

ENCHANTMENT

IN AN AGE OF DISENCHANTMENT:

A STUDY OF AUSTRALIAN CATHOLICS

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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of a Doctorate
in Philosophy, March 1999.

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SUMMARY

This thesis deals with one of the most characteristic aspects of modernity, namely the loss of the sense of mystery in everyday life. Max Weber described this phenomenon as the 'disenchantment' of modernity and attributed its spread to the influence of rationalisation, intellectualisation and scientifically oriented thinking. This dissertation in addition to studying Weber's argumentation about 'disenchantment', draws on the work of two other sociologists who explore the same topic, namely Thomas Luckmann and Pierre Hegy.

This thesis studies a group of church-going Catholics – labelled the 'integrationists' – whose experience seems to defy the above sociological predictions about the loss of enchantment within modernity. Contrary to sociological expectations the 'integrationists' retain their sense of enchantment, while being thoroughly enmeshed in the rationalisation of modernity. I also choose a second group of Catholics – whom I call the 'dualists' – to act as contrast to the 'integrationists'. This second group is chosen on the basis that their experience of enchantment typically occurs in organised religious activity rather than in everyday life. I explore the characteristics of both groups through in-depth interview.

The thesis explores this sociological conundrum (people sustaining enchantment during the rationalisation of modernity) by presenting Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's argumentation in the form of sets of hypotheses. Each hypothesis is reduced to an empirical identifiable implication; the plausibility of which is evaluated against the contemporary data generated from the interview material. While the interview data supported Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's overall 'rationalisation-disenchantment' argument, it revealed the existence of

conceptual practices which curtail 'disenchantment'. The thesis identifies which conceptual practices sustain enchantment within the rationalisation of modernity; the conceptual practices the 'integrationists' typically employ are shown to be quite distinct from those of the 'dualists'.

The interview data reveal that the nature of the conceptual practices the 'integrationists' employ have a non-rational character about them, and that the 'integrationists' commonly employ symbolic and analogous forms of thought. The 'integrationists' are ill at ease with overly rationalised forms of religion which occur in aspects of institutional Catholicism. The thesis addresses the issue of the potential split in the relationship between the 'integrationists' and institutional Catholicism. The interview data together with a number of Weberian insights offer a modus vivendi for the 'integrationists' and institutional Catholicism not only to avoid polarisation, but actually to support one another. This thesis proposes that the conceptual practices the 'integrationists' employ when they experience enchantment are actually sustained by the mythic elements of ritual provided by institutional Catholicism. At the same time the interview data reveal that the disenchanting effect rationalisation has upon institutional Catholicism is minimised by the characteristics typifying the 'integrationists'.

'I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.'

.....
Michael Brennan

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I wish to thank my supervisor Dr Bill Martin, who was prepared to work with me in a research area, which is currently understudied. Dr. Martin accepted me as a doctoral student after my earlier supervisor, Dr. Elisabeth Porter took up a University position in Northern Ireland. Dr. Martin has continued to offer me encouragement in this work and has shown particular interest in the unfolding of ideas and themes. His encompassing knowledge in allied fields, have opened up many lines of inquiry for me. Dr. Martin arranged for another Sociologists, Dr. Dusko Seculik to take over the supervision of the research, during an interstate study commitment. I thank Dr. Seculik for helping me make connections between emerging issues of the thesis. I also thank Dr. Jason Pudsey who suggested the title of the thesis, Professor Riaz Hassan for his gracious interest and Dr. Heinz Wiemann for his critical reading of the thesis.

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Finally I wish to pay tribute to Mr. Alan Patience, who after supervising me in my B A honours degree, suggested that I undertake the Master's course. Mr. Patience's passion for issues of social justice influenced me to choose him as my supervisor. His approach to his intellectual work reflected the underlying connection between his faith and his life. Alan, took up a posting in the Victorian University of Technology at Footscray.

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given the current decline in numbers of clergy in the Catholic Archdiocese of Adelaide. This indicates the commitment some members of the hierarchy have toward furthering the ongoing study of priests.

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FOREWARD

In this foreword I want to provide some grounds to help answer a number of questions such as, why I was drawn to this thesis topic rather than some other, and why I end up constructing the thesis in the way I do. In addressing these questions I focus on two subjects, namely where I come from, and how I came to be doing this thesis.

Where I come from

Talking about where I come from offers an insight into the context that gives birth to this thesis. I was born of Australian parents, who themselves were third generation Irish and English background. The Irish side was far more acknowledged by my father. Both my parents were Catholic and church-going. I was born at the end of the second world war and life was basic. There was a lack of the financial and social comforts that came toward the mid to late 1950s.

My father was a barman in an Adelaide hotel. My mother after obtaining a musical degree had a band of her own, married and had five children. Our family home – possibly typical of many homes during the early 50s – was a gathering place on Sunday afternoon, with tea and scones and songs around the piano.

My own upbringing was influenced by attendance at Catholic primary and secondary schools. This rather protected setting was rudely ended when my father had a stroke, after which he had to leave paid work. Needing to find work, I started an apprenticeship as an electrical fitter in the South Australian Railways. I had grown up with a simple faith and devotion through the Catholic school system, but when I met the language and work behaviour of the work-shops, this innocent faith was shocked.

Effectively I was living in two worlds: the first was the world of the work-shop, with its direct plain, somewhat aggressive matter of fact interaction; the second was the world of Church, which I began to see as removed from the everyday life of working people. I can remember thinking at church 'What these guys are preaching has nothing to do with the life I live in the work-shop'. This in part explains something of why I developed the title of this thesis, namely 'Enchantment in an age of disenchantment: a study of Australian Catholics'. I was living two forms of existence and unable to resolve why these worlds were not meeting.

After four years in the apprenticeship system I decided to train for the Catholic priesthood. During my eight year preparation for the priesthood I met a priest who invested his energy in working with young people and challenging them to analyse issues of justice in the workplace. He spoke of the need to evaluate work practice by looking at issues of safety, work conditions, fair pay and personal dignity in terms of primary Gospel values, particularly that of justice. I remember asking this priest, Are you going to be a social worker or a priest? Later when I thought back on my question, I began to realise how my spirituality was essentially dualistic. This priest's ability to see his work in the social/political arena as intimately part of his spirituality posed a problem for me. After being ordained, I found that I was fascinated by individuals whose lives proclaimed that their spirituality was located in their every-day life. The way these people spoke about their work did not convey the belief that their social involvement was depleting their spiritual life, rather the opposite was the case; their engagement in social affairs sustained and energised their spirituality.

Why I undertake the study in the way I do

Because I wanted to understand the social world in which I lived more fully, I began studying Sociology some 12 years ago, at that stage I was 13 years ordained as a Catholic priest. When I discovered Max Weber's rationalisation and disenchantment thesis, I recognised that it spoke directly about some of the issues I was trying to understand when I left school and worked in the Railway workshops. Weber's thesis also expressed the underlying preconceptions I had when I was perplexed by some of the young people I knew in my work as a youth chaplain. These people seemed to have an integrated spirituality, a fact that challenged my dualism.

I was also aware that the lack of enchantment in the workshop setting was partly due to the form of spirituality I received (or interpreted) from my school and church. Weber's (1976) work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism acknowledged how religious faith could influence personal understanding and interaction with one's social world. My knowledge firstly of the priest who found enchantment through his involvement in social work and secondly of people who lived their spirituality in their work lives, told me that there was a form of spirituality – different from my own – which did sustain enchantment in the world of modernity.

I recognised that Weber's rationalisation and disenchantment thesis provided a theoretical structure for the thesis; I also recognised that I had found people whose experience seemed to be at variance with the rationalisation thesis. I decided that the best way to get some depth in examining the issue was to gather data about the people who seemed to integrate their spirituality with their every day life.

Acknowledging personal influences in the study

Because the impetus to study how people sustain enchantment within modernity springs from my own life experience as an apprentice electrical fitter in the work-shop situation, it is critical that I acknowledge how my personal experience influences not only the topic of the thesis, but how I go about constructing the study. Given I had found people who find enchantment where I generally failed to do so, does make it likely that I would idealise their form of spirituality.

The more deeply I enter into this thesis the more I recognise the similarity between the ideal type individual who belongs in the primary group, who experiences enchantment within modernity, and the ideal notion I have of myself. Similarly I recognise those elements within myself that restrict enchantment, become expressed in the ideal type person in the contrast group. This latter group typically perceives life as a dichotomy – a realm of the sacred and a realm of the profane. Many of the philosophical and theological tenets I intellectually esteem exist in the philosophical and theological tenets of the 'integrationists', the group that 'integrates' the spiritual and the everyday. The converse also is true, the philosophical and theological tenets I find embarrassing and attempt to deny bear a strong resemblance to the philosophical and theological tenets of the contrast group. I acknowledge that my attempts to avoid perceiving the typical contrast group member in a disparaging light frequently fail.

The effect this has on the thesis is that I run the danger of constructing the group that achieves enchantment, in everyday life as well as in organised religious practice, as the epitome of social and spiritual life. The correlative is

that I am in danger of casting a negative view on those who see the world of work as essentially separate from the world of enchantment. The psychologist Carl Jung (1974) maintains that those aspects of life we most abhor in others, can be to be the very things we have denied in ourselves. He also argues that if we name the things which we detest in others, and then dialogue and encounter those things within ourselves, then those very things become the source of our liberation. I argue that both these groups offer insights into how enchantment might become more realised. I also argue that engaging with the thought and passions of both groups will become an energising force that connects us more closely to the earth. This in turn binds us to the simple pleasures of life and of each other and provides the drive and passion for us to work for justice in the wider society and within the church.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is concerned with the loss of enchantment, the loss of mystery, fascination and awe, during our modern age. The title of the thesis 'Enchantment in an Age of Disenchantment: a study of Australian Catholics' reflects the overall theme. In the closing years of the twentieth century many people in the Western world have an overall sense of living in a society and in a period that subverts the possibility for a spiritual life. People occasionally claim society fails to encourage peoples' sensitivity toward one another. Not uncommonly people express disappointment that our culture does little to engender a sense of fascination with the mystery of life. At special moments, such as at the birth of child, the magic of life seems to break through, but such moments rarely last; modernity seems to erase these experiences.

Speaking about the soul destroying character of contemporary life, people frequently mention that the personal element seems to have left social living. Once people used to meet to exchange pleasantries and news about life and talk to others when they went buying and selling goods. Supermarkets and the telephone use of credit cards diminish this personal contact. The person buying becomes an account number and the person selling becomes almost anonymous, in the case of purchase through telephone, email and post catalogue. Enchantment and fascination with life effectively evaporate because bureaucracies and governments control the personal elements of life.

People suggest they lose the sense of fascination, enchantment, awe and mystery with life because their sense of self and self-identity is in such a state of flux. People say that once they knew who they were, where they belonged, now they feel a lack of connection to others, to the world and even to themselves. How has modern society done this to us? Some people attribute the loss of

stability to the mobility of jobs, the job market demands rapid re-skilling, use of new systems of technology, changing methods of processing; all of which leads to a change in one's sense of who one is.

Some people talk about how the primary institutions of society were once relatively secure structures around which life revolved and through which people understood themselves. In our modern western world all institutions, values and beliefs become impermanent, and what they stand for becomes contestable. Arguably one of the current expectations of society is that one needs to stand alone and prove oneself in terms that are non-negotiable, rationalised and controlled by faceless boards of management, distant governmental bodies and systems of global economy.

Another factor, to which people commonly attribute the loss of enchantment is the extensive transformation in education. Once, full secondary and tertiary study permitted the study of a cross section of knowledge, which included mathematics, the sciences, the humanities, philosophy, art, drama, the exploration into the symbolic, and the exploration into peoples' relationship with the transcendent. Today people express concern that the job market suppresses or eliminates the reflective side of education, to the point that education is highly selective, with very little cross disciplinary exposure.

In the religious area it is not uncommon to hear people complain 'we've lost the sense of mystery.' Within Catholicism, some people suggest, we've lost the sense of reverence for the sacred. Some ask what has happened to the reverence we used to have within church, to the sense of quiet. In earlier times people were encouraged to visit the church for private prayer, people appreciated stained glass windows, devotion to the saints, incense, and the use of holy water during the ceremonies and rituals. People ask why we need all this

theological dissection of the Scriptures. Some also ask why we can't just accept things on the basis of faith and be humble, rather than analyse and complicate the mystery of God and religion. Other people express loss over the demise of symbolic and mythic elements in religion.

This thesis addresses the underlying concern expressed in the above comments, namely the sense that there is an overall loss of enchantment that has taken place within modernity. The way I have chosen to set up an exploration into this question is to employ a sociological examination of the issue and draw upon a number of sociologists who have engaged with the notion that people have experienced an overall loss of enchantment with the world during modernity.

In examining the claim that there is a loss of enchantment that has occurred during modernity, Max Weber (1964; 1978; 1982) approached the topic by focusing on three elements in society, namely modernity, religion and disenchantment; he also studied the relationship between these elements. He argued that the primary issue revolves around the fact that in modernity there has been an enormous switch in the way humanity interacts with life at the social and personal level. Once, in primitive and traditional society our perceptions and constructions of life were a conflated mix of intuition, thought and feeling. The mythic, symbolic, poetic and magical merged and intertwined with practical planned action. Now we move from that way of understanding and approaching life (Weber, 1982:282). Having been influenced by the Age of Enlightenment, we now adopt a different stance, we interact with the world through using three interrelated modes of engagement. We impose rationalisation, intellectualisation and a scientifically oriented form of thinking upon the whole of our experience (Weber, 1982:138, 155).

Weber argued that these rational styles of approaching life served to destroy the 'non-rational', 'meta-rational' or 'irrational', that is, it destroyed the forms of engaging with life that employ either intuitive, symbolic, mythic or magic forms of knowledge. Most importantly of all, however is that rationalisation has introduced an overall sense of disenchantment with social and personal life. This thesis became known as Weber's rationalisation or disenchantment thesis, and it has become a very influential view in and beyond sociology. Through my dissertation I assess the empirical accuracy of Weber's account of the disenchantment that occurs within modernity.

Basically therefore, Weber (1978; 1982) was arguing that modernity has brought people to the point that they have lost the sense of fascination and mystery in life. There is no more an overall sense that life enthrals and entices us, be it through relationship with oneself, personal relationships, societal relationship, or relationship with the cosmos. Our dominant sense of life in modernity has become one where we have lost our inner sense of mystery, our soul. We seem to have lost connection with our inner world. Our inner world, at the very least, suffers in the present context. In modernity, life does not seem able any more to charm us to the point that we get lost in its spell (Weber, 1982:140). Life ceases to be mystical. Modernity minimises our spirituality. As soon as spirituality is organised and takes the shape of religion, that spirituality becomes sterile (Weber, 1978; 1982).

Weber's identification of rationalisation (and its consequent disenchanting effect) as the primary characteristic of modernity, becomes a convincing claim after a closer examination of the periods about which Weber wrote. Weber (1982:141) cited the Greek philosophers, Socrates and Aristotle, when he argued about 'intellectualisation' and disenchantment. He mentioned Renaissance figures, such as Leonardo, Galileo and Bacon. There were huge shifts that had

taken place in society, rationalisation being one such shift. Rationalisation, though gathering momentum in the Renaissance, came to full strength in the Age of Enlightenment (Robertson, 1978; Garrett, 1989; Martin, 1981). Besides exalting in the power of discursive reason and logic – to the point of triumphalism – the age of Enlightenment developed and transformed scientifically oriented thinking into the most prized form of knowing. Garrett (1989: 215) argues that 'The orientation of scientific reductionism is a direct legacy of the Enlightenment, with its naturalistic, scientific conception of the world and the place of human beings within it.'

Writing from a history of philosophy perspective, Copleston (1985a) identified the same two elements, which Weber had earlier identified as instrumental in effecting the disenchantment of modernity. According to Copleston (1985a:14), the Age of Enlightenment had a 'concentration on the critical, analytic and scientific understanding' of the world. The shortcoming of this focus was a diminution of 'the role of creative imagination and the role of feeling and intuition', which the romantics attempted to address (Copleston, 1985a: 14). Weber (1982) argued society had changed, there had been a shift from society's traditional form to its modern form, resulting in a wholesale movement toward systems of governance, education, manufacture and economy based on rationalisation, intellectualisation and scientifically oriented principles. This pervasive rationalisation of society became a major concern of philosophers of history, of poets and of sociologists.

Weber's identification of 'intellectualisation' as one of the primary characteristics of modernity, is exemplified in the person of Wolff (1679-1754), who championed rationalism and the power of discursive reason (Copleston, 1964: 142). Wolff argued that human reason was sufficient to attain certainty in the field of metaphysics and in metaphysical knowledge of God (Copleston,

1964: 126). Some of the titles of Wolff's works reveal his underlying philosophy, one such study being 'Rational ideas' of God, the World and the Soul of Man' (Copleston, 1964: 126).

Baumgarten, a disciple of Wolff's, considered the study of aesthetics an inferior activity of thought, because aesthetic intuition could not be a form of purely logical thinking. It was, so to speak a lower place in the ladder of knowledge (Copleston, 1964: 139). The importance placed on intellectualisation during the Age of Enlightenment was central, as indicated through the disciplines of logic and the theory of knowledge in the seventeenth century, especially in the works of Descartes and Leibniz (Cassirer, 1979: 62).

Cassirer (1979) argued that the Enlightenment forged a link between intellectualisation and empiricism, and in so doing supports Weber's claim that intellectualisation and scientifically oriented thinking dominate the Age of Enlightenment. In France, Condillac argued that 'The new logic...is neither the logic of the scholastic nor of the purely mathematical concept; it is rather the "logic of facts".' (Cassirer, 1979: 8) Empiricism in England had its strong proponents in Locke, Berkeley and Hume (Copleston, 1964: 17). Hume demanded that empirical philosophy remove all elements of a metaphysical and transcendent nature (Cassirer, 1979: 64). J. S. Mill argued that social science looks to causal laws in its explanation of human behaviour. In doing this J. S. Mill showed he was not satisfied with simply using rationality to account for the world, he demanded something more, namely the use of verification and 'hard data' (Copleston, 1985b: 81).

Enlightenment thinking finds expression in contemporary thought, as indicated in Martin's (1981: 30) claim that, 'cultural phenomena which are suffused with mythic and symbolic elements have been a particular problem for the social sciences.' She (1981: 30) criticises the type of sociology that is excessively

influenced by the Enlightenment, particularly when it 'worked under the rationalist assumption that symbol, myth and religion were the wasting assets of a rapidly disappearing stage of social evolution.'

In this thesis, I note how the pursuit of one form of approach to life tends to bring a reaction. With the rationalism of the Age of Enlightenment there was a corrective movement through the Romantics. These Romantics call for freeing the spiritual, mythic and symbolic elements of life. Shaftesbury, to some degree, anticipates Weber's approach to the problem of disenchantment within modernity. Shaftesbury wrote about the limitations inherent in having pure reason and experience as the sole basis for knowledge. He claimed reason and experience by themselves are unable to reach the 'real' depth of the world. Access to this inner life requires the aid of associative imagination and the aesthetic world.

Neither the discursive form of thinking which feels its way slowly from one concept to another, nor the acute and patient observation of particular phenomena, can penetrate this depth. It is accessible only to an intuitive understanding that does not proceed from parts to the whole, but from the whole to the parts. (Shaftesbury, in Cassirer, 1979: 317)

Scholars like Shaftesbury were alluding to the diminution of the imaginative and associative dimensions of the human person. Weber (1978, 1982) expressed his concerns with this trend in his history of philosophy. Speaking of two approaches to learning, one founded upon the interpretative heuristic tradition and the other on the empiricist tradition, Taylor (1985: 122) claims that Weber through his 'verstehen' notion of respecting the subjectively intended meanings of social actors stood against an exclusive acceptance of empiricism. Taylor (1985: 137) points to Weber's 'historically specific account of Calvinism' as one of the ways he incorporated the interpretative tradition so that he could identify

the 'particular goals and cravings' people used to adopt 'the life-form of rationalizing achievement'. In this vein, Taylor (1985:2) cites the scientific method of 'Behaviourism' because it 'tried to ignore purpose and intentionality, indeed, even side step consciousness', in explaining human behaviour. There is a failure to address the realm of the 'inner world'; the mythic and symbolic world dropped out of consideration.

The importance and influence of Weber's disenchantment thesis to sociology are evident in Weber's impact on the Chicago school and on symbolic interactionism. Clifford Geertz relies heavily on Weber's attention to the subjectively intended meanings of social actors; Geertz acknowledges this approach in his definition of culture.

Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive [sic] one in search of meaning. (Geertz, 1973: 5)

Geertz, takes Weber's image of the spider suspending itself on the webs it weaves, and extends this metaphor to refer to the role of the inner world of intentionality. Subjectivity, interiority and signification are critical for they engage with the soul of experience; they are vital components of the study of culture. Weber (1982) saw the exclusive use of exteriority and empiricism as an exclusion and subjugation of consciousness, pre-consciousness and the 'non-rational'. Disenchantment ensues because our society acknowledges the role of symbol and myth only to the extent that they submit to rationality.

Weber's commitment to the value and role of the inner world becomes obvious in his definition of sociology. He (1978: 4) said sociology is a science which concerns 'the interpretive understanding of social action'. Weber (1978: 4)

referred to 'action' 'insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior – be it overt or covert, omission or acquiescence.' The issue at stake here is that Weber acknowledged and incorporated into his sociology those dimensions of human life which cannot be reduced to the state of objective hard social facts. Weber (1978: 4) declared that his own work maintained 'a sharp distinction between subjectively intended and objectively valid "meanings"'. The point is that Weber believed 'subjectively intended' meanings were not reducible to 'objectively valid meanings'. There is a world that eludes rationalisation, which if denied, ushers in the disenchantment of the world.

Weber's critique of the Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment led him to identify an unrelenting movement, within the period, that transposes life into an intelligible, analysable, verifiable and functional form. Though his sociology complies with the norms of logical consistency and has the purpose of identifying and dealing with those factors in social structure which impact on human life and subjectivity, he continued to return to and give recognition to those dimensions of life that cannot be reduced to the intelligible and functional.

In the thesis I note how Weber sees disenchantment happening in religion, not only because of the attempt to 'intellectualise' religion by treating that which is of its nature mythic and symbolic purely as intelligible. He also argues that disenchantment happens in religion because of the 'rationalisation' of religion.

After discussing Weber's thoughts about rationalisation bringing disenchantment to religion, this thesis notes how Thomas Luckmann, writing at a later period pursues the same issue. Luckmann (1990), while acknowledging the power of specialisation within all sorts of institutions to diminish

enchantment within society holds that enchantment still exists in the personal realm.

Shifting self-identity: another factor in disenchantment

Besides addressing disenchantment through Weber's notions of rationalisation, intellectualisation and scientifically oriented thinking and Luckmann's notion of 'institutional specialisation', my dissertation attends to the issue of self-identity. The self-identity theme is another aspect of Weber's prediction that modernity is and will be characterised by disenchantment. The notions of self-identity, self-image and the development of one's personality are present in Weber's reflections about the relationship between culture, identity and disenchantment. As Robertson (1978: 68) argues, Weber was interested in 'the cultural foundations, cultural trends and forms of consciousness of modern society...the link between culture and the individual, including the nature of identity.' Weber's (1976) identification of the Calvinist influence in shaping capitalism indicates that he acknowledged the power religious ideas have in shaping one's self-identity, the identity of groups and to some degree society's sense of itself (Robertson, 1978: 55).

In the thesis I note how the shift of religion from its simple primal form into its institutional form (characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation) entailed a shift in the culture of religion, and in the self-identity of those within institutional religion. The disenchantment which Weber predicted would happen, happened to people who no longer had a solid sense of self, because of the shifts within the fabric of society. Disenchantment was mediated through a shift in our sense of self.

Weber's theme of self-identity is taken up by Luckmann (1974) and becomes an important element in Luckmann's account of the disenchantment experienced within modernity. He claims that in traditional society the primary institutions gave individuals their sense of self. In contemporary society, however, the primary institutions fail to do so. Modernity furthers the disenchantment of the world, by its power to disconnect people from the society and world in which they work and live. The transient nature of personal identity is due to the self-determining and self-constituting character of the individual in modernity.

In examining the disenchantment of institutional religion and its relationship to the changing role of self-identity, I draw upon the work of Pierre Hegy (1987). Hegy explores Luckmann's notion that religion in modernity moves from its institutional, 'visible' form toward its private, 'invisible' form. I note how Hegy focuses on Catholicism and argues that a section within Catholicism has to some extent overcome the rationalisation that characterises institutional Catholicism. The basis for Hegy's contention is grounded in the notion of self-identity. Some Catholics have developed a high sense of moral autonomy and to some extent are prepared to dismiss the overly rationalised functioning of hierarchical authority. They then freely connect with the elements within religion which defy rationalisation, and occasionally experience enchantment in so doing.

The issue is important to sociology, particularly to the schools that are committed to accessing the world of intentionality and subjectively intended meanings, which Weber (1978) promoted. The issue is also important to the study of modernity and its interplay with the theme of self-identity. In the work Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in Late Modern Age, Giddens (1991) studies a series of issues about the impact of modernity on individual identity, perception of self, and society. By examining the subjective

experiential world of people in modernity my thesis relates to studies associated with Giddens' work. This is particularly so when identifying how sub-culture can support personal control over the type of personality one develops, one's 'self-identity' and one's participation in modernity. The study offers insight to sociologists interested in examining sub-culture and self-autonomy within modernity.

The dissertation generates insights into the state and quality of contemporary spirituality and religious life. It is important to the sociology of religion, because it examines the issue of religious life in terms of its location and its meaning in modernity. It has a further interest for the sociology of religion by studying institutional religion in terms of its reflexive possibilities in the area of the individual and sub-groups engaging with the institutional structure of religion. It does this by examining those who find enchantment both within everyday life and in institutional religion.

This dissertation on the disenchantment within modernity is of interest to sociology because it addresses a number of key issues concerning meaning and culture. It addresses issues of hermeneutics, of the individual and enchantment within modernity in the area of intentionality and self-identity. It addresses 'rational and non-rational forms of individual action' (Silverman, 1986: 40), and seeks to establish regularities in particular styles of interior life, spirituality and religious life within a culture (Silverman, 1986:41).

Some dominant issues within the thesis

This thesis revolves around Weber's prediction that modernity is characterised by rationalisation, which in turn ushers in an overall sense of 'disenchantment' with the world and life. Given that I know people who seem to defy Weber's prediction, I am faced with the task of finding out how are they doing this.

How can they avoid this overall sense of disenchantment, which Weber predicts pervades modernity? One of the instruments I use in exploring what these interviewees are doing when they defy expectations and experience enchantment, is a construct called a 'conceptual practice'. I use the term 'conceptual practice' to explain the underlying attitude or approach toward life the interviewees employ when they experience enchantment (the term is explained in chapter three). Hence the question, how are these particular 'conceptual practices' able to avoid the corrosive impact of rationalisation of modernity?

Weber (1982: 155, 351) claimed that the first and primary function of human behaviour to be suppressed under the onslaught of rationalisation was the 'non-rational'. This insight suggests the possibility that these people who defy expectations and experience enchantment are using a tool, namely their 'conceptual practices' which guards them against the effects of rationalisation. Could it mean that their 'conceptual practices' act to strengthen the 'non-rational', which is decimated under the overall influence of rationalisation? I approach this thesis suspecting that these particular 'conceptual practices' may very well be characterised as that which energise the 'non-rational', since Weber argues the 'non-rational' is suppressed through rationalisation. I suspect it is because of this that the 'integrationists' are not overcome by the power of rationalisation.

Another possibility is suggested by the notion that if rationalisation can be characterised as a means of control – since after analysis it organises and gives power – then the 'conceptual practices' the 'integrationists' use, may serve to nullify this control. One of the ways I go about clarifying this issue in the thesis is to identify the dominant 'conceptual practices' the primary group of interviewees use, when they experience enchantment. As the list of 'conceptual

practices' grows, the information about the nature of these 'conceptual practices' also expands, permitting an assessment of the underlying nature of these 'conceptual practices'. I suspect that there is a general character to the particular 'conceptual practices' the 'integrationists' use to soften the harshness of rationalisation. I predict that this general character is approximated by notions such as 'openness', 'spontaneity', 'intuition' and 'use of the "non-rational"'.

Another issue on which I focus in this thesis centres around the question, what sustains the 'integrationists' use of these particular 'conceptual practices' in the face of the disenchanting effect of rationalisation. Given that symbolic and mythic elements of life are closely associated with experiences of enchantment (Weber, 1982: 353), and given that the primary group use particular 'conceptual practices' when they experience enchantment, I ask whether there is a relationship or connection between the particular 'conceptual practices' the 'integrationists' use and the symbolic and mythic elements of life? Does access to the symbolic and mythic elements of life serve to sustain the 'integrationists' continued choice and use of particular 'conceptual practices'? Is their use of the symbolic and mythic dimensions embedded within the Catholic ethos a reason why they use these particular 'conceptual practices'? Is it that there is a subculture within Catholicism which generates and supports these 'conceptual practices'? In this respect I anticipate that the 'integrationists' receive an appreciation of the mythic and symbolic elements of life from their Catholic ethos, and it is because they think and experience life mythically and symbolically that they are predisposed to employ particular 'conceptual practices'.

A third issue I take up in the thesis is the apparent dilemma facing the relationship between the primary group (the 'integrationists') and institutional religion. If the first issue of the thesis, named above, shows that the

'integrationists' use 'conceptual practices' which energise the non-rational, or at least modify rationalisation, then it would seem that the 'integrationists' will be characterised by a certain non compliance with the rationalising aspects of wider society and institutional religion. This is highlighted by Weber's argument that rationalisation permeates primal religion and transforms it into 'institutional' religion. Does this mean that this group of 'integrationists' will ultimately leave organised religion? Can there be some way that these 'integrationists' and institutional religion avoid this split by working through their different approaches to life? Could this take place by modifying the rationalisation that takes place within religion? What will happen to the enchantment the 'integrationists' are able to experience at present if they conform to the rationalisation of institutional religion? Since it is not only Weber who argues that rationalisation builds the institutional aspect of religion, but also Luckmann and Hegy, this issue seems to be important.

In the thesis I continue to return to this theme, namely the tension that is built into the relationship between the 'integrationist' form of religion and institutional religion. The history of Catholicism reveals movements which suggest something of this tension. While acknowledging the tremendous difference in culture and society, it would seem that there may be some parallels in the explosion of mysticism in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in medieval Europe. Around the same time there was an emergence of the use of the discriminating intellect, in the form of the philosophical and theological tradition of Thomism. Did this become overly intellectual and bring about a loss of connection with the 'non-rational' and mystical element of religion? Did the two traditions, the mystical and the intellectual, so split that both ultimately lost their dynamism, because of the lack of tension and relationship between each other? Was the intellectualisation of religion simply an extension of the organisational dimension of religion (an expression of its rationalisation)? Was

this intellectual movement a reaction to the heavy emphasis on the mythic and symbolic elements of mysticism? I present these questions in the form of an analogy between the issues facing the interviewees who defy rationalisation and the institutional church (which Luckmann argues loses its soul because of its institutional specialisation). It would seem that institutional religion needs the 'integrationists' because of their connection with the primal and 'non-rational'. This issue is expressed in some form by Weber's (1982) distinction between the prophet and priest, the former typifying the unpredictable and the latter portraying the procedural dimension of religion. Both have difficulty with each other, and institutional religion has difficulty with the prophet.

At this point in the thesis, I predict that the examination of the 'conceptual practices' the 'integrationists' use will provide information about how these 'integrationists' will live out their religiosity in the face of 'institutional' Catholicism. And further, I predict the stories they tell through their interviews, will offer insights into how institutional Catholicism will need to modify itself if it is to avoid the disenchantment of rationalisation, which Weber, Luckmann and Hegy argue pervades all organised religion. I predict some third way of dialogue, interaction and creative tension, between the 'integrationists' and 'institutional' Catholicism lies in the spirit of movements which – like the Second Vatican Council – step outside the functional operation of the church and reviews itself aware that it needs the 'non-rational', mythical and symbolical to retain its soul. This question will be addressed again in the concluding chapter.

An outline of the chapters

This thesis assesses Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's predictions about the decline of enchantment, in terms of the empirical accuracy of each sociological

story. The way I test which theory offers the most accurate account of the demise of enchantment in modernity is to isolate a list of hypotheses which emerge from each account. I then transpose each hypothesis into an identifiable empirical implication and evaluate each implication against the interview material. This interview material is the body of data generated by interviewing two groups of church-going Catholics. By inviting these interviewees to tell their stories, I then glean information about enchantment in modernity.

In order that I might gain access to individuals in the two groups I study (the 'integrationists' and 'dualists'), and then identify the 'conceptual practices' these interviewees employ when they experience enchantment, I select a qualitative styled methodology. This permits me to conduct in-depth interviews and by using a grounded theory approach, gradually build up a picture of the basic ways these people engage with everyday life.

There are three parts to this thesis: the first section is a theoretical section, the second is empirical and the third is both theoretical and empirical. By examining Max Weber's rationalisation thesis the first chapter situates the question of disenchantment within modernity as a sociological question. The purpose of this chapter is to locate the issue of disenchantment within the context of the changing nature of society under the influence of modernity.

The second chapter explains how this thesis is set up as a research problem, as noted above. The second chapter continues the work of the first by picking up Max Weber's central argument concerning the disenchantment in modernity. It moves on to discuss Thomas Luckmann's and Pierre Hegy's predictions about the same topic. This chapter develops the notions of individuality, personality and self-identity as used by the theorists during the telling of their socio-religious stories of modernity.

In the third chapter I clarify two of the primary concepts used in the thesis, namely 'conceptual practices' and 'ideal types'. I discuss the nature and origin of the term 'conceptual practice'. I also examine its relationship with other social scientific concepts, as a way of deepening understanding about the term. I discuss the character of the construct 'ideal type' and by way of further clarification examine the two groups of church-going Catholics selected for the study as 'ideal types'.

In order to substantiate the status of the two interview groups as constructs, I cite relevant sociological literature to demonstrate that they typify two forms of religiosity, which have an existence in real life. This serves the purpose of situating my dissertation within the body of literature on the topic. I also discuss these two groups with reference to my own personal experience within Catholicism.

In chapter 4, I discuss the methodology I use in the thesis and the overall research design of the work. By way of explaining the composition and formation of the two groups of interviewees, I discuss how I construct the sample. This chapter also cites the social indicators used in the selection of subjects, matters dealing with obtaining assistance in gathering suitable subjects. I discuss the socio-economic mix of the sample and how I conducted the interviews. By identifying the biases I bring to the work, I address the issue of who shapes the outcome of the research. I also comment on the interviewees' role in determining the content and depth of discussion material. I discuss standards for the quality of qualitative research and mention the incorporation of such issues as confirmability, dependability, credibility, transferability and application, in the body of the thesis. I finally address the issue of analysing the data.

The next section, the empirical section of the thesis (chs 5-8), discusses the 'conceptual practices' that emerged from analysing the interview material. It focuses on the personal experience of the subjects who constitute both groups. Each of the chapters (5-8) deal with one dominant conceptual practice that emerges from the interviews; in order they are 'Vulnerability' (ch. 5), 'Inter-subjectivity' (ch. 6), 'Ambiguity' (ch. 7) and 'Immanence' (ch. 8). During each of these chapters, I refer not only to the given dominant conceptual practice, but also to its specific subsidiary conceptual practices.

As a way of ensuring that the interview analysis concurs with the research problem set up in chapter 2, I present a series of observations throughout chapters 5-8 concerning how the findings emerging from the interview material relates to the issues raised in the opening chapters. I focus on the dominant and subsidiary conceptual practices which the integrationists employ if and when their material sustains notions of enchantment. By restricting the discussion in each chapter to only one of the dominant conceptual practices (and its subsidiary conceptual practices), I isolate what the integrationists are doing when they experience enchantment. The purpose of analysing the conceptual practices the interviewees employ is, in part, to isolate the primary characteristics emerging from the interviewees. The discussion seeks to test if they are people of their day and if they experience enchantment in everyday life.

Having finished the empirical chapters (5-8), I turn in chapter 9 to discuss the interplay of these interview stories and Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's predictions about disenchantment in modernity. I answer the research problem set up in chapter 2 by evaluating each identifiable empirical implication that I deduce from the hypotheses of the three theorists. I evaluate these implications considering the interview data (chs. 5-8).

Chapter 10 concludes the thesis by offering an overall theoretical assessment of Weber, Luckmann and Hegy, in terms of how well each theorist accounts for the 'integrationist' and 'dualist' interviewees experience of enchantment in modernity. In this chapter I revisit the three issues I forwarded above, and discuss them in the light of the findings emerging from analysing the interview material (chs 5-9). In doing this I discuss how the interview data either support, reject or modify the initial observations in the introductory chapter. Chapter 10 also evaluates whether it would be worthwhile pursuing particular issues in future research.

CHAPTER 1

Rationalisation and disenchantment

In this chapter, I present what is the most general element in Max Weber's philosophy of history, namely rationalisation (Gerth and Wright Mills, in Weber, 1982: 51). This chapter deals with disenchantment, as a direct consequence of the rationalisation which occurs in modernity (Weber, 1982:155). Weber argues that rationalisation has become so pervasive and inexorable that the world has become disenchanted. Fate and science function without need for belief in an ultimate meaning to life according to Weber (1978; 1982). We build our personality and sense of self-identity without having to rely on constructions beyond empirical reality (Weber, 1982:120). The analysis of this chapter provides the context for my subsequent discussion of religion in late modernity.

Rationalisation, intellectualisation and the scientific method –

Do they further the disenchantment of the world?

In 1918, only two years before he died, Weber (1982) wrote in the essay Science as a Vocation that humankind has come to experience a sense of disenchantment with the world. Weber derives this word 'disenchantment'

from the German poet Friedrich Schiller (Gerth and Mills, in Weber, 1982: 51, 73). Friedrich Schiller – a close friend of Goethe – wrote from the 1770s until his early death in 1805 on the theme of enchantment and how enchantment relies for its existence upon humanity employing the full range of human faculties – from the affective to the discriminating intellect. Schiller (1983: 38) says that the people of his day need a committed return to 'the philosophic and the creative', to the 'tender and the energetic', and to living 'the youthfulness of fantasy with the manliness [sic] of reason in a splendid humanity.'

One of Schiller's primary concerns is how humankind can lose the fantasy of life and a sense of enchantment by being compelled by social forces to an exclusive use of the rational faculty at the expense of the emotive, the imaginative and the intuitive. He laments how society has served to bifurcate holistic ways of human engagement into a polarised functioning of rationality and intuition – as he notes 'intuitive and speculative understanding took up a hostile attitude in opposite fields' (Schiller, 1900: 39). Over a century later Weber (1982: 282) wrote

The unity of the primitive image of the world, in which everything was concrete magic, has tended to split into rational cognition and mastery of nature, on the one hand, and into 'mystic' experiences, on the other.

Schiller (1900:39) claims that it was 'culture itself that gave these wounds to modern humanity'; he notes how culture operates via the forces of the 'community', the 'state' and 'the superior of your employment' (person in

charge). Schiller isolates the utilitarian drive within the modern state as a dominant cause of specialisation of employment and the consequent emasculation of the intuitive faculty

If the community or state measures man [sic] by his function, only asking of its citizens memory, or the intelligence of a craftsman, or mechanical skill, we cannot be surprised that the other faculties of the mind are neglected, for the exclusive culture of the one that brings in honour and profit. (Schiller, 1900: 40)

Schiller (1900: 39) targets a number of themes – the disjunction of 'laws and customs' and how 'enjoyment was separated from labour, the means from the end, the effort from the reward' – these characteristics of modernity reappear later and dominate much of Weber's (1964, 1976, 1978, 1982) thought about rationalisation and disenchantment in modernity.

Bruno Bettelheim (1976: 4) writing from a Freudian perspective in The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales, cites Schiller's insistence on embracing the imaginative and metaphorical dimensions of life in order to avoid disenchantment. Bettelheim notes how Schiller maintains that meaning is sustained through engaging with the non rational, the mythic, the symbolic and in particular with the world of fantasy in fairy tales. 'Deeper meaning resides in the fairy tales told to me in my childhood than in the truth that is taught by life' (Schiller, in Bettelheim, 1976: 5).

Weber's concern with the theme of disenchantment is an extension of his rapport with humanist and cultural liberalism. Like Schiller, Weber sees the invasive nature of economic liberalism through its destruction of the 'cultivated man [sic] as a well-rounded personality in favor of the technical expert' (Gerth and Mills, in Weber, 1982: 73). Weber (1982) argues that humanity has become disenchanted because it has developed a predilection for an ongoing analysis of social and personal behaviour. He singles out the preponderance of intellection and scientifically oriented thinking as the other contributing factors in the loss of enchantment.

Religion's move toward institutionalism because of rationalisation

Weber (1982) argues that rationalisation shapes religion in a variety of ways. He mentions how priestly religions tend to intellectualise religion by insisting on transposing that which is of its nature mythic and symbolic into the rational realm. This also occurs in the tendency to formalise the moral and ethical dimensions of religion. Writing of the perceived need to rationalise religion Weber cites 'the inward compulsion of the rational character of religious ethics and the specifically intellectualist question for salvation'(1982: 352).

Another element of rationalism within religion is the trend toward the imposition of meaning upon the world. Thus Weber argues there has been a demand

that the world order in its totality is, and could, and should somehow be a meaningful 'cosmos'. This quest, the core of genuine religious rationalism, has been borne precisely by strata of intellectuals. (1982: 281)

Rationalisation also impacts on religion, particularly larger organisations, because of the bureaucracy which grows up within religion (Weber, 1982: 299). Hence in Catholicism the function of hierarchical ordering exemplifies the practice of rule from on high being transferred through cardinals and the Roman curia, to bishops to priests to lay people; the right to exercise authority is linked explicitly to decrees and enactments (Weber, 1982: 298). Weber (1982: 294) refers to this as a 'type of corporate authority' and explains that the ordering of power revolves around being ordained. He notes 'They represent "hierocratic" associations, that is, their power to rule is supported by their monopoly in the bestowal or denial of sacred values' (Weber, 1982: 294). Thus Weber also notes how the prophet has a difficult time in rationalised and priestly religion because the unpredictable nature of the prophet's charisma frequently runs across the 'correct' procedure of institutionalised religion (Weber, 1982: 289).

Different aspects of Weber's use of the concept 'enchantment'

Weber's dominant use of the word enchantment refers to that which is 'mysterious' and 'incalculable'. In his paper 'Science as a Vocation' Weber (1982: 139) wrote about disenchantment as a state of social and personal experience

where notions of 'mysterious incalculable forces' have no relevance and are not even entertained. To be in a state of enchantment is to allow and accept that there are 'mysterious and incalculable forces' operative in life, forces which influence life, are not rational, defy identification and elude comprehension.

Within Weber's reflections on the concept 'enchantment' there is an explicit sense that to be in a state of enchantment is to accept the 'mystery' of life without needing to solve life's mystery. Weber explained that the reason why 'Abraham or some peasant of the past, died "old and satiated with life"', was that 'for him there remained no puzzles he might wish to solve' (1982: 140).

Weber explained that this acceptance of the 'mystery' of life led to an acceptance of the world itself as a place of mystery and magic. The world itself was revered and seen to be sacred.

Weber's use of the concept 'enchantment' entails that to be enchanted one experiences life as personal rather than as an impersonal force. There is a strong sense that when one is enchanted one relates to the world in such a way as to acknowledge its subjectivity rather than treat it as an object (Weber, 1978: 630). The term connotes the idea of surprise, magic and personal engagement. Weber (1982: 149) wrote of the difference between the gods of old and the gods of today and claimed that the latter were 'disenchanted' because they took the 'form of impersonal forces.' Hence to be enchanted one relates to the world, the mystery of the world, the gods of the world, or the mystery within the world, as

an 'I-Thou' personal relationship rather than a mechanistic, impersonal relationship. To be enchanted is to perceive and interact with the world as if it were enigmatic, whimsical and sometimes even petulant.

This notion that the world itself is a place of mystery and magic appears in Weber's (1978: 630) reflection on the primitive world as an 'enchanted garden'. According to Weber, the world as enchanted garden was a place where there were practices of revering the spirits and practicing 'ritualistic' and 'sacramental' procedures. To engage in ritual is to acknowledge some belief that the world itself is deserving of respect, or that there are gods, spirits of some ultimate mystery in life, or some ultimate mystery sustaining life to which one responds. The notion of ritual and sacramentality reveal the deeper meaning of enchantment. Both notions of ritual and sacramentality are tied to the notion of mediation. The invisible and unknown depths of reality are manifested in visible ways. The elusive mystery behind the world and its subjectivity, 'is disclosed through signs: the cosmos, history, persons, and mystical experience.' (McBrien, 1980: 182)

Weber highlighted the notion of enchantment as essentially connected to an awareness of and respect for the autonomy, and self actualising character of the world. He did this by claiming that it was ascetic Protestantism's determination to pursue a 'methodically rationalized fulfilment of one's vocational responsibility', that 'completely eliminated magic' (1978: 630). Enchantment is

'non-rational' and does not submit to manipulation, or evaluation, and defies attempts to gauge its 'subjective meaning' (Weber, 1978: 1376). The experience of enchantment is most likely therefore when one respects life's subjectivity; some of the ways this was achieved were through employing mythic, symbolic, and intuitive forms of engaging with the world (Weber, 1978: 630). The magic and mystery of life is denied and destroyed when the world is interpreted and transformed 'into a causal mechanism' (Weber, 1982: 350).

Weber (1982: 148) also used the term enchantment to express the possession of 'mystical but genuine inward plasticity'. For Weber (1982: 155) enchantment is soul, and brings the possession of 'ultimate and most sublime values'.

Enchantment captures 'what the life of the spirit brings forth ever anew' (Weber, 1982: 140) that something 'pulsating that corresponds to the prophetic pneuma' (Weber, 1982: 155).

These are various meanings Weber has of the concept 'enchantment'. The meaning I use for the term 'enchantment' in this thesis is 'an awareness of the world as pervaded by mystery, magic, and the Sacred.' In this thesis I suspect the contrast group of interviewees (the dualists) will experience a sense of mystery, magic and the Sacred, however I predict they will not predominantly find this mystery in the world of work and everyday life, but rather in settings of a specifically religious form. Such a setting would be likely to be organised religious worship, structured prayer, or acts of piety. I also suspect that on

those occasions when they do experience mystery in the world it will be because they have brought a specifically religious frame of mind from their formal religious life to their encounter with the world.

By using this restricted meaning of the term 'enchantment', namely 'an awareness of the world as pervaded by mystery, magic, and the Sacred', I am retaining Weber's use of the term. One of the consequences of keeping this tight meaning of the term 'enchantment' is that the dualists do not strictly experience 'enchantment', in the sense I use the term in this thesis. I do not suggest that the dualists fail to experience a sense of mystery magic and the Sacred, but rather that this mystery does not primarily occur in the world. The world is effectively disenchanted for them. I also predict the dualist group will not only have a different meaning of the term 'enchantment' to the primary group of interviewees, but that they will experience it differently.

What form will this enchantment take? Will it simply be an affectual state, a momentary state of heightened affect, a feeling of intense awe and reverence, will it be a constant mode of cognition, or will it be a quality of social interaction of the one-to-one form? This will become clearer after the interview section of the thesis, that is after chapters five to nine. What I can say at this point in the inquiry is that in chapter four I outline a process I argue the interviewees employ when they experience enchantment. I use a construct by the name of 'conceptual practice'. I argue that when the interviewees,

experience enchantment, in its strict sense given above, particular conceptual practices influence their engagement with the world of work and everyday life.

By analysing the quality of their social interaction through the interviews, I hope to isolate what is distinctive about the particular attitudinal stance these people employ when they experience enchantment. I am not arguing that enchantment is solely a product of some cognitive framework. With Bruner (1986) I hold that our experience is shaped by, and shapes the culture, language, dominant symbols, forms of interpersonal exchange and the narratives we employ. I also acknowledge with Lyon (1999) that our experience takes place in a culture and is influenced by a culture which has undergone huge change, which to some measure is alluded to in the thought of postmodernism.

In examining the subject I am not claiming that the subject is the sole player who brings enchantment into being. Given subjects do not experience enchantment independently of the complex set of exchanges within which s/he finds her/himself. I am narrowing the study so that I can identify a number of basic attitudinal stances the individual employs in those instances of enchantment. By doing so I recognise that cultural life is more complex than that. However my venture is more a heuristic strategy rather than a statement that enchantment can be reduced down solely to the predisposition of a given individual.

The many factors involved in peoples' experience of enchantment.

It is important to recognise that there is an inherent danger involved in choosing to purposefully orient the particular focus of this thesis on interviewees involved in social interaction. The danger is that the study will not give adequate recognition to the acts of reflexivity institutions employ (Giddens, 1991), to the cultural base for the shared myths and narratives, the ongoing re-negotiation and re-interpretation of symbols, which take place within the culture itself and the many people with whom the interview subjects interact (Bruner, 1986).

By way of acknowledging the power and role of myths within a culture to shape the way life is perceived Bruner (1986) argues that many of the popular understandings which influence us derive from the metaphors used by the society in which we live. He writes, 'folk theories about the human condition remain embedded in metaphor and in a language that serves the end of narrative' (1986:49). These folk narratives, like the narratives which employ scientific method, serve to influence our thought and social interaction. The important point here is that, as I have noted earlier, Bruner shows how deeply the metaphors of a culture influence the subjects within that culture, how those subjects interpret and bestow meaning on their experience. One of the implications flowing from Bruner's observations is that not only is there a

connection between the metaphors of culture and how we view our experience, the metaphors also influence our consequent experience of enchantment.

What I want to emphasise at this point is that there are many factors, which impinge on the question, how do people experience enchantment in late modernity? In this thesis I could have attempted to identify the primary metaphors in our society and culture which operate to bring about a sense of enchantment. I could have analysed, following Giddens (1991), how institutions are engaging in social acts of reflexivity, which free the human subject to the possibility of enchantment. I could have attempted to examine the primary symbols, concepts and narratives which the interviewees and those with whom they interact continue to re-negotiate and re-interpret their experience and attempted to examine enchantment occurring during that process (Bruner, 1986).

While I narrow the parameters of this thesis to concentrate on what is happening in the individual who is experiencing enchantment, I want to state quite clearly that there is a greater and wider dynamic unfolding. This thesis must be seen within the context of the other social and cultural factors in play. I do not discount the importance of recognising the role of key metaphors and symbols, which gain dominance in contemporary society. Neither do I disregard the function of language in sustaining symbolic meanings, which the interviewee subject uses to re-negotiate and re-interpret his/her experience.

Nor do I disagree with Bruner that '...man, surely is not "an island, entire of itself" but part of the culture that he inherits and then recreates (1986:149).' Nor do I deny that our symbolically encoded experience, our meanings and sense of enchantment are made possible because we continue to interact with our social world (Bruner, 1986:158).

What I do is to examine the individual who, like everyone else around him or her engages in re-negotiating and re-interpreting the symbols, myths and narratives, which are sustained by the given culture. I study the individual as a key player in the construction of his or her world out of his/her symbolically encoded experience. What I study is a person who exercises agency. As Bruner (1986:97) observes:

The clinical psychologist must always be impressed with the 'reality' with which patients endow their rich narratives. And constructivism is nowhere more compelling than in the psychology of art and creativity.

I study what the individual is doing when s/he is experiencing enchantment. Given that the person is engaged in interpreting and negotiating with his/her particular symbolically encoded experiences, is involved in the dynamic of social interaction, uses language, myth and metaphor, this same individual still adopts a particular stance toward his/her world. I study the conceptual practice

that this particular individual adopts as s/he engages with her/his world and comes to experience enchantment.

I argue, that the individual has some purchase over what symbols, metaphors and narratives s/he selects, and that the individual has a degree of freedom in interpreting and giving meaning to his/her experience of being involved in social interactions in given cultural setting. With Bruner (1986:130) 'I am...a constructivist, and just as I believe that we construct or constitute the world, I believe too that Self is a construction, a result of action and symbolization.'

Enchantment rises out of a social and cultural context, and what I do is examine what the human subject is doing when s/he comes to experience enchantment.

Understanding and controlling the world rather than respecting the non explainable

Weber (1982) comments on how the world was once perceived as a place of magic in which supernatural forces were in play. Issues and events – both explainable and non-explainable – were seen to be under the influence of the gods. Humankind acted out of attitudes of wonder, fascination, and awe – attitudes which accompanied the practical and purposive tasks of providing a living within the world.

Now, however, humankind has adopted a different orientation toward the world; instead of approaching social life with a sense of mystery, humanity

adopts an attitude of focused intellection toward the world. Rather than attributing unexpected occurrences to the gods and primal elemental forces, the human person pursues and expects logical explanations for every event she confronts. Today people habitually strive to understand and control the world rather than permit that which is, simply to be. The world has become the subject of detailed and single minded analysis, hypothesis and verification. In short, the empirical method has become the dominant form of engaging with the world. The consequence is that the sense of mystery, fascination and experience of the Sacred are no longer part of human engagement with the world. As Weber (1982: 155) maintains 'The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the "disenchantment of the world".'

Weber notes how the term 'rationalisation' may mean two different things. The first is the kind of rationalisation 'the systematic thinker performs on the image of the world: an increasing theoretical mastery of reality by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts.' (1982: 293) – this is the meaning I use for the term 'intellectualisation' in this thesis; The second kind of rationalisation is 'the methodical attainment of a definitely given and practical end by means of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means.' (1982: 293) – this is the meaning I use for the term 'rationalisation' in this thesis, that is instrumental rationality.

Weber's term 'rationalisation' can be used broadly to refer to the relentless push through a variety of related processes within the social fabric of modernity which subjects all aspects of human action and the world to calculation, measurement and control (Abercrombie et al., 1988: 202). Gerth and Mills (in Weber, 1982: 51) maintain that rationalisation comes to ascendancy where there is an increase in the tendency to think systematically and coherently; more correctly what increases is both rationalisation and intellectualisation.

People do not need to make supplication to the gods and spirits, as was done in earlier times to attain an object of their desire. Technical means and calculation have become common place strategies bringing about the desired result (Weber, 1982: 139). Where the rationalisation process is in play the attitude adopted toward the world views human life in terms of means and end, and hence there is a dominance of 'means-end rationality' – this is the strict meaning of rationalisation.

'Rationalisation' – the most general element in Weber's philosophy of history

The concept 'rationalisation' dominates much of Weber's writings. Weber studies successive institutional structures of society, such as the patrimonial economy, and demonstrates how it 'rationalised' the administration of the time (one of the ways of furthering the process of rationalisation). Comprehensive systems of taxation were enacted with the development of economies, state

provisioning, financing of colonies, trade and money lending (Weber, 1978: 614). Weber points to the interrelationship of economy and the legal system as an indicator of 'rationalisation' (1978: 1047). Rationalisation is enhanced and underpinned through the action of rulers in positions of power, classes, parties, law, political authority, education and empirical training (Weber, 1978: 787). Weber sees a trend toward rationalisation in the process of bureaucracy where 'rules, means, ends and matter-of-factness dominate its bearing.' (1982: 244) He speaks of the advance of the rational bureaucratic structure of domination – there is a 'rational matter-of-factness', characteristic of the professional expert (Weber, 1982: 240). Weber notes how the notion of rationalisation promotes specialisation and the technical expert. One consequence of specialisation is the demise of the integrated, well-rounded cultivated person, for whom the concept of mystery becomes a curious attitude of a dead past. Bureaucracy has swept away systems based on the 'non rational'

This is the same influence which the advance of rationalism in general has had. The march of bureaucracy has destroyed structures of domination which had no rational character, in the special sense of the term. (Weber, 1982: 244)

The structures which had no 'rational' character and which bureaucracy destroyed are named as patriarchalism, patrimonialism, feudalism, and charismatic authority (Weber, 1982: 244).

In referring to the change in human thinking and attitude which happens as a consequence of this rationalisation process, Weber employs Schiller's phrase 'disenchantment' and argues that the process of disenchantment occurs in the minds and attitudes of people whenever logical, sequential and coherent thinking replaces thinking in terms of magic, superstition, the gods, the Sacred or divinity (Gerth and Mills, in Weber, 1982: 51).

In attempting to account for the experience of 'disenchantment' in our world Weber speaks of it as a by-product of rationalisation and intellectualisation. The person consumed by an attitude of rationalisation perceives and constructs the world in terms of pragmatism. It is the intellectual who transforms the concept of the world into a problem of meaning. The person who adopts these ways of interacting with the world ceases to believe in magic. The dynamics which are operative in the world are no longer considered to have the quality of magical significance; world movements and cycles simply 'are' and just 'happen'. The consequence of such demise in magical thinking is that the world has become 'disenchanted' (Weber 1964).

Science - another factor in disenchantment

The other facet of intellectualisation which brings about the demise of enchantment is science. 'Scientific progress is a fraction, the most important fraction of the process of intellectualisation which we have been undergoing for thousands of years' (Weber, 1982: 138). According to Weber it is fate which has

ushered in the time of disenchantment, the death of the gods and of religion. As well as fate, science has aided the process of rationalisation, intellectualisation and disenchantment. Even though Weber argues that intellectualisation and rationalisation are part of religion and add to its demise by applying methodical and internally consistent theorising upon religion or sacred values (Weber, 1982: 153), it is science which transcends the mythic. Science does not accept notions of meaning derived from outside the experience of this world, neither does it accept the notion of God. As Weber (1982: 147) notes 'Science "free from presuppositions", in the sense of a rejection of religious bonds, does not know of the "miracle" and the "revelation".'

Though natural sciences give answers to the question of what must be done to control life technically they do not attempt to address questions such as should we control life or does it make sense to ultimately control life? (Weber, 1982:144) According to Weber where social sciences teach us to interpret social phenomena in terms of their origins, theology interprets how to live in this world with meaning. He (1982: 153) notes 'Every theology...presupposes that the world must have a meaning, and the question is how to interpret this meaning so that it is intellectually conceivable.'

The empirical perspective presents a fundamental challenge to humanity, in terms of relating to the world as a place of enchantment. Weber (1982: 153) claims it is no longer appropriate for humanity to seek solutions to problems by

resorting to the gods, the spirits or the Sacred. The empirical method demands that the intellect be the way of life for humanity, not superstition and magical attitudes. Science has become the paradigm for acting within modernity and it is this which presents the fundamental challenge to the religious person

The conflict between empirical reality and this conception of the world as a meaningful totality, which is based on a religious postulate, produces the strongest tensions in man's inner life as well as his external relationship to the world. (Weber, 1964: 59)

Instrumental rational action – the expected and encouraged form of social action of our time

When Weber (1978: 24) studies 'social action' he says that it may have four basic orientations - 'instrumental', 'value', 'affectual' and 'traditional'. Instrumental rationality (*zweckrational*) is that way of acting by which a person perceives objects in the environment as well as other human beings as 'conditions' or 'means' for the actor's own specific calculated and pursued ends (Weber, 1978: 24). The scientific method employs attitudes and understandings of life which thus can be described as 'instrumentally rational'. Science specifically in using instrumentally rational action excludes the notion of value, as Weber (1982: 146) observes 'I am ready to prove from the works of our historians that whenever the man of science introduces his personal value judgements, a full understanding of facts ceases.'

According to Weber the adoption of a 'value-rational' (wertrational) orientation in social action has no place in science. This is so, because 'value-rational' action is shaped by a 'conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behaviour, independently of its prospects of success' (Weber, 1978: 25).

If the employment of value-rational methods in the social sciences is seen to be inappropriate then even more so the 'affectual' and 'traditional' forms of action. Affectual action is emotional action influenced by the actor's feeling states, similarly 'traditional' action is unacceptable in the social sciences since such action is 'determined by ingrained habituation.' (Weber, 1978: 25)

Purposive-rational or instrumental-rational action has become the most dominant form of social action within modernity (Weber, 1982: 146). The orientation of social action toward instrumental rational (zweckrational) action dominates not only science but also the realms of business, politics and industry. The world of modernity expects this form of action since it sees instrumental-rational action, or the method of rational calculation to be synonymous with rationality itself (Scaff, 1991: 233). By extension the notion of value-rationality (action which is oriented by a conscious belief in the value of an ethical stance) is discouraged within societies dominated by instrumental rational action.

Weber's understanding of rationality can be segmented into two forms of rationality, namely substantive and formal. Formal rationality (in the zweckrational sense) continues pursuing the efficient adaptation of means to particular ends. In terms of the rationalisation of business within modernity this exhibits itself in the form of a heartless rationality (Weber, 1964: 182), value considerations are purposefully avoided. Substantive rationality (in the wertrational sense) has a softer more human dimension, in that substantive rationality is not specifically determined by efficiency of means to achieve a particular end (Scharf, 1970: 157).

When Weber refers to substantive rationality in terms of economic action, he notes how it critiques the attainment of an end by considering certain values, such as the value of egalitarianism. Substantive rationality is full of ambiguities, it does not purely restrict itself to the technical pursuit of goal orientation. Hence it does not necessarily take the form of rational calculation, which employs the technically most adequately available methods – it can demand that goals be ethical, that the ends take into account scales of 'value rationality' (Weber, 1978: 85).

The implications of this is that formal rationality imposes a constant pressure upon enchantment; the scientific method and economic practice ensures the demise of the 'soft' orientations of ethics, aesthetics, spirituality and religion. The frequency of the phrase 'business is business' is chilling to the person who

comes under its power. Formal rationality adds to instrumental rationality and ensures that ends-means becomes the predominant form of human behaviour in a time of modernity. These forms of rationality ensure that value rationality becomes practically ineffectual by the dominant forces within social structure (Scaff, 1991). Even where value rationality is used it still furthers the process of rationalisation, given it is a purposefully orchestrated series of acts in order to achieve a goal, where the goal is a desired value:

The orientation of value-rational action is distinguished from the affectual type by its clearly self-conscious formulation of the ultimate values governing the action and the consistently planned orientation of its detailed course to these values. (Weber, 1978: 25)

Science ensures that life has become meaningless

Weber turns to Tolstoi when considering the notion of meaning and life; he says that Tolstoi clarifies the question of meaning in relationship to science. Tolstoi, speaking of the instrumental rational approach to life says, 'Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important to us: "What shall we do and how shall we live?"'(Tolstoi, in Weber, 1982: 143) Weber supports this interpretation of science since science, after having described the world, cannot prove if its existence is worthwhile, that the world has any meaning, or that it makes sense to live in the world science describes (Weber, 1982: 142).

Weber is full of contempt for those in science who claim science does provide meaning – he says

And today? Who – aside from certain big children...found in the natural sciences, still believes that the findings of astronomy, biology, physics or chemistry could teach us anything about the meaning in the world?

(Weber, 1982: 142)

Weber (1982) denies that science can be a way to meaning, to true being, true art, true nature, God, or happiness. He goes further by claiming that those in the sciences who claim science can provide meaning ensure that 'the "meaning" of the universe die out at its very roots.' (Weber (1982: 142)

Disenchantment – the 'Fate of our times'?

Weber (1964, 1978, 1982) argues that since our time of modernity is beset with the onslaught of rationalisation and intellectualisation we have to face that the gods and spirits have departed and disenchantment is our common experience. Weber (1982: 153) says that the lasting interests of the 'truly religiously musical' person are not aided by hiding from that person the fundamental fact that he or she is living a false existence. Weber (1982: 153) argues that to have a primary orientation toward considering the world as a place of ultimate meaning, significance, magic and charm, is false and belongs to the past. Weber regards it is a lack of intellectual truth to offer the religious person the false support of an

enchanted view of the world. The 'inward interest' of the religious person is not cared for by hiding the fact that he or she is

destined to live in a godless and prophetless time by giving him [sic] the ersatz of armchair prophecy. The integrity of his religious organ, it seems to me, must rebel against this. (Weber, 1982: 153)

Weber does not equivocate – he states categorically that this is a 'godless and prophetless' time. The gods are dead. Mystery, magic, and superstition have left the nub of life. It is reprehensible for someone to attempt to alleviate the pain this realisation causes for people who are religiously 'musical'. Such action does not serve the religious person's true and lasting 'inward' interests. The religious person is better off undergoing the pain of facing the fate of our times. To attempt palliative solutions denies the religious person the opportunity to face the fact that disenchantment is complete, the gods are dead and this is a prophetless time.

Weber's (1982:148) notion of 'disenchantment' has an aspect of deep loss. The loss is not necessarily about the demise of the sense of God, rather it is the sense which accompanies the absence of a particular quality within humankind. In the time of 'enchantment' there was an interior suppleness within humanity – people who lived in a time of 'enchantment' were more likely to be impressionable and sensitive to the cyclic events and particular moments in the world. What Weber misses is not necessarily the passing of the mystical, per se,

but rather an interior quality of the inward person which enabled a certain sensitivity. It is the true character of pliancy which is a value we should still hold without having to go back to a life of Sacred experience. Weber (1982) argues that the time of the mystical is past – we ought not hanker after the fabrication of religious experience, but rather reclaim the deeply human qualities which belong to the person of the here and now, as he says: 'the bearing of man has been disenchanted and denuded of its mystical but inwardly genuine plasticity.' (Weber, 1982:148)

Given disenchantment, how should we act?

We are being called to a state of psychological and mental toughness. Rather than have the comparative assurance which comes from a uniform ultimate value system – the derivative of belief in a God outside of our experience – Weber asks us to undergo the unease of contestation. This is a world where ultimate values cease to exist, it is a world where people have to endure the pain of uncertain and paradoxical values – as Weber proclaims ' the various value spheres of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with each other.' (1982: 147)

Weber (1982:120) presents humankind with the 'ethic of responsibility' based on the exclusion of interventions from outside our world. This ethic exists in opposition to the 'ethic of brotherliness' or 'ultimate ends' – the derivative of religious presuppositions. The ethic of responsibility is a hard ethic since as an

existential choice it cannot be guided by religious tradition, or by science (given that ethics is not the concern of science).

According to Weber the religious world view presents a closed system in which all uncertainties are answered, if on the other hand a person is to enter the world robbed of its gods then s/he has to give up resorting to the certainties offered by religion (Weber, 1982: 154). According to Weber paradox awaits those who are brave enough to respond to the fate of our times (Weber, 1982: 154).

The construction of one's personality, and self-identity

The following topic of personality and self-identity provides a link between Weber's discussion of 'disenchantment' within modernity with that of two subsequent sociologists in this thesis, namely Thomas Luckmann and Pierre Hegy. Weber makes a point of noting how the individual builds his or her character only after a committed decision to undertake a pathway of determined steps and actions. He (1964) portrays the task of maintaining one's personality in a thoroughly solid form. He (1964) discusses the topic of the personality of the person and distinguishes between the enduring aspect of personality and the transient nature of atomised action.

Weber discusses the notion of self-identity and personality through examining the reformation notion 'the calling'. In analysing the concept of 'calling' Weber

(1976:79-92) traces its specific historical, cultural, religious and theological contexts, and identifies how the construction of a new cultural personality and self-identity evolves within those settings. In addition to the cultural and ideational influences on the formation of personality and self-identity, Weber mentions material and economic factors. Weber acknowledges that the social production of personalities is shaped within the material social forces of economies, and the practical implementation of politics (Gerth and Mills, in Weber, 1982: 74). In this way Weber's treatment of these factors which influence the construction of self-identity sets him apart from the abstract conceptual categories of Kant and Fichte.

In discussing the church discipline of the Puritan, Weber notes that it operated through 'the necessity of one's having to hold one's own' (Weber, 1982: 320). Continuing this theme of personality Weber says that when one is in the company of one's associates and is forced to take a personal stand there is 'no stronger means of breeding traits' (1982: 320). The heroic individual who accepts that there are no ultimate meanings and values does so in the context of an ethos which affirms the duty of holding firm to one's centre, to one's deep insight. In committing themselves to the basic life orientation of the ethic of responsibility they construct their personality. There is a need to subscribe to an overall world-view (the death of the gods). By affirming the fate of our times and responding to the demands of the day we will be constructing our personality, because we 'bear the fate of the times like a man [sic]' in spite of the

fact that the 'arms of the old churches are opened widely and compassionately' (Weber, 1982: 155).

The rationalisation process: Has it diminished since Weber's day?

Not all sociologists agree with Weber's claim that rationalisation is the primary characteristic of modernity, particularly when this assertion is applied to social and cultural life at the turn of the 21st Century. Zygmunt Bauman and Mike Featherstone without explicitly employing a postmodern sociology examine current social life and both identify consumers and consumerism as key features of the postmodern condition (David Lyon, 1998:105). By way of examining the concept of consumerism Mike Featherstone critiques contemporary shopping malls, and claims that '...calculative rationality no longer underlies these economic transactions. Rather, shopping has become a leisure-time cultural activity, an experience of spectacle' (in Lyon, 1998:104). In addition to consumerism and consumers Bauman and Featherstone consider other dominant characteristics of postmodernity to be those of globalisation, media, utilizing electronic information and communication (Lyon, 1998:105).

Another feature of late modernity is the sense that the experiential world ceases being 'real', and instead takes on a surreal aspect (Ritzer, 1998:121). Following this notion Baudrillard (in Ritzer, 1998) uses the term 'simulacra' to describe this feature within contemporary social phenomena. Ritzer (1998:121) claims

'...instead of "real" human interaction with servers in fast-food restaurants...or with telemarketers, we can think of these as simulated interactions.' This 'hyperreal quality', according to Ritzer, appears in cybermalls and virtual shopping. The surreal aspect of social phenomena at the turn of the 21st Century, according to Giddens, is embedded in the processes of Consumption, Mass media and Entertainment. These social forms and collage of images serve as escapes and '...substitutes for real satisfactions unobtainable in normal social conditions.' Giddens (1991:199)

Giddens' (1991:207) portrays late modernity as a society of high risk. There has been a transition from 'certain knowledge and control' to areas of 'relative security interlaced with radical doubt and...risk'. Giddens (as I note throughout the thesis) argues that the individual is embedded in a social setting of shifting values, meanings and perspectives. He (1991:114) maintains that the 'monitoring of risk is a key aspect of modernity's reflexivity.' The individual is caught up in this reflexive project by being called to engage in the ongoing reconstruction of self.

The search for self identity, a major feature of late modernity, can be examined in the example of anorexia, which represents one who is 'striving for security in a world of plural but ambiguous options' (Giddens, 1991:107). The tightly controlled body can stand as a symbol of a 'safe existence' in an open and a risk

environment. Much of this depicts a world quite diverse from the world where instrumental rationality dominates.

Lyons (1998:80) notes how the postmodern mood militates against the Enlightenment epistemologies. And yet Helen Car (in Lyons, 1998:80) warns of those contemporary doctrines, which leave little else but feelings of powerlessness and encourage escapism. As Lyons (1998:80) observes the postmodern context with its emphasis on individual choice, consumer preference, epistemological doubt and pluralism, has the capacity to 'befuddle and paralyse'. Lyons (1998:91) comments on the role of managerialism in postmodern society and how technique dominates. Hence in health, welfare, education and politics issues of social goals and purpose are 'reduced to performance criteria: "Can we manage?" is the main question.'

Given these indications of huge shifts that are occurring in late modernity, what is the state of rationalisation? Is this era so transformed into consumerism, globalization, mass media and the surreal that rationalisation cease to impact on everyday life? Though Ritzer (1998:117) claims 'most analysts see rationality at heart of modern society', he also implies that rationalization appears to have become less visible. At the same time however its lack of visibility does not mean that it is absent, far from it! It drives the world of simulacra and glitz:

'But lift up the circus tent, wipe off the sugar and salt and strip off the clown suit and what you will find just beneath the surface is the cold skeletal framework needed for construction of the iron cage of rationalization.

(Ritzer, 1998:79)

Indeed Ritzer (1998:191) argues that rationalisation rather than going into demise, will expand as we move beyond postmodern society. Giddens (1991:144) writes about the control through globalization of social and economic activity. Surveillance, one of the forms of rationalisation continues to expand ensuring 'control of social activity by social means' (Giddens, 1991:149).

Ritzer' (1998) offers detailed examples of the use of instrumental rationality in the McDonald's fast food restaurant chain and credit cards. His study is not without social significance since one in eight Americans have worked in the McDonald restaurants; in addition to this the company enjoys a strong share in overseas marketing, accounting more than half of its annual financial profits (Ritzer, 1998:59). There is extensive planning at higher levels to produce sets of detailed work procedures for employees. This it would seem has little in common with a postmodern world of open choice making and negotiating multiple narratives. Ritzer (1998:19) states 'Rules, regulations, scripts and the like have increased significantly the regulation of the behaviour of those associated with the McDonaldized systems.' Belying the human face and supposed personal encounter most underlying transactions take place via

determined forms, such as the following set speech codes, 'May I help you?'; 'Would you like a dessert with you meal?'; 'Have a nice day!' (Ritzer, 1998:64). As for the opportunity to engage in personalized reconstructions of one's self, the individual worker is not trusted to break the overarching McDonaldized narrative by engaging in free flowing dialogue with customers. Weber's influence on Ritzer is evident in the use of the notion of rationalisation in Ritzer's (1998:63) analysis of the McDonaldization of eating, '...the specialization of work furthers rationalization making work tasks, more predictable, efficient and calculable.'

Alongside this controlling structure, Ritzer (1998:79) alludes to other narratives that challenge the McDonaldized systems: 'There is hope in the distaste for standardization and homogenization in France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and elsewhere.' The French treat eating customs with respect for they know that eating entails much more than the consumption of food, eating reflects the very nature of cultural identity. There is a strong awareness in Europe, according to Ritzer (1998:89) of the highly rational characteristics of the 'Americanisation' of eating behaviour. We see in this the presence of rationalisation and at the same time the reactive human spirit.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have highlighted the notion of enchantment by referring to Friedrich Schiller's (1900; 1983) reflections about the need to balance rationality with intuition in order that modernity does not lose the fantasy of life. I mention Schiller because he pre-dates Weber by a century and wrote about the value of enchantment as a tender, energetic affective part of social and personal life. Enchantment is endangered by the sway of instrumental rationality over the poetic, symbolic and intuitive faculties.

In this chapter I noted how like Schiller, Weber (1964; 1978; 1982), named enchantment as a prized element of social living which was being lost in modernity. Weber named the mysterious and incalculable aspects of the world as its enchanting character. I pointed out that Weber wrote about enchantment as the personal aspect of the world and its 'magical' dimension. Magic is a facet of enchantment because it points to the 'non-rational' side of life, which threatens the very premises upon which the predictable and routine ordering of modernity is based.

This chapter isolated the routine and predictable aspects of modernity because Weber argues these destroy enchantment. I have mentioned how Weber was deeply saddened by the loss of the mystical and 'genuine inward plasticity' of humankind and connects this with the loss of enchantment. Indeed it may be argued that Weber suffered and experienced metaphysical pathos over the

issue of disenchantment (Abercrombie et al. 1988). Weber (1982: 73) argued that this inward soul, which sustains the 'well-rounded personality' is destroyed in modernity at the hands of the technical expert. Hence like Schiller, Weber attributed the loss of enchantment to a decline in the employment of the intuitive, affective, poetic and mythic faculties.

I noted how Weber goes further than Schiller, when he identified the causes of disenchantment as rationalisation, intellectualisation and scientifically oriented thinking. These three related ways of approaching social and private life seriously undermine any style of thinking and behaviour which does not accord with rational, logical, coherent, forms of operation. In this vein I also noted how Weber (1982: 244) argued that bureaucracy – an extension of rationalisation – also damaged intuitive, poetic, mythic and symbolic forms of knowledge. The implication of this is that there is an extensive erosion of social action and thought which were out of sympathy with empirical, logical, sequential rational processes. Magic, ritual and sacramentality – aids to enchantment – were relentlessly jettisoned.

This chapter has also shown how rationalisation is present even within systems which purport to celebrate enchantment, namely religion, particularly when religion moves toward organised and institutional religion. To this end I noted that Weber (1982: 153) argued that theology itself was an attempt to reduce that which eludes meaning – the mythic, the symbolic – to the 'intellectually

conceivable'. Hence this chapter shows that organised religion can join with bureaucracy and bring about the demise of enchantment.

In this chapter, I pointed out how Weber (1982: 143) argued that the process of rationalisation brings about not only the loss of enchantment but the loss of meaning. This led to a discussion of Weber's response that given there is no meaning, the truly brave path is to pursue a moral life built on ethical conduct, which does not rely on revealed 'truths' for meaning. This was a step toward building one's individuality. I noted how Weber (1982: 320) refers to the Puritan church ideal that to stand one's ground against a sea of opposition is the best aid in developing one's personality traits. This concurs with the move toward individualism and utilitarian principles. The reason for accentuating this point is that it becomes a pivot issue not only in Weber's reflections on enchantment in modernity, but is picked up by Luckmann and Hegy (ch. 2).

This chapter has noted a number of ways culture and people defy instrumental rationality. I alluded to the cultural base for sustaining shared myths, and narratives. I mentioned how language and culture employ metaphors which influence peoples' understanding and ongoing renegotiation with social life. Some of these metaphors serve to liberate humankind from enslavement to rationalisation and some perpetuate this enslavement. I cited Bruner's (1986) use of the notions of myth and symbol, in doing so I point to facets of society and culture which moderate rationalisation. In this chapter I referred to the

work of sociologists who examine the postmodern condition and note their identification of consumerism, mass media, entertainment and the surreal as primary characteristics of the turn of the 21st century. Whilst acknowledging social and cultural shifts since Weber's day, I argued, with Ritzer (1998) that rationalisation still operates through a variety of forms, such as surveillance, globalization of economic activity and 'McDonaldization'.

In the next chapter I note how Luckmann (1974) continues this discussion of personality by focusing on the continual process of choosing one's personality. Luckmann makes a point of the idea that individuals who choose their value system do so from an array of values offered by various competing bodies (the churches being one such body). It is during this task of selecting from the competing values that the individual self emerges, which is a distinguishing trait of modernity (Luckmann, 1974). Hegy (1987) treats this notion of personality through discussing how the individual believer evaluates what the institutional church has to say and then through use of personal conscience (a function of one's autonomy) adopts his or her own stance. What emerges is that all three theorists share a particular interest and focus on the emergence of the individual sense of self identity in modernity. The topic of personality provides the basis for developing a series of hypotheses in the subsequent chapters.

In this way I have laid the foundation for a discussion of how Weber, Luckmann and Hegy agree and disagree over the fate of enchantment in

modernity. Chapter 2 will focus on the hypotheses these thinkers forward about the impact of rationalisation, intellectualisation and scientific thinking have upon enchantment and religion, the place of religion and sacralisation in modernity, and the form religion takes in modernity, and how these questions take place around the topic of self identity in modernity. Chapter 2 will present Weber, Luckmann and Hegy's hypotheses as a research question, which will be evaluated in the light of data generated from interview material in the empirical section of the second part of the thesis (chs 5-8).

CHAPTER 2

Weber and contemporary sociology of religion: empirical implications

In this chapter, as well as summarising Max Weber's argumentation about the issues of rationalisation and disenchantment within modernity I introduce two contemporary sociologists, Thomas Luckmann and Pierre Hegy who address similar themes. Thomas Luckmann is perhaps best known for his book The Social Construction of Reality, which he wrote with Peter Berger. One of the issues Luckmann (and Berger) deals with is the notion that everyday life is an intersubjective world having both objective and subjective elements. This has implications for a discussion on the topic of enchantment. In terms of the notion of enchantment, Luckmann (1974; 1978;1990) addresses shifts in social consciousness and the internalisation of social reality. This has importance particularly when religion falters as one of the primary symbol systems of society. I restrict most of my discussion of Luckmann to the focus of this thesis, namely to treating Luckmann's argumentation about the loss of public expressions of enchantment through the agency of institutional religion and how enchantment (specifically its expression through religion) is shifted into the private realm of personal living.

One of the reasons why I include Pierre Hegy as another contemporary sociologist is that he like Luckmann is interested in the notion of the self, personal identity, and how the sense of the self is vitally connected to its social identity (Hegy, 1974). Hegy researches the notion of 'myth' as a cultural force and symbolic charter for the social and religious fabric, as well as for one's sense of self (Schwartz, 1993). He deals with issues which fascinate Luckmann (1974; 1978; 1990), namely the shift away from moral absolutes and consensus toward moral and spiritual diversity (Schwartz, 1993).

In this chapter I will show how Max Weber's sociology speaks directly to the central issue of this thesis, through focusing on two questions which arise from his work. Is spirituality and enchantment really possible and actual in modernity? and What happens to religion in this period? I will also concentrate on how Thomas Luckmann and Pierre Hegy approach the same issue. I also identify the different hypotheses Weber, Luckmann and Hegy propose about enchantment and religion in modernity. I will show how the hypotheses of each theorist entail at least one corresponding identifiable empirical implication. In effect, I present three different stories of what happens to enchantment and religion in modernity. I do not presume in this discussion that religion itself fails to have an impact upon modernity.

The discussion of Weber's argument that rationalisation, intellectualisation and scientific orientation impact on enchantment within modernity (ch. 1) will illuminate Luckmann's and Hegy's treatment of shifts in enchantment and religion in late modernity. I argue that both these latter scholars write in the tradition of Weberian sociology. At the same time, however, Luckmann and Hegy have different insights and different accounts of what happens and will happen to religion in modernity. Another facet which alters these three stories is that each story is told at a slightly different period of modernity. Weber, writing from the 1890s to the late 1910s saw modernity and religion at an earlier period than Luckmann – who wrote in the early 1960s through to the present (1990s). Hegy began writing later than Luckmann, in the 1970s and continues into the present. Both Luckmann and Hegy have an advantage over Weber in that they have been able to observe modernity and religion at a later time in the twentieth century.

Because this thesis examines enchantment by means of interviewing church-going Catholics, some examples of enchantment are embedded within reflections about religious life. Some interviewees (mainly from the contrast dualist group) experience enchantment primarily in the context of religious life. While this is so, it is important to recognise that the concept enchantment is distinct from that of religion. This distinction comes to the fore through the reflections of a number of interviewees from the primary group (the integrationist group). Many of these integrationist interviewees talk about experiencing a sense of mystery in settings of everyday life. Indeed as Luckmann (1974) maintains, one of the features of late modernity is that there is a trend toward privatising spiritual experience, away from organised religion. Luckmann (1974) clearly distinguishes between enchantment and religion, when he argues that instrumental institutional religion loses touch with the sacred. Hegy (1987) writes about an emerging segment within Catholicism, which finds energy and spiritual life within organised religion. In so doing he points to the interplay between religion and enchantment.

Arguing in the form of hypotheses and identifiable empirical implications

I present Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's accounts of enchantment and religion in modernity through the form of a research problem. I discuss the distinctive account of each theorist and how each body of argument can take the form of a given number of hypotheses. In forwarding Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's accounts of enchantment in modernity as three sets of hypotheses I

identify the empirical implication which each hypothesis entails. This sets up the discussion in the form of a research problem. This allows an evaluation of Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's arguments in terms of the accuracy of each identifiable empirical implication against the body of data generated through in-depth interviewing of contemporary Australian subjects (chs 5-8).

This chapter, therefore, is designed to produce a number of testable hypotheses. I will have the opportunity to debate some of the issues Weber, Luckmann and Hegy claim are central to religion in a time of high modernity. Hence I will be engaging in issues which have their origin in a body of literature spanning a number of centuries. Weber, though writing in Germany, travelled and studied religion not only in Germany, but also in America. Luckmann similarly has first hand experience of both settings. Hegy also worked in the North American continent and Europe.

Max Weber

Functional rationality and religion's resultant implausibility

In the last chapter I have laid the grounds for an understanding of the concepts of rationalisation, disenchantment and the development of individual personality. I noted how Weber claimed rationalisation has become so pervasive in society that it has become the dominant form of social action. Human behaviour has been influenced to the extent that the characteristic and primary attitudinal stance is synonymous with means-end rationality. Weber notes that the foremost feature of human intellectual behaviour in modernity is that of calculation (1982: 355) and says that there is a hardened 'matter-of-factness' about the functional attitude of so many people in contemporary life (1982: 244).

Weber links 'rationalisation', 'intellectualisation' and 'scientific orientation' together and ascribes to them a major role in shaping society's general loss of the sense of mystery and magic. The particular term he uses to describe this phenomenon is that of 'disenchantment'. Because of the general feeling of 'disenchantment', Weber predicts that the finer and most worthwhile qualities of humanity will vacate the primary social institutions of the day.

Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendent realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness [sic] of direct and personal human relations. (Weber, 1982: 155)

'Intellectualisation', and 'scientifically oriented thinking' as well as 'rationalisation' have a particularly negative impact on religion. There is an ongoing tension between religion and intellectual knowledge due to the nature of Christianity according to Weber, 'Redemptory religion defends itself against the attack of the self-sufficient intellect' (1982: 352). Religion demands the 'sacrifice' of the intellect (Weber, 1982: 154, 352). Because religion claims that its foundational principles are 'revealed' or given directly by God it puts its foundational principles beyond the contestation of rationality. Weber (1982: 148, 155, 350, 357) predicts that religion will become ever more redundant as it is pushed into the irrational by the dominance of rationality employed in the sciences. He notes

Every increase of rationalism in empirical science increasingly pushes religion from the rational into the irrational realm; but only today does religion become the irrational or anti-rational supra-human power. (Weber, 1982: 351)

This positions religion at variance with the dominant and encouraged mode of modernity, namely 'intellectualisation', 'scientifically oriented thinking' and 'rationalisation'. These latter characteristics being enshrined within modernity are the benchmark of plausibility for public institutions. Because religion does not submit its foundational principles to the critique of functional and instrumental rationality, its estimation within society plummets (Weber, 1982: 330, 332).

Weber's discussion of this matter can arguably be presented in the following three hypotheses, namely

- H1 In modernity, rationalisation, intellectualisation and scientifically oriented thinking brings about the demise of enchantment and religion;
- H2 Religion will move from the centre of the social institutions of society and become ever more irrelevant;
- H3 In modernity religion will move to the margins of society.

There are two identifiable empirical implications entailed in hypothesis H1, namely Hr1 and Hr2:

- Hr1 Religious experiences seldom occurs in people who predominantly employ instrumental rational action in everyday life;
- Hr2 In modernity people with scientifically oriented thinking who follow religion experience internal conflict.

The hypothesis H2 suggests three identifiable empirical implications, namely:

- Hp1 Institutional religion will experience a demise at the centre of public social life;
- Hp2 The primary social institutions and the people in those institutions will see religion as ever more irrelevant;

Hp3 Religion will become anachronistic.

The hypothesis H3 can be presented in the form of the following identifiable empirical implications

Hp4 Religion will move to the margins of social life;

Hp5 Even in intimate gatherings religion will by degrees be ever less able to survive modernity.

Weber and the idea that meaning can be found outside religion

Weber argues that meaning is critical to the human enterprise. He (1982: 155) calls upon humanity to forego the 'ultimate' meaning which comes from the churches and pursue the meaning that comes from living an ethical life. The trouble with the churches, according to Weber lies in the claim of having immediate knowledge of meaning. According to Weber (1982:352), 'Religion claims to offer an ultimate stand toward the world by virtue of a direct grasp of the world's meaning.'

Rather than seek meaning from an 'ultimate' outside of our world, Weber says that the human person can have meaning from another source. He calls for a meaning which comes from a commitment to the demands of the day. This generates what Weber (1982: 120) names 'the ethics of responsibility'. The 'meaning', which is so important to humanity can now be offered to society through individuals facing the implications of each and every decision they make while living through the 'ethic of responsibility'. This ethic demands more than the Christian ethic (the ethic of 'brotherliness'/'ultimate ends') since the individual has to take account of all the consequences of given particular ethical decisions. Weber (1982: 156) argues that a truly authentic and courageous path of 'integrity' is open to the individual who renounces the religious as grounds

for morality and ethics. It would seem logical that Weber's argumentation can be presented in the form of the following hypothesis:

H4 In modernity the meaning which comes from religion will be replaced with the meaning that comes from the 'ethics of responsibility'.

The identifiable empirical implication which logically flow from this hypothesis is that:

(Hf1) Religion will cease addressing public social issues, and in the personal issues of life it will become ineffective.

Developing personality and self-identity independently of religion

Weber argues that individuals develop an ethical personality after they have faced the fate of our times and commit themselves through the ethics of responsibility to plan their life (Kronman, 1983). Weber speaks of choosing one's pathway solely out of consideration of ethics and morality (without religion). He calls for the courage to face the fact that the gods are dead. The individual is called upon to respond to the demands of the day by opting for an ethic based on responsibility rather than on 'ultimate' ends (Weber, 1982: 120). The ethics of 'ultimate ends' calls for immediate obedience to commandments rather than taking into account all the implications of the immediate act. Weber argues that the certitude of the past is gone – paradox awaits those who are brave enough to respond to the fate of our times. Logically these arguments can be presented in the following hypothesis:

H5 People seek to avoid the paradox of modernity by seeking refuge in the certitude of religion.

This hypothesis entails the following two identifiable empirical implications:

(Hf2) Religion will be characterised more by a reliance on certitude than by risk taking;

(Hf3) Religious people will place priority on obedience rather than employ individual conscience.

While only the first of these hypotheses (H1) explicitly mentions the notion of enchantment all four hypotheses effectively deal with this notion. They do this by examining how enchantment is being manifest within religion in modernity. Weber argues that the very issues which bring about disenchantment in the wider society, namely rationalisation and intellectualisation are those which bring about the disenchantment within religion (through its institutional form). By selecting hypotheses (and empirical implications) which involve religion I use religion as the medium to examine what is happening to enchantment; the interviewees reveal what is happening to their sense of enchantment through their relationship with religion.

Having presented some of the primary hypotheses and the identifiable empirical implications which flow from Weber's hypotheses I now turn to Thomas Luckmann.

Thomas Luckmann

One of the reasons why I chose Luckmann as a contemporary sociologist is that his major questions and energy focuses on issues similar to those of Weber. Luckmann's interest is in taking account of the subjective world of the human individual (Berger and Luckmann, 1987). Like Weber, Luckmann (1978: 9), reflects about the 'secularization' of social theory which failed to pursue an understanding of the social world as a human reality. He writes approvingly of Weber's attempt to give 'methodological recognition to the human 'constitution' of the subject matter of the social sciences' (Luckmann, 1978: 10). Luckmann

describes Weber's task as one which provided a mediation between 'the "positivism" of science and the idealistic "historicism" of the humanistic disciplines' (1978: 10).

Another reason I chose Luckmann as a contemporary sociologist for this thesis is because of his interests in phenomenology. He sees phenomenology as a system which puts the individual human being at 'the centre of a system of coordinates on which the experience of the world is mapped' (Luckmann, 1978: 8). He focuses on the 'reflexive' by 'returning to the intentional feature of experience' (Luckmann, 1978: 8). In this vein he acknowledges George Herbert Mead and the symbolic interactionist school for their attempts to engage with the human person's subjectivity.

Luckmann's interest in the subjective world of the human person, and his concern about the bifurcation of thought within modernity following its separation from its religious roots, makes his sociological approach a helpful tool in pursuing the intent of this thesis, namely gaining insight into the subjective world of people who experience enchantment in modernity.

Luckmann (1974: 37) maintains that religion has shifted from its institutional organised form at the centre of society to the periphery of 'modern' life in a privatised form. He argues that a dominant factor in modernity bringing about the growing irrelevance of religion to the primary social institutions of modernity is 'functional rationality' (Luckmann, 1974: 101). Luckmann (1974) claims functional rationality influences primary social institutions to the extent that they lose perception that the world resides within the context of the Sacred.

Luckmann (1974: 101) identifies the second set of factors in modernity hastening the demise of religion in the public social domain as 'institutional specialisation' and 'institutional segmentation'/'differentiation' (Dobbelaere,

1987: 112). Institutions which become more and more specialised also become distinctive and thereby separated from the functioning of other segmented institutions – when this happens there is a loss of an overall sense of interconnection. Luckmann claims that 'The more autonomous and rational the specialised institutional areas became, the less intimate grew their relationship to the transcendent Sacred cosmos.' (1974: 101)

The reason why I draw attention to these two aspects of modernity is that they explain in part how Luckmann (1974; 1990) perceives modernity and religion. Luckmann (1990) contends that the specialised institutions of modernity regard institutional religion as irrelevant and passé. Luckmann (1974: 99) argues that the primary institutions of society do not support constructions of a Sacred cosmos and in particular they do not support a unified 'Sacred cosmos'.

Luckmann (1974: 35) theorises that in a time of late modernity religion moves out of the public arena (where the social institutions have become increasingly specialised) and takes up its location in the privatised segments of individual lives. His discussion may be presented in the form of the following hypothesis:

H6 Religion in late modernity becomes ever more privatised.

This hypothesis entails an empirically identifiable implication, namely (Hp6) 'People in late modernity who live a religious life do so primarily in the personalised spheres of their lives and not in the public arena.'

Luckmann and the idea of individual autonomy epitomising the individual in modernity

A distinctive feature of religion in late modernity is associated with the maintenance of personal identity and individual consciousness (Luckmann, 1974: 77; Giddens, 1991). According to Luckmann (Berger and Luckmann, 1987)

traditional society acted as a source for the formation of consciousness and personality. Today however the social order of modernity fails to provide this role. Luckmann argues that this is so despite the fact that society exercises expansive spheres of control through its functionally rational 'mechanisms' (1974: 97). Since the primary social institutions retreat from the work of providing a source for the forming of conscience it is the task of the individual in today's society to generate and maintain a sense of self identity and autonomy. Luckmann claims that the construction of the self by the self is a distinctive trait of modernity – he notes 'Personal identity becomes, essentially, a private phenomenon. This is, perhaps, the most revolutionary trait of modern society.' (Luckmann, 1974: 97)

Luckmann's view of personal identity is supported by Giddens' (1991) assertion that the individual in modernity needs to be engaged in an ongoing reconstruction of self-identity. The reason why I mention this particular facet of Luckmann's theorising about the interplay between modernity and the individual is that it is linked to his theory of religion's privatisation in a time of late modernity. Luckmann (1974) argues that compared to traditional society the individual is required to engage in a much higher degree of choice-making. One has to undergo the exercise of personal autonomy in choosing goods, services, partners, basic life orientations and meaning systems. As Luckmann (1974: 98) maintains the choice of 'ultimate meanings' takes place 'in a relatively autonomous fashion'.

Individual religiosity acquiring the individuation of modernity

The ramifications of these changes in society from its traditional form to the present time of modernity upon religion are profound. Luckmann (1990: 134) argues that the autonomous 'consumer' of religion who goes about society in

late modernity acts in a highly discriminating fashion, much in the style of a purchaser of goods. From the array of theological, spiritual and religious beliefs, attitudes and values offered on the market place of modernity the individual selects in a discriminating fashion what he or she regards as important. The market is no longer dominated by institutional religion, there are a host of competing agents who offer alternative symbolic universes. Individual religiosity is thus no longer a replica or approximation of an official model (Luckmann, 1974: 83). The essential point I make here is that Luckmann is claiming a high degree of diversification in late modernity. There is no longer a unified 'Sacred cosmos' – the 'thematic unity', which once typified 'the traditional cosmos breaks apart' (Luckmann, 1974: 98). Luckmann (1990: 134) emphasises the autonomy of the subject who selects and arranges the items of her or his 'Sacred universe'. The task of arranging the particular selected facets into a personal 'sacred universe' is not easy. Like other dimensions of the personal within modernity it is inherently fragile. Speaking of the privatised selection of religious themes chosen by the individual in modernity, Luckmann says that the subject 'builds them into a somewhat precarious private system of "ultimate" significance.' (Luckmann, 1974: 102)

Functionally differentiated sacred cosmos and unified sacred cosmos

Luckmann maintains that institutional religion has 'traded off' many of its supernatural elements in order to be viewed as 'relevant' by public society. Specialised religious institutions still use some traditional language but such use only disguises the gap between itself and primal Christian tradition. Luckmann (1974) maintains that specialised religious institutions have become attached to the interests of the bourgeoisie, to political advantage and to nationalism and in this way institutional religion has left the core of primal Christian tradition.

The modern 'sacred cosmos' of the autonomous individual within late modernity – a private system of 'ultimate significance' – is quite distinct from specialised institutional religion (Luckmann, 1990: 134). The private system of 'ultimate significance' which individuals build for themselves in modernity becomes 'invisible' with respect to the public institutions of religion. Their religious lives also become 'invisible'. These autonomous individuals see the functional norms specialised institutional religion uses to operate in modernity as abhorrent and antithetical to religious life. Hence Luckmann (1990: 134) claims that individual religiosity no longer replicates or approximates institutional religiosity.

The argument Luckmann pursues here can be reduced to the following hypothesis:

H7 Individual religiosity in high modernity does not replicate the religiosity found in public institutional religion of that time.

This particular hypothesis of Luckmann's logically entails the following identifiable empirical implication:

(Hf4) Individual religiosity is likely to be distinctly different from institutional religion within modernity.

The other point Luckmann makes above is that in modernity people are averse to the functional rationality of 'institutional' religion. They set up their own 'sacred cosmos' and do so without wanting to be involved in functional rationality – Luckmann contends

In the 'private sphere' the partial sharing, and even joint construction, of systems of 'ultimate' significance is possible without conflict with the

functionally rational norms of the primary institutions. (Luckmann, 1974: 106).

The logic of Luckmann's argumentation above can be presented in the following hypothesis, namely

H8 In modernity people leave the institutional churches and reconstruct a 'sacred cosmos' because they desire a form of religiosity which operates outside of the realm of functional norms.

This hypothesis logically entails an empirically identifiable implication, namely that

(Hr3) Privatised religious life in late modernity tends to avoid functional rationality.

The identifiable empirical implication Hr3 should be able to be observed in the interview situation by analysing the comments individuals who subscribe to privatised religious life make about religious life. Luckmann's claim that there are structural differences between 'institutional' and 'privatised' religious life implies that individuals from either way of life would use distinctively different forms of religious language.

Religion not disappearing from modernity

While Luckmann (1990) claims that there has been a specialisation of institutional religion he disagrees with those who see this as a process of secularisation and the eventual disappearance of religion. He argues that this is a gratuitous belief in the aetiological myth of modernity. Luckmann argues that the change institutional specialisation of religion brings about is not the demise of religion but rather the relocation of religion in modernity. For him this

process within modernity is none other than the 'privatisation' of religion (Luckmann, 1990: 132).

Luckmann contends therefore religion is not in demise but has gone into the private realm and has become 'invisible' (Luckmann, 1974; 1990: 135). This new form of religion, its relocation and emergence as privatised religion takes place in a period when institutional religion has been undergoing demise. The emergence of this new form of religion also takes place apart from the primary social institutions of society (Luckmann, 1990: 135).

One of the primary characteristics of this relocated emerging religion is that the themes which occupy the dominant positions in modernity's new 'Sacred cosmos' tend to be different from those of the traditional Christian tradition cosmos. Some themes within the new 'Sacred cosmos' have their origin in the traditional Christian cosmos, some originate in the 'secular' ideologies of the eighteenth and nineteenth Centuries, but most themes revolve around individual existence and can tend toward 'solipsism', the process of being caught up in oneself (Luckmann, 1990: 135).

Luckmann' ties the notion of 'transcendence' to the here and now

There is a strong difference in the way Luckmann (1990) and Weber (1978) talk about the notion of 'transcendence'. One of the influences upon Weber's (1976) explanation of transcendence is his expressed wish to offer some account of the emergence of Capitalism in the West – his work leads him to focus in a particular way on the thinking behind Calvinism. One of the features of Calvinist theology which Weber (1978:1198) notes is the sense of awesomeness and 'otherness' of God. Weber predominantly uses the word transcendence to refer to this aspect of God's separateness and difference with respect to human

experience. Weber (1978: 462, 552) speaks of transcendence by emphasising the tremendous otherness of God, God's distance from humanity and humanity's unknowability of God. By contrast Luckmann claims another meaning to transcendence, even though he acknowledges 'the "great" other-worldly transcendences' (1990: 127). Luckmann (1990: 129) identifies three types of transcendence, namely the great other worldly; the 'intermediate' (political); and the minimal transcendence of spatial and temporal everyday life. When Luckmann speaks of this third type of transcendence he says that it has become part of modern life, he notes 'human experience is a continuous flow of transcendence' (Luckmann, 1990: 129). He claims (1990: 128) in this modern time religion has undergone a change of location and has moved into the private sphere, hence the kind of 'great' transcendences celebrated in the European Middle Ages has gone into demise. The point is that what has not gone into demise is the transcendence of everyday life. According to Luckmann 'otherness' or 'transcendence' is possible in the everyday because peak experiences are necessarily connected to the ordinary in a person's life.

ultimate meanings of life make sense only in the context of the significance of common everyday affairs and the 'transcendent' is only transcendent with respect to something that is 'immanent'. (Luckmann, 1990: 128)

Luckmann's presentation of the notion of transcendence demands a tie between the 'Sacred' and common human experience. He promotes the integration of the 'Sacred' and the mundane and everyday aspects of human life. Speaking of modern social constructions within the newly emerging 'invisible' form of religion, Luckmann says that it 'tends to bestow a sacred status upon the individual.' (1990: 127)

The anti-hierarchical dimension of Luckmann's 'invisible' religion

Luckmann refers to the 'New Age Movement' as a type of the emerging social form of religion. Luckmann argues that the new social forms of 'invisible religion' range widely with respect to which level of transcendence each supports. There is syncretism of popular psychology, Eastern 'mystical' writings, astrology, bio energetics and meditation (Luckmann, 1990: 136).

The emerging form of 'invisible' religion has a very loose organisational structure, there is little evidence of any tendency toward dogmatic formulation of tenets of belief, neither are there any disciplining functionaries (Luckmann, 1990: 137). As Luckmann notes, the desire for such a loose overall structure typifies the reluctance many people feel within modernity toward the specialisation of cultural domains, like science, art and religion (Luckmann, 1990: 137). This move away from overly formalistic interpretation of ritual, beliefs, morality and organisation tends to characterise the emerging 'invisible' religion of modernity as anti-institutional and anti-hierarchical.

Luckmann's argumentation may be forwarded in the form of the following hypothesis:

H9 In modernity 'invisible' religion opposes dogmatic formulation of belief and disciplining procedure.

Arguably this hypothesis can be reduced to the following identifiable empirical implication:

(Hf5) In late modernity the newly emerging privatised form of religion is anti-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian.

Invisible religion and its lack of socio-political involvement

Luckmann (1974) claims that 'invisible religion' within modernity typically is not involved in social issues, nor associated with social or political movements. He argues 'invisible' religion is not tied to the vested interests of particular social strata nor does it articulate these vested interests. It offers itself as an 'unprecedented opportunity for the autonomy of personal life for "everybody"' (Luckmann, 1974: 117). Luckmann claims that 'invisible' religion entices people away from socio-political concerns affecting society. 'It contains the danger of motivating mass withdrawal into the "private sphere" while "Rome burns"' (Luckmann, 1974: 117).

Luckmann's argumentation can logically be presented in the following hypothesis:

H10 The privatisation of religion into an 'invisible' religious form of modernity encourages an abandonment of social and political responsibility.

This hypothesis entails an empirically identifiable implication, namely (Hf6) People in modernity who live a privatised form of religious life, will indicate through in-depth interviewing a withdrawal from socio-political involvement in society.

In this section of the chapter I have represented Luckmann's reflections upon functional rationality, institutional specialisation of religion and modernity in the form of a series of hypotheses and subsequent empirically identifiable implications. This will provide the basis for an assessment in the light of the data generated from in-depth interviewing in the empirical section of the thesis (chs 5-8). This list of identifiable implications and hypotheses is collated in

appendix 1; it also provides the means for comparing Luckmann's hypotheses with those of Weber and Hegy.

Pierre Hegy

In this section on Pierre Hegy (1987) I will follow the structural form I used in Luckmann's story, that is, I will forward the argumentation in the form of a hypothesis and then identify the empirical implication/s which each hypothesis entails.

Hegy holds quite a different position to Luckmann (and Weber) on the notion of disenchantment. Where Luckmann's discussion on enchantment focuses on its shift from the public arena of institutionalised religion into the private arena, Hegy deals with enchantment in terms of the quality of its existence within institutional religion and in the private arena. He narrows his focus so that his study concentrates purely on the contesting cultural and theological traditions within Catholicism. Hegy earns his place in the thesis because he addresses the shifts that have occurred in the subcultures within Catholicism. His analysis helps this thesis particularise the notion of enchantment for the Catholic interviewees in the study. His study is also helpful because he inquires into two diverse streams of spirituality and religion within Catholicism, each of these traditions impact on the issue of how its adherents experience or do not experience enchantment within modernity. Hegy's approach ensures that the discussion on peoples' experience of enchantment within institutional religion does not proceed simplistically as though there are not competing subcultural religious traditions within the one organised religion. Hegy's focus on two traditions of spirituality within Catholicism also provides another way of gauging and evaluating the two styles of spirituality I construct for discussing the issue of enchantment within modernity.

Brief overview of similarities and differences between Hegy and Luckmann

Luckmann's (1974; 1990) interest in modernity's newly emerging privatised form of religion which he names 'invisible' religion is taken up by Pierre Hegy (1987). Hegy restricts his discussion to a similar phenomenon occurring within the Catholic church, he highlights how many aspects of the 'visible' institutional religion are being rejected by a newly emerging 'invisible' form of religion within Catholicism.

As a way of noting some of the similarities and differences between these two theorists – discussed more fully below – I will briefly outline these points here. Both Luckmann (1974, 1990) and Hegy (1987) agree that institutionalisation is being rejected by the emerging form of 'invisible' religion within modernity. The individuals who participate in Luckmann's 'invisible' religion and Hegy's 'invisible' Catholicism tend to have a well developed sense of self and to some extent an ongoing reconstruction of their self-identity (Giddens, 1991). Luckmann's and Hegy's descriptions of people who practice 'invisible' religion have a number of common characteristics, such as: a heightened sense of personal right and personal autonomy to select specific elements of religion both inside and outside 'institutional' religion; and an aversion to attitudes presumed in traditional society, such as hierarchy, conformity and dogmatism.

The characteristics Hegy attributes to his 'invisible' Catholics and those Luckmann ascribes to his 'invisible' religion differ in the following respects: Where Luckmann discusses a major antithesis occurring between the institutional specialisation of the Christian churches and society, Hegy focuses on the struggle taking place between the institutional form of Catholicism which hangs onto its sub-culture of clericalism, and the emerging form of

religion within Catholicism – 'invisible' Catholicism; Where Luckmann (1990) argues that the emerging form of religion in modernity leaves the Church, Hegy argues that it stays within the Church. These theorists also diverge over the issue of socio-political involvement – Luckmann argues that 'invisible' religion encourages people to leave involvement in the socio-political affairs of society, Hegy argues the opposite (1987).

Luckmann and Hegy differ over what they see to be the primary concerns of the emerging form of religion. According to Luckmann the newly emerging 'invisible' form of religion rejects functional rationality. He maintains that the abhorrence of functional rationality by certain people is the prime reason why these people move into privatised religious life. In choosing to privatise religious life, individuals decide to make their religion free of functional rationality – the central dimension of the institutional specialisation of religion and the public social institutions of society (Luckmann 1974). Hegy (1987: 174) views the situation differently – he does not seriously engage with the sociological notion of functional rationality – he regards the primary concern of the emerging form of 'invisible' religion to be that of institutional religion and its subculture of clericalism (which can be seen as a by-product of institutionalism). Hegy maintains that there are signs within Catholicism that religion is seeking to 'overcome its own sub-culture in the name of higher religious principles' (1987: 174). Effectively therefore – according to Hegy – invisible Catholicism is not totally rejecting functional rationality, rather in a paradoxical fashion it employs a discriminating intellectual faculty to identify traces of the equivalent of functional rationality and call it into question in the light of 'higher religious principles' (Hegy 1987: 174).

Having outlined some of the similarities and differences in Luckmann's and Hegy's stories, I will present these points a little more fully so that I can draw a

series of hypotheses and the consequent empirically identifiable implications which flow from each respective hypothesis. Before I do this it will be helpful to present Hegy's story briefly in the light of religious shifts within Catholicism over the latter part of the twentieth Century.

Locating Hegy's story of religion within the context of changes in Catholicism

By way of situating Hegy's story, I will note some of the ferment occurring within Catholicism in terms of Luckmann's notion of 'institutional specialisation' within late modernity. One of the events which highlights this turbulence is the struggle which occurred in the Catholic church after the Second Vatican Council (1963-1965). This council – arguably one of the most significant councils within the Catholic church since the council of Trent (1545-1563) – provoked tension within the church over the issue of institutionalisation. Just as Luckmann (1974) refers to institutional specialisation and Hegy (1987) to the sub-culture of clericalism so this Catholic Council challenged institutionalisation within Catholicism.

One of the areas within Catholicism which the Second Vatican Council demanded be reviewed and changed was that of the liturgy (a potential base for the ongoing promotion of the 'institutional' model of the church). The liturgy came to be a contentious field in which challenges to power, status and self identity within institutional religion were forwarded. The Council demanded that the liturgy be changed in order to permit a 'more communal celebration' (Abbott, 1966: 135). The issue of institutionalism with which Hegy (1987) deals has no greater arena for contestation than that offered in ritual. Dinges (1987) notes how ritual encapsulates many facets of humanity – it addresses and challenges social location within society, hierarchy, self-identity and power.

As symbolic and expressive communication, ritual conveys multiple meanings (see, Durkheim, 1912; Radcliffe Brown, 1952; Malinowski, 1955; Van Gennep, 1909) that both reflect culture, values and structures and generate and transform them. (Geertz, 1973 in Dinges, 1987: 140)

Hegy (1987) contends that the power relationships of hierarchy and clergy over laity are no longer acceptable to individuals who belong to the emerging 'invisible' form of Catholicism. Dinges (1987) in noting that ritual is the pivotal point about which power relationships are underpinned is addressing the field of liturgy. When the Second Vatican Council changed the liturgy it effectively brought established clerical and lay roles into question. In changing the liturgy the Council also affected theological and doctrinal understanding. Much of the liturgical change encouraged a less hierarchical, more egalitarian and communitarian form of religion. The enormity and implication of such changes were not always well received, opposition to the implementation of the renewal of liturgy was sometimes vocal, sometimes it took a silent form of resistance – the deeper motive for discontent centred on the doctrinal implications of liturgical change. Dinges (1987) specifically addresses the question of how liturgical change impinges on doctrinal understanding, he says that 'ambiguity regarding lay/clerical roles in sharing liturgical action was also a frequently raised subject with clear doctrinal implications.' (Dinges, 1987: 144)

Hegy addresses the issue of institutionalism and formalism within the Catholic church by examining the diverse sociological models of church; a significant contribution to this study was made by Richard Niebuhr (1956) and developed by Avery Dulles (1978). Hegy (1987) refers to one of Dulles' models of the church, namely the 'institutional' model and notes how – according to Dulles (1978) – this 'institutional' model dominated the Catholic church from 1600 until about 1940. The style of religion encapsulated by the 'institutional' model was

one where all aspects of church life such as, membership, sacraments, authority were determined by due reference to 'visible, social, and legal criteria' (Hegy, 1987: 168). In bureaucratic style this tended to promote and sustain a monolithic construction of Catholicism; the 'institutional' model was a culture of its own – it became a resistant sub-culture within a church called to change by the Second Vatican Council (Hegy, 1987). In the eyes of the post-Vatican ethos the Catholic church is multi-faceted and offers a variety of ways of being Church (models which position themselves alongside the 'institutional' model).

The monolithic construction of religion embodied in the 'institutional' model of Catholicism became the subject of Hegy's study of Catholic clergy in France in 1981 (Hegy, 1987). Hegy points to studies which demonstrate the high degree of uniformity in the training of clergy prior to the Second Vatican Council (1963-1965). Latin being a universal and dead language ensured conformity and uniformity – it supported a strong sub-culture within Catholicism. Hegy (1987) cites studies based on analysis of questions presented to clergy from Peru, the United States of America, and France, which indicate a remarkable identity in terms of training, belief and devotional practices extant among clergy prior to the Second Vatican Council. The characteristic of uniformity is central to what Richard Niebuhr (1956) and Avery Dulles (1978) refer to above as the 'institutional' model of the church.

Hegy's (1987) research focuses not only on the propensity for uniformity, but also on a quite diverse features emerging in Catholicism, namely the readiness of clergy to give up those aspects of their sub-culture which furthered 'institutionalism' and clericalism. Hegy (1987) notes how the clergy were given two sub-scales, called the 'visible church scale' and the 'invisible church scale'. On the basis of responses to a series of statements offered from either 'church' scale, the clergy indicated whether they had moved from 'institutional' thinking

(prior to the Second Vatican Council) toward the thinking typical of the emerging form of Catholicism, which typifies elements of the 'invisible' religious form. On half of the topics, a majority of priests indicated that they favoured the 'invisible' form of religious Christian life. The notion of church as a 'visible' social institution was approved only by a minority of clergy, the conception of church as an 'invisible' community was preferred by 70 per cent. Hegy argues that his study indicates a phenomenon much broader than a study of shifting thinking among Catholic clergy. He cites nation-wide studies of people within France between 1944 and 1976 and finds that the laity mirror the clergy in respect to their shifts in attitudes and beliefs (Hegy, 1987: 170) – hence he argues that there is a general shift among clergy and laity within organised Catholicism toward 'invisible' Catholicism.

Hegy's study also touches on the issue of how in a time of late modernity people are able to live in today's society and retain enchantment in the midst of everyday involvement. Two propositions address this issue of enchantment in every day life: the first suggests a separation between the spiritual and the temporal; the second suggests there is no separation between the spiritual and the temporal. The former had an acceptance rate of less than 30 per cent, the latter received overwhelming acceptance. The former proposal typifying the 'institutional' model of church was not therefore favoured in the response.

Hegy's general argumentation seems logically to lead toward the following overarching hypothesis:

H11 In modernity institutional specialisation within Catholicism is being rejected by individuals within Catholicism who choose a new form of religion, namely 'invisible' Catholicism.

This general hypothesis embraces a number of issues – I will name the issues, put them into the form of particular hypotheses and then present the particular empirically identifiable implication/s entailed in each respective hypothesis.

Hegy's primary argument revolves around the non-acceptance of the institutional specialisation that has occurred within Catholicism. This claim of Hegy's can take the form of the following hypothesis:

H12 There are Catholic individuals in modernity who though still practicing formal worship reject the 'institutional' model of the church.

This hypothesis entails an empirically identifiable implication, namely that (Hf7) 'Invisible' Catholics will reflect their rejection of the 'institutional' model of the church in the way they speak about related issues in an interview situation.

A more detailed concern of the above is the issue of 'clericalism'. I take the meaning of 'clericalism' from that offered by Küng (1978) who notes that a clericalistic attitude 'can only recognize real and decisive activity and initiative in the Church if it comes from the clergy rather than from the other members of the people of God.' (Küng, 1978: 179). Hegy claims that individuals who have opted for 'invisible' Catholicism reject the sub-culture within institutional Catholicism typified by the term 'clericalism'. The struggle between clericalism (a particular form of institutionalism) and 'invisible' Catholicism is according to Hegy (1987:168) the most important struggle facing Catholicism. This argument logically leads to the following hypothesis

H13 In high modernity individuals who are part of 'invisible' Catholicism reject the sub-culture within institutional Catholicism, known as 'clericalism'.

The empirically observable implication, which this hypothesis entails, is that

(Hf8) In modernity individuals who are part of 'invisible' Catholicism will show that they are uneasy with 'clericalism' through in-depth interview situations.

Another dimension of Hegy's argumentation revolves around the issue of the Sacred and the profane. Hegy argues that the new form of religion emerging in this time of late modernity has a strong aversion to the theological separation of life into Sacred and profane spheres. This claim of Hegy's logically can be presented in the following hypothesis, namely that

H14 Individuals within 'invisible' Catholicism in late modernity reject the separation of the Sacred and the profane since their everyday experiences are a locus for their experience of the Sacred.

The empirically identifiable implication which flows from this hypothesis is that

(Hp7) 'Invisible' Catholics will indicate in an interview situation a belief that their everyday experiences are a locus for their experience of the Sacred.

Another way that Hegy's 'invisible' Catholicism shows a similarity with Luckmann's 'invisible' religion is over the issue of the source of moral authority – an issue which is intimately connected to Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's claim that self identity, individuality and personality is a feature of modernity. Interestingly Weber's notion of the 'ethic' of responsibility (not a characteristic of the religious believer according to Weber) places the onus on individual exercise of conscience. It is precisely this habitual claiming one's own moral conscience which both Hegy (1987) and Luckmann (1974) affirm is a feature of the 'invisible' religious person. Weber (1982) criticises the Christian 'ethic of ultimate means' on the grounds that individuals who use this latter ethic opt out of the responsibility found in conscience. Both Luckmann and Hegy

maintain that moral authority resides in the individual conscience for those who follow the emerging 'invisible' form of religion.

The question, where does the basis of moral authority reside? is arguably a core issue not only for the newly emerging form of religion but also for 'institutional' religion. Hegy (1987) argues that this topic is the central issue for the emerging 'invisible' form of Catholicism. In the French studies cited above Hegy (1987) notes how out of a national sample of 303 priests in France the question was posed where does the highest moral authority reside? Those who supported the pre-Second Vatican Council subculture said the highest legal and moral authority lay with the hierarchy. According to 44 per cent of the clergy, in the 1976 survey, individual conscience is the locus of legal and moral authority. Hegy (1987) argues that there has been a shift away from placing moral and legal authority in the hands of the hierarchy. The seat of moral and legal determination has been taken back by the individual. This Hegy (1987) argues indicates the emergence of a new kind of Catholicism.

Hegy's argumentation in this instance can take the form of the following hypothesis, namely:

H15 In late modernity individuals who are part of 'invisible' Catholicism do not place moral and legal authority in the hierarchy of the church, but within their own individual conscience.

This hypothesis entails the empirical implication

(Hf9) That 'invisible' Catholics who believe moral and legal authority is based in their own conscience, will give voice to this belief in an interview situation.

Points of difference between Luckmann and Hegy

One of the major differences between Hegy and Luckmann is over the issues of whether or not the emerging form of 'invisible' religion maintains socio-political involvement. Hegy (1987:167) argues that the new emerging form of Catholicism is 'both more secular and more religious' – individuals who are part of 'invisible' Catholicism, tend to be involved in the affairs of everyday life, while at the same time being open to the Sacred.

According to Hegy 'invisible' Catholicism rejects the traditional separation of the spiritual and the temporal. In the place of this separation 'invisible' Catholicism is committed to involvement in the socio-political demands of the day. Individuals participating in 'invisible' Catholicism show a desire to be part of a 'universal fight against all forms of injustice, inside and outside the church. Luckmann's traditional opposition between church and society seems to be overcome.' (Hegy, 1987: 172) Hegy's argumentation here can be presented in the form of the following hypothesis:

H16 'Invisible Catholics are committed to address both socio-political injustice and injustice within Catholicism.

An empirically observable implication which flows from this hypothesis is that (Hf10) 'In an interview situation 'invisible' Catholics express a commitment to address socio-political injustice, as well as injustice within the church.

By contrast Luckmann emphasises the 'privatisation' of religion to the point that the 'privatisation' pulls the individual out of socio-political involvement. He

claims 'invisible' religion has the danger of 'motivating mass withdrawal into the 'private sphere' (Luckmann, 1974: 117).

These implications offer a number of questions when analysing the in-depth interviews later in this study – these are: Is religion in demise or in change? What form of existence does religion adopt in this time of modernity? If the primary group of interviewees do sustain a sense of enchantment within modernity, are there any distinctive practices they employ which permit this to happen?

Conclusion

In this chapter, in addition to discussing Max Weber's views on the notion of disenchantment in modernity, I have also discussed two other sociologists, namely Thomas Luckmann and Pierre Hegy who, write on the same topic. I have noted that these latter figures are contemporary sociologists and that each of them, though supportive of Weber's methodological approach, differ in their evaluation of the state of enchantment (and consequently the state of religion) in modernity.

The chapter has also highlighted the methodological strategy of reducing the body of thought of each theorist to a number of hypotheses and then isolating at least one identifiable empirical implication of each hypothesis. I noted how each of these identifiable empirical implications is a way of testing the plausibility of the given theorist's hypothesis. The benchmark is the body of data generated from in-depth interviewing contemporary Australian subjects.

In this chapter I singled out three themes in Weber's thought which related to the topic of disenchantment in modernity. The first theme was Weber's notion

of functional rationality, its impact on enchantment in modernity and the ensuing loss of religious plausibility. This section highlights functional rationality as the underlying issue in Weber's discussion of disenchantment. Functional rationality is common to all three factors affecting disenchantment, namely 'rationalisation', 'intellectualisation' and 'scientifically oriented thinking'. The second theme addressed Weber's argument that meaning which was once primarily derived from religion would find its source outside of religion in the exercise of an ethics of full personal responsibility for one's actions. The importance of this section is in its implications for religion in modernity – people, according to Weber (1982: 155), do not have to seek out religion to make a life of meaning for themselves. Logically religion in this scenario becomes mere appendage. The last theme I dealt with was Weber's arguments concerning the creation of one's personality and self-identity in modernity. The importance of this for a treatment of Weber is that it opens up one of the core topics of the thesis, namely how people in modernity create their sense of self by the exercise of their freedom in responsibility. This theme of self-identity is picked up by Luckmann and Hegy, who writing later in modernity basically share Giddens' (1991) idea that there is an on-going reconstruction of self-identity in modernity. The point of this is that people in modernity exercise more individual responsibility in maintaining a sense of who they are. Where traditional religion once provided a cosmos of meaning within which individuals were given understanding of their identity (Luckmann, 1974) now there is an ongoing task for the individual to reconstitute one's identity – a task which has passed from traditional religion and transferred to the individual. This has strong implications for the way individuals in modernity experience the self, as well as where and how they experience the self through enchantment.

I then focused in a particular way on Weber's thought on disenchantment in modernity, which leads to his argument about the demise of religion in modernity. I reasoned that Weber's main arguments about this issue were the following: enchantment would go into demise, religion would move from the centre of society and become irrelevant, it would eke out a meagre existence on the margins of society, that the meaning which once came from religion would be replaced with a meaning that comes from an ethics of responsibility independent of religious presuppositions, and that finally those who could not face the paradoxes of modernity would seek refuge in the certitudes offered by religion.

This chapter has also introduced Thomas Luckmann's thoughts about religion which relate to the question if and where enchantment is experienced by people within modernity. The chapter has noted that Luckmann (1974: 101), like Weber, argues that one of the dominant factors in modernity bringing about the irrelevance of religion and the demise of disenchantment is 'functional rationality'. I highlighted Luckmann's identification of 'institutional specialisation' as the second major factor bringing about disenchantment. This factor has particular implications for traditional religion since it relates directly to the existence and location of religion in modernity, it provides an explanation for the move of religion from its institutional form into a private existence. Luckmann's construct 'institutional specialisation' also ensures that the topic of enchantment in modernity remains central to the discussion of the thesis.

This chapter has noted Luckmann's focus on the theme of personal identity within modernity, and his interest in individual responsibility and choice making as it affects one's spiritual and religious self. By identifying the topic of personal identity, this chapter has laid the grounds for an exploration into the

question of the relatively autonomous character of religious life in modernity. In keeping with the theme of personal identity I noted how Luckmann identifies an anti-institutional and anti-hierarchical character about much of religious life in modernity. These features of religious life in modernity lead into a discussion of Luckmann's argument that there is a lack of socio-political involvement characterising contemporary religion. This point in turn raises the question, where do people experience enchantment and religious life in modernity, do people experience enchantment and religious life away from everyday life, is the experience of enchantment relegated to formal religious practices, or has it gone into demise? All these questions become issues of difference between Luckmann and Hegy.

This chapter has also introduced Pierre Hegy as a third sociologist who discusses the issue of the place and form of religious life in modernity. I noted how Hegy takes up Luckmann's distinction between 'visible' and 'invisible' religion and applies it to Catholicism. As a way of explaining Hegy's argumentation this chapter has situated his thought within the radical shifts that have occurred within some sections of Catholicism over the last forty years (1960s – 1990s). I have noted how the Second Vatican Council of the Catholic Church (1963-1965) has challenged the Catholic Church on the issue of its over-institutionalisation, an issue equivalent to Luckmann's concept of 'institutional specialisation'. The advantage of having discussed the Second Vatican Council is that a parallel can be recognised between Luckmann's constructions of 'visible' and 'invisible' religion and the two styles of religiosity within Catholicism discussed above. This enables the thesis to address Hegy's discussion of Catholicism, it also permits a fuller understanding of the cultural-theological forces in play in the lives of the interviewees chosen for the experiential section of this thesis – they are all church-going Catholics.

In the next chapter I will discuss the notion 'conceptual practice', a construct which helps answer the questions raised above. The 'conceptual practice' construct is used in isolating what the interviewees are doing when they experience enchantment. This permits Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's arguments to be evaluated against the experiential data gathered from interviewing contemporary church-going Catholics. I use this construct as a way of understanding the nature of religious life in modernity and how enchantment is being experienced today.

CHAPTER 3

Conceptual practices, Ideal types, the Relationship between them and the experiential basis for the two interview groups

This chapter devotes a substantial portion of space to the notion of conceptual practices because this construct is the primary working tool in the thesis. The conceptual practice construct serves the function of identifying what the interviewees are doing when they experience enchantment, and the Sacred. The construct is important because one of the primary aims of the thesis is to answer the question 'Are there any particular ways of approaching everyday life, relationships and society in modernity, which will open up the possibility for enchantment rather than disenchantment?'

The purpose of creating the conceptual practice construct is to sharpen the terms in the above question so that the phrase 'particular ways of approaching everyday life' refers to something that can be named, identified, worked with and used as a functional instrument or unit in comparing and contrasting the approaches to everyday life which yield enchantment. The construct permits a clearer understanding of how the 'integrationist' approach to everyday life differs quite markedly from the 'dualist' approach. The conceptual practice construct effectively becomes the currency of the empirical chapters 5-8. It is in these chapters that the construct is worked on, worked with and analysed.

Later on in the thesis the construct serves to maintain a sharper distinction between the two forms of spirituality and religion the interviewees from integrationist and dualist groups typically exercise. The construct also helps in evaluating the accuracy of Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's hypotheses about how spirituality and religion will be lived in modernity, against the data generated in the interview material.

I arrange this chapter around three sections. The first deals with the conceptual practice construct. The second examines the notion of ideal types by considering conceptual practices as ideal types, and then by discussing the two groups of interviewees (integrationist and dualist), as ideal types. I discuss the relationship between conceptual practices and ideal types by showing how particular forms of conceptual practices are associated with either the integrationist or dualist ideal type interviewee. I mention the use of the notion of orthogonality in reference to conceptual practices and ideal types – I do this to offer a way of avoiding two gratuitous presumptions, the first that particular conceptual practices are antithetical with respect to other conceptual practices and the second that the two ideal type interviewee subjects ('integrationist' and 'dualist') are contrary types. The third section of the chapter questions what is the basis in the practical world for the existence of these two interview groups?

Are these two ideal types (integrationist and dualist) plausible? By way of answering these queries I forward relevant material from the sociological literature. I also draw upon personal history and experience, and preliminary data gleaned from in-depth interview work with both groups of subjects.

The issue of cultural context and human agency.

The primary focus in this thesis is on the question: What permits people to experience enchantment? The question invites the discussion of a range of issues, such as what collective practices do these people employ when they experience enchantment; how are these collective practices found within their culture; what conceptual practices are they employing? People do not come to experience enchantment independently of their social world. The use of symbol, ritual and language permits people to negotiate with others in their everyday life (Bruner, 1986). Symbols, rituals and language embedded within culture influence the meanings individuals adopt toward others, self and the world in which they live. And just as the culture is dynamic and in transition, so also those within culture are renegotiating and reconstituting themselves in an ongoing fashion (Giddens, 1991).

In using symbol, ritual and language people interpret their world. As Bruner (1986:97) observes 'Blake, Kafka, Wittgenstein and Picasso did not find the worlds they produced. They invented them.' People process and make sense of

their experience. They do not just engage in daily practices with others without at the same time having their own intentionality. People adopt and employ particular viewpoints and attitudinal stances toward the world in which they live. Hence though there are collective practices, namely the languages and other symbol systems we employ, there is also the issue of what we intend and the basic stance we adopt while negotiating through the collective practices of the given culture. This is the distinction between using the language and other symbol systems (collective practices) of one's culture on the one hand and that of interpreting and making sense of that world on the other. In the latter work, one's version of the world and a sense of self are in play (Bruner, 1986:99). As we order our world we operate out of our story and our experience. We have frames of mind (Bruner, 1986:104) we employ as we negotiate with our world. It is this last function that I select as a focus for this thesis. In doing this I use the term conceptual practice (a term I define later) to acknowledge the particular frame of mind we employ as we engage with our world.

By way of acknowledging the role of collective practices in the experience of enchantment and explaining why instead I focus on conceptual practices, I turn briefly to the work of Jerome Bruner. In a penetrating and convincing account of social and cultural life Bruner (1986) analyses two primary modes of approaching the literary and social world in the late 20th Century. In Bruner's (1986) work Actual Minds, Possible Worlds he suggests that by the mid-1970s, social sciences had moved beyond the traditional positivist stance to an

interpretive posture. He argues that meaning and interpretation become central issues. Questions are asked, such as 'In what sense can culture itself be treated as a "text" that participants "read" for their own guidance?'

Bruner presents two stylised forms of thought he sees occurring in contemporary life. On the one hand we have the psychology of literature dominated by the psychologist and on the other hand we have the narrative where playwrights, poets and novelists abound. The former style of thought continues through psychoanalysis, structural linguistics and the philosophy of history, the latter through story, novelist and poet. Bruner (1986:11) suggests that what we have in play is basically two modes of cognitive functioning; the former being procedures for establishing formal proof and the latter not the establishment of truth per se but 'verisimilitude'. The first form Bruner names 'paradigmatic' or logico-scientific, he maintains this is regulated by the language of consistency and non-contradiction and is driven by principled hypotheses. The second form is the imaginative application of the narrative mode and leads to 'good stories, gripping drama, believable (though not necessarily "true") historical accounts' (Bruner, 1986:13).

Bruner shows that in everyday life people commonly swing from logico-scientific forms of thinking to the narrative mode and back again. Since both styles of thinking use language, metaphor and symbol systems both influence the way we see ourselves and form part of our collective practices. We employ

both the paradigmatic and the narrative form of cognition in many of our everyday activities. As Goodman maintains, constructing meaning '...in the arts, sciences, and life in general involves the use - the 'interpretation, application, invention, revision - of symbol systems (in Bruner, 1986:101).

The point I am making here is that whatever form of thinking people use they do so by engaging the diverse symbol systems of the culture. Effectively therefore the attempt to make meaning out of our experience brings us into contact with a range of collective practices of the culture within which we live. We are connected to our culture as soon as we employ language, since language making draws us into the use of metaphor, imagery and constructions influenced by the society and culture, which sustains that language. Bruner (1986:65) notes the interplay between culture (and therefore collective practices) and language when he writes that 'learning how to use language involves both learning the culture and learning how to express intentions in congruence with the culture.'

The acts of interpreting one's experience, making sense of life and experiencing enchantment are connected to the collective practices of one's culture. In this thesis, while I acknowledge the contextual nature of discussing the notion of enchantment, I purposefully leave aside the topic of collective practices and focus on conceptual practices. I do so because an examination of collective practices demands that the study be too broad. By restricting my area of interest

to that of the conceptual practices people use when they experience enchantment, I have the opportunity of taking the study to greater depth.

SECTION 1 – 'Conceptual practices'

Conceptual practices: What are they?

The term conceptual practice refers to a function within the human person which involves the use of intellectual perspectives, attitudinal stances, approaches and engagements with social life. I define a conceptual practice as the adoption of particular understandings, constructions, perceptions, perspectives and attitudinal stances at a foundational level as a way of engaging with and approaching life. Conceptual practices are closely connected to thought attitudes, to intuitive understanding and ways of approaching life. Conceptual practices are prior to and influence these facets of human activity.

I use the term conceptual practice, therefore in a very broad sense, since I indicate that it is prior not only to the thinking these interviewees adopt as they experience enchantment, but also prior to their non rational forms of engaging with their world. The term conceptual practice is only conceptual in the sense that the interviewees adopt particular stances or ways of seeing their world and approaching their world. The term conceptual practice underpins the basic attitudinal stance out of which the interviewees engage with their world.

Weber draws a sharp distinction between objectively valid meanings and subjectively intended meanings. He (1978:4) gives an example of the former by citing disciplines such as jurisprudence and logic, which seek to attain 'true' and 'valid' meanings. He associates sociology with the work of accessing subjectively intended meanings. Weber (1978:4) writes that sociology 'is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences.' And he (1978:4) notes that when he refers to 'action' he does so 'insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior – be it overt or covert, omission or acquiescence.' In writing of the notion of subjective meaning, Weber (1978:9) introduces his notion of 'verstehen', a notion sometimes translated as understanding. I take the meaning of 'verstehen' that is offered by Abercrombie et al. (1984:265), namely "'Verstehen" consists of placing oneself in the position of other people to see what meaning they give to their actions'. In this thesis, the interviewee talks about her/his own subjective experience and meaning, and in so doing reduces my involvement in estimating the subjective meanings of the interviewee.

This thesis does not claim that particular conceptual practices cause enchantment, despite the fact that interviewees offer self-reported experiences of connection between the two. As noted earlier, individuals employ particular metaphors, myths and narratives in coming to interpret and understand their experience. These metaphors, myths and narratives are sustained through

social interaction, language and culture. All this points to the complex set of factors, which are involved in the experience of enchantment.

In this thesis, I acknowledge on the one hand that enchantment emerges out of the interplay of diverse factors, but on the other hand I also stress that there is a particular role for conceptual practice in this process. I do not claim that the use of particular conceptual practices will cause enchantment, but I do claim that the use of particular conceptual practices will influence both the emergence and experience of enchantment. Clearly then, while these conceptual practices are not the only thing to explain enchantment, they are however singularly relevant and important in influencing the emergence and experience of enchantment. As the thesis unfolds the power of the conceptual practice in shaping experiences of enchantment becomes ever more evident, particularly through the data the interviewees generate while they reflect about the subjectively intended meanings of their personal and social lives.

Conceptual practices: From where do they emerge?

The conceptual practices in this thesis emerge from the data generated through the in-depth interviews. I use a particular technology (soft-ware package) to analyse sociological categories attached to discrete sense units of the interview. Some of these sociological categories are the expressions of the interviewees themselves – selected because they capture a central sociological insight

(Strauss, 1990) – and the others are pure sociological constructs. I refer the core categories which come to prominence in the interview data as 'dominant' conceptual practices, I term those which emerge further down the hierarchical conceptual order as subsidiary conceptual practices (Strauss 1990).

Developing the concept of conceptual practice by referring to an example of what I look for in coding a text

In this thesis I interview two groups of people, a primary group, and a contrast group. At this point I will offer an example of how I codify the text generated by a subject through the interview situation; this codification reveals the conceptual practice the person employs. In the case discussed below the person being interviewed is a midwife who is ascribed the pseudonym Angela – she is selected from the primary group (the 'integrationist' group as opposed to the contrast or 'dualist' group). During her interview Angela observes:

I'm quite fascinated when you [sic] find mystery or something of God in ordinary events. Like even living in community and relating to the people I live with, I mean you [sic] one could describe that as being ordinary and yet there is something of the mystery of our humanity in it. And that's what I find in birth (Angela 604).

With the help of a computer software package I retrieve the categories I have attached to this passage – there are four categories or terms, in order they are 'earthy' 'ordinary' 'mystery' 'holistic'. Three of these four terms are used by

Angela herself, two of which are found in this passage ('ordinary' and 'mystery') and the third ('earthy') occurs four sentences later in Angela's interview; the term holistic is used by the eleventh interviewee Libi (an employment project officer). I select the very words Angela and Libi use because they sociologically capture the sense of what Angela is doing – the conceptual practice she is employing.

Throughout Angela's interview she talks about the 'earthiness', the 'ordinariness' and the 'mystery' of life; she notes how the 'mystery' in life comes out of incidents and experiences which are quite 'ordinary' and 'earthy'. Angela's description of work situations and relationships reveal her own approach to life. Her approach to her work is very 'earthy' – as a midwife she deals with the body in an intimate and connected way.

Strauss (1990: 33) explains how there can be two types of codes used in analysing interviews: there are firstly 'in vivo' codes (the very expressions the actors employ when talking about some issue in the interview situation) and secondly sociological codes or constructs the sociological analyst uses when examining the text of the interview. Strauss (1990: 32) cautions the analyst about being 'too committed to the first codes he or she opts for in attempting to create a sociological set of categories about the text'. He notes how the researcher analyses interviews in a number of stages, frequently there is a proliferation of initial codes and only later after intensive analysis is complete these codes can

be replaced by others which through continual verification show that they are the codes of best fit. As I have noted above these codes, terms or categories which I affix to the text are none other than conceptual practices.

An early analysis of Angela's interview generates two 'in vivo' codes, namely 'earthy' and 'ordinary'; later the more generic category of 'immediacy' is placed over them. This process of analytically and hierarchically ordering the text generates a fourth sociological category - that of 'immanence' - which is placed over that of 'immediacy'.

By examining these categories it is possible to gain an insight into the types of conceptual practice interviewees employ. These categories (conceptual practices) describe the primary attitudinal stances interviewees like Angela adopt as they engage with life. The conceptual practice 'immediacy' emerges only after an analysis of other interview material which mirrors the basic approach Angela adopts to life.

What then can be said of the conceptual practice construct? It is associated with intellectual functioning, it refers more accurately to the form of thought than the content of thought. It is associated with the attitudinal stances people employ as they perceive and construct life.

Understanding conceptual practices by identifying their interrelationship with other social scientific terms

Attitude

'The attitude construct is the central social psychological concept used to explain behavioral intentions and actual behavior' (Ajzen, 1996: 298). Rosnow and Robinson define attitude as that which 'denotes the organisation in an individual of his [sic] feelings, beliefs, and predispositions to behave as he [sic] does' (in L. Mann, 1982:108). Most writers dealing with the 'attitude' construct consider that there are three facets to the notion, namely the cognitive, the affective and the behavioural (Chaiken, Wood and Eagly, 1996: 702).

The cognitive aspect of the attitude construct

One of the classic studies in the cognitive aspect of the attitude construct – carried out by Janis and King (in Chaiken, Wood and Eagly, 1996: 704) – showed the power of cognition to shape attitudes. Janis and King demonstrated that when students were asked to advocate a position on an issue and later served as an audience member for other issues, they were more persuaded by the message and content they had to argue, than they were by the messages forwarded by other students. Janis and King showed that attitudes can be modified by self-persuasion (Chaiken, Wood and Eagly, 1996: 704). The issue for my thesis is that cognition is a major element in the attitude construct. Janis and King's work was later challenged by Leon Festinger (in Chaiken, Wood and

Eagly, 1996: 704), who generated the 'cognitive dissonance' theory. Festinger claimed he could show that people shifted their belief (cognition) to avoid the negative state of arousal which happened when their thinking was inconsistent with their behaviour. In terms of the thesis, the point is that cognition is a key facet of the attitude construct.

The affective dimension of the attitude construct, incorporating values and beliefs

J Drever and H Wallerstein (1983: 23) define an attitude as 'A more or less stable set or disposition of opinion, interest, or purpose, involving expectancy of a certain kind of experience, and readiness with an appropriate response'. The attitude concept defined here includes the emotive aspect of human personality. The phrase 'interest...involving expectancy of a certain kind of experience' acknowledges that the 'attitude' construct is more than cognitive, it is affective as well.

Attitude and behaviour

Much of the study of the attitude construct is oriented toward predicting the behavioural dimension of the notion (Hill, 1981). Emphasis on the behavioural facet of the 'attitude' construct can be recognised in Allport's definition, namely that it is

a mental and neural state of readiness, organised through experience, exerting a directive and dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related. (in Malim, 1997: 149)

The extent of the treatment of the behavioural component of the attitude construct is noted by Ajzen when he talks about the analysis and prediction of behaviours associated with given attitudes (Ajzen, 1996: 298).

The early optimism over how knowing peoples' attitude could predict their behaviour came to be questioned when studies showed low predictable capacity (Ajzen, 1996: 310; Ajzen in Malim,1997: 150; Myers, 1996: 125). Fazio claimed that only a strong attitude could be automatically translated into action (in Malim, 1997: 150). The insistence on incorporating the social and personal factors associated with behaviours rising from particular attitudes has brought a greater confidence in the worth of the attitude construct (Chaiken et al.,1996: 723).

The evaluative implications of the cognitive, affective and behavioural dimensions of attitudes

An aspect of the attitude construct which moves the notion beyond that of the cognitive, the affective and the behavioural is encompassed by paying attention

to its 'evaluative' character. Chaiken et al. (1996: 702) present the attitude concept as a procedural act. They make a distinction between different stages in the formation and execution of the attitude construct by talking about the three components of the attitude (cognitive, affective and behavioural), the attitude object and then the evaluation. 'Attitudes thus arise from and symbolize the evaluative implications of affective, cognitive, and behavioral responding to attitude objects'. (Chaiken et al. 1996: 702)

Icek Ajzen (1996) also stresses the stage beyond the cognitive and affective dimension of the attitude construct when he focuses on the notion of 'evaluative reaction'. He claims

It is the evaluative reaction to the attitude object that is considered to be the core of a person's attitude...this evaluative reaction is generally thought to be based on the person's expectations or beliefs concerning the attitude object.

(Ajzen, 1996: 298)

This evaluative function of the attitude construct is alluded to by Lemon – the evaluative stage is seen to be consequent to the 'beliefs' about the attitude object. Lemon defines attitude as 'A relatively stable system of beliefs concerning some object and resulting in an evaluation of that object..' (in Abercrombie et al., 1988: 15).

Choosing the 'conceptual practice' construct in preference to the attitude construct

Of all the social psychological and sociological terms available, the 'attitude' construct more than any other explains what people are doing when they experience enchantment in a time of modernity. However where attitudes are an evaluative orientation toward things in the world, conceptual practices are not like that. Conceptual practices are modes of apprehending things in the world. They are guides or frameworks which shape how the individual approaches the world and how the individual adopts particular attitudes toward the world. The conceptual practice is thus prior to attitudes. Conceptual practices, being guides or frameworks in apprehending the world, structure the experience individuals have of the world, it is only then that people evaluate the world through the attitudes they adopt.

Trait

When Lauer and Handel (1977: 92) define attitude as 'certain regularities of an individual's feelings, thoughts, and predispositions to act toward some aspect of his [sic] environment' they could almost be talking about the 'trait' construct. The phrase in this definition, 'certain regularities' is core to the trait notion because it stresses the idea of a characteristic which is not prone to change (D. Zillmann and M. Zillmann, 1996: 61). Zillmann et al. (1996) refer to long term behaviour traits when they address activities such as being shy, socially

spontaneous, or socially unrestrained. All these features entail the notion of an enduring quality or characteristic of a particular person. Rockeach (1973: 21) defines the trait construct as a human characteristic that is 'highly fixed and not amenable to modification by experimental or situational variation'.

The emphasis on personal dispositions, such as 'authoritarianism', 'introversion' and 'aggression' - typical of discussions on the trait construct - reveal the fixed aspects of the human personality. This enduring feature of the trait construct is conveyed by Carlston and Skowronski's (in Higgins et al. 1996: 186) study of how people remember others better when they identify a given 'trait' and associate that trait with the given person. The stable character of personality to which the trait construct refers sometimes comes to be so accentuated that behaviour is judged not in terms of the social context but primarily with regard to the trait of the given person (Golliwitzer and Moskowitz, in Higgins et al. 1996: 389).

Why I do not use the 'trait' concept

Some of the writing about the trait construct reveals that the notion of trait entails something akin to an automatic response. This shows an aspect of the trait concept which lacks intentionality (Kruglanski, in Higgins et al. 1996: 501). This thesis does not explore the fixed characteristics of people who experience enchantment in modernity, rather it explores the forms people employ as they adopt particular perceptual stances toward the world. Dimensions of the

human personality such as 'authoritarianism', 'introversion' and 'aggression' are the enduring characteristics which are quite distinct from the specific guides or frameworks of apprehending the world this thesis needs to identify.

The 'conceptual practice' construct permits the thesis to identify much more discrete aspects of human personality, such as the framing of perceptual stances like 'listening', 'letting go', 'ambiguity'. The conceptual practice construct enables the thesis to capture not the broad predictable way certain people react to social life, but to isolate how given people adopt particular perceptual stances toward life. Sometimes these stances may be voluntary – a quality not part of the repertoire of the trait construct. The trait construct dominantly refers to the overarching stable and inexorable dimensions of given human persons and as such is unsuitable as the type of construct needed for this thesis.

Perspective

The term perspective-taking has been used to refer to how well one person is able to empathise with the situation of another person (Krauss and Fussell, 1996). Krauss and Fussell, in attempting to identify some of the components of another's perspective, include not only the person's background knowledge, beliefs and attitudes but also how the person currently interprets personal messages and social issues, the person's plans and goals as well as the personal and social context of the person (1996: 674). They define a person's perspective as a 'combination of relatively stable components (eg, background knowledge,

beliefs, attitudes, etc.) in addition to such changing factors as vantage point and moment-to-moment states of comprehension' (Krauss and Fussell, 1996: 674).

Like the attitude construct, the perspective construct encompasses a range of human faculties. The term suggests that when one is about to adopt a particular perspective toward another, one accesses a wealth of personal experiential knowledge, personal and social beliefs, attitudes and biases. Vander Zanden (1981: 31) defines perception as

the process by which we gather and interpret information. It serves as the mediating link between us and our environment...we transform these outer stimuli into an inner system to which we attribute meaning.

There is some similarity between the notions discussed above about the function we employ as we interpret the world about us, and what is being described by the use of the notion 'conceptual practice'. Where the perception construct entails the notion that we interpret the world, the 'conceptual practice' construct implies the following: we have chosen a particular framework for apprehending the world; we are set up to 'see' or interpret the world about us; we also invite the other person/s or issue/s to relate to us in particular ways because of the particular stance which follows our conceptual practice. Hence if a subject employs the conceptual practice of 'vulnerability' s/he invites the other person/s to enter into relationship without being defensive, the other is predisposed because the conceptual practice of 'vulnerability' provides the framework for stances of openness in sharing thoughts, feelings and beliefs.

Conceptual practices provide the framework from which attitudinal stances are adopted toward the world, that is conceptual practices influence our construction, perception and interpretation of the world. Following the perspective theme, Schultz notes that much of our intellectual life is essentially an interpretive act – an act where we choose, or at least at a pre-conscious level orientate ourselves, to see things from particular vantage points.

All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, ie., a set of abstractions, generalisation, formalisation, and idealisation specific to the respective level of thought organisation. Strictly speaking, there are no such thing as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset facts selected from a universal context by the activities of our mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts (Alfred Schutz, in Vander Zanden 1981: 32).

What the construct 'conceptual practice' is capable of achieving for this thesis is that it is able to help us identify the type of framework a subject employs as s/he adopts particular perspectives toward the world. In this conceptual practices precede the perspective construct.

Value

Irving Tallman and Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman (1979: 216) use a restrictive sense of the term value when they define it as 'a preferential ordering that is relatively stable over time'. Vander Zanden (1981: 280) speaking from a social

psychological perspective defines a value as 'an ethical principle to which people feel a strong emotional commitment and which they employ in judging behaviour'. He says values impart meaning to life and provide us with our conceptions of good and evil. Vander Zanden defines value in such a way that makes it far too tied to notions of right and wrong and of ethics for the construct 'value' to be at all suitable for the function required of the construct in this thesis.

Values are part of normative behaviour and the accruing or avoiding of personal and social guilt (Rusbult and Van Lange, 1996: 584). The recognition of the normative and ethical component of the value construct sets it apart from the 'conceptual practice' construct. Where value ascription involves a judgment in terms of right and wrong, conceptual practices transcend this moral judgment making faculty. Occasionally there may appear to be a value component of a particular conceptual practice but this is not intrinsic to the construct. For instance, in the conceptual practice of 'ambiguity' it may be argued that prior to this conceptual practice the individual already relinquishes the need to reduce the complexity of life to a functional rationalist, interpretation. In choosing to encounter the awkwardness of paradox and mystery the individual – it would seem – has to have made a value judgment that complexity and the 'irrational' (in Weber's sense of the word) are not wrong. The conceptual practice of 'ambiguity' sets up a style of approaching the world through the poetic, the mythic, the symbolic and the irrational – thus the

moral dimension (if present) is not essential to the conceptual practice of 'ambiguity'.

Robin William claims that people select and organise clusters of values and arrange them into hierarchical systems

It is the rare and limiting case, if and when a person's behaviour is guided over a considerable period of time by one and only one value...More often particular acts or sequences of acts are steered by multiple and changing clusters of values. (in Rokeach 1973: 11)

Rokeach (1973: 11) holds that once a value is learned it 'becomes integrated into an organised system of values wherein each value is ordered in priority with respect to other values'.

Conceptual practices provide the framework for adopting particular stances in perceiving and constructing the world – as such they transcend moral judgments about the goodness or badness of a course of action and the maintenance of social conformity and meaning systems (Markus, Kitayama and Heiman, 1996: 901). Some conceptual practices by providing particular ways of thinking about issues, perceiving issues, adopting attitudinal stances and particular approaches toward issues operate without impacting on normative issues. For instance when a person adopts the conceptual practice of 'letting go' she moves away from a controlling approach to people in order – one would

think – to engage with life at greater depth; the moral dimension though probably present is not at all as central as it is to the 'value' construct.

The power of conceptual practices is quite extensive when one considers that they influence values which in turn influence attitudes. Values precede attitudes according to Allport (Rokeach 1973: 17). This supports Hughes' (1989) finding – discussed later in the chapter – that clergy who ascribe particular values to the created physical world in terms of its innate goodness or badness tend also to adopt particular theological attitudes which accord with the moral values held. Newcomb, Turner, and Converse (in Rokeach, 1973: 18) in claiming that values are but 'special cases of the attitude concept' effectively state that while the value construct and the attitude construct have some aspects in common, they are not the same thing. The same can be said of the conceptual practice construct and the value construct – these two notions cannot be completely collapsed one into the other; values though influenced by conceptual practices are distinct from conceptual practices.

Rokeach (1973: 17) notes that the value notion transcends objects and situations whereas the attitude construct focuses on a given object or situation. The idea of transcendence and focus offers further insight into the conceptual practice construct when the construct is thought of in these terms. After the adoption of a conceptual practice, the act of ascribing moral value to objects or issues is an act which transcends the particular by virtue of the fact that an ethical

judgement (the universal element) has been applied to the object or issue. The employment of a conceptual practice focuses the individual to the given object or situation by the constraint of the particularity of the adopted conceptual practice (which influences the adoption of particular attitudinal or perceptual stances). This further highlights the distinction between the conceptual practice and the value construct and why the former construct rather than the latter is chosen in this thesis.

Having compared and differentiated the conceptual practice construct with a number of like concepts in order to gain some clearer understanding of the conceptual practice construct I, now turn to the second major construct which I use in this thesis, namely the 'ideal type' construct. The ideal type construct is used of the host of conceptual practice constructs generated through sociologically analysing the interview material, it is also used of the 'integrationist' group and the 'dualist' group of interviewees.

Section 2

'Ideal types'

The 'ideal type' construct comes into prominence primarily through the agency of Weber (1978: 20, 57; 1982: 294, 323). He uses the construct primarily as an heuristic aid to further his understanding of social life; the 'ideal type' refers 'to the construction of certain elements of reality into a logically precise conception' (Gerth and Mills, in Weber 1982: 59). As Weber observes

sociological analysis both abstracts from reality and at the same time helps us understand it, in that it shows with what degree of approximation a concrete historical phenomenon can be subsumed under one or more of these concepts. (Weber, 1978: 20)

Weber (1982: 324) explains that for him the notion of the 'ideal type' is 'merely a technical aid which facilitates a more lucid arrangement and terminology.' As a conceptual tool the 'ideal type' is used in considering extreme and 'pure cases' of historical events and persons – however as Weber notes we must be aware that the 'real meat' of history falls between the pure types we construct.

Weber argues that these pure types or 'ideal types' are not confined to rational forms of cognition, they may involve the emotive and the intuitive. Speaking of the task of undertaking sociological study he says

sociological investigation attempts to include in its scope various irrational phenomena, such as prophetic, mystic and affectual modes of action, formulated in terms of theoretical concepts which are adequate on the level of meaning. (Weber, 1978: 20)

The importance of recognising Weber's advice about taking notice of the dimensions of social and personal life which fall outside the parameters of the purely rational is that the 'ideal type' can be employed to understand various perceptual and attitudinal stances which are non cognitive. Hence Weber encourages the analysis of the affectual, the mythic and the symbolic.

The conceptual practice as an 'ideal type'

The 'conceptual practice' construct is an 'ideal type' to the extent that it is I who propose that specific sociological categories (the conceptual practices) account for the social reality taking place when individuals employ particular perceptual or attitudinal stances – the substance of which is accessed in the verbatim interview material. In practice there will be some gap between the sociological analytic category chosen (the conceptual practice) and the particular attitudinal/perceptual stance which a given interviewee is employing simply because terms never completely do justice to the reality being lived. It is only after a host of interviews have been analysed and the early suggested conceptual practice is assessed in terms of how well it reflects the empirical experience that the putative conceptual practice can be accepted as having a measure of accuracy in portraying the life situation. Some conceptual practices as noted earlier are jettisoned soon after being forwarded in preliminary analysis – these may have to be replaced by others after the phase of intensive analysis. In time 'the real meat' lost between the gap of the 'ideal type' and actual perceptual stance being employed is minimised when the conceptual practice of best fit is identified.

The purpose of the 'ideal type' construction is to more clearly identify the attitudinal stances or forms of perceptions people adopt (which the conceptual practices bring into being) when they engage with modernity. In the second

half of the thesis (the empirical section) I analyse the interview data the 'integrationists' generate so as to discern what conceptual practices these interviewees are employing when their story-telling reflects experiences of enchantment. Similarly I analyse the data the 'dualists' generate to identify the conceptual practices these people employ when their story telling reveals instances of enchantment.

The 'ideal type' construct is thus used as a way of gaining greater cognitive clarity about the perceptual and attitudinal stances the interviewees employ. I expect to find that the 'integrationists' (the dominant group) who experience enchantment in the midst of the rationalisation of modernity characteristically employ conceptual practices which are peculiar to them. I also expect that the 'dualists' (the contrast group) who experience enchantment outside the rationalisation of modernity typically employ quite a different set of dominant conceptual practices.

'Integrationists' as an 'ideal type' and 'dualists' as an 'ideal type'

Just as the 'ideal type' construct can be used as an aid to distil and isolate which particular perceptual stance or attitudinal stance (influenced by the conceptual practice chosen) is being employed by interviewees when their stories reveal enchantment, so also the 'ideal type' construct can be used as an heuristic device to clarify one's thinking about a given group of people (Weber, 1982: 324). Since this thesis revolves around Weber's claim that modernity can be characterised by rationalisation and disenchantment, I use this as a context within which I

select a primary group (the 'integrationists') of individuals whose experience of modernity is one of enchantment rather than disenchantment. I also choose a contrast group (the 'dualists') who experience the disenchantment of modernity but also the enchantment of formal religious settings.

Just as Weber (1978, 1982) notes that 'pure type' or 'ideal type' constructs of particular forms of action never completely conform to the everyday reality, so in practice there will be individuals who even though they fall within the wide parameters of the 'integrationist' approach to social life will differ from the pure type 'integrationist'. Similarly individuals who though displaying many of the characteristics which typify the classical 'dualist' person will occasionally display features which do not belong to the 'ideal type' 'dualist' person – the feature may be more appropriate of the 'ideal type' 'integrationist' person.

Section 3

What is the status of these two groups and what is the basis for their existence in the experiential world?

Why do these two groups (integrationists and dualists) appear in the study?

What is their basis in social life? and What status do these groups hold as sociological constructs? In answering these questions I cite three different spheres or sources which help establish the authenticity of both these groups of people. Firstly I source the Sociology of Religion literature for references to these two primary ways of engaging with the world. Secondly I return to my

own life experience as a base for identifying these two ideal type forms of spirituality. Thirdly I use the data generated through the in-depth interview work to illustrate the existence of both these ways of approaching the world.

References from literature

Weber makes mention of spiritual experiences of God embedded within human experience on numerous occasions – he cites 'the pantheistic experience of God, which is peculiar to the mystic' (1982: 286). In this sense he also distinguishes between experiences of the Sacred which are relegated beyond human engagement and those which are part of everyday life by acknowledging that a 'whole series of purely historical motives has determined the development toward the supra-mundane or the immanent conception of God' (1982: 286).

In a 1987 sociological national study of the theological and spiritual life of five Christian denominations within Australia, Hughes and Blombery (1990) found that theological diversity within the clergy of five distinct denominations is best explained in terms of the philosophical presuppositions individuals held in the study. A central philosophical presupposition in the study revolved around the question of good and evil – this finding emerged in an earlier study of Hughes (1989). Hughes' study demonstrated that theological diversity is best accounted for in terms of the philosophical tenets in which individuals ground themselves. Hughes asked individuals the question 'Do you believe that there is more good or bad in the world?' He found that individuals who answered this

question in the affirmative tended to subscribe to a theological view of the world as spiritually a good place. The correlative also proved to be true, those whose philosophical view of the world was negative tended to theologically construct the world as evil and in opposition to God.

Hughes employed a multi-variate analysis on a battery of questions and found that the single most explanatory factor which demonstrated theological diversity was the way individuals answered the philosophical question.

Hughes explains how individuals who philosophically argue there is more evil than good in the world and then theologically construct a universe in terms which are antithetical with respect to God, tend also to project dualistic frames of thinking on other spiritual perceptions -for instance they emphasised dualism in the construction of God (God as 'Saviour' God as 'Judge'). The pattern when extended to humankind generates similar dualisms - tendencies to see humanity as 'sinful', in need of 'grace'. The philosophical dualism is reflected in the theological dualism of these people - they tend to construct the world as antagonistic to God, it is portrayed as a dangerous place. Hughes (1989: 34) argued that by using factor analysis on responses to questions about there being more good or bad in the world he was able to account for 15% of the variance among a cross section of clergy in terms of theological inclusion and exclusion.

The significance of this inclusion – exclusion theme is that it points to two strongly divergent frames of thought, philosophical and theological. Hughes found that clergy who characteristically approach life with a sense of inclusion believed that 'the world was basically a good place' (Hughes 1989: 34). Clergy who characteristically approached life and faith with a sense of exclusion believed that 'the world was a place of evil. People needed to be rescued from the world. The church was the exclusive group of those who had been rescued.' (Hughes, 1989: 34).

Hughes (1989) found that there were eight dimensions of theology and practice which were influenced by the inclusion and exclusion theme and that these eight dimensions covered a broad sweep of religious thought and practice. Among these dimensions there were two divergent styles of perceiving the nature and function of God and God's relationship to the universe. The more strongly the clergy tended to belong to an inclusive theological position the less likely they were to attempt to convert people and the more likely they were to see the prime purpose of the church as that of 'recognising the Creator in worship.' (Hughes, 1989: 36). Clergy belonging to the inclusive position were also likely to have a greater sense of enchantment with everyday life – suggested by Hughes' (1989: 36) finding that 'In daily life, they valued the sense of purpose that they found through the acknowledgment of God as Creator'.

A further reason to recognise the importance of these two divergent styles of religion on the question of enchantment is that Hughes (1989) found that clergy who were more at ease with theological exclusion were more likely to perceive God as the Almighty and Eternal Redeemer. The implication of this is that this group is oriented toward dualism rather than holism or integration. The greater the emphasis on God being portrayed as the Almighty and Eternal Redeemer the less likely the clergy were to construct God as 'friend' (Hughes 1989: 37). It follows that if the person permits notions of the sacred, mystery or fascination to be appropriated by a God figure who is completely other, then that person is less likely to accept notions of the sacred mystery or fascination as proper to everyday life.

It would seem therefore that those clergy who are more strongly characterised by inclusion are more likely to approach life expecting enchantment than those characterised by exclusion. This follows logically from Hughes' (1989) finding that the clergy who see the world as basically good in itself tend to hold an inclusive theological position. Since Hughes found that theologically inclusive clergy tended to construct God as embedded within human experience it follows that for these clergy notions of sacredness (or in Weber's terminology 'enchantment') are more likely to be embedded within the everyday life than outside the physicality of life. Indeed this is indicated in Hughes' (1989: 36) finding that clergy who are inclusive are more likely to emphasise the ability of creation itself to effect good, whereas clergy who are characterised by a

theologically exclusive position are more likely to perceive creation as effecting evil. The theologically exclusive group of clergy are in need of a God who is 'interventionist', and a God who intervenes from outside (from heaven or the spiritual realm above) before good can happen in this physical world.

Another aspect of Hughes' (1989) focus on this inclusive - exclusive dimension is that clergy characterised by the former orientation are more likely than those in the latter group to experience God as 'presence'. There are strong implications associated with this finding. Those who are prepared to use the language of 'presence' to describe their experience of God implicitly acknowledge the role of the preconscious, the symbolic and the sensate in raising awareness of God (enchantment). This is indicative of holism, a state which is quite distinct from the dichotomous construction of a God who is outside our immediate experience. Again this points to two diverse religious traditions along the lines of an 'integrationist' (inclusive) approach and a 'dualist' (exclusive) approach.

Tricia Blombery (1989) found that people who believe there is more evil in the world than good tend to show minimal interest in expressing their faith through alleviating the troubles of the world. Blombery (1989: 58) mentions the multi-faceted levels of meaning-giving philosophies which exist in peoples' lives. A person's religious beliefs and practices can operate at any one of the levels of meaning-giving. Hence a person's Church involvement may be quite private

and compartmentalised to the point that it fails to connect to the wider aspects of life. By contrast another person's faith may manifest a coherent philosophy which involves acknowledging God's presence in all facets of life. This supports the translation of faith into human behaviour by acting as if all of life is special and sacred. The group whom Blombery (1989: 58) notes 'fail to connect to the wider aspects of life' and the group who acknowledge 'God's presence in all facets of life' present themselves as two disparate orientations of spirituality. The styles suggest approaches to spirituality and religion of the type characterised by 'dualist' and 'integrationist' forms of spirituality.

In continuing with the question of what evidence there is that the 'integrationist' and 'dualist' ideal type constructs have a basis in sociological thought, I turn to a question Andrew Greeley (1989; 1991b: 56) claims has fascinated him for almost 30 years. Greeley argues that within contemporary society there is a sub-culture which enables people to experience everyday life with mystery. He argues that this sub-culture empowers the world to act as a metaphor of the Sacred, it mirrors the divine - in Greeley's (1991b: 45) words it is 'somewhat like God' it is 'a "sacrament" of God'. He argues that there is a dynamism within the Catholic religion (though not lived by all within it) to further this sub-culture of society - Greeley uses religion according to Clifford Geertz's meaning of the word

Religion is a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men [sic] by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of

factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. (In Greeley, 1991b: 37)

Greeley explains that for him the core term in this definition is that of 'symbol'. Greeley (1991b: 36) associates the symbolic with a host of allied words, namely metaphor, story, image, daydream and fantasy. Greeley argues that Catholicism based as it is on an emphasis on the 'communitarian ethic' (Weber and Durkheim, in Greeley 1991b: 44) tends to nurture a way of interpreting life through the use of the symbolic, the imaginative and the poetic. The prime symbol is God and according to Greeley (1991b: 44) there is a way of imaging God that is particular to Catholicism and another way that is particular to Protestantism.

Greeley bases his argument on the work of David Tracy (Greeley 1991b: 45) who analyses the classical thinkers of both the Catholic and Protestant traditions (Aquinas, Luther and Calvin) and concludes that whereas the Catholic imagination is 'analogical' (meaning metaphorical, poetical, symbolical) the Protestant imagination is 'dialectical'. Greeley contends that it is this unique 'analogical imagination' which assists Catholics to experience the world as magical, as mystical and as a poetic revelation of God. This claim is highly pertinent to the claim of my thesis, namely that there is a group of people who can live in the midst of a highly rationalising world and experience enchantment rather than disenchantment.

After Tracy, Greeley (1991b: 45) claims

The Catholic 'classics' assume a God who is present in the world, disclosing Himself in and through creation. The world and all its events, objects, and people tend to be somewhat like God. The Protestant classics, on the other hand, assume a God who is radically absent from the world and who discloses Himself only on rare occasions (especially in Jesus Christ and Him crucified).

Some parallel is present in Weber's (1982: 324) observation about the saints in Christianity representing a conception of God 'which was rather less supra-mundane than was the God of Jewry'. Greeley's (1991b: 45) position is that the tendency within Catholicism (which I suggest is not fully experienced by the 'dualist') is to perceive the physical universe as a symbol and metaphorical form of God, in fact Greeley says that the classical Catholic perceives and experiences creation revealing God. Greeley (1991b: 45) argues that the classic (ideal type) Catholic sees society as 'natural' and 'good'. This corroborates Phillip Hughes' (1989: 36) finding above that people who perceive that there is more good than bad in the world tend also to see God as present in the physical world (have a sense of enchantment) and experience an overall sense of purpose.

Greeley (1991b: 50) uses data from two studies on Australia to test the correlation between religious imagination on the one hand and values and attitudes on the other - the Australian figures confirmed Greeley's American findings. He (1991b: 53) tested to see if the differences between Protestant and Catholic religious imagination declined because of secularization or post-

Vatican Council 'modernization'. He found that there was 'no important difference between the correlations and hence no sign of the demise of the analogical imagination' (Greeley, 1991b: 53).

The aspect of Greeley's (1989, 1991b) study most pertinent to the question of the sociological basis for constructing the 'integrationist' and 'dualist' ideal types is his notion of analogical religious imagination. It is this style of religious imagination which positively influences the Catholic tendency to see everyday life as good in itself and as a metaphor for the divine. This focus offers a strong directive when examining the question of enchantment in a time of rationalisation; it offers ideas on constructing the 'integrationist' ideal type (the dominant group in the thesis).

Greeley's (1989, 1991b) analyses portray those who are steeped in the use of the analogical imagination as people who accommodate diversity, who are involved in social justice and ecological issues, who are open to feminist concerns and whose religion withstands the onslaught of secularisation and rationalisation. The Catholic culture, through its use of symbolic images (stained glass windows, incense, saints, angels, rituals and other pre-rational or 'irrational' vehicles), stimulates the use of metaphor and image and through this the analogical imagination which in its purest mode perceives God through created reality - a characteristic one assumes of enchantment. Greeley's (1989, 1991b) development of the notion of analogical imagination provides the ground for the

claim that the ideal type of the 'integrationist' has a base in current sociology of religion literature.

The 'dualist' ideal type is chosen as a contrast to the 'integrationist' ideal type. Greeley's typification of Catholic imagination as analogical is the primary image which interests me in his model; I do not assume that the dialogical imagination he applies to Protestantism (after David Tracy) can necessarily be applied to my construct of the 'dualist' ideal type. The dualist ideal type forwarded in this thesis is primarily a contrast ideal type to the dominant ideal type (the integrationist group) in the study. Where the integrationist ideal type is constructed to portray those Catholics who can find enchantment within everyday life in modernity, the dualist ideal type is chosen on the basis that it represents those Catholics for whom enchantment is experienced in places other than everyday life. I do not therefore claim or presume the dualist ideal type necessarily employs a dialogical religious imagination.

Other material within the sociological literature which points to the existence of two diverse styles of spirituality within Australian Catholicism come from Rowan Ireland's and Paul Rule's (1991) reflections on the diverse ways of being Catholic in late modern Australian society. Ireland and Rule (1991: 30) focus on two primary orientations within contemporary Australian Catholicism: the first is a 'decentrage project' a move to shape the structure of the Church into a form which restores the egalitarian and local character of the Church; the second - a

'recentre project' – is a move to reinstate the hierarchical line of command by underpinning papal, episcopal and priestly authority.

Ireland and Rule suggest signs of the 'decentre project' exist in a number of Australian Catholic experiments in living the faith through building community (Mary Britt 1988 in Ireland and Rule, 1991: 32). The form of spirituality which typifies these communities functions without over reliance on the institutional church, it operates without any 'self-conscious challenge to the governance of the Church' (Ireland and Rule, 1991: 32).

A further sign of the decentre project is the massively disproportionate increase of laity with respect to clergy who undertake encompassing theological studies which draw on the insights of social science (Ireland and Rule, 1991: 37). The significance of this systematic reflection on faith and spirituality is that this reflection is no longer the domain of the clergy; further to this there are many women who through feminist theology bring a radical critique to debates within the Church. Such a move toward serious study of spirituality and faith by lay men and women points to a growing awareness on the part of lay people within Australian Catholicism that understanding social life and spirituality 'is much more complex than listening to the pronouncements of bishops, clergy and church bodies' (Beward, 1993: 233). These moves suggest styles of spirituality not dissimilar to the 'integrationist'.

Ireland and Rule (1991) refer to a 'recentrage project' – a parallel to the dualist ideal type. They mention the example of the 'Opus Dei Movement'; this movement achieves quite an autonomous role by being able to circumvent the local style of spirituality through having its own bishop directly responsible to the Pope rather than the local church authorities. As Ireland and Rule (1991: 31) point out the aim of the movement 'is to be a model of pure Catholicism rather than a mass organisation'. The choice of the term 'pure' conveys a specific meaning and concern, namely that in the eyes of the movement 'orthodoxy' is central and is currently under attack.

A further indication of this 'recentrage project' is the emergence of an anti-modernist theological and Church affairs monthly, *AD 2000*. Ireland and Rule (1991) note how this paper repeatedly mentions by name clergy and bishops it considers are disloyal to express directives from Rome and thus undermine Papal authority – one such example is the practice of continuing the debate over women's ordination. Ireland and Rule write of a particular Australian auxiliary bishop who, championing the 'recentrage project', said that 'the doctrine of the primacy of conscience should be quietly ditched' (1991: 31) – this same auxiliary bishop was six years later made an Archbishop of an Australian capital city. Ireland and Rule's (1991) construction of the 'recentrage project' offers a model of spirituality which is characterised by excessive concern about the dangers of the 'world', dangers of human freedom, dangers of conscience. There is a heavy reliance on the moral authority of the hierarchical institutional Church and a

strict distinction between the spiritual role of the ordained and the non ordained. This current state of a stream within contemporary Catholicism provides a model for the construction of the 'dualist' ideal type I use in my thesis.

The Adelaide Archdiocese is a local example of living a broader style of Catholicism than that characterised by overly institutionalised forms of Catholicism. A number of documents promoting a spirituality of everyday life were produced by the 'Working Party for the future Pastoral Care of the Archdiocese of Adelaide' since the late 1980s, such as Your Kingdom Come and Toward More Collaborative On-going Pastoral Planning. Edward's and Wilkinson's (1992) work The Christian Community Connection reflected this awareness of the sacred within the hurly burly of life. These discussions are contextualised within the wider community of society, there is an insistence that collaboration move beyond a clerical focus and a call for equal inclusion of women and men.

One of the primary tenets underlying these documents is the right and duty of ordinary people within the Australian Catholic Church to listen to their experience, respect their conscience and affirm the role they have in shaping the Church of the future. There is an explicit focus on the need to address social issues such as unemployment and multiculturalism.

A further social basis for the 'integrationist' ideal type can be found in the cultural shift that has occurred within Catholicism over the notion of conscience. As Breward (1993: 232) notes 'The impact of Vatican 2 on the Catholic community since the 1960s has seriously weakened inherited patterns of Christian authority'. The Vatican 2 Council's teaching on conscience has been taken up within the Adelaide Archdiocese to the extent that the official Catholic Adult Education Service has published a book supporting peoples' use of their own conscience in decision making (Trainor and Morris, 1996).

Another source which indicates that the 'ideal type' of the 'integrationist' has a basis in contemporary Catholic spirituality and religion in South Australia is the existence of a centre for the explicit purpose of pursuing 'feminist spirituality...justice and care for the environment' (Moloney et al. 1995: 2). This centre named 'Sophia' (from the Greek wisdom) even though not officially linked with the Adelaide Catholic institutional Church is in dialogue with it and offers many women and men a broad feminist spiritual understanding of society, spirituality and religion.

Another source prompting the 'dualist' ideal type can be found in the notion of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism in its pure form rejects values such as 'individual rights, pluralism, a democratic ethos, [and] a trust in public reason' (David Tracy in Hughes et al. 1995: 106). Hughes et al. (1995) argue that fundamentalism is a reaction to the complex set of changes which beset

modernity, such as the fragmentation of life and values. Modernity is characterised by the presence of a range of 'life-world' perspectives each offering values peculiar to itself. Hughes et al. (1995: 109) identify a type who goes beyond the confines of their own 'life-world' and beyond the need to judge other 'life-worlds' simply on the basis of their own. This type suggests the 'integrationist' ideal type is worth examining.

One of the features of contemporary religion in Australia is that 'while there have always been sub-groups in larger denominations, now there is no single "normal" in each denomination.' (Bouma, 1996: 96) Bouma refers to some of the diverse modes of thought within each community as 'significant sub-communities with differing and irreconcilable understandings of what it is to be Christian' (Bouma, 1996: 97) Bouma (1996: 98) situating his discussion within the shifts taking place in the wider social system points to the fragmentation of the more 'singular cultural strands' which marked Australian society prior to the second world war. The social and cultural plurality which has emerged in Australia since the second world war is reflected within religious organisations to the point that religion can to some extent be thought of as a barometer of the pluralism present in society (Bouma and Dixon, 1986; Bouma, 1996).

It would seem that the larger the affiliates of any denomination the more likely there is to be diversity within such denomination (Bouma, 1996: 98). Bouma, reflecting on the Anglican and Catholic communities within Australia, suggests

that since their populations consist of 4 and 4.6 million respectively 'it is no surprise that there is so much diversity' (1996: 98). One such diverse position is that of 'fundamentalism' which sociologically 'denies the reality that people are the product of a variety of influences and traditions.' (Hughes et al., 1995: 107). This response to the pluralism of contemporary society seeks to account for the rapid change of values and beliefs by holding to one 'life-world' (Hughes et al., 1995: 106). The diversity within the churches of which Bouma (1996) and Hughes et al., (1995) speak – particularly concerning fundamentalism – point to styles of spirituality within contemporary Australian sociology of religion indicative of the two ideal type forms I construct for this thesis ('dualist' and 'integrationist').

Mason et al., (1997) studied the diversity present in the theology, spirituality and faith life of church attendants in the Australian Catholic Church of 1996. Mason et al., (1997) chose 400 parishes to take part in a questionnaire (of which 284 parishes formed a statistical sample). Mason et al. posed a series of questions the responses to which reveal a spirituality and faith life not dissimilar to the 'integrationist' and 'dualist' ideal types I use in this thesis. Question 15 (which has a sample size of 60,700 respondents) is followed by a number of options, it asks

Which of the following comes closest to what you believe about the Virgin Birth?

1. Jesus' conception was no different from any other human conception. – 2.3%

2. The Virginity of Mary is not meant to be taken literally; it is a way of saying that Jesus is both human and divine. – 26.2%
3. Mary gave birth to Jesus without having had sexual intercourse. – 65.3%
9. Don't know. – 6.2%

The second option reflects a high degree of symbolic and metaphorical thought. This second option refers to a central tenet of the Catholic faith but does so in analogical language. The poetic framing of the question is unambiguous it says it 'is not meant to be taken literally'; the poetic sense is embedded in the phrase 'it is a way of saying' rather than a phrase like 'it states that'. This proposition is supported by 26.2% of the 60,700 respondents as that which best describes their personal Catholic belief. Mason et al. (1997) identify a style of spirituality present in contemporary Australian Catholicism which mirrors Greeley's (1991a, 1991b) claims about the analogical imaginative life in American and Australian Catholics.

The third option offered, namely 'Mary gave birth to Jesus without having had sexual intercourse' entails a more literal understanding of belief about the Virgin Birth. It does not however exclude the possibility that people who agree with the statement also have metaphorical imagination and enter the symbolic world.

The third option is not framed in such a way as to deny the use of metaphor, it simply asks if people agree with the statement 'Mary gave birth to Jesus without having had sexual intercourse'. Those who agree with option 3 may do so because they agree with the notion of the virgin birth but also celebrate that in a

highly symbolic and metaphorical way – they could quite poetically extend the meaning to an all embracing enchantment with the world and see all things being capable of divinisation. At the same time it would seem that there are people who in affirming option 3 do so because their style of belief follows the literal process without much of the metaphorical at all. The responses to question 15 thus reflects and confirms the diverse 'life-worlds' Hughes et al. (1995) claim are present in Australian mainstream Christianity.

Question No. 16 in the Catholic Church Life Survey elicits the diversity present within Australian Catholicism over the issue of hierarchical authority. There are 70,000 contemporary Church going Catholics in this sample – the question is followed by a series of options and asks

Do you accept the authority of the Church to teach that certain doctrines of faith and morals are essential to faith, and are true, and to be believed by all Catholics?

1. No 5.4%
2. Yes, with great difficulty. 6.1%
3. Yes, with some difficulty. 37.5%
4. Yes, with no difficulty. 47.6%
9. Don't know. 3.4%

The 5.4% response to option 1 suggests quite a strong stand by this grouping of people particularly in view of the way the question is framed. The question presents acceptance in a restrictive sense, it does not state 'Do you accept...that

all doctrines...?' but 'Do you accept...that certain doctrines...?' Option 1 implies a categorical denial that the hierarchy can require agreement with any particular ('certain') statement of faith. In a somewhat similar fashion 6.1% of the sample respond to option 2 and admit that it is 'with great difficulty' that they give authority to the Church. Effectively therefore 11.5% of Australian Catholics currently have 'great difficulty' (at least) in accepting that the Church has authority to demand compliance over 'certain doctrines of faith and morals'. By implication this 11.5% represent a group of Australian Catholics who tenaciously hold that they have the right to their own understanding and position in conscience in matters of faith and morals. Where the affirmative respondents to option 2 of the earlier question (No. 15) exhibit breadth of analogical imagination the respondents to option 1 and 2 of question 16 manifest a high recognition of personal autonomy in areas of faith and morals. There are also 37% of respondents who admit that they only accept that the 'Church' (in this case effectively the hierarchy) have the right to require acceptance of 'certain doctrines of faith and morals' with 'some difficulty'. On the other hand 47.6% of respondents have 'no difficulty' in accepting the question.

What these various responses to question 16 reveal is the range of diverse styles of approaching religion and spirituality in contemporary Australian Catholicism. This data supports Bouma's (1996) and Hughes' et al. (1995) claims concerning the spiritual, theological and life-world diversity present within Australian Christian denominations especially the larger ones such as

Catholicism. Respondents to option 1 and 2 in question 16 of the Catholic Church Life Survey provide some basis for the construction of the 'integrationist' ideal type. Respondents to option 4 suggest a group which is quite happy attributing theological authority to the hierarchy of the Catholic Church – to this extent these respondents suggest a characteristic somewhat oriented toward the 'dualist' ideal type. These two orientations provide some basis within the contemporary sociology of religion in Australia for constructing the 'integrationist' and 'dualist' ideal types.

Personal experience as a base for the existence of typifying an 'integrationist' and a 'dualist' mode of spirituality

As suggested in the preface of the thesis I was aware early in my Catholic school life that being Catholic in Adelaide during the 1950s entailed being part of a religious culture which saw itself as a minority. Catholic schools in Adelaide received no form of government financial support until 1961 (Press, 1991: 206). I had a sense that society was segmented: the rich – who went to private Protestant schools; the Catholics – who frequently struggled financially; and the majority – who went to government schools.

Belonging to the Catholic school system was for me an experience of a culture of difference. This culture of difference manifested itself through the overtly religious dress of the religious teachers (nuns, brothers and priests) – the different dress suggested a withdrawal from the ordinariness of everyday life.

The Catholic school system survived despite the financial hardship of having to draw upon a base of Catholic parents who were often from the lower end of the socio-economic scale (Mol, 1985).

The motivation to keep Catholic schools functioning was seen by me at the time to come primarily from the Catholic bishops who typically interpreted society as secular and occasionally non supportive of religion. Hence my intuitive sense of society was of something that stood over and against the religion of my youth. The professional religious brothers who taught us challenged us about keeping our faith in a world which does not always respect faith. One of the brothers portrayed entry into work life as being a period of decision whether to 'hold onto the faith' or 'abandon the faith'.

As mentioned in the preface of the thesis I experienced my entry into the life of an apprentice within the world of workshops and unions as a time of rude awakening - coloured I suggest by my sheltered school life. Life within the apprenticeship over a length of time gave me a sense that there was a genuineness and goodness about these men with whom I worked.

Psychologically and spiritually I was undergoing a dramatic shift in my sense of where goodness lay, on the one hand I had grown up within a culture of nurture, and on the other hand here I was among the life of the workshop where I was gaining a sense of the integrity of the working men in that place.

The dilemma was that of being a Catholic who believed goodness lay within the church on the one hand and experiencing goodness within everyday work life as an apprentice trades person. When I went into the seminary to train for the priesthood I became aware of a form of spirituality which made sense of work life in the midst of a thoroughly technological world. Later as a priest youth-worker my thinking was broadened to see the goodness within many young and ordinary people who were living out a spirituality in the midst of trade-work technology and related fields within modernity.

Later I became aware of two styles of spirituality: one which constructed a world so that it had the character of being antithetical to all things spiritual and religious; the other which constructed a world which periodically showed signs of the mystery within life. Still later as a priest I came to recognise how an influential element within the organisational structure of Catholicism promoted a spiritual tradition characterised by dichotomy and frequently viewed spirituality which had integrationist orientations as dangerous. I came to see that two 'ideal types' of spirituality were powerfully present within Catholicism, namely the 'dualist' and 'integrationist' forms.

The more I studied sociology the more I came to recognise how huge rational systems – like institutional Catholicism – demand order and methodical processes and therefore encouraged the predictable, safe ordered servant. As Weber (1982: 283) notes 'Ritual has corresponded to rules and regulations, and,

therefore, wherever a bureaucracy has determined its nature, religion has assumed a ritualist character.' Rationalisation of spirituality flows from systems like Catholicism (Weber, 1978: 426). Those who are most favoured within such a system are those who in a rational, priestly fashion insist on reworking human experience and spirituality into a sphere of the rational and the formal on one hand (which is favoured) and a sphere where the sensate and the irrational are allowed to run free alongside the rational. Being aware of the perennial presence of both forms of spirituality (the dualist and the integrationist) within the structure of Catholicism leads me to the conviction that portraying spirituality in these two 'ideal type' forms reflects a dynamic in play within religion. I will now move to the third base which suggests these two forms of spirituality.

The data generated through the in-depth interview work confirms the status of these 'ideal types'

As part of arranging suitable subjects for the primary and the contrast group in this study I had contacted a number of sources, namely parish priests, pastoral associates and a lay leadership formation team. I found that once I had listed a battery of typical 'integrationist' characteristics and of typical 'dualist' characteristics my contact sources had little difficulty in recognising both forms of spirituality. The contact sources were able to name with relative ease a number of people they knew who lived one or other of these styles of

spirituality (see chapter 4 for further discussion of criteria for selection of suitable subjects for either group).

Very early in my analysis of the interview data, elementary sociological categories began to emerge in divergent clusters. An example of a cluster from the integrationist group are 'risk', 'freedom', 'holistic', 'connectedness', 'ordinary', 'symbolic', 'ambiguity', 'paradox', 'poetry', 'trust', 'intimacy', 'listening to'; an example from the dualist group are 'changeless', 'obedience', 'certitude', 'a-priori', 'interventionist', 'duty', 'security', etc. A cursory glance over Hughes' (1989) findings concerning the two divergent 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' themes mentioned above indicate that the characteristics which emerge in this thesis from grouping interviewees according to the 'integrationist' and 'dualist' 'ideal types' resemble Hughes' typification.

I have so far been citing sources from which I gleaned the 'integrationist' and 'dualist' forms of spirituality in order to establish the adequacy of two 'ideal types' and that they 'ring true' in relation to the practical world out of which they emerge. They have a status as constructs which mirror two styles of living spirituality within contemporary everyday life. I briefly now turn to examine the relationship between the two ideal types: the conceptual practices on the one hand and the forms of spirituality (integrationist and dualist) on the other.

Relationship between conceptual practices and the two forms of spirituality

I have already discussed the notion of the 'conceptual practice' as an 'ideal type' and the notion of 'integrationist' and 'dualist' groups as 'ideal types' in the second section of this chapter. The question remains: Is there a relationship between these ideal types, that is between 'conceptual practices' on the one hand and the 'integrationist' and 'dualist' groups on the other? A cursory glance over the cluster of conceptual practices (mentioned immediately above) which the 'integrationist' group generate and the cluster which the 'dualist' group generate indicate that there is a commonality proper to each group of conceptual practices.

The cluster of dominant and subsidiary conceptual practices emerging from the 'integrationist' interviewees tends to exhibit approaches to every day life which are engaging, relational, holistic and mythic/poetic. The cluster of dominant and subsidiary conceptual practices emerging from the 'dualists' gives the sense of a spirituality which is guarded, in doubt about the trustworthiness of its innate intuition and unprepared to act without reference to higher authority.

These two clusters of conceptual practices and the two ideal type forms of spirituality do seem to have a measure of comparability in so far that the conceptual practices generated by the integrationist ideal type tend to express approaches to life which accord with integrationist spirituality. Similarly the conceptual practices emerging from the dualist ideal type sustain a style of

engaging with life which parallels the overall attitude to life of dualist spirituality.

There are a number of relationships in this thesis which might be assumed to be mutually exclusive and antithetical. For instance one relationship which could easily be presumed to be polarised is the relationship between the integrationist form of spirituality and the dualist form of spirituality. A similar judgment could be adopted toward the relationship between particular conceptual practices belonging to the integrationist group and those belonging to the dualist group. As a way of avoiding this assumption it is critically important to attend to the concept of 'orthogonality'.

The orthogonal relationship between 'integrationist' and 'dualist' 'ideal types'

I use the term 'orthogonal' to mean that which is skewed with respect to something else. For instance two subjects may have many social or personal dimensions the same but are contrary in terms of one of their dimensions. Hence if two persons are compared they may both have the same socio-economic status, the same voting patterns, the same ethnicity but may differ in terms of religion. If the first adheres to Anglicanism and the second Roman Catholicism, it is arbitrary to presume that their religious position is mutually contradictory, all one can say is that the way they view certain issue may be oblique with respect to each other. In all likelihood they may have broad

grounds for dialogue and mutual understanding, and at the same time they may disagree over a number of questions.

The question of the relationship between the 'integrationist' and the 'dualist' ideal type groups being orthogonal with respect to each other is critical to understanding these two ways of experiencing enchantment within modernity. The notion of orthogonality serves in the task of discovering what is unique about both the forms of spirituality experienced by the integrationist and dualist groups. The relationship between these two ideal types may very well be orthogonal rather than contradictory (Richard et al., 1992: 17). The notion of orthogonality like the philosophy of synthesis does not deny that some relationships may be quite contrary, it seeks to acknowledge that some tensions may need to be maintained for eventual creativity (Porter, 1991: 50).

Conclusion

In this chapter I located the discussion of conceptual practice within its broader cultural and social context by noting how we cannot engage in any form of reflection nor adopt any basic approach to life without having first employed the symbol systems of our culture. Our language draws us into the metaphors, symbols and constructions used by our society and culture. I then moved on to discuss the conceptual practice construct in order to isolate this particular function of the individual during his/her moment of enchantment. In using particular conceptual practices people adopt given attitudinal stances toward

the world so that they both construct and perceive the world in particular ways. The conceptual practice is effectively a structure or framework which people construct prior to and during their engagement with the world.

As a way of giving greater understanding to the notion of conceptual practice this chapter discussed not only the nature of the conceptual practice, but also other similar social scientific terms. This chapter explored commonalities between these social scientific terms and the conceptual practice construct. It studied various reasons why each of these terms do not adequately perform the task required by this thesis. In doing this it extended insight into the conceptual practice construct.

The discussion of the 'ideal type' construct in this chapter is presented in order to provide parameters and limits to the various 'ideal types' employed in this thesis, such as, 'conceptual practice', 'integrationist' and 'dualist'. Finally the forwarding of material which underpins the status of the two interview groups has permitted an overview of some of the relevant sociological literature. This offers background insight into some of the issues which arise in the empirical interview chapters (5-8), such as relationship to organised religion, the power of rationalisation to effect a blocking of enchantment within institutional religion and the diversity of spiritualities between the two interview groups (integrationist and dualist). This chapter by discussing the question of personal

experience as a basis for the existence of the two interview groups, offers background material against which these two groups might be viewed.

I turn now in the next chapter to explain how I chose a particular methodology which would best fulfil the needs of the thesis, namely an approach which would permit access to the dynamics people employ when they experience enchantment in modernity. This next chapter will assist in understanding how I go about interviewing, gathering and presenting data for the empirical section of the thesis (chs 5-8).

Chapter 4

Methodology

In this chapter I discuss four aspects of the methodological approach I use in this thesis, namely the overall research design of the entire thesis; constructing the interview sample; conducting interviews; and how I analyse the data. In addressing the issue of the research design I employ in this study I show how the data collection is structured in such a way that I can answer the questions set up in the early part of the thesis, that is the questions rising out of the series of hypotheses and identifiable empirical implications from Weber, Luckmann and Hegy.

Because the type of research in this thesis is qualitative rather than quantitative it is important to acknowledge that the expectations and claims of the study will be quite different from what can be demanded of quantitative work. In order to assess how well this thesis meets the demands of the standards of qualitative research I weave a series of observations throughout this chapter. These observations call attention to five facets of qualitative research that help in assessing the 'trustworthiness' and 'authenticity' of the study. The five facets of the study I refer to are those suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994:277), namely: objectivity or confirmability; reliability, dependability or auditability; internal validity, credibility or authenticity; external validity, transferability or fittingness; utilization, application or action orientation.

Part 1

The overall research design of the thesis

This section touches upon an aspect associated with the quality of the research, namely reliability, dependability, auditability – it does so by responding to Miles and Huberman's (1994: 278) requirement for reliability, namely 'Are the basic paradigms and analytic constructs clearly specified? (Reliability depends, in part, on its connectedness to theory).' In the first few chapters of this thesis I single out the notion of the loss of 'enchantment'. I use the term 'enchantment' to mean an awareness of the world as pervaded by mystery, magic, and the Sacred. In connection with this I write of how Weber uses the term 'rationalisation' to depict the modern age. The term rationalisation effectively describes the relentless move within society to interpret and explain social (and to a large extent personal) events by subjecting such events to calculation, measurement and control (Abercrombie et al., 1988). I note how Weber argues that the ongoing loss of enchantment within the age of modernity is due to 'rationalisation', 'intellectualisation' and the scientific orientation of modernity.

I focus on Weber's prediction that because of the influence of rationalisation in modernity religion will become ineffective, go into demise, and be found only in the personal and marginal spheres of society. I note how two other theorists, Thomas Luckmann and Pierre Hegy, make predictions about religion's future and the forms it will take.

In chapter 2 I developed a number of hypotheses pertinent to each theorist's notions of disenchantment and the place of religion in late modernity. It is from these hypotheses that I developed identifiable empirical implications for each theorist. I moved the discussion toward a sociological conundrum – I claim to have identified a group of people who sustain enchantment in modernity despite Weber's sociological predictions to the contrary. It is in chapter 2 that I contributed most to the building up of the internal validity of the study – I did so by laying out the rules (the fulfilment of empirically identified implications) for the confirmation of the hypotheses of Weber, Luckmann and Hegy (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 279).

Effectively therefore I have at my disposal the basis for setting up the research design of this thesis. The set of questions which flow from the hypotheses and empirical implications of each theorist influences the shape of the overall research design for this thesis. Following Hakim's (1987: X11) advice that 'empirical research is fruitful only when studies selected for a project or research programme are appropriate to the questions being addressed', I select a qualitative style for this work.

The prime questions this thesis addresses revolve around enchantment in late modernity. The following questions capture the central issues with which the thesis engages, namely: Is enchantment being sustained in late modernity and if it is what nature does it have? How are the people in the interviews sustaining

enchantment? What are the salient features of these people? Are they employing particular conceptual practices which permit them to sustain enchantment despite being part of the rationalisation of the day?

It is in the light of the answers to the above questions that a further question comes to the fore: Mindful of the data generated through the in-depth interviews of this study, does Weber, Luckmann or Hegy best account for these stories of enchantment in this time of late modernity?

The style of questions being addressed and how they direct the research design

In this section I work on having clear research questions and having 'the features of the study design congruent with them' (Miles and Huberman 1994: 278); in so doing I build up the reliability and dependability of the study. The questions this thesis addresses revolve around the subjective world of individuals. The nature of the topic 'enchantment' – even though it has social ramifications – is bound up with the intentional world of the social actors interviewed in this study. Accessing this intentional world in the interview situation demands that subjects recall their inner state of awareness, conscious, intuitive associations, and meanings.

The task in choosing which particular study type is best suited for the research design of this thesis is simplified by having identified that the key questions of

this work have a character which is both of a subjective and intentional nature. Following the principle that particular research designs are best selected when the purpose and intellectual strategy of the study is considered rather than the methods and techniques used (Hakim, 1987: 8), I turn my focus to the purpose of this study. The purpose of the study is to understand the subjective intentional world of social actors. Knowing this I choose a study type which best facilitates access into the reflective world of the people who experience enchantment in modernity.

Hakim (1987: 3) distinguishes differences in the design of theoretical research and policy research. She calls to mind how each type of research has a parallel in Scott and Shore's (in Hakim, 1987: 3) distinction between knowledge for understanding and knowledge for action. Knowledge for understanding – like theoretical research – deals with causal processes and explanations; knowledge for action – like policy research – tends to be influenced by the dictum that it is more important to change the world than to understand it (Hakim, 1987: 3).

One of the characteristics of theoretical research is that it is commonly developed within a single social science discipline and written primarily for the social science community. On the other hand policy research tends to have its origins in a multi – disciplinary base and is written for policy makers and action groups. The nature of the research design I choose for this thesis has more in common with theoretical research than with policy research – acknowledging at the same time the overlaps which occur between these two types of research.

Within these broad parameters I select a qualitative style of study and do so with the specific intent of being able to engage in the intentional world of the social actors I interview. I use the term 'qualitative' to describe the study in a much more restrictive sense than simply to imply a non use of quantitative data. Referring to qualitative research in this restrictive sense Hakim (1987: 9) says that it deals 'with causes only at the level of the intentional, self-directing and knowledgeable individual whereas case studies can deal with a greater variety of causal processes.'

The most critical reason why I employ 'qualitative' styled research is that it is ideally suited for this study since one of the premises upon which it is based is that individuals' own definition of their experience is vital in gaining access to the meanings which exist in their minds whilst they go about their everyday lives (Hakim, 1987: 26). This style of research permits access to the realm of intentionality, which is frequently 'lost from view in the over-socialised conception of man [sic] in sociology (Wrong 1961, in Hakim 1987: 26)'.

Qualitative styled research - in the restrictive sense of that term - offers me the opportunity to engage with the subjective intended meanings of social actors and therefore is the most appropriate style of research to deal with this issue (Hakim, 1987: 9).

I use the term in-depth interview throughout this thesis in a way that is consistent with a definition offered by Taylor and Bogdan (in Minichiello et al., 1990: 93), namely that it is

face-to-face encounters between the researcher and informants directed toward understanding informants' perspectives on their lives, experiences or situations as expressed in their own words.

This definition makes the point that the purpose of the in-depth interview is 'directed toward understanding informants' perspectives on their lives'. I use in-depth interviewing in this research not to focus so much on how the interviewees see their lives, but more on accessing the conceptual practices the interviewees employ when enchantment occurs. Thus my goal is not primarily the content of the ideas but the form of the ideas.

Part 2:

How did I go about constructing my sample?

At this point in the chapter I will discuss the formation of two groups in composing the interviewees for the study; the criteria used in selecting people for the study, how I sought the help of a number of agencies in choosing these people, how I approached the interviewee sources, the means I employ in seeking a cross socio-economic mix in the sample, and the type of people who eventually constitute the samples. By outlining these steps I develop the objectivity/confirmability aspect of the research – I do so by responding to Miles' and Huberman's (1994: 278) question 'Are the study's general methods

and procedures described explicitly and in detail: Do we feel that we have a complete picture, including "backstage" information?'

Formation of two groups for the study

There are two groups of people in this study – the first and main group, whom I name the 'integrationists', is a group of people who engage with the rationalisation of modernity and despite this engagement (and contrary to Weber's general thesis) are apparently able to sustain a sense of the enchantment of every day life. The ideal typical person in this 'integrationist' group has the sort of characteristics, which pose a problem for a Weberian account of enchantment in the late modern age – to the extent that this person experiences enchantment in the midst of the rationalisation of modernity.

I purposefully select the second group to act as a contrast to the first group. The strategy of a contrast group permits further insights and understanding into how some of the 'variables' (in this study conceptual practices) function across different interviewees (Miles and Huberman (1994: 195). Hence by having another group of subjects (the 'dualists') I can gain ideas about the character of each group by comparing and contrasting the diverse ways each group use particular conceptual practices. Just as I can single out 'exemplary' cases in one of the groups to explore how a variable or conceptual practice functions when a typical 'integrationist' acts and when a negative case (a-typical case) from the 'integrationist' acts, so the contrast groups serves a similar role. Because the

contrast group is purposefully chosen on the grounds that its typical members adopt quite distinct approaches to spirituality with respect to the 'integrationist', they – by virtue of their 'deviance' – generate knowledge about the main group.

The 'integrationists' are thrown into greater relief by the way the contrast group tend to restrict their sense of the Sacred to formal organised worship and set prayer rather than extending it to every day life. An example of this is a group of women from a traditionalist theological order called the 'Missionaries of God's love' who are going to Rwanda to work as nurses among the refugees. This challenges one of the impressions I have had about the 'dualists', namely that they tend to be less engaged in social justice than the 'integrationists'. However, perhaps it also says that there is a divergence operating in the way they go about their works of charity. By having such a contrast group I am continually called to rethink, inquire and sharpen my ideas about the spirituality which is specific to the 'integrationists'.

Social indicators to help in the selection of suitable subjects for each group

The primary sign I wanted to convey to the people who were to be agents for me in selecting candidates was, does the given person live his or her spirituality in everyday life? I emphasised the point that candidates for the first group will approach their everyday life as if they believe that the ordinary and everyday

facets of life were in themselves potential encounters with meaning, enchantment and the divine. I said that the persons most suitable for the second group would tend not to see life in itself revealing God and would reserve references to God for formal religious occasions and formal prayer.

I mentioned that one of the indicators pointing to suitable candidates for either group revolved around language. Candidates for the 'integrationist' group - those who live their spirituality in everyday life - would speak about life with a sense of the innate goodness within it. Their language would reflect the belief that the world is good and has the potential to reveal the divine. They would use words associated with the divine, such as 'mystery', 'sacred', 'awe' or 'presence', not only in reference to God but also in reference to everyday life. Candidates for the 'dualist' group would reserve such words to formal references to God. Suitable candidates for the 'dualist' group would typically reveal their belief that everyday life is separated from God, that it is bad and in need of 'saving' and 'redeeming'.

I also mentioned that what typifies candidates for the primary group is the propensity to see and approach life as if it were essentially a unity in itself, and the mark of the contrast group was a tendency to view life as if there was a perpetual and internal conflict operative between good and bad, God and the 'world'. I mentioned that candidates for both groups needed to be Catholic and regularly attend the Catholic church.

How I sought the help of a number of agencies in choosing these people

By way of providing grounds for assessing the reliability, dependability, auditability (Miles and Huberman 1994: 278) of my research I explain how I used four different approaches in selecting people for the integrationist (primary) group. In the first instance I contacted a body set up by the Catholic Archdiocese for training Catholic lay people in leadership related to the church. I knew a number of people on the board of this committee and I explained to them that I wanted to meet with individuals who were actively engaged in society and at the same time lived out their spirituality in their everyday life. This agency promotes this approach to spirituality and thus were familiar with the concepts I shared with them. The second method I used to find individuals for the primary group was to contact priests and pastoral associates who worked in parishes within the Archdiocese of Adelaide. These personnel frequently have a good knowledge of people within their own parishes. When I explained the indicators (mentioned above) of language, reflection and basic approach to life, the priests and pastoral associates had little difficulty in understanding the type of person I sought – in this I had a clue that the demand for reliability, dependability, auditability was being met. The third method I used was to call upon my own knowledge of Catholic lay people. At the time of preparing for the selection of these subjects I had been involved in the Archdiocese of Adelaide for 19 years as an ordained priest and had contact with

a large range of people. The fourth avenue I used was the 'snowball' technique – I did this after a number of interviews. When I found an interviewee who demonstrated a high sense of 'enchantment' in the midst of his or her daily life I would ask if he or she knew of any other person who had a similar approach to life.

When I sought the dualists I attempted to use the same agencies, that is, the parish priests and pastoral associates, the diocesan lay leadership formation committee, my personal knowledge and the snowballing technique. I found however that the lay leadership committee was unable to recommend any persons for the dualist group. On reflection, this was a quite logical state of affairs, given that the dualist individual would typically disagree with the theology of the lay leadership committee (which accentuates lay leadership, autonomy of the individual and belief in the indwelling presence of the divine in the physical universe) and hence not volunteer themselves to be part of such a group.

Instead of the lay leadership formation committee I sought the help of a number of priests who are involved with a specific traditional and conservative style of liturgy in the Adelaide Archdiocese. This liturgy caters for the type of Catholic who wants to worship in a more formal setting which retains many of the rituals – including the Latin language – used before the changes of the second Vatican Council (1961-65). The parish priests, pastoral associates on the

one hand and the priests connected with the traditional liturgy on the other, found that the indicators of language reflection and basic approach to life enabled them to isolate individuals for inclusion into the dualist group.

Approaching interview sources

I phoned and met with the committee instituted for Catholic lay leadership related to the church, and the priests and pastoral associates who worked in parishes within the Archdiocese of Adelaide. My supervisor and I had drafted a letter which was addressed to the parish priests and signed by my supervisor (see appendix 3). This letter had the official university title at its head, the thesis topic, a brief explanation that 'The project examines, if and how, some Catholics develop a spirituality for their active involvement in society'. The letter also explained how the project was part of a thesis, that I was in my second year of a Master's degree and finally that it had been approved by the Ethics committee for research in Social Sciences.

In order to avoid the danger of leading the research, I told very little to the priests, pastoral associates, lay formation committee and through them the interviewees about the purpose of the study except to talk briefly around the subject of a spirituality for social involvement. The letter explained that I was bound to confidentiality by the Ethics committee. The letter of introduction asked each priest for his assistance in helping me gather individuals to take part in an interview.

In phoning and contacting both the lay leadership committee, the priests and the pastoral associates I spoke about how I wanted to interview two distinct and different groups of people. By using spiritual and religious terminology I talked about the characteristics of people who would be ideal candidates for inclusion in the main group (integrationists) and in the contrast group (dualists). I referred to the set of criteria which would be helpful in selecting suitable people. In order to preserve the freedom of individuals the lay leadership committee, the priests and pastoral associates and I agreed that I would only contact prospective interviewees after I had received approval to do so by either the leadership committee, the parish priests or pastoral associates.

Once I had been given the names of 30 people for inclusion into the main group and the names of 14 people for the contrast group (two of whom had to be replaced) I contacted each individual by phone to arrange a convenient meeting time and place. I interviewed 35 people in their own homes; I found this preferable to interviewing people in my home since the interviewees seemed more at ease in their own domain. I conducted 9 interviews in my home, 7 of these interviewees were known to me prior to the study.

I gave a letter of introduction to the prospective interviewee from my supervisor with the official university notation (see appendix 4) and then a letter seeking the interviewee's signed statement of freedom of consent for the interview to

take place (see appendix 5). I also showed my university identification card to each interviewee. I explained how the tape recording of the conversation is vital in this project because of the accuracy it affords in transcribing the interview onto computer. I noted how tape recording helps in discerning emphases and detecting the shades of meanings carried in the human voice. I found that these steps of formal procedure – letters of introduction, identification card, mention of ethics committee and confidentiality – gave the study a professional basis and helped the interviewees to perceive me primarily in the role of sociologist.

Seeking a cross socio-economic mix in the sample

Table No. 1: Interviewee Numbers by Source

Source	Integrationist	Dualist
Parish priest/ assoc.	15	7
Lay Formation Com.	7	0
Traditional Rite Priests	0	5
Personal knowledge	5	1
Snowball	3	1

The reason there are double the amount of integrationists compared to the dualist (30 and 14 respectively) is that the thesis revolves around the issue of enchantment across the experience of modernity, rather than enchantment apart from immersion in public and private life of modernity. Since the integrationist group is chosen on the basis that it experiences enchantment in

modernity these subjects are the ones in which I invest most attention – the dualist group is chosen chiefly to clarify by means of contrast the character of the primary group of integrationists.

I attempted to gather people from a diverse spread of socio-economic backgrounds to strengthen the external validity of the research (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 279). It has been possible to achieve an overall balance in the gender distribution across all age groupings.

Table No. 2 Age by Gender of the Integrationist Group

AGE	MALE	FEMALE
30 - 39	4	4
40 - 49	5	5
50 - 59	4	4
60 +	2	2

I started the age groupings at age 30 primarily because I judged that interviewees who have gone through their 20s are much more able than those currently in their 20s to achieve a rich depth of personal reflection and experience on the subject of enchantment.

Table No. 3: Age by Gender of the Dualist Group

AGE	MALE	FEMALE
30 - 39	1	1
40 - 49	2	2
50 - 59	2	2
60 +	2	2

The integrationist and dualist groups are reasonably balanced in terms of educational achievements, the 'integrationists' however have a slightly higher representation in the degree and diploma brackets. While the dualists have six at the certificate level they offset for this by having two of their number hold doctorates.

Table No. 4 Education by Interviewee Group

Educational Level	Integrationist	Dualist
Doctorate	4	2
Degree	8	1
Diploma	7	2
Certificate	8	6
Secondary	3	3
Primary	0	0

The representation of the two groups in the occupational positions in society shows that the integrationist group is weighted slightly toward the more advantaged positions compared to the dualist group and to the general Catholic population (Mol, 1985: 169).

Table No. 5 Occupation by Interviewee Group

Occupation	Integrationist	Dualist
Managerial/ Admin	4	1
Professional	6	1
Social professional	7	2
Para professional	6	2
Trades person	3	3
Personal service	1	1
Assembly line work	1	1
Home duties/retired	2	3

The 'integrationist' group is comprised of 2 researchers and 2 university lecturers (int. no's 3, 26; 4, 27); 1 hospital lay chaplain (int. 5); 2 medical doctors (int. 12, 24); 1 lawyer (int. 22); 3 management administrators (int. 7, 9, 13); 4 adult education teachers (int. 11, 28, 21, 30); 1 school education teacher (int. 14); 2 refugee workers (int. 15, 29); 5 community care service workers (int. 8,10, 16, 18); 1 vice squad (int. 19); 5 health service workers (int. 1, 2, 5, 6, 17); 1 electrician (int. 20); 2 retired (int. 23, 26 – later being researcher).

The 'dualist' group comprised 1 musician (int no. 34 having a PhD); 1 lawyer (int. 35); 1 taxation analyst (int. 43); 1 lab technician (33); 1 land agent (int. 42), 1 nurse (int. 41); 1 administrator (int. 36); 3 secretaries (int. 32, 38, 39); 2 retired

(int. 40 – int. 44 having PhD); 1 home duties (int. 31); 1 ex air-force officer (int. 37).

PART 3:

Conducting interviews

As a way of providing a basis for the confirmability or objectivity of this study I discuss my initial meeting with the interviewees, how I introduced them to the study, the procedure I followed in the interviews, such as the recursive method and the role the interviewees assumed in directing the emergence of recurring themes and how this influences the shaping of the concepts and categories the study examines.

Initially I was concerned about the fact that a good portion of the interviewees would come to know I was a Catholic priest. My fear was that the knowledge about my priesthood would effectively act to 'lead' the interviewees. Hence I was glad of the formality available through the series of official university letter-headed mail. In the first six interviews I placed significance on my role as sociologist by mentioning how the study would be examined critically and would have to meet the demands of a professional examination board. I asked these early interviewees to see me more as sociologist than as priest. I did a test on evaluating the effectiveness of my efforts and found indeed that people were apologising for introducing 'spiritual' matters. I realised I had overplayed my advice and so became more at ease in subsequent interviews. I simply

mentioned how interviewers can 'lead' interviews and to offset this it was important that the interviewee would feel free to take control of the interview, talk about anything he or she would want as well as decide how far issues could be pursued.

Out of a desire to avoid leading the interviewees I purposefully introduced the study in a generic way. Typically I initiated the interview by asking questions of the following kind: 'Could you talk about the areas in your life where you experience a sense of commitment, energy or deep feeling'; 'What would be some of areas in your life which have significance for you and where you find meaning?' Hence I would commonly answer specific questions about the purpose of the study by saying that the purpose is to have people talk about the things that are important to them in their everyday life. This is quite an honest reply, since it is one of the purposes of the study. If the interviewees knew what my original notions were concerning 'integrationist' and 'dualist' people, their ensuing comments could be influenced by such knowledge.

With these questions I would encourage the interviewee to explore issues to some depth; frequently I would say something of the following nature 'In talking about your life feel free to tell your own story, because it is uniquely yours and has a value in its own right, go to the depth you feel comfortable with.' I took a role in shaping the direction of the study by actively listening to the interviewees and then asking them to return to particular points in their

stories. The strategy I followed here was that of the 'recursive method' (Minichiello et al., 1990).

All interviews were conducted alone with the given interviewee, 44 interviews were taped and ranged from 35 minutes in length to 2 hours – the average time of each interview was 50 minutes. The average number of words spoken during the interviews ranged around 8,500 words, the longest was over two sessions and exceeded 13,000 words, the most difficult interviewee I worked with produced only 2,700 words, the next most restrained interviewee generated 5,100 words.

Acknowledging personal biases: a step toward objectivity

At the beginning of this chapter I noted how I use in-depth interviewing in this study. This technique is connected to and flows out of the interpretative philosophical tradition. The interpretative tradition is built on and relies heavily on the philosophy of Schutz (1962), Geertz (1973), and Berger and Luckmann (1987). I note once again this tradition stresses the importance of acknowledging one's philosophical tradition – this is a step within the sociological techniques which rise out of this tradition. One of the tenets of the philosophy underpinning in-depth interviewing technique is that for the study to move toward objectivity it must proceed without being unduly influenced by unacknowledged researcher bias. Good research becomes possible when the various influences which shape the gathering of data and its interpretation are

identified. The paradoxical truth which comes out of the interpretative research tradition is that when I disclose my preconceptions and acknowledge their influence in research that very act of disclosure serves to strengthen the work.

Disclosing the personal presuppositions which promote researcher bias has a number of benefits, namely: Knowledge of the presuppositions permits some idea of why one prefers doing research this way rather than another; Knowledge of the presuppositions alerts the researcher and the reader about the things which will tend to be emphasised – this helps the researcher and reader see the gathering of data, their selection, examination and interpretation as the product of a known orientation rather than the product of a researcher who claims to be above bias or orientation; Knowing one's presuppositions can help the results of the study reflect the world of the interviewees rather than the unacknowledged world of the interviewer (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 278).

Summarising my preconceptions as a way of acknowledging personal bias I state that philosophically I believe that the universe is a whole and is good at its root (even though composed of both bliss and tragedy). The wholeness of the universe demands the interplay of all beings within it. I also believe that within the universe there is a mystery, and that this mystery defies being named – despite this, terms such as 'the all', 'the ground of being', 'the Sacred', and 'God' haltingly refer to the mystery within the universe. I hold that it is most important to use these and associated terms analogously and metaphorically

rather than concretely and literally. As the researcher I see myself – at my better moments – valuing the principle of inclusivity (a commitment to dialogue and a commitment to engage with the diverse rather than reconstruct the diverse as antithetical). Another presupposition I acknowledge is that I am displeased with an overly bi-polar approach to life – an approach which I hold inhibits wholeness in one's relationships with the self, others, society and the universe (Porter, 1991: 150). The extension of this presupposition is that the more I dichotomise life the more the sense of the Sacred and enchantment are diminished. In retrospect I also acknowledge that some of my deepest aspirations are those of the ideal type 'integrationist' (characteristics of which emerge in the interview section of the thesis).

Acknowledging these personal presuppositions reveals a number of implications, namely: Because I believe life at its root is good and whole rather than dichotomised I will be predisposed to see value not only in the rational but also the sensate, the imaginative, the intuitive, the symbolic, the mythic and the poetic. This predisposition to see value in the sensate could very well become an issue for me when I have to accept that some interviewees will tend to construct a dichotomised view of life in such a way that there are two basic arenas of life, the first being the rational and the spiritual – seen as good; and the second being the irrational and the body (with its sensate operations) – seen as bad.

My tendency to accept diversity and paradox will cause me to readily empathise with the interviewees who disclose these orientations while they reflect about enchantment -this can have two effects on the research: It is likely that I will have good rapport with the interviewees who accept diversity and paradox (likely to be the 'integrationists' or primary group) and because of my interest in this approach, I will be in danger of unwittingly showing approval to these approaches to enchantment; The other effect could be that because I am biased toward accepting paradox I may tend to make greater claims about the existence of enchantment than would someone who is restrictive in applying the term. Another implication of my presuppositions about the importance of being able to use symbolic, poetic and metaphorical language and images when attempting to talk about the mystery in life, is that I will be in danger of showing disappointment to interviewees who insist on using only clear, tight and fixed concepts of the Sacred.

The recursive method

Because I took brief thematic notes during the interview or jotted down single words or phrases, I became alert to the occasions where the interviewee would mention issues, attitudinal stances or conceptual practices raised in earlier conversations. When this occurred I would wait for a pause in the conversation and recall to the interviewee the very words he or she had used and then suggest that we might return to the matter and talk about it further.

Occasionally the interviewee's speech level intensified – indicating the issue or

person discussed was of particular significance to the interviewee. Following this 'recursive' method I entered into the subjective world of the interviewee; I also retained a measure of control over which scenarios raised by the interviewee were in my estimation worth pursuing.

As a way of testing a number of ideas, issues, themes and theories which were beginning to emerge from the ongoing interviews I would introduce a topic when it became obvious that the interviewee was not going to raise the issue. In doing this I would wait for a pause and a lull in the discussion and mention in a general way an idea that 'some people suggest'. For instance a host of interviewees from the 'integrationist' group indicated from the way they talked about humanity and nature that they had an overall perception of the world as a good place in itself. I would test this emerging theme by finding out how people of a diverse approach – particularly the 'dualists' – viewed the question. The issue of how interviewees influence the direction and agenda of the interviews becomes important to recognise in in-depth interviewing.

The Interviewee's role in shaping the content of the interviews

In the in-depth interview style I have followed in this study I have worked to ensure that the informants assume egalitarian stances in the conversation – a move to further strengthen the objectivity and external validity or transferability of the study (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 279). Where appropriate I have used the language forms of the interviewees and have

attempted to discern their particular frames of thinking. The interview is an interaction between interviewees on the one hand who contribute views about social reality and myself on the other, who by active listening and responding to their comments pushes the exchange to deeper levels. My intent in the process was to accentuate the role of interviewees over the content of the interview.

Another way that the interviewees have had influence over the direction of the study has been brought about by my listening, checking audio-tape transcripts and inserting interviewer comments into the 'NUDIST' software package (described later in this chapter). I would replay sections of tapes familiarising myself with the original interview so that my recall of the experience was rich. One of the indicators that the interviewees did influence the data and have purchase over subsequent interview directions was the degree to which I 'joined' the interviewees. At the beginning of the generation of themes and concepts during a number of early interviews one of my supervisors challenged me about joining the interviewee to the point that I was losing the critical role of being sufficiently detached to exercise sociological analysis (Strauss, 1990: 29). This is an indication that the research did not lack empathy and active listening.

The content of the interviews

Many of the stories of the interviews revolve around the personal experiences these people had of relationships formed with others in a paid and non paid

work setting. When I asked the interviewees to talk about areas in their lives where they found meaning and commitment I moved into a more directing role in the conversation. The type of data I wanted these conversations to produce was data which would reveal the conceptual practices each interviewee adopts toward life at the moment of enchantment. Effectively there are a number of levels of information being carried in the content of the interviews: there is information about events where people are interacting and being relational; there is information about the conversation being generated by interviewee and interviewer; there is information about the attitudinal stances and the conceptual practices the interviewees employ when they experience enchantment; and finally the conceptual practices the informants employ as they tell their stories about enchantment. The interviewees did not use the sociologically loaded term 'enchantment' - nor did I suggest that word to them - however they did use language indicating the equivalent, such as 'I felt especially touched', 'I felt privileged to be there', 'I felt I was standing on holy ground'.

My consistent and primary goal throughout the in-depth interviewing stage of the research was to access the attitudinal style, form and mode of each interviewee's interaction with life in order that I might find how enchantment is or is not being experienced in the contemporary world. This is true not only of the main group but also of the contrast group - since my intent in interviewing the dualist group was to bring the integrationists into greater focus. I was

driven to discover what approach to life these interviewees employ when they re-enter – through their story telling – their moments of enchantment. From a methodological perspective, the in-depth interview technique permitted me so to engage with people that I could collect the type of data required to answer the research questions presented in chapter 2 of this thesis.

The notion of contextualisation and the strength it brings to the work: an aid in internal validity

Another aspect of this qualitative styled research is its ability to address the issue of contextualisation. The in-depth interview does permit the interviewees and myself to bring forward a 'variety of circumstantial and contextual factors' (Hakim, 1987: 28). When this happens it is possible to pursue and test the links which exist between these factors. Writing about qualitative styled study, Hakim notes that its strength lies in its validity- in the quote below she uses the term 'qualitative' in the restrictive sense (1987: 9) noted earlier

The strength of qualitative research is the validity of the data obtained: individuals are interviewed in sufficient detail for the results to be taken as true, correct, complete and believable reports of their views and experiences. (Hakim, 1987: 27)

Because the in-depth interview technique enhances the freedom of the interviewee individuals commonly recall situations which are unique in both content and form. The quality of the dialogue between the interviewee and myself as interviewer most commonly grows as the meeting progresses. One of

the factors which brings internal and external validity to the stories is the role constructed for the interviewees – they are expected to use real life situations as the base material for their stories.

The two groups making up this study (the 'integrationists' and the 'dualists') are chosen as part of a purposive study, the sampling is highly selective. The subjects are chosen on the specific grounds outlined above – all individuals from the primary and contrast group are present in the study because of their distinctive relationship with the issue of enchantment. The study therefore is restrictive in its claims – it deals with Catholic peoples' relationship with enchantment in the South Australian Archdiocese of Adelaide during the 1990s. The transferability of the findings of this study are specific in nature – there are boundaries of reasonable generalisation (McGrath and Brinberg, 1983, in Miles and Hubermann, 1994: 279).

The categories (conceptual practices) I develop through interviewing both sets of subjects are all tightly supported by bodies of texts, which in turn are contextual in nature. Because the transcripts of the interviewees' conversation with me are located within bodies of texts the transcripts are given greater validity – since they occur not as isolated statements but as part of the whole genre and meaning of the total script. This provides enough 'thick description' for readers and people with whom I reflect about the study to 'assess the potential transferability appropriate to their own settings' (Miles and

Hubermann, 1994: 279). Because each interview is transcribed into the software package in full, the research has the ability and does in practice present the characteristics of the 'original sample of persons, settings, processes' so that it is possible to compare these samples with those occurring in other studies (Miles and Hubermann, 1994: 279).

There is an element of rigour which is introduced into the body of the study by virtue of the hierarchical arrangement of concepts which causes the concepts to be systematically related (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The 'NUDIST' software package encourages the internal coherence of these concepts. The software package helps in the creation of concepts; some of these concepts are descriptively close to the experience of the interviewees. The range of concepts helps in the task of sociologically analysing and understanding the interviews. The analytic codes or categories or at least their offspring (subsidiary or subordinate categories) are directly connected to discrete pieces of verbatim interview material. Hence the hierarchical ordering of concepts represents not only an arrangement of concepts but also the host of hierarchically arranged discrete verbatim material. Each concept is able to maintain its ranking because it is underpinned by the evidence of exactly-transcribed interview material. The availability of such interview data is made accessible by calling up the coding number for the concept placed into the software package. It is on this basis that these concepts (conceptual practices) earn their place.

The emergence of these concepts indicate the inductive process I have followed in developing these concepts and the hierarchical ordering of concepts shed light on the analytic procedure I have followed in this study. The interviewees, speaking about the issues in which they invest personal meaning and energy, provide the data for analysis. It is out of this material that I as a sociological researcher engage in analytic study. As a way of testing the concepts which emerge I return to the interview material for confirmation (as well as test them with subsequent interviewees during the process of completing all 44 interviews).

The fact that many of the categories are closely tied to 'in vivo' codes (the very word/s and expressions of the interviewees) gives the content of the interviews a close connection to the real life experiences and reflections of the interviewees. It is this element of the study which provides the reader with enough 'thick description' to assess the potential transferability of the work (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 279).

The interviewees nuance and construct the meanings of the concepts and categories developed from one successive interview to the next. Because in-depth interviewing gives freedom and power to the interviewees to direct the conversation, many of the topics raised are those which the interviewees consider to be central; the content of the study is matter which exists in the real lives of people rather than issues I alone consider important. Because the

structure of the in-depth interview process enables the interviewees to bring forward all types of matters, pivotal and tangential, the shape of the emerging concepts of the study reflects peoples' everyday life experiences. This strengthens the transferability of the study since the people I have spoken to about the study repeatedly reply that it is 'consistent with their own experience' (Miles and Hubermann, 1994: 279).

The external validity of the study comes from the sense that the eventual overarching categories do 'ring true'- it is the knowledge that these categories are confirmed by people outside the study. When I have explained the process of the study I have undertaken and how those who have been able to retain enchantment have been faithful to the practices of 'vulnerability', 'inter-subjectivity', 'ambiguity' and 'immanence' (the dominant conceptual practices of the study), the story has been readily accepted by interviewees and people outside the study. This brings confirmation that the findings of the study resonate with the lived experience of people in the wider community.

Part 4 :

Analysing the data

Through explaining the analysis of the data this last section of the chapter provides grounds for assessing the external validity and objectivity of the thesis. In this section I refer to my use of resource work books such as 'field log', 'analysing and coding', 'coding and memo' and the software package entitled

'NUDIST' (mnemonic for non numerical, unstructured data, indexing, searching and theorising).

I used a number of strategies to develop and test emerging concepts. At the very beginning of the interview work I employed the 'analytic induction method' (Minichiello et al., 1990: 286). Starting from the general statement of focus, namely 'Enchantment in a time of disenchantment' I sought to gather data which would illuminate the topic. As the number of interviews progressed there was a modification of ideas about how enchantment was being realised. There is a 'modifying, revising and expanding' of thinking as data are collected (Minichiello et al., 1990: 286). Part of the process was being attentive to cases which did not fit the emerging ideas; then testing these negative cases and then modifying emerging theory so as to accommodate the negative cases.

The primary style of data collection and coding which shaped the way I conducted interviews was the notion that analysis of data begins 'with the very first, second, or third interview' (Strauss, 1990: 26). Because it is easy to be flooded by a rich amount of initial data in interview styled research (Strauss, 1990: 26) I codified and kept a memo of material during and after interviews. As Strauss (1990) and Minichiello et al., (1990) advise with each successive interview new data served to confirm or modify the notions and theory which emerged from previous interviews.

I looked for apparent contradictions which challenged my thinking and preconceptions. For instance in the second interview the midwife by the pseudonym of Angela spoke of how she delighted in her work because it is 'earthy', 'raw' and 'real', she said 'you can grasp hold of it'. Yet at the same time she also said that there is something of the 'mystery of humanity' in the work. During the writing up of the field notes I commented on how Angela experiences something of the mystery of humanity in the very act of touching the physicality of life. This challenged preconceptions about mystery being an experience of the 'other' of the 'spiritual'. For Angela 'mystery' emerged out of her sensate experience of life – it is connected and grounded, not a removed 'spiritual' experience.

I believe that one of most influential factors which shaped the analysis of this piece of research was the software package 'NUDIST'. The mnemonic title of this package explains its purpose – it is designed to assist the researcher build and test theory based on interview material (Richards and Richards, 1990). The package is a research tool and can like any tool be used in different ways according to how the researcher uses some of its capabilities more than others.

I found that the primary benefit of the nudist software is its ability to build categorisation and abstraction. This assisted me to adopt a sociological perspective with respect to the interviewees rather than stay immersed in the experiential world of the interviewees. The program's facility in generating

sociological categories helped me move from descriptive coding to analytic coding (Strauss, 1990: 4; Strauss and Corbin, 1991: 21; 29; Minichiello, 1990: 295). Strauss (1990: 4) comments on the various levels of analysis during a study: lower level analysis reports what is seen and heard without much awareness of how this fits into the overall generation of theory; higher analysis becomes more systematic and interpretative and the levels of abstraction become greater. The structure of the 'NUDIST' program invites these codes to produce categories of greater abstraction and so promote more complex sociological thinking.

I used the program to attach sociological categories to sections of texts -these texts may be of any length, they may be a single word, a phrase or multiple sentences. Strauss and Corbin (1991: 72) suggest a number of ways of doing open coding on text data by analysing either 'line-by-line', sentence or paragraph, or entire documents. In the main I broke the data down to sense units which seem to deal with a particular issue; thus I would develop the categories and conceptual practices by focusing on these sense units.

The sociological nature of a piece of transcription may be captured by a word interviewees use within the interview. Some of the terms the interviewees used are 'being with', 'letting go', 'goodness' – these terms are effectively sociological in so far as they describe ways people interact with life. Where possible I retained these life situation expressions or 'in vivo' codes (Strauss, 1990; Strauss

and Corbin, 1991). Frequently however I found that some terms the interviewees generated ('in vivo' codes) are incapable of sustaining the abstract sociological concepts the theory is generating. Hence I forwarded sociological codes, such as 'relationality', 'inter-subjectivity', 'mediation', 'ambiguity'.

As I worked on the texts from one interview to the next I attempted to adopt a critical stance toward the data generated from the interviews – and in this way generate tentative questions about connections and implications. In order to make sense of the data I had to interpret the data without offering simplistic interpretations. I did this by building conceptually dense concepts. I engaged in detailed analysis of the data in order to reveal the latent causal and interactive relationships operative between the concepts which were beginning to emerge (Strauss, 1990: 10). The recurring stance I adopted toward the data is to relate the categories emerging from the data to each other (Strauss, 1990: 81).

In the early stages of interpretation much of the efforts at finding appropriate codes necessarily involved makeshift attempts at classification. I strove to follow Strauss' (1990:28) advice to pursue different stages in coding, such as 'open coding'; 'axial coding'; and 'selective coding'. Strauss (1990: 28) encourages researchers who are at the stage of groundbreaking theorising not to become overly concerned at 'the true meaning of a line – or about the "real" motives of the interviewee'. In this early stage of the investigation (called 'open coding'), I sought – as the word suggests – to 'open up' the inquiry (Strauss,

1990: 28). My aim was to develop concepts which best fit the data; this occasionally means that existing codes have to be replaced with newer and emerging codes – codes the ongoing investigation generates. These open coding investigations have a tentative character about them – the open codes have to be prepared to give way in the light of further analysis which comes from inquiring into the new 'conditions, strategies, interactions and consequences' (Strauss, 1990:28), this stage of inquiry suggests.

I pursued ongoing 'open coding' until eventually the analysis of the material leads into 'axial coding'. Strauss defines axial coding as intense analysis done around one category at a time, in terms of the paradigm items (conditions, consequences, and so forth). This results in cumulative knowledge about relationships between that category and other categories and subcategories. (Strauss, 1990: 32)

This notion of 'axial coding' is at the heart of much of the analysis of the four dominant codes (or conceptual practices) which comprise chapters 5-8 of the thesis. As Strauss (1990: 32) explains: because this stage of the inquiry revolves around the 'axis' of one category at a time it takes place later and after the initial open coding has been reasonably completed. Another feature of this portion of the work is that the coding becomes 'selective coding', named because the focus on coding is to systematically and concertedly work only with those codes which relate to the axial code (Strauss, 1990: 33). As this axial coding continued

I was forced to think more critically and sociologically about the data this analysis helped generate. This stage of analytic coding called for the development of new thinking about the material, new hypotheses were subjected to testing by raising questions with subsequent interviewees (Miles and Hubermann 1984, in Minichiello et al. 1990: 295; Strauss, 1990).

I used the 'NUDIST' program in such a way as to benefit from its capabilities with hierarchical arrangement. I found that when I called up the results of coding in the 'NUDIST' program I had amassed a huge number of categories but they were not distinctively hierarchical. The hierarchical arrangement of 'NUDIST' demands that categories be arranged in order of increasing abstraction on a hierarchical ladder. I used the 'NUDIST' facility to collect the texts associated with each code. I found that by comparing texts and asking questions of the texts the codes became more accurately defined. The package has the ability to take existing codes and categories and substitute more accurate codes and categories which the data are generating as the analysis proceeds in successive interviews.

The emergence of particular conceptual practices because of the hierarchical nature of the soft-ware package

In this following section I will cite by example and show how the categories force themselves to the surface – this also demonstrates internal validity and reliability (Miles and Huberman 1994). Early in the analysis stage I began to

gather a vast number of descriptive categories, such as 'when feel warm and fuzzy', 'when seek quiet', 'at work'. I recognised the need to think not just descriptively but analytically. I worked toward the more analytic concept such as 'relationship'. The extract of this notation from the hierarchical ordering of the nudist program are presented thus

(14 3 3) /relationship/rel to beyond/at work

(14 3 4) /relationship/rel to beyond/when feel warm-fuzzy

(14 3 5) /relationship/rel to beyond/when seek quiet

By examining the successive listings of sociological categories in the 'NUDIST' program it is possible to detect concepts which are out of harmony with their hierarchical subordinate concepts in these listings. Thus for example the concept 'joining' (10/5/93) emerges from a cluster of other subordinate concepts such as: 'letting go', 'prayer', 'ecology', 'interconnected', 'ordinary', 'pain'. The notation in the software package is arranged in the following hierarchical order.

(5) /Joining

(5 1) /Joining/body

(5 2 1) /Joining/broken body/prayer

(5 2 1 1) /Joining/broken body/prayer/letting go

(5 3) /Joining/ecology

(5 6) /Joining/ordinary

(5 7) /Joining/pain

In this example the early label 'joining' serves to express an attitude of being present to, or being immediately joined to. The original verbatim texts stand as a benchmark against which the new categories must be checked. It is the text which determines whether or not a category truly expresses the nature of the text.

Hence in this example the overarching concept 'joining' is challenged by its subordinate categories 'body', 'ordinary', 'pain', 'interconnected' and others. The evidence of the interview texts clashes with the concept 'joining' since the concept fails to adequately express the reality the subordinate concepts generate. In the light of this I changed the concept 'joining' to that of 'immediacy' (5/4/95).

- (5) /immediacy
- (5 1) /immediacy/body
- (5 1 1) /immediacy/body/earth
- (5 1 2) /immediacy/body/special
- (5 2) /immediacy/broken body.

The process I follow here is similar to the process I outlined above when I explained the transition from 'open coding' to 'axial coding'. The difference is that when I engage in axial coding there is a more overt focus on analysing one category at a time, in terms of the conditions and consequences operative

around that category (Strauss, 1990: 32). This term 'immediacy' does justice to the conceptual practice the interviewees were adopting in telling their story. When I examined the subordinate concepts, the dominant sense the 'integrationists' are expressing is the sense of a full engagement or immersion into the event or issue. The interviewees from whom these categories emerged did in fact enter and engage with everyday life in the fullest sense of 'immediacy'. The interviews demonstrate how very present the interviewees are to people, issues and the experience of life. Thus the 'NUDIST' software package became a powerful instrument in identifying 'immediacy' as one of the core subsidiary conceptual practices of 'integrationist' interviewees.

Continuing to work with the 'NUDIST' programme, this concept 'immediacy' in its turn finds a place with other categories (called sibling categories which are frequently orthogonal to each other yet connected). The meaning behind the choice of the term orthogonal as explained in chapter 3 is that these categories are not 'exclusive systems of categories, but rather orthogonal ones: they divide up the same domain in different ways' (Richards et al., 1992:17).

- (7 1) /immediacy
- (7 2 2) /mediation/2nd sight
- (7 4 4) /divinity/presence
- (7 5 4 1) /nature/compassion/Sacred.

In the case of 'immediacy' (see appendix 2) these orthogonal categories are : 'mediation', 'divinity' and 'nature' (19/10/95). Together these four concepts generate a more overarching concept, namely, 'immanence'. Hence I have used categories which emerge from the interview material, they position themselves on the hierarchical order of concepts and give expression to the diverse themes generated by the interviewees. The new arrangement becomes

- (7.1) /immanence/immediacy
- (7.2) /immanence/mediation
- (7.4) /immanence/divinity
- (7.5) /immanence/nature.

When this concept 'immanence' (see appendix 2) is studied in the light of its own subordinate concepts (19/10/95) – such as 'immediacy', 'mediation', 'divinity' and 'nature' – the fuller meaning of the concept is offered. All this serves to build the internal coherence and systematic relationship of the concepts, which in turn furthers the internal validity of the research (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 279).

Keeping a log on my own feeling states during the research process

One of the practices I followed prior to, during and after field work was to keep an ongoing self awareness and self analysis diary – a process designed to strengthen the objectivity of the work. I maintained three work books and respectively titled them 'field log', 'coding and memo', and 'analytic coding'.

Perhaps the most revealing book is the one I used during interview work and immediately after. One example of this is the second interview with the midwife by the pseudonym of Angela. In the interview book I wrote the following note while conducting the session 'My feelings – positive exciting'. Immediately after the interview I reviewed the exchange by heading a page with the title 'What was going on in me – my feelings'. In that page I wrote the following

I was consciously trying to ensure that Angela had every opportunity to be at ease, calm and feel good and safe...I left the door open to the hallway and the front door open. Angela looked out onto the garden.

In the next page I wrote about what I noticed in Angela's behaviour. The title was 'Details I noticed about the interview situation. How Angela was acting – her attitude and gestures.' In the light of having written about Angela I found that my awareness of myself deepened and as a result I wrote another page under the title 'What was going on in me' (this was in addition to the first page which asked the same question), I wrote

I must admit I was pleasantly surprised when Angela chose to comment on my practice of picking up key issues and reflecting these back to her for verification and as an aid in going further into the path of understanding and building a picture of her subjectively intended meanings. (field log page 20)

Conclusion

This chapter is directed by the methodological approach I used in this thesis. One of the most important issues in this is the demonstration that the data collection is guided by the need to answer the questions rising out of Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's hypotheses in chapter 2. By discussing the sample's composition, this chapter has given some insight into the philosophical, theological and spiritual world of the typical 'integrationist' and 'dualist' interviewee, and thereby offered a glimpse into how these interviewees might experience enchantment. The section concerning the conducting of interviews cites the steps used, prior to and during the interviews. The final section dealing with the analysis of the interview data has mentioned the variety of strategies employed in generating and verifying putative concepts. Throughout the chapter where appropriate, material has been discussed in the light of the requirements of qualitative research.

There are five facets of qualitative study (confirmability, auditability, authenticity, fittingness and action orientation), I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, which contribute to the 'trustworthiness' and 'authenticity' of the project (Miles and Hubermann, 1994: 277). Many of these facets overlap, but the one that becomes most evident in the next four chapters (which treat the interview analysis) is the authenticity or credibility or internal validity of the to the people we study. These four chapters (5-8) are context rich; there is sufficient detail to give the sense that these accounts 'ring true'. Miles and

Hubermann (1994: 277) maintain that 'qualitative studies take place in a real social world', good qualitative studies should therefore be able to convey 'a reasonable view of "what happened" in any particular situation'. In the next four chapters the character of the interviewees come forward through the text in a strong fashion, permitting the above requirement to be fulfilled.

I now turn to the empirical section of the thesis by discussing the four dominant conceptual practices and their respective subsidiaries. It is in these chapters that the ground work is laid for building the utilization, application, action orientation of the research in chapters 9 and 10 (an empirical and theoretical section). In chapters 9 and 10 the hypotheses and their identifiable empirical implications (the fifth facet of assessing the quality of the research) are judged against the light of the interview material discussed in chapters 5-8.

CHAPTER 5

Vulnerability' and its expressions: distinctive marks of a modern form of religion?

Having outlined the methodology of the thesis in the last chapter the first major section is concluded, I now move to the second major section, namely exploring the conceptual practices the interviewees employ when they experience enchantment in modernity. In each of chapters 5-8 I focus on one of the particular dominant conceptual practice and its subsidiary conceptual practices the integrationists use when they experience enchantment. In each chapter I also address one dominant conceptual practice and its subsidiary conceptual practices the dualist interviewees employ when they experience enchantment. Each of these four conceptual practices are the most frequently recurring conceptual practices employed by the interviewees and hence ensures a greater faithfulness to the stories told by the interviewees.

The dominant conceptual practices generated – in the main – by the integrationists are: 'vulnerability', 'inter-subjectivity', 'ambiguity' and 'immanence'. The subsidiary conceptual practices associated with each of these dominant conceptual practice are listed in the chart below. The four dominant conceptual practices which the dualist interviewees tend to employ are: 'Follow', 'Anxiety', 'Categorise' and 'Avoidance' – their subsidiary conceptual practices are also listed in the table below.

Table No. 6: Interview Group by Conceptual Practice

Interview Group	Dominant Conceptual Practice	Subsidiary Conceptual Practice		
Integrationist	vulnerability	listening	letting go	Courage
Dualist	Follow	Model	Obedience	
Integrationist	Inter-subjectivity	Being with	Intimacy	Community
Dualist	Anxiety	Fear		
Integrationist	Ambiguity	letting go	Mystery	Language
Dualist	Categorise	Certitude	A Priori	
Integrationist	Immanence	A Posteriori	Mediation	Immediacy
Dualist	Avoidance	Anti Nature	Anti Body	

Throughout chapters 5 – 8 as I explore the given conceptual practice under discussion I recurrently go back to the question 'what are the sociological implications?' The reason that I do this derives from Chapter 2 where I present the thesis in the form of a research problem. In that chapter I focus on Weber's (1982) rationalisation thesis, which states that in a time of modernity due to the prevalence of rationalisation society is characterised by the disenchantment of the world. I then presented Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's thoughts about the disenchantment question, in order to subject all three theorists to critique. I noted in chapter 2 that I will use the data generated from the in-depth interviews of the 'integrationist' and 'dualist'

subjects as a benchmark in evaluating which of the three theorists best accounts for the contemporary state of enchantment/disenchantment found in the two groups of interviewees.

Chapters 5-8 focus on generating data which impinge on the issue of disenchantment. Hence even though each chapter deals with a dominant conceptual practice and its subsidiary conceptual practices the whole work is oriented toward the production of data relevant to disenchantment through its correlative, namely enchantment. In this chapter which is concerned with the dominant conceptual practice of 'vulnerability' the interview analysis is guided by the question, How is this subject (interviewee) experiencing modernity in terms of enchantment or disenchantment?

'Vulnerability' as a dominant conceptual practice

I use the term conceptual practice in a general theoretical sense when describing a number of ways people engage with the world (for further clarification see ch. 3). This chapter discusses 'vulnerability' as a dominant conceptual practice. One of the features of 'vulnerability' is its paradoxical strength. It is not as though vulnerability is a supine, passive lack of ability or power. It has the quality of purpose and direction as it avoids pushing relationships into master/mistress and slave configurations. The power of vulnerability can be seen through the choice of one who makes space and invites the action and presence of the other. In doing this the initiator

indicates through his or her attitude that the other person is invited and welcome to move in and contribute to the setting.

The diverse aspects of 'vulnerability'

The dominant conceptual practice of 'vulnerability' is a structure or mechanism which can manifest itself in more than one way; in the present case, 'vulnerability' comes to be noticed in a number of similar attitudes the 'integrationists' exhibit in their interviews. The dominant conceptual practice of 'vulnerability' also acts in a somewhat vicarious way through its subsidiary conceptual practices of 'listening', 'letting go' and 'courage'. These subsidiaries of the dominant conceptual practice assist in the task of understanding the character of the dominant conceptual practice. This chapter shows how the 'integrationist' group typically use the conceptual practice 'vulnerability' to organise the world in which they live. The interviewees in this chapter indicate through the way they conceptually organise their world that this affects not only the way that the world is understood but also how it is interpreted and spoken about.

The predisposition that individuals from the 'integrationist' group typically have for the dominant conceptual practice 'vulnerability' is highlighted by the presence of the contrast group, the 'dualists'. This becomes ever more obvious after successive 'dualists' show that, in the main, they employ a quite divergent dominant conceptual practice to that of 'vulnerability'. Instead of

adopting stances toward the world of the kind suggested by 'vulnerability', namely 'listening', 'letting go' and 'courage', the 'dualists' indicate that they use the dominant conceptual practice 'follow'. The subsidiary conceptual practices which the dominant conceptual practice 'follow' gives rise to are: 'obedience' and 'model'. The contextual settings are revealed as the interviewees tell their stories; this helps disclose the meanings operating within the given scenario.

In this chapter I examine the way interviewees understand, interpret and give expression to notions of religion, spirituality and experience of the 'Sacred'. By being alert for any 'orthogonal' characteristics (see ch. 4) this chapter uncovers one of the dominant ways that 'integrationists' and 'dualists' tend to be skewed with respect to each other over the dominant conceptual practices of 'vulnerability' and 'follow'.

Throughout the next four chapters I cite particular interviewees and spend some time in developing their character as well as examining the particular conceptual practices they employ during enchantment. The benefit of doing this is that it becomes more likely that each character is more ably defined in terms of his or her context, approach and attitudes. One of the costs of doing this however, is that there is a limit to the number of interviewees who appear in this section of the thesis. It is important to recognise that the conceptual practices I describe are not idiosyncratic to the individual, but

rather typify a wider segment of either 'integrationist' or 'dualist' interviewees.

'Listen': the first subsidiary conceptual practice of 'vulnerability'

The conceptual practice of 'vulnerability' is lived out through a variety of subsidiary conceptual practices and approaches to life. The subsidiary conceptual practice 'listen' is evident in a particular way in nine of the thirty integrationist interviewees. With each successive narrative indications accumulate and together indicate that this subsidiary conceptual practice 'listen' points beyond itself to the dominant conceptual practice 'vulnerability'.

Glen, one of the 'integrationist' interviewees, speaks of how he is present to nature. He says that his primary way of being, is to be open and in some way be 'vulnerable' to the life that is taking place in the bush. His narrative builds an overall picture of how he adopts a respectful and sensitive stance toward the bush. Hence rather than enter the bush primarily as subject and take the position of one who constructs the bush as an object for analysis, he attempts to be open to the bush and allow it to impact on him. His narrative suggests that the bush plays a stronger role than the one he does – his narrative implies that he adopts the stance of listening to the bush. One of the explanations Glen gives is that the experience of the bush is profound and rich, the 'experience is so overwhelming' (Glen 111). He says that in this time of his life he purposefully becomes receptive and open when he is within the

bush. Glen explains that this stance is quite intentional and that his style of relationship in the bush is typified by the category 'listen'. 'I get my benefits just from opening myself to the bush as totally as I can.' (Glen 118)

Even in this early example which strives to address the notion of an interviewee exercising one of the frequently cited conceptual practices (in this case 'listen'), it is possible to recognise the presence of an underlying conceptual practice. In the present case the dominant conceptual practice 'vulnerability' is suggested and implied by the choice of words Glen uses, particularly his phrase 'opening myself to the bush as totally as I can'. It would seem that prior to 'opening myself...as totally as I can' Glen acts out a given conceptual practice which enables him to let go of control, distance and power. Arguably the dominant conceptual practice 'vulnerability' enables Glen to sustain the conceptual practice of 'listen'.

Glen reveals the stance he takes toward the bush as well as the deeper dominant conceptual practice he employs by the metaphor he uses. Employing the phrase 'relationship' he constructs the bush as a 'Thou' with whom he is in relationship. Basing his stance on the attitude 'listen' he speaks of the bush as a presence and as a relational being.

The life goes into me, I get my charge from it. It inspires me, it gives me strength, it gives me purpose...and in the times when I choose to name it, I thank it and I feel overwhelming gratitude to be seeing this, to be part of it. (Glen 144,150)

Glen expresses exasperation about people who do not employ the conceptual practice of 'listen' when present to the bush. He speaks disparagingly of those who need to name, categorise and subject the bush to their predetermined view of the world. In particular he refers to Christians who impose theological constructs and interpret experience in the bush by using religious language of it. He says that by using the word 'God' of the bush, this type of Christian chooses to avoid the experience of the bush. By labelling the experience, he says they evade being 'vulnerable', they also refuse to 'listen'. Glen uses the word 'mystery' as a vital component of the conceptual practice of 'listen'.

I get very frustrated amongst Christians when they use God, God, God, God all the time, its very frustrating, 'cos to me, utter reality is utter mystery...I resent giving it labels. (Glen 243-246)

Implicit in Glen's phrase 'giving it labels' is a plea to return to the conceptual practice 'listen'. It would seem that behind Glen's refusal to name or label the experience within the bush there is tentativeness about controlling the experience. In urging that the notion of 'mystery' within the bush be respected implies that true and deep experience is elusive. He explains that one of the reasons why he avoids the hasty use of theological constructs is that he desires to undergo the uncertainty of the experience. To refuse to undergo the uncertainty is to eliminate the stance 'listen', 'giving it labels and

treating it as if we knew all about it' (246). Glen's conceptual practice 'listen' is central to the world view he has in the bush.

The 'integrationist' interviewee Glen provides an opportunity to see the conceptual practice of 'listen' being closely tied to the conceptual practice of 'vulnerability'. The conceptual practice of 'listening' is referred to in a direct fashion when Glen sees himself as one who is being led to the mystery in nature by nature itself. Speaking of the mystery behind nature Glen says of nature that 'nature kind of shows it, leads the way to it' (Glen 240). It is here that the underlying or dominant conceptual practice of 'vulnerability' reveals itself. In telling this story Glen mentions how naming or imposing concepts upon the bush are foreign to his underlying mode of being in the presence of the bush.

What are the Sociological implications?

Glen typifies a theme present to the 'integrationists', namely an exasperation with institutional Christians who impose theological constructs such as 'God' instead of utilising the conceptual practice 'listen'. His annoyance reflects the feelings of those individuals who see the institutional church removing the intimate interplay which ensues between the individual and the sacred; it does this through readily imposing theological constructs of primal experience. Speaking of the rationalisation which permeates the institutional church, Luckmann (1974) predicts that such specialisation will bring about a loss of connectedness to mystery and 'enchantment'. 'The more autonomous

and rational the specialised institutional areas became, the less intimate grew their relationship to the transcendent Sacred cosmos.' (Luckmann, 1974:101)

Luckmann's prediction is verified in part by this 'integrationist' interviewee Glen. Luckmann speaks of an emerging 'invisible religion' within modernity - he suggests that it typifies those who abandon formal institutional religion because of its failure to sustain connectedness with the 'transcendent Sacred cosmos' (Luckmann, 1974:101). Glen's experience in part replicates Luckmann's view of religion in modernity, however Glen - even though critical and repulsed by the dogmatism and formalistic aspect of ritualism within Catholicism - still remains a Catholic. The pertinent point here is that while the institution continues to manifest the principles of hierarchy and conformity Glen still persists in believing that there are some salient aspects within Catholicism. He says of the institutional church that 'Catholicism has a lot of good things about it' (Glen 224). Ever ready to critique the institutional church, Glen points to areas where it needs to move. One such change he mentions is the need to be open to the insights of Buddhism. He says of the institutional church that it 'could benefit by Buddhist contact' (Glen 211).

One of the strongly dominant features in Glen's approach to enchantment is his ability to be inclusive. His fundamental stance vis-a-vis nature is to be the listener and to position himself as one who is 'vulnerable'. His reflections about the bush indicate that he relates to the bush in such a way that it might

lead him where he needs to go. At the same time he indicates that he is prepared to let institutional religion lead him. Despite this he maintains that the dominant source of his spiritual sustenance comes not from organised religion but from nature.

Glen speaks about how he is aware of the intricacy that is part of the workings within nature. He reflects about the variety within nature, its patterns and its designs; he mentions how for him an eco-system which works well is the epitome of elaborate interdependent systems. In recognising the life he gets from such a system he claims that there has to be a life behind the system and that life is 'divinity'. Speaking of the ability of nature to restore damage done to it he says

it recovers, corrects, carries on, its life. And in witnessing it, I get life from it.

And I guess there's got to be a divinity behind it. My gosh, its the biggest reality there is. I chose to call that divinity I guess. (Glen 131-134)

Having with reluctance used the classical term – and therefore a conceptual notion – 'divinity' Glen stresses that for him it is important to let go of constructions about the notion of 'divinity'. In keeping with this approach he again returns to the notion of rejecting any need to impose theological constructs upon nature. To bestow theological categories is to position the self as subject and nature as object, which is to counter the stance of the one who listens.

He cites the medieval theologian Meister Eckhart, who called people to let go of the notion of God. Glen in this way safeguards his notion of nature and refuses to constrain it by imposing the theological construct 'God' upon it.

the words of Meister Eckhart, 'letting God be God, letting go of God'...Not trying to take God and conceptualise him/her into your thing, but let go, let the bush be the reality for you and the bush will lead you where you need to go. (Glen 250 and 255)

For Glen, the associative meanings encompassed by the construct 'God' are inappropriate for the person who wants to stop treating nature as an object. Glen explicitly calls for a 'letting go' of the control and power in relationship to nature. Rather than impose the concept 'God' on nature he demands that we 'listen' to the bush and let that be 'the reality for you'. Returning to his earlier thought that 'utter reality is utter mystery' he says that his fundamental stance vis-a-vis nature is one which respects the mystery of nature, seeks not to name it, nor analyse it, but rather be one who is the listener. In adopting a stance to nature of one who listens Glen's actions reveal the dominant conceptual practice of 'vulnerability', being prepared to be lead (Glen 255).

Another 'integrationist' interviewee Jane (a palliative care nurse), also manifests the subsidiary conceptual practice 'listen'. In dealing with people who are experiencing terminal illness she encourages them to attend to and be present to their body. Jane maintains that by being sensitive and aware of

one's own body we can discover the truths we need to hear. She says that when the individual practises deep listening to the body, the body mediates messages to the individual from the universe and the Sacred: 'people learn to listen to their bodies, so that they learn what they can do and what they can't. As for me, that's a real, um [sic], connection with God.' (Jane 475)

In this interview Jane constructs the notion 'listen' as a deep attitude or stance one adopts to life, it takes place in the most immediate realm possible, namely one's body. She speaks of this subsidiary conceptual practice as a fundamental orientation toward life itself. The person who employs the subsidiary conceptual practice 'listen' has the ability to discern and be connected to meanings not only of the body, but beyond the limits of one's body. For Jane the conceptual practice 'listen' sensitises her to truths in the universe. It is interesting that Jane constructs listening as an effective means of joining life at its root. She speaks of the conceptual practice 'listen' as bringing about a deep connection of the self to the body, to the wisdom within the body, the universe and the Sacred (Jane 475).

'Letting go': the second subsidiary conceptual practice of 'vulnerability'

Not only does the conceptual practice of 'vulnerability' express itself through the conceptual practice 'listen', it also manifests itself through the conceptual practice 'letting go'. The 'integrationist' Libi indicates that she lives out of the subsidiary conceptual category 'letting go' when she talks about changing her understanding of the Sacred. In speaking about her

involvement with people who have been dismissed from work and those who have been unemployed for a long time, she uses the term 'Eucharistic'. In response to her use of that term I ask her 'What is the Eucharist?' (Libi 812). Libi addresses that question by using an expansive concept, she says 'The broken body, the broken...the whole symbol of Eucharist and Resurrection. I often see the cycle.' (Libi 814, 818)

Libi goes on to explain that through studying theology at the tertiary level she is able to let go of narrow and formalistic religious constructions. Libi speaks of the unemployed with whom she works and how she sees these people undergo transformations. She expresses her compassion for these people as they experience feelings of personal inadequacy after they have lost their employment - an experience she refers to as 'brokenness'. She speaks of being close to these people and experiencing personal elation when they recover their personal dignity. The letting go occurs when she is able to move beyond the literal sense of notions such as 'Eucharistic' and 'Resurrection' and use these terms as symbols or metaphors of what is happening in the lives of the 'broken' people she works with. Hence it is that in the letting go of the literal and formal sense in specific religious concepts she begins to apply the wider symbolic meaning of these terms to her everyday life experiences.

What seems to be taking place in Libi's story is a story of an 'integrationist' who 'lets go' of formal and literal religious conceptual construction. Like Glen, she expresses an irritation toward people who use formal religious terms in a tight and fixed manner. She speaks of the freedom which comes when she 'lets go' of the restrictive sense of such a concept and how in that freedom she is able to perceive wider meanings and a bigger picture. She says that she can see 'the cycle', 'the patterns' and 'the mystery' within human brokenness and transformation (819, 843).

Libi touches on another aspect of 'letting go', namely 'trust' – which is arguably ontologically prior to the act of 'letting go'. In associating the term 'trust' to that of 'letting go' Libi effectively names the steps she takes in the conceptual practice of 'letting go'. She says she has learnt to 'let go' of being constrained and bounded by the overt meaning of Scriptural events when applying these images to life. She now thinks more analogically and metaphorically in using concepts such as 'the Spirit'. She mentions how this transition requires trust on her part because she has had to let go of the secure the tried and the known concepts. The result of such letting go is a world uncluttered by fixed formal constructions.

I think I'd be in another phase of my religion which is of the Spirit...Now I've a much greater sense of awe and wonderment, the patterns, mystery...But it's trust, it's a trust. Just a trust and letting go. And I know that there is a liberation in that. (Libi 840, 842, 847)

The subsidiary conceptual practice of 'letting go' is also explicitly referred to by another 'integrationist' interviewee, Tom. Tom refers to an occasion he experienced after his first son suicided. He says that he began to be worried about another of his sons who was drug-dependent and had suicidal tendencies. In this situation Tom says that he tried using his traditional Catholic concepts and dogmatic formulations of the faith. Resorting to these conceptual constructs he mentions how he started constructing the sacred and God in terms of one who had to be bartered with.

I'd be a good son of the Church, I would be in community and I would raise my voice in song, answer the er reply to all the prayers, I would stack the chairs and I'd be a good...But I could not pray again. (Tom 187)

To Tom's dismay his second son suicided and he speaks of how he dropped relying on these constructions of God. Tom describes how he underwent an overwhelming and terrifying experience, which he describes as feeling that he would be annihilated. He mentions how he fled from the experience both 'mentally and spiritually'. As a result of that experience Tom recalls how he decided that if that was 'God then all this was phoney' (Tom 191). In particular he dismisses the way he had constructed notions about the Sacred from set received concepts.

I believe its er [sic] in concepts, er either created concepts or imposed concepts, which er really don't carry any validity. I had a long session of proving that during [sic] the course of my sons' deaths. (Tom 135.136)

Through the rest of the interview Tom focuses on how he has 'let go' of traditional religious constructions of God. 'Letting go' of these constructions he explains that he now uses two approaches he regards as valid in experiencing the Sacred, one is general life experiences and the other is his relationships with people: 'my avenues now to God is experience and people' (Tom 194). He says that he has had to 'let go' of his previous constructions of God. The reason Tom gives is that his constructions were built on conceptual knowledge rather than experiential knowledge (Tom 201). Tom says that he has had to 'let go' of the faith that he had constructed and says that it was not 'valid' (Tom 221). Speaking of his attempt to use traditional constructions of God to resolve his dilemma over his two sons suiciding, Tom says that the structure he had maintained was ineffectual. Using earthy language about the hollow nature of the conceptual constructions of God he once employed Tom says 'Let's put it this way, it had no balls at all' (Tom 226).

The subsidiary conceptual practice of 'letting go' recurs throughout Tom's interview. He calls into question a host of different 'models' which people employ as 'the' way to the 'Sacred'. Though having once been part of the charismatic movement he now calls this movement into question because of its rigidity in style and form. He similarly attacks other religious constructions which propose tight or uniform conceptual categories.

some of these models, religious models...They don't move out of their model...they're locked into something which er [sic] even the charismatic thing like its um a terribly restricted model. (Tom 301)

Underlying Tom's conceptual practice 'letting go' there is an indication of the dominant conceptual practice 'vulnerability'. In being prepared to forego the familiar conceptual construction he had built for himself, he undergoes an 'awesome' and 'terrifying' experience. He names this experience as a 'God' experience. Arguably he has had to let himself become 'vulnerable', by 'letting go' of his secure conceptual models in order to have the experience. Tom's disregard for the 'terribly restricted models' (Tom 301) of religion portrays his insistence that people 'let go' of literal and non-expansive conceptual thinking. It seems that Tom's choice to 'let go' of the known and secure construction entails that he has already opted and committed himself to the dominant conceptual practice 'vulnerability'. This in turn implies a certain degree of 'courage', another sibling conceptual practice which appears together with the subsidiary conceptual practices 'listen' and 'letting go'.

The subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' and its connection with 'vulnerability'

The 'integrationist' Tom mentions in the interview that he does not share the intimate details concerning his 'terror-filled' experience. After mentioning how he feels he would be 'blown apart' and 'wiped out' (Tom 269), he says

that it is 'the only valid rapport I have with God' (Tom 277). Tom has 'let go' of relying on a conceptual approach to God; in particular he refuses to use any 'restricted model' (Tom 302).

In putting these comments about Tom together the interplay between 'letting go' and 'vulnerability' become a little easier to see. Tom says conceptual constructions of God limit and distort the nature of the mystery the concepts attempt to label. Alongside conceptual constructions of God, Tom also places restricted models of spirituality. He says of both that they are not 'valid'; he 'lets go' of both. The result of letting go for Tom is that he opts to enter the 'experiential' encounter with the Sacred, however, the memory of this style of encounter is one which has been demanding, exhaustive and potentially destroying. He refers to his unique religious experience in the manner that it is overwhelming. Even so, he says 'I recognise the reality of it' (Tom 281) and then speaks of his preparedness to be open to the experiential style of relating, because 'there's no other worth having'. Arguably his preparedness to 'let go' of conceptual constructions is possible because Tom has the prior conceptual practice of 'vulnerability'. He lays himself open to experiential encounter because in the first place his mode of being is essentially that of vulnerability.

A further way of understanding the interconnection between the conceptual practices of 'listening', 'letting go', 'courage' and the conceptual practice of

'vulnerability' is to ask a series of questions, such as: Does 'letting go' come before 'listening'? Does courage come before either? Is it associated with one more than the other? So far in this chapter the interplay between the dominant conceptual practice of 'vulnerability' and each of its subsidiary conceptual practices has been explored to some extent. Hence the more pertinent question revolves around the series of questions given immediately above.

Earlier in this chapter the 'integrationist' Glen provides some grounds for reaching an answer to the question does 'letting go' precede 'listening'? When Glen cites the medieval theologian Meister Eckhart's maxim 'letting go of God' (250) he does so in the midst of talking about how necessary it is to 'let go' of conceptual constructions if the bush is to 'lead'. Glen treats the issue of how personal constructions act to forward personal agenda and thereby fail to invite the other to initiate and share his or her insight. Glen chooses to relate to nature by insisting on the importance of letting go of personal constructs in order that nature might 'lead' us where we need to go.

Glen's statement from Meister Eckhart's 'letting go of God' captures the spirit of Eckhart's thesis that the individual has to be rid of the concept 'God' before the deeper mystery behind/within life can be free to influence that individual (Fox, 1983:50). Glen's words 'letting go of God' (Glen 250) parallel Fox's assessment of Eckhart 'God's exit is her entrance' (Fox, 1983:50).

Specifically Glen refers to the individual 'letting go' of personal constructions he or she has of 'God'. This entails the notion that there is personal, cultural and societal conceptual baggage individuals bring to the concept 'God'.

Hence in this instance Glen demands the letting go of conceptual constructions so that there might be a possibility for 'listening' to nature, the mystery in nature, or divinity. In this instance the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' precedes that of 'listening'.

Sociological implications

Both Libi's and Tom's interviews seem to lend support to a number of Luckmann's predictions about the form religion takes in a time of modernity. Luckmann (1974:102), speaking of how individuals in a time of modernity will construct a privatised selection of religious themes, hypothesises that there will be a divergence between privatised and institutional religion. Libi speaks of 'letting go' of traditional constructions and mentions how she tends to embrace the more elusive notion of the 'Spirit' when referring to the Sacred (Libi 840). Tom, in a rather more dismissive style, describes the religious conceptual constructions which he had built 'because I was a Catholic' (Tom 104) as not 'valid in the first place' (Tom 188). Hence it appears the stories of these contemporary 'integrationists' support Luckmann's (1974:102) prediction that 'invisible' religion in a time of modernity will cease replicating the 'official model'.

Even though all the interviewees were chosen on the basis of being 'church-going Catholics', on that basis it is not Sociologically accurate to disregard Luckmann's prediction that the 'invisible' religious person would leave organised religion, never the less Hegy's (1987) predictions about the nature of 'invisible' Catholicism within modernity seem to be closer to the stories of these 'integrationists'. Hegy claims that 'invisible' Catholics will build a greater reliance on their own decision-making process and use their decision making to critique the same institutional church and the world in which they live.

Hegy (1987) argues that one dominant focus shared by 'invisible' Catholicism is a rejection of the premises upon which clericalism is built. In particular Hegy mentions that individual 'invisible' Catholics show a strong move away from obsequious loyalty to traditional religious constructions of the hierarchy. Both Libi and Tom mention how they no longer depend upon these religious concepts.

One of Luckmann's (1990: 127) predictions is that the modern constructions of religious significance, having 'shifted away from the "great" other-worldly transcendences', have moved to the 'minimal transcendences of modern solipsism' (taking solipsism to mean limiting one's boundaries to the self). Luckmann (1990: 127) gives an example of modern solipsism – he suggests that the privatisation of religion in its form of 'invisible religion' will be

characterised by 'self-realisation, personal autonomy and self-expression'.

Both Glen and Libi seem to counter Luckmann's hypotheses: Glen talks of the onerous nature of being in relationship with the bush -it is not simply for personal gratification. The bush (the unique form of religious significance for Glen) assumes the role of 'leading' and insists that certain courses of action be undertaken. This is not a relationship into which Glen withdraws in the style of 'modern solipsism'. He makes reference to the personal sacrifice he undergoes in generating social awareness about the plight of the bush.

Its very demanding. It challenges all the time and I guess a good simile would be to have a trumpet blast blowing in your ear all the time and saying 'hoy, hoy, come on, next thing'...there's a lot to be done. A lot of work...the bush is so threatened. (Glen 276, 282)

Libi talks of putting herself into personal danger. She speaks of how she has climbed through windows and doors when she has discovered people in turmoil. She relates how this was done 'to get them out in suicide cases...I haven't run away from things' (Libi 740, 751). In her story she tells how the strength she needs to face these situations was more than her own: 'I see that as, if you want to say, of God' (Libi 755).

Marg, another 'integrationist' interviewee talks about her social work with women who are in continual life-threatening situations because of their relationships with men. She says that people frequently warn her about the danger she faces by supporting and encouraging these women to move away

from destructive relationships. Marg mentions her fear, knowing that some men have found out that she was prompting a number of women to terminate their relationships

Sometimes when I've escaped – a couple of times this year by the skin of my teeth – a violent situation and I've thought 'It was only God looking after me then. (Marg 749)

Luckmann (1990:138) speaks of 'invisible' religion in modernity as being 'partly egotistic and hedonistic'. This prediction does not seem to accurately account for the stories of these 'integrationist' interviewees. However, Luckmann does accurately describe these individuals' strong sense of autonomy. Where they differ from his model is in their commitment to stay within rationalised institutions and critique the rationalisation process in the light of the core principles which they hold and celebrate. It would seem these 'integrationists' experience the sacred in their every day lives and even though being critical of institutional religion manage to find some form of enchantment within institutional religion.

'Courage': the third subsidiary conceptual practice of 'vulnerability'

As suggested earlier in this chapter, the 'integrationist' stories suggest that the conceptual practice of 'courage' is tied to the dominant conceptual practice 'vulnerability'. The 'integrationist' Tom demonstrates that the stance of courage is central to his style of experiential engagement in life. There are

strong indications of this in his selection of content matter for interview discussion; other indications of his use of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'courage' are the way he appears in the interview stories and how he approaches life – he exudes courage. Courage becomes evident in the way Tom talks about his decision to 'let go' of the set ways he had constructed for his notions of everyday life and the Sacred. He speaks of how in a powerful experience he felt that he was being overwhelmed and at the point of being 'annihilated' (Tom 190) – he speaks of this encounter as unique and frightening. Reflecting on the phenomenon he says it was 'a tremendous experience – some people call it a peak experience – which I call it my three tenths of a second...er changed my life.' (Tom 189)

Tom employs the subsidiary conceptual practice 'courage' when he speaks of the issue of social justice. He says he is now able to give himself completely to working for social and personal change. He notes that when he acted out of traditional conceptual constructions about faith and the Sacred, that 'things before were a chore...All social justice and all all [sic] that' (Tom 233). Now Tom says that because 'I only know God through experience or people' (Tom 248), social justice has become life giving and in addition fulfils his social justice obligations.

This example of Tom highlights a distinction which begins to develop between the integrationist and dualist interviewee's experience of enchantment in doing work. Tom returns to the notion that experiential

engagement offers the deepest form of knowing a person or the Sacred. As his story unfolds, his stance and conceptual practice of 'courage' comes to the fore. He engages with life at depth, he refuses superficiality. He approaches life by immersing himself into the human experience because he says 'That's the only valid um rapport I have with God' (Tom 277). 'Vulnerability' and 'courage' appear entailed in Tom's orientation to everyday life because he opens himself to the influence of that which once gave him fear (the associative memory of his son's suiciding and how God fits into that).

Paradoxically, Tom surpasses fear in challenging the religious sanctions to which he previously deferred. He speaks dismissively of formalistic and hierarchically-imposed conceptual constructions. It would appear that he has come to an awareness of his own courage when he recalls his earlier obedience to the institutional church. He notes how he

did the traditional things...went to church every Sunday. So sure, this is fine, this is how religion works. And now, suddenly bingo!...none of 'em hold any fears for me. (Tom 507, 514)

The stance and conceptual practice of 'courage' helps Tom's reappraisal of church conformity. He says that his reasons for staying within the church are now quite different. He mentions that he doesn't 'despise' the structures. This difference is that 'they have no more the value that they had' (Tom 522).

Wanting Tom to say more about this stage of transition in his religious life, I relate to Tom what I heard him say 'So you re-enter into experience and engage at its depth?' (Tom 526) Tom concurs with this reading of his story and says that the reason he engages so deeply is 'Because I see its the ultimate reality...engaging in the ultimate reality gives meaning to, um gives meaning to life in God, I suppose.' (Tom 532, 540)

Relationships between the subsidiary conceptual practices of 'courage' and 'letting go'

Some insight into the relationship between these two subsidiary conceptual practices can be found in the reflections of another integrationist, Pat. He suggests that these two stances can indeed build a greater sense of courage in the individual. He cites the case of the Catholic social justice conference 'Turning Point' held in Adelaide, where some 600 people came together to study issues of justice. Pat talks about the way that the organisers 'listened' to each other and were prepared to 'let go' of their individual needs to have their personal vision become the only vision for the conference. He says that there was a tremendous sense of solidarity and power.

people coming together here and working out strategies for the future...economics, to immigration, to Aborigines...in that process...being raised to a different level of activity in themselves or raising themselves to it and because they share it. (Pat 1277-1297)

Pat talks about how the 'courage' and purpose of individuals unfolds and develops because they have 'listened' to each other and 'let go' of personal ego. Implied in his reflection about the people who worked with him on the project is that some degree of courage was required of these people before the project was undertaken. In effect, therefore, the dynamic which took place was that 'courage' came first, then the 'letting go' and 'listening', but the result was that the initial 'courage' was fuelled and grew.

Sociological implications

Tom mirrors a number of sentiments which typify the 'integrationist' interviewee. In naming the transition which has taken place in his relationship with the church (and his general approach to everyday life), Tom's story has implications for Luckmann's and Hegy's predictions about religious life within modernity. Luckmann (1990:134) theorises that institutional religion has been transformed 'by the loss of monopoly in defining the sacred cosmos'. This is supported by Tom's story, particularly given the way he describes how he has moved away from whole-hearted compliance with formal procedures and practices in the church. He has redefined and reconstructed the sacred cosmos and as Hegy (1987) predicts he has taken moral authority back from the church and placed it firmly within his own conscious making. Yet, unlike Luckmann's 'invisible' religious persons of modernity, Tom and many of the 'integrationists' do not totally abandon the morality and theology of the church. What the

'integrationists' do is review and critique the moral and theological proposals of the institutional church by adopting particular conceptual practices. In this instance Tom embraces a number of conceptual practices, namely those of 'vulnerability' and its subsidiaries 'listening', 'letting go' and 'courage'.

So far in this chapter I have discussed the dominant conceptual practice of 'vulnerability' and its subsidiary conceptual practices of 'listening' 'letting go' and 'courage'. Each of these characteristics is generated out of the distinctive style and approach 'integrationist' interviewees adopt toward everyday life. The recurring feature throughout these interviews is that the interviewees who manifest the dominant conceptual practice of 'vulnerability' and its subsidiary conceptual practices 'listening', 'letting go' and 'courage' come primarily from the 'integrationist' group. This is one of the primary ways 'integrationists' come to a sense of enchantment a sense of mystery and God.

Some interviewees who use these conceptual practices come from the 'dualist' group of interviewees, however this happens rather infrequently, yet it does show how some interviewees who can be categorised as either integrationist or dualist in their spirituality, switch to the other form of spirituality in some areas.

The dualists and the dominant conceptual practice entitled 'follow'

The 'integrationists' are typified by conceptual practices which are consonant with notions of being 'vulnerable' to the mystery and unknowns in life, and letting go of the known and inviting experience by laying aside securities and certitude. The 'dualists' on the other hand tend to be characterised by an overall determination to hold firm to 'received' and 'accepted' models of thought and practice. The dualist group therefore can be recognised by their predisposition to avoid adopting the role of one who is morally autonomous. Overwhelmingly their dialogue is laden with reference to sets of guidelines derived from authoritative sources, such as the Scriptures or church teaching on morality and dogma.

One of the 'dualists', Jack exemplifies this when he speaks about a need to 'follow' the leadership of particular 'infallible' models. The model he offers is that of Mary, the mother of Jesus. Jack's references to Mary are accompanied by a strong emphasis on the divinity of Jesus (to the degree that Jesus' humanity is minimised). By associating Mary with this heavily divinised construction of Jesus, Mary is linked to the divine Jesus more than the human Jesus.

Christ was the only Son of God, that has ever been conceived as a virgin...He is the Prince and King of our Church...Our Lady deserves our respect, she is the Mother of God...she's the perfect Christian, she's the perfect Catholic she's our model. (Jack 349-455)

What Jack does here is to present a figure who is flawless; Jack accentuates the associations between Mary and the notion of divinity latent in popular Catholic piety. He repeats the adjective 'perfect' when talking about Mary as a 'Christian' and a 'Catholic'. He separates Mary from the root humanity by noting her 'virginity' while still being a mother. Jack presents someone who cannot be imitated (in the sense of her virginity and motherhood) yet Jack insist she should be imitated and portrays her as the model for people to follow.

Another 'dualist' interviewee Tony – like Jack – manifests the subsidiary conceptual practice 'model' when speaking about how people can best hope for an experience of the Sacred. Tony presents Christ as someone to follow: 'if Christ were in this situation, what would he say if he were standing here right now what would you say...so that I don't upset the hidden Christ.' (Tony 315-323) Another 'dualist', Joy, suggests the conceptual practice of model as a predisposition to look at Christ as someone we imitate. She says 'you are a Christian you are following Christ' (Joy 455).

Another subsidiary conceptual practice, namely 'obedience' is closely allied to the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'model'. The 'dualist' interviewee Jack speaks about his marriage by selecting the term 'obedience'. He says that he considers himself 'called' to his marriage and that by entering it he is 'doing

God's Will'.(Jack 485) His portrayal of marriage emphasises the role of submission.

I know that I am called to marriage and it just means obeying, submitting, surrendering continually and trying to be joyous...there is kinda a strange joy associated with knowing I am doing God's Will. (Jack 485)

Soon after writing up this interview from listening to the audio tape I inserted a comment about the singular dour mood which pervades the interview. I note how paradoxical Jack's comment is about 'joy'. When he speaks about 'joy' his grammatical construction indicates it is a state not yet achieved – he says he is 'trying to be joyous'. The cause of Jack's 'joy' is pertinent to the conceptual practice of 'obedience'. Jack says that the source of his joy is in knowing that he is being obedient. After having listened to the audio taped interview I insert in the form of a post script comment 'The word 'joy' does not appear much in Jack's language. There seems to be a singular lack of 'joy' in his tone of voice.' (Jack 487)

Another 'dualist' interviewee – who, interestingly, like Jack is also dour – is Mabel. She speaks about the need for 'obedience' in such a way that there is a sense that if one is obedient then one fulfils all one's social, moral and religious obligations. Mabel, speaking about 'loyalty' to the Pope associates that loyalty to the idea of being loyal to Christ. She presents this notion of 'obedience' as something which is not extraordinary. It is something that the

'ordinary' Catholic is required to do. She speaks about people being present in Adelaide for the Pope's visit at Victoria Park racecourse

We were all there as perfectly ordinary Catholics, giving our total loyalty to the Holy Father in his position as Christ's vicar...That's all we have to do. We are bound to do. Absolutely bound as Catholics to do. We've no choice.

(Mabel 91-95)

Mabel expresses how deeply the subsidiary conceptual practice 'obedience' has become part of her functioning when she comments on the issue of women's ordination in the Catholic church. Her stance on the issue is determined by the stance the Pope takes. She says that once the Pope has decided on the question and has said 'no' then all discussion should stop. Mabel states that those Catholics who debate the issue do not have the faith. 'they'll say "Well why shouldn't priests marry" or "Why shouldn't er women become priests?" You instantly know that they haven't the faith.' (Mabel 486)

The same conceptual practice is deeply embedded in another 'dualist' interviewee Tony's approach to life. He talks about the issue of changing the way the Mass (the Eucharist) is celebrated. According to Tony the changes which have happened in Adelaide to enhance gender sensitivity in language are wrong because final approval has not been given by the authorised body in Rome. Tony manifests his use of the conceptual practice 'follow' by claiming that according to him it is critical for Catholics to look to Rome for

directions in matters of liturgy and religious practice 'Once it is approved by Rome I will accept it until the cows come home' (Tony 428).

Concluding remarks about the 'vulnerability' as conceptual practice

Through this chapter there have been many examples of how the 'integrationist' interviewees have devised ways of operating which permits them to sustain a sense of enchantment. There has been the recurrent influence of the conceptual practice 'vulnerability' in each of the subsidiary conceptual practices of 'listening', 'letting go' and 'courage'. These subsidiaries arguably show how 'vulnerability' is basically 'openness'. Those who practice the conceptual practice 'vulnerability' are adopting a process of making themselves open to the experience of life in all its dimensions. The integrationist interviewees force themselves to drop their defences and permit life's experiences to impinge on their perception.

The subsidiary conceptual practices show how this 'openness' is set up and maintained. The subsidiary 'listening' demonstrates how it assists interviewees – integrationists in the main – encounter life's experience at depth. One of the chief ways this takes for these interviewees is by constantly practicing 'letting go' of pet constructions and habitual ways of approaching life. These interviewees show how this does not happen without a price, and how the price is overcoming personal fears through exercising the subsidiary conceptual practice 'courage'.

The dominant conceptual practice 'vulnerability' becomes for the integrationists the first of their primary ways of coming to an experience of enchantment. Vulnerability is practiced in life situations and also in moments of personal encounter with enchantment. The 'dualist' interviewees also indicate that they have been able to sustain a sense of 'enchantment' and the Sacred. The conceptual practice 'follow', and its subsidiaries 'model' and 'obedience', are exercised typically under the influence of formal religion. Where the 'integrationists' tend to use 'vulnerability' when they refer to God the 'dualists' typically use 'follow'.

There are implications of this in terms of Weber's prediction that disenchantment will increase in the midst of the ongoing rationalisation of modernity. These 'integrationists', it would seem, have struck upon a way of being in the midst of an instrumental pragmatic Western world and at the same time experience enchantment. The next chapter deals with the second dominant way these 'integrationists' come to experience enchantment in the midst of the rationalisation of modernity. This is through the dominant conceptual practice 'inter-subjectivity'.

CHAPTER 6

The conceptual practices of 'inter-subjectivity'

In this chapter I intend to identify the second dominant conceptual practice and its subsidiary conceptual practices the integrationist interviewees employ when they experience enchantment. I also intend to name and discuss the second dominant conceptual practice (together with its subsidiaries) the dualist interviewees use when they experience enchantment. I hope this chapter will help set these conceptual practices within context, by locating them within the stories and lives of the integrationist and dualist interviewees. These extracts are drawn from the interviews on the grounds that these are the occasions when the interviewees generated material that revealed the notion of enchantment.

This chapter deals primarily with the dominant integrationist conceptual practice 'inter-subjectivity' and its subsidiary conceptual practices 'being with', 'intimacy' and 'community'; it also addresses the dominant dualist conceptual practice 'anxiety' and its subsidiary conceptual practice 'fear'. As noted in the last chapter one of the ways of knowing the characteristics of the dominant conceptual practice is through studying its subsidiaries, I will open up the discussion of 'inter-subjectivity' through analysing its first subsidiary, namely 'being with'.

'Inter-subjectivity' and the subsidiary conceptual practice 'being with'

The subsidiary conceptual practice 'being with' is noted in 19 of the interviewees – two of these interviewees were from the 'dualist' group. The 'integrationist', Angela (a midwife), frequently employs this conceptual practice – as indicated by her recurring use of the following terms: 'belonging', 'relationship' and 'self discovery'. It is while she mentions these concepts that she reveals she experiences some sense of enchantment.

in my important relationships I discover something of God's nature if its if it is [sic] actually a relationship going on, not not [sic] just you know two people together, but you know where there's some kind of dialogue or reciprocal type of communication. (Angela 356)

It would seem that there is some connection in Angela's sense of human interaction and an awareness of the sense of 'enchantment'. She identifies her important relationships as the ground for experiences of the Sacred.

Another 'integrationist' Pat also experiences enchantment through relationship. Pat claims that the primary experience of enchantment is the experience of the human spirit. According to Pat we ought to honour this experience of the human spirit much more fully and recognise how the experience of the human spirit mediates our experience of the divine Spirit. Pat says that the 'decision and commitment and and [sic] love and um identification and sharing...in that

sense I think the person um who is fully alive is in relationship with God.' (Pat 1408). In this way Pat reflects the same attitude as the integrationist Glen (243) when he talks in the last chapter about being annoyed by some Christians who forever want to impose the word 'God, God, God' on every experience rather than staying in the present experience, and respecting it as mystery (enchantment).

This subsidiary conceptual practice 'being with' appears in another 'integrationist' interviewee Barb when she talks about her experience of connecting with people. She talks about times when in a women's group all present might cease talking and lapse into a quietness. She notes how occasionally this happens simultaneously. The women appreciate some need to be still together and respect their shared life together

I often think the most intimate times are when there is [sic] no words. I can think of one of our women's group afternoons. We'd all been talking, talking and talking and then we just all stopped...then there's been this silence. (Barb 809)

The notion of 'quiet' is present in another 'integrationist' interviewee's reflections about the concept of 'being with'. Flora expresses the notions of 'being there' and 'quiet' and links them to the notion of 'enchantment'. She does this by talking about an occasion when she was invited to sit with some Aborigines in a bush circle

we were asked to sit within that circle...I thought of the generation upon generation of Aborigines who had been there. And I felt this was rather holy ground. (Flora 202)

Flora emphasises the notion of 'silence' by using the Aboriginal term 'sitting'. Her story tells of being with others in silence, respecting the setting and being aware of the connections with all who went before. This appreciation of being connected occurs in the context of the silence of being with these people. It is interesting that there is little emphasis on notions of reciprocity, engagement, or dialogue, but rather simply a sense of being with. In some sense it is almost a meditative state generated by being in each other's presence.

The subsidiary conceptual practice 'being with' is employed by another 'integrationist' interviewee, Jane. Jane is a palliative care nurse who finds herself in situations of closeness to people as they approach the period of dying. She cites experiences where she finds difficulty in connecting and having rapport with certain individuals. In particular she mentions how difficult it is to be connected with people who hold uncompromising views about many aspects of their lives. She mentions dealing with people who habitually assert power over others and who use the same approach toward life in general (people who have little regard for others or for many issues in life). They refuse to interact in a relational fashion. They attempt to influence the outcome of every facet of life. Jane speaks of the paucity of trust in the lives of these people. She says at the deeper level there is a lot of fear.

Jane singles out three cases where the exercise of this subsidiary conceptual practice 'being with' is very difficult. Each of these people when faced with the process of dying have 'had a lot of fear associated with it'. All these people 'have been people with strong views' (Jane 333). She cites an 'old Catholic' person who had been 'brought up in the old theology' and this person was very frightened. Jane mentions how he was a 'Tridentine Rite man'. The descriptive term 'Tridentine' signifies Catholics who reject the validity of changes in the Catholic church since the second Vatican council (1962-65). The reason for this rejection, in part, is over widespread changes to the text of the Mass. The translation of the missal into the vernacular was forbidden by Pope Alexander VIII (d. 1667) under pain of excommunication (McBrien, 1980:637).

Jane associates this 'Tridentine' Catholic with another person who was terrified of death. This second person, according to Jane, was a Christadelphian. He believed that only a small number of people are 'picked' by God for eternal life and the rest go to Hell. Jane mentions the 'terror' present in these two peoples' lives. She found a similar terror in another person who had stridently advocated euthanasia all his life, but at the time of his death he made no requests in this direction. She found it very difficult to 'connect' and 'be with' these three men as they entered a phase of their life over which they had no control. Because they habitually used a 'control' approach in dealing with people they seemed unable to accept help, closeness or intimacy. Approaching

death they were unable to let go, accept the other in trust, or exercise the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'being with' the other in intimacy.

The notion of 'being there' and 'silence' comes into Jane's reflections about her own feelings of having to face the death experience

I would want someone with me, to help me...to be with me when I was dying...while I was going through um all the anger and um fear and all that stuff. (Jane 369)

Like many of the 'integrationists' Jane, says that at these close moments of being with the person there are times of quiet. Jane notices how the individual dying person learns to 'be with' his or her body during this stage of accepting oncoming death. She learns to 'be with' individuals as they learn to accept and listen to their bodies. In the being with the person she talks about how she appreciates the importance of joining them. She says 'I sometimes pray um that we'll be able to connect...at a deeper level' (Jane 496).

Being with becomes for Jane the occasion where she experiences enchantment or in her words 'being with God' – she observes:

being with someone who is dying, or who is looking at that, is really like being with God. as well as, I was going to say before, 'like being in God', but its like, being with God. (Jane 458)

At this point Jane repeats the very thought Pat expresses above, namely that to experience the human spirit is to be in relationship with the divine with God (Pat 1408). Jane explains that it is a privilege being with someone who journeys into the process of death and who in doing so is willing to face the innate paradox and confusion of the experience. She notes how honoured she is to 'be with' the person who chooses to encounter the unknowns since such a person 'is usually being really honest, and...living at a level which is very basic' (Jane 459).

Jane reflects upon what is happening in her as she 'journeys' with these dying people. The 'being with' these people becomes for Jane the occasion for her to 'learn about myself and other people...the human spirit and body' (Jane 511). She says part of her learning is to find out how 'the being human thing works' (Jane 511). It appears therefore that the stance of 'being with' becomes for Jane a unique pathway of insight into the human experience of 'spirit and body'.

The stance of 'being with' another is for Jane a way into deeper 'inter-subjectivity'. The 'inter-subjectivity' is not only with the dying person, but with other significant people in her life. It is also a way of inter-subjectivity with the Sacred. Jane uses an image of being engulfed in the Sacred. Having spoken about gaining insight into how 'the being human thing works' she immediately continues within the same sentence to talk about entering into relationship with the Sacred

the more I learn about um myself and other people and how you know, the human spirit and body and just the being human thing works, the more I am going into God. (Jane 511)

Jane's 'learning' is not simply an intellectual approach to life, it is rather an understanding which comes to her as a result of employing the conceptual practice of 'being with' when she is with people in difficult circumstances. She is also able to 'be with' people in silence. It would seem that there is a depth to her 'being with' people. When she describes how difficult it was for her to see the three men (mentioned above) who were characterised by certitude and control during their life but who now face death with terror, she indicates that she is emotively engaged. Jane use of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'being with' in these cases are occasions for experiences of rapport and interrelationship. Arguably this is why she finds being with these three men so difficult – given their customary lack of trust. It seems they could not or would not permit her any margin of presence. It would appear that they were functional and distancing.

In instances where people permit Jane to exercise the subsidiary conceptual practice 'being with' in an accommodating fashion, she learns and knows about 'being human'. At this point the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'being with' enters the level of deep rapport; when this happens she says 'the more I am going into God' (Jane 511). It would seem that for Jane the subsidiary conceptual practice 'being with' potentially mediates divinity. She also implies

that the experience of being with another at significant times is itself an experience of the Sacred. Hence there is a sense that her story is 'grounded'. The human experience is the locus and nub of her 'sacred' experience (Jane 458).

One of the features of Jane's story is that she tends to talk about the Sacred in terms which suggest that the Sacred 'engulfs' her (Glen 491 uses a similar image of the Sacred as a woman and a lover). Jane employs a feminist and earth spirituality and talks of the earth metaphorically as the 'body' and the 'womb' of God - she parallels this to the way the earth and the body 'births' human experience and 'true' knowledge. Jane recalls how she once wrote 'I er um fit into Him or something. And it felt like, the times when I'm not, that I've been ripped away' (Jane 512).

The notion of 'being with' does not refer to the individuating beings who make up the relationship but rather the rapport of the relationship. What seems to typify the style of Jane's use of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'being with', is this strong emphasis on association. She frequently uses the terms 'context' and the 'sense of connection'. Jane's talk about her sense of the Sacred most commonly takes place when the content of her discourse is her connection with people. Hence a deep sense of context and rapport effects in Jane an immersion into the context, or as she says 'going into God' (Jane 511). It is as if the milieu is more important than the exact nature of individuals in the relationship. This appears to be consonant with Jane's references to Celtic earth spirituality which

accentuates the notion of 'connectedness' and the inter-subjectivity of being and the 'One'. If Jane therefore speaks out of this context it seems logical that she refers to her being with the person who is dying as a being with a whole experience of life and humanity. It is in this that she seems so connected and it is here that she experiences her deepest sense of enchantment. Perhaps this explains why Jane felt so out of harmony with the three men who in facing the final stage of life resort to struggle rather than permit this unavoidable stage in their life.

Sociological implications

Jane chooses a way of life which enhances the possibility of being with, context, and rapport. Implicitly she acknowledges the disenchanting power of the rationalisation about which Weber writes:

principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. (Weber, 1982: 139)

Jane has been exposed to the rationalisation and calculation which underpins modernity yet she chooses to critique this rationalisation process rather than submit to it. She accepts part of its effectiveness in saving human life but she refuses to be in awe of it. She talks of her work in a neonatal intensive care unit, where she was restricted in her 'being with' the new born babies in her care. She was required 'to watch monitors' and notes how if she touched the child it

leaped because it was in pain and it associated human touch with pain, um because it had had [sic] foot pricks so often to get blood. So I couldn't even, um sit there and stroke this child...I had to take most of my clues...from watching the blooming machines. (Jane 266)

Because Jane chooses to leave this form of nursing which is heavily committed to calculation as the core element of healing, she effectively realises the overall truth of Weber's disenchantment thesis, namely that rationalisation has power to effect disenchantment.

'Being with': a way into full relationship

Jane connects the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'being with' to the dominant conceptual practice of 'inter-subjectivity'. She is ever so mindful about respecting the uniqueness of the person and hence refrains from exercising an intrusive influence. She says 'I'm careful when people are dying – not to impose anything' (Jane 414). She seems to deal with the dying as if she should adopt an attitude of quiet and deep respect.

Jane moves from using the subsidiary conceptual practice 'being with' to an experience of ultimate enchantment – she doesn't seem to hesitate, or see the need for explanation when she moves on from talking about 'being with' the dying to talk about 'going into God'. In the light of this Jane uses the term 'holy' when describing the human body: 'I very much see the human body as holy,

and as a place of the sacred' (Jane 415). It would seem logical therefore to argue that when Jane uses the subsidiary conceptual practice 'being with' in relation to the dying she is on the edge of experiencing enchantment.

This subsidiary conceptual practice 'being with' seems to be characteristic of those individuals who place great store on establishing connections with those whom they meet. This also applies to the way they approach the settings and issues with which they deal. This is indicated by the way another 'integrationist', Pat, answers the question What is it to be human? – Pat says

A human person is an entity that is in relationship with other entities...at the level of decision and commitment and love and identification and sharing...being totally simpatico with somebody else. (Pat 1398)

It is interesting that when Pat defines what it is to be human he places the notion of 'being with' at the centre of his statement. The state of being 'totally simpatico' with another person is that which makes a person truly 'human' in Pat's eyes. Pat's emphasis on quality places on relationships with others is reflected in his comments about why he left his work as a missionary in Africa. He notes how the church authorities in the Catholic mission placed an undue priority on efficiency and productivity. Pat found this stressful when he attempted to build friendships, he didn't have the required time. Where the 'integrationists' show that they operate out of the conceptual practice of 'being with' and move toward experiences of enchantment, such does not seem to occur with the 'dualists'.

Dualist conceptual practices.

When the 'dualist' interviewee, Jack, approaches the conceptual practice of 'being with', he discusses the issue in quite distinct terms from those of context and rapport. Jack employs the notion of relationship in such a way that it is the individuating entities within the relationship which are made dominant. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the conceptual practice of 'being with' is characterised by an awareness that the relationship has an existence in its own right. By contrast what typifies Jack's approach to the issue of relationship is an overwhelming concern about himself in the first place, then a focus on the second person in the relationship. Jack opens up a discussion and chooses to talk about the 'relationship and intimacy that I have with my God' (Jack 47).

When he talks about his relationship with God he dwells on his pervasive sense of unworthiness and 'shame' (Jack 92); in this, Jack constructs God strongly as 'other' – the notion of relationship with God brings about a focus on the individuals in the relationship, not a sense of the relationship in itself. In this there is no sense of enchantment but rather a sense of personal unworthiness and guilt – enchantment seems singularly unlikely. Even though Jack begins to use the words 'relationship' and 'intimacy' to describe the dynamic operative between himself and his God, it is not very long before the focus switches from the relationship to the beings within the relationship. Jack says of this 'of course you always, you feel, I look at my God and feel great shame, no matter when I

look' (Jack 92). Jack is making a universal claim in this statement, since he says that every time he attempts to think about the relationship between himself and his God he is filled with 'great shame'.

Similarly when Jack talks about his relationship with God in terms of the notion of 'grace' he does so by speaking about the deeds he does which will give him some sign that he is 'close to heaven'; the important thing is 'knowing that you are doing that which is good' (Jack 84). The character of Jack's relationship with his God is one that pivots around the notion of doing good works. Jack uses a benchmark of good deeds as a way of perceiving his relationship.

The 'integrationist' Jane provides a markedly divergent approach to this same issue of relationship. The words she uses to speak about herself and her God do not enhance the individuating beings in the relationship. Indeed any sense of individuation dissolves and what comes to the fore is only oneness. She becomes less conscious of herself, in fact there is only the 'One'. She says 'I am going into God...I fit into Him' (Jane 511).

At a deeper level it appears that what underpins Jack's approach to relationship approximates the dominant conceptual practice of 'anxiety'. It is interesting that the comments I wrote up immediately after having completed the interview with Jack refers to feelings within myself of being seen as dangerous or a cause

of unease. The words I wrote about my subjective state are useful in understanding what Jack's feelings may have been

Throughout this interview, I frequently mutter little affirmations, such as 'ah', 'mm', in order to allay Jack's feelings of caution – feelings which may actually border on suspicion and possibly hostility. (Jack 88)

Of all the interviewees in the 'dualist' group, Jack's form of spirituality differs most markedly from the ideal type 'integrationist' form of spirituality. The majority of 'dualists' employ the conceptual practice 'anxiety' in a way that is less driven than Jack. Ruth is a 'dualist' who speaks of having friends 'that are very trustworthy and with only one or two exceptions... returned my trust' (Ruth 81). Ruth (85) speaks of the importance of relationship and enjoying life with friends. Hence Ruth is quite different from the anxious and driven 'dualist' Jack, yet in other areas such as her compliance with Church teaching and ordered forms of worship, she is similar to Jack.

Sociological implications

The conceptual practice which tends to shape Jack's approach would seem to be that of 'anxiety'. This raises the question whether or not Jack represents a mode of religion best described as one which is adversely affected by the rationalisation of religion and society in a time of modernity? This is so because where the integrationists in this chapter appear to be able to engage actively in the world in which they live and find a sense of enchantment, Jack's experience

is decisively different, he is threatened by much of what he encounters in modernity. Similarly the mode and style of religion Flora, Jane and Pat seem to live might very well typify the sort of religion which has managed to modify the effectiveness of the rationalisation present in religion and society in modernity, given that the theme of enchantment emerges spontaneously from their every day engagement with modernity.

Flora, Jane and Pat repeatedly take steps to challenge the rationalisation dynamic within society and church. Flora does this by her membership and work in social movements for the defence of aboriginal native land. Jane indicates she challenges rationalisation by adopting a pro-active style of enabling people to engage with the 'earthy' experiences of the dying process - she refuses to emasculate dying peoples' dignity by rejecting the role of a detached drug provider prior to death. She supports people who choose to engage with the paradoxes inherent in that event. Pat decides that he will leave his work as a missionary in Africa because he is denied the opportunity to practice the conceptual practice 'being with'. Pat decides to move into a way of life, which for him, permit the fulfilment of human relational needs. These integrationists act in such a way as to reclaim their moral autonomy back from an overly institutionalised expression of religion.

The dualist dominant conceptual practice 'anxiety'

By contrast the dualist interviewee Jack turns to hierarchical authority as the ground of his morality. His referent point for his morality is external to himself. His benchmarks for evaluating his moral stance are those of commandment and law. Jack talks about the notions of 'truth' as an entity existing independently of the individual. He sees the source of 'truth' in the Church since it provides the truth 'when I say, live in the light and live under the umbrella of truth, that umbrella is the Catholic Church and the Catholic Church is truth, right?' (Jack 382)

Jack constructs a world of certitude, he speaks about the truth residing in one place, the Church. Jack chooses from the many possible metaphors used about the church that of the church being the 'bride of Christ', and says 'that's church dogma' (Jack 508). In doing this Jack uses the image more in an absolute sense rather than seeing the metaphor as only one among many; and one which needs other images to balance its meaning. He uses the term 'dogma' to emphasise the link between Christ and the Church. He treats the metaphor 'the bride of Christ' as though it were not a metaphor but rather a literal and physical description. One effect of Jack's tying the Church so closely to Christ is to elevate the Church by association with the divine. Positioned it in this way he places Church directives are beyond question. Jack's approach serves to undermine the task of those who search and arrive at decisions based on personal judgement highly

problematic – given that the 'truth' is already given via the Church (according to Jack).

Jack constructs the church in such a way that it is not only the primary but the sole source of moral authority. This undermines those who would resort to individual conscience as a means for judging the moral rightness or wrongness of particular courses of action. In using the dominant conceptual practice 'anxiety', Jack looks to the institutional Church to provide safe and fixed directives so that one is given a flawless path to truth. Jack's nervousness about using individual conscience predisposes him to doubt his intuition and personal feelings; he does not associate personal freedom and the notion of enchantment.

Jack's use of the dominant conceptual practice of 'anxiety' can be also seen from the comments I wrote in the transcript after listening to the tape recording and typing the interview. The following observations reflect his use of the conceptual practice 'anxiety'. I write Jack is 'very dour' and 'has tight control on every word which he uses' (Jack 41). I note I 'reassure Jack, since I pick up a slight touch of panic in his voice' (Jack 104). I note Jack 'constructs the world as a place of hostility' (Jack 248) and that the 'tone of Jack's voice is unrelentingly ominous.' (Jack 438)

'Inter-subjectivity' and its second subsidiary conceptual practice 'intimacy'

The subsidiary conceptual practice of 'being with' primarily reveals itself as a personal stance of rapport and context. This expresses one dimension of the dominant conceptual practice of 'inter-subjectivity'. The subsidiary conceptual practice of 'intimacy' offers another aspect of 'inter-subjectivity'. In the interviews where intimacy becomes a recurring stance, the interviewees appear to accentuate the notion of 'person' rather than 'rapport' or 'context' (a characteristic of the stance 'being with'). There are eight interviewees who manifest the conceptual practice of 'intimacy' through the way they relate in everyday life. All these interviewees are from the 'integrationist' group. There is a gender balance – four males and four females.

The stance of intimacy occurs in a situation where one of the interviewees Barb, relates a story about a child. Barb talks about an experience she once had in church on a Sunday with two of her children. On this occasion a Filipino woman by the name of May and a friend of Barb's brought another Filipino woman, Mary, to church with her – Barb did not know Mary. During the service Mary's four year old boy left his mother and wandered over to Barb and sat next to her son John. John did not know the four year old and when the young child started talking to John, John became uncomfortable since he did not know the boy. The little boy said to John, 'Hello can I sit on your lap?' Barb

notes how her son John is quiet and reserved by nature hence when the little boy asked if he could sit on John's lap Barb said 'Talk to him!' (Barb 282).

Barb notes how the occasion was slightly unsettling because the little boy continued to chatter away during the service even in parts of the service which are quiet and reserved. In this somewhat difficult scenario John, conscious of his mother's request, attempted to relate to the child and said to the little boy 'Where's your mum and dad?' The little boy said in reply 'Oh my dad's in heaven and my mum's sitting over there' - the day happened to be Father's day. The child's mother who did not know Barb waved at her from a distance.

After the church service Mary brought her friend and her friend's little boy over to Barb. As she approached Barb she started talking to Barb in Spanish and continued to talk in Spanish, even though Barb could not speak or understand Spanish. Barb notes how they had been friends for a long time and was therefore curiously surprised that Mary forgot Barb could not speak Spanish.

In the interview Barb forwards this incident as significant and says

I was overwhelmed...She had totally accepted me being the same as her so much so that she even expected me to know her language. And I I [sic] was just so moved by that...I felt very very visited and graced by her doing that to me.

(Barb 311)

Barb demonstrates through her interview that she habitually pursues issues by searching out their implications and meanings. In this event she refuses to dismiss Mary's attempted dialogue with her in Spanish as simply a mistake. Barb analyses the rapport between Mary and herself and interprets it to mean a deep acceptance of her by Mary. She says of herself 'I didn't know that I had sent those vibes out'. (Barb 317) After reflecting about how Mary, her friend and her friend's child seemed quite comfortable about the child sitting on Barb's son's lap, Barb says of the incident

That was one of the biggest compliments that I've ever been paid in my whole life...example of of [sic] God in your life or that moment of grace or whatever coming to you in the most unexpected way. (Barb 323)

Barb's description of the event points to the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'intimacy'. She experiences a sense of personal intimacy between Mary and herself. It also seems that Barb has already reflected about this event at depth and that the intimacy between Mary and herself becomes an occasion for being overcome. In describing the contact between Mary and herself as a 'moment of grace', Barb bases that experience firmly in personal intimacy. This is distinct from relationships which are based in a sense of 'rapport' or 'context'.

Pat, another integrationist interviewee, discloses the subsidiary conceptual practice 'intimacy' through the way he approaches and talks about everyday life. In his interview he talks about the need Australia has for strong leadership. He says Australia needs leadership types who are 'well-known for their strong moral positions on things'. He goes on to mention that the people who

frequently appear as leaders are Fred Nile and Bruce Ruxton. When I ask Pat what he thinks of these two men he says 'they're totally groundless' (Pat 1031); Pat singles out the lack of 'tolerance' these men have toward individuals. According to Pat these two men who are touted as moral leaders derive their leadership not from personal vision or human experience but from archaic traditions. Pat says our society needs to ignore those who work out of 'myths and received ideas rather than experience' (Pat 1039).

Pat cites the Anglican Bishop Peter Hollingworth as an example of an Australian who displays moral leadership. Pat says Bishop Hollingworth typifies 'people who've got a whole breadth about themselves.' (Pat 1052) Pat continues to reflect about the ground of one's moral sense by mentioning his wife Helen ' she's the most real person I've ever met...To me it [sic] its extremely important. It is that a person is in touch with their own experience.' (Pat 1097)

During Pat's conversation the subsidiary conceptual practice 'intimacy' continues to surface as one of his key conceptual practices. He demands that all fabrication and distance be cast aside and says the individual has to be 'straight up about where they're at and what they're doing and why they're doing it (Pat 1101 - 3). Pat's comments about his wife Helen becomes all the more significant in the context of his earlier statements about people acting out of grounded experience. When Pat says that he knows his wife as the 'most real person I've

ever met' he indicates something of the level of human encounter that operates between them both.

Pat goes on to talk about how he met Helen while he was a Catholic priest in a mission country. Again he reveals the depth of intimacy extant between Helen and himself; he says that in being in a third world country meant Helen and he had scant resources, he notes

We didn't have a thing to our names, either of us. We didn't have a clue how to go about looking for work or anything else. Well, we thought, the hell we're going to do it anyway...A sense of conviction that I am right and I'm going to do this. (Pat 1217)

Pat's reflections begin by citing people: who have a breadth of experience about them; who see the need to act out of experiential knowledge; who know that this has to be grounded in the personal to the point of intimacy; and who are aware that the sharing of experiential life requires naked honesty at a deep intimate level.

In listening to the tape recording of Pat's interview it is difficult not to be moved by the passion of Pat's feeling for social justice. Perhaps the singular feature about Pat's story is that he repeatedly ties his passion for justice back to the intimacy of his relationship with his wife Helen. He speaks of relationship and commitment to justice, but stresses that this has to operate at the one to one level of personal intimacy. Pat speaks about how the lack of intimacy destroys

the possibility for inter-subjectivity and any sense of being part of a network of relationship. In regards to his appointment in the mission field he says

the one thing that did...that I found hard about it, I found difficult to reconcile, I think, was that there seemed to be no personal commitment in it...no commitment to any particular people that we were working in one Parish one day and another one another day...no continuity. (Pat 676)

Sociological implications

This description of Pat's life captures some of the features of life in modernity. Pat was expected to be a person of high mobility. His work setting changed from day to day. His home living was also transient. In terms of Weber's and Luckmann's prediction about the pervasive influence of rationalisation in institutions of modernity, Pat's story seems to fulfil the rationalisation/disenchantment theses. 'Disenchantment' did happen as Pat explains the work was non-relational and dehumanising. Rationalisation was occurring at another level. Pat talks about the requirement of celibacy in the context of his duties to be responsible for so many disparate mission centres. He perceives the celibacy issue in term of its functionality. Celibacy does permit people like Pat to be efficiently deployed, given that they do not have to come back to their spouse and family. What initially was intended to be a work to engage with people in a relational fashion and be nurtured by a sense of community, a sense of mystery, 'enchantment' and the 'Sacred' ultimately became disenchanting. Pat speaks of the disenchantment which results when

rationalisation operates to make the ministry more instrumentally rational and efficient. Pat says that the hardest thing about life on the mission was celibacy. He speaks of his need for intimacy which went with life-long commitment to an individual

The hardest part of the celibacy thing for me, um not a sexual thing so much, as having somebody to relate to...Being close to somebody as a, as a friend, somebody to share life with...I had come to the conclusion that I wasn't going to survive. (Pat 709)

In Pat's story the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'intimacy' becomes one of the primary ways that the underlying conceptual practice of 'inter-subjectivity' is articulated. This becomes more evident in the light of Pat's pronouncements that moral leadership does not come from a passive acceptance of time honoured traditions of thought and practice. He says moral leadership is grounded in being true to one's experiential engagement with the people among whom one lives. This engagement has to be located in relationship and connected back to the life of intimacy in that person.

Pat speaks about people picking up their own power, life, zest, commitment and relationship with each other; in doing this Pat claims that it is essential in relationship that people engage to the point of intimacy if that relationship is to generate enchantment. He says they have to be 'careful that they're faithful to their own experience...It is an experience of being in relationship with God.'
(Pat 1328, 1358)

'Dualists' and the dominant conceptual practice of 'anxiety' and its subsidiary conceptual practice 'fear'

Both the 'integrationists' Barb and Pat mentioned above express their key relationships through the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'intimacy'; both speak of their relationships as sources of life for their relationship with the 'Sacred'. However the dualist interviewees seem to be quite distinctly different in this matter – they do not give evidence of this sequential moving from personal and physical intimacy to intimacy with the Sacred, there are no signs among the dualists that they move from the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'intimacy' to the dominant conceptual practice of 'inter-subjectivity'.

One of the 'dualists', Pricy, talks about a Catholic Mass she attended where those present were invited to a rather full participation in the service. Pricy speaks disparagingly of the high human involvement and portrays such activity as a distraction from the Sacred rather than – as Barb and Pat might express it – as the ground of their experience of the 'Sacred'. Pricy is critical of the new changes in liturgical worship on that there is an overemphasis on the human dimension. Pricy perceives human interaction itself as an obstacle for an experience of God. She mentions 'liturgical dance' and 'slides' and says of such involvement 'I was finding it hard to focus on God.' (Pricy 429) Pricy recalls how she attended Mass on environmental Sunday and found that there were

car bodies and 'bits of junk all over the front of the altar' (Pricy 434). In reflecting about her experience she says that she felt 'lost'.

Pricy becomes aware of feelings of anger and fear when she recalls the intrusion of issues of ecology and social interaction into the structure of formal worship – she says such involvement causes her to lose her sense of God's presence. When talking about the introduction of a focus on human interaction within worship Pricy says it was like 'losing the spiritual side of me...I didn't even get in contact with God' (Pricy 425). In speaking of how she felt about this emphasis on social involvement within Mass, she names her primary experience as that of 'fear'. It seems that beneath this fear there also exists a deeper conceptual practice of 'anxiety'. Pricy says 'I'm losing my spirituality, its going and it scared me, it really scared me' (Pricy 436).

A further insight into the way Pricy constructs her world view is offered by one of her reflections about the Mass. She indicates that her 'Sacred Cosmos' is a cosmology where God lives apart and intervenes at special moments. Speaking of what the Mass or Eucharist means to her she says 'I feel the Mass is God coming down' (Pricy 417). Another comment she makes – about her recent experience that there has been too much focus on human participation – reinforces the cosmology that humanity and divinity are located in different spheres. She says of her recent experience of worship 'I thought it was people oriented and not God-oriented' (Pricy 440).

It appears that the conceptual practice of 'anxiety' comes to full consciousness in Pricy's life when her cosmology – the way she customarily constructs her sacred world view – fails to be realised in the liturgical renewal movements. Arguably her traditional cosmological view is being replaced by another cosmology when Pricy is exposed to liturgy which accentuates issues of ecology and social concerns.

By contrast where Barb and Pat interpret human interaction to the point of intimacy as one of their dominant experiences of 'inter-subjectivity' and through that the Sacred, Pricy has quite a different way of experiencing the Sacred. Where the integrationists Barb and Pat perceive human involvement as that which mediates mystery and the Sacred, Pricy speaks of the human involvement in liturgy not as that which mediates the Sacred but as that which blocks the Sacred.

'Inter-subjectivity' and its third subsidiary conceptual practice 'community'

The 'integrationist', Barb, exhibits the subsidiary conceptual practice 'community' through the type of relationships she sustains. Barb reflects on the particular way a number of people went about organising a social justice conference. This conference called the 'Turning Point' conference was held to commemorate the centenary of the social justice document on the conditions of

workers entitled 'Rerum Novarum' issued by Pope Leo XIII in 1891 (McBrien, 1980).

Barb reflects how the group had worked so intently and creatively that 600 people attended the conference from Friday evening to Sunday afternoon. She mentions how the planning stages of the conference started more than a year prior to the event. Barb describes the shared attitudes of those who gathered to develop the theme and direction of the conference. She says 'there was a kind of a spirit of, you know getting along with everyone that's let put aside our differences and get on with it' (Barb 484).

Barb mentions how the group was noted for its overall commitment to good relationship. There was a common acceptance that everyone should be prepared and willing to work with any individual, regardless of how well personal beliefs complimented one another. In doing this she mentions how people were prepared to drop egotism and switch their focus to the bigger picture, namely the life of the group. Barb notes how people worked together 'we all did our part and we all did it well and that was good' (Barb 434).

Barb introduces the notion that when people share their efforts, dreams and hopes they become conscious of a bigger dynamic operating within the group. She speaks of a common experience of people in the group who were aware that the overall effectiveness and achievement of the group was greater than the sum total of all the individual work being done, she says

There was a real movement of the Spirit might be one way of defining it, that whether we like it or not and whether we could stop it or not, something was happening. (Barb 438)

Barb uses the concept 'harmony', she notes that the dream of individuals grew beyond their particular vision to encompass a bigger common vision. She mentions that the groups' refusal to view differences as obstacles helped people believe that 'so much more can grow' (Barb 487).

Evidence that the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'community' sustains and furthers the sense of 'enchantment' is found in a number of Barb's comments about the changing consciousness in those planning the conference. Barb remarks upon the energy generated within the group, when individuals within it interact in a supportive and concerned way; noting this dynamic she says 'they are very sacred moments really I think. And that would be true within a family or a relationships...or it might be all these people gathered' (Barb 488).

Barb talks about relationships of different kinds; she mentions the relationships which exist within a family and gives the example of a birthday celebration. When the birthday cake is lit, people gather, the electrical lights are put out, people sing and the candles are blown out. She says there is a moment of silence before the lights are switched back on. At that very moment of pause there is a recognition of something special happening. Barb speaks about the family which comes together to celebrate the memory of one of its members. Barb suggests that at this point a special insight into reality happens as people

face who they are and have been for each other. The recalling and remembering is a recognition of the shared life that every member in the family has created. Barb's reflections, like those of Jane's and Pat's support Luckmann's (1990:128) observation that 'invisible' religion has broadened the meaning of transcendence so that it touches almost every facet of life. As I noted in chapter 2 Luckmann promotes the integration of the 'sacred' to every aspect of human life. Of all the instances where the integrationists introduce the element of enchantment into their stories, the majority occur when these integrationists talk about the mundane and ordinary aspects of human life. It is interesting that relatively few signs of enchantment for the integrationists arise from recollections about formal religion.

In the present example of the social justice conference, Barb says that when people share as a community, a new life emerges in the group. She names this as the sacred event. Barb refers to one of the guest speakers at the conference, Donal Dorr, and notes how he spoke about three areas of social justice. He held that there can be justice at the personal level; at the interpersonal level; and at the social level. Barb (545) recalls how Donal drew three intersecting circles in such a way that there was a small common area shared by all three circles. Each circle represented one of the three aspects of justice (personal, interpersonal or social). Donal claimed that when people share in a life of full community, three stages need to be fulfilled: firstly each individual within that community lives justice within his or her personal life; secondly the individual contributes to the

justice existing at the interpersonal level between those who make up the group; and thirdly he or she contributes with others in the group to act with justice at the social level. When all these stages operate there is a general awareness in each individual within the group of a deep sense of peace or 'SHALOM' (the Jewish word for peace). The common area shared by all forms of justice constitutes the peace, the sacred space.

It is significant that the terminology, concepts and imagery used in this 'integrationist' type spirituality and religion is encompassing and poetic rather than literal. This seems to be the case when the phrase 'sacred space' is used to describe that which comes to birth as a result of the conceptual practice of 'community'. In other parts of her interview Barb speaks of this phenomenon interchangeably with terms such as 'graced' (Barb 311), 'visited' (Barb 311), 'the movement of the Spirit' (Barb 436, 448, 450).

It would seem that Barb's participation in the 'Turning Point' social justice conference, and her reflections about what it and other settings mean to her, indicates that the use of the conceptual practice of 'community' brings her a sense of 'enchantment' and an awareness of the Sacred. She overtly connects community and the Sacred by citing a Scripture text mentioned by Donal. Donal associates his theory on justice with the book of Micah in the Jewish and Christian Old Testament Scriptures 'This is what God asks of you, only this: that you act justly, that you love tenderly, that you walk humbly with your

God' (Micah, 6:8). Barb notes how the text addresses three facets of justice, namely the public or social, the interpersonal and the private

act justly, which was the like a public expression; and the love tenderly was the personal [sic], no the interpersonal; and the walk humbly with God was the personal. (Barb 558)

It would seem therefore that Barb ties her diverse notions of relationship together. She speaks of relationship which operates between one individual and another as though it needs to link into the interpersonal and social contexts of life. The metaphors and constructions she uses – in addition to the way she goes about her social involvement – suggest Barb operates out of the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'community'. She frequently uses the concept 'inter-subjectivity' – she points to the possession of a common will and passion in those who live community and act with 'inter-subjectivity'. Her reflections about the process of planning the 'Turning Point' conference are consistent with the principle that no individual is to be positioned as an object. Implied in her discussion of social justice is a deep belief that it is vital to the nature of personhood that the individual experiences herself or himself as subject.

Barb's reflections are in effect a sustained argument upholding the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'community'. This conceptual practice itself presupposes the deeper dominant conceptual practice of 'inter-subjectivity'. Individuals who are partners in a living community periodically critique their enterprise in terms of how well it furthers 'inter-subjectivity'.

Implication of these conceptual practices for the hypotheses of Weber, Luckmann and Hegy

Luckmann hypothesises that, because of the institutionalisation of religion in modernity, individuals construct their 'sacred cosmos' as 'assortments of "ultimate' meanings"' (1974:102). Such does not seem to be the case with the individuals who organised the 'Rerum Novarum' centenary conference. Barb's portrayal of this venture is characterised by its ability to create a synthesis out of diverse 'ultimate meanings'. She claims there was an agreement between those present to 'put aside our differences and get on with it' (Barb 484). She refers to 'something really much bigger than all the rest of us' (Barb 433). In analysing the process she uses the imagery of a common 'spirit'. The conference therefore is not a pot-pourri or medley of 'ultimate meanings'. It would seem more accurate to describe it in terms of a synthesis of 'ultimate meanings', rather than 'assortments of "ultimate' meanings"'. It is interesting that Barb talks about this synthesis by employing such concepts as the 'spirit' of the individual and the overall 'spirit'. She seems to employ the religious term 'Spirit' in describing the synthesis which was achieved by all the participants. She says 'there was something really much bigger than all the rest of us...There was a real movement of the Spirit might be one way of defining it' (Barb 438).

One of the insights which comes from this quotation from Barb's interview is that she not only claims the group acts out of some centre – in this case, the

conceptual practice of 'inter-subjectivity'- but something more. Barb talks about the commitment of the people who decided to 'lay aside our differences' in the sense of people who were prepared to employ the conceptual practice of 'community', yet she says more. In referring to her own joining in the 'mammoth task' (Barb 432), she says that she became aware of 'something even bigger...a real movement of the Spirit' (Barb 437). She implies that this something which was 'bigger' than the shared effort and spirit of those present, had a dynamism of its own 'whether we could stop it or not, something was happening' (Barb 438).

It would seem that Barb presents in a detailed account the stages of awareness she went through during the conference. She arrives at a point where she talks about the Sacred in such a way that she does not want to separate it from the action of those involved. Hence rather than talk about the 'Spirit', she employs the phrase the 'movement of the Spirit'. At the same time, however, she gives this 'movement of the Spirit' something of an identity of its own. When I ask Barb what she is talking about in the phrase 'something bigger than us', she says

Well I don't know whether you want to call it the Spirit of God, or something, I mean I don't know what I'd call it. I mean I would think of it as the movement of the Spirit. (Barb 446-8)

It would seem that in Barb's reflection she holds firmly to the belief that when she engages in daily life and employs the conceptual practices 'community' and

'inter-subjectivity', she comes to an awareness of 'enchantment' and the 'Sacred'. She talks of this 'enchantment' and the 'Sacred' in such a way that it is grounded in the personal engagement of individuals. She does not separate it from the 'spirit' of people who employ the conceptual practice of 'community', but has it grow out of the 'spirit' of the people. Rather than use the term 'the Spirit', she uses the term 'the movement of the Spirit'. It would seem, therefore, that she wants to avoid dualism. She chooses not to perceive human engagement as a thing in itself apart from the 'Spirit'. The phrase 'movement of the Spirit' appears to serve the function of 'enchantment'. The peoples' enterprise is seen in the light of the bigger picture of the cosmos. She almost employs the metaphor of the people's 'spirit' dancing with the 'movement of the Spirit' as they commit themselves to community and the dominant conceptual practice of 'inter-subjectivity'.

A feature of these 'integrationists' is their ability to respect others who hold values which differ from their own. The 'integrationists' are also able to redefine meanings so as to be able to share 'ultimate' meanings. They do more than merely position these meanings alongside each other and regard this as their 'sacred cosmos'. It would seem that the process of their conceptual practices of 'being with' (rapport and context), 'intimacy' and 'community' predisposes them to have their shared 'ultimate' meanings engage in dialogue not only with each other, but also with some of the primal and traditional 'ultimate' meanings of the group. This is where Hegy's hypothesis concerning new religion within

modernity – particularly within the Catholic stream known as 'invisible' Catholicism – engages in a continual process of critique of the present and the past in such a way that it does not cut itself off from what is core in early Christianity. Hegy claims

The old Catholicism was a 'church', a social institution, a social force based on collective discipline. The new Catholicism can be defined so far only as different, if not opposed, to the institutional model of a visible church. (Hegy, 1987: 167)

Luckmann's (1974: 102) notion of 'assortments of "ultimate" meanings' does pick up a feature within the spirituality and religious life of these 'integrationists'. They are ever ready to appropriate evolving insights and meanings, however they also seem able to identify key principles enshrined in primal Christianity and then have these two elements interact.

The 'integrationists' mentioned in this chapter who display the conceptual practice of 'inter-subjectivity' tend to experience 'enchantment' in their everyday life. 'Enchantment' comes out of their everyday experience, it is not superimposed upon it. There is little indication that the references to the Sacred which appear in their interviews are extraneous to the issues being discussed. Barb, Jane and Pat – typifying the other 27 'integrationists' – can be markedly noted for not drawing upon a collection of deductive or a priori categories while talking about their engagement in daily life. When the concept of the Sacred appears in the interviews it emerges out of the content and context of the

lives of the interviewees. In effect these modern 'integrationists' seem to engage with modernity in such a way that their mode of engagement itself sustains a sense of 'enchantment'.

Summarising the idea of 'inter-subjectivity' and its relevance to the thesis

The experience of these 'integrationists' appears to be at odds with Weber's thesis that the relentless and pervasive influence of 'rationalisation' within modernity brings about the disenchantment of the world. Perhaps an appropriate question to ask at this point is: What is distinctive in the way that these 'integrationists' engage with the world, that permits them to sustain a sense of enchantment? Some of the ways these 'integrationists' sustain enchantment in the midst of their engagement in everyday life is through the use of the dominant conceptual practice of 'inter-subjectivity' and the subsidiary conceptual practices of 'being with' (rapport or context), 'intimacy' and 'community'. So far in this chapter it would seem that people who use the dominant conceptual practice 'inter-subjectivity' have been able to sustain a sense of enchantment in everyday life. The interview material shows that those 'integrationists' who employ the dominant conceptual practice 'inter-subjectivity' are also likely to employ one or more of the subsidiary conceptual practices 'being with', 'intimacy' or 'community'. These subsidiary conceptual practices do differ from one another. They are not all practiced by the same interviewee.

These three subsidiary conceptual practices of 'being with', 'intimacy' and 'community' seemingly constitute a way of approaching life in modernity. The first with its emphasis on rapport or context aids the individual's search for a style of daily interaction which is more than functional or instrumental. The way that these 'integrationist' interviewees repeatedly speak about the notion of rapport and context indicates how the aspects of connection and belonging are central to their perception of daily life within modernity. The issue of relationality is one of the most commonly-raised topics in the 'integrationist' interviews.

Similarly the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'intimacy' comes to the fore because these 'integrationists' habitually employ this subsidiary conceptual practice in their engagement with daily life. It is part of the way they operate. They engage in their daily life in such a way that intimacy is noted as a characteristic.

The subsidiary conceptual practice of 'community' is the third most common cited feature of these modern 'integrationists' who employ the dominant conceptual practice of 'inter-subjectivity'. Arguably this indicates that the 'integrationists' so engage in their everyday interaction that those with whom they engage are treated as subjects not objects. The concept 'subject' in this thesis refers to the ability of the human person to be the locus of and source of moral judgement and decision-making. The 'subject', though self actualising

and self determining to some degree, does off course, as this conceptual practices 'community' suggest, derive his or her motivation and energy from those among whom he or she interacts. The concept of 'object' refers to that attitude which expects the human person to be passive, non-critical and compliant in the face of directives from individuals and society.

The subsidiary conceptual practice of 'community' influences the individual's style of relating and draws the person into the inner life of the group. Weber's thesis that there would be a loss of 'enchantment' in this world of modernity seemingly needs qualification given the lives of these 'integrationists'. The reason why 'disenchantment' is made less effective – it would seem – is that each of these 'integrationists' approach others expecting that they will act as subjects rather than be used by the system. It appears therefore that the proactive dynamic of expecting individuals to operate as subject rather than object works to counter the effect of rationalisation on the person.

These three subsidiary conceptual practices: 'being with', 'intimacy' and 'community' are three vital and key dimensions or aspects of the more encompassing dominant conceptual practice 'inter-subjectivity'. 'Inter-subjectivity' as a conceptual practice invites enchantment – it looks for and orientates the individual to search out signs of interaction and in so doing assist people to adopt a subject to subject mode of engagement.

Another interesting feature about these 'integrationists' concerns Weber's (1982:282) statement that primitive religion expressed peoples' encompassing sense of the Sacred. What these 'integrationists' appear to do is somehow recapture the sense of integration possessed by pre-modern religion. They heal the split between rational cognition and mystic experience Weber (1982:282) argues takes place in modernity (ch. 1). These integrationists show through the employment of particular conceptual practices that they can engage in both 'rational cognition' and 'mystic experiences'. Both Jane and Barb are women who have received education at the higher levels, Jane is skilled in both assessing the need for drugs and in the administration of drugs to the terminally ill, Barb has taught in Universities. Hence these women move in the realm of 'rational cognition', yet they also move across that realm into that of mythic, symbolic and poetic meaning. Through the conceptual practices 'inter-subjectivity', 'being with', 'intimacy and 'community' their interviews reveal that 'mystic experience' is not absent from their life in modernity. It does appear therefore that the 'integrationists' cited in this chapter live a type of life within modernity which is mythic and capable of enchantment. In the light of this they do seem to have struck upon a way of circumventing the 'disenchantment' Weber predicts will happen when people become embroiled in the rationalisation of modernity (ch. 1).

Thus far this chapter has been able to identify and locate the second dominant conceptual practice and its subsidiaries the integrationists employ when they

experience enchantment, it has also done the same with the dualists. This together with the conceptual practices identified and discussed in chapter 5 will provide the basis for evaluating (ch. 9) the identifiable empirical implications derived from Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's hypotheses discussed in chapter 2.

CHAPTER 7

The conceptual practice of 'ambiguity'

So far in the thesis I have discussed two dominant conceptual practices, namely those of 'vulnerability' and 'inter-subjectivity' (and their subsidiary conceptual practice). The purpose is that as the interviewees reflect about where they find energy, meaning, passion or a sense of commitment in their lives sufficient material is generated to allow the identification of the key conceptual practices these interviewees employ in those instances. My purpose in this chapter is to situate each conceptual practice in the context of the lives out of which they emerge. In this way the discussion becomes 'thick' enough to judge if these stories and categories ring true to life (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 279).

I now turn to an exploration of the nature of the third dominant conceptual practice I find amongst the 'integrationist' interviewees of this study. The dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' emerges from three independent and different subsidiary conceptual practices. The three most popular subsidiary conceptual practices which colour and shape the character of the notion 'ambiguity' are 'letting go', 'mystery' and 'language'. These features emerge primarily in the 'integrationist' interviewees rather than the 'dualist' interviewees. When these conceptual practices appear in the 'dualist' interviewees there are a number of differences in the ways they are expressed. The issues the integrationist interviewees talk about when they reveal the

dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' are issues which for the dualist interviewees typically generate the dominant conceptual practice 'categorise' and its two subsidiaries 'certitude' and 'a priori'.

As a way of obtaining some sense about the nature of the third dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' I offer a simple sketch of a number of its characteristics. This conceptual practice emerges in the lives of the interviewees who live quite ably in a world of complexity. The dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' expresses itself in characteristics such as being both prepared to talk about the paradoxes within life and leave the subject knowing that it has been unresolved.

The dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' therefore becomes apparent in the way that interviewees speak about the diverse aspects and elements of an issue. What typifies the approach of these interviewees is that when they refer to the different facets, factors and forces operating within a particular issue, they seem to recognise the perennial nature of those facets and factors. When these interviewees reflect about the complexities of life and the various factors and interests of an issue, they typically avoid constructing the different facets, factors, forces and interests in opposition. Thus the complexities of life are frequently discussed with an awareness of the diverse bodies of thought and tradition which constitute the issue. Mary Douglas' warnings about the heuristic practice of rearranging life into discrete sections expresses the

underlying attitude of the integrationists who employ the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity'

Binary distinctions are an analytic procedure but their usefulness does not guarantee that existence divides like that. We should look with suspicion on anyone who declared that there are two kinds of people or two kinds of reality or process. (Mary Douglas in Jose Casanova, 1994 : 40)

The conceptual practice 'ambiguity' has some affinity with a poetic approach to life in contradistinction to a literalist approach. The poetic approach operates through the medium of imagery, symbol and open-ended metaphor. In making this association with the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' I am suggesting that the integrationist typically foregoes the allure of literalism. This seems logical given that those who employ the conceptual practice 'ambiguity' typically sustain constructions about life which refer to its unknown and unresolved aspects. This moves the discussion toward the question of the underlying or subsidiary conceptual practices which tend to constitute the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity'.

I have mentioned that there are three subsidiary conceptual practices of the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' and that they are 'letting go', 'mystery' and 'language'; at this point I will focus on the first of these three. The conceptual practice 'letting go' can be noticed in seven of the thirty interviewees from the dominant 'integrationist' group. This conceptual practice also occurs among the 'dualist' interviewees, however this is evident in only one of the

fourteen interviewees. There is also quite a difference in how the conceptual practice 'letting go' is used in this case compared to the seven 'integrationist' interviewees. Unlike the 'integrationists' who express 'letting go' specifically when they are talking about their relationships with other human beings, this 'dualist' expresses 'letting go' when she is talking about her relationship with God.

'Letting go': The first subsidiary conceptual practice of 'ambiguity'

This subsidiary conceptual practice of 'letting go' occurs not only under the dominant conceptual practice of 'ambiguity' but also under the dominant conceptual practice of 'vulnerability'. As noted in chapter 5 subsidiary conceptual practices frequently reveal aspects of the dominant conceptual practice. In chapter 5 the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' is shown through the story of Libi who talks about letting go of old theological constructions and understandings and how this has helped her to become vulnerable in her dealings with people. She moves out of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' and into the dominant conceptual practice 'vulnerability'.

In the present chapter the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' reappears as an aspect of the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity'. Just as in other cases, the figures I describe in this chapter represent more than themselves, they are typical of so many of the 'integrationists'. When some of the integrationists –

and I cite the examples of Pat, Pete, Tom, Flora and Sal – begin using the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' they frequently move on to employ the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity'. Effectively therefore what seems to be happening is that there is a relationship between the dominant conceptual practices 'vulnerability' and 'ambiguity' because when the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' is employed the interviewee moves on to use either 'vulnerability' or 'ambiguity'.

It is logical that the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' is a prelude to the dominant conceptual practices 'vulnerability' and 'ambiguity'. In the sphere of vulnerability the stories the interviewees tell frequently reveal incidents where they have relinquished positions of power in order to take up the dominant conceptual practice 'vulnerability'. In this chapter which deals with the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' the stories the interviewees tell give insights into how they have freely opted to jettison fixed or literal theological and spiritual understandings in order to enter the mythic and poetic realm.

One of the typical manifestations of this subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' occurs in the realm of thought. Of the seven 'integrationists' who overtly manifest this subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' there is not one who does not speak about his or her readiness to relinquish traditional constructions. These traditional constructions frequently are set ways of thinking and talking about the notion 'God'.

In chapter 5 I noted how the 'integrationist' interviewee under the pseudonym Glen claims that the individual person must be able to abandon his or her 'received' or 'pet' constructions about the Sacred if there can be any chance for a new imaging or perception of the Sacred (Glen 250). One of the sibling conceptual practices of 'letting go' is 'paradox' (8 4; see appendix 2). This conceptual practice, 'paradox', opens up some associated meanings surrounding the conceptual practice 'letting go'. It typically refers to interviewees who are able to face the absurdity of issues, believing that the apparent absurdity provides the basis for new dynamism and creativity.

The 'integrationist' interviewee, Pat, demonstrates the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' during his reflections about the social justice conference entitled 'Turning Point' (ch. 5). Pat mentions how he had for some time been disillusioned with the Catholic Church; he saw far too many people living passive lives in which they did not challenge their own set constructions. In contradistinction to this Pat says that he was invited to be part of a group of lay people in setting up a conference on the issue of social justice. He says that this conference made a deep impression on him because he saw so many people pushing the boundaries of tight doctrinal and pastoral conceptions beyond their existing limits.

Pat talks about the people who were part of the planning of the assembly in terms of individuals who were 'giving out of their hearts and their experience'. He notes that 'There wasn't any sense...of authority being laid on anybody' (Pat 843). The feature of the conference organisation about which Pat becomes enthused was the number of new liturgies which were developed by women. Speaking about how these liturgies pushed the limits of the participants' conceptualisation of justice, life and involvement he says that these liturgies 'weren't based on our traditional Catholic liturgies, but were very evocative of basic human emotions in terms of belonging...longing for justice and peace.' (Pat 863)

Reflecting about the conference Pat mentions how people working together generated a new vision – these individuals encouraged each other to think new thoughts, to think in new ways and to entertain dreams of relationship and justice. Pat recognises that before people can take up new forms of thought they have to be prepared to drop the constraints which hold the thought bound.

Pat mentions that the new future people see as a possibility emerges out of their own selves. He says that it is inappropriate to disregard the human component in creating a new spirit; he notes how people do this by attributing the new energy to God. In this Pat quite independently expresses the same sentiments as Glen in chapter 5 where Glen (243) says he gets infuriated by Christians who

impose theological constructs rather than stay with the experience and enter it deeply in their own being; Pat says

When people are fully alive...Its the spirit of themselves. It is the spirit of people. That's the spirit of life in people. And I think its unfair to say that God is taking over their lives in any way. (Pat 1311)

Pat argues a case for recognising the distinctive nature of individual experience when he speaks about human engagement in life. In the above quote Pat focuses on how important it is for people to recognise and own their own unique spirit whenever they experience life in relationship with others. This is central to the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'letting go' because later when Pat talks about the concept 'God' he does so by referring back to this notion of the individual's unique spirit. It is in this context that Pat talks about a notion of God.

He says that when people begin to exercise the full expression of their giftedness and become 'fully alive', they begin to experience themselves and themselves in relationship. He specifies that it is in that state of living out one's potential one is in relationship with the Sacred. 'I think the person um, who is fully alive is in relationship with God.' (Pat 1408)

After Pat makes this comment and because it is he who uses the term 'God' I ask him to talk around the notion of God. I use Pat's own image of a person who is fully relating to another and who fully respects the individuality of the

person. I continue by asking about the person who takes charge of his or her life, who takes responsibility and sets personal agendas. In this context conscious that it is Pat who generated the term 'God' I ask Pat 'Where is God in that thing for you?' (Pat 1436)

It is at this point of the interview that Pat demonstrates the conceptual practice of 'letting go'. Rather than refer to some of the traditional terms of the conception of God, such as 'Being without beginning or end', or 'Almighty', 'Eternal' or 'Unchangeable', Pat chooses to drop these conceptions. Pat talks about the conception of God not in terms of a being in itself, but rather in terms of the individual's awareness of his or her own experiential relationship. 'I have to define God in terms of what I am relating to when I'm doing that...This is God for me.' (Pat 1441)

In choosing to answer the question in this form Pat relativises the conception of God - he does this because he ties the notion to his state of relationship with others at any particular time. Hence logically if Pat chooses not to be 'fully alive' or not to be 'totally simpatico with somebody else' (Pat 1398) then his experience of God is quite different from those occasions in his life when he is in deep relationship with another person.

Pat articulates this relative nature of his construction of God by stating 'God is the other half of that experience in some way.' (Pat 1449) By constructing the

notion of God in terms of human relationship Pat comes to recognise that he has 'let go' of classical constructions of God. He moves to the position where he has to state 'I cannot put a name on it' (Pat 1450)

Pat clearly expresses the connection of the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'letting go' with the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity', when he continues the above statement 'Like its far too vague and amorphous and all the rest of it...But it is a reality, I'm convinced of that.' (Pat 1454)

Here Pat uses the concepts 'vague' and 'amorphous' together with the notion he is attempting to describe and yet he says that even despite its vague and amorphous character 'it is a reality'. Hence though Pat uses conceptions of God which necessitate God being constructed in ambiguous terms he is quite assured in holding to the notion 'God', since he says above 'God is the other half of that experience in some way' (Pat 1449). From one perspective it seems a contradiction in terms to claim a conviction about a relationship which is by its nature ambiguous, yet Pat is still prepared to use the conceptual practices 'letting go' and 'ambiguity' despite the apparent contradiction their use generates.

Pete is another integrationist who employs the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go'. He talks about how his examination of the Catholic faith led him to many issues with which he couldn't agree. At first he was somewhat worried

that he 'couldn't agree with probably 50 per cent. of the Creed' (Pete 339). He came to the conclusion that the things he didn't believe should not prevent him from joining the Church (Pete 340). On the occasion when I was typing up his interview while listening to Pete's voice on the audio tape, I inserted a commentary in the transcript which read 'Again Pete seems able to accept ambiguity.' (Pete 342) Pete was the fifteenth interview I had conducted and in the early stages of writing up interviews the notion of ambiguity recurred continually.

Sociological implications

Pete's approach to Catholicism seems to support Luckmann's (1974, 1990) prediction that religion is becoming more individualised and dismissive of institutional forms. It would also seem to support Hegy's (1987) claim that within the 'invisible' form of Catholicism people are taking more personal responsibility for their theological and moral stances. Interestingly both Luckmann's and Hegy's predictions diverge from the ideal types Weber (1982:120) constructs about religion in terms of ethics of ultimate ends and ethics of responsibility. Here Pete's approach to joining Catholicism tends to bridge the ethics of ultimate ends and the ethics of responsibility. Pete's readiness to join Catholicism even though he doesn't agree with quite a substantial portion of its teachings indicates a shift within religion where the individual takes personal responsibility rather than accept the teaching and moral position of the institution.

'Ambiguity' and 'letting go': not simply a possession of the fortunate but of those who have suffered

The interviewees who exhibit the conceptual practices 'ambiguity' and its subsidiary conceptual practices are frequently people who experience personal hurts and struggles in their lives – one such person is Tom (ch. 5). Tom has gone through the trauma of having two of his sons suicide – the second of whom suicided some two years after the first. Tom uses the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' as part of accepting that the absurdity of life cannot be neatly answered by resorting to categorical statements of faith. Tom lets go of conceptual and categorical answers to faith and life.

Tom contradicts the assumption that the 'integrationist' interviewees are merely a group of people who are born in fortunate circumstances and this is why they can use the conceptual practices 'letting go' and 'ambiguity'. Tom cannot be grouped with the idealised person who is well adjusted, at one with self, others and the universe – such is not the case. Tom and many of the integrationist interviewees go through periods of deep soul searching; they frequently become disillusioned with institutions they have trusted, such as the Church.

Flora is a Catholic religious sister who unambiguously rejects many facets of religion. Flora specifies the facets of the Catholic religion she jettisons. The notion of 'cult' entails formal organised ritual which frequently follows a

prescribed procedure. In talking about priesthood she links it specifically to the context of cult – she is adamant that both need to be abandoned. The implications of her statement are particularly powerful given the fact that she has been a religious sister for most of her life and she is not young. Part of the traditional formation of the Catholic sister has been a recognition of the central importance of the celebration of Eucharist. The priest – more so in the past than now – has traditionally been allotted an integral part in this act of cultic worship.

Flora distinguishes between that of which she lets go and that to which she holds. Flora says that she wants Eucharist without the structural components which perpetuate patriarchy, hierarchy and formalism. She speaks of having Eucharist with a group of women and of a ceremony she shares with an Anglican friend; though the Anglican doesn't regard their shared meal as a Eucharist, Flora does. 'It's with a group of women. And to me, that's the most real Eucharist that I go to' (Flora 575).

Flora says that she will work toward an egalitarian, social justice based Church after having let go of cultic male priesthood and hierarchy. She says that the form of religion which will evolve will have a small group at the centre, there will be no separate priestly caste, there will be simple sharing of the Scriptures and bread and wine. What will characterise this sort of religious way of life will be a radical commitment to social justice linked to 'the gospel we dare to read' (Flora 593). Her statements refer to an existing form of this type of religion

which exists in the present time in South America (Flora 597). Flora's reflections reveal the conceptual practice 'letting go' – a practice many of the 'integrationist' employ.

Another religious sister by the pseudonym of Sal mirrors much of the thinking expressed by Flora in terms of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go'. Sal mentions how both the images and metaphors which have been traditionally constructed about God effectively confine the notion of God within tight conceptual boundaries. In particular she alludes to political, economic and cultural interests which are at play in the shaping how people talk and think about God. 'Images of God, metaphors for God limit...we've actually put God into a box, I think has continued in the oppression of the earth.' (Sal 94)

Throughout Sal's interview she argues from a feminist and an ecological spiritual viewpoint. In the quote immediately above Sal points out the ecological and feminist implications of the continued use of particular images and metaphors for God. She contends that guilt lies not only on those who construct patriarchal and homocentric images of God, but it also falls on the shoulders of everybody who perpetuates those constructions by using the pertinent images and metaphors.

Sal manifests the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' through her use of new images and metaphors which free people from the need to use particular

traditional images. One such metaphor she employs is imaging the earth as the body of God. This metaphor runs counter to much of traditional Catholic thinking, there is a strong set of teachings which allude to a real distinction between God as creator and the earth as creature of God. The notion of 'grace' is used as a way of mediating the presence of God to the creature and at the same time maintaining God's distinctive being. Sal, in employing this metaphor, even though it is ostensibly used only by analogy, pulls the two notions of God and the earth very much together. This has profound ecological and feminist implications in terms of theology and spirituality for religion. Sal's proclaimed agenda lies both in the sphere of ecology and feminism. By promoting this new image and metaphor for God, Sal is manifestly moving away from particular older constructions which continue to dominate the earth and women. She displays the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go'.

Sal reflects about the transitions in her own spirituality and how she has chosen to leave images of God which have particularly detrimental implications for women and the earth. She notes that some of these images maintain the separation and distance of God from all that is earthly, particularly the body with its affectual and physical aspects. She discusses how particular images and metaphors profoundly impact upon the very existence of a spirituality grounded in social justice and a theology of social justice

my images of God have just been developing again over the last number of years from a very stereotyped image of God as a distant God. And so one of my

reasons for linking feminism and ecology with God...is to be on about justice.
(Sal 162)

Sal calls upon some of the insights of feminist and ecological spirituality and theology of Sally McFague (1987) to support her case that particular images and metaphors of God impact on issues of social justice. One of the common points between feminist and ecological spiritualities and theologies is the notion of the interdependence which underlies much of life. This challenges theologies and spiritualities which further notions of dominance and distance. Sal takes up this issue of distance in the quote immediately above and targets the images and metaphors which promote the view of God as 'distant'. Feminist and ecological theology and spirituality oppose such constructions. Sal explicitly states that the reason why she brings the insights of feminism and ecology to bear upon the selection of images and metaphors for God is precisely because her primary concern is about justice (Sal 162). Sal, in accentuating the interdependence and intimacy of God with the earth emphasises a God who cannot but be implicated in issues of justice (given the metaphor of the earth as God's body).

Sal chooses new images for God and in so doing claims she drops the stereotypical images which perpetuate a God of distance. Through using the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' Sal's theology and spirituality leave aside constructions which continue to oppress women and the earth. Later on in the interview I return to Sal's reference to images which distance God. I put the question in a form which is somewhat provocative, since I ask it in such a

way as to imply she favours the notion of God as distant. I ask her if her God is distant? Sal's response is immediate and sharp

No! I said that I used to have an all-pervading stereotyped image of God that was as a God God [sic] distant...over the last few years, especially since my mid in my mid-life years I've come to appreciate that um yeah, that that [sic] God is within. And now no, I don't have the absoluteness [sic] securities that I used to.
(Sal 760)

By contrast she says that now she has come to understand 'that God is within'. (Sal 759) It is interesting that she immediately follows up this statement about the intimacy she has with God with a reflection about her own ambiguity. Sal says 'And now no, I don't have the absolute securities that I used to.' (760) It would seem therefore that Sal is making some connection with her sense of 'letting go' of the traditional images of a distant God and her sense of ambiguity in her life. The shift from a God who is 'other', 'distant' and by implication is all knowing, all powerful and communicates with the universe from outside it, to a God who is within, seemingly is large. The God who is within suggests a God who shares our human condition which is unpredictable and messy. The 'letting go' of the image of a God who controls from afar and the moving to imaging God as intertwined in human experience manifests Sal's use of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go'.

In the discussion of this subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' it appears that the implementation of this way of life requires effort and commitment.

When Sal says that she no longer has 'the absolute securities that I used to.' (Sal 760), that statement entails an element of loss. Some people move into anxiety when their securities are taken from them. It would seem that she is prepared to undergo the insecurity consequent to 'letting go' of the God of ultimate security; and she does this presumably because her passion is for justice, the earth, women and marginalised people in society.

I would like to emphasise this point because otherwise the spiritual style of these 'integrationist' interviewees can be touted as a spirituality simply for the elite. More to the point, these 'integrationists' in the main are people who experience a great deal of personal hurt from the reactionary attitudes and expressions of those who are fixed in their understanding of spirituality and religion. Sal comments on how she is positioned as 'other' by people with whom she shares life and by people allied to the institutional sphere of Church. Tom, the 'integrationists' mentioned earlier, made huge changes in the way he conceptualised God. He noted how this was done after having experienced the ordeal of having one of his sons suicide and then a year and half later he was faced with more pain when his second son suicided. Thus it is incorrect to assume that these 'integrationists' are self-assured and carefree personalities, who are gifted and so fortunate that they can brush aside the disparaging remarks of close companions.

The subsidiary conceptual practice of 'letting go' contributes to an overall sense of the dominant conceptual practice of 'ambiguity' in Sal's switch of images for God. She talks about God being constituted as 'distant' due to the continual use of stereotypical images. She is now determined to embrace the notion of God as intimate by resorting to metaphors such as the earth being God's body. Sal mentions how this has affected the way she experiences a shift in her sense of security. From the absolute securities she once had, her life has become a journey of shifting awareness. Besides this subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' having an impact upon the overarching and more dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity', there is a second subsidiary conceptual practice – entitled 'mystery', which contributes to this sense of 'ambiguity'. This subsidiary conceptual practice of 'mystery' is a sibling conceptual practice to the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'letting go'.

'Mystery': Ambiguity's second subsidiary conceptual practice

Of all the diverse forms of conceptual practices perhaps the form of 'mystery' provides the easiest way of understanding a conceptual practice in operation. The notion of mystery is commonly referred to in terms of a basic attitude or disposition individuals adopt toward life. However the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mystery' differs from an attitude or stance of mystery. What I argue is that the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mystery' is so basic to the way these 'integrationists' take up their stance vis-a-vis life that it acts almost to predispose these individuals to look at life in itself as mystery. The

'integrationist' interviewees place a high priority on this subsidiary conceptual practice and frequently conceive of the notion of 'God' in terms of 'mystery'.

An 'integrationist' interviewee who displays the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mystery' is Sal. Throughout Sal's reflections about a 'cave experience' she had she seems to typify the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mystery'. When Sal talks about her cave experience she stays with the experience. She refuses to put the experience in the safe categories she remembers from early childhood. Even though the experience happens in the context of a trip to Jerusalem Sal does not flee from the personal nature of her experience by imposing classical religious themes.

She begins this reflection by talking about how she was on an archaeological tour of Israel with a group of people, one of whom was a feminist biblical scholar. Sal talks about an occasion when the group went to a site with a cave in it. Sal had an emotional reaction and felt 'shivery'. She said she couldn't stay with the group who were talking to the guide. She describes how she drew aside in an attempt to respect the experience she was having. In doing this she became aware of an event of some 12 years earlier when she was on a 30 day retreat. In that earlier retreat event Sal says she used to periodically visit a cave in her imagination and there talk to Mary, the mother of Jesus. She recalls how she would ask Mary about some of the deeper issues she was facing in her life, such as where her life was going. Sal mentions how a flow of answers would

come to her. All the while she knew that the answers were rising from her own experience and knowledge yet the answers were deep and connected into life issues.

Reflecting on her more recent experience on tour Sal says that the cave immediately connected her with the earlier set of experiences. She says however that the recent cave experience was much more than a point of connection with the 30 day retreat. She mentions how the cave took on the significance of a sacred place. Sal explains what the term 'sacred place' conjures up in her mind by using a metaphor of salt water where the salt is so part of the water that at a simple level it cannot be separated.

Sal continues to reflect about what the experience meant for her and talks around the issue for some time. Eventually after talking about how for some people the burial place of Jesus or the old city of Jerusalem was special, such was not the case for her. The events which seem to tap into her personal story became significant, hence the desert wilderness and the sea of Galilee triggered off deep associations. Sal finally expresses what the cave as a 'sacred place' meant for her. Choosing to avoid an overly-pious answer she reluctantly uses an expression which is somewhat opaque and oblique; she says that a sacred place is a place where she becomes aware of being connected to divinity. 'So that...by sacred there, I mean that I was in touch with divinity in a very strong way...mystery, divinity, mystery, something beyond myself.' (Sal 302, 306)

Sal withdraws from the group; she avoids resolution of the ambiguity of the experience, she attends to all that was happening in herself. She connects to the shivering, she is so in touch with her unconscious that an event from 12 years previous comes flooding back to her. She knows that these events are triggers which connect her to her deeper insights. She describes this by saying that all the answers were coming from within. Finally she comes to recognise the extent of the connection; it is not only connection to her own inner psyche, it is an awareness of connection 'with divinity in a very strong way'.

All this presupposes that Sal has an inner commitment which honours and responds to the experiential moment. Her readiness to attend to the deeper experience in the cave and the desert wilderness is an indication that Sal purposefully lives out the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mystery'. What she is displaying is not merely an occasional decision to stay open to the moment. The depth of her reflections suggests a commitment to a way of life. Her attitudinal stance has become a conceptual practice. She is present in the face of the immediate experience and attempts to honestly be open to that utter reality as much as she is able.

Later in the interview I invite Sal to talk a little more about her experience in the cave. I ask her about what she means by the phrases she uses, 'place of mystery' and 'place of divinity'. Sal explains what was going on by suggesting two levels

of understanding – the first stays at the sensory level, the second goes beneath to a deeper meaning. At the sensory level the explanation is somewhat superficial because there is an attempt to deal with the event purely by discussing what happened in visual, auditory and olfactory terms.

Sal says of the second level one goes 'below the surface and beyond the superficial' (Sal 320). Concerning this second mode Sal speaks of being connected; yet the connection is something more than what is immediately before her. She says that the experience led her to a consciousness that she is connected to all that is. This connection embraces all that is, is part of the particularity of being and yet also transcends the individual being. Sal says that the experience in the cave lead her to a rich insight into how all beings are connected and are connected to something bigger. She exclaims

this is all connected with something much greater and deeper than I am, and yet its like I'm [sic], its part of me. And its another part of the world, its another part of the divinity...Its where humanity meets divinity somehow and it was a sacred meeting. (Sal 325)

Once again the notion 'mystery' appears in two distinct forms in this discussion. On the one hand Sal is dealing with 'mystery' by recalling, reflecting and talking about it so that it becomes part of the content of her interview conversation. On the other hand she employs the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'mystery' when she becomes aware of mystery as an object of her focus. She is respectful, she attends upon the moment, she attempts to be open to all the

associated memories that well up in her as she is present to the experience of the cave. Her stance, her attitude, her orientation toward what she is experiencing suggest that she acts out of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mystery'.

An important revelation occurs immediately after Sal's discussion of the cave experience. I present back to Sal what I heard her say about the cave. I note how I heard her speak about the cave as a place where humanity meets divinity and how she mentioned the unconscious material which resurfaced in her awareness. I note that she referred to the experience as a consciousness of divinity or mystery.

Sal's reflections on my reading of the conversation reveals how the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mystery' is being closely allied to the dominant conceptual practice of 'ambiguity'. She says that even though she used many words and ideas in the end she does not understand the event. She specifically notes that there is a reason why she chooses to use the words 'mystery' and 'divinity' – it is because her experience eludes full comprehension. She says she uses the words 'mystery' and 'divinity' because 'I don't understand it'. (Sal 347) I ask Sal why she uses the term 'mystery' and associate it with 'not understanding'? It is here that Sal ties the notion of 'mystery' to that of ambiguity; she says

Well, partly that I...can't grasp it. That its elusive...that its part of life, but its not something I can pin down or box in, and I don't really want to. And its always got depths to be plumbed and explored. (Sal 355)

One of the impressions that this part of Sal's interview can give is that her subsidiary conceptual practice 'mystery' comes into operation only in unique and occasional moments of her life. As a way of testing whether or not this is so I pick up on one of the phrases Sal uses in the section above. I ask her about the phrase she used, namely that mystery is 'part of life'. She answers Yes. I then ask if she experiences 'it at other places?' Sal goes on to explain that she experiences a sense of mystery in relationships. When Sal is able to say that she experiences a sense of 'mystery', 'connection' and 'divinity' in and through human relationships, she ties her sense of enchantment to that which is 'part of life'. This is the point of her spirituality, it is not a private experience which takes place in esoteric places – she ties it to relationships. Her cave experience recalled her 30 day retreat awareness but the content of the retreat experience was a set of answers which did not come from outside herself but from deep within herself. She mentions the name Mary and says that she was aware that what was happening was a growing awareness of her own unconscious wisdom and insight. Sal's spirituality is a spirituality which calls her to get in contact with her own memories and experience – she is connected to her everyday life. This it would seem is a strong statement about a spirituality for social engagement and it also describes the dynamics which permit enchantment in this time of modernity.

After talking about a few other topics with Sal I return to her notion of mystery. I ask Sal about her use of the word mystery when she talks about her experiences, and if she uses any other words? It is here that Sal shows how her sense of enchantment and divinity is enmeshed in the experiences of life. She offers a string of words which express the basis of physical life itself. She connects the notion mystery to an ontological understanding of being. She interchanges notions about the ground of physical life with the notion mystery. In answer to my question 'When you say mystery, er what other words would you put on that'? Sal says 'God, Goddess, um Life force, um groundedness, um heart-centre, heartbeat, passionate place.' (Sal 727) Where Sal has extended her sense of mystery to the realm of her relationships with people and nature, this does not tend to happen in the lives of the 'dualist' interviewees.

Dualist use of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mystery'

One of the dualist interviewees Cecilia exhibits an overall sense of an attitude of waiting, reverence and presence. However she indicates that this sense of mystery occurs for her dominantly in reference to God. She talks about when and where this experience would happen:

it happens sometimes on a good day in what you would call private prayer. But also it could be just walking down the street, thinking about nothing in particular, it could just sometimes be a bit overwhelmed by what you assume is God's presence. (237)

Cecilia begins to talk about what could be some of the things that happen in her life which would block out this sense of awe. She mentions being overstressed at home with her family or other things as obstacles to the sense of mystery. It is while saying this that Cecilia reveals a little more than she intends. She says that she is getting off the topic. This contrasts strongly with the way that the 'integrationists' talk about the sense of mystery. To talk about relationship with the family is not 'off the topic'; it is precisely 'the topic'. In fairness to Cecilia she does specify the type of relationship as one which is 'over-stressed'.

At another point in the interview Cecilia reflects about an occasion when she experiences a sense of mystery – she locates the event in a formal prayer setting. One of the phrases she uses suggests quite a different approach to spirituality than that expressed by many of the 'integrationist' interviewees. Speaking about the occasion of prayer she refers to it as 'an important part of worship, which sort of takes one out of one's self in a way and sort of unites you with other people and their prayer.' (Cel 147)

The question I want to pursue here is Does Cecilia leave her own human experience when she talks about mystery? She does speak about mystery in a way that is different to the way the 'integrationists' speak about it. Soon after having completed the interview and listened to the tape I wrote a commentary note about Cecilia's expression at this point.

Her statement around Q28 was 'It takes one out of oneself' seems to sum up her perception of spiritual experience. This is so unlike Jane and Angela who talk of the 'naked' 'raw' 'earthy' stuff of life being the basis of insight into mystery. (Cel 497)

Jane and Angela are 'integrationist' interviewees and I note (chs 5, 6) that they frequently work from the ground of human experience and it is within that context that they begin reflecting about notions of spirituality and the conceptual practice of 'mystery'. It seems that the 'dualist' interviewees do manifest the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mystery' but they speak of it as an experience which takes them out of their everyday life. On the occasions in daily life where they do come to a sense of awe this sense does not appear to dwell in the physical being or sensory experience, but quickly transcends the immediate tangible being or event and becomes lodged in a construction of God. They display the conceptual practice primarily in their relation to God in times of formal worship or prayer. I would like now to turn to the third major way that the dominant practice of 'ambiguity' finds expression in the lives of the 'integrationist' interviewees. This is the subsidiary conceptual practice of language.

'Language': the third subsidiary conceptual practice of 'ambiguity'

From the above set of discussions it follows that there is an orientation among the 'integrationist' interviewees to respect the elusive, complex and diverse nature of deep human experience. As the 'integrationist' interviewees describe

the elusive and complex aspects of their lives typically there seems to be little evidence that they wish to control, limit and categorise these experiences. The 'integrationist' commonly explain that when people name this experience too readily by using words such as 'mystery', 'enchantment', 'the other', 'the Sacred', an injustice is done to the experience. Words characterise, limit and carry associated meanings and thus a problem arises – How can anyone characterise that which eludes definition?

Barb, one of the 'integrationists', manifests the subsidiary conceptual practice 'language' in her reporting about the same social justice conference of which Pat spoke at the beginning of this chapter. Barb speaks of this conference on social justice as an event in which people experienced a deep sense of commonality. Barb's observations mirror Pat's comments about how many individuals were able to lay aside differences, take time to appreciate different points of view and gain a sense of consensus. Barb remarks on the common force and purpose which emerged as the conference evolved. Barb exhibits the subsidiary conceptual practice 'language' by her refusal to use terms and phrases which too readily define what was happening. The majority of the people at the conference were from a Catholic tradition and one of the stock explanations of what was happening would have been to say 'God was at work here'. None of the interviewees however attempt such an encompassing statement – it would fail to take account of the state of human awareness at the time. Barb's language

respects peoples' experience – she says there was a common sense of 'something really much bigger than all the rest of us.' (Barb 433)

She moves to explain this further by maintaining similarly inclusive concepts.

She says that there was a sense that the momentum of the conference had a life and a mind of its own. She notes that even if individuals would switch or suppress the orientation 'that whether we liked it or not and whether we could stop it or not something was happening.' (Barb 438) Presumably Barb did have some sense that the nature of this consensus-like creation had some connection with the notion of the transcendent, mystery, the 'other', God. She does not use the term 'God' but rather a term which is less specific. 'There was a real movement of the Spirit might be one way of defining it' (Barb 437).

The phrasing of Barb's sentence is rather oblique. She does not make the 'Spirit' the object of her sentence, instead she speaks of 'a real movement of the Spirit'. This way of constructing her conversation permits her to talk about an action rather than the person of the 'Spirit'. She also adds the qualifying phrase 'might be one way of defining it'. Even this rider has two relative terms 'might be' and 'one way'; she suggests therefore that her original notion need not be the case and also that there could be other ways of speaking about the experience.

In the interview I follow up Barb's observation by asking her what she meant when she says 'something bigger than us' (Barb 444). She explains that she

chooses the phrase 'movement of the Spirit' rather than 'the Spirit' because the former phrase emphasises the action of the people involved – the latter fails to do this. The idea 'movement' suggests lack of definition.

There's a washing over us or blowing through us or whatever, and its part of, we've all got a little bit of it, but even all our little bits of it, there's still something more than that. (Barb 458)

When I pursue the issue by inquiring if Barb thinks of the 'Spirit' apart from human activity she avoids a direct answer. Instead she replies by saying that she understands what she is describing in terms of human action. Her words in this instance carry the notion of relativity. She says 'I think where I see it the most and can name it the most, is more...in the human experience I think.' (Barb 471) Hence in attempting to be faithful to her experience Barb couches her language most carefully, her phrasing avoids a definitive style, she says 'I think' rather than 'It was'. In addition to this her phrase 'see it most' suggests degrees of 'seeing'. Similarly she uses the term 'most' when she decides to attempt to 'name' it, implying that the naming of 'it' is more analogous than literal. I would like to draw attention at this point to how this subsidiary conceptual practice 'language' which Barb employs is closely allied to the dominant conceptual practice of 'ambiguity'. Like the other two subsidiary conceptual practices of 'letting go' and 'mystery', 'language' supports the dominant conceptual practice of 'ambiguity'.

Later in the interview, Barb talks about how one of the key musicians in the conference had composed a song which expresses the idea of God being in the middle of a turning world. As Barb recalls the words of the song she says that the sentiments it expresses mirror her own. She says 'that's kind of where God is for me too, and it is a gut thing, more than a head thing.' (Barb 634)

Earlier in the interview Barb had used the term 'Sacred' when expressing the same event she says 'And I suppose in the context of this conversation I would call that the Sacred.' (Barb 569) In response to this I inquire why she uses the word 'Sacred'. She explains that her choice of the term 'Sacred' indicates the difficulty she has with the 'language about God.' (Barb 668) When she uses the term 'God' about an experience she states that she still has an internal struggle while doing so. She quite clearly indicates that the term is inadequate and that it is only a substitute until she can find something which more truly represents her experience. She says

Yeah that's God, I know I name that as God, but I don't know, I mean I'm experimenting with other words. But for now God will do. Yes certainly God in my life and its certainly an experience of God. (Barb 711)

In this self-analytic mode she talks about her 'struggle' in 're-imagining' what the words portray. At this point Barb's set of reflections serve to highlight how very aware she is of the shortcomings present in language and its inability to express experience. Barb moves on to talk about how terms come to be loaded with associated meanings not present in the original construction of the terms. She

mentions how she feels the need to reconstruct a new language about 'God' which will not carry so many images which are appendages and serve to misrepresent what she means (Barb 679).

Another 'integrationist' interviewee Rob – like Barb – talks about how language about the Sacred ought to be sufficiently inclusive to accommodate and respect other peoples' experience. Rob talks about his uncle who is in his 70s and who is not affiliated with any formal religious denomination. Rob mentions how his uncle has talked about experiences, which according to Rob are experiences of the 'Transcendent'. Rob states how very important it is to be aware of the diversity of experience between his uncle and himself; he therefore insists on using language which accommodates such diversity.

his experience of a transcendent being might of course be quite profound, I don't know, you see. I suppose that's why...we've talked about peoples' aspiration to a transcendent being. (Rob 575)

Rob broadens the discussion by talking about the diversity of people within the social justice movement called the 'Action for World Development'. He notes how many of these people besides rejecting the institutional churches also have difficulty in speaking about 'a male God and things like that.' (Rob 578) Rob maintains that these people while being uneasy about such constructions of God are ready to accept the notion of 'some transcendence' or the idea of a 'transcendent being' (Rob 579). The associated qualities of the notion of transcendence are sufficiently expansive that they elude sharp definition. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1964: 1378) defines the term transcend as to 'Be

beyond the range or domain or grasp of (human experience, reason, description, belief etc.).'

Sociological implications

Rob respects the different experience of his uncle; he cites the exact words of his uncle's reflection about raising his family 'I've tried to do my best by this mob' (Rob 557). Apparently on the basis of this Rob says even though his uncle would not use the term 'God' about his relationship with his family Rob is prepared to say that a way of describing the experience is to talk about his uncle's family life as having 'some transcendence' (Rob 579).

As noted in chapter 2 Luckmann (1990:128) claims that with the privatisation of religion in our modern era, constructions of religious significance have shifted the use and the meaning of the term 'transcendence'. Luckmann claims that the dominant contemporary use of the term 'transcendence' is part of the privatisation of religion and refers to the everyday events of human life. Rob certainly does embed his use of the phrase 'some transcendence' firmly into his uncle's everyday life, however unlike Luckmann's prediction this is not a focus on self. Where Luckmann claims modern privatised religion is primarily caught up in the themes of 'self-realization, personal autonomy, and self-expression' (Luckmann, 1990: 127), Rob's interaction with his uncle contradicts this because he is not focused by himself.

Rob uses the phrase 'some transcendence' to speak about an experience of everyday life which though grounded in everyday life extends beyond it. As a prelude to telling his story about his uncle, Rob makes reference to his grandfather who helped set up the Labor movement, the workers' club and the ALP in Port Pirie. Rob mentions how his uncle – a cousin to his father – 'in my teenage years used to ear-bash me about all this and I got stirred up.' (Rob 92) Rob is convinced about his uncle's passion for social justice and human dignity, particularly in the work place and in the worker's family home. Hegy (1987), even though writing about 'invisible Catholicism' accounts much more accurately for the spirituality Rob can see in his uncles than does Luckmann (1990). Hegy does this because he claims the spirituality of 'invisible Catholicism' drives people to see and name injustice both within and outside the Church and then take issue with it. Hegy's account of 'invisible Catholicism' mirrors Rob's life.

The language of transcendence and the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity'

Concepts such as 'transcendence' which are frequently used by the 'integrationists' typify the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity'. The way some of these 'integrationists' use the term 'transcendence' as a way of accommodating diverse experiences of spirituality, is a classical feature of the subordinate conceptual practice of 'language'. The 'integrationists' instinctively

strive to couch their thinking in terms and phrases which can sustain the sense of 'ambiguity'. It is as if the 'integrationists' seek to honour their experience of the Sacred by employing the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'language' and select such terms as a way of avoiding reductionist and fixed concepts.

The same term 'transcendence' is used by another 'integrationist' Tom (the father of two sons who suicided). Tom speaks about remembering the experience of silence and awe; he says that he carries these experiences with him throughout his life. When Tom refers to his sense of the Sacred he chooses to use the same term as Rob; Tom says 'I had a sense of awe...I was always attentive and I could always recognise the transcendent' (Tom 551). Tom goes on to mention a limiting influence and says that his experience of the transcendent 'began to be shaped in terms of church structure and things like that' (Tom 552). In this example it is possible to see Tom's avoidance of images and language which literalise notions of the Sacred. Tom makes a point of mentioning how institutional religion frequently tends to shape and structure that which of is beyond definition. Tom's use of the term 'transcendent' is an indicator of his conceptual practice of 'language'. The close connection between the subordinate conceptual practice 'language' and the dominant conceptual practice of 'ambiguity' runs through Tom's and Rob's reflections on respecting the elusive nature of their (and others') experience of the Sacred.

Words similar to the 'transcendent' are used by a host of other 'integrationists'. Libi mentions how she speaks of God as 'other and spirit and whatever' (Libi 455). Barb notes how when she thinks about the notion of mystery she will frequently employ terms such as 'the movement of the Spirit...I think of something that is very powerful but gentle and mobile, its dynamic you know.' (Barb 449)

Barb suggests that there is a 'dynamic' aspect to the notion of the 'movement of the Spirit'. Introducing this feature continues to expand the ambiguity which typifies the 'integrationist' construction of mystery and 'the movement of the Spirit'. The 'dualist' interviewees tend to speak about these issues in quite a different way. Where the 'integrationists' employ the subsidiary conceptual practices of 'letting go', 'mystery' and 'language' as facets of the dominant conceptual practice of 'ambiguity', the 'dualist' interviewees frequently employ the subsidiary conceptual practices of 'certitude' and 'a priori' as facets of the dominant conceptual practice of 'categorise'.

The dualist dominant conceptual practice of 'categorise' and its subsidiaries 'certitude' and 'a priori'

The subsidiary conceptual practice 'certitude' is expressed by one of the 'dualist' interviewees Jack. In my opening comments to Jack I begin by inviting him to talk about some area in his life where he finds some sense of meaning, energy and importance. Jack (15) responds by saying that he cannot speak about such

things because everything is subjected to his faith – a reply which needs further elaboration by Jack, but which I dare not pursue lest he terminate the interview. He goes on to talk about being a Catholic and says that this is entirely different from every other religion. It is at this point that Jack forwards one of his typical statements of certitude – he says 'By that I mean being Catholic, which I believe is entirely different than any other religion in the world, because other religions aren't faith' (Jack 27). In re-reading the comments immediately after completing the interview and listening to the tape recording I wrote 'The atmosphere of the interview is very intense. Listening to the taped replay, Jack has tight control on every word which he uses' (Jack 41).

The conceptual categories and language Jack chooses to use have sharp boundaries – there is little diversification within those boundaries. Jack speaks about a hypothetical situation of one of his brothers leaving the church. He says if such a thing were to happen he would refuse to have anything further to do with that brother. The imagery Jack employs reflects the mechanical nature of his decision making – he says 'if one of my brothers were to leave the church, that's it, I would just cut them off.' (Jack 269) Jack explains by conjectures about a possible scenario of one of his brothers who might be in a relationship with a woman which 'was immoral'. Jack says he would not make that person welcome in his home. In concluding his reflections about the case Jack uses words which leave no doubt about the certitude of his assessment of the situation; he says

you can't be middle of the road there are no soft options, there is no changing the rule...I don't welcome people in my home who I know are living immoral relationships. (Jack 294)

Later Jack speaks in general about how human beings differ, though his examples lack any delicate shades of meaning. He reduces humankind to two basic types. Individuals are either good or bad, there are no shades between these two categories. Jack says 'a person is either a good person, or a basically bad person, what they are doing is either basically right or basically wrong. Now how else, what more?' (Jack 540). In examining the sibling codes I have attached to Jack's statement I note that besides the code of 'categorise' and 'certitude' I also made connections to the codes of 'evil' and 'dualist'/'dichotomous'. Jack's reflections and comments markedly diverge from the observations about the complexity of life offered above by Jane, Angela, Barb, Rob, Glen, Sal, Flora and Tom. These latter 'integrationist' interviewees continue to use conceptual and verbal constructions which reveal underlying sets of conceptual practices which perceive the world as ambiguous. Jack's imagery and language reflect an underlying set of conceptual practices which portray a need to 'categorise' and have 'certitude'.

Another 'dualist' interviewee Mable speaks about what is required in order to be classified as having 'a Catholic mind'. Where the 'integrationist' interviewee Peter (339), mentioned early in this chapter, spoke about not being able to agree with half of the creedal formulae of Catholicism Mable rejects such theological

latitude. She states that Catholics should agree on all things. She notes that the only boundaries to move within are those which are marked out by the Pope. Mable says 'There's only one Catholic mind, there's only one Catholic teaching, there's only one Church and there's only one Pope. We shouldn't differ on anything' (Mable 154).

Later in the interview Mable attacks biblical scholars who by extending opinion about the Scriptures invite debate. She refers to 'all the modernists that are running around who have lost their faith' (Mable 263). The term 'modernist' in the context of this discussion on Scriptural study has a highly specific meaning. The term refers to the move by the papal authorities late in the Nineteenth Century against the style of research undertaken primarily in Protestant Scripture scholarship. The dominant feature of this study was the employment of scientific tools of literary criticism in attempting to gain access to the original and extended meanings of the Scriptural texts. A whole set of inquiries were launched: historical, source, form, redaction, canonical, audience, sociological, literary, structure, narrative and rhetorical criticism (Brown and Schneiders, 1992:1148). There were a number of official Catholic condemnations between the years 1905 and 1915 of the approach undertaken by the 'modernists' (Brown and Collins, 1992:1167). The issue at point here concerns how the 'dualist' interviewee Mable groups all people who are conversant with the diverse forms of criticism into one category. Mable declares of the people who use these forms of Scriptural criticism that they've 'lost their faith' (Mable 263). Her touch-stone

is the certitude which comes from loyalty and obedience to the pope. She calls on people to give 'total loyalty to the Holy Father in his position as Christ's vicar' (Mable 91).

When I present the possible scenario of a non church-going person choosing to be physically at the side of the dying because this non church-going person cares for the dying and finds such a situation to be where they meet their God, Mable responds by criticising the idea. The notion of people meeting 'their God' appears too relative for her liking. She says 'What sort of God? What is it? You know, there's only one God' (Mable 764). The approach Mable adopts in this instance reflects the subsidiary conceptual practice 'certitude'. She refuses to sustain discussions which accommodate notions driven by the dominant conceptual practice of 'ambiguity'.

One of the notes I wrote into the interview after listening to the tape recording mentions the sharpness with which Mable would cut across my story telling when I attempted to talk about a person who chose to be with the dying, because that individual found his or her God in that particular scenario. I noted 'Here as in other places throughout the interview Mable quickly interrupts the construction of my question before I have time to finish' (Mable 753).

The sibling conceptual practice to that of 'certitude' is 'a priori'. The subsidiary conceptual practice 'a priori' reveals itself when the interviewees (typically

dualists) shows that they are reasoning and arguing in a deductive fashion from universal and generic laws or prescriptions to particular cases. There is another subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori' which would seem to be a correlative conceptual practice of 'a priori', this appears under the dominant conceptual practice 'immanence' and is discussed early in the next chapter. As is discussed more fully in chapter 8 the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori' tends to be employed when the interviewee is reasoning, much in the way of the scientific inductive method, that is working from particular events toward some overall generic principle or rule.

There is something unique about this conceptual practice – all but one of the 'dualist' interviewees exhibit its presence in their thinking and 11 of the 30 'integrationist' interviewees show signs of having 'a priori' as a subsidiary conceptual practice. Such an array of support across both the 'dualist' and 'integrationist' groups does provide grounds for question. When all the texts of the interviews are examined there is a clue offered to the question why would the 'integrationists' show such alignment with the 'dualists' over a particular conceptual practice? The 'integrationists' who show signs of the conceptual practice of 'a priori' do so in a manner which is somewhat different from that of the 'dualists'. Many of these 'integrationists' exhibit the conceptual practice of 'a posteriori' prior to that of 'a priori'. There is something logical about the way they do this. Just as in the physical and social sciences theory develops because people gathering observations about particular and discrete events and work toward the establishment of a general and universal principles, so it is with the

process the 'integrationists' undertake. There is a stage of 'a posteriori' observation which seems to continue for an extensive length of time until a point is reached where some overall principle is claimed. In the case of the 'integrationists' this process takes place around the notion of faith.

When the 'integrationists' have come to a point where they affirm an acceptance of 'Gospel values' they then move to a point where they apply those 'Gospel values' in a somewhat deductive 'a priori' manner. The 'integrationists' who employ the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a priori' deductively apply the 'Gospel values' they enshrine as core values. The 11 'dualists' who also manifest the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a priori' do not show many signs of the 'a posteriori' conceptual practice. The list of interviewees who generated the conceptual practice 'a posteriori' is made up of 15 'integrationist' interviewees and only one 'dualist' interviewee.

The way that the 'dualists' differ from the 'integrationists' over the use of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a priori' can be seen in the case of the dualist by the pseudonym of Lily. Where the integrationists, mentioned above, begin to use the 'a priori' approach only after they have built up a body of 'a posteriori' data leading to a position they can assent to, Lily extends the use of this conceptual practice to cover not only key principles which derive from the Christian Gospel but also Church teaching. Lily perceives the Church as an organisation which provides a sure set of teachings on many facets of social and

cultural life. In choosing her marriage partner she decides that either he becomes a Catholic or she will not marry him. She said to her potential husband

you don't have to become a Catholic but I certainly won't marry you otherwise...and I could not bring up a family unless it was totally committed to the church. (Lily 104, 113)

As a way of testing how some of the 'dualist' interviewees come to experience the Sacred I ask a dualist by the pseudonym Joe if it would be possible for a human being to have an awareness of God in the midst of a human experience? He replies that it would be possible if the person was 'looking for it' (Joe 289). Joe adds that because he has had an upbringing which has taught him to look for a cause behind human experience he would have some chance to recognise 'God's hand on the world' (Joe 289). He adds that a person who was not educated to inquire and search for the ultimate cause behind things would not likely have such an experience of God.

Joe argues somewhat deductively that a person who believes in God comes to believe in the Church 'Church is the end result if you believe in God' (Joe 465). This claim does not leave room for the individual who has a belief in a God and chooses to maintain and pursue this belief at a personal level through nature or reflection on human interaction. Joe's logic seems to follow a series of deductive steps of an a priori fashion, such as if 'A' then 'B' and if 'B' then 'C'.

Another 'dualist' interviewee Pricy displays the conceptual practice of 'a priori' in a reflection she makes about the notion of community. As was mentioned earlier Pricy recalls an incident where she went to church and there were pieces of car bodies strewn around the sanctuary. She says she was upset and couldn't see the reason why the priest would have put such rubbish within the church. As I ask her what the priest might have been trying to accomplish by this arrangement Pricy says he was probably trying to get people to care for our environment (Pricy 500). Pricy states that she does not go to church to be presented with these issues. She says 'I don't see that as part of my...when I go to Mass it is a time for God, getting in touch with God' (Pricy 502). When Pricy talks about the issue of having pieces of car bodies on the sanctuary of the church she reveals a singular lack of the 'a posteriori' conceptual practice. When she notices the car parts she uses a phrase she does not complete, namely 'I don't see that as part of my' (Pricy 502). Pricy quickly moves on to say that she goes to Mass in order to get 'in touch with God'. It would seem that Pricy by making these two statements is saying that the process of moving from the particular and concrete object to an overall and general idea is not commonly part of the way she approaches the notion God. Pricy by making the statement that she goes to Mass in order 'to get in touch with God' seems to be stating that dealing with the physical and the singular is not going to help her purpose of getting 'in touch with God.'

By contrast to the frequent use of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a priori' the integrationists tend more readily to employ the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'a posteriori'. The integrationists commonly approach the physical and the particular in such a way as to avoid a segmentation between the physical and the Sacred. Pricy on the other hand is quite explicit in noting that these things are not connected to the Sacred. She does this by expressing her annoyance at seeing the car parts and then pronouncing that she comes to Mass to 'get in touch with God'.

Her familiarity with the a priori approach can be seen in the way she moves from universal notions of God to particular ideas of caring for the environment and community. She says these particular things occur once there is an acceptance of the overarching notion of God. She says

it we are in touch with God and if we have a relationship with God, out of that comes everything: love, communication, beauty of nature – because if God's in you that's all natural. Everything springs from that. We don't have to make community, because community will happen if God is in your life. (Pricy 522)

The series of statements Pricy makes above manifest the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a priori' which tends to characterise many of the 'dualist' interviewees. The universal principle is applied not only to belief in God but to acceptance of the Church. Many of the 'dualist' interviewees interchangeably position the Pope and the teaching authority of the Church with that of the authority of God. In practice therefore the 'dualists' have a battery of prescriptive

applications as they move from acceptance of the Church to the need to act in particular ways in concrete instances.

Sociological implications

In the light of the discussion of the dominant conceptual practice of 'ambiguity' and its subsidiaries 'letting go'; 'mystery' ; and 'language' there is a marked divergence when the subsidiary conceptual practices 'certitude' and 'a priori' are considered. What typifies the 'integrationist' interviewee who is at home with the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' is the facility to embrace the vicissitudes of life and accommodate the paradoxes in such a way that 'enchantment' can still be a possibility amid this time of modern living in a Western democracy. On the other hand the same social setting will have 'dualist' interviewees manifesting a quite disparate form of spirituality.

The 'integrationist' spirituality appears able to accommodate living in the midst of a rapidly mobile world and at the same time be open to enchantment within these day to day events. The 'dualist' spirituality on the other hand fails to show signs of letting ambiguity mediate the Sacred. The 'dualist' it would seem impose an a priori system in a quite extensive manner and deduce ways of understanding the world and acting within that world. Instead of the particular and concrete physical events of life presenting possibilities for overall enchantment, the 'dualist' interviewee closes down this option by demanding that particular and concrete physical events fit within the overall scheme resulting from acceptance of the universal principle of God.

One of the findings of this chapter which has direct relevance to the empirical implications flowing from Weber's hypotheses (ch. 2) is that the certitude of the past is gone. Weber holds that paradox awaits the people who are brave enough to respond to the fate of our times; they have to face the disenchantment which is everywhere around us; they have to handle the constellation of contesting values. The empirically identifiable implication which flows from the above hypothesis is that in a time of modernity those following religion will be characterised more by a reliance on certitude rather than be typically risk takers. Since the ethics of 'ultimate ends' calls for obedience to commandments rather than taking into account all the implications of the immediate act, logically – according to Weber – religious people typically will place priority on obedience rather than employ individual conscience.

This hypothesis – derived from Weber (1982: 120) – is relevant to the conceptual practice 'ambiguity' (ch. 2). This has many ramifications in terms of the question whether 'integrationists' have learnt a way of living within the rationalisation of modernity. 'Integrationists' could also be living a form of spirituality quite divergent from the types Weber addresses. The logical extension of Weber's hypothesis predicts that 'those following religion will be characterised more by a reliance on certitude rather than be typically risk takers' (ch. 2). This does not seem to be the case with these 'integrationists' who operate out of the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' – they seem to be people who forgo certitude,

take risks and experience enchantment rather than disenchantment. Could it be some of those who are brave enough to face the fate of our times are 'believers', albeit believers of a different kind than those of whom Weber (1982:155) speaks?

Conclusion

In this chapter, the integrationists mentioned typify many other integrationists in the way they use the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' and its subsidiary conceptual practices 'letting go', 'mystery' and 'language'. Perhaps one of the most important findings of this chapter is the disclosure that the integrationists readily employ their poetic and symbolic faculties. By showing that they work with the mythic and the metaphorical frames of thought, the integrationists reveal that they are not restricted to purely rational and logical thought processing. The significance of this is that it adds another dimension to understanding the character of the integrationist form of spirituality and religion. Hence when attempting to draw conclusions in the final chapter, this chapter will have served the purpose of showing how the integrationists are able to work with rationalisation, intellectualisation and scientifically oriented forms of thinking and still experience enchantment. The chapter indicates that the 'non-rational' faculties of the human person can be fully integrated by people who are also at ease with their logical faculties. It would also suggest that the rational faculty need not always be dominant to the point of suppressing the 'non-rational'.

CHAPTER 8

The conceptual practice of 'immanence'

I come now to the last chapter in this section dealing with the conceptual practices people employ who experience enchantment in this time of disenchantment. As in the last three chapters I locate the discussion of the conceptual practices in the life situation of the interviewees. This provides the ground for claiming that particular conceptual practices are employed and important to those interviewees who come to experience enchantment, since it is when they use these conceptual practices that they begin to speak about the Sacred. I also intend that this chapter will provide the means for deepening understanding of how integrationist spirituality and religion works and sustains enchantment within rationalisation and by using rationalisation.

The fourth dominant conceptual practice the integrationist interviewees typically employ is that of 'immanence'. There is a sense in which this dominant conceptual practice is hierarchically above the first three dominant conceptual practices, namely 'vulnerability', 'inter-subjectivity' and 'ambiguity'. One of the reasons for making this assertion comes from an awareness of the conceptual similarity between the two notions of 'enchantment' and 'immanence'.

The meaning of the term 'immanence' in this thesis refers to the predominant tendency to stress the awareness of the pervasive and indwelling nature of God's presence in the universe. Hence the person who is described as having a sense of immanence is a person who tends to perceive and construct God as present in every facet of life. By contrast, the term 'transcendence' in this thesis means the way of perceiving and constructing God which stresses God's otherness - even though it is in some sense grounded in the present; the term 'transcendence' can mean God is not contained by the immediate, that is that God eludes the concrete here and now. In some understandings of transcendence God is seen to be exterior to and removed from the flesh-and-blood issues of humanity and the earth, however this is more a dualist construction. The integrationists use the term transcendent in such a way as to acknowledge not only its connection to the here and now but also to recognise that the here and now can not contain the Sacred.

'Immanence' and its first subsidiary conceptual practice - 'a posteriori'

The way that the term 'a posteriori' is used in this thesis concerns an attitudinal stance interviewees adopt in approaching everyday life. Even deeper than this, it concerns a particular conceptual practice these interviewees act out of as they attempt to relate to life. This subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori' expresses itself through a process which works from effects to causes. It refers to a way of engaging with life where the individual orients his or her focus

primarily on the immediate issue at hand. It is in the midst of this involvement that the individual may become aware of how the present experience opens out and connects to more universal dimensions of being, events or issues, such as the notion of the cosmos or of the Sacred. In other words the 'a posteriori' conceptual practice occurs when an individual engages with immediate life and - in the midst of this experiential involvement - becomes aware of how the immediate experience connects into more encompassing and general entities. Where an 'a priori' subsidiary conceptual practice (ch. 7) starts from causes and universal laws and moves to the particular effect, the 'a posteriori' subsidiary conceptual practice reverses the process. Therefore while someone using the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a priori' typically approaches life with the notions such as that there is a universal cause of life, the 'a posteriori' approach begins by experiencing life of the everyday, then permitting those everyday experiences to generate awareness of the cosmic and the 'Sacred'.

The conceptual practice of 'a posteriori' is observed in 15 'integrationist' interviews and only one 'dualist' interview. This conceptual practice comes to the fore in two ways, firstly in the how the interviewees speak about everyday life, and secondly in how these interviewees interact in daily life.

One of the recurring features noticeable in the interviewees who indicate an 'a posteriori' conceptual practice or approach to everyday life is a high sense of immanence (sense of the pervasive and indwelling presence of God). The

characteristics a posteriori and immanence are closely correlated in the lives of the interviewees who manifest either feature in the way they tell their stories.

Pat is one of the fifteen 'integrationist' interviewees who manifest the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'a posteriori'. He mentions a number of things, which impress him about the local Catholic Church while working with others in preparing the Catholic 'Turning Point' social justice conference (ch. 5). He says that he was impressed with the way people talked about their experience of life and the issues and concerns, which were part of those life experiences.

He says that the people preparing the conference agenda were essentially asking each other to respect their own experience. In honouring that experience the individuals called each other to be faithful to a particular process. The process involved people remembering and re entering their experience, then reflecting about that experience, sharing the insights of the experience with others and finally transposing the particular concerns and issues into more universal and general concerns. Pat upholds the importance of people listening to and respecting their own experience of life as a primary source of insight and wisdom.

Personal experience: our primary revelation

The use of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori' is indicated in the way Pat shares his reflections about his personal belief in valuing one's individual experience over the received 'truths' from cultural and social

sources. In particular he cites religious authority and states that propositions and laws coming from such traditions ought be perceived as secondary to the individual person's experience of life, he says 'the primary revelation for each individual is in his or her own experience of life.' (Pat 564)

At this point in the interview Pat's use of the term 'revelation' has particular significance. The context of Pat's discussion is religious – he speaks specifically about the 'Scriptures'. The term 'revelation' in Catholic circles is commonly tied to the notion of the biblical Scriptures. Therefore when Pat uses the term 'revelation' to describe the individual's 'own experience of life' (564), arguably he is saying that the individual's personal life experience prevails over the Scriptures as a primary source of 'revelation'. In opting for the term 'primary', Pat is stressing not only the validity but also the power which can be attached to one's 'own experience of life' – such a claim is consonant with many of the integrationist interviewees but quite uncharacteristic of the dualist interviewee.

Pat's claim that a person's individual experience of life ought take priority as a source of insight and wisdom takes on an encompassing nature – this becomes evident when he includes Scripture, tradition, theology and reflections of other people under the concept external 'authority'. He speaks not only of 'Scriptures', but also formal scientifically organised reflection on the Scriptures in the form of 'theology'. He includes under the note of external 'authority' the received wisdom from society

tradition, advice from other people, theology, the Scriptures, all of those are basically the reflections of other people, which are passed on and are to be related to one's own experience...But those other things come from outside and are secondary for that primary experience of one's own living. (Pat 569-579)

Pat's proposition is possibly one of the strongest statements of the 'integrationist' interviewees. He urges people to start from the particular, the concrete and the physical. He calls people to respect their 'instincts', 'feelings', and see these as the 'source for their for their [sic] development.' (Pat 568)

Starting in the area of peoples' sensate experience he insists that people re-visit and be present to their original experience, wait upon that experience and be present to it. In doing this he claims that the awareness of impulses and feelings lead into a personal knowledge which is based on reflection and the testing of truths against the deeper truth of one's own experience.

The importance Pat gives to the a posteriori way to knowledge and 'revelation' has implications for the sociological claims of Hegy (1987). Hegy (1987: 170) refers to the transition within 'invisible' Catholicism from the traditional stance of giving away one's legal and moral authority to the hierarchy, to a contemporary stance where the individual reclaims such authority and locates it within his or her own conscience. Pat says societal and cultural wisdom, tradition and Scriptures ought be related to one's own circumstance. He goes further; he notes that external 'wisdom' and authority need not only be related

to one's own circumstance, but they remain 'secondary' to the truth of personal reflection on one's own unique experience as a source of knowing.

Luckmann holds that the tension between religion and society is due to the institutionalisation of religion (Hegy, 1987: 174). Pat typifies a person who both recognises the power of institutionalisation in religion to effect disenchantment and takes steps to emasculate this impact of institutionalisation. He typifies the 'integrationist' approach to spirituality and religion because he does not give respect to dichotomous distinctions between religion and society. Arguably the way he treats and uses the term religion refers to its wider meaning rather than the formalisation of religion where it becomes synonymous with institutional religion. By use of the 'a posteriori' conceptual practice Pat fights against the acquisition of moral and legal authority by the hierarchy of the church.

In talking about people seizing opportunities for life and engagement Pat (1308) says that these people are exercising 'the spirit of life', 'the spirit of themselves'. In exercising their own spirit and living their own lives to the full, Pat says 'I think that they're...in a more effective active relationship with what God is all about, with what life is all about' (Pat 1322). At this point Pat is claiming that when people are being 'faithful to their own experience' (1328) they are living life more enthusiastically and actualising their original nature. Pat says that if they live in deep accord to the true nature of life itself something further happens – they live in relationship.

It is interesting that Pat introduces the concept of relationship out of the context of a discussion on the 'a posteriori' conceptual practice. In effect Pat makes the conceptual practice 'a posteriori' philosophically prior to the dynamic of 'relationship'. It would seem therefore that Pat is not prepared to talk about relationship without a number of presuppositions being accepted – one such presupposition is that people have to be 'faithful to their own experience' before their relationship with life and the Sacred can be 'effective' and 'active'.

The subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori' and honouring one's personal experience

Pat discusses the notion of being in relationship with God in the context of honouring and listening to one's own personal experience. Pat, it would appear claims that once the individual listens to his or her own life experience and acts in accord to that, he or she becomes truly alive. When this happens – according to Pat – the individual cannot but enter relationship with life itself and the Sacred. According to Pat it is more important that we live this relationship, than it is to actually identify and name the relationship. He claims that to live life respecting the authenticity of personal experience is to live within the Sacred

the person who is fully alive is in relationship with God...Now lots of people do not name it as being in relationship with God. I think that's far less important than actually doing it. (Pat 1415)

Again Pat makes the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori' ontologically prior to many other aspects of human life. He makes it a prerequisite for relationship with life itself. Pat delays using the word 'God', he says that people who use the notion 'God' ought situate the concept in the context of one's own life experience. The individual's first task is to acknowledge and honour one's own personal experience – only after this occurs ought one talk about the notion of God. Pat mentions that he has to 'define God in terms of what I am relating to' (Pat 1441).

Pat returns to the theme of honouring one's own experience as a basis not only for being 'truly alive' but for relationship itself. This psychological axiom impacts on his theology – his reflections about the Sacred only takes place in the context of personal experiences of life. He thereby opposes the tendencies within religion to separate life into two realms: one of the Sacred; and another of human existence. Similarly when discussing the issue of relationship with the Sacred, Pat says that our notions of this have to be associated with the unique relationships which we have with other people.

I think we tend a lot to talk about our relationship with God quite differently from our relationship with other people. And yet personally its the best analogy we have for what God is. (Pat 1758)

Just as Pat talks about the relationships we have between ourselves and another person in terms of our consciousness of ourselves in relationship, rather than consciousness of the other person, so he implies the same operates in

relationship to the Sacred. In effect we do not experience the Sacred, rather we experience ourselves in relationship with others. It is this which brings us to an awareness of being in relationship with the Sacred. This perhaps is one of the clearest expressions of the integrationist using the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori', it is also one the clearest expressions of the integrationist style of spirituality.

'Mediation': the second subsidiary conceptual practices of 'immanence'

One of the sibling conceptual practices of 'a posteriori', is that of 'mediation'. The subsidiary conceptual practice 'mediation' refers to that habit of mind which predisposes a person to see the immediate experience as a vehicle to other aspects of life. Interviewees employing the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mediation' respond to the present moment, because they are aware of the potentiality of the immediate event. Because of this people who employ the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mediation', discuss abstract issues by connecting them to matters of the here and now. They tend also to talk about the future or the past by linking them to the present moment. The conceptual practice of 'mediation' implies that the individual believes life happens in and through the immediate experience of the present moment. There seems to be a belief that the present has within itself a latent world of insight – the only requirement is that the individual cease imposing judgements and adopt a stance somewhat akin to 'vulnerability'. This procedure is quite consistent with the

'integrationists' belief that the present reveals and carries ultimate reality and mediates the Sacred (similar to Greeley's notion of creatures being metaphors of the divine – see ch. 3).

Brian, one of the 'integrationists', is a surgeon and speaks of his fascination of the human body, of how it is constructed and functions. He says 'I mean just knowing how the body works is total mystery – an amazing phenomena to be involved in medically I suppose' (Brian 56). He mentions how he is aware that he is part of this 'amazing creation' and how he recognises that the universe is 'filled with all sorts of mystery and unexplained phenomena' (Brian 54).

In this vein Brian goes on to say that periodically he is caught up in the present moment. He reflects about the times when he is in surgery and sees all the intricacies of the human body – he says that this is all he needs to attend to. The interplay of organs and their various parts makes him conscious of the overall interplay within the system. Being present to the moment moves Brian to a point of awe and sense of mystery; he says

its largely in observations of you know humanity and creation in general, its in people that I see that I work with the amazing insides of people when you cut them open...its just so obvious that there is something or somebody around who is pulling the strings. (Brian 109)

Brian (110) speaks about his overall wonder at the interdependency of all the parts of the body, he employs the musical metaphor of someone who is

'orchestrating it all'. As a surgeon a major part of Brian's world is the examination and restoration of the workings of the human body. His comments suggest that he does indeed become wholly engaged with the present moment. He appears to give all his attention to that which is before him. There is little evidence that he flees the present. His imaging the human body in terms of an orchestra implies engagement and focus on the intricacies and whole picture of the present.

'Immediacy: 'the third subsidiary conceptual practice of 'immanence'

One of the closely related conceptual practices to that of 'mediation' is the subsidiary conceptual practice 'immediacy'. Indeed the categories which the 'NUDIST' program has helped develop has 'immediacy' and 'mediation' as sibling conceptual practices. From a logical point of view it seems that a person who is going to exercise the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mediation' would have already employed the subsidiary conceptual practice 'immediacy'. This follows because unless the individual is already committed to the present moment he or she would hardly bestow sufficient importance to the present for it to mediate deeper insight, offer bigger connections, be a primary source of revelation, or be a primary source of enchantment.

Brian models the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mediation' not only in his presence to the human body as surgeon but also in his presence to nature. He

mentions how he likes 'to go into the bush...and just sort of observe the wonders of the world. I like to go to the top of the mountains and look down look out' (Brian 70). Among his reflections the one which appears to have particular meaning for him is his presence to the ocean. He notes how he likes to be there and experience all its changing nature from a still to a turbulent day. He mentions how he becomes aware of the Sacred

I'm aware of the presence, but to actually go beyond that to sort of perhaps recognise God for his own sake, God's presence...in the power and the fury in the storms and also in the tranquillity of it, a calm day, glassy clear sea water...its an amazing demonstration. (Brian 111, 121)

Brian mentions the importance of stopping and reflecting about that with which he is engaged. He notes how it is quite possible to get 'sidetracked by many other things like survival' (154). One of the points Brian is making is that it is important to take the time to mull over and think through one's experience. Brian seems to suggest that he uses the reflection to enter even more deeply into the experience and opens himself to hear the message within his personal experience. Brian seems to have the same approach as Pat does (cited above) to the dominant conceptual practice 'immanence'. When Pat uses the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori' and says that the person who is fully alive is present to God, Brian says that he comes to an awareness of God when he is truly present to his immediate experience. Talking about the need to pause and

be openly reflective to one's personal experience, Brian notes 'God is there in amongst all that...all parts of the creation is part of God' (Brian 169).

On the occasions when Brian makes such comments he demonstrates the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori' as well as 'mediation'. Having spoken about the particular he goes to the general. He mentions the calms and the storms of the ocean and from these observations says 'God is there in amongst all that'. Brian moves on to make an observation about contemporary society in Australia and contrasts it with the more primeval type of society which existed in Ireland. He (200) notes how awareness of the Sacred must have been more common because society was more integrated (Weber, in ch. 1). Brian says that in his opinion 'there are many people who are deeply spiritual' (Brian 227), but our society does not encourage people to reflect deeply. He suggests many people 'just trickle along'. He mentions how he is in a group called the 'teams of Our Lady' and individuals commonly 'discuss a lot and try to sort of fathom and understand the spirituality of relationships' (Brian 237). The theme Brian repeats is the need to return to one's own experience and enter into that experience more deeply by giving oneself time to reflect and be open to the dynamics occurring in that experience. In the doing of this Brian lives out the subsidiary conceptual practices 'immediacy' and 'mediation'. These subsidiary conceptual practices both serve to enhance the dominant conceptual practice 'immanence'. Brian repeatedly moves from speaking about singular and particular incidents to comment on how these events are the ground for his

sense of wonder and mystery at more general notions such as the universe, life or the Sacred. He stays present to the immediate moment and becomes aware of something within and beyond the immediate. He names this in a variety of ways: 'awesome', 'magnitude', 'something or somebody who is pulling the strings' (Brian 109), 'orchestrating it all', 'the presence', 'manifestation of God', 'the significance of creation', 'recognise God for his own sake (Brian 112)' or 'God'.

Sociological implications

Brian as a surgeon takes part in a profession which highly utilises instrumental rationality; it does this through technical apparatus and the sophisticated use of scientific equipment. His professional work has led him into detailed focus on specific procedures in testing and in surgery. In terms of Weber's (1982, 1978) rationalisation – disenchantment thesis, this approach to work would tend to lead Brian into disenchantment. However instead he is led into enchantment through his work.

What seems to be at play is that Brian – as his comments above indicate – is quite taken by the elegance of the human bodily system. The finely tuned and inter related parts work together in such order that Brian is moved toward a state of wonder and fascination. Hence his path to enchantment is not through an avoidance of instrumental rationality but rather through the use of instrumental rationality. Where other integrationist like Jane simply listen to

their body, Brian shows that by using his brain he is led to a sense of mystery and enchantment.

'Immediacy' and 'mediation' as 'second sight'

The subsidiary conceptual practices 'immediacy' and 'mediation' can be noticed in the way one of the 'integrationists' Flora reflects about her life experiences.

Flora narrates a story of how an aboriginal friend of hers, by the pseudonym of Bill, is able to see more deeply into sites and situations than many people she knows. Flora seems to have some of the qualities Bill displays – she notes how Bill is able to enter beneath the immediate and initial sensory experience of being present in a particular setting. Flora speaks about this characteristic as an ability not only to see, hear, feel, smell and taste a place in nature but also to be able to experience the story of the place. She refers to this as a second sight.

Talking about the aborigines she says

a second sight almost that Aborigines have; they see rocks and they see water but they also see the song and the mystery and the associations with say this mythology behind them. (Flora 112)

Flora speaks about the degree to which Bill and his people are present to nature. She seems fascinated by his ability to engage so completely with the particular setting. When present in a given setting there is no suggestion of talking about something other than that which is present. Flora notes how these

people begin with the sense of sight and then go to a deeper level of 'seeing' – 'they see rocks and they see water (Flora 111)', and the act of seeing becomes the medium or the vehicle for 'seeing' more deeply. She speaks of how there is another level of being aware, it is as if there is another realm of experience available. She refers to the shift which happens in peoples' awareness when they fix their eyes on the physical space before them as 'second sight'. Flora's account rests on the notion that sensory experience is the pre requirement for gaining the deeper insight. The sensory experience is the vehicle and the medium for the person who wants to access the fuller picture and richer story. Her explanation of the notion of 'second sight' is strikingly similar to the 'integrationists' who employ the conceptual practices of 'immediacy' and 'mediation'.

Flora gives a broader account of the realm of knowledge and experience available to the person who is prepared to attend to the present. Her story speaks of the richness to be gained in terms of coming to an awareness of the bigger historical picture within and behind the sensory data of the moment: 'we will be looking at the beauty of the scene, but also remember that the whole area is charged with this other 'song' for a thousand years.' (Flora 113) Flora shared in some of these insights and it would seem that in her own way she too employed 'second sight'.

She speaks about a particular place Bill shows her while they were taking some primary school children on a picnic. Flora talks about an area of land which was

circular and situated behind a sand dune, she comments on having 'quite a strange feeling' as she looked at this scene. Vegetation grew completely around the circular area she looked at, but in the centre of the circle not one plant or grass grew. She speaks of experiencing it as a meeting place and notes how she felt bonded to the place and the people whose lives were part of its story. It would seem that Flora has 'second sight' or at least that she employs the subsidiary conceptual practices 'immediacy' and 'mediation'. Being present to the sensory experience of the place she notes how she becomes aware of being connected and part of the story behind and in the physical place – she says

I do have [sic] feel an affinity and particularly there, it was something that really struck me and almost took my breath away there...I don't feel distant from those people, there's some sort of oh union there's some continuity with myself and them. (Flora 156)

There seems to be a similarity in the way Flora reflects about her experiences and the way that Pat and Brian tell their stories. All three of these 'integrationists' stay connected to their immediate experience and story. Pat singles out the unique respect people paid to their story in the 'Turning Point' social justice conference. There was no deferring to external authority in the form of knowledge outside the story of those present. Brian speaks about how as a surgeon he is drawn into the fine detail of what is before him. Flora tells of the affinity she feels with Bill as he talks about seeing the rocks and the sea and through them seeing the song, the mystery and the mythology which rises out of those particular rocks and sea. Flora as 'integrationist' interviewee tells of

how she sees the rocks the sea and the circle where people engaged in their sitting. She speaks of seeing how she herself is connected to the bigger story of this place. Experiencing a sense of having her breath taken away she comes to an awareness of deep connection to the history of this place, its people and their deeds. She concludes by naming her experience spiritual – she says 'And to me that's a spiritual experience' (Flora 160). All these examples of these interviewees reveal individuals who come to the experience of enchantment through use of the subsidiary conceptual practices, 'a posteriori', 'mediation' 'immediacy' and the dominant conceptual practice 'immanence'.

Flora talks about the interconnections present by being in that setting. In a particular way she mentions nature and attributes a consciousness to nature by not having vegetation grow within the circle of sitting. She acknowledges the people who for thousands of years gathered in that place. By generating terms such as 'song', 'mythology', 'mystery' and saying that she came to see that she was part of this, Flora deals with the very content of spirituality, namely the recognition of being part of the interconnected story of this place. It is an interconnection which is grounded in the immediate, stays faithful to the present and yet because of the physicality of the present encompasses a big picture. Flora alludes to this by speaking of union and continuity with the people of this place. She deals with concepts that by their nature imply a recognition of consciousness of beings and relationships. She sees herself part of

the interplay of all these interdependent conscious subjects and in that sense she is able to say 'And to me that's a spiritual experience'.

The 'integrationist' Glen (ch. 5) has the same basic attitude to life. Glen speaks about being able to see the minute interplay which operates in nature. He claims a sense of fascination as he sees life unfolding everywhere about him. He says 'Because I'm surrounded by life, because I know that I have life, we all share it and it all works so beautifully together if you go with it' (Glen 172). Glen like Pat, Brian and Flora begins by noticing the details and faithfully attends to that which is at hand. He mentions the disparate minute beings, the sense of many parts yet also the sense of the overall interconnection – the pattern and the sense of oneness. He says

I'm life too, its all parts, the rapport is between the Universe and myself, I'm part of the Universe. Life is the Universe, I am life. That's the beauty of it, its all together, there's a oneness, that's the great thing about it, its one. You know the same perfection that is in that little wasp is in me. (Glen 191)

'Immediacy' and 'mediation' leading toward 'immanence'

Glen explains that he interchanges the term 'one' with terms, such as 'divinity' and 'Universe'. The process that seems to be taking place here is that Glen employs the conceptual practice of 'immediacy' and 'mediation'. Frequently he goes down to the finest detail when examining a native fly or wasp. He observes the workings of the creature and comments on its unique ability to fly

backwards and forwards. He mentions its sparkling colour, its particular enlarged eyes and their function. Staying in the presence of that which is before him he comes to recognise the behaviour patterns of individual insects and plants. He notes the interplay, the interdependency and the oneness. He moves to the point of recognising himself as part of this myriad of life. He names the overall picture the 'One', 'divinity' 'Universe'. Glen indicates that he is not only fascinated with the individual beings about him but is aware of the connection between all these beings. His stance is not simply that of a spectator rather he comes to appreciate his own immersion into the total story. His basic attitude is that of awe and thanksgiving as he remains present to that which eludes definition. He foregoes any personal need to name, identify and control that with which he is involved. He says 'I don't bother to give it a name because I'm part of it and its all around me, its through me, why bother giving it labels? Just being grateful' (Glen 198). He goes from the particular to the general and in that way displays characteristics compatible with the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori'. In staying present to the moment it would seem his basic attitudinal stance is underpinned by the subsidiary conceptual practices 'immediacy' and 'mediation'.

Observations about these subsidiary conceptual practices and their connection with the dominant conceptual practice 'immanence'

So far in this chapter I have discussed three subsidiary conceptual practices, namely 'a posteriori', 'mediation' and 'immediacy'. The evidence of the interview material points to the conclusion that the 'integrationist' interviewees overwhelmingly manifest these particular conceptual practices. Further to this, these 'integrationists' express an awareness of the Sacred present within physical beings and settings.

Earlier in this chapter I defined how I use the term 'immanence' as a 'predominant tendency to stress the indwelling nature of God's presence in the universe. Hence the person who is described as having a sense of immanence is a person who tends to perceive and construct God as pervasively present in every facet of life (ch. 8). This definition expresses the typical attitudinal stance the 'integrationist' interviewees adopt in their daily life. In using the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori' they begin by working with the sensory data immediately available to them and are faithful to their own experience. From this engagement they move toward a more generic conceptualisation of notions of 'mystery' and the 'Sacred' and an awareness of how this emerges out of their experience. In this way the dominant conceptual practice 'immanence' comes into play. These people articulate how they come to a sense of mystery within their concrete relationships in life. Similarly the interviewees who reveal the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mediation' demonstrate they begin by not only talking about seeing the immediate but seeing behind it to the stories, associations and mystery with which it is pervaded (Flora and second sight).

Flora uses the notion 'second sight' to express the idea of how certain aboriginal people she knows move from the phenomenal to the noumenal level of perception. I use the term 'phenomenal' to mean the practice of perceiving only that which is available by means of sensory data and not going further to perceive deeper meanings or connections within the object. I use the term 'noumenal' to mean apprehending the life, meaning or soul of the object which lies beneath the sensory data. Indeed Flora moves from the phenomenal to the noumenal level herself when she talks of an awareness while being present in a bush clearing close to the beach, she becomes connected with the people who belonged to the place over the ages. She describes her sense of unity as a 'spiritual experience'. She moves from the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mediation' to the dominant conceptual practice 'immanence'. She comes to an awareness of bigger issues and a bigger story. She knows herself in a new way as one who belongs and is part of a story and the figures in the story. She begins with particular sensory data and adopts a stance which is akin to that of the 'second sight' stance which her aboriginal friend Bill employs; and so she comes to experience enchantment through seeing depth in the sensory phenomena before her.

The orientation of those who have the conceptual practice 'immanence' is similar to those who act out of the subsidiary conceptual practices 'a posteriori', 'immediacy' and 'mediation'. There an awareness of the Sacred and of mystery.

This awareness is found in Weber's (1982:155) description of the term 'enchantment'.

Dualist conceptual practices

Jack, the dualist interviewee, constructs the human person as split and basically alienated from God. Jack says

there is a struggle between the human and um the part of us that is not human, but is from God...even the human, God made, so you have to learn to love that part as well, despite its wretchedness. (Jack 118, 126)

This is one of the clearest expressions of a dichotomised perception of the universe given by any interviewee throughout the thesis. Jack describes the 'human' part of the person made by God as 'wretchedness' – this is quite a shift from all the reflections given above by the integrationist interviewees. At this point Jack employs the dominant conceptual practice 'avoidance', which is quite different to the conceptual practices 'immediacy' and 'a posteriori', which Jane, Libi and Marg use.

Bruno, one of the integrationist interviewees, shows that he operates quite differently to the typical integrationist who uses the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori'. After Bruno had spent some time talking about the shortcomings of his wife I introduced a reflection designed to test if Bruno came to a

sense of enchantment through using the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori'.

Wanting Bruno to think about an ideal time in his relationship with his wife I asked him whether being in love had opened up for him any sense of enchantment? His response lacked charm – he simply said 'when you are first in love everything is rosy' (Bruno 413). I persisted and asked 'Did that lead you into a sense of wonder?' (Bruno 415) He responded with the one syllable word 'No'. I kept trying to break open his memory and so I asked if his early experience had led him to a sense of mystery? He responded again 'Not really'. I was struck by the disparity between his approach and that of the integrationist Glen. After having finished listening to the audio tape and transcribing the interview I wrote within the body of the text.

Bruno's answer here is so dissimilar to that of Glen from the first group, for whom the interaction with another in love is the locus for experiencing mystery, not beyond but in the present experience. (Bruno 423)

Where, for Glen the experience of the here and now leads him to a sense of wonder mystery and enchantment, for Bruno (even though he belongs to the integrationist group, though more a dualist on this dimension of 'a posteriori') the here and now becomes a distraction from wonder, mystery and enchantment.

Drawing observations from the dominant conceptual practice

'immanence' in terms of the notion 'enchantment'

It would seem that the interviewees who use the dominant conceptual practice 'immanence' are at ease when talking about experiencing a sense of the Sacred. In the beginning of the chapter Pat talks about the 'Turning Point' social justice conference and how at that conference he noticed a commitment to respecting the opinions of every participant regardless of status. He notes how the process of the conference worked from the data generated from the floor rather than follow norms and expectations from higher authority. Pat spoke of this process of being free from hierarchical imposition of moral authority. He says that is was an occasion when for the first time for so long 'I felt at home with that kind of Church' (Pat 551).

Pat's use of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori' and the dominant conceptual practice 'immanence' is consistent with the one recurring principle Pat enunciates throughout his interview, namely 'the primary revelation for each individual is in his or her own experience of life' (Pat 564). Pat's comments effectively say that the immediate and proximate experience available to the individual through reflection on one's life is the basis for deeper awareness. Given the loaded meaning the term 'revelation' has for the Catholic and given that Pat completed theological studies as a priest, his use of the term 'revelation' is presumably not unreflected. It logically follows in this context that Pat asserts that immediate reflection on one's own life experience is the primary occasion

for an experience of the Sacred. This it would seem is tantamount to saying that reflection on one's life experience is the place for awareness of the Sacred – this is a very short step away from talking about the notion of enchantment.

This points to the notion that this dominant conceptual practice 'immanence' and its subsidiaries 'a posteriori', 'mediation' and 'immediacy' are very closely allied to the notion 'enchantment'. All other 'integrationists' treated in this chapter reveal that their experience of the immanence of the Sacred is also a rich experience of enchantment. Perhaps the most striking examples of such stories are the surgeon Brian while using the subsidiary conceptual practice 'mediation' and Flora through that of 'immediacy'.

This completes the four chapters which deal with the integrationist and dualist dominant and subsidiary conceptual practices. In these chapters there have been many examples of interviewees who after having used particular conceptual practices introduce the notions of the enchantment, mystery and God. These people, who though involved in the rationalisation of modernity through their education and work, still have been able to sustain enchantment. The data generated from the interviews provide a benchmark for gauging whom among Weber Luckmann and Hegy (ch. 2) offers the most plausible account of the existence and life of enchantment and religion in contemporary modernity. This task of evaluation is aided by using the series of identifiable

empirical implication which is derived from Weber's Luckmann's and Hegy's theories (ch. 2).

CHAPTER 9

Evaluating hypotheses in the light of the interview data

This chapter is constructed in three units. It treats the relevant hypotheses rising from Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's reflections about the state of enchantment and religion in modernity, under three different themes. The first theme is the impact on religion of Rationalisation, functional rationality and scientifically oriented thinking. The second theme is the place of religion and sacralisation in modernity. The third theme is what form religion takes in modernity.

By way of discussing what each of these three sociologists predict will happen to enchantment and religion in modernity around these themes, I recall the key propositions of each theorist from chapter 2. In order to test the accuracy of each hypothesis against the practical lived experience of people in modernity, I note how in chapter 2 I reduced each hypothesis down to an identifiable empirical implication. Hence the hypotheses relating to the impact of rationalisation, functional rationality and scientifically oriented thinking upon religion in modernity are presented in the form of identifiable empirical implications. So also the hypotheses dealing with the place of religion and sacralisation in modernity, and those springing from the form of religion in modernity are presented as a series of identifiable empirical implications.

In each of the three sections of the chapter, I examine the given identifiable empirical implication against the body of data generated from interviewing the integrationist and dualist spirituality groups; material drawn from the empirical chapters 5-8. Most of the discussion in the third section – dealing with the emerging form of religion in modernity – tends to revolve around the integrationist interviewees, this is due to the fact that the dualist interviewees typically do not participate in the evolving forms of religion taking place in modernity. The findings which emerge from this chapter form the basis for a set of conclusions in chapter 10.

Section 1

Rationalisation, scientific thinking and functional rationality: their impact on religion

Weber

In chapter 1 and 2 I note that Weber (1976; 1978; 1982:244, 355) writes of how modernity is characterised by a relentless employment of rationalisation and intellectualisation. I defined Weber's use of the term 'rationalisation' as the habitual practice of subjecting the various facets of human action under analysis and control. I noted how these themes are the most general elements in Weber's philosophy of history (Gerth and Mills, in Weber, 1982: 51). In chapters one and two I focused on Weber's (1982:355) claim that calculation, together with means-

end rationality, analysis and a 'matter-of-fact' attitude have become the expected form of action and typify human intellectual behaviour in a time of modernity. I commented on Weber's claim that within modernity people customarily adopt technical means and calculation to meet their personal and social needs (Weber, 1982:244, 355).

I make a central point of how Weber (1982: 155) identifies disenchantment as the other primary feature of modernity, particularly linking disenchantment and rationalisation. Disenchantment comes into being – according to Weber (1982:139) – because we rely on calculation and analysis to solve a range of issues. He defines disenchantment by claiming people in modernity believe that:

principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation.

This means that the world is disenchanted. (Weber, 1982: 139)

This product of the Enlightenment ensures that this 'routinised economic cosmos...has been a structure to which the absence of love is attached from the very root' (Weber, 1982: 355). People have lost their fascination and wonder (Weber, 1982: 139). Concrete and literal forms of thought replace the intuitive, the reflective, the metaphorical, and the symbolic.

The first section of the present chapter revolves around Weber's (1982: 281) contention that religion in modernity has been pushed into the realm of the

irrational. The primary hypothesis which encapsulates this focus springs from my discussion of Weber's argument that instrumental rational action is the encouraged and expected form of action in modernity and that this gives rise to disenchantment (ch. 2).

The other dominant hypothesis, which springs from Weber's discussion about the impact of scientifically oriented thinking upon religion in modernity is that scientifically oriented thinking has like rationalisation, become a primary characteristic of modernity. Similarly just as rationalisation has replaced ways of knowing which have relied upon the non rational, the intuitive, the mythic and the symbolic, so also scientifically oriented thinking has replaced these facets of human knowing.

From this point in the chapter to its end I move to systematically itemise and discuss each identifiable empirical implication one at a time. I indicate when I begin treating the new identifiable empirical implication by placing its code number, that is, Hr1, Hr2, Hr3 etc., (see appendix 1 and ch. 2) and the text of the empirical implication (or its shortened form), at the top of the paragraph commencing the new section.

(Hr1) 'Religious experiences would seldom occur in people who employ instrumental rational action in a predominant way in their living.'

In chapter 4 I give a breakdown of the educational levels achieved by the integrationist and dualist interviewees in Table 4. This table indicates that a

good number of the interviewees are likely (because of their higher degrees training) to be familiar with a range of research approaches, some more instrumentally rational than others. Graduates coming out of the humanities and the literary studies are encouraged to critique the functionalist approach. In table 5, however the breakdown of interviewee groups by occupation reveals that four of the integrationists are involved in managerial/administrative work. It would be hard to imagine ideologies which promote notions of 'down-sizing', efficiency drives and goal achievements are not involved with instrumental rationality. Likewise organizations that answer to shareholders and the issue of investment returns, demand facility in the area of instrumental rationality. Given that there are three trades persons in the integrationist group besides the four managerial/administrative persons, it would seem somewhat arbitrary to deny the presence and influence of instrumental rationality in the world of these interviewees.

As Giddens (1991), Lyon (1999) and Bruner (1986) argue there are complex forms of interaction within society during late modernity, some forms having a reflexive nature. However these authors also allude to subtle forms of rationalization hidden beneath current work-practice. Ritzer (1998) in particular is convinced that Weber's notion of rationalisation is powerfully operative within society at the turn of the 21st Century. Within these diverse forms of functioning chapter five demonstrates that the integrationist interviewees experience enchantment while exercising the conceptual practice 'vulnerability'.

In chapter 6 – where I focus on the dominant conceptual practice 'intersubjectivity' – the integrationist interviewees disclose many experiences of enchantment. Similarly both the chapter on the dominant conceptual practice of 'ambiguity' (ch. 7) and the chapter on 'immanence' (ch. 8) have many examples of these interviewees experiencing enchantment. What then does this set of data suggest about the identifiable empirical implication

(Hr1) 'Religious experiences would seldom occur in people who employ instrumental rational action in a predominant way in their living'?

The integrationist subjects mentioned in chapters 5-8 show that they have an ability to embrace various forms of thought processing and work practice. Through their educational training they show they are familiar with logical rationality, as well as the paradoxical; through their work-practice they indicate exposure to diverse forms of interaction, instrumental rationality being among them. In some cases interviewees actually employ instrumental rationality and then go beyond through using 'irrational' (non rational, or meta rational) conceptual practices. An example of one such integrationist interviewee is Brian the surgeon (ch. 8) who while being completely absorbed in his precise clinical and procedural techniques moves through it to a point of enchantment. The intricacies of the human functioning body lead him to a state of wonder.

The data suggest that the majority of integrationists, though living in a culture which engages various forms of interaction ranging from the consumerist driven ideologies to the instrumentality rational, still manage to employ the completely non-rational conceptual practices of 'vulnerability', 'inter-subjectivity', 'ambiguity' and 'immanence' and their subsidiaries.

The data therefore suggest this first identifiable empirical implication derived from Weber (Hr1) is inaccurate with respect to the integrationist interviewees. Some integrationists have learnt to work with instrumental rationality so that it actually becomes a source of enchantment (like Brian).

The dualist subjects, who also appear in Table 4 (ch. 4) experience enchantment in ways that are different to the integrationists. Where the integrationists sustain enchantment in unrestricted settings, the dualists typically and dominantly reveal experiences of enchantment when their reflections about life are governed by formal religious principles or when they reflect about structured religious forms of prayer or worship. In these structured religious settings it would seem that they terminate instrumental rationality by employing forms of understanding where they attribute to the Church the ability to access pure truth through revelation – a source which defies the purely rational (Weber, 1982:154). These dualists rarely reveal experiences of enchantment in their interviews when talking about everyday human and social interaction.

The dualists tend to experience enchantment when they use conceptual practices, which are steeped in formalism and structure, such as 'follow', 'anxiety', 'categorise' and 'avoidance' and their subsidiaries. Through these conceptual practices, the dualists tend to stay dependent on institutional religion and view that as their primary source of truth rather than personal conscience. There does not seem to be sufficient evidence to draw conclusions about the dualists in terms of this first identifiable empirical implication (Hr1).

These two different ways of engaging with the world suggest that the sort of religion Weber most commonly typifies (1982:332; 357) tends to describe the dualist form of religion rather than the integrationist form. An example of this is Weber's discussion of the question of aesthetics – he portrays the realm of 'this world' as being 'in its core hostile to God' (Weber, 1982:144). On the other hand far from finding this world 'hostile' to God, the integrationists find it a place of enchantment, indeed it becomes for them a metaphor for God. Hence through the conceptual practices of 'vulnerability', 'inter-subjectivity', 'ambiguity' and 'immanence' the integrationists find this world not hostile but amenable to God.

Hr2 In a time of modernity people with scientifically oriented thinking who follow religion will experience internal conflict.

In chapter 2 I discuss another Weberian hypothesis linked to the above – this derives from Weber's focus on the role of scientifically oriented thinking within

modernity and his association of intellectualisation to it. He claims 'Scientific progress is a fraction, the most important fraction of the process of intellectualization' (Weber, 1982:138). I note how Weber argues logically that just as in a time of modernity rationalisation has brought disenchantment more fully into social and private life so also will scientifically oriented thinking. The empirically identifiable implication which flows from this hypothesis is Hr2.

The interviews with the integrationists generate data which suggest this is not the case for them, however the data concerning the dualists suggest the proposition applies to the dualists. In chapter 4 I construct Table 5 showing occupation by integrationist and dualist interviewees. When this table is used together with the educational table (no. 4) the evidence suggests that many of the integrationists do engage in scientifically oriented thinking.

The interviews with the integrationists reveal people experiencing enchantment in the midst of their social and professional life. Their sense of fascination, wonder and enchantment at the workplace challenges the identifiable empirical implication that there will be internal conflict. In chapter 8 I refer to an interviewee by the pseudonym of Brian who as a medical surgeon employs a high level of scientifically oriented thinking. Brian selects the words 'amazing creation' when he talks about the functioning of the human body and describes the universe as being 'filled with all sorts of mystery' (Brian 54).

I note in chapter 8 how 15 integrationist interviewees (and only one dualist) used the conceptual practice of 'a posteriori'. I explain how this conceptual practice expresses itself through a process which works from effects to causes and how by examining a number of discrete particular immediate events it works toward general conclusions. I mention how the interviewees who use this conceptual practice become aware of 'how the present experience opens out and connects to more universal dimensions of being, events or issues, such as the notion of the cosmos or of the Sacred' (ch. 8). The conceptual practice 'a posteriori' is subsidiary to the dominant conceptual practice of 'immanence' – itself being one of the primary ways these interviewees come to enchantment. The significance of this for a discussion on science being able to coexist with a religious attitude is that there is a high degree of similarity between 'scientifically oriented' thinking and the conceptual practice of 'a posteriori'.

In chapter 8 I note how the interviewees who had a predilection for the conceptual practice of 'a posteriori' were also those who approach life with a high sense of 'immanence' – a term meaning one 'who tends to perceive and construct God as pervasively present in every facet of life'. I note also how these subjects typically avoid separating the idea of God from 'the flesh and blood issues of humanity'. This type of data suggests that these integrationist interviewees indeed revel in the detailed engagement of hard scientific methodology, analysis and work on the physical universe. The identifiable empirical implication (Hr2) is at variance with the data these integrationists

generate, hence the empirical implication inaccurately describes the real life situation of contemporary integrationists.

The dualist subjects typically generate references to enchantment when there is an association with what they are doing and an explicit church ordinance – that can be the very act of engaging in functionally rational activity and pursuing scientifically oriented thinking. The dualists follow a style of religion which asks for obedience and for the imposition of absolute categories, this is a view of the Church as the institution possessing all truth and having access to revelation. Because the dualists employ the dominant conceptual practice 'categorise' and its subsidiaries 'a priori' and 'certitude', they tend to impose definitive categories upon a host of social questions. The dualists who employ these conceptual practices typically experience little internal conflict since they tend to approach social issues from the position of certitude and give scant evidence of experiencing self doubt. It would seem therefore that this identifiable empirical implication (Hr2) 'that in a time of modernity people with scientifically oriented thinking who follow religion will experience internal conflict' is not an accurate prediction of what happens in the lives of these contemporary dualist interviewees.

Thomas Luckmann's notion of functional rationality's impact on religion

I note in chapter 2 that Luckmann's theorising about the impact of modernity upon religion owes much to Weber; he also adopts a number of Weber's approaches to the notion of religion's shifts in modernity. Luckmann presents 'functional rationality' and 'institutional segmentation' as two dominant factors, which bring about the demise of institutional religion within modernity. He (1974:101) contends that in modernity society's major institutions rely heavily on 'functional rationality'. He holds that 'functional rationality' – an aspect of rationalisation – influences institutional structures of society by drawing these institutions away from contexts of the Sacred.

Luckmann argues that functional rationality and institutional segmentation share major roles in bringing about the social phenomenon of 'disenchantment'. Social institutions have experienced both a loss of interconnection and a contextualisation within the Sacred (Luckmann, 1987:103). There has been an overall demise of the social-structural conditions, which in the past sustained a sense of a sacred cosmos (Luckmann, 1974:61).

Hr3 Privatised religious life tends to avoid functional rationality.

In chapter 2 the identifiable empirical implication I draw from Luckmann's hypotheses concerning functional rationality and religion is that (Hr3)

Privatised religious life tends to avoid functional rationality. There is some difficulty in assessing where the integrationists fit with respect to Luckmann's category 'privatised religious life'. The integrationists share many of the

characteristics of his typology, such as a high value on personal autonomy and do not readily defer to extreme notions of clericalism. However, unlike Luckmann's privatised religious type the integrationists participate in institutional religion. Insofar as the integrationists can be considered privatised religious the data the integrationists generate in their interviews both support and discredit the accuracy of this implication.

The data from the 'NUDIST' software programme reveals that 15 of the 30 of the integrationist subjects and only 1 of the 14 dualists employ the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a posteriori'. As I note in chapter 8 the term 'a posteriori' in this thesis refers to the method employed by people who work from particular incidents to a point where they are prepared to make general conclusions. These people gather a host of information and by using the discursive rational process arrive at some general conclusion – just as in the scientific method people use the inductive method to generate an overall statement of claim. In the doing of this they experience enchantment.

These integrationist subjects typically use some if not all of the four dominant conceptual practices of 'vulnerability' 'inter-subjectivity' 'ambiguity' and 'immanence'. The data generated by the integrationist interviewees do not therefore seem to support the identifiable empirical implication (Hr3) that privatised religious life tends to avoid functional rationality. In some situations these subjects make use of functional rationality in arriving at enchantment and

in other cases these subjects forgo functional rationality when they experience enchantment.

The identifiable empirical implication (Hr3) that 'privatised religious life tends to avoid functional rationality' has a greater degree of accuracy when it is applied to the dualist subjects. As I mention above only one of the dualist interviewees shows evidence of the conceptual practice of 'a posteriori'. All four dominant conceptual practices the dualists employ, namely 'follow' 'anxiety' 'categorise' and 'avoidance' share a basic orientation toward a deductive 'a priori' approach. The dualists draw upon a set number of source materials, namely institutional church teaching and dogma and a reading of the Christian Scriptures, which is characterised by the directed interpretation of catechisms. The dualists frequently employ the dominant conceptual practice 'categorise' and its subsidiary conceptual practices of 'a priori' and 'certitude' - these conceptual practices do not readily harmonise with the functional rational approach. In addition to this 11 of the 14 interviewees who employ the subsidiary conceptual practice 'a priori' are dualist interviewees. It would seem therefore that the identifiable empirical implication (Hr3) 'privatised religious life tends to avoid functional rationality' is moderately accurate in terms of dualist interviewees.

Section 2

The place of religion and sacralisation in modernity

In this second section, the chapter moves from a focus on the impact of rationalisation, scientifically oriented thinking and functional rationality upon religion, to the question where does religion and sacralisation go in a time of modernity? Weber's reflections on rationalisation's impact on religion entails that religion effectively becomes marginalised. This follows logically from his contention that the functionalist, intellectualist and scientific approach has become so pervasive as to put religion into such a position that in modernity it ceases to be seriously considered (Weber, 1982:282). In this setting religion moves out of the public arena and diminishes its influence on the public institutions of society (Weber, 1982:155). One of the outcomes of this is that religion struggles to maintain a meagre existence in the private and personal spheres of individual lives (Weber, 1982:155). Even in the personal sphere of life Weber predicts it will decline with the advance of the rationalisation of modernity.

There are five identifiable empirical implications I discuss in chapter 2 which are embedded in Weber's discussions about the impact of social institutions and social perceptions on enchantment. The identifiable empirical implications, which deal with the place of religion are:

- Hp1 Institutional religion will experience a demise at the centre of public social life;
- Hp2 The primary social institutions and the people in those institutions will see religion as ever more irrelevant;

- Hp3 Religion will become anachronistic.
- Hp4 Religion will move to the margins of social life;
- Hp5 Even in intimate gatherings religion will by degrees be even less able to survive modernity.

I critique these identifiable empirical implications in the light of the data the interviews generate.

There is a danger in using the term 'institutional' religion that one can read back into Weber's discussion notions, which belong to Luckmann. This point is pertinent here because even though Weber (1982:155) treats the notion of religion's demise in the public arena and alludes to its weakened existence in the personal sphere of life, it is Luckmann who accentuates the distinction between institutional and private religion to the point that it becomes a centre piece of this theorising.

- Hp1 Institutional religion will experience a demise at the centre of public social life.

From Weber's reflections about the disenchantment and consequent diminution of religion in social structures of modernity (ch. 2) I deduce the identifiable empirical implication (Hp1) 'that institutional religion will experience a demise at the centre of public social life' is pertinent to the question about the degree and form of enchantment in the lives of these interviewees. The integrationist

subjects interviewed in this thesis generate data, which show that these subjects experience enchantment in the midst of society's orientation toward rationalisation and intellectualisation. The data on interviewees' occupations indicate that the integrationist subjects work in strong utilitarian and goal oriented positions. These are people who, though being part of a wider social instrumentalist approach to life, also habitually move into conceptual practices of 'vulnerability', 'inter-subjectivity', 'ambiguity' and 'immanence'. These conceptual practices become catalysts for these integrationists' experience of enchantment. These data therefore suggest that the empirical implication inaccurately describes the behaviour of these integrationist subjects.

The degree to which these integrationist interviewees are part of institutional religion is somewhat contentious. They are church going and therefore to some extent are involved in institutional religion. At the same time however the style of religious life these interviewees live is not the same as 'institutional' religion. The difference between how the term 'religion' is used with respect to the integrationists and how the term is used with the prefix 'institutional' is as follows: the former refers to how the integrationists are able to participate in the life of the church without succumbing to its inherent rationalisation; the latter use of the term refers to the rationalised and intellectualised aspects of religion operative through dogma codified law and bureaucracy (Weber, 1982:281, 324, 351).

The data show integrationist subjects not giving unqualified support for 'institutional' styled religion. While subscribing to core theological and moral positions of organised religion, these integrationists reject religion typified through dogma, codified law and bureaucracy. Weber refers to this when he notes the systematisation dynamic within religion 'the very attempt of religious ethics practically and ethically to rationalise the world' (Weber, 1982:356). Weber (1982:351) argues that institutional religion tends to deal with mystical issues in an intellectualist mode. His reflections about church life – unmistakably pointing to the Catholic organisation of religion – singles out priestly functioning as responsible for much of the intellectualisation of religion (Weber, 1982:282). This identifiable empirical implication when tested against the data generated is inaccurate in relation to the integrationist interviewees.

While these integrationist interviewees withdraw support for institutional religion the case is very different for the contrast group – the dualist interviewees. These dualists typically employ the dominant conceptual practices of 'follow', 'anxiety', 'avoidance' and 'categorise'. The subsidiary conceptual practices 'obedience', 'model' and 'duty' come under the dominant conceptual practice 'follow'; the subsidiary conceptual practice 'fear' comes under the dominant conceptual practice of 'anxiety'; the subsidiary conceptual practices of 'certitude' and 'a priori' come under the dominant conceptual practice 'categorise'. These subsidiary and dominant conceptual practices of the dualist interviewees strongly parallel the characteristics of the form of religion Weber

cites when he isolates the dogma, codified law and bureaucracy of organised religion (1978: 426, 439, 562; 1982: 282, 288, 291, 299, 324, 326, 349). On the other hand Weber offers the barest of suggestions as to the existence of a style of religious life portrayed in the integrationists (1978:488, 528, 552; 1982: 325).

The data tend to support the identifiable empirical implication (Hp1) that 'institutional religion will experience a demise at the centre of public social life' and to that extent it is accurate in terms of institutional religion. Given that the dualist interviewees reveal strong commitment to institutional religion there is a tendency to follow its retreat from the centre of public social life. It would seem therefore that this identifiable implication accurately describes the spiritual and religious life of the dualist interviewees.

Hp2 'Primary social institutions and the people in those institutions will see institutional religion as ever more irrelevant'.

The second identifiable empirical implication which deals with social institutions and social perceptions is (Hp2) that 'primary social institutions and the people in those institutions will see institutional religion as ever more irrelevant'. Taking the meaning of the term 'irrelevant' as 'not to the point' or 'lacking relatedness', the data show integrationist interviewees making sense of religion, that is religion in its generic sense rather than institutional religion; the integrationists do not give unqualified support to institutional religion.

The way the integrationists live religion is vastly different to the type of religion (institutional religion) Weber and Luckmann relegate to the periphery. Chapter one notes how, according to Weber (1978:426; 1982:282) rationalisation pushes religion into its 'institutional' frame, and how Weber also maintains the priesthood promotes doctrine as one of its primary traits. The shaping of religion into this systematised instrument is the form of religion the integrationists see as very much secondary to the core of religion; they tend to see it simply as a functional adjunct. The evidence for this conclusion can be seen in the example of Barb (ch. 6) who relates a story of being in church when a boy wanders over to her during a Sunday Mass from across the aisle and sits on her son's lap. Barb's reflections indicate that notions of order, structure and bureaucracy do not effectively impinge on her consciousness. In chapter 5 Marg, another integrationist, tells her story of how she lives her faith in the life situations of her work, where she is frequently under personal threat for her support of battered women. Though a regular church-goer she does not permit issues of rationalisation within institutional religion to deflect her from her relationship with the Christ of the Gospels.

These women, like the majority of integrationist interviewees, appropriate a number of features of modernity and employ these features in their religious behaviour and yet, are still part of 'institutional religion'. It would seem that the primary social institutions who witness people like these integrationist interviewees will not see institutional religion as 'ever more irrelevant'. The

identifiable empirical implication (Hp2) is inaccurate with respect to the integrationists, but possibly moderately accurate with respect to institutional religion.

The dualist subjects display an unquestioning loyalty to institutional religion. In chapter five the dualist interviewee Mable, parallels 'loyalty' to the Pope to the idea of being loyal to Christ. She claims loyalty to the church is not extraordinary. It is something that the 'ordinary' Catholic is required to do when she states; we are 'giving our total loyalty to the Holy Father in his position as Christ's vicar.' Through adopting this attitude of unquestioning obedience Mable typifies other dualists who through the conceptual practices 'follow', 'anxiety', 'avoidance' and 'categorise' dramatically diverge from many of the values typified in late modernity. Contrary to the values Mable esteems, Luckmann (1974; 1990), Hegy (1987), Giddens(1991) and Lyon (1999) note that contemporary institutions and the people in late modernity are characterized by attitudes such as personal autonomy and personal identity. Hence when the dualists, like Mable, triumph the hierarchical forms of religion, it would seem that they are making institutional religion ever more irrelevant to primary social institutions and the persons in those institutions. This identifiable empirical implication (Hp2) would seem to be moderately accurate with respect to the dualist subjects.

Hp3 Institutional religion will become anachronistic.

The third identifiable empirical implication, which deals with Weber's argumentation on the position of religion in modernity is Hp3 that 'institutional religion will become anachronistic.' The third empirical implication though similar to the second empirical implication differs from it in that the former revolves around the notion of time and the latter deals with the issue of relevance.

The data that have been discussed in chapters 5-8 on the four dominant integrationist conceptual practices show that the integrationists are equivocal in terms of their compliance to notions of moral and dogmatic authority within institutional religion. The integrationist interviewees also demonstrate a high use of independence in terms of moral decision making. They show a reluctance to accept directions which have a hierarchical and bureaucratic character. They typically favour processes, which incorporate egalitarian and democratic principles. An example of this is the integrationist interviewees (Barb, Pat, Rob, Ben, Flora and Marg) who talk so passionately about how the 'Turning Point' social justice conference succeeded because it avoided bureaucratic forms of structure and control.

The data cited in chapters 5-8 demonstrate that the integrationist interviewees are a body of people who typically accept the contemporary values of democracy and autonomy. They display some measure of difficulty in accommodating religion when it adopts a strong institutional character. These

integrationists, are conversant and at ease with many of the unquestioned values of modernity, such as democracy, egalitarianism and autonomy. Their difficulty with the institutional character of Catholicism indicates that this implication Hr3 that institutional religion will become anachronistic is accurate in the eyes of the integrationist interviewees. When this identifiable empirical implication, which derives from a Weberian hypothesis, is applied to the integrationist interviewees themselves, it is shown to be inaccurate.

The data generated through the interviews with the dualist subjects typically confirm the accuracy of the empirical implication Hr3 that 'institutional religion will become anachronistic in modernity'. This is primarily because the dualist interviewees generally conform with those elements of religion Weber (1982:288) portrays as institutional, namely hierarchy and patriarchy.

The factor which most supports the identifiable empirical implication Hp3 that 'religion will become anachronistic' in a time of modernity in regard to the dualists is that these interviewees typically employ the conceptual practices of 'follow', 'anxiety', 'avoidance' and 'categorise'. These conceptual practices parallel the scenario Weber portrays when describing institutional religion. Identifying control as a way of generating compliance he notes:

Now every hierocratic and official authority of a 'Church' - that is, a community organised by officials into an institution which bestows gifts

of grace – fights principally against all virtuoso-religion and against its autonomous development. (Weber, 1982:288)

With respect to new frames of thought and movements, which lie outside hierocratic control, there are calculated moves made by officialdom within the Church to bring these elements within the ambit of the rationalisation of the institution (Weber, 1982: 294). Weber (1982:289) uses the term 'virtuoso' to describe the type of religion under the influence of the ascetic, the monk, the prophet, the charismatic, the saint. Where the integrationists tend to follow the 'virtuoso' who calls people to take personal responsibility for their spirituality, the dualists follow the type of 'virtuoso' who calls for greater obedience to particular devotions and forms of piety sanctioned by the Church. To the extent that the dualists tend to have a high value of the notion of compliance to sanctioned religious authority their style of religious observance does appear to be anachronistic in modernity, hence the empirical implication is accurate with respect to the dualists.

Hp4 Religion will move to the margins of social life.

The accuracy of this implication, Hp4 that 'religion will move to the margins of social life', has to be called into question when tested against the data generated by the integrationist interviewees. These subjects are involved in the centre of social life (Table 5 ch. 4), they employ rationalisation (Table 4 ch. 4) and also find enchantment in the mainstream of social activity (the dominant conceptual

practices through which they experience enchantment are used in the centre of social engagement). One example of an integrationist who experiences enchantment in the midst of the social fabric is Pat who comments on the overall commitment to values of justice and dignity when looking at issues of Government policy making by the 600 participants of the 'Turning Point' social justice conference. Pat mentions how he is struck by the sense of unity, solidarity and sense of God's Spirit among the group (ch. 5). Other examples are Barb who works in the political arena and brings her Christian values of social justice to that work (ch. 7). However these same interviewees also find religious experience at the margins of social life. Many of the stories told by the integrationists in chs 5-8 have their settings in the personal realm. A number of such examples are provided by the integrationist Rom who reflects about his experience of the Sacred during private walks in nature (ch. 7) and Flora who speaks of her sense of mystery in nature (ch. 7). This is a point made by Luckmann (1990) when he claims transcendence has become a universal experience. These interviewees do experience enchantment both in the centre of social life and in its margins. Hence the accuracy of this empirical implication has to be called into question for predicting and implying a vacuum of religion at the centre of social life.

With respect to the dualist subjects, there is evidence from the interviews that this empirical implication (Hp4) does describe the location of religion with a degree of accuracy. The data suggest that dualist subjects are less likely than

integrationist subjects to experience enchantment within the centre of social life. The interviews tell of dualist subjects experiencing enchantment on occasions while acting under the influence of prescribed theological and moral directives. The dualist interviewees tend to find the centre of social life disenchanting; this identifiable empirical implication (Hp4) would therefore seem to be minimally accurate with respect to the dualist interviewees.

Hp5 Even in intimate gatherings religion will by degrees be ever less able to survive modernity

The last of Weber's hypotheses in this section deals with the demise of religion even in the private arena. Through the interviews the integrationists show themselves to be able to relate with deep meaning and significance in occasions of intimacy. The integrationists frequently employ the subsidiary conceptual practice of 'intimacy' besides the dominant conceptual practice 'inter-subjectivity'. These conceptual practices are ideally suited to nurture the intimate forms of religion found in small gatherings. When the integrationist subjects employ these conceptual practices they also generate references, which are laden with enchantment. An example of the integrationists experiencing enchantment in occasions of intimacy are Jane who speaks of numerous events when she is personally present to the intensely private realm of a person's preparation for death. She speaks of commonly experiencing a sense of God in those encounters (ch. 8). Another example is the midwife Angela who recalls events where she shares the personal relationships which frequently lead to a

deep consciousness of the presence of the Sacred (ch. 6). This identifiable empirical implication can be said to be inaccurate with respect to the integrationists.

The interview data suggest that dualist subjects typically employ the conceptual practices of 'follow', 'anxiety', 'avoidance' and 'categorise'. In intimate gatherings the religion these dualists exercise is of a type that enables the above conceptual practices to operate – it is a practice which opposes key elements within modernity, such as individual autonomy and individualism. In chapter 2 I note that one way Weber (1982:120) characterises modernity is through the notion of individual responsibility and autonomy. Weber (1982: 352) says that rather than follow religion's claim to '...offer an ultimate stand toward the world by virtue of a direct grasp of the world's meaning' the individual in this time of modernity can create meaning from commitment to the demands of the day by the exercise of the ethics of individual responsibility. Because of the conceptual practices, such as 'follow' and 'avoidance' the data indicate that modernity runs counter to a number of foundational presuppositions of the dualists. On the other hand the dualists tend to use set forms of prayer and worship in intimate gatherings, hence to this extent they can exercise their religion in a fashion, which is almost indifferent to the moves of modernity. Overall bearing these issues in mind the data do seem to suggest that this identifiable implication (Hp5) that 'even in intimate gatherings religion will by degrees be ever less able to survive modernity' is minimally accurate with respect to the dualists.

Luckmann's emphases on the question of the place of religion and sacralisation in modernity

Luckmann (1974:95) speaks about the transition of the traditional social order into the modern industrial social system. He notes how 'institutional specialisation' has modified all institutions including religion causing religion to become institutional religion. He uses the term 'institutional' to distinguish religion in its functional and structural aspects from the character of religion in itself. He also uses the term 'invisible' religion in order to refer to the use of religion at the non public and purely personal level. According to Luckmann institutional religion under the influence of 'institutional specialisation' has moved 'to the periphery of modern industrialised societies' (Luckmann, 1974:101). The specialisation of institutional religion has occurred concurrently with its reliance on 'functional rationality'. One of the changes this specialisation has wrought upon institutional religion is its withdrawal from intimate relationship with a transcendent sacred cosmos (Luckmann, 1974:101).

Hp6 People in late modernity who live a religious life do so primarily in the personalised spheres of their lives and not in the public arena.

The identifiable empirical implication derived from Luckmann's hypotheses (ch. 2), which is concerned with the location of religion and sacralisation is (Hp6)

that 'people in late modernity who live a religious life do so primarily in the personalised spheres of their lives and not in the public arena'. Because the integrationists critique institutional religion and do not automatically defer to it does not mean that institutional religion ceases to be an effective source of enchantment for them. When integrationist subjects identify a given social teaching or pronouncement of institutional religion as thoroughly grounded in the core values and insights of primal religion these same subjects will work in the public arena to implement these teachings.

The integrationist subjects who employ the dominant conceptual practices 'vulnerability', 'inter-subjectivity', 'ambiguity' and 'immanence' do so in the public arena and also in the personalised spheres of their lives. The interview data indicate that the integrationist subjects experience enchantment primarily when they employ these particular conceptual practices. The integrationist subjects – owing to their self actualising moral stands – readily engage in public issues without waiting for institutional religious leadership. The identifiable empirical implication (Hp6) that 'people in late modernity who live a religious life do so primarily in the personalised spheres of their lives and not in the public arena' does not find support from the interview material and therefore the implication is an inaccurate representation of the integrationist interviewees.

The dualist subjects experience enchantment primarily when they feel they are in deep accord with the teaching, attitude, worship and forms of prayer of

institutional religion. Much of this takes place in organised public religious ritual, however the 'public' nature of the ritual is primarily within the restricted confines of institutional religion and much of it is public in that sense. It is not public in the sense of the integrationists who experience enchantment and exercise their religious life among other wider social institutions.

Where clear guidelines are laid down by church authorities in terms of institutional procedure, tradition and Scripture the dualists readily live their religious life in the public arena – the interviews confirm however that this is a restricted activity. This identifiable empirical implication would seem to be minimally accurate concerning the dualist subjects.

Hp7 Everyday experiences are a locus for experiences of the Sacred. The identifiable empirical implication connected to Hegy's hypotheses about sacralisation is (Hp7) that 'Invisible' Catholics will indicate in an interview situation a belief that their everyday experiences are a locus for their experience of the Sacred.' (ch. 2). The integrationists generate discussions indicating enchantment when they employ the dominant conceptual practices 'vulnerability', 'inter-subjectivity', 'ambiguity' and 'immanence'. These conceptual practices appear in the data when these integrationists talk about their everyday life. The empirical implication when applied to the integrationists is highly accurate.

Even though the term 'invisible' Catholic does not truly describe the dualist subjects it is noteworthy that this first identifiable empirical implication does not so accurately describe the dualists as it does the integrationists. One of the reasons for this is the dualists employ the dominant conceptual practice 'avoidance'. This conceptual practice – as the term suggests – does little to encourage the dualist interviewee to approach everyday life with the belief that it has within it the seed of enchantment. An example of this is given in chapter 8 where Jack, the dualist, speaks of a dichotomy existing within the human person. His reflections – like many of the other dualists – indicate everyday life requires the introduction of Gospel insights and values, rather than view everyday life in itself as a locus for an experience of the divine. This empirical implication (Hp7) is therefore only minimally accurate with respect to the dualists.

Section 3

The form Religion takes in modernity

Hf1 Religion will cease addressing public social issues and in the personal issues of life it will become ineffective.

There are three Weberian empirical implications around the issue of the form religion takes in modernity (see appendix 1). The first part of this identifiable empirical implication (Hf1) is that 'In modernity religion will cease addressing public social issues and in the personal issues of life it will become ineffective.' The findings of the interviews suggest this implication is highly inaccurate with

respect to the religion integrationists exercise in modernity. The dominant conceptual practices the integrationists employ are all ideally suited to the work of engaging with public social issues. When the integrationists generate the notion of enchantment the activities they describe are typically embedded in the stories of peoples' engagement in social issues (Pat in ch. 5, Rob in ch. 6, Sal in ch. 7, Flora in ch. 8). A passion for justice in the public arena is a common scenario for enchantment in the reflections of these integrationist interviewees. This adds weight to the contention that the first part of this first empirical implication is highly inaccurate concerning the integrationists.

The latter part of the implication (Hf1), namely that religion will become ineffective in the personal issues of life, is similarly inaccurate when applied to the integrationist interviewees. Just as the interviews reveal a group of people displaying interest in the public sphere of life so also it shows a collection of people who experience enchantment while engaging in the personal issues of life. The type of religion practiced by the integrationist subjects is not becoming ineffective in the personal issues of life, as indicated by a cursory glance at some of the dominant and subsidiary conceptual practices such as, 'inter-subjectivity' (ch. 6), 'being with' (Angela, ch. 6), 'intimacy' (Barb, ch. 6), 'immediacy' (Brian ch. 8), 'mediation' (Flora, ch. 8). These conceptual practices which arise out of the context of personal settings suggest that the identifiable empirical implication (Hf1) that religion will become ineffective in the personal issues of life is highly inaccurate when applied to the integrationist interviewees.

It is difficult to gauge the accuracy of the first part of this identifiable empirical implication (Hf1) dealing with the form of religion that 'In modernity religion will cease addressing public social issues...' in terms of the dualist interviewees. The dualists tend to speak about a narrower range of public social issues than do the integrationists. The dualist motivation typically comes in a deductive 'a priori' form from authority sources such as Catholic tradition, Scripture, the Pope and bishops when these sources explicitly refer to public social life. Some of these directives apply to social justice while others refer to public moral order. The dominant conceptual practices 'follow' and 'categorise' are employed by the dualists in public social issues particularly in matters which overtly contravene the official teachings and morals of institutional religion as enunciated by the hierarchy. It would seem therefore that this first part of the empirical implication (Hf1) that religion will cease addressing public social issues is only minimally accurate in terms of the dualists.

One of the ways of measuring the accuracy of the empirical implication (Hf1) that religion will become ineffective in the personal issues of life is to ask if enchantment occurs, and if it does occur then in what setting the interviewees begin to reveal notions of enchantment? Enchantment most commonly arises for the dualist subjects when the situation is connected to formal religious prayer or set personal habits which spring from religious training. The stories the dualists speak of when they reveal a sense of enchantment do not seem to be stories of

simple delight in the inconsequential and apparently sometimes trivial ordinary experience of personal life. I note in chapter 7 that when the dualist subjects experience enchantment they typically so accentuate the other worldly dimension of the event that it loses its connection with the common place and mundane – it becomes removed from daily life. Speaking of those occasions when the dualists show awareness of enchantment I note 'they speak of it as an experience which takes them out of their everyday life' (ch. 7). The later part of this empirical implication (Hf1) that religion will become ineffective in the personal issues of life would seem then to be only minimally accurate with respect to the dualist interviewees.

Hf2 Religion will be characterised more by a reliance on certitude than by risk taking.

The second identifiable empirical implication (Hf2) dealing with the form of religion which I derive from Weber (ch. 2), states that 'In modernity religion will be characterised more by a reliance on certitude than by risk taking.' This identifiable implication is highly inaccurate of the integrationist interviewees.

One of the strongest indications that this is so can be found in the typical integrationist use of the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' and its subsidiary conceptual practices 'letting go', 'mystery', and 'language'.

I mentioned in chapter 7 when discussing the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' how in everyday life the integrationists typically are oriented toward

the poetic and symbolic rather than the literal. In making this observation I noted the connection between this metaphorical attitude and the commitment to sustain 'constructions about life which refer to its unknown and unresolved aspects.' (ch. 7) With respect to the religious believer this metaphorical attitude shows little need for certitude, and indeed if anything it displays a willingness to enter into risk taking. To this extent the identifiable empirical implication is inaccurate in regard to integrationist subjects.

I noted in chapter 7 of the thesis when analysing integrationist interviewees in terms of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' that these people commonly speak about the need to go beyond set traditional ways of constructing understandings of 'God'. Similarly the subsidiary conceptual practice 'language' continues to be employed in contexts where the subject talks about freeing oneself from conceptually tight notions – the purpose being to be open to new perceptions which rise out of dialogue with the other person. The data indicate this identifiable empirical implication (Hf2) that 'In modernity religion will be characterised more by a reliance on certitude than by risk taking' is highly inaccurate in relation to the integrationist interviewees.

The data suggest however that this identifiable empirical implication (Hf2) accurately describes the type of religion lived by the dualist subjects. In chapter 7 on the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity', I note how the dualist interviewees typically use the dominant conceptual practice 'categorise' and its

subsidiary conceptual practices 'certitude' and 'a priori'. I also note how a dualist interviewee by the pseudonym Jack proposes a moral issue and in discussing it says 'you can't be middle of the road, there are no soft options, there is no changing the rule' (Jack 294). The data indicates that subjects who live a dualist form of religion demand certitude in matters of faith and morals. Besides employing the above conceptual practices these individuals tend to use the dominant conceptual practice 'follow' with respect to the ordinances of institutional religion. This empirical implication (Hf2) that 'In modernity religion will be characterised more by a reliance on certitude than by risk taking' would seem therefore to be accurate with respect to the dualist interviewees.

Hf3 Religious people will place priority on obedience rather than employ individual conscience.

This identifiable empirical implications (Hf3) deals with Weber's prediction that organised religion will encourage people to place priority on obedience rather than employ individual conscience (ch. 2). In chapter 7 I deal with one of the subsidiary conceptual practices 'courage' and note late in the chapter how a number of integrationist interviewees are personally prepared to go against specific requests of clergy in positions of power in the hierarchy. In these cases these individuals act out of their own moral view and do so knowing that their personal conscience runs counter to the expressed will of particular authority figures in the institutional church. The form of religion these integrationist subjects develop is such that there is such a priority placed on the duty to listen

to one's conscience that these individuals are prepared to go against the voice of institutional religion when called to do so by conscience. This implication (Hf3) that religious people will place priority on obedience rather than employ individual conscience seems therefore to be highly inaccurate in terms of the integrationist interviewees.

This identifiable empirical implication (Hf3) that 'religious people will place priority on obedience rather than employ individual conscience' would seem to be an appropriate description of the dualist subjects when considered in terms of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'obedience'. In chapter 5 I note how a dualist interviewee by the pseudonym Tony says that he has problems with the use of gender sensitive language during the public worship of the Eucharist. The reason Tony offers for this is that to his knowledge change in accord to gender sensitivity has not yet been authorised by officialdom in Rome, once approval for such a change is given Tony says he will be completely at ease with the change. Tony typifies a tendency among the dualist interviewees to place a high priority on obedience to institutional authority within Catholicism at the expense of using individual conscience. This empirical implication would therefore seem to be accurate in terms of the dualist interviewees.

Luckmann and the notion that self-identity and personal religious expression typify a new form of religion in modernity

Where Weber argues on the one hand that the development of moral integrity takes place outside of religious systems (Weber, 1982:120, 141, 147, 356; Scaff, 1991:98), Luckmann maintains on the other hand that individuals in late modernity use religious systems when taking responsibility for selecting their personal meaning systems. These individuals are highly discriminating when choosing from the various values, beliefs and meanings on offer (from institutional religion and other contemporary systems) as they build up their own 'ultimate meaning system' (Luckmann, 1974:105).

According to Luckmann (1974:103) individual autonomy in today's society has to be taken up by the individual, it is not supported by the primary social institutions. This is so despite the fact that society exercises expansive spheres of control through its functionally rational 'mechanisms' (Luckmann, 1974:97). The task of maintaining a sense of personal identity according to Luckmann becomes the onus of the individual. As Luckmann says (1974:97) 'Personal identity becomes, essentially, a private phenomenon. This is, perhaps, the most revolutionary trait of modern society.'

In chapter 2 I showed how Luckmann's theorising can be reduced to a number of hypotheses. From these hypotheses I developed a number of identifiable empirical implications. It becomes obvious in this section of the present chapter how different Luckmann's implications are from those of Weber. Where Weber (1982) argues that religion in modernity goes into demise, Luckmann (1974 :76;

1990) sees this demise occurring only in the form of religion, not in its very existence. So according to Luckmann religion goes into demise in its institutional religious structure, but keeps its vitality in a different form – it takes up its existence in the private lives of individuals and on the periphery of society. Religion's metamorphosis has occurred and continues to occur when religion leaves its 'institutional' 'visible' form and takes up a private or 'invisible' form. According to Luckmann (1974) the dominant social institutions within modernity view religion as inconsequential and redundant (ch. 2).

Hf4 Individual religiosity is likely to be distinctly different from organised institutional religion within modernity.

Luckmann hypothesises that people in modernity select their own individual systems of religion; he also claims that these individual systems of belief will not simply replicate institutional models of belief. The empirical implication I draw from these hypotheses in chapter 2 states (Hf4) 'individual religiosity is likely to be distinctly different from organised institutional religion within modernity' (ch. 2). Given integrationists typically value personal conscience and moral autonomy above a universal acceptance of the authority of institutional religion, it follows that this implication accurately portrays the integrationists in this thesis.

Where Weber (1982:120) and Luckmann (1974) identify loyalty and obedience as characteristics of the institutional religious person, the integrationists differ

because they subject institutional religious authority to a serious evaluation based on how well it measures up to the primal Gospel (integrationists who mention the social justice conference). At the same time however these integrationists do not deviate so far from institutional religion that they disown it. There are some central parts of institutional religious practice, which integrationists still find to be a source of enchantment in modernity. While this identifiable empirical implication (Hf4) that 'individual religiosity is likely to be distinctly different from organised institutional religion within modernity' does express some characteristic forms of how integrationist subjects live religion, the implication can be said to be moderately accurate, at the most, with respect to the integrationist interviewees.

The dualist subjects exercise religion in a form closely identified with the spirituality and religious practices of organised institutional religion - it follows logically that the implication (Hf4) that 'individual religiosity is likely to be distinctly different from organised institutional religion within modernity' is inaccurate with respect to the personal religiosity of the dualist interviewees.

Hf5 In late modernity the newly emerging privatised form of religion is anti-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian.

Luckmann's second identifiable empirical implication dealing with the form of religion (Hf5) is that 'in late modernity the newly emerging privatised form of religion is anti-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian.' The plausibility of this

identifiable empirical implication with respect to the integrationist is quite solid. The integrationists who generate the dominant conceptual practice 'vulnerability' commonly also employ the subsidiary conceptual practices 'listening', 'letting go' and 'courage'; in addition there are integrationists who employ the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' and its subsidiaries 'letting go', 'mystery' and 'language'. All these subsidiary conceptual practices have a high congruence with attitudes which value individual conscience and moral autonomy. These conceptual practices indicate that this identifiable empirical implication (Hf5) that 'in late modernity the newly emerging privatised form of religion is anti-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian' is at least moderately accurate with respect to the typical integrationist interviewee. Because the dualists frequently employ the conceptual practices of 'follow', 'duty', 'obedience', 'paternalism', 'security', 'a priori', 'categorise' and 'rigidity' this implication (Hf5) concerning the dualists is highly inaccurate.

Hf6 Withdrawal from socio-political involvement in society.

In chapter 2 I derive a third identifiable empirical implication from Luckmann's hypotheses concerning the form of religion, and it (Hf6) states 'People in modernity, who live a privatised form of religious life, will indicate through in-depth interviewing a withdrawal from socio-political involvement in society.' There is a distinction between the characterizations, 'privatised' and 'withdrawal from socio-political involvement'. The notion 'privatised' form of

religious life, refers to Luckmann's identification of a trend within late modernity among some people to withdraw from organised religious practice and pursue their own forms of religious life away from the public gathering of people. The classification 'withdrawal from socio-political involvement' refers to the trend Luckmann asserts exists within society in late modernity to absent oneself from interest, work and engagement with issues of a socio-political nature.

There is some difficulty in associating the integrationists with Luckmann's typification of 'privatised form of religious life'. The discussion of the interview data (chs 5-8) show that, while the integrationists have many of the notes Luckmann typifies as a 'privatised form of religion' (personal decision making, autonomy, value on self-identity and the ongoing reconstruction of self identity), the integrationist interviewees cannot be completely identified with that category. The overriding reason being that the integrationists (unlike Luckmann's ideal type) are involved in institutional religion.

Far from withdrawing from socio-political involvement in society the integrationists demonstrate through in-depth interviewing (chs 5-8), that they seek out involvement in socio-political affairs in society. Integrationist interviewees work in refugee associations and participate in committees structured by indigenous people. They are involved in women's movements focusing particularly on the abuse, safety, health, and spirituality. They are committed to argue the cause of women's rights within institutional religion.

Other aspects of their social interest can be found in the area of marriage and family support, necessitating financial and crisis intervention. Some integrationists are active members of ecology education and public policy formation committees. Other integrationists are active in political parties and trade union movements. Of the 30 who comprise the integrationist group there are less than five who are not currently involved in some of the above issues and movements. Hence insofar as the integrationists can be thought of as living Luckmann's 'privatised form of religious life' (an association which as noted above has only some shared characteristics), the empirical implication (Hf6) is an inaccurate description of the integrationist interviewees.

The dualist interview group have less in common with Luckmann's religious category 'privatised religious life' than do the integrationist interview group. Unlike the integrationists, who share a number of key characteristics with Luckmann's 'privatised religious life', such as personal decision making, autonomy, etc., the dualists have few points of connection.

The data show that where institutional religious authority proclaims approval or disapproval of particular social attitudes and behaviours the dualist subjects have a socio-political involvement. These dualist interviewees tend to work in the more traditional forms of charity work, such as giving help in the distribution of food, clothing and shelter. Most commonly these dualist subjects perform these activities through organisations affiliated with the institutional church, most commonly St. Vincent de Paul society and the Catholic women's

league. The dualists avoid engaging in social and political analysis. They seldom ask questions about structures which perpetuate poverty. In this way they are unlike the integrationists who consider that this form of inquiry is just as important as helping the results of unjust social policy. Whilst acknowledging that the dualists cannot be classified as 'privatised religious', the implication (Hf6) is only minimally accurate with respect to the dualists.

Pierre Hegy and the appropriation of personalised ultimate meaning systems while staying within institutionalised religion

The distinctiveness of Hegy in this section dealing with the new form of religion in modernity is that he hypothesises and tests theory about Luckmann's idea of 'invisible religion' within the confines of the Catholic religion. One of the differences which emerges between Hegy and Luckmann occurs around the meaning of the concept 'transcendence'. Luckmann (1990:128) tends to generalise the term 'transcendence' so that all of life becomes sacralised as he says 'ultimate meanings of life occur in the context of everyday life.'

Hegy (1987) accuses Luckmann of a simplistic portrayal of the emergence of 'invisible' religion when Luckmann examines the demise of religion in terms of a polarised reductionist 'religion-church' model. Having criticised Luckmann for being reductionist in offering the polar 'religion-church' model Hegy could

possibly be in danger of reproducing the same error. Hegy (1987:168) isolates 'clerical culture' as the dominant issue and positions it in an oppositional stance to 'religion'; he ends up with a 'religion-clerical culture' model. In this he repeats some of the earlier observations Weber (1982:351) makes about clerical influences on the rationalisation of religion (chs 2).

By choosing the encompassing concept 'culture', Hegy (1987:168) constructs the concept of the 'invisible Catholic' as a multifaceted subject. He (1987:168) explains the term 'invisible' Catholicism by talking about an emerging style of religious consciousness within Catholicism and typifies this emerging consciousness as a 'Vatican 2' scale – a scale that gives 'alternative conceptions of sin, celibacy, the sacred, morality, the sacraments, and the papacy' (ch. 2).

How Hegy's model varies from that of Weber and Luckmann

Even though Hegy (1987:168) speaks about the different ways of conceptualising morality, liturgy and church order he restricts the discussion of 'disenchantment' to the parameters of the church. Hegy's notion of 'clerical culture' paradoxically limits what he attempts to address – the disenchantment of institutional Catholicism – by narrowing the discussion of culture with the category 'clergy'. The term 'clerical culture' is too readily confined to an ethnocentric and culturally limited vision. By contrast, Weber's notions of 'rationalism' and

'intellectualism' and 'institutionalism' are not restricted to the particular audiences they address.

Hegy (1987:168) differs from Luckmann when the latter contends that the new form of religion - 'invisible' religion - emerging in late modernity directs the individual away from social involvement (ch. 2). Hegy maintains that the New Catholicism he studies and labels as 'invisible' Catholicism is both more secular and more religious, since 'invisible' Catholicism's secular involvement is inspired by its religious beliefs. Hence where Luckmann (1974) predicts this new form of religious life focuses on self and away from societal responsibility, Hegy (1987) argues the opposite. People who are joining the emerging 'invisible' Catholicism are socially aware and active, their theology urges them toward social engagement as an integrated part of religious life.

Hf7 'Invisible' Catholics reject the 'institutional' model of the church.

The first of the identifiable empirical implications drawn from Hegy's hypotheses about the form of religion is (Hf7) that 'Invisible' Catholics in an interview situation will reflect their rejection of the 'institutional' model of the church in the way they speak about related issues(ch. 2). While studying ambiguity (ch. 7) I note how integrationists, even though they are within institutional religion, recognise and speak about the disenchantment generated

by the institutional aspect of organised religion. I cite the example of Flora (a Catholic religious sister) who while still practicing religion within the formal structure of Catholicism voices her rejection of the bureaucracy and functional dimensions of religion. She quotes (ch. 7) from an anthropologist who holds religion can restrict enchantment, when it can block the sense of enchantment.

In chapter 6 on the dominant conceptual practice of 'inter-subjectivity' there are also references about dissatisfaction with the functional aspects of religion. This becomes obvious by looking at the hierarchy of subsidiary conceptual practices under 'inter-subjectivity' the integrationists use, such as 'nature', 'small communities' and 'informal structure' (appendix 2). Although these integrationist interviewees typically reject the 'institutional' model of the church, yet they also uphold certain individuals within institutional Catholicism who stand against bureaucracy. One such figure they celebrate is Pope Leo the 13th who fought for the rights of working people through his encyclical 'Rerum Novarum'. An example of this is Rob, the integrationist, who in chapter 7 spoke of his elderly uncle's solid and good life as a father trying to do the best for his children. Rob notes that though his uncle was never a church goer he furthered values of justice. According to Rob, his uncle basically held Christian values regardless of the fact that he did not see himself as part of the institutional church. Rob is quite incensed at attitudes from some quarters within 'institutional' Catholicism which would suggest his uncle is not part of the wider church. The data generated from the interviews indicate, that the

identifiable empirical implication (Hf7) that "'invisible" Catholics will reflect their rejection of the "institutional" model of the church in the way they speak about related issues in an interview situation' is moderately accurate with respect of the integrationists. Given the dualists cannot be categorised as 'invisible' Catholics, this identifiable empirical implication does not apply.

Hf8 'Invisible' Catholicism being uneasy with 'clericalism'.

The second identifiable empirical implication I deduced in chapter 2 from Hegy's hypotheses (Hf8) is that 'In modernity individuals who are part of 'invisible' Catholicism will show that they are uneasy with "clericalism" through in-depth interview situations' In practice this implication is almost identical to Hegy's implication dealing with the 'invisible' Catholics' rejection of the 'institutional' model of the church. Where the first treats the notion of the 'institutional' model of the church the second concerns 'clericalism'. This thesis uses the term clericalism to refer to the expectation of privilege which comes from belonging to the clerical group; it also refers to the belief, and the presumption that the clergy possess essential knowledge, power, legitimation and status purely from being part of the professional ordained group within institutional religion. The interviews with these integrationist Catholics generate material that displays their uneasy feelings about attitudes of 'clericalism' and show how this empirical implication (Hf8) is a highly accurate portrayal of the integrationist subjects. The dualist interviewees, in the main, cannot be considered to belong to Hegy's 'invisible' Catholic group (ch. 2).

Hf9 'Invisible' Catholicism and moral authority.

The third identifiable empirical implication (Hf9) I develop in chapter 2 dealing with Hegy's hypotheses about the form of religion states "'invisible" Catholics who believe moral and legal authority is based in their own conscience, express this belief in an interview situation.' The hypothesis from which this implication derives deals with the group within Catholicism who no longer give moral and legal authority to the hierarchy of the church, instead they reclaim personal ownership and control over their consciences. The dominant conceptual practices the integrationists employ indicate they limit the moral claims made by religious institutional figureheads, and to that degree invest meaning in their own conscience.

In chapter 7 I note how Barb, the integrationist interviewee, uses self actualising moral language. She reflects on the 'Turning point' social justice conference and comments on the collective insights and shared experience, the conference generated. In particular she notes the overall arrival at personal and collective moral decisions. In another part of her interview Barb's language indicates that she finds it quite objectionable when priests assume moral authority, she notes 'I find really oppressive, you know the priest standing up and all that stuff, frustrating (Barb 881)'. In doing this Barb represents a host of other integrationist interviewees, among whom are: Libi, Rob, Rom, Pat, Ben, Tom, Glen, Flora, Sal, Jane, Angela, Marg, Brian and Lou. The integrationist interview data indicates

this third identifiable empirical implication ('"invisible" Catholics who believe moral and legal authority is based in their own conscience express this belief in an interview situation') is accurate with respect to the integrationist interviewees. The dualist interviewees, in the main, cannot be considered to belong to Hegy's 'invisible' Catholic group (ch. 2).

Hf10 'Invisible' Catholics express a commitment to address socio-political injustice in and outside the church.

The fourth identifiable empirical implication which I deduce from Hegy's hypotheses in chapter 2 dealing with the form of religion (Hf10) states 'In an interview situation "invisible" Catholics express a commitment to address socio-political injustice in and outside the church'. In chapter 5 I cite the integrationist by the pseudonym of Libi who talks about her work with the unemployed and how she attempts to show these people to avoid interpreting job loss simply in terms of personal inability. Libi displays some of the passion she has for the personal transformation of these individuals by collectively discovering new goals and hopes. Her commitment to face socio-political injustice is present in the way she talks about her friends, she does this 'to get them out in suicide cases...I haven't run away from things.' (740, 751)

Lou, an integrationist is committed to address injustice within the church. She joins with other women who work with her addressing the issue of women's participation in decision making processes within Catholicism and the denial of

priesthood to women. Lou chooses to use the term 'power' while talking about 'institutional' Catholicism. She says 'some people didn't want to give up power.' (Lou 50) Later she uses the terms 'freedom', 'liberation', 'strength' when she talks about standing against systematic exclusion which 'has been for centuries for us anyway.' (Lou 91) A number of women in chapters 5-8 comment that the reason why they remain within the 'institutional' structure of Catholicism is because their sense of belonging springs from the Gospel and Baptism not from notions of clericalism or hierarchy. The data generated from integrationist interviews show this fourth identifiable empirical implication 'In an interview situation "invisible" Catholics express a commitment to address socio-political injustice in and outside the church.' is accurate with respect to the integrationist interviewees. The dualist interviewees, in the main, cannot be considered to belong to Hegy's 'invisible' Catholic group (ch. 2)

Conclusion

This chapter has taken a thematic approach to Weber, Luckmann and Hegy's hypotheses concerning religion in a time of modernity. It has grouped the identifiable empirical implications, which spring from these hypotheses into three different sections (see appendix 1). The first focused on how rationalisation, intellectualisation and scientifically oriented thinking affected religion. The second studied the place of religion and sacralisation in modernity. The third examined the particular form religion would take in modernity.

What emerges in the first section is that Weber and Luckmann's overall predictions fail to accommodate the type of religiosity lived by the integrationists. These integrationists have learnt to employ instrumental rational action and still sustain enchantment (Hr1, Hr2 and Hr3). At the same time however, the data shows that integrationists need to employ particular conceptual practices in order to avoid the disenchanting effect of rationalisation. The second section reveals that Hegy is closer than either Weber or Luckmann in predicting the type of religion being lived by the integrationists. The integrationists have a locus for their experience of the Sacred in everyday life. This second section shows that Weber and Luckmann accurately predict how institutional religion operates in modernity. The last section indicates that integrationists appropriate many of the qualities esteemed by modernity, such as value on personal autonomy and democracy. In light of this, the integrationists have a strained relationship with institutional religion over the issues of clericalism, bureaucracy, moral and dogmatic authority. Hegy's predictions accurately accommodate the social justice orientation of these integrationists. I will now turn to draw a number of observations and conclusions in chapter 10.

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion

In this chapter I provide an overall assessment of Weber, Luckmann and Hegy, and explain what this means considering enchantment in modernity. In doing this I address the key issues of the thesis that were raised in the introductory chapter concerning the nature of conceptual practices, the relationship between the symbolic and these conceptual practices and the question is there some way religion can go beyond the apparent polarisation between the integrationist style of religion and the institutional dimension of Catholicism. I offer comment on how this thesis contributes to similar work being done elsewhere, and assess whether further related study should be pursued in particular areas.

I will start my assessment of Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's reflections about enchantment in modernity by examining how their theories account for the nature of the particular conceptual practices the integrationists use in achieving enchantment in late modernity. I raised this topic as the first dominant theme of the thesis in the introductory chapter.

Weber's theory accounts for the integrationists using these particular conceptual practices rather well, given that he argues that rationalisation, intellectualisation and scientifically oriented thinking are the elements of human and societal orientation which disenchant the world. Essentially,

Weber's three elements are a form of control over individual and social life; and the important word here is 'control'.

The processes of control typifying rationalisation are very different from the character of integrationist conceptual practices, which is basically the diametrical opposite of 'control'. Considering the integrationist conceptual practices as a whole (table 6, ch. 5), it would seem that these particular conceptual practices can be characterised as 'openness', 'interest in the other as a subject', 'ambiguity' and the 'pervasive sense of mystery'. These characteristics predispose the individual toward engagement, acceptance, fascination and awe.

The nature of these conceptual practices is quite logical, given Weber's claim that rationalisation, intellectualisation and scientifically oriented thinking characterise modernity. The integrationist conceptual practices as a whole act as a buffer against the 'controlling' dynamic of rationalisation. In this sense Weber's theory accounts rather well for the nature of the conceptual practices the integrationists employ.

When the integrationists act out of these conceptual practices the controlling dimension of rationalisation is somewhat modified. The conceptual practices serve to work with rationalisation to give space for the reflective experience of the individual whilst he or she cooperates with the rationalisation. Brian, the surgeon (ch. 8), typifies other integrationists who while being involved in

complex work are led into enchantment through the use of the conceptual practice 'a posteriori'.

In the opening paragraphs of the introductory chapter I talk about peoples' experiences of control. In chapter 9 the identifiable empirical implications Hr1 and Hr2 isolate this very feature of Weber's disenchantment hypothesis, which predicts disenchantment through peoples' use of rationalisation. Both implications are shown to inaccurately describe the integrationists, because of their use of particular conceptual practices.

Chapter nine's assessment of the implications Hr1 and Hr2, draws on the issue of how some integrationists work with instrumental rationality by switching over to the use of particular conceptual practices, and how others stay with instrumental rationality and go beyond it into enchantment. In the former case these interviewees use conceptual practices in such a way that they effectively become insulated from the disenchanting effect of rationalisation. In the latter case, interviewees use conceptual practices in such a way as to become enthralled with the intricacy of the work that rationalisation, intellectualisation and scientifically oriented thinking helps bring into existence. Weber's rationalisation and disenchantment theory accounts, to some extent, for the integrationists using these particular conceptual practices.

Luckmann's theoretical position on disenchantment in modernity also accounts rather well for the nature of the particular conceptual practices the integrationists use in achieving enchantment in late modernity. I note in chapter two how Luckmann accounts for disenchantment by arguing that disenchantment is due to the presence of 'functional rationality', 'institutional specialisation' and 'institutional segmentation/differentiation'. Because these features – according to Luckmann (1974) – operate primarily in the public arena, he maintains religion migrates from the public to the private sphere. These facets of rationalisation, which Luckmann employs to explain disenchantment, all provide a good account for the nature of the particular conceptual practices the integrationists use in achieving enchantment in late modernity. An example of this point is the conceptual practices 'vulnerability', 'inter-subjectivity', 'intimacy', 'community' and 'ambiguity'. All these conceptual practices foil the disenchanting effects of 'functional rationality', 'institutional specialisation' and 'institutional segmentation'. Bureaucracy is frustrated by conceptual practices of this type.

In chapter nine I discuss Hegy's identifiable empirical implications Hf7 and Hf8 in the light of the interview data (chs 5-8). Hf7 and Hf8 refer to the institutional model of the church and 'clericalism'; both these issues reflect Weber's notion of rationalisation as expressed through bureaucracy and hierarchy. Hegy's account expresses the difficulty the integrationists have with the controlling dimension of bureaucracy and hierarchy. His theory explains this difficulty

rather well, given the particular conceptual practices the integrationists use. Most of these conceptual practices mitigate the 'controlling' facet of rationalisation, though some work with this facet and direct it toward the service of human and social need.

Though Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's reflections about disenchantment in modernity revolve around the notion of rationalisation, their accounts of disenchantment do differ. I argue that Weber gives the best overall account because he offers a more comprehensive discussion of the social as well as the cultural dimensions of rationalisation and disenchantment. His work shows how rationalisation, intellectualisation and scientifically oriented thinking impact across society generally, on the cultural experience of private life and on the culture of particular religious groupings. In his study of religion (1978, 1982), he shows how rationalisation and intellectualisation influence the institutionalisation of religion. Hence the particular conceptual practices the integrationists use are logical considering Weber's theory. There seems no better way of disengaging from the disenchanting effects of overly structuring religious belief and practice, than to use the integrationist conceptual practices 'ambiguity', 'letting go', 'community', 'courage', 'inter-subjectivity', 'mystery', 'language', 'immediacy' and 'intimacy', and others listed in table 6 (ch. 5).

Luckmann's account of disenchantment, while dealing with the public arena through the notion of 'instrumental rationality' and 'institutional specialisation'

and 'institutional segmentation', involves the notion of self-identity. He predicts the strong current movement within institutional Catholicism toward specialisation and differentiation. However, his argument that current institutions fail to bestow self-identity, would seem difficult to support in terms of institutional Catholicism. This is so because it would appear that there is a residual cultural ethos within Catholicism that supports the use of conceptual practices, such as 'mystery' and 'ambiguity', and the use of myth and symbol. At the same time however, while the integrationists derive a good measure of their self-identity from this residual Catholic ethos, much of it – as Luckmann (1974:97) argues – is also constructed by the self (ch. 2).

Hegy's account, though lacking the conceptual depth and extension of Weber's explanation, offers a good focus on the cultural dimensions peculiar to Catholicism. By isolating the subculture of 'clericalism', Hegy (1987) effectively deals with Weber's notion of rationalisation and intellectualisation. The strength of Hegy's account is that it penetrates into the cultural issues within which the clericalism of the Catholic church is embedded (Hf7 and Hf8). His theory is compelling because it is a historically specific analysis of the shifts in the subcultures within Catholicism prior to and since the second Vatican Council, and as such offers a good account for the integrationists' use of their particular conceptual practices.

Chapter six demonstrates how the dominant conceptual practice 'inter-subjectivity', through generating a high sense of meaning on the sacredness of the other, helps sustain enchantment while under the onslaught of impersonal rationalisation, both in wider society and within institutional Catholicism. In chapter nine while assessing the accuracy of Hegy's identifiable empirical implication Hf7 against the integrationists' data, I note the example of Rob, who uses the subsidiary conceptual practice 'language' (Ch. 7) to offset the disenchantment he feels which flows from the institutional church. Chapter seven has shown that the dominant conceptual practice 'ambiguity' is a most effective way of avoiding the corrosive impact that institutional clericalism has upon enchantment. The identifiable empirical implications (Hp7, Hf7, Hf8, Hf9 Hf10 in ch. 9) flowing from Hegy's account of disenchantment are highly provocative. This is because they touch on issues which are relevant to the integrationists. A reading of chapters five to eight reveals that many integrationists survive the disenchantment of institutionalised Catholicism, through using particular conceptual practices. To this degree Hegy's theory makes the use of integrationist conceptual practices a very logical act, as a way of avoiding the disenchantment of institutionalised Catholicism.

Weber, Luckmann and Hegy, and the institutional - integrationist relationship

In providing a theoretical assessment of Weber, Luckmann and Hegy, in terms of disenchantment, I now turn to examine how they account for the apparent

impasse between integrationist religiosity and institutional Catholicism. As I noted in the introductory chapter, this is one of the main issues this thesis addresses. Thus far this thesis has shown that the integrationists experience enchantment typically when they employ one or more of the particular dominant conceptual practices of 'vulnerability', 'inter-subjectivity', 'ambiguity' and 'immanence', or any of the subsidiary conceptual practices in the integrationist group (table 6 ch. 5). These particular conceptual practices – as noted above – have an underlying character which predisposes the integrationist toward 'engagement, acceptance, fascination and awe'. These tendencies shape the integrationists' spirituality and religion and are arguably the diametrical opposite of the tendencies which sustain and develop institutional Catholicism, namely rationalisation and intellectualisation.

As I noted above, the factors driving disenchantment, which Weber, Luckmann and Hegy identify, can be characterised as 'control'. Chapters five to eight all demonstrate the controlling character of rationalisation, within the wider society and religion. The gift of the particular conceptual practices integrationist religiosity typically employs is such that it directs the individual away from attitudes which are either means-end oriented, utilitarian, rationalistic, reductionist, literalist or controlling. Hence in the midst of a controlling social environment, the integrationists manage to sustain their enchantment because of their particular conceptual practices. All three theorists predict conflict between the integrationists and institutional Catholicism. Their account of this

tension also makes sense of the particular conceptual practices the integrationists use to defy disenchantment.

Weber's, Luckmann's and Hegy's predictions and account of the impasse between institutional religion and the emerging individual in modernity is evident throughout the thesis. I note in chapter one how Weber argued that rationalisation and intellectualisation shaped religion by transforming it into an organised functional institution. Weber (1978, 1982) argued that these factors are at work within Catholicism whenever there are moves to order its structure, such as the hierarchical ordering of clerical and lay states of religion, theological specialisation, moral and doctrinal decrees, and the codification of moral law. Weber (1982:353) criticised institutional religion for being under the spell of intellectualisation when it 'surrenders the unassailable incommunicability of mystic experiences'. He explains that even though religion can bring about 'mystic experience as events; it has no means of 'adequately communicating and demonstrating them.'

Weber argued that it was intellectualisation that enticed religion to explain mystical experience, by forcing its transposition from the 'non-rational' realm of ambiguity (which defies evaluation and explanation), into the rational world of theological exploration and doctrinal statement. Chapters one, two and nine have all shown that Weber identified rationalisation as the cause of disenchantment not only in wider social life, but also in religious life. In

discussing the identifiable empirical implication Hp3 (ch. 9), which I derive from Weber, I note how the integrationist interviewees show a reluctance to accept church directives when such directives have either a hierarchical or bureaucratic character. The discussion (ch. 9) of this empirical implication, which states 'institutional religion will become anachronistic' addresses the tension which exists between integrationist religiosity and imposition of bureaucratic decision making within institutional Catholicism. This demonstrates that Weber successfully accounts for the disparity and tension between institutional Catholicism and the integrationist form of spirituality and religious life.

Luckmann's explanation of disenchantment also anticipates and accounts for the difficulty between institutional Catholicism and the integrationist form of spirituality and religion. In chapter nine I note the identifiable empirical implication Hf4, which I derive from Luckmann, that states 'individual religiosity is likely to be distinctly different from organised institutional religion within modernity'. When this prediction is evaluated against the interview data in chapter nine it is found to be a 'moderately accurate' account of integrationist religiosity. The empirical implication Hf5, that 'in late modernity the newly emerging privatised form of religion is anti-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian', is shown to be 'moderately accurate' with respect to integrationists' religiosity (ch. 9). Luckmann's theories, like those of Weber, accurately isolate and focus

attention on the troubled relationship between institutional Catholicism and integrationist religiosity.

Chapter nine has shown that Hegy's account of disenchantment within Catholicism is highly accurate with respect to the integrationist form of spirituality and religious life. I have noted four identifiable empirical implications, namely Hf7, Hf8, Hf9 and Hf10, which are the operational forms of four hypotheses I derived from Hegy in chapter two, namely H12, H13, H15 and H16 respectively. All these empirical implications and hypotheses concern the divergent nature of religion existing between institutional Catholicism and the integrationist form of Catholicism (ch. 9).

The question, where does moral authority ultimately reside is a very contentious issue in the relationship between institutional Catholicism and integrationist Catholicism. The empirical implication Hf9 states 'Invisible Catholics who believe moral and legal authority is based in their own conscience will give voice to this belief in an interview situation' is shown to be accurate with respect to the integrationists. The empirical implication Hf10, which states "'Invisible' Catholics express a commitment to address socio-political injustice in and outside the church." is found to 'accurately' represent the state of play operative within integrationist religiosity.

In this discussion Hegy focuses solely on Catholicism and in particular on an emerging form of religion within Catholicism which closely parallels the thirty interviewees I group under the integrationist form of spirituality and religion. His account more than that of Weber and Luckmann is directed specifically at the hiatus between institutional Catholicism and the integrationists. At the same time however, Hegy's account is neither conceptually deep nor as encompassing as Weber's. Where Weber provides a comprehensive treatment of the 'non-rational' dimension of religion – the basis for a conceptual understanding of the difficulty between integrationist religiosity and institutional Catholicism – Hegy deals directly with tension between the two religious orientations.

Is there some third way?

This dissertation has identified a state of unease between institutional Catholicism and the integrationist form of Catholicism. On the one hand, there is the possibility that the relationship between both parties will become not only polarised, but eventually irreconcilable. If the relationship between both elements of religion eventually breaks, then arguably there will be a great deal of harm done to institutional Catholicism, to integrationist religiosity and to the wider social fabric. On the other hand, it is possible that both religious orientations move toward some form of exchange, engagement and reciprocity. This latter scenario, could become a 'third way' through which religion might sustain both its own structure as well as the integrationist form of religion. If

this eventuates, it could lead to religion supporting and enhancing the kinds of approaches to the world which seem to sustain integrationist enchantment. One way of exploring this issue is to ask the following questions: Do these parties have particular gifts that they could offer each other? Is it the case that they actually need each other in the fashion of a symbiotic relationship?

My immediate response to the question posed above is that there is a 'third way' and that the 'way' is embedded in the findings of the thesis. I show this is the case by setting out three scenarios: firstly what the institutional church has to offer; secondly what the 'integrationist' form of religion has to offer; and thirdly what the balance of these forms can offer as a 'third way'.

What the institutional church has to offer

One of the insights which emerges from the interview material (chs 5-8) is that despite the fact that the institutional church suffers from rationalisation and intellectualisation, at least it does provide a place for the celebration of ritual and sacrament, and has the mechanisms necessary for the conducting of such ceremonies. Conscious of the tendency of institutional religion to order, codify, intellectualise and multiply doctrines, Weber (1982:353) argues that despite this, one of the things institutional religion does well is to provide the 'means of bringing mystic experience about as events'. Weber is not claiming institutional religion has access to the meaning or explanation of 'mystic experience', but

simply that it has the instruments, the expertise and the overall sense of creating ceremonies and rituals, as occasions and happenings. These sacraments and rituals are events where 'mystic experience' may occur.

The Catholic integrationist form of spirituality and religion, because of its essential connection to the 'non-rational' has a critical need to engage in ritual that is embedded in primeval symbols that defy the rational. Many of the integrationists' experiences of enchantment occur in everyday life. Nevertheless these same integrationists refer to their need of the symbolic and the mythic, through the medium of sacrament and ritual. When institutional religion brings 'mystic experience about as events', it fulfils this primal need of integrationist religiosity.

This need is located and expressed in the nature of their conceptual practices. This is particularly so in the case of the two dominant conceptual practices 'ambiguity' and 'vulnerability' and in the subsidiary conceptual practices 'mystery', 'letting go' and 'courage'. The conceptual practice 'ambiguity' relishes and thrives in the celebration of ritual which cannot be understood without engaging mythically and symbolically. Similarly conceptual practices, such as 'letting go', demand 'non-rational' and even 'irrational' ritual as a base from which they derive their nurture and life. In the discussion of the subsidiary conceptual practice 'letting go' (chs 5 and 7), there are repeated references to the jettisoning of concepts and rational forms of apprehension in favour of

experiential encounter. The integrationist religiosity has a strong need for ritualising the 'non-rational'; the agent which can bring this about as an event is institutional Catholicism. The need is there, institutional religion can fulfil it (when it limits rationalisation and intellectualisation).

The second contribution institutional religion has to offer integrationist forms of religion and the wider society, comes in a form the integrationists tend to censor, namely 'doctrine'. Conscious of institutional religion's compulsive desire to intellectualise mythic experience, Weber identified the use of doctrine as an ironic gift when it creatively influences practical behaviour. Weber argued that

The rational elements of a religion, its 'doctrine'..., the Calvinist belief in predestination, the Lutheran justification through faith, the Catholic doctrine of sacrament...the nature of the images of God and of the world, have under certain conditions had far-reaching results for the fashioning of a practical way of life. (Weber, 1982:286)

The paradoxical truth of institutional religion is that even though it runs the danger of losing enchantment by intellectualising mystical experience, it sometimes supports enchantment when it identifies the core of the experience. In the example Weber offers of the Catholic notion of 'sacrament', the institutional church names the core of integrationist spirituality and religion. Greeley (ch. 3) shares Weber's argument that the doctrine of 'sacramentality' shapes the practical lives of Catholics. Greeley argues that what is unique about

Catholicism is this idea of sacramentality, that is, it teaches that the world acts as a metaphor of the divine, it is 'somewhat like God' it is 'a "sacrament" of God' (Greeley, 1991b).

What Weber (1982:286) identifies about the function of 'doctrine' is that, ironically in this case, institutional Catholicism, through defining the notion of 'sacrament', brings people into a way of perception which is essentially poetic and mythic. In traditional sacramental theology the notion 'ex opere operato' emphasised the power of the rite and ritual to effect an encounter with God, it does not overly emphasise the predisposition of the human individual participating in the sacrament (McBrien 1980). In one sense this is very close to what Weber (1982) describes as the magical, 'non-rational' element of religion.

Similarly, the Catholic doctrine of the 'incarnation', has 'far-reaching results for the fashioning of a practical way of life'. (Weber, 1982:286) This theology teaches that since God became human through the person of Jesus, then God is enmeshed in the world. Again institutional religion, paradoxically, supports and encourages people like the integrationists to engage with the world because of the 'doctrine' of the 'incarnation'. This is a contribution institutional religion has to offer integrationist religiosity and wider society.

What the integrationist form of religion has to offer

Perhaps one of the most positive assets the integrationist form of religion offers institutional religion and the wider world is its value of the 'non-rational', 'meta-rational' and 'irrational'. Earlier, I noted how Weber (1982:353) wrote that institutional religion has the 'means of bringing mystic experience about as events'. He went on to argue institutional religion 'has no means of adequately communicating and demonstrating them' (1982:353). Throughout this thesis the story of the integrationists is a story of a body of people who are forever castigating institutional Catholicism, when it intellectualises and defines 'mystic experience'.

This thesis has demonstrated that enchantment is essentially 'non-rational'. This is still the case, even when enchantment is experienced after engaging with the discriminating intellect (the conceptual practice 'a posteriori' ch. 8). The thesis has established the 'non-rational' nature of enchantment by identifying the conceptual practices the integrationists typically employ. These engage the 'non-rational' through the experiential, the analogical and the symbolical. It does this particularly through the conceptual practices 'ambiguity', 'letting go', 'mystery' and 'language' (ch. 7). The integrationist form of Catholicism challenges institutional Catholicism whenever it attempts to transpose mythic experience into intellectualist constructions (Table No. 6, ch. 5). According to the integrationist form of spirituality, such rarefaction saps religious experience

and everyday experience of its soul. All that is left is an ideational structure (Weber, 1976, 1978, 1982).

This integrationist form of Catholicism has an intuitive awareness that enchantment does not submit to manipulation or evaluation, and defies attempts to gauge its 'subjective meaning' (Weber, 1978:1376). Integrationist religiosity knows enchantment is likely to occur in the most unexpected and unorthodox ways and settings. Integrationist religiosity takes delight in surprise, since surprise defies the expected, the planned and the controlled. This religiosity typically identifies with the clown, the fool and the deviant. The gift integrationist religiosity offers the world and religion is a link to the primitive, the magical (Weber, 1982:275), and to the 'non-rational'. This connection impels integrationist religiosity to play a watchdog role toward institutional religion's penchant for intellectualising and controlling 'mythic experience'. Hence whenever religion attempts to explain away the complexity of life by intellectualising it, by overly formalising ritual, by controlling the primeval, the chaotic, the symbolic or the mythic in ritual, integrationist religiosity confronts this surrender of 'the unassailable incommunicability of mystic experiences'(Weber, 1982:353).

A second contribution the integrationists bring to institutional religion and the wider society is the experience of being enchanted with the ordinariness of everyday life. Weber (1982:282) claims that in a disenchanted world the only

possible 'beyond' is the inexpressible content of 'mystic' experiences. Contrary to Weber's claim, the integrationists experience their ordinary world as enchanted. They do not relegate the 'beyond' (the transcendent, divinity) to the inexpressible contents of 'mystic' experiences. Instead they create a system where the transcendent is part of their engagement in wider society and part of their passion for social justice and part of their sense that the world is good. This has been shown through Hegy's attack on Luckmann (ch. 2). It has also been established in chapter nine, through the empirical implication Hf10 that states, 'In an interview situation "invisible" Catholics express a commitment to address socio-political injustice, as well as injustice within the church.' This empirical implication when matched against the integrationists was found to be 'accurate' (ch. 9).

What the integrationists therefore have to offer wider society and institutional religion is a passion for social justice. They - unlike Luckmann's (1974) 'invisible' religious individuals - experience enchantment while doing the work of social justice. Their passion for social justice flows from their sense that the ordinary and 'trivial' is sacred and enchanted. Integrationist spirituality derives much of its energy and enchantment from its engagement with the ordinary through such conceptual practices as, 'courage', 'being with', 'letting go', 'immediacy', 'a posteriori', 'mediation' and 'immanence'.

What the balance of these forms can offer as a 'third way'

The recurring theme that comes out of this thesis is that integrationist religiosity has a critical need to engage with doctrine that is symbolic and mythic.

Integrationists have a need for ritual which resonates with the primitive and the paradoxical. They have a need for a sense of self that, while engaging in a degree of reconstruction is basically grounded in an accommodating tradition that celebrates mystic experience. In modernity the church can still provide such an ethos, if by limiting its rationalisation and intellectualisation it reconnects to its primal symbolic and mythic origins.

Integrationists reveal that religion has served them well when two things have happened: firstly it has helped in the formulation of a number of key principles that intellectually distil core Gospel values; and secondly when it has provided the setting and milieu in which ritual symbolically and mythically engages human experience. The former function ensures that there is some structure for the 'non-rational' and the individual's spirituality and religion does not become awash in a sea of emotion. The latter function permits the individual in modernity to ritualise his or her experience of God in everyday life. Luckmann (1974:117, in ch. 2) comments that religion which has moved away from structure moves into solipsism. As noted earlier (ch. 2), Luckmann uses the term 'solipsism' when he discusses privatised religion's tendency to limit one's focus to the boundaries of one's personal world. The result is that without the social structure of organised religion privatised religion loses interest in social justice. If the church is able to

accommodate integrationist religiosity – which has some of the characteristics of privatised religion – it will not only reinvigorate itself, but will support the integrationists' engagement with the social fabric in modernity (Hegy, in ch. 2).

In discussing this 'third way' whereby there might be some interactive engagement between institutional Catholicism and integrationist religiosity, it is important to note that Catholicism is a sacramental church (Weber, 1982:286). Its approach to worship and faith is oriented toward ritual and symbol, in distinction to evangelical Protestantism's tendency to emphasise the rational through the 'Word of Scripture' (Weber, 1978). I do not presume to suggest that there are not ways that evangelical Protestantism employs the symbolic, my point here is simply to typify Catholicism's sacramental approach. If Catholicism is to reclaim its subculture and its ethos and reconnect with the 'non-rational' dimension of ritual, it would seem that its leadership needs to be trained and exposed to the 'non-rational'. If Catholicism is to once again respect and act in accord with what Weber (1982:353) describes as 'the unassailable incommunicability of mystic experiences', it needs a particular form of training for those who conduct ritual and reflect about Scripture (McFague, 1987). Persons in key roles in a sacramental church, such as priests and other key figures involved in the sacramental area need to be trained, exposed to and made conversant with disciplines, such as anthropology, Jungian psychology and literary studies.

I nominate these three areas of knowledge as examples because they move across the diverse forms of knowing, from the rational to the symbolic and experiential, from the social to the personal. The pertinent issue here however is, whether religion can present its ritual in its primeval symbolic form and so permit the integrationists and others not only to be present to the event of mystical experience, but partake in that mystical experience.

The reason why I name anthropology, Jungian psychology and literary studies is that this thesis has shown that rationalisation and intellectualisation have permeated Catholicism (Weber, 1978, 1982). Because of this, religion needs to have leaders who experience the significance and power of being open to the symbolic life, not only as it is played out at the social level but also at the personal level. I argue that when the celebrant is steeped in the mythic and symbolic elements of life and is also alert to the shortcomings of a purely literalist understanding, then that person will have a facility in moving across the terrain of social and human experience, from the clear critical discursive forms of thinking to the world of the symbolic and 'non-rational'. What occurs here is a balance between the role of institutional religion to provide the celebration of 'mystical experience' as an event and a structure, and the role of integrationist religiosity to assist peoples' engagement with the 'non-rational', mythic and symbolic elements of life and ritual. The 'third way' needs the interaction of both rationality and 'non-rationality'.

There is another way the balance of institutional Catholicism and the integrationist form of religion can provide a 'third way' for religion to sustain and enhance enchantment in modernity. It is available in two forms: Firstly through an awareness of the conceptual practices the integrationists use; Secondly, through distinguishing between core and non-core Catholic doctrines. Concerning the first form, I argue that the integrationists have succeeded in establishing a form of spirituality and religion which works within the context of modernity and Catholicism. The whole group of conceptual practices the integrationists employ when they experience enchantment in modernity is a blueprint for those who wish to design a new 'third way' of being religious in modernity (table No. 6, ch. 5). Hence the 'third way' would, I suggest, need to incorporate 'vulnerability', 'inter-subjectivity', 'ambiguity' and 'immanence', together with all the subsidiary conceptual practices, in shaping the way doctrine ought be presented and ritual celebrated.

Concerning the issue of core and non core doctrine, Weber (1982:286) argues that under certain conditions these doctrines influence the religious adherents' practical way of life. There are a number of these doctrines which resonate with the fundamental orientation of the integrationists, particularly that of sacramentality (ch. 2) and incarnation (the teaching that God is enfleshed and joined to our human condition at its root because of the physical birth of Jesus the son of God). This latter doctrine is basic to the Catholic notion that the earth is good. I argue that the key issue here is establishing doctrines in order of priority, starting from

essential statements about primal religious faith, and working down toward peripheral propositions of faith. This latter portion in the range is frequently in the order of theological opinion and as such is not considered to be 'weighty' doctrines or teachings (Rahner, 1977a). I agree totally with Weber (1982:286), in naming the doctrine of sacrament as that which characterises Catholicism (Greeley, 1991a; 1991b). As I explained above, this doctrine has huge implications in shaping the frames of thought within Catholicism, because it frees people to see life symbolically. The employment of such primal doctrines requires a recognition of institutional religion. This doctrine of sacramentality should act as a censor over the role of intellectualisation and rationalisation within religion, by imposing limits on the reign of both intellectualisation and rationalisation.

Earlier in this chapter, I referred to Weber's (1982:286) argument that religious doctrine can influence its adherents' practical way of life. I would also like to point out that Weber goes on to claim that external social factors, such as social stratification and economy, influence religious values and beliefs. With Weber, I argue that the integrationists are a contemporary expression of modernity's influence on Catholicism. The uniqueness of these integrationists, however, is that they have learnt to grasp the core doctrine of Catholicism, namely that of sacramentality, and have used this to engage with modernity and retain enchantment. Their conceptual practices are indications of how this operates in practice.

The question remains, what structure is capable of setting up such a series of statements of faith in order of priority (from core to non core doctrine). To whom is this work to be given? To institutional Catholicism? This would seem doomed, given the level of rationalisation and intellectualisation present. To Catholicism? Yes, if by that one means religion, not simply in its institutional form, nor in its integrationist form, but Catholicism in the form of both. Therefore, I would propose that the task of isolating the core articles of faith and ordering these in priority, be given to a composite body of people. Such a group I suspect, needs to include: theologians and non theologians who are grounded in disciplines which move beyond the realm of abstract theology and embrace the approaches to life which engage with the primitive, the experiential, the pre-conscious, the symbolic and the mythic, as well as people who are proficient in studying contemporary society. The body would have to be quite distinct from the organs of bureaucracy operating within institutional Catholicism, yet there would need to be some form of permanent liaison between both.

Effectively what this entails is that doctrine and ritual be shaped by integrationist conceptual practice. That is, in presenting points of doctrine and presenting ritual all people involved would do well to adopt the integrationist conceptual practices as a foundational approach to thinking and acting.

Sociological factors involved in such a rapprochement

There are serious sociological reasons which suggest that such a close working relationship with institutional Catholicism will bring about the ultimate regularisation and formalisation of the 'integrationists' form of Catholicism. Weber (1978, 1982) shows how rationalisation and intellectualisation transforms religion, hence what is going to stop the same happening to these 'integrationists'?

I argue that the nature of the 'integrationist' form of Catholicism will act to prevent its collapse into the rationalisation of institutional religion. My argument for the 'third way' is not a form of the classical Hegelian dialectic, thesis, antithesis and synthesis, neither is it in the idealist form, rather the argumentation arises out of empirical data generated from interviewing the 30 integrationists (chs 5-8).

Integrationist spirituality is typically embedded in the everyday life of the social world. This is its essential nature. It is a spirituality for everyday life. This has been already demonstrated by testing the empirical implication Hp7 derived from Hegy's hypothesis H14 (ch. 2) against the interview data (ch. 9). This empirical implication, namely 'Everyday experiences are a locus for experiences of the Sacred' is found to be highly accurate with respect to the integrationists. This form of Catholicism is particularly uneasy with moves to overly 'spiritualise' enchantment by tying it to conformist religiosity. The language, reflections and way of life of characters such as Jane (ch. 5), Pat (ch. 6), Tom (ch. 7) and Marg (ch. 8) characterise the earthy ethos of these integrationists. These interviewees, typifying integrationist religiosity, derive and express their passion for justice and

sense of the sacred in the context of their social and political involvement with everyday life. Such a connection (identifiable throughout the integrationist interviews in chapters 5-8) provides grounds for arguing that the integrationists can maintain their ethos in dialoguing with institutional Catholicism.

The other hypotheses I deduced from Hegy's argumentation pertinent to this issue, namely H12, H13, H15 and H16 (ch. 2) and the respective identifiable empirical implications which flow from them, namely Hf7, Hf8, Hf9 and Hf10 when tested against the interview data (ch. 9) are shown to range from being moderately accurate to highly accurate. In the face of this empirical evidence it is difficult to maintain that the integrationists will join the institutionalism and clericalism of institutional Catholicism, and will jettison their own moral authority and give up addressing social injustice within organised religion. The integrationists, characterised by buoyancy and respect for self actualisation are expressions of modernity, they like so many of their contemporaries continue to engage in the on-going reconstruction of self identity (see Giddens in ch. 2). I argue that such an approach, relying as it does on self realisation, will not readily acquiesce into conformist practice. This segment within Catholicism, as Mason et al., Greeley, Ireland and Rule (see ch. 2) point out, defy the rationalising element within religion. Through using the conceptual practices 'ambiguity', 'letting go', 'mystery' and 'language', the integrationists are well placed to dialogue and retain their own centre.

The most sociologically difficult player in this scenario is arguably institutional Catholicism. Will it be able to limit the impact of its own rationalism and intellectualism to such an extent that it can tolerate the ongoing and contesting voice of the integrationist form of Catholicism? Prophets, as Weber (1982) points out have had a hard time in priestly religions.

History, however provides the grounds for optimism. There is evidence of similar styles of dialogue occurring before between contemporary thinkers of the integrationist mode and institutional Catholicism. While discussing the foundational changes that took place within Catholicism during the Second Vatican Council (ch. 2) I noted how dialogue brought new moral and doctrinal understanding. Issues of hierarchy, egalitarianism and styles of communitarian church structure were addressed during the Vatican Council to the point that significant shifts occurred (see Dinges, in ch. 2). The precedent exists. The dynamism for the future is in the hands of institutional Catholicism. Will it engage with the integrationist form of Catholicism? Given changes such as the Second Vatican Council, I argue that the human desire for life and transformation will drive institutional Catholicism.

Does this thesis contribute to similar work being done elsewhere, and does it offer suggestions about future research?

In chapter 3 I discussed Andrew Greeley's (1991) book The Catholic Myth: The Behavior and Belief of American Catholics, in which he talks about a subculture

within society which experiences everyday life with mystery. There is a parallel between the subculture he talks about and the integrationist form of religion. Greeley claims that the subculture he describes perceives the world as a metaphor of the Sacred, that it mirrors the divine and that this subculture perceives the world to be 'somewhat like God', that is as 'a "sacrament" of God' (Greeley, 1991:45). Effectively, Greeley is writing about enchantment with the world, and his cultural group lives within contemporary society.

Greeley (1991) argues that the subculture which he identifies is an element within Catholicism (not equating the two) which uses 'analogical imagination' in its most pure form, and perceives God through created reality. This closely parallels my earlier discussion of the dominant conceptual practice 'immanence', which I describe as an awareness of the pervasive and indwelling nature of God's presence in the universe (ch. 8). The immediate experience becomes the primary vehicle or medium for the experience of the Sacred (conceptual practices 'immediacy' and 'mediation', ch. 8). Greeley writes about the use of 'analogical imagination', and argues that it is a feature within Catholicism, which though not shared by all within it, nevertheless enables people to metaphorically see something of God in seeing created reality. I believe my thesis extends Greeley's work by providing a range of detailed styles of 'analogically' engaging with modernity.

Michael Mason's et al. (1997) very fine and comprehensive Catholic Church Life Survey of over 60,000 Catholic respondents, breaks open the issue Greeley (1991)

raises about 'analogical imagination'. Like Greeley, Mason's et al. ability to craft proposals within their questionnaire surfaces the issues of analogical imagination, myth and the poetic. My thesis about enchantment in an age of disenchantment offers Mason's et al. (1997) work a detailed and contextualised study which deals with issues of analogical imagination and captures the personalities who think metaphorically and use 'analogical imagination' as their primary vehicle to God.

What this thesis offers by way of suggestions for future research lies in the exploration of symbol, myth and ritual as ways of acknowledging the 'non-rational' dimension of the human person within the rationalisation of modernity and religion. In terms of addressing how religion might sustain and enhance the integrationist form of spirituality it would be helpful to further explore the role of ritual in connecting one's self-identity within modernity to one's religious subculture. Because this thesis provides the range of conceptual practices integrationist religiosity typically uses to sustain enchantment, it may be helpful to further explore what happens to the institutional dimension of religion when these conceptual practices are employed within religion.

APPENDIX 1

Hypotheses and identifiable empirical implications

Part 1

Hypotheses springing from Weber's argumentation

- H1 In modernity, rationalisation, intellectualisation and scientifically-oriented thinking brings about the demise of enchantment and religion.
- H2 Religion will move from the centre of the social institutions of society and become ever more irrelevant.
- H3 In modernity religion will move to the margins of society.
- H4 In modernity the meaning which comes from religion will be replaced with the meaning that comes from the 'ethics of responsibility'.
- H5 People seek to avoid the paradox of modernity by seeking refuge in the certitude of religion.

Hypotheses springing from Luckmann's argumentation

- H6 Religion in late modernity becomes ever more privatised.
- H7 Individual religiosity in high modernity does not replicate the religiosity found in public institutional religion of that time.
- H8 In modernity people leave the institutional churches and reconstruct a 'sacred cosmos' because they desire a form of religiosity which operates outside of the realm of functional norms.
- H9 In modernity 'invisible' religion opposes dogmatic formulation of belief and disciplining procedure.
- H10 In modernity the privatisation of religion into an 'invisible religious form of modernity encourages an abandonment of social and political responsibility.

Hypotheses springing from Hegy's argumentation.

- H11 In modernity institutional specialisation within Catholicism is being rejected by individuals within Catholicism who choose a new form of religion, namely 'invisible' Catholicism.
- H12 There are Catholic individuals in modernity who though still practicing formal worship reject the 'institutional' model of the church.
- H13 In high modernity individuals who are part of 'invisible' Catholicism reject the sub-culture within institutional Catholicism, known as 'clericalism'.
- H14 Individuals within 'invisible' Catholicism in a time of late modernity reject the separation of the Sacred and the profane since their everyday experiences are a locus for their experience of the Sacred.
- H15 In late modernity individuals who are part of 'invisible' Catholicism do not place moral and legal authority in the hierarchy of the church, but within their own individual conscience.
- H16 'Invisible Catholics are committed to socio-political injustice and injustice within Catholicism.

Part 2 – Identifiable empirical implications in thematic groups.

Rationalisation intellectualisation and scientific thinking: Their impact on enchantment and religion

- Hr1 Weber Religious experiences seldom occurs in people who predominantly employ instrumental rational action in everyday life.
Results: for integrationists this implication is inaccurate; for the dualist there is insufficient evidence to comment.
- Hr2 Weber In modernity people with scientifically-oriented thinking who follow religion experience internal conflict.
Results: for the integrationists this identifiable implication is inaccurate; for the dualists this implication is inaccurate.
- Hr3 Luckmann Privatised religious life in late modernity tends to avoid functional rationality.

Results: for integrationists both accurate and inaccurate depending on the situation; for the dualists this implication is moderately accurate.

Place of religion and sacralisation in modernity.

- Hp1 Weber Institutional religion will experience a demise at the centre of public social life
Results are accurate for 'institutional' religion; for integrationist religion the identifiable implication is inaccurate; for dualists the identifiable implication is accurate.
- Hp2 Weber The primary social institutions and the people in those institutions will see religion as ever more irrelevant
Results for institutional religion the implication is moderately accurate; for integrationist religion the implication is inaccurate; for dualist religion this identifiable empirical implication is accurate.
- Hp3 Weber Religion will become anachronistic
Results for institutional religion this implication is accurate; for the integrationists this implication is inaccurate; for the dualists the implication is accurate.
- Hp4 Weber Religion will move to the margins of social life
Results: for integrationists this implication is moderately inaccurate; for the dualists it is minimally accurate.
- Hp5 Weber Even in intimate gatherings religion will by degrees be ever less able to survive modernity
Results for the integrationists this implication is inaccurate; for the dualists the data suggests this implication is minimally accurate.
- Hp6 Luckmann People in late modernity, who live a religious life do so primarily in the personalised spheres of their lives and not in the public arena
Results for the integrationists this is inaccurate; for the dualists the identifiable empirical implication is minimally accurate.
- Hp7 Hegy 'Invisible' Catholics will indicate in an interview situation a belief that their everyday experiences are a locus for their experience of the Sacred.

This is almost identical to the two implications attached to Luckmann above
 Results for the integrationists the implication is highly accurate; for the dualists the empirical implication is minimally accurate.

The form of religion in modernity

- | | | |
|-----|----------|--|
| Hf1 | Weber | Religion will cease addressing public social issues, and in the personal issues of life it will become ineffective.
Results for the integrationists are highly inaccurate for the dualists is minimally accurate. |
| Hf2 | Weber | Religion will be characterised more by a reliance on certitude than by risk taking.
Results for the integrationists highly inaccurate for the dualists this is accurate. |
| Hf3 | Weber | Religious people will place priority on obedience rather than employ individual conscience.
Results: For the integrationists this is highly inaccurate. For the dualists this is accurate. |
| Hf4 | Luckmann | Individual religiosity is likely to be distinctly different from organised institutional religion within modernity.
Results: For the integrationists this is a moderately accurate. For the dualists this empirical implication is inaccurate. |
| Hf5 | Luckmann | In late modernity the newly emerging privatised form of religion is anti-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian.
Results for the integrationists this implication is moderately accurate. For the dualists it is highly inaccurate. |
| Hf6 | Luckmann | People in modernity who live a privatised form of religious life, will indicate through in-depth interviewing a withdrawal from socio-political involvement in society.
Results for the integrationists indicate that this is a highly inaccurate implication. For the dualists it is minimally accurate. |
| Hf7 | Hegy | 'Invisible' Catholics in an interview situation will reflect their rejection of the 'institutional' model of the church in the way they speak about related issues in an interview situation. |

Results for the integrationists indicate that this is a moderately accurate implication. The dualists are not part of 'invisible' Catholicism.

- Hf8 Hegy In modernity individuals who are part of 'invisible' Catholicism will show that they are uneasy with 'clericalism' through in-depth interview situations. Results: Data shows this to be a highly accurate implication in reference to the integrationists. The dualists are not part of 'invisible' Catholicism.
- Hf9 Hegy 'Invisible' Catholics who believe moral and legal authority is based in their own conscience will give voice to this belief in an interview situation. Results for the integrationists suggest that this identifiable empirical implication is accurate. The dualists are not part of 'invisible' Catholicism.
- Hf10 Hegy In an interview situation 'invisible' Catholics express a commitment to address socio-political injustice, as well as injustice within the church. Results for the integrationists show this implication is accurate. The dualists are not part of 'invisible' Catholicism.

APPENDIX 2

Qualitative software package:

The hierarchical ordering of the nudist program

- (5) /Vulnerability
- (5 1) /Vulnerability/letting go
- (5 2) /Vulnerability/autonomy
- (5 3) /Vulnerability/freedom
- (5 4) /Vulnerability/courage
- (5 6) /Vulnerability/pain
- (5 6 1) /Vulnerability/pain/letting go
- (5 7) /Vulnerability/discovery
- (5 8) /Vulnerability/listen
- (5 10) /Vulnerability/contrasting
- (5 10 1) /Vulnerability/contrasting/Follow
- (5 10 1 1) /Vulnerability/contrasting/Follow/ duty
- (5 10 1 2) /Vulnerability/contrasting/Follow/obedience
- (5 10 1 3) /Vulnerability/contrasting/Follow/paternalistic
- (5 10 1 4) /Vulnerability/contrasting/Follow/model
- (5 10 1 5) /Vulnerability/contrasting/Follow/anti inclusive

- (6) /Inter-subjectivity
- (6 1) /Inter-subjectivity/Relationality
- (6 1 1) /Inter-subjectivity/Relationality/intimacy
- (6 1 1 1) /Inter-subjectivity/Relationality/intimacy/Sacred
- (6 1 2) /Inter-subjectivity/Relationality/love
- (6 1 3) /Inter-subjectivity/Relationality/trust
- (6 1 3 1) /Inter-subjectivity/Relationality/trust/vulnerability

- (6 1 3 1 1) /Inter-subjectivity/Relationality/trust/vulnerability/Sacred
- (6 1 4) /Inter-subjectivity/Relationality/mythic
- (6 1 4 1) /Inter-subjectivity/Relationality/mythic/Sacred
- (6 1 6) /Inter-subjectivity/Relationality/at depth
- (6 2) /Inter-subjectivity/Symbiosis
- (6 2 1) /Inter-subjectivity/Symbiosis/synchronous
- (6 2 2) /Inter-subjectivity/Symbiosis/interdependence
- (6 3) /Inter-subjectivity/Church
- (6 3 1) /Inter-subjectivity/Church/church going
- (6 3 1 1) /Inter-subjectivity/Church/church going/communion
- (6 3 2) /Inter-subjectivity/Church/organised structure
- (6 3 2 1) /Inter-subjectivity/Church/organised structure/formality
- (6 3 2 2) /Inter-subjectivity/Church/organised structure/obstacle
- (6 3 3) /Inter-subjectivity/Church/informal struct
- (6 3 3 1) /Inter-subjectivity/Church/informal struct/informal God
- (6 3 4) /Inter-subjectivity/Church/building
- (6 3 5) /Inter-subjectivity/Church/anti inst
- (6 3 5 1) /Inter-subjectivity/Church/anti inst/interdep
- (6 4) /Inter-subjectivity/be with
- (6 4 1) /Inter-subjectivity/be with/being with
- (6 4 1 1) /Inter-subjectivity/be with/being with/relationship
- (6 4 1 2) /Inter-subjectivity/be with/being with/other
- (6 4 2) /Inter-subjectivity/be with/small communities
- (6 4 3) /Inter-subjectivity/be with/kindred spirit
- (6 4 4) /Inter-subjectivity/be with/child
- (6 4 5) /Inter-subjectivity/be with/service
- (6 4 6) /Inter-subjectivity/be with/story
- (6 5) /Inter-subjectivity/nature

- (6 5 1) /Inter-subjectivity/nature/Sacred
- (6 6) /Inter-subjectivity/contrast
- (6 6 1) /Inter-subjectivity/contrast/Anxiety
- (6 6 1 1) /Inter-subjectivity/contrast/Anxiety/Mary
- (6 6 1 2) /Inter-subjectivity/contrast/Anxiety/security
- (6 6 1 2 1) /Inter-subjectivity/contrast/Anxiety/security/changless
- (6 6 1 3) /Inter-subjectivity/contrast/Anxiety/anti intellectual
- (6 6 1 4) /Inter-subjectivity/contrast/Anxiety/insecurity
- (6 6 1 4 1) /Inter-subjectivity/contrast/Anxiety/insecurity/fear

- (7) /Immanence
- (7 1) /Immanence/Immediacy
- (7 1 1) /Immanence/Immediacy/body
- (7 1 1 1) /Immanence/Immediacy/body/earthy
- (7 1 1 2) /Immanence/Immediacy/body/special
- (7 1 2) /Immanence/Immediacy/broken body
- (7 1 2 1) /Immanence/Immediacy/broken body/prayer
- (7 1 2 1 1) /Immanence/Immediacy/broken body/prayer/letting go
- (7 1 2 2) /Immanence/Immediacy/broken body/service
- (7 1 3) /Immanence/Immediacy/ecology
- (7 1 5) /Immanence/Immediacy/non interventionist
- (7 1 6) /Immanence/Immediacy/ordinary
- (7 1 6 1) /Immanence/Immediacy/ordinary/earthy
- (7 1 6 2) /Immanence/Immediacy/ordinary/non rarification
- (7 1 7) /Immanence/Immediacy/pain
- (7 1 8) /Immanence/Immediacy/Good
- (7 1 8 1) /Immanence/Immediacy/Good/Sacred
- (7 1 9) /Immanence/Immediacy/creative

- (7 1 10) /Immanence/Immediacy/experiential
- (7 1 10 1) /Immanence/Immediacy/experiential/Sacred
- (7 1 10 2) /Immanence/Immediacy/experiential/spectrum
- (7 1 10 2 1) /Immanence/Immediacy/experiential/spectrum/Sacred
- (7 2) /Immanence/mediation
- (7 2 1) /Immanence/mediation/awareness
- (7 2 2) /Immanence/mediation/2nd sight
- (7 2 2 1) /Immanence/mediation/2nd sight/transcendence
- (7 2 2 2) /Immanence/mediation/2nd sight/non dualist
- (7 2 2 3) /Immanence/mediation/2nd sight/Sacred
- (7 2 3) /Immanence/mediation/mediation
- (7 2 3 1) /Immanence/mediation/mediation/Sacred
- (7 2 4) /Immanence/mediation/appreciation
- (7 2 5) /Immanence/mediation/privilege
- (7 2 6) /Immanence/mediation/beauty
- (7 2 6 1) /Immanence/mediation/beauty/Sacred
- (7 4) /Immanence/divinity
- (7 4 1) /Immanence/divinity/Sacred
- (7 4 2) /Immanence/divinity/mystery
- (7 4 3) /Immanence/divinity/Spiritual
- (7 4 4) /Immanence/divinity/presence
- (7 4 5) /Immanence/divinity/instrument
- (7 4 6) /Immanence/divinity/care
- (7 4 6 1) /Immanence/divinity/care/enobling
- (7 4 7) /Immanence/divinity/other
- (7 4 8) /Immanence/divinity/ambiguity
- (7 5) /Immanence/nature
- (7 5 1) /Immanence/nature/beauty

- (7 5 1 1) /Immanence/nature/beauty/Sacred
- (7 5 2) /Immanence/nature/interconnected
- (7 5 2 1) /Immanence/nature/interconnected/Sacred
- (7 5 2 1 2) /Immanence/nature/interconnected/Sacred/person
- (7 5 2 1 3) /Immanence/nature/interconnected/Sacred/lover
- (7 5 2 2) /Immanence/nature/interconnected/awareness
- (7 5 2 2 1) /Immanence/nature/interconnected/awareness/Sacred
- (7 5 3) /Immanence/nature/human
- (7 5 4) /Immanence/nature/compassion
- (7 5 4 1) /Immanence/nature/compassion/Sacred
- (7 5 5) /Immanence/nature/thanks
- (7 5 6) /Immanence/nature/mystery
- (7 5 6 1) /Immanence/nature/mystery/Sacred
- (7 5 7) /Immanence/nature/ambiguity
- (7 5 7 1) /Immanence/nature/ambiguity/Sacred
- (7 6) /Immanence/a posteriori
- (7 7) /Immanence/contrasting
- (7 7 1) /Immanence/contrasting/priori + post
- (7 7 2) /Immanence/contrasting/avoid
- (7 7 2 1) /Immanence/contrasting/avoid/busyness
- (7 7 2 2) /Immanence/contrasting/avoid/anti nature
- (7 7 2 3) /Immanence/contrasting/avoid/anti body

- (8) /Ambiguity
- (8 1) /Ambiguity/letting go
- (8 1 1) /Ambiguity/letting go/Sacred
- (8 2) /Ambiguity/diversity
- (8 3) /Ambiguity/presence

- (8 4) /Ambiguity/paradox
- (8 5) /Ambiguity/Sacred
- (8 6) /Ambiguity/experience
- (8 7) /Ambiguity/ritual
- (8 7 1) /Ambiguity/ritual/interconnected
- (8 7 1 1) /Ambiguity/ritual/interconnected/Sacred
- (8 8) /Ambiguity/mystery
- (8 9) /Ambiguity/language
- (8 10) /Ambiguity/trust
- (8 12) /Ambiguity/contrast
- (8 12 1) /Ambiguity/contrast/categorise
- (8 12 1 1) /Ambiguity/contrast/categorise/a priori
- (8 12 1 2) /Ambiguity/contrast/categorise/ceritude
- (8 12 1 3) /Ambiguity/contrast/categorise/rigidity
- (8 12 1 3 1) /Ambiguity/contrast/categorise/rigidity/reductionist
- (8 12 1 4) /Ambiguity/contrast/categorise/evil
- (8 12 1 4 1) /Ambiguity/contrast/categorise/evil/apopolyptic
- (23) /Mythic
- (23 1) /Mythic/symbolic
- (23 2) /Mythic/poetry
- (23 3) /Mythic/beauty
- (23 4) /Mythic/language
- (23 5) /Mythic/image

APPENDIX 3

The Letter of Introduction for Parish Priest

THE FLINDERS UNIVERSITY
OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
School of Social Sciences

Sociology Discipline
4th June 1991
Tel: 201 2454

Parish Priests

Dear Father,

This letter is to introduce Father Michael Brennan, a second year M.A. student in the Discipline of Sociology at this University.

He is undertaking research leading to the production of a thesis on the subject of Spirituality for Social Involvement: A Study of Australian Catholics. The project examines, if and how, some Catholics develop a spirituality for their active involvement in society.

I would be most grateful if you could assist this project by advising Father Brennan of suitable interviewees in your parish. Provided that such people have given their consent to you and that they know there may be more than one interview, could you provide Father Brennan with the necessary phone numbers and addresses?

As Father Brennan will explain, any information provided will be treated in the strictest confidence and none of the participants will be individually identifiable in the resulting thesis.

This study has been approved by the Sub-Committee on Ethical Standards in Research in the Schools of Social Science and Education. I can be contacted on 201 2454. The secretary of the Ethics Committee can be contacted on 201 2772.

Thank you for your assistance.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Elisabeth Porter
Lecturer, Discipline of Sociology.

Location: Sturt Road, Bedford Park, South Australia.

APPENDIX 4

Letter of Introduction to the Prospective Interviewee

THE FLINDERS UNIVERSITY
OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
School of Social Sciences

GPO Box 2100
Adelaide 5001
Australia
Telephone: (08) 201 3911
Fax: (08) 201 2566

10 June 1991

Dear Sir or Madam,

This letter is to introduce Fr. Michael Brennan a Masters student in the Discipline of Sociology at this University. He will produce his student card, which carries his photograph as proof of identity.

He is undertaking research leading to the production of a thesis on the subject of practicing Catholics, under the title of Spirituality for Social Involvement: A Study of Australian Catholics.

I would be most grateful if you could spare the time to assist in this project by granting Michael an interview, touching upon certain aspects of this topic. Because this research does not follow a questionnaire format, follow up interviews may be asked for in some cases.

As Michael will explain any information provided will be treated in the strictest confidence and none of the participants will be individually identifiable in the resulting thesis. You are of course, entirely free to discontinue your participation at any time, or decline to answer particular questions.

Since Michael intends to make a tape recording of the interview (and subsequent interviews should any be made) he will seek your consent on the attached form, to record the interview, and to use the recording in preparing the thesis on condition that your name or identity is not revealed. A copy of a sample consent form is attached.

Any inquiries you may have concerning this project should be directed to me at the above address or by telephone on 201 2454. This study has been approved by the Sub-Committee on Ethical Standards in Research in the School of Social Sciences and Education. The Secretary of this Committee can be contacted on 201 2772.

Thank you for your assistance.

Yours sincerely,

DR. ELISABETH PORTER.

Lecturer, Discipline of Sociology.

Location: Sturt Road, Bedford Park, South Australia.

APPENDIX 5

Freedom of Consent Statement for participation in the interview

THE FLINDERS UNIVERSITY
OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
School of Social Sciences

GPO Box 2100
Adelaide 5001
Australia
Telephone: (08) 201 3911
Fax: (08) 201 2566
4th June 1991

CONDITION OF USE FORM FOR INTERVIEWS

Concerning interviews for the thesis study on the subject of a Spirituality for Social Engagement: A Study of Australian Catholics conducted by Michael Brennan a Masters student in the Discipline of Sociology at Flinders University of South Australia

I,

.....
.....

(being over the age of 18 years), give permission to Michael Brennan, mentioned above, to record this interview, part of this interview, or any subsequent interviews (if made) and use these recordings for research and publication of his Masters thesis, on the understanding that my identity will not be divulged.

I note that the tape of this interview (and any subsequent interviews if made) will be held by Michael Brennan and once transcribed by him or his typist for the purposes of this project, this taped interview (and any subsequent interviews if made) will be completely erased.

[I do/not wish to be advised of any request to publish this interview or part of this interview in a place other than the Masters thesis.] [Strike out irrelevant parts.]

Signature.....

Address.....

.....

Date

Location: Sturt Road, Bedford Park, South Australia.

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