutch policy responses to racial discrimination have been characterised in the following ways. Anti-discrimination is central to Dutch human rights policy and is constitutionally entrenched. As described in the institutional settings, there was a network of anti-discrimination NGOs that collaborated with the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (CRM) and municipalities. However, there were competing narratives over what the role of the state should be in this policy area. On the one hand, Prime Minister Rutte said that people should fight harder to overcome discrimination, intimating that existing legislation was sufficient. Others disagreed, such as the Police Organisation which recognised that positive action could improve the cultural diversity of their workforce. They argued that improving the number of frontline employees from culturally diverse backgrounds could help to address issues such as ethnic profiling by police.
7.3.3 Equal opportunity: the labour market and socio-economic integration

The purpose of this section is to unpack perspectives from policy actors about how Dutch policies respond to the issue of equal opportunity. As Reeve’s definition states, equal opportunity requires that individuals should be “equally placed with respect to opportunities to compete for a good” (2009: 155). Recalling the Venn diagram in Figure 1 from Chapter 3, there are instances where the lines between REC objectives can overlap. In the Netherlands, this is particularly true for discrimination and equal opportunity in the labour market. Dutch policy actors repeatedly identified labour market discrimination as forming a significant barrier to socio-economic integration. This section begins by exploring some of the policy responses in this area, framed in terms of equal opportunity. The second part of the section goes on to address the impact of ‘mainstreaming’ on socio-economic integration. In addition to the interview data, this section draws upon government reports and other grey literature to triangulate the findings.

Policies addressing equal opportunity and discrimination in the labour market

The labour market was identified by some interviewees as a significant policy domain for the issues of equal opportunity and discrimination. Participant N05f had been involved as a researcher in multiple studies exploring the nature and the extent of labour market discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. In 2016, people with a non-Western migration background had an unemployment rate of 13.2 per cent, compared with the overall unemployment rate of 5.4 per cent in December 2016 (CBS 2017b, 2017c). However, she stated that even after adjusting the statistics to account for criteria such as educational background, there was a component of the higher unemployment rate attributable to racial discrimination. She went on to explain how her work had delved deeper to demonstrate discrimination:

We also did studies . . . [where] we send out CV’s to actual job openings and then we had one CV with a Dutch name and one CV with, for example, a Moroccan name, . . . [these studies] all showed that there is discrimination in the labour market. . . . [Some people] just gave up because it's such a negative experience. . . . Some other people say, “Well, I only look for jobs within multinationals or the government, because they are used to a diverse [workforce]”.

– Participant N05f, public servant

In describing the scale of labour market discrimination, Participant N04m stated that approximately 20 per cent of the discrimination cases received by his organisation over the past two decades related to the labour market. He said that historically, discrimination tended to be due to ethnic origin. A similar trend is found in the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (CRM). In 2016, racial discrimination was the most common ground for
opinions given by the CRM, with 23 per cent of all opinions being race-related (College voor de Rechten van de Mens 2018: 17-18).

In response to this problem, The Hague municipality initiated a policy of blind recruitment. Participant N05f discussed the success of the response:

> As a result [of our studies], the municipality of The Hague introduced [blind recruitment] . . . [removing] the names and everything that is related to background . . . Last week they had . . . [an evaluation] of this study . . . [and] they said it was a success.\(^{77}\) – Participant N05f, public servant

Although blind recruitment and anonymous applications were one proposed policy solution, it was not universally accepted. For example, Participant N01m was generally sceptical about the effectiveness of blind recruitment, referring directly to The Hague’s pilot. His preferred option for the municipality of Rotterdam was to focus on training professionals to identify, recognise and address discrimination within organisations.

Participant N01m then explained that in Rotterdam, this had been institutionalised through the ‘Rotterdam Platform Against Labour Market Discrimination’ (*Rotterdam Platform tegen Arbeidsmarktdiscriminatie*). The Platform focused on equal treatment policy across all characteristics, including age and disability, not just race or ethnicity. Participant N01m described it as a group of 14 of the largest employers in Rotterdam, brought together by the municipality. He was not very forthcoming when giving specifics about organisations’ ‘targets’ and ‘goals’. One plausible explanation was that he was trying to obscure the lack of group-specific initiatives. When pressed, his response indicated that the Municipality of Rotterdam had chosen to not specifically focus on boosting representation for people with a migrant background:

> The municipality itself [doesn't] have a targeted group approach when it comes to our personnel, but [instead has] a target on providing internships for young people . . . disengaged [from] the labour market . . . due to a lack of education, or work experience. – Participant N01m, public servant

The lack of a group-specific approach was reflective of the mainstreaming of immigrant integration into other policy areas. This will be explored further later in the chapter. Participant N04m also provided further insights regarding the strategy behind the Rotterdam Platform:

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\(^{77}\) Participant N05f qualified The Hague's evaluation of the blind recruitment project: “They compared the amount of people who actually answer to job openings within this project to one year ago . . . [and] more people of minority background are responding, and [they] hired more people with minority backgrounds, so it's a success . . . I think from a scientific point of view you could argue, well, you still don't know if the [claimed success] is related to the project or not”.

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It’s an attempt to start an affirmative action program, although a lot of companies are not already fully convinced. Companies are very much looking for possibilities to integrate people which come from overseas or have a disability because otherwise they will be facing government regulations. One thing companies don’t like is extra regulations. – Participant N04m, civil society

Participant N01m did not identify a specific policy from the Municipality of Rotterdam to start regulating non-compliant firms. However, the inference from Participant N04m was that an ‘informal threat’ of regulation was used to motivate hesitant companies.

One of the direct outcomes from the Rotterdam Platform was the Public Transport Organisation of Rotterdam (RET; Rotterdamse Elektrische Tram) recognising cultural bias within its recruiting practices. In particular, RET had noticed that their entrance test had a high fail rate, and that people with a migrant background were disproportionately affected:

80 per cent of [applicants] don’t pass [RET’s entrance] test… [and] we can support them with this because the National Association of Psychologists has done research on… cultural bias in tests… So [test bias] is one of targets [RET] have chosen. – Participant N04m, civil society

Despite the contestation in public discourse over the state’s role in promoting equal opportunity and combatting discrimination, policymakers had still made considerable efforts. There was a strong emphasis on developing initiatives to decrease discrimination and foster equal opportunity in the labour market. However, the general impression from the interview data was that these initiatives and programmes are localised and fragmented. Oftentimes, these efforts occurred from within municipalities rather than stemming from a single, coherent national framework.

Socio-economic integration: the impact of ‘policy mainstreaming’ on equal treatment

Integration was a central concept that emerged from the interviews in relation to equal opportunity in the Netherlands. The first of the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration in the EU states that “integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States” (EU Justice and Home Affairs Council 2004). Commitment to the Common Basic Principles was reaffirmed by the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council in 2014, with the recognition that the ‘two-way process’ “requires efforts from both migrants and receiving societies and is critical for tapping into the potential of migration and for enhancing social cohesion” (EU Justice and Home Affairs Council 2014). This definition closely aligns with the Swedish understanding of integration and mutual cultural accommodation detailed in Chapter 5. In contrast, Dutch policy has retreated away from the notion that integration is a two-way process. Rather, the interview
participants tend to argue that emphasis has been placed on migrants’ own responsibility to integrate.

Broadly speaking, integration in the Netherlands is understood by policymakers under two categories: socio-economic and socio-cultural. This section focuses on the socio-economic dimension, but socio-cultural integration will be considered in the next section in terms of mutual cultural accommodation.

Participant N02m described the distinction between the two:

The definition we use in the Netherlands is that... integration has two dimensions. The socio-economic dimension, so education, labour market situation, income, housing, and also in direct health and criminality. And the other dimension [is] the socio-cultural, or the more normative dimension which consists of beliefs, attitudes, orientations on the Netherlands on their own ethnic background. – Participant N02m, public servant

He went on by explaining how the goals of socio-economic integration is framed by Dutch policy as ‘equal outcome’, with clear targets such as ‘equal positions’ in the labour market, in education, in housing and in criminality.

Whilst the long-term policy goal was an ‘equal socio-economic position’ between people with Dutch and migrant backgrounds, Participant N02m highlighted that Dutch policy recognises that integration-as-equal-position is a process that takes time. In many cases, this takes longer than a single generation. Accordingly, the policy objective for the medium-term was a ‘proportional socio-economic position’, where people with a migrant background ought to be approaching the cohort of people with a Dutch background.

However, in recent years group-specific integration policies have been abolished. Their replacement are so-called ‘mainstreamed approaches’ that focus on reducing socio-economic barriers without operating in a paradigm of race or cultural diversity. Participant N02m used the examples of education and labour market inequality to explain how policy mainstreaming functions:

Most [integration] policy is mainstreamed.... [For example, schools] should handle the needs of individuals whether they are from Moroccan descent or Dutch descent in the same way.... [Group-specific approaches] has all been ended; [the] labour market approach for indigenous Dutch unemployed is, in effect, the same as for Turkish or Surinamese unemployed. – Participant N02m, public servant

Mainstreaming is also a significant policy paradigm in some municipalities. Participant N01m explained that when his city seeks to improve the socio-economic integration of young people, they do not take cultural background into consideration. In trying to explain the rationale behind policy mainstreaming, Participant N05f suggested:
It was a normative change that ethnic background should not matter and ... that it’s general things like socio-economic background of your parents that matters. But I'm not quite sure what was the exact reasoning behind the abolition [of group-specific policy]. – Participant N05f, public servant

Nonetheless, a key finding of an evaluation of Dutch socio-economic integration policy since 2000 was that although the students of a non-Western background do face disadvantage, the Dutch education system achieves proportionality. That is, second-generation Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans are just as well-educated as their Dutch counterparts with comparable characteristics. Additionally, the Surinamese-Dutch and Antillean-Dutch are only slightly less well-educated than Dutch native-born (SCP 2016: 5). Participant N02m used this data to argue that the Dutch education system is generally colour-blind.

We know from those kinds of analysis that our education system is colour-blind... Because of the average lower education level of parents of migrant pupils, [the 'educational gap'] transfers . . . over generations. But it works the same for indigenous Dutch as for immigrants. – Participant N02m, public servant

The same sentiment was also in Participant N05f’s discussion about policies to improve socio-economic integration:

We try to focus mostly on structural dimensions of integration, so [making] sure that people have a good education. . . . The policy is to provide ethnic minorities with enough human capital so that they can integrate into Dutch society on [a socio-economic] level. – Participant N05f, public servant

Despite these efforts of mainstreamed integration policy, Participant N05f suggested that second and third generation migrants with Moroccan and Surinamese backgrounds still lack equal opportunity due to racism and labour market discrimination. In particular, they felt unable to access better quality jobs despite their high levels of qualifications. Though they may be considered well-integrated, the feeling of societal exclusion and marginalisation due to discrimination could have been undermining integration policy:

They're not allowed to belong to the Dutch society because they're discriminated against: they're negatively stereotyped, [even though] they're very much 'oriented' towards the society . . . They were seen as highly integrated . . . but there you also see that they are turning away from Dutch society more. – Participant N05f, public servant

With the abolition of group-specific approaches due to policy mainstreaming, ethnic minority organisations and associations were also defunded. As Participant N03fa put it, mainstreaming has led to a ‘double handicap’:
There was no [specific] policy anymore on ethnic minorities, and [ethnic minority organisations] were not consulted anymore as they were before.... So the one thing was seen as detrimental to the other, a kind of double effect. – Participant N03fa, statutory officer

In other words, this double handicap meant that ethnic minority organisations were not consulted by policymakers to give feedback about potential implications of policy actions. At the same time, these organisations also could not assess the impact of policy mainstreaming on people with a migrant background due to a lack of resources. The impression given by some interview participants was that policymakers were now unable to accurately determine the extent of barriers facing people with racial or cultural minority backgrounds. This is because these factors were no longer considered to be relevant at a structural level.

In sum, Dutch policy responses to equal opportunity can be described as follows. The findings suggest that there was a strong research and evidence base for tracking and evaluating socio-economic integration for people with a migrant background. The education system appears to be statistically colour-blind because ethnicity does not seem to significantly affect educational outcomes. However, improved education and language proficiency do not necessarily translate to improved labour market integration. There were diverging views about the underlying causes of labour market inequalities. Some participants emphasised cultural background, such as labour market discrimination by employers during the hiring process. In contrast, others focused on structural barriers such as education.

Mainstreaming was another common theme in the interviews, with group-specific policies being replaced by mainstreamed approaches that focus on broader socio-economic barriers. Furthermore, some participants described mainstreaming as causing a double handicap. On the one hand, there was limited scope for consultation with specific cultural groups about policy decision-making. On the other, there was also a lack of funding for ethnic advocacy organisations to actually assess impacts for people with a migrant background.

7.3.4 Mutual cultural accommodation: Dutch rejection of multiculturalism

The purpose of this section is to explore how the Dutch government’s turn towards assimilation plays out in the area of mutual cultural accommodation. The section highlights how integration has been redefined from a two-way process into a very one-sided approach: immigrants are now responsible for their own integration. The section then examines Zwarte Piet, a Dutch Christmas character as a key flashpoint highlighting the nexus between
racism, tradition and colonialism. Following this, the section discusses the influence of the radical-right on shaping the tone of Dutch integration politics, arguing that ‘one-way integration’ is just assimilation by another name. In addition to the interview data, this section draws upon scholarly research and grey literature to triangulate the findings.

**Socio-cultural integration: migrants’ own responsibility to integrate**

Whilst there are clearly definable and measurable metrics for socio-economic integration, socio-cultural integration is more difficult to track. The goal of ‘equal positions’, as described by Participant N02m, was particularly limited in its usefulness even though there is an interplay between integration in the two domains:

*On the ideas of religion, other values, it’s very difficult to have an idea of ‘equal positions’ in terms of modernity of values, for example. So [while] the idea of equality and the proportionality is very suitable for the socio-economic dimension. . . it has its boundaries [and limitations] for the socio-cultural dimension.* – Participant N02m, public servant

The focus on socio-cultural integration was first introduced in 2003 by Rita Verdonk, the Ministry of Immigration and Integration. In contrast to previous integration policy which primarily concerned itself with socio-economic integration, academic Peter Scholten argues that Verdonk’s ‘Integration Policy New Style’ framed cultural difference as being “problematic cultural distances” (Scholten 2013: 104). Rather than cultivating the benefits of a culturally diverse society, in line with multiculturalism, the Netherlands took a distinctly assimilationist turn with *inburgering* (civic integration). *Inburgering* requires non-EU foreigners to take a course which teaches oral and written Dutch language proficiency and information about Dutch society. The Civic Integration Act 2007 (*Wet Inburgering*) linked permanent residence status on passing an *inburgering* test, and also required *inburgering* participants to pay for their own course fees and residence permits (Meer et al. 2015: 709; Gebhardt 2016: 747-748). As such, integration became a ‘self-responsibility’, stylised by most interview participants as ‘migrants’ own responsibility’:

*We have a colonial past, so in a way diversity has always been part of our culture. . . . I think what’s very typical now . . . at the national level, that there is this focus on the ‘own responsibility of migrants’. . . . I think that’s something that, at least for the Netherlands, [is] very distinctive at this moment.* – Participant N01m, public servant

Underpinning this policy paradigm is the premise that Dutch society shouldn’t have to adapt to newcomers. In light of the retreat from the conception of integration as a ‘two-way process’, Participant N05f was quite blunt in her assessment of Dutch integration policy:

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78 Gebhardt (2016: 747-748) points out that the only financial support for *inburgering* courses is an interest-bearing loan of up to 5000 euros.
“We don’t have any ['true'] integration policies right now”. Although she discussed mainstreamed approaches to reducing socio-economic barriers that people with a migrant background faced, these were described as indirect and colour-blind policy measures.

Participant N06f made reflections in a similar vein:

> What struck me in your [interview] questions is . . . these things that you are asking about are all issues about the ‘other side’ in the two-way process. The other side: . . . anti-discrimination and social cohesion, equal opportunity are all policies that government should have in place. We don’t have much. – Participant N06f, civil society

Almost all of the interview participants described Dutch integration policy in terms of ‘migrants’ own responsibility’, with many despairing that the expectation of assimilation is having adverse impacts on people with a migrant background. They explained that the mainstreaming of integration policy erodes the responsibility of Dutch society to adapt to new arrivals, further emphasising the shift towards assimilation. As discussed earlier, ethnic minority advocacy organisations and associations have been systematically defunded leading to a ‘double handicap’. This policy trend away from two-way integration has not gone unopposed though. For example, Participants N03fb and N03fa argued that integration is supposed to facilitate participation in society through providing access to human rights. They explained that it was incumbent on the society to make efforts to accommodate new arrivals and ethnic minorities.

Additionally, two participants argued that the ‘pillarisation’ model that facilitated Dutch multiculturalism has been dismantled. Participant N06f described the shift in thinking:

> [Multiculturalism] is closely related to [pillarisation]: . . . we try to deal with newcomers [saying], ‘. . . We treat you the same way: we have Protestants . . . Catholics . . . Socialists . . . minorities’ . . . [But] it didn’t work like that, and the pillarisation was not [functional] anymore because of secularisation . . . The framing was changed: . . . this is not good for society as a whole, so we should abolish the idea. – Participant N06f, civil society

As mentioned in the section on institutional settings earlier, some scholars are sceptical about the role that pillarisation has played in developing the foundation for Dutch multiculturalism. Instead perhaps, there is a mythology surrounding pillars that enabled societal tolerance and consociational political arrangements, or as Participant N03fa put it: people from different backgrounds lived “apart, together”. Nonetheless, the fact that some of the policymakers interviewed used pillarisation as a conceptual reference signifies its normative importance.
Some interview participants also highlighted an overlap between the domains of socio-cultural and socio-economic integration. Participant N06f raised concern that ‘one-sided integration’ may lead to detrimental socio-economic outcomes for society and people with a migrant background. Given the European migrant crisis of 2015-16, she claimed that there would be wide-ranging consequences if a large segment of society were to become reliant upon welfare:

Because of the larger influx of refugees suddenly . . . [some say inburgering] is so much one-sided, and people have to deal with so many obligations . . . We must learn from the past that if we are not careful then, people will not have jobs . . . and will distance themselves from the society. Perhaps we should change . . . so that they will have the chance to become part of society instead of [unwanted] citizens. – Participant N06f, civil society

These concerns had not been ignored by policymakers as there were some policy changes in response to the influx of asylum seekers since the autumn of 2015. Participant N06f described how by December 2015, a group of researchers from different national research institutes met together with policymakers. Although she said some researchers disagreed with the premise of ‘one-way integration’, the group agreed that there was a need for urgent policy measures to assist asylum seekers with accessing language skills to better prepare them for prospective employment. The research institutes advocated that asylum seekers ought to be able to access Dutch language training while waiting for their refugee status determination. By November 2016, the Rutte Government made this announcement (Stoffelen 2016):

[The] government decided to make it possible for asylum seekers who have a reasonable chance of getting their status to have access to professional language training . . . This policy has been laying on the table of different ministries and they couldn’t agree because we have a coalition government who are socialist and liberals . . . so it’s difficult for positive policies to really be implemented, or at least even embraced by the government. – Participant N06f, civil society

A policy announcement such as is this quite remarkable, given the constraints of a centre-left-centre-right coalition. Participant N06f was hopeful that this shift away from deterrence was indicative of a broader softening of tone, with the Rutte-Asscher cabinet to be more receptive to ideas that typify integration as a two-way process. Clearly, the Dutch state still implements two-way integration policy to some extent, even if rhetoric suggests the contrary. Even if these efforts could be stronger, some examples of this two-way approach did emerge from the interviews. Both Participant N05f mentioned a recent policy focus from government ministries on combating societal exclusion:
I think for a year or maybe a little bit longer, [the government ministries] were focused on this topic of discrimination and exclusion in a broader sense. So, who is the ‘we’ in the Netherlands? How diverse are we? – Participant N05f, public servant

Participant N02m went on to describe how the policy development was still in its early stages within the ministries, but that the goal was to inform and influence the direction of public debate:

What is very important is to have a better awareness within the media on how the news they are providing . . . is influencing inclusion and exclusion within society . . . they are influencing public opinion with consequences for behaviour of people, and a feeling of exclusion from minorities in the Netherlands. – Participant N02m, public servant

This section has shown that Dutch policy firmly articulated that migrants should take responsibility for their own integration. However, some interviews suggested a softening to this approach. At the time, there seemed to be a nascent discussion within the public sector expressing some willingness for Dutch society to adapt and accommodate new arrivals.

Zwarte Piet: A nexus between racism, tradition and colonialism

The Dutch interviews took place in November, and pre-Christmas traditions were well underway. Zwarte Piet is a controversial character because he is usually portrayed by actors wearing blackface makeup.79 Until recently, Zwarte Piet has been considered as a taboo topic because the tradition has an “odour of racism that nobody wants to address” (Participant N06f, civil society). However, there have been clashes in recent years between activists and protestors demanding that Zwarte Piet be reformed, and others seeking to preserve tradition (Bos 2016). Participant N07f made this observation about the community polarisation on the issue:

[There is] a renaissance of awareness of many young people . . . [regarding] slavery and colonialism . . . When the UN said the Netherlands should act . . . the elite were really very upset. They said . . . “you are taking away from us something we cherish: [Zwarte Piet] is a party for the children” . . . Now there is a discussion on changing this symbol of Zwarte Piet . . . If there was not this young generation who are very rebellious doing it, it’s not something that evolves by itself. – Participant N07f, statutory officer

One of the issues at the heart of the debate is whether Dutch society and culture ought to adapt and change as part of the socio-cultural integration process. As discussed earlier, Dutch policy has firmly established a one-way integration process with very little room for mutual cultural accommodation. Yet given the volatility of the Zwarte Piet debate, this firm

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79 In Dutch folklore, the figure of Zwarte Piet (Black Pete) accompanies St Nicholas as he enters and travels around the Netherlands in the leadup to a feast on Sinterklassavond (St Nicholas’ eve: 5 December).
position does not appear to be completely settled. There are at least some members from both the policymaking community and Dutch society who believe that Dutch culture is not above critique, and that sometimes reform is needed to reframe cultural practices and traditions. By extension, this broadly represents a recognition that the ‘give-and-take’ process of mutual cultural accommodation is important in a society with significant cultural diversity and a history of slavery and colonialism. Participant N04f summarised the symbolism of the Zwarte Piet debate for integration policy:

[Zwarte Piet] is quite symbolic for the discussion on integration, that some politicians, and especially populist politicians, say, “Well, if [people with a migrant background] just adopt [Dutch culture], there’s no problem.” And in other parts of society says, “Well, it’s not a one-way adoption; [integration] is an adoption from two sides.” – Participant N04m, civil society

Participant N04m alluded to a significant concern facing those policymakers who wished to reorient integration policy towards being a ‘two-way process’: the influence of the populist and nationalist radical-right on Dutch mainstream politics. Geert Wilders is the leader of the populist Party for Freedom (PVV; Partij voor de Vrijheid). Following the 2017 election, the PVV is now the second largest party with 20 seats in the 150-seat House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer) and approximately 13 per cent of the vote (Khan 2017).80 Wilders is one of the leading defenders of the ‘traditional’ depiction of Zwarte Piet, having even gone so far as to suggest legislating as a means to protect the tradition (Bos 2016).

According to Participant N05f, this nationalist sentiment stemmed from fear of the ‘other’ and cultural anxiety:

[The Zwarte Piet debate] is very focused on the question of perceived cultural threat: is the Netherlands that these people have in their minds an imagined concept? Will it stay that way? People are very afraid that it might change…. These discussions on [Zwarte Piet]….tensions on Islamic-inspired terrorism…. [feeding] anxiety which is, I guess, why certain people….feel more loudly uncomfortable with the multi-ethnic society. – Participant N05f, public servant

It is this discomfort amongst Dutch voters that was emblematic of a wider shift coinciding with the rise of nationalist populism embodied by Wilders. Furthermore, the emergence of the PVV in 2006 and its subsequent rise into mainstream politics has taken place concurrently with the ‘reimagining’ of two-way integration policy with some strikingly assimilationist overtones.

80 At the time of interviews, the PVV was the third largest party with 15 seats (Khan 2017).
Assimilation masquerading as integration: pressures from the radical-right

A common theme that emerged from the interviews was the pressure brought to bear by radical-right populists on mainstream political parties to incorporate assimilationist views that have manifested as ‘one-sided integration’. Prior to the backlash against multiculturalism, cultural values and beliefs were considered private matters. In contrast, interviewees described that policy changes under ‘one-sided integration’ have meant people with a migrant background have become firmly pressured by the state and some municipalities to adopt so-called ‘Dutch norms and values’. Examples included gender equality and LGBT emancipation. In one municipality, this was evident through the Integratietour (Integration Tour) project:

[Integratietour] is a series of dialogues...[on] some taboo topics...[such as] the acceptance of homosexuality within religious communities, or the position of men and women in conservative groups. ... There is a tension between the more dominant view of how we would like to be as the Netherlands, and the perception of how [religious, Islamic] migrants are looking at the world. – Participant N01m, public servant

Several participants were critical of this general shift towards cultural assimilationism, suggesting that these approaches had gone too far. For example, Participant N06f suggested that the influence of the PVV has steadily dragged the political mainstream to the right:

What's so strange is [Geert Wilders] is not the government but he has huge influence...[politically correct] politicians try to see what they can learn or at least not be too positive about immigration because if you do that then perhaps [Wilders] will win the elections. And he is playing with this, and you see that in the discourse...how things have changed...little by little. – Participant N06f, civil society

Participant N07f went further, warning of the danger to the fundamental principles that underpin Dutch liberal democracy by pandering to the populist right:

The problem... is when [other parties] compete with Geert Wilders... The Christian Democratic Party... have policies which are really an infringement with the rule of law... For example, second generation or third generation [can have their Dutch citizenship] taken away... [By competing with Wilders] they don't see that we are really eroding the fundament of our nation-state. – Participant N07f, statutory officer

The assertions of Participants N06f and N07f were explicitly tested in a study of Dutch 2010 and 2012 party manifestos and press releases by van Atteveldt et al. (2017). The study found that following the 2012 election, the PVV had become ideologically isolated on the radical-right, with all other parties converging towards the political centre (2017: 56-60). Although their study did not analyse the 2017 election, the authors did suggest that the VVD (Prime Minister Rutte’s People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) and the Christian
Democrats may have moved even further to the rhetorical right (van Atteveldt et al. 2017: 60).

As mentioned earlier, *inburgering* (civic integration) education courses and tests have entrenched principles of assimilation within integration policy. This has taken place because of the rhetorical retreat from 'two-way integration' and its replacement by the expectation that integration should be 'migrants’ own responsibility'.

In summary, mutual cultural accommodation was highly contentious in the Netherlands, as was the case in Sweden. Unlike Sweden though, the findings presented here suggest that the mainstream governing Dutch parties have adopted assimilationist principles by officially reinterpreting integration to be a one-sided process that is the responsibility of migrants themselves. The process of socio-cultural integration seemed to focus on migrants being pressured to adapt to Dutch society. Very little attention at all was given to ways that the Dutch state or society could be more accommodating. There was also some evidence to suggest that this shift away from multicultural principles by mainstream parties had been due to the influence of radical-right populist parties. These issues have then all intersected in debates about *Zwarte Piet* and the perceived cultural threat that people with a migrant background pose to Dutch society.

### 7.3.5 Summary of REC Framework findings

Analysis of Dutch policymaking using the REC Framework has provided several main findings. Although anti-discrimination is constitutionally entrenched as part of Dutch human rights policy, there were conflicting approaches on how to implement this principle. There appeared to be reluctance by the state to become more actively involved in addressing racial discrimination, epitomised by Prime Minister Rutte’s comments about migrants needing to fight harder to overcome discrimination. However, some public agencies, such as the Police Organisation, had turned to multicultural policies such as positive action to increase the number officers with migrant backgrounds to reduce ethnic profiling. Another key area of focus for Dutch policymakers was the labour market and socio-economic integration. Some evidence suggests that there has been a convergence towards a ‘proportional socio-economic position’ between people with a migrant background and those with a Dutch background. However, some concerns arose about the replacement of group-specific policies by mainstreamed approaches that have led to a double handicap and state colour-blindness. Finally, the area of mutual cultural accommodation provides the strongest indication that Dutch policymakers have abandoned multiculturalism. Although multiculturalism and integration can be compatible within a
'two-way process', the Netherlands had officially implemented 'one-sided integration' that placed most of the emphasis on migrants' own responsibility to integrate. Although many of the participants were critical of this policy shift, it can be argued that one-sided integration is little more than assimilation masquerading as integration. The remainder of the chapter uses these findings to help assess the degree of Dutch multicultural policy success.
7.4 Policy success of multiculturalism in the Netherlands

The previous section provided evidence from policy actors and policy documentation that helps to describe and characterise Dutch policy approaches through the lens of the REC Framework. The following discussion assesses and evaluates Dutch policy in a more succinct and systematic manner, using Marsh and McConnell's (2010) 'three-dimensions' heuristic for evaluating policy success. Although the Netherlands has formally retreated away from the rhetoric of multiculturalism, it is concerning that integration policy has been substantially diluted at the same time as the populist radical-right has garnered significant influence.

7.4.1 Political success

Firstly, multicultural policy in the Netherlands exhibited a generally low degree of political success, as depicted in Table 19 below. Dutch politics have turned sharply towards assimilation, with successive Rutte governments rejecting conceptions of integration as a two-way process of mutual accommodation. Over the past two decades, the radical-right has consolidated sizable influence over the direction of integration policy in mainstream parties due to electoral pressure. Multiple participants argued that the power of Geert Wilders and the PVV has been acutely felt, with centre-right parties accommodating elements of PVV platform in attempts to prevent their voter-base from moving to the PVV. On the whole however, the Netherlands is caught between two paradigms: one which tolerates, accepts, respects and values cultural diversity; and one which does not accept deviation from so-called ‘Dutch norms’ within the architecture of ‘civic integration’. Scholten (2013) goes as far to suggest that this tension has been central to the centre-right coalition under Mark Rutte after 2010, with Rutte not taking particularly strident integration policy action despite strong discursive rhetoric. Whilst there has been a discursive return to assimilationism, Dutch values and national unity, the Rutte Government "did not actually pursue corresponding policies in these areas" (2013: 105). Because the First Rutte Government (2010-12) relied upon the anti-immigrant PVV for support, Rutte steered clear of state-led integration policies by affirming integration as being the individual responsibility of migrants (Scholten 2013: 106).
Further complicating the political pressure from the populist right, the grand coalition between the VVD and PvdA of the Second Rutte Government (2012-2017) faced left-ward pressures too. The VVD may prefer to downplay the role of the state in integration policy as evident in Rutte’s comments about migrants needing to ‘push harder’ to overcome discrimination. However, their coalition partners in the centre-left PvdA did not follow suit (van Atteveldt et al. 2017: 56-60). Despite this, the status quo remained largely intact. Responsibility for socio-economic integration has been shifted away from the state firmly onto people with a migrant background themselves. Likewise, the dominant political discourse continues to expect that socio-cultural integration be a one-way process for people of a migrant background to learn about the way Dutch society operates and societal expectations with limited accommodations from the state (Entzinger 2014: 699). In addition, there has been some divergence between national and local policy responses. There is some evidence that indicates there used to be a degree of municipal autonomy for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REC Framework</th>
<th>Racial discrimination</th>
<th>Equal opportunity</th>
<th>Cultural accommodation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Political success** | - Anti-discrimination central for human rights policy: constitutionally entrenched  
- Competing policy narratives: PM said people need to fight harder to overcome discrimination, downplaying role of state  
- MCP Index: retreat between 2000 and 2010 away from discrimination reporting, but renewed policy interest more recently | - Some policy actors place blame for labour market inequality on cultural background, though others focus more on structural barriers  
- Equal treatment law not necessarily translating in everyday life: hyper-diverse populations in cities under policies of assimilation | - Pressure from far right, drawing other parties favour assimilation: pressuring people with a migrant background to adopt ‘Dutch norms and values’ (including gender equality, LGBT emancipation) too firmly  
- ‘Migrants’ own responsibility’ (one-sided integration) is contested, in contrast to VVD-PvdD coalition government’s official position |
| **Source of evidence** | - Interview data  
- Article 1, Dutch constitution (2008)  
- Umar (2015)  
- MCP Index data | - Interview data  
- Scholten (2013)  
- van Atteveldt et al. (2017)  
- Entzinger (2014)  
- Gebhardt (2016) | - Interview data  
- Umar (2015) |
| **Rating** | - Moderate success | - Low success | - Low success |
overseeing and funding civic integration policies (van Breugel and Scholten 2017: 518-520; Gebhardt 2016: 747-748). However, this decentralisation ended in 2013 when the state retracted financial support for immigrant integration. This change had the concurrent effect of depriving municipalities the means to spend public money on integration.

The MCP Index indicates that policies under the category of ‘Affirmative Action’ retreated from receiving a score of 1 in 2000, to a score of 0 in 2010 because the Act on the Promotion of Minority Groups in the Labour Market 1994 was rescinded in 2004 due to a lack of support from employers. However, as discussed earlier, multiple interview participants suggest that equal opportunity policies which share elements with multiculturalism have seen some renewed support. These include the Rotterdam Platform Against Labour Market Discrimination and access to Dutch language education for some asylum seekers. Furthermore, participants also highlighted that structural discrimination in the labour market was now back on the policy agenda again, after having been previously sidelined by policymakers. Despite these changes though, the abandonment of formal multiculturalism due to a lack of political support, and its replacement with civic integration policies indicates a low degree of political success.

7.4.2 Programmatic success

Secondly, the findings drawn from the Dutch data suggest a generally moderate degree of programmatic success, as depicted in Table 20 below. The Netherlands formally retreated away from multiculturalism in 2011 in response to the multicultural backlash (van Breugel and Scholten 2017: 519). Unlike the UK where the retreat from multiculturalism tended to be largely rhetorical rather than substantive, the Dutch case saw strong overlap between political rhetoric and policy substance. The MCP Index data represents this shift as a downgraded rating from 4.0 in 2000 to 2.0 in 2010. In fact, the Netherlands is one of only two countries to have ever been downgraded by the Index.81 The mainstreaming of integration policy and abandonment of group-specific approaches has had the effect of dissolving explicit integration policy. To give one example, the MCP Index describes the once widespread practice of funding ethnic minority organisations as having “declined precipitously in the current period [2000-2010]” (2016: 76). Several participants shared the view that the Netherlands no longer has a formal ‘two-way integration’ policy framework. In turn, this has eroded the responsibility of society to adapt to new arrivals. Coupled with integration now being predominantly viewed as migrants’ own responsibility,

81 The other country to have received a downgraded rating was the United States which fell from 3.5 in 1980 to 3.0 in 1990.
there has been an ideological shift away from the multicultural principle of mutual accommodation. In fact, one-sided integration is not integration at all but can be considered as assimilation.

**Table 20 Dutch multicultural policy success in the programmatic domain**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REC Framework</th>
<th>Racial discrimination</th>
<th>Equal opportunity</th>
<th>Cultural accommodation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Programmatic success** | - Reforms in police organisation to improve representativeness and reduce ethnic profiling  
- Second and third generation migrants still face racism and discrimination, despite being socio-economically integrated  
- Some localised responses to structural discrimination, but lesser national focus under PM Rutte  | - Labour market integration is a strong policy emphasis  
- In general, education system is colour-blind: ethnicity does not appear to affect outcomes  
- Improved education and Dutch language do not necessarily translate to improved labour market integration  
- Group-specific integration policy has been replaced with mainstreamed approaches, focusing on socio-economic barriers  
- Reforms in police organisation to improve representativeness and cultural diversity  | - Integration is migrants' own responsibility: Dutch society shouldn't have to adapt. This attitude is having adverse impacts on people with a migrant background.  
- Mainstreaming integration policy erodes responsibility of society to adapt to new arrivals, moving emphasis towards assimilation  
- Funding cuts to ethnic minority organisations |
| **Source of evidence** | - Interview data  
- Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (2016)  
- CBS (2019)  
- Janssen (2019); Pieters (2019)  
- Verkuyten (2016)  | - Interview data  
- Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (2016)  
- van Breugel and Scholten (2017)  
- Janssen (2019); Pieters (2019)  | - Interview data  
- MCP Index data  
- Verkuyten (2016)  
- van Breugel and Scholten (2017) |
| **Rating**         | - Moderate success                                                                  | - Moderate success                                                             | - Low success                                                                          |

Despite these concerns, several participants also referred to longitudinal evaluations and studies of socio-economic integration that were, at the time, unpublished. In contrast to the narrative that integration has ‘failed miserably’ in the Netherlands, Participants N02m and N07f pointed to this unpublished evidence that most second and third generation migrations are well-integrated, with each generation having better integration outcomes than their parents’ in the socio-economic domain. The findings of the SCP (2016) study...
Integratie in zicht? (Integration in sight?) show that educational achievement and Dutch language proficiency is improving over time for the four migrant groups studied.\textsuperscript{82} However, these investments in human capital have not necessarily translated into improved equality of opportunity in the labour market between 2007-2016 for the second generation, suggesting that structural discrimination may be a significant barrier for future socio-economic integration (SCP 2016: 19). Furthermore, there are concerns in terms of criminality, with Participant N02m describing the disparity as, “the first generation behaves better” than the second generation (SCP 2016: 11). The study argues that the lack of integration proportionality for second generation criminality goes beyond general socio-economic and demographic factors, suggesting instead that disparity could be caused by “generational and acculturation conflicts within the family and differences in social control of young people within the different migrant groups” (SCP 2016: 11).

Furthermore, programmatic success may also be affected by what is called the ‘integration paradox’, a concept articulated by Participant N04m. Put simply, people with a migrant background that are well-educated and socio-economically integrated may psychologically ‘turn away’ from society due to feelings of ‘relative deprivation’ (Verkuyten 2016: 584). In other words, this highly-educated group can become disillusioned due to a sense that they are still at an unfair disadvantage due to discrimination or other barriers which can lead them to disengage from society. Verkuyten’s study focused on applying the theory to the Dutch case in an empirical manner, finding that more highly educated members of ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands perceived a lower acceptance of ethnic minorities by Dutch society than their lower educated counterparts. Likewise, this more highly educated cohort perceived more racial discrimination against ethnic minorities. Combining these two findings together led to a less favourable attitude towards the native Dutch majority (Verkuyten 2016: 590-591).\textsuperscript{83} This less favourable attitude is central to whether these highly socio-economically integrated people psychologically retreat from society, leading to weaker feelings of belonging and higher rates of criminality.

In sum, there seems to be an element of unintended programmatic success. There is a pattern of long-term success in terms of socio-economic integration which was at one time attributable to multiculturalism, but the multicultural paradigm is no longer pre-eminent in Dutch policymaking. Rather, multiculturalism is viewed in dominant political discourse as being antithetical to the policy expectation that integration is migrants’ own responsibility. That being said, the Dutch integration policy framework has still achieved some outcomes

\textsuperscript{82} These groups are people with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean background.
\textsuperscript{83} The study controlled for personal experiences of discrimination.
aligning with the REC objectives of reducing racial discrimination and improving equal opportunity.

7.4.3 Process success

Thirdly, the Netherlands has achieved a generally low degree of process success. Table 21 illustrates that on the one hand, there some positive elements, including the collaborative partnerships focused in the areas of anti-discrimination and equal opportunity. The network of anti-discrimination agencies such as RADAR and Art. 1 have close working relationships with municipalities and public authorities, with some municipalities inviting these NGOs to provide substantial consultative work. Examples include institutional reviews into structural discrimination and supporting employers to develop equal opportunity strategies, in addition to receiving and resolving discrimination complaints from the public.

Table 21 Dutch multicultural policy success in the process domain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REC Framework</th>
<th>Racial discrimination</th>
<th>Equal opportunity</th>
<th>Cultural accommodation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process success</td>
<td>- Network of anti-discrimination agencies responsible for responding to discrimination</td>
<td>- Strong research and evidence base for tracking and evaluating migrant integration</td>
<td>- Assimilation is entrenched through civic integration education and courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Consultation and partnership between municipalities, public authorities and anti-discrimination agencies</td>
<td>- Mainstreaming leads to a double handicap: no consultation AND no funding for ethnic advocacy organisations to assess impact on people with a migrant background</td>
<td>- Pillarisation model has been dismantled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of evidence</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview data</td>
<td>Moderate success</td>
<td>Low success</td>
<td>Low success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (2016)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, a common theme from interview participants was a strong research and evidence base for policymakers to develop strategies to address issues such as structural discrimination in the public sector labour market. Likewise, the centrality of research expertise in the policymaking process is evident through the dialogue between the
Netherlands Institute for Social Research (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau; SCP) and other government agencies that centres around empirical evidence gathered by the SCP. Scholten and Holzhacker acknowledge that “traditionally, the nexus between policy-making institutes and institutes that provide science-based policy advice has been strongly institutionalised in the Netherlands” (2009: 86). Yet this relationship is steadily eroding as Dutch political discourse has become more polarised with the ascent of the PVV (van Atteveldt et al. 2017: 59-61), and as the Dutch social sciences have become increasingly fragmented (Scholten and Holzhacker 2009: 87; Scholten 2011: 89). There are also some concerns about the SCP’s objectivity given the direct financial links between the SCP and the ministries that fund it (Verbeek et al. 2015: 228). In this way, process success is being impeded by political factors.

However, there are also other areas that impact process success. Most notably, the mainstreaming of integration policy leads to a double handicap for people with a migrant background. Since policymakers can no longer consider group-specific approaches, the scope for consultation with people from a migrant background is severely restricted. This is then further compounded by the de-funding of ethnic advocacy organisations which previously would assess policy impact on people with a migrant background, and report to government agencies through formal consultative dialogue. Principles of assimilation have also become entrenched through civic integration education and courses due to the embedded emphasis on ‘migrants’ own responsibility’ for integration (Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Meer et al. 2015: 709). Such principles then impede the process of developing policies centred around ‘two-way integration’. Likewise, it appears that pillarisation is no longer a guiding policy paradigm. As discussed elsewhere, whether multiculturalism was ever shaped by pillarisation is up for debate. Nonetheless, the mythology of pillars providing a mechanism for societal tolerance and acceptance has certainly diminished in contemporary policy discussions.

### 7.5 Summary

Unlike the other case studies, the Netherlands has formally institutionalised the rhetorical backlash by retreating from policy approaches promoting multiculturalism both in political rhetoric and in policy substance. The chapter has shown that Dutch multiculturalism has been largely dismantled, only to be replaced by assimilation masquerading as civic integration. Successive policy developments since the 2007 have eroded the state’s responsibility and involvement in immigrant integration. Migrants are now expected to take full responsibility for their own integration, with only extremely limited support provided
from the state. The evidence presented suggests group-specific policy approaches have been abolished as part of the mainstreaming agenda, with ethnic minority organisations defunded resulting in the 'double handicap'. There is limited consultation with migrant communities during policy development, but peak representative organisations also now only have limited capacity to convey concerns about adverse impacts arising from policy changes.

Although the score of 2.0 out of 8.0 on the MCP Index in 2010 highlights the Dutch retreat, it is apparent that multiculturalism has not been completely dismantled. Socio-economic integration policy is achieving 'proportional positioning', with migrants and their children closing the gap in all areas except for criminality which is generally not decreasing among the second generation. Similarly, issues relating to ethnic profiling by police and structural discrimination in the labour market have returned to prominence on the policy agenda to some extent. Despite this however, the Netherlands achieves a rating of 'low' for mutual cultural accommodation in all three categories of policy success because of the assimilationist turn in Dutch policymaking. Without changes to this area and a recognition that the state and Dutch society should adapt to aid immigrant integration, it is difficult to argue that the Netherlands is a proponent of multiculturalism any longer.
CHAPTER 8 – SOUTH AUSTRALIA: ‘QUIET MULTICULTURALISM’

8.1 Introduction

This chapter evaluates the success of government policymaking to embed multiculturalism in the state of South Australia from the period of 2007 until 2017. Overall, the policy efforts by successive state governments in South Australia can be characterised as ‘quiet multiculturalism’, in that they have become entrenched as the political norm. The issue tends not to be politically contentious, leaving policymakers to implement policies promoting multiculturalism without much fanfare. Despite this ‘quiet’ approach, the findings of this chapter suggest these policies are well-established. Institutionally, the South Australian Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs Commission (SAMEAC) acts as the key consultative and advocacy link between CALD communities and the state government. The state government provides public acknowledgement and a positive valuation of people from culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) backgrounds.\(^{84}\) For example, this is evident in the public funding of cultural events and political representation from both major parties at these events. Furthermore, there is explicit bipartisan support and commitment at the state level that largely reflects a similar commitment from the mainstream parties at the Commonwealth level.\(^{85}\)

At the same time though, the risk that accompanies South Australia’s ‘quiet multiculturalism’ is that of complacency. Deeper structural barriers to equal opportunity may be overlooked due to an attitude that existing policies are sufficient or can be scaled down. The findings presented in this chapter suggest that the under-resourcing of the South Australian Equal Opportunity Commission (SAEOC) and mainstreaming of multicultural policy initiatives risks hollowing out the solid foundations of multiculturalism. Likewise, over-reliance on multicultural grants for community festivals as the primary face of public multiculturalism makes it difficult for policymakers to deepen policy efforts beyond a superficial level.

\(^{84}\) CALD is an official, Australian-specific term to describe people from non-Anglo-Celtic or English-speaking backgrounds. The term was introduced as a replacement for ‘NESB’ which referred to people from ‘non-English speaking backgrounds’.

\(^{85}\) Australia has a federal system of government. The terms ‘Commonwealth government’, ‘federal government’ and ‘national government’ can be used interchangeably in the Australian context.
8.1.1 Overview of the chapter

The chapter is structured in three parts. The first section presents contextual background information, including a timeline of important key events that have shaped multicultural policies. Following this is a description of the prominent institutional settings related to the development and implementation of policies promoting multiculturalism. In Australia’s federal system of government, the agenda for multiculturalism is largely set at the Commonwealth level, however state governments do retain significant jurisdictional independence in this policy area (Koleth 2010: 3).

The second section of the chapter then presents the findings from the South Australian case study, beginning with the Australian data from the Multiculturalism Policy (MCP) Index Project (MCP Index Project 2016) which scored Australia 8.0 in 1990, 2000 and 2010. This enduring maximum score suggests that multiculturalism has indeed been embedded in Australia’s political institutions. The section then presents thematic findings from the semi-structured elite interviews with policy actors. The findings are analysed through the REC Framework of multicultural policy objectives to explain how multiculturalism has played out in South Australia.

The final section of the chapter interprets these findings to evaluate the success of South Australian multicultural policies. There are three findings related to the three dimensions of policy success from Marsh and McConnell’s (2010) heuristic. First, there has been a high degree of political success for multiculturalism in South Australia. This is because multicultural policy has become entrenched as part of the mainstream political paradigm at the state level, reflecting a similar bipartisan entrenchment at the federal level that has solidified over the past four decades.

Second, South Australian multicultural policy has achieved a high degree of programmatic success. The state has seen good outcomes across the REC Framework, especially in the area of mutual cultural accommodation. Likewise, the policy settings for eliminating racial discrimination and facilitating equal opportunity are positive but require continual commitment for shaping societal norms and reducing structural barriers.

Third, there has only been a moderate degree of process success. The South Australian government recognises consultation and open dialogue with culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities as an important priority. However, there are other areas of concern such as the mainstreaming of ‘diversities’ such as gender, ethnic background or disability by the state and Commonwealth governments which have the potential to hollow out the principle of ‘access and equity’. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the formal policy platforms for multiculturalism at the state and Commonwealth levels have tended to
be superficial with a preference for altruistic motherhood statements. This impedes efforts to establish firm and assessable policy goals.

8.2 Contextual background

The purpose of this section is to outline the context for the South Australian research findings. As detailed in Chapter 4, this subnational case has been chosen due to the lack of scholarly literature evaluating South Australian policy approaches promoting multiculturalism. In addition, South Australia also partly served as an exploratory case study by providing opportunities for refining the research propositions and approaches taken in the European cases. South Australia is the smallest jurisdiction examined in this thesis with a population of 1.8 million people. On a population basis, this puts South Australia on a par with European countries such as Latvia and Slovenia. However, of the four cases, South Australia has the highest proportion of its population born abroad, at 23 per cent in 2016 (ABS 2020, 2017c, 2017b, 2017a). South Australia is a state in a federal political system, and its bicameral parliament is characterised by a two-party system. The section begins with an overview of how policies promoting multiculturalism were developed in Australia at the Commonwealth level and at the South Australian state level. Following this is a summary of recent developments since 2007. The final part of the section highlights the major institutional settings to serve as context for the discussion of the findings later in the chapter. Most of the discussion in this chapter relates to the well-established CALD migrant communities who have continued to emigrate and settle in Australia since the Second World War. This includes second and third generation migrants, though some discussion considers more recent arrivals too.

8.2.1 History of Australian and South Australian policy approaches promoting multiculturalism

This section summarises the key events and important government policy responses for multiculturalism in Australia and South Australia in the latter half of the 20th century. These events and responses are listed in Table 22 below. Developments at the Commonwealth level are included because these have tended to influence the agenda for state-based policymaking.
After federation in 1901, one of the first pieces of legislation passed was the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901*. This Act formed the basis of the 'White Australia policy' which aimed to prevent non-Europeans from migrating to Australia (Parkin and Hardcastle 2019: 625). Following the Second World War, the Commonwealth government sought to increase Australia's population through immigration (Castles and Miller 2009: 104). Since Britain was unable to meet demand, additional immigrants were sourced from eastern and southern European countries (Castles and Miller 2009: 104). In line with the White Australia policy, the new mass immigration scheme continued to racially exclude non-
Europeans and expected non-British entrants to assimilate into the broader population (Jupp 2011a: 44-45). However, by the late 1960s it had become clear that Australia's ethnic variety was not going to disappear. Non-British arrivals had tended to cluster around low-income employment opportunities, and had maintained their religious, cultural and linguistic diversity (Castles and Miller 2009: 250-251). Increasing agitation to end the White Australia policy broadened from students and clergy to include political support from key leaders like Prime Ministers Harold Holt and Gough Whitlam (Jupp 2011a: 45-46; Castles and Miller 2009: 251; Soutphommasane 2012: 9). Prior to becoming the South Australian premier in 1970, Don Dunstan was an instrumental figure in removing the White Australia policy from the national platform of the Labor party in 1965 (Jakubowicz 2009: 26). The following year, the South Australian Labor government passed the first legislation in Australia to protect people against racial discrimination: the Prohibition of Discrimination Act 1966 (SAEOC 2011b: 1). As national multicultural policies took form during the 1970s, Dunstan continued to promote multiculturalism and the interests of South Australia's culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities (Whitelock 2000: 150).

In 1973, the Commonwealth Immigration Minister Al Grassby bypassed his department and presented an unprecedented visioning paper to a Melbourne symposium by applying the nascent Canadian concept of multiculturalism to the Australian context (Pietsch 2019: 412). A multi-cultural society for the future painted a picture of a future Australia that encouraged its immigrant citizens to freely express their cultural heritage (Grassby 1973: 9). This formative vision recognised and included cultural diversity into Australian national identity, swiftly receiving bipartisan support (Jakubowicz 2014: 4-5; Jupp 2011a: 47-49; Lopez 2000: 257-260). The release of the Henderson Report in 1975 highlighted the stark socio-economic disadvantages faced by immigrants (Henderson 1975). This laid the foundation for the Fraser government to frame Commonwealth welfare policy for migrants under multiculturalism (Jakubowicz 2014: 5).

1978-1996: institutionalising multiculturalism
The 1978 Galbally Report is one of the most foundational documents for the development of Australian multiculturalism. Four principles underpinned the report's recommendations: equity of access for government services, ethno-specific services to achieve equality of access and provision, settlement services to facilitate migrant self-reliance, and encouragement of cultural diversity (Galbally 1978: 4). These principles still form the framework for contemporary policymaking. Within the framework laid out by the Galbally Report, the Commonwealth and state governments created agencies to conduct policy research and promote awareness about the multicultural principles of understanding,
tolerance and respect to the wider public. In 1980, South Australia legislated and established the South Australian Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs Commission (SAMEAC) to focus on migrant settlement and welfare (Koleth 2010: 23). SAMEAC’s functions were soon expanded to provide advocacy and advice to the South Australian government on matters of ethnic affairs and migrant rights (Totaro and Faulkner 1983). In 1989, the SAMEAC Act was amended to provide a clear legislative basis “for the establishment of multiculturalism as a public policy” in South Australia (Koleth 2010: 23).

The National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia (1989) was the Hawke government’s multicultural policy statement and sought to address the concerns raised by some conservative opponents. Multiculturalism was expanded from its prior focus on migrant welfare to being a cultural-pluralist model of citizenship for all Australians (Tavan 2012: 551-552). Cultural rights were to be balanced by an overriding commitment to Australia, accepting Australian political structures, accepting English as the national language, and reciprocal respect for others to express their cultures, beliefs and values (OMA 1989: ix).

1996-2007: retreat from multiculturalism under Howard

Labor’s defeat in the 1996 federal election revealed significant fissures within the Australian electorate with regard to the Keating government’s socially progressive agenda that had included a strong commitment to multiculturalism (Brett 2005: 20-31; Tavan 2012: 552). The incoming Coalition government proved to be no friend to multiculturalism as it swiftly abolished the two leading multicultural policy research and design agencies: the Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA) and the Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research (BIMPR) (Jakubowicz 2014: 10). In contrast, South Australia did not abolish SAMEAC, even under successive Liberal governments from 1993 to 2002. In fact, the Brown Liberal government made a ‘Declaration of Principles for a Multicultural South Australia’ in 1995 (Government of South Australia 1995). Furthermore, the South Australian Liberal Party is the only state branch of the party to have dedicated committee for multiculturalism (Jaensch et al. 2004: 62; Manwaring 2015: 94).

Despite Prime Minister Howard’s ideological opposition to multiculturalism (Brett 2005: 37; Jakubowicz 2014: 10), the 1996 election of Pauline Hanson to the House of Representatives directly challenged the national Australian multicultural policy framework (Soutphommasane 2012: 32). Her anti-Asian, anti-immigrant and nationalist rhetoric harkened back to notions of White Australia. Hanson’s rise was rapid, though her One Nation party has never managed an electoral breakthrough in South Australia. Successive Howard governments from 1996-2007 were wary of the Hanson phenomenon and a potential backlash from voters who were sympathetic to Hansonist ideology. Concerns were
especially heightened given the rise of transnational Islamic extremist terrorism, as well as the 2005 Cronulla race riots in Sydney triggered by an altercation between a group of Anglo-Australians and a group of people with a Middle Eastern appearance. Accordingly, Howard’s policy strategy was to avoid mentioning ‘divisive issues’ such as racism or multiculturalism and instead focus on the positive language of “building harmonious and tolerant relations between groups” (Jakubowicz 2014: 14-15). However, Parkin and Hardcastle (2019: 631) note a striking similarity between the Howard government’s policy documentation and that of the Hawke Labor government’s. This suggests yet another example of the backlash against multiculturalism being largely rhetorical and not reflected by substantive changes to policies.

8.2.2 Recent developments

As mentioned earlier in the thesis, there is a lack of literature specifically discussing or evaluating contemporary multicultural policy in state of South Australia. It is this gap that this chapter seeks to fill. As a result, this section primarily focuses on recent policy developments at the Commonwealth level. Some additional notes regarding multiculturalism in South Australia’s Strategic Plan and the Multicultural Action Plan 2017-18 are included in the overview of institutional settings.

During the period of the Rudd-Gillard-Rudd federal Labor governments (2007-2013), the Australian Multicultural Advisory Council (AMAC) was created in December 2008 (Tavan 2012: 554). AMAC released its advisory report 18 months later, focusing on social cohesion, countering racism, community education on the benefits of cultural diversity, and the participation of migrants in Australian society (AMAC 2010: 7). Labor’s policy response was only given in 2011 with the release of The People of Australia: Australia’s Multicultural Policy (DIAC 2011). Tavan (2012: 554-555) argues there was a hesitancy from Rudd and Gillard to explicitly associate with multiculturalism due to fears it contributed to the 1996 election loss, despite the ALP’s longstanding connections with culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities. Labor reaffirmed its commitment to multiculturalism under Prime Minister Julia Gillard, partly due to fears of a backlash from migrant communities. This is an important political consideration in the Australian context, given the comparatively higher rates of overseas-born citizens and Australia’s system of compulsory voting (Costar 2014: 152). However, the Gillard government was careful to balance cultural rights with civic obligations to minimise the impact of criticism suggesting Labor’s previous vision of multiculturalism encouraged the establishment of cultural silos (Tavan 2012: 555-557).
The Turnbull government released its long-awaited multicultural policy statement, *Multicultural Australia – united, strong, successful*, in March 2017, ending the Coalition’s policy silence on the issue since the change of government four years prior. The statement reaffirms the importance and beneficence of cultural diversity as part of the nation’s social fabric. It also re-emphasises shared values, rights and responsibilities for all Australians, and recommits to the principle of access and equity for service provision (DSS 2017c). There are some notable differences when compared with the Gillard government’s 2011 policy document though. One is the new statement’s greater emphasis on the integration of migrants into Australian society. This suggests that there has been a shift in the balance of mutual accommodation towards a somewhat greater responsibility on the part of migrants, as reflected in the government’s proposed changes to citizenship requirements (DIBP 2017b). The second key difference is the inclusion of a short section entitled ‘A safe and secure Australia’ which identifies terrorism as a threat to a diverse and harmonious society (DSS 2017c: 11). This echoes a similar theme in the Howard government’s 2003 policy document which was itself responding to international terrorist attacks (DIMIA 2003). Nonetheless, it is clear that multicultural policy has secured enduring bipartisan support (Parkin and Hardcastle 2019: 633-634). This is seen in the continuity of the principles underpinning multicultural policy of governments from both persuasions across the past four decades.

The federal double dissolution election in 2016 saw the re-emergence of Pauline Hanson and the One Nation party winning four Senate seats (Parliament of Australia 2017). In her first speech to the new Senate, Hanson echoed the sentiments of her 1996 first speech by declaring that Australia is “in danger of being swamped by Muslims, who bear a culture and ideology that is incompatible with our own” (Hanson 2016: 78). In a sign of solidarity, both major parties continued to denounce racial intolerance, with the 10 October 2016 joint motion to the House of Representatives reaffirming the commitment to the equal rights of all Australians irrespective of cultural or linguistic background (Turnbull 2016). The motion opened with the same five clauses of the October 1996 parliamentary statement on racial tolerance, with Opposition Leader Bill Shorten explicitly calling out Hanson’s comments by stating that Australia is “not being ‘swamped’ by anyone” (Shorten 2016). This further reiterates the persistent theme of bipartisan commitment to multiculturalism.

As former Labor Premier Mike Rann has observed, South Australia has a long history as a ‘social laboratory’ for progressive reform (Rann 2012; Manwaring et al. 2019). Despite this longstanding connection between South Australia and the national development of multiculturalism, recent policy developments have not yet been studied at the state level.
The existing literature on multiculturalism tends to focus on policies at the national level (Soutphommasane 2012; Jupp 2011a; Jakubowicz 2017, 2016, 2014; Jakubowicz and Ho 2014; Dunn and Nelson 2011; Boese and Marotta 2017; Boese and Phillips 2011), or small-scale studies such as multiculturalism in regional towns or community language print media (Radford 2016; Cover 2013). There are also studies that only explore multiculturalism in the context of education and community language policy (Liddicoat 2009; Muenstermann 1998; Clyne et al. 2004; Clyne 2011), or in health policy (Baum et al. 2014). Therefore, there is a significant gap in current knowledge about how policies promoting multiculturalism in South Australia are playing out. In response, the chapter draws together unique contributions from South Australian policy actors.

8.2.3 Institutional settings

The relationships connecting the governance and implementation of policy approaches promoting multiculturalism in South Australia are depicted in Figure 5. The Australian Constitution gives clear responsibility for immigration to the Commonwealth (Parkin and Hardcastle 2019: 639), but multicultural policies are a shared responsibility. The
institutional settings of South Australian multiculturalism consist of two main areas of responsibility. In contrast to the other three cases, the first area is formal multicultural policy. At the time of interviews in early 2017, responsibility for this area was headed by the Department for Communities and Social Inclusion (DCSI). Within DCSI, Multicultural SA was the agency responsible for advising the state government on the development of multicultural policy, and implementing the state government’s *Multicultural Action Plan 2017-18* in conjunction with other key stakeholders (DCSI 2016a: 5). Some of its functions included (DCSI 2017):

> Improving equitable access to government services for people of [CALD] backgrounds... fostering a coordinated approach to multicultural affairs across government... promoting the benefits of cultural diversity and fostering community harmony.

Multicultural SA was also responsible for administering the multicultural grants program, which provides funding for CALD communities to develop projects that strengthen multicultural communities and celebrate cultural diversity (DCSI 2016a: 5). Multicultural SA is guided first and foremost by the longstanding policy principle of ‘access and equity’. The principle was articulated in the 1978 Galbally Report in identifying the need for Commonwealth, state and local governments to mitigate increasing socio-economic disadvantages experienced by people in Australia’s growing CALD communities. As the Report argued, multicultural policy should be framed in the following way:

> All members of our society must have equal opportunity to realise their full potential and must have equal access to programs and services... [and the] needs of migrants should, in general, be met by programs and services available to the whole community but special services and programs are necessary at present to ensure equality of access and provision. (Galbally 1978: 4)

In other words, all people should be able to access all government services with minimal impediment, and that ethno-specific services are justifiable to ensure equality of access. As a result, South Australian governments have oriented multicultural policy in line with these socio-economic concerns, basing the provision of government services on the principle of access and equity. Additionally, the second update of the South Australian Strategic Plan included one target relating to multiculturalism: "Target 5: Maintain the high rate of South Australians who believe cultural diversity is a positive influence in the community" (DPC 2011: 27). Until December 2017, Multicultural SA’s counterpart at the Commonwealth level is the Department of Social Services (DSS) which had responsibility...

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86 Following the 2018 election, Multicultural SA was renamed ‘Multicultural Affairs’. Multicultural Affairs and SAMEAC were both moved from DCSI to the Department of the Premier and Cabinet.
for overseeing multiculturalism and settlement service provision for new arrivals services. However, the multicultural affairs policy function has been moved into the newly created Department of Home Affairs (DSS 2017a).

The South Australian Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs Commission (SAMEAC) is a statutory authority that is incorporated within Multicultural SA. SAMEAC is a statutory authority that has two primary functions established by the SAMEAC Act 1980: firstly, to promote awareness and understanding of South Australia’s cultural diversity and the implications of this diversity for policymakers and the community more broadly; and secondly, to advise and support government and public bodies on matters concerning multicultural affairs.

The second area of institutional responsibility is for countering racial discrimination. The South Australian Equal Opportunity Commission (SAEOC) is the statutory authority responsible for promoting equal opportunity with the view to eliminate discrimination. The EOC undertakes several key functions such as providing education and training services, conciliating complaints of discrimination, voluntary reviews of external organisations’ programs and practices, advising government on legislative and policy reform, and conducting research to find solutions to structural discrimination (SAEOC 2016: 7). Countering racism and racial discrimination is one area of statutory responsibility, and so the SAEOC is an important actor in South Australia’s institutional framework for multiculturalism. Legal protections from racial discrimination are provided in South Australia under several pieces of legislation: the Equal Opportunity Act 1984, the Racial Vilification Act 1996, and provisions in the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SAEOC 2011a). Furthermore, South Australians are also protected under the Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act 1975, as administered by the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC). The AHRC has a similar function to the SAEOC through its statutory responsibility to investigate and conciliate complaints of discrimination, including racism and racial discrimination (AHRC 2018).

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87 The Australian Human Rights Commission was originally called the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. The original 1986 title reflects its focus of reforming society underpinned by the principle of equal opportunity.
8.3 Findings: South Australian multicultural policymaking from 2007 to 2017

The purpose of this section is to evaluate South Australian policy approaches to multiculturalism from 2007 to 2017. The section begins with a summary of data from the Multiculturalism Policy Index which gives Australia the highest possible score of 8.0 in 2010. The section then presents empirical findings from semi-structured elite interviews with policy actors and is structured according to the REC Framework. South Australian policy actors view efforts combatting discrimination as the starting point for multiculturalism. A number of the interviewees argued that there was room to further develop policy responses to mitigate structural discrimination. Similarly, the principle of access and equity is a central characteristic of Australian multiculturalism. However, there are some tensions and challenges surrounding this principle. In particular, the underfunding of the South Australian Equal Opportunity Commission (SAEOC) and the tendency towards policy mainstreaming pose risks for multiculturalism. Finally, there is a significant amount of attention dedicated to mutual cultural accommodation in this section because it was emphasised more strongly in the interview data compared to the other case studies. Mutual cultural accommodation in South Australia closely follows the definition laid out in Chapter 3: policies promoting accommodation by the state, accommodation by the CALD communities and accommodation by broader society.

8.3.1 Policy presence: secondary data from the Multiculturalism Policy Index

The Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP Index) measures the presence and evolution of multicultural policies in 21 democracies, including Australia (Banting and Kymlicka 2013; MCP Index Project 2016). The MCP Index data is the leading cross-national comparative index of its kind.

As detailed in Chapter 3, the Immigrant Minority Policy subset is divided into 8 indicators, with each country is given a quantitative score of 1 (if a policy is present), 0.5 (if the policy is partially present), and 0 (if the policy is not present) (MCP Index Project 2016: 5-6). From a total possible score of 8 points, Australia at the national level has scored exceptionally well over the past four decades, receiving scores of 5.5 (1980), 8.0 (1990), 8.0 (2000) and 8.0 (2010) (MCP Index Project 2016: 3). Australia is the only democracy to have ever received a score of 8.0 in the history of the MCP Index. This indicates that Australia has

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88 For a more detailed explanation of the ‘Decision Rules’ used to measure the presence of multicultural policies, see (Multiculturalism Policy Index Project 2016: 4-6).
demonstrated an outstanding commitment to multiculturalism that has lasted many decades. A summary of Australia's scores is included below in Table 23.

Table 23 Australia’s scores from the MCP Index (Immigrant Minority Policy)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Curriculum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemptions</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Citizenship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingual Education</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative Action</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SCORE</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MCP Index Project (2016: 8)

The mean score for 2010 across all 21 democracies measured was approximately 3.6. Australia was the top-rated country, with Canada receiving a rating of 7.5, Sweden a rating of 7.0, and Finland and New Zealand a rating of 6.0. The UK was rated 5.5 and the Netherlands 2.0.

The MCP Index Project only claims to describe the presence and evolution of multicultural policy across 21 democracies. It does not, however, seek to evaluate the

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89 ‘Affirmation’ is defined by the MCP Index as “constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal levels and the existence of a government ministry, secretariat or advisory board to implement this policy in consultation with ethnic communities” (2016: 4).

90 ‘School Curriculum’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum” (2016: 4).

91 ‘Media’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing” (2016: 5).

92 ‘Exemptions’ is defined by the MCP Index as “exemptions from dress codes (either by statute or court cases)” (2016: 5).

93 ‘Dual Citizenship’ is defined by the MCP Index as whether immigrants and their offspring “may retain their original citizenship even after acquiring the citizenship of the host country” (2016: 5).

94 ‘Funding Ethnic Groups’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the funding of ethnic group organizations or activities” (2016: 5).

95 ‘Bilingual Education’ is defined by the MCP Index as “the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction” (2016: 6).

96 ‘Affirmative Action’ is defined by the MCP Index as whether the “country has an affirmative action policy that targets [disadvantaged] immigrant minorities” in either the public sector, the private sector or both. Such action must extend beyond human rights policies to include “target action aimed at removing barriers or more positive action measures such as quotas or preferential hiring” (2016: 6).
impact or effectiveness of these policies. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the MCP Index is also limited in some ways. In particular, the data is not disaggregated by municipality or region. The Index does incorporate Commonwealth, state and local government policy as part of its assessment, but there is no specific assessment of each individual state’s policy approaches. Accordingly, this thesis is able to supplement and enhance the MCP Index data by the detailed semi-structured elite interviews with policy actors and provide rich qualitative perspectives.

8.3.2 Racial discrimination: the central pre-condition for multiculturalism

The next three sections primarily draw upon new empirical research, with the findings analysed using the REC Framework. As detailed in Chapter 3, the REC Framework is a tool for operationalising the policy objectives of multiculturalism. These objectives are:

- (R) - reduce discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnicity or cultural background
- (E) - provide an equal opportunity for diverse cultural groups to fully participate in society
- (C) - facilitate a mutual cultural accommodation between immigrant groups, the state, and broader society without forced assimilation

The purpose of this section is to shed light on the perspectives of policy actors regarding South Australian efforts to combat racial discrimination. The empirical findings are based on 13 semi-structured interviews with 15 policy actors. 1 participant was a politician, 2 participants were state public servants, 2 participants were Commonwealth public servants, 6 participants were current or former statutory officers, and 4 participants were members of civil society. 4 participants were also prominent migrant or ethnic minority leaders. In addition to the interview data, the section also draws on legislation, government reports, scholarly literature and other grey literature to triangulate the findings. The commitment to combat discrimination from successive South Australian state governments since the Prohibition of Discrimination Act 1966, and from Commonwealth governments since the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, has been an essential pre-condition for other elements of multicultural policy to flourish. The section begins by discussing how policy actors understood anti-discrimination as fitting within multicultural policies. The section then explores some policy reforms that interview participants want to use for addressing the issue of structural discrimination in South Australia.
Discrimination is antithetical to multiculturalism

In general, interview participants viewed racial discrimination as hostile to the ideals of multiculturalism. For example, Participant A04f, a prominent member of civil society, expressed this sentiment unequivocally:

Racial discrimination can’t work in multiculturalism. You can’t be discriminating against race or religion or ethnicity or some peoples against others for various reasons and talk about multiculturalism, … Discrimination and racism are not on. – Participant A04f, civil society

Similarly, other interview participants agreed that it is the role of governments, both state and Commonwealth, to set and enforce societal ‘ground rules’ that prohibit discrimination. For example, Participant A12m, a member of civil society explained it this way:

The multicultural policies that [are] in place, [are] there to ensure that communities can actually thrive and are protected from hate speech . . . [and can] stand up for themselves and integrate into the community. – Participant A12m, civil society

The institutions of the SAEOC and its Commonwealth counterpart, the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), are central for upholding anti-discrimination legislation. Though there has been considerable debate about changing some of the wording to Section 18c of the Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act 1975, the broader architecture has bipartisan support. However, the Scanlon Foundation’s Mapping Social Cohesion surveys in both 2016 and 2017 found the reported experience of racial discrimination to be 20 per cent of respondents nationwide, rising from 15 per cent in 2015, and 9 per cent in 2007 (Markus 2017: 59; 2016: 25). This illustrates that despite relatively strong institutional processes and a high score in the MCP Index, there is still pervasive racial discrimination in Australia.

The issue of ‘positive messaging’ was an area of division between interview participants. Some participants expressed views that policymakers and civil society ought to minimise negative rhetoric about racism and discrimination in favour of emphasising the harmonious nature of Australian society where people of all backgrounds can live together peacefully. The justification for this view is that issues like racism are confronting and divisive when in public discourse. Other participants from both the public sector and from civil society strongly disagreed with this approach. These participants instead argued that racism should be ‘called out’ through initiatives like the AHRC’s national anti-racism

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97 The Mapping Social Cohesion 2017 survey question was worded “Have you experienced discrimination in the last twelve months because of your skin colour, ethnic origin or religion?” (Markus 2017: 59).
strategy ‘Racism. It Stops With Me’, to which the South Australian government recommitted in 2015 (SAEOC 2016: 13). Participants who ascribed to the latter line of thinking didn’t necessarily oppose projects like ‘Harmony Day’. Instead, they preferred a two-pronged approach incorporating positive messaging and anti-racism together so that underlying problems are not buried deeper.

**A need to improve efforts countering structural racial discrimination**

Multiple interview participants with similar backgrounds as statutory officials or public servants identified that the issue of structural discrimination is a policy area requiring attention. The labour market was frequently mentioned as a prime example of where structural discrimination occurs. Participant A07f emphasised that this issue affects Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as well as individuals with a CALD background. She explained that the Australian Workplace Gender Equality Agency (WGEA) has done significant work addressing male-biased human resources systems which tend to discriminate against women. Likewise, she proposed government should consider this work to “run a race lens” over human resources practices, procurement strategies and wage gap analyses:

> [WGEA’s work] could easily be picked up [by the South Australian government] and looked at in terms of racism. … You run a race lens over everything. … You look at your procurement strategies…. “Do you even think about running a lens over how many Aboriginal organisations you contracted within the past year?” … The public sector is the largest employer and should show leadership and should do it. – Participant A07f, statutory officer

Participant A07f also identified positive action employment targets set by the South Australian government for people of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander background in the state public service. However, the government has not extended this positive action measure to people with a CALD background. Another option discussed by former statutory officer Participant A11f was granting the SAEOC powers to mount investigations centring on a particular theme of discrimination. However, she described this avenue as being “resisted” by the prominent ministers in the South Australian Labor government who were “unresponsive” due their desire to contain and limit the scope of the state’s *Equal Opportunity Act*.

In addition, Participant A04f who is a prominent member of civil society, expressed concerns about lip-service government policies that set goals without a corresponding

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98 Harmony Day is celebrated in Australia on 21 March to coincide with the United Nations International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
implementation agenda. For example, improving the cultural competence in the workforce without a plan that leads to the valuation of cultural difference by workplaces:

If cultural competence isn’t one of [the Vocational Education and Training competencies], you’re not going to recruit people who speak languages other than English or look different because anybody can do it… You’re not going to value difference… So there’s a whole lot of things that sit nicely in policies, but there is no implementation agenda. – Participant A04f, civil society

Furthermore, Participant A04f was troubled by the lack of “agenda to review, monitor and review and keep updating policies”. There is a continuing need to address barriers that structurally discriminate against members of CALD communities. The ‘race lens’ metaphor and positive action measures are both potential solutions which could be further explored by policymakers. Reconsidering SAEOC powers to launch thematic investigations may also lead to the uncovering of discrimination occurring on a wider systemic level.

In sum, South Australian policy responses to racial discrimination can be characterised in the following ways. Commitment to anti-discrimination is framed by policy actors as being the basis for multiculturalism. Legislation prohibiting discrimination has enjoyed longstanding and broad support at the state and Commonwealth levels. Furthermore, the South Australian government and parliament have both recognised the need to identify and call out racial discrimination. This contrasts with the view of the former Howard Commonwealth government that preferred a strategy of ‘positive-only messaging’ to avoid being divisive. In addition, there have not been race riots or racially motivated civil disturbances in South Australia’s recent history. However, more can be done to counter structural discrimination. In particular, the state’s reliance on a complaint-based mechanism does little to identify or reform discriminatory power structures.

8.3.3 Equal opportunity: challenges to access and equity

The purpose of this section is to discuss how policy actors see South Australian multicultural policy approaches addressing equal opportunity. The section centres around the challenges facing the foundational concept of ‘access and equity’. There were some political concerns around funding of policy initiatives, as well as the mainstreaming of CALD-specific approaches into generalised policy in the spirit of ‘whole-of-government’ reforms. In addition to the interview data, this section draws upon government reports, scholarly literature and other grey literature to triangulate the findings.

Political tensions around access and equity

Access and equity is one of the hallmark principles of Australian multiculturalism as articulated by the Galbally Report (Galbally 1978: 4). However, Participant A06fa explained
that equal opportunity is often not clearly defined, despite an unspoken acceptance of what it means. She defined equal opportunity as:

Everyone, regardless of personal characteristics of race, disability, gender, sexual preference [and] sexual identity should be able to have equal access to opportunity in our community… I can’t think of a more sophisticated way to put it. – Participant A06fa, statutory officer

In terms of multiculturalism, there is a strong overlap between the South Australian Equal Opportunity Commission’s (SAEOC) policy objectives of facilitating an equality of opportunity and the elimination of racial discrimination. Much of the SAEOC’s work focuses on the conciliation of discrimination complaints, community education about societal norms and expectations, and training initiatives for individual organisations. Similarly, the principle of access and equity is designed specifically to redress barriers which impede upon people’s ability access government services in an equitable manner. In its 2017 multicultural policy statement, the Turnbull government reaffirmed the ‘Multicultural Access and Equity Policy’ which “ensures programs and services meet the needs of all Australians, whatever their cultural and linguistic background” (DSS 2017c: 11).

However, some participants from civil society raised concern that access and equity may be under threat in the aged care sector. Participants A02f and A10f singled out the ‘consumer-focus’ in aged care under the Commonwealth ‘My Aged Care’ reforms. They argued that this reform package would lead to the merging or closure of ethno-specific service providers in favour of larger corporate providers. In turn, they suggested the reforms were signalling to people with CALD backgrounds that if they want an ethno-specific service that is culturally and linguistically appropriate, then they should be prepared to pay for it themselves. Despite the subsuming of some smaller ethno-specific providers into larger corporations, both participants criticised the larger providers as being unable to cater for the specific needs of people with CALD backgrounds in an adequate and appropriate manner.

The relationship between the SAEOC and the state Labor government in power at the time was also discussed in several interviews. Participant A11f described the work of the SAEOC as having a deleterious effect on this relationship because:

Upholding . . . the importance of the [Equal Opportunity] Act, the values and so on, that would put [the SAEOC] on an increasing collision course with the [Right Faction of the Labor] government. – Participant A11f, former statutory officer

In her observations, Participant A11f linked the tension to a funding cut of approximately one third to the SAEOC’s operating budget in 2012. Other participants also
suggested that political tension coincided with the dramatic cuts to the Commission’s budget, saying that the reduction in resources inhibited the Commission’s ability to broaden its community education and training initiatives. Between 2009/10 and 2018/19, the SAEOC’s budget was cut by 55% with full-time equivalent staffing reduced from 20.2 to 5.7 (SAEOC 2019: 6). Whilst the mandate under the Equal Opportunity Act includes discrimination on other grounds in addition to race, these political factors made it difficult for the SAEOC to effectively uphold the anti-racial discrimination component of multiculturalism in South Australia. Despite this challenge, some participants highlighted that the Commission has had to become much more efficient and has reduced its initial assessment and response for a complaint to within 30 days, down from six months previously.

**Access and equity in practice: concerns over mainstreaming**

Under the policy of access and equity, people with a CALD background are able to access translation and interpreting services. Participant A01m strongly emphasised that “interpreters are critical for making sure there’s access and equity in the delivery of services”. He explained this using an example: if someone with poor English language proficiency goes to the doctor, the patient is able to access an interpreter either in person or via telephone link. Participant A01m later clarified that it is principally a government responsibility to fund interpreting and translation provision to ensure that individuals are able to have equitable access to public services:

> The people who provide the interpreting service do it on a fee-for-service basis. So a government agency, in many cases, will be paying for that service. – *Participant A01m, public servant*

In another example, Participant A01m highlighted that the South Australian Interpreting and Translating Centre, which currently resides within the Department for Communities and Social Inclusion, grew out of a judicial interpreting service. Judges explained to prosecutors that the court’s ability to understand witnesses or defendants was critical for carrying out justice. Where people could not speak English proficiently for the court, interpreters became the crucial intermediary. Participant A01m explained that this service was later expanded across all government services. As the examples of the healthcare and judicial systems indicate, the principle of access and equity is a key standard of what the public sector is expected to provide for Australians with a CALD background. More specifically, the onus is on the public sector to ensure that all Australians have equitable access to public services.
Just under half of the South Australian interview participants identified the recent trend for policymakers to mainstream and combine various ‘diversities’ together. Participant A03f, who is a public servant, explained the view of the Department for Communities and Social Inclusion (DCSI):

What DCSI tried to do was to . . . focus on inclusivity, inclusion and accessibility . . . rather than have the situation that had been perpetuated for many years where you identified this group of people by cultural and linguistic diversity. The Department’s view was that you shouldn’t pigeonhole people like that, even though people have got a whole range of different aspects that make up their identity, not just race or language or culture. – Participant A03f, public servant

She went on to explain the rationale for this approach, giving the example of youth inclusion policy:

[There are] these particular ['diversities'], and we have got some statutory responsibilities for some of these groups . . . to work with culturally diverse communities to help establish preventative community-based approaches that protect and promote youth inclusion. We’re also trying to build in responses to our [CALD] youth within our general youth programs . . . we’re trying to not make it a marginalised group. – Participant A03f, public servant

Participant A07f echoed this sentiment, suggesting that mainstreaming ‘diversities’ together can lead to a cross-pollination of ideas about improving equal opportunity by building on successful models or programs. Several other participants however, predominantly members of civil society, were critical of the mainstreaming approach and its implications for people with a CALD background. The previous section mentioned some specific concerns about mainstreaming in the aged care sector whereby small ethno-specific providers that provide unique culturally relevant care are squeezed out of the market by larger corporations. Participant A10f, a former public servant and now a member of civil society criticised mainstreaming for diluting specific concerns facing people with a CALD background in the aged care system:

The next incarnation is that the CALD strategy in ageing will be replaced, [and] subsumed by a Diversity Framework. . . . It’s being subsumed by a working group that will be looking at [Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders], LGBTIQ,\(^99\) CALD, and probably other issues as well like homelessness. . . . The [CALD] community perceives that this is constant watering down of its issues. – Participant A10f, civil society

The sentiment here was concern that the unique issues for CALD communities were being diluted to the point where they become invisible amidst many different ‘diversities’ through mainstreaming. Similarly, Participant A04f, a member of civil society, raised

\(^{99}\) Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer.
concerns about the inadequacy of mainstreaming to effectively empower people with a CALD background within the framework of access and equity:

You get fads in policy . . . Both sides of politics I think wanted to make mainstream organisations culturally competent . . . [through] mainstreaming . . . but the social inclusion policy became mainstreaming . . . That required a whole lot of other things. How did that sit under access and equity? Because that's one of the items of multiculturalism that you have to deal with . . . [And] it hasn’t been resolved. – Participant A04f, civil society

These sentiments were echoed by other participants from civil society too. For example, Participant A10f said that a mainstreamed, generalist policy setting tends to prefer superficial options to cater for people with a CALD background:

[There is an acknowledgement of] diversity within diversity, which seems to be a very popular term at the moment, and that as programs and services are implemented that due attention will be paid to that diversity. Very often it's about teaching people how to . . . use interpreters, rather than really drilling down and looking at it in a more holistic sense . . . but there's so many other dimensions to working with CALD population groups, that go beyond just the use of interpreters. – Participant A10f, civil society

There are some significant tensions occurring here. Access and equity is the lynchpin for South Australian multiculturalism, but several interview participants are concerned about fads in policymaking weakening this key element. As the interview material indicates, the state Labor government appeared to prefer policy mainstreaming rather than strengthening CALD-specific approaches.

*Human capital* as a significant factor for socio-economic integration

In addition to structural barriers, many of the South Australian participants also recognised a need to focus on improving individuals’ human capital as a pathway for socio-economic integration. The Commonwealth Government’s 2017 multicultural statement re-emphasised the importance of new arrivals finding employment as quickly as possible (DSS 2017c). This priority was also reflected in the 2016-17 immigration figures listed in Section 5.2 where two-thirds of permanent visas granted were through the skilled migrant stream (DIBP 2017a: 254). It is recognised that new arrivals to a country face challenges due to lower ‘host-country’ human capital when compared with the native-born population (Kogan 2006: 697-698). In particular, policymakers understand that English language proficiency and education are important elements of an individual's human capital for entering the labour market. The Adult Migrant English Program, funded by the Commonwealth, forms part of the settlement services framework by supporting eligible migrants “to learn foundation English language and settlement skills to enable them to participate socially and economically in Australian society” (DSS 2017c: 11). However,
Participant A01m, a senior South Australian public servant, noted that migrants face a dilemma. They recognise the importance of learning English but the economic imperative to pursue employment is equally important:

There is a barrier to learning English if people are also seeking employment... [If migrants] apply for Centrelink [welfare] payments while... seeking employment and they're saying "Well, you're not chasing these jobs"... [Migrants] can't then say "I'm studying in English", because that's not [considered] a sufficient reason not to be chasing employment. – Participant A01m, public servant

Given that undertaking English language training was not considered a sufficient reason for not seeking employment, these migrants were not eligible for 'Jobseeker' welfare payments. Migrants were therefore indirectly penalised for pursuing language skills that would be more beneficial for their long-term employment prospects. Participant A01m said that the Commonwealth’s Joint Standing Committee on Migration’s Inquiry into Migrant Settlement Outcomes was considering this very issue. Numerous submissions made to the Inquiry commented on these competing priorities, along with limited success of the Adult Migrant English Program in providing adequate language proficiency in some cases (Joint Standing Committee on Migration 2017: 47-57). In its response to Committee's report, the Commonwealth government referred to changes in the Budget 2018-19 allowing more time for newly arrived refugees to develop English language proficiency before entering the 'Jobactive' employment services program. These changes acknowledged the need of the state to accommodate the needs of humanitarian entrants whilst promoting equal opportunity.

Summing up, South Australian policy responses to equal opportunity can be described as follows. The centrepiece is the principle of 'access and equity' which has been established as the consensus paradigm at both the state and Commonwealth levels for decades. Access and equity requires public agencies to mitigate barriers faced by CALD communities to accessing public services. Similarly, SAMEAC plays a key representative and advocacy role, serving as a bridge between CALD groups and government. However, there are concerns regarding the impact that policy mainstreaming may have for access and equity. There are some benefits to be gained by combining ‘diversities’ such as race or gender together, such as shared learnings. However, this compromise comes at the cost of a separate, specialised focus. Similarly, justifying policy mainstreaming by emphasising an individualised ‘consumer-focus’ risks undermining the fundamental principle of access and equity. Ethno-specific organisations may often be well-placed to deliver client-centred services, but mainstreaming can risk sidelining these bodies.
### 8.3.4 Mutual cultural accommodation: transformative multiculturalism

This section discusses the third policy objective in the REC Framework: mutual cultural accommodation. This objective is very prominent in South Australian multiculturalism, especially when considered as a two-way compromise between migrants and their new society. The section begins by discussing how the South Australian government positively values and recognises the importance of cultural diversity. Following this, there are also obligations placed on members of CALD communities including a commitment to adhere to the law and uphold Australian political values. This is indicative of how the obligations of civic integration can be effectively joined to multiculturalism. The section ends by exploring how accommodation by the wider Australian society reinforces that multiculturalism is for all Australians. In addition to the interview data, this section draws upon government reports and other grey literature to triangulate the findings.

#### Cultural accommodation through public recognition and grant funding

At the core of Australian multiculturalism is the recognition that cultural and linguistic diversity is part of the nation’s social fabric. Accordingly, Australian governments actively consult with CALD community organisations on policy matters, fund cultural events to celebrate the nation’s diversity, and fund cultural and linguistic maintenance programs. Across the three tiers of government, Australia publicly recognises CALD communities and promotes the societal benefits of this diversity. For example, two of SAMEAC’s principal tasks are to “facilitate communication between the government and CALD communities; [and] promote multiculturalism as an integral part of the state’s social and economic policies, and work towards an inclusive society” (SAMEAC 2016: 15). One interview participant explained that SAMEAC acts as a bridge between CALD communities and the state government. Since the adoption of a new Community Engagement Strategy in early 2015, SAMEAC now conducts half of its monthly meetings as community consultation and engagement sessions with different cultural groups to hear “their ongoing needs and aspirations” (SAMEAC 2016: 24). This consultation and dialogue between government and CALD communities is vital for ensuring successful process outcomes, so that policy projects can be responsive in meeting community-identified needs in a targeted manner.

Another key pillar of South Australian multicultural policy is the Multicultural Grants program, administered through Grants SA. Through these grants, the South Australian government strongly emphasises its role in publicly recognising and supporting CALD communities. The program provided $1 million for CALD communities to develop projects to strengthen multicultural communities and celebrate cultural diversity (SAMEAC 2016: 18). As Participant A05m explained:
[South Australian] government policy has been very proactive in encouraging and empowering the community to showcase their own cultures and . . . open up for others to come in and appreciate [different cultures]. At the same time, [CALD communities] should learn and appreciate the cultures outside of their own community as well. – Participant A05m, statutory officer

Furthermore, he stated that both sides of South Australian politics have shown consistent leadership so that society now largely views cultural difference as making a positive contribution to the South Australia.

Participant A08m, a South Australian politician, explained the importance and significance of having government fund community grants for cultural events:

[The cultural event is] obviously powerfully nostalgic for them. It's a social occasion where they get to meet other people from the same nationality. It's an occasion where they can speak the old language or languages. And usually there will be a government and an opposition representative there and it's a way of saying, "Look, we know why you're in Australia; we know why you came here. We know what you bring to Australia in your language and your cultural mores and we're actually willing to spend a small amount of taxpayers' dollars letting you celebrate that so that . . . you won't feel alienated or rejected. – Participant A08m, politician

Ensuring the presence of political representation at the cultural event is a powerful symbol for the CALD communities and signals the positive valuation and recognition of cultural diversity within South Australian society. Public recognition demonstrates government support for the encouragement of cultural diversity, and it validates the presence of CALD communities as being significant contributors and participants in the societal fabric.

Some participants did raise some concerns, suggesting that South Australian multicultural policy is at times lacking in substance. The second update of the state's Strategic Plan included only one target relating to multiculturalism about maintaining the high level of support for cultural diversity in the community (DPC 2011: 27). This rate of support refers to the 2008 baseline from the Strategic Plan Household survey, where 89% of South Australians saw multiculturalism as a positive influence (DPC 2011: 15). Given that there are 100 other targets in the Strategic Plan, a move to simply maintain or improve community attitude was described by multiple participants as being very unambitious. Participant A03f suggested that this lack of ambition was symbolic of a lack of deep, comprehensive multicultural policy in South Australia. She partly attributed this to under-resourcing:
This is awkward... I don’t think we have much policy in multiculturalism... We've had resource cuts in this whole area... If you compare the resources that South Australia has in this area compared to other jurisdictions, ... which I think reflects where our government is and the fact that we’re not a very rich state. – Participant A03f, public servant

She went to praise recent increases to the Multicultural Grants funding. However, she qualified this with the need to ensure the development of practical multicultural policy that goes beyond simply supporting anti-discrimination legislation and the ideals of the SAMEAC Act:

Despite the fact that we don’t have a lot of money in South Australia, the government has seen multiculturalism as really important and... put a whole lot of investment into the grants, which is fantastic. But we do need to keep developing our policy responses. – Participant A03f, public servant

The policy responses mentioned are those that actively include people of CALD backgrounds into South Australian society, rather than viewing them as marginalised people reliant upon government support. This view echoes Participant A04f who supported a shift in focus from ‘vulnerable victims’ towards meaningful empowerment.

These concerns link together when considering the issue of policy evaluation and assessment. In the context of discussing tendency towards mainstreaming in multicultural policy, Participant A10f, a former public servant and now a member of civil society, commented:

You can only evaluate something that’s very specific, very targeted, and very clear in its aspirations and outcomes... there’s a lot of general statements out there, or what we used to call motherhood statements, but what we don’t see is a lot of really targeted specific outcomes-focused policy and that’s the only sort of policy that you can evaluate in a proper sense. – Participant A10f, former public servant, civil society

Public servants gave mixed responses to questions about evaluation metrics. One public servant wanted to see a return to standardised reporting mechanisms for access and equity across government, whereas others saw this approach as being out-dated. They preferred the notion of self-assessment, where individual government agencies can tailor their own reporting and evaluation due to in-depth knowledge of their own clientele. This is not necessarily a problem. However, the concerns raised by Participants A03f and A10f about the lack of substantive multicultural policy imply that there could be difficulties in making meaningful and incisive evaluations.

Obligations placed on CALD communities to adapt to Australian society and norms
A longstanding part of the compromise of mutual accommodation in Australia is that some obligations are also placed on members of CALD communities. New arrivals are expected to
uphold Australia's shared values, including its political institutions. In this way, multiculturalism is constrained by a framework of social liberalism. The rule of law is a crucial part of this liberal framework. Participants A11f and A09f both made remarks that drew upon this principle. Firstly, Participant A11f recounted an experience from one of her staff members who visited a meeting of members from one particular CALD community group. This group had very strict expectations about gender roles and was concerned about no-fault divorce in the Family Law Act.

[The group] wanted [no-fault divorce] overturned, and they did not want their wives to be able to get Centrelink benefits if they left them, as supporting parents. – Participant A11f, former statutory officer

This of course is unacceptable given the important principle of equality before the law in Australia, and her staff needed to explain this to the community group. Likewise, both Participants A09f and A07f explained that SAMEAC has engaged in discussion with CALD communities about domestic violence, ageing and elder abuse. Participant A09f said that CALD communities welcomed this dialogue, which was aimed at educating communities about societal expectations before police intervention is necessary. She described the communities' responses in this way:

I think people are really [thinking], "Oh, we'd never really thought about how those issues as they relate to us . . . Everyone's dealing with it, whether you want to acknowledge it or not. Everyone's got ageing parents. And there's no reason why ethnic communities will be shielded from what we know goes on in other communities. – Participant A09f, statutory officer

Participant A01m made similar remarks about the role of the state in shaping behaviours and norms for new arrivals:

Some of it is to do with new arrival elements. If you’re new to Australia, then you might not know about the laws here or the accepted practices and the practices that aren’t accepted. There’s a need to get that information through [at the same time as initial settlement services] . . . [These sorts of] matters tend to get dealt with when the issue arises in practice, rather than “let’s go along to a meeting and hear about it”. – Participant A01m, public servant

These examples demonstrate the complexities that face policymakers. However, the participants' accounts highlight that multiculturalism performs a culturally transformative function, with both new arrivals and established CALD communities expected to conform to societal norms and boundaries. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is an example of how civic integration can be successfully interwoven with multiculturalism.
Multiculturalism is for ‘all Australians’: accommodation by the state and society

Both the South Australian and Commonwealth governments have identified social cohesion has a priority area. In December 2016, the South Australian Labor government announced $8 million in funding allocated over four years under the new *Stronger Families Stronger Communities* grants initiative (DCSI 2016b; Multicultural SA 2017). The grants were available for one-off funding projects that help people from CALD communities to “feel included, accepted [and] respected . . . [through] training, development skills, strengthening families and building social connections that support a sense of belonging and wellbeing” (DCSI 2016b). Similarly, the Commonwealth Coalition government allocated $45 million in funding over three and a quarter years to the new *Strong and Resilient Communities* grants program (DSS 2017b). One of the three new grant programs under the Commonwealth initiative was the ‘Community Resilience grants’ to explicitly “support projects in communities to address potential or early signs of low social cohesion and/or racial, religious and cultural intolerance” (DSS 2017b).

The rationale for grants such as these is not new however, as Participant A10f explained that the Hawke government developed a ‘community relations strategy’ in the 1980s:

> We saw the development of a community relations strategy . . . but back then the focus was very much on what do we need to do to ensure that the myths that feed racism, discrimination . . . how do we create a society that understands the benefits of multiculturalism, [and] is accepting of other cultures? . . . Funds were expended into making sure that those strategies were effective, that they were community-driven and consultation-driven. – Participant A10f, former public servant, civil society

Multiple participants explained that the goal of achieving good community relations was to educate society to become accepting of cultural diversity and understanding of the benefits arising from multiculturalism. This also extends to the Turnbull government's position that multicultural policy is not just for the newest arrivals. Instead, multiculturalism reinforces that the entirety of Australian society can share the benefits of a culturally and linguistically diverse population. As Participant A13fa, a senior federal public servant explained:

> I think [the Turnbull] government has been particularly keen to emphasise the fact that multicultural policy is not just about the newest arrivals but about all of us, and what being part of a culturally diverse community means both in terms of sharing in the benefits of that but also what that means collectively in terms of responsibilities and having shared values. – Participant A13fa, federal public servant
Contrasting with these efforts promoting cultural accommodation, a majority of interview participants saw the return of Pauline Hanson to the Commonwealth Parliament in 2016 as a major threat to multiculturalism. Participant A10f sees as a 'culture of fear' being compounded by Hanson’s divisive and populist rhetoric:

A culture of fear [has developed] around terms like multiculturalism, cultural diversity, and we've seen political forces actively nurture that culture of fear because it suited their political ends. – Participant A10f, former public servant, civil society

Participant A10f went on to say this culture of fear threatened to undermine multiculturalism. In particular, she believed that fears of porous borders, terrorism and immigration more generally has led to a blindness toward migrants' valuable contributions to society. With these persistent fears, she believed there was a need for policymakers to demonstrate leadership with positive messaging to change the tone of debate. Similarly, policies can act as building blocks to foster good relations between migrant communities and the majority population by countering these fears and anxieties.

In summary, mutual cultural accommodation was a prominent theme for South Australian multiculturalism. The very premise of ‘access and equity' in the Australian context is the accommodation of the state to adapt service provision to meet the cultural and linguistic needs of CALD communities. Likewise, multicultural grants represent a positive valuation by government of cultural and linguistic diversity in the public sphere. Moreover, frequent dialogue between SAMEAC, SAEOC and CALD groups about societal norms and expectations in South Australia underscored the 'mutual' component of mutual cultural accommodation. Politically, One Nation has not achieved electoral success in South Australia unlike in the Queensland or Commonwealth parliaments. This has meant political rhetoric challenging mutual cultural accommodation in South Australia has been muted, though many interview participants expressed anxieties about people sympathising with One Nation's anti-immigrant views. Despite these strengths, there were some concerns highlighted in the findings. Several participants expressed concern about the prevalence of vague 'motherhood'-type statements and unambitious policy goals, indicating a diminution of a substantive policy agenda in the state. Without a comprehensive policy framework, it is difficult for policy actors to easily evaluate initiatives.

8.3.5 Summary of REC Framework findings

Applying the REC Framework to the South Australian case has led to several findings about how the state’s policy approach can be characterised as 'quiet multiculturalism’. First, the premise of multiculturalism in South Australia is a strong commitment to anti-
discrimination and calling out racism. However, the state’s reliance on a complaint-based mechanism limits the capacity for the SAEOC to respond to structural discrimination. Second, South Australian multiculturalism centres around the well-established principle of access and equity. This principle requires government to address and mitigate the unique barriers that people with a CALD background may have when accessing public services. However, there were some concerns about policy mainstreaming undermining access and equity in practice. Third, the findings presented in this chapter suggest that mutual cultural accommodation is strongly emphasised in South Australia. Positive valuation and public recognition of cultural and linguistic diversity is achieved through multicultural grants, institutional consultation and advocacy through SAMEAC, and bipartisan representation at CALD community events. Participants emphasised constructive dialogue between institutional representatives and CALD communities, centred around the expectation that migrants also need to adapt by conforming to South Australian legal and political norms. There were also some tensions between key institutional actors over the direction of multicultural policymaking, especially over the funding of the SAEOC. The remainder of the chapter uses these findings to help assess the degree of South Australian multicultural policy success.

8.4 Policy success of multiculturalism in South Australia

The previous section provided evidence from policy actors and policy documentation that helps to describe South Australian policy approaches in terms of the REC Framework. The purpose of this section is to evaluate South Australian policy using Marsh and McConnell’s (2010) ‘three-dimensions’ heuristic for evaluating policy success. Within the federal political system, South Australia has established sound policy foundations that demonstrate a high degree of political success and enduring bipartisanship. However, this section highlights areas that require continual commitment and reform to achieve programmatic outcomes, and there are some concerns arising from the current trajectory of policymaking process.

8.4.1 Political success

Firstly, government policymaking to support multiculturalism in South Australia, and Australia more broadly, exhibits a generally high degree of enduring political success across both the Commonwealth-state divide and the partisan divide. There is a strong similarity in the way the Commonwealth and state governments define and frame multicultural policy. In particular, there is a striking resemblance between three key documents: the first official

Comparing the three documents shows a remarkable similarity and enduring resilience in the understanding of how governments ought to frame multicultural policy. The principle of access and equity is a central element, with governments recognising the need for the public sector and society to adapt to help the integration of new arrivals. All three documents emphasise the importance of cultural and linguistic diversity for Australian society. This is perhaps best summated by Zubrzycki who in 1977, during his appointment

| Table 24 South Australian multicultural policy success in the political domain |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **REC Framework** | **Racial discrimination** | **Equal opportunity** | **Cultural accommodation** |
| Political success | - Establishment and longevity of state and Commonwealth anti-discrimination legislation has been largely bipartisan | - Access and equity has received bipartisan support since the 1970s, becoming entrenched as part of the mainstream consensus paradigm at both state and Commonwealth levels | - Dissonance on multicultural rhetoric between SA and Cwth resolved under Gillard, with further continuity seen under Turnbull-Morrison Coalition |
| | - Tensions between SA Labor government with SAEOC, coinciding with funding cuts of 55% | | - Access and equity: governments and society adapt to help the integration of new arrivals. |
| | | | - Tensions between SAMEAC and Multicultural SA about future of multiculturalism |
| | | | - One Nation has not achieved electoral success in SA |
| Source of evidence | - Interview data | - Interview data | - Interview data |
| | | - Department of Social Services (2017a; 2017b; 2017c) | |
| | | - Australian Ethnic Affairs Council (1977) | |
| Rating | - Moderate success | - High success | - High success |
by the then federal Coalition government under Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, reported that Australia needed to endorse the shift away from cultural homogeneity and work towards “a voluntary bond of dissimilar people sharing a common political and institutional structure” (Australian Ethnic Affairs Council 1977: 14). In the same way, the establishment and longevity of state and Commonwealth anti-discrimination legislation has been bipartisan, though recent debates on Section 18c challenge the integrity of the federal legislation. Though there have been changes in focus over the past forty years, the ideas that infuse Australian multiculturalism remain durable and entrenched (Parkin and Hardcastle 2019: 633-634).

This bipartisanship does not equate to uniform consensus though. Multiple participants raised concern that toxic public discourse undermines multiculturalism, inflating anxieties about CALD people. The political divisions have exacerbated disharmony, further inflamed by the publicity and recent breakthrough of the radical-right One Nation party in the Commonwealth Parliament, and to a lesser extent in Queensland. Although One Nation does not have a parliamentary presence in South Australia, this discourse obscures the positive contributions made by people with a CALD background to Australian society. This in turn impedes government efforts to seek to promote and celebrate these positive contributions through initiatives such as multicultural grants for cultural events. Divisive rhetoric from One Nation also undermines the positive steps made by the new Stronger Families, Stronger Communities and Strong and Resilient Communities programs which seek to combat intolerance and promote good relations between groups.

Furthermore, multiple participants spoke disparagingly about a significant funding cut to the SAEOC in 2012, indicating that this was, in part, attributable to political disagreements between the Commission and members of the South Australian Labor government. Nonetheless, the overarching policy approach is well-established and bipartisan at both the South Australian and Commonwealth levels, suggesting a high degree of political success.

**8.4.2 Programmatic success**

South Australian multicultural policy is also characterised by a generally high degree of programmatic success with the best outcomes in the areas of mutual cultural accommodation and equal opportunity. Cultural and linguistic diversity has been positively valued on a regular basis in the public domain by government through multicultural grants (SAMEAC 2016). Representatives from both sides of politics attend cultural events, and SAMEAC has fostered open channels of dialogue with CALD communities that serves as a
bridge for accessing government. Other face-to-face dialogue with CALD communities about domestic violence and ageing, from both SAMEAC and the SAEOC, underscores the ‘mutual’ responsibility for accommodation in line with societal norms and expectations. South Australia has also not seen racially motivated conflicts or riots despite having a high degree of cultural and linguistic diversity (Soutphommasane 2015: 6). Additionally, the partnership between the state and Commonwealth governments as part of the new Stronger Families, Stronger Communities and Strong and Resilient Communities initiatives show promise with the provision of funding to address intolerance. However, participants themselves highlighted that it was too early to evaluate the strategy’s effectiveness yet.

### Table 25 South Australian multicultural policy success in the programmatic domain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REC Framework</th>
<th>Racial discrimination</th>
<th>Equal opportunity</th>
<th>Cultural accommodation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Programmatic success | - There is a recognised need to address structural racism in proactive manner: complaint-based powers unable to reform structures  
- Anti-discrimination law not reducing discrimination but does establish societal norms  
- SA government has recognised the need to call out and identify racial discrimination  
- No incidents of race riots or disturbances in South Australia | - Principle of access and equity mitigates barriers migrants face in accessing public services  
- SAMEAC dialogue with CALD groups serves as bridge for accessing and advising government | - Multicultural grants represent a positive valuation of CALD in public domain by government.  
- SAMEAC and SAEOC dialogue with CALD groups about societal norms and expectations underscores ‘mutual’ accommodation.  
- Multicultural grants demonstrate a valuation and acceptance of CALD groups in society.  
- New Stronger Families Stronger Communities (SA) and Strong and Resilient Communities (Cwth) programs provide funding to address intolerance |
| Source of evidence | - Interview data  
- SAEOC (2016)  
- Soutphommasane (2015) | - Interview data  
- MCP Index data | - Interview data  
- SAMEAC (2016) |
| Rating | - Moderate success | - High success | - High success |

Likewise, the policy settings for eliminating racial discrimination and facilitating equal opportunity are quite well-founded. For example, anti-discrimination laws were not necessarily reducing the rates of racial discrimination complaints accepted by the SAEOC.
However, these laws still play an important role by establishing acceptable societal norms. There is a recognised need to address structural discrimination in a proactive manner, though complaint-based legislative powers have difficulty in reforming these structural barriers. More proactive measures, such as the British equality duty discussed in Chapter 6, may be more effective in addressing structural discrimination.

Furthermore, multiple participants stressed the need to couple positive messaging that promotes harmony with explicit anti-racism strategies. In 2015, the South Australian government signed a recommitment to the ‘National Anti-Racism Campaign Supporter Agreement’, followed by South Australian parliamentarians pledging support for the ‘Racism. It Stops With Me’ campaign in 2016 (SAEOC 2016). Otherwise, the veneer of relentless positive-only messaging can impede or even mask deep-rooted problems that should be brought to the surface.

**8.4.3 Process success**

Finally, South Australian policy approaches promoting multiculturalism have achieved a moderate degree of **process success**. The consultative dialogue between CALD groups, SAMEAC and the SAEOC was a crucial structural element for ensuring that policy directions are appropriate and relevant. Furthermore, the process of consultation was an explicit valuation and recognition of the CALD-group self-organisation. It sends a positive message that the state government recognises and supports cultural diversity in the public domain. Additionally, multiple participants mentioned the regular meeting of an ‘anti-racism roundtable’, which brought together relevant stakeholders from across the public sector and civil society to identify and direct action towards areas of concern. Another area of improvement, highlighted by interviewees, was the reform to the SAEOC discrimination conciliation processes. Communication between the Commission and involved parties is now more transparent, less legalistic, and faster. According to several interview participants, the Commission had reduced its initial assessment time for a complaint to 30 days, down from six months.

On the other hand, there were a number of concerns about policy development process. Several interviews highlighted a growing trend towards policies mainstreaming different attributes together (e.g. gender, race, religion, disability etc). This may yield some benefits (Scholten et al. 2017: 284). For example, structural barriers in the labour market share commonalities across these areas, and so advances or strategies in one area could be more

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100 The SAEOC 2015-16 Annual Report shows the number of accepted complaints on the grounds of race were 29 in 2012-13, 17 in 2013-14, 11 in 2014-15 and 18 in 2015-16.
readily applied to another in a mainstreamed policy setting. However, multiple participants raised concerns that mainstreaming under the catch-all banner of ‘diversity’ could lead to a dilution of specific ‘diversities’ and the nuanced differences between them. The example mentioned by several members of civil society was how mainstreaming processes may be hollowing out access and equity because of the consumer-focus in the Commonwealth’s ‘My Aged Care’ reforms.

**Table 26 South Australian multicultural policy success in the process domain**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REC Framework</th>
<th>Racial discrimination</th>
<th>Equal opportunity</th>
<th>Cultural accommodation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Process success</strong></td>
<td>- No powers for thematic investigations limit potential for addressing widespread structural discrimination - Reforms improving the efficiency of SAEOC conciliation processes, increasing the accessibility for complainants and respondents</td>
<td>- Mainstreaming: some benefits of combining ‘diversities’, but loss of specialised focus. - Mainstreaming: hollowing access and equity by ‘consumer-focus’ - Self-assessment evaluation without a substantive policy base decreases effectiveness of access and equity</td>
<td>- Mainstreaming: diminishes access and equity by ‘consumer-focus’ - Competitive tender processes undermining NGO collaboration - SAMEAC dialogue with CALD groups is a bridge for accessing government - Vague motherhood statements and unambitious policy goals: diminution of substantive policy base that is difficult to evaluate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rating</strong></td>
<td>- Moderate success</td>
<td>- Moderate success</td>
<td>- Moderate success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another area of concern was the increase in prevalence of vague ‘motherhood-type’ statements in the multicultural policy sector, leading to the diminution of a substantive policy and evidence base. This contrasts with the way one participant described the centrality of rigorous research and policy options papers during the Hawke-Keating era through OMA and BIMPR. This sentiment is reflected in Jakubowicz’s analysis (2014) of the interaction between research, policy and politics. One participant cynically suggested this diminished and politicised research base is intentional, because if a policy statement is vague and intangible, its effectiveness cannot be thoroughly evaluated and assessed. At the same time, these motherhood statements could in fact facilitate bipartisan support and
aforementioned political success precisely because they are vague and broad (Thacher and Rein 2004).

Furthermore, recent shifts in both the state and Commonwealth public sectors towards access and equity ‘self-assessment’ could be problematic and ineffective when combined with a lack of a substantive policy base. There was division between interview participants on this, with some arguing that individual agencies may know their client-base and operations best. However, other participants would prefer to see standardised evaluation metrics that ensure objectivity and rigour.

Whilst this does not fit within the REC Framework of multicultural policy objectives, one particularly experienced former public servant reflected on the relationships between non-government organisations. With NGOs becoming increasingly responsible for the delivery of services, Participant A10f said that the competitive tendering process for government contracts was undermining potential collaboration between organisations. She lamented this fact and compared it to earlier periods where different stakeholders from the public and private sector would work together through the sharing of expertise and resources. The participant may have presented a romanticised interpretation of past events, but further investigation falls outside the scope of this thesis.

One final area of concern is the SAEOC’s lack of powers to conduct thematic investigations into discrimination. Participants described a resistance from the state government to the idea of such powers. This limits the potential of the SAEOC to address widespread structural discrimination in either the public or private sectors, meaning political concerns are impeding process and programmatic outcomes.

8.5 Summary

As a subnational case in a federal system, the state of South Australia provides unique insights into how policies promoting multiculturalism can be developed and implemented. Even though Australian states have a high degree of autonomy in this policy area, South Australia has not been examined by scholars in this manner before. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that South Australian policies can be characterised as ‘quiet multiculturalism’ by being effective without fanfare. South Australia enjoys relative peace and stability when it comes to relations between different cultural groups. Bipartisan commitments to multiculturalism are not qualified by the presence of an anti-immigrant radical-right party in the state’s parliament. These are all markers indicating a high degree of success, congruent with Australia’s maximum score of 8.0 in the MCP Index in 2010.
State-based policy initiatives are clearly also scaffolded by a broadly supportive Commonwealth policy framework.

Whilst South Australia has established sound policy foundations, there are areas requiring continual commitment and reform to achieve programmatic outcomes, and there are concerns arising from the current trajectory of policy process. There is scope to strengthen anti-discrimination approaches by increasing the focus on structural discrimination. Moreover, relying on multicultural grants as one of the primary focal points for policy in South Australia implies a somewhat superficial engagement with the fundamental principles of multiculturalism. Festivals are an important public expression of the value of cultural diversity, but they should not be treated as the primary mechanism for facilitating mutual cultural accommodation. In addition, the tendency towards policy mainstreaming also bears the risk of potentially leading to colour-blindness if not adequately managed. In other words, policymakers ought to have a sense of caution so that people with a CALD background do not disappear into ‘diversity obscurity’ as an unintended consequence of a mainstreamed policy approach. Otherwise, access and equity becomes an empty catch-cry without South Australian society making any meaningful cultural accommodation.
Chapter 9 – Policy Approaches Promoting Multiculturalism in Practice: Four Cases in Comparison

9.1 Introduction

This chapter draws together the findings from the case studies for comparison in order to answer the research questions. As articulated in Chapters 1 and 4, the aim of this thesis is to compare and evaluate the success of different policy approaches promoting multiculturalism and integration in four case studies between 2007 to 2017: Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands and South Australia. This is done with a focus on elite perspectives that are triangulated with other evidence. The two research questions guiding this thesis are:

**R1.** How has multiculturalism been understood and operationalised into public policy in the four case studies?

**R2.** What factors contribute to, or undermine, the policy success of multiculturalism in the four case studies?

The chapter is structured in two parts, one for each of the research questions. The first section addresses R1 by mapping how each case study has implemented multiculturalism. There were two main themes that emerged from the findings of the case studies:

1) The term ‘multiculturalism’ was not used or accepted in all cases, symbolic of the rhetorical retreat.
2) In each case, some elements of multicultural policymaking featured more prominently due to the different political, demographic and geographic contexts.

The first theme relates to normative understandings of multiculturalism and the seeming political unpalatability of the term, to the extent that the language of ‘multiculturalism’ was not even used or accepted in all cases. Instead, as is highlighted in the section, proxy terminology is used in some case study countries: race equality and inclusion in the UK, and integration in Sweden and the Netherlands. Furthermore, in this section it is demonstrated how policies promoting multiculturalism can still be present in cases as shown through the Multiculturalism Policy Index Project, even if there has been a rhetorical retreat from the terminology. The second theme relates to how the three
elements from the REC Framework\(^{101}\) are emphasised to different extents in each case. For example, anti-discrimination is less of a central policy area for multiculturalism in South Australia compared with the proactive public sector equality duty in the UK. These differences are subsequently reflected in the different institutional frameworks in each case. Furthermore, the geographic and demographic context of each case influences how multiculturalism and integration are understood, and how these understandings become operationalised as policy.

In the second section of the chapter, R2 is addressed by comparing how well each case implemented policy approaches promoting multiculturalism and integration. The research findings from this comparative analysis of the case studies revealed five main overarching themes:

1) A common theme for political success was tacit and explicit bipartisanship between major political parties.
2) Radical-right parties have had a varied impact when comparing the four cases.
3) Programmatic success did not require explicit justifications framed by multiculturalism.
4) Consolidated efforts to combat racial discrimination are best undertaken through explicit strategies in supportive institutional and legislative contexts.
5) Mainstreaming governance and policies promoting multicultural integration were a potential barrier to process success.

The first two themes centre around the political domain. Cases found to have greater political success also had stronger political support for multiculturalism or multicultural principles within the mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties. At the same time, radical-right parties have not had a uniform level of impact on the four cases. Electoral systems based on proportional representation tend to enable radical-right parties to achieve greater electoral success. However, even under majoritarian systems these types of parties are still able to wield significant political influence.

The third and fourth themes relate to programmatic success. The case studies indicated that though policy actors may have retreated from the language of multiculturalism, the objectives of multiculturalism can still be enshrined in policy. It is apparent that success in

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\(^{101}\) As detailed in Chapter 3, the REC Framework is a tool for operationalising the policy objectives of multiculturalism. These are: reducing racial discrimination (R); facilitating equal opportunity (E); and promoting mutual cultural accommodation (C).
the programmatic domain does not necessarily require explicit normative justifications to be framed by multicultural discourse. In addition, the fourth theme considers a narrower scope by comparing the success of policy responses to racial discrimination. In particular, the UK’s equality duty and the lack of a national human rights institution in Sweden are striking differences compared with the institutional frameworks and policy responses found in the other cases.

Finally, the fifth theme suggests the trend towards mainstreaming multicultural integration policy and multicultural integration governance poses a potential barrier to process success. Furthermore, mainstreaming may present risk for programmatic success also, should centrist bipartisan support for multicultural principles succumb to concerted political opposition.

9.2 R1: How multiculturalism has been understood and operationalised

The purpose of this section is to answer the first research question by detailing how multiculturalism has been normatively understood and operationalised as public policy in each case. To assist with this, Table 27 below draws upon the data presented in the case study chapters to map multicultural policy across four categories for the four cases: normative understandings of multiculturalism; institutional frameworks and arrangements responsible for policymaking and implementation; legislative frameworks and key programmatic initiatives; and geographic and demographic factors influencing immigration and cultural diversity. The table also highlights other factors emerging from the findings to help answer R1. From these categories in Table 27, two themes emerged. The first theme emerging from the findings is that the rhetoric of multiculturalism was often politically unpalatable in three of the four cases. This is consistent with the rhetorical backlash against multiculturalism discussed in Chapter 2. The second theme is that for each case, some elements of multicultural policymaking feature more prominently due to the different political, demographic and geographic contexts. This is not a surprising finding, though it does mean that care should be taken when generalising about multiculturalism between different jurisdictions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Normative understandings</th>
<th>Institutional frameworks</th>
<th>Legislation and key initiatives</th>
<th>Geography and demography</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>- No explicit support for multiculturalism, but key principles are constitutionally enshrined</td>
<td>- Unitary system with strong municipal authorities</td>
<td>- Anti-discrimination legislation</td>
<td>- Member of Schengen zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Language centres around integration</td>
<td>- No national human rights institution (NHRI)</td>
<td>- Comprehensive welfare system</td>
<td>- 19% born abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Public Employment Service is a key policy actor</td>
<td>- Introduction program</td>
<td>- 32% with at least one parent born abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Integration policymaking is mainstreamed</td>
<td>- No compulsory language or integration tests</td>
<td>- Border closed to irregular migrants during 2015-16 crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>- Laissez-faire multiculturalism</td>
<td>- Quasi-federal, devolved system</td>
<td>- Public sector equality duty, Equality Act</td>
<td>- Only land border is with Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 'Multiculturalism' not used aside from societal descriptor</td>
<td>- EHRC: an NHRI with more powers than other cases</td>
<td>- Lacks a comprehensive integration strategy</td>
<td>- Eng &amp; Wales: 13% born abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Focus tends to be on race equality</td>
<td>- Government has a weak coordinating role for integration policy and governance</td>
<td>- Citizenship and language testing</td>
<td>- Scot: 7% born abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- N Ire: 4.5% born abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neth.</td>
<td>- Explicitly abandoned multiculturalism and two-way integration</td>
<td>- Unitary system with strong municipal authorities</td>
<td>- Anti-discrimination legislation</td>
<td>- Member of Schengen zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Policy now resembles assimilation (i.e. one-way integration)</td>
<td>- Network of anti-discrimination NGOs and centralised NHRI</td>
<td>- Strong civic integration education and testing scheme</td>
<td>- 11% born abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Integration policymaking is mainstreamed</td>
<td></td>
<td>- 22% with at least one parent born abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>- Bipartisan usage: 'multiculturalism'</td>
<td>- State within a federal system</td>
<td>- Anti-discrimination legislation</td>
<td>- No land borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Focus is on access and equity</td>
<td>- Access and equity mainstreamed across government, overseen by SAMEAC</td>
<td>- SAMEAC Act</td>
<td>- 23% born abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- SAEOC (and federal counterpart AHRC) responsible for anti-discrimination</td>
<td>- Provision of settlement services</td>
<td>- 49% with at least one parent born abroad (AU)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.2.1 Politically unpalatable: the term ‘multiculturalism’ is not used or accepted in all cases

This thesis has outlined the ‘backlash’ against multiculturalism. In three of the four cases, the official government language no longer formally uses the term ‘multiculturalism’ for describing public policy. Accordingly, it is reasonable to suggest that multiculturalism lacks a certain political palatability (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 592; Banting and Kymlicka 2013). As has been demonstrated through the case study chapters and the data from the MCP Index Project (2016), the rhetorical retreat away from the terminology has not resulted in a widespread scaling back of multicultural policy, with the exception of the Netherlands. Thus, public policy that co-aligns with the REC Framework102 objectives of multiculturalism can still be present even if not couched in multicultural discourse. In Chapter 4 it was outlined that this rhetorical retreat in policymaking discourse became apparent prior to the data collection phase of the project. As such, it became necessary to make use of proxy terminology such as ‘integration’ and ‘cultural diversity’ in order to discuss the features of ‘multicultural’ policy with the interview participants even if they themselves no longer used the language of multiculturalism.

The MCP Index Project notes that British policy discourses “tends to shy away from the use of the term ‘multiculturalism’ and leans instead toward that of cohesion and integration” (2016: 109). Where the term multiculturalism is used, it tends to simply be employed as a societal descriptor. That is to say, multiculturalism is acknowledged in terms of demography and statistics rather than as a public policy framework. Throughout the interviews with British policymakers and stakeholders, the participants tended to focus on race equality as articulated under the Equality Act 2010 as the public sector equality duty. In fact, one Scottish participant acknowledged that the language of ‘cultural diversity’ and ‘multiculturalism’, which is quite common in Australian policy discourse, “is not . . . the language that would trip off the tongue here. We tend to talk more about equality.” (Participant B10m, public servant). As such, proxy terms like race equality, inclusion and integration were necessary for British interviews in order to draw out findings relating to the overarching REC Framework developed for comparing and evaluating multicultural policy. Using this proxy terminology proved quite effective given the overlap of race equality and the two REC policy objectives of addressing racial discrimination and equal opportunity. Likewise, the terms of inclusion, integration and cohesion also overlapped with the policy objective of mutual cultural accommodation. In fact, for the protected

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102 As detailed in Chapter 3, the REC Framework is a tool for operationalising the policy objectives of multiculturalism. These are: reducing racial discrimination (R); facilitating equal opportunity (E); and promoting mutual cultural accommodation (C).
characteristic of race, the public sector equality duty very closely aligns with the REC Framework: eliminate unlawful discrimination, advance equality of opportunity, and foster good race relations (EHRC 2017a). Accordingly, the use of proxy terminology is reasonable and justified.

As noted in Table 27, the Swedish and the Dutch policy actors also did not use the terminology of multiculturalism. However, the MCP Index Project acknowledges that the Swedish constitution has enshrined multicultural principles under the guise of state responsibilities: promote equality and opportunity to participate in society for all, combat discrimination, and promote opportunities for minorities to preserve and develop a cultural and social life of their own (2016: 99). As with the equality legislation in the British case, the detail of the Swedish constitution very closely aligns with the REC Framework of multicultural policy objectives. The Swedish policymakers tended to discuss policy in terms of migrant integration, and so this was used as the primary proxy term. In contrast, the Netherlands has explicitly abandoned multiculturalism and the two-way model of integration, and its policy now resembles assimilation. The discourse of integration was still used by the policymakers interviewed, though the emphasis on migrants’ self-responsibility to integrate very clearly demarcated Dutch policy as ‘one-way integration’. Generally speaking, the Dutch interview participants tended to frame their responses around racial discrimination, socio-economic integration and socio-cultural integration. This suggests a reasonable overlap with the REC Framework, though the assimilationist policy leanings clearly oppose the notion of mutual cultural accommodation.

In contrast to the European cases, multiculturalism enjoys bipartisan support and usage in South Australia. The normative focus tended to centre on the notion of ‘access and equity’ to public services. Some participants did not necessarily conceptualise anti-discrimination as a key element of multicultural policy, but instead considered it to be the ‘starting-point’ assumption that other multicultural policies and programs could be layered upon. When comparing the Australian and European policy contexts, Participant A13fa, a senior Commonwealth public servant, observed that settlement policies and services have a striking equivalency with integration policies and programs in European jurisdictions. When considering the nine priority areas identified in the National Settlement Framework (DSS 2016: 3), the issues of language, employment, education and housing were also consistently recurring themes for addressing the integration of migrants in the European case study interviews. Although it is not a perfect overlap, integration does serve to be a reasonable proxy term for considering and comparing multicultural policy in cases that no longer use the discourse of multiculturalism.
As a subnational case, South Australia may also be inoculated from the more heated and divisive debates because immigration is a primarily a federal issue. As noted in Chapter 8, Australian states have no jurisdiction over immigration, although they often need to respond to infrastructure or service demands arising from population growth driven by immigration (Parkin and Hardcastle 2019: 638-639). Even when the Howard Coalition Commonwealth government (1996-2007) had retreated from using multicultural terminology, state governments including South Australia maintained their explicit support for multiculturalism (Jupp and Clyne 2011a: xvi; Jupp 2011a: 50). One potential explanation for this could be that the political stakes were lower since state politics were more protected from visceral debates about immigration. A cross-state comparison of state political discourse is an area worthy of further investigation but falls beyond the scope of this thesis.

The disappearance of multiculturalism from political nomenclature in the European cases does raise some concerns. On the one hand, evidence presented throughout this thesis indicates that policies promoting multiculturalism are enduring in Sweden and the UK despite limited rhetorical acknowledgement. However, if the term ‘multiculturalism’ has become taboo in some countries to the extent that it “may be irretrievable” (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 592), surely this is precarious territory. In Chapter 2, it was shown how these beleaguered multicultural principles have been demonised and challenged by political opponents since their inception.

It is a grim prospect indeed to consider that such sustained opposition and toxic discourse has driven from public debate a set of liberal values applied to matters of culture. Conceptions such as positive liberty, human rights, toleration, state neutrality and individual autonomy form the basis of multicultural ideology, yet their application to immigrant cultural minorities has been so controversial. Although integration was used as a proxy term for practical purposes, it is important to remember that integration and multiculturalism are not synonymous. In particular, the findings described in Chapter 7 about the Dutch ‘redefinition’ of integration policy as assimilation should signal concern.

Whilst multiculturalism may be in a precarious position, the European case studies also suggest the concept is ideologically malleable and resilient. Core principles and themes clearly have been embedded within the Swedish and British political systems. Multiculturalism has managed to endure despite being sidelined in favour of fresh vernacular. The discourse may be disappearing, but there does seem to be a degree of institutional ‘muscle memory’. However, whether Swedish and British institutions and political leaders can resist following the Dutch path towards assimilation remains to be seen.
9.2.2 The impact of political, demographic and geographic contexts on multicultural policymaking

As the Chapters 5-8 have demonstrated, each of the case studies emphasises the elements of multiculturalism from the REC Framework in different ways and to different extents. It also should be acknowledged here that the terminology and the ‘unit of analysis’ differed between jurisdictions. For instance, Swedish policy actors principally focused on people seeking asylum. In contrast, the UK was explicitly framed in racial terms, exploring the impact of multicultural policies on people from Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) backgrounds. The focus in the Dutch case was primarily on established first and second generation migrants. South Australian policy actors took a broader approach and was framed by the term ‘culturally and linguistically diverse’ (CALD) communities which covers established migrants and new arrivals.

When comparing across cases, these different emphases are then reflected in the differences between institutional frameworks as depicted in Table 27. This is unsurprising when recalling Freeman’s argument that no state anywhere in the world can claim to have one single and ‘coherent’ policy model for the incorporation of cultural minorities (2004: 946). Similarly, the MCP Index Project data reflects these differences between cases. As Table 28 indicates below, the Netherlands is the clear outlier of the four cases on the MCP Index. Its score of 2.0 in 2010 is representative of the retreat from multicultural policy, having previously peaked at a score of 4.0 in 2000. The Dutch policy shift towards assimilation under the guise of civic integration has been acknowledged as one of the only ‘casualties’ of the backlash against multiculturalism (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 579, 584). The findings of Chapter 7 explained that the Dutch policy emphasis on ‘migrants’ own responsibility to integrate’ signifies the abandonment of mutual cultural accommodation in the REC Framework. Such a position clearly differentiates Dutch policy from the other case studies.

The UK places a stronger policy emphasis on race equality by combating racial discrimination and promoting equal opportunity through the public sector equality duty. However, the UK does not have a comprehensive integration strategy for new arrivals unlike the other three cases. Instead, the state leans towards ‘laissez-faire multiculturalism’ with government only taking a relatively weak coordinating role (Scholten et al. 2017: 295). This finding concurs with the UK’s score of 0 for the ‘Affirmation’ indicator in the MCP Index Project and to a lesser extent, the score of 0 for the indicator of ‘Bilingual Education’ (2016: 2-3).
South Australia differs to the UK with a much stronger and centralised focus on equal opportunity and mutual cultural accommodation through the embedding of access and equity across the entirety of government. Similarly, the state takes a stronger supportive role through funding a comprehensive suite of settlement services to help recent migrants integrate into Australian society. This is supplemented by a strong positive valuation of cultural diversity by the state and its public institutions. Community grants for cultural groups to celebrate festivals ensure that the profile of individual groups is raised in the public sphere and funding is provided to support the learning of community languages and mother-tongue instruction (MCP Index Project 2016: 2-3). This is not to say that anti-discrimination efforts are downplayed in the South Australian case, but are instead simply not seen as being part of the central multicultural policymaking approach.

**Table 28** Policy indicator scores from the MCP Index (Immigrant Minorities) for 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Curriculum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemptions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Citizenship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingual Education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative Action</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL (2010)</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: MCP Index Project (2016: 2-3)*

Sweden differs again because the introduction program for new arrivals is a central focus, overseen by the Public Employment Service (*Arbetsförmedlingen*) as a key actor responsible for integration policy at the national level. However, municipalities in Sweden have a significant level of autonomy for resourcing and directing integration policy in their respective jurisdictions. Nevertheless, this is all framed by Sweden’s comprehensive welfare system. Integration, especially in the socio-economic domain, is understood to be an extension of the welfare state, which in itself is a major policy mechanism for promoting equality and societal participation for all. Migrants with a residence permit have full access to the welfare state, so long as they expect to stay in Sweden for more than one year (Koning
As such, socio-economic integration is an expression of social-democratic emancipation in Sweden.

Furthermore, geography and demography are important distinguishing factors for states' different policy approaches to multiculturalism. Table 27 highlighted earlier that the Swedish and South Australian populations have a higher proportion of residents born abroad, at 19 and 23 per cent respectively. However, it was discussed in Chapter 5 that Sweden experienced a disproportionately high number of people arriving in 2015 seeking asylum during the European Migrant Crisis. Sweden’s geography includes an open border with Denmark via a bridge-tunnel complex across the Öresund Strait. Connected to Copenhagen via a short train journey, the Swedish city of Malmö became the epicentre of the crisis. In 2015, 162,877 people sought asylum in Sweden, with 70 per cent of this number arriving between September and December (Migrationsverket 2016: 1). Almost all of these asylum seekers arrived and were processed through the southern port city of Malmö, the largest population centre on their journey northwards (Traub 2016). The sheer scale of numbers and their sudden arrival in a short time period during the autumn of 2015 justifiably strained the existing institutional arrangements, with processing time from asylum application to decision increasing from as little as three months before 2015 to greater than twelve months in the aftermath of the crisis (Emilsson 2016: 28). Not only that, Swedish Migration Board’s asylum reception system did not have the facilities to adequately house arrivals due to the rapid swell in numbers, with accommodation arrangements for asylum seekers after receiving a residence permit also quite precarious (Emilsson 2016: 28; Traub 2016). Sweden’s immigration and integration systems were simply not prepared for a crisis of such a scale, leading to extraordinary decisions such as identity checks at the Danish border. In contrast, the crisis did not affect the other European cases to the same extent. This could be due to Sweden’s comprehensive and inclusive welfare system, as well as Malmö’s geographic accessibility from Copenhagen.

The impact of this sudden spike in asylum arrivals will ripple through socio-economic and socio-cultural integration policymaking and governance in the years and decades to come. Housing, education and employment policy will have to accommodate this change in demography. Likewise, Sweden’s profile of cultural diversity has been markedly changed which will affect the formation and constitution of cultural minority organisations and their surrounding social networks. In contrast with the other cases though, Sweden does not have a national human rights institution (NHRI; Raoul Wallenberg Institute 2016). There are still mechanisms for reporting and responding to complaints of discrimination through the
Equality Ombudsman *(Diskrimineringsombudsmannen)* and local anti-discrimination NGOs, but this is downplayed as a key realm of multicultural policymaking.

Given the Dutch retreat from multiculturalism, it is not surprising to see a rejection of mutual cultural accommodation. Despite this though, Dutch policy still maintains a strong emphasis on anti-discrimination through a centralised NHRI and a network of anti-discrimination NGOs that operate at the municipal level. Furthermore, equal opportunity is still a central consideration for socio-economic integration policy, and is reflected in improved integration outcomes for second-generation migrants in all domains except criminality (SCP 2016: 11).

Dutch policy approaches promoting multiculturalism still focus strongly on two of the three REC Framework objectives: reducing racial discrimination and facilitating equal opportunity. However, the fact that the Netherlands only received a score of 2.0 in the 2010 MCP Index Project does raise a discrepancy between the MCP Index policy indicators and the REC Framework. This is because the MCP Index tends to underemphasise policy efforts combatting discrimination. Anti-discrimination is an essential component for multicultural policy, however it is not exclusive to multiculturalism. That is to say, a country favouring assimilation can still strongly defend individuals’ rights to be free from discrimination on racial, cultural, linguistic or religious grounds. As such, it is likely that the MCP Index assumes that each country has anti-discrimination legislation and adequate institutional protections.

In sum, when considering the wide variety of contextual factors that differ between the cases, these lead to the development of differing institutional arrangements for multicultural policy development, implementation and governance. As has been shown, the cases place differentiated emphasis on the different components constituting multiculturalism and multicultural policy. Thus, there is not one simple metric or criterion that can be relied upon to evaluate the success of multicultural policy frameworks. In Chapter 3 several existing typologies were reviewed, highlighting that the MCP Index Project underemphasises policy efforts for addressing discrimination, as well as ensuring equitable access to public services. Similarly, the MCP Index compares the presence of multicultural policies in 21 liberal democracies but does not seek to evaluate their success (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 593). The REC Framework supplements the MCP Index by operationalising the key objectives of multiculturalism that could then be used to make proximate judgements of policy success in each of the case study chapters. The next section consolidates these findings into cross-national comparison in response to R2 by discussing the relative success of multicultural policy frameworks in each of the case studies.
9.3 R2: The factors contributing to and undermining multicultural policy success

The purpose of this section is to answer the second research question by detailing the factors that contribute to, or undermine, the policy success of multiculturalism across the four case studies. Table 29 below summarises the evaluations of success from Chapters 5-8 for each dimension of policy success. The boxes in the table are also shaded to present a ‘heat map’ of success, where the darker the shading equates to a higher rating of success. Five themes emerge from these findings, with the first and second relating to political success, the third and fourth relating to programmatic success, and the final theme relating to process success. A rating of ‘high’ is given if a case performs well for the REC Framework of policy objectives for multiculturalism. A rating of ‘moderate’ is given if there are some factors detracting from a case’s performance for the REC Framework. A rating of ‘low’ is given if there are very few indicators, if any at all, that a case is achieving success for the REC Framework. See Chapters 3 and 4 for a more detailed rationale of how the proximate judgements of success have been made.
A common theme for political success was political bipartisanship

The first theme is that tacit and explicit bipartisanship between mainstream political parties in support of multiculturalism is a factor common to political success. In both South Australia and in Sweden, there is broad support and acceptance from the mainstream centre-left and centre-right political parties to the principles of multiculturalism. These commitments closely reflect objectives of multicultural policy as described by REC Framework developed in this thesis. In the case of South Australia, there is a longstanding and an enduring bipartisanship towards multiculturalism at the Commonwealth and state level (Parkin and Hardcastle 2019: 633-634). The long-term entrenchment of ‘access and equity’ as the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political success</th>
<th>Programmatic success</th>
<th>Process success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td><strong>MODERATE SUCCESS</strong></td>
<td><strong>MODERATE SUCCESS</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| - Mainstream parties support REC objectives | - Policy scaffolded by comprehensive welfare system | - Sophisticated network of institutional and NGO collaboration  
- Cordon sanitaire limits Sweden Democrat access to policy decision-making processes |
| **UK**            | **LOW SUCCESS**      | **MODERATE SUCCESS** |
| - Austerity has undermined race equality  
- No comprehensive integration strategy | - Equality Duty is broader than complaint responses, reducing structural discrimination  
- Unintended consequences of *Immigration Act 2016* | - Proactive Equality Duty and other responses established in response to murder of Stephen Lawrence  
- New arrivals not accessing Equality Duty |
| **Neth.**         | **LOW SUCCESS**      | **LOW SUCCESS** |
| - Rejection of multiculturalism and two-way integration in favour of assimilation | - Strong emphasis on labour market integration with positive results  
- Group-specific policy has been replaced by policy mainstreaming | - Double-handicap: no group-specific policies leads government to consult NGOs less, but defunding minority organisations limits capacity to assess impact of policies  
- Assimilation paradigm undermines efforts for two-way integration |
| **South Australia** | **HIGH SUCCESS** | **MODERATE SUCCESS** |
| - Enduring, bipartisan support for multicultural policy framework | - ‘Access and equity’ is deeply entrenched  
- Strong positive valuation for cultural diversity in grants and programs | - Mainstreaming and ‘motherhood’ policy undermines rigour  
- Self-assessment may impede integrity of policy evaluation |
centrepiece of Australian multiculturalism indicates an enduring and bipartisan support for the principle of equal opportunity for people with a CALD background. Likewise, both parties maintain support for efforts to stop and prevent racial discrimination through the institution of the Equal Opportunity Commission (SAEOC 2016). Some of the interview participants referred to bipartisan representation at cultural events setting an example for the general population to be receptive and accommodating for people with a CALD background. These bipartisan agreements at the state level are largely then also reflected by a similar bipartisan support for multiculturalism and the associated policy objectives at the federal level of politics too. The Commonwealth Coalition government’s multicultural statement maintained a commitment to multiculturalism in a similar vein to the previous Labor government (DSS 2017c).

Similarly in Sweden, the parties in the centre-left and centre-right blocs are also committed to the REC Framework objectives. However, this political commitment goes deeper than party platforms to the fundamental agreement for the rules of Swedish politics. The ‘Instrument of Government’ in the Swedish Constitution exhibits a close similarity to all three elements of the REC Framework (Parliament of Sweden 2016, Chapter 1, Article 2: 65):

(Equal Opportunity): The public institutions shall promote the opportunity for all to attain participation and equality in society . . .

(Racial Discrimination): The public institutions shall combat discrimination of persons on grounds of gender, colour, national or ethnic origin, linguistic or religious affiliation, functional disability, sexual orientation, age or other circumstance affecting the individual.

(Mutual cultural accommodation): The opportunities of . . . ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities to preserve and develop a cultural and social life of their own shall be promoted.

These three constitutionally enshrined principles have then been expanded upon by legislation and public policy. For anti-discrimination, this is evident in the passage of the Anti-Discrimination Act 2008 by the centre-right Alliance government. Subsequent Social Democrat governments have not repealed this legislation, suggesting a degree of support at the very least. In addition, there is an enduring support for the comprehensive social democratic welfare system from both blocs, even if the system has undergone transformations due to pressures from globalisation and cuts to benefits (Schall 2016: 184-185). This system underwrites Swedish multicultural policy through efforts promoting equal opportunity by mitigating socio-economic barriers for people with a migrant background. In terms of mutual cultural accommodation, children continue to have the right to mother-tongue instruction and cultural minority organisations are provided ongoing
financial support from public authorities (MCP Index Project 2016: 105). Both the Liberal and Moderate Parties from the centre-right bloc have previously attempted to move towards language testing as a component of the naturalisation process, however this was seen as a move too far to the right towards the assimilationist and xenophobic views of the Sweden Democrats (Borevi 2013: 153-154). As a result, the party abandoned these efforts in favour of upholding the status quo along with the other mainstream bloc parties.

In contrast, the UK has adopted a laissez-faire approach to multiculturalism and multicultural policymaking. While New Labour established the public sector race equality duty through the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000 (Worley 2005: 484), in Chapter 6 it was argued that race equality has subsequently slipped down off the policy agenda under the consecutive Conservative-led governments. Since the Global Financial Crisis, the staunch austerity measures have further limited the capacity for the British policymakers to allocate resources for the development and implementation of multicultural policy. The impact resulting from this climate of austerity has then been further compounded by the coordinated agitation to leave the European Union and the undercurrent of anti-immigrant sentiment (Tournier-Sol 2020; Evans and Mellon 2019). The resultant 'hands-off' approach supports the principle of cultural tolerance and race equality but fails to go much further beyond this point. Accordingly, this has undermined efforts to improve race equality outcomes.

In particular, it was apparent from the interview data collected in October and November 2016 that the UK did not have a comprehensive integration strategy for the numbers of migrants entering the country on an annual basis. The influence of Eurosceptic groups espousing anti-immigrant sentiments framed this issue as central to the Leave campaign during the leadup to the Brexit vote in June 2016 (Tournier-Sol 2020). Under the laissez-faire approach, these new arrivals were provided only with very limited support services apart from the welfare safety-net. Furthermore, the lack of a firm commitment to multiculturalism has created a space for policy decisions and directions that further weaken race equality. In particular, the implementation of the so-called hostile climate for irregular migrants was enshrined in the Immigration Act 2016. The requirement to provide evidence of migration status to access public services, housing and employment decentralised the responsibility of the state and instead created an environment that fosters suspicion, discrimination and exploitation towards the BAME population. This then culminated in the Windrush scandal where migrants had settled in the UK decades prior, but did not have adequate documentary evidence or had not naturalised (Williams 2020).
The Netherlands differs from the other three cases examined because although it exhibits a generally low degree of political success, this is because Dutch policymakers have largely abandoned policies promoting multiculturalism in favour of assimilation. This finding is supported by the MCP Index Project which identified the Netherlands as the only country within the Index that has dismantled multicultural policies following the European ‘backlash’ against multiculturalism (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 579, 584). As might be expected, there is no strong centrist cross-party alliance in the Netherlands that is advocating for multiculturalism or its foundational principles against more extreme political actors. Instead, the decline of Dutch multicultural policy can be partly attributed to the rise and ongoing influence of radical-right anti-immigrant and populist parties that have been present in the Dutch political system over the past two decades.

9.3.2 The varied impact of radical-right parties

Although both South Australia and Sweden demonstrate a greater degree of political success than the Netherlands or the UK, the influence of radical-right differs in each country. The Sweden Democrats (SDs) have become a significant anti-establishment party, built upon a populist anti-immigrant platform. As the third largest party in Sweden, they have undermined the traditional bloc politics making it very difficult for either the centre-left or centre-right blocs to form majority government in their own right (Aylott and Bolin 2019: 1-3). This is because both of the blocs have established an enduring cordon sanitaire to preclude the SDs from participating in executive decision-making and policy development. The mainstream blocs view the SDs’ attitude towards matters of immigration and cultural diversity as unacceptable, built upon a legacy of racism and discrimination (Aylott and Bolin 2019: 2, 10-11). Therefore, one effect of the cordon sanitaire is to position policies supporting mutual cultural accommodation as an axis of significant political contestation between the two blocs and the radical-right. Despite the sustained political pressure since the electoral breakthrough of the SDs at the 2010 election, the cordon sanitaire has proven resilient. This suggests that both blocs would prefer significant parliamentary difficulties than to compromise the principles underpinning Swedish policies promoting multiculturalism. Furthermore, this speaks to the resolve of mainstream politics in rejecting the anti-immigrant agenda central to the political identity of the SDs.

Into the future though, this resolve will continue to be tested if the SDs remain as the third-largest party in Swedish politics. The cordon sanitaire only survives so long as the centre-right bloc finds the difficulty of post-election coalition negotiations to be more manageable than navigating the political fallout of a compromise deal with the SDs.
Westlake (2020: 186) argues that cross-party support is necessary for the adoption of policies promoting multiculturalism. This gives centre-right parties unique power and influence over the expansion or retraction of these policies. Westlake’s theory suggests that in response to growing support for radical-right parties, centre-right parties are less likely to support multiculturalism for fear of backlash from their support base. For the time being though, the centre-right Alliance bloc have needed to maintain distance from ideas such as civic integration education or language testing to avoid being seen as engaging with the SD policy platform (Borevi 2013: 154). Furthermore, Austria is a precedent where the Social Democrats (SPÖ) ended a 30-year commitment to the cordon sanitaire around the radical-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ, Bodlos and Plescia 2018: 1360). This example suggests that a centre-left party can sometimes be willing to compromise on key principles to gain a parliamentary majority.

In contrast, in Australia Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party has not managed the same degree of political significance as the SDs. In South Australia, and Australia more broadly, One Nation has certainly secured a significant portion of media airtime due to political controversy that has generated significant anxiety amongst policymakers in the multicultural policy sector. One Nation may be Australia’s most successful radical-right populist party but when compared to equivalent parties in the other three cases, it remains relatively unsuccessful. Primarily, this is due to One Nation’s electoral support being geographically concentrated in the state of Queensland. South Australian parliamentary politics has tended to focus on the mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties without a serious electoral challenge from One Nation or any other alternative radical-right group. Moreover, the absence of One Nation from South Australian politics has meant support for the radical-right in South Australia has tended to be fragmented. The Family First party aligned itself with the Christian Right in the United States, focusing on issues such as sex education and abortion but did not campaign on matters of race (Peppard 2008: 505). In 2017, Family First merged with Cory Bernardi’s new Australian Conservatives party, but poor electoral success quickly led to the dissolution of the Australian Conservatives in June 2019 (Doran 2019).

Another reason for this could be the firm bipartisan commitment to multiculturalism and a non-discriminatory immigration program from both the Coalition and Labor at the federal level. Both parties reiterated this commitment in response to Hanson’s first speech to the Senate following her re-election in 2016, in which she declared that Australia was being “swamped by Muslims”. The wording of the statements from both sides of mainstream politics closely echoed the bipartisan response to Hanson’s first speech in 1996 in which
she had dramatically entered Australia’s political consciousness by asserting that Australia was being "swamped by Asians" (Hanson 1996). This bipartisanship is somewhat qualified by remarks from federal Coalition figures. For example, Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton made thinly veiled anti-refugee comments in 2016. He suggested that “illiterate” refugees would “be taking Australian jobs” while simultaneously “[languishing] in unemployment queues and on Medicare” (Keany and Anderson 2016). Although Dutton was not presenting official Coalition policy, his remarks do pose a risk to bipartisan support for multiculturalism and non-discriminatory immigration.

An additional explanation for why One Nation and other radical-right parties struggle to garner the same level of political significance as in European countries could be due to the structure of the South Australian and Australian electoral systems. The diffusion of power in a bicameral system is a significant structural barrier for One Nation and other smaller parties that struggle to win lower house seats (Costar 2014: 155-158). Minor parties rely upon electoral success in upper houses of parliament that are elected via proportional representation. In turn, this amplifies the political voice of minor parties such as One Nation due to the need for governments to negotiate with the crossbench to pass legislation. Despite the relatively small parliamentary presence of the radical-right at the federal level and no parliamentary presence at the South Australian state level, the media attention given to these extreme views may shape the views and attitudes of the wider electorate as seen through the influence of UKIP and the Brexit referendum (Evans and Mellon 2019). Furthermore, it is plausible that the combined factors of compulsory voting and a high proportion of overseas-born citizens have meant that political parties are less likely to advocate policies opposing multiculturalism.

Unlike the relatively poor electoral performance of the radical-right in South Australian and Australian elections, the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) under Geert Wilders has become the second largest party in the national parliament (van Holsteyn 2018: 1365). The populist radical-right has consolidated and become entrenched in the Dutch politics, suggesting a degree of palatability in the Dutch electorate for the extreme views expressed by Wilders and his colleagues. In contrast to the case of Sweden, mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties in the Netherlands have not maintained a strong ongoing commitment to mutual cultural accommodation. Instead, the centre has abandoned multiculturalism and the principle of two-way integration in favour of assimilation, as seen through the policy shift towards the assertion that it is the migrant’s own responsibility to integrate into Dutch society (Meer and Modood 2009: 474; Scholten 2013: 106; Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 579; Berger et al. 2016: 1124). This shift can be partly explained by the ongoing legacy from
previous populist, nationalist parties that shaped policy debate during the assimilationist turn towards civic integration.

The UK differs from the other three cases principally because Brexit has become such a defining feature of British politics. The timeframe of the British case is from 2007 to 2016, with the interviews being conducted in October and November 2016. As Chapter 6 highlights, only a few months had transpired since the referendum in June 2016, meaning all of the interview participants were very uncertain as to how the UK’s withdrawal from the EU would transpire. Traditional radical-right parties such as the British National Party continue to remain relatively marginalised, partly due to the limitations within the majoritarian single-member constituency electoral system for the House of Commons. Instead, radical-right politics and anti-EU sentiment coalesced around the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the referendum decision to leave the European Union.¹⁰³

In particular, the Leave campaign during the referendum is a strong example of how mainstream politics courted the nativist, radical-right (Evans and Mellon 2019). Supporters of the Leave campaign incorporated a strong vein of anti-immigrant discourse, with UKIP leader Nigel Farage presenting an anti-immigrant poster captioned “Breaking Point” (Stewart and Mason 2016). Worryingly, this poster bore a striking resemblance to Nazi propaganda about immigrants. Especially concerning was the spike in incidences of racially motivated hate crime immediately following the referendum (Burnett 2017: 86). This sits within the broader context of the Conservative Party’s policy of imposing a hostile climate for irregular migrants, and the resultant consequences of unlawful discrimination against BAME residents and citizens. UKIP may have achieved their main political objective, but the Conservative Party has been fractured by the inability to reconcile the aims of Tory Brexiteers advocating a hard or no-deal Brexit and those who would prefer a softer variation Brexit with closer ties to the EU. With the spectre of Brexit looming so large over British politics, it is no surprise that matters of race equality and multiculturalism have slipped down the policymaking agenda. As suggested earlier, the responses of mainstream parties to the challenges posed by the radical-right are a factor for the extent of political success in each case. A strong bipartisanship in the political centre is important for protecting multicultural policy. Where this political bipartisanship lacking, the radical-right is able to establish a stronger degree of influence to undermine the principles of multiculturalism.

¹⁰³ In 2019, the new Brexit Party emerged and became the largest British party by number of seats at the 2019 European Parliament election (Tournier-Sol 2020).
9.3.3 Programmatic success did not require explicit justifications framed by multiculturalism

Of the four case studies, only South Australia has avoided the rhetorical retreat away from the discourse of multiculturalism following the so-called backlash at the turn of the 21st century. Yet despite stepping back from the language of multiculturalism, the other three cases also exhibit generally high or generally moderate degrees of programmatic success. This trend concurs with the findings of the MCP Index, which argues that only in the Netherlands has the retreat from multicultural discourse been reflected by a retreat from multicultural policies (MCP Index Project 2016: 72-77; Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 579, 584). With this in mind, policy success in the programmatic domain does not necessarily require policy to have explicit normative justifications framed by the language of multiculturalism.

Sweden is perhaps the best example of strong multicultural policy without the use of the term ‘multiculturalism’ or equivalents. Even though not labelled as part of an official ‘multicultural policy framework’, Chapter 5 shows how the embedding of multicultural principles in Sweden’s constitution and the comprehensive welfare system provides multicultural policy in all but name (Borevi 2014: 710-712). Although the MCP Index Project does not specifically measure the degree of commitment to multiculturalism in political and policy discourse, the Index’s first indicator is the affirmation of multiculturalism by government and the existence of a public agency to implement multicultural policy (MCP Index Project 2016: 4). In 2010, Sweden received a full score of 1 for this indicator even though the principles embedded in the Swedish Constitution do not include the term multiculturalism and there is not a specific public agency explicitly responsible for implementing or overseeing multiculturalism. Policy measures including the funding of minority organisations, the provision of mother-tongue instruction for cultural minorities, and the embedding of multicultural principles in the curriculum are not explicitly framed as being ‘multicultural policy’. Although the justification for such policies might be expressed through the language of integration or ‘interculturalism’ (MCP Index Project 2016: 99-100), Swedish integration policy demonstrates a generally high degree of programmatic success that is very closely aligned with the principles of multiculturalism.

In contrast, it is quite clear that some elements of multicultural policy may be missing in the case of the Netherlands. Certainly, there is no public affirmation of multiculturalism by Dutch policymakers, which has instead been replaced by integration with a very strong flavour of assimilation in the socio-cultural domain (van Breugel and Scholten 2017: 519). The Dutch rejection of integration as a two-way process of mutual accommodation, in
favour of the expectation that migrants ought to take responsibility for their own integration, is a shift away from the multicultural policy objective of mutual cultural accommodation. Nevertheless, Dutch policy efforts to improve integration in the socio-economic domain do more closely co-align with the equal opportunity and anti-discrimination elements in the REC Framework. In particular, the strong policy focus on labour market integration has yielded positive outcomes for people with a migrant background, leading to the assessment that the Netherlands exhibits a generally moderate degree of programmatic success (SCP 2016). It is intriguing to consider that although the Netherlands has formally abandoned multiculturalism as evident in the low degree of political success, Dutch policymaking still overlaps to some extent with the broader policy objectives of multiculturalism.

The United Kingdom on the other hand acknowledges multiculturalism as a demographic description, but does not have any constitutional or parliamentary affirmation of the principles of multiculturalism (MCP Index Project 2016: 109). Instead, in Chapter 6 it is argued that British multicultural policymaking tends to be framed in terms of race equality, integration or cohesion, and exhibits a generally moderate degree of programmatic success. However, this moderate success is a story of mixed results. As will be discussed further in the next section, British anti-discrimination policy through the public sector equality duty is unique and innovative when compared with the other three cases. However, this is counterbalanced by the impact of austerity cuts on the ability of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) to implement race equality policy (Runnymede Trust 2016). Likewise, the consequences of the Immigration Act 2016 (Williams 2020) and the so-called ‘hostile climate’ for irregular migrants residing in the UK have significantly impeded programmatic success.

9.3.4 Comparing the policy responses addressing racial discrimination: proactive and reactive approaches and institutional underpinnings

This section focuses on programmatic success for policies addressing racial discrimination, as this was a distinguishing element across the case studies. A key theme emerging from the findings was that consolidated efforts to combat racial discrimination are best undertaken through explicit strategies in supportive institutional and legislative contexts. There are several distinctive differences between the cases when considering anti-discrimination policy. The section begins by highlighting the difference between the UK’s proactive equality duty and the other cases’ reactive complaint-based responses. Then the lack of a national human rights institution (NHRI) in Sweden is discussed in contrast to the other three cases that each have a strong centralised institutional body or agency. The section then concludes
with a short reflection on the peculiarity of the Sweden Democrats’ commitment to anti-discrimination in contrast with radical-right parties in Australia and the Netherlands.

Beginning with the UK, earlier discussion has noted a generally moderate degree of programmatic success. British multicultural policymaking has led to rather mixed results because a strong positive element such as the public sector equality duty does not fix or override problems such as the Windrush scandal or the impact of austerity. However, of the four cases discussed, only the UK has a proactive legislative framework: the innovative race equality duty for countering racial discrimination and promoting race equality (Ahmed 2007: 590). Although the duty is now also applied to other protected characteristics, the duty with regard to race compels all public bodies to demonstrate how they are acting to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination, advance equal opportunity, and foster good relations between people of diverse racial backgrounds (EHRC 2017a; MCP Index Project 2016: 114). The policy responses addressing discrimination in the other cases tend to focus on reactive or complaint-based approaches. In contrast, the UK is unique through its development of a proactive obligation on the part of public sector organisations to self-examine their procedures to rectify potential direct, indirect and structural racism and discrimination. The EHRC certainly still receives and responds to direct complaints of racial discrimination. However, Chapter 6 shows that the EHRC has a far larger mandate and a more sophisticated suite of powers compared to NHRI’s in other cases. These include the capacity to instigate broad thematic investigations into suspected discrimination and to ensure that public sector agencies are upholding their proactive obligations in preventing discrimination.

The equality duty is a remarkable innovation that has shifted the policymaking focus from responding to individual complainants to requiring that public sector organisations develop strategies to prevent discrimination from occurring in the first place (EHRC 2017a). Despite this, there are also some weaknesses in the implementation of the duty though. As discussed in Chapter 6, an EHRC study (2012: 5-6) found that only one in two public authorities were adequately upholding their obligations under the general equality duty by publishing equality information about workforce and service users. Similarly, red-tape reduction efforts under the Cameron Tory government (Cameron 2012) led to the dismantling of ‘equality impact assessments’ (EIAs). EIAs were designed to help public bodies reduce structural discrimination caused by policies or program initiatives, and their abolition signifies a procedural weakening of the equality duty. EIAs provided a useful tool for reviewing and evaluating the impact that decision-making and policy direction would have upon race equality. EIAs were also similar in function to current efforts described by
two Swedish and South Australian interview participants who applied tools from the gender equality sphere such as passing a 'gendered lens' over policy decisions to ensure that public sector activity does not discriminate or hamper equality. Instead, the rejection of EIAs seems to suggest that they were associated with a 'box-ticking' mentality, rather than a mechanism for meaningful reform. The *Windrush Lessons Learned Review* explicitly identified the dismantling of EIAs as a contributing factor to the Windrush scandal (Williams 2020: 84).

Another point of contrast between the cases is that only three have a national human rights institution (NHRI). Under the *Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions*, known as the Paris Principles and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1993, an NHRI should be charged with the promotion and protection of human rights. More specifically, an NHRI ought to advise government authorities on matters of human rights, examine and make recommendations regarding legislation and policy, and prepare reports on the national situation of human rights (Raoul Wallenberg Institute 2016). An NHRI should also collaborate with other NHRIs at an international level, develop educational programmes for the promotion of human rights, and “publicise human rights and efforts to combat all forms of discrimination, in particular racial discrimination, by increasing public awareness” (UN General Assembly 1993). The UK has the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Netherlands has the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, and South Australia has the Australian Human Rights Commission at a federal level and the South Australian Equal Opportunity Commission at a state level. In contrast, Sweden does not have an NHRI at all. Despite the Swedish Parliament and policymakers recognising that there is an institutional deficiency in this area (Government of Sweden 2017: 23), Sweden has not managed to create an appropriate statutory authority to fill this policymaking role in keeping with Sweden’s obligations under the Paris Principles. Instead, the Raoul Wallenberg Institute roundtable report argues that Sweden’s current human rights landscape is “fragmented” without a centralised NHRI to “carry out strategic litigation to achieve broader systemic change” (2016: 9). This debate is under-researched and there is scope for future investigation to determine the potential impact of not having an NHRI.\(^{104}\)

One such concern is if the *cordon sanitaire* around the Sweden Democrats falls, there is no

\(^{104}\) Carver (2011) compared European countries including the merging together of multiple Swedish *ombudsmän* into the single Equality Ombudsman (*Diskrimineringsombudsman; DO*) in 2008. However, this study was conducted several years before the Swedish government would acknowledge that the DO is unable to adequately fulfil the role of an NHRI (Government of Sweden 2017).
NHRI to coordinate a centralised defence of human rights that could be threatened by coalition government including the Sweden Democrats.

Notwithstanding the debate in Sweden about the lack of an NHRI, there is also a high degree of political nuance in the Swedish case when considering different parties’ positions on the role of the state in responding to racial discrimination. As mentioned earlier, the Swedish constitution makes it very clear that the state and the public institutions are charged with the responsibility to combat discrimination (Parliament of Sweden 2016, Chapter 1, Article 2: 65). As such, it is not very surprising to see in Chapter 5 that both the mainstream bloc parties and the Sweden Democrats are formally opposed to racial discrimination, all agreeing that the state ought to take a prominent role in leading efforts to eradicate discrimination. Hübinette (2014: 73) highlights the importance of anti-racism as a self-perceived national value in Sweden, meaning that even Sweden Democrats proclaim their commitment to anti-racism. However, this political common ground between the radical-right and the political mainstream in Sweden is not likely extended to more comprehensive approaches, such as measures addressing structural discrimination faced by immigrants. Although the Sweden Democrats who were interviewed argued that the efforts of the Equality Ombudsman were lacklustre due to underfunding, it is highly unlikely that the Sweden Democrats would favour a stronger proactive approach similar to the British public sector equality duty. Furthermore, the Sweden Democrats’ notional condemnation of racial discrimination seems to be at odds with the party’s own legacy, given it grew out of a neo-Nazi political movement (Mulinari and Neergaard 2014: 45-46; Hellström et al. 2012: 190). As such, the Sweden Democrats might be willing to pay lip service to anti-discrimination insofar as this acknowledgement does not require a deepening of state policy measures. Likewise, such an acknowledgement may help the party to garner electoral support by presenting a more palatable offering to the Swedish electorate.

Although it falls beyond the scope of this thesis, a future study could compare the Sweden Democrats’ peculiar ‘commitment’ to anti-racism with other radical-right parties. In contrast, Geert Wilders has twice appeared before Dutch courts accused of inciting discrimination, being acquitted in 2011 but being found guilty in 2016 over a second incident (Darroch 2016). In Australia, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party and Fraser Anning’s now defunct Conservative National Party have both advocated for a return to a discriminatory immigration program (Hanson 2016; Anning 2018).
9.3.5 Mainstreaming multicultural integration policy and governance: a potential barrier to process success

This section discusses the shift towards policy mainstreaming which is a growing trend in policy approaches promoting multiculturalism and integration. Scholten et al. (2017: 284) defines mainstreaming as the nexus between a shift in policy focus from group-specific to ‘whole society’ approaches. This is also coupled with a shift in governance focus from state-centric to poly-centric governance. In other words, mainstreamed policies do not target specific cultural groups but instead reframe cultural diversity as an issue to be addressed by policy that targets the entirety of a society. Concurrently, mainstreamed governance reallocates the responsibility for coordinating multicultural or integration policy horizontally across various relevant departments rather than having a single state-centric coordinating agency. Furthermore, a vertical dimension of mainstreamed governance recognises the interplay of policymaking relations between different tiers of government, such as the supranational, national, subnational and local levels (Scholten et al. 2017: 286-288). Mainstreaming was a key theme to emerge from the findings, and so the following compares how this issue has played out in each case.

Considering each of these elements in South Australia, it is fair to say that South Australian policymakers have only partially incorporated principles of policy and governance mainstreaming. Centralised bodies responsible for overseeing multiculturalism still remain: the South Australian Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs Commission (SAMEAC) and the public service agency Multicultural Affairs SA. However, there is also evidence to suggest a degree of decentralisation has occurred too. Principles such as access and equity have been strongly embedded across all government bodies, and the provision of settlement services involves a wide array of public and private actors. Likewise, interviews with South Australian policymakers suggests that the capacity of the state government to realistically coordinate multiculturalism from a centralised platform is relatively small. The findings presented in Chapter 8 suggest that state multicultural policy has been sidelined somewhat by motherhood statements. The distribution of cultural grant funding has at times been tokenistic, with former Labor governments demonstrating little ambition beyond maintaining the same level of support for multiculturalism and cultural diversity amongst the state's population (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 2011: 15, 27; Department for Communities and Social Inclusion 2016a). At the Commonwealth level, Jakubowicz (2014) traces the trend towards thin, unambitious policy statements to government-fostered research droughts under the Howard and Abbott federal Coalition governments. In response to the Turnbull federal Coalition government’s multicultural policy statement,
Levey (2019b) raises some concerns about mainstreaming in the Australian context. He argues that “[the] post-multiculturalist rationale for mainstreaming multicultural policy presupposes a certain level of institutional and attitudinal reform [regarding cultural minorities]” that is not yet present in the Australian context (Levey 2019b: 467). Furthermore, if a more concerted political challenge to multiculturalism akin to the Sweden Democrats were to arise in South Australia, this trend in policymaking and governance risks future programmatic success. That being said, efforts to mainstream multicultural policy in South Australia have not been as comprehensive when compared with the other three cases.

In the Netherlands, the mainstreaming of integration policy and the abolition of group-specific policy approaches (van Breugel and Scholten 2017) led to what was described by some interview participants as a ‘double handicap’. Cultural minority advocacy organisations no longer receive government funding and governments no longer comprehensively consult the remaining underfunded organisations on future integration policymaking direction. As a result, this then means that Dutch policymakers are no longer able to receive direct input from minority groups regarding the impact or potential impact that policy mainstreaming is having. This is a clear example of how an assimilationist turn in policy directly contravenes the principle of mutual cultural accommodation.

In contrast, the mainstreaming of multicultural integration policy in Sweden has not followed the same pattern as in the Netherlands. Although the Swedish Integration Board was initially created to guide and support municipal governments to implement their integration policymaking responsibilities (Emilsson 2016: 23-24), it was abolished in 2007 in favour of giving municipalities greater governance independence. As mentioned in earlier sections though, Swedish multicultural policy is still present through the constitutionally enshrined principles that are enacted through national and local policymaking: a comprehensive welfare system including the introduction program for new arrivals; the provision of mother-tongue instruction for people with a migrant background; and the inclusion of multiculturalism in school curricula, expressed in terms of ‘interculturalism’ (MCP Index Project 2016: 99-103). Still, the threat to multicultural integration policymaking posed by the Sweden Democrats cannot be understated. For now, the cordon sanitaire to limit the radical-right influence is holding. However, should the Sweden Democrats surge in electoral popularity to become the second-largest party as occurred with the Dutch PVV, the centre-right bloc may not be able to maintain the current status quo. If the cordon sanitaire falls, a mainstreamed and decentralised multicultural integration policymaking apparatus may not be able to withstand the political challenge.
In the UK context, when it comes to the implementation of multicultural integration policies, Scholten et al. (2017: 295) emphasise the importance of devolution to local governments in partnership with the EHRC. Westminster has tended to maintain a laissez-faire approach (Levey 2019a: 1005), with the Home Office and the Department of Communities and Local Government only maintaining a “relatively weak coordinator role” (Scholten et al. 2017: 295; Spencer 2011). Since the early 2000s, these policies have been mainstreamed. For example, the Community Cohesion response to the unrest in regional English towns in the 2000s was primarily framed as a localised issue with limited central policymaking leadership, and targeted the general population, not just specific BAME groups (Scholten et al. 2017: 295). Likewise, the UK’s mainstreamed inclusion strategy, ‘Creating the conditions for integration’, positions migrant integration within the broader context of social inclusion and intercultural contact. The strategy asserts the principal policymaking role held by local governments and other actors at the local context level in the UK (Scholten et al. 2017: 295).

Although the analysis provided by Scholten et al. (2017) only considers mainstreaming in the UK, France, Germany and Denmark, they make a particular pointed conclusion. They argue that there are potential risks with mainstreaming integration policy and governance. Similar to the ‘traditional’ fields of mainstreaming like gender or disability, the trend towards mainstreamed integration policy “rarely involves efforts to create a generic awareness of migration-related diversity” (Scholten et al. 2017: 299). As such, replacing group-specific policy with mainstreamed approaches may dilute multicultural integration in the minds of non-specialist policymakers. In addition, most interview participants did not consider independent evaluations of mainstreamed policy and programs to be a high priority. Instead, the findings in Chapter 6 indicated that tools such as equality impact assessments have been dismantled in the UK. Similarly, in Chapter 8 it was noted that some South Australian public bodies were seeking to ‘self-assess’ their access and equity performance. In Chapter 7, it was argued that Dutch cultural minority organisations have had their capacity for advocacy and consultation significantly weakened. With such a reluctance towards comprehensive evaluation mechanisms from governments, there is a risk of programs being developed without sound and robust process. Furthermore, this could also lead to echo-chambers in policymaking circles that lack sufficient accountability or critique. As Scholten (2020: 120-121) notes, mainstreamed approaches to complex policy issues like integration benefit from policy actors adopting reflexive research-policy dialogues with scholars. Given that mainstreaming processes are often oriented towards making transformations to an entire society (Scholten 2020: 119), there is no one-size-fits-
all approach. Clearly, there are potential benefits from policy mainstreaming, but this trend may risk sidelining the unique challenges faced by cultural minorities.

9.4 Summary

Multiculturalism is a concept steeped in controversy and political opposition. It cuts across preconceived ideas about nationhood, ethnicity and the rights afforded to migrants, challenging the primacy of the established nation in the political institution of the nation-state. Proponents of multiculturalism challenge this foundation by arguing for a redrawning of rights for new arrivals and people with a migrant background. They argue that the state should actively promulgate efforts to counter racial discrimination. Similarly, they promote the allocation of funding and resources to facilitate socio-economic and socio-cultural integration by reducing barriers faced by migrants in a new society. Proponents of multiculturalism also argue that the state and its society should accommodate new arrivals through a two-way process of cultural adaptation and public expenditure. With this in mind, in this chapter the data, findings, analysis and supporting literature from throughout the thesis have been consolidated to answer R1 and R2.

Multiculturalism has been understood and operationalised into public policy quite differently in each of the four cases. The discourse of multiculturalism has largely been rejected in all cases except for South Australia which maintains a strong commitment, endorsement and public affirmation of multiculturalism by government and the state. In contrast, Swedish policy tends to shy away from multicultural language despite firmly entrenching multicultural principles in the Swedish constitution. Likewise, the UK has embedded these same principles in its equality legislation and proactive anti-discrimination efforts, though the state has tended to take a more hands-off approach to ‘multicultural policy’ and socio-economic integration. Dutch policymaking on the other hand has strongly downplayed the notion of ‘mutual cultural accommodation’, in favour of advocating that migrants must take ownership and responsibility for their own integration into Dutch society. Though veiled in the language of integration, this policy approach rejects one of the essential principles of multiculturalism by instead veering towards assimilation.

In terms of multicultural policy success, some strong themes and contributing factors have emerged. Countries may jettison the language and rhetoric of multiculturalism, but this does not necessarily predetermine an abandonment of multiculturalism. From a policy output point of view, this is not necessarily problematic if the corresponding multicultural policy infrastructure remains intact, as found by the MCP Index Project and in the Swedish and UK case studies. However, if the language and symbols of multiculturalism are not
present, this may open potential doors for challenge from opponents including the radical-right, as seen in the Netherlands. Furthermore, maintaining a strong bipartisan agreement on the principles of multiculturalism is important for its political viability irrespective of whether policymakers have retreated away from framing these principles through multicultural discourse. Similarly, strong institutions should be protected by this bipartisan support to avoid a hollowing out of statutory responsibilities and minority advocacy due to underfunding or radical-right opposition. In particular, the risk for Sweden is that if the _cordon sanitaire_ around the Sweden Democrats falls, there is currently no national human rights institution to centrally defend and advocate for the rights of people in Sweden who may face discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, national origin, religion or cultural background.

At first glance, some of the principal findings in response to R2 are seemingly self-evident and uncontroversial. Ensuring political bipartisanship and adequate institutional support multiculturalism are reasonable expectations. However, the European case studies in this thesis highlight the potential consequences arising when governments and mainstream parties do not maintain a commitment to these seemingly self-evident points. Most notably, the Dutch case in Chapter 7 is an instructive example of how an abandonment of multiculturalism has corresponded with a policy trend towards assimilation.

Until recently, there has been a lack of an empirical evidence base to demonstrate the importance of these ‘uncontroversial’ findings. For instance, Westlake (2020) argues that the successful adoption of policies promoting multiculturalism relies on the support of centre-right parties. Being able to provide additional empirical evidence to corroborate this finding is of significant practical importance for policy actors. Comparing the political and policy contexts of four different case studies has certainly yielded important insights into how multiculturalism is playing out.

Bipartisanship and robust institutional support may be quite uncontroversial from the perspective of Australia which enjoys strong, enduring and explicit political commitment in favour of multiculturalism. However, this is not the case for the European cases examined in this thesis. Bipartisan support for the nomenclature of multiculturalism has been completely abandoned in political discourse. This has been mirrored with a retreat from the principles of multiculturalism in the Netherlands. The existential challenge to Swedish multiculturalism posed by the Sweden Democrats is ongoing. Austerity cuts in the UK have severely impeded race equality efforts. Accordingly, these seemingly self-evident findings should reiterate the importance of maintaining a strong political commitment to the principles of multiculturalism at the very least.
CHAPTER 10 – CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MULTICULTURAL POLICYMAKING

10.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to situate the implications arising from this thesis for future research that examines the political phenomenon of multiculturalism. Likewise, this thesis offers some insights for policy actors in how they might engage with these findings. The chapter is structured in three main sections. The first section summarises the main contributions of the thesis, both in terms of policy and practice, as well as the theoretical contributions. This section also situates the findings of the research in the wider scholarly field of multicultural studies. The second section considers future directions for research that can build upon this study. This is done by discussing each of the case studies and developments that occurred since the interviews were conducted and reflecting on the scope and limitations of the thesis. Some general implications are highlighted, as well as the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The final section then presents some practical recommendations drawn from the comparison of the four case studies.

10.2 The key contributions of the thesis

To reiterate previous chapters, the aim of this thesis has been to compare and evaluate the success of different policy approaches promoting multiculturalism and integration in four case studies between 2007 to 2017. This section highlights the contributions of the thesis for multicultural policy and practice, as well as the contributions to the theoretical literature.

10.2.1 Policy and practice contributions

The principal contribution of this thesis is a systematic mapping of policy approaches promoting multiculturalism in four case studies. The architecture for this mapping relies upon the intersections between the REC Framework of multicultural policy objectives and Marsh and McConnell's (2010) three-dimensions heuristic of policy success. The REC Framework acts as a conceptual bridge between the theoretical dimensions of multiculturalism explored in Chapter 2 and how these policies played out in practice in the

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105 The REC Framework outlines three main objectives: (R) - reduce discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnicity or cultural background; (E) - provide an equal opportunity for diverse cultural groups to fully participate in society; and (C) - facilitate a mutual cultural accommodation between immigrant groups, the state, and broader society without forced assimilation. Chapter 3 discusses this in more detail.
case studies. The REC Framework is built upon the work of Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010: 4), and as the discussion in Chapter 3 described, it provides a comprehensive yet parsimonious approach for operationalising the policy objectives of multiculturalism. The mapping process for the each of the case studies provided insights into how multiculturalism has been implemented in practice. Furthermore, the thesis found that some of the REC Framework elements are more prominent and exhibit a stronger degree of policy success resulting from different political, demographic and geographic contexts. The rich story of comparative case studies helps to disentangle these findings. For example, Swedish policy actors do not frame cultural diversity in terms of race, meaning that institutions are limited in their capacity to identify and respond to structural discrimination. In contrast, their British counterparts are more forthright in using race-based categories to inform statistical data monitoring to track disproportionality and unequal treatment.

A further contribution this thesis makes to the scholarship on multiculturalism is the application of Marsh and McConnell’s (2010) three-dimensions heuristic of policy success: political success, programmatic success and process success. In Chapter 3, it was outlined how this heuristic could be applied to the REC Framework as an approach for evaluating the success of policies promoting multiculturalism. Superimposing these schemas together is a unique and innovative way for disaggregating the complexities of multicultural policies, but also provides a mechanism for providing proximate judgements of success.

A regular reference point throughout this thesis has been the Multiculturalism Policy Index, and in particular its measurement of multicultural policies for immigrant minorities (MCP Index Project 2016). The MCP Index is the leading cross-national comparative index of its kind. However, Banting and Kymlicka note that the Index only measures the presence of policies, but not how effective or ‘successful’ these policies have been (2013: 593). They explicitly call for research that evaluates policy approaches promoting multiculturalism. This thesis has responded to this call by evaluating these policy approaches in four case studies.

The thesis has also built upon the work established by the MCP Index by presenting detailed new empirical findings about four specific cases based on qualitative data. The findings drew on interviews with a broad range of policy actors spanning current and former politicians, public servants, statutory officers and staff from NGOs. The case studies supplement and update the MCP Index data from 2010, until the new figures for 2020 are completed. At the same time, the release of the 2020 figures will shed significant light on the impact of the backlash discourse. Of particular importance is whether more countries in addition to the Netherlands have retrenched policies promoting multiculturalism.
In addition, this study contributes to the existing qualitative scholarship that examines multiculturalism. Through their edited collection, Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010) were sceptical about the rhetorical backlash against multiculturalism in Europe. Similarly, this thesis highlights that policy approaches promoting multiculturalism have generally not been abandoned, even if they remain in a precarious position. By presenting an innovative approach to evaluating multicultural policy success, the study also provides new comparative insights to different bodies of scholarship. The study highlights that policy approaches promoting multiculturalism have generally not been abandoned, even if they remain in a precarious position. By presenting an innovative approach to evaluating multicultural policy success, the study also provides new comparative insights to different bodies of scholarship. The study builds upon works that have sought to normatively understand and measure the empirics of multiculturalism (Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Kymlicka 1995; Crowder 2013; Modood 2007; 2016). The findings presented in this thesis also closely engage with scholars debating and challenging multiculturalism in the context of the backlash (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Soutphommasane 2012; Grillo 2010; Prins and Saharso 2010; Borevi 2013; Meer and Modood 2013; Meer et al. 2015). Furthermore, this thesis is positioned amongst scholarship examining the future direction of multiculturalism and multicultural policies in a post-backlash environment (Uoberoi and Modood 2019; Modood 2019; Parkin and Hardcastle 2019; Levey 2019c, 2019b; Soutphommasane 2017; Kymlicka 2018). Additionally, this thesis is the first body of work to evaluate the success of policy approaches promoting multiculturalism in South Australia.

10.2.2 Theoretical contributions

This thesis adds nuance to the wider theoretical debates about the advance and retreat of multiculturalism in liberal democracies. The discussion in Chapter 2 details the contentious nature of multiculturalism over time, evident in the ‘backlash’ against multiculturalism in political rhetoric during the early 2000s. All four cases experienced this backlash, albeit to differing extents. The findings presented in this research give us a clearer idea of why the extent of the backlash differed across the cases. Empirical findings such as these provide a distinctive way to interpret liberal multicultural theory.

The three European cases have largely turned away from ‘multiculturalist’ rhetoric and terminology. South Australia has not seen the same retreat, although the Howard Coalition government (1996-2007) at the federal level distanced itself from multiculturalism because of its potentially divisive nature. Analysis throughout the thesis suggests that although the backlash may not have led to widespread retrenchment of multicultural policies in Sweden, the UK and South Australia, multiculturalism does still find itself in a precarious position. Interpreting the Windrush scandal through a new institutionalist paradigm highlights that the state is clearly capable of contravening the rights afforded to immigrant cultural
minorities (Soutphommasane 2012: 10; Kymlicka 2010: 35-36). Furthermore, the findings from the Swedish case suggest that state colour-blindness can indeed interfere with equal opportunity by masking structural discrimination (Modood 2009: 351-352). In contrast, the findings for the Dutch case highlight the substantial retrenchment of policies promoting multiculturalism. Instead, the Netherlands has strongly advanced a policy agenda of ‘one-way’ civic integration that emphasises migrants’ self-responsibility to integrate. This policy shift clearly conflicts with Crowder’s normative conceptualisation of multiculturalism introduced in Chapter 1. Mutual cultural accommodation requires an acceptance and positive valuation of cultural diversity by the state, recognised through public policy and public institutions (Crowder 2013: 7). Normative theory has been embedded throughout this thesis. Whilst the REC Framework is a way of operationalising multiculturalism, the elements are inherently value-laden and contested (List and Valentini 2020: 195). By assessing each case against these core principles, the empirical work demonstrates that multicultural policies cannot be separated from normative judgements about the philosophical foundations underpinning multiculturalism.

In addition, the REC Framework is a useful tool for the conceptual disaggregation of multiculturalism that can aid theoretical examinations. Once disaggregated, the REC Framework can then be applied as a way to frame and compare multiple case studies. From the outset, it has been clear that multiculturalism is embedded within complex interrelationships between theoretical and political rhetoric, as well as case-specific policy settings. For example, Sweden does not explicitly affirm multiculturalism. However, by interpreting Swedish policies through the lens of the REC Framework, there is clear evidence of consistent policy efforts that align with multiculturalism in Sweden. By employing a relatively straightforward framework for operationalising multiculturalism, the thesis has been able to explain and compare policy success in discrete areas.

Likewise, a strength of this research is the incorporation of new institutionalism in the methodological approach. As the cases studies have highlighted, this thesis has explored how political institutions have embodied certain norms, values and power relationships (Lowndes 2010: 61). By investigating how policymaking institutions have interacted with the central values of multiculturalism, the thesis has applied a critical lens to the political values informing policy shifts over time. In this way, the thesis is able to bridge the normative and operational aspects of multiculturalism in a manner conducive for making proximate judgements of success.
10.3 Future directions

This section charts some potential directions for future research arising out of this thesis. It begins with an update on the case studies in the time that has passed since the interviews were conducted. Following this are general reflections on the study, including some limitations, and how these can inform new research that builds upon the contributions of this thesis. The section then discusses the COVID-19 pandemic and the need for investigations examining the impact of this disease on multiculturalism and integration.

10.3.1 Reflections and updates on the case studies

There are a number of potential avenues of inquiry and follow-up research in each of the case studies. Case study research inherently tends to be a ‘snapshot in time’ because the interviews were conducted over a period of eight months in 2016-17. Since then, the political and policy landscapes in each case have changed.

Sweden

In Sweden, the impact of the 2015-16 migrant crisis will continue to be felt in the years and decades to come. Studies could seek to understand the socio-economic integration, as well as the political agency of these migrant communities on Swedish society. In addition, a parliamentary committee released a report in September 2020 reviewing immigration and integration policies in Sweden (The Local 2020). The committee proposed some legislative changes including language and civic education requirements for permanent residency. All of the committee’s recommendations have been accepted by the ruling Social Democrat party. However, their junior coalition partner, the Greens’ do not support the majority of the changes. In contrast, the centre-right opposition bloc does not think the proposals go far enough (The Local 2020). The shift on language proficiency and civic education from the Social Democrats and centre-right parties is a major change for Swedish politics. In the past, centre-right parties that had proposed language testing later backed down due to concerns about pandering to the radical-right Sweden Democrats (Borevi 2013: 154). These changes are not inherently incompatible with multiculturalism though. Civic integration policies can coexist with multiculturalism, as the Australian and Canadian examples both demonstrate (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 587-589). However, this change warrants further investigation to examine whether there is an undercurrent in Swedish policymaking circles to retreat from policies promoting multiculturalism more generally.
The UK

For the British case, the thesis has highlighted two main areas for future research. The first is the ever-growing ripple effect of Brexit. As the UK navigates the transition period for disentangling itself from the European Union, there are a number of unresolved issues relating to immigration and integration. Free movement between the EU and the UK has been a frequent sticking point in exit negotiations. Similarly, any future policy changes for a centralised integration strategy arising from the All Party Parliamentary Group’s report (2017) on social integration will be dependent on settling the matter of free movement. Even now, there still remains significant uncertainty about what the post-Brexit policy environment will look like. The Human Rights Act 1998 was enacted as part of the UK’s commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights as an EU member-state (EHRC 2018). Once the nature of the UK’s exit from the EU is finally determined, issues such as these can be navigated, investigated and then resolved.

The second main area of focus relates to the Windrush scandal. The scale and extent of policy changes is still uncertain in the wake of the Windrush Lessons Learned Review (Williams 2020). It will be worthwhile to compare the policy impact of this review with that of the Macpherson Report (1999) inquiring into Stephen Lawrence’s murder. In particular, it should be examined whether any changes are as extensive as the introduction of the public sector race equality duty.

One final note on the matter of the Windrush scandal. Had the EHRC not been undermined by austerity, and had equality impact assessments not been abolished, the mistreatment of this cohort of people may never have happened to such an egregious extent. The Windrush Lessons Learned Review explicitly identified the abolition of equality impact assessments in 2012 as a factor contributing to the scandal (Williams 2020: 84). The review also found that the Home Office did not adequately consider its responsibilities under the public sector equality duty to mitigate potential disproportionate treatment or structural discrimination (Williams 2020: 84-87). Equality impact assessments may have prompted the Home Office to consider the disproportionate and adverse impact the ‘hostile environment’ policy would cause to BAME communities. The EHRC and a properly funded race equality NGO sector might also have been able to pre-empt or rapidly respond to the appalling treatment experienced by members of the Windrush generation.
**The Netherlands**

Although the cordon sanitaire around the Sweden Democrats is currently holding, the situation is more volatile in the Netherlands. At the 2017 election, the vote for the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) collapsed, rendering them the seventh largest party. In contrast, the radical-right Party for Freedom (PVV) gained seats to become the second largest party. Although all main parties refused to form a coalition with the PVV (DutchNews.nl 2017), their status as the second largest party raises the profile of their anti-immigrant platform. Furthermore, the findings in Chapter 7 highlight that not all policy actors agreed with the official government position that explicitly rejects ‘two-way integration’. However, civic integration informed by assimilationist tendencies appears to be well-entrenched by the centre-right governing parties. The findings in Chapter 7 seem to indicate that the retrenchment of policies promoting multiculturalism has continued since 2010, the most recent data point for the MCP Index.

**South Australia**

Unlike the other four cases, South Australia has experienced a change in government since the time of interviews, following the 2018 state election. The centre-right Liberal Party under Steven Marshall formed government, and has moved the renamed ‘Multicultural Affairs’ section into the Department of the Premier and Cabinet (DPC 2019a). In 2019, the Marshall government held a public consultation process into reviewing the *South Australian Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs Commission Act 1980*. In response to the consultation, the government “believes there is a good case for reviewing, updating and expanding [South Australia’s] multicultural legislation” (DPC 2019b: 6). Future research could track how any prospective legislation changes compare to the current Act, and also how any legislative change affects state policymaking. In addition, a number of respondents during the consultation advocated for a “review of the term ‘multiculturalism’, as this was not considered current or inclusive” (DPC 2019b: 5). If the government chooses to change this term, the replacement terminology and definitions will shape the future course of policymaking in this sector.

In addition, South Australia is only a subnational case and therefore the findings are not generalisable across the other states and territories. Therefore, there is also scope to directly extend the approach of this thesis to consider Australia at the national level. Alternatively, this thesis has frequently highlighted the issue of policy differentiation between national, subnational and local levels. Future research could consider differences between devolved nations in the UK, or divergences in other countries between municipalities and national governments.
10.3.2 Reflections on the scope and limitations of the thesis

The purpose of this section is to acknowledge several implications that arise from the scope and limitations of this study and its research design. The first relates to case selection. Unlike the three European cases, South Australia is a subnational case from a federal political system. However, throughout Chapter 8 it was argued that South Australia exercises significant autonomy in the implementation of policy approaches that support multiculturalism. This independence is also shared by the other Australian states (MCP Index Project 2016: 9). It should also be noted that at the Commonwealth level, Australia has consistently received the highest rating on the MCP Index. The similarity between South Australia and Australia is reflective of the broadly supportive approach taken at the national level toward multicultural policies. In addition, South Australia was included as a standalone case to address the lack of scholarship evaluating multicultural policymaking in the state, whilst still acknowledging the influence of initiatives at the Commonwealth level.

The number of cases chosen is a trade-off for comparative political studies. Studies that consider only one or two cases are able to have much greater case-specific detail, compared to studies with many cases that can glean unique insights from broader comparisons. I chose to include four cases to strike a balance. As a result of this decision, only a relatively small number of elite interviews were conducted in each case: 8 in Sweden with 10 participants, 10 in the UK with 11 participants, 7 in the Netherlands with 8 participants, and 13 in South Australia with 15 participants. That said, the purpose of the interviews was to gain access to elite perspectives and insights, rather than interview a representative sample of policy actors. This relates to the ‘strength of voice’ from the participants in their professional capacities which helps to validate and support the findings. To further mitigate this limitation, triangulation was highlighted in Chapter 4 as a critical technique for a more accurate representation of each case. Throughout the case studies and the cross-national comparison, the interview data was never considered in isolation. Instead, it was discussed in relation to supplementary data including government and non-government research reports, policy documents, position statements, news articles, political speeches and scholarly literature.

Another potential limitation relates to the ‘unevenness’ between the interviews participants. It was difficult to consistently access participants from upper management or executive levels or politicians. My access relied upon their availability and interest. This unevenness occurred at the internal level within each case, but it also affected the equivalence of interviews across all of the cases. As above, the findings of the thesis are not
reliant on the range of interviews to fully represent the case and so this limitation was also mitigated through the process of triangulation.

Furthermore, in Chapter 4 I acknowledged that the data collection was influenced by my positionality as a white, male, English-speaking researcher. I recognise that I am an active participant in the research process, and my participation has the capacity to affect the content of the empirical data as well as its analysis. I mitigated this limitation in part by using the Framework Approach as a well-established process for thematic data analysis (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). In addition, my inability to speak Swedish and Dutch was a limiting factor for both the interviews and their triangulation with non-English supplementary documents.

Using the interview method, the findings presented in this thesis are derived from the perspectives of elite policy actors and their views on the development and implementation of multicultural policies. This is both a strength and a limitation. Semi-structured elite interviews provide unique access to policy actors and institutions that are instrumental in developing policy approaches. However, there is scope for future research to consider voices from the grassroots level also. This could be done by consulting people with a cultural minority or migrant background from outside policymaking circles for their perspectives on how they have experienced government approaches to multiculturalism.

10.3.3 General implications for future research

The REC Framework has versatility to be adapted and applied to future research evaluating multiculturalism. There is scope to explore how the REC Framework could be iterated upon by drawing on the ‘Bristol school’ approach to studies of multiculturalism (Uoberoi and Modood 2019; Levey 2019c, 2019a). For example, this could be done by more strongly differentiating religion and faith from race, ethnicity or culture. Future empirical work could investigate what Uoberoi and Modood (2019: 961) describe as the distinction between ‘colour racism’ and racism based on religious or cultural differences. Primarily, this thesis has drawn on a theoretical foundation of liberal multiculturalism which has predominated multicultural scholarship. Although Kymlicka (2019) argues that Bristol school theorists can comfortably sit within the broader family of liberal multicultural nationalism, Levey (2019a) disagrees. Levey identifies that the ‘Bristol school’ theorists are not preoccupied by framing minority claims within liberal values, but instead are focused on specific minority group experiences, intercultural dialogue, and “on critiquing and remaking the national narrative” (Levey 2019a: 1003). Notwithstanding the broader debate about categorising
theoretical approaches to multiculturalism, the REC Framework could serve well as a prism for interpreting these lines of inquiry.

This element of ‘critiquing and remaking the national narrative’ is a political process in which the researcher becomes an active participant. Compared to the early 20th century, all of the case studies have shifted from ethno-centric national identities to civic-based national identities that focus upon values that are common to the nation (Borevi 2011: 50; 2013: 144; Emilsson 2016: 22; Parliament of Australia 2018: 7358-7376; Meer and Modood 2009: 479-480; Meer et al. 2015: 706-713). There is often some debate about what distinguishes a particular country’s values – ‘Australian’, ‘Dutch’, ‘Swedish’ or ‘British’ values – from the values of other liberal democracies (Haslam 2017). However, what can be seen through mechanisms such as civic integration education or citizenship tests can interpreted as a commitment to the values of liberal democracies expressed in terms of national identity. In contrast to the European cases, since both the South Australian and Commonwealth governments explicitly endorse multiculturalism, multicultural policy has therefore become a nation-building tool (Soutphommasane 2012: 22, 76). This tool actively incorporates new arrivals through the citizenship and the naturalisation process by publicly acknowledging that cultural diversity is one of the defining features of Australian society. Remaking the ‘national narrative’ in this way is also a central element of Bristol school scholarship. However, this process can also be situated within the REC Framework objective of mutual cultural accommodation.

This thesis has also deliberately focused on multicultural policies for immigrant minorities. As earlier chapters have explained, the study has deliberately not considered multiculturalism directed towards indigenous or subnational minorities. There is scope for evaluations exploring the intersection between the types of multicultural policies for immigrant, indigenous and subnational groups, because these groups have different claims to rights such as sovereignty and self-determination.

**Additional ideological implications**

Earlier in Chapter 9, some points were also raised about the ideological implications stemming from the rhetorical retreat from multiculturalism in the European case studies. In essence, there is uncertainty over the extent to which multiculturalism can endure as a set of political values if its terminology has faded from public discourse. Most importantly, the immediate question is how long multiculturalism can survive as values and policy practices without explicit normative support. Although this thesis has not set out to explicitly answer this question, it remains a matter of paramount concern to policy actors who seek to advocate multiculturalism in the years to come.
In particular, the case of the Netherlands is an instructive one when considering this question. Is the path of the Netherlands, where an abandonment from multicultural rhetoric was also combined with an abandonment of multicultural policies, going to occur elsewhere? Or can cases like Sweden and the UK sustain the decoupling of nomenclature from policy practice? The immediate response might be to wait for the 2020 update of the Multiculturalism Policy Index to examine whether the retreat away from policies promoting multiculturalism has also spread to other countries. In the meantime, there are some hypothetical scenarios that could be considered and evaluated.

The first is a continuation of the status quo. Countries such as Sweden and the UK could continue down a path where the language of multiculturalism remains absent from the political spotlight, but this is not reflected policy jettison. A scenario such as this does present significant anxiety, with political opponents continuing their attacks yet multiculturalism is somehow able to endure. Such an outcome would likely require a degree of bipartisanship to uphold the central tenets of multiculturalism, even if the terminology has been poisoned beyond the point of no return.

A second scenario could entail the rhetorical decline, but this could be combined with a political ‘white-anting’ of the central tenets of multiculturalism over time. If political commitment withers to the point that institutions cannot adequately produce and implement robust policies, multiculturalism may well be crippled. Even if the Multiculturalism Policy Index is able to demonstrate the presence of policies within jurisdictions, the effectiveness of these policies may be severely hampered.

A third scenario might be where the rhetorical decline is met with an emboldened challenge from radical-right parties. For instance, it is not unrealistic to envision a breakdown of the cordon sanitaire around the Sweden Democrats. Were anti-immigrant sentiment to be captured by mainstream political and institutional actors, multiculturalism as a practice could be subverted and replaced by strident expectations of assimilation.

Future research could certainly seek to build upon the findings of this thesis and more vigorously assess the likelihood of different policy directions. The importance of discursive power in preserving political norms or values is something that could be investigated further. For the time being though, it is worth reiterating some of the main findings of this thesis. Maintaining bipartisan commitment to the principles of multiculturalism is an important protective factor against such potential outcomes. Similarly, this political will should be backed by adequate resourcing and institutional support. These may seem uncontroversial, yet the European case studies highlight the potential for policies to be unwound or key principles to slip down the agenda.
10.3.4 Impact of COVID-19 on multiculturalism and integration

The immense disruption caused by COVID-19 to societies across the globe cannot be understated. The consequences of this pandemic are far-reaching and will no doubt fundamentally transform societies, even after the disease is brought under control. There are a number intersections between COVID-19, multiculturalism and integration that will be important to consider, with many potential avenues for future research. For example, if the virus and social restrictions have disproportionate impacts on cultural minorities, what is the extent of this disproportionality and how might this reflect racial discrimination? For example, some early reports indicated that Somalis and Iraqis in Sweden were overrepresented in the case numbers. In April 2020, the Public Health Agency confirmed that Somalis consisted 5 per cent of the total number of cases in Sweden, despite making up only 1 per cent of the population (Keyton 2020). The REC Framework can also be applied to the impact of COVID-19. In terms of racial discrimination, a preliminary report has found that people in Australia with Asian backgrounds have experienced heightened instances of racial abuse directly attributable to coronavirus (Om 2020).

When it comes to equal opportunity, there is scope to investigate how people with a migrant background have been affected in the labour market given many countries are experiencing an economic recession. Furthermore, questions should also be asked about how well people with a migrant background are able to access health and welfare systems. Access to healthcare is obviously of critical importance during a pandemic. Similarly, welfare support is often essential in the context of full or partial lockdowns where people are unable to work. With this in mind, the welfare exclusion literature may offer some insights into the experience of people with a migrant background (Koning 2019; Morris 2019). In the Australian context, temporary visa holders were excluded from the Jobkeeper and Jobseeker welfare support packages, despite working in heavily casualised industries that were hit hard by lockdowns (Berg and Farbenblum 2020). The impact of these barriers to equal opportunity will be important to assess.

Finally, the objective of mutual cultural accommodation is also affected by responses to the pandemic. Social networks are significantly disrupted by social distancing. Future research should consider the extent to which inter-group contact has been impacted and limited. Likewise, lockdowns and social distancing have also disrupted intra-group support networks that are critical for new arrivals. Future research could consider the impact and long-term consequences arising from these significant social disruptions for recent migrants in these extraordinary times.
10.4 Implications of the findings for policy and practice

Drawing upon the findings and analysis presented in the thesis, this section provides some potential practical recommendations relating to five main issues. These are:

- institutional and legislative infrastructure
- funding for the development and implementation of multicultural policies and programs
- government support for civil society
- support for multiculturalism demonstrated through political will
- framing the language and terminology of multiculturalism

10.4.1 Institutional and legislative infrastructure

Policy approaches promoting multiculturalism flourish best when they are supported by strong institutional and legislative infrastructure. Comparing the four case studies, it is clear that each balances legislation and institutional responsibility in different ways. However, this thesis has shown the importance of maintaining both. For example, it was highlighted in Chapter 9 that the UK’s public sector equality duty goes beyond the complaint-based policy measures implemented to address racial discrimination in other cases. The duty is backed by both strong legislation and a national human rights institution (NHRI). The Equality Act 2010 articulates the state’s responsibilities which closely align with the objectives contained in the REC Framework. Concurrently though, the UK currently lacks a centralised strategy for the integration of migrants that is coordinated by a national institution or supported by clear legislation. In Sweden, the constitution (Parliament of Sweden 2016, Chapter 1, Article 2: 65) enshrines the three elements contained in the REC Framework despite not explicitly mentioning ‘multiculturalism’. However, Sweden does not have an NHRI to nationally coordinate proactive measures for combatting discrimination, promoting equal opportunity or facilitating mutual cultural accommodation.

The Dutch case is instructive because the Netherlands has explicitly rejected multiculturalism (van Breugel and Scholten 2017: 518-520; Gebhardt 2016: 747-748), most notably the element of mutual cultural accommodation. It was explained in Chapter 7 that anti-discrimination is enshrined in Article 1 of the Dutch constitution, and that equal opportunity is framed in terms of socio-economic integration. Both elements are also supported by institutions. Yet despite this, policy approaches promoting multiculturalism have been retrenched in favour of ‘migrants’ own responsibility for integration’. The
political backlash against multiculturalism in the Netherlands is well-established (Prins and Saharso 2010; Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Gebhardt 2016), but the lack of institutional and legislative infrastructure upholding all three elements has contributed to this policy retreat. These findings highlight the importance of establishing and maintaining legislative and institutional support for multiculturalism.

10.4.2 Funding

Without adequate financial resourcing, strong institutions backed by strong legislation will struggle to be effective. Funding cuts to key institutions was a prominent theme in both the British and the South Australian cases. Austerity cuts and ‘red-tape reduction’ measures in the UK have substantially affected the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s (EHRC) capacity to discharge its duties under the Equality Act 2010. The legislative infrastructure may be present in the form of the public sector equality duty, but a lack of funding for case workers and policy officers has inhibited BAME people’s abilities to access their legal rights. A country might have the very best policy settings, but without sufficient resources directed to frontline workers in lead institutions, these settings will not be able to adequately fulfil their primary functions.

Ultimately, budgets are manifestos of governments’ priorities. For example, providing an NHRI with sufficient resourcing and statutory powers to conduct thematic investigations provides the state the capability to address structural discrimination and improve equal opportunity. Some British interview participants in Chapter 6 acknowledged that large thematic investigations enabled them to identify and mitigate structural discrimination that they would not have otherwise been able to do, had they relied upon complaint-based mechanisms. However, these sorts of investigations have since been wound back due to austerity. If funding cuts disproportionately affect institutions responsible for implementing policies that promote multiculturalism, these cuts then flow on to have a disproportionate effect on cultural minorities. Government funding needs to be sufficient for institutions to carry out their mandate effectively.

10.4.3 Government support for civil society

In addition to adequately funding institutions, governments should also actively foster and support civil society organisations. As the findings of this thesis demonstrate, organisations in the ‘third sector’ perform several crucial functions. NGOs are often intermediaries between governments and cultural minorities, acting as advocates and peak representatives for voices that may otherwise be unheard. These organisations may be subcontracted to provide integration or settlement services for new arrivals. Similarly,
NGOs in the multicultural sector are also socio-cultural hubs that foster a sense of identity and belonging for immigrant minority groups. The MCP Index (2016: 5) rightly places a strong emphasis here, explicitly measuring whether governments provide funding for ethnic group organisations or activities.

Once again, the Netherlands proves to be an instructive case. Ethnic minority organisations were systematically defunded due to the retrenchment of ‘group-specific approaches’ in favour of integration policy mainstreaming. As was argued in Chapter 7, this led to a ‘double handicap’. Those NGOs and associations that remained were no longer consulted by policy actors to provide feedback about potential implications of government policies due to policy mainstreaming. At the same time, the lack of financial resources meant that these organisations were also no longer able to critically assess the impact of government policies on people with a migrant background. Adequate funding for these associations and organisations is critical for ensuring a healthy, vibrant NGO sector that can support state policy approaches promoting multiculturalism.

10.4.4 Political will and commitment

One of the key findings described in Chapter 9 was that the political success of multiculturalism relies upon an enduring political commitment from mainstream parties. Even if parties do not explicitly endorse ‘multiculturalism’, there is still a need to publicly demonstrate support for the underlying principles. Establishing collective political will from mainstream parties is critical given the rise of populist, radical-right parties that espouse anti-immigrant sentiments.

The impact of radical-right parties on politics and policymaking was discussed in each of the case studies. Although some of these parties may couch their discourse in trappings of anti-racism, as in the case of the Sweden Democrats, the ideological positions of radical-right parties tend to be fundamentally opposed to multiculturalism. Complacency towards these parties is a risk, especially when a mainstream party suffers electoral collapse like the centre-left Labour Party (PvdA) in the Netherlands. Where the state has retreated from an explicit commitment to multiculturalism, there is a potential risk for implicit commitment to multicultural principles to be eroded as radical-right parties gain increased political influence. The Sweden Democrats have had a destabilising effect on Swedish politics. As the third largest party with almost 20 per cent of the seats (Aylott and Bolin 2019: 1-3), neither of the two traditional blocs can form an outright parliamentary majority. Electoral stalemates pose a significant risk to the cordon sanitaire that keeps the Sweden Democrats out of a governing coalition.
Demonstrations of shared political will from mainstream parties are one way to limit the corrosive effect of radical-right parties. In Australia, the response from the two major parties to the xenophobic first speeches of Pauline Hanson (2016) and Fraser Anning (2018) were decisive (Turnbull 2016; Shorten 2016; Parliament of Australia 2018). Although Australia’s majoritarian electoral system limits the capacity of minor parties to win lower house seats, the lesson here is for mainstream parties to establish and maintain a set of acceptable political norms. Populist and xenophobic voices should not be courted in order to gain a parliamentary majority. In contrast, it is more challenging to mitigate the steady erosion of policies promoting multiculturalism as occurred in the Netherlands. There may not have been a sudden collapse of a cordon sanitaire in the Netherlands, but mainstream party policies rejecting multiculturalism appear to have shifted right-wards. This may have been to stave off populists like Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV), but the PVV continues to gain increasing levels of electoral support. Mainstream parties can help to reduce the political influence of the radical-right by explicitly rejecting anti-immigrant or xenophobic views.

10.4.5 Language and terminology

A consistent theme throughout this thesis has been the rhetorical backlash against multiculturalism. The choice of language and terminology is inherently political, even if the backlash has not led to widespread retrenchment of multicultural policies (Banting and Kymlicka 2013). Despite its political baggage, there are benefits from maintaining an explicit connection with the terminology of ‘multiculturalism’ because it is informed by well-established political theory. As states such as South Australia consider whether multiculturalism should be rebranded and modernised (Department of the Premier and Cabinet 2019b), decisionmakers should be cautious of terms lacking the same level of theoretical rigour. ‘Cultural diversity’ or ‘interculturalism’ may be part of the current policy zeitgeist, but proponents tend to misrepresent multiculturalism when they critique it as being an outdated concept that fosters cultural silos (Modood 2017: 1-2; Joppke 2017: 37). It would be more beneficial for policy actors to engage with the nuances of multiculturalism and its implications, rather than rejecting it on the basis of misinformed stereotypes.

In addition, there are also benefits from explicitly framing policy issues in terms of racial, ethnicity or cultural background. In Chapter 6, the UK case highlighted the benefits of maintaining ‘race’ as a social category in the political lexicon. Several British interview participants mentioned that being able to conduct data monitoring on the basis of race, ethnicity or cultural background enabled policymakers to be more readily able to identify
structural discrimination and racial disproportionality. In contrast, Swedish and Dutch institutions cannot make distinctions between racial, ethnic or cultural groups. Some have suggested that colour-blind anti-racism in Sweden makes it difficult for government to detect and respond to structural discrimination (Fekete 2014; Lappalainen 2005; Hübinette 2014). It is important to ensure that political language enables policymakers to address key problem issues. At the very least, terminology should not hinder or impede these efforts.

10.5 Final remarks

This study has examined the development, implementation and ‘success’ of policies promoting multiculturalism across four liberal democracies, between 2007 and 2017. Generally speaking, multiculturalism was in a state of precarious endurance in three out of the four cases. South Australia was the only case to still explicitly affirm multiculturalism. Although the terminology may have been abandoned in the Swedish and UK cases, the principles have remained embedded in constitutional, legislative and institutional mechanisms. The exception is that of the Netherlands. The thesis concurs with the findings of the MCP Index that found multicultural policies in the Netherlands have, in many instances, been retrenched and replaced by assimilationist-leaning policies.

By exploring and contrasting these four cases, it has been demonstrated in this thesis that multiculturalism is clearly not ‘dead’ in South Australia, Sweden and the UK. There are some examples of strong policy success with the entrenchment of access and equity in South Australia, the innovative public sector race equality duty in the UK, and the centrality of the Swedish welfare system in promoting equal opportunity. However, the thesis has also indicated that structural discrimination and race inequality exist concurrently with these policy successes. As populist radical-right parties flourish, their xenophobic ideologies pose an existential threat to multicultural principles. In response, policy actors with responsibility for promoting multiculturalism should double down on their support for this policy agenda. The social reforms achieved by advocates of multiculturalism have been hard-fought over many decades. With ongoing commitment from political leaders, policymakers and civil society, multiculturalism can endure for many more.
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APPENDIX 1 – FRAMEWORK OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (SEMI-STRUCTURED)

- How does your organisation define or understand the terms ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘integration’?

- What policies or programs has your organisation (or Swedish, British, Dutch or South Australian policymakers more broadly) developed and implemented in the areas of ‘multiculturalism’, ‘integration’, or ‘cultural diversity’?
  o What were the aims and objectives for these policies or programs?
  o How were the policies or programs implemented in order to reach these aims?
  o How were these policies or programs evaluated? How can it be determined if these policies were successful or effective?
  o If these policies or programs were to be implemented again, what would be done differently?
  o How do these policies or programs differ from previous approaches?

- Are there any emerging areas of focus for diversity policy in Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands or South Australia? What are the current challenges and difficulties that policymakers are facing?

- How does your organisation see the issues of racial discrimination, equal opportunity, mutual cultural accommodation and social cohesion relating to diversity policy frameworks?

- What is unique about Swedish, British, Dutch or South Australian policy in this space? Do you think there are any key differences in other countries for these policies are developed and implemented?

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106 Note: the REC Framework originally included a fourth objective: social cohesion. After the interviews were conducted, social cohesion was amalgamated into mutual cultural accommodation.
## APPENDIX 2 – INTERVIEW CODING INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Definition/Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Key concepts: definitions and understandings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Integration (normative)</td>
<td>Definitions or normative understandings of integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Assimilation (normative)</td>
<td>Definitions or normative understandings of assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Multiculturalism (normative)</td>
<td>Definitions or normative understandings of multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Interculturalism</td>
<td>Intercultural dialogue and understanding, transcending multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Debates about 'national'/liberal-democratic values</td>
<td>Discussion about the roles of values in socio-cultural integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Intersectionality</td>
<td>Examples of intersections between ethnicity, culture, class, gender, religion etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>RECS Framework</td>
<td>Acronym: Racial discrimination, equal opportunity, mutual cultural accommodation, social cohesion&lt;sup&gt;107&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Discrimination, racism</td>
<td>Node for general content relating to discrimination, racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1</td>
<td>Labour market discrimination</td>
<td>Racial discrimination specific to the labour market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2</td>
<td>Hate crime</td>
<td>Criminal actions with a racial or ethnic motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3</td>
<td>Structural racism</td>
<td>Includes institutional racism, indirect discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.4</td>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>Anti-discrimination or race equality legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Equal opportunity</td>
<td>Node for general content relating to equal opportunity to fully participate in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1</td>
<td>Barriers to equal opportunity</td>
<td>How barriers (e.g. education attainment level, labour market discrimination, exclusion) inhibit equal opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2</td>
<td>Equal treatment/race equality</td>
<td>Positive approaches going further than pure anti-discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Mutual cultural accommodation</td>
<td>Node for general content relating to mutual cultural accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Social cohesion</td>
<td>Node for general content relating to social cohesion, include discussion on fears and anxieties about migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.1</td>
<td>Tolerance/Intolerance</td>
<td>Social cohesion as 'tolerance' of cultural difference; include discussion about intolerance also</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2</td>
<td>Welcoming acceptance</td>
<td>Social cohesion as embracing a 'welcoming acceptance' of cultural difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.3</td>
<td>Contact theory and conflict theory</td>
<td>How contact theory informs policy; a counterpoint from conflict theory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>107</sup> Note: the REC Framework originally included a fourth objective: social cohesion. After the coding index was developed, social cohesion was amalgamated into mutual cultural accommodation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Definition/Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>Public policy</td>
<td>General expectations about the role of the public sector in society</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Role for public sector</td>
<td>The role of the public sector in shaping, establishing or reinforcing societal norms</td>
</tr>
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<td>3.1.1</td>
<td>Shaping norms</td>
<td>Node for general material relating to the role of civil society in policy sector</td>
</tr>
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<td>3.1.2</td>
<td>Role for civil society</td>
<td>Content relating to how policymakers interact with different stakeholders, public bodies, civil society, NGOs</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>Policy and program development</td>
<td>Decentralisation of multicultural policy; do local initiatives differ from national agenda?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2.1</td>
<td>Consultation, networking, collaboration</td>
<td>Debate about ethnic data monitoring and its role in public policy formation</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2.2</td>
<td>Policy shift</td>
<td>Monitoring and reporting of human rights; human rights education</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2.3</td>
<td>Mainstreaming</td>
<td>Material relating securitisation of migration, terrorism, deradicalisation</td>
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<td>3.2.4</td>
<td>Decentralisation; localism v national convergence</td>
<td>EU, global phenomena, including neoliberalism and globalisation, diaspora and foreign influence</td>
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<td>3.2.5</td>
<td>Research and evidence</td>
<td>General information relating to integration policy, including pressure placed on migrants to integrate</td>
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<td>3.3.1</td>
<td>Settlement services</td>
<td>State policy and services for settling new arrivals</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.3.2</td>
<td>Integration education and assessment</td>
<td>Policy measures including civic integration classes; assessing 'integration'</td>
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<td>3.3.3</td>
<td>Language proficiency</td>
<td>Content and policy relating to language proficiency in host society main language</td>
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<td>3.3.4</td>
<td>Societal segregation; parallel societies</td>
<td>Debates surrounding segregation, stratification; abstract arguments about 'parallel societies'</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
<td>Multiculturalism (policy frameworks and programs)</td>
<td>Material relating to provisions for mother-tongue instruction</td>
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<td>3.4.1</td>
<td>Mother-tongue instruction</td>
<td>Content relating to ethnic or community associations and organisations</td>
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<td>3.4.2</td>
<td>Ethnic associations</td>
<td>'Hands-off' approach to multiculturalism; let people do what they want when it comes to culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Policy effectiveness and success</td>
<td>Node for content debating the effectiveness or success of policy frameworks</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<td>South Australia and federal relations</td>
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<td>Indigenous Australians</td>
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<td>4.1.3</td>
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<td>Formal immigration program</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>Commission for Racial Equality/Equalities and Human Rights Commission</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Equalities duty; equality impact assessments</td>
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<td>4.2.3</td>
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<td>Brexit</td>
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<td>4.2.4</td>
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<td>Austerity</td>
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<td>4.2.5</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>'Shaking hands' dilemma</td>
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<td>Zwarte Piet (Black Pete)</td>
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<td>Demographics and statistics</td>
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<td>Nuances in language</td>
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