Why Confess? The Role of Instrumental and Symbolic Motivations on

Confessions in an Interpersonal Context

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Thesis Summary

The aim of the present research is to better understand the motivations driving the decision to confess in an interpersonal context. Confession is an act of acknowledging responsibility for a wrongdoing or violation of social norm. In a theoretical taxonomy I propose that individuals confess wrongdoing for either symbolic or instrumental reasons, and for individual or social purposes. These two orthogonal continua create a four-factor integrated model of motivations. That is, motivations driving the decision to confess can be individual instrumental (benefits to the self), individual symbolic (self-integrity), social instrumental (welfare of another) or social symbolic (group values and identity).

For any one or more of these motives, offenders may decide to confess or not confess depending on which they believe better serves their salient motives. Which motives are salient should depend on dispositional and situational factors, including the offender's moral identity, self-construal, as well as the trustworthiness of the confidant. Similarly, the belief that confession (rather than non-confession) can satisfy the motives should also depend on dispositional and situational factors, specifically an offender's dispositional propensity to trust and/or the trustworthiness of the confidant. In the first case, individuals with higher faith in humanity may believe that in general, people are kind, forgiving and willing to aid in resolving concerns once one has confessed. Alternatively, trustworthy confidants can be expected to be more benevolent, lenient and/or forgiving in response to one's confession and thus alleviate offender concerns.

Studies 2.1 and 2.2 established the four-factor model of confession motives through two retrospective surveys where participants recalled occasions where they transgressed against another person. Participants rated a list of 20

motivations on their relevance in driving confession or non-confession. Results showed support for the four-factor structure, while the evidence for the predicted dispositional correlates was mixed.

Study 3.1 replicated the four-factor model in the context of a hypothetical scenario and also investigated the role of trust. Participants were more likely to confess to trustworthy confidants, mediated through relevant confession motives. Studies 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 used experimental paradigms, staging wrongdoing in the lab and online, respectively. Studies 3.2 and 3.3 confirmed that trustworthiness of the confidant affects confession, and Study 3.4 found the same for offender's propensity to trust and general faith in humanity. However, this was neither mediated nor moderated by confession motives. Study 4.4 used a 3-week diary study in which participants recorded their transgressions and relevant confession behaviours. Again, trust in the confidant was related to confession, mediated through relevant concerns yet did not moderate the relationship between concerns and confession.

Overall, these results indicate that motivations driving the decision to confess can be categorised into four major types of concerns. Offenders are more likely to confess to people they trust and if they have a higher propensity to trust. Yet, there is little evidence that trust affects how offenders resolve the motivations. Rather, trust appears to increase symbolic concerns that tend to motivate confession and reduce individual instrumental concerns that tend to motivate non-confession.

Declaration

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any
material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that
to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously
published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the
text.

Carmen Yap

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Chapter 1: An Introduction into the Motivations Driving the Decision to Confess

"I was unfaithful. I had affairs. I cheated. What I did is not acceptable, and I am the only person to blame."

Tiger Woods.

The famous confession by golfer Tiger Woods regarding his extra-marital affair is a compelling and sensational example of confessions in everyday life. While there are some instances like the above where there is an abundance of evidence and a confession seems inevitable, there are also occurrences of confessions when there is no suspicion of any misconduct happening. Why are people confessing if there is little to no evidence, suspicion or confrontation about their role in a transgression event? I am not necessarily talking about trivial matters but rather transgressions that harm another person either physically, emotionally or financially without the victim's knowledge of who is responsible for the wrongdoing.

For example, in 2012, Jack Wendell Pursel walked into a police station and confessed to a double homicide he committed 1981. There was no substantial evidence against him and the case had been considered cold for many years (Chuck, 2012). So what prompted him to confess? Was it because "he just wanted to talk to someone about it," as suggested by the police captain?

There are many potential reasons for Pursel's spontaneous confession. It is possible that he revealed his transgression in an attempt to relieve himself of guilt or shame. Alternatively, he might have confessed for his own instrumental gain, be it for fame or a stroke to his ego. He might have confessed for the benefit of his victims and their families, possibly in an attempt to provide them with closure.

Or it might have been out of a desire or need to do the "right thing" as deemed by society; that is, confessing for the sake of honesty, truth or justice. I argue that there is not a single answer to the question "why do people confess?" but rather multiple motivations that may work in tandem to influence the decision to confess a wrongdoing. Specifically, whether a confession occurs is dependent on whether it is able to resolve the most salient concern an offender may have following a transgression. A more precise understanding of all the potential concerns following a transgression will better inform us about the precursors of confession and its psychological effects.

When one thinks of confession, the most frequently imagined scenarios are confessions in the context of criminal justice, psychotherapy or religious practice. However, we forget that confessions frequently occur in everyday life. It is inevitable as we move through life that we commit transgressions, whether intentional or accidental (lying, gossiping, cheating, etc.) and thus the decision to confess or not is a common decision we have to face. Despite this, surprisingly little research has studied confession more comprehensively in an interpersonal context.

In one of the first (and generally few) papers on the psychology of confessions, Horowitz (1956) argues that when one commits a transgression, there are psychological consequences that leave the offender feeling restricted or uncomfortable. Confession acts as a path to "psychological freedom". Horowitz defined psychological freedom as the "extent to which the person feels able to do things that he wants to do or that he feels that he may want to do" (Horowitz, 1956, p.199). That is, if the offender believes that someone suspects him or her of a transgression, he or she may feel unable to act freely for fear of confirming that

suspicion. Accordingly, not knowing where he stands or how much the other person knows, the offender has to decide how to proceed with the situation to escape the uncertainty.

Horowitz suggests that in addition to feeling guilty, there must be an accusation (either actual or implied) from a person of authority that has the power to limit one's freedom as well as the belief in the presence of evidence against the accused, for a confession to occur (Horowitz, 1956). While, Horowitz provides an interesting first look into confession, his theoretical notions are untested and there are many gaps that still have not been addressed today.

Aiming at a more comprehensive understanding, it may be instructive to look at a variety of fields, ranging from legal to religious domains, in addition to insights from related psychological concepts such as apology, secrets and disclosure in order to develop an integrative model of the motivations behind confessions. While the focus of this dissertation is to investigate confessions in an interpersonal context, our findings may well have implications for a variety of contexts in which confessions play a role, including criminal justice. For example, our research could inform more sophisticated ways to encourage confessions, and reduce the need for aggressive interrogation techniques and the false confessions these can elicit. Studying voluntary and spontaneous confessions in everyday life where there is little external pressure can inform us on what drives the decision to confess and aid us in eliciting true confessions in situations where the consequences are much greater.

Definition of Confession

Although it may seem straightforward, the concept of confession must first be carefully defined, as there is often confusion about where the limits of

confessions lie. The Oxford English Dictionary defines confession as "The disclosing of something the knowledge of which by others is considered humiliating or prejudicial to the person confessing; a making known or acknowledging of one's fault, wrong, crime, etc." ("Confession," 2010). However, the present review is concerned specifically with interpersonal transgressions and the disclosure of responsibility for an act of harm against another person. Therefore, I define confession as an admission of responsibility or involvement in an act of harm, to a confidant who can be either the victim or a third party. Thus, confessions of transgressions often imply three roles, the offender, the victim and the confidant. It is not necessary for the offender to feel a moral responsibility for the transgression in order for a confession to occur. By moral responsibility I mean a sense of remorse or guilt, or the feeling that what he or she did was *wrong*, violating the accused's own values and set of moral ideals. The present definition of confession requires only an acknowledgement of causal responsibility in an act that others may regard as wrong and potentially harmful to a victim. Conversely, I use the term non-confession for an offender's denial of wrongdoing or lack of confession. While a denial is an outright refutation of a charge that the offender committed the transgression, a lack of confession can also occur when the reproach is not explicit and the offender does not offer any confession in its absence.

Hale (1987), in her comparison of responses to transgressions, suggests there is a basic sequence of events following an event such as a transgression. The action sequence usually begins with a reproach, followed by a response or account to the transgression from the accused and concludes with an evaluation of the account by the victim (Schönbach, 1980). Similar to Horowitz (1956), Hale

assumes that only the anticipation of a reproach is necessary, although anticipation of reproach does not necessarily mean that the victim actually will reproach or even knows about the transgression. In fact, it is possible one may volunteer one's wrongdoing even in instances where the victim has no idea of the offenders culpability. Thus, the presence of an anticipated reproach may just be purely a figment of the accused's mind.

Although confessions are characterised by an acknowledgement of the transgression they can sometimes, but are not required to, be accompanied by remorse (apology), excuses and justifications (Hale, 1987). It is therefore important to be also clear about the difference between confession and these other transgression account strategies.

Apologies, like confessions, are by definition an acknowledgement of harm and an acceptance of causal responsibility. However, apologies also imply a sense of remorse and promises of restitution to the victim and better future behaviour (Darby & Schlenker, 1989). In other words, apologies involve expressions or implication of *moral* responsibility, whereas it is not a requirement for confession that offenders acknowledge or feel moral responsibility.

According to Scott and Lyman (1968) an excuse is an admission of harm done accompanied by an explanation that the offender is not fully responsible, whereas a justification is an acknowledgment of responsibility but with a denial or downplaying of the harmful consequences. Scott and Lyman (1968) illustrate this difference through an example of a soldier who killed an enemy combatant during a war. In an excuse, the soldier admits that he killed the combatant but explains that he is not fully responsible as he was under orders from his commanding officer. In a justification, the soldier still admits responsibility for

the action but denies that it is a wrongdoing as the combatant was part of an enemy group and 'deserved' the fate.

Therefore, all three other account behaviours (apologies, excuses, justifications) have a component of confession, in that all these accounts imply admission that the offender engaged in an act (of commission or omission) that was perceived as wrong and hurtful by another person and was thus causally responsible. However, confessions do not need any or all of the additional accounts. Confessions are purely an acknowledgement of an offence (or what others might see as such), and an admission of causal (not necessarily moral) responsibility. Confession is a behaviour in its own right, such as, when criminal suspects confess in order to show their cooperation with the police, or a dying person confesses to come clean on their deathbed.

It is also possible that people confess as a necessary first step before engaging in one of the other accounts. Following a transgression, certain offences may arise and confession is a possible avenue for resolving the concern. What follows, an apology, excuse or justification depends on which one will resolve the initial concern that motivated the confession. Previous research by Benoit and Drew (1997) show support for this idea. Excuses are an attempt to minimize responsibility, justifications an attempt to reduce offensiveness, while apologies are a vehicle for the expression of remorse (Benoit & Drew, 1997). For example, if the primary concern of an offender is to repair a relationship damaged by a transgression, an apology may be more effective than a pure acknowledgement of responsibility, or a confession accompanied by an excuse or a justification. Conversely, an offender primarily interested in repairing a good impression, may excuse their actions, emphasising he is not fully responsible. Of course, the

motivation leading to the decision to confess, apologise, excuse or justify are much more complex than what was just described, and will be expanded on later in the review. Nevertheless, if we want to understand what motivates people to confess (or not), we need to consider a broad range of functions that confessions may have in interpersonal relations; we need to consider a variety of concerns that offenders experience as a consequence of their wrongdoing and how confession or non-confession resolves these concerns.

Fields of Research Relevant to Confessions

Confessions in Law

The bulk of empirical research on confessions is in the context of criminal law. Confession evidence is regarded as the most potent source of evidence in legal proceedings. Due to the importance of confession evidence, much research has gone into investigating the authenticity of confessions and how to produce accurate and authentic confessions without violating the basic rights of suspects (Gudjonsson, 1992; Gudjonsson & Bownes, 1992; Gudjonsson & Petursson, 1991; Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, Bragason, Einarsson, & Valdimarsdottir, 2004; Kassin, 2005).

In criminal psychology it has been argued there are three main reasons for confessing: internal pressure, external pressure and evidence (Gudjonsson & Petursson, 1991). When these three reasons are extended to interpersonal transgressions, internal pressure refers to the presence of guilt and shame that may lead offenders to confess. External pressure is where someone else suspects the wrongdoing and consequently urges the offender to confess. While in an interpersonal context there would commonly be no interrogation process to urge a confession, the pressure may be more implicit in nature and involve accusations

and confrontations by victims or their families, or gossip and whispers from social peers. People may confess when they believe there is evidence against them. As Horowitz (1956) argues, only the *belief* of the availability of evidence is necessary for confession. The following models expand on these three reasons for confessing and implications for confessions in the interpersonal context are discussed.

Initially the Reid Technique, developed by Reid and associates (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2011) as a training manual for interrogations, was based on the idea that offenders will confess to a transgression if the perceived consequences are less unfavourable than the distress caused by deception (Deslauriers-Varin, Lussier, & St-Yves, 2011; Jayne, 1986). The Reid technique targets and suggests methods of breaking down a suspect by decreasing the severity of consequences while increasing anxiety associated with denial. Two types of consequences, real and personal, are detailed where real consequences involve financial losses or a loss in freedom, and personal consequences involve reduced self-esteem and integrity.

The Reid technique is highly focused on eliciting confessions by any means and suggests placing suspects in aversive and high-pressured environments. Consequently, a confession may be the best possible outcome for an individual regardless of whether they committed the offence or not. Questionable interrogation techniques such as placing suspects under severe pressure and an emphasis on instrumental rewards such as the promise of reduced anxiety, fear, and negative consequences may lead to a high chance of false confessions. The underlying assumptions are logical and sound from the perspective of generating confessions but not necessarily for generating true

confessions. They are also not empirically tested and in fact, the majority of psychological evidence runs counter to the claims of the Reid technique. Additionally, as high-pressured hostile interrogations rarely occur in everyday interactions, the value of this model is limited and does not encompass all the possible motivations I am interested in.

Hilgendorf and Irving (1981) approached confession from a research perspective by developing a decision-making model of confessions. The decision-making model of confessions is concerned with the idea that the suspect has multiple options open following a transgression and has to weigh the potential gains (e.g., reduction of guilt and shame, reduced negative consequences) against potential losses (e.g., loss of social approval and self-esteem). In particular, suspects' decisions are concerned with three major factors: the choice between several courses of actions, the perceived likelihood of consequences attached to these actions and the utilitarian gains associated with the actions. If gains outweigh losses a confession is more likely to occur than if losses outweigh gains. Based on research by Janis (1959), Hilgendorf and Irving (1981) suggest that when making the decision to confess or not, there are four categories of concern: utilitarian gains and losses for the self (threats against the self), for others (threats made against family), self approval and social approval. However, the authors do not draw any conclusions about why and when people would weigh certain outcomes over others or which gains are preferable.

The previous models provide a simplified take on the why confession occurs but as St-Yves and Deslauriers-Varin (2009) stated "Confessing is a complex process which cannot be explained by one factor alone but rather a series of factors that interact" (p.5). Moston, Stephenson, and Williamson (1992)

proposed an interactional model of confessions. In this model, Moston and

colleagues (1992) claim that a suspect's response to an allegation involves the

interaction between the suspect's background characteristics (personality, age and

offence type) and the contextual factors of the case (interrogation techniques and

legal advice).

Similarly, Gudjonsson and colleagues' cognitive-behavioural model of

confessions (Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989; Gudjonsson, 1989) proposes that

suspect's characteristics, the surrounding environment and others in the

environment interact to influence the decision to confess. Importantly,

Gudjonsson and colleagues highlight the importance of considering the

antecedents, events occurring before the interrogation, and consequences, both

short and long-term of confessions. However, in the model, each antecedent

frequently involves the presence of police or some kind of interrogative and

external pressure; this does not frequently occur in interpersonal interactions.

Regardless, the important point is that a wide variety of factors are involved in the

decision to confess but confessions that occur without police pressure,

confinement or the presence of legal advice and procedural routines must be

further investigated.

The combination of suggestions from policing manuals (Reid technique)

and research in the psychology of criminal confessions has revealed many

interesting reasons for why people confess. The Reid technique suggests that

offenders are concerned with primarily two types of consequences, real

instrumental consequences such as prison time or financial losses as well as more

personal symbolic consequences such as guilt, shame or a damaged self-image

(Jayne, 1986). Hilgendorf and Irving (1981) suggest that confessions involve the

consideration of not only gains for the self (whether these be instrumental or symbolic) but also gains for others. Additionally, Moston et al. (1992) highlighted the importance of considering the interaction of the background characteristics of the case with the contextual situation of the interrogation. While interrogations are not frequent in interpersonal interactions, there are still situational factors involved in everyday transgressions such as the presence of suspicion, the emotions or behaviour of the victim and so on. Lastly, Gudjonsson's (1989) cognitive-behavioural model of confession, considering the importance of antecedents and consequences, is also informative as those antecedents also represent the types of motivations that could drive confessions in an interpersonal context. For example, motivations may include the drive to alleviate the isolation felt as a result of breaking a norm, or the drive to alleviate the emotional distress caused by guilt or shame, the motivation to reduce cognitive distress and dissonance as a result of committing a transgression etc.

However, these studies do not pay much attention to voluntary spontaneous confessions. While the courts and the judicial system may consider the confessions admitted in court as voluntary, they are often provoked by police interrogative pressure and often by what the offenders believe is overwhelming evidence against them. Perhaps, because the cost of confession is so high, the studies assume that only a small number of people will confess if they have no need to do so; that is, if there is no one accusing them of the crime and there is no evidence brought against them, no confession will occur. However, it is often the case that costs of confession in interpersonal contexts are still high (loss of job, marriage, relationships) and yet voluntary and spontaneous confessions still occur.

Confessions in Religion

For some, the thought of confession may bring forth an image of the catholic confession ritual where a penitent asks for forgiveness and absolution from a priest in a confessional stall. Nevertheless, it is not only Catholics who believe in confession. Many religions around the world such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism and even the cultural traditions and beliefs of tiny Asian or Native American tribes like the Peyote tribe believe that confession is necessary for the well-being of the *soul* and of the *community* (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004; La Barre, 1947).

Early Christianity (4th-6th century) used confession as a social motivator where confessions were held in public and were a requirement for reconciling the individual with the community and restoring them to full membership within said community (Brooks, 2000). However, as time progressed, the focus on confession turned inward, and private confessions focused on saving one's soul began to take the forefront (7th -9th century). Confessions became less about reintegration into the community and more about personal growth. Eventually, by the 10th century, religious confession turned legalistic, with a stronger focus on shame and guilt and fault-finding rather than personal healing. Looking into the changes that occurred throughout Christianity's history presents a broader range of motivations for confessing beyond the obvious shame and guilt. It also includes social (community connectedness) and personal reasons (personal spiritual growth) as motives for confession (Brooks, 2000).

Research into religious or spiritual confession define confession as an acknowledgement that a spiritually significant norm has been violated (Murray-Swank, McConnell, & Pargament, 2007). Christian spiritual confession has two

functions: 1) to acknowledge a sin against God was committed and 2) to seek absolution and forgiveness. Murray-Swank and colleagues cited an unpublished thesis (Wise, 1996) where a small group of participants of the Roman Catholic Sacrament of Reconciliation were interviewed. The research revealed that confession according to the Roman Catholic Church is fundamentally a cathartic experience often prompted by guilt. Guilt or shame is reduced through God's forgiveness and one is expected to grow from each confession experience. Second, confession reduces the sense of moral isolation created by violation a sacred norm. Catholic confession provides a sense of connectedness as personal struggles are shared with another in an environment where all parties hold the same beliefs and values (Wise, 1996 as cited in Murray-Swank et al., 2007). Hymer (1995) suggests that religious confession strengthens individuals and bonds us to a larger community which allows us to express both individual identities and relationships needs.

In Judaism, Yom Kippur is a day when confessions are offered as a way of getting closer to God. On this day, Jewish rituals emphasise cleansing and aligning oneself with God's will. It is not enough to focus on reconnecting with God, rather the Jews also emphasise the reconnecting with other members of the community (Hymer, 1995).

Religion research has taught us that confession is not only for relieving guilt and internal distress but also for re-connecting with the community. However, the fundamental driver of confession is guilt and thus these explanations for why confession occurs cannot fully account for confessions without remorse. By definition, confessions that are not accompanied by remorse are also lacking in guilt, which is the primary drive of religious confession. These

confessors do not believe that their transgression is a sin or morally wrong so there is no moral basis for their confession. This thesis will attempt to investigate the mechanisms behind confessions with and without a moral drive.

Confessions in Psychotherapy

Psychologist Sigmund Freud (1957) believed that patients experience relief immediately after purging their unconscious thoughts from their mind and this idea spawned the psychoanalytic school of thought that is still used in therapy today.

Freud's ideas were further expanded on by his student Theodore Reik. Reik (1959) postulates that guilt is the underlying theme of all confessions, and we are motivated to confess in order to express repressed urges. Although Reik does not narrow confessions down to just transgressions but rather takes a broader view of confession, he does define confession as 'an attempt at reconciliation that the superego undertakes in order to settle the quarrel between the ego and the id' (p. 216). The superego acts on the feelings of guilt and the need of punishment by confessing to the crime and thus forcing the ego to see the severity and emotional implication of the transgression. It is only once the emotional significance of the transgression is realised that guilty feelings are relieved. Therefore, according to Reik the primary motivator of confession is guilt. Furthermore, Reik breaks guilt down into two components, fear of losing love and fear of retaliation. It is interesting to note that while Reik (1959) primarily focuses on guilt, the two components of guilt involve externally mediated consequences and social costs. While the fear of retaliation is primarily focused on the self and the possible negative consequences of the actions, fear of losing love implicitly involves consideration of others such as the need for social approval and belongingness.

According to fellow psychoanalyst, Carl Jung, seeking connectedness is the main psychological benefit of confession.

The tremendous feeling of relief that usually follows a confession can be ascribed to the readmission of the lost sheep into the human community. His moral isolation and seclusion, which were so difficult to bear, cease. Herein lies the chief psychological value of confession (Jung, 2011, p. 110).

More recently, James Pennebaker and colleagues conducted a series of studies investigating the function of confession as a therapeutic process (Pennebaker, 1989, 1997; Pennebaker, Hughes, & O'Heeron, 1987). Pennebaker and colleagues found that confession was beneficial as it aided participants in understanding the meaning of events. As a result, participants who wrote confession essays showed significant improvements in physical health and mental health (Pennebaker, 1989; Pennebaker et al., 1987).

Psychological research into confessions has taught us about the benefits of confession. These benefits may be derived from reduction of guilt (Reik, 1959), connectedness with others (Jung, 2011) or finding new meaning from troubling events (Pennebaker, 1989).

All three fields of research – criminal psychology, psychotherapy and religion - investigate confessions in different lights, but they each provide a limited understanding of the motives for confessions. The present analysis provides a more comprehensive look at confessions, investigating symbolic motivations such as guilt, shame and the upholding of ideals and values, as well

as instrumental motivations such as reduction of punishment, impression management and benefits for others. At the same time, personal reasons for confessing, such as the alleviation of the aforementioned guilt and shame, can be contrasted with more social reasons for confessing such as alleviating pain for the victim and re-committing to shared values. More importantly, this thesis is concerned with the integration of these four (symbolic, instrumental, personal and social) motivations for confessing and, based on these motivations, what induces and what prevents confessions.

An Integrated Model of Motivations for Confessions

As the review of relevant literature has shown, there are many potential motivations for confessing, ranging from personal reasons such as the drive to alleviate guilt (Reik, 1956) to social reasons such as the desire to protect others (Gudjonsson & Petursson, 1991). Additionally, as research based around the Reid Technique (Inbau et al., 2011) has proposed there is also a difference between "real" motivations, such as financial loss, and "personal" consequences, such as self-esteem and social approval (Jayne, 1986). As such a taxonomy providing a systematic method of categorizing motivations in an integrated way is needed to further our understanding of the processes behind confession.

The literature reveals a very broad and scattered look into the motivation behind confessions. In the present research, I suggest a model as a first attempt at integrating research from various domains in order to investigate the reason why confessions occur. By bringing all these different theories together, we can start to see the same broad types of motivations consistently appear in literature as vastly different as criminology and psychotherapy.

Second, understanding the various possible motivations is important if we hope to increase the rate of confession, as arguably the case in the criminal justice system, without increasing the rate of false confessions. It may allow us to create conditions under which offenders believe confession (rather than non-confession) would best satisfy their present motivation. Or, we could try to make a specific concern salient to a suspect, so that under given conditions offenders would perceive confession as a means to better resolve these concerns than non-confession would.

I suggest a two-dimensional taxonomy of motivations or concerns people have when they decide whether to confess or not. The first dimension distinguishes between instrumental and symbolic motivations. Similar to what was previously called "real consequences", instrumental motivations are related to the pursuit of practical benefits for oneself and/or others, such as the avoidance or reduction of punishment or loss, convenience, efficacy or any other valuable commodities that allows the individual to control the environment (Dittmar, 1992; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). Instrumental motivations may also include the pursuit of practically beneficial consequences or the avoidance of undesirable consequences. These benefits are not necessarily tangible rewards in themselves but may be instrumental for their attainment, such as power, respect and trustworthiness. For example, individuals could confess to gain favours and reduce punishment or they could decide not to confess in an attempt to avoid punishment altogether. Alternatively, offenders could confess to show that they are in fact of good character by presenting an image of honesty and trustworthiness, or they could decide not to confess and to avoid tarnishing their good image by admitting to a transgression.

In contrast, individuals may also be motivated by more symbolic concerns when they decide to confess or not. In fact, there are many incidents in everyday life where confessions occur without an accusation or threats of punishment and scorn. An example may be a cheating spouse confessing to an unknowing partner about an affair. In this case, the 'victim' may not have any knowledge of the offence let alone the 'offender's' responsibility in the act. Thus, it would be appear the offender could only lose by confessing if instrumental benefits were all he or she was concerned about. Alternatively, a confession may not be directed at the victim but instead one may turn to a partner or best friend and confess a transgression towards a stranger. In this case, there would be little benefit in confessing for the purpose of reducing the risk of retribution or punishment so more internal, symbolic motives must be present. Symbolic motivations are here defined as concerns about one's personal, relational and social self, and the moral integrity of one's self and one's relevant personal relationships or social group. These motivations are related to both the needs of social expression (interaction and social acceptance) and social identity (values essential for self-concept) (Ennis & Zanna, 2000). Therefore, motivations such as the desire to resolve guilt or shame, the desire to reaffirm a commitment to social norms and value etc. are classified as symbolic motivations.

A second dimension distinguishes between a more individual (self-oriented) versus social (other-oriented) nature of the motivations. Individual-level motivations are focused on benefitting oneself individually or alleviating one's own individual distress. For example, offenders may be concerned about the punishment or loss if others were to find out about their offence. This does not mean that these are necessarily asocial motivations; rather the attainment of

benefits, or instrumentalities towards their attainment, may be socially mediated and may occur through other people. Yet, the ultimate goal is a benefit (or avoidance of loss) for the individual self. For example, guilt is an intra-psychic phenomenon whose causes and functions are of interpersonal or intragroup origin; specifically it relies on the internalization of social norms and serves the regulation of social belonging (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995). That is, although the generally accepted primary function of guilt is to repair interpersonal relationships damaged by the transgression, I still consider it an individual motivation, albeit socially-mediated, as the primary goals are to relieve the individual distress experience and to maintain the individual's moral self or image.

Alternatively, an offender's concern may instead be about the benefits or losses of others, or the moral integrity or identity of a group of people; that is, either their dyadic relationship with the victim or a group of people that is salient as a moral community. Offenders might be concerned about how their wrongdoing might harm others, and how their decision to confess or not may alleviate that harm. These are here called social motivations. For example, offenders might be concerned about the losses or pain the victim incurs due to the wrongdoing, or how their actions might undermine the group's social consensus about values that define their identity and moral fabric. The difference between individual and social motivations can be explained also in terms of the relative salience of a personal versus social self, as it is distinguished by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). To the degree that an individual's personal self is salient and they define their identity in distinction from other individuals they are more concerned with outcomes that benefit them. However, with greater salience

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of their social self, their identity is more strongly based on what they share with others; they become more interchangeable with others and others' goals become their own goals and others' outcomes become their own outcomes, explaining concerns for shared identity, common value and others' welfare.

These two dimensions of symbolic versus instrumental, and individual versus social concerns underlying confessions combine to four broad motivations underlying confession decision. They offer a level of differentiation often lacking in discourse on confession, and we need to be aware that our common usage of terms is sometimes not that sharp. For example, the reduction of guilt is a symbolic motivation but others, like Reik understand it also as doing right in order to reduce punishment. Likewise, reduction of guilt is here understood as an individual motivation, but the act of relieving guilt may have benefits for others, leading also to social implications. Therefore, the place of guilt (or any other motivation) in this integrated model is largely dependent on what is the ultimate goal.

Individual Symbolic Motivations - Restoration of Self-Integrity

Following an interpersonal transgression, a range of thoughts and emotions are evoked. Specifically, how an individual feels about an offence influences how they will consequently act. If individuals feel bad about the transgression they will act to restore their self-image and as such may be prompted to seek reassurance that they are not actually bad people (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967). That is, generally individuals have a need to perceive themselves as moral and acceptable people and feelings of wrongdoing can lead to actions driven by guilt or shame, in an effort to defend against a threat to a person's moral integrity (Baumeister, 1996).

In this respect the decision to confess or not confess following a transgression may be based on the motivation to relieve the negative aversive state of guilt or cognitive tensions. I suggest that the decision to confess or not will depend on whether one expects confession or denial to better alleviate the emotional distress or the cognitive tension caused by the transgression.

Looking into the related literature of secrets and disclosure provides insight into the potential processes that may be at work when people are motivated to confess for individual symbolic motivations. This is because secrets tend to be negative or stigmatizing information that one would rather not disclose for fear of negative consequences (Kelly & Kahn, 1994). Secret keepers also tend to have higher levels of guilt and shame involved with hiding information from others (Kelly & McKillop, 1996); revealing secrets may also provide a cathartic effect, reducing an individual's emotional arousal by relieving feelings of stress, guilt, shame. By revealing a secret for the purpose of coming to terms with it and gaining new insights into them, individuals are able to find closure and feel a sense of resolution (Kelly, 1999). In a sense, withholding information about a transgression committed can be thought of as a secret.

Like secrets, guilt, shame and other negative aversive emotions or thoughts may be a drain on one's mental and cognitive resources but suppressing information such as one's role in a transgression is difficult. Confession may be an alternative way of reducing the tension. Wegner and colleagues showed that people are remarkably bad at intentionally suppressing information and suggest the reason why suppressing information is so difficult and stressful is due to induced hyperaccessibility (Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). Suppressing information ironically requires the person to

constantly keep the information close to the surface. There are two cognitive processes at work in the suppression of information. The first is a controlled process that is constantly keeping a distracter in consciousness. It is the process that is implemented when a person decides to think about something else to avoid thinking about the distressing thought. The second cognitive process involved in suppression is the automatic target search. This process is consistently on the lookout for the unwanted thought so that the controlled process can be implemented. However, constantly watching for the unwanted thought makes the person more sensitive to the thought and may be returned to consciousness with minimal prompting (Wegner & Erber, 1992). Therefore it may be reasonable to suggest that the reason humans are "confessing animals" is because in general we lack the cognitive resources required to maintain the suppression of information over a large period of time.

However, Kelly and Kahn (1994) found that this rebound effect does not generalise easily to secrets. Surprisingly, suppressing one's own thoughts actually does diminish the intensity and reoccurrence of the thought (Kelly & Kahn, 1994). The researchers suggest that this is because participants have practice at distracting themselves from the thoughts and as a result have an extensive network of distracter thoughts. People are also constantly suppressing their own intrusive thoughts in a variety of new environments that can reduce the intensity of the rebound effect. However, when participants were returned to the original environment, they once again experienced the rebound effect. Kelly and Kahn (1994) suggest that the rebound effect is reduced by the lack of continuity between the initial suppression contexts and subsequent expression contexts, and a rebound effect only occurs in the contexts of previous suppression attempts.

Therefore, in an interpersonal transgression, the rebound effect may still be partially responsible for motivating an offender to confess to the victim but only when he or she sees the victim, as the sight of the victim reminds of the initial suppression context. Offenders may confess to relieve themselves from the stress of continuously inhibiting disclosure.

In support of the cognitive relief theories, Baumeister et al. (1995) found that guilty participants were more likely to confess to transgressions and make amends to victim than non-guilty participants. The desire for reparative actions following guilt inductions have been frequently and consistently found throughout the years (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Cryder, Springer, & Morewedge, 2012; De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007; Konecni, 1972). Guilt seems to consistently motivate reparative behaviours. However, these reparative behaviours do not necessarily mean a confession is made and can lead to either confession or non-confession. If confession does not repair any damage to the relationship and consequently does not alleviate any emotional distress from violating personal norms, guilt need not necessarily predict confession. In support, Gudjonsson and Petursson (1991) suggest that guilt is dual in nature, acting concurrently to encourage perpetrators to confess while at the same time inhibiting them from confessing.

Similar to guilt, shame is an unpleasant emotion that occurs after a moral failure. However, the feelings associated with shame are more holistic than with guilt as shame involves feelings such as inferiority and worthlessness (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Shame is traditionally conceptualised as a failure of the global self, leading individuals to protect any further damage to their self-image by withdrawing (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). As such, studies have found that

feelings of shame do not promote cooperative behaviour but rather prompt denial, withdrawal and escape (De Hooge et al., 2007). Consequently, the literature seems to suggest that individuals with greater feelings of shame may be less likely to confess than individuals low in shame.

However, De Hooge and colleagues found that if the shame induced is specific to the transgression event rather than just general feelings of shame, the affected individuals are motivated to act to repair the relationship (De Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008). Additionally, research has found shame acknowledgement is essential for genuine self-forgiveness whereas shame denial leads to pseudo self-forgiveness, with deleterious consequences for both interpersonal restoration and the individual's intrapersonal restoration (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2006; Gausel & Leach, 2011; Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2013). Self-forgiveness is "a willingness to abandon self-resentment in the face of one's own acknowledged objective wrong, while fostering compassion, generosity, and love toward oneself" (Enright & The Human Development Study Group, 1996, p. 116). Therefore, self-forgiveness is important as the offender is less motivated to self-punish and more willing to be accepting of the self, resulting in a reduction in the feelings of self-blame and, at least in the longer term, overcoming regret, guilt and shame (J. H. Hall & Fincham, 2005; Zechmeister & Romero, 2002).

In sum, I propose a subset of motivations that are primarily concerned with relieving the internal feelings of distress or negative cognitive load associated with processing a transgression.

Social Symbolic Motivations – Restoration of Shared Values

In addition to individual-level symbolic motivations, there are also more social and community-level motivations such as the desire to uphold a moral principle and shared values of the society.

According to many theorists, a transgression is a violation of a rule or norm and a disregard for the values shared by the group (Durkheim, 1893; Mikula, 1986). Therefore, justice can be restored not only through punishment but also through re-affirming values shared between an offender and a victim that were violated when the offence was committed (Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008, 2010). Wenzel and colleagues (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008; Wenzel, Okimoto, & Cameron, 2012; Wenzel et al., 2008) developed a conceptual model of restorative justice consisting of a distinction between two types of concerns following a transgression. They suggest that, following a norm violation, victims are concerned with violations to their status/power as well as violations of shared values such as justice.

These two concerns are not independent of each other and either one or both may be elicited (Wenzel et al. 2008). Which one is dominant depends on various situation factors. In particular, Wenzel et al. (2010) identify group identity as a predictor of endorsement of restorative concerns. According to self-categorisation theory, the extent that one identifies with a group, the more one expects others within the group to hold the same values and norms (Turner, 1985). For concerns about shared values to be salient, the offender must therefore be part of a group shared with the victim and can thus be expected to hold similar values, defining of their shared identity. Hence, if a transgression violates a relationship-defining norm, the transgression threatens not only the validity of the

norm of the group but also threatens how the two parties define the relationship (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009). By verbally re-affirming values of the group through a confession, an offender acknowledges and re-commits to the norms of the group.

This analysis, while originally focused on victims' concerns, can be extended to offender perspectives (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2014). If, an offender perceives the victim as an outsider opposed to any attempts at reconciliation or forgiveness, the offender may prioritise the desire to protect his or her own status/power. If the offender feels a sense of kinship and a desire to re-affirm their shared ideals, motivation to reaffirm said values may be dominant. The desire to re-affirm shared values and protect the relationship is consistent with Baumeister and Leary (1995) theory of a need to belong. The need to belong suggests that individuals have a strong need for belongingness and connectedness and the threat of social exclusion could lead to negative outcomes. Similarly, a transgression, as a violation of a social norm, results in the offender being isolated from the public and as such the offender must take measures to re-integrate into the community. Publicly acknowledging their violation can be seen as a sign of respect for the rules of the community (see also Shnabel & Nadler, 2008).

Again, a confession could be a double-edged sword: it could either consolidate the offender's acceptance into the community and agreement with current social norms, or it could contribute to the offender's alienation as a norm violator. If confession is expected to lead to the second option, it is unlikely that perpetrators are willing to risk the isolation, rejection and social exclusion, choosing instead to withhold the confession. As others do not know, or at least are not certain, about the offender's role in the violation, the offender could

believe that their silence might protect their moral image and maintain their social acceptance. On the other hand, the offender's confession might be viewed as a re-commitment to the violated values and restore their social-moral identity, annulling the implications of their transgression and the threat of exclusion, perhaps even strengthening their inclusion and bond with the group.

Individual Instrumental Motivations – Utilitarian-Based Decision Making

If there is a lack of shared identity between the offender and the victim, then the offender may consider him or herself distinct from the victim and consequently be less concerned about "us" (the relationship with the victim and his or her welfare) and more about "me" (offenders own goals and welfare). Offenders may base the decision to confess on what they believe should lead to the best possible outcome for them. These motivations are categorized as individual instrumental motivations.

There are two subtypes of individual instrumental motivations. The first are motivations that involve tangible and practical benefits. These include motivations such as the desire to reduce or avoid material losses or the desire to reduce punishment. These motivations are well established in research and are the type of motivations that the majority of research in eliciting criminal confessions is based on (Hilgendorf & Irving, 1981; Jayne, 1986).

When one commits a transgression, one thought that could come to mind is "How much trouble am I in?" If another finds out about one's role in a norm violation, there are often dire consequences, offenders have the potential to lose freedom, relationships, money, their job etc. Conversely, confession also opens the possibility that one might be rewarded for one's honesty through a reduction in punishment, saving the relationship, a sympathetic view (of their truth-telling)

that helps one keep their relationship, job etc. Scher and Darley (1997) found that confessors were less blameworthy and less deserving of punishment than non-confessors. I expect that if concern about practical gains or losses for oneself is the main motivator driving the decision to confess or not, then this decision is dependent simply on cost-benefit analysis and whichever choice provides the best outcome for the transgressor.

In addition to the pursuit of tangible benefits, one might also be concerned about socially mediated benefits. Socially mediated individual instrumental motivations involve the desire to achieve practical benefits through others primarily through manipulating self-presentation. Self-presentation is the way we communicate information about ourselves to others (Baumeister, 1982). The purpose of self-presentation is two-fold. The first is to obtain rewards through impressing on others favourably. The second is as a means or a substitute for self-fulfilment through presenting a public image in line with one's ideal self. Motivations include the desire for a good image or acceptance amongst a social group where the benefits of acceptance and admiration from the social group are directed at the individual. It is the pleasant feelings of validation elicited from interaction with other members of a treasured group that is the primary motivation behind the decision to confess or not. Supporting this idea, McLaughlin, Cody, and Rosenstein (1983) found that people who confessed received less hostile reactions from others compared to those who did not confess.

Similarly, Schnabel and Nadler (2008) suggest that reconciliation following a transgression is based on a social exchange of emotional need satisfaction and the perpetrators' primary need is for relatedness and acceptance and perpetrators fear exclusion from their social and moral community as a result

of having deviated from its social norm. Wenzel (2004) found evidence where the deterring features of punishment were shown to be enhanced when individuals have not internalised a norm but see wide-spread social support for that norm. Believing that others would strongly condemn the violation of the norm or law, adds to the deterring effect of punishment. The desire to be accepted is closely related to the social symbolic motivation of reaffirming a shared identity. The very subtle difference is that the former is primarily concerned with the benefits that come with acceptance such as positive feelings and the latter is concerned with more internal identity needs.

Thus, this category of motivations is involved with the practical benefits for the individual. These benefits may be tangible rewards such as reducing punishment or socially mediated benefits such as a good impression and are targeted only at the individual.

Social Instrumental Motivations - Altruism

In contrast to individual instrumental motivations that are based on the expected costs and benefits of confession for offenders themselves, social instrumental motivations are concerned with the protection of or benefits for another person. Specifically, these motivations are associated with the desire to acquire practical benefits for the victim or third parties. The desire to benefit others can take many different forms. For example, offenders may desire not to cause the victim any (further) harm. They may thus decide not to confess so victims remain unaware of their victimization, or they may decide to confess in order to relieve the victims' feelings of hurt by assuring them it is not their fault. Alternatively, offenders may want to protect the peace within the wider group, if by confessing an issue that may have been forgotten is revived and conflict is

caused, an offender may decide not to confess. Likewise they may want to protect another individual who is falsely suspected of the wrongdoing, and they may decide to confess to protect that individual from unjust punishment or image loss. Although there is an assumption of human behaviour is that people will act in their own self-interest, there are people who confess purely to protect others (Gudjonsson & Petursson, 1981).

It could be that by adopting another person's perspective and imagining the consequences of the transgression for the other, individuals will be more strongly motivated to act for the benefit of the other person. If the offender believes that confessing to a transgression will cause the victim unnecessary hurt and distress, then for the benefit of the victim it might seem better to withhold the information. However, if confessing will alleviate distress and confusion for the victim then offenders may be more strongly motivated to confess than not. The decision to confess or not is then an altruistic one.

Batson (2014) defines altruism as the goal of improving the welfare of another. He proposes that a key source of altruism is emotional distress over the suffering of others through adopting their perspective. While other researchers doubt the existence of solely altruistic motives, stating instead that pro-social and helping behaviour results from more egoistic reasons such as gaining positive feelings (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Dovidio, 1984) or tension reduction (Festinger, 1957), there is still substantial evidence for helping behaviour driven by *empathic concern* for another individual (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; De Waal, 2008; Schroeder, Dovidio, Sibicky, Matthews, & Allen, 1988)

Empathic concern, as coined by Batson and colleagues is the affective focus on another person's welfare over the needs of oneself. The empathy-altruism hypothesis submits that empathic emotions including sympathy, compassion and tenderness lead to helping behaviour driven by a desire to benefit the other person for whom empathy is felt (Batson, 1987).

Maner and Gailliot (2007) found a significant positive relationship between empathic concern and willingness to help but only if the person imagined was a family member (rather than a stranger), signifying that the empathy-altruism relationship is dependent on relationship context. Additionally, empathic concern was found to be significant over and above motivators such as perception of one-ness and desire to reduce negative state arousal. Consequently, as it seems that empathic concern leading to helping behaviour is dependent on relationship strength, the same principles may apply to confessions. That is, the decision to confess (or not) for the benefit of another person is dependent on how close the offender is to the victim or the confidant. If the offender is in a close positive relationship with the confidant, then empathic concern may motivate them to act in a way that benefits the welfare of the victim regardless of the consequences for the offender.

Therefore, this category of motivations underlying confessions has as its primary concern the practical benefits (versus costs) for others. It is distinct from individual instrumental motivations because the practical benefits are targeted at others rather than self, and distinct from social symbolic motivations as it relates to practical and instrumental consequences for another person rather than ideational consequences relating to shared morals, values and identity.

Conclusion

At present there is little research on confessions in an interpersonal context. This is the first thorough investigation into motivations driving confessions in an interpersonal context. Differentiating the motivations provides us with a broader understanding of why people confess beyond reasons like guilt or reduction of punishment.

The present perspective integrates a large range of potential reasons to confess or not into a coherent model. In particular, this research focuses on the role of motivations, both symbolic or instrumental and individual or social, that drive confessions or non-confessions of transgressions of an interpersonal nature.

It is important to know which motives are driving the decision to confess because not only does forming a typology of confession motivations provide a broader understanding of mechanism behind confessing behaviour, it can also be informative for an understanding of restorative justice and moral repair following wrongdoing more generally. To the extent that admission of responsibility is a first step towards reparative behaviours, that is, the restoration of victims but also of offenders themselves through genuine self-forgiveness, an elaboration of the concerns and motives underlying confessions might also inform us about the obstacles and pathways towards such interpersonal and intrapersonal restoration (Wenzel, Woodyatt, & Hedrick, 2012; Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2013).

Further, if we are able to realise which motivation is dominant under which conditions, we can act accordingly and manipulate the situation to increase the likelihood of confession. For example, we can use the insights for creating situations that entice confessions without excessive pressure or coercive

interrogation in criminal and legal situations and possibly avoid their problems of

eliciting false confessions.

Chapter 2: Four-Factor Model of Motivations

Confession of errors is like a broom, which sweeps away the dirt and leaves the surface brighter and clearer. I feel stronger for confession. - Mahatma Gandhi

Confession is good for the soul only in the sense that a tweed coat is good for dandruff - it is a palliative rather than a remedy. -Peter De Vries

To confess or not to confess? In day-to-day life, people frequently commit offences against other people. What is not as frequent is the admission of responsibility for these offences. With the same offence, offenders may choose to accept and admit responsibility in some cases, while in others they may choose to keep quiet or even outright deny their role. So why do people choose to confess in some situations and not others? What are the concerns or motivations driving this decision? This chapter is interested in the motivations behind confessions and non-confessions in an interpersonal context.

Currently there is a range of literature on confession in domains including criminal psychology, psychotherapy and religion (see Chapter 1 for a review). Consequently, the conceptual definition of confession is broad and varied. For the purpose of this study, confession is the admission of causal responsibility in an act of harm. This admission may be directed at either the victim or a third party. It is important to emphasize that confessions are distinct from the related concept of apologies. Confessions are purely acknowledgements of causal responsibility and while they are usually accompanied by remorse, they do not *require* remorse.

From the different domains and lines of research in confession behaviour, there is a pattern of motivations falling into two distinct dimensions (Hilgendorf

& Irving, 1981; Murray-Swank et al., 2007).

First, motivations driving the decision to confess may lie on a symbolic-instrumental continuum. Symbolic motivations are concerns related to one's integrity or the integrity of one's group, and the drive to reduce the cognitive or emotional distress that occurs when the desire to achieve an ideal self or desired social identity conflicts with the knowledge of causal responsibility for a transgression (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). In particular, I consider motivations that are generally related to individual or social integrity such as guilt, shame and concerns about violation of shared values to be symbolic motivations.

Alternatively, instrumental motivations are concerns related to the pursuit of practical benefits for oneself or others (Dittmar, 1992; Rempel et al., 1985). Practical benefits include the reduction of punishment or material loss. They may also include socially mediated rewards such as acceptance by the wider community or maintenance of a good impression.

I expect that concerns about moral identity will map onto the two different ends of this symbolic-instrumental continuum. Moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002) is a source of motivating moral action and separates into two dimensions: internalisation, an internalised identity where moral traits are seen as central to a self-concept, and symbolisation, where moral traits are not so much central to identity but are reflected in interactions with others in an effort to show that one possesses the characteristics (Aquino & Reed, 2002). It is expected that symbolic motivations are associated with an internalised moral identity while instrumental motivations are associated with symbolisation.

Lying orthogonally is a second continuum of confession motives. It has long been thought that confession was beneficial for the well being of the soul

and the community (La Barre, 1947). The decision to confess also relies on whether the offender is motivated to resolve either individual or social concerns. Individual motivations are concerned with the self, whether it is the drive to reduce moral distress from committing a transgression or the desire to gain benefits and reduce loss. In contrast, social motivations are concerned with the maintenance of social identity and the integrity of social relationships with a target group. These concerns include motivations such as the desire to acquire or maintain benefits for another person or persons or the desire to re-affirm and acknowledge the shared values of society.

One way of reflecting the difference in individual and social motivations is through self-construals. Self-construals are associated with individuals' definition of self in relation to others (Hardin, Leong, & Bhagwat, 2004). The two subscales of the self-construal scale measure the sense of self in relation to others, and this sense of self is partially determined by the individualist or collectivist cultures a person grew up in (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994). Independent self-construal refers to a stable self-concept irrespective of varying interpersonal contexts, values autonomy and uniqueness of the self and aims at the relative advancement of self through self-promotion, assertiveness etc. Specifically, independent self-construals are concerned with internal thoughts and feelings as well as promoting one's own goals (Singelis, 1994). Interdependent or collectivist self-construals, on the other hand, are more flexible and intertwined with the social context, valuing connectedness with relevant others, belonging and conformity with group roles and norms. While one's self-construal is partly determined by context, I expect that a person's tendency towards interdependent self-construal will be associated with social motivations to confess or not, as both

are concerned with harmony within the group or healthy social bonds. Independent self-construal will be associated with individual motivations, as both imply gaining self-esteem through validating internal attributes and achieving personal goals.

The two continua of confession motivations are orthogonal and intersect to create four potential subsets of concerns: individual symbolic, individual instrumental, social symbolic and social instrumental. First, individual symbolic motivations are related to concerns about one's own integrity and the conflict between the ideal self and the implications of a norm violation for the concept of self. This subset of motivations are particularly concerned with relieving the emotional and cognitive distress aroused from committing an offence that is not in line with our perceptions of our self and moral integrity. Thus these motivations involve the desire to reduce guilt, shame or cognitive dissonance. Individual symbolic motivations are based on ideas of self-affirmation theory where, according to Steele (1988), the primary goal of the self-system is to protect its self-integrity and moral adequacy.

Second, individual instrumental motivations are primarily concerns about practical benefits or prevention of loss. These motivations are egoistic and include reducing punishment, improving impressions of the self and maintaining one's regard in others' eyes. Egoism is when the ultimate goal of an action is to secure benefits for oneself. The idea behind these egoistic motivations is very utilitarian in nature: would the benefits of confessing (reduction of punishment, improvement of impressions) outweigh the costs of confessing?

Third, social instrumental motivations are concerned with the benefits or welfare of another person and, thus, may be described as altruistic (Batson, 1987).

Batson et al. (1981) describe altruism as the empathic concern for another person that leads to helping behaviour. In particular, Batson et al. (1989) refutes the suggestion that these actions are just a special type of egoism (where we help others and enjoy the benefits of feelings good for helping others). The ultimate goal of altruism is to help others as opposed to oneself. Social instrumental motivations involve a focus on others and, as such, the likelihood of confession depends entirely on what would ultimately benefit the victim or others affected. For example, if one feels that confessing a transgression would cause the victim further stress and anxiety, one may choose not to confess. Conversely, if the victim feels anxiety due to not knowing who the perpetrator is or whether the perpetrator will strike again, then confessing will benefit the victim by putting them at ease. Thus, the decision to confess has the victim's (or third-parties') needs as the priority.

Fourth, social symbolic motivations involve concerns about values shared between the offender and the community he or she identifies with. This subset of motivations is concerned with the acknowledgement and restoration of shared values. As transgressions are violations of social norms and the values shared by a group (Durkheim, 1893), offenders must re-affirm their commitment to the values of the group or the values shared between the offender and the victim in order to restore a sense of justice (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008). The drive to re-affirm shared values are likely to do with the fundamental need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) or the importance of social relationships to define one's self. According to self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985), to the extent that one identifies with a group and therefore self-categorizes as a member of a group, the greater the expectation that others within the group hold the same values. By

transgressing, the foundations that are holding the group together are dismissed, leaving the offender to feel isolated from the group as a misfit inconsistent with group norms. By publicly acknowledging their wrongdoing, an offender shows respect and allegiance to the values of the community. Conversely, if the transgression is not widely known, admitting to a fault may create discord in the group. Rather than being the cause of unnecessary disharmony, one may choose to remain silent about the transgression.

This research proposes an integrated model of motivations and presents a 2-dimensional, 4-category typology of motivations: 1) individual symbolic 2) social symbolic 3) individual instrumental and 4) social instrumental. Figure 2.1 illustrates the typology and also shows a list of example motives that represent each type of motivation. The first aim of this chapter is to determine whether motivations driving the decision to confess lie on two dimensions (individual and social, symbolic and instrumental). The second aim of the study is to investigate if these motivations are meaningfully associated with self-construals (Study 2.1) and moral identity (Study 2.2).

Figure 2.1. A taxonomy of symbolic vs. instrumental, and individual vs. social motivations for confession and non-confession

Study 2.1

Methods

Design and Overview

The survey uses a retrospective self-report design to investigate participant behaviours and feelings following a previously committed transgression event. In this study participants were asked to recall an instance where they committed a transgression against another person, one who was not aware of the participant's involvement or responsibility in the offence. The fact that victims did not know definitively about the offender's role meant that the action of confessing is a voluntary offer of accountability rather than just confirmation of responsibility after the fact. Details collected include information regarding the transgression event, participant feelings and thoughts at the time and potential motivations driving confessions or non-confession.

Participants

One hundred and thirty-six students from Flinders University participated in the study. Participants were provided with an online link to the questionnaire through various means including emails, flyers on noticeboards, and advertisements on the university online boards. However, 25 participants chose to discontinue due to their inability to think of a relevant transgression event, 10 had missing data and another nine did not understand the instructions sufficiently and wrote invalid transgressions. Data analysis involved a final number of 92 participants, of which there were 32 males and 60 females with a mean age of 24.77 years ($SD = 6.97$).

Procedure and Materials

Before they decided to start the survey, participants were assured through an online consent and confidentiality form that all information provided would be kept anonymous and confidential. Participants were asked to describe an event in the past where they committed a transgression against another person and the victim was not aware of the offender's role in the offence. At this point there was an option to discontinue participation in the questionnaire should the participant be unable to recall an appropriate transgression event. Participants who continued were asked 12 questions (on a 7-point likert scale) about specific details such as their relationship with their victim, the severity of the transgression and how wrong they perceived their transgression was (See Appendix 1).

After describing the transgressions, participants were asked whether they confessed to the victim or a third party about their responsibility for the offence. At this point the online questionnaire branched into two parallel parts depending on whether the participant confessed or refused to confess to the transgression

event. If a participant confessed, they were presented with a series of questions asking who they confessed to, the amount of detail they divulged and what prompted the confession as well as their feelings about and following the confession (not all of these data will be reported here; for details please contact the author). Crucially, participants were also presented with a list of 20 motivations and asked to rate (on a 7-point likert scale) the extent to which each of the motivations contributed to their decision to confess. Some examples of motivations from the list include feeling good about yourself, understanding and acceptance from others and presenting a positive image (See Appendix 1). Conversely, if the participant did not confess, a similar set of questions asking what prompted them not to confess and how they felt about the refusal or omission was presented. The same list of 20 motivations was also presented to non-confessors, with a request that participants rate the extent to which the motivations contributed to their decision not to confess (Appendix 1). The last part of the questionnaire was the Self-Construal Scale (SCS).

The Self-Construal Scale (SCS) (Singelis, 1994) is 24-item questionnaire designed to measure two dimensions of a person's self-image, their independent and interdependent self-construal. In addition to having high face validity, the self-construal scale also has high construct and predictive validity (Singelis, 1994). Cronbach's alpha was moderately high for the both the independent and interdependent items ($\alpha = .70$ and $\alpha = .74$ respectively) showing adequate internal reliability.

Results

Transgression Themes and Occurrences

Out of 92 participants, 45 confessed to another person about their

responsibility for the recalled transgression, leaving 47 non-confessors. Nineteen participants confessed to the victim and 26 confessed to another person. Transgressions could be broadly sorted into nine categories: romantic infidelity (cheating on boyfriend), insult (name-calling behind the victim's back), betraying confidences (telling a secret), deception (lying), stealing, sabotage (deliberately causing a friend to fail a test), defamation (gossip), neglect (forgetting a child) and physical damage (hitting a parked car). The frequency of each type of transgression occurring is presented in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1

Frequencies of transgression types

	Frequency	Percentage
Betraying Confidences	12	13.0
Damage	15	16.3
Deception	10	10.9
Defamation	10	10.9
Insult	7	7.6
Neglect	5	5.4
Romantic Infidelity	13	14.1
Sabotage	7	7.6
Stealing	13	14.1
Total	92	100.0

Univariate analysis indicated that those who confessed believed that the victim was more suspicious of their role in the transgression ($M = 1.38$, $SD = .49$) than those who didn't ($M = 1.19$, $SD = .40$), $t(90) = -2.01$, $p = .048$; also, those who confessed believed that the consequences of confessing would be more positive ($M = 4.42$, $SD = 1.16$) than those who didn't ($M = 2.53$, $SD = 1.38$), $t(88) = -6.99$, $p < .001$.

However, neither victim suspicion nor perceived consequences mediated

or moderated the different subtypes of motivations in predicting confessions and will not be discussed further in this study.

Motivations

A principal component analysis (PCA) with a direct oblimin rotation was conducted on 17 items from the list of motivations. Two items were excluded due to ambiguous phrasing (pride and feeling good about yourself) and one was excluded as it correlated highly with every other item (conflict with others). Missing values were replaced with the mean. Based on the scree plot and eigenvalues greater than one, a four-component structure was chosen (See Table 2.2).

Table 2.2

Rotated factor loadings (>.35) for four-factor solutions from principal component analysis with oblimin rotation, (N=92)

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
Guilt	.83			
Reducing tensions and conflicts within yourself	.80			
Shame	.74			
Personal values	.59		.42	
Re-establish psychological stability	.49		.46	
Presenting a positive image		-.70		
Maintaining trust		-.70		
Avoiding suspicion and tensions among people around me		-.70		
Prospect of punishment or retribution		-.68		
Material benefits		-.55		
Trying to find meaning in events.			.64	
Concern about justice			.61	
Concern about shared values			.59	
Understanding and acceptance from others		-.42	.48	
For the benefit of others				-.80
Concern about victim welfare				-.77
Maintaining relationship		-.41		-.61

As can be seen in Table 2.2, Factor 1 seems to reflect the individual symbolic dimension, highlighted by the appearance of guilt and shame. Factor two reflects individual instrumental motivations as indicated by the appearance of prospect of punishment and presenting a positive image. The presence of concern for justice and concern for shared values suggests that factor three may represent the social symbolic dimension, leaving factor four, the social instrumental dimension, supported by the presence of the victim welfare motivation and the benefit of others motivation.

Unexpectedly, the item "maintaining trust" loaded on the individual instrumental factor instead of the social instrumental factor. Although, it was strongly correlated with maintaining relationship ($r = .63$, $p < .001$), which itself loaded as expected on the social-instrumental motivation, a qualitative analysis of the participants' open-ended responses suggested people sought to maintain trust primarily for their own gain. For example, people were motivated by maintaining trust do so for their own benefit, to retain the benefits from a trusting relationship, rather than maintain trust for the relationship itself.

"Avoiding suspicion and tensions among people around me" also loaded surprisingly. Initially, the item was expected to load on social instrumental. The motivation was initially designed to represent the welfare of the group by reducing tensions and unease amongst members. However, it could be that the suspicion component was interpreted as suspicion against self from others rather than among others.

Despite the small sample size a confirmatory factor analysis using maximum likelihood was conducted. The top three items of each factor scale was included in the analysis. The four-factor model was evaluated by three fit

measures: the chi square, the comparative fit index (CFI) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). Results of the chi square test indicated a significant deviation of the model from the data, $\chi^2 (48) = 71.08$, $p = .017$; however as the chi-square/df ratio is 1.48 and less than 2, this is considered a reasonable fit. The CFI, a measure of relative fit comparing the model with null model, was .91, indicating a very good fit with the model. In addition, the RMSEA was .07 also indicating that the model fitted the data very well (Loehlin, 2004).

Compared to a single-factor model, $\chi^2_{diff}(6) = 71.99$, $p < .001$, and the two possible two-factor models distinguishing only between individual vs. social or instrumental vs. symbolic motives, $\chi^2_{diff}(5) = 31.83$, $p < .001$ and $\chi^2_{diff}(5) = 46.84$, $p < .001$, respectively, the four factor model revealed to be the best fit as the chi-square difference tests were significant and in favour of the less restrictive four-factor model (See Figure 2.2). Additionally, a multi-group factor analysis was conducted to test whether the four-factor model held equally well for both confessor and non-confessor groups. Although results should be interpreted with caution due to the small sample size, none of the more constrained models that set model parameters to be equal between the groups (i.e., measurement weights, measurement intercepts, structural covariances and measurement residuals) differed significantly ($p > .14$) from the unconstrained model, indicating that four-factor measurement model of motivations underlying confession decisions held equally for confessors and non-confessors.

Figure 2.2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis via maximum likelihood for the four-factor model of motivations driving confession ($N = 90$) with standardised estimates.

Formation of Scales

For further analysis, averaging scores from the top three items created four scales each factor. The individual symbolic scale comprised reducing guilt, shame and distress. The individual instrumental scale consisted of the prospect of punishment, positive image and material benefits. The social instrumental scale included the items benefit of others, concern with victim welfare and maintaining relationship. Finally, the social symbolic scale was the average of the scores from concern with shared values, concern with justice and finding meaning. Reliability analyses resulted in internal consistencies (Cronbach's α) of .78 for individual symbolic, .51 for individual instrumental, .61 for social symbolic and .73 for social instrumental.

There was a significant difference between confessors and non-confessor

in level of motives. Confessors had higher levels of individual symbolic, $t(90) = -2.09$, $p = .04$) and social symbolic $t(90) = -2.32$, $p = .02$ concerns than non-confessors. Conversely, confessors had lower levels of individual instrumental concerns than non-confessors, $t(90) = 3.24$, $p = .002$. There were no significant differences between confessors and non-confessors level of social instrumental concerns, $t(90) = 1.23$, $p = .22$. Means and standard deviations for confessors and non-confessors are presented in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3

Means (and standard deviations) for confessors (N=45) and non-confessors

(N=47) for each of the four motivations

	Confessors	Non-confessors
Individual Symbolic	4.89 (1.81)	4.17 (1.51)
Individual Instrumental	3.00 (1.26)	3.87 (1.32)
Social Symbolic	3.93 (1.60)	3.25 (1.22)
Social Instrumental	3.87 (1.73)	4.30 (1.63)

There were no differences in levels of motivations between confessions to victims and confessions to third parties. See Table 2.4 for means and standard deviations.

Table 2.4

Contrast of confessions to victims and confessions to third parties for each of the

four motivations

	Victim	Confidant	$t(43)$	p
Individual Symbolic	4.96 (1.71)	4.85 (1.90)	.22	.83
Individual Instrumental	2.91 (1.20)	3.06 (1.32)	-.40	.69
Social Symbolic	3.63 (1.64)	4.15 (1.56)	-1.09	.28
Social Instrumental	4.35 (1.55)	3.51 (1.80)	1.63	.11

Motivation Types and Dispositional Measures

In order to test the relationships of the four types of motivations

(individual symbolic, individual instrumental, social symbolic and social

instrumental) with the self-construal scale, correlational analysis and logistic

regressions were conducted.

The interdependent subscale of the self-construal scale (SCS) (Singelis,

1994) was significantly related to individual symbolic motivations and social

instrumental motivations. This suggests that individuals scoring higher in

interdependent beliefs are associated with higher concerns about their own moral

distress and concern for others. The independent subscale of the SCS was not

associated with any motivation (see Table 2.5). There were also no significant

differences between confessors and non-confessors in levels of interdependent,

$t(90) = -1.32$, $p = .19$ or independent self-construals $t(90) = 1.10, p = .28$.

Table 2.5

Correlations between motivations and the interdependent and independent self-construals scale (N=92)

	Individual Symbolic	Individual Instrumental	Social Symbolic	Social Instrumental
Interdependent SC	.28**	0.17	0.06	.30**
Independent SC	-0.08	0.11	-0.1	0.1

**p < .01

Furthermore, linear regression revealed that interdependent self-construal, when independence is controlled for, significantly predicted individual symbolic motivations, $B = .048$, $SE = .02$, $t(91) = 2.99$, $p = .004$ but independence, when controlling for interdependence did not ($p = .19$). Neither interdependent ($p = .15$) nor independent self-construal ($p = .44$) predicted individual instrumental motivations or social symbolic motivations, $p = .45$ and $p = .31$, respectively. As expected, interdependence, when independence is controlled for significantly predicted social instrumental motivations, $B = .05$, $SE = .02$, $t(91) = 2.90$, p = .005 but independence was not significant ($p = .65$).

Discussion

In Study 2.1 I investigated confessions in everyday life through a retrospective survey. As expected, participants reported a wide range of transgressions. Roughly half of these transgressions resulted in a confession, and slightly less than half of these confessions were directed at victims compared to third parties. The primary aim of this study was to investigate the presence and structure of the motivations driving these decisions to confess.

Study 2.1 investigated both confessions and non-confessions, and findings revealed support for a four-factor model of motivations and the pattern of loading of items was nearly as expected with only one or two deviations. Additionally,

confirmatory factor analysis confirmed the model provided a better fit for the data than either a single or two-factor solution. However, due to the extremely small sample size for such a data analysis, results must be interpreted with caution.

The exploratory factor analysis revealed that at least two items "maintaining trust" and "avoiding suspicion" loaded differently than expected. A look into participants' open-ended responses suggested that the way the items were worded could have led to different interpretations than intended.

Maintaining trust loaded on individual instrumental motivations when it was initially expected to load on social instrumental ones. However, maintaining trust could be interpreted as for one's own gain rather than for the benefit of the relationship; the benefits of a trusting relationship are directed at the individual rather than the wellbeing of the other person or the relationship.

Although understanding and acceptance loaded on social symbolic as expected, it also cross-loaded on individual instrumental factors and these loadings were nearly identical indicating that the item could be associated with both factors. It could be that the "acceptance" part is more closely associated with individual instrumental motivations while the "understanding" part could be interpreted similarly to finding meaning or re-affirming social values and norms.

"Avoiding suspicion and tensions among people around me" was potentially problematic due to the emphasis of the terms "avoiding suspicion" and "around me" over the more social based "tensions among people". While I primarily wanted to focus on group tensions when circumstances were unknown, it is possible that by using such individual-focused words such as suspicion and me, I accidentally primed concerns for oneself rather than the for the group as a whole, leading this item to load on individual instrumental rather than the expected social

instrumental factor.

Contrary to expectations, I did not find any significant relationships between the independent subscale of the self-construal scale and any of the motivations. It appears that even when individuals may generally be more independently oriented, this does not mean that they are more likely to be concerned with matters of their own interest as far as decisions to confess or not are concerned. As expected, there was a significant relationship between the interdependent subscale and the social instrumental motivations, consistent with the idea that those who define their self primarily through their social relations tend to be more concerned about the harmony within those relations and feel responsibility for relevant others. However, there was no significant relationship between interdependent self-construal and social symbolic motivations, which is unexpected as social symbolic motivations are concerned with shared values that should also be relevant to interdependent self-definition. On the other hand, individual symbolic motivations showed a significant positive relationship with the interdependent subscale. It is possible that if one considers shame and guilt to be socially-mediated emotions caused by violating a social norm, then the more interdependently oriented a person is the more likely they are to suffer moral distress as a result of violating norms.

One major limitation of this study is that broad labels for motivation items may have been too open for interpretations. Study 2.2 attempts to provide stronger evidence for the proposed model by replacing the broad labels for motivations with labels in a more conventional statement format that should be clearer in their meaning. In order to do so, it was necessary to focus on confessions only, as opposed to both confessions and non-confessions. By

focusing only on confessions some of the noise and variability present in the Study 2.1 is reduced, allowing a closer look at why *confession* occurs.

Study 2.2

Study 2.2 involved a retrospective questionnaire focused only on confessions. I expected to replicate the findings of Study 2.1 by providing support for a two-continua, four-factor model of motivations. In Study 2.1, I decided on a broad label approach for each item so that I could tap into the dual nature of confession. A generic label such as guilt, shame, concern about shared values etc. is flexible enough to be meaningful for both confessors and non-confessors. However, it appears this permitted some confusion about which meaning of the word I was trying to access. It Study 2.2, I therefore used items in a more conventional, explicit statement format. The complete list of items can be seen in Table 2.7.

Methods

Design and Overview

There was one measurement session consisting of an online questionnaire. The questionnaire was based on Study 2.1 and modified to investigate the processes of confession only. Participants were asked to recall an instance where they committed a transgression against another person without that person being aware or certain about the participant's role in the wrongdoing, and where the participants subsequently confessed to the transgression.

Participants

A total of 159 participants completed the questionnaire. The mean age was 24.19 ($SD = 7.04$) of which there were 41 males and 118 females. Information about participant's age, sex and ethnicity were collected but these

demographic factors had no significant influence on either confession or motivation types.

Procedure and Materials

Participants logged onto the questionnaire via an online link presented to them via physical and online noticeboards or emails. The present survey followed closely the format of the questionnaire in Study 2.1. However, several modifications were made. Similar to the previous survey, the questionnaire was divided into four main parts: demographics, event description, motivations and various individual difference measures

The demographic and event description section of Study 2.2 is almost identical to the previous study, except that the study focused on confessed wrongdoing only. That is, participants reported only transgressions that they confessed to.

In Study 2.2, the same 20 motivations as Study 2.1 were presented to participants for rating on a 7-point scale. However, unlike Study 2.1 where only short labels of motivations were provided, such as, guilt, benefit of others, Study 2.2 employed a more descriptive way of presenting the motivations. Some examples include "I confessed because I felt guilty" or "I confessed to spare others' pain, confusion or anxiety". A full list of items of confession motivations is provided in Table 2.7.

The moral identity scale by Aquino and Reed (2003) is a 10-item questionnaire that measures two aspects, internalisation "It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics" and symbolisation "I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics", of moral identity. The items were presented with 5-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly

agree). In this study, internal reliability for internalisation (α = .75) and symbolisation (α = .82) were both good.

Results

Akin to Study 2.1, participants reported a wide variety of transgressions with the majority of transgressions relating to damage (property damage), romantic infidelity or stealing. Table 2.6 shows the distribution of reported transgression types.

Table 2.6

Frequencies of different transgression types

	Frequency	Percentage
Betraying Confidence	14	8.8
Damage	27	17
Deception	49	30.8
Insult	6	3.8
Cheating/Infidelity	32	20.1
Stealing	14	8.8
Other	17	10.7
Total	159	100.0

Formation of Scales

An exploratory factor analysis using principal component analysis with a direct oblimin rotation was conducted on motivations and initially five factors emerged. A direct oblimin rotation was chosen instead of a varimax because the motivations are all highly correlated with each other despite the orthogonal dimensions. Running the factor analyses through an orthogonal rotation led to similar results.

The first four factors were as predicted while the fifth factor consisted of only two items, "I wanted people to understand why I did what I did" and "I did not want wrongful suspicion to fall onto someone else". The first was expected to

fall under social symbolic concerns while suspicion was expected to load on social instrumental. These two items were also problematic in Study 2.1 and, considering they now form a lone uninterpretable factor, I decided to exclude these items from further analysis. A second principal component analysis revealed the four-factor structure as expected (see Table 2.7). The four factors accounted for 61% of the variance.

Table 2.7

Principal component analysis of motivations revealing four-factor structure

(N=159)

	1	2	3	4
I wanted to give the impression that I am a good person	.75			
I hoped to gain people's acceptance despite my actions.	.73			
I wanted others to believe I am trustworthy (which they might not if they had caught me out)	.69			
I expected a more positive response for "fessing up".	.66			
I needed to explain to someone that what I did was not the real me	.57			
I thought the consequences would be worse if I got caught out.	.48			
I was torn up and conflicted about what I did, and hoped confessing would provide me with relief.		-.86		
I felt ashamed and needed to come clean about it.		-.80		
I felt guilty and felt the urge to own up to my actions.		-.72		
I wanted to prevent the other person from being hurt or harmed even further			-.84	
I thought it would help the victim to overcome loss, harm or feelings of hurt			-.82	
I felt the sooner this is cleared up, the less pain, confusion or anxiety it will cause anyone else.			-.66	
I hoped it would help to maintain satisfying relationships.			-.65	
My actions caused tensions and suspicions among the people around me, and I wanted to restore trust between them.			-.55	
I felt I might be rewarded for telling the truth.	.41		-.48	
I believed it was the right thing to do.				-.64
My actions undermined values we all share, and I wanted to express my commitment to those values.				-.55
I wanted to demonstrate that honesty and trust are some of our most important values.				-.51

Factor 1 (eigenvalue = 6.45) accounted for 35.8% of the variance and consisted of motivations that are primarily concerned with practical and/or social benefits for the individual. Factor 2 (eigenvalue = 1.85) accounted for 10.3% of the variance and appeared to reflect the individual symbolic dimension, highlighted by the appearance of guilt and shame. Factor three (eigenvalue = 1.49) accounted for 8.28% of the variance and consisted of items that promote the welfare of another person and thus may represent social instrumental motivations. Factor 4 (eigenvalue = 1.23) accounted for 6.84% of the variance and consisted of items such as shared values and honesty, suggesting that they represent the social symbolic dimension.

Unexpectedly, the item "I felt I might be rewarded for telling the truth" loaded on factor three, the social instrumental factor. However, it also correlated to a similar degree with the individual instrumental factor. Overall, despite the unexpected cross-loadings of this item, the predicted four-factor model appears to be supported.

A confirmatory analysis using maximum likelihood analysis was conducted to confirm the presence of the four categories of motivations. As individual symbolic and social symbolic motivations consisted of only three items each, and a balanced number of items seemed advantageous for further research with these scales, the decision was made to include only the three highest-loading items for each type of motivation. However, as the three highest-loading items from the individual instrumental factor were all socially-mediated benefits, the fourth-loading item "I expected a more positive response for "fessing up" was used in place of "I wanted others to believe I am trustworthy (which they might not if they had caught me out)" in order to maintain the breadth of the individual

instrumental motivations. See Figure 2.3. The four-factor model was evaluated by three fit measures: the chi square, the comparative fit index (CFI) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). Results of the chi square test indicated that the model significantly deviated from the data, $\chi^2(48) = 79.33$, $p = .003$; however as the chi-square/df ratio is less than 2, this is considered a reasonable fit. The CFI was .96, RMSEA was .06, and the NFI was .90 all indicating a very good fit with the model.

Compared to a single-factor model, $\chi^2_{diff}(6) = 196.35$, $p < .001$, and the two possible two-factor models distinguishing only between individual vs. social or instrumental vs. symbolic motives, $\chi^2_{diff}(5) = 140.82$ $p < .001$ and $\chi^2_{diff}(5) = 143.26$, $p < .001$, respectively, the four-factor model revealed to be the best fit as indicated by the significant chi-square difference tests.


Figure 2.3. Confirmatory Factor Analysis via maximum likelihood for the four-factor model of motivations driving confession with standardised estimates.

Motivations and Previous Measures

Averaging three items for each factor formed four scale scores; the same three items as those chosen for the confirmatory factor analysis. To test for convergent validity, each motivation scale was then correlated with subscales from the moral identity scale.

The moral identity scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) is supposed to consist of two dimensions, an internalised moral identity concerned with moral traits as central to a self-concept, and another dimension known as symbolisation, where moral traits are reflected in interactions with others in an effort to convey that one has these characteristics. The present four-factor model of motivations driving confessions correlated meaningfully with those two moral identity subscales. Individual symbolic motivations showed a significant positive relationship with internalisation, $r(154) = .21$, $p = .01$, while individual instrumental motivation was significantly associated with symbolisation, $r(154) = .18$, $p = .03$. Linear regression revealed that internalisation, when symbolisation is controlled for, significantly predicted individual symbolic motivations, $B = .11$, $t(153) = 2.58$, $p = .01$. Conversely, symbolisation, when internalisation is controlled for significantly predicted individual instrumental motivations, $B = .06$, $t(153) = 2.34$, $p = .03$.

Considering the fact that moral traits are based on the values and norms of society, it seems reasonable that both internalisation and symbolisation showed a significant positive relationship with social symbolic motivations, $r(154) = .24$, $p = .003$ and $r(154) = .20$, $p = .02$, respectively. In a linear regression model, both internalisation and symbolisation significantly predicted social symbolic motivations, $B = .13$, $t(153) = 2.96$, $p = .004$ and $B = .07$, $t(153) = 2.42$, $p = .02$

respectively.

Discussion

In the second study, the focus was on confessions only and results from exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis again revealed support for four subgroups of motivations. In the exploratory factor analysis items loaded as expected with the exception of "I felt I might be rewarded for telling the truth". This item cross-loaded on social instrumental factor and on individual instrumental. While loading on instrumental individual was intuitive and expected, an association with social instrumental concerns lacks any theoretical reason and seems an odd result.

To confirm the presence of the four factors, a maximum likelihood confirmatory factor analysis was conducted. For clarity sake, the top three items from each factor were included in the confirmatory factor analysis and fit statistics indicated that the model was a good fit. Results indicated, that as predicted, motivations fell within four subgroups: individual symbolic, individual instrumental, social instrumental and social symbolic. It was also revealed that the four-factor solution provided a more accurate model than potentially more parsimonious models with fewer factors.

According to Aquino and Reed (2002), moral identity is a commitment to a self-concept centred on a set of moral traits, and a self-regulatory mechanism for motivating moral action. Similarly, I contend these self-definitions are related and influence the distinction between symbolic and individual motivations in regards to confession. Correlational analyses show support for the differences in symbolic and instrumental motivations in *individual* motivations. When each subgroup of motivations was correlated with internalisation and symbolisation,

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there were significant positive associations between individual symbolic

motivations and internalization, and between individual instrumental motivations

and symbolization. Internalisation is strongly associated with moral reasoning and

represents the degree to which moral traits are essential to the self-concept

(Aquino & Reed, 2002). Similarly, individual symbolic motivations are primarily

drives to resolve threats to moral integrity and self-concept, so it is unsurprising

that the two concepts are related.

Aquino and Reed (2002) found that symbolisation was strongly correlated

with impression management and self-presentation. Their findings revealed that

while the relationship between symbolisation and self-reported volunteering was

significant, the relationship between symbolisation and actual donation behaviour

was not. Individual instrumental motivations act similarly, they deal primarily

with resolving threats to the self, in particular, threats to impression management,

acceptance and fear of negative consequences. Therefore, we predicted that

individual instrumental motivations would be positively associated with

symbolisation and our results supported the prediction.

Both internalisation and symbolisation predicted social symbolic

motivations. Social symbolic motivations are concerned with resolving threats to

shared values and social norms. It is also possible that the relationship between

social symbolic and *both* internalization and symbolization suggests that it is a

hybrid motivation. Social symbolic motivations implicate the individuals' moral

identity as they see themselves and as they want others to see them and this

shared identity arises as a consensus about their commitment to shared values.

General Discussion

The goal of this study was to investigate the motivations driving the decision to confess in day-to-day life. In this study, two retrospective self-report studies investigated confessions to transgressions committed and the concerns that motivated either confession or non-confession.

It was hypothesised that the many motivations driving the decision to confess can be reduced to two underlying orthogonal dimensions. The present two studies provide evidence for this hypothesis, as exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses in both studies found support for a four-factor model of motivations. The first factor identified was individual symbolic motivations comprised of items such as *I feel guilty* and *I feel ashamed*. Motivations such as the desire to form a good impression or gain acceptance from others formed a second factor, individual instrumental. A third social symbolic factor was comprised of motivations such as the desire to do the right thing and affirming shared values. Last, motivation to prevent the victim from further loss and helping the victim to overcome loss formed the fourth social instrumental factor.

The four-factor solution aligns with the previous thoughts of Hilgendorf and Irving (1981) who wrote on the decision-making model of confessions. In their work, they suggest that there are four main concerns when deciding to confess. There are utilitarian gains for the self, gains for others, social approval or disapproval and self-approval or disapproval. However, Hilgendorf and Irving did not attempt to conduct any empirical research but rather based their theory on previous research on concerns a person might have when making *any* decision. My research provides empirical support for the four categories.

I also found some support for the theoretical differentiation of the four

confession motives. However, the findings did not show any associations of interdependent self-construal with social symbolic motivations, rather such associations were present with individual symbolic concerns instead. There were also no significant relationships for independent self-construal. As previously discussed it is not clear why this pattern of results occurred. However, one should be aware that perhaps independence and interdependence are not as separate as previously thought. Instead there is evidence for a coexistence model (Kim, 1994). That is, being high in one construal does not preclude high scores in the other. For examples, Asians were found to score highly on interdependent and independent self-construal indicating an ability to separate the private and public self and placing importance on both goals (Sinha & Tripathi, 1994). Further, my results showed a similar pattern of results to previous research where there were differences in interdependence but not on independence (Feldman, Mont-Reynaud, & Rosenthal, 1992; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995) and failure to find expected differences in social values and goals (Feather, 1986; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990). Due to the problematic nature of the pattern of results, perhaps future investigations should use alternative measures for individual and social differentiation.

Second, Study 2.2 revealed tentative support for the symbolic-instrumental dimension. In particular, internalised moral identity is the degree to which moral traits are central to the self-concept and is strongly associated with moral reasoning (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Therefore it does not come as a surprise that it is associated with both individual and social symbolic motivations. Symbolisation is the degree to which one is concerned about presenting a moral identity and thus it is closely related to individual instrumental motivations.

Social symbolic motivations also showed a significant relationship with symbolised moral identity potentially as social symbolic concerns focus on re-affirming and acknowledging the shared values of the group. It is the lack of associations between social instrumental motivations and either internalised or symbolised moral identity that is the most surprising.

The present study has important limitations. First, it is retrospective in nature and therefore, there are recall biases involved. This study required participants to recall their feelings and potential motivators at the time of the transgression event. Some of the transgression events reported occurred as far back as 20 years ago. The ability to recall motivations driving the decision to confess or not is questionable at best, more likely, participants at the time of filling out the survey would have had to estimate or, in their minds, justify the actions of the past.

A second limitation involves the issue of labelling the motivations. In the first study, the same motivations were presented to both confessors and non-confessors. Therefore, the wording of each motivation had to be applicable to both. However, some motivations were more obviously related to confessions than non-confessions and vice-versa. For example, avoiding punishment is much more applicable to non-confessors than confessors. To avoid this issue, the second study focused only on confessors. But focusing on confessors meant we were no longer able to investigate the decision-making process as the decision had already been made.

A final limitation of the study is the use of dispositional measures such as the self-construal scale Singelis (1994) and the moral identity scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) to investigate a highly context dependent process. These trait

measures were not able to fully capture the dynamic nature of the motivations.

In summary, this study showed support for the presence of four-factor model of motivations and motivations driving the decision to confess can be successfully reduced to four categories lying on two orthogonal dimensions. In the future, a model of motivations such as this can be used to help dig deeper into the decision making process behind confession, revealing answers to important questions such as, who confesses and when?

Chapter Three: When do people confess: The role of trust in the decision to confess to transgressions

"We're never so vulnerable than when we trust someone - but paradoxically, if we cannot trust, neither can we find love or joy"

- Walter Anderson

Trust is broadly defined as the "willingness to be vulnerable based on the expectation of positive actions from another party" (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Confession, an act of disclosing or revealing responsibility for committing an offence, carries the possibility of negative fallout once others are aware of who is responsible for the offence. Following a transgression, a choice has to be made, whether to confess or to stay silent and it is likely that trust is needed to anticipate a positive outcome for a risky action such as confession. This study investigates the role of trust in predicting confession and how trust interacts with other motivations driving the decision to confess.

Confession to transgressions comes with the risk of physical, emotional, psychological and financial damage from angered, betrayed or otherwise hurt victims or third parties. Disclosure of secrets to the wrong person may result in harsh penalties and severe negative consequences, thus confidants must be discreet, trustworthy, non-judgmental and able to help (Kelly & McKillop, 1996). Therefore when there is a desire to confess, a suitable confidant must be present.

Rempel, Holmes and Zanna (1985) argue that trust in another depends on predictability, dependability and faith. Predictability is the probability of a certain outcome based on past experience. Dependability is the evaluation of the qualities and characteristics of the partner that goes beyond probabilities of certain events. And faith is the belief that in the presence of all plausible alternatives, one still

chooses to commit and believe in the relationship with the other. It requires emotional security beyond dependability and predictability.

More recent research has expanded on the three requirements of trust and instead suggests that risk-taking is dependent on two separate components of trust, comprised of the trustworthiness of the trustee and the propensity to trust of the trustor, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998). The first three studies in this chapter will investigate the trustworthiness of the confidant. The final study will investigate trust propensity.

Figure 3.1. The relationship of trustworthiness and dispositional trust on the decision to take a risky action (confession)

Mayer, Schoorman and Davis (1995) argue that a trustworthy person must embody three characteristics: ability, integrity and benevolence. First, ability is associated with a group of skills, competencies or characteristics required to complete a task. It is functional in nature. Integrity is associated with a set of principles that the trustee abides to and the trustor shares. These principles

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include concepts such as fairness and reliability. Third, a trustee must show evidence of benevolence, where the trustor believes that the trustee *wants* to do good and has good intentions.

Dispositional trust or the propensity to trust is stable within an individual and indicates a general willingness to trust in the goodness of humanity (McKnight, Kacmar, & Choudhury, 2004). It is the cognitive believe that another person will generally be trustworthy. However, dispositional trust predicts behaviour only in situations where the trustee and trustor are new to each other and information about the possible actions of the trustee are not readily available such that the general expectancy and faith in humanity is all that can be relied on (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982). As the salience of the situational factors increase, the importance of dispositional trust decreases proportionally (McKnight et al., 1998). Therefore, I expect that in the absence of any additional cues, individuals higher in dispositional trust will be more likely to confess than individuals low in dispositional trust.

Motivations Driving the Decision to Confess

In Chapter 2 we described a dual-continuum model of motivations driving the decision to confess. This integrative model of motivations comprises of a symbolic-instrumental dimension that consist of concerns that range from moral integrity or broad social values (symbolic motivations) on one end to materialistic or instrumental benefits (instrumental motivations) on the other end. On a separate continuum, motivations driving the decision to confess may range from individual concerns to concerns regarding the benefits for another person or group. These two dimensions lie orthogonal to each other and intersect to create four subtypes of motivations- individual symbolic, individual instrumental, social

symbolic and social instrumental. Figure 3.2 shows examples of motivations that fall under these four subgroups. (For a thorough description of the model see Chapter 1 and 2).

INDIVIDUAL

INDIVIDUAL SYMBOLIC	INDIVIDUAL INSTRUMENTAL
Threat to moral integrity Feelings of Guilt Feelings of Shame Cognitive Dissonance	Fear of Punishment Impression Management Acceptance

SYMBOLIC ←————————————→ INSTRUMENTAL

SOCIAL SYMBOLIC	SOCIAL INSTRUMENTAL
Threat to Shared Values Justice Norms	Welfare of Others (Altruism)

SOCIAL

Figure 3.2. The dual-continuum model of motivations driving the decision to confess

Trust and the Motivations

This study aims to investigate trust and motivations for confession decisions and how they influence each other. As trust implies the willingness to be vulnerable, I expect that regardless of which motivation is most salient, offenders will be more willing to confess to somebody they trust.

Each of the four types of concern has the potential to lead to confession or non-confession. These motivations must be resolved and the decision to confess or not depends on which outcome is best equipped to resolve the concerns most effectively.

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Trust provides offenders with a sense of security that their concern will be met with a good outcome. That is, whether a motivation leads to confession or non-confession is moderated by how much they trust the confidant (See Figure 3.3). For example, when offenders are concerned more about individual symbolic concerns such as guilt or shame, the decision to confess will depend on which action is most likely to alleviate these negative feelings. If the offender does not trust the confidant to act benevolently or forgiving, then they are unlikely to believe that confession will alleviate their guilt. On the other hand, if the offender trusts the confidant, then it is likely that a confession will help purge the guilt and helps restore an offender's moral integrity.

Similarly, a trusted confidant can be expected to be lenient in the event of a transgression. A trusted confidant is expected to respond in a lenient or benevolent manner such that in the event of a confession, the offender expects little to no negative consequences. If the offender expects punishment or a vengeful response, a confession is unlikely to alleviate individual instrumental concerns. In fact, the increased likelihood of punishment suggests that non-confession should be more effective at resolving instrumental concerns.

When one is more concerned about social symbolic concerns such as concern for the society and the values upheld by the community, one will also be more likely to confess when there is a trustworthy over an untrustworthy confidant. The perception of a confidant as trustworthy implies that a confidant has a high level of integrity and may hold the same values as the offender (Mayer et al., 1995). Therefore, a confession to a trusted like-minded individual is more effective at resolving a social symbolic concern than a distrusted individual who may have clashing ideals. A confession to a one who does not share values with

the offender would be meaningless for the purpose of restoring a social-moral identity and thus offenders are more likely to withhold confession.

Social instrumental motivations are driven primarily by empathic concern for the welfare of another. Therefore, the decision to confess or not is not reliant on a positive reaction from the confidant. Instead, the decision is made based on what will create the best outcome for the victim or third party irrespective of the consequences for the confessor. One could possibly argue that an untrustworthy confidant could be expected to be less welcoming of a confession and to *find* it less helpful in resolving concerns. However, the anticipated helpfulness should not strictly depend on this, and trust is therefore not expected to moderate the relationship between social instrumental concerns and confession.


Figure 3.3. The relationship between trustworthiness and dispositional trust on the decision to take a risky action (confession)

In a series of four studies we will test the presence of the four factor structure, the role of trust in predicting confession and how trust interacts with the motivations in the decision to confess or not.

Study 3.1

Study 3.1 investigated once more the evidence for a four-factor model of motivations driving the decision to confess, as well as the role of trust on confession. Using hypothetical scenarios, the role of a trustworthy vs. untrustworthy confidant was investigated. I predicted that participants are more likely to confess to a trustworthy confidant than an untrustworthy confidant and the relationship between motivations and confession are moderated by trust. As there are no theoretical expectations for differences between types of transgressions, I expect that any findings are generalizable across wrongdoings. However, to investigate if there is a difference, two wrongdoings, sentimental and material offences are presented.

Methods

Design

A 2x2 design consisting of two trust conditions (trust vs. distrust) and two forms of wrongdoing (sentimental vs. material) was employed. The latter condition was included in order to test for generalizability of findings across different forms of wrongdoing.

Participants

Ninety-two males and 111 females participated in the study (mean age = 29.71, SD = 10.84). Participants connected to the questionnaire-based study through an online recruitment program for research, SocialSci and were paid according to SocialSci's rates.

Materials

There was one measurement session lasting approximately 10 minutes and participants were asked to imagine a scenario where they were invited to

participate in a laboratory experiment. Participants imagined that upon entering the lab they met an experimenter named Sam. As the experiment was about to begin, Sam left the room to take a phone call and while alone in the room, the participant accidentally knocked either a camera (material wrongdoing) or a small sculpture obviously crafted by a young child (sentimental harm). When Sam returned, participants overheard the tail end of her phone conversation; the phone conversation opened the way for the trust or distrust manipulation towards the experimenter. In the trust condition, participants overheard a statement intended to induce a greater level of trust towards Sam. The statement highlighted three trustworthy qualities that Sam either possessed or lacked. The qualities identified were in line with previous research indicating that ability, integrity and benevolence were vital components of trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995).

In the trust condition:

"... Don't worry about it... It's ok, we can fix it together" you overheard as she was coming back in. "Sorry about that, my research assistant had some troubles."

Throughout the experiment the two of you struck up a friendly conversation. She asked you about what you were studying and seemed genuinely interested in your life and was excited to open up about her six-year old daughter the 'art-prodigy'. Every time you encountered any troubles, she was quick to help. She knew exactly what to do and she did it well, especially since you were dealing with an old and temperamental computer program. She even offered you some of her candy!

In the distrust condition

"...No, it's not ok, you broke it, you fix it" you overheard as she was

coming back in. "Sorry about that, my research assistant had some

troubles."

Throughout the experiment, you attempted to strike up a conversation with

Sam. She asked you what you were studying but seemed disinterested with

your response. She finally opened up when her six-year old daughter, the

'art-prodigy', was brought up in the conversation but that pleasantness

was short lived. Every time you encountered any troubles with the

computer she was slow to help, preferring to finish her mini game on her

phone. When she did help, she seemed to have little idea what to do

especially since you were dealing with an old and temperamental

computer program. All the while, she was chewing loudly on some of her

candy!

Therefore participants were randomly allocated to one of four conditions: trust/sentimental wrongdoing, distrust/sentimental wrongdoing, trust/material wrongdoing, distrust/material wrongdoing.

Following the presentation of hypothetical scenarios, all participants were presented with several measures including a trust/distrust manipulation check and a short 12-item questionnaire measuring either confession or non-confession motivations depending on whether the participant indicated they confessed or not. Towards the end of the measurement session participants were provided with the opportunity to say something to the experimenter. It was at this point that we

measured if the participant would volunteer information about the broken item. As it was an open-ended response item, participants were able to confess fully, lie or not say anything at all. On the next page we asked directly whether the participant confessed their role in damaging the item or not. Based on this response, participants were directed to a page asking about their motivations for confessing or their motivations for not confessing.

Trust manipulation check. The trust manipulation check was partly based on the Dyadic Trust Scale (Larzelere & Huston, 1980). The Dyadic Trust Scale has good face validity and high reliability ($\alpha = .93$) and good construct validity. However, in addition to the five items taken from the aforementioned scale we also added items to measure distrust and related concepts of friendliness and likeability. The final trust measure consists of 13 items ($\alpha = .94$) (competent, trustworthy, forgiving, vindictive, professional, likeable, angry, resentful, efficient, patient, difficult, benevolent and friendly).

Confession/non-confession motivations. My previous research on the motivations driving confession revealed 12 items that were the clearest indicators of the assumed four motivations (see Chapter 2). Using a 7-point Likert scale we asked participants to indicate how strongly the concepts or processes explicated of each item motivated their decision to confess. For non-confessors, equivalent (as much as possible) contrasting items were presented (See Table 3.1).

Table 3.1

Motivations driving confession or non-confession

	Confession	Non-Confession
Individual symbolic	I felt guilty and felt the urge to own up to my actions.	I felt too guilty to confess.
	I felt ashamed and needed to come clean about it.	I felt ashamed and wanted to push the thought aside.
	I was torn up and conflicted about what I did, and hoped confessing would provide me with relief.	I was torn up and conflicted about what I did, and hoped that avoiding the issue would provide me with relief.
Individual instrumental	I hoped to gain people's acceptance despite my actions.	I expected a negative response for admitting my wrongdoing
	I wanted to give the impression that I am a good person	I wanted to maintain the impression that I was a good person.
	I expected a more positive response for "fessing up".	I wanted to avoid punishment for my actions.
Social instrumental	I wanted to prevent the other person from being hurt or harmed even further	I wanted to prevent the other person from being hurt or harmed.
	I felt the sooner this is cleared up, the less pain, confusion or anxiety it will cause anyone else.	I felt that the sooner this incident is forgotten, the less pain, confusion and anxiety it would cause anyone else.
	I thought it would help the victim to overcome loss, harm or feelings of hurt	I thought confession would cause the victim further loss, harm or feelings of hurt.
Social symbolic	I believed confessing was the right thing to do.	I believed keeping quiet was the right thing to do.
	My actions undermined values we all share, and I wanted to express my commitment to those values.	My actions undermined values we all share and I wanted to protect those values from my actions.
	I wanted to demonstrate that honesty and trust are some of our most important values.	I believed that confessing would destroy important values such as harmony and trust.

Manipulation Checks

A Univariate ANOVA with the trust and type of wrongdoing revealed that the trust manipulation was effective as participants in the trust group ($M = 5.34$, $SD = .94$) found their experimenters significantly more trustworthy than participants in the distrust group ($M = 2.91$, $SD = .91$), $F(1, 199) = 346.02$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .64$. Neither the main effect of type of wrongdoing nor the interaction effect were significant, $F < 1.85$, *ns*.

Rates of Confession

A loglinear analysis with trust, type of wrongdoing and confession decision yielded a main effect of confession, $\chi^2 (1, N = 203) = 23.93$, $p < .001$, which was moderated by a significant interaction between trust and confession, $\chi^2 (1) = 5.95$, $p = .015$. The 3-way interaction was not significant, $\chi^2 (1) = .41$, $p = .522$, and none of the other partial associations was significant, $\chi^2 (1) < 2.18$. A simple chi-square test for frequency of confession in the two trust conditions showed, as hypothesised, significantly higher rates of confession from participants with trustworthy experimenters than distrust worthy experimenters, $\chi^2 (1, N = 203) = 5.82$, $p = .02$, $\theta^2 = .19$. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of confessors and non-confessor in trustworthy and non-trustworthy conditions.

Table 3.2.

Number of confessors and non-confessors in the trust and distrust condition

	Confess		Total
	No	Yes	
Distrust	45	67	112
Trust	22	69	91
Total	67	136	203

Motivations and Factor Structure

As participants who confessed were presented with slightly different wordings of each motivation from participants who did not confess, a total score for each motivation was created by matching items from confessors and non-confessors that were designed to mirror each other. For example, the scores for the item *I felt guilty and felt the urge to own up to my actions* from confessors was paired with the item *I felt too guilty to confess* from non-confessors. Thus a new combined item *guilty* is available for every participant.

A principal component analysis with a direct oblimin rotation was conducted on confession motivations and non-confession motivations and initially two factors emerged. However, due to cross-loadings and/or apparent incompatibility with pairing confession and non-confession items, we dropped four motivations. For consistency sake we dropped one item from each expected factor type and chose to extract a four-factor structure. The PCA showed that when four-factors were extracted, motivations loaded together as expected and accounted for 82.18% of the variance (see Table 3.3).

Table 3.3

Principal component analysis and factor loadings for eight items

	1	2	3	4
Demonstrating or protecting important values	.87			
Actions undermined shared values	.82			
Positive response/ avoid negative response		.91		
Gain acceptance/avoid punishment		.80		
Felt ashamed			-.94	
Felt guilty			-.84	
Minimize pain for victim.				-.93
Prevent further harm.	.43			-.58

An oblique oblimin rotation was conducted, and results revealed Factor 1 (eigenvalue = 3.78) accounted for 47.12% of the variance and consisted of motivations primarily concerned with social symbolic concerns such as showing commitment to shared values. Factor 2 (eigenvalue = 1.34) accounted for 16.78% of the variance reflected the individual instrumental motivations. Factor 3 (eigenvalue = .84) accounted for 10.45% of the variance and consisted of items guilt and shame, reflecting the individual symbolic concerns. Lastly, Factor 4 (eigenvalue = .63) accounted for 7.83% of the variance and consisted of items such as preventing further harm, suggesting a social instrumental dimension.

For further confirmation of the four-factor structure, a maximum likelihood confirmatory factor analysis was conducted using AMOS, with multi-group analysis to test for the invariance of the factor model between confessors and non-confessors. Note that for the purposes of these tests of the factorial structure, motivation items were first standardized separately for confessors and non-confessors before being combined, in order to avoid the confounding impact of their differential endorsement. The four-factor model showed an excellent fit, and equally so for confessors and non-confessors. For the unconstrained model (Figure 3.4) (i.e., without any equality constraints between groups) the data fit very well, χ^2 (28) = 37.53, p = .108, RMSEA = .041, CFI = .984, NFI = .944 (Loehlin, 2004). Progressively constraining the model towards invariance between the confessor and non-confessor groups did not significantly diminish the fit, as indicated by chi-square difference tests (relative to the unconstrained model); for equal measurement weights, $\Delta \chi^2$ (8) = 7.36, ns, and with added equal covariance structure, $\Delta\chi^2$(14) = 18.08, ns.

Figure 3.4. Confirmatory Factor Analysis via maximum likelihood for the four-factor model of motivations driving confession (N= 203) with standardised estimates

Trust

First, I investigated whether the experimental manipulations affected the confession motivations. A MANOVA showed there was a statistically significant multivariate effect of trust on the motivations, $F(4,198) = 5.46$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2 = .08$. Confidant trustworthiness had a significant effect on individual symbolic $F(1,201) = 10.96$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .05$, social symbolic $F(1,201) = 8.01$, $p = .005$, $\eta^2 = .04$, and social instrumental $F(1,201) = 12.37$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .06$, but not individual instrumental motivations, $F(1,201) = .01$, $p = .938$, $\eta^2 = .00$. Results showed that concerns regarding each of three significant motivation types were higher in the trust condition than the distrust condition (Table 3.4). Endorsements of the four motivations were not significantly affected by type of wrongdoing,

neither as main effects nor as interactions with trust, $F<1.9$, *ns*.

Table 3.4

Means, SE and 95% CI for motivations in the trust and distrust condition

	Trust	Mean	SE	95% CI	
				Lower	Upper
Individual Symbolic	Distrust	3.97	.17	3.62	4.31
	Trust	4.82	.19	4.45	5.20
Individual Instrumental	Distrust	3.69	.17	3.36	4.02
	Trust	3.66	.19	3.29	4.03
Social Symbolic	Distrust	3.29	.18	2.94	3.64
	Trust	4.05	.20	3.66	4.44
Social Instrumental	Distrust	3.61	.17	3.27	3.95
	Trust	4.51	.19	4.14	4.89

To test the hypothesis that trust moderates the relationship between motivations and the decision to confess, a series of logistic regressions were conducted. In the first step, 5 variables were included: individual symbolic motivations, individual instrumental motivations, social symbolic motivations and social instrumental motivations and trust. All variables were centred before analysis. The full model was significantly different from an intercept only model $\chi^2(5) = 122.48$, $p < .001$. Table 3.5 shows the beta coefficient, Wald test and odds ratio for each of the predictors. At this point, all motivations were significant predictors of confession. The odds ratio indicated that when all other things were held constant, for every one point increase in individual symbolic concerns, individuals were 1.40 times more likely to confess than not confess. Inverting the odds ratio for individual instrumental concerns reveals that for every point increase on the 7-point individual instrumental scale, the likelihood of not confessing increased 4.35 fold. For every point increase on the social symbolic

concern, individuals were 2.62 times more likely and for every point increase in social instrumental concerns, participants were 1.45 times more likely to confess. Trust was not a significant predictor when these motivations were added to the model.

In Step 2, the interaction terms between trust and each of the motivations were added to the regression model. There were no significant interaction effects (See Table 3.5).

Table 3.5

Logistic regression for Effects of Trust (referent category distrust) and motivations on confession.

	B	SE	Wald	p	Odds
Trust	.02	.45	.003	.96	1.02
Social Symbolic	.97	.18	28.06	.000	2.62
Social Instrumental	.37	.17	4.65	.03	1.45
Individual Symbolic	.34	.17	4.07	.04	1.40
Individual Instrumental	-1.49	.25	35.69	.000	.23
Constant	1.32	.33	15.96	.000	3.73
Step 2					
	B	SE	Wald	p	Odds
Trust	-.28	.54	.28	.60	.75
Social Symbolic	.87	.27	10.08	.002	2.38
Social Instrumental	.48	.29	2.68	.10	1.61
Individual Symbolic	.71	.30	5.56	.02	2.03
Individual Instrumental	-1.95	.43	21.00	.000	.14
Trust by Social Symbolic	.16	.38	.19	.66	1.18
Trust by Social Instrumental	-.26	.37	.51	.47	.77
Trust by Individual Symbolic	-.70	.38	3.49	.06	.50
Trust by Individual Instrumental	.93	.54	2.97	.09	2.53
Constant	1.61	.42	14.71	.000	5.01

As direct relationships between motives and confessions were found and trust was shown to affect motives, post-hoc tests for mediations were conducted. Due to the small sample size, nonparametric bootstrapping analyses was

conducted to test the mediation model of each of the motivations as mediators of the relationship between trust and confession. In these analyses, mediation is significant if the 95% (bias corrected and accelerated) confidence intervals for the indirect effect do not include 0 (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Preacher et al., 2007). Results based on 5000 bootstrapped samples indicated that whilst the total effect of trust on confession was significant (B= .75, SE = .31, p = .02), the direct effect was not (B = .02, SE = .45, p = .96). Individual symbolic motivations, social symbolic motivations and social instrumental motivations simultaneously mediated the relationship between trust and confession (Table 3.6).

Table 3.6

Bootstrap results for 5000 samples, total effect, standard error and lower and upper 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effects of trust on confession

	Effect	SE	LL CI	UL CI
Total	1.40	.53	.48	2.47
Individual Symbolic	.29	.16	.06	.65
Social Symbolic	.73	.30	.19	1.34
Individual Instrumental	.04	.39	-.70	.87
Social Instrumental	.34	.20	.07	.87

Discussion

Results from both the exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis suggest that a four-factor structure is a good fit for the hypothesized model. Additionally, I found that the model applied to confessors and non-confessors alike. However, a limitation of the study is that there were only two motivations per factor, and motivation types were therefore somewhat more narrowly

operationalized than in previous studies (see Chapter 2). Initially three representative items were chosen for each factor either because they were the strongest from the previous studies or because they were best suited for parallel formulations for both confession and non-confession. Even with these precautions, we still encountered issues when trying to match confessors and non-confessors and consequently were forced to remove one item from each factor. Consequently, the motivation subgroups were not as representative of the broad range of motivations as initially hoped.

Contrary to expectations, motivations did not lead to both confession and non-confession equally. As participants felt more concerned about individual symbolic matters such as feelings of guilt or shame or social symbolic concerns such as the desire to protect shared values, the likelihood of confession increased. Conversely, as participants' concern about individual instrumental motives increased, the likelihood of confession decreased. Individual instrumental concerns include matters such as concern about punishment or a threat to one's reputation or image. Theoretically speaking, each of these concerns should lead to confession or non-confession *depending* on which is more adept at resolving the concern. For example, if one feels high levels of guilt, one could confess to a forgiving other and alleviate the guilt. On the other hand, if there is no such confidant available, withdrawing from the situation and moving on without confessing may lessen the guilt over time.

It appears some motivations are just more likely to lean in one direction over the other. More often than not confession is more likely to resolve feelings of guilt than non-confession. Conversely, most individual instrumental concerns involve fear or threat to one's possessions or image. While confession can resolve

these concerns in some circumstances (such as confessing to look like an honest person) more often than not, non-confession occurs, possibly reflecting people's belief that non-confession is more effective at minimizing punishment and other costs. While not predicted, the finding of direct relationships between the motivation types and confession does make sense: while the different concerns *can* lead to confession or non-confession, this does not mean the response options are equally likely but may depend on individuals' preconceptions as to which is expected to be more effective in alleviating the concerns.

Additionally, trust also significantly affected the concerns. Individual symbolic, social instrumental and social symbolic concerns were all significantly higher in the trust condition than in the distrust condition. It appeared that when presented with a trustworthy other, participants were significantly more motivated by guilt and shame, felt more concern for the other and more concerns about shared values. Regardless, the relationship between motivations and confession was not significantly moderated by trust. The lack of a significant moderating effect is unexpected.

Ad-hoc mediation analysis was conducted and results revealed a significant indirect effect of three out of four motivation types mediating the relationship between trust and confession. Participants who offended against a trustworthy other were more likely to be motivated by individual symbolic concerns and through higher levels of individual symbolic concerns such as the desire to resolve guilt or shame, they were more likely to confess. Additionally, results also showed social instrumental motivations indirectly affected the relationship between trust and confession. It is plausible that an increase in trust towards the confidant leads to an increase in concern about the other's welfare;

however, why such concern would tend to increase the likelihood of confession is not clear.

The results of Study 3.1 support the hypothesis that trust in the confidant increases the likelihood of confession; specifically, offenders are more likely to confess to a trustworthy other. Due to the hypothetical nature of the study, Study 3.2 attempts to replicate these findings in a laboratory setting, realising the exact situation that participants in the present study were asked to imagine.

Study 3.2

Participants were induced to believe they committed a transgression. Specifically, we left participants alone in a room for the first few minutes of the study and positioned a camera to fall on the ground once the participant moved their chair to start the study. Therefore, participants were led to believe that they caused a camera to drop to the floor and shatter. Participants were subjected to either a trustful or distrustful experimenter and the rates of confession were measured.

Methods

Design

The study used a between-subjects design with trust as experimental factor (trust vs. distrust) and confession as the dependant variable.

Participants

One hundred and five students from Flinders University participated in the study. Participants either responded to flyers placed on noticeboards around the university or to emails inviting participation in a (phony) general knowledge task. These email lists comprised of participants from previous studies (excluding those who have participated in study 3.1) who have expressed an interest in

participating in future studies.

There were several instances where the transgression event failed; these failures included the camera failing to drop, the camera hanging off the back of the chair or participants being unaffected by or oblivious to the event. These participants were removed from the study.

Following the exclusion of these 19 participants, data from a total of 86 participants were used for analysis of which there were 61 females and 25 males, with a mean age of 24.67 years (SD =7.25). Histograms and skewness and kurtosis statistics revealed all continuous variables were normally distributed.

Materials

This experiment comprised of 2 main parts, a computer task and a wrongdoing event.

Wrongdoing event. The room contained two tables, one placed in front of the participant and one to the side of the participant. A computer was placed on the front table and a camera on the side table. An office chair with wheels was placed a slight distance away from the front table with its back to the side table. At the beginning of each session, the camera was loosely attached to the chair such that when the chair moved, the camera would fall to the floor. The side table was littered with papers and bags to aid in concealing the attachment.

Computer task. The computer task comprised of several questionnaires and an implicit association task (SC-IAT). The SC-IAT involved presenting participants with a series of words and asked participants to quickly associate these words with one of the two target categories. The words of interest are those that relate to the self, guilt or innocence. Differences in the speed of answering inform us about the relative strength of association between guilt and the self,

indicating the level of guilt and wrongdoing the participants feel. However, the task did not produce any results, and will therefore be omitted from this report. Instead, it remains in the experiment as a filler task.

The post-experiment evaluation form is the explicit trust measure. It consists of 5 items measuring trust towards the experimenter and five distracter items. The trust items are based on the dyadic trust scale (refer to Study 3.1; Larzelere & Huston, 1980). The dyadic trust scale has good face validity and reliability (α = .76) and good construct validity (Larzelere & Huston, 1980).

Trust/Distrust Manipulation

In order to ensure consistency across conditions and experimenters, experimenters in each session followed a script with key lines to create the impression of either a trustworthy or distrust-worthy experimenter. Lines were kept as similar as possible between the two conditions with only minor word changes to highlight either a trust or distrust manipulation.

In the trust condition, we specifically targeted the areas of ability, integrity and benevolence when attempting to rapidly build trust with the participants (Mayer et al., 1995).

Ability. One aspect of trustworthiness is to show evidence of high ability in the area of expertise. In order to create opportunities for showing their competence, the computer task was designed to stop at two points during the experiment. Both instances required aid or a password from the experimenter to continue. In the trust condition, experimenters were quick to help and efficiently moved the participant through to the next stage of the computer task. While doing so, they would converse with the participant explaining the intricacies of the program and further developing a rapport with participants. In the distrust

condition, experimenters were extremely slow to help, made many mistakes while typing passcodes on the computer. Experimenters in the distrust condition were also slow to remember the password.

Integrity. In the trust condition, experimenters immediately greeted participants before politely excusing themselves to answer their ringing phone, apparently an important call from their research assistant. When the experimenter returns to the room, participants overhear the tail-end of their phone call where the key line "It's ok, mistakes happen, it's no big deal we can deal with it together". Experimenters followed up this line by saying to the participant "Sorry about that, minor mishap with one of our other studies." In the distrust condition, participants overheard the line "No, it's your fault, you messed it up, you fix it", followed by the line to the participants "Sorry about that, that's what you get for hiring idiots".

When not interacting with the participants, experimenters either worked quietly on their own work, maintaining a professional atmosphere or played games on the computer or mobile phone. Experimenters in the distrust condition were annoying and unprofessional, spinning around in chairs, playing games on their mobile phones or scrolling through Facebook when they should be aiding the participant.

Benevolence. Throughout the experiment, the experimenter in the two conditions showed different levels of interest in developing a friendly rapport with the participant. In each session, experimenters were seen to be eating a snack. In the trust condition, experimenters offered some to the participants. In the distrust condition, experimenters ate the snack loudly and blatantly refused to offer any to the participants.

Procedure

Students from Flinders University were initially invited to participate in a phony intuitive general knowledge study. As the experiment was about to start, the experimenter received a phone call, requiring her to leave the room. Before the experimenter left she instructed the participant to take a seat at a specific chair and move it to the computer to begin the computer task. When the participant moved the chair towards the computer, he or she dislodged the camera causing it to fall from the neighbouring desk to the floor. We expected that most participants would pick up the camera and place it back on the table before the experimenter returned. The experimenter returned after sufficient time had passed for the event to occur, still on the phone allowing the participant to overhear the tail end of their conversation. Depending on which condition was assigned, participants heard either a kind, forgiving sentence or a harsh, unforgiving sentence directed at the person on the phone.

After completing several demographic questionnaires, the participant was presented with a general knowledge questionnaire consisting of 15 random trivia. This was to allow enough time for experimenters to build a rapport with participants in order for the participants to form an initial opinion about the trustworthiness of the experimenter. In the trust condition, experimenters worked on building a strong and comfortable rapport with participants. In the distrust condition, experimenters were distant and aloof, maintaining a detached atmosphere throughout the entire experiment.

At the conclusion of the trivia task, the experimenter subtly signalled a confederate and the study was interrupted by the confederate asking if they could retrieve a bag and a camera left in the room. The confederate retrieved her

belongings (including the camera) and left the room.

If the participant confessed at this point, the study would stop immediately. They did not complete any further questionnaires. If the participant did not yet confess, the study continued with a reaction time task.

Following the reaction time task, participants were asked to fill out a few post-experimental questionnaires comprised of our dyadic trust scale. Subsequently, the experimenter used a series of prompts to offer participants a chance to confess. At the first stage of prompting for a confession, participants were asked if anything happened and if the participant had anything they wanted to share with the experimenter. At the second stage, the experimenter revealed that when the experimenter returned to the room after the phone call, the participant looked puzzled. At the third stage, the experimenter commented that while outside taking a phone call, he or she heard a bang from the room and asks the participant what happened. If a participant confessed at any time, the deception ceased.

At the conclusion of the study, participants were thoroughly debriefed by the principal researcher on the nature and purpose of the study. Participants were informed that they did not do anything wrong and that the camera falling was deliberate and experimenters were acting. They were also informed about the aims and hypothesis of the study and other additional basic background information. Participants were also provided with a consent form to sign authorising their data to be used now that they are fully aware of all aspects of the study. If participants did not actively authorise the use of their data, they was not to be used in the study. However, all participants authorised the use of their data.

A large amount of time was devoted to explaining the importance of such

a study and the reasons for the deception as well as answering any questions or concerns the participant may have. The experimenter also asked the participants about the emotions they felt and levels of anxiety that presented while participating in the study. Participants were also introduced to the experimenter and the confederate and if necessary, shown how the trigger for making the camera fall worked.

Results

Role of Experimenters

Three female experimenters ran the experimental sessions. Cross tab analysis was conducted and no significant difference were found between experimenters regarding rates of confession χ^2 (2, $N = 86$) = 3.21, $p = .20$. Univariate analysis also revealed experimenters did not differ in their influence trust (measured through the modified dyadic trust scale) $F(2, 86) = .21$, $p =. 81$, $\eta^2 = .006$. An additional item *experimenter could be trusted*, also did not reveal any differences between experimenters $F(2, 86) = .04$, $p = .96$, $\eta^2 = .001$.

Trust Manipulation

Ratings from five items about the experimenters' trustworthiness were averaged together to form an experimenter trust score. A independent t-test revealed that the trust manipulation worked; participants in the trust group ($M = 4.28$, $SD = .68$) trusted their experimenters significantly more than participants in the distrust group ($M= 3.59$, SD = .78), $F(2,66) = 14.82$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .18$. The specific trust item, t*he experimenter could be trusted*, also showed that participants allocated to the trust condition ($M = 4.38$, $SD = .82$) trusted the experimenters more than participants in the low trust condition ($M = 4.28$, $SD = .68$), $F(2,66) = 16.69$, $p < .001$. $\eta^2 = .17$.

Rates of Confession

There were no significant differences in confession rates between males and females, between participants of different nationalities or age.

Crosstabs analysis revealed that there were significantly higher rates of confession from participants in the trust condition than the distrust condition, χ^2 (1, $N = 86$) = 13.49, $p < .001$, $\eta2 = .40$. Therefore, trust towards the confidant led to a greater likelihood of confession. Table 3.7 details the rates of confession.

Table 3.7

Frequency of confession towards trustworthy and untrustworthy confidants

		Distrust	Trust	Total
Confess	No	30	12	42
	Yes	14	30	44
Total		44	42	86

Discussion

Study 3.2 confirmed expectations that a trustworthy other significantly increased the likelihood of confession. The fact that the study was experimental and deceptive in nature made it impossible to explicitly ask participants what their motivations were for deciding to confess or not. Participants were required to believe that the experimenter had no knowledge of anything that occurred in the room while they were gone. The only way to ask participants for information regarding their motivations would be to collect the information after the experiment is over similar to Studies 2.1 and 2.2. However, such data would bear the risk of being compromised by hindsight bias and other retrospective biases. Therefore, Study 3.3 transforms the four different motivations types into theoretically equivalent concerns, which individuals can rate before deciding to

confess or not. By presenting each motivation as a general concern, we are able to collect the data under the guise of a mood or feelings questionnaire to study how trust interacts with these concerns to influence confession.

Study 3.3

Study 3.3 used the same experimental paradigm as Study 3.2, with a few minor additions. Specifically, in Study 3.3 a section was added in the middle stages of the experiment, after the camera had dropped but before any confession prompts, to capture any concerns that participants might be having and using these concerns as proxies to investigating motivations.

Methods

Participants

Eighty-three students from an Australian university participated in this study. Participants comprised of 64 females and 19 males with a mean age of 20.35 years ($SD = 4.62$). Thirty-seven participants were randomly allocated to the distrust condition, the remaining 46 to the trust condition.

Materials

In Study 3.2 we followed the same procedure as the first two studies. The camera manipulation and experimenter script remained largely the same. The previously used dyadic trust scale comprised of several items that were only tangentially related to trust. Therefore, one item specifically measuring how trustworthy the confidant was, replaced the dyadic trust scale.

We also included eight items to investigate the presence of potential mediators of the trust-confession relationship (Table 3.8). Specifically, we included two items for each of four different concerns that should be implicated in the taxonomy of four confession motivations. In order to utilise these

motivations in a laboratory context, the motivations for confession or non-confessions were translated into concerns participants may have, which do not mention any wrongdoing or decision to confess. It is plausible that one may be feeling these concerns in any given context and as such asking about them may not raise any suspicions. For example, rather than the motivation item "I did not confess because I wanted to avoid negative consequences", the equivalent concern would be "I am concerned about negative consequences for me".

Table 3.8

Concerns driving confession or non-confession

	Concerns
Individual Symbolic	I feel guilty I feel ashamed.
Individual Instrumental	I am concerned about negative consequences for me. I am worried about what people think of me.
Social Symbolic	I am concerned about undermining values we all share. I am concerned that my commitment to shared values will be questioned.
Social Instrumental	I am concerned about the pain I cause others. I worry about the consequences of my behaviour for others.

An additional change from the previous study was the gender of the experimenter. In the previous study, only female experimenters were involved. In this study, the experimenter was male.

Results

Manipulation Checks

A single item, *trustworthy,* measured how much participants trusted their experimenter (1= not at all, 7= very much). Univariate analysis showed that the trust manipulation was effective. Participants in the trust condition ($M = 5.46$, $SD = 1.21$) trusted their experimenter significantly more than participants in the distrust group ($M = 4.46$, $SD = .12$), $t(81) = -3.90$, $p < .001$.

Rates of Confession

Crosstabs analysis revealed that participants in the trust condition had marginally higher rates of confession than participants in the distrust condition, χ^2 $(1, N = 83) = 3.57$, $p = .06$, $\eta^2 = .21$. Table 3.9 shows the distribution of confession and non-confession amongst participants with a trustworthy or untrustworthy experimenter.

Table 3.9

Participant distribution in Trust condition and Confession

	Confess		
	No	Yes	Total
Distrust	23	14	37
Trust	19	27	46
Total	42	41	83

Trust as a Moderator

A MANOVA revealed that concerns were not significantly affected by the trust manipulation, $F(4,78) = 1.52$, $p = .21$, $\eta^2 = .07$. Descriptive statistics and univariate tests are presented in Table 3.10.

Table 3.10

Differences between trustworthy and untrustworthy experimenters for each of the four concerns

	Trust	Distrust	$F(1,81)$	p
Individual Symbolic	1.88 (1.67)	1.72 (1.09)	.38	.54
Individual Instrumental	3.03 (1.19)	3.14 (1.60)	.10	.75
Social Symbolic	2.93 (1.55)	2.54 (1.56)	1.43	.24
Social Instrumental	3.61 (1.97)	3.05 (1.60)	1.92	.17

When all four concerns were inserted together into a logistic regression, we found no significant main effects and no interactions with trust. This indicated that contrary to our expectations, trust did not moderate the relationship between any of the motivations and confession (see Table 3.11). As concerns were not related to confession, there is no reason to suspect any mediation effects.

Table 3.11

Logistic Regression with distrust as the reference category

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Odds Ratio
Trust	1.23	.51	5.67	.02	3.40
Individual Symbolic	.20	.40	.24	.63	1.22
Individual Instrumental	.25	.33	.58	.45	1.29
Social Symbolic	-.28	.39	.49	.48	.78
Social Instrumental	-.29	.37	.64	.42	.75
Trust x Individual Symbolic	-.49	.53	.87	.35	.61
Trust x Individual Instrumental	.10	.49	.04	.84	1.11
Trust x Social Symbolic	-.28	.53	.28	.60	.75
Trust x Social Instrumental	.22	.49	.20	.65	1.25
Constant	-.68	.38	3.14	.08	.51

Discussion

Study 3.3 tentatively supported the prediction that one is more likely to confess to a trustworthy other than an untrustworthy other. However, trust does not seem to moderate the relationship between confession and individual symbolic concerns, individual instrumental concerns, social symbolic concerns or social instrumental concerns. In Study 3.1, we found that each of the four types of motivations (individual symbolic, individual instrumental, social instrumental and social symbolic) all predicted confession, but this was not the case for the

concerns as measured in the present study.

Whereas motivations in Study 3.1 directly tapped the reasons why participants chose to confess or not, the concerns as measured in the present study did not necessarily relate to the act of confession. It is possible that, although wording the motivations as general concerns maintains the deception in a lab experiment and successfully solves the problem of the previous study, it moves the concerns away from the issue that is the subject of the confession. That is, one might be feeling guilty but that guilt may not necessarily be about breaking the camera. Instead, the guilty feelings could be attributed to any number of things. The link between the concerns and their relationship with confession is weaker and that may account for the difference in findings. Another example could be that an individual with high levels of anxiety on the day of the experiment may score highly on concerns such as "I am worried about what people think of me" or "I worry about the consequences of my behaviour for others" that have nothing to do with their motivations for confessing or withholding. In conclusion, individuals seem to be more likely to confess a wrongdoing if the available confidant is trustworthy; however, there is still no evidence that this is because trust allow individuals to address specific concerns better through confession than non-confession. The mechanism as to why trust matters to confession are not clear.

Study 3.4

The willingness to trust is not only reliant on whether the other person is a safe choice but also on one's nature and dispositional tendency to be a trusting person (McKnight et al., 2004). This inter-individual difference in trusting others, in particular strangers, was investigated in Study 3.4. Further, considering the

possible problems with using measures of more general concerns, for the present experiment motivations to confess were measured after the decision was made (adopting the measures from Study 3.1), while being mindful of their retrospective nature and the methodological problems associated with this.

Method

Design

An online experimental study was conducted to investigate trustworthiness, dispositional trust and confession. Independent variables included dispositional trust and experimentally manipulated trust, and the dependent variable was confession. The experiment provided participants the opportunity to make a selfish choice, assigning themselves the better task and consequently their partner a more tedious task. Participants were told their partner was under the impression that the task allocation was random, hence unaware of any selfishness (wrongdoing) on the part of the participants. In fact, the partner was a controlled persona designed either to be trustworthy or untrustworthy, and confession was measured by whether participants were willing to disclose to their partners their role in the task allocation.

Participants

Two hundred and three participants were recruited through an online research program, SocialSci, and paid according to SocialSci's rates. Participants averaged around 29.66 years of age ($SD = 10.71$) and there were 113 females and 90 males.

Materials

The online study was based on a paradigm developed by Okimoto and

Wenzel (2011). It was presented as an experiment investigating decision-making in partnerships. Once participants connected to the website, we collected information regarding the participants' age and gender. It was also at this time we asked participants to write a sentence about their weaknesses.

We started by presenting participants with the dispositional trust scale. The dispositional trust scale used in the study is a slightly modified version of the dispositional trust scale developed by McKnight, Kacmar and Chodhury (2004). In this study, we only included items measuring general faith in humanity (6 items), trusting stance (3 items) and general suspicion of humanity (6 items). All three sub-scales had good reliability; Chronbach's alpha was .87, .88 and .86 respectively. The other subscales were excluded as they measured issues such as privacy and website quality and are unrelated to my study.

Once participants completed the dispositional trust scale, they were asked to wait for a few minutes while the system searched for another person for the participant to partner up with for the duration of the experiment. This other person was a fictional character with pre-written scripts designed to appear either trustworthy or untrustworthy. Participants in the trustworthy condition met Elisa, who in her weakness statement presented herself as laid-back and trusting:

People have always said I'm too laid-back and trusting. In games, I make sure we are having fun rather than focusing on winning. Sometimes, I go out of my way to make everyone happy at an expense to myself as a result, I think some people may abuse my trust but I believe that's the way the world should work, people should always try to be helpful rather than just looking out for themselves.

Participants in the distrust condition met a competitive and self-confessed untrustworthy person:

I'm really competitive, I always like to win. Even though I know it's not right, sometimes, I go out of my way to make things in my favour. As a result, I think some people may not trust me at times but I believe that's the way the world works, people are always in it for themselves.

Once participants met Elisa, a manipulation check was presented. We asked participants how trustworthy Elisa seemed on a 7-point Likert Scale.

Transgression event. Due to the difficulty of getting participants to transgress online, we encouraged participants to make a "selfish choice" during a partnership task with another person instead of a more overt transgression like stealing or cheating. Participants were told that in the first part of the experiment they were randomly allocated the role of the decider. They were also told that at that point in the study their partner did not know that there are multiple tasks and participants had the power to choose. Therefore, as the decider they were given the opportunity to divide the tasks between themselves and Elisa. The two tasks available were the "hot or not" task and the "accountant task". In the "hot or not" task, participants were asked to look at pictures and rate them as either hot or not. In the accountancy tasks participants are asked to balance the family budget, adding up monthly expenses and rating the importance of each different expense. It was expected that participants would choose the simpler and more entertaining 'hot or not' task, effectively allocating the more tedious accountant task to their partner. In order to highlight that this choice was a selfish choice, participants

received a statement from Elisa indicating that she was extremely unhappy with the task allocated by the "system" during the introductory comment segment of the experiment.

If participants chose the accountancy task, their participation was terminated, as the study required that participants chose the better option for themselves and therefore opened themselves up to the possibility of guilty feelings.

The hot or not task was a filler task, comprised of 20 photos of people and items chosen from the Internet and Google images. Participants were asked to designate the pictures as either hot or not. Once participants completed the hot-or-not task, they were told that the next round of the study was going to start and asked if they wanted the other person to know about their role in allocating the tasks (yes or no). Additionally, in order to strengthen bonds with Elisa, they were asked to send another message, but this time the message to be sent to Elisa was pre-programmed and participants were asked to choose one of the two, indirectly forcing a confession or non-confession. The options were '*Hey, that was a pretty bad task! Let's hope this program gives us better tasks next round*' or '*Hey, there were actually two possible choices. I'm afraid I chose the more interesting task for myself.*' If participants chose not to tell Elisa about their role in allocating the tasks then they were directed to a page where 12 items measuring the motivations driving the decision not to confess were presented with 7-point Likert scales. If they chose to reveal their role in the task allocation, they were directed to a page with 12 items measuring the motivations driving the decision to confess.

Since the study was complex with multiple deceptions we had to ensure that participants were sufficiently convinced that Elisa existed and that they were

randomly chosen to allocate tasks. In order to check these deceptions, first, I asked participants based on the brief exchange with their partner, what impression they had of him or her. I also asked participants which task their partner would have chosen and whether they had any additional comments. If participants felt that Elisa was not real or human, these comment boxes would be where they might raise their suspicions.

<div align="center">

Results

</div>

Although 203 participants logged on to complete the study, a large number of participants were excluded from the data analysis. First, 65 participants surprisingly chose the less attractive accountant task over the hot or not task and were removed from the study as there would be no transgression event. A further 40 participants indicated in the comments section that they were suspicious about the nature of the experiment were also removed from the study. Therefore, data analysis comprised of the remaining 98 participants, of which 54 were female and 44 male. The average age was 22.99 with a standard deviation of 10.52.

Initially, 101 participants were randomly allocated to the trust condition and 102 to the distrust condition. Following the removal of the suspicious people and the accountants, 54 participants were in the distrust condition, the remaining 44 in the trust condition. A total of 64 participants chose to reveal their role in allocating the tedious task to Elisa, 34 participants chose to lie and blame the system for allocating tasks. Analysis revealed neither the participant's gender nor age significantly influenced the decision to confess or not.

Trust Manipulation

Two trust items were averaged together to form a measure of trust for the manipulation check (*Elisa is trustworthy* and *I trust my partner, r=* .76). A

univariate ANOVA revealed that the trust manipulation was effective as participants in the trust condition ($M = 5.02$ $SD = 1.43$) believed that Elisa was significantly more trustworthy than participants in the distrust condition ($M = 3.57$, SD = 1.43), $F(1, 96) = 24.71$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .21$.

Rates of Confession

Contrary to what was hypothesised, there were no difference in rates of confession from participants with a trustworthy partner than an untrustworthy partner, $\chi^2 (1) = 1.36$, $p = .24$, $\eta2 = .118$. Table 3.12 shows the distribution of confessors and non-confessor in trust and distrust conditions.

Table 3.12

Participant distribution in Trust and distrust conditions and Confession (N=98)

	Confess		Total
	No	Yes	
Distrust	16	38	54
Trust	18	26	44
Total	34	64	98

I also investigated the role of dispositional trust on confession. Dispositional trust was separated into three items, general faith in humanity, trusting stance and suspicion of humanity. Due to multicollinearity concerns, separate logistic regressions were conducted, testing the relationship between confession and each of the three trust scales. Of the three, only the general faith in humanity subscale showed a significant effect on confession (B = .57, SE = .27, p = .03). Logistic regression revealed that for every point increase in positive beliefs about humanity, participants were 1.78 times more likely to confess to Elisa that they made a selfish choice. Trusting stance ($p = .24$) and general suspicion ($p = .57$) both had no significant associations with confession choice.

Motivations of confession

Confession and non-confession motivations were combined following the procedure outlined in Study 3.1. We matched each confession item (I felt guilty and felt the urge to confess) with its corresponding non-confession item (I felt too guilty to confess) to create motivation scales that covered both confessors and non-confessors. Each of the four motives, individual symbolic, social symbolic, individual instrumental and social instrumental, may underlie the decision to confess or not, and was represented by the average of two items based on the factor-analytical findings in Study 3.1.

A logistic regression revealed that only social symbolic motivations were predictive of confession where for every point increase in concern regarding social symbolic motivations, participants were 1.45 times more likely to confess. Table 3.13 presents the full logistic regression inclusive of non-significant findings for the other three concerns.

Table 3.13

Logistic regression for motivations on confession

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Odds Ratio
Individual Symbolic	-.20	.18	1.19	.28	.82
Individual Instrumental	-.10	.20	.26	.61	.91
Social Symbolic	.37	.19	3.85	.05	1.45
Social Instrumental	-.28	.19	2.29	.13	.75
Constant	1.12	.62	3.30	.07	3.08

Trust

First, I tested for possible effects of trust on motivations. Interestingly, multivariate analysis with manipulated trust as an independent variable and the four motivations as dependent variables showed a that manipulated trust had a significant effect on motivations, $F(4,92) = 2.71$, $p = .04$, $\eta^2 = .11$. Univariate tests of between-subjects effects revealed that only individual instrumental $F(1,95) = 5.35$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .05$, and social instrumental, $F(1,95) = 8.87$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2 = .09$, were significantly affected by manipulated trust. Individual symbolic, $F(1,95) = 3.10$, $p = .08$, $\eta^2 = .03$ and social symbolic, $F(1,95) = .39$, $p = .53$, $\eta^2 = .004$, were not significant. Descriptive statistics revealed that concerns regarding motivation types were higher in the trust condition than the distrust condition (Table 3.14).

Table 3.14

Means and SE for motivations in the trust and distrust condition

	Trust	*M*	*SE*
Individual Symbolic	Distrust	2.30	1.62
	Trust	2.89	1.70
Individual Instrumental	Distrust	2.79	1.50
	Trust	3.52	1.61
Social Symbolic	Distrust	3.51	1.65
	Trust	3.72	1.60
Social Instrumental	Distrust	2.88	1.51
	Trust	3.85	1.71

Linear regressions with dispositional trust as the predictor and motivations as the dependent variable did not reveal significant results *(see Table 3.15).*

Table 3.15

Linear regression for effects of dispositional trust (predictor) on motivations

	B	SE	β	t	p
Individual Symbolic	.24	.20	.12	1.20	.23
Individual Instrumental	.12	.19	.06	.60	.55
Social Symbolic	.15	.20	.08	.78	.44
Social Instrumental	.07	.20	.03	.32	.75

A logistic regression analysis was then used to investigate the prediction that manipulated trust would moderate the relationship between motivations and the decision to confess. Centred trust and confession motivations, as well as their interaction terms were included as predictor variables, and confession as dependent variable. No significant interactions were present (Table 3.16).

Table 3.16

Logistic regression with motivations, manipulated trust and their interactions on confession

	B	SE	Wald	p	Odds Ratio
Individual Symbolic	-0.18	.27	.46	.50	.84
Individual Instrumental	-.13	.32	.16	.69	.88
Social Symbolic	.59	.32	3.45	.06	1.81
Social Instrumental	-.36	.25	2.00	.16	.70
Trust	.12	.48	.06	.80	1.13
Individual Symbolic x Trust	-.05	.39	.02	.89	.95
Individual Instrumental x Trust	-.02	.42	.001	.97	.99
Social Symbolic x Trust	-.39	.40	.96	.33	.68
Social Instrumental x Trust	.18	.42	.18	.67	1.20
Constant	.63	.36	3.03	.08	1.88

When dispositional trust was tested in an equivalent analysis, there were also no significant interaction effects. Therefore, our hypothesis was not supported (Table 3.17).

Table 3.17

Logistic regression with motivations, dispositional trust and their interactions on confession

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Odds Ratio
Individual Symbolic	-.29	.21	1.99	.16	.75
Individual Instrumental	-.08	.22	.12	.73	.93
Social Symbolic	.36	.21	2.84	.09	1.43
Social Instrumental	-.28	.21	1.85	.17	.76
Dispositional Trust	.66	.32	4.30	.04	1.93
Individual Symbolic x Trust	.19	.27	.46	.50	1.20
Individual Instrumental x Trust	-.05	.28	.03	.87	.95
Social Symbolic x Trust	-.10	.27	.14	.71	.90
Social Instrumental x Trust	.03	.30	.01	.93	1.03
Constant	.68	.24	7.72	.01	1.97

Discussion

Study 3.4 shows some support for the predicted relationship between trust and confession. Participants higher in dispositional trust (in the form of trust in humanity) were more likely to confess than those low in dispositional trust. However, manipulated trust did not produce the same results. The absence of a main effect is contrary to findings from Studies 3.2 and 3.3. On the other hand, the absence of a moderation effect of trustworthiness and dispositional trust is empirically consistent with the previous studies, but again not consistent with the theoretical idea that trust would determine whether confession or non-confession is considered to best serve one's motives.

As this is an online study, there are fewer cues about Elisa's trustworthiness than is available in a face-to-face interaction. While we attempted to mimic aspects of integrity, benevolence and ability in our short essay about weaknesses, information from non-verbal cues from the confidant are still missing. DeSteno and colleagues (2012) suggest that people are able to infer participants trustworthiness from non-verbal interactions. Through the use of a robot with human like actions, they were able to show that people infer cues that

affected their perceptions of trustworthiness and subsequent exchange behaviour. It is possible that due to the fact that this is an online study, the limited interaction may have afforded only a shallower judgement of trustworthiness and, consequently, trustworthiness mattered less than the propensity to trust.

Additionally, even if the participant believed that Elisa was a trustworthy or untrustworthy person based on the short essay, the outcomes from confessing would not change dramatically as Elisa was virtually an anonymous stranger largely incapable of delivering positive or negative consequences. Trust many not be needed when the nature of the interactions largely shield the participant from severe negative consequences. Additionally, the measure of dispositional trust is largely reliant on faith in humanity and faith in humanity does not depend on just one person but rather on believing in the goodness of people in general. Therefore, the offender confesses because it is the right thing to do or because people are generally good and honest. In return, the confidant will act kindly in return either because in general, people *really do care about the wellbeing of others* or *because forgiveness is the right thing to do* (McKnight et al., 2004).

A second limitation is that the transgression presented is not an overt norm violation, nor did it actually physically or emotionally harm the other person. Although it is an underserved outcome for the victim, a selfish choice could indeed be considered as "justified self-interest" (Lerner, 1971). According to Lerner, there are certain circumstances where individuals can justify causing suffering to another. These conditions include situations where there is an implicit understanding there is an equal amount of risk among all participants and participants are justified to pursue the best outcomes for themselves within the fair game rules (Lerner, 1971; Lerner & Lichtman, 1968). Therefore, it is

considered acceptable to take advantage to further their self-interest and not taking advantage might indeed be considered foolish (Lerner, 1971). In this study, participants were given the opportunity to allocate tasks; they were well within their rights to choose the more enjoyable task. If participants do not feel they committed a wrongdoing, there is no reason to confess to a transgression or the information shared does not quite qualify as a confession.

Along the same lines, it is possible that if the majority of the participants believed choosing the more enjoyable task was justified, participants who chose the accountancy task might have done so to avoid such feelings of guilt. It would have been more informative to look at differences in guilt levels between participants who chose the enjoyable task compared to participants who chose the tedious task. Unfortunately, if the accountancy task was chosen, the experiment was terminated, so data necessary to confirm or refute these propositions are unavailable.

General Discussion

Overall the findings from these four studies suggest there is a significant relationship between trust and confession. In particular, it supports the idea that following a transgression, offenders need to be able to believe that their confidant are able to provide a safe and desirable outcome before they are willing to be vulnerable enough to take a risky action such as confession. Study 3.1 provided hypothetical scenario based evidence that participants are more likely to confess to a trustworthy other compared to an untrustworthy other. However, due to the hypothetical nature of the study, a more realistic approach was taken in Study 3.2.

Study 3.2, through a lab-experimental approach, partly replicated the results found in Study 3.1. Specifically, participants were more likely to confess

to breaking a camera to a trustworthy experimenter than an untrustworthy experimenter. The deceptive nature of the experiment in Study 3.2 meant the investigation into the motivations driving the decision to confess was limited.

In Study 3.3, motivations to confess were re-worded as concerns and through these concerns we were able to test the moderation effects of trust. However, it is possible that these concerns did not adequately reflect the motivations driving the decision to confess. Therefore, while the overall relationship between trust and confession was still significant, trust did not moderate any relationships between motivations and confession.

Study 3.4 included a measure of dispositional trust as well as manipulated trust. In order to investigate the effect of participant's propensity to trust, we used an online methodology to control confidant trustworthiness and reduce the number of cues available to the participant. Study 3.4 was innovative in that it allowed us to measure the motivations driving the decision to confess as motivations while still maintaining an experimental approach. However, it was limited in that the transgression chosen might not have been strong enough to warrant a confession. Additionally, we used a research website where possibly the same people participate in many research studies and consequently have a higher level of suspicion over the real objectives of the study, or the presence of a "real" partner. Many participants either did not choose the obviously easy task or mentioned their suspicions in the comment section and were subsequently removed from the study. Therefore, the sample size available for analysis was halved and left a possibly biased sample of overly naïve and trusting participants.

Overall, the findings suggest that both trust in the confidant and a higher propensity to trust leads to an increase in confession. Offenders are more likely

to confess if they feel that the confidant is able to provide them with a sense of security for a beneficial outcome.

The research presented here used vastly different and novel methodologies to investigate confessions in an interpersonal context. From hypothetical, to physical to moral transgressions, the relationship between trust and confession was moderately strong. However, the difficulty lay in investigating why these confessions occur, what motivates an offender to confess or not confess. Future studies should solve the methodological dilemmas of setting up a transgression event that is strong enough to warrant a confession; yet complex enough to provide researchers with the opportunity to investigate why these confessions occur.

Chapter 4: Confessions in Everyday Life: Situational and Dispositional Influences

Hurting another person either intentionally or accidentally is an unfortunate by-product of everyday life. Rarely a day goes by without a person doing something wrong such as telling a lie, gossiping or cheating. But when and why do we confess or not confess wrongdoing in everyday interactions? Research on confession commonly focuses on particular domains, such as in criminal/legal contexts, in psychotherapy, or in religion. Yet research into confessions and interactions between people on a daily basis is limited. Previously, I have developed an integrated informal model of motivations in an attempt to explain what drives the decision to confess in an interpersonal context. However, while the model assumes the relevance of confessions in everyday life, the occurrence and processes of interpersonal confessions have not yet been thoroughly studied in a real-world context.

The present study is an attempt to thoroughly look at the nature of confessions and what prompts the decision to confess in everyday life through the use of a daily diary methodology. Specifically, I am interested in the role of trust and closeness and how these variables interact with the motivations driving the decision to confess. In previous chapters I have already discussed trust in an interpersonal context but in everyday interactions it is common for people to define relationship strength through closeness. It will be interesting to investigate these close but distinct concepts. A secondary aim involves studying the influence of independent and interdependent self-construal. Self-construals refer to the way an individual defines his or her self, either independently of others (e.g., as unique, autonomous) or interdependently with others (e.g., as connected with

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others, defined through roles and relationships) (Cross, Hardin, & Swing, 2011). Self-construals are commonly measured as a stable dispositional measure that may affect the self-related implications of transgressions for offenders, and hence the concerns they may consider when deciding whether to confess or not.

Unlike retrospective studies, information collected through daily diaries is current and reflective of actual experiences. For a period of three weeks, participants were instructed to update their diaries as transgression events occurred, each time they confessed, to whom they confessed and why. Immediately updating the diary reduces the risks of hindsight or recall bias. A diary study is also advantageous over an experimental study, in that it is less artificial and a truer reflection of real life.

Integrative Model of Motivations

In previous chapters (Chapter 2 and 3) I found support for an integrated model of motivations driving the decision to confess. The model is based on two dimensions: social vs. individual and symbolic vs. instrumental (For a thorough description of the model see Chapter 1 and 2).

Motivations lying on the symbolic-instrumental continuum range from concerns related to symbolic threats to the pursuit of instrumental benefits. Symbolic motivations are primarily concerned with the desire to reduce distress caused when a particular action conflicts with one's self-concept or group identity. These concerns include the desire to reduce guilty or shameful feelings or the desire to re-affirm shared values. Instrumental motivations are primarily concerned with the desire to gain benefits or reduce negative outcomes either for the self or another.

On a separate dimension, motivations driving the decision to confess lie

on an individual-social continuum. Individual motivations are concerned with the self, where the benefits may either include reduction of internal moral distress or tangible rewards such as the reduction of negative consequences. Social motivations are concerned with an individual's relationship with another person, group or society at large. Such motivations include the desire to benefit the welfare of another person or maintain a group identity by protecting shared values.

Consequently, these two dimensions intersect to create four subsets of motivations: individual symbolic, individual instrumental, social symbolic and social instrumental. Individual symbolic motivations are concerned with reducing threats to an individual's self-identity by reducing the distress elicited when an action conflicts with an identified self-identity. Individual instrumental motivations are concerned with practical benefits for oneself. Social instrumental motivations are concerned with practical benefits for another person or the group, and social symbolic motivations are concerned with shared values and social harmony of a treasured group.

The integrated model of motivations was developed entirely with confessions in an interpersonal context in mind. In daily life we encounter a variety of people, from strangers to significant others. Within each interaction there is the possibility that one might cause offence. In a previous chapter, I investigated the role of trust towards the victim and how this trust influences the decision to confess, with some mixed results. The role of trust is grounded in the idea that following a transgression, the act of confession is a risk. Confessing to a transgression potentially leads to rejection and scorn from the victim, to punishment or retribution, or the loss of a valued relationship and identity. Unless

offenders see potential for a positive outcome, they might not consider confession an option. One way to gauge the likelihood of positive outcomes is to determine the trustworthiness of another person. Generally, it is the willingness to put the self at risk, either through an action or intimate disclosure, on the belief and reliance of another's benevolence.

The studies reported in Chapter 3 showed that, for the most part, offenders were indeed more likely to confess to a trustworthy rather than an untrustworthy other; however, there was no evidence that trust moderates whether confession or non-confession is used to alleviate or satisfy any of the four concerns or motivations. Further, offenders experienced greater motivation to resolve certain concerns with a trusted than distrusted victim or confidant. However, the evidence was not always consistent. In contrast to Study 3.1, confession motivations were unrelated to trust in Study 3.3; and in Study 3.4 manipulated trust was not a significant predictor of confession.

It is possible that these inconsistent and partly unpredicted results are due to a possible confound where the concept of trust may have been intertwined with the related concept of closeness. A trustworthy other is generally also one we tend to feel closer to. Specifically, it is plausible that while trust should moderate whether individuals take the risk to confess (in response to motivations), closeness may affect how strongly individuals experience those motives or concerns in the first place as explained below. In other words, trust might *moderate* the effects of confession motives, whereas closeness effects would be *mediated* by motives.

The present study introduces closeness towards the victim as a variable that influences the decision to confess, and this relationship is mediated by the

motivations (individual symbolic, individual instrumental, social instrumental and social symbolic). In turn, the relationship between the motivations and the decision to confess is moderated by trust (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1. The role of closeness, trust and motivations in predicting confession

The first leg of the model deals with feelings of closeness towards the victim. Committing an offence against a stranger may not even trigger the thought to confess. On the other hand, harming an important significant other gives rise to a variety of concerns such as increased guilt or concerns for the victim's welfare.

Transgressing against a close other is likely to lead to greater feelings of guilt, shame and internal distress. In a study comparing partner-induced versus spontaneous guilt, Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton (1995) found that participants were more likely to feel more guilt over offences to close partners than distant others. As an interpersonal emotion, guilt is thought to strengthen social bonds by motivating people to behave in ways that maintain relationships. In particular, Baumeister et al. (1995) suggest that guilt operates mainly to protect treasured relationships, as guilty participants were more likely to hold the victim in high regard than non-guilty participants. If the transgression is against a distant other, there may be less motivation to protect the relationship and less distress

from causing harm.

Secondly, committing a transgression against a close other is expected to increase individual instrumental concerns. Increased individual instrumental concerns may be due to increased psychological costs of rejection from a close other than a stranger (Braiker & Kelley, 1979; Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Risk regulation theory (Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 2006) suggest that as the desire for closeness and interdependence increases, so does the risk and pain of rejection. Therefore, offenders are increasingly concerned about their own welfare to protect against the greater hurt a rebuff from a close other would cause compared to a stranger.

Social instrumental motivations involve a focus on the protecting or increasing the welfare of another. I expect that concern for another's welfare over the welfare of oneself is more likely to occur if the victim is a close other rather than a stranger. Previous research into altruism and helping behaviour has found that one is more likely to help a close rather than distant other (Cialdini et al., 1997). In particular, people are more likely to help family members and close friends than acquaintances (Stewart-Williams, 2007). Maner and Gailliot (2007) found that the factors motivating willingness to help close others and distant others differ. Empathic concern (when egoistic motivators such as negative affect is controlled for) is associated with the willingness to help close others but not strangers. Therefore, true social instrumental motivations such as empathic concern for another should increase with closeness of the other.

It has been consistently found in the literature that close social bonds are formed between individuals who share similar views and values (J. A. Hall, 2012; Verbrugge, 1977). Such similarities can underpin a common categorization of self

and other (see Aron, Aaron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991), and individuals sharing the common category membership are expected to be similar (see Turner, 1985). Therefore, a threat to those shared values is a threat to one's identity and the desire to protect or re-affirm a value consensus motivates the decision to confess or not.

Each of the four subset of motivations should lead to confession or non-confession depending on which (confessing or not confessing) is expected to resolve the concern. Therefore, it is expected that a variable that affects this expectation such as trust in the confidant will moderate the response. When confessing to a trustworthy other, there is an expectation of a positive outcome, either through benevolence, forgiveness or leniency that will lead to a positive resolution for the concern. For a more detailed discussion of the role of trust in confession see Chapter 3. I predict that trust moderates the relationship between motivations and confession. In particular, when an offender trusts the victim, individual symbolic, individual instrumental, social instrumental and social symbolic motivations are more likely to be resolved through confession.

When offenders are motivated by individual symbolic concerns such as guilt or shame, they are more likely to confess when there is a trustworthy confidant than an untrustworthy confidant. A trustworthy other is expected to act benevolently and forgivingly, possibly absolving or resolving guilty or shameful feelings.

When offenders are motivated by individual instrumental concerns such as reduction of punishment or impression management, they will also be more likely to confess when there is a trustworthy relative to an untrustworthy confidant. This is again due to the belief that a trustworthy other will act benevolently and show

leniency, which allays concerns about material consequences to the offender. A harsh and untrustworthy other is more likely to lead to non-confession, in an attempt to safeguard against such threats.

When offenders are concerned about upholding social norms and shared values, they will be more likely to confess when there is a trustworthy confidant who is perceived to share those values and more likely to reaffirm the values with, rather than against, the offender (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009).

When offenders are concerned about the welfare of another, it is unlikely that trust will have a significant effect on their decision to confess or not. The benefits of confession for the victim or others are less plausibly dependent on the others' trustworthiness. While it is possible that offenders fear that their prosocial behaviour could be rejected from untrustworthy others, that is, they may not "trust" the other to accept their help, the ultimate goal of social instrumental motivations is to benefit another and thus trust, in the sense of staking one's own outcomes on the benevolence of others, is of no relevance.

In addition to trust that relates to the perceived trustworthiness of the other, the offenders' confession response may also depend on how they perceive themselves. Specifically, how one's definition of self-identity influences the process of confession. Self-construals are associated with individuals' sense of self in relation to others (Hardin et al., 2004) and does not depend on closeness or trustworthiness of either the victim or the confidant. Independent self-construal conceives of the self as separate from social context and is focused on goals such as being unique, direct and assertive as an individual. Specifically, independent self-construal is concerned with internal attributes, abilities, thoughts and feelings in an effort to promote one's own goals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis,

1994).   According to Markus and Kitayama (1991) a highly independent individual derives self-esteem from the ability to assert the self. Interdependent self-construal, on the other hand, is dependent on the relationship with the social world. It implies the valuing of social harmony, fitting in, being indirect, knowing one's place and engaging in appropriate actions (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Highly independent individuals derive their self-esteem from asserting themselves as well as being authentic and true to their self (Singelis, 1994). Therefore, being high in independent self-construal should be related to greater salience of individual concerns following a transgression. Conversely, individuals high in interdependent self-construal gain their self-esteem from their ability to adjust and restrain self for the benefit of social harmony. Being high in interdependent self-construal should therefore be positively related to social concerns.

Additionally, self-construal is not only likely to be related to different concerns following a transgression, but it may also affect how such concerns are being resolved. Specifically, social symbolic motivations such as the desire to protect shared values are more likely to lead to confession rather than non-confession to the extent that offenders define their self as interdependent. This is likely so, one can argue, because an interdependent self-construal implies a greater emphasis on shared rules, social norms and conformity and, thus, the social-interdependent validation of values through shared consensus. Therefore I predict that with higher interdependent self-construal offenders are more likely to confess in order to resolve social symbolic concerns than individuals low in interdependent self-construal.

This is the first investigation into the nature of confession in everyday life.

As in previous studies, but through a novel method that allows for real life incidents, I investigated whether the decision to confess is dependent on whether confession is able to address an offender's concerns. I investigated the influence of both trust in the other and the related concept of closeness on the decision to confess. Finally, this study investigated the dispositional tendency of individuals to construe their self as independent from versus interdependent with others and how this might influence whether they decide to confess to a transgression.

Methods

Design

A diary approach was taken to investigate transgressions and confessions across three weeks. Through these diaries I collected information about transgression events, how participants felt after choosing to confess or not confess and other miscellaneous information.

Participants

Twenty-four participants from an Australian university participated in the study. Three participants did not return their diaries resulting in a total of 21 participants. These 21 participants recorded a total of 218 transgression events. The number of transgression events recorded was not uniform across participants and ranged from one participant recording two events to another recording 20 events. To account for these differences, data analyses using general linear mixed modelling and logistic regressions were conducted.

The mean age of participants was 20.9 years ($SD = 4.75$); there were seven male participants and 14 females.

Materials

Transgression event. For the purpose of collecting information about the

transgression event, participants provided details about the transgression event through an open-ended question. Participants further recorded the time and date of the offence, how severe and wrong the transgression was and how much pain and hurt was caused. This section also collected information such as how close, forgiving and trustworthy the victim was and whether the victim had any suspicions about the participant's involvement in the transgression.

Motivations. My previous research on the motivations driving confession revealed 8 items that were the clearest indicators of the four types of motivation for confession. Using a 7-point likert scale I asked participants to indicate how strongly each item motivated their decision to confess. For non-confessors, equivalent contrasting items were presented.

As outlined in a previous study (Chapter 3), I matched each confession item (I felt guilty and felt the urge to confess) with its corresponding non-confession item (I felt too guilty to confess) to create motivation scales that covered both confessors and non-confessors (feeling guilty). Subsequently, the two items previously found to load together on factor analyses (feeling ashamed and feeling guilty) were averaged together to create the four motives that underlie the decision to confess or not - individual symbolic, social symbolic, individual instrumental and social instrumental. Table 4.1 shows the formation of motivation scales.

Table 4.1

Items for the four different motivations to confess or not confess

	Confession	Non-Confession
Individual symbolic	I felt guilty and felt the urge to own up to my actions.	I felt too guilty to confess.
	I felt ashamed and needed to come clean about it.	I felt ashamed and wanted to push the thought aside.
Individual instrumental	I expected a more positive response for "fessing up".	I expected a negative response for admitting my wrongdoing.
	I hoped to gain people's acceptance despite my actions.	I wanted to avoid punishment for my actions.
Social symbolic	I wanted to demonstrate that honesty and trust are some of our most important values.	I believed that confessing would destroy important values such as harmony and trust.
	My actions undermined values we all share, and I wanted to express my commitment to those values.	My actions undermined values we all share and I wanted to protect those values from my actions.
Social instrumental	I felt the sooner this is cleared up, the less pain, confusion or anxiety it will cause anyone else.	I felt that the sooner this incident is forgotten, the less pain, confusion and anxiety it would cause anyone else.
	I wanted to prevent the other person from being hurt or harmed even further.	I wanted to prevent the other person from being hurt or harmed.

Extended self-construal scale (Hardin et al., 2004). The present study used the extended Self-Construal Scale (SCS) (Hardin et al., 2004), a 30-item questionnaire designed to measure two dimensions of a person's self-image, their independent and interdependent self-construal. In addition to having high face validity, the self-construal scale also has high construct and predictive validity (Singelis, 1994). In this study both interdependent ($\alpha = .73$) and independent subscales ($\alpha = .72$) had good internal reliabilities.

Closeness and trust. Two items (how much you trust the confidant and how trustworthy is the confidant) were averaged together to create a trust measure ($\alpha = .99$). Closeness ($\alpha = .98$) was created from the mean of three items (closeness to victim, intent to persist with relationship and commitment). All items were presented on a 7-point likert scale.

Procedure

Participants were invited to an introductory session and provided with both a hard copy and an online version of the diary to be kept for three weeks. At this initial session, participants also completed an online survey collecting demographic and aforementioned dispositional measures (i.e., self-construal scale).

Participants updated their diary by logging the time and date of the transgression and answering a range of questions about the nature of the transgression. Participants were also asked whether they confessed to the transgression. If there was a confession (to either the victim or another person), they completed a confession detail sheet. If not, participants completed a non-confession detail sheet. Additionally, participants spent approximately five minutes every night updating their diary with a summary of their day. The

summary included information such as whether any transgressions occurred or whether there was a delayed confession.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

Participants reported a mean number of 10.38 transgressions over a three-week period ($SD = 4.88$, median = 10, range = 2 - 20) for a total of 218 transgressions. On average, participants rated transgressions on a 7-point likert scale as moderately severe ($M = 4.10$, $SD = 1.61$), moderately wrong ($M = 4.41$, $SD = 1.66$) but causing little pain or hardship ($M = 2.70$, $SD = 1.75$). The breakdown of targets of transgressions by closeness is presented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2

Breakdown of victims of transgressions by closeness to offender

	Frequency	Percentage
No particular person	13	6.3
Stranger	27	13.0
Acquaintance	41	19.8
Close Friend	62	30.0
Family Member	50	24.2
Partner	14	6.8
Total	207	100.0

Participants reported confessing to 31.2% of transgressions and of those confessions, 36.5% asked for forgiveness. The likelihood of confession did not differ between victim types, $F(5,203) = 1.01$, $p = .41$. Participants directed confessions towards victims 60% of the time and the rest were towards third-party confidants.

General Linear Mixed Modelling

General linear mixed modelling is a data analytical technique that takes into account events nested within, and unbalanced across, participants. In this case, transgression events are nested within individuals and each individual reports a different number of transgression events. Therefore, predictors can arise from both the level of the transgression event (situational factors) and at the level of the person (dispositional traits). General linear mixed modelling accounts for the non-independence of the data that results from multiple transgression events coming from the same person.

First, generalised linear mixed modelling (GLMM) was conducted to investigate the effect of the motivations on confession. All variables were centred before the analysis was conducted. Results revealed that all except social instrumental motivations were predictive of confession. The odds ratio indicates that for every point increase in individual symbolic concerns participants were 1.45 times more likely to confess. For every point increase in individual instrumental concerns, participants were 2.12 times less likely to confess and for every point increase in social symbolic motivations, participants were 1.49 times more likely to confess (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3

Coefficient, SE and odds ratio of motivations on confession

	B	SE	t	p	Odds Ratio
Individual Symbolic	.37	.14	2.71	.01	1.45
Individual Instrumental	-.74	.15	-5.11	.000	.48
Social Instrumental	-.15	.16	-.99	.33	.86
Social Symbolic	.40	.16	2.52	.01	1.49
Intercept	-.26	.52	-.51	.51	.77

Closeness as Predictors of Confession

As predicted, GLMM with trust and closeness as predictors and confession as the criterion variable revealed that trust was a highly significant predictor of confession, $B = .37$, $(SE = .10)$, $F(1, 206) = 14.31$, $p < .001$, whereas closeness was a marginally significant predictor of confession, $B = .14$, $(SE = .07)$, $F(1,204) = 3.49$, $p = .06$.

When linear mixed model analysis was conducted with closeness as the independent variable and each of the motivations as dependent variables, closeness had a highly significant effect on all four types of motivations (Table 4.4). Additionally, for all motivation types, this effect was positive. That is, the closer an offender felt towards the victim, the more motivated he or she was by each concern.

Table 4.4

Parameter estimates, SE and p values for closeness (IV) on motivations (DVs) with N = 203, df = 201

	Estimate	*SE*	*t*	*p*
Individual Symbolic	.32	.06	5.82	.000
Individual Instrumental	.15	.06	2.78	.006
Social Instrumental	.36	.05	6.68	.000
Social Symbolic	.29	.05	5.54	.000

I predicted that each of the four motivations would mediate a relationship between closeness and confession. Specifically, transgressing against someone one is close to will lead to an increase in individual symbolic, individual instrumental, social instrumental and social symbolic concerns. And mediated through these motivations, it was predicted, offenders would be more likely to confess to a close rather than distant other. Mediation analysis was conducted

using PROCESS (Hayes, 2008) and bootstrap analysis revealed that individual symbolic, social symbolic and individual instrumental motivations all significantly mediated the relationship between closeness and confession as the 95% (bias corrected and accelerated; see Table 4.5) confidence intervals for the indirect effect did not include 0 (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). Although PROCESS does not fully take into account higher order information, conventional regression analysis yielded nearly identical results to those conveyed from GLMM for all previously mentioned analysis. Therefore, in lieu of any other available options, I proceeded to investigate mediation through PROCESS

Table 4.5

Bootstrap results for 5000 samples, total effect, standard error and lower and upper 95% confidence intervals

	Effect	*SE*	Lower 95%	Upper 95%
Individual Symbolic	.12	.05	.04	.24
Individual Instrumental	-.10	.06	-.24	-.02
Social Symbolic	.10	.06	.01	.24
Social Instrumental	-.08	.06	-.21	.03

Individual symbolic and social symbolic motivations led to an increase in confession, while individual instrumental motivations contributed to a decrease in confession. The indirect effect of social instrumental motivations was not significant. Specifically, when one hurts someone they are close to, one may be more likely to be concerned by guilt (individual symbolic) and values (social symbolic). The increase in individual and social symbolic concerns leads to an increase in confession. Mediation analysis also revealed that hurting a close rather than distant other increased individual instrumental motivations, which led to a

decrease in confession.

Trust as a Moderator

I predicted that trust would moderate the relationship between each of the four motivations and confession. To test this prediction, GLMM was conducted with all four motivation types, trust and the product terms of trust and each motivation entered as predictors. As can be seen from Table 4.6, results revealed only a main effect of trust when motivations and interactions were controlled for. There were no significant interaction effects between trust and any of the four motivations and my hypothesis was not supported.

Table 4.6

Coefficient, SE and odds ratio of trust, motivations and their interactions on predicting confession

	Coefficient	SE	t	p	Odds Ratio
Trust	.35	.12	2.94	.004	1.48
Individual Symbolic	.01	.27	.03	.97	1.01
Individual Instrumental	-.48	.38	-1.28	.20	.62
Social Instrumental	-.12	.37	-.33	.74	.89
Social Symbolic	.37	.54	.69	.49	1.45
Trust x Individual Symbolic	.06	.06	.99	.32	1.06
Trust x Individual Instrumental	-.04	.07	-.61	.55	.96
Trust x Social Instrumental	.03	.07	-.48	.63	.97
Trust x Social Symbolic	-.00	.10	-.004	.997	1.00
Intercept	-2.70	.06	-4.32	.00	.07

Self-construal

Linear mixed modelling was conducted to investigate the effect of self-construals on motivations. Specifically, analysis was conducted to test the prediction that interdependent self-construals are related to social motivations and independent self-construals to individual motivations and results revealed that interdependent self-construal when independent self-construal was controlled for,

predicted higher levels of social instrumental, *B* = .68, *SE* = .21, *t*(212) = 3.26, *p* = .001, social symbolic, *B* = .80, *SE* = .20, *t*(212) = 4.09, *p* < .001, and (marginally) individual symbolic motivations, *B* = .41, SE = .21, *t*(212) = 1.93, *p* = .055, but not individual instrumental motivations (*p* = .92).

Independent self-construal, when interdependent SCS was controlled for, predicted lower levels of individual symbolic, *B* = -.60, *SE* = .21, *t*(212) = -2.86, *p* = .01, and social instrumental motivations, *B* = -.43, *SE* = .19, *t*(212) = -2.07, *p* = .04. Individual instrumental *(p = .77)* and social symbolic (*p* = .09) were not significantly related to independent self-construal.

GLMM revealed that neither independent *(p = .27)* nor interdependent *(p = .57)* self-construal predicted confession. However, when motivations were controlled for, GLMM showed independent individuals were marginally more likely to confess while interdependent individuals were marginally less likely to confess (see Table 4.7)

Table 4.7

Interaction of interdependent self-construals and motivations on the decision to confess while controlling for independent self-construals

|	B	SE	t	p	Odds Ratio
Independent self-construal	-.87	.41	-2.12	.06	.42
Interdependent self-construal	.87	.43	2.03	.06	2.39
Individual Symbolic	-.40	.12	-3.38	.001	.67
Individual Instrumental	-.86	.16	5.32	.000	2.37
Social Instrumental	-.24	.17	1.40	.16	1.27
Social Symbolic	-.58	.16	-3.68	.000	.56
Interdependence x Individual Symbolic	.14	.21	0.69	.49	1.15
Interdependence x Individual Instrumental	.43	.21	2.10	.04	1.55
Interdependence x Social Instrumental	.14	.23	.62	.54	1.15
Interdependence x Social Symbolic	-.66	.16	-4.05	.000	.52
Intercept	1.32	.27	4.87	.000	3.76

As seen in Table 4.7, interdependent self-construal, when controlling for independent self-construal, significantly moderated the relationship between social symbolic motivations and confession and individual instrumental motivations and confession. In line with predictions, social symbolic motivations were positively related to confessions but particularly so for highly interdependent individuals. When participants held highly interdependent beliefs, they tended to resolve their social symbolic motivations through confession over non-confession (see Figure 4.2). In other words, with greater levels of interdependent self-construal, social-symbolic motivations were more strongly related to confession. There were no significant interactions with independent self-construal.

Figure 4.2. Significant interaction between social symbolic motivations and interdependence on confession

Unexpectedly, individual instrumental motivations were negatively related to confession but particularly so for highly interdependent individuals. At high

levels of interdependence, individuals tended to resolve their individual

instrumental concerns through non-confession (see Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3. Significant interaction between individual instrumental

motivations and interdependence on confession

In order to investigate the relationship between self-construals,

motivations and confession, mediation analysis was conducted. I predicted that a

positive relationship between interdependent self-construal and confession would

be mediated through the social motivations, particularly social symbolic

motivations. First, independent and interdependent self-construal effects were

tested on the motivations through linear mixed modelling; the results are

presented in Table 4.8. In the second step, the relationship between the

confession (DV) and the four motivations (mediators) were tested (see Table 4.3)

and all but social instrumental motivations were significantly related to

confession.

If we consider these two legs of the mediation, there was a negative indirect effect of independent self-construal on confession via individual symbolic motivations. Similarly, there was a positive indirect effect of interdependent self-construal on confession via social symbolic motivations. However, bootstrap analysis via PROCESS revealed that when all four motivations were entered into the mediation, only social symbolic motivations were a significant mediator for the relationship between interdependent self-construal and confession (Effect = .27, *SE* = .15, lower 95% = .06, upper 95% = .64). It is important to note again though that PROCESS does not take into account the nested and non-independent nature of the data and the results can therefore only be considered an approximation.

Table 4.8

B, SE of independent and interdependent self-construal on each of the four motivations, where N=215, df = 212.

		B	SE	t	p
Individual symbolic	Independent	-.60	.21	-2.86	.01
	Interdependent	.41	.21	1.93	.06
Individual instrumental	Independent	-.06	.20	-.29	.77
	Interdependent	-.02	.20	-.11	.92
Social symbolic	Independent	-.33	.19	-1.73	.09
	Interdependent	.80	.20	4.09	.000
Social Instrumental	Independent	-.43	.21	-2.07	.04
	Interdependent	.69	.21	3.26	.001

Discussion

The current study suggests that minor transgressions occur frequently in everyday life and people confess regularly (in the present study to almost a third of such transgressions). While the nature of transgressions is not a focus of this study, it is interesting to see that within a three-week period, participants reported

on average 10 transgressions that, while varied in nature, were perceived as at least moderately severe. However, it is noted that on average transgressions did not cause severe pain or hurt. Participants confessed to roughly 31% of the transgressions committed and approximately 60% of these confessions were directed towards victims. The majority of these confessions were directed to close friends, family members or partners.

Due to the nature of the study, we were able to look at confessions as they occurred in real time, avoiding the pitfalls of hypothetical scenarios or retrospective studies. Even though a very different methodology was used, the present findings are similar to those of Study 3.1, in that individual symbolic and social symbolic motivations were positively related to confession behaviour while individual instrumental motivations were negatively related to confession. Social instrumental motivations did not predict confession. As previously described in Chapter 3, each motivation can lead to either confession or non-confession and which outcomes occurs should be dependent on which is more effective at resolving the motivation. However, it is possible in most instances in real life, certain concerns are more frequently resolved by one outcome over the other. For example, although individual instrumental concerns such as avoiding punishment or maintaining a good impression can theoretically be resolved through either confession (confessing to minimise punishment or to look like an honest person) or non-confession (avoiding responsibility altogether), the latter option may frequently be a simpler and more effective option. Therefore, as the data suggest, empirically it may seem like individual instrumental motivations are associated with non-confession but conceptually, the option for both outcomes are still possible.

Closeness was predicted to affect the decision to confess, primarily through different motivation pathways. Results showed that while the relationship between closeness and confession was marginally significant, the relationship between closeness and each of the motivations was highly and positively significant. As predicted, increased closeness is associated with increased individual symbolic, individual instrumental, social instrumental and social symbolic concerns. Interestingly, an increase in closeness was also associated with an increase in individual instrumental concerns, which resulted in a decreased likelihood of confession. Previously, I hypothesised that individual instrumental concerns increase as closeness increase possibly due to the higher costs of rejection that occurs with increased interdependence (Murray et al., 2006). However, it is also possible that individuals are concerned about more dire consequences from having transgressed against a close (or ingroup) other, in line with what is known in psychology as the black sheep effect (Eidelman & Biernat, 2003; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). The black sheep effect is a phenomenon where deviant in-group members are treated more negatively than an outgroup member. As the offender has violated a norm presumably shared with the close other, he or she might fear harsher consequences as the confidant attempts to distance himself or herself from the deviant. That is, individuals may be more concerned about the consequences from transgressing against a close other, who may be potentially more offended or disappointed than someone they were close to victimized them.

As previously mentioned increased closeness is associated with increased individual symbolic concerns, social instrumental and social symbolic motivations. These results support previous research where people were more likely to feel guilty towards close others compared to strangers (Baumeister et al.,

1995) and more likely to help as closeness increases (Cialdini et al., 1997).

Lastly, when a transgression occurs against a close other mutually held beliefs

and norms are jeopardized. Conversely, if individuals are not close (thus lacking a

sense of shared identity), there is little expectation to share the same values and

reduced commitment to validate and re-affirm shared values (Turner, 1985).

Although all four motivations were significantly and positively associated

with closeness, the indirect effects of each motivation led to different confession

outcomes. Through individual symbolic and social symbolic motivations,

closeness predicted greater levels of confession. Through individual instrumental

motivations, closeness predicted lower levels of confession. Social instrumental

motivations were not significant as a mediator.

As predicted, trust is a highly significant predictor of confession. The

effect of trust on confession has been a fairly consistent finding in my previous

studies. However, trust did not moderate the relationship between the motivations

and confession. The absence of moderations suggests that the effect of trust on

confession is not dependent on the particular motives currently measured.

It is possible that confession is less of a cost-benefit driven decision

(which behaviours serves my motives best?) and rather a more categorically

moral decision: to the extent that one violated personal values or social values and

consequently are motivated by symbolic concerns, there is a moral mandate to

come clean and confess (Skitka & Houston, 2001). According to the moral

mandate hypothesis, when people have a clear moral standard, they perceive

consequences as fair if the outcome was achieved regardless of the fairness of the

process (Skitka & Houston, 2001). This hypothesis is supported as significant

relationships were found between increased concern regarding individual

symbolic motivations and social symbolic motivations and increased likelihood of confession. Along similar lines, to the extent that the other is a trusted and close other, there is a moral mandate to be honest to them.

Interdependent and independent self-construals also showed interesting results. Interdependent self-construal is the general inclination to define oneself through one's social relationships. As predicted, an increased interdependent self-construal is associated with increased *social* instrumental and *social* symbolic concerns. Surprisingly, independent self-construal is conversely not related to *individual* instrumental motivations and negatively related to *individual* symbolic motivations and social instrumental motivations. It is possible that having a highly independent self-construal does not necessarily mean that individuals are more concerned about the self (selfish), although the negative relationship to social instrumental motivations suggests they are *less* concerned about others. However, while independent cultures have been shown to be lower in shame and guilt (individual symbolic concerns) than collectivist cultures (Bierbrauer, 1992), in the present study interdependence was negatively related to individual symbolic motivations. Still, it is understandable that an increase in independent self-construal is associated with less social instrumental concerns, as the individual does not identify themselves through their relationships with others.

Additional analysis revealed that interdependent self-construal has a moderating effect on confession. Highly interdependent individuals tend to resolve social symbolic motivations through confession rather than non-confession yet tend to resolve high individual instrumental motivations through non-confession instead.

It makes sense that an individual high in interdependent self-construal (or, relatedly, collectivism) would want to resolve social symbolic motivations by outrightly acknowledging norm violations with the treasured community and re-affirming the importance of them. Conversely, a highly collectivist person concerned with individual instrumental motivations, may choose to resolve these concerns through non-confession in an effort to save face. Face is defined as a sense of self-image or worth that an individual wants to claim for him or herself (Guan, Park, & Lee, 2009; Ting-toomey & Kurogi, 1998). In their study of apologies in a cross-cultural setting, Guan et al. (2009) found that contrary to their expectations American participants had a stronger desire to apologise to offences than Korean and Chinese participants. They suggested that saving face in collectivist cultures refers to avoiding shame or disgrace on themselves or their family. The social nature of the transgression event in their study (personal space violation) increased individual instrumental concerns such as "bringing shame on them" and, in order to save face, the Chinese and Korean participants chose not to apologise (Guan et al., 2009). In this scenario bringing shame is conceptually different to feeling shame. The former is associated with self-presentation concerns and the latter is associated with the emotional experience of a damaged self-image. Similarly, if individuals are highly interdependent yet individual instrumental concerns are the most salient, then non-confession may be best equipped to resolve these concerns.

Limitations, Implications and Conclusions

There are several limitations to this study. First, by directly asking participants to record their transgressions I have heightened their awareness of transgressing. Therefore it is possible that they consciously or unconsciously

reduce the number of norm violations they normally would have committed. Alternatively, some participants may be on the other end of the spectrum, "faking bad" in an effort to seem more interesting. General linear mixed modelling should account for the individuals on the both ends of the spectrum by controlling for differences between participants, but this is an issue that could potentially limit the realism of the study.

Second, I asked participants to record each time a confession was offered. Although one might desire to confess and apologise when they have caused hurt, sometimes these transgressions are so minor, it might not be worth bringing up. When participants are asked to record confessions every night, they are reminded (through socially accepted conventions) that they have committed a transgression and the usually the social expected thing to do is to apologise. Consequently, the diary study may have picked up confessions from transgressions that would normally have been forgotten or dismissed.

Lastly, there is an issue with the small sample size in the study. Although there are over two hundred transgression events, there are only 21 participants in total. The small sample size suggests that caution is advised when interpreting results. When using a general linear mixed model, researchers are advised to compute a null model to determine the variance component of the random effect to see if there is statistically significant variability in intercept across participants, justifying a multi-level model. In this study, the variance component of level two could not be computed. The error message in both MPlus and SPSS suggests that computing a variance estimate may not be logically possible, at least not within the algorithms that are used for this technique. When there is not any difference between the higher order variable, or in this case, no variance component to

determine, then traditional analytical techniques such as regression and ANOVAs can be used to analyse data (Peugh, 2010). When logistic regression analyses were conducted on the present study, results were nearly identical. Considering regression produces nearly identical results, results from the GLMM are presented in this study.

A daily diary study provides us with a novel way of investigating confessions in an interpersonal context. The addition of closeness as a predictor variable afforded us with a more intricate understanding of the process that leads to the decision to confess. However, the absence of moderation effect of trust means that we are still not fully informed of when confessions occur and why they occur in some circumstances and not others. Future studies should consider other moderators of confession in order to fully explain the relationship between motivations and the decision to confess.

Chapter 5: General Discussion

The present research focuses on confessions in an interpersonal context and explores the influence of motivations through surveys, scenarios, experimental procedures and a diary methodology. Each chapter explores a different aspect to confession behaviour in everyday life and brings a deeper understanding to the influence of trust, closeness and self-construals on the motivations driving the decision to confess. Overall, the findings from the studies have important implications for forgiveness, reconciliation and confession in both interpersonal and criminal justice domains. However, the studies presented are not without limitations and will require further research. This final chapter will discuss the implications, limitations and suggested avenues of research.

Integrated Model of Motivations

Findings from Chapter 2 reveal the presence of a four-factor model of motivations driving the decision to confess. This is the first study, in my knowledge, to develop and create a taxonomy of potential motivators for the *decision* to confess. The strength of the model lies in its foundation since motivators and concerns were sourced through the integration of confession research from a wide range of fields, from criminal justice research to psychological research to religious research (Hilgendorf & Irving, 1981; Horowitz, 1956; Hymer, 1995; Pennebaker, 1989). Thus, the applications of the integrated model of motivations are theoretically endless and may be extended to interpersonal, religious and criminal contexts.

Findings from exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses from Studies 2.1, 2.2 and 3.1 reveal that the same motives apply to both confessions and non-confessions. That is, motives are dual in nature, and can theoretically lead to both

outcomes. For example, in an attempt to protect and maintain a good impression, individuals may confess in an effort to show that they are a good and honest person. Alternatively, individuals may deny responsibility for a wrongdoing altogether to keep their good image untarnished. However, when real confessions to transgressions were studied in Chapters 3 and 4, individual instrumental motives were generally associated with non-confession while symbolic motives (individual and social) were associated with confession. As previously discussed (Chapter 3) it possible that, although motives are theoretically dual in nature and *can* lead to both outcomes, in real life, possibly through past experience, some motives are just expected to be more easily resolved through confession and others are more frequently and effectively resolved through non-confession.

If we accept this evidence for the presence of direct relationships between motives and confession, the present research offers more potential motives, beyond instrumental incentives, for interrogators or other interested parties to use to encourage confessions. These motives also provide support for restorative justice research as they are primarily symbolic in nature, based on affirming shared values and moral identity. For example, motives from the social symbolic side of the continua are not commonly appealed to in the criminal justice, yet findings from Chapters 2 and 3 repeatedly showed that they are strong predictors of confession. If interrogators appeal more strongly to a shared value consensus, it is possible that the rate of confessions may increase. As suggested by Wenzel and colleagues, when a transgression is committed offenders are primarily concerned about value consensus and justice can be restored through re-affirming shared values (Wenzel et al., 2008, 2010). Publicly acknowledging a norm violation and

re-affirming values can be seen as a sign of respect for the rules of the community (see also Schnabel & Nadler, 2008) .

However, it is possible that providing interrogators with such a wide range of offender concerns and motives may be problematic, as their use may also inadvertently raise the likelihood of false confessions, especially if applied to vulnerable people. Kassin & Gudjonsson (2004) propose two categorisations of false confessions, coerced-compliant and coerced-internalised. Coerced-compliant confessions are instrumental false confessions offered by innocent suspects as a means of escaping an aversive environment or to gain some benefit or reward. Coerced-internalised confessions occur when, through the use of highly suggestive interrogative techniques, innocent suspects internalised the guilt and believe they believe they committed the crime.

The possibility of false confession may also be greater with a trusted confidant. Psychological research suggest that the urge to confess is grounded in anxiety as a response to social pressure, resulting in a need to confess the offence, especially to someone close (Bering & Shackelford, 2004; Reik, 1959). Drake (2011) suggests that police interviewers may inadvertently tap into these feelings of insecurity, consequently leading suspects to believe that confession (genuine or false) is more beneficial than maintaining their innocence. In addition to the risk of increased coerced-compliant false confessions due to external incentives (e.g., to reduce a punishment that seems unavoidable), symbolic motivations such as increased positive and social regard from a trusted authority may also increase the risk of false confession.

In line with these concerns are the criticisms against the Reid technique (Inbau et al., 2011) and the psychologically coercive nature of the technique's

fundamental interrogation processes. In the Reid technique, interrogators are instructed to break down the suspect's denials and resistance while increasing the suspect's desire to confess, whether it be through trickery, deception or psychological manipulation (Gudjonsson, 1992). Some may argue that the purposeful activation of particular motivations during interrogations may also be considered psychologically manipulative and therefore it is important to be aware of the possibility of crossing ethical boundaries. The fine line between psychologically coercive techniques and activation of motivations must be further explored.

The direct and negative relationship between individual instrumental motives and confession suggests that the majority of currently accepted interrogative techniques primarily grounded in providing incentives or highlighting punishment may actually be counterproductive. Studies from Chapter 2 to 4 all found that individual instrumental motivations were *negatively* related to the likelihood of confession. It is important to remember that the motivation measures were designed to be dual in nature, such that confession and non-confession would be both equally likely outcomes. A consistently negative relationship between individual instrument motives and confession might imply that when interrogators offer reduced punishment, they are potentially priming a motivational frame of mind that decreases the likelihood of confession. Therefore, further research should investigate the benefits of avoiding appeals to individual instrumental concerns and instead increasing the salience of symbolic concerns.

The Role of Trust and Closeness

It was initially expected that the decision to confess is dependent on which of the two, confession or non-confession, resolve the concern most salient to the offender. Specifically, I expected that trust would moderate the relationship between motives and confession. I hypothesised that the willingness to confess is dependent on whether the confidant will react positively either through forgiveness, leniency or benevolence. However, there was little to no evidence of a moderation effect. Instead, I consistently found a direct relationship between trust and confession. As previously mentioned in the discussion of Chapter 4, it is possible that the decision to confess is primarily a moral decision and not dependent on whether the confidant is able to aid in resolving offender concerns. The moral mandate hypothesis suggests that when there is a clear moral standard, people judge the fairness of the outcome based on whether the standard was achieved regardless of the process of achieving it (Skitka & Houston, 2001). These moral mandates, attitudes rooted in moral conviction, are based on an individual's perception of right and wrong (Skitka, 2010; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). In this case, the fair outcome would be confession when clear moral standards such as the concerns for shared values and justice are primed and salient, then the right thing to do would be confession regardless of whether the other person is able to forgive or react benevolently.

Instead of moderation effects, I found evidence that trust determines the salience of certain motives (Chapter 3). However, upon closer examination (Chapter 4) it is more likely that the related concept of closeness is responsible for increasing the likelihood of certain concerns. This has interesting implications for interpersonal relationships and conflict resolution between close individuals. In

Chapter 4 it was found that the direct relationship between closeness and confession was only marginal. That is, there was marginal evidence that an increase in confession was associated with an increase in closeness. However, mediation analysis revealed significant indirect effects of individual symbolic, individual instrumental and social symbolic motives. Of particular interest is that individual instrumental concerns were related to a *decreased* likelihood of confession. That is, it would seem closeness increases the likelihood of individual instrumental concerns but these concerns lead to decreased confession. Thus, when a transgression occurs between two close individuals, closeness predicts confession through three different pathways; and as confessions tend to repair relationships (Hale, 1987; Scher & Darley, 1997), my findings suggest that it is better to highlight symbolic concerns so that confessions are more likely. Although, it is important to note, that this suggestion should be taken with caution as confessions (via apologies) are not always effective (Skarlicki, Folger, & Gee, 2004).

The Role of Self-Construals

Self-construals were initially investigated in Chapter 2 and significant associations between interdependent self-construal and social instrumental motivations were found. In Chapter 4, the relationship between interdependence and social instrumental was replicated. In addition, I also found a significant positive relationship with social symbolic motivations. This finding is not surprising, as interdependence and the social connectedness of the self increases, so should social concerns.

The finding of particular interest is the moderation effect of social symbolic motives. At high interdependence, social symbolic motivations were

resolved through confession and individual instrumental motives were resolved through non-confession. As discussed in Chapter 4, the former effect may reflect the increased motivation to restore a social identity and its defining moral values through the interdependent means of social validation and shared consensus. In contrast, the latter effect may reflect the increased concern of saving face, avoiding the loss of public image and social acceptance that are of increased relevance for individuals who construe their self as interdependent with others. This finding has interesting implications for criminal research; if we can make interdependent self-construals salient, we may be able to manage the motives in order to encourage confession. For example, if we prime interdependence in suspects, we might be able to encourage motives such as the desire to re-affirm shared values and through these pathways, encourage confession.

Additionally, the different findings of independent and interdependent self-construals and their associations with motivations may have larger cultural implications. Independence and interdependence are commonly associated with western and eastern cultural ideals and thus there may be cultural differences in approaches to confession. Cross-cultural research suggests that there is a fundamental difference in the way individualist cultures and collectivist cultures view apologies (Maddux, Kim, Okumura, & Brett, 2011). Collectivist cultures interpret the meaning of apologies differently and consequently have different meanings for trust repair, and conflict resolution. While, apologies are conceptually different to confessions, both share the requirement one must accept causal responsibility. However, in collectivist cultures an apology functions as an acknowledgement of a transgression and because responsibility is diffused amongst many, it acts as an acknowledgement of the shared values and a re-

affirmation of said values. In individualist societies an apology is taken as an acceptance of blame (Maddux et al., 2011). Further research is required to advance our understanding of the cultural differences and implications of confession.

Limitations and Future Research

Overall, the investigation of confessions in this thesis encountered several limitations. First, confessions were always tested as a dichotomous categorical variable. In each study, participants either confessed or did not confess. This is problematic in two respects: 1) people often confess to only part of their transgression 2) confessions are investigated without consideration of additional components such as the presence of remorse, excuses and justifications

In regards to partial confessions, Peer, Acquisti, and Shalvi (2014) found that people sometimes confess to some but not all of their wrongdoing, and this is particularly so for people who cheated to the full extent. In my "broken camera" studies (Studies 3.2 & 3.3) participants occasionally reported that *"something fell" or " x item (book, bag, papers) fell"*. Although I recorded these as non-confessions, according to Peer at al. these would be considered partial confessions where participants admitted to causing something to drop but not to the full extent that they admitted responsibility for damaging the camera. These partial confessions increase credibility, but decrease emotional wellbeing through negative affect when compared to full confessions (Peer et al., 2014). Since partial confessions have different implications from full confessions, future research should fully investigate the role of partial confession and whether there are differences in salient motivations.

Second, a brief look at the open-ended responses from surveys Studies 2.1 and 2.2 showed that confessions were frequently accompanied by at least one qualification: remorse, excuses and/or justifications. Investigating confessions solely as a yes/no dichotomy without regard for these qualifications may limit our understanding, as it is possible that different motivations leads to confessions of different meaning and function *through* one of these qualifications. For example, an individual motivated by individual instrumental concerns may confess to present a good and honest impression. In order to ensure that impression management concerns are resolved, the confession may be accompanied by a justification, explaining that the transgression was not really the fault of the individual but rather due to external influences. Similarly, an individual motivated by individual symbolic concern may apologise in addition to confess in an attempt to show remorse and reduce feelings of guilt and shame. In the future, it will be interesting to investigate the role of each of the four motivations in predicting the likelihood of apology, excuses and justifications.

Another limitation is that the majority of transgressions were low to moderately severe and causing minimal physical or emotional harm. There are two implications of this limitation. First, there is the methodological dilemma between clean experimentation in the lab and ethical restrictions this puts on the research. Commonly, transgressions most people would be afraid to confess to are those that have severe implications for the offenders' moral integrity and self-identity as good people. Offences such as physical abuse of a spouse or infidelity are undeniably hurtful; and should one admit responsibility for such transgressions, the damage to self-identity and integrity is severe if one defines himself as a loyal and faithful partner. In the present research, it is possible that

since the transgression does not cause much harm, individuals may confess because the negative repercussions are not severe or not confess because there is not a purpose to confessing to such a minor issue. Investigating severe transgressions are important as they can inform us about whether motivations and their interactions with trust and closeness really stand to the test when threat to the offender is great. However, it is not ethical to encourage such behaviour or deceive the participants into believing they either committed such a transgression or are even *capable* of committing such an offence.

The consistently low levels of guilt do not allow for effective investigation. It was originally hypothesised that guilt may act as an overarching sense of wrongdoing that can imply different relationships with each of the four motivations. Due to the low guilt levels it was not possible to investigate the implications of guilt and therefore no findings were reported and thus must be investigated in the future. The balance between developing methodology severe enough to induce guilt without crossing ethical boundaries is an issue that will always be of concern.

An additional limitation is that on many occasions, participants were removed from studies due to difficulties with studying confessions in an experimental design. Consequently, some studies were underpowered. Many participants were removed from the study either due to incomplete participation (incomplete diaries, reporting transgressions where victims were already aware of offenders responsibility) or failed manipulations (failed camera drops, choosing the selfless choice). This was particularly unfavourable for data analytic techniques that required large sample sizes such as confirmatory factor analysis, general linear mixed modelling (GLMM) and is an unfortunate consequence of

employing novel techniques. Regardless, I argue it is important to continue developing ways of investigating transgressions and confessions outside of retrospective surveys of hypothetical scenarios in order to fully understand confession behaviour in everyday life.

Over the series of studies confessions to victims and third parties were not thoroughly differentiated. Although, results from Study 1 revealed no differences between the two types of confidants in meaning and endorsements of any of the four concerns, theoretically, there should be certain motivations that only a victim can resolve and other motivations that are more effectively resolved by a third party. Previous research found that third parties reacted to transgressions differently from victims. In particular, observers were less likely to forgive than victims and the effect was mediated by perceived offender intentions (Green, Burnette, & Davis, 2008). That is, third parties were less forgiving because they made less benevolent attributions of the offender. Conversely, Fincham, Paleari, and Regalia (2002) found that kinder attributions of the offender led to increased forgiveness. Therefore, third parties may initially be harsh and unforgiving but when an offender has the chance to confess and explain their actions, then forgiveness is likely to increase. Skarlicki and Kulik (2004) suggest that third parties are important as they are able to gather information from many sources and able to process the information in a broader context without a sense of personal vulnerability or self-interest. Confessions in an interpersonal context are commonly directed towards trusted individuals such as significant others or family members yet there are still many questions regarding the reactions of third parties to offender confessions and how validation or refutation from a third party affects the offender.

Lastly, recent research suggest that acceptance of responsibility for their transgression is dependent on the offender's implicit theory of personality (Schumann & Dweck, 2014). In particular, individuals who believe personality is malleable (incremental theorist) are more willing to accept responsibility than those who see personality as fixed (entity theorist). Schumann and Dweck (2014) posit that this is because incremental theorist are less likely to perceive accepting responsibility as a threat and view the opportunity to grow, repair and develop the relationship with the victim. Although, I have made attempts to include dispositional variables in my investigation of confession, I did not take into account implicit personality theories and wonder if these beliefs will lead to the salience of certain motivations. It is possible that if an offender believes personality to be fixed, certain concerns such as the desire to restore moral integrity or desire to re-affirm shared values might no longer be relevant. Further research could extend confession research beyond social situational variables and look at how personality traits affect offenders' motives and what this means for confession.

Conclusion

The research presented in this thesis contributes to the body of literature on motivations of confession to wrongdoing and the potential moderators and mediators involved when deciding to confess. In particular, findings suggest that using an integrated model of motivations that encompasses both individual-social and symbolic-instrumental continua is a starting point for understanding the concerns that underlie confession. Furthermore the relationship between motivation and confession is influenced by situational determinants such as the trustworthiness of the confidant, closeness to the victim and the dispositional

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traits of the offender. This should have valuable implications for criminal psychology, where a more nuanced understanding of spontaneous and voluntary confessions and of the processes leading up to the decision to confess may aid police interviewers to encourage genuine confessions.

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Appendix A – Survey 1

1. Please select and describe in detail an event in your past where you have committed a transgression against another person. A transgression is a violation of a norm that the other person could consider to be wrong and or hurtful. Specifically, think of an incident where the other person was not aware or not certain about your role or culpability. In other words, the other person did not know or wasn't sure that it was you or what you did.

2. How long ago did the offence occur?

3. What was your relationship with the other person?

    - Partner/Significant Other

    - Close Friend

    - Family

    - Acquaintance

    - Stranger

The following items (4 -12) are on a 7-point Likert Scale (1= Not at All, 7 = Extremely)

4. How close were you to the other person at the time of the transgression?

5. How close are you to the other person at the present time?

6. How serious did you perceive your transgression to be at the time of the offence?

7. How serious do you perceive your transgression to be now?

8. How wrong did you perceive your transgression to be at the time of the offence?

9. How wrong do you perceive your transgression to be now?

10. How wrong do you think others would perceive your transgression to be?

11. How wrong would the other person perceive your transgression?

12. How hurt (physically or emotionally) was the other person as a result of the transgression?

Questions 13 – 22 presented only to confessors.

13. Did you confess your transgression to the victim or anyone else?

   o Yes/No

14. Who did you confess to?

   o The other person

   o Someone else

15. If it was someone else, what was your relationship with the other person.

   o Partner/Significant Other

   o Close Friend

   o Family

   o Acquaintance

   o Stranger

16. How close were you to your confidant at the time of the transgression?

   • 7-point Likert Scale (1= Not at all, 7 = Extremely)

17. How close are you to your confidant at the present time?

   • Open Space Answer

18. How soon after the incident did you confess?

   • 7-point Likert Scale (1= Immediately, 7 = Very Long After)

19. What level of detail did you reveal in your disclosure?

   • 7-point Likert Scale (1= None, 7 = Everything)

20. How honest or truthful was your confession?

- 7-point Likert Scale (1= Not at all, 7 = Extremely)

21. Did you ask for forgiveness from your victim?

- Yes/No

22. Did he or she forgive you?

- Yes/No

Question 23- 29 Participants presented either confession or non-confession version depending on whether they confessed or not.

23. What thoughts or reasons prompted your decision (not) to disclose your role in the transgression?

- Open Space Answer

The following items (20 – 23) are on a 7-point Likert Scale (1= Very bad, 7 = Very good)

24. How did you feel following your decision (not) to disclose?

25. How did you feel about yourself following your decision (not) to disclose?

26. How do you presently feel about your decision (not) to disclose?

27. How well did you cope with your decision (not) to confess?

28. Did the other person confront or challenge you about the incident at any point?

- Yes/No

- Please Expand

29. Do you believe that the other person suspected your involvement in the transgressions?

- Yes/No

- Please Expand

30. How positive or negative do you anticipate/were the consequences would

have been had you confessed?

- 7-point Likert Scale (1= Not at all, 7 = Extremely)

List of Motivations

1. Prospect of punishment or retribution

2. Reducing tensions and conflicts within yourself.

3. Concern about justice

4. Concern about victim welfare

5. Concern about shared values

6. Maintaining trust n

7. Maintaining relationship

8. For the benefit of others

9. Conflict with others

10. Guilt

11. Re-establish psychological stability

12. Material benefits

13. Personal values

14. Understanding and acceptance from others

15. Shame

16. Pride

17. Presenting a positive image

18. Trying to find meaning in events

19. Feeling good about yourself

20. Avoiding suspicion and tensions among people