

**THE IMPACT OF A GENDER QUOTA ON GENDER
EQUALITY IN THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT
DURING THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY
2009-2014**

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CANDIDATE'S DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Maryuni

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The impetus for this study was my concern about the implementation of the gender quota in the National Parliament of Indonesia (*DPR*) during the transition to a new legislative election system period 2009-2014. I was part of a civil society organisation during this period and witnessed the tension between women activists and female legislators during discussions about gender equality policy proposals for the *DPR*. These tensions were caused in part by a lack of knowledge among women in civil society about the political environment in the *DPR* that women politicians operated in, and this motivated me to conduct research on the issue. This study was funded by an Endeavour Post-Graduate Scholarship, awarded by the Department of Education and Training, the Government of Australia. This thesis would not have been completed without supervision from Associate Professor Jane Haggis and Professor Susanne Schech. Their guidance has been invaluable in this project and in building my capacities as an independent and confident researcher in incorporating analytical thinking and finding my voice in writing. It has furthermore enhanced my passion for scholarship and writing. I would like to also thank Associate Professor Yvonne Corcoran-Nantes for her valuable input during the development of the thesis proposal. I also received much support from staff at the National Parliament during the data collection for this thesis. Mbak Sali Susiana, Mbak Dina Musi, Mas Budi, Mas Singgih, Mbak Andam, Mbak Yanti, Bu Yanti and many others who cannot be individually named, provided assistance in accessing documents from the

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ABSTRACT

The return to democracy in Indonesia has benefited women by allowing greater access to the political institution of parliament. The Election Laws 2003, 2008, and 2012 legislated for a 30% quota of women candidates for legislative election. This study aims to evaluate the impact of the quota in the consolidated period of Indonesian democracy (2009-2014). To what extent has increasing women's representation in the Indonesian National Parliament (*DPR*) due to the quota promoted substantive impact in legislating laws addressing women's interests? The scope of the study is the structure of the *DPR* and the changing political environment in the parliament for women's substantive representation during the period 2009-2014.

To explore these issues, a qualitative field study was undertaken at the *DPR* during 2009-2014. The study involved interviews with 22 parliamentarians, 13 parliamentary staff and 3 women activists; participant observation of parliamentary committee work; and textual analysis of parliamentary documents. Drawing on feminist and grounded theory methodology, this data was analysed through thematic coding to produce the following key findings.

This study finds that the gender quota succeeded in increasing the number women elected to the *DPR* during period 2009-2014. These women were as equally qualified as their male counterparts in terms of education and experience as politicians. However, women elected through direct election

during the consolidation period of Indonesian parliamentary democracy, 2009-2014, were less effective in promoting feminist legislative agendas compared with those in the transition period (1999-2009). The reasons for this, I argue, are several, including the changing characteristics of Indonesian parliamentary cohorts, the failure to follow the quota reform with broader gender equity measures in the working of the *DPR*, and the de-linking of civil society and formal party and parliamentary politics.

First, during the consolidated period, more men and women legislators came into the *DPR* from business backgrounds, replacing the cohort of reformists – largely from non-business backgrounds – who had shaped the parliaments of the democratic transition era. The male legislators from business backgrounds were less accommodating toward women’s issues. More women legislators were from business backgrounds and similarly demonstrated a lack of interest in women’s issues. In addition, these women legislators tended to be less engaged with other women in civil society, and had less of a commitment to a feminist agenda. Second, the introduction of the quota was not followed by addressing the gendered nature of the parliament itself. Specifically, the gendered organisational qualities of the parliament hindered women legislators from participating equally in political discussion. The organisation of standing committees placed less importance on women’s issues, with women’s empowerment being incorporated into the standing committee concerned with religious issues. In addition, the *DPR*, as a workplace, did not support women’s double duties,

with no maternity leave provisions and a lack of childcare facilities for young mothers.

In effect, access to the location of power required women legislators to display masculine behaviour and obey the orders of male political elites. The presence of women in leadership positions did not translate into support for a feminist legislative agenda or more focus on women's issues. Control of the Indonesian Women's Parliamentary Caucus (*KPPRI*) by political parties meant the caucus was less effective in supporting both women parliamentarians and feminist legislative initiatives. This situation was a key trigger for tension between women legislators and women activists in civil society. Lack of communication between the two groups led to a less effective strategy in addressing women's issues at the parliamentary level.

The study complements literature on the implementation of gender quotas in new and developing democracies through its discussion of the Indonesian democratisation and the influence of Islamic values on the political system in parliament, along with emerging democracies in Islamic societies. The significance of this study and its findings are important for feminists in developing effective strategies for advancing gender equality in parliament. It will also be useful for both women's civil society organisations, and women legislators in Indonesia, to revisit strategies on gender mainstreaming at the parliamentary level, and adjust to the way the political climate has changed after almost two decades of Indonesian democratisation. The thesis argues that as well as sustaining the relationship between women's civil society

organisations and women legislators, the women's movement also needs to focus their agenda on development of the organisation of the *DPR* to a more woman friendly work place.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Ansipol:	Civil Society Alliance for Women in Politics (<i>Asosiasi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Perempuan Politik</i>)
BAKN:	State Financial Accountability Committee (<i>Badan Akuntabilitas Keuangan Negara</i>)
Baleg:	Legislative Committee (<i>Badan Legislasi</i>)
Bamus:	Steering Committee (<i>Badan Musyawarah</i>)
Banggar:	Budgeting Committee (<i>Badan Anggaran</i>)
Bappenas:	National Development Planning Agency (<i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional</i>)
Bawaslu:	Election Supervisory Body (<i>Badan Pengawas Pemilu</i>)
BPK:	State Auditing Agency (<i>Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan</i>)
BPP:	Pre-defined Quota (<i>Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih</i>)
BPS:	Statistics Indonesia (<i>Badan Pusat Statistik</i>)
BURT:	Domestic Affairs Committee (<i>Badan Urusan Rumah Tangga</i>)
CEDAW:	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
DIM:	List of Concerns (<i>Daftar Isian Masalah</i>)
DPD:	Regional Representatives Assembly (<i>Dewan Perwakilan Daerah</i>)
DPR:	Indonesian National Parliament or People's House of Representative (<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i>) ¹
DPRD:	Regional Parliament or Regional People's House of Representatives (<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i>)
Fraksi:	Party caucus or political grouping in the Indonesian National Parliament
Golkar:	Service Society Party (from <i>Golongan Karya</i>)
GPPP:	Women's Movement for women's political Concern (<i>Gerakan Perempuan Peduli Politik</i>)
IAI :	Indonesian Association of Accountants (<i>Ikatan Akuntansi Indonesia</i>)
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
IPU:	Inter-Parliamentary Union

¹ Common usage in Indonesia is *DPR* refer to whole parliament but actually *DPR* is abbreviation of the People's House of Representatives

IWAPI: Indonesian Business Women's Association (*Ikatan Wanita Pengusaha Indonesia*)
 Kejaksaan: Supreme Court (*Kejaksaan Agung*)
 Komisi : Standing committee
 Komnas Perempuan: National Commission on Violence against Women (*Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan*)
 KPI: Indonesian Women's Coalition (*Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia*)
 KPK: Corruption Eradication Committee (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi*)
 KPPI: Indonesian Women's Political Caucus (*Kaukus Perempuan Politik Indonesia*)
 KPPRI: Indonesian Women's Parliamentary Caucus (*Kaukus Perempuan Parlemen Republik Indonesia*)
 KPU: General Election Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum*)
 KPUD: Regional General Election Committee (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah*)
 Kowani: Indonesian women's congress (*Kongress Wanita Indonesia*)
 MK: Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*)
 MPR: People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*)
 NDI: National Democratic Institute
 NGO: Non-Government Organisation
 NRM: National Resistance Movement
 NU: *Nahdlatul Ulama* (an Islamic organisation)
 P3DI: Centre for Research and Development for Data and Information (*Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Data dan Informasi*)
 PAN: National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*)
 Panja: Working committee (*Panitia Kerja*)
 Pansus: Special committee (*Panitia Khusus*)
 PDI-P: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia- Perjuangan*)
 PKB: National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*)
 PKK: Family Welfare Movement (*Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga*)
 PKS: Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*)
 Polri: Police of the Republic of Indonesia (*Polisi Republik Indonesia*)
 PPP: United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*)
 PR: Proportional Representation
 Puskapol UI: Research Centre for Politics of the University of Indonesia (*Pusat Kajian Politik Universitas Indonesia*)
 Reformasi: 'Reform'- the post-New Order period

RPJMN:	Medium-term National Development Plan (<i>Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional</i>)
Tatib:	Rules of procedure (<i>Tata tertib</i>)
Timsin & Timus:	Synchronised and Steering Teams (<i>Tim Perumus dan Tim Sinkronisasi</i>)
TNI:	Indonesia National Military (<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i>)
SADC:	South African Development Community
SBREC:	Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee
SIP:	The Voice of Concerned Mothers (<i>Suara Ibu Peduli</i>)
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA:	United Nations Population Fund
UNTAET:	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UU:	Law (<i>Undang-Undang</i>)
UUD NRI:	Indonesian Constitution (after amendment) (<i>Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia</i>)
UUD RI:	Indonesian Constitution (prior to amendment) (<i>Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia</i>)
WHO:	World Health Organisation

Chapter 1 Introduction

This thesis engages with the impact of gender quotas in achieving gender equity for women in parliamentary representation and influence on legislative outcomes. It does so through a detailed case study of the newly democratised Muslim majority country of Indonesia. Globally, women are under represented at the decision-making level of parliaments with women's representation at 23% in 2016 (Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU] 2016). Gender quotas have become a widely adopted strategy to address the persistent exclusion of women, with 128 countries adopting gender quotas by 2015 (International IDEA et al. 2015). Feminists continuously evaluate the impact of gender quotas in increasing women's representation in Parliament and their substantive impact on legislating women's interests into law.

There exists significant variation in the effectiveness of gender quotas on increasing the numbers of women parliamentary representatives internationally. Rwanda is an example of the success of quotas. The legislative gender quota and voluntary party quota introduced in 2003 resulted in the country having equal gender representation with more than half of the legislators being women (IPU 2016; Krook 2006, p. 313).

Meanwhile, the party quota in Kenya brought less of a numerical impact with 19.7% of legislators being women, and the legislative quota in Nigeria resulted in only 5.6% in 2016 (IPU 2016; Krook 2006, p. 313). Feminists explain that these variations are related to the electoral systems operating in these countries (Kethusegile-Juru 2004; Peschard 2003) and the

participation of women's civil society organisations in monitoring the implementation of the quotas (Bylesjo & Seda 2006; Kantengwa 2010; Peschard 2003; Walsh 2012a).

Evaluation of the substantive impact of gender quotas however, suggests that numbers alone are insufficient and that the presence of women legislators does not necessarily lead to the interests of women being translated into legislative agendas and laws (Bauer & Burnet 2013; Franceschet & Piscopo 2008). The thinking behind the gender quota as a mechanism for achieving gender equity presumes that the numerical impact correlates with a substantive impact: that an increased representation of women in parliament would naturally lead to more legislation addressing the interests of women. However, evidence from Argentina (Franceschet & Piscopo 2008), and Rwanda and Botswana (Bauer & Burnet 2013), showed that the substantive impact of gender quotas had little correlation with numerical representation. A higher proportion of women legislators aligned more closely with legislation on women's interests, but there was difficulty in passing these bills into laws. The substantive impact was more likely correlated with women's ability to access power in their party and parliament (Connolly 2013; Franceschet & Piscopo 2008; Mackay 2008; Miguel 2012; Murray 2012; Freeman 2010). It was also correlated with the sustainability of political elites' support towards the idea of gender equality. In Tanzania and South Africa (Muriaas 2013; Walsh 2012a), for instance, the objectives of establishing gender quotas were not aligned with the male elites' interest to secure their seats in the

increasingly competitive environment brought about by the consolidation of democracy in these countries. Male elites also responded unfavourably to women legislators who actively pursued a feminist agenda.

This thesis focuses on extending these analyses of the substantive impact of gender quotas using the case study of recently democratised Indonesia. The analysis is influenced by the theory of the politics of presence and the politics of ideas of Anne Phillips (1995), discussed in more depth in Chapter 3.

Phillips argues that without proper development of gender quotas, women's presence may be limited merely to symbolic representation. For Phillips, gender quotas are a feminist strategy to attain the politics of presence with the expectation that the presence of women will attain the politics of ideas in legislating laws in the interests of women. Anne Phillips (1995) argues, however, that to achieve women's substantive impact on the politics of ideas, further strategies beyond gender quotas are essential. International evidence (Connolly 2013; Franceschet & Piscopo 2008; Freeman 2010; Mackay 2008; Miguel 2012; Murray 2012) shows that the presence of women is not easily translated into the politics of ideas due to challenges of women members of parliament acquiring power. In achieving the politics of ideas, I argue that the gender quota needs to be bolstered by strategies to support women in acquiring power in parliament. This thesis extends Phillips analysis by looking more closely at how parliaments operate as gendered organisations and hence pose significant challenges for women in acquiring effective power and influence. Analysis of the organisation of parliaments in

Australia, Germany, Sweden, and the United States (Bolzendahl 2014; Crawford & Pini 2011) suggest that parliament is not gender neutral and that the gendering process in these countries occurred at the point of women's assignment to committees. This thesis extends these analyses further to examine the gendered organisation of parliament as a workplace for women, following evidence that the power structure of a workplace frequently prevents women from reaching their potential (Itzin 1995; Kelly et al. 2010; Peterson & Runyan 2010; Samardzic & Taksa 2011).

This thesis also interrogates the correlation of a reduction in women's substantive impact with the changing political environment in a consolidating democracy such as Indonesia. Studies in Tanzania and South Africa (Muriaas 2013, p.92; Walsh 2012a) suggest that the attitudes of political elites can negatively impact on women's substantive influence despite the existence of a women's quota. In the consolidation period in Indonesia, changes in the political make-up of the political elite appear to have played such a role in reducing the substantive impact of the women's quota in the Indonesian National Parliament (*DPR*). The role of the informal body of the Indonesian Women's Parliamentary Caucus (*KPPRI*) is also examined following evidence of its significant role for women's substantive representation (Bakopanos 2004; Costa et al. 2013; Johnson & Josefsson 2016).

This thesis contributes to international gender theory and practice, particularly in regard to the effectiveness of gender quotas in achieving

gender equality in democratic polities. It argues that gender quotas are only a pre-condition for achieving equality between men and women in society. Continued development of gender quotas is important to achieve gender parity in the politics of ideas. As argued by this thesis, the critical areas are the development of the organisation of parliament as a decision-making institution and a workplace for women, and maintaining the relationship between women legislators and women's civil society organisations.

1.1 Indonesian Case Study

Indonesia shifted to a system of democracy (known as *Reformasi*) when economic crisis hit the Asian region in the late 1990s. Skyrocketing food prices, along with prolonged dissatisfaction with the authoritarian rule of President Soeharto, drove social movements from all strata of Indonesian society to demand political reform.² The undemocratic processes under Soeharto with no opposition permitted in elections, vote manipulation to maintain Soeharto's power, and corrupt practices in governing the nation were of great concern to the Indonesian people and led to their demand for democratisation. The weak power of the government during the economic crisis allowed for negotiation between civil society and government which eventually resulted in the government's commitment to political reform. Democracy has undoubtedly benefitted the people of Indonesia who can now

² A timeline of the Indonesian government system since independence in 1945 is outlined in Appendix 1.

directly vote for the president as well as representatives in parliament at national and provincial levels of government. A policy of devolution or decentralisation also meant the provinces enjoyed the autonomy to govern locally with less intervention from the central government in Jakarta.

Since then, Indonesia has attracted a great deal of research on the country's democratisation, not only on the reform of the political system (Freedman & Tiburzi 2012; Fukuoka 2013; Kingsbury 2003; Rabasa & Haseman 2002; Schmidt 2010; Sebastian 2004; Sherlock 2010), but also in feminist areas of concern. Feminist scholars have explored the relationship between gender equality and Islam (Bahramitash 2004; Bennett 2005; Bennett 2010; Fattore et al. 2010; Hellwig 2011; Rinaldo 2013; Rinaldo 2014) and gender equality in politics in the newly democratised Indonesia (Bessell 2004; Bessell 2010; Bylesjo & Seda 2006; Davies 2005; Haryanti 2006; Siregar 2010). However, most research on gender equality in politics focuses on women's access to Parliament during the country's transition to democracy (Bessell 2004; Bessell 2010; Bylesjo & Seda 2006; Davies 2005). Research on substantive representation was conducted by Haryanti (2006) who focused on the period 1999-2004, and Siregar (2010) for the period 2004-2009. Both timeframes were during the country's transition to democracy. At the time of writing, Indonesia is entering a period of consolidating democracy. Continued evaluation on the impacts of the gender quota is critical to provide feminists with important information to act to augment the gender quota's impact in working towards achieving equality between women and men in Indonesian

society.

The gender quota in Indonesia was initially successful in achieving an increase in women in the Indonesian National Parliament (*DPR*). The proportion of women legislators doubled from 9% in 1999 to 18% in 2009. One of the stand out features of the Indonesian experience is that although the number of women in *DPR* increased, the substantive impact in terms of gender informed policy is, to date, weaker than anticipated, as discussed in Chapter 5. Studies on the substantive representation of women during the transition to democracy suggests that this may be the consequence of the dominant gender ideology of womanhood and wifehood, and the differing views among women legislators with regard to what is defined as women's issues (Haryanti 2006; Siregar 2010). The state gender ideology as prescribed in the Marriage Law assigns women as supporters of men and this ideology, as suggested by Haryanti (2006), created internal barriers for women legislators in pursuing a political career in the *DPR*. She argued that this gender ideology might not only contribute to the internal barrier of women's lower self-confidence, but might also be reflected in the organisation of the *DPR* itself. Male political elites, who dominate leadership positions, she suggests, might internalise the ideology and undermine the capability of women to take on important parliamentary duties in leadership roles. In addition, male elites do not recognise that women legislators perform double or triple duties as mothers and wives, as well as legislators. Haryanti hypothesised that her findings indicated that the organisation of the

parliament itself might fail to recognise the different needs of men and women, which could lead to women legislators having to work harder to participate in political discussion. This thesis moves forward from Haryanti's findings to consider this question of how the Indonesian patriarchal gender ideology affects the organisation of the *DPR* as a decision-making institution, particularly with regard to the organisation of standing committees, and as a workplace for women.

A second major study of gender, women, and the *DPR* is Siregar's 2010 study. Siregar conducted an analysis of the substantive representation of women in the Regional (*DPRD*) and National (*DPR*) Parliaments. Her findings at the *DPR* (Siregar 2010, p. 197) suggest that different opinions among women parliamentarians existed concerning legislative proposals affecting Indonesian women on pornography and the regulation of abortion. Her study suggested that the different perspectives among women legislators on what constitute women's issues made it difficult for them to establish a common agenda. Without such an agenda, the women legislators were less effective in working across party lines to respond to such important issues in parliamentary debates. Siregar proposes that a more robust Indonesian Women's Parliamentary Caucus (*KPPRI*, an informal body in the *DPR*) could minimise this problem. The idea of a Women's Caucus, among other things, is to provide a forum of discussion among women legislators across party lines, and to build networks with women's civil society organisations. It bridges communication among women legislators and between women

legislators and women in civil society, which is important to resolve differing opinions among women. To what extent has the *KPPRI* contributed to the decreasing substantive impact of women? Experience from other democratising countries suggests that the support of political elites toward the gender equality initiative could change upon the country's consolidation to democracy (Muriaas 2013; Walsh 2012a). There has not been a comprehensive study conducted to analyse the changing political environment in the *DPR* following the consolidation of democracy. This thesis aims to address that gap.

1.2 Objectives and Research Questions

As the above outline of the literature on women's substantive representation internationally (Bakopanos 2004; Bauer & Burnet 2013; Bolzendahl 2014; Connolly 2013; Costa et al. 2013; Crawford & Pini 2011; Freeman 2010; Johnson & Josefsson 2016; Mackay 2008; Miguel 2012; Muriaas 2013; Murray 2012; Phillips 1995; Walsh 2012a) and in Indonesia (Haryanti 2006; Siregar 2010) shows, there exists gaps in knowledge about achieving substantive gender parity in democratic polities. In the Indonesian context, there remains no explanation as to why the gender quota appears to have a reduced impact on achieving substantive parity in the *DPR* and on its legislative agendas and outputs during the period of democratic consolidation.

As identified above and explored more fully in later chapters, three knowledge gaps have been identified regarding the *DPR*:

1. the influence of gender patriarchal ideology on the organisation of the *DPR* as a decision-making institution such as the organisation of standing committees, and as a workplace for women.
2. The role of the *KPPRI* in strengthening the influence of women in the Indonesian Parliament.
3. The question of political elites' support for the needs of women in the consolidated democracy of Indonesia.

This study aims to address these gaps in knowledge. The following research questions provide guidance for data collection and analysis:

1. To what extent has the organisation of the *DPR* in terms of its gendered nature, parliamentary norms in the workplace, and legislative decision-making process affected the substantive impact of women legislators?
2. To what extent has the changing political conditions in the consolidated democracy affected women legislator's participation in the decision-making process to promote the interests of women in the parliamentary political discussion?

These questions provide guidance in analysing the contributing factors of the organisation of the *DPR*, and the changing conditions during the consolidation period, to the lessening substantive impact of the gender quota

in Indonesia.

This thesis argues that development of the organisation of parliament and maintaining favourable conditions for women in their role as democratic representatives and members of parliament, are important to ensure their substantive impact on legislating more laws addressing women's interests in the consolidating democracy of Indonesia. The findings of this study also contribute to the international literature on the impact of gender quotas in order to provide a better understanding of the contribution of the organisation of parliament and changing political environments in newly democratic and Muslim majority nations, and provides empirical evidence on ways to advance feminist thinking about how to achieve gender equality in parliament. It does this through the use of Anne Phillips' distinction between the politics of presence and the politics of ideas to suggest how and why going beyond gender quotas is important to the achievement of gender parity in substantive democracy.

1.3 Organisation of the thesis

In presenting the findings, the thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter 2 discusses methodology, describing the conduct of the study and its limitations. This study adopts qualitative research methods, namely, grounded theory in the research design, and mixed methods in data collection. The combination aims to gather rich data grounded in the participants' experiences specific to their location.

Chapter 3 provides a conceptual framework for answering the research questions through a qualitative analysis of the research data in the subsequent chapters. Literature reviews on democracy and women's participation, establish a definition of democracy, its organisation, and women's location within the democratic organisation and processes. Importantly, the chapter establishes a theoretical framework for the thesis using Phillips' (1995) theory on the politics of presence and the politics of ideas in achieving substantive gender parity in a democratic polity. The chapter also reviews the literature evaluating the international experience of gender quotas in achieving gender equality and locates the Indonesian experience within the international context.

Chapter 4 discusses Indonesian political reform and the impact of parliamentary reform on women's participation in parliamentary processes and debates. It reviews the democratisation process in Indonesia with attention to the reform of the legislative institutions of the *DPR* and the gender quota that has brought more women into the *DPR*.

Chapter 5 addresses two issues: whether the quota brought qualified women legislators to the office, and whether they acted to represent feminist voices. It does this through a discussion of whether the increased presence of women legislators who were as equally qualified as their male counterparts has seen a significant impact in legislation on women's issues.

Chapter 6 unravels the gender issues and gender relations in the organisation of the *DPR*. It seeks to explain the factors that have led to the low substantive representation. The evaluation focuses on the centres of legislative decision-making, the standing committee (*komisi*) and the *DPR* as a workplace for women legislators and staff.

Chapter 7 provides an in-depth account of the impact of women leaders on the substantive representation. It examines, in particular, the impact of the women's party caucus (*fraksi*) and standing committee (*komosi*) leaders in supporting feminist agendas in legislation.

Chapter 8 explores the role of the Indonesian Women's Parliamentary Caucus (*KPPRI*) in women's substantive representation. It discusses the organisation of the Caucus and its effectiveness in addressing women legislator's issues, and connecting with the women's civil society organisations.

Chapter 9 explains the impact of the political changes in the *DPR* since *reformasi* and particularly since the consolidation era, on women's substantive representation in the *DPR* and in pursuing feminist legislative agendas. It does this through a comparison of the changes in the occupational background of legislators during the transition (1999-2004) and consolidation periods (2009-2014). The comparison aims to understand changes in the *DPR* political configuration and to seek an explanation for the changing effectiveness of women legislators in substantive representation.

Chapter 10 concludes the study by summarising the findings and outlining the contribution the study makes to feminist political studies internationally. It draws out the significance of its findings for the Indonesian situation in the consolidated period of democracy, and provides recommendations for women's civil society organisations as well as women legislators in pursuing gender equality at the parliamentary level. This chapter also identifies areas for further research to complement this study.

Chapter 2 **Methodology**

The research methods were selected for this study with the aim of gaining a thorough understanding of the research questions as outlined in Chapter 1. The study adopts a qualitative research approach due to the understanding that many factors influence women's ability to promote a feminist legislative agenda and a female-friendly working environment and legislation process. Grounded theory guides the data collection and analysis, and aims to build theories on implementation of the gender quota in Indonesia based on the women legislators' own experience. Feminist methodology also influences the conduct of the research through building on the notion that women speak their situated truths distinct from men in a gendered social context (Burn & Cantler 2011; Ramazanoglu & Holland 2002). The first section of this chapter discusses the selection of research techniques, followed by a description of the data collection and analysis processes. The last section describes the research limitations and strategies employed to mitigate them.

2.1 Application of qualitative research

The decision to select a qualitative research approach over quantitative methods is guided by the nature of the questions discussed in this study. These questions focus on the construction of realities about the impact of the quota in the *DPR*, and the social relationships that are embedded in the processes of implementation and change. A qualitative research approach is

more suitable because qualitative research aims to understand personal behaviour, organisational functioning, social movements, or interactional relationships (Strauss & Corbin 1990). It aims to describe and analyse social realities in which people are connected to each other (Miller 1997). A qualitative approach generates more relevant data to my study as it allows an inductive understanding of the meaning individual legislators give to the phenomena of the impact of the quota.

Another consideration in the decision to use a qualitative approach was the use of the literature review and data analysis. The literature review on quantitative approaches focuses on determining variables, and identifying questions and hypothesis. The data analysis seeks to test relationships among variables or to test the hypothesis. In contrast, the role of literature review in qualitative research is to justify a problem (Creswell 2007; Creswell & Clark 2011). The literature aims to build assumptions and generate research questions. The focus of this study is to understand the complexity of the issues surrounding the impact of the quota by using open-ended questions to collect data through words or images from study participants at their location; the legislature offices at the *DPR's* building. In reporting the realities, direct quotations are used. The quotations are employed to show the different perspectives of the participants.

This study uses feminist arguments advocating for the introduction of affirmative action strategies such as gender quotas, as discussed in Chapter 3. Feminist methodology influences the development of the research

questions and the conduct of the research. Burn and Cantler (2011) and Ramazanoglu and Holland (2002) argued that the feminists methodology builds on the notion that women speak their situated truths distinct from men in a gendered society, which is important information to transform gender inequality in the relevant society. This methodology enables knowledge to be produced that is grounded in women's experience, in this instance the experiences of women legislators. The knowledge so produced aims to reveal how gendered injustice in the operations of the *DPR* reflects the broader subordination of women in Indonesian society that permeates through to the national parliamentary level. Understanding the gender inequalities in Indonesian society from the lived experience of a feminist researcher and an Indonesian woman, reinforces critical approaches to the research data.

The decision to use grounded theory was based on the flexibility it offers in the data collection and techniques of data analysis. Grounded theory aims to construct theories from the data via analysis. Data collection and analysis does not always occur in a linear pattern where one immediately follows the other (Charmaz 2006). The raw field data collected was analysed by separating, sorting, and synthesising to get an initial overview of the field. This initial analysis led to the following processes of data collection by seeking further data to answer questions and to fill gaps. A similar process continued for each round of data collection until a comprehensive understanding of the issues was achieved.

The role of literature in grounded theory is to build theoretical sensitivity into the collection and interpretation of data (Charmaz 2006; Strauss & Corbin 1990). Technical literature such as reports of research studies on the implementation of quotas, and professional and disciplinary writing on the history of democracy and its critique, served as background materials for comparing findings from the actual data. The technical literature was a starting point to develop interview questions, to look at the data, to listen to the interviewees, and to think analytically about the data. Non-technical literature, such as biographies of female legislators, documents, manuscripts, records, reports, and catalogues, were used as ancillary data sources to supplement interviews and field observations.

2.2 Data collection

The multi-method technique for data collection, and access to the research site and participants are discussed in this section. Data was collected to understand the processes and relationships of a socially organised area of study. The application of the multi-method technique was due to an understanding that the research goals are frequently shaped and constrained by data, and the qualitative researcher should not be overly attached to one research technique (Miller 1997). Thus, adopting a multi-method, or triangulation strategy, increases the possibility of locating new topics and different facets of problems by using a combination of two or more different research strategies. Applying more than one research strategy stimulates a variety of findings and data interpretation. It increases the possibility for

gathering more complete information and enhanced understanding by adding additional layers of information and varieties of data to validate or eliminate earlier findings (Reinharz & Davidman 1992; Sprague 2005).

Interviews, observation of standing committee works, textual analysis of committee work proceedings, and field notes are combined to gain rich data to build theories grounded from the women legislators' experiences and those of their male colleagues. Both men and women legislators were interviewed as well as male *fraksi* leaders, parliamentary staff, and women activists in civil society. These varied interviewee perspectives aimed to fill gaps and confirm information derived from the interviews with women legislators. Observation and textual analysis provided insights on data interpretation to understand the women legislators' behaviour in the decision-making processes.

The research site is where the power exists and the participants were Indonesian members of a political elite – elected representatives to parliament (Priyadharshini 2003). This context of power and status influenced the conduct of the research. Issues were encountered concerning access to the research site and participants. Access was influenced by negotiations between the researcher and the members of the institution on the research aims and methods. Prior to undertaking doctoral studies, I was involved in several projects for a parliamentary support programme funded by international development agencies in Indonesia (UNFPA and UNDP) during the transition to democracy. This equipped me with familiarity with the

legislature offices and parliamentary offices such as the standing committee (*komisi*) and party caucus (*fraksi*) offices at the parliamentary secretariat.

This prior work experience assisted me with identifying the 'gatekeepers' and following the proper procedures to gain access to the *DPR*.

Access to the participants posed another challenge. The power and responsibility possessed by the legislators as the leaders of the nation mean they are often less easily approached by researchers. It is harder to gain access to the elites participants than non-elites. Negotiation with potential research participants took a great deal of time and effort and required building relationships with them. The unbalanced power relations between the interviewee and interviewer can impede the interview processes and the objective of obtaining good quality data (Priyadharshini 2003). However, my five years of experience in face-to-face discussion with legislators while conducting earlier projects for the parliamentary support programme and parliamentarian advocacy assisted in obtaining access to the participants and minimised the power gap during interviews. My familiarity with the institution and background knowledge of many legislators assisted me with participants during the introductory process to create a comfortable environment, to attract their interest and engagement in the interviews, and to produce good quality data. The conduct of each method in data collection is discussed further in the following subsections.

2.2.1 Interviews

This research gained approval from the Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee (SBREC), Flinders University, South Australia, with approval number 5755. The Ethics Committee approved target participant numbers of sixteen women legislators, four male legislators, and two parliamentary secretariat staff. The processes of data collection at the research site were in accordance with the procedures approved by SBREC.

First, an introduction letter from Flinders University was sent to the *DPR* to obtain permission to access the parliamentary office. Permission to access the parliamentary office was granted shortly after, as shown in Appendix 2.

Data collection was undertaken from September to November 2012.

Interview schedules were developed to guide the conduct of interviews as outlined in Appendix 3. Recruitment of the interviewees followed procedures approved by the Flinders University SBREC. Identification of potential interview participants came from analysis of the profiles of women legislators obtained from the *DPR* Secretariat. The profiles contained information on standing committee (*komisi*) membership, positions on the *komisi*, party caucuses (*fraksi*), constituencies, contact numbers, and office addresses.

The profiles were used to select the interviewees, with the main consideration to balance representation of the *komisi*, *fraksi*, position on the *komisi*, and constituencies. The intent of the selection was to capture a variety of perspectives from different groups. Forty three women were identified and approached (Appendix 4). Letters of introduction from the

University and the researcher, along with an information sheet (Appendix 5) about the research were sent to the potential interviewees. After a week, phone contact was made with the legislators' secretaries to confirm each participant's willingness to participate in the interview, and to arrange the time and place of the interview.

There were only twenty five women legislators who responded to the invitation, and eighteen were interviewed. Cancellation of interview appointments was due to many reasons, including the urgent need to travel to constituencies and short notice of duties required by political parties. The urgent travel to constituency locations was often due to a revision at short notice of requirements for candidacy registration in the 2014 general election. Short notice duties from the participant's political party were related to the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2012. A few women legislators from two supporting political parties were involved in this campaign. Although appointments were rescheduled, the interviews could not take place. A few potential interviewees did not respond to attempts to contact them, and others rebooked appointments but later cancelled.

Initial data analysis was conducted after each interview. The initial analysis of the previous interview helped to shape the interview with the following participant by identifying key information and gaps. The ensuing interview was used to confirm the findings and to fill the information gaps. Field notes and memo writing were maintained during the processes. Initial analysis also led to the recruitment of women activists in civil society and staff of the

KPPRI as additional interview participants.

Recruitments of male *fraksi* leaders, staff, and women activists in civil society followed the same procedures. Male *fraksi* leaders were identified from the *fraksi* leadership structure obtained from the relevant secretariats. Nine *fraksi*, and nine male leaders were approached. Three male *fraksi* leaders and one male supplementary committee leader were interviewed.

Recruitment of staff and feminists in civil society organisations was based on initial analysis of interviews recorded with the female legislators. The recruitment was targeted at certain positions to fill gaps of information identified in the initial analysis. Aliases were used for all interviewees, as per Flinders University SBREC ethics guidelines and ethics clearance requirement as detailed in Appendix 6, to protect interviewees, particularly women legislators, who may criticise their parties or leaders in ways which might jeopardise their political careers if comments were openly ascribed. Assurances of confidentiality and anonymity of the participants were stated in plain language in the letter of introduction and informed consent form so that participants had sufficient understanding of the processes around the de-identification of data. However, for the small number of women leaders who were interviewed, assurance was further explained during the verbal recruitment. While anonymity was preserved for all participants, due to the small number of women leaders, there was inevitably a reduced degree of anonymity and confidentiality that could be guaranteed compared to other participants. This was explained to the women leaders for their consideration

before they agreed to participate in the research. It is likely that, in this study, some women could be identified due to their roles, and the interviewees were aware of this possibility. As national leaders they are accustomed to media and public attention, and they took this into account when agreeing to participate in this study.

The frequency of unplanned parliamentary work posed a challenge in the timely conduct of the interviews. There were frequent changes to *komisi* schedules and often short notice of *fraksi* meetings or assignments from the political parties. This caused the cancellation of interview appointments at short notice, inability of potential respondents to meet the scheduled interviews, or delays in appointments from three hours to several days, which sometimes led to cancellation. Previous experience of working with legislators prepared me for such situations. Strategies to gain enough women legislators were applied by negotiating allocated times and places for the interviews. Recognition of the nature of committee work is important. Delays of up to 45 minutes in conducting meetings frequently occur. For instance, the interview time was frequently scheduled for 10:00am but usually started at 10:30 or 10:45. Sometimes it was possible to conduct interviews in these waiting times in the morning *komisi* schedule. Another strategy was to make appointments on Fridays when legislators were more likely to have fewer commitments. When the scheduled interview was delayed, I usually proposed other locations such as at the legislator's house during the weekend. I also stayed at the *DPR*'s building during the

parliamentary working days to capture any opportunity for interview appointments at short notice. These strategies proved effective. Interviews took place at various locations including at the legislator's office, at *komisi* secretariat offices, at *komisi* plenary rooms, and at the legislators' private residences. Interviews at the legislators' houses were conducted during a public holiday, as suggested by the interviewees. Time allocation for interviews varied from 30 minutes to two hours.

As part of the interview procedures approved by the University Ethics Committee, interviewees were asked to sign an informed consent form. However, a few legislators, particularly those who held leadership positions, were reluctant to sign the consent form as they had done many interviews with journalists, civil society, and local researchers and had never been asked to sign a consent form before. They verbally agreed to have the interviews recorded for study purposes and returned the signed form afterwards. No barriers were encountered in arranging interviews with staff and feminists in civil society, and these were carried out according to appointment schedules and interview procedures.

2.2.2 Textual analysis of parliamentary proceedings and other related documents

Reports and documents from the parliamentary secretariats and from the *KPPRI's* Secretariat were used to supplement data and bring context to the interviews. Initial data analysis from interviews was used for the identification of documents to fill gaps in information and to deepen understanding of the

issues. Proceedings on the Bill of the amendment of the 2008 Election Law were identified as significant to the understanding of the interaction of women and men legislators in the decision-making processes, particularly on quota articles. *Komisi* working schedules were used to understand the nature of parliamentary work. Other related documents were collected, such as rules of procedures, proceedings from activities conducted by the *KPPRI*, and *fraksi* official letters. These documents provided context and depth to the analysis of the interview data.

2.2.3 Observation

Observations were conducted to gain insight into the nature of the realities and interaction of legislators during parliamentary meetings. Observations were conducted at *komisi* meetings that were open to the public, as listed in Appendix 7. This included public hearings and working meetings with government partners. The selection of which *komisi* meetings to attend was based on the proportion of women members and the association of the committees with men's and women's work based on the initial analysis of interviews. *Komisi* Three on law enforcement, *Komisi* Six on trades and industry, *Komisi* Seven on mineral resources and *Komisi* Eleven on economics were selected to represent *komisi* with a small proportion of women members and an association with male work. *Komisi* Eight on religion and women's empowerment, *Komisi* Nine on health and family planning, and *Komisi* Ten on education and cultural affairs were selected to represent a larger proportion of women members and an association with

women's work. Observation of the ways women legislators participated at the meetings enriched data analysis and interpretation. Frequency of speaking, the issues raised during the meeting, and male colleagues' attitudes toward the women legislators were valuable indicators. Observation was also undertaken at a workshop conducted by the *KPPRI* at their office for the purpose of gaining insight on the operation of the support system for women legislators in the *DPR*. The nature of issues discussed at the meeting, the organisation of the meeting, and women legislators' attendance and participation provided important information that enhanced my understanding of the roles of the *KPPRI*, its member relations and interactions.

2.2.4 Field notes and memo writing

Field notes and memo writing were part of the data collection (Birks & Mills 2011). Field notes recorded my perception of the scene and the person, and assisted with the interpretation of interview data. They captured the context of the research locations, the parliamentary office, and interactions with the interviewees, and provided a written record of the situation during the interview process and the interviewees that could not be captured by the audio recording. Memo writing was used to record my feelings and thoughts about the research work to guide future actions. It also contained my analytical thinking by comparing data, codes, categories, and concepts. The memos contained initial analysis at the completion of each interview to record the initial findings, crucial information, and the gaps of information that would

inform the next interview. They also served as a tool for communication with the thesis supervisors during the collection of data in the field. Feedback on the initial findings from the supervisors enriched data collection. The field notes and memo writing were important in maintaining the quality of the research processes and the quality of the theories produced by the research.

2.3 Data analysis

The data analysis aimed to develop concepts that would explain the studied phenomenon as envisaged by a grounded theory research design (Charmaz 2006; Strauss & Corbin 1990). The primary process in creating the theory was the coding process. Coding helps to break down the data, conceptualise it, and put it back together in a new way to assist the researcher in building theories (Charmaz 2006; Strauss & Corbin 1990). There were several steps in the coding process. Open coding separated data into discrete parts enabling close examination, comparing similarities and differences, and grasping phenomenon reflected in the data. The examination was word by word, line by line, sentence and paragraph, and the entire document. Line by line analysis aimed to generate categories. Sentence by sentence, or paragraph by paragraph analysis aimed to code around the generated categories. Analysis of the entire document made it possible to compare similarities and differences.

Axial coding is another step to build a foundation for understanding the relationship between the organisation of the *DPR* and the substantive impact of women in the democratic consolidation by reassembling the results of data

analysis at the open coding phase, and making connections between categories. It examines conditions, context, action or interactional strategies, and consequences of the categories. Selective coding was conducted as the final stage of analysis. This coding aims to integrate data into categories to form theories. The process of integration was similar to the open coding, but at a higher and more abstract level of analysis. Field notes and memo writing assisted in the coding processes. The final step was constructing theories from the data by using techniques of storyline and theoretical coding (Birks & Mills 2011; Charmaz 2006). Storyline conceptualised stories generated from interviews undertaken in the early stages of data collection by writing memos. Theoretical coding advanced the abstraction of the storyline which took place at the final stage of the analysis. The process involved repeatedly checking between categories and data to form conceptual levels of categories.

Qualitative data research software, NVivo, assisted in these coding processes. NVivo is a tool used to manage, shape, and to make sense of unstructured information. Interviews were recorded and transcribed in the original language of Bahasa Indonesia. All data was then imported into the software including interview transcriptions, recordings, field notes, memos, and proceedings. First, data was grouped and coded separately. For instance, data from interviews was grouped based on the demographic of the interviewees. Five distinct groups were established: women legislators, men legislators, parliamentary secretariat staff, *KPPRI* staff, and women activists

in women's civil society organisations. Each group was coded by words, sentences, and paragraphs in Bahasa Indonesia. The coding on the transcriptions for each interviewee considered the memos and field notes for initial guidance and data interpretation. The second step was comparing codes among interview transcripts, among groups, and among different sources of data. The processes enabled confirmation, rejection, or enriching of initial categories that involved frequent checks of data, and revision of codes and categories, to produce more precise categories, contexts, and phenomenon. The results of this analysis were translated into English and presented through quotations and tables. Tables contain summaries of information to present a more concise understanding.

2.4 Research limitations

This research has some limitations that are related to the qualitative techniques of data analysis and the sample of the study. The limitation stemming from the sample was the small number of interviewees compared with the population, even though it met with the recommended sample number for grounded theory of around 20-30 participants. The total number of interviewees was 38, as outlined in Appendix 6, but only 19 women legislators were interviewed out of a total of 102. Therefore, the data cannot be assumed to fully represent the condition or the reality of the population. Another limitation comes from the qualitative technique of the interviews. The data from the interviews represent individual opinions and might not reflect the overall opinions in the population. Although recruitment was

directed to incorporate representation of *fraksi*, *komisi*, and constituencies in order to balance individual opinions from various backgrounds, three standing committees, *Komisi* One on foreign affairs, Six on trades and industry, and Seven on mineral resources, and two *fraksi* of *PAN* and *PKB*, are not represented in the study. Although the participants represent all areas of Indonesia, western, central, and eastern Indonesia, these limitations might result in bias, as the sample could not possibly represent the whole population.

The interpretation of the data may also contain bias produced by my own educational and social background, although the nature of qualitative research provides room for data interpretation. My interpretation began with the translation process from Bahasa Indonesia to English. As an international student from a non-English speaking country, my productive abilities in English are more limited than those of my native languages, which might lead to less precise word choices in quotations and interpretation. My social and educational background may also affect the interpretation. I had limited knowledge of issues surrounding politics as I have mostly engaged with population and gender issues in my career. I took various steps to minimise the bias in data interpretation, with the aim being to produce comprehensive analysis. Multi-method data collection was used for data verification. For instance, statements made by individual legislators were verified by related official documents such as the rules of procedure, official letters and documents from *fraksi* and other groups. Academic literature on

the modern democracy and political theories deepened the political component of the analysis. Other strategies included discussion with supervisors and scholars from American politics and the Fulbright Distinguished Chairs at Flinders University, and presenting the work at conferences. Those processes aimed to build a solid base for portraying the realities in the *DPR*.

2.5 Conclusion

The adoption of qualitative research in this study aims to capture the multiple realities which existed in the *DPR*, particularly in 2012. The realities aim to represent one term of legislator service from 2009 to 2014. The action plan for the research uses grounded theory and multi-methods in data collection. All strategies are directed at capturing personal and structural factors that influence the experience of women legislators in the decision-making processes of the *DPR*. Despite the limitations identified in this study, actions were taken to minimise bias in data interpretation. Those strategies aimed to produce innovative research findings based in solid, qualitative, empirical work.

Chapter 3 **Democracy and Women's Participation**

The issue of women's representation, and equal access to political power and influence, is a problem that besets most liberal democracies, whether established or emerging democracies in rich or poor countries. As such, it has attracted the attention of feminist political theorists in particular, who themselves build on an earlier critique of the model of modern democracy and its claims to equality. In this chapter, I begin by reviewing the literature critiquing the democratic model and its claims of equality through the work of Christiano (2003), Cohen (2003), Dahl (1998), Lafont (2006), Phillips (2003), Weale (1999), and Young (2000, 2003) as a prelude to a critical discussion of how feminists have identified and interpreted gender inequality in democracies, and conceived gender quotas as a way of addressing the issues.

While several countries have introduced quotas, as I discuss later in this chapter, the results are unclear in terms of the impact on gender equity in legislative terms. Debate has arisen over whether gender quotas alone are successful in increasing the number of women in parliament, and are sufficient to have a substantive impact. While Young (2000, 2003) argued for the inclusion of women to address the problem of inequalities between men and women, others (Bauer & Burnet 2013; Franceschet & Piscopo 2008; Mackay 2008; Miguel 2012; Murray 2012; Trimble 2006) argued that numbers alone are insufficient. The presence of more women in parliament would not be enough to foster and sustain the substantive impact of

legislating feminist interests in laws and policies.

The assumption that the numerical impact of gender quotas would be followed by a substantive impact on legislating the interests of women is increasingly challenged by feminist researchers. Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) and Bauer and Burnet (2013) argue that the numerical impact is correlated with initiatives of feminist agendas in legislation but has little connection with the resulting laws and policies. One of the most sophisticated contributions to this debate is from British political theorist Anne Phillips (1995) who analysed why quotas are necessary but insufficient in achieving gender equity in democratic political institutions. Anne Phillips (1995) offers an analysis as to why the quotas have only partially worked and brings attention to the importance of advancing gender quotas. She argued that to achieve more than descriptive representation, quotas needed to be reinforced by developing the presence of women within parliamentary elites, in order to influence the legislative agenda in favour of gender equity and women's rights. Anne Phillips' theory of the politics of presence and the politics of ideas elucidates obstacles in achieving the substantive impact of gender quotas and urges further development beyond the quotas. The chapter then reviews the literature evaluating the international experience of gender quotas in achieving gender equity and substantive democracy. The chapter concludes by locating the Indonesian experience within this international context, thus laying a framework for the in depth qualitative exploration of these issues in the Indonesian National Parliament (*DPR*)

during the period 2009-2014 in the remainder of the thesis.

3.1 Problems of equality in democracy, and the politics of presence and ideas

According to Dahl (1998) and Weale (1999), democracy is a system of government. The fundamental essence of democracy is government by the people and for the people. The system ideally facilitates public decisions on law and policy by citizens who have equal capacity to exercise their equal political rights. The ideal democracy presumes equal participation in decision-making processes. The formal system of public discussion is the operation of fair election and decision-making processes in the parliament. The principle of the deliberative decision-making process appeals for equal participation and equal weights of opinions, interests, and proposed solutions of people involved in the discussion.

However, the principle of equality is difficult to apply in the practice of democracy due to social and economic inequalities in society. Those who are poor and less educated would be less likely to be able to participate in discussion and to express their interests, opinions, and proposed solutions in political debates. This becomes a problem in realising the principle of equality. Discussion would involve a process of narrowing down the solutions and disagreement would occur in deciding a common solution. In managing the disagreement, voting often occurs, which turns the deliberative discussion into bargaining. This process is frequently utilised by interest groups with more power to exert their interests than the individual citizen.

Christiano (2003), Cohen (2003), and Lafont (2006) argued that the problem could be addressed by promoting equality issues in the deliberative discussion and ensuring equal opportunity for individuals or groups to learn about each other's interests during the decision-making process. The focus of the discussion should be the substance of the solution, which could be achieved by quantifying reasons such as measuring evidence, arguments, and objectives of the proposed solutions. The participants in the discussion should be seen as equal partners working together to address shared concerns.

While the arguments around creating the ideal conditions for deliberative discussion would resolve the problem of equal participation and rights, the question remains as to where the under-represented groups in the decision-making institutions of deliberative discussion are situated. The under-represented groups of minority and disadvantaged groups, such as women, would not have equal opportunity to learn about other group interests and be part of the discussion in judging the reasons for the proposed solutions due to their exclusion from the decision-making institution of parliament.

Arguing from the standpoint of the minority and disadvantaged groups, Phillips (2003) and Young (2000, 2003) appeal for special treatment in the political system for the inclusion of minority and disadvantaged groups. The disadvantaged group of women, for instance, is persistently under-represented in parliament. This means that the decision-making around laws and policies are conducted in the absence of women who are potentially

impacted by the decision. The proposed solutions would come from the perspectives of men alone. It would be men who assess the relevant factors and make the decisions. Young (2003) argued that exerting one group interest to the rest of society as the whole of society's interest, would create a homogenous society and sustain the power of that particular group. Young (2000) and Phillips (2003) argued that one of the important ways to deal with the problem is intervention in the political institution designed specifically to increase participation of the minority and less advantaged groups. Society is structured in systemic inequalities and exclusion of groups with less power will persist if there is no special intervention. Special intervention measures, such as gender quotas for the inclusion of women in parliament, would allow for the equal opportunity of women and men to learn about each other's interests, and to be equal partners working together to address shared concerns. It would also allow the equal opportunity of women's proposed solutions to be equally considered in the making of policies and laws. However, the question is whether the increased presence of the minority and disadvantaged groups in the decision-making processes would be followed by the ability to exert their interests, opinions, and proposed solutions in law and policy making. Power relations would continue to operate in the political institution.

However, the question is whether the increased presence of the minority and disadvantaged groups in the decision-making would be followed by the ability to exert their interests, opinions, and proposed solutions in law and policy

making. Power relations would also operate in the political institution, which becomes the focus of this study. The work of Anne Phillips (1995) offers an analysis that intervention for the inclusion of minority and disadvantaged groups would not be sufficient for the adoption of their interests and proposed solutions in laws and policies. Her analysis of the relationship between the politics of presence and the politics of ideas informs this study in explaining why the numerical measure of women's representation sometimes does not grow linearly alongside the policies and laws produced in the interests of women. This thesis adopts her theory on the politics of presence and the politics of ideas to build a foundation to explore the lessening substantive impact of the gender quota in the Indonesian case study.

3.1.1 The politics of presence and the politics of ideas

Anne Phillips' (1995) theory of the politics of presence focuses on the political elites; while the politics of ideas examines policy outcomes. The politics of ideas is about the policy outcome in the interests of those represented. The politics of presence is about the number of political elites, in this case the legislators. The politics of presence addresses the concerns of the minority and disadvantaged groups who have difficulties in equally accessing the political institutions and voicing their concerns to the political elites who hold the power to transform their interests into policy. The argument for the politics of presence is that the interests of the minority and disadvantaged groups would be better represented by political elites who share their experiences and interests. Women's interests, for instance, would be better

protected by the presence of elite women among those political elites.

The politics of presence focuses on increasing the presence of the disadvantaged and minority groups within political elites in the political institution. The expectation is that their presence will transform the groups' interests into policy outcomes. Strategies include gender quotas to provide a guarantee that women candidates will be preselected at the party level. Transforming the presence (elected representatives) into the ideas (policies) is not easy. Anne Phillips argues that the minority and disadvantaged group's presence may result in merely symbolic representation due to the challenges in acquiring power and defining relevant interests. The substantive impact of the minority group may be challenged by the very group they represent, because by being a minority, they possess less power to influence policy outcome. The majority may continue to deny the interests and concerns of the minority. Women legislators who make it to parliament may find themselves challenged by the differing perspectives of what constitutes women's interests. It would be difficult to differentiate men's and women's interests in the representational function. Women legislators, for instance, are elected not only by women, but also by men. Thus, women legislators should act on behalf of their represented constituencies of men, as well as women. In addition, not all women will share the same interests. Single women, for example, might not have a strong interest in childcare issues. In addition, women's interests, as defined by the Indonesian women's movement during the campaign for the gender quota, may indeed be

unsustainable upon achieving the politics of presence. Women might sign petitions, or actively engage in a series of political activities during the intensive campaign period for the gender quota. However, sustaining an ongoing relationship between the elected women and organisations or movements that actively support women's interests may prove to be challenging in the longer term. In addition, the political elites of the minority and the disadvantaged groups may face challenges from the political system in the decision-making process. They may be required to follow party policy and have little room to object which presents difficulties in pursuing the group interests.

Anne Phillips further argued that although the political elites might not be able to achieve the power to bring about policy outcomes for their groups, their symbolic representation is important as an enabling condition for the politics of ideas. She argued that the political elites should have autonomy; they are not only messengers to pass a predetermined policy, but their presence would allow the sharing of experience, and consequently challenge and modify the basis upon which public policy is defined. The real force of political presence lies in the further development of their presence.

Anne Phillips' work provides the foundation for the development of this study on the evaluation of the gender quota in Indonesia. Her comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the politics of presence and the politics of ideas provides insight into factors affecting the implementation of the gender quota, and whether the quota as a strategy to increase the presence

of women in the *DPR* could be transformed into the politics of ideas in promoting policy that addresses women's issues. Using Anne Phillips' argument that further development of the politics of presence is important for the achievement of the politics of ideas, achieving substantive impact from the gender quota requires further development of women's presence in the parliament. Anne Phillips does not specifically discuss which areas of development are crucial to the transformation of presence into ideas, yet she indicated that one of the challenges in achieving the politics of ideas for women is the unsustainability of the relationships between the elected women and the groups supporting the interests of women. The conditions under which the quota was introduced during the transitional period of Indonesian democracy may prove unsustainable. Ideal conditions, such as were present during the transition, relate to substantive democracy, as discussed in the following section. Ideally, within a democratic system, active participation of women's civil society organisations would be fostered to formulate and define common interests, to lobby the political elites who would consequently respond in line with the public demand. Anne Phillips also argued that the political and institutional design of modern democracy could pose a challenge for the minority and disadvantaged groups' representatives to achieve the politics of ideas. Substantive democracy comes into view as a possible solution to achieve the politics of ideas for the minority and disadvantaged groups of women. Substantive democracy advances the discussion to identify potential areas of further development to achieve the politics of ideas.

3.2 Substantive democracy

Substantive democracy is established when equal participation within a democracy is achieved. While modern democracy places emphasis on the political: on election and decision-making procedures; substantive democracy focuses on the responsiveness of political elites to public demand, and the substance of policy outcomes or the relationship that citizens have to decision-making and policy making processes (Brabant 1998; Jacobs & Shapiro 1994; Welzel & Klingemann 2008). It constitutes the ideal condition for the politics of ideas, a situation which brings about quality in a democracy (Walsh 2012b), is a condition for the success of democratisation (Ekiert 1991; Huntington 2009; Mondak & Gearing 1998; Gibson 2001) and exists during the introduction of quotas (Larson 2012; Lubertino 2003; Tamale 2004; Walsh 2012a).

The first condition of substantive democracy is the formulation, definition, and identification of the public's political demands and interests. To achieve this condition, citizens should actively participate in political discussion to formulate a political objective (the demand or the interest). It is an important role of civil society to provide networks and forums of discussion among citizens for the formulation of this objective. Civil society, in the political system, refers to organisations outside of government and business sectors, that serve as a vehicle for citizens to voice their civic wishes and interests (Hermoso & Luca 2006, p. 319; Carothers 1999, pp.19-20). Civil society organisations are not limited only to Non-Government Organisations (NGOs),

but also professional associations, ethnic organisations, and other forms of organisations in society outside of government and business. The weakness of civil society has been blamed for challenges facing the political systems in post-communist states in Eastern and Central Europe (Ekiert 1991; Mondak & Gearing 1998), and Russia (Gibson 2001) in their bids to achieve democratic consolidation, and in the Philippines (Hermoso & Luca 2006) in maintaining a successful democracy. The robustness of civil society is determined by the effectiveness of the organisations to facilitate forums of communication among citizens about their wellbeing, and by the strength of connections between organisations which enables the formulation of common political objectives. The existence of coherent political objectives is significant in directing civil society towards social and political participation.

The other condition for substantive democracy is that civil society should be connected to the political elites to enable the effective communication of their political demands. It is the political elites who have the power and ability to transform those demands into policy. The existence of political elites who openly engage with civil society and are responsive to their demands is crucial for the transformation of the political objectives of civil society into policy (Bernhard 1993; Huntington 1991, pp.121-124; Huntington 2009; Kotze & Toit 1995). Huntington (2009), furthermore, argued that the political elites who are supportive of those demands should seek the power to influence the opposition, as transformation can only occur if supporters of the demand outweigh the opposition. Strong pressure from civil society could

contribute in changing the position of those in opposition to one of support. This is also a condition for women's substantive representation. Lloren (2014) argued that elite women's capacity to represent women's interests is strengthened when women elites connect with civil society. Celis et al. (2008) and Celis and Sarah (2008) state that women legislators are not the only critical actors in achieving substantive representation. The role played by the women's movement in civil society is also important. While the different perspectives among women on the definition of their interests could diminish women's capacity to act substantively (Celis 2008; Celis & Childs 2012), active participation of women in civil society facilitates the formulation of women's interests.

Thus, the substantive impact of women can only be achieved if women's organisations in civil society are robust in developing a common women's political agenda (interests) to guide the political movement, and women political elites are responsive to the demands of the women's organisations. Women elites must acquire enough supporters of the women's interests to transform the interests into policy outcomes. Women elites should contest the opposition with rational justification of the women's demands in the parliament to gain that support, and women's civil society organisations should apply pressure to the male elites.

The accommodation of women's demands for the gender quota generally occurs during a country's transition to democracy when the ideal conditions of substantive democracy exist (Larson 2012; Lubertino 2003; Tamale 2004;

Walsh 2012a). It is when the common political objective of women's inclusion in the political institution exists, and when the political elites who are supportive to the gender quota outweigh the opposition that such an initiative may occur. Pressure from women's organisations in civil society must be strong enough to lobby the opposition to support the quota. However, the situation may revert back again during the consolidation to democracy, when the power of the political elites grows stronger than that of civil society. In this situation, the voice of civil society becomes less solid and is often ignored by the political elites. Under such conditions, it would be less likely for their demands to be transformed into policy (Askarov & Doucouliagos 2015; Peels & Develtere 2009). Thus, if the power of women's civil society organisations does not grow in line with the power of the political elites, the substantive impact will decline.

Using the theory of the politics of presence and ideas of Anne Phillips (1995), and the concept of substantive democracy outlined above, this thesis argues that the ideal condition of substantive democracy should exist to achieve the politics of ideas in terms of the substantive impact of gender quotas. It requires the presence of robust women's civil society organisations, and the presence of feminists within the elite group, or elites that are sympathetic to the idea of gender equality. This study addresses only one of these components, that of the political elites. The assessment of the political elites in this thesis is limited to women legislators and this study does not specifically focus on the condition of women's civil society organisations.

Exploration of the role of women in civil society in relation to politics is undertaken in this study in a limited way only to confirm suggestions made by women legislators. This study acknowledges the importance in assessing the changing condition of the women's movement during the consolidation period, which will complement the initial findings of this study. It acknowledges the importance of the evaluation of the women's movement during this critical period of Indonesian democracy. Analysis of the women's movement in Indonesia under the regimes of Soekarno and Soeharto was conducted by Blackburn (2004). A comprehensive evaluation of the women's movement during the consolidation period requires a dedicated study, which will be important to provide insight on the contribution of women's civil society organisations in relation to the substantive impact of gender quota. However, this thesis and its findings does provide a useful contribution to such a future study by revealing the constraints limiting a strengthening of the politics of presence and substantive democracy sufficient to achieve the politics of ideas required for meaningful gender equity in the *DPR*.

3.3 Gender quotas in the democratic system

This section provides a review on the origin of gender quotas as a strategy to achieve the politics of presence for women by bringing more women into political office. It also provides an overview of the background of the demands for the political inclusion of women in political institutions, and how these demands have been variously justified. This information is important to contextualise this study in uncovering the emergence of the politics of

presence for women as a disadvantaged group, and the expectations of their presence in parliament.

Historically, women's right to engage in the economic and political development processes was denied in many countries. In the early period of modernity, men were considered the source of knowledge, reason, and human intelligence (Paxton & Hughes 2014, pp. 102-103; Smith 1987), and enjoyed the privilege of controlling economic and political developments. They enjoyed the right to vote and to become elected representatives, and both rights were granted as a reward for going to war and defending their nation (Stevens 2010, p.44). Women's roles were to support men by fulfilling domestic duties. Even though women in most countries now have the same rights as men on paper, women remain the minority in political institutions. There are two main barriers: the external barrier of the political system and the internal factors of ideology and psychology.

The internal barrier derives from the stereotyping of gender roles in society related to women's expected position as supporters of men. Men are generally perceived as leaders in society, also reflected in their domination of leadership roles in political parties and in governments, while women are expected to support them in this role (Freeman 2010). Politics is associated with the masculine traits of competition and aggression. When women are motivated to engage in the political system, the dominance of these masculine traits often dissuades them. Women often therefore believe that politics is not an appropriate career choice for them (Mulia 2007; Shvedova

1998a, pp. 33-34; Stevens 2010, pp. 85-86), and that they are not capable of taking up the role of a leader if it requires being aggressive and competitive (Abou-Zeid 2006; Mulia 2007). Media coverage frequently reinforces these stereotypical gender roles (Paxton & Hughes 2014, pp.120-121; Shvedova 1998a, pp.37-38). These internal barriers contribute to the low supply of women willing to run for election in many countries. The stereotyping affects women and many feel uncomfortable and guilty about engaging in political activity. Conversely, men may internalise these gendered values and discriminate against women in political activities including within the structure of party recruitment processes, which creates external barriers for women to engage in political activities.

The external barriers come from the party recruitment system which is costly and discriminates against women. To enter the candidacy process, for instance, women (and men) must spend a substantial amount of money for the chance to secure party nomination and to cover the expenses of the political campaign should their bid for candidacy be successful (Paxton & Hughes 2014, pp.124-125). The stereotypical gender roles in society may result in political party preferences for male candidates, particularly in societies embedded in a strong patriarchy³. In Indonesia, for instance, the

³ The term patriarchy refers to a system in society, in which men are more dominant in building the social, political, and economic institutions of society. In that society, men control the economic resources and dominate the political processes and positions of authority (Paxton & Hughes, 2014, p.27).

Marriage Law describes women's roles in society as mothers and housewives, which leads to party assumptions that men would be more attractive candidates to voters and thereby increase a party's chance to win the election (Kusumaningtyas 2006; Mulia 2007; Wijaksana 2005). However, this is not the case in the United States (Sawer et al. 2006, p.11). Women who run in elections in the United States were reported to have a greater chance to win, though the problem facing equal representation in the US context is that women are less likely to run for election. The stereotyping in patriarchal society may affect party policy directives to invest more resources in male candidates than female candidates, as suggested by Gore (1993), Mulia and Farida (2005), and Prihatmoko (2008). They reported that parties provided less financial support, less access to networking opportunities, and less education and training to women than their male colleagues. They also suggested that in a country where corruption impacts the conduct of elections, women may face further barriers in paying expenses related to the candidacy processes. Candidates may need to make informal payments to party leaders to be nominated, along with other expenses related to party campaigning. Women will be more likely to face greater financial disadvantages, as they are likely to have less access to education and often earn less than their male counterparts. Women are further disadvantaged by the domination of men in controlling party activities. Archer (2009) and Bhavani (1993) found that party activities frequently do not allow women to balance their domestic roles as mothers and wives. These practices may discourage or exclude women and, as a result, women party members

engage less in party meetings and have less knowledge about party matters as indicated by Mulia and Farida (2005). These internal and external factors are of concerns to feminists in their agenda of achieving equal representation in political institutions.

The affirmative action of instituting gender quotas has become a feminist strategy to overcome these barriers. Feminists have developed arguments to gain supports for the initiative of the quotas. Feminist supporters of the quotas argue that equal gender representation in political office is integral to the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and the quotas will be a corrective action to guard that legitimacy (Jalalzai 2009; Karam 1998; Lovenduski 2010, pp.82-83; United Nations 1992; Sawer et al. 2006, p.16; Stevens 2010, p.112). In addition, supporters argue that women being only a small proportion of total representatives in political office means that women will be left behind in the democratic process; and this will disadvantage society as a whole because women possess half of a society's potential talents, which differ from those of men (Paxton & Hughes 2014, p.9). The supporters further argue that women's voices would be best delivered by women, as women will be more able to understand and empathise with women's problems than men. These arguments were used by Indonesian feminists to gain support from political elites during the campaign for the introduction of gender quotas.

Interestingly, the democratic transition period appears to be more conducive to support for gender quotas. It is where substantive democracy exists with

equal power between women's civil society organisations and political elites. Argentina, for instance, adopted a quota when the political institutions were restored to democratic function after a period of authoritarian government (Lubertino 2003). The Argentine quota law was enacted in 1991. Likewise, Afghanistan initiated a quota after the fall of the Taliban (Larson 2012). Uganda introduced a quota in 1986 after the National Resistance Movement (NRM) took government (Tamale 2004), and South Africa introduced a voluntary party quota during the government transition in 1994 following the demise of apartheid (Walsh 2012a). These cases show that the gender quotas have often been adopted during the transition to democracy, during which political elites are more accommodating to social reform, and the women's organisations in civil society are sufficiently exerting the demand for the gender quota. This is also the case in Indonesia, where the introduction of the gender quota came after the fall of the Soeharto regime and the subsequent introduction of a democratic system of government.

The first condition for women's substantive impact is the robustness of civil society. The adoption of the gender quotas has frequently occurred due to pressure from women's movements, such as that in Argentina (Lubertino 2003), Afghanistan (Larson 2012), Uganda (Tamale 2004), and South Africa (Walsh 2012a). The active participation of women's organisations in civil society during the transition to democracy is frequently due to support from the international community. Influence from the development agenda of international development agencies with an interest in increasing women's

political participation such as the United Nations, the Council of the European Union (Krook 2009, p.24-25), and the South African Development Community (SADC) (Kethusegile-Juru 2004) have contributed to the robustness of women's organisations and accelerated the adoption of gender quotas.

The support mentioned is provided in the form of capitalising on resources to women's organisations such as sharing knowledge, providing necessary resources for lobbying groups, and establishing networking links between the organisations for the sharing of experience and best practice. The SADC secretariat, for instance, actively assisted its state members to meet the target of having 30% women's representation at all levels of decision-making by providing assistance for women organisations, among others, to participate in international events, which inspired local women to raise the issue of equal participation at a national level. This strategy was evident when Ugandan women lobbied to initiate a quota (Tamale 2004). The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (1999 - 2000) (UNTAET) missions, for instance, provided training on gender mainstreaming strategy to women focused NGOs (Corcoran-Nantes 2009, p.166).

Another important element is the responsiveness of political elites to women's demand for gender quotas for the inclusion of women in the parliament. Anne Phillips (1995) argued that the ideal conditions that are often present during the introduction of the quotas is frequently unsustainable. The introduction of a gender quota is rarely translated into a commitment

from the political elites for equality in its implementation in practical terms, as discussed in the following section.

3.4 Implementation of quotas

Existing evaluations of the gender quotas are primarily focused on numerical, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic impacts. The numerical impact evaluates the effectiveness of the quota in increasing the amount of women elected to parliament; while the descriptive impact assesses the qualification of the women legislators elected, generally measured by their level of education and experience compared with their male counterparts. The assumption is that these qualifications are important to their capacity to approach the decision-making process using rational justification for their decisions. The substantive impact evaluates women legislator's ability to represent the interests of women in the form of supporting legislation addressing women's interests. The symbolic impact evaluates the impact of women's presence in encouraging other women to enter politics.

The implementation of the gender quotas to increase the presence of women in political institutions relies on the active participation of women's civil society organisations to monitor the implementation and the responsiveness of the political elites to the demands of women to strengthen the implementation of the quotas. There are also reports on the impact of the electoral system on the effectiveness of the gender quota, but there is yet to be agreement on the kind of electoral system that is most conducive to a

successful gender quota. The proportional representation electoral system⁴ is claimed by some to be more favourable to quota implementation, evidenced by the South African (Kethusegile-Juru 2004), and Argentine experiences (Peschard 2003). The proportional system gives women better opportunities for election in larger districts. The combination of the proportional representation system with a closed listing system⁵ works to the advantage of women, because women can focus their efforts within the party to get a winning position in the candidate lists (Peschard 2003). Voter preferences for individual candidates in the proportional system, in combination with an open listing system, influences the results of the winning seat. In a predominantly masculine culture that assigns men as leaders and women as supporters, this system of voting disadvantages women. Voters might preferentially cast more votes for men. However, this impact is less evident in the cases of Peru and Indonesia, both countries that employ listing systems but achieve a higher proportion of women legislators with an open system. The proportion of women representatives doubled in Peru under the open system from 10.8% in 1995 to 21.67% in 2000 (Schmidt 2003). In Indonesia, with the majority of the population adhering to Islam, the proportion also doubled from 9% in 1999 under the closed system, to 18% in

⁴ The PR system is an electoral system using multiple member voting districts. Divisions in an electorate are reflected proportionately in the elected body and all votes determine the result. For instance, if 30% of the votes go to a political party, then the party will win approximately 30% of seats.

⁵ Party list system is a system in which political parties define candidate lists, and voters vote for a list. Lists can be closed or open. The open lists allow voters to indicate individual candidate preferences. The voter preferences will affect who wins the seats, while with the closed lists the positions in the listing will determine the seats. Candidate listed number one will have a greater chance to win the seat.

2009 and further to 17% in 2014 using an open system, discussed further in chapter 4 (Aritonang 2014; Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat [DPR] 2014c; Mahkamah Konstitusi 2008). Thus, there is yet to be a broad consensus in the literature on what constitutes the best possible combination of a proportional system and open or closed system to negate systemic disadvantage to women candidates.

The conditions of substantive democracy are more likely to ensure the effective implementation of gender quotas in bringing more women into representative institutions. Walsh (2012b) refers to it as the quality of democracy. During a period of substantive democracy, the elites are responsive to the demands of women's civil society organisations. Rwanda is an example of the success of gender quotas, where the quota has succeeded in the country having equal gender representation with more than half of the legislators being women (IPU 2016). Rwanda's success in achieving equal representation in parliament is due to the elites' commitment to engender politics; the efforts of active feminist individuals and organisations in monitoring and pursuing a feminist legislative agenda; and support from women legislators (Kantengwa 2010). Endorsing the implementation of a quota frequently does not translate into the elites' commitment to gender equality in practice. Women frequently face challenges in achieving favourable positions in the candidate listing. Women candidates are often clustered at the least optimal levels in the lists in many Latin American countries (Peschard 2003), South Africa (Walsh 2012a), and

in Indonesia (Bylesjo & Seda 2006).

The active participation of women's organisations in civil society in the electoral processes has led to greater success in quota implementation. In Latin America, for instance, the women's movements pressured the political elites to oblige political parties to implement equal distribution of female candidates and impose sanctions for parties who fail to comply. Women in Indonesia and South Africa demanded a 'zipper' system that required male and female names be alternated on party lists. However, numerical achievement is not the only concern in relation to quotas. Abolition or amendment of discriminatory laws and challenging the masculine norms of the institutions are the other objectives of the quotas. Achieving those objectives requires the active participation of women legislators in political discussions within political institutions. Women must be as competent and capable as their male political colleagues. Evaluation of the capabilities of women legislators elected through quotas becomes the centre of attention in the descriptive impact of quotas.

Descriptive evaluation of quotas evaluates women legislators' educational qualifications. Analysis of four congressional terms in Argentina found that women elected through a quota are as highly qualified as their male colleagues (Franceschet & Piscopo 2012). Female and male legislators had a similar level of education and political experience. Ugandan women legislators, elected with or without quotas, show no difference in occupation and level of education, and women elected through quotas have been shown

to have greater experience in elected office than male legislators (O'Brien 2012a). Such findings in these countries diminish concerns from the opponents of the quotas that the quotas will replace qualified men with unqualified women. There is also an indication of further benefit from the quotas in that it widens the age range of women legislators to include a younger demographic (Murray 2012; Franceschet & Piscopo 2012). This indicates that quotas have attracted younger groups of women to engage in political activities. However, the qualities of the political system could hinder the success of quotas, as in the case of Morocco. The monarchical system was accused of weakening the reserved seat quota in that country (Sater 2012). The quota decreased the proportion of women elected outside the reserved seats in 2007. Even though women legislators from the reserved seats are more educated, they came from well-connected families. Control by the monarch of major political decisions was the contributing factor to the failure of the quota in advancing women's participation in the wider community. This may indicate that gender quotas as a strategy to increase women's participation might be more suitable to a modern democracy that is more open to public participation.

Other assessments of quotas focus on the substantive impact such as the effectiveness of women legislators to represent their gender constituents, or their substantive representation of women. The active participation of women's organisations in civil society, support from women legislators for the feminist agendas, and accommodating political elites are key conditions to

achieving a substantive impact.

The achievement of such conditions is difficult. For instance, in Afghanistan, the expectation that representation should be in line with the ethnic identity of constituents prevented women legislators from working collectively in pursuing a gender equality agenda in parliament (Larson 2012). Friction among women's organisations in civil society could decrease their effectiveness and become an obstacle to the achievement of feminist political agendas in Turkey (Turam 2008) and in New Zealand (Curtin 2008, Grey 2006). The lack of communication between women civil society organisations and women's legislators weakened women's influence in the Russian Parliament (Shvedova 1998b). These cases showed that communication between the women's organisations in civil society and women legislators is significantly important for women's substantive impact, and that a robust women's movement⁶ should exist to sustain the substantive impact of women. The existence of a common goal among women in civil society and women legislators would maintain the political motivation of women and eventually strengthen the demand to legislate a feminist agenda.

In addition, attitudes of the political elites to gender equality contribute to achievement of substantive impact. The South African government's control

⁶ A women's movement exists only if a diverse array of women's organisations come together to form a coalition based on their gender identity.

of feminist activities and civil society in the period 1999-2004 diminished women's substantive achievements (Walsh 2012a). The party elites demoted women legislators who were active in pursuing a feminist agenda of gender equality. In addition, women in general have less access to the elites. Brazilian women legislators, for instance, are clustered in the less important areas at the periphery of the political arena (Miguel 2012). The gendered division of labour in the French Parliament creates structural problems for women to fulfil important parliamentary duties (Murray 2012). Male legislators, who are seniors in the party, hold the authority to decide which individuals may assume parliamentary leadership positions. The senior party members are also more likely to be active in committee work and be assigned to tasks such as authoring reports and bills. Practices of the parliamentary system posed a significant challenge for women's substantive representation in the Canadian Parliament (Trimble 2006). Canadian women legislators were frequently assigned to duties related to feminine issues, which prevented them from voicing interests or opinions outside of the boundaries of women's issues. They reported that the environment of the parliament was unwelcoming to their participation. Women have to adjust to the masculine systems, and not all of them succeed in pursuing a political career. Political hostility towards equality could be an explanation for the less substantive impact of the quotas.

These cases show that achieving a transformation of substantive impact to the politics of presence into the politics of ideas, women elites face

challenges from the organisational structure of the representative institution. Men control the organisation and determine women's political careers and their ability to achieve influential positions. To address this, some scholars have argued the need for informal supporting systems such as a women's parliamentary caucus to facilitate women in working towards substantive representation (Bakopanos 2004; Costa et al. 2013; Johnson & Josefsson 2016; Veberyte 2015). Such a body could provide political and personal support for women, and eventually strengthen their influence in the male dominated parliament. A women's parliamentary caucus is an informal body for women legislators to work together across party lines, build informal networks with women's civil society organisations to strengthen women's political impact (Costa et al. 2013; Lowe-Morna 1998), and provide personal support for women newcomers in parliament to gain experience to become effective legislators (Sawer 2015 p. 117; Veberyte 2015; Sawer 2015, p. 117). The caucus held a crucial role in the introduction of gender responsive budgeting in Timor-Leste (Costa et al. 2013); and in sponsoring approximately 29 laws on gender issues in 2000-2010 in Uganda (Johnson & Josefsson 2016, p. 11). Such an organisation has the capacity to encourage the parliament to be more sensitive towards women's issues in its daily operations.

Another objective of the quotas is the symbolic impact that women's presence in the institution exerts, sending a message to women in the broader community that politics is not too harsh an environment for women

and this may motivate other women to pursue a political career (Franceschet et al. 2012). Associated with this is the expectation that women's presence in the institution would change the nature of politics and diminish the masculine mode of political behaviour. The assumption is also that a gender quota might have an impact on the party's attitude in increasing the pool of women candidates for party offices and considering gender an important criterion for selecting candidates. A study in Belgium, however, found that a quota did not affect the political elites' attitude to accommodating institutional changes such as revising existing procedures, rules, and processes in selecting candidates for elected office (Meier 2012). A quota in Mexico failed to change citizens' political attitudes to women (Zetterberg 2012), yet the equal presence of women legislators in Rwanda has increased respect from family and community members towards women (Burnet 2011). Women being in leadership positions has reduced masculine preferences in leadership styles (Foti & Hauenstein 2007; Gershonoff & Foti 2003; Powell et al. 2002) and more leaders have displayed a combination of masculine and feminine characteristics (Gibson 1995). The presence of women has exposed other leaders and employees to feminine styles that emphasise warmth, kindness, honesty, cooperation, and sympathy (Paris et al. 2009). The presence of women leaders in Indonesia and the Philippines, for instance, has encouraged other women to pursue political careers and increased the number of women in government (Bennet 2010; Marie Col 2013).

3.5 Indonesian experience of the gender quota

Indonesia adopted the gender quota during the country's transition to democracy and this initiative has brought more women legislators into the *DPR*. The expectations held by feminists for the adoption of a gender quota in Indonesia was that the women legislators would bring the interests of women into political discussion and unravel gendered legislation (Siregar 2010, p.54). Haryanti's (2006) examination of women's substantive representation in the *DPR* found that the gender ideology of womanhood and wifehood as the ideal position of women, which was inherited from the previous government, impeded women's participation in the political discussion. Siregar (2010) examined women's access to the Parliament and their substantive representation at the regional and national levels. Women legislators elected through the quota were equally qualified, in terms of education and experience, to their male counterparts. She reported that the challenges of women's substantive representation in the *DPR* came from the different perspectives on what was defined as women's interests, and limited supporting facilities such as staff. For instance, women had different views on the role of women in Indonesian society and felt that women legislators should represent their electorates regardless of their gender. This finding suggests the difficulty in formulating a women's political agenda or women's common interest despite the introduction of a quota.

Siregar (2010, p.180) also reported the clustering of women at committees dealing with women's issues of health and empowerment, and challenges for

women appointed on committees that dealt with issues commonly considered more masculine. This indicates the contribution of the organisational structure of the Indonesian Parliament itself to the challenges facing women in the acquisition of power and influence. Siregar did not examine the factors affecting the clustering of women on certain committees, however, evidence from other countries suggests this is important. Bolzendahl (2014), using case studies of Germany, Sweden, and the United States, and Crawford and Pini (2011) using the case study of Australia, reported that the division of labour, such as assignment to a committee, indicates a gendering process which is used by men to maintain their power in parliament.

Haryanti (2006) reported on the significant role of the women's parliamentary caucus (*KPPRI*) during the transition to democracy. The *KPPRI* played a significant role in promoting women's issues in the *DPR* through providing forums for networking between women legislators and women's civil society organisations, as well as international donors. However, Siregar (2010) suggested that the limited resources of the *KPPRI*, such as insufficient funding and no office space, posed a significant challenge for the effective work of the caucus. This indicates changes in the support system for women in the Parliament are required to make the *KPPRI* effective. The international literature also argues for the importance of a functioning caucus for substantive impact (Bakopanos 2004; Costa et al. 2013; Lowe-Morna 1998; Johnson & Josefsson 2016; Sawer 2015; Veberyte 2015). Thus, assessing further the condition of the caucus during the consolidation of democracy is

important due to the crucial role of the caucus as a forum of communication between women civil society organisations and women legislators.

This section argued that the implementation of the gender quotas requires the condition of substantive democracy: the existence of robust women's civil society organisations, and women legislators who are responsive to the demands of women. The success of gender quotas in bringing more women into parliament is strongly linked to the active participation of women's civil society organisations in monitoring and taking corrective measures at the point of implementation. This section shows that achieving substantive impact requires favourable conditions for women legislators to acquire power. The organisation of parliaments frequently poses challenges for women to access the location of power. The number of women legislators matters for the symbolic impact of encouraging other women to pursue careers in politics, yet achieving the substantive impact requires further development for the women legislators to acquire power in the parliament. It is the development of organisations relating to the parliament, such as the informal body of the women's parliamentary caucus that is critical to successful implementation of gender quotas.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter argued, by applying the work of Anne Phillips (1995) on the politics of presence and ideas, that the gender quota is only a halfway point in achieving the mainstreaming of gender equality in legislation, laws and programmes. Further development of the quota is essential to transforming

the presence of women legislators into a substantive impact on unravelling laws which discriminate against women. As argued in this chapter, establishing conditions that are favourable for such a substantive impact, such as conditions during the legislating of the gender quota, is important. It is the condition of substantive democracy that is most effective, in which the power of the women's movement is robust and the political elites are responsive to the demands of women. This chapter also argued that the organisation of parliament poses a significant challenge for women to acquire power sufficient to impact on and influence the decision-making process. The organisational structure of parliament has been used by men to maintain their power. Women must be able to gain power of influence to achieve a substantive impact.

These two elements are the focus of this thesis. The evaluation of the impact of the gender quota in this study focuses on two main areas: the contribution of the organisation of the *DPR* to women's substantive impact, and the changing condition of political elites following the consolidation of Indonesian democracy. The theoretical framework of substantive democracy identified two conditions for substantive impact which are the responsiveness of the political elites, and the active participation of women's organisations in civil society. This study examines only one of these conditions, which is the responsiveness of the political elites. The evaluation focuses on the changing composition of the political elites by comparing the conditions during both the transition period and the consolidation period of democracy. Although the

study focuses on the political elites, interviews with women activists in civil society were also conducted to gain a comprehensive understanding of initial findings and to fill gaps of information. Analysis on the role of women's civil society organisations discussed in this thesis is merely confirmation of the information gained from women's legislators. The evaluation of the organisational structure of *DPR* focuses on the parliamentary decision-making procedures and its impact on women's capacity to acquire the power to impact and influence parliamentary discussions. Evaluation is directed at the organisation of standing committees, the *DPR* as a workplace, and women's access to leadership positions to influence the decision-making outcome. Consideration is also given to the role of women's parliamentary caucus in leveraging the impact of women in parliament.

As discussed above, the works of Haryanti (2006) and Siregar (2010) form the basis for this thesis. Their respective arguments about the challenges for substantive representation from the gender patriarchal ideology and diverse perspective of women legislators are acknowledged. In the following chapters I explore another thread that adds to their studies: how the quota operates later in the transition period, and how the *DPR* itself operates as a gendered workplace. Haryanti (2006) suggested that the gender ideology in Indonesian society poses internal barriers for women legislators to actively participate in political discussion. The ideology might also have penetrated the organisation of the *DPR*. This study does not revisit the influence of gender ideology or patriarchal ideology of the Indonesian society in posing an

internal barrier for women's substantive representation.

Siregar (2010) suggested that there exists limited support in the *DPR* for the women's parliamentary caucus and a tendency for women to be assigned to the standing committees associated specifically with women's issues. This study extends these findings by analysing the gendered organisation of the standing committees and exploring the organisation of the women's parliamentary caucus due to the significant role of these parliamentary bodies in supporting women's representation to acquire power and influence in political debates. Haryanti (2006) and Siregar (2010) gave full analyses of women's struggle to introduce the gender quota and to access parliament. This study does not specifically revisit women's struggle to enter parliament, rather it focuses on women legislators' struggle for substantive representation in the *DPR*.

The following chapter provides an overview of the local political context of Indonesia, including the democratisation process and the effects of democratisation to the changing of the organisation of the *DPR*. It also describes the organisation of *DPR* and the decision-making procedures, including the role of party *fraksi* in political contestation in the *DPR*. This study does not focus on the women legislators' interaction internally within their party, instead the evaluation is directed to the party role in the organisation of the parliamentary decision-making processes.

Chapter 4 Indonesian Democratisation

This chapter provides the local political context for this study. As outlined in Chapter 1, Indonesia's path to democracy, known as *Reformasi*, was triggered by the economic crisis which struck Indonesia in the late 1990s. The reform of the political system established a new electoral system and new institutions to accommodate public interest to participate in the new government. This chapter addresses the reform in the national parliamentary system in response to the return of the legislative power to parliament. It was this reform which spurred the introduction of the gender quota that has brought more women politicians into the *DPR*. The chapter begins with an overview of the political reform, and is followed by a discussion of the reform undertaken in the institution of the *DPR*. The chapter closes with a discussion of this institutional reform specifically in terms of responses to the gender quota.

4.1 The democratisation of Indonesia

The momentum for the return to democracy in Indonesia was marked by the resignation of authoritarian President Soeharto on May 21st 1998, after ruling the nation for thirty two years. The reformists reformed the political system to accommodate the voices from the grassroots through three key changes: the adoption of a multi-party system; the implementation of direct elections; and the establishment of new government institutions. The adoption of the multi-party system in elections, and direct elections for legislative and presidential elections, were aimed at allowing greater participation of citizens in the

government system. The new political institutions were designed as a mechanism to avoid concentrating power in one location.

The multi-party system accommodates wider political interests and provides more choices of political affiliation for citizens. The system was introduced to replace the limited party system prevailing under the Soeharto regime. It encouraged citizens to group with others with similar political agendas of reform in the country and form new political parties. Over two hundred parties sought registration at the first election in 1999 (Sebastian 2004).

Consequently, the number of parties in the *DPR* has increased substantially, and reduced the effectiveness of political discussion in the institutions due to diverse political interests.

The system has also returned the influence of Islam to the political arena, previously suppressed by Soeharto's regime (Kingsbury 2003; Rüländ et al. 2005). The *PKS* (Prosperous Justice Party), for example, grew out of the underground campus resistance to Soeharto, who tightly controlled religious activism. Dozens of Islamist parties sprang up and sought registration in the 1999 election (Anonymous 2009).

There were twenty one political parties in the *DPR* in the 1999 election compared with three parties in the previous government (DPR 2011). Based on rules of procedure, a party *fraksi* should have at least thirteen legislators. A party who has less than thirteen seats should merge with others, for example, *Fraksi Reformasi* in the period 1999-2004 was a combination of

PKS and *PAN* (National Mandate Party). A party *fraksi* with members from several political parties was less likely to be effective due to tension among the parties (Tweedie 2008). The existence of many parties in the *DPR* limits the effectiveness of the parliamentary work, which led to the parliamentary threshold in the election laws of 2003 and 2008 aimed at reducing the number of parties. Only parties who had 2.5% of seats in the parliament were eligible to register for the 2004 election, and 3.5% seats was the threshold for the 2009 election. The implementation of the parliamentary threshold reduced the number of parties to sixteen in 2004, nine in 2009 and ten in 2014. Another reform in the institution was the termination of the Army *fraksi* (*Fraksi TNI ABRI*) representation in the *DPR* in 2004. This measure reduced the military influence in the political system, as envisaged by the amendment of the UUD 1945 Constitution.

The reform of the presidential and legislative election system strengthened representatives' duties. The direct elections strengthened the president's and legislators' duties so that they could govern with confidence derived from the legitimacy of a popular mandate. The president, who was elected by the parliament in the previous government, was elected by the people from 2004 onwards. The reform in the legislative system from closed listing to open listing or direct election, was a gradual process between the 2004 and 2009 elections. The 2003 Election Law stipulated direct elections for the president, and the 2008 Election Law for directly elected legislators. The 2009 legislative election was marked by abundant campaign material and vigorous

competition among individual candidates (Reilly 2007). It demonstrated the consolidating of the democracy period and broad public acceptance of the changes in the political system (Schmidt 2010). However, competitive direct election also increased the cost of running the election, especially campaign expenses (Rüland et al. 2005; Sebastian 2004). This potentially impacted on women candidates more than their male counterparts as women were less likely to have large financial resources and hence less likely to be able to attract voters compared to their wealthier male counterparts. In general, the wealthier candidates (men and wealthy women) gained more benefit from the system due to their access to greater capital resources to conduct their campaign and attract voters.

New institutions were established to accommodate the new political system and to balance the power between the executive and legislative branches. The roles of these institutions are to ensure transparency in the conduct of the new system and include *Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU* or General Election Committee), *Badan Pengawas Pemilu (Bawaslu* or Election Supervisor Body), *Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK* or Constitutional Court) *Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK* or Corruption Eradication Committee) and *Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD* or Regional Representatives Assembly). The *KPU*, which is responsible for the registration of political parties, applied rigorous selection criteria for party registration, such as the ability to conduct a nationwide campaign, and having offices in at least two-thirds of the country's provinces and two-thirds of the districts within the provinces

(Sebastian 2004). *Bawaslu* is responsible for monitoring the transparent conduct of elections (Badan Pengawas Pemilu [Bawaslu] 2014). The *MK* arbitrates election result disputes and accommodates citizens' demands for judicial review of laws. The *KPK* is an independent institution to combat systemic corruption within the Indonesian Government (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi [KPK] 2014). The *DPD* is a new branch of the parliamentary system to ensure regional voices are heard in the workings of Parliament. These new institutions reinforce the implementation of the new political system.

4.2 The Indonesian National Parliament (*DPR*) in the new democratic system

The parliamentary system generally consists of the upper and lower house; the upper house acts as a supervisory body of the lower house, and the lower house is more powerful due to the legitimacy of its members who are elected by the people (Laundy 1989). The Indonesian parliamentary system has a weak checks and balance mechanism. There were two institutions in the previous government; the *MPR* (the People's Consultative Assembly) and the *DPR*. During the previous system of government, the *MPR* acted as the supervisory body of the *DPR*, but members of the *MPR* were also members of the *DPR* and representation from community organisations was elected through a reserved seat system. The reform of the parliamentary system aimed to strengthen the power balance by establishing the new institution of the *DPD*. The *DPD*'s members are elected through direct election; and the members of *MPR* now come from members of the *DPR* and *DPD*.

Nonetheless, there are still some weaknesses in the system. The *DPR* has more power than the *DPD* because of the size of its membership and its legislative duties. There are three times more members of the *DPR* than the *DPD* with five hundred and sixty members compared with only one hundred and thirty six in the *DPD* as cited in article 227:2 of the Law no 27/2009 on power relation of the Houses (UU nomor 27 tahun 2009). The *DPD*'s duties are limited to proposing bills on issues of regional autonomy; centre-regional relations; the formation, expansion and merger of regions; the management of natural resources; and financial balance between national and regional levels. The authority in legislative deliberation is at the *DPR* level and the *DPD* is limited to an advisory role. The *DPR* has the power to finalise bills and request approval from the executive of the president for enactment. Thus, the checks and balance mechanism in the Indonesian parliamentary system remains weak.

The amendment of UUD 1945 (The Indonesian Constitution) in 2000⁷ returned legislative power to the *DPR*. The previous system of government was weighted towards the executive in bill preparation and finalisation, and the role of the *DPR* was limited to being a 'rubber stamp' of final approval. With the return of legislative power, the institutions of the *DPR* needed to be reformed to accommodate new roles such as support for staff on the

⁷ The amendment of the UUD 1945 was conducted in four phases in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002.

expertise required to finalise legislation. However, evaluation of the support system indicates that the parliament is still under-resourced given the importance of its legislative role. Rüländ et al (2005), reported that the parliamentary research centre was under-staffed with only approximately thirty to thirty five permanent staff to handle complex issues such as restoration of the Indonesian economy, and to reform an outdated legal system. The library of the parliament was also under performing due to poor staffing levels and an outdated computer system. With such poor services, legislators rarely seek support from the *DPR* Secretariat.

The legislators' involvement in the preparation of legislation is more procedural than substantive, although many of them have professional backgrounds such as law. Poor employment conditions constrain the *DPR* in attracting qualified parliamentary personnel (Rüländ et al. 2005). Most staff with expertise are employed on a contract basis with relatively poor social security allowances, unattractive payment schedules, and few employment benefits. The permanent staff primarily perform administrative duties. The reform of the political system of the *DPR* has not been followed by a commitment to equip the institution with adequate resources to fulfil its new functions. The poor support systems in the institution may affect legislators' participation in political discussions. The political discussion in the *DPR* is located within the two central bodies of the *fraksi* (party caucus) and *komisi* (standing committee). The decision-making in the institutions is a hierarchal process from the *fraksi* to the *komisi*.

4.2.1 Party caucus (*fraksi*)

Fraksi is a grouping of legislators based on the political configuration of parties. Its role is in enhancing the relationships with constituents. It has the function of coordinating legislator activities to perform representative duties. The aspirations of the constituents are discussed at the *fraksi* level to make collective decisions. The collective decisions made at the *fraksi* will be brought into the parliamentary discussion via standing committees (*komisi*). The *fraksi* is also responsible for legislators' capacity to develop skills, such as handling the media, public speaking, and networking. A legislator must be a member of a *fraksi* and a *fraksi* must have at least thirteen legislators as members.

Referring to Table 4.1, classification of the *fraksi* visions is made based on a party's key political ideology of either nationalism or Islamism, similar to the classifications of nationalist or secular parties, and Muslim or Islamic parties in Indonesia as described by Rüländ et al. (2005, pp.144-145). A party classified as nationalist references only to the state ideology in its vision and mission. A party classified as Islamist is a party that refers to Islamic teaching in its vision and mission.

Table 4.1 Party caucuses (*fraksi*) for the periods 2004-2009, 2009-2014, and 2014-2019.

<i>Fraksi</i>	Vision	2004-2009	2009-2014	2014-2019
		% of the 550 seats	% of the 560 seats	% of the 560 seats
<i>Demokrat</i>	Nationalist	10	26	11
<i>Golkar</i>	Nationalist	23	19	16
<i>PDIP</i>	Nationalist	20	17	19
<i>PKS</i>	Islamist	8	7	7
<i>PPP</i>	Islamist	9	5	7
<i>PKB</i>	Islamist	11	10	8
<i>PAN</i>	Islamist	10	8	9
<i>Hanura</i>	Nationalist	-	3	3
<i>Gerindra</i>	Nationalist	-	5	13
<i>Nasdem</i>	Nationalist	-	-	6
Others		9	-	-
Total		100	100	100

Sources: Partai Demokrat 2013; DPR 2014b; Partai Gerindra 2013; Partai Golkar 2013; Partai Hanura 2013; PAN 2014; DPR 2011; PDIP 2014; PKB 2014; PKS 2013; PPP 2013.

Parties with Islamic and nationalist ideologies are balanced in proportion, but nationalist parties dominate the seats in the *DPR*. The nationalist *fraksi* account for approximately 70% of the seats in the *DPR*. Political configuration in the *DPR* fluctuated over the period. *Demokrat*, for instance, had the most seats in the period 2009-2014, but their number of seats was small in the periods 2004-2009 and 2014-2019. New parties emerged for each time period. *Hanura* and *Gerindra* were newcomers in 2009, and *Nasdem* emerged in 2014, showing that the political configuration in the *DPR* is still fluctuating. Only two parties, *Golkar* and *PDIP*, have enjoyed a steady proportion of seats in the *DPR*. These figures might reflect the political

dynamic in society with the continuing formation of new parties which are supported by the voter base. Even though the 2009 election marked the point of consolidating democracy, the political dynamic in the institution continues to evolve.

No one party has had a majority of seats in the *DPR*, and this will impact on the decision-making processes. The decision-making process in the *DPR*, as regulated in the rules of procedure and the UUD 1945 Constitution, is deliberative to reach consensus (*musyawarah untuk mencapai mufakat*). It calls for unanimous agreement and if the consensus fails to be achieved, voting will be carried out. Securing the political agenda of one party is difficult when there is no majority. Negotiation among parties will take place and there could be many interests contested in the discussion. This system may enrich the decision-making process, as contestations of diverse interests are the essence of substantive democracy.

4.2.2 Standing committee (*komisi*)

The *komisi* is the centre for political decision-making in the *DPR* for legal enforcement of the electors' wishes. The *komisi*'s roles manifest the parliamentary functions in legislative deliberation for laws and government budgeting, and in overseeing the government's implementation of the laws and development programme. In addition to the *komisi*, there are supplementary committees such as the Budgeting Committee (*Banggar*), Legislative Committee (*Baleg*), Domestic Affairs Committee (*BURT*), and others that function to support the effectiveness of the political discussion.

The Budgeting Committee, for instance, is responsible for finalising drafts of the budget from the *komisi*. Meanwhile, the Legislative Committee has the function of making legislation a priority for one period, and reviewing that priority annually, which guides the *komisi*'s legislative work. The organisation of the *komisi* is based on the grouping of working areas. The decisions determining the *komisi*'s working areas is based on the collective decision of the legislators at the beginning of the parliamentary session for each period. During the period 2009-2014, there were 11 standing committees with working areas and relevant executive partners, as shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Standing committees (komisi) working areas in the period 2009-2014.

Standing committees	Working areas	Working partners
<i>Komisi 1</i>	National defence and foreign affairs	Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Communication and Information; National Security Committee; State Intelligence Committee
<i>Komisi 2</i>	Domestic affairs and bureaucratic reform	Ministry of Domestic Affairs; Ministry of State Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform; Ministry of Secretary of State; State Administrative Committee; Human Resources Committee; National Archive; Election Committee
<i>Komisi 3</i>	Law enforcement and national security	Ministry of Justice and Human Rights; High Court; National Police; Corruption Eradication Committee; Judicial Committee; Constitutional Court; Human Rights Committee
<i>Komisi 4</i>	Forestry and food security	Department of Farming; Department of Forestry; Department of Oceans and Fisheries
<i>Komisi 5</i>	Transportation, infrastructure, public housing, rural areas development, and climate issues	Ministry of General Operations; Ministry of Transportation; Ministry of Public Housing; Ministry of Marginal Area Development; Climate and Geophysics Board
<i>Komisi 6</i>	Trade and industry	Department of Industry; Department of Trade; Ministry of Micro Economics; Ministry of National Corporations; National Investment Board
<i>Komisi 7</i>	Energy and mineral resources, technology and the environment	Department of Energy and Mineral Resources; Ministry of Environment; Ministry of Technology and Research
<i>Komisi 8</i>	Religion, social welfare, and women's empowerment	Ministry of Religion; Ministry of Social Affairs; Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection; Committee for National Disaster Response
<i>Komisi 9</i>	Workforce, transmigration, family planning and health	Department of Health; Ministry of Workforce and Transmigration; National Board for Family Planning Coordination; Medicine and Food Monitoring Board; National Board for Migrant Protection
<i>Komisi 10</i>	Education, tourism, culture, and youth	Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs; Ministry of Tourism; Ministry of Youth and Sport; National Libraries
<i>Komisi 11</i>	Economics and national development planning	Ministry of National Development Planning; Bank of Indonesia; Bureau of Statistics; Financial and Development Monitoring Board; Centre for Financial Analysis and Transaction; National Procurement Board


Source: DPR (2014a)

There has been reform of the number and working areas of standing committees. The number of committees increased from nine for the period 1999-2004, to eleven in the period 2004-2009 onwards. The two additional committees from 2004 onwards are *Komisi* Three on Law Enforcement, and *Komisi* Eight on Religion and Women's Empowerment. *Komisi* Three previously came under the working area of *Komisi* Two on Domestic Affairs. Women's empowerment used to be the working area of the *Komisi* dealing with portfolios of health and family planning, while religion was under the *Komisi* for education and cultural affairs (Yayasan API 2001; Pakpahan 1994). The impact of committee reform in relation to the quota, particularly the committee on women's empowerment and religion, is discussed further in Chapter 6. However, the reform of standing committees has not led to them being more publicly accessible while substantive discussion proceeds (Sherlock 2010). Outsiders still have difficulties seeking information or getting involved in the *Komisis'* debates.

Discussion at the standing committee level is mainly organised as shown in Figure 4.1. There are three main institutions that have the right to propose a bill; the *DPR*, the *DPD*, and the executive. The bill's proposal should be submitted to the speaker of the house, who then announces the proposal during the plenary meeting. The centre of the discussion is at Stage I, where a collective decision among the *fraksi* is based upon the *fraksi's* list of concerns (*DIM*). The discussion is likely to be at the *komisi* level or the supplementary committees such as *panja* (working committee); *pansus*

(special committee); or *Banggar* (Budgeting Committee) if the proposals relate to the government budget. This procedure assures public engagement in the political discussion through public observation of the *komisi's* discussions, yet as Sherlock (2010) points out, this public engagement still has limited or no impact on the outcomes of the committee's decisions and subsequent legislative action. The collective decision at Stage I is then legally approved at the plenary meeting or Stage II. The flow of the decision-making in Figure 4.1 indicates that there is a hierarchy in the contestation of arguments from the levels of *fraksi*, through to the *komisi*, with final approval the responsibility of the Speaker of the House and the President.

Figure 4.1 The sequence of discussion leading to legislation in the DPR.



Source: Rules of Procedure of the DPR Chapter IV (DPR 2009a)

4.3 The impact of the new system on women

Women were a key part of the political movement during the transition to democracy. When the economic crisis hit Indonesia in 1998, women mobilised their campaign and engaged in political activities. The first movement was a women's rally to protest soaring milk prices, known as *Suara Ibu Peduli* (SIP or the Voice of Mothers) in February 1998 (Bessell 2004). The rally was inspired by the *Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo* in Argentina, which is a women's movement instigated by mothers seeking justice for those who disappeared under the military dictatorship between 1976-1983 (Mar'lyah 2000). The SIP's movement was the first public protest against Soeharto and inspired other groups to rally publicly. Subsequently, many mass organisations, including students, joined public rallies to protest against the Soeharto regime. The aftermath was the occupation of the Parliament building by students and groups called reformists from the 18th to the 22nd of May, 1998. It led to the resignation of President Soeharto on the 22nd May. Many women's organisations sprang up, such as the Women's Coalition for Justice and Democracy (*Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia untuk Keadilan dan Demokrasi*), the Women's Movement for Voter Education (*Gerakan Perempuan Sadar Pemilu*), and others.

After the resignation of Soeharto, the women's movement seized the momentum to bring a focus to women's political agenda. In August 1998, women feminists assembled and defined their political agenda for the first free election in 1999 (Mulia 2007). The meeting produced the formation of a women's pressure group under the name *Gerakan Perempuan Peduli Politik*

(*GPPP* or Women's Movement for Political Concern). Their agenda was to achieve gender equality through revision of discriminatory laws and the affirmative action of a gender quota in parliament. A key concern was the declining women's representation in the *DPR* from 12.15% in 1992, to 11.20% in 1997, and 8.8% in 1999 (Mahkamah Konstitusi 2008). A public campaign was launched to raise awareness of the issues, and a series of discussions were conducted (Bessell 2010). International support for the movement brought momentum to their lobbying. Lobbying government officials and political elites including male and female legislators, was part of their strategy, which resulted in the accommodation of a quota article in the 2003 Election Bill, proposed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Department of Justice.

The legislators' positions were divided between opposition and support, including women legislators. The first woman president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, opposed the proposal. She argued that the quota would diminish women's achievement by implying that women could not compete with men (Bylesjo & Seda 2006; Siregar 2010, p.61). The women's pressure groups adopted the strategy of using women legislators who supported the proposal to approach key decision-makers in the party (Siregar 2010, pp.51-73). Siregar reported the difficulties faced by women to promote the initiative of a gender quota in the legislative debates. Pressure on political elites was achieved by threatening the opposing parties that women's groups would defame their parties publicly, and women voters in the 2004 Election would not vote for them. These collective pressures from women outside and inside

Parliament succeeded in the introduction of the gender quota.

The reform in the legislative election system has brought benefits for women.

The pressure from the reformists and the weakening of government power allowed negotiation between organisations in civil society and the political elite to build a new democratic system for the country. The Election Law assured women's participation in legislative elections. The commitment of civic engagement allowed women's civil society organisations to monitor and revise the quota articles in the Election Law to check on its effectiveness.

The evaluation of the quote's first implementation at the 2004 election found that women candidates were often placed at the bottom of the candidate listings with little chance of winning (Bylesjo & Seda 2006). For instance, *PDIP* placed only 7.0% of women candidates in the winning positions of numbers one and two on the lists, while *PAN* had only 6.6 and *PKS* a mere 4.4%; *PKB* achieved the highest number of women in top positions, at 12.5%. In addition, many parties failed to meet the 30% women candidate quota on their lists. This evaluation was used by feminists to pressure political elites for revision of the quota articles for the 2009 election.

The pressure resulted in the amendment of the quota articles in the 2008 Election Law. A quota article in the 2003 Election Law was expanded to incorporate several articles about sanctions, the listing system, and women's representation in the political parties in the 2008 Election Law. Articles 8 and 15 of the Election Law no 10/2008 require parties who contested the 2009 election to have at least 30% of women in party leadership at the national

level. Article 55 regulates the listing system by implementing the 'zipper' system to alternate the names of male and female candidates on party lists. Articles 57, 58:2, 61:6, and 66:2 impose sanctions for parties who fail to meet the 30% quota of women candidates in the listing. The election committee are obliged to verify the 30% women's representation in the party's listing and announce the parties to the public. As a result, the proportion of women legislators in the *DPR* has doubled.

The reform in the listing system from closed to open listing has created concern among feminists in relation to the advancement of the quota. The concern is due to the patriarchal society in Indonesia and the increasing influence of conservative Islam in the daily life of Indonesian society. Some regions have established *Shari'a*⁸ Laws that limit women's public activities (Susiana 2011). Open listing reduces women's opportunity to win seats in these regions as the majority of society would be likely to vote for men. Nonetheless, the reform in the listing system has brought more women into the *DPR*. A study using data from the 2003 Republic of Indonesia National Opinion Survey on voters' attitudes toward increasing the number of women in political institutions, suggested that Indonesians' support for gender equity in politics was only loosely correlated with their faith or culture (Fattore et al. 2010). The study also found that Islam was not linked to hostility to gender

⁸ *Shari'a* is Islamic law based on the Qur'an and Sunna or model behaviour of the Prophet recorded in the compendia called the *Hadith*.

equality in the *DPR*. This might explain the higher women's representation in the *DPD*, which uses direct election with 20% representation of women in the 2004 Election, 23% in 2009 and 26% in 2014 (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah [DPD] 2012) and varied figures relating to regional representation, as indicated in Table 4.3.

The data presented are based on the Indonesia time zones of west, central and east Indonesia. The majority of legislators were from Western Indonesia, which is by far the most populous region in the country, where female representation was 18%, which was also reflective of the representation in the *DPR*. Central Indonesia had the lowest proportion of women and the East had the highest.

Table 4.3 Distribution of women legislators in the DPR based on region for the period 2009-2014.

No	Region	Total seats	Women's seats	
			No	%
1	West Indonesia	443	81	18
2	Central Indonesia	98	13	13
3	East Indonesia	19	8	42
Total		560	102	18

Source: tabulated from CETRO (2010).

The distribution across provinces is varied, as presented in Appendix 8. Some provinces had no women representatives at all, such as Aceh, Nusa Tenggara Barat, and Kalimantan Selatan, while others had strong female representation such as Maluku Utara, Sulawesi Utara, and Jambi.

Indonesia has a very diverse culture and level of adherence to Islam. Aceh and Sulawesi Barat which have no female representation, for instance, have a higher level of adherence to Islam and have imposed *Shari'a* law. The discrepancy of female representation across provinces in Indonesia could also be due to the influence of local values towards women. *Adat*, or local custom, influences the interpretation of Islamic teaching among Indonesians, and the diverse multi-ethnic groups and customs of Indonesia affect local interpretations of Islamic teaching and attitudes to women (Bennett 2010). Some groups have more gender egalitarianism than others due to the influence of patrilineal and matrilineal cultural traditions (Cunningham 2011; Siregar 2010, p.30). Women from a society with egalitarian political and social structure systems, and matrilineal descent, generally value directness of speech and behaviour. They can be argumentative in interpersonal relationships (Parawansa 2006). Thus, the impact of the reform in the listing system might affect women in a number of different ways, and those from the more egalitarian areas such as Maluku Utara (see Appendix 8) may benefit more from the system compared with those from Aceh.

The distribution of women legislators across parties after the quota was introduced is shown in Table 4.4. *Demokrat* had the highest number of women legislators in the period 2009-2014, and *PDIP* in 2014. In general, nationalist parties had a higher proportion of women when compared with the Islamic parties such as *PKS* and *PPP*, which had the lowest. Women's representation in *PKS* dropped over the period shown. Women's representation in each party caucus is significant in giving voice to issues of

gender equality in the *komisi* meetings.

Table 4.4 Women’s representation in party caucuses in the periods 2004-2009, 2009-2014 and 2014-2019.

Party caucus (<i>fraksi</i>)	2004-2009	2009-2014	2014-2019
	% of total <i>fraksi</i> 's seats	% of total <i>fraksi</i> 's seats	% of total <i>fraksi</i> 's seats
<i>Demokrat</i>	11	24	21
<i>Golkar</i>	14	18	18
<i>PDIP</i>	11	19	20
<i>PPP</i>	5	18	26
<i>PKB</i>	14	14	21
<i>PKS</i>	5	5	3
PAN	13	15	18
<i>Hanura</i>	-	17	13
<i>Gerindra</i>	-	19	25
<i>Nasdem</i>	-	-	11
Others			
% of total 560 seats	11	18	17

Source: tabulated from Aritonang (2014), Mahkamah Konstitusi (2008), Kaukus Perempuan Parlemen Republik Indonesia [KPPRI] (2012a), Sukma (2010).

Discussion of gender equality issues can occur only if the *fraksi* raises the issues in the *komisi*. Thus, a *fraksi* with more women, such as *Demokrat* in the period 2009-2004, would be more likely to discuss gender issues in the meeting due to the higher female representation and their ability to negotiate within their party to gain support from their party elites on such issues. The support of the party elites toward the issues of gender equality is further discussed in Chapter 9.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter provided the context and foundation for identifying possible contributing factors in the gender quota achieving substantive impact in the

DPR. The chapter noted that despite the many positive impacts of the democratisation of the Indonesian political system, there are some weaknesses. The limitations include the weak mechanisms of checks and balances of the parliamentary system due to the limited power given to the *DPD*, and inadequate supporting systems at the *DPR* to deal with the new legislative roles of the institution. However, these matters are merely to provide background information for this study and will not be pursued further. In relation to the purpose of this study, the democratisation has brought positive results in successfully facilitating a greater level of political engagement in Indonesia through the adoption of a multi-party system. A greater number of parties contested elections under the new system, which allowed a wider spectrum of political ideologies to be represented in the *DPR*. Women are among those who benefited from the transition to democracy. Women's participation in the legislative election is guaranteed by the 30% quota for women candidates in the Election Law. The number of female legislators in the *DPR* has increased steadily over the period since the introduction of the quota.

Alongside these positive results, however, are limitations of the democratisation in relation to the gender quota as this chapter has noted. The first limitation was apparent in the prevalence of women candidates at the lower positions of party listings. This may have indicated a lack of commitment from the male political elites to gender reform through the quota. The male political leaders support for the initiative of the gender quota may be explained by political expediency, hoping to win over women electors by

placing women on the list, but ensuring most were not in electable positions. Thus lip service only was paid to women activist demands in the *Reformasi* movement, a phenomenon also reported in other studies such as Tamale (2004) and Walsh (2012b). Nevertheless, the chapter discusses how the participation of women's civil society organisations and their influence in evaluating the implementation of quota in early elections, ensured successful pressure was brought to bear to strengthen articles in the quota legislation to prevent such actions, and hence, the quota has produced better outcomes for Indonesian women in terms of increasing their presence as elected members of the *DPR*. This is indicative of the significance of the participation of civil society in securing feminist political agendas.

The other limitation of democratisation, which may hamper the achievement of women's substantive representation, comes from the emergence of Islamic influence into the political system. The new democratic political system has brought forward the interests of the Islamic community to govern the nation based on Islamic teaching. A number of parties with Islamic core values have entered the *DPR* since the fall of Soeharto. Indonesian feminists noted that Islamic teaching has significantly impeded women's movement toward equality (Haryanti 2006; Mulia & Farida 2005; Mulia 2007). Although the new system has provided prospects for women to enter political institutions, the influence of Islam in the new political system could hinder women's participation in terms of political influence. Distribution of women legislators across provinces in Indonesia (where regions with a higher level of adherence to Islam had significantly fewer women representatives) and

distribution of women legislators across parties in the National Parliament (where Islamic parties had fewer women representatives) further suggest that Islamic values may impede the substantive impact of the quota. This chapter also argued that the new organisational structure of the *DPR* offered women opportunities to contest the reform agenda at different levels from *fraksi* to the *komisi* level, up to the plenary sessions. However, these processes could also pose significant challenges in securing support for women's political agenda in parliamentary discussions. Finally, the specialisation of the legislative working areas of the *komisi* (see Fig. 4.1) indicate the commitment of the new government towards social reform in relevant areas. However, this is offset by the reorganisation of the *komisi*, particularly the *komisi* working on women's empowerment, could also hinder women's substantive representation. This issue is further explored in Chapter 6.

Chapter 5 The Impacts of the Quota

This chapter addresses two issues: whether the quota brought qualified women legislators to office, and whether women legislators acted to represent women's voices. This chapter also addresses issues around whether Phillips' notion of the politics of presence, a greater presence of women legislators who are equally qualified to their male counterparts, is linearly correlated with her concept of the politics of ideas: of more laws addressing the interests of women. These issues are at the centre of descriptive and substantive evaluations of the quota, as discussed in Chapter 3.

The criteria used to assess the qualification of women to hold office in this study are their level of education, and their length of experience as legislators. Educational qualifications provide a fundamental capacity for individual legislators to process information from the electors and to present the wishes of the electors in the political discussions using persuasive arguments. Experience as legislators may provide benefit to individual legislators in securing support from other individuals or parties for their political agenda. Political negotiation is an important skill that enables legislators to effectively participate in the decision-making processes in political institutions. Thus, the assessment of these two qualifications is adopted in this study, as they affect the ability of female legislators to promote women's issues in the *DPR*.

The chapter also considers the issue of substantive representation: the

extent to which the presence of women impacted on the amount and quality of legislation addressing women's issues. The final section of this chapter connects the findings of the descriptive and substantive representations in order to draw some conclusions about the successes and limitations of the Indonesian gender quota in the era of democratic consolidation.

5.1 Descriptive impact

Despite assessment of qualifications of women legislators elected after the introduction of the quota being based on education and experience, this section also assesses other benefits from the quota in attracting younger women into politics.

5.1.1 Level of education

The minimum educational requirement for Indonesian citizens to become candidates for legislative election is graduation from senior high school (Article 12:2, Election Law 2008). Table 5.1 shows that the majority of the legislators graduated from university, and there is no significant difference in educational level between women legislators elected within the remit of the quota and their male counterparts.

Table 5.1 Educational attainments of male and female legislators in the periods 2004-2009 and 2009-2014.

Educational level	2004-2009		2009-2014	
	% of total 477 male legislators	% of total 73 female legislators	% of total 458 male legislators	% of total 102 female legislators
Senior high school	12	3	6	3
College (<i>D3</i>)	6	1	4	0
Bachelor degree	50	67	49	54
Masters degree	26	23	34	33
PhD	5	4	8	10
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: tabulated from API (2001), CETRO (2010), DPR (2009b), Susianah and Suryani (2006).

A similar pattern of educational level exists among male and female legislators with the majority of both groups being university graduates. Approximately one third of legislators hold a master's degree in both groups and periods. Legislators in the period 2009-2014 show higher levels of educational attainment. Examining closely the differences in the proportions of both groups, women legislators are actually more highly educated than their male counterparts. A greater proportion of women legislators graduated from university than did men. Another consideration is whether educational levels among women legislators changed as a result of implementing the quota. Table 5.2 shows that the quota has brought more educated women into the *DPR*.

Table 5.2 Educational qualifications of women legislators in the periods 1999-2004, 2004-2009 and 2009-2014.

Educational level	1999 – 2004 ⁹	2004 – 2009	2009 – 2014
	% of total 41 female legislators	% of total 73 female legislators	% of total 102 female legislators
Senior high school	10	3	3
College	5	1	0
Bachelor degree	68	67	54
Masters degree	10	23	33
PhD	7	6	10
Total	100	100	100

Source: tabulated from API (2001), CETRO (2010), DPR (2009b), Susianah and Suryani (2006).

The proportion of women legislators with qualifications in the lower educational categories of high school and college decreased after the quota introduction for the periods 2004-2009 and 2009-2014. There has been an increase in the post graduate categories of Masters and PhD. The increase in the PhD category is not as high as that of the Masters degree, but it is clear that women legislators elected after the quota was implemented are, in general, more highly educated than before the quota was introduced.

Compared to the total population, women legislators are much more highly educated. Around 90% of women elected after the quota, are university graduates. Looking at statistics for the general population, only around 7% of Indonesian women pursued higher education; while only 20% graduated from

⁹ Women from reserved seats of military representation (*fraksi TNI*) are excluded from the data.

senior high school, showing that the majority of Indonesian women have lower levels of education (Suhartini et al. 2012). This shows that women legislators are an elite group. However, a similar pattern is also evident in male legislators, who are well above the average educational level of the overall male population of 7% with higher education qualifications, 26% with senior high school, and the vast majority with only middle school certificates or lower. Elitism in politics not only applies to women but also to male legislators. It is a general phenomenon of Indonesian politics that the educated population has a better chance of attaining political office.

This evidence thus convincingly rebuts the arguments that the quota might promote unqualified women into political institutions in the Indonesian context, where the quota actually brought more highly educated women into the *DPR* whose level of education compared favourably with those of men. The findings supported evidence from other countries such as Argentina and Uganda (Franceschet & Piscopo 2012, O'Brien 2012a) that quotas facilitated educated women's election to political office (see chapter 3).

5.1.2 Length of experience as legislators

The length of experience is divided into two groups: newcomers who have no previous experience as legislators, and those legislators with prior experience serving as legislators, either at national or regional levels of government. Table 5.3 compares the experience levels of male and female legislators in two periods; 2004-2009 and 2009-2014. It shows that women legislators are equally as experienced politicians as their male counterparts.

Table 5.3 Prior experience of male and female legislators in the periods 2004-2009 and 2009-2014.

Experience as legislators	2004-2009		2009-2014		% of total legislators	
	% of men	% of women	% of men	% of women	2004-2009	2009-2014
Newcomers	80	73	74	73	79	74
Experienced legislators	20	27	26	27	21	26
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: tabulated from API (2001), CETRO (2010), DPR (2009b), Susianah and Suryani (2006).

In general, around three quarters of legislators, regardless of gender, are newcomers to political office. The figure is similar over the two periods, though the proportion reduced slightly in the second period. The proportion of newcomers decreased slightly among the men, and was even among women legislators in both periods. The fact that the majority of legislators are newcomers may be influenced by the transitional period in Indonesian democracy as suggested by Rüländ et al. (2005) that this pattern frequently occurs in young democracies. The quota has promoted approximately one quarter of experienced women legislators into the parliamentary bureaucracy, a proportion similar to that of experienced men. .

Information regarding the experienced legislators is broken down into the length of experience in categories of 1-5 years representing one term of service, 6-10 years for two terms of service, 11-15 years for three terms, and over 16 years for four terms or more. Table 5.4 identifies the length of experience as legislators between the women elected with and without the

quota; it shows that more women legislators with no experience as legislators entered the *DPR* after the introduction of the quota in 2004.

Table 5.4 Length of women’s experience as a politician in the periods 1999-2004, 2004-2009 and 2009-2014

Length of experience as a politician	1999-2004	2004-2009	2009-2014
	% of total 41 female legislators	% of total 73 female legislators	% of total 102 female legislators
None	59	73	73
1-5 years	15	14	21
6-10	7	7	3
11-15	10	4	3
>16 years	10	3	0
Total	100	100	100

Source: tabulated from API (2001), CETRO (2010), DPR (2009b), Susianah and Suryani (2006).

The proportion of women legislators with no experience has increased over the subsequent legislative periods, while the proportion with experience of more than two periods of service decreased gradually. There was a steady increase in the single term of experience group over time. This pattern might indicate that there was a turnover of membership within the *DPR* and those who dominated the *DPR* for over a decade have now been replaced by a new generation. The conclusion from this table is that women legislators elected after the quota was introduced have less experience in parliamentary bureaucracy than those elected without the quota. This might be due to the effect of the democratic transition, but it could not be simply interpreted that the quota brought less experienced women into office.

As noted previously, the democratic transition allowed new parties to flourish. The previous government of Soeharto allowed only three political parties, *Golkar*, *PPP*, and *PDI*, to contest elections, and only *PPP* and *Golkar*

contested elections during the transition to democracy. The *PDI* spawned a new party, *PDIP*, as a result of internal friction in 1996 (Sianturi 2014). This meant that *Golkar* and *PPP* were the only parties who could muster experienced candidates for the 1999 election. The distribution of women legislators across parties is shown in Table 5.5. The distribution of women legislators indicates that *Golkar* and *PPP* contributed half of the women elected in 1999, and approximately one quarter of women in 2004 and 2009. The experienced legislators, particularly in 1999, were likely to have come from *Golkar* and *PPP*. Thus, the increasing number of non-experienced legislators after the implementation of the quota might be due to the significant increase in new parties with newcomers to the political arena.

Table 5.5 Distribution of women legislators across party caucuses (fraksi) in the periods 1999-2004, 2004-2009 and 2009-2014.

Party caucuses (fraksi)	1999-2004	2004-2009	2009-2014
	% of total 41 female legislators	% of total 71 female legislators	% of total 102 female legislators
<i>Demokrat</i>	-	8	34
<i>Golkar</i>	39	25	19
<i>PDIP</i>	34	17	18
<i>PPP</i>	10	4	5
<i>PKB</i>	7	10	8
<i>PKS</i>	-	4	2
PAN	-	10	7
<i>Hanura</i>	-	-	3
<i>Gerindra</i>	-	-	5
Other parties	10	21	-
Total	100	100	100

Source: tabulated from API (2001), CETRO (2010), DPR (2009b), Susianah and Suryani (2006)

To sum up, the increase in non-experienced women legislators in the *DPR* after the introduction of the quota is related to the impact of the transition to democracy. It is also shown that there is a similar pattern between men and women legislators in terms of their prior experience as politicians. After the transition to democracy, the majority of legislators in the *DPR* were newcomers. Thus, men and women legislators have similar qualifications and level of experience as politicians.

5.1.3 The age of women legislators

Quotas have been claimed to bring further benefit in attracting younger women into political activities (Franceschet & Piscopo 2012; Murray 2012). In Indonesia, the quota has also proven attractive to a wider age range of women, as shown in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 Distribution of women legislators in the *DPR* based on age group for the periods 1999-2004, 2004-2009 and 2009-2014.

Age grouping in years of age	1999-2004	2004-2009	2009-2014
	% of total 41 female legislators	% of total 73 female legislators	% of total 102 female legislators
21-30	2	4	9
31-40	17	15	26
41-50	37	40	35
51-60	34	33	17
>61	10	8	13
Total	100	100	100
Youngest and Oldest	30 and 68 years	23 and 70 years	25 and 78 years

Source: tabulated from API (2001), CETRO (2010), DPR (2009b), Susianah and Suryani (2006).

The youngest women legislators before the quota period of 1999-2004 were in their early thirties, which was reduced to mid-twenties in 2004 and 2009.

The oldest age for women increased from late sixties before the quota, to

early seventies and late seventies after the quota. On average, women legislators are younger after the quota. The age distribution has shifted to a younger category from the dominant age groups of 41-50 and 51-60 in 1999 and 2004, towards the age groups of 31-40 and 41-50. The proportion of women legislators in the youngest age group of 21-30 years also increased steadily. The oldest group, over 61 years of age, fluctuated by around 10%. Overall, the quota has extended the age range by encouraging not only younger women, but also more mature women to become legislators. The quota has put pressure on political parties to recruit more women and it has succeeded in attracting a wider age range of women to pursue a political career.

Interviews with women legislators representing the older group of those over 61 years, and the young group of 21-30, during their first period of service in the *DPR* refer to the effect of the quota on their motivation to enter politics. Interviewees indicated that they became involved in political activities due to persuasion from their parties who were trying to meet the 30% quota for women candidates. Ms Fany represents the oldest age group and comes from a new political party. She explained that her decision to pursue a political career was due to persuasion from her party.

I became a legislator because I am a woman. At that time, my party needed more women to meet the 30% quota for female candidates. The party asked me to take on the candidacy. I was number three on the list. For the next election, I am not sure whether I will run again or retire.

(Ms Fany, legislator, 26 September 2012, interview, lines 147-151)

The quota has forced parties to recruit more women. Ms Fany's occupational background was as a senior staff member at a private insurance company

(CETRO 2010); she had a profession that gave her an independent financial income. Thus the party might seek to recruit women fitting certain criteria such as financial stability. The other interviewee from the oldest group shared a similar experience.

I accepted candidacy due to a proposal from my party. I was a retired public servant. I received proposals from a few parties for candidacy several times. Initially, I did not have any interest due to the negative image of politicians. Then, my husband entered politics and persuaded me to consider the proposal from my party, *Gerindra*. He said that its vision and mission were appealing. Then, I decided to contribute more to this country through the *DPR*, so I accepted the proposal.

(Ms Putri, legislator, 16 October 2012, interview, lines 41-45)

Ms Putri was a high ranking public servant before she retired (CETRO 2010) and had received several proposals from parties to accept candidacy. Her experience echoes that of Ms Fany's, and confirms that parties recruited qualified women to meet the quota. Another point implied in Ms Putri's statement is that the multi-party system allowed her a wider choice in terms of which political values she wanted to be associated with. Thus, the new electoral system has brought diverse political interests into the *DPR*, which is essential in achieving substantive democracy.

A similar case is found in the youngest group. Ms Gadis was also recruited due to the quota.

To be honest, my candidacy at the 2009 Election was due to a request from my party to meet the quota. I had a little experience in political practice from assisting my father to conduct his campaign for election as governor. My candidature was processed quickly. My party provided training to balance my lack of experience as a politician.

(Ms Gadis, legislator, 10 October 2012, interview, lines 46-49)

Ms Gadis indicated that the party has responded to the increased recruitment of newcomers by providing training to candidates. This indicates that the

quota has also forced each party to design a training strategy in response to the newly recruited women legislators.

The quota has promoted qualified women legislators and encouraged a wider female population to engage in political activities. In addition, the quota has attracted both younger and more mature women into political activities. It has had a positive impact on the Indonesian political system in terms of encouraging the political elite to recruit and train more women. Women legislators shared similar socio-economic backgrounds with male legislators, with both groups being drawn from the most educated and financially stable groups in Indonesian society. This raises a concern as to whether these female legislators could understand and sympathise with the majority of Indonesian women who are less educated and poorer than them. Although it is proven that quotas have brought qualified women legislators into Indonesian society, there is a broader aspiration among Indonesian women including feminist agendas in civil society. One of the Indonesian feminists' expectations from the quota is unravelling laws which discriminate against women (Siregar 2010, p.54) such as the Marriage Law. These feminists' expectations become the focus of the substantive impact analysis as discussed in the next section.

5.2 Substantive impact

Studies on substantive impact focus on the actions of women legislators to represent women's voices. Siregar (2010, pp. 165-204) conducted analysis on women's substantive representation by addressing questions on women

legislators' perception of their capabilities to perform representative functions, their experience in addressing women's needs in Parliament, and their strategies in undertaking such representation. She found that acting for substantive representation for women was not easy, and would be influenced by many factors such as democratic climate, electoral system, and experience in the women's movement. Unlike Siregar's approach in assessing the substantive representation, the evaluation of substantive impact undertaken in this study is focused on the production of legislation addressing women's issues. By comparing the legislation produced before and after the introduction of the quota, an assessment is made of the impact of increased numbers of women legislators.

5.2.1 Benchmarking national legislation for gender equality in Indonesia

Laws are vital to establish female rights and interests in political, social, and economic spheres of society. Laws regulate every aspect of human relations and are, therefore, critical to protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of all human beings (Cheema 2010). Laws establish rights, compel duties upon individuals, and regulate conduct within the public and private spheres. Laws affect the ways of life of citizens in society, and how men and women seek opportunities and make choices to better their lives and invigorate human development. Absence of women's voices in legal deliberation processes might result in a failure to ensure gender equality in laws, and this could curtail the fundamental rights and freedoms of women in society.

Evaluation of gender equality in the legal system requires not only examining

formal equal rights for men, women, and people, but also requires uncovering gender biases that are integral to the legal process and affect the ways women experience the law. The UNDP conducted an evaluation of gender-equitable laws in five Asian countries, including Indonesia, to assess their compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (Cheema 2010). The evaluation was of the national *de jure* laws' compliance with the international standards of CEDAW's articles on gender equality. A total of 113 indicators were used to assess the national legislative compliance with CEDAW's articles.

Table 5.7 shows that many parts of the Indonesian legal system do not accommodate the provision of gender equality in the amended Indonesian constitution. Some legal systems were outdated, such as the Penal Code 1999 and the Civil Code 1848, or contained discriminatory articles, as is the case with the Marriage Law. The evaluation furthermore indicates that interpretation of religious and harmful customs and traditions were an important source of gender bias in the legal system. The persistence of the narrow interpretation of Islamic teaching allowed discriminating articles in the legal system to prevail, such as the discriminatory provision of the 1974 Marriage Law.

The Marriage Law contains provisions that establish unequal roles for husbands and wives; 16 years as the legal minimum age of marriage for women; a fault based divorce system; and the court's duty to promote reconciliation. The provision for divorce, article 39:2, stated that to apply for

divorce, the couple have to provide sufficient reasons. For example, a man can use this article to divorce his wife if she fails to give consent to polygamy (Fazriyati 2011). The marital age minimum is also based on an interpretation of Islamic teaching. According to these teachings, women should be allowed to enter marriage if they have reached biological maturity to bear children, which is decreed to be 16 years of age. The provision supports the high maternal mortality rate, as early marriage leads to early age of pregnancy. Pregnancy of young mothers carries higher risks of complication and subsequent maternal mortality.

Table 5.7 Main findings of Indonesia's compliance with CEDAW benchmarks.

No	Findings of compliance with CEDAW benchmarks
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Constitution provides protection against discrimination on any grounds yet there is no expression to ensure equality of access and results. The Penal code of Indonesia 1999 criminalised sexual offences, and article 46 of the 2004 Law Regarding Elimination of Violence in Households ensures that anyone who commits sexual violence should be punished. However, the criminal and civil procedures still adhere to a gender neutral paradigm that restricts women's full access to justice. Family members need to lodge a complaint for elimination of violence in the household. The prosecution of rape cases is initiated only if there is a complaint.
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The 2002 constitution stipulates that every person is entitled to special treatment to achieve equality and fairness. • The 30% quota for women candidates in political parties for the legislatures is legislated. Special measures also apply in the education field, including quotas, fellowships, and subsidies at all levels, and guaranties of admission for girls to schools and institutions of higher education.
3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Certain customs and traditional norms such as early marriage, arranged marriage, arbitrary divorce, and a narrow interpretation of religions remain major challenges in implementing the CEDAW. In the name of regional autonomy, Islamic <i>Shari'a</i> Law regulations restrict female mobility and freedom of movement.
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human trafficking is illegal under the penal code of Indonesia 1999. In practice, human trafficking remains rampant, and Indonesia served as a source, transit and receiving country of human trafficking.
5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Even though a 30% quota is ascribed in the Election Law, in practice the quota remains non-compulsory and culture remains a concerns for the women's participation.
6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is no legal barrier for women's representation at the international level. Indonesian women have served as members of major international institutions such as WHO and IMF, however, female ambassadors are still minimal.
7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The amended Law on Citizens in 2006 allows Indonesian women to pass on their nationality to their children regardless of their marital status or spouses' nationality. • However, discrimination to gain equal nationality rights remains in the provision that if women marries a foreign national, she will lose nationality even if she remains in Indonesia if by law her husband's country requires citizenship of the wife to follow her husband's nationality. However, this does not apply for Indonesian men.
8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Even though the Constitution stated that Indonesian citizens have obligations to undertake basic education and the government has to fund it, in practice, boys and girls access to education is unequal. Poverty, expensive transportation and early marriage restrict girls' access to education.
9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The labour laws prohibit discrimination in relation to wages and the right to jobs, and forbid differential preferences. Article 23 of Law no 13/2003 states that employers are under obligation to provide proper opportunities to breast-feeding mothers, and such workers must be allowed time to breast-feed their babies if that must be performed during working hours. Female and male workers are also determined to have equal remuneration. • In practice, women's work are often under-valued in the workplace, and women are more likely to work part time or to work long hours and their wages are lower.

No	Findings of compliance with CEDAW benchmarks
10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Abortion is a criminal offence that is contrary to CEDAW's requirement. Women are forced to undertake unsafe abortion and abortion accounted up to 15% of maternal mortality rate.
11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Civil servants are entitled to health and medical insurance, however, the government has not been able to enforce the provisions in the private sector.
12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Act of 2007 granted the right to exploit water resources over 95 years, which might become a threat to female access and control over natural resources.
13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Constitution maintains equality between men and women before the law and obligates respect of law with no exceptions (article 27:1). Law 39/1999 on Human Rights, article 5:1 stated that everyone has the right to demand and obtain equal treatment before the law as befits his or her human dignity. However, Indonesian civil code 1848 articles 1006 and 21, which is still being used, discriminates against women in accessing the civil justice system. Married women cannot act as prosecutors of inheritance wills and should not have any residence other than that of their husbands.
14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Marriage Law 1/1974 article 4:2 allows polygamy. Practicing polygamy is allowed under the reasons of spousal inability to perform as a wife due to any physical inability or inability to bear a child. In the case of divorce, the husband is required to pay alimony and living expenses to his ex-wife, but there is no sanction. This might cause economic hardship for the ex-wife. The divorce decree is granted only if the reconciliation process for both parties is unsuccessful. The law infringed on the marital right for women by discriminatory roles for husband and wife. A man is perceived as the head of the household while a woman as wife and mother of the household. The law discriminates between the inheritance rights of a son and a daughter. A son entitles more proportion of the inheritance.

Source: tabulated from Cheema (2010, pp.20-45).

Furthermore, inequality between husbands and wives restricts women's freedom to engage in economic and political activities. The provisions in the Marriage Law have led to discriminating provisions in other laws. There are many discriminating laws that require amendment to obtain gender equal practices in Indonesian society. In the next section, I consider the extent to which the quota system and the increase in female representation in the legislature has led to a reduction in gender bias in the legislation passed by the National Parliament.

5.2.2 Production of legislation on women's issues

Feminist perspectives on the implementation of the quota assume that it will lead not only to increasing numbers of women in political office, but also to the possibility to influence the decision-making process as individuals or with specific women's or feminist points of view. Women's impact in influencing decision-making processes is in legislation on women's issues (Lovenduski & Karam 1998, p.153). When legislation on women's issues is being discussed, the evidence indicates that women become more prominent when they are more active and effective. Adopting the measurement of women's impact, as suggested by Lovenduski and Karam, this section reviews the production of legislation on women's issues. Table 5.7 indicates that there are many areas of women's issues that should be addressed at the parliamentary level. Comparison of legislation on women's issues before and after the quota is shown in Table 5.8.

Table 5.8 Legislation on women's issues during the periods 1999-2004, 2004-2009, and 2009-2014.

Legislation	Remarks
1999-2004	
1. Election Law no 12/2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Article 65:1 stipulates the requirement of the political party is to nominate candidates with consideration of minimal 30% female candidates for each constituency.
2. Law no 13/2003 on Labour Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Article 23 states that employers are under obligation to provide proper opportunities to breast-feeding mothers, and such workers must be allowed time to breast-feed their babies if that must be performed during working hours.
3. Law no 23/2004 on elimination of domestic violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The law signified achievement of women in demanding the state recognises that domestic violence is not a private matter.
4. Law no 39/2004 on placement and protection for Indonesian migrant workers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The law enforces the state responsibility to ensure the processes of recruitment, job placement and workers returned to home are safe and protect the workers from exploitation. The Law will benefit women as the majority group of the migrant workers. The Law initiated due concerns on significant numbers of women migrant worker trafficked to prostitution industries at the destination country (IPU, 2013).
2004-2009	
1. Law no 12/2006 on Indonesian citizenship	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Article 4 stated that an Indonesian citizen is that who (sub article e) was born by Indonesian woman and father without citizenship or if by the law of her husband's country does not give citizenship to the children. Sub-articles (g) and (h) stated that Indonesian citizenship could be granted to children who were born from unmarried women. Those articles amended previous provisions that denied women and unmarried women the right to pass on their nationality to their children.
2. Law no 21/2007 on elimination of human trafficking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At the section of consideration at the Law, the Law is initiated due to concerns that a high number of people, particularly women and children were subjected to human trafficking. The Law is to extend the human rights provision of the Constitution and to provide a comprehensive legal system for human trafficking.
3. Election Law no 10/2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Articles 8 and 15 impose on any political party who participates in the election the requirement to have at least

Legislation	Remarks
	<p>30% of women in party leadership at the national level.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Article 53 regulates a candidate listing which requires at least 30% of women candidates in the listing from the political party. • Article 55:2 imposes on each party the need to implement a zipping system for one women at every third listing spot. • Articles 57, 58:2 and 61:6, 66:2 are about sanctions that the election committee will verify the 30% women's representation in each party's listing and announce it to the public as regulated. • Article 215 (b) stated that if two candidates gained equal highest votes, the decision for the seat should take into account the distribution of the votes across areas and to consider women's representation.
4. Law no 52/2009 on Population and Family Developments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Article 5a stated the individual has the right to form a family and has children through marriage. • Article 5c stated the individual has the right to access information and health services on reproductive health in accordance with social and religions norms • The articles emphasise on marital status and religious norms. The articles discriminate against unmarried women to seek information and health services for family planning or contraception.
5. Law no 36/2009 on Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Article 74 (2) stated that reproductive health services should comply with religious norms and related policies. • Article 75 stated that abortion is illegal except for special cases such as medical reasons or pregnancy due to rape and cause physiological problem. • The articles deny women's reproductive right to access safe abortion.
6. Ratification of the protocol for prevention, execution and punishment for human trafficking particularly women and children, supplementary to the United Nations convention on combating organised transnational criminal.	
7. Ratification on protocol on combating migrant smuggling through land, sea and air, supplementary to the United Nations convention on combating organised transnational criminals.	
2009-2014	
1. Election Law no 8/2012	The Law retained quota articles similar with the Election Law no 10/2008.
2. Ratification on the International Convention on the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.	
3. Ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.	

Source: tabulated from DPR (2003), DPR (2004), DPR (2006), DPR (2007), DPR (2008), DPR (2009c), and DPR (2012a).

Assessment of the legislation on women's issues indicates that the effectiveness of female legislators in getting legislation passed that is favourable to women has actually decreased. The most effective period was after the first and second elections. During 1999-2004 four Acts of legislation on women's issues were passed. There were five laws and two ratifications of International Commitments. The definition of ratification, based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Ratification 1968, Article Two, is a state's consent to be bound by a treaty. Thus, comparison is made here only about laws. The number of laws passed significantly decreased during the period 2009-2014.

The period 1999-2004 was a milestone for state recognition of women's rights to equal access to political activities, justice, and equal treatment in the labour force. The quota article was a state intervention addressing women's low participation in political activities. Domestic violence was acknowledged as a public matter during this period after ten years of feminist campaigning about the issue (Munti 2005). Recognition of women friendly workplaces was legislated, as well as a state commitment to combat human trafficking, especially that of women and children.

The following period, 2004-2009, in which women legislators were elected with implementation of the quota, produced less legislation on women's issues and showed mixed results. Some laws failed to adequately secure women's needs. The Health Law and Law on Population and Family Development failed to address women's reproductive rights. Abortion is still illegal and unmarried women are unable to access contraception. In addition,

the Law on Citizenship, despite providing choices for Indonesian women to pass on their nationality to their children, dictates that an Indonesian woman is still unable to hold Indonesian citizenship if she marries a foreigner as she is expected to pursue citizenship in her husband's home country. In addition, there is also the controversial Law no 44/2008 on Pornography. Feminists opposed the Law because of the gendered definition of pornography. Article 1 stated that the definition included public acts that were in conflict with Indonesian social norms. The definition of social norms is closely attached to religious norms in the legislation. Thus, women's acts in public are controlled by the state through Law, including the dress code. However, during this same period, there was the remarkable achievement in expanding the quota articles in the Election Law.

The second implementation of the quota in the period of 2009-2014 has produced the least effective women legislators. There were two bills on women's issues in that period; the Bill on amendment of the 2008 Election Law and Bill on Gender Equality (*RUU Kesetaraan Gender*) (DPR 2014b). The Bill on the Amendment of the 2008 Election Law was passed into Law no 10/2012 on Election Law, though the Gender Equality Bill did not make any progress. The 2012 Election Law contains similar quota articles as that of the 2008 Election Law, and this represents no significant improvement.

Discussion on the Gender Equality Bill is discussed in Chapter Six, section 6.1.2, while the Amendment of the 2008 Election Law on the revision of quota articles is discussed further in Chapter Seven, subsection 7.4.1.

From Table 5.8, it can be concluded that women's substantive impact has

been diminished, and women legislators have become less effective in accommodating a feminist agenda in legislation. Meanwhile the feminists' biggest concern is the Marriage Law as the primary source of discrimination against women to equally access economic and social opportunities in Indonesian society. The Law has to be amended in order to improve the general well-being of Indonesian women, yet the proposal for the amendment on the Law has not yet been raised in the legislative work of the *DPR*.

5.3 Conclusion

Anne Phillips (1995) stated that the politics of presence of the gender quota focuses on increasing the number of women legislators with the expectation of legislating women's interests into laws. This chapter argued that the politics of presence, or the numerical impact of gender quotas, does not align with the politics of ideas or the substantive impact of legislating more laws in feminist interests. The increasing number of women legislators in Indonesia has not been followed by the legislation of more laws in the interests of women. The less substantive impact of the quota in the period 2009-2014, compared to previous periods, is not explained by the descriptive representation. The analysis shows that women legislators in the period 2009-2014 are better educated than in the previous period, and are as experienced as their male counterparts. The number of women legislators in the period 2009-2014 is higher than in the previous periods, but the doubling of the number of women legislators in 2009-2014 did not translate into more gender sensitive legislation. From the descriptive perspective, women legislators in this period should have been more effective than their earlier counterparts. There must be other explanations for the declining

performance. Anne Phillips (1995) argued that the real force of political presence in achieving the politics of ideas lies in this further development of their presence.

Studies on the substantive impact of the quota indicate that many factors affect women legislators' performance. Competing interests among legislators due to the influence of individual attachment to constituencies and ethnicity prevented women legislators in Afghanistan from acting collectively (Larson 2012). Changes in the political environment, in which the political elites' attitude was less friendly to civil society, contributed to women being less effective in South Africa (Walsh 2012a). Access to the location of power and influence determines the impact of female legislators in promoting women's issues in Brazil (Miguel 2012). Women legislators cannot be left at the periphery of the political arena with a low level of influence to bring about substantive representation. Access to leadership positions is crucial as these positions hold significant responsibility in authoring bills and influencing committee work (Murray 2012). Studies suggest that institutional norms that are not female friendly impede women's effectiveness in promoting equal practices in the office (Hawkesworth 2003; Mukhopadhyay et al. 2006). This less substantive impact can also come from outside the political institutions; i.e., from women's civil society organisations (Curtin 2008). Women in civil society have to also actively put pressure on political elites to act in the interests of the feminist agenda.

The decision-making processes in Parliament follow the procedural process, which is organised hierarchically and structured by power relations between

individual politicians and party groups. As noted earlier in Chapter 4, sub section 4.2.2., women members present arguments in support of their proposed programme in the interest of women at the party level before it progresses to the standing committee for discussion. It is then followed by debates at the *komisi* level between parties about collective decisions at the *DPR*. The following chapters seek explanations as to why the improvement in number and qualification of women legislators could not be translated into more substantive participation. To find the causes of the less substantive representation, the following chapter addresses the organisation of the *DPR* as an institution for women to work and to participate in legislative decision-making processes.

Chapter 6 Gender Relations in the *DPR*

This chapter addresses possible areas for further development of the gender quota. As argued by Anne Phillips (1995), the real force to transform the presence of women to the politics of ideas: of legislating women's interests in laws, lies in further development of the gender quota. As discussed in Chapter 3, the international literature suggested that democratic parliaments, as decision-making institutions, are not gender neutral (Bolzendahl 2014; Crawford & Pini 2011), and that the arrangement of a workplace frequently prevents women from reaching their potential (Itzin 1995; Kelly et al. 2010; Peterson & Runyan 2010; Samardzic & Taksa 2011). To what extent has the organisation of the *DPR* responded to the increasing number of women legislators? This chapter extends the findings of Haryanti (2006) that gender ideology posed internal barriers for women legislators to pursue a political career in parliament and explores the degree to which penetration of the broader Indonesian patriarchal gender ideology informs the organisation of parliament.

This chapter addresses two key areas in the gendered organisation of the *DPR*. The examination stems from evidence from other countries of the significant effect of organisation into women's ability to promote gender issues in political office (Acker 1990; Kelly et al. 2010). It aims to establish the extent to which increasing the number of women legislators has affected the gender norms in the *DPR*. The first part of the chapter explores gender relations in the legislative decision-making process, while the second part explores gender in the *DPR* as a workplace. The gender analysis of these

two areas aims to explain factors affecting the low substantive impact of the gender quota's impact in increasing the number of women members in the *DPR*. An unequal relationship between men and women exists not only in the practices and ideologies of Indonesian society, but also in those of its institutions. Thus, addressing unequal gender relationships will not be achieved only by institutionalising gender concerns in policies and programmes, for instance, affirmative action strategies such as the quota (Mukhopadhyay et al. 2006). It requires the unravelling of gender issues in the organisation itself. The gendered organisation of the *DPR* could be part of the explanation as to why the numerical increase of qualified women legislators appears to have had little impact on improving the substantive representation on gender equality.

The chapter focuses attention on the *komisi* (standing committees) as the central arena for the deliberation of legislation and, hence, the key to decision-making in the legislature. If women legislators wish to redress the laws that discriminate against women, they are required to raise the issues in the operations of the relevant *komisi* (see Figure 4.1). It is at the level of the *komisi* that debate occurs among legislators from different parties. Gender equity practices in the *komisi* would help ensure that the feminist agenda would be considered and debated. In addition, the *DPR* as a workplace for women needs to recognise the different roles of women and men in Indonesian society in order to ensure that women achieve their potential to the same extent as male legislators. Gender blind workplace policies and practices are likely to impede women in achieving equal participation at work.

6.1 Gendered organisation in the parliamentary legislation decision-making process

The *komisi* is the centre of parliamentary discussion and the key forum for women legislators to raise issues of gender equality (IPU 2008, p.62). As discussed in Chapter 4, a legislator must be a member of a *komisi*. The number of *komisi* and groupings of policy areas are flexible based on agreement between the legislators in the initial period of a new government. The female membership of the eleven standing committees is shown in Table 6.1. The committees each have a fairly even composition of between forty five and fifty members, with the smallest being *Komisi Eight* on religion, social welfare and women's empowerment. The table also indicates that not all legislators are assigned to a *komisi*, with only 538 out of 560 represented. Those in leadership positions in the *MPR* (people's consultative assembly) are exempt from *komisi* work. The *MPR* has the highest authority with its membership coming from the *DPR* and the *DPD*. There were 100 women out of 102 in the *komisi* because one woman was assigned as a deputy to the *MPR*, and another, from *PKS*, passed away and was replaced by a male legislator based on the parliamentary procedure that replacements are based on the second most voted for candidate.

Table 6.1 Distribution of women legislators on *komisi* in 2012.

<i>Komisi</i> (Standing committees)	Areas	Total members	Women members	
			No	% of total members
<i>Komisi 1</i>	Foreign affairs and state defence	46	12	26
<i>Komisi 2</i>	Domestic affairs and bureaucracy reform	50	10	20
<i>Komisi 3</i>	Law enforcement and human rights	49	3	6
<i>Komisi 4</i>	Forestry and food security	49	9	18
<i>Komisi 5</i>	Infrastructure and rural development	50	6	12
<i>Komisi 6</i>	Trade and industry	50	3	6
<i>Komisi 7</i>	Mineral resources and environment	50	5	10
<i>Komisi 8</i>	Religion, social welfare, and women's empowerment	45	13	29
<i>Komisi 9</i>	Labour force, transmigration, and health issues	50	22	44
<i>Komisi 10</i>	Education and culture	50	9	18
<i>Komisi 11</i>	Economics and national development	49	8	16
Total number		538	100	100

Source: tabulated from DPR (2014a) and KPPRI (2012a).

Table 6.1 reveals a discrepancy in the female distribution across the committees. The highest proportion of women legislators is found on *Komisi* Nine: labour force and health issues. The lowest proportion is on *Komisi* Three: law enforcement, and *Komisi* Six: trade and industry. The number of women on the committees affects the ability of women to promote women's issues, as the number affects behaviour and the relationship between groups on the committee (Kanter 1977). A balanced number of men and women, proportionately 40:60 or 50:50, would result in a more equal distribution of

power between legislators. A numerical disparity is likely to create unequal relations or relative disadvantage for women. *Komisi* with a smaller proportion of women are less likely to promote women's issues in the committee discussions, as women face greater pressure to conform to the male majority. For example, amending the Marriage Law falls within the domain of *Komisi* Eight on religion which, as Table 6.1 shows, does not have gender parity in membership.

The assignment of policy areas to *komisi*, as shown in Table 6.1, suggests the existence of a gender division of labour operating in the *DPR*. Acker (1990) argued that the division of labour in organisations is the most obvious gendering process to a casual observer. The construction of the division is generally related to power, where men are at the highest position of power. However, more recent literature (Bolzendahl 2014; Crawford & Pini 2011; Frisch & Kelly 2003; O'Brien 2012b; Swers 1998; Thomas 1991; Thomas & Welch 1991) suggests that there are variations in the patterns and extent of gender division in the assignment of policy areas in parliamentary committees internationally. There are also mixed explanations on these patterns regarding the extent of the influence of gendering processes in the variety of parliamentary committee portfolios. The persistent patterns of clustering women on the feminised committees could be due to the influence of women's differing natural preferences and choices. Women could see issues of health, education, and social welfare as particularly relevant to women in society, thus, clustering women on committees handling these issues may be due to the women politicians own choices. A stronger feminist opinion is that the pattern is created by men to maintain their power and

influence in the parliament. Quantitative data internationally shows little evidence of gender bias in the decisions over committee membership, and that membership selection is mainly based on personal motivation of both men and women in the United States House of Representatives (Frisch & Kelly 2003) and in the British House of Commons (O'Brien 2012b). The clustering of women on certain committees was due to their different preferences. Some authors argue however, that women would be more likely to have preferences and policy priorities relating to issues concerning women, children, and family matters (Swers 1998; Thomas 1991; Thomas & Welch 1991). Thus, women would be more likely to request to be members of the committees handling these issues to pursue their policy priorities. Others argue that the persistence of these unequal patterns indicate a gendering process sufficient to reproduce gendered inequality in parliament, as shown in the legislative committees in Germany, Sweden, the United States (Bolzendahl 2014), and in Australia (Crawford & Pini 2011). Women might actually want to enter masculine committees, yet party decisions may discriminate by insisting that women's natural talents are more suitable to handle the feminised committees and the gendered division of labour in the committee assignment signals unequal power relations. The following subsection analyses to what extent women's assignment to *komisi* in the Indonesian DPR reflects a gendering process.

6.1.1 Constitution of the membership of *komisi*

Article 50 of the Rules of Procedure on *komisi* membership establishes the responsibility of *fraksi* leaders to distribute *fraksi* members proportionately across each *komisi*. It also states that the rotation of *komisi* membership is

determined by *fraksi* decisions. Interviews with male *fraksi* leaders and women legislators reveal the considerations informing the *fraksi* in the placement of legislators in the *komisi*.

Siregar (2010, p. 181) argued that the *fraksi* leader plays a significant role in the decision-making of the *komisi* assignment. To shed more light on this decision-making process, an interview with a male party leader is analysed. In the following excerpt, the male party leader from a new political party discusses how the party's mission and the qualifications of the legislators were important in his decision-making. His concern is to appoint the right person for the right *komisi* in line with the party's mission. He conducted monitoring and evaluation of his decisions, and rotation of the membership to achieve this goal.

My duty as leader is to bring my party's mission into parliamentary work (lines 5-6). The decisions on membership of the *komisi* are made by *fraksi* leaders. I make the decision based on assessment of the member's competency, educational background, previous work experience and an interview with each member. The process is designed to ensure that the most suitable *komisi* is found for each member so that she/he can perform to their utmost. I will monitor their work on the *komisi* and, sometimes, I need to rotate the membership to deal with a weaker performer.

(Mr Dani, *fraksi* leader, 21 September 2012, interview. lines 277-283)

Mr Dani made decisions based on the legislators' competency and formal qualifications, such as education and work experience, to capitalise on a potential synergy between legislator experience and the working area of a specific *komisi*. Thus, it could be assumed that a lawyer might be suitable for *Komisi* Three on legal enforcement. Other male leaders spoke similarly about the factors affecting their decisions, emphasising the qualifications of the legislators and the party ideology.

My *fraksi* puts three main considerations into the decision, which are preferences, competency, and constituent representation.

(Mr Anto, *fraksi* leader, 4 October 2012, interview, lines 27-28)

Our decision is based on fair discussion at every leadership level of my *fraksi*

(Mr Benny, *fraksi* leader, 28 September 2012, interview, line 5)

Interviews with women legislators complemented the emphasis placed on qualifications in determining *komisi* membership. Ms Ratu, who is a newcomer from a new party, confirmed the significance of the party mission and indicated that there is another factor in the qualification criteria.

The party needs to have influence in decision-making processes at *komisi*. If a member could not promote the party's interests at *komisi* due to reasons such as being unable to speak, *fraksi* will rotate its members to strengthen its position in the *komisi*.

(Ms Ratu, legislator, 24 October 2012, interview, lines 27-31)

Ms Ratu articulates how the decisions about membership of *komisi* are geared to promote the party's mission in parliamentary work, and that the ability to voice the party's mission at the *komisi* level was significant in the decision. She indicated that the competency aspect in the decision on membership of a *komisi* related to the legislator's performance and their ability to speak assertively to promote party interests. This supports the argument that *komisi* structure is central in the political decision-making process, and that it relies on contestation of arguments. The ability to put forward and defend an argument, and to influence others, are key criteria used by the party leader in allocating members to *komisi*. However, Ms Ellia, an experienced legislator from a long established party, reflects on the lack of synergy between her education and previous working experience, and the party's decision on her *komisi* membership.

At an early stage, my *fraksi* assessed our preferences on the *komisi*'s membership. Individual members filled out a preference form and I put *Komisi* Four on forestry and food security, and Six on trade and industry, as my preferences. I had experience working in the areas covered by those committees when I was in the provincial parliament. However, the decision made by my party caucus surprised me, because I got *Komisi* Eight with working areas of women's empowerment and religion. I was in a mess, as I had prepared myself for *Komisi* Four or Six, and I had recruited my personal staff with expertise in those committee areas. It was tough as I needed to start from the beginning by learning the issues of *Komisi* Eight. (Ms Ellia, legislator, 20 September 2012, interview, lines 71-86)

Ms Ellia's comments reveal that the decision on her membership of the standing committee was irrelevant to her qualifications. Her placement on a committee that was not relevant to her educational and work experience had affected her performance. The question is whether Ms Ellia's experience applies to other legislators. Unfortunately, data about committee memberships in 2009 was not available from the parliamentary secretariat. The 2012 information shed little light on the earlier situation because of the high rotation of *komisi* memberships over the intervening period.

To get more insight into her case, a comparison was made between Ms Ellia and a male legislator from the same party. Mr Firman had served on *Komisi* Four since the beginning of his parliamentary service. Mr Firman and Ms Ellia had similar qualifications regarding length of service in their political party and as legislators (CETRO 2010; Zahroh 2009). This indicated that Ms Ellia was in a disadvantaged position because, unlike Mr Firman, she did not get her preferred *komisi* placement. Ms Ratu, a newcomer from a new party, outlined a similar experience of not being able to join her desired *komisi* and was placed on *Komisi* Eight.

I am interested in *Komisi* One on foreign affairs, yet I am on *Komisi* Eight on religion and women's empowerment as they said, it is related to good deeds and women will perform the best there. Other members are not interested in *Komisi* Eight. (Ms Ratu, legislator, 24 October 2012, interview, lines 19-23).

Ms Ratu indicated that she was placed on *Komisi* Eight because it was assumed that, as a woman, she would be better placed to deal with women's empowerment. However, committees working with women's issues were unappealing to her as well as to her male colleagues. Her concerns indicated that there was gender stereotyping in the *DPR*. She makes clear that she was reluctant to be placed on *Komisi* Eight, wanting to serve on *Komisi* One on foreign affairs, which carries a much higher status. Ms Ratu indicated that some *komisi* are considered more important than others. This is supported by Mr Dani's comments about the evaluation and rotation processes, which are used to promote and demote *fraksi* members serving on *komisi*. Thus, the qualifications considered in making decisions about *komisi* membership were not based entirely on education and experience, but also the ability to speak assertively in *komisi* meetings, as Ms Ellia explained.

There is no standard established by the party on how to put forward our arguments. There is also no training provided by the party (lines 4-5). The skills to debate should be learned by the individual member. He/she might obtain the skills from individual experience, how to be a good debater as a legislator.

(Ms Ellia, legislator, 20 September 2012, interview, lines 16-18)

Ms Ellia indicated that contesting arguments was at the centre of *komisi* work. She gained these skills from her experience in parliament. The importance placed on debating skills in the selection of *komisi* members reflect the adversarial qualities of decision-making procedures in democratic political institutions. Those who can make convincing arguments to justify the proposed programme are more likely to gain support from other parties.

The emphasis on debating skills in the selection of *komisi* members may be a problem in terms of gender parity. The literature (Ashford & LeCroy 2010,

p.495; Paxton & Hughes 2014, pp.89-91) indicates that women and men often demonstrate different behaviours in discussion, and that the male behaviour is more valued. Men tend to speak more and take control of the conversation by using rational discussion and problem solving, while women tend to be more passive and act to support others by expressing emotions and listening. Speaking assertively is associated with male conversational behaviour. How then does this evaluation criterion affect women legislators? Women interviewees explained the challenges of meeting the requirement of being assertive in *komisi* debates.

During my first two years as a member of *Komisi* Eleven, I could not make a contribution at the *Komisi* because I rarely spoke up. I thought it would be better to stay silent than to speak recklessly.

(Ms Fany, legislator, 26 September 2012, interview, lines 47-48)

I noticed that male legislators were better at covering up their mistakes through their ability in speaking. I think their contributions are similar to women's. Women would rather be silent if they think that they are not knowledgeable about the issues.

(Ms Olga, legislator, 24 September 2012, interview, lines 26-27)

I noticed that because of the women legislator's behaviour in discussion, their contributions were valued less than men's. Women sometimes put forth subjective arguments, or are irrational and unable to control their emotion.

(Ms Ratu, legislator, 24 October 2012. interview, lines 82-84)

These comments are drawn from experience in different *komisi*, but all three women identify similar challenges faced by women legislators. Women who behave differently to male legislators, found that their contributions were less valued. Women's behaviour was also judged as inferior by women legislators, as Ms Ratu stated, women might be more emotional, irrational, and subjective, whereas political deliberation in the political institution is based on rational ideas. Ms Ratu's comments suggest that women are required to behave the same way as men if they want to hold their place in

the institution. This suggests that the qualities required for success in the *DPR* are male oriented. This may also be due to the minority number of women in the *DPR*, with the highest proportion being only 18% since the independence of the nation. Women's lack of representation in the institution has encouraged men to take command and define the cultural environment.

Given men's control over the institution, women are under pressure to conform to the male norm. The behaviour of women legislators will have higher visibility than that of men because there are fewer of them (Child & Krook 2008; Kanter 1977). Women may be overlooked and yet more noticeable due to the contrast of their behaviour with the male norm. As Ms Ratu commented, the perception of women's behaviour as more emotional, subjected and irrational were unwanted, and viewed as an indicator of being unqualified or a weak performer. Haryanti's study undertaken during the transitional period of 1999-2004 produced similar findings. Women legislators were less able to speak assertively in parliamentary discussion (Haryanti 2006). Thus, since the introduction of the quota at the 2004 election, women politicians have not been able to challenge the male norms.

The party system sustains practices that are based on male norms in the Parliament, particularly in the practices of regular evaluation of *komisi* membership, as Mr Dani indicated. Interviews with women legislators outlined the rotation process and the discrepancies in women's representation across *komisi* (Table 6.1). Ms Ratu said "Other legislators are not interested in *Komisi Eight*." This implies that there are other *komisi* that are more attractive. Ms Jeihan, a newcomer and from *Komisi Five*, and Ms

Ana from *Komisi* Eleven explained the issue further.

Komisi Five on infrastructure is considered to have a higher status. A committee that does not attract legislators is *Komisi* Eight: religion and women's empowerment. *Komisi* Nine on health is also less attractive. *Komisi* Ten on education is more attractive now, because the budget for education has increased. *Komisi* Five is a masculine one and none of the women from my party caucus are on it, because it is about infrastructure, building bridges and roads, which is not a women's area. Most legislators want to be on *Komisi* Five because the impact will be more visible.
(Ms Jeihan, legislator, 2 October 2012, interview, lines 30-34)

Komisi Eleven on economics is a prestigious one. Both women and men legislators are interested in that *Komisi*. Being member of *Komisi* Eleven is an achievement.
(Ms Ana, legislator, 2 November 2012, interview, lines 121-122)

Ms Jeihan and Ms Ana shared Ms Ratu's view that certain *komisi* are better than others. Ms Jeihan explained that *komisi* associated with women's work, such as *Komisi* Eight and Nine, are lower in prestige and are less attractive to legislators. She indicated that the status of *komisi* was based on budget allocation and visibility. *Komisi* Ten on education used to be low ranked until its position changed due to a significant increase in the budget allocated to the education sector.

6.1.1.1 Analysis of budget allocation

Analyses of *RPJMN* or the Medium-term National Development Plan 2010-2014 (Bappenas 2010) was conducted to gain insight into how budget allocations affect the visible hierarchy of *komisi*. Each *komisi* has a set of governmental working partners (see Table 4.2). The budget allocation was tabulated for each *komisi*. The budget detailed at the *RPJMN* relates to the operational costs for the ministries or departments.

Table 6.2 Budget allocation of *komisi* government working partners based on RPJMN 2010-2014.

Standing Committees	Budget allocation (in million AUD) ¹⁰
<i>Komisi 1</i>	33.94
<i>Komisi 2</i>	10.56
<i>Komisi 3</i>	22.64
<i>Komisi 4</i>	12.82
<i>Komisi 5</i>	42.30
<i>Komisi 6</i>	2.96
<i>Komisi 7</i>	10.20
<i>Komisi 8</i>	20.73
<i>Komisi 9</i>	17.74
<i>Komisi 10</i>	38.49
<i>Komisi 11</i>	11.96

Source: tabulated from Bappenas (2010).

Komisi Five on infrastructure had the biggest budget, followed by *Komisi* Ten on education, *Komisi* One on foreign affairs, and *Komisi* Three on law enforcement (Table 6.2). As explained by Ms Jeihan, those committees are also those perceived among members of the *DPR* to rank highest. Surprisingly, *Komisi* Eight and Nine, which were considered low ranking, had higher budget allocations than *Komisi* Eleven, which deals with banking and finance. The association between budget allocation and ranking on *Komisi* 11 cannot be verified.

Another possible explanation for the association of the committee on banking and finance and its high ranking might come from the numerous corruption cases against legislators in the *DPR*. The chance to build lucrative networks with committee partners could affect its status. *Komisi* Eleven, allows legislators to meet wealthy business people from the world of banking and

¹⁰ Calculated on the approximation of AUD 1 = IDR 10,000.

finance who could become financial contributors to political campaigns. According to Shapiro (1999), this is a common feature of democratic political processes. The wealthy may provide financial contributions for political campaigns to intervene in political processes to meet their desired goals. There have been several male legislators from *Komisi* Ten and Eleven accused of receiving bribes from individuals and embezzling government funds (Artika 2013; Djunaidy 2008; Sitompul 2013).

The financial burden of running for candidacy is substantial as it involves costs for nomination for candidacy and producing campaign materials which have become necessary in the open listing system (Mulia & Farida 2005; Prihatmoko 2008). The more cash individual party members contribute to the party, the more chance they have of getting nominated as a candidate, and getting a better position on the candidate list with a higher chance of winning. The open listing system allows individual candidates to compete with each other, and is marked by vigorous campaigns (Rüland et.al. 2005) involving television advertising, mass rallies, gifts of free t-shirts and Rp 20,000 notes, and singing and dancing performances (Anonymous 2009). Legislators who intend to run in subsequent elections have to secure a substantial amount of money. A *komisi* working area, thus, also offers the potential for members to gain access to financial contributors.

6.1.1.2 *Komisi's* visibility

Insights regarding visibility of working areas of *komisi* were obtained through observation of work conducted in the committee. As indicated by Ms Jeihan, visibility might refer to the impact of a *komisi's* work on the public's popular

consciousness. Women legislators expressed a desire for greater awareness among their constituents of the work they were doing on the *komisi*.

What can I bring to my constituents? Under the previous *BKKBN* leadership, my photo was used on a family planning poster. My point is what can I bring to my constituents for this upcoming recess? I hope *BKKBN* will provide me with support, so that my visits to my constituents can bring maximum result.

(Legislator speech, observation of working meeting with National Population and Family Planning Coordinating Board/ *BKKBN*, *Komisi* Nine, 19 September 2012, 10.00-13.00)

My work as a legislator is dedicated to my constituents. My communication with the Ministry of Education is weak in my constituency. For instance, when I met with a constituent, they said that the budget increase for the local school was not related to my duties as a legislator. I just want them to acknowledge my work. I worked in the *DPR* for my constituents, but it seems that they were not aware.

(Legislator speech, observation of working meeting with Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs, *Komisi* Ten, 3 October 2012, 10.00-14.30)

The women indicated that gaining attention from their constituents was important to their re-election, and that the issues of family planning and education might get less public attention. The popular votes could explain these legislators' concerns on the lack of awareness of their contribution to their constituents. The legislators hold representative duties, and therefore feel they are expected to promote the interests or wishes of their electors. This is the central tenet in the relationship between electors and their representatives in a modern democracy. The visibility of their work to constituents might enable the legislators to strengthen this relationship. The low prominence of some *komisi* could also indicate that Indonesia might place less focus on issues which seem to be related to women. *Komisi* associated with men's work, on the other hand, could facilitate the securing of financial resources and more favour from electors, and this would explain their high ranking in the order of the *komisi*.

The evaluation mechanism, as explained by Mr Dani, also indicates a hierarchy among *komisi*. Membership of higher ranking *komisi*, such as *Komisi* Eleven and Five, indicates achievement, while assignment to *Komisi* Eight or Nine could be seen as demotion. Accessing the higher ranked *komisi* was harder than entering the lower ranked ones as most legislators preferred to be on the higher ranking *komisi*. Ms Ellia and Ms Jeihan, both members of higher ranking *komisi*, identified the challenges of entering these *komisi*.

In my *fraksi*, party leaders always pursue a place on prestigious *komisi*. There are three party wings and they will compete for their people to be members of those *komisi*.

(Ms Ellia, legislator, 20 September 2012, interview, lines 274-277)

For instance, my *fraksi* is eligible for 15 members at the supplementary *komisi* on budgeting, yet there is only one woman who is about to be replaced by a man. The reason was because she was on two prestigious *Komisi*: *Komisi* Three and the supplementary Budgeting *Komisi*. After negotiation, she is still on the budgeting *komisi* but demoted to *Komisi* Nine (lines 228-235). Women are focusing on survival, as men frequently target us for demotion to the lower *komisi*. I use my energy to hold my current position from men's competition.

(Ms Jeihan, legislator, 2 October 2012, interview, lines 244-247)

These comments highlight the competitive nature of membership on the high ranking *komisi*. Party elites dominate the *komisi*, and women are more vulnerable to competition. This is illustrated by comparing the anecdote from Ms Jeihan about the women legislator who could not hold two prestigious *komisi*, and the example of Mr Anwar, from the same party and on the Budgeting Committee. Mr Anwar was on *Komisi* Eleven, a highly ranked committee, as well as on the Budgeting *Komisi* (DPR 2014c). His membership on the two prestigious *komisi* contradicts the case brought by Ms Jeihan, in which her woman colleague was demoted to a lower ranked *komisi* on the basis that she could not hold membership of two prestigious

komisi. This suggests that even though women have equal capabilities, they need to work harder to gain equal positions.

Ms Jeihan and Ms Ellia described their journeys to enter higher ranked *komisi*.

I requested that my caucus leaders move me to *Komisi* Five. I argued that *Komisi* Five was more relevant to my education and that I would perform better. Yet, it was rejected. What I got from the decision processes was that my party *fraksi* will assign only the senior legislators. The seniors have their own league, and if I want to become part of the league, I need to be accepted (lines 50-56). The seniors evaluated me to ensure that I won't be a threat. They need to feel secure with my presence on the *komisi*. After two years, they placed me on *Komisi* Five.

(Ms Jeihan, legislator, 2 October 2012, interview, lines 86-91)

I requested that my caucus move me to *Komisi* Four from Eight since I was inspired by members of the supplementary Legislation Committee who seemed smart when we discussed a bill on poor people proposed by *Komisi* Eight. After two years in *Komisi* Eight, my request was approved. Issues discussed at *Komisi* Eight were lighter, and *Komisi* Four has better leadership, and is more professional in managing *komisi* work.

(Ms Ellia, legislator, 20 September 2012, interview, lines 211-230)

After three years of service in the *DPR*, our (women's) capabilities and loyalty to the party were starting to get attention from my party leaders. In the first year, we (women) were invisible, and all strategic positions were for men legislators.

(Ms Ana, legislator, 2 November 2012, interview, lines 115-118)

Ms Jeihan indicated that endorsement from party elites, the seniors who are close to power and influence, was an important factor in being assigned to the high ranked *komisi*. She spoke about capabilities and loyalty. Loyalty might also be reflected in Ms Jeihan's account; she needed to show that she could be an asset to the dominant men to support their career; she needed to be trusted with their secrets, and not become a threat to them or overtake their positions. Ms Ana also had to demonstrate loyalty to the elites. Men take control of the parliamentary system and legislators who do not follow their rules from their location of power cannot advance their political careers. Women have to show loyalty if they want to advance their political career,

such as being obedient to men's orders, and this may allow women to come closer to being included in the more male dominant activities.

The loyalty tests were a reassurance that women would not turn against the male leaders or use any of the information gained through their experience of the men's world to harm the group. The secrecy in the *DPR* could relate to the rampant corruption cases against male legislators, hence, they needed to believe that women could be trusted.

Ms Ana and Ms Ellia's comments suggested that women take longer to access places of power and influence. Ms Ellia indicated that to be accepted as rational and professional politicians, women have to adopt men's behaviour to become more powerful.

The finding suggests that the division of labour in *komisi* assignment reflects the gendering process. This supports the arguments that the division of labour is impacted by a gendering process that reiterates gendered inequality in parliaments (Bolzendahl 2014; Crawford & Pini 2011). In the *DPR*, the gendering process occurs in the assignment of *komisi* membership, and in the evaluation process of legislators' performance. Men's behaviour becomes the standard in the evaluation. The *komisi* are organised within a hierarchy with more highly ranked *komisi* associated with better performers who are closer to the prevailing power and influence. Women were associated with *komisi* on women's issues, and these *komisi* were low ranked.

6.1.2 *Komisi* Eight: conflicting issues

Komisi Eight on women's empowerment, social affairs, and religion is a standing *komisi* specialising in gender equality issues. According to Marian Sawyer (2015), a standing committee specialising in gender equality holds an important role in mainstreaming gender equality in parliamentary work, initiating gender equality laws, and reviewing the implementation and application of a gender lens in proposals of legislation and programmes. Such a committee could be in the form of a dedicated group handling the status of women, or a committee handling multi-portfolio issues such as family, children, and social welfare. In Indonesia, *Komisi* Eight deals with multi-portfolio issues. A dedicated gender equality committee on the status of women in the Canadian parliament, for instance, performs important policy advocacy and examination functions on the advancement of the status of women (Grace 2016). The committee has also played an important role in ensuring government programmes benefited women. Yet, the impact of the committee would also rely on the nature of the committee's power in the parliament (Holli & Harder 2016). As indicated in the previous subsection, *Komisi* Eight has little power in the *DPR*, despite playing an important role in initiating the proposal of legislation on gender equality, and in applying a gender lens in the proposal of legislation and programmes. In addition, issues under the *komisi* of women's empowerment and religion are also conflicting. This subsection focuses on the impact of the combination of these conflicting issues on women's substantive representation.

Komisi Eight was established during the parliamentary reform in the democratic transition period of 2004-2009, as discussed in subsection 4.2.2.

The result of the reform was the shifting of the issue of women's empowerment from the *komisi* handling issues of health and family planning, to a *komisi* combining the issues of religion and social welfare: *Komisi Eight*. This subsection discusses the impact of the reform of the dedicated parliamentary committee on women's empowerment to women's substantive representation in promoting women's legislative initiatives. In this section, the case of the Gender Equality Bill is used to assess the effect of the conflicting issues in promoting women's issues in the *DPR*.

The Gender Equality Bill was on the list of national legislation priorities in the period 2009-2014, yet it failed to be enacted. The Bill aimed to strengthen the mainstreaming of gender equality in Indonesian society by compelling not only the executive, but also legislative and private organisations, to apply gender equality practices (Kalyanamitra 2014). Interviews were carried out with women legislators and women in civil society to understand how they engaged with legislators during the discussion of the Bill in the *DPR*. A woman activist and two women legislators suggested that Islamic teaching had hindered the progress of the Bill.

We lobbied for the Gender Equality Bill at *Komisi Eight* and the response was that it was not a priority. When *Komisi Eight* conducted a public hearing about the Bill, they stated that it would be aligned with religious norms (lines 22-24). We still have agendas for bills on Domestic Workers, Gender Equality, and amendment of the Marriage Law. We had also lobbied for the Bill on amendment of the Marriage Law since 2009, but religious leaders opposed it.

(Ms Ratih, activist, 1 November 2012, interview, lines 155-160)

I was on the working committee for the Gender Equality Bill. The challenges came from religious leaders. Many argued that the Bill does not suit Indonesian culture. Women should stay at home and not enter the workforce. The man is the one who should be the breadwinner. There were many such messages opposing the Bill.

(Ms Fany, legislator, 26 September 2012, interview, lines 33-38)

I was irritated when members spoke on irrelevant issues while I was on *Komisi* Eight. It might be because many members had backgrounds as clerics who frequently conducted public Islamic teaching.
(Ms. Ellia, legislator, 20 September 2012, interview, lines 198-199)

The respondents indicated that religion was the main obstacle in promoting gender issues, and as *Komisi* Eight had many members with a background in religious leadership, the *Komisi* focused more on religious issues. They suggested that the issue of women's empowerment was not important to the *Komisi*. Thus, it was hard to raise women's issues in the *Komisi* as it was interpreted as against Islamic teaching, which is also a focus of *Komisi* Eight. This indicates unbalanced power relations between the issues of religion and women's empowerment in the *komisi*, which is supported by an assessment of the budget allocation between the Ministries of Religion and Women's Empowerment below.

There was an obvious gap in the budget allocation between the two Ministries. The Ministry of Religion received AUD 17.85 million, while the Ministry for Women's Empowerment was allocated only AUD 0.09 million (Bappenas 2010). As the budget covers the operational costs at the related ministry, as detailed in the *RPJMN*, this is a clear indication that the Ministry of Religion is bigger and much better supported, and, hence, explains why *Komisi* Eight focuses more on religious issues, and other issues, such as women's empowerment, were aligned with religion, as indicated by Ms Ratih.

The grouping of religious and women's empowerment issues together under *Komisi* Eight dates from the period 2004-2009. This period also saw the initial implementation of the quota. Under the previous government, and the first democratically elected legislators in 1999-2004, religion fell under the

working area of *Komisi* Ten on education and culture, and women's empowerment was in *Komisi* Nine grouped with health and population issues. This indicates that there was a shift in paradigm. Previously, women were seen to be part of the solution in addressing population growth through family planning, which targeted women, and health issues, such as high maternal and infant mortality. Religion was seen to be part of cultural affairs. The new grouping of women and religion indicates that women were now seen to be responsible for maintaining culture and religion as part of their role in educating young children. It suggests a silencing process to suppress the empowerment and activism that women gained during the transition to democracy. Under religious or Islamic teaching, women have to follow men's orders as their leaders. The silencing process refers to an absence of voice, or passivity of the oppressed imposed by the dominant to maintain their power (Harlow et al. 1995). The silencing process could act in two ways: by inclusion through silencing of the minority's voice, such as denial of speech; and by structural silence, such as ignoring women's contributions.

Silencing processes in the *DPR* occurred in both ways. The inclusion was by the quota, endorsed to silence women activists, who pressured the political elites during the transition to have equal representation in decision-making institutions. Following the quota, the grouping of women's empowerment issues with religious issues inhibited women's ability to address issues of women's empowerment. The new grouping also prevents feminists from pursuing agendas on women's empowerment. The gendering process occurred at party *fraksi*, which decide the grouping of working areas at *komisi* and their hierarchy, and results in the silencing of those who wish to pursue a

feminist agenda.

6.2 Gendered organisation in the *DPR* as a workplace

The literature on gendered organisations suggests that the structure of a workplace frequently prevents women from reaching their potential (Itzin 1995; Kelly et al. 2010; Peterson & Runyan 2010; Samardzic & Taksa 2011).

The parliament is a workplace for both men and women legislators as they pursue their careers. Workplace practices frequently do not recognise different cultural expectations between men and women in society. Failure to recognise those expectations reinforces gender inequality in the workplace.

The way gender operates in institutions frequently becomes a barrier for women to make similar progress in their careers to their male counterparts (Kelly et al. 2010). For instance, Indonesian women undertake most of the activities related to the household, while men do a very little of the domestic work (Pitt & Rosenzweig 1990). In addition to household tasks, women are responsible for community work such as maintaining water sustainability and preparation of communal ceremonies (Dungga 2006). Assignment of parental roles builds work segregation between women and men in Indonesian society (Davies 2005; Rahayu 2004; Suryakusuma 2004). The segregation is also reflected in the ideologies of Islamic parties such as *PKS* and *PPP* (Kusumaningtyas 2006; Mulia 2007), which limit women's roles in politics to supporting the education of children, and maintaining moral standards.

Focusing on increasing the number of female legislators is only part of the solution as women might put much of their energy towards adapting to male political culture, rather than developing strategies to change that culture

(Newman 1995). The assumption behind the quota was that the elected women would contribute equally to men in the decision-making process, and that women will willingly assume their full share of responsibility. However, this does not recognise women's responsibilities in family and society.

Interviews with three male party leaders indicated different opinions on women's participation in politics. Mr Dani, from the Islamic party, stated that women and men shared similar problems in society so that gender is irrelevant, while Mr Anto (nationalist party) and Mr Benny (Islamic party) argued that there are different consequences for women and men pursuing political careers.

We never consider gender as an element in decision-making as it is always based on capabilities and capacity. It is a pity if we concentrate on such issues because the focus should be the national interests. Men and women face similar problems including problems in the family (lines 79-87). Political activity is all about individual competencies not gender. I never consider whether it is women or men in my decision, as it could lead to bias in decision-making. Every politician has to be aware of the consequences [of entering politics], such as no private life and responsibility to the public. Thus, a politician has to gain support from their family.
(Mr Dani, *fraksi* leader, 21 September 2012, interview, lines 179-196)

There are limitations for women, for instance gossiping if they work 'til late. If a woman wants to pursue a political career, she needs to get permission from her husband due to the consequences for the family. Her time allocation for taking care of her husband and children is reduced. So ask the husband first before joining politics. If her husband is not happy, it ends in divorce. Based on Islamic teaching, if a woman follows her husband's command, she will be blessed.
(Mr Anto, *fraksi* leader, 4 October 2012, interview, lines 73-80)

The women's challenge comes from biological differences such as pregnancy. One of our women members just gave birth. She had to stay at home for about one month. We do not have a policy for maternity leave. We are not civil servants.
(Mr Benny, *fraksi* leader, 28 September 2012, interview, lines 41-44)

These male leaders all suggest that gender does not have a place in the *DPR* and women have to bear the consequences if they do not fit in. They expressed reluctance to change the organisation of the *DPR* to accommodate the different gender roles in society. The assumption is that

women and men legislators are equally competent and equally committed to their work as politicians. Even though they know that women bear more responsibility than men, they do not see the need to support women in dealing with the consequences of their choice to enter politics. For instance, the absence of maternity leave, as confirmed by Mr Benny, would create a significant hindrance for women legislators. The expectation might be that there is no excuse for a politician's absence from work.

However, difficulties frequently arise from the setting of gender blind policies, which undermine the essential value of men and women in society (Buchy & Basaznew 2005; Newman 1995). Operating as if men and women are equal fails to recognise the inequalities in gender roles which lie beneath the surface. Men had neither need nor experience of trying to juggle the roles between home and the workplace, and see no reasons for difficulty in doing so (French 1995; Pitt & Rosenzweig 1990).

6.2.1 Work practices in the *komisi*

Women's roles in Indonesian society tend to be limited to educating their children and maintaining the domestic sphere (Blackburn 1999; Martyn 2005). The previous government of Soeharto connected women's roles with the concept of mother (Blackburn 2004; Davies 2005; Rahayu 2004; Suryakusuma 2004). The idea was to support the nation's development via the nuclear family which identified the father as the main breadwinner and the mother as the supporter in the household. This ideology was embedded in school teaching and activities conducted by women's organisations. Through teachers, school curricula, and institutional routine, the government

reinforced gender roles upon girls as having responsibilities for goodness, moral education for their children, and services to family and society, while boys were trained to see themselves playing a role in economic development. Therefore, the assumption in this study is that even though women engage in political activities, they still have to perform domestic tasks. Thus, gender-blind working practices in the *DPR* will discriminate against female legislators.

Chapter 16 of the *DPR* Rules of Procedure of the conduct of parliamentary work define parliamentary work as taking place in four sessions annually; two plenary and two recess sessions. The plenary session starts on 16 August, runs for approximately three months, and is followed by a recess of a similar duration, then repeated in the second part of the political year. The recess session is time allocated for the legislators to visit their constituencies for face-to-face communication with their electors. The plenary session takes place in the *DPR* building in Jakarta. The plenary consists of an intensive schedule of standing and supplementary committee meetings. The meetings are held for political debate between parties on their electorate's political interests. The collective decisions made in the debates aim to seek legislative authority for those interests. The analysis below examines activities in the *komisi*, which are the centre of the legislative decision-making process.

The *komisi* meetings often run from morning until close to midnight, Monday to Thursday, as regulated by the Rules of Procedure. Fridays are allocated for party *fraksi* meetings. The time allocation in the *komisi* meeting is divided

into three sessions: 09:00-12:00, 13:00-16:00, and 19:30-23:30. This does not mean that the *komisi* meetings will be conducted from morning until midnight. The decision on the use of the allocation is based on an agreement among the members of each *komisi* and, if desired by the majority of members, the meeting could go beyond the allocated time.

The major concern is that the night meeting from 19.30-23.30 might not be suitable for women. As indicated by Mr Anto, “there is a limitation for women, for instance, people gossip if they work til late”; thus, the night schedule hinders women from participating in the committee discussion. In order to understand the practices in the *komisi*, samples of the previous working schedule of each *komisi* were collected. However, not all *komisi* had documented their schedule, as the planned schedules frequently changed. *Komisi* Three and Five, for instance, did not have recent documents and were reluctant to provide information. The data from each *komisi* was then compared. The data is presented by the amount of daily time allocation per *komisi*, and proportion of *komisi* time spent in these timeslots (Table 6.3).

Table 6.3 shows that most *komisi* used all three timeslots, from morning until night, except for *Komisi* Nine which allocated all of their work during the day. *Komisi* Six and Eight had the highest propensity to use three time allocations in a sitting day, suggesting that the committee members preferred working from morning until night.

Table 6.3 Time allocations for *komisi*'s work in the plenary session, 16 August to 25 October 2012.

<i>Komisi</i> (Standing committees)	% of time allocations of committee meetings			
	One allocation	Two allocations	Three allocations	Total
<i>Komisi 1</i>	48	30	22	100
<i>Komisi 2</i>	21	61	18	100
<i>Komisi 4</i>	39	45	15	100
<i>Komisi 6</i>	29	33	38	100
<i>Komisi 7</i>	11	60	29	100
<i>Komisi 8</i>	11	54	36	100
<i>Komisi 9</i>	29	71	-	100
<i>Komisi 10</i>	29	45	26	100
<i>Komisi 11</i>	37	33	30	100

Source: tabulated from *Komisi 1* (2012); *Komisi 2* (2012); *Komisi 4* (2012); *Komisi 5* (2011); *Komisi 6* (2012); *Komisi 7* (2012); *Komisi 8* (2012); *Komisi 9* (2012); *Komisi 10* (2012); *Komisi 11* (2012).

Komisi Nine did not conduct meetings at night, which would be friendlier to women legislators. It might indicate that women in *Komisi* Nine were more able to negotiate the scheduling than others, and this *komisi* had the highest proportion of women members, who generally prefer working during the day, as suggested by a woman legislator from *Komisi* Eight.

I actually wanted parliamentary meetings to not be held at night. Yesterday, the meeting was conducted until midnight. The head of the working team was male, and male legislators prefer conducting meetings at night.
(Ms Fani, legislator, 26 September 2012, interview, lines 53-55)

Ms Fani indicated that there were different preferences between male and female legislators in regard to working times. The men preferred night time more than women. The difference in preferences was pronounced at the working committee (*panja*) for the Bill on the amendment of the 2008 Election Law. The deliberation of the Bill was conducted at three levels from *pansus* (special committee), to *panja* (working committee), and *timsin* and *timus*

(synchronised and steering teams). The chairs of those committees were men, and their suggestion to use the evening times was persistent. The suggestion was made from the first meeting at the *pansus* and further intensified at the second level discussion at *panja*, whose chair encouraged the members to use the evening time slot.

The chair concluded the meeting by stating “for the purpose of effectiveness in discussion, we can use night-time. Both parties of members and government should use the night times as much as possible. At the level of *panja* and *timsin & timus*, of course the Ministers will be represented by Echelon One or Two so that the Minister does not need to attend the night meeting.”

(Proceeding of 4th *pansus* meeting, 12 February 2012)

Women legislators attempted unsuccessfully to challenge the practices at the *panja* meetings.

The meeting was closed at 5.00 pm, then the chairman offered to open the next meeting at 19.30 and he said “it is 17.00 already, we need to take a break and meet again at 19.30.” (then he corrected) “Alright at 19.00, as requested by the ladies, it seems that they wanted to get home earlier.” The chairman opened the meeting at 20.00 even though he agreed to start the meeting at 19.00.

(Proceeding of the 3rd *panja* meeting, 20 January 2012)

Ms N raised the scheduling concerns at the *panja*. The chairman explained the schedule arrangement from 1-27 March. She asked, “Chairman, why is the scheduling made at night for all meetings? Why not make the schedule at morning or noon which is friendlier to me as a mother?” Then the chairman responded, stating that the schedule was designed in response to time allocation at *Komisi Two*, which was still working with another bill. She responded by asking a question, “why are all meetings in March proposed at night? There is earlier time such as at 14.00 or 16.00. Why do we not conduct the meeting at 14.00 or 16.00?” Then the chairman said, “OK Ms N, we can adjust it.” Then he jokes “This is because Ms N would work only at morning.”

(Proceeding of 20th *panja* meeting 27 February 2012)

There was an indication that women’s voices were taken lightly by the chair of the *panja*, who did not take the request seriously, suggesting that the women’s requests were simply individual preferences that should not override parliamentary work. According to this perspective, gender has no place in the *DPR*, which is furthermore supported by Mr Dani’s statement that

gender consideration would lead to bias in decision-making, and detrimental consequences. As a result, there is no accommodation of women's need to combine their family roles with a career in politics.

Male decision-makers failed to acknowledge the social expectation, which implies that women should stay at home at night because Islamic values place women under the guardianship of men, and limits their access to public activities particularly at night (Mulia 2007; Mulia & Farida 2005). Ms Jeihan, who is a newcomer to the Parliament, explained the barriers women legislators face in subordinating themselves to male work preferences.

We occasionally stay at a hotel for a few days in order to ensure bill deliberations meet with the deadline. However, a few women still have difficulties staying away from their family. Sometimes they come with their husbands or with their extended family. Staff are mostly unwilling to stay with them if the meeting goes until midnight or requires staying outside of Jakarta for many days. In response to the demand of the work, some women legislators recruit their staff from their family members so that they can accompany them during times of intensive work.

(Ms Jeihan, legislator, 2 October 2012, interview, lines 363-366)

Ms Jeihan's statement suggests that women's work may be compromised by the need to sacrifice qualified staff to fulfil social expectations. This is likely to disadvantage them as they could then have less qualified staff. Hiring family members might furthermore confirm the stereotype that women are less professional and less serious in pursuing their political career. The parliamentary working schedule is clearly designed for men, and women legislators have to adjust to the practices. Even though men are aware of women's problems in complying with the practices, they ignore women's demands for change. The silencing practices indicate men's reluctance to share their power, forcing women to work harder to juggle their professional and domestic roles.

Another practice that hinders women's participation in parliamentary work is the frequent scheduling of unplanned work. One of the norms of an ideal worker is flexibility in responding to work demands at short notice, which signals an employee's commitment (Kelly et al. 2010). Male workers are frequently more able to respond quickly to unplanned work, as they do not have expectations placed upon them to also perform domestic duties. Thus, the men are able to demonstrate what is considered a greater commitment and progress in their career more quickly than women. Interviews with female legislators and staff, indicates how the practice of unplanned work takes place in the *DPR*.

Scheduling at the *komisi* is uncertain. There is no advanced fixed schedule even for a week. For instance, for a meeting tomorrow, I got the confirmed schedule this afternoon 5:00 pm. The routine is that the secretariat distributes the *komisi* schedule one day before by 5:00 pm. The next morning, I have to check with the secretariat to confirm that today's *komisi* activity is unchanged.

(Ms Pipit, legislator's secretary, 1 November 2012, interview, lines 17-29)

Ms Pipit, who works for a female legislator, indicated that there is no fixed plan in the schedule and members are controlled by the leaders' decision on schedules and the agenda of the meeting. An unplanned working schedule at the *komisi* level indicates the demand for legislators to be prepared for a last minute call to work. The impact of unplanned work was significant for women who have to balance other roles, as expressed by Ms Dewi from *Komisi* Eight.

The schedule of meetings is uncertain. I do not dare to schedule a family gathering or meeting with someone from outside the Parliament. I do not dare to say to my mother that I have time for her on a certain day. Even on holiday, I get text messages expecting me to attend party meeting.

(Ms Dewi, legislator, 26 September 2012, interview, lines 252-257)

Ms Dewi indicated that the unplanned schedules come not only from the

komisi but also from her party, affecting both her domestic duties and in her engagement with people outside of parliament. Because of the high frequency of unplanned work, the time allocation sometimes exceeded the allocated time, as stated by the rules of procedure. Ms Gadis from *Komisi* Nine described this practice.

Right now, I have no problem with schedules of meetings. I need some time to adjust to the scheduling system. Even though, the rules of procedure regulate the scheduling up to 11:00pm, in practice I have to be prepared to work until 1:00am.

(Ms Gadis, legislator, 10 October 2012, interview, lines 3-5)

Ms Gadis was referring to work on supplementary committees such as *panja*. Physical presence at the meeting is important to ensure that the legislator's input is recorded, as Ms Jeihan pointed out.

When an issue is discussed and there are conflicting views, I have to stay until the meeting ends. I had an experience in such a situation when the ideas were conflicting. I was able to state my opinion, but when I left the meeting room, my statement was gone. I would stay until the meeting ended to ensure my statement on the political agenda resulting from the meeting.

(Ms Jeihan, legislator, 2 October 2012, interview, lines 256-259)

Ms Jeihan indicated that even though the time allocation for the meeting was not favourable for women, they must comply if they want to secure their agenda and influence the political outcome. As the proportion of women in the *DPR* is only 18%, women might be more effective if they work together and divide the burden equally to support the feminist agenda across political parties.

In addition to the practices that do not support female society and domestic roles, the workload as a politician is overwhelming. Women legislators not only perform their duties as politicians, but are also expected to represent their gender. The expectation is reinforced by the quota, which aimed to

increase female numbers in order to promote their interest in parliamentary work so that the legislation will be more accommodating toward women's experiences in Indonesian society.

Legislators must perform not only on *komisi* but also on supplementary committees, such as the Legislative Committee (*Baleg*), Budgeting Committee (*Banggar*), Steering Committee (*Bamus*), Domestic Affairs Committee (*BURT*), working committees, and other ad hoc committees. A legislator can hold membership of a supplementary committee in addition to a *komisi*. The decision on additional membership of the supplementary committee was based on a legislator's performance, as indicated by Mr Dani.

In her first year, Ms H needed time to adapt to the tasks of the *DPR*. She is now showing her competency and actively voicing issues on international affairs, such that I assigned her to the Inter-Parliamentary Committee.

(Mr Dani, party caucus leader, 21 September 2012, interview, lines 52-54)

He indicated that the better a legislator performed, the more likely she/he is to receive additional tasks and the more likely she/he will have a higher workload than others. They are more likely to have busier schedules than others, as indicated by Ms Ellia.

I have a heavy workload. I work at *komisi*, *Baleg* and two *panja* (working committees). Frequently, I have two meetings scheduled at the same time. Dealing with the problem, I check the meeting agendas and I attend the meeting with the more crucial agenda in decision-making. For instance, the working committee at the Food Security Bill is at the stage of decision process to solve disagreement about *halal* food, while the other committee is at the stage of discussion. So I prioritise the Food Security Working Committee, and delegate my staff to monitor the process of discussion at the other meeting from the balcony.

(Ms Ellia, legislator, 20 September 2012, interview, lines 240-246)

As she stated, Ms Ellia balanced multiple duties by employing her staff to monitor the less significant meeting. She would be present at the meeting that has reached the decision-making stage, as having a physical presence

was significant in influencing the outcome. Ms Ellia was from a big *fraksi* with more members than other *fraksi*. The regulations on the quorum to conduct a meeting hindered legislators from a small *fraksi* from applying a similar strategy. For example, Ms Ratu from a small *fraksi* expressed her concern about multiple duties at the *DPR*.

I come from a small *fraksi* with only 17 members. There are 11 *komisi*, so that there is only one legislator at each *komisi* from my party. Compared with the bigger *fraksi*, they can assign about 11 to 18 members for each *komisi*, I am the only one from my *fraksi* in *Komisi* Eight. Conversely, I have to perform other duties such as in the working committee and another supplementary committee. At every meeting, I have to be physically present in order to comply with the quorum requirement. I am a very busy legislator and have more work than other legislators from bigger *fraksi*.

(Ms Ratu, legislator, 24 October, 2012, interview, lines 9-15)

Ms Ratu indicated that she could not use the strategy used by Ms Ellia as she was from a smaller *fraksi*. Being from a small party, Ms Ratu could not share the responsibility, as she was the only person on the *komisi* to represent her party. Her absence from the meeting would therefore mean the absence of her party's voice in the discussion.

A similar case might also apply to representing gender constituents or women's needs. Women's presence at *komisi* would be significant to secure women's political demands toward issues related with women's interests. Thus, the number of women is important in promoting women's issues in the *DPR*. The size of the *fraksi* affects the women's commitment to a feminist agenda, as women from a small *fraksi* have a higher workload than women from a bigger *fraksi*, and less time to support the feminist agenda. Ms Olga, from a big *fraksi*, revealed her experience in working with a woman legislator from a smaller *fraksi* in voicing the feminist agenda in the working committee for the 2012 Election Bill.

When I was on the working committee for the Election Bill, there were only two women. The other woman was from a small *fraksi* and she has more tasks from her party than me. She could not attend the discussion on a regular basis when I needed her support in voicing the women's issues in the discussion.

(Ms Olga, legislator, 24 September 2012, interview, lines 87-90)

Ms Olga indicated that she found it difficult to voice the feminist agenda in the committee without support from other women legislators. The absence of women in the committee influences the women's effectiveness in promoting women's issues. In addition, approximately 70% of women legislators were newcomers who would be less likely to be concerned with a feminist agenda as their priority was to adjust to the new working environment. Ms Gadis, for example, had difficulty balancing multiple duties from committees and parties, which affected her performance.

A politician has no job description. There are many tasks from *komisi*, supplementary committee, and party leaders. Tasks from the party have multiple layers, which could come from the headquarters in Jakarta and from the party branch of my constituency. For instance, recently my party put me in charge of the governor's election in my constituency and Jakarta. I have difficulties balancing those tasks. Frequently during the meetings in *komisi*, I get a text message about other tasks that makes me lose concentration. I am still unable to manage the tasks. I also have a little son who needs my attention.

(Ms Gadis, legislator, 10 October 2012, interview, lines 28-35)

Clearly, Ms Gadis had significant duties from parliamentary work as well as from her party. She was also a mother with young children who demanded her time. Both Ms Ellia and Ms Gadis come from big *fraksi*, but Ms Ellia indicated that she managed her duties better, as she was an experienced legislator who previously served at the regional parliament for a decade, while Ms Gadis was a newcomer. In addition, Ms Ellia was from the more mature group with grown up children who do not need her attention.

Women legislators have to take on an equal amount of work as their male

colleagues, but the men control the work organisation at the *DPR* based on their own preferences. The different expectations and roles between men and women in society bring different demands for working arrangements. However, men ignore women's demands and women work harder to cope with working practices and lack of support. Thus, to pursue further their political careers women have to work harder than men. In addition, women legislators were expected to voice a feminist agenda in parliamentary work, which might create additional tasks for them.

6.2.2 Supporting mechanisms for women's reproductive rights

Another concern within the institution of the *DPR* is the response towards the increasing proportion of younger women legislators. Approximately 35% of women legislators were aged between 21-40 years (see Chapter 5). They are likely to have a young family and competing duties as a mother and wife. How does the *DPR* respond to those younger legislators? Observation at the parliamentary office found that there were no childcare facilities or breastfeeding rooms for the needs of female legislators and staff.

Furthermore, Mr Benny indicated that women at his *fraksi* require support related to pregnancy, but the *DPR*, unlike the government bureaucracy, does not have a maternity policy. Mr Benny acknowledged barriers to equality, but even though he had authority to address these barriers, such as by advocating for policies to meet the needs of female legislators, he did not act on it. Ms Dewi and Ms Jeihan, who were newcomers, raised their concerns on the lack of facilities for young mothers.

When I was a member of *BURT* [Supplementary Committee for Parliamentary Domestic Affairs], I raised issues of providing a breastfeeding room or baby room. This is due to conditions in the *DPR* where there is no maternity leave for women legislators or staff. However, there was no positive response to my request. I think that if there is a breastfeeding or baby room in the building, women legislators could still attend meetings, while their babies are with the nannies and could stay in the room. With a lack of facilities, women could not come to the office and will be left behind on issues discussed at the *DPR*.

(Ms Dewi, legislator, 26 September 2012, interview, lines 259-263)

This period of 2009-2014 has many young women legislators. There are a few who just gave birth. They need to breastfeed their babies. In the meantime, there is no facility such as a breastfeeding room or refrigerator to keep their breast milk at the office. This condition is also hard for women staff. The staff do not have maternity leave either. Staff will be in a difficult situation if they are breastfeeding and their bosses are male legislators. Most men do not understand women's special needs and still request women who have babies to stay 'til midnight until the meeting ends. I will be more understanding towards these issues, so that I will send my women staff home earlier. There is no maternity leave for women legislators or staff. If they have decided to have a break from working due to their maternity reasons, their salaries will be stopped.

(Ms Jeihan, legislator, 2 October 2012, interview, lines 350-359)

The interviewees indicated the concerns among women legislators about the lack of facilities for women in the workplace of the *DPR* as it affected them and their staff. The decision regarding women's reproductive rights is made by their bosses, such as *fraksi* leaders for women legislators, or male and female legislators in regard to female staff who serve individual legislators on a contractual basis. Based on the Workforce Law no 13/2003, Articles 82 and 84, women are eligible for maternity leave for three months with full payment, but this does not apply to the *DPR* itself, which produced the Law.

The lack of facilities for women along with the unfriendly working schedule minimises the attractiveness of a career in the *DPR* for women. Data from human resources in 2012 shows that female staff accounted for only 31% and were concentrated in administrative roles, such as secretaries to legislators (Mr Utomo, staff of Parliamentary Secretariat General for Human Resources, 25 October 2012, interview, lines 79-80). Women staff confirmed

the impact of the unfriendly working schedules in the *DPR*.

I frequently stayed with Ms AT until the meeting ended. If the issue discussed has conflicting interests across parties, I could stay till 3:00am, such as when discussing the Century Bank cases, gasoline subsidies, and election issues. If there is only a *komisi* meeting, I usually finish my work at 7pm or 8pm when the meeting at the *komisi* starts. If it is only a *komisi* meeting, Ms AT did not ask me to stay, so I can go home early.

(Ms Hilaliah, legislator's secretary, 5 November 2012, interview, lines 28-32)

Supporting staff, based on expertise positioned at *komisi*, are hired on a contractual basis. The performance evaluation is by the *komisi* members, the legislators. Staff have to work a similar schedule to the *komisi*. They sometimes need to work until morning for an intensive discussion. For instance, a meeting finished at 4:00am and the next morning's schedule was at 9:00am. In such conditions, all supporting staff should work to that schedule. All staff at *Komisi Five* are men. There was a woman, but she resigned soon after being recruited. It might be because she could not cope with the schedule.

(Ms Utami, staff at secretariat of the Standing *Komisi Five*, 6 November 2012, interview, lines 84-91)

These respondents indicated that the demanding working hours discouraged women staff from pursuing a career at the *DPR*. As indicated by Ms Utami, the evaluation of staff performance was made by the legislators, who might use the ability to meet men's work patterns as a standard for evaluation. At the same time, the institutions provided no facilities for young mothers. The work practices and lack of support for women employees significantly deters women from pursuing careers as politicians or parliamentary support staff. The absence of maternity leave, even though a right which is enshrined in law, is surprising. The reason for the absence of maternity leave in the *DPR* might be due to the view, indicated by Mr Dani that politicians should serve the community and he/she should be available to serve them on any occasion. Women who have special needs, such as maternal needs, that require them to be off duty do not meet this requirement.

6.3 Conclusion

This chapter argued that development of the organisation of parliament, as a decision-making institution and as a workplace, to be accommodating to women's needs is essential in achieving the politics of ideas. It extends the argument of Anne Phillips (1995) that further development of the politics of presence is important for the achievement of the politics of ideas. The full impact of the gender quota cannot be achieved without reforms to parliament as a workplace.

This chapter suggested that the organisation of the *DPR*, as the centre for political decision for laws and government policies, and as a workplace, does not support women's equal participation in the decision-making arena. Women legislators were at the periphery of the political arena, concentrated in *komisi* that are associated with women's issues and other issues considered less important, and lacking access to political power. Male legislators dominated the *komisi* that are more lucrative in terms of money and networking opportunities that could benefit the legislators in securing their candidacy and seats at the next election. Men acted as gatekeepers to entering the *komisi* and required women legislators to meet loyalty tests confirming their compliance with male leadership. The organisation of *komisi* working areas is used by the male leaders as a way to maintain their control over women by grouping the issues of women's empowerment with those of religion. The working hours hindered women's participation in political discussion and lack of support for young mothers created difficulties for young women legislators to balance their domestic duties.

The *DPR* plays an important role in shaping the life of society as it produces laws and policies applicable to every citizen. The centre of the Indonesian parliamentary work is the *komisi* for debate to arrive at rational justifications and decisions concerning legislation. The process aims to minimise bias in decision-making and to settle political discussion (Christiano 2003; Lafont 2006; Weale 1999). The findings in this study support the gendered organisation theories which explain that gendering processes that occur from formal policies and procedures, informal work practices, norms and pattern of work, or everyday social interaction (Acker 1990; Ely & Meyerson 2000; Kenney 1996). This study strengthens findings from other countries that parliament is not gender neutral, and that the division of labour in standing committees signals a gendering process to maintain men's power in parliament (Bolzendahl 2014; Crawford & Pini 2011; Hawkesworth 2003). It supports the notion that unravelling gender inequality in organisations requires addressing gender issues in each institution. Sawyer (2015) and Sawyer and Turner (2016) argued that the development of the gender-focused parliamentary bodies should be part of the agenda of the women's movement. Aligning with their arguments, this thesis argues that Indonesian feminists should start to move beyond the number of legislators and pay more attention to the role of *Komisi Eight* in mainstreaming gender equality in the *DPR*. A number of gendering processes in the *DPR* were identified including organisational practices that created gender segregated work and inequality of status in the organisation.

Ideally, the democratic decision-making processes should have the capacity to weigh up equally arguments both for and against a certain policy value. In

practice, power relations affect the decision-making output and, in the Indonesian case, women have less power. Male legislators have more impact on decision-making by their superior presence in *komisi* and are more able to make a difference by persuading others to vote to adopt their stance. The ideal model of democracy cannot be implemented in the *DPR*. Even though the proportion of women legislators has increased since the quota was introduced, it is not sufficient to challenge the power of the male legislators. Men hold the power to evaluate women's performance and to determine women's political career prospects. Evaluation of legislator performance uses men's values and behaviour as the gold standard. To pursue political careers and to enter men's location of power and influence, women have to adopt these standards such as speaking assertively, showing loyalty towards men, being responsive to unplanned work, working long hours, and being detached from domestic tasks. To pursue a career as a politician, women have to behave like men.

Meanwhile, women legislators are also expected to represent gender constituents. Their greater presence at the *DPR* is a direct result of the quota. However, the achievement of these objectives is problematic as women legislators were under pressure to be obedient to men legislators. Furthermore, the men block women's efforts to raise concerns on women's issues by tying women's empowerment to religion, and by relegating *komisi* more obviously associated with women's issues such as health, family planning, and women's empowerment to lower ranks in the *komisi* hierarchy. Members of those *komisi* have less power to influence decision-making in parliamentary work. Thus, the affirmative action of the quota in Indonesia is

not sufficient to achieve the objective of equal representation in practice. Programmes and strategies have to be designed to address the gendering processes. Women activists, as well as government actors such as the Ministry of Women's Empowerment, have to combine their focus on bringing more women into the parliament, with a focus on assisting women legislators to challenge the gendered organisation within parliament. However, the gendered nature of the legislature as an organisation does not explain the different outcomes of products of legislation on women's issues before and after the quotas. The organisation was also similar in the period 2004-2009, yet women legislators during that period produced better outcomes than during 2009-2014. Thus, there must be other contributing factors to the poorer substantive impacts as discussed further in subsequent chapters of this thesis.

Chapter 7 **Women Legislators in the Leadership: What is the Impact?**

This chapter focuses on the role of female political elites in the Indonesian National Parliament (*DPR*) in achieving substantive representation for feminist legislative agendas. It addresses the research question on the political environment in the consolidated democracy affecting women legislator's participation in the decision-making process to promote a feminist agenda in the parliamentary political discussion. Substantive democracy comes into view as a possible solution to achieve the politics of ideas which, as argued by Phillips, requires further development of the politics of presence. One of the important elements of substantive democracy is the attitudes of elites (Jacobs & Shapiro 1994; Welzel & Klingemann 2008). Elites' attitudes may help explain why women legislators appear to have been less effective in achieving substantive representation in the period 2009-2014. Elites are those persons who hold authoritative positions in powerful organisations and can influence decisions (Kotze & Toit 1995). The authority to affect decisions, attitudes, and behaviour of their fellows is a function of power and influence, and can significantly impact on turning gender equality into reality.

The elites in this study are the legislators who hold leadership positions in both the *komisi* and the *fraksi*. Gaining a leadership position means gaining more influence in parliament (Miguel 2012). Political changes, such as equality in social and political justice, are possible only if the elites are willing to listen to and represent public demands for political change. It can be assumed that female elites are more willing to accommodate a feminist

legislative agenda than male elites. The chapter begins by describing the proportion of women leaders in committees and party caucuses, and is followed by the factors affecting leadership emergence and leadership roles.

7.1 Women leaders in the standing committees and party caucuses

Leadership qualities are frequently associated with intelligence and traits that are associated with masculinity such as competence, assertiveness, ambition, independence, forcefulness, self-confidence, action, persistence, and dominance (Foti & Hauenstein 2007; Gershenoff & Foti 2003; Smith & Foti 1998). Leaders who combine masculine traits and intelligence are more likely to gain the most approval in a parliament that is male centred.

The Rules of Procedure of the *DPR* regulate leadership appointments at the *komisi* level. Article 52 outlines the appointment procedure and specifies that a *komisi* has a chairperson and approximately three deputies. The appointment procedures are based on consensus among *komisi* members with consideration of *fraksi* proportions and women's representation. The *fraksi* proportion means that those *fraksi* with more members are entitled to more positions. Women's representation in *komisi* leadership is not specified. The decision on the composition of the *fraksi* leaderships is determined at the party level.

Fraksi is a grouping of legislators based on the political party configuration in the *DPR*. It is a forum for individual legislators to shape a *fraksi's* collective decisions. Women's representation in *fraksi* leadership is therefore essential to ensure the feminist agenda is discussed at the *komisi* level, yet women

leaders in high positions remain rare. Leadership structures vary from one party to another. In the governing system of *Golkar* and *PKB*, *fraksi* steering committees function as advisors to the party chairperson. The *fraksi* steering committees consist of senior members of the political parties. *PDIP*, however, does not have a *fraksi* steering committee. The composition of *fraksi* steering committees also varies, for instance, the leadership of the *Demokrat* party consists of a chairperson, a vice chairperson, and 18 members. *Golkar* had only three members on its *fraksi* steering committee who are ranked equally. The proportion of women *fraksi* leaders varies, with *PDIP* having the highest proportion, and *PAN* the lowest. The proportion of women leaders in the *fraksi* in 2012 is shown in table 7.1.

Table 7.1 Women leaders in *fraksi* in 2012.

Party caucus (<i>fraksi</i>)	Proportion of women in the caucus	Proportion of women in the caucus leadership
<i>Demokrat</i>	24	21
<i>Golkar</i>	18	18
<i>PDIP</i>	19	38
<i>PKS</i>	4	13
<i>PAN</i>	15	9
<i>PPP</i>	29	29
<i>PKB</i>	29	29
<i>Gerindra</i>	12	23
<i>Hanura</i>	29	29
Total	18	23

Source: tabulated from DPR (2013); Fraksi Gerindra (2012); Fraksi Golkar (2012); Fraksi Hanura (2012); Fraksi PAN (2012); Fraksi Partai Demokrat (2012); Fraksi PDIP (2012); Fraksi PKB (2012); Fraksi PKS (2012); Fraksi PPP (2012); KPPRI (2012a).

The appointment procedure for *fraksi* leaders is not specified in the Rules of Procedure. Few legislators offered information about the kinds of considerations underpinning each party's decision to select individual legislators for leadership positions. Ms Ellia, from a large *fraksi*, and Mr

Benny, a chairperson from a small *fraksi*, stated that the leadership of their *fraksi* was a reflection of the party leadership. Mr Anto, from a large *fraksi*, furthermore elaborated on the connection between the *fraksi* and political party in making these decisions.

The decision on leadership positions is made at the level of *fraksi* with close communication with political parties. My *fraksi* has a policy that leaders of the political party will automatically be leaders of the *fraksi*.
(Ms Ellia, legislator, 20 September 2012, interview, lines 294-298)

The main consideration for leadership appointment at my *fraksi* is the member's position in the party. To be a leader at my *fraksi*, she/he should hold leadership positions in my party. There are women leaders in my *fraksi*, and they are at the positions of secretary and head of division on women's empowerment at the party office.
(Mr Benny, *fraksi* leader, 28 September 2012, interview, lines 7-10,)

We tried to create a gender balance in our decision. One consideration to be leader is period of service in the *DPR*. My intention was to allow exchange experiences from senior to junior members. For instance, I appointed Ms Jeihan as my secretary. The other consideration is competency, passion and willingness. *Fraksi* and party leaders considered those aspects.
(Mr Anto, *fraksi* leader, 4 October 2012, interview, lines 39-42)

The respondents indicated that the positions held in parties are carried into the *fraksi* in the *DPR*. Thus, *PDIP* with a higher female representation at the political party leadership also has a higher proportion of female *fraksi* leaders. Passion and willingness might refer to the self-categorisation processes in which the individual should believe in his/herself that they have leadership qualities and should pursue the position. Competency might relate to their performance as legislators and, as Mr Anto also stated, length of service in parliament was part of the assessment. Mr Dani from a new party described his decision for Ms Dewi's appointment as head of the social welfare division in his *fraksi*.

The appointment of Ms Dewi as head of the social welfare division was due to her competency and approval from the party. Input from other members on her performance at committee were considered. We have only 57 members so we know about each other's performances (lines 112-115). I have been working with Ms Dewi since 1998, when we were at NGOs. We were involved in the party at the same time as we were part of the party establishment. I know her qualities and she knows my expectations. I had thought to put her in my team, even before I was appointed as chairperson. (Mr Dani, *fraksi's* leader, 21 September 2012, interview, lines 125-130)

Mr Dani's decision was based on his assessment of the female member's individual qualities such as being a good team player. Mr Dani's *fraksi* had only two women members and he assigned one of them to the position of division leader on issues associated with women. Mr Anto indicated that his party also considered gender balance, but he positioned women at a lower position such as his secretary. *PDIP* and *Demokrat* had women in high leadership positions, such as the chairperson of the party *fraksi*. The other *fraksi* placed women at the positions of secretary, treasurer, and head of division on women's empowerment. *Fraksi* who had steering committees did not have female representation except for the *fraksi Demokrat*, which had only four women among the 20 members of its steering committee. This indicates that women are generally at a lower position in the political parties, except in *PDIP* and *Demokrat*. Only two *fraksi* of *Demokrat* and *PDIP* had female chairs.

There should be a total of forty four leaders of *komisi* as each *komisi* has one chair and three deputies. Even though the rules of procedure require consideration of women's representation in the *komisi* leaderships, women were still rare in these positions, as shown in Table 7.2. There were six women leaders in 2012, and the data in 2014 showed only four women leaders; two chairs led *Komisi* Eight and Nine, and two deputies on *Komisi*

Nine and Eleven (DPR 2014a). The chairperson of *Komisi* Five and a deputy of *Komisi* Eight were replaced by men. The proportion of women leaders was lower than the proportion of women in the *DPR*, with only 18% in 2012, and 9% in 2014, and concentrated on *komisi* associated with women's issues. *Demokrat*, *Golkar*, *PDIP*, *PAN* and *PKB* had female *fraksi* leaders, but there were none in other *fraksi*.

Table 7.2 Women leaders on *komisi* in 2012.

Committees	Leaders (one chair and three deputies)
<i>Komisi</i> 1	All men
<i>Komisi</i> 2	All men
<i>Komisi</i> 3	All men
<i>Komisi</i> 4	All men
<i>Komisi</i> 5	A chairwoman (<i>PAN</i>)
<i>Komisi</i> 6	All men
<i>Komisi</i> 7	All men
<i>Komisi</i> 8	A chairwoman (<i>PKB</i>) and a woman deputy (<i>Golkar</i>)
<i>Komisi</i> 9	A chairwoman (<i>PDIP</i>) and a woman deputy (<i>Demokrat</i>)
<i>Komisi</i> 10	All men
<i>Komisi</i> 11	A woman deputy (<i>Demokrat</i>)

Source: tabulated from DPR (2012b).

Overall, the proportion of women leaders at the *fraksi* level was higher than the proportion in the parliamentary *komisi*. The leadership of *fraksi* is closely related with the leadership at the party level, indicating that women are more able to gain leadership positions in parties. Competition for leadership of *komisi* is tougher for women, as it involves a large number of parties. Although women gained leadership positions, these were usually related to administrative tasks and areas associated with women's issues. In the hierarchy of the *komisi*, these areas were less important and had less influence in political decision-making, as discussed in Chapter 6.

Ms Ellia explained how the leadership positions at *komisi* were decided

based on the size of *fraksi*.

Golkar, the second biggest *fraksi*, is entitled to six leaders at *komisi* and one at *Banggar* (Budgeting Committee). *Demokrat*, the biggest *fraksi* is entitled to the highest number of positions, thus the *fraksi* has more opportunity to put women into the leadership positions. Women who come from smaller party *fraksi* will be less likely to gain such positions, as the men who lead the party will take these positions.

(Ms Ellia, legislator, 20 September 2012, interview, lines 298-302)

Ms Ellia highlighted that the size of the *fraksi* affected the opportunity of women to gain the positions. Women had a higher chance of being appointed to a leadership position in larger *fraksi*. *Golkar*, for instance, had seven leadership positions in the *fraksi*, yet there was only one women deputy at *Komisi Eight* who was replaced by a male deputy in 2014. *Demokrat*, as the biggest *fraksi*, had ten leaders in *komisi*, and *PDIP*, as the third biggest *fraksi* had five (DPR 2014c), yet *Demokrat* had only two women leaders out of ten and *PDIP* had one out of five. The smaller *fraksi* had no women in leadership positions except for *PKB* and *PAN* which appointed a female chairperson at *Komisi Five* in 2012 who was later replaced by a man in 2014.

Ms Jehan suggested that the political race prevented development of collective action among female legislators to demand leadership positions. The political environment in the *DPR* prevents women from acting collectively to demand more leadership positions. The political competition in the *DPR* was daunting for women.

The number of women in leadership positions is still small. It is still relying on men's willingness to allow women to gain such positions. There was no collective action from women to fight for the positions, such as women promoting other women to get the positions. Women concentrate on surviving in the *DPR*, for instance, I just focused on keeping my position. Competition is high and other legislators wanted my current position. Women are weaker in the competition and frequently become an easy target for demotion.

(Ms Jeihan, *fraksi* leader, 2 October 2012, interview, lines 243-251)

Ms Ana, a woman deputy, described the qualities she needed to gain her leadership position.

The first requirement to be appointed as a leader in the *DPR* is competency. A *komisi* leader, for instance, has to meet certain criteria such as ability to manage many legislators from other *fraksi* with diverse individual characters and political interests from nine political parties. My party is the government party so my party also considers advice from the government or working partners of the related committees. They advise on issues such as which member spoke frequently at *komisi* to secure government programmes.

(Ms Ana, standing committee leader, 2 November 2012, interview, lines 39-47)

Ms Ana implied that the qualities are similar to those needed to enter higher ranking *komisi*. They included the ability to speak assertively to secure the party political agenda in the *DPR*. In the case of Ms Ana, as she was from the ruling party, she had to show her capabilities to influence the outcome of the *komisi* work in favour of the government. She also suggested that the ability to manage political tensions between parties and individuals in the *komisi* was important.

However, these qualities are not the only criteria, as shown by comparing Mr Dani and Ms Dewi, both from same party. Even though Mr Dani and Ms Dewi joined the party at the same time, Mr Dani's political career has progressed further than Ms Dewi's. Mr Dani holds the top position as the chairperson of the *fraksi*, while Ms Dewi was at the division level and in areas associated with women issues. This suggests that women must work harder and longer

to achieve a leadership position. Ms Ana and Ms Kirana confirmed this.

We (women) must work hard to prove our capabilities. It took time for men leaders to notice our qualities and loyalty to party. The first and second years, our qualities were invisible and only men were at the leadership positions. In the third year, women were permitted to hold the leadership positions at *fraksi* and *komisi*.

(Ms Ana, *komisi* leader, 2 November 2012, interview, lines 117-121)

I have been in the *DPR* since 1997 and was a cadre at the party for a long time before entering the Parliament. I did not ask for a leadership position, I just focused to work to the best of my ability. After 10 years of service at the *DPR*, in 2007 I was appointed as a deputy at *Komisi* Eight, until now.

(Ms Kirana, *komisi* leader, 5 October 2012, interview, lines 6-10)

These quotes suggest that women were viewed as intruders in the *DPR*, which men considered their own arena. Ms Ana suggested that women had to prove to men that they had men's qualities and would obey men's orders or be loyal to men, indicating that the political race was more challenging for women. Women were on the periphery of the political arena. The tough competition may discourage women from pursuing leadership ambitions.

7.2 Self-categorisation processes

The emergence of a leader involves two processes; quality categorisation and self- categorisation (Toh & Leonardelli 2012; 2013). Self-categorisation means believing that one has the qualities sufficient to pursue leadership positions. Ms Kirana and Ms Ana each described a similar process of focusing on their work and waiting for their male colleagues' approval. They took a passive approach in pursuing leadership positions, and Ms Dewi indicated a similar approach to gain her position as a *fraksi* leader.

I had never demanded the position from my party leaders. The decision was made under my party leader's authority. I was involved in the party since its initiation in 1998. They may consider my position at political party as head of division of social welfare covering issues of health and women empowerment, which is similar to my position at the *fraksi*.

(Ms Dewi, *fraksi* leader, 26 September 2012, interview, lines 13-16)

Ms Dewi's passive approach involved strengthening her performance so that her qualities stood out among men. All three women took many years to prove their qualities. Ms Kirana, took ten years to secure a leadership position, while Ms Ana, who came from a new party, took three years. Ms Ana had previously served in local parliament for one term before entering the *DPR* (CETRO 2010). Ms Kirana and Ms Dewi were involved in the party for quite some time and took longer than men to prove their qualities. Haryanti's (2006) earlier study suggested similar passive behaviour by women legislators. Women avoided confrontation and waited for party leaders to notice their qualities and decide to promote them, while men tended to be more aggressive and proactive (Ashford & LeCroy 2010, p.495; Paxton & Hughes 2014, pp.89-91).

However, there were also other women interviewees who expressed a more active approach to securing a leadership position in their *fraksi*.

I asked my party leaders for a leadership position. I insisted on the position. I said 'I am much better than other men members who have leadership positions, then why I do not have a chance to be in the position.' I am now leader of community aspirations at my *fraksi*. I gained the position through lobbying party leaders.

(Ms Indah, *fraksi* leader, 26 October 2012 interview, lines 38-41)

I got the strategic position in little steps. First, I established networks with key people at the party. Then, I brought my CV to show my qualifications to them. After that, I asked to volunteer at organising important events for the party. This activity expanded my network and brought me closer to key people in the party. Then, I started to approach the key people and asked to be part of their team. After a while, my party leader noticed my work and offered me a strategic position. First, I got promotion in the party to be team member for party regional relationships. Then, I got a position at *fraksi* leadership.

(Ms Jeihan, *fraksi* leader, 2 November 2012, interview, lines 68-81)

Ms Indah and Ms Jeihan took proactive approaches with party leaders to gain positions. Compared with the passive approaches, proactive strategies appear to shorten the time it takes for women members to gain a leadership position. Ms Jeihan's case showed that she could gain the position in her first period of service while others needed longer, like Ms Kirana, who came from the same party but took more than ten years. However, it might also not be comparable as they hold different leadership roles at *komisi* and *fraksi*. Despite the different approach, all interviewees indicated that they worked hard to gain their positions. The competitive environment of the political parties and parliament values the qualities of politicians over and above gender. Thus, women could achieve qualities as politicians first, before gaining sufficient influence which may enable them to bring the issues of women to the parliamentary agenda.

7.3 Leadership roles

The above discussion revealed that women need to work harder and longer to gain a leadership position in the *DPR*. Why is it significant for women to gain such positions? Evaluation of substantive representation suggests that leaders have more influence and authority in directing policies, thus they are significant in voicing women issues (Murray 2012; Miguel 2012). The leadership roles require winning political coalitions (March & Olsen 1989) by building alliances in the political office to gain support from others, which sometimes involves elite bargaining (Shapiro 1999). The Rules of Procedure, Article 30, specify roles of leaders at the *DPR* such as agenda setter, and leader in political discussions. Ms Ana, the *komisi* deputy, described her position in influencing the outcome of *komisi* discussions.

When I led a meeting, I managed the flow of the discussion and directed participants to reach agreement. When discussion was challenging with many disagreements, I needed to stay calm. In such a situation, I needed to keep focus on my party position as ruling party and in supporting the government. I should always support the government.

(Ms Ana, *komisi* leader, 2 November 2012 interview, lines 69-71)

Ms Ana implied that she can manipulate the outcome in her party's interests.

Leaders have more advantage to influence others for a desired outcome.

Thus the ability to secure the party's interest in the *komisi* work might

become an important leadership quality. Ms Putri, chairperson of a

supplementary committee, confirmed the significance of the agenda setting

role.

I should be knowledgeable about the issue and listen to other opinions. When there was disagreement, I needed to decide, which I thought was the best for a final decision. There would always be opposition to the final decision, but it was part of the democratic discussion. I hold the highest authority in the decision-making process.

(Ms Putri, *komisi* leader, 16 October 2012, interview, lines 28-33)

Ms Putri had significant power in the decision-making process of her *komisi*,

and the position allowed her voice to be heard and to be listened to by

others. Ms Ana explained that she acted for her *fraksi* interests, which might

suggest the position was to pursue *fraksi* interests, instead of individual

interests. Thus, gaining leadership positions in *komisi* does not mean that

women leaders will necessarily voice and defend women's issues in the

komisi. They are selected as leaders by *fraksi* and are expected to follow the

orders of the *fraksi* leaders to secure their *fraksi* mission in the *DPR*. The

individual voice was often contested at *fraksi* level, as indicated by one of the

women *komisi* leaders.

Individual voices are contested at *fraksi* discussions. At the *komisi*, there will be no individual opinion, only the *fraksi* opinion. Thus, members from the same *fraksi* would voice the same opinion as their differing opinions were sorted out in the internal *fraksi*.

(Ms Kirana, *komisi* leader, 5 October 2012, interview, lines 21-26)

Ms Kirana explained that the discussion starts at the *fraksi* level, in which everyone could present their arguments to reach an agreement, and the resulting decision should then be supported by all members. The decision made at the *fraksi* would then be contested at the *komisi* levels, as stated by Ms Kirana. *Komisi* were an arena for *fraksi* contestation of ideas and programmes. Within this mechanism, women's issues should be voiced at *fraksi* level to gain political support for the *komisi* level.

The roles of *fraksi* leaders are not specified in the Rules of Procedure. Ms Dewi described her role as a *fraksi* leader.

I prefer avoiding confrontation in leading discussion. I noticed that other members were not aware that I led them to my way of thinking. I would not show that I had a different opinion or preference. I should be calm and organise my thoughts during the discussion and would slowly direct others towards mine.

(Ms Dewi, *fraksi* leader, 26 September 2012, interview, lines 371-376).

Ms Dewi's description was like that of Ms Ana, in which her position allowed her to influence others. However, Ms Dewi's motivation was to influence others to her individual preference while Ms Ana was working for her *fraksi* preferences. Ms Dewi was a leader of the welfare division, which covered issues of education, health, and women's empowerment. Thus, her position allowed her to influence issues only for members of *Komisi* Eight, Nine, and Ten. She operates at the lowest level of discussion among the members of those *komisi*, and then conveys her decision to a higher level under the supervision of the *fraksi* chairman.

In addition to the role of leading discussion, the *fraksi* leader's role is also to supervise *fraksi* members in the *komisi* discussion to ensure that its members discuss the *fraksi's* standpoints.

I am head of the subdivision on health for my *fraksi*. I need to ensure that my *fraksi* colleagues at *Komisi* Nine have same voices for a certain issue discussed at the *Komisi*. I am from the ruling party so I need to ensure that we stand for the government programme.

(Ms Hanifah, *fraksi* leader, 9 October 2012, interview, lines 117-121)

Ms Hanifah indicated that she used her authority mainly to ensure that other members followed the party line. The *fraksi* leader had authority to discipline others who were against party decisions (Tweedie 2008). *Fraksi* directed parliamentary works. Ms Dewi, another *fraksi* leader, confirmed this, explaining how she used text messaging to pull her party colleagues into line (Ms Dewi's interview, 26 September 2012, lines 303-313). At the parliamentary level, there would be no individual voice, only *fraksi* voices. This suggests that the political party has a strong influence on the parliamentary agenda. Hence, I argue that each party should have a vision on gender equality and it is the role of women party cadres to gain party leaders' support on gender equality issues. An examination of the parties' visions found that there was no reference to gender equality or women's empowerment in any of the available parties' vision statements (Partai Demokrat 2013; Partai Gerindra 2013; Partai Golkar 2013; Partai Hanura 2013; PAN 2014; PDIP 2014; PKB 2014; PKS 2013; PPP 2013). This might suggest that the power of women's party wings were weak and insufficient to challenge the opposition of the male party elites to institute gender equality in the parties' agendas. Analysis on the party lines towards gender equality requires further research on the role of the women's party wing in

mainstreaming gender equality in the party agenda.

Agenda setting may not be sufficient to determine how the issues brought to the agenda are resolved. The leaders must bargain with members, offering persuasive arguments, to achieve desired outcomes. Lobbying activities were part of the decision-making process in the *DPR*, as suggested by Ms Ana.

Informal networking is very important. The networking brings advantages to the party. To succeed in our goal, we cannot work on an individual basis. We must build a coalition with one or two party *fraksi*. Lobbying will be much easier if we have good relationships. I established networking with other legislators from not only my *fraksi*, but also other *fraksi*, which is my priority. Networking can be achieved by many methods such as mutual relationships. I identified my potential allies and opponents. I will focus on the potential allies for political support.

(Ms Ana, *komisi* leader, 2 November, interview, lines 49-58)

Ms Ana demonstrated that part of her role was to build political alliances to gain political support. The Rules of Procedure, chapter 17, regulate the decision-making procedure. The decision is based on consensus and if a consensus cannot be reached, voting is then required. Consensus means an agreement among parties, which was not always likely to occur as there were nine parties with different missions and interests in the National Parliament during this period. If voting took place, the decision would be decided by a simple majority.

The proportion of each *komisi* held by the nine *fraksi* during the period 2009-2014 (see Table 4.1) shows that no caucus held a majority of the seats. The biggest *Demokrat fraksi* had only 26% of seats, and had to secure political support from at least two other *fraksi* to form a majority. Ms Ana indicated that there were mutual relationships, which could mean offering benefits to other parties to secure their support. Mutual relationships could also refer to

providing information, and identifying possible coalitions (March & Olsen 1989). Ms Ana indicated that she identified possible coalitions and that subsequent side payments may occur in exchange for their support. Rampant cases of corruption among legislators could be evidenced by the side payment practices for the exchange of political support. The act of providing information was suggested by Ms Putri, a chairperson for a supplementary committee on state accountability.

My strategy is lobbying with assertive arguments. I provide evidence and solid information to support my arguments, so that others would understand my point of view. I must be assertive and persistent in holding my opinion against resistance. Resistance will always exist. I just need to manage the conflict properly.

(Ms Putri, *komisi* leader, 16 October 2012, interview, lines 35-40)

Lobbying is a task for those in leadership positions such as head of division. In my *komisi*, lobbying should be conducted by the head of the social welfare division.

(Ms Nisa, legislator, 18 October 2012, interview, lines 138-140)

Negotiation occurs in the lobbying activities by providing sufficient information and facilitating side payments, as indicated by both Ms Putri and Ms Ana. Only the leaders are responsible for this, as Ms Nisa pointed out. With the dominance of male party and parliamentary leaders, they control this deal-making process. If women disagree with such practice, they have to leave the *DPR*, as suggested by Wijaksana (2005), or are unable to pursue their parliamentary career as suggested by women legislators' struggle to join *komisi* associated with men's work, as discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.1. Furthermore, the significance of the lobbying activities was revealed at the proceedings of the working committee (*panja*) meetings on the Bill on the amendment of the 2008 Election Law.

At every working committee meeting on the Bill discussion, the chair

overviewed the meeting agenda and the previous meeting's conclusion. One of the issues was the procedure for decision-making, as follows:

In the opening remarks, the chairperson stated that the working committee [*panja*] will focus on four crucial issues identified at the special committee [*pansus*]. The chairperson emphasised that the discussion processes will depend on the lobbying activities by party leaders on those issues.
(Proceedings of the *panja* meeting, 12 January 2012)

In the opening remarks, the chairperson explained the organisation of discussions. Special committee [*pansus*] will resolve the unresolved issues from the working committee. The progress of the Bill will also depend on lobbying activities among *fraksi*. One [male] member interrupted "I think the lobby is decided by the powerful. We are just implementers as ordinary members. The male leaders acted as God determining the results, which occur in parties. So, I propose that we should focus on today's agenda and ignore the lobbying processes. Let the male leaders handle the lobbies. I also believe that the chairman must have lobbied other leaders already." The chair responded to his speech saying that the lobbying process could not be avoided, as it was part of the political processes.
(Proceedings of the *panja* meeting, 18 January 2012)

In the opening remarks, the chairperson spoke to a male member from *Demokrat* who asked about last night's meeting which lasted until 3:00am. It was related to lobbying activities among leaders.
(Proceedings of *panja* meeting, 25 January 2012)

The proceedings suggested that lobbying determined the outcomes, was carried out by male leaders, and conducted informally in the male schedule. With the domination of men in the lobbying processes, and the fact that most of the lobbying activities appeared to take place at night, women leaders were likely to be less effective. This may have led to the failure to revise the quota articles in the 2012 Election Law, as discussed in the following section.

7.4 The substantive and symbolic impact of women leaders

Women's access to leadership positions enables them to pursue legislative outcomes that are in the interests of women. Leadership qualities and recruitment might affect women's ability to promote issues in parliamentary operations. Women leaders must comply with men's norms to secure approval for their behaviour. There were two women in the top positions of

fraksi in *PDIP* and *Demokrat*, and three *komisi* with women in the top positions; *Komisi* Five, Eight, and Nine. Nevertheless, Chapter 5 showed that the women legislators serving in the period 2009-2014 had the least impact on substantive representation in promoting feminist agendas in parliamentary operations.

7.4.1 Substantive impact

During the period 2009-2014, the feminists' proposal of the Gender Equality Bill, and the revision of quota articles in the Bill on amendment of the 2008 Election Law, failed to be passed into law. The feminist concern was that the proportion of women in the *DPR* is still low following the 2009 Election. The evaluation of the 2009 Election indicates that several parties failed to nominate 30% women candidates at all levels; the national, provincial and district (speech of a women activist, proceeding of the Election Bill *Pansus*, 14 December 2011). The candidates were clustered at lower positions in the listing with less chance to win. Of the candidates at high positions on the listings, 83% were men and only 18% were women (speech of a women activist, proceeding of the Election Bill *Pansus*, 14 December 2011).

There were five demands made by women's organisations to revise the quota articles (KPPRI 2011a). The first demand was revision of the wording to strengthen the call for 30% women candidates. The second was to regulate the listing system to require women to be at least 30% of the top three positions of the party lists in all constituencies. The third was to include an article allowing disqualification of parties failing to meet the provisions, and for the supervisory body of the election to publish the names of those

parties in the public media.

The Bill deliberation was in three stages; the *pansus* (special committee), *panja* (working committee), and *timus & timsin* (synchronised and steering teams). *Pansus* work focused on public engagement in the bill deliberations through a public hearing. The procedure reflects the deliberative decision-making procedures used to settle political discussion so that the procedure involves public or institutional discussions for coordination among people who share concerns about the proposed legislation.

Pansus conducted 12 public hearings with civil society organisations on drafts of articles in the bill. The organisations included professional organisations such as the Indonesian Association of Accountants (IAI), government institutions such as the State Audit Agency (BPK), the General Election Committee (KPU), and the Election Supervisory Body (*Bawaslu*), Police (Polri) and Army (TNI), NGOs, and individual experts (proceeding of *pansus*, public hearing, October 2011-April 2012). The Indonesian Women's Parliamentary Caucus (*KPPRI*) facilitated a hearing with women's organisations (Chapter 8 further discusses the *KPPRI*'s role).

The Gender Equality Bill was in the working area of *Komisi* Eight, and the Bill for the amendment of the 2008 Election Law was the responsibility of *Komisi* Two. *Komisi* Eight had a woman chairperson and a woman deputy, but the Gender Equality Bill did not progress. The Bill was on the legislation priority list in 2012 and 2013, but not in 2014. If substantive impact is assessed only by the policy outcome, the presence of women leaders in *Komisi* Eight did not translate into substantive outcomes.

The impact of women leaders on substantive representation can also be assessed at the *fraksi* level. There were two women *fraksi* leaders representing the *Demokrat* party with 26% of the vote and *PDIP* with 17%. This would have given the Gender Equality Bill 43% of the vote and required the formation of a coalition with one small *fraksi* to achieve over 50%. However, this was not attempted or achieved. This suggests women's inability to form coalition and put pressure to male leaders to gain men's supports. To be able to form coalition, the Bill should become a common agenda among women across party lines. The role of women's parliamentary caucus to strengthen women's political influence would be significant, which is discussed at Chapter 8.

On these findings, I argue that a woman's presence in a leadership position does not necessarily translate into appointing more women legislators to the working committee (*panja* and *pansus*) on the revision of quota articles. *PDIP* and *Demokrat* had no women's representation on the *panja* and *pansus*. The chairs of the committees were men from *Demokrat*, *PDIP*, *Golkar* and *PPP*. Women's representation at the *pansus* was small, with just three women (two from *Golkar* and one from *PKB*) out of thirty members or 10%. Women's representation was then reduced to only two out of twenty members, or 10% from the same caucuses at *panja* level. *Timsin* and *timus* had no women legislators among their thirteen members. These figures suggest that *PDIP* and *Demokrat* showed a lack of support for the quota amendment, or that women leaders did not support the revision. Ms Olga, a member of the *panja* was concerned about the lack of support from the female leaders.

Promoting women's issues in the *DPR* is also dependent on support from women leaders. If the leaders are not aware and provide political support on feminist issues, it would be less effective. The quota revisions, for instance, did not get support from the biggest *fraksi* of *Demokrat* who had the most women legislators, but they failed to put forth women's representation at the working committees. It upset me the most.
(Ms Olga, legislator, 24 September 2012, interview, lines 141-146)

The lack of support from female leaders may indicate the strong control of male party elites. As discussed in Chapter 6 on the constitution of the standing committees, in order to advance their political career, women have to conform to male norms. Supporting the revision of the quota law risks jeopardising their political careers by going against male power holders. Women leaders thus may confront difficult choices between pursuing their political career or loyalty to the women's movement. As Ms Olga indicated above, many appear to put their career first. Although female leaders were potentially critical actors in the coalition-building and lobbying processes essential to gain support from the majority of male party elites to revise the quotas, they were rendered comparatively powerless. This goes some way to explaining the inability of women parliamentarians to strengthen the quota articles in the Election Law of 2012.

The proposal for the revision was made at the public hearing at *pansus* level on the 4th of December 2011, with a meeting agenda for a public hearing with *KPPRI*. The hearing was attended by seventeen out of the thirty members, and chaired by male leaders from *PPP*, an Islamic party. There was only one woman legislator from *PKB* who attended the hearing; the other two women legislators from *Golkar* were absent. There were many women's organisations at the hearing such as *Puskapol UI* (Research Centre for Politics of the University of Indonesia), *Komnas Perempuan* (National

Commission on Violence against Women), and *Ansipol* (Civil Society Alliance for Women in Politics). All caucuses represented by men legislators rejected the demands that were presented by the women from civil society at the beginning of the hearing. *Golkar*'s male members rejected the revision on the grounds that the demands did not provide sufficient data of female cadres at the parties, particularly at the regional level. *Golkar* did not have sufficient women cadres to meet the 30% quota, particularly at the regional level. Other caucus members expressed concern about international influences on the quota issues, which clashed with local values. However, the spokesperson did not detail the issues of international influence. The other rejection from *PKS* raised four main concerns. The first was that women should compete fairly, and the second that there should be a focus on quality rather than quantity of women legislators. The third was that the argument that more female members would lead to less corruption was faulty as there were some women legislators who were also accused of embezzling government funds. The last concern was that *PKS* did not have sufficient women cadres who were qualified to become candidates. *Demokrat* shared the first two concerns of *PKS*, but added that women were not qualified enough to enter political activities. Some caucuses including *PDIP* did not respond to the demands at the hearing. The discussion at the *pansus* level indicated that the presence of women leaders in *Demokrat* did not translate into support for the revisions.

Discussion at the *panja* level of the amendment of the quota articles occurred at two *panja* meetings. The first discussion was at the meeting on 16th of February 2012. Ms Olga said, "I want to voice the demands of the 30% quota of women candidates. My party agreed to the proposal, even the leaders said

it should be 50%” (proceedings of *panja* meeting 16 February 2012). A man from *PDIP* said “I think Articles 53-57 are problematic. The article about sanction by public announcement for a party failing to meet the quota, for instance, is meaningless. The article about sanctions is ineffective. Thus, I suggest bringing the issues into the lobby forum” (proceedings of *panja* meeting on 16 February 2012). Male members from *Demokrat* and *Golkar* agreed with the members from *PDIP*.

The second attempt at discussing the issues was at the *panja* meeting on the 28th of February 2012, when it was raised by Mr Ibnu, a member from *Golkar* who held a leadership position in the caucus, but the response from the other caucuses was similar to the earlier meeting. A man from *PDIP* said, “I personally agree with the proposal, however discussion in my party is not easy. The problem in my party is there are insufficient women cadres committed to political activities. Thus, I suggest bringing the issue into the lobby forum” (proceeding of *panja* meeting, 28 February 2012). The Islamic party, *PPP*, supported *PDIP*'s standpoint of bringing the issue into the lobby forum. *Demokrat* shared similar concerns with *PDIP* on the insufficient number of qualified women cadres. A male member of *Golkar* defended the demands, something that did not happen at the previous meeting. He cited the justifications made by the women's organisations in civil society, as presented at the previous *pansus* hearing, however the majority still opposed the revisions. The chair concluded that the issue should be discussed at the lobby forum, which provides an opportunity for civil society to lobby party leaders.

Thus, the deliberation of the feminist proposal to secure a favourable interpretation of the quota articles demonstrated how men joined forces across party lines to oppose the proposal. Female leaders were not able to do the same in support of the proposal. The findings are similar to that of the Gender Equality Bill where the presence of women leaders at *Komisi Eight* was not sufficient to overcome the opposition toward the Bill. The leadership qualities and recruitment in the *DPR* affect the substantive impact of women leaders. The leaders have to abide by the orders of the male party leaders. The aim of the leaders is to secure their party interests in the parliamentary operations; the responses toward the proposal from all caucuses were to have a discussion at the lobby forum. Lobbying was seen to be the forum for political bargaining among party leaders. Lack of support from *PDIP* and *Demokrat* may indicate either that women leaders are unable to persuade their male colleagues, or that women leaders do not have a feminist agenda. Either way, the presence of women leaders did not help to advance women's issues in the *DPR*.

7.4.2 Symbolic impact

This section investigates whether women leaders could challenge the norms in the *DPR* and, thus, make the workplace friendlier for other women. Interviews with women legislators suggested that women leaders were more sympathetic and accommodating towards women's issues in the workplace. Ms Olga, a caucus leader, expressed her sympathy for issues experienced by women, and used her position to empower other women legislators.

My caucus attempts to increase effective participation of its members. My role is distributing party assignments among the members in the parliamentary work such as membership at committees. I will be more careful in making decisions for women members' assignment. The intention is to motivate more women legislator participation. For instance, I avoided rotation of women in the committee membership. I had a regular discussion with the women who participated less to advise them on how to improve their performance.

(Ms Olga, *fraksi* leader, 24 September 2012, interview, lines 171-175)

As discussed in Chapter 6, women were easy targets for rotation in the committee membership, but the rotation caused significant barriers for them.

Ms Olga used her leadership position to help women avoid committee membership rotation. Another female caucus leader, Ms Hanifah, empathised with female colleagues who had young families.

Parliamentary schedules are very busy and take almost all of our time. I distribute tasks equally among members and am considerate toward young women who have little children. For instance, if the child is unwell, I could understand her situation, and try to share her duties with others.

(Ms Hanifah, *fraksi* leader, 9 October 2012, lines 101-106)

Ms Hanifah and Ms Olga indicated that they had a better understanding of the challenges women faced in meeting parliamentary working norms than their male counterparts. Although male leaders recognised the women's challenges to equally participate in the parliamentary decision-making processes as suggested by a *fraksi* leader of Mr. Anto at p. 142, male leaders were inconsiderate toward women's problems. Thus, female presence in the leadership positions facilitated other women's ability to balance domestic and parliamentary tasks, but on an individual basis and not in a systematic way. Ms Cindy from *Demokrat* confirmed the positive impacts of women leaders in making the workplace friendlier for women.

I, and other women legislators, proposed to change the caucus's meeting schedule from Friday to Thursday night. The proposal was due to women's concerns regarding staying away from their family, particularly those whose family stayed in their electorates. The proposal aimed to give women more days at the representative areas to have more time with families from Friday to Sunday. The proposal was ignored until Ms Nurhayati took the position as chairperson. After her appointment, she approved the proposal. (Ms Cindy, legislator, 17 September 2012, interview, lines 170-181)

Ms Cindy, Ms Olga, and Ms Hanifah all suggested that women leaders were more willing to accommodate women's domestic roles and more sensitive to their needs. In addition, the presence of female leaders in top positions increased other women's confidence, as described by Ms Hanifah.

I am on *Komisi* Nine on health, and two leaders of the committee are women. Their presence makes me feel able to share my ideas at the meetings. I feel more relaxed in discussion. The response to my problems is also better. Since the appointment of Ms Nurhayati as party caucus chairperson, she cares about my work and that motivates me more to do my best.

(Ms Hanifah, legislator, 9 October 2012, interview, lines 59-68)

Ms Hanifah suggested that the presence of other women had inspired her to perform better, and a female leader was more attentive towards women's problems. Women leaders serve as role models, assisting in the self-categorising process that each woman has leadership qualities.

Observation of standing committee meetings that were open to the public further indicated that women legislators were more active in participation on committees with a woman leader, and those committees with more women members. The list of the committee meetings that were observed in this study is in Appendix 6. Those committees with more women in the membership, such as *Komisi* Eight and Nine, demonstrated similar behaviour by both leaders and members in the committee discussions. The chairs were more attentive towards members' demands to share their opinions and were more relaxed. They allowed the members more time to share their opinions

compared with the chairs of committees with fewer women members, such as *Komisi* Three and Eleven. The committees also shared similarities in the women's behaviour in discussions. *Komisi* Eight and Nine's women members were more active, and spoke more frequently and for longer periods. There is also some indication that women could ally themselves with other members and support each other's demands. This indicates that women had more power compared with those on *Komisi* Three and Eleven.

In *Komisi* Three, Six, and Eleven, considered as important committees that focused on issues associated with male work, women members behaved differently in committee sessions. *Komisi* Eleven had a woman leader while the other two did not. The committees shared similarities in the behaviour of the chairs, but not in the behaviour of the female members. The chairpersons at those committees took control over the flow of discussion and limited the time of speakers. Women's behaviour in discussion at *Komisi* Eleven was more confident; they shared their opinion during the discussion while in the other two committees none of the women members spoke up. Women members of *Komisi* Eleven were more active in discussion, even though their contributions were short and less assertive compared with the women of *Komisi* Eight and Nine.

Looking at the interviewee responses and researcher observations of the committee meetings in combination indicates that the presence of women in top positions in the *DPR* has brought some positive impact for women legislators in non-leadership roles. Women legislators were more confident when women held leadership positions in the committees, and had more confidence in performing parliamentary work. This is likely to increase

women's visibility in parliamentary work due to their more active participation and, hence, they might gain more respect and trust from their male colleagues to assume important tasks in the parliament. This is likely to bring women closer to substantive power and influence in the political arena.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter argued that access to locations of power is crucial in voicing women's issues in parliament. However, it found that women's access to leadership positions did not guarantee that women's issues would be a priority and gain political support. The procedures of recruitment and the hierarchy in parliamentary decision-making require women leaders to follow the objectives of the party rather than the individual or group. The political reality in the Indonesian National Parliament is that negotiation for women's interests faces a challenging journey through the hierarchy in the decision-making procedures from the party to the standing committees. Committee and caucus leaders have the authority to influence others to choose one decision over another, but the presence of female leaders in the *DPR* was not sufficient to promote a feminist agenda in the parliamentary operations. A more significant impact of the women leaders is related to their function as a role model which increases confidence and motivation of other women in legislative discussions. Women leaders were more attentive towards other women's needs to balance domestic tasks with their parliamentary role.

If the argument for a quota is that women's presence in parliament would advance a feminist legislative agenda, this chapter argued that it has failed to do so. Women leaders had little room to act against party policy. The findings

suggest that party caucuses that have women in top positions did not support the feminist proposal to improve the quota legislation by imposing sanctions and securing a favourable listing number for women candidates. The presence of women leaders in *Komisi Eight* did not result in the enactment of the Gender Equality Bill. Aligned with Phillips' (1995) argument of the importance of the women's movement in advancing the gender quota, this chapter further argued that feminists should also work to create favourable conditions for women leaders to gain influence in the party caucus. One of the conditions is strengthening the role of women's parliamentary caucus, which is the subject of Chapter 8. The leadership qualities of senior women politicians might affect women's behaviour in supporting a feminist agenda, but leadership recruitment in the committees and party caucus still used male standards.

Even though women can gain the top position at committees and caucuses, their number has not been sufficient to challenge the masculine norms to be more accommodating toward women's voices. All leaders need to go through competitive processes to attain leadership, but it is harder for women. Once they are in the leadership position, they face enormous pressure to conform to the majority (male) norms and demands. Thus, it is reasonable to presume that one of the reasons women leaders have not been more demonstratively pro-feminist in policy promotion is because pushing feminist issues would be too politically risky or against the status quo, and to do so might be political suicide (Genovese 2013). This study also suggests that lobbying played a significant role in the decision-making process. Lobbying was an informal forum among (male) political leaders to bargain on legislative issues, and

was a closed discussion. Consequently, the lack of women in leadership positions combined with male lobbying practices affected women's access to the forum, leading to women's lack of influence and power in the Indonesian National Parliament.

Chapter 8 **The Indonesian Women's Parliamentary Caucus: Its Role in Substantive Representation**

Women's parliamentary caucuses are one strategy suggested and developed by feminist theorists and activists to address the problem of substantive impact (Bakopanos 2004; Ballington 2008; Costa et al. 2013; Johnson & Josefsson 2016; Sawer 2015; Sawer & Turner 2016; Veberyte 2015). As Anne Phillips (1995) points out, the political institutions of modern democracy can operate to marginalise minority and disadvantaged groups such as women, this is what makes the move from the politics of presence to the politics of ideas so difficult and which acts as a barrier to such groups having meaningful influence on the legislative outcomes of parliament and substantive political equality. In terms of gender equity in the democratic process, Anne Phillips further asserts that the failure to achieve the politics of ideas through the implementation of gender quotas is due to the failure of the women's movement to incorporate sustainable relationships between the elected women members of parliament and the women's civil society organisations to establish a common agenda. This thesis argues that a women's parliamentary caucus could bridge the gap by establishing networking and communication between women legislators and women's civil society organisations, which is essential for the formulation of a common agenda. The significant role of the caucus was proven in the Indonesian experience of legislating gender quotas during the period of democratic transition. As a number of scholars have pointed out (Brabant 1998; Jacobs & Shapiro 1994; Welzel & Klingemann 2008), establishing a common agenda and connection between the women's civil society organisations and women

legislators is also favourable to the attainment of substantive democracy in achieving the politics of ideas.

As Siregar (2010) argues, a robust Indonesian Women's Parliamentary Caucus (*KPPRI*) might be able to bring together the diverse perspectives among women legislators on what is considered women's issues. The Women's Parliamentary Caucus could facilitate the establishment of cross-party consensus before discussions in the standing committees (Ballington 2008, pp.68-69; Sawyer 2015, pp.116-117; Sawyer & Turner 2016, p.770). Such cross party consensus building is essential in resolving differing opinions among women legislators. As discussed in Chapter 3, where a women's parliamentary caucus has been implemented effectively, studies indicate they can play a key role in supporting successful legislation on women issues (Costa et al. 2013; Johnson & Josefsson 2016, p. 11; Bakopanos 2004). Johnson and Josefsson (2016), and Costa et al. (2013), argue that the caucus can only work effectively if it defines its goals, receives sufficient funding, communicates effectively with its partners from inside and outside parliament, and receives strong backing from women's civil society organisations.

This chapter analyses the key elements for the effectiveness of such a caucus in the Indonesian National Parliament. It does so by extending Haryanti's (2006) findings on the significant role played by the Indonesian Women's Parliamentary Caucus (*KPPRI*) in women's substantive impact during the democratic transition in 1999-2004. However, Siregar (2010, pp 192-193) reported that the effective work of the caucus decreased in the

period 2004-2009, compared to the previous period, due to a lack of money and resources. This chapter adds to the work of Haryanti (2006) and Siregar (2010) by exploring the role of the *KPPRI* in the 2009-2014 legislative period. It seeks to establish whether the *KPPRI* played a role in the less effective substantive representation of women legislators during this period.

The chapter argues that the *KPPRI* was less consolidated during this period due to stronger party intervention. Ineffective communication between female legislators and women in civil society caused friction with the women's caucus and reduced the effectiveness of the women legislators in substantive representation.

8.1 *KPPRI*'s objectives, outreach, and partnership strategies

The *KPPRI* aims to enable women to bring about greater equality between men and women in the daily operations of the *DPR*. It aims to unite women legislators across party lines, around a common goal that they all can support (Bakopanos 2004; Costa et al. 2013; IPU 2013; Johnson & Josefsson 2016; Veberyte 2015). The goal is to defend women's legislative priorities and increase their influence in parliament so that women's issues are discussed and articulated in legislation. The women's caucus has been particularly effective in changing legislation and policies from a gender perspective and raising awareness about gender equality. Has this aim been achieved in the *DPR*?

The establishment of the women's parliamentary caucus has a specific purpose that varies across countries. The establishment of a caucus in South Sudan, for instance, aimed to achieve women's priorities such as addressing

female poverty as a result of the country's civil war (Akec 2012). In Lesotho, the caucus was established to address issues of gender-related violence and inheritance rights (Nduru 2007). The establishment of a women's caucus of the Parliamentary Assembly of Portuguese-speaking Countries aimed to build a supportive network, establish a pathway for the development of a gender equality agenda, and enhance women's capacity as effective representatives (Costa 2016, p.4).

The *KPPRI* was initiated in 2001 by women legislators elected in the 1999 election. The women's movement initiated the affirmative action of the quota, and lobbied the female legislators to establish a women's parliamentary caucus in the *DPR*. Both actions, the quota and the establishment of the *KPPRI*, were part of the democratic transition as well as reflecting the influence of women in the international community. Ms Cindy, who was a member of the *DPR* from 1999-2004, outlined the influence of the international community in the establishment of the *KPPRI*.

The *KPPRI* was established due to demand from the international community. I was also a member at that time and I disagreed with the establishment of the women's caucus. It was because of the pressure from the women's international parliament [Inter-Parliamentary Union/IPU] and from the Ministry of Women's Empowerment that we formed the caucus. If we did not establish it, Indonesia would be isolated from the international community. However, I thought that if there was no benefit and if it did not come from our own initiative, it would be ineffective.

(Ms Cindy, legislator, 17 September 2012, interview, lines 123-128)

Ms Cindy indicated that there was disagreement among female legislators about the *KPPRI*. Ms Cindy's opposition was due to her concerns about international influences, which had pushed for its establishment. The same argument was also raised by a male legislator in his opposition to the quota revision, as stated in Chapter 7 (subsection 7.4.1 on substantive impact),

where it was discussed that the opposition used the suspicion of international influence to reject the feminists' proposal. In the modern world, Indonesia has embraced the international community, and women's organisations and female legislators have access to international experience, knowledge, and advice. However, there are still strong feelings about Indonesia's autonomy being undermined by international influence, but exploring this further is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The *KPPRI* has a vision to accelerate the Indonesian democratic transition by increasing women's participation in policy deliberations; ensuring gender equality in policy outcomes; increasing women's access and participation to development processes; and supporting the government's policy in mainstreaming gender equality (KPPRI 2011a). The vision in the period 2009-2014 was similar to that in the period 2004-2009. Based on these objectives, the caucus sought to enable women legislators to participate in decision-making processes to achieve substantive gender equality for women in Indonesian society. As discussed in the previous chapters, the gendered organisation of the *DPR* and leadership qualities have prevented women from having equal access and influence in legislative work. However, this is not a concern of the *KPPRI*, which focuses on addressing legislative issues.

To achieve its objectives, the *KPPRI*'s strategies were to eliminate gender biased laws, initiate drafts of legislation that promote gender equality, and enhance partnerships with parties at national, regional, and international levels (KPPRI 2012b). The strategies focused on legislative outcomes and

did not detail the pathways to achieve these objectives. The first strategy, for instance, does not identify which laws are gender biased. Strategy number two does not detail which issues should be the legislative focus. Strategy number three could be directed to gain support for the caucus activities, yet it does not have specific targets on which parties would be involved in partnerships, and how these would be implemented to achieve strategies number one and two.

The *KPPRI* developed guidelines for its activities (KPPRI 2011a). The key activities were to support the *DPR* and the government programme in gender budgeting, to develop partnerships with government and civil society, and to implement a capacity-building programme for women legislators. In addition, the *KPPRI* aimed to communicate effectively with national and international partners in the implementation of the Beijing Action Plan and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and to exchange information and work closely with women's civil society organisations in securing the implementation of the quota.

The vision, objectives, and strategies of the women's caucus do not align, as there were no specific targets set. There was lack of focus on what the *KPPRI* wanted to achieve during the five-year parliamentary term. Even though the guidelines emphasise cooperation with government and civil society, there was no clear direction as to what the cooperation was to achieve. The imprecise objectives caused ineffective organisation of the *KPPRI*'s activities, as Ms Ana, chairperson of *KPPRI* outlined.

There is no specific agenda. *KPPRI* activities were to achieve equality in the areas of social welfare. The main activities aim to improve women's participation at committee level, and to support the government programme to meet the MDGs. I urged women legislators to focus on the constituent and *fraksi* interests, then on women's interests. Activities conducted to increase women's participation at the committees included workshops and seminars. We invited resource people from ministries, civil society such as NGOs, academicians. The themes related to women's issues. The aims of the activities were to increase women's confidence in committees to support the achievement of MDG targets. For instance, women legislators in *Komisi* Nine should monitor government efforts to overcome maternal mortality.

(Ms Ana, legislator, 2 November 2012, interview, lines 3-17)

Ms Ana interpreted the objective of the *KPPRI* as to support the government in achieving the MDGs through active participation in committee work. In her opinion, the loyalty of female legislators must first be with the party and second to their constituents; gender constituents came third. However, the effectiveness of the female caucus depends on the ability to unite women legislators across party lines. The encouragement to align with the party by the chairperson of the *KPPRI* could prevent the caucus from working effectively, as parties do not place women's issues high on their agenda, as discussed in Chapter 7.

Support from women's civil society organisations is significant in the effectiveness of the women's caucus (IPU 2013), and Ms Ana identified an important role of the *KPPRI* in bringing diverse input into parliament. Women's civil society organisations can also be a key factor in substantive representation if the organisations are connected to political resources. This is where the relationship between women's civil society organisations and female political elites becomes important. *KPPRI* should link female legislators and the organisations that have similar objectives to *KPPRI*. For instance, *KPPRI*'s connection with women's civil society organisations focusing on women's reproductive rights would benefit women legislators

from *Komisi* Nine in providing data on women's difficulties in accessing their reproductive rights so that the legislators could use the data to support their political participation in committee discussions. Strong links between the caucus and women's groups in civil society would also help the organisations to inject their concerns into parliamentary discussions and debates. Chapter 7 discussed that the proposal to revise the quota article came from women's civil society organisations and was presented at a working committee through facilitation of the *KPPRI*. Is the nature of the relationship between women's civil society organisations and the *KPPRI* part of the explanation for the failure of the proposed revisions?

KPPRI members were divided over the issues of outreach and partnership with women's civil society organisations. Ms Dewi, who was the head of the outreach division, had designed a strategy for partnership with organisations outside Parliament, but her female peers showed little interest.

I have developed programmes to enhance female networking with other institutions. However, many have different opinions and they said that they do not need the networking. When we conduct a seminar or workshop, only a few women members attend. We had an experience with no members attending legal drafter training organised by an NGO.

(Ms Dewi, legislator, 26 September 2012, interview, lines 227-236)

Other women legislators confirmed the lack of interest.

I hold a position as head of a subdivision of the caucus, but I am an inactive member in *KPPRI*. I think *KPPRI* should have a focused agenda, as there are too many issues handled by the *KPPRI*. Someone should develop strategic planning for the *KPPRI*'s activities.

(Ms Gadis, legislator, 10 October 2012, interview, lines 95-99)

I am an inactive member in *KPPRI* because I do not have spare time for caucus activities. I will attend *KPPRI*'s activities only if I am interested in the topic. The *KPPRI* handles too many issues.

(Ms Nisa, legislator, 18 October 2012, interview, lines 121-125)

Ms Gadis and Ms Nisa suggested that they lack interest in the *KPPRI*

because its focus is unclear, and it is largely irrelevant to their agenda. Ms Jeihan and Ms Berta suggested activities that would attract their interest to become active members in the *KPPRI*.

Many women members are inactive members of *KPPRI*, because it focuses on capacity building activities (line 273). I suggested instead of conducting workshops or seminars, *KPPRI* should focus on advocacy about women issues nationally, such as political statements to the media about women's issues. It will cement *KPPRI's* position and advocate for the issues.
(Ms Jeihan, legislator, 2 October 2012, interview, lines 318-322)

I hope that the caucus could provide data at the regional level, particularly on women's issues. The data is significant to provide insight on problems, so that I can voice them in the committee. If I voice the issues, I could get closer to my women constituents. If caucus could perform such a function, it will assist us to voice the needs of women elector constituents.
(Ms Berta, legislator, 11 October 2012, interview, lines 48-59)

I am an inactive member in the *KPPRI* because I prefer working in my constituency, dealing with factual problems in the community such as women who face domestic violence. I do not have time to attend seminars at hotels, which are insignificant to my work. I think attending a seminar at a hotel would not benefit my constituents. I would place my responsibility to my electors as my first priority, such as voicing the problems of my female constituents in the *DPR*.
(Ms Cindy, legislator, 17 September 2012, interview, lines 112-117)

The main reason for many inactive members of the *KPPRI* is the lack of benefits from the institution. I suggest that *KPPRI* activities should be held at member's constituencies. I believe that the members would support the *KPPRI* activities in their constituencies. For instance, if *KPPRI* holds a seminar or workshop in my constituency, I will support the funding, because the activity will help me to meet with my women constituents and will increase my popularity among them. It will show my constituents that I am concerned about women's issues through my membership at the *KPPRI*.
(Ms Gadis, legislator, 10 October 2012, interview. lines 101-113)

These interviews of the *KPPRI's* members demonstrated that women legislators are more interested in practical activities that would directly benefit their political role. Political statements to the media might expose the work of women legislators in the media and increase their profile in their electorate. Both would benefit them in the next election. Facilitating access to relevant data would increase female legislator effectiveness in committees, and benefit their political career.

It appears that women legislators would be active in the *KPPRI* only if the

activities benefit their political career. Ms Jeihan indicated that *KPPRI* activities focused on capacity building which did not support her political career as a legislator. For example, of the 34 activities conducted in 2010, most were receiving delegations from civil society such as academics, international donors, and research centres (KPPRI 2012c). There were also seminars and discussions with government organisations and women's civil society organisations. The issues in the seminars ranged from the environment and poverty to women and politics. Ms Ratu shared similar concerns with Ms Jeihan that capacity building conducted by *KPPRI* was not suitable for women legislators.

The *KPPRI* should not focus on capacity building activities, as they are not suitable for us. We are busy with parliamentary activities and do not have the spare time to attend seminars and workshops. The activities are suitable for candidates, not legislators. Legislators should act as facilitators or speakers at seminars or workshops, not as participants. We should be positioned to absorb problems voiced by organisations in civil society such as NGOs. I think organisations in civil society such as NDI [National Democratic Institute] used us as legislators to get more funding for their organisations.

(Ms Ratu, legislator, 24 October 2012, interview, lines 112-122)

Ms Ratu suggested that there was a gap between the *KPPRI* members' expectations and its programme implementation. She expected a mutual exchange of experiences and news on women's issues between a legislator like herself and civil society organisations. She suspected that civil society organisations merely used the *KPPRI*'s members to gain more funding. The interviewees indicated that women's civil society organisations have a limited understanding of the process inside the *DPR*. Another complaint was poor programme planning. Ms Dewi's initiative for an outreach and partnership strategy that included legal drafting training was not relevant for legislators as they already had the support of legal drafters at the *DPR* (DPR 2011).

Involvement of the members of parliament in legislation preparation is more procedural than substantive (Rüland et al. 2005).

This mismatch between legislator expectations and the *KPPRI* programme suggests a lack of communication among the female legislators. The outreach and partnership strategy assumed that female legislators relied on the knowledge of women's civil society organisations, but these organisations lacked experience in political activities inside the *DPR*. The activities were driven by women's civil society organisations, and failed to recognise female legislators' experiences. Workshops organised with women's civil society organisations were designed to convey information to political candidates, rather than members of parliament. Positioning members of parliament as participants effectively silenced them and side stepped the opportunity to learn what is happening inside the parliament. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, female legislators had to deal with many challenges inside the *DPR*, which were not recognised by *KPPRI*'s partners from outside the *DPR*.

The *KPPRI* aims to defend female legislative priorities and increase their influence in the *DPR*. This relies on the female legislators identifying women's issues as a common goal. Feminists focus on stereotypical women's issues, as exemplified by the proposal to revise the quota articles. However, female legislators, like Ms Berta, Ms Cindy, and Ms Gadis, defined women's issues as issues faced by their women electors. The definition of women's issues thus differed between the female legislators and the women's civil society organisations, and to establish common ground would require a different communication mechanism from those offered by the

KPPRI.

8.2 Communication within the *KPPRI*

This chapter has argued that the *KPPRI*'s communication strategy failed to establish a flow of ideas among its members and between legislators and civil society. Communication plans to target communication efforts and determine how information will be circulated will assist the Women's Parliamentary Caucus in meeting their objectives. As its mission and vision states, *KPPRI* defines communication with national and international partners as one of its strategies, but it is clearly shown its communication with national partners has failed. It is because *KPPRI* did not breakdown into measurable indicators its generic communication strategy. A similar problem is also found in its strategy to maintain communication among members, and this created a gap between members' expectations and the programmes implemented.

Ms Fany, Ms Olga, and Ms Ratu identified the lack of leadership as playing a part in the problem of communication among *KPPRI* members.

The problem in the *KPPRI* is lack of leadership qualities. The leader needs to show charisma so that members will follow her leadership. The leader needs to be able to communicate with the members. Saying hello to members would be nice, but she never said hello to me. She might be busy, but I think even if she is busy, she could use technology to respond to members.

(Ms Fany, legislator, 26 September 2012, interview, lines 131-136)

The leader of the caucus should be humbler and put herself at the same position as other members in carrying out her duties. If she is humbler, she could communicate better with the members. I prefer an egalitarian style of leadership in the *KPPRI* and prefer an informal style of communication method like that adopted by NGOs. The bureaucratic style of leadership, such as using an official letter invitation and requiring an RSVP (reservation) for attendance, is not suitable for *KPPRI*. It would be better if we communicate through text messages to transfer information faster to members because we are all busy with legislative duties.

(Ms Olga, legislator, 24 September 2012, interview, lines 130-136)

I expected that the women's caucus would have vision and objectives. The vision and objectives must be disseminated to the members so that the sense of belonging will increase among the members. But it seems that the *KPPRI* chairperson is not aware of those aspects.
(Ms Ratu, legislator, 24 October 2012, interview, lines 92-95).

Although Ms Fany, Ms Olga, and Ms Ratu have different occupational backgrounds and ages,¹¹ they had similar opinions on the leadership issue at the *KPPRI*. Ms Ratu, a former bureaucrat, suggested that lack of communication between the *KPPRI* leader and the caucus members undermined the sense of belonging in the caucus. Ms Fany, who has a similar occupational background to Ms Ratu, indicated her disappointment in the *KPPRI*'s leadership style that showed a lack of individual attention towards members. This also indicated the lack of communication between the leader and the members.

Both Ms Fany and Ms Olga, who has an activist background, expected the *KPPRI* arrangements to be more informal and more egalitarian. The bureaucratic style adopted by the current *KPPRI* leadership was hierarchal and positioned members lower than the leader. This did not suit the members as they did not have an obligation to follow the leader's orders. Furthermore, the *KPPRI* leader had no impact on the member's political career.

Conversely, *KPPRI* members were competing for leadership positions in the Parliament.

¹¹ Ms Fany is from a business group while Ms Olga was a woman activist, and Ms Ratu was a high ranking bureaucrat. Ms Ratu and Ms Fany were from the older age group of over 61 years of age, while Ms Olga was from the younger group of 41-50 years.

Ms Nisa and Ms Jeihan suggested that *KPPRI* effectiveness was diminished by competition among individual members of the caucus. This discouraged the members from taking active roles in women's concerns.

I am an inactive member of the *KPPRI*, because I do not like the working environment. There were too many ideas and individual members want to show their qualities. There is a lot of talking but less effort. There is no target and I prefer working on my own agenda. The individuality is distinct and everyone wanted to be better than others. I do not want to work in that environment.

(Ms Nisa, legislator, 18 October 2012, interview, lines 111-116)

To maximise my performance at the *DPR*, I prefer using smaller networking opportunities among women members from the same committee. The *KPPRI* members are too many and have great diversity of political interests from many *fraksi* and *Komisi*. It is a more challenging environment.

(Ms Jeihan, legislator, 2 October 2012, interview, lines 312-316)

Ms Nisa and Ms Jeihan indicated that tensions exist in the *KPPRI* due to diverse political interests, and the caucus leadership did not act to diffuse potential conflicts or encourage cooperation between members from different political parties (IPU 2013). Female legislators would participate actively in the *KPPRI* if its activities benefitted their political careers. *KPPRI* could be a useful institution to increase the popular profile of members through media attention on women legislators' activities relating to women's issues. There was strong competition as each member wanted to improve their political career (as discussed in Chapters 6 in the section on the constitution of committee membership, and Chapter 7). Thus, the *KPPRI* has a weak strategy of both internal communication among its membership, and external communication with civil society as discussed in the previous section. The leadership was ineffective in maintaining the flow of communication among the members.

8.3 Leadership issues in the *KPPRI*

Leadership was identified by the interviewees as a problem in the *KPPRI*.

The leadership failed to diffuse conflicts and bring members together across party lines on gender issues. The caucus could be arranged in formal and informal ways. The informal ways would have non-hierarchical structures.

There would be no decision-making mechanisms or leadership positions. The more formal arrangement would employ a chairperson to lead the caucus.

The informal arrangement would put all caucus members at an equal status to avoid internal power struggles. In both arrangements, the presence of critical actors who have the capacity to organise others, lays the groundwork for successful collective action for women's substantive representation (Johnson & Josefsson 2016). With the informal arrangement, the critical actors could come from the founder of the caucus, or individual members who have the capacity to coordinate the other members and articulate the caucus agenda. In the formal caucus, it is the role of the chairperson. The *KPPRI* adopts a formal arrangement with a leadership position. A collective decision on who should lead the *KPPRI* would be a first step to avoid potential conflicts and to increase acceptance of the *KPPRI* among female legislators.

However, the *KPPRI* does not have a standard process for selecting a leader. Interviews with members revealed that the leadership structure had changed from the period 2004-2009. Initially implemented via collegial chairs, for the period 2009-2014 a single chairperson was appointed. Siregar (2010, p. 193) reported that during the period 2004-2009, the collegial system of leadership allowed the sharing of power between the *DPD* and *DPR*, and

among parties of *Golkar*, *PDIP*, *PKB*, and *PAN*. In the period 2009-2014, the leadership was located in the single party of *Demokrat*. This change in leadership was proposed by women in civil society to increase the effectiveness of the *KPPRI*. Ms Maya, who was one of the chairs in the *KPPRI* in the previous period, explained the changes in the leadership structure.

In the previous period, the board management at the *KPPRI* used a presidium. Four leaders took turns in leading the *KPPRI* annually. The leaders were from both houses, *DPR* and *DPD*. I was the leader from the *DPD*.

(Ms Maya, member of the *DPD*, 29 October 2012, interview, lines 3-5)

Ms Maya indicated that the collective system during the previous period allowed power sharing among the houses and parties. Her statement on the number of the leaders differed with Siregar's (2010, p.193) report of five leaders, one from *DPD* and the other four from *DPR*. Despite Ms Maya being at odds with Siregar regarding the number of leaders, her comments support Siregar's finding that, during the period 2004-2009, the collegial leadership system allowed sharing of power among political parties and houses of the *DPR* and *DPD*. The sharing of power might ease tensions between parties and houses, and make the women's caucus able to effect substantive representation. The single leadership was proposed to encourage the *KPPRI* to produce a long-term programme, rather than responding to issues on an ad hoc basis. Ms Sinta explained the reasons for the proposal.

The *KPPRI* for the period 2004-2009 could not work effectively because of the short-term programme. The *KPPRI* had only an annual programme based on the programme of each chair. At every rotation of the leadership, the programme changed. The newly appointed leader did not continue the previous leader's programme. They failed to develop long-term programmes and objectives. In 2009, we proposed a new leadership structure from collective leaders to a single leader. We specified conditions that the appointment of the leader should be based on competency, not based on the proportion of *fraksi*. The other condition was that the leadership should be on a long-term basis, not on rotation, and the leader should design short-, medium-, and long-term programmes such as annual, three-yearly, and five-year programmes. The legislation targets of the programme should be in detail for each area, for instance in the domestic affair areas the legislation targets are the amendment of the Election Law, the Regional Autonomy Law, or of the Political Party law. All women members should work together to influence the decision-making at the *fraksi*, *komisi*, *Baleg*, etc.

(Ms Sinta, activist, 12 October 2012, interview, lines 111-127)

The civil society proposal to install a single leader of the caucus for the entire legislative period was to ensure a long-term strategic perspective. However, the definition of a competent leader is interpreted differently by civil society organisations and female legislators. Ms Sinta indicated that competency defined by civil society is the ability to articulate a feminist legislative programme, giving the example of gender biased laws. Leaders of *fraksi* and parties defined a leader as someone who is assertive, able to secure party interests and maintain loyalty to their party and its senior members.

The *KPPRI* accepted our proposal to change the leadership structure from collegial into single chair, but they ignored our condition to elect the leader based on merit, not based on the majority seats at the *DPR*. Competency has been transformed to the most seats so that the leader is based on the biggest *fraksi* in the *DPR*, the *Demokrat*. We had identified some qualified women for the leadership position from *Golkar* and *PAN*. Now, we find difficulties in discussing our issues with the *KPPRI*. They always have excuses to avoid meeting with us. Our proposal to change the leadership structure was accepted, but the new leadership has obstructed our civil society programme.

(Ms Sinta, activist, 12 October 2012, interview, lines 139-148)

Ms Sinta indicates here that civil society had less access to political elites because of the reorganisation of the *KPPRI* leadership. The parliamentary system had selected the leader based on party caucus size and influence, rather than on her understanding of gender equality or cross party appeal.

The relationship between the women's civil society organisations and women legislators became weak as a result.

The new leadership obstructed relationships with women's civil society organisations and strengthened the control of *fraksi* over the *KPPRI*. This became evident in the change of the *KPPRI*'s leadership in 2012. During the fieldwork undertaken in 2012, observation of the *KPPRI* national workshop on 7-8th September 2012 (see Table 8.1) included the period of the replacement of the *KPPRI* chair. The replacement decision was internal to *Demokrat*, without consultation with the other members of the *KPPRI*. The change of leadership in the *KPPRI* was announced during the opening remarks by the newly appointed *KPPRI* chair, Ms Peter who is from the same party as Ms Andi. This was unexpected, as the organiser of the workshop still expected Ms Andi to open the workshop, as she was named on the workshop agenda distributed to participants. The new chair of the *KPPRI* started her speech with the announcement that Ms Andi had been replaced by her party at short notice to take up a leadership position in her party.

The members of the *KPPRI* had not been involved in the appointment of the new leaders. This mode of operating conflicts with the role of the *KPPRI* as a forum of women legislators to gain power and influence in the *DPR*, and an informal network to provide mutual support to women members. It is supposed to balance male informal networking and establish a more equal playing field for female members of *DPR*. Thus, it is a forum for women, and women should decide on the operation of the caucus. The decision by the leader's party to replace Ms Andi with another party member goes against

the spirit of a women's caucus.

Ms Ellia, the deputy leader of the *KPPRI*, outlined the lack of consultation in the change of leadership.

Ms Peter is the new *KPPRI* leader, because Ms Andi was appointed by her party to be a leader of *Komisi* Eleven. The appointment of the new *KPPRI* leader is in Ms Andi's internal party because the chairperson position at the *KPPRI* is for the biggest party, *Demokrat*. The appointment of Ms Andi as the *KPPRI*'s chair was through election among *KPPRI*'s members. *Demokrat* proposed two candidates, Ms Andi and Ms Nur, and Ms Andi won the most votes. I had worked cooperatively with Ms Andi to run the *KPPRI*. I said to Ms Andi that I would not accept the replacement without a formal letter from her party caucus. I said to her, "We, leaders at caucus, were appointed by party caucus so where is the official letter? Without the letter, I still consider you as the leader."

(Ms Ellia, legislator, 20 September 2012, interview, lines 274-282)

As Ms Ellia points out, the *KPPRI* members were not only excluded from taking part in the decision-making on the leadership replacement, but also had not been officially notified of the leadership change almost two weeks after the announcement. Ms Geisha, staff of *KPPRI*, maintained that *KPPRI*'s members were unaware of the leadership change in the women's caucus, adding that:

Ms Peter was not an active member of the *KPPRI*. She rarely attended *KPPRI*'s activities.

(Ms Geisha, staff of the caucus, 5 November 2012, interview, lines 38-39)

By appointing a new leader who was not familiar with women's issues or the *KPPRI*'s agenda, the *Demokrat* party compromised the *KPPRI*'s ability to advance the programme for gender equality in the *DPR*.

There had, in fact, been official correspondence about the leadership reshuffle on the 31st of August 2012 indicating that there was a communication hurdle between the party and *KPPRI* (Pimpinan Fraksi Partai Demokrat, 31 August 2012). However, this letter from the *Demokrat* party

was not directed to *KPPRI* members, but to the speaker of the *DPR* and copied to the secretariat of the *DPR*. The *Demokrat* party leadership was apparently unaware that the *KPPRI* was not a formal women's caucus, and thus was not part of the *DPR* structure. A formal caucus is formed by a parliamentary resolution with their specific roles and responsibilities outlined in the Parliament's internal rules. A formal caucus may also be eligible to request staff, office space, meeting rooms, and funding from the Parliament, but is subject to compliance with the Parliament's standing rules (IPU 2013). An informal caucus is formed outside the parliamentary structure, and has no rights to financial support from the Parliament. The *KPPRI* is an informal organisation, even though it has an office in the *DPR*. The *DPR* does not provide financial assistance to the *KPPRI*, and directing the letter to the speaker of the house was not appropriate. In addition, the *KPPRI* comprises members from both houses, the *DPR* and *DPD*, but the letter was only sent to the *DPR*. The structure of the leadership in the *KPPRI* should have the chair as the highest position. These events suggest that the *KPPRI* was powerless and vulnerable to being taken over by political parties.

Given that women parliamentarians were unable to control their own caucus, the *KPPRI* became part of the problem of the parliament's diminished effectiveness in the period 2009-2014. Subordinating the *KPPRI* to party interests meant that the women's caucus would be unlikely to work in women's interests if the party did not have those interests on its agenda.

8.4 *KPPRI's* funding and activities

In general, the women's caucuses have less secure financial resources. Caucuses rely on funding from its member's contributions, and support from international donors, and rarely have full-time staff (Steele 2002; Sawer 2015, p.117; Jonhson & Josefsson, p.5). The women's caucus in Timor Leste, for instance, received support from IPU, UN Women, and UNDP, and other bilateral donors such as Australia, Norway, and Sweden (Costa et al. 2013, p. 339). The support was to establish a gender resource centre, training in gender analysis and undertake relevant research among other things. The lack of funding in the women's parliamentary caucus at the international parliamentary institution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Portuguese-speaking Countries has resulted in a merely symbolic commitment to gender equality (Costa 2016, p.11). The lack of funding poses a significant challenge for the caucus to hold regular meetings and provide technical and political support to national initiatives.

In the *Reformasi* years, the *KPPRI* had limited resources with no supporting staff (Haryanti 2006) and no office space (Siregar 2010). In the consolidation period, the *KPPRI* had better access to financial resources and office space.

Ms Ana outlined the *KPPRI's* source of funding in conducting its activities.

The *KPPRI's* members make an individual contribution to run the office. Each woman member contributed at least IDR100,000 monthly (AUD \$ 10). The money is for the operation of our office. For other activities, such as seminars or workshops, we receive funding from our partners such as NGOs, ministries and other sources.

(Ms Ana, legislator, 2 November 2012, interview, lines 25-28)

Ms Ana indicated that the *KPPRI's* activities were mostly sponsored by civil society and government partners. However, lack of focus on the specific

targets of what *KPPRI* wanted to achieve during the five-year period of service has led to an unfocused scope of activities. There was no continuous sequence of activities addressing a specific issue in the activities in 2011. The activities were more on an ad hoc basis, or incidentally based on requests from outside partners. There were courtesy visits from donors such as NDI, UNIFEM, UNDP, UNFPA, The Asia Foundation, Partnership, and Common Ground (*KPPRI* 2011b). They sought caucus views on the caucus priorities for the possibility to provide assistance. NDI proposed to provide staff assistance for the caucus secretariat and individual members, and UNDP offered to provide staff assistance at the standing committees. However, the caucus did not accept the proposal and hired two staff for the secretariat operation using the members' monthly contribution. Interviews with the caucus staff revealed that the caucus did not target a specific agenda using the outsider's support. Ms Geisha stated that there was flexibility to accommodate demand from outside the Parliament as long as the issues were related to women (caucus staff, 5 November 2012, interview, lines 22-23).

Ms Geisha's statement does not explain the refusal of the *KPPRI* to support the proposal for staff assistance. A more flexible response by the *KPPRI* to the donor's request would have allowed them to agree to the proposed assistance and this would have helped women members of parliament perform their duties in the standing committees, and hence strengthen the *KPPRI*. The decision to refuse the assistance may have been related to the lack of focus of the *KPPRI*, due to the failure to build an agreed agenda. A consequence of this was that caucus members' interest in participating in

caucus activities declined; the activities of the *KPPRI* were not seen to meet the needs of the caucus members, as indicated during the observation of the caucus's national workshop, discussed below.

The national workshop on 7-8 September 2012 received support from NDI Indonesia. Female caucus members felt that the *KPPRI*'s activities did not respond to their needs related to their female constituents to increase their own parliamentary performance. The schedule of the September workshop (Table 8.1) suggests that it was to familiarise members with the roles of the women's caucus, sharing international experiences on gender mainstreaming in legislation, and to build the capacity of women legislators to establish effective networking and communication with the public. The workshop had two international facilitators from civil society, and two national facilitators with professional backgrounds. The workshop suggested that the *KPPRI* saw itself as a forum for connecting women legislators to the international community and women's civil society organisations.

Table 8.1 Schedule of *KPPRI*'s national workshop, 7-8 September 2012.

Time	Schedule	
	Friday, 7 September	Saturday, 8 September
08:30 – 09:00	Participant's registration	
09:00 – 10:00	Opening remarks (<i>KPPRI</i> chair)	Establishing networking and political profile (by independent consultant on campaign strategy)
10:00 – 10:30	Role of women's parliamentarian caucus (by international consultant of NDI)	
10:30 – 11:00		
11:00 – 11:30		

Time	Schedule	
	Friday, 7 September	Saturday, 8 September
11:30 – 12:00		
12:00 – 12:30		Lunch
12:30 – 13:30	Lunch	
13:30 – 14:00	Gender equality- lessons learned from the Philippines (by civil society from the Philippines)	Public communication (by national consultant on personality and image)
14:00 – 14:30		
14:30 – 15:00		
15:00 – 15:30		
15:30 – 16:00		
16:00 – 16:30	Afternoon tea and closing remarks	
16:30 – 17:00		

Source: KPPRI (2012c).

Observation of the workshop established that the contents were not suitable for mid-period women legislators, as it did not address the internal problems in the *DPR*. Participants were women legislators from national and regional parliaments, and representatives from women’s civil society organisations.

On the first discussion item, the role of a women’s caucus, women legislators shared their experience in working with the female caucus at the national and regional levels. They identified the high level of activities as a problem preventing them from being an active member of the *KPPRI*. However, the facilitators did not follow up the problems raised by the women, which would have provided a basis for evaluation and consolidation of the work of the women’s caucus for the remaining period. Instead, the session was dominated by the facilitators.

The second session was about lessons learned from the Philippines in

gender mainstreaming. The facilitators were from an NGO and presented the history of women's representation in the Philippines Parliament, the establishment of the female caucus, and the caucus activities in gender mainstreaming. This session was similar to the previous session, with one-way communication from the facilitator and lack of interaction with participants. The session could have incorporated former members of the *KPPRI* sharing their experiences of the previous periods, 1999-2004 and 2004-2009, when the *KPPRI* was more effective in promoting gender equality legislation. Sharing experiences with previous legislators would have enabled newcomers to the parliament to learn from their peers.

The second day of the workshop was devoted to networking and public communication. One facilitator presented strategies to build political profiles and communicate effectively during political campaigns. He used examples of marketing strategies for product brands, and encouraged the legislators to adopt a business style strategy to attract more voters. This produced some interaction between the facilitator and the participants by encouraging female members to share their strategies from the previous campaign, and the facilitators provided suggestions to produce more effective campaign strategies. The second session was facilitated by a professional on public communication, who presented techniques for communicating effectively in public. In her lecture, she provided examples from various women world leaders' speeches in their political campaigns. A few women legislators demonstrated their public speaking, or were evaluated by the facilitators. A woman legislator from *DPD* stated that the session was not suitable for them, because of its content and the way it was organised. Workshop participants,

the women legislators, had already gained experience in public speaking in their 2009 election campaign. It was therefore inappropriate to position the legislators as participants who had limited knowledge of the issue. Overall, the observation at the workshop confirmed interviewees' comments on the irrelevance of the *KPPRI's* activities to their needs and their levels of interest in participating.

In addition to the inappropriate contents of the workshop, the supporting material for the participants was also inappropriate. This was exemplified by a guide for legislators on their parliamentary duties (Hanafi 2009). The guide contains illustrations to visualise the work of legislators, which presents legislators as men and the secretary as the female figure. Figure 8.1 shows examples of the illustrations used in the guide book. While the contents of the book did not raise concern, the illustrations presented could harm attempts to achieve acceptance of women in political roles. They strengthen the idea of the *DPR* as a male domain. The first and third illustrations, for instance, show male legislators maintaining relationships with constituents, who are also male, while the second illustration shows men lobbying for a leadership position.




Figure 8.1 Cartoons in a guide book for legislators.

Source: Hanafi (2009, p.12,14,35,83)

This sends a message to the readers that only males participate in public discussion and represent their constituents effectively in parliament. The second cartoon shows the political bargaining process as one occurring only between men. This sends the message that men run the *DPR*, and raises the question of how female members can be involved in decision-making. In contrast, the last chapter of the booklet, on the role of the secretariat, uses a female character. The cartoon illustrates female servitude. Male figures are used to illustrate the parliamentary work of legislative debates, absorbing electorate aspirations, and deciding on parliamentary leadership. In contrast,

the only female figure in the book illustrates the parliamentary secretariat function as a supporter of legislators. Such illustrations and captions send a message to readers that women are supporters or servants in the *DPR*. It acts as a reminder for women that their role in Indonesian society is to support men undertaking the more important job of ruling the nation. This mirrors the organisation of the *DPR*, which is male centred in the decision-making process and in leadership appointments, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.

The Women's Parliamentary Caucus, in general, aims to challenge the power of men in the parliament and empower women legislators. These illustrations jeopardise these aims and discourage women from seeing the *DPR* as their rightful place. Ms Indah voiced concerns about the *KPPRI*'s inability to challenge gender relations in the *DPR*.

I used to voice concerns that the *KPPRI* did not challenge the status quo or the unequal relations between men and women in the *DPR*, but it was ignored. I did not agree with the *KPPRI*'s programme, as they did not have an agenda to change the existing gender relations. It depends on the leaders' willingness.

(Ms Indah, legislator, 26 October 2012, interview, lines 47-50)

Ms Indah suggested that the *KPPRI* leadership failed to live up to her expectations in directing the *KPPRI*'s objectives. The leadership in the period 2009-2014 was unable to achieve tangible outcomes for the women's movement. This confirmed Ms Sinta's observation from an activist's perspective, that the new management process in the *KPPRI* had disadvantaged the women's movement by creating a structural distance between women legislators and women activists, confirmed in the observations of Ms Olga and Ms Ratu, both women legislators.

Since the first election during the reform era, we assisted female candidates. We developed a database for potential female candidates and we assisted the individual candidates during the campaign and election processes such as Ms Andi, Ms Melanie, Ms Oky, and many others. Many women legislators were under our guidance during the candidacy processes. The 2009 election brought more women, which exceeded our prediction, but they have performed less well. They have little knowledge on what they should do in Parliament. Most of them think only about their individual benefit. Once they got the seats, they forgot us in the civil society. That disappointed us. They needed us during the campaign, but now we have difficulty accessing them; they frequently cancelled their attendance at the very last minute of our scheduled events. Many women's organisations face similar problems. So we started to ignore them with the expectation that they will cope with the work in parliament by themselves. Yet, they did not show any progress.

(Ms Sinta, activist, 12 October 2012, interview, lines 58-73)

We are busy as legislators. Many people sneer at us; they say that we do not have any sense of responsibility and they question the impact of our presence in the DPR. They do not understand that they also need to conduct the lobbying and they have to be proactive. It is not the time to sneer at each other. They said that I became a snob after I became a legislator, but nothing is taken for granted, we need to work hard to achieve something. They do not understand what I have done in the DPR. I worked hard and I travelled to remote areas to reach my constituents and other areas such as Papua and Manado.

(Ms Ratu, legislator, 24 October 2012, interview, lines 94-106)

The outsiders are not united anymore. We as insiders feel a heavy burden to put pressure on the party elites [in revision of quota articles]. If the pressures come from both sides, the insiders as well as the outsiders, our work will be much easier. If the condition is just like now, which is very loose, people will easily forget [about the quota], and if I am the only one to pressure the elites, I could not bear the burden. When I failed to bring changes in the article of the quota of the Election Law, I felt that I was attacked by female activists and had no defence from other women members. I feel lonely and very exhausted because I work by myself to guard women's issues in my party. There are no other women legislators sounding women's issues and I cannot force them to place concern on the issues.

(Ms Olga, legislator, 24 September 2012, interview, lines 86-95)

The above quotes reveal the tension between women in civil society and those in parliament. Civil society activists feel betrayed by women legislators who have failed to maintain communication and to secure progress with pro-women legislation. Ms Olga, a member of the working committee on the 2012 Election Bill, felt abandoned by women activists and isolated in the Parliament, indicating that the women's caucus did not provide any support. Ms Ratu expressed her frustration about the lack of understanding outside

the Parliament of the workload faced by her and other female members. Overall, these comments indicate a growing chasm between the women members of parliament and women's civil society organisations.

8.5 Conclusion

This chapter enriches and extends the work of Haryanti (2006) and Siregar (2010). Their earlier studies revealed the significant contribution made by the *KPPRI* in strengthening women's capacity to influence the legislative outcome. However, this chapter shows that during the period 2009-2014, the *KPPRI*'s role weakened because it followed party lines rather than working to build cross-party solidarity among women parliamentarians. This led to weak communication between women and an inability to establish consensus on a women's agenda.

This chapter contributes to identifying the areas which need further development if the gender quota is to achieve the politics of ideas. The chapter argues that feminists should give more attention to strengthening the organisation of the Women's Parliamentary Caucus. The weakening of the *KPPRI* is partly to blame for the diminished impact of women legislators with regards to pro-women legislation. Their work is difficult as they have entered an environment dominated by males. There are great expectations placed on women legislators by women's civil society organisations and by their female constituents. They are subjected to pressures and obligations to act for gender constituencies, as well as to behave in the same way as their male colleagues.

The women's parliamentary caucuses in many countries have been used by

women as a forum to find a way to meet these challenges, and have been shown to be effective in leveraging women to positions of influence to reshape political and legislative outcomes (Bakopanos 2004; Costa et al. 2013; IPU 2013; Johnson & Josefsson 2016; Sawer 2015, pp.116-117). Although, the *KPPRI* was better off in terms of resources in the period 2009-2014, women's substantive impact did not reflect this improved position. The women legislators' performance was weaker in the period 2009-2014, during which they were unable to succeed with prioritised bills proposed by women's civil society organisations, such as the revision of the quota articles and the Bill on Gender Equality.

The lack of communication and weak leadership structure led to the failure to produce common goals and embrace members working together across party lines. Dissatisfaction with the less consolidated women's caucus discouraged women activists from maintaining their relationship with the caucus. This will jeopardise attempts to mainstream gender equality in legislation. Connections between women's civil society organisations and women political elites is an essential condition for the transformation of women's presence in the parliament into the politics of ideas to achieve women's substantive political impact.

The change in leadership has weakened the role of the *KPPRI*'s leaders to act as a mobilising agent to coordinate the other members to define common goals and communicate those goals to its outside partners including potential donors. This supports the argument of Costa (2016), and Johnson and Josefsson (2016), that the existence of critical actors to mobilise women

across parties and effective communication with partners determine the effective work of a women's parliamentary caucus. Funding is necessary to run the caucus, but it is not a pre-condition for its effective work. This has also been shown by Siregar's (2010) finding that although the *KPPRI* had less financial resources and office facilities prior to the 2009 election, women's substantive impact was greater. Another factor that might explain the decreased substantive impact of the quota is the political environment in the *DPR* in the consolidated period of Indonesian democracy, which is discussed in Chapter 10.

Chapter 9 **The Era of Democratic Consolidation: What is the Impact on Women's Representation in the *DPR*?**

This chapter analyses the changes in the political elite following the consolidation period of Indonesian democracy. The ideal condition for the politics of ideas is the condition of substantive democracy (Brabant 1998; Jacobs & Shapiro 1994; Welzel & Klingemann 2008), in which the political elites are responsive to the demands of feminists. It is also a pre-condition to enable transition to democracy (Ekiert 1991; Huntington 2009; Mondak & Gearing 1998; Gibson 2001), as existed in Indonesia during the legislation of gender quotas into policy or laws (Larson 2012; Lubertino 2003; Tamale 2004; Walsh 2012a). Following evidence from Tanzania and South Africa (Muriaas 2013; Walsh 2012a) that the elites' support for the idea of gender equality was unsustainable after the initial stage of democratisation, this chapter seeks evidence of whether this pattern is repeating itself in Indonesia.

The 2009 direct election marked the consolidated stage of Indonesian democracy. The new democratic system, discussed in Chapter 4, has achieved broad-based social acceptance within Indonesian society. The political contest has entered another level, involving broader public contestation and more diverse political interests. This chapter examines the impact of the consolidated period on women's substantive representation. It argues that new political actors entered the *DPR*, which changed its political configuration. This in turn affected the promotion of women's issues in parliament. The consolidated period brought into the *DPR* fewer elites who

were sympathetic to the demand of feminists. This chapter provides an overview of the occupational backgrounds of legislators during the transition and consolidation periods with a view to understanding the changing effectiveness of female members to affect changes for Indonesian women.

9.1 Democratic consolidation: the impact of political priority in the *DPR*

The work of Huntington (1991, 2009) on the theory of democratisation is useful in thinking about achieving the politics of ideas and the legislation of women's interests into laws. Huntington (1991, 2009) argued that there are certain conditions for political change from an authoritarian regime to a more democratic country. These conditions include a weakened authoritarian status quo, and an opposition that grows in strength. Democratic transformation can occur only if democratic reformers are stronger than the authoritarian status quo. This might also apply to the politics of ideas and the substantive impact of gender quotas. The politics of ideas and the substantive impact of gender quotas can happen only if those who support feminist demands are stronger than their opposition. Walsh (2012b) argued that transition to democracy creates the right conditions to allow women's rights to be extended. During this stage, the political elites who are supportive to the initiatives of gender quality are stronger than the opposition. However, these conditions appear to be unsustainable as democracy is consolidated.

According to Huntington (1999, 2009), there are five major phases of the transition to democracy in terms of political change. The first phase marks the emergence of reformers, a group of leaders or potential leaders, who

believe that movement towards democracy is desirable or necessary. The second phase sees the reformers acquiring power in government. Subsequently, subduing opponents enables the reformers to start democratising. The opponents do not give in easily, and they will challenge the reformers, who must be able to co-opt the opposition to proceed with democratisation. Normally, this involves consultation with the leaders of the opposition, political parties, and major social groups and institutions. In pursuing a feminist agenda in the *DPR*, women must go through all of these phases. Feminists need to gain power in the government and be able to co-opt the opposition. This chapter argues that women legislators have to gain power and overcome opposition to feminist proposals on legislation. Increasing women's representation in the *DPR* through the quota aims to gain power in the institution, so that the feminist agenda becomes incorporated into the parliamentary political agenda.

Women legislators experienced their most effective moments during the first and second elections, during the transition phase to democracy in Indonesia. Once Indonesia entered the consolidation period, 2009-2014, women became less effective in promoting the feminist agenda, as outlined in Chapter 4. Modern democracy, as adopted by the new government of Indonesia, adopts liberal concepts but democratic consolidation does not guarantee this (Rhoden 2013). Contestation of more diverse political interests also occurs in the consolidation stage. There is no endpoint for democratisation and liberalisation, as new groups in the new government will enter a new stage of contestation due to freedom of speech and expression. Women legislators consistently face new political opponents and have to gain

power to overcome the new opposition. The diminished effectiveness of women legislators in the consolidated period may reflect a lessening of the power of feminist supporters in that period, and an increase in the opposition's power.

Mr Dani, party caucus leader, indicated that consolidation has affected the priorities of the *DPR*. The change was due to new actors entering the political arena and a decline in the number of reformists in the *DPR*. Mr Dani, who served his second period in the *DPR*, highlighted several issues. One of them is that the reformists left the *DPR* in the period 2009-2014. The other issue is that the new democratic system has brought new actors from business backgrounds into the Parliament. He pointed out that the new liberal democratic system has increased competition between political candidates and favoured the wealthier candidates with business backgrounds.

I think, we are still at the stage of democratic transition, even though it has been a while. Parliament has had many changes in the quality of its members. The 1999-2004 period consisted of legislators who were combatants for democracy as part of the movement to challenge the previous dictatorship. They risked their lives and had strong characters. The previous government party of *Golkar*, for instance, consisted of members who supported the changes. There were many new parties established wanting to be part of reforming the country. The period 2004-2009 changed slightly. Money politics occurred during the 2004 election. This condition was due to gaps in our society between the poor and the rich. Politicians used the strategy of vote buying. There were about 50% of the legislators from the reformer group, who remained in the *DPR*. The period of 2009-2014 is worse due to the direct election system, which makes politics more liberal. The reformers for democracy, who were part of the movement in 1998, no longer exist in the house. The thinkers have gone, as they could not survive direct election. The party has no power to protect their loyal cadres, and the loyal cadres have lost against the newcomers who have more money. People from business are now dominating the *DPR*. They use their money to conduct intensive campaigns through media, not only TV but also radio and newspapers, to attract voters. Many newcomers with a short career in the party dominate the house. This affects the performance of members as they drag in policies to give advantage to their business.

(Mr Dani, *fraksi* leader, 21 September 2012, interview, lines 220-247)

Even though the new democratic system has reached the consolidated stage, it continues to evolve. New actors entered the *DPR* and changed the composition of the parliament from reformists to business people. In addition, the turnover of the membership in the *DPR* is high. These changes impact on the priorities pursued in the *DPR* as the social backgrounds of the legislators shape their preferences and affect their actions and decisions as legislators. As Mr Dani indicated, the priorities have become more business oriented.

Table 9.1 Legislators' occupational backgrounds in the periods 2004-2009 and 2009-2014.

Occupational background	Percentage %	
	2004-2009	2009-2014
Bureaucrats	17	14
Academics	23	14
Lawyers	4	3
Business people	44	59
Social workers	5	6
Journalists	5	3
Clerics	2	1
Total	100	100

Source: tabulated from CETRO (2010) and Kompas (2005).

Table 9.1 indicates the occupational backgrounds of the legislators during the periods 2004-2009 and 2009-2014. The bureaucrats consist of people from the executive branch of government, such as previous government ministers, governors, and civil servants. The business people are owners and employees of companies, while academics include teachers at university and school levels. The table suggests that the proportion of legislators with a business background increased in the consolidated period. Business people became dominant in the *DPR* at approximately 60%, while other groups were

reduced to less than 15% from each occupation. The decrease of the legislators with an academic background is significant, from 23% to 14%. The decrease was also at the level of seniority in their previous career; there were thirteen senior academics, university deans and senior lecturers from reputable Indonesian universities during the transition period, and only four in the consolidated period. Similarly, during the 2004-2009 legislative period, there were more bureaucrats from higher positions, including ten ministers and five governors during the transition, which was reduced to only five ministers and five governors in the consolidated period.

According to *fraksi* leader, Mr Dani, the social background of the individual legislators affects their political interests and decisions. Politicians with a business background are likely to have different priorities to politicians with an academic background. Political elites with a business background may be less likely to place a high value on women's issues, as they appear to have little direct commercial relevance. Thus, due to the composition of the *DPR* in the consolidated period, the attitude of political elites becomes less supportive of feminist agendas.

9.2 Democratic consolidation: the impact on women's substantive representation

How does the changing political configuration impact on women legislators and on female substantive representation? Has the female membership of the Indonesian National Parliament changed in ways that could explain their diminished impact in the period 2009-2014? Ms Indah, serving her second term in the *DPR*, noticed a declining standard of members of both genders.

I think this is a general phenomenon that we need to go through because of the changing stage of democracy and the election system. The quality of legislators, in general, is decreasing; not only the quality of women but also men. There were many legislators who were reformists in the previous period. Now, I am feeling hopeless because many legislators entered the candidacy process using money politics and lack competency.

(Ms Indah, legislator, 26 October 2012, interview, lines 105-108)

A declining number of reformists elected to *DPR* has affected the work of the parliament, according to Ms Indah. The reformists were part of the movement to end the dictatorship and replace it with a more democratic nation with freedom of speech and participation in political activities. For the purpose of female substantive representation, the declining share of reformists and the high turnover of members in each election has resulted in fewer legislators committed to the equality of representation for women.

Table 9.2 Women legislators' occupational backgrounds in the periods 2004-2009 and 2009-2014.

Occupational background	Percentage %	
	2004-2009	2009-2014
Bureaucrats	16	10
Academics	32	17
Lawyers	8	4
Business people	35	56
Social workers	7	8
Journalists	2	5
Clerics	1	0
Total	100	100

Source: tabulated from CETRO (2010) and Kompas (2005).

Like their male counterparts, the occupational backgrounds of female legislators have also shifted towards business, as indicated by Table 9.2. During the consolidation period, there were more women legislators with a business background than during the transition with the proportion nearly doubling. Conversely, the proportion of women legislators who were

academics decreased by half. More than half of the female members of *DPR* in 2009-2014 were from the business community.

The shift away from academia and bureaucracy towards a business background means that legislators have less connection with the grassroots, as suggested by Ms Tati, a women's activist.

In the previous period from 2004-2009, women legislators gained more respect from men than this [current] period. The previous women had vast experience at the grassroots level engaging with communities. They had the skills to communicate effectively in the *DPR* and had visions of what they wanted to do in the *DPR*. They had a good relationship with women's organisations in civil society. When we proposed the quota article revision on the 2003 Election Law, they gave us direction such as which political elites should be lobbied. Ms A for instance said, "Tati, you have to meet with Mr X to represent civil society and talk about the proposal. I will talk with him as well." They knew which key persons should be approached, and what strategies would gain the leader's support. The current women, period 2009-2014, do not have these qualities.

(Ms Tati, activist, 27 September 2012, interview, lines 84-94)

Ms Tati, who was engaged in the political movement during the transition, suggested that the women legislators in the 2009-2014 term had less vision and power, less connection with women's civil society organisations, and less knowledge of sound political strategy in the *DPR*. These capabilities are essential to achieving substantive representation. Possession of vision and power in the *DPR* would allow the feminist agenda to be heard and discussed in the parliament. Engagement with women's civil society organisations enables women legislators to put more pressure on political elites in the *DPR*. Identification of the gatekeepers within the *DPR* can assist the women's movement to lobby them in a targeted manner. The consolidated period had none of these conditions. Hence, there was a lack of collective action among women legislators on women's issues. Analysis from the perspectives of women legislators gives more insight into the changing

cohort of women legislators during the consolidation period, as the following interview excerpts reveal.

Only about 10% of female members are skilful enough to perform their duties in the House. The quality has decreased this period. In the previous period, 2004-2009, I had many working partners in promoting women's issues. For instance, I texted the women's issues concerning me to other women legislators such as Ms Lukman, Ms Nursyahbani, Ms Latifah, and they responded fast, [with answers] such as 'Ok, I will prepare the press conferences', 'I will prepare the press release', 'I will speak for the issue', etc. It was so easy to raise women's issues because many [legislators] were concerned about the issues. This period is really hard. There is a legislator actively voicing women's issues, but she works independently. This condition is because the majority of the women come from a new party, *Demokrat*, and are newcomers to politics; they are still learning. Conversely, there are instructions from their party to support the government. It limits their freedom to express their opinion, as their party is the ruling party.

(Ms Indah, legislator, 26 October 2012, interview, lines 100-115)

What I see is that voicing women's issues in the House is difficult because there are many newcomers who do not have passion for the agenda. We cannot force the women legislators to voice women's issues in the *DPR*. However, less engagement with the community might affect their concern for women's and children's rights.

(Ms Ellia, legislator, 20 September 2012, interview, lines 150-155)

Women legislators should act collectively to voice women's issues inside the House. Many women legislators do not act to support the issues because they have many duties.

(Ms Olga, legislator, 24 September 2012, interview, lines 166-168)

All three women suggested there was a lack of support for women's issues among the women legislators in the period 2009-2014. They indicated that this is due to a lack of experience in political activities, lack of interest in women's issues, and inability to manage the workload in the *DPR*. As indicated by Ms Ellia, lesser engagement with women's civil society organisations means that female parliamentarians were less interested in pursuing feminist agendas or women's issues.

The lack of experience in political activities also hampered many newcomers' ability to tackle gender issues, as they were still learning how to be good politicians, as also suggested by Ms Indah. Ms Indah also suggested that the

control of the ruling party was becoming more apparent in directing women members towards the issues they should voice in the parliament. As gender issues might not be on the party's agenda, female party members would be less likely to focus on them. Rather than working together on gender issues, female members focus on their party's business.

When I tried to speak with other women legislators about strategy to bring women's issues to their committee, many said 'I could not do that because I must put priority on my own duties and my duties are not related with women's issues'. On another occasion, I spoke with a male legislator to gauge the possibility to put passage on the women's quota in the State Apparatus Bill, but they said it was too late because the Bill was almost finalised. Even though, there was a woman on the Bill working team, she was not aware that it was about increasing the number of women in the state apparatus.

(Ms Ellia, legislator, 20 September, 2012, interview, lines 139-145)

There is no interaction among women members on my committee, even though there are only three women. This is because there is no similar agenda among us, the women. I am also not sure that they have women's issues on their agendas.

(Ms Indah, legislator, 26 October 2012, interview, lines 9-12)

I am not a member of the working team on the 2012 Election Bill, so I was not involved in the discussion about revision for the quota articles. However, I participated in discussions at the *KPPRI* with NDI about the proposal. The proposal for revision of the listing number was due to findings from a study conducted by *Puskapol UI*. It found that 70% of Indonesians cast their vote to the candidate at the top of the list.

(Ms Dewi, legislator, 26 September 2012, interview, lines 199-205)

There are different spirits between women legislators from the previous period and this period. Women previously entered *DPR* in the climate of the spirit of struggle, the struggle for endorsing the 30% women quota. The women from this period, 2009-2014, come from a more comfortable environment, the situation where the quota has been established. They think that without civil society or female activists, they can make it into the *DPR*. Therefore, the current women might feel that the gender issue is not their issue in the *DPR*.

(Ms Ratih, woman activist, 27 September 2012, interview, lines 76-81)

Ms Ellia suggested that many female members of parliament did not consider gender issues as a part of their duties. Chapter 8 suggested that many women legislators interpreted women's issues as their female constituents' issues, but did not relate that to a feminist agenda. Ms Indah mentioned a lack of connection with other women about feminist issues in her committee,

Komisi Three on law enforcement, while Ms Dewi did not lend her support toward the proposal to strengthen the quota legislation even though she is knowledgeable about it. This indicates that the female legislators tended to work on their-own and did not connect with each other on gender issues, as had been intended with the establishment of the women's caucus. Ms Ratih indicated that these conditions were because the importance of fighting for political reform during the transition had passed.

At the same time, as the solidarity among female legislators declined, it became harder to achieve change in the *DPR*, as expressed by Ms Ellia and Ms Ana.

I felt stressed by their (women's civil society organisations) pressure. We tried hard in the *DPR*, but we cannot easily raise the proposed passage on the quota or on gender issues. If we speak about gender at any occasion in the meeting, it is difficult as the opposition is also strong.

(Ms Ellia, legislator, 20 September 2012, interview, lines 388-390)

Compared with the situation before the quota existed, the fight to refine the article is much harder. The men's opinion was that women have been given privilege through the 30% quota, so it is hard to make sense of women still demanding higher guarantees for seats in parliament. The level of resistance becomes higher. We are lucky to be able to guard the quota article in the Election Law of 2012. The prerogative of women legislators is now fighting for their existence. Through the failure to refine the article of the quota, I think we need time to consolidate and to gain our power before we can fight for other women's issues in the parliament.

(Ms Ana, legislator, 2 November 2012, interview, lines 79-86)

Both women indicate how the resistance towards feminist agendas became stronger in the consolidated period. Insisting on a feminist political agenda could result in disapproval by the (male) majority and threaten the gains already made. Ms Ana suggested that the stronger opposition came from the men feeling that they had granted enough favours to women. She suggested that the women should focus on strengthening their position in the *DPR* instead of focusing on a feminist agenda. To strengthen women's positions in

the *DPR* in the consolidated period means obeying the male political elite, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.

The literature (Ekiert 1991; Gibson 2001; Hermoso & Luca 2006; Mondak & Gearing 1998) on substantive democracy also suggests that changes could stem not only from the level of political elites, but also from civil society. The greater disunity among women's civil society organisations, as well as the inability of the organisations to access the political elites are among the reasons for the less effective substantive impact of women. Wells-Dang and Wells-Dang (2011) also suggest that the independence of organisations in civil society from the influence of donors is essential. During the Indonesian transition to democracy in 1998-2000, thousands of NGOs were formed to distribute loans and grants from various international development agencies such as IMF, the World Bank, USAID, AUSAID, and United Nations Agencies (Hadiwinata 2003, p.viii). Women's civil society organisations were among the recipients (Cattleya 2010; UNDP 2008; UNDP 2012; Women's Research Institute [WRI] 2013). The funding aimed to support women's participation in political activities, such as through assistance for women legislative candidates, voter education, and civic education on women's rights in politics. However, Ms Sinta and Ms Olga suggested that the relationship between political elites and women's civil society organisations, and among women's civil society organisations, has changed during the consolidated period of democracy, 2009-2014 (see subsection 8.4). Women's civil society organisations are less united, which also contributed to the failure in the quota article revision. The less united women's civil society organisations in Indonesia could be part of the explanation for the less substantive impact of

the gender quota, but this issue is beyond the scope of this study, although is clearly an important area for further research.

9.3 Conclusion

This chapter argued that support from the political elites is essential in achieving the politics of ideas and the substantive impact of the gender quota. The diminished support from political elites toward feminist agendas provides another facet of the explanation for the decrease in the substantive impact of the quota in the period 2009-2014. The uneven growth of power between the supporters and opposers of feminist issues is responsible for the decreasing substantive impact of the gender quota in the consolidating period of Indonesian democracy. The power of opposition groups grew stronger than the power of supporters, confirming Huntington's thesis, discussed at the start of this chapter. Given such conditions, it is less likely that the transformation of the politics of presence into the politics of ideas will occur. This insight, gained from the Indonesian case study, enriches the literature on the impact of changing political environments to women's substantive political representation.

The chapter sought to explain the changes in the situation in the 2009-2014 Indonesian national government: why were women legislators less attached to feminist issues, even though many of them were sponsored by feminist organisations? Firstly, the growing domination of business people in the *DPR* became a barrier for feminists to pursue their agenda on women's issues. Political elites from a business background tended to be less interested in, and less supportive of, women's issues in parliament. The female members

elected to parliament in 2009 were less politically skilled, and thus unable to win battles such as the passing of the Gender Equality Bill. Feminists found it hard to market gender issues to business people.

The success of the previous legislative periods were because reformists and feminists had acquired power in the *DPR*, which enabled them to advocate for gender equality in national legislation. To achieve further gains, feminists need strategies to cope with the opposition and adjust to the changing political landscape in parliament. However, the 2009 election diminished the power of feminists in the *DPR* and this resulted in their inability to pursue political change to benefit Indonesian women, despite the existence of the quota and the women's caucus.

Chapter 10 **Conclusion**

This chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the importance of the findings in identifying possible directions to achieve the substantive impact of gender quotas in a newly democratic Muslim majority country such as Indonesia. The thesis provides new knowledge on the contribution of the gendered organisation of the Indonesian Parliament, and the changing political conditions inside the Parliament, to the declining substantive impact of the gender quota in the consolidation stage of Indonesian democracy. These findings are then discussed in terms of their contribution to the international literature on gender and democracy, especially concerning the utility of gender quotas in achieving substantive democracy for women. In particular, the use of Anne Phillips work as a framework for analysing the Indonesian material is discussed in terms of the new light it sheds on the problems of achieving gender equity in newly emerging democracies. A final section focuses on the policy relevance of the thesis findings for Indonesian feminists and the important areas for further research the thesis findings open up.

10.1 Findings

This study shows that the impact of the quota has led to an increase in the number of women legislators in the Indonesian National Parliament since the transition to a parliamentary democracy. However, the gender quota by itself was not sufficient to achieve a substantial impact on legislation. Even though the quota brought more women into the National Parliament; women as qualified as their male counterparts, the consolidated period of democracy

has had the least substantial impact in promoting a feminist legislative agenda. This study found that there are several explanations for this.

The first explanation is that the women's movement did not follow up the achievement of the quota by addressing gender issues in the organisation of the *DPR*, as discussed in Chapter 6. For example, the centralised decision-making about the membership and structure of the standing committees hindered women legislators from voicing women's issues. The organisation of standing committees relegated issues associated with women to less important positions, and undermined the standing committee on women's empowerment by combining it with religious affairs. The focus of attention on women's empowerment shifted from resolving gender inequality in health issues, such as the high maternal mortality rate and issues of children's health, to a religious perspective on gender roles and social issues. This shift has put women in a more difficult position to raise issues of gender equality, as it often conflicts with religious beliefs held by some women and the majority of men on the standing committee. The *DPR*, as a workplace, did not support the increasing number of younger women legislators and staff. It failed to provide maternity leave and mechanisms by which women could balance work and parenting duties. Men's domination of the work schedule prevented women legislators from participating equally in committee discussions and in the decision-making processes.

Male legislators also dominate leadership recruitment and members' placement in standing committees. Men's control in the organisation of the standing committees allows them to undermine the status of committees

handling issues related to women. These committees often come to be viewed as less important strategic committees. The recruitment of leaders and membership to strategic positions requires the women legislators to show masculine characteristics and follow instructions from the male gatekeepers, as discussed in Chapter 7. Within this kind of structure, women face more challenges in acquiring power to influence the decision-making process and promote feminist legislative agendas in parliamentary debates.

A second explanation is that the relationship between women legislators and women's civil society organisations became weaker in the consolidated period, as discussed in Chapter 8. This was due to the weakening functions of the Indonesian Women's Parliamentary Caucus (*KPPRI*) as a forum of networking and discussion with women's organisations in civil society and among women legislators across party lines, and as a forum for capacity building of women legislators to strengthen the influence of women in Parliament. The change of the leadership model, from collegial to single leadership, allowed party intervention into the *KPPRI*'s activities. The *KPPRI*'s leader was more attached to party policy and did not communicate effectively with members. The leader did not act as a mobilising agent to coordinate the members to define common goals and communicate the *KPPRI*'s priorities to its outside partners, including potential donors. The lack of communication between the leader and the members of the caucus generated a gap between the needs of the members and the activities of the *KPPRI*, and an inability to create a common agenda to direct women legislators as coherent advocates for gender equity and women's issues. It furthermore distanced the women legislators from women's civil society

organisations. The lack of communication led to differing definitions of what counted as women's issues between women legislators and women's organisations in civil society. Women legislators defined women's issues as the issues relating to their female constituents, while women activists defined women's issues as strategic pieces of legislation that would address gender inequalities throughout Indonesian society and in accord with international treaties and charters. Friction between the two groups contributed to the less substantive representation of women legislators in the National Parliament.

The third explanation comes from changes in the constitution of the political elites, as discussed in Chapter 9. Women's civil society organisations continued to expect a commitment from the women legislators to a feminist legislative agenda as happened in the transitional periods of Indonesian democracy. They failed to recognise the changing attitude of the political elites in the consolidated period, which became less accommodating toward the demands for gender equality. This change in attitude was due to fewer legislators who were reformists, and an increasing number of male and female legislators with a business background. Opposition to issues of gender equality became stronger in the consolidated period. Control from the ruling party over its members' participation in parliamentary work further constrained women legislators from voicing gender equality issues in party and parliamentary committees. At the same time, the women's movement did not sufficiently sustain their efforts to strengthen the relationship between women legislators and women's civil society organisations. The power of the women's movement did not grow in line with the power of male political elites during the consolidation period of Indonesian democracy.

The lack of knowledge about the working conditions inside the National Parliament fuelled the inability of women's civil society organisations to adjust their strategy and expectations of women legislators. The activists focused their agenda on revision of laws and proposing new legislation without taking into account the changes occurring to the constitution of parliamentary representatives. Male political elites became unresponsive to the issue of gender equality, and the organisation of the parliament prevented women legislators from gaining power and influence. Combined with the weakening relationship between women legislators and women's civil society organisations, the substantive impact of the gender quota has decreased following the consolidation of the Indonesian democracy. The findings of this thesis are important to Indonesian feminists to expand upon the achievement of legislating the gender quota, and to develop further the increased presence of women legislators to achieve more substantive impact on the legislative processes of the parliament.

10.2 Theoretical significance

The thesis confirms and strengthens Phillips' (1995) theory on the relationship between the politics of presence and the politics of ideas. Phillips argued that achieving the politics of presence through the legislation of a gender quota does not provide a guarantee of achieving the politics of ideas necessary to transform the interests of women into policy outcomes. She argued that women's presence may become merely symbolic representation due to challenges in acquiring power and in defining women's interests. The adoption of the gender quota is a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving the equality of men and women in society; the real force lies in

further development of that presence into substantive democratic representation. As the Indonesian case study demonstrates, the increased presence of women legislators does not correlate in any linear way with increased legislation addressing the interests of women. Extending Phillips' argument, this thesis argues that further development of gender quotas in the organisation of the Parliament - the organisation of standing committees; the Parliament as a workplace for women; and the informal body of the women's parliamentary caucus; are all essential to achieving the politics of ideas for women.

The Indonesian case also strengthens the argument of Sawyer (2015), and Sawyer and Turner (2016), that parliamentary institution building should be part of the women's movement's agenda for achieving gender equality. As the discussion of the Indonesian Women's Political Caucus (KPPRI) in Chapter 8 revealed, a weak KPPRI had devastating consequences for the passage of important gender legislation in the consolidation period.

Parliament has rarely been analysed as a workplace. While many studies explore gendered work places and their impact on women's careers (Itzin 1995; Kelly et al. 2010; Peterson & Runyan 2010; Samardzic & Taksa 2011), few have examined the institution of parliament as a gendered workplace. This thesis argues that parliament is also a workplace for women legislators and staff, and practices such as night sessions, unexpected timetables, no provision for maternity leave or child care and breast feeding, all hinder women parliamentarians and their staff from reaching their full potential as agents of change. Further research on parliaments as workplaces needs to

be undertaken because, as this thesis suggests, parliaments often ignore the needs of women imposed by culturally entrenched gender norms and force them to adopt a 'male model' or see their careers diminished. This is likely to be a major disincentive for women to consider careers as parliamentary representatives or as staffers in the parliament.

The evidence from the Indonesian experience of the gender quota, further reinforces the argument that numbers alone are insufficient for women to effect legislative processes to achieve substantive equality. Strengthening of the women's caucus and reform of the parliament as a place of employment, would not only encourage more women to consider a parliamentary career but would allow the quota's politics of presence to exert more forcefully the restructuring of the standing committee and party faction systems in ways more conducive to exerting women's power and influence within the decision-making processes of the parliament itself.

Overall, the findings of this thesis convincingly demonstrate that parliaments are gendered institutions, supporting the findings from other countries such as Australia, Germany, Sweden, and the USA (Crawford & Pini 2011; Bolzendahl 2014). Chapters 6 and 7 examine how the party caucuses and parliamentary standing committees operate as a division of labour and organisational culture in a gendering process to maintain men's power and influence in the parliament. One key example is how women's issues are now placed in a standing committee with religion, at a time when political Islam's influence is on the rise in Indonesia. Dominated by men, many of whom have clerical backgrounds, it is almost impossible for women to get

progressive attention given to issues of concern to feminists such as the Marriage Act. It is even less likely that such a committee will put its political weight behind strengthening and extending the gender quota to make it a more effective way to establish women's politics of presence and foster the shift to the politics of ideas and substantive political gender equality.

Moreover, the clustering of women's issues in committees with less power, smaller budgets and lower status and strategic importance for parties, further reinforces women's comparative lack of power and influence in a male dominated parliamentary process, where women find it difficult to gain access to positions of leadership (Miguel 2012; Murray 2012).

This thesis also enriches the international literature on the impacts of gender quotas, particularly during the consolidation of new democracies. The gender quota in Indonesia has seen the election of women legislators who are as equally qualified as their male counterparts, reinforcing the findings from other countries (Franceschet & Piscopo 2012; O'Brien 2012a).

At the national level, this study enriches the previous studies on the substantive impact of the gender quota in the Indonesian National Parliament. Haryanti, in her 2006 study argued that the dominant Indonesian gender ideology posed internal barriers of low self-confidence for women to pursue political careers. This thesis argues that this same hegemonic gender ideology structures the operations and organisation of the National Parliament. Siregar's (2010) later study of the period 2004-2009 found that women legislators held different perceptions of what was defined as women issues. She argued this was a significant barrier to women's substantive

representation. This is confirmed by the findings in Chapter 8 where members of the KPPRI had trouble establishing a common agenda, and in the gap between the feminist concerns of the civil society women's movement and the focus of the women representatives on their women constituents' concerns. Strengthening the informal body of the Indonesian Women's Parliamentary Caucus is one step in facilitating the emergence of a common agenda among women parliamentarians across party lines. It is the role of the Women's Parliamentary Caucus to facilitate the formation of a common agenda and build consensus among women towards certain issues to support collective action in order to voice that consensus in political debates.

These points of theoretical significance are important for Indonesian feminists in providing insight on how to extend the achievement of gaining the gender quota to accomplish the essence of their objective, to mainstream gender equality in laws and programmes of the Indonesian National Parliament. The following section discusses the possible policy implications flowing from this thesis and identifies the gaps in knowledge it has revealed that merit further study.

10.3 Policy implications and further research

There are several areas of development identified by this thesis, which should be considered by Indonesian feminists to achieve the substantive impact of women on policies and law at the national level.

The first area that needs development is the communication channels between women legislators and women's organisations in civil society. These

are likely to be key in preventing any backward movement during the consolidation period. This thesis provides in depth knowledge for women activists in civil society as to the ways in which the National Parliament has altered since the period of transition to democracy.

The Parliament is no longer dominated by influential reformers who supported the women's movement agenda and helped pass the gender quota into law. In the consolidation period, more men and women are drawn from business backgrounds and are less reform minded or sympathetic to the goals of gender mainstreaming. The power of more conservative male political elites and the women's movement grew asymmetrically. Women political elites faced more challenges in acquiring power following stronger control by male political elites. On the other hand, the women's movement became less cohesive. Communication between women legislators and women's organisations in civil society deteriorated following the ineffective operation of the Women's Parliamentary Caucus, as discussed in Chapter 8.

The women's movement failed to take note of these changes to the constitution of the National Parliament and did not change their political objectives to meet the new context of democratic consolidation. This study provides evidence of the changing situation of the political elites. Women's organisations need to revisit their political agenda and strategies for the advancement of women. Review of their agenda and strategy will consolidate the power of the women's movement which needs to expand simultaneously with the power of male political elites. Better communication between women's organisations in civil society and women political elites will facilitate

the adjustment of each other's expectations, and the formulation of common political objectives to direct the women's movement and the women members of parliament.

The second area of development required is the organisation of the National Parliament itself. Indonesian feminists should direct their efforts not only towards bringing more women legislators into office, but also to unravelling the gendered practices in the organisation of the Indonesian Parliament.

Feminists should prioritise within their movement the need for Parliament to be more accommodating to women's needs to balance work and parental duties. They should also focus on de-linking the Standing Committee on Women's Empowerment and Religion. The combination of these portfolios prevents women legislators from raising issues of women's empowerment in the committee discussions due to conflicting issues with religious belief.

Capacity building for parliamentary staff is also critical. The staff hold important roles in assisting the legislators in reviewing proposals of legislation and programmes. Staff capacity in applying a gender lens in the proposal of legislation and programmes would assist the mainstreaming of gender equality. Enhancing the knowledge of staff dedicated to the Standing Committee on Women's Empowerment and Religion with regard to women neutral interpretations of Islamic teaching would also be relevant to the feminist agenda.

The other significant area of development is strengthening the role of the Women's Parliamentary Caucus. Indonesian feminists should revisit the leadership model of the Caucus. This study provides evidence that the

change in leadership model, from collegial to single leadership, did not address the problem of the inability to produce long-term programming to direct the women's movement in the Parliament. The single leadership, in fact, brought stronger party influence and a weakening of the functions of the Caucus to empower women legislators to promote gender equality in the Parliament.

Recommendations for Further Research

This thesis has identified gaps in knowledge that merit being explored further. A comparative study between the Indonesian Parliament as a workplace, with countries which have more established support facilities for women would be very relevant. Such information would be useful to build arguments to demand the availability of support systems for women to help balance work and parental duties in Indonesia.

In Chapter 7, the importance of lobbying as a key process in the decision-making of the National Parliament, was revealed, but to date, little research has been done on women's lobbying practices. More research in this area is required to obtain a deeper understanding of how women can achieve substantive impact.

An evaluation of the knowledge of parliamentary staff around gender issues and skills in applying a gender analysis lens in the proposal of legislation or programmes, would also merit further research. The results of such an evaluation would be useful in identifying relevant capacity building activities for parliamentary staff, as the staff hold important roles in assisting the

legislators in reviewing initiatives of legislation and government programmes.

Three actors have been the key to the success of the gender quota initiation and implementation in Indonesia and elsewhere: the women's movement, political elites, and the international community. This thesis offered insight into the roles, practices, and perspectives of the political elites during the consolidated period of Indonesian democracy. The balance of power between women's organisations in civil society and the elites is essential for the substantive impact of women. While this thesis has focused on the elite actors in the National Parliament, a more in-depth research on the roles of women's organisations in civil society in the implementation of the quota in the consolidated period of Indonesian democracy would complement this study. Some of the interview materials suggested that women's organisations in civil society have been less united than in the transitional stage of democracy, which merits further research.

The role of the international community is also significant in providing expertise and funding for women's organisations in civil society. The issue of sustainability of the women's organisations in civil society may become a problem during the consolidated period. The multi donor trust funds (funds from international development agencies such as USAID, United Nations agencies, the World Bank) were an important vehicle for Indonesian development partners during the economic crisis and democratic transition (Hart & Soetjipto 2014; UNDP 2008; Nelson & Juliani 2004). Part of the funding was for strengthening civil society. The social and political environment was conducive to strong civil society organisations. NGOs, for

instance, multiplied greatly, including specialist women NGOs. The 2009 election marked the consolidated period of Indonesian democracy, and the economic recovery. Indonesia has shifted from being a poor country to a middle-income country and international support is now scaling down (Hart & Soetjipto 2014). The development attention has shifted from crisis recovery to long-term development in accordance with national goals. Consequently, women's civil society organisations might have less access to funds. How will this affect the role of women in civil society in maintaining substantive impact of the gender quota in democratised Indonesia?

This thesis offers significant insight into the implementation of the quota to increase women's political representation in Indonesia and to achieve the substantive impact, and provides an instructive case study for the international community on how the biggest Muslim country in the world and a young democracy has handled the quota. A series of programmes should be pursued to maximise the effectiveness of the impact in order to meet the aims of the quota to increase not only the number, but also the substantive representation, of women in the Indonesian Parliaments (both national and regional levels). The evaluation of the political conditions within the Indonesian National Parliament is required to advance the impact of women legislators in the decision-making process. The work should gain support, not only from women's organisations in civil society, but also from women legislators. Communication between them remains a significant pre-condition to achieving the objectives of the quota and pursuing a common agenda and goals.

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
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Indonesian government system since independence in 1945

Period	Name of the government system	President	Legislative election system
Independence (1945)-1966	<i>Orde Lama</i> (Old Order)	Soekarno	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multi-party system • Closed listing system
1966-1998	<i>Orde Baru</i> (New Order)	Soeharto	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Three parties system • Closed listing system
1998 – now	<i>Reformasi</i> (Reform era)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BJ Habibie (1998-1999) • Abdul Rahman Wahid (1999-2002) • Megawati (2002-2004) • Susilo Bambang Yudoyono (2004-2014) • Joko Widodo (2014-2019) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multi-party system • Closed listing system in 1999 Election • Semi open listing system in 2004 Election • Open listing system in 2009 and 2014 Elections

Appendix 2. Official letters from Flinders University and Secretary-General of the DPR (Indonesian National Parliament)



29 June 2012

Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences

Assoc. Prof. Jane Haggis
School of International Studies
GPO Box 2100
Adelaide SA 5001
Telephone +61 8 8201 2559/8201 2225
Facsimile +61 8 8201 5111
Jane.haggis@flinders.edu.au
<http://www.flinders.edu.au/people/jane.haggis>

Dear Sir/Madam,

This letter is to introduce Ms Maryuni who is a doctoral research student in the School of International Studies at Flinders University. She will produce her student card, which carries a photograph, as proof of identity.

She is undertaking research leading to the production of a thesis and other publications on the subject of *Women members of the national parliament in Indonesia and their participation in decision making*. I am supervising her PhD project.

I write to ask for your assistance in facilitating her collection of data. Specifically, she requires access to records of the Parliament in order to contextualise the interviews she is conducting with members of the Parliament of Indonesia.

Any enquiries you may have concerning this project should be directed to me at the address given above.

Thank you for your attention and assistance.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Jane Haggis".

Associate Professor Jane Haggis
School of International Studies

This research project has been approved by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee (Project Number 5755). For more information regarding ethical approval of the project the Executive Officer of the Committee can be contacted by telephone on +61 (8) 8201 3116, by fax on +61 (8) 8201 2035 or by email human.researchethics@flinders.edu.au.



SEKRETARIAT JENDERAL
DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT REPUBLIK INDONESIA
Jalan Jenderal Gatot Subroto - Jakarta 10270

Number : HM.01/774/SETJEN/VIII/2012 Jakarta, August 2012
Nature : Ordinary
Degree : Immediately
Attachment : -
Subject : Reply on the letter of Research
Proposal by Ms. Maryuni,


Dear,

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR JANE HAGGIS
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
ADELAIDE SA 5001

In response to your introduction letter of Ms. Maryuni, I provide permission to her to conduct data collection for her research project entitled "**Women members of the national parliament in Indonesia and their participation in decision making in the national parliament of Indonesia**".

She can access records of members such as member's office phone number, access to transcript of open public meetings, and access to conduct observation of meeting at commission open to public. She can also have access to other documents identified later from the interview as long as the documents could be access to public or could be access for the purpose of study. She can also interview senior staff of the secretariat general for the purpose of her study.

We will facilitate her work while collecting data at the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI).

SECRETARY GENERAL,

Dra. NINING-INDRA SHALEH, M.Si.
NIP. 195504131981032001

CC :
Yth. Ketua PPID DPR.

Appendix 3. Interview schedule

<u>Interview Schedule</u>
Gender quota impacts in the consolidated democracy of Indonesia: Pathways to gender equality through parliamentary level
<u>Locating the participants and the interviewer</u> The interviewer will begin by talking a little about the interviewer's background, then will talk about the study and discuss participants' concerns, if any. The interviewer will then invite the participant to locate themselves biographically, which may include: Years of services as members of parliament Representative region Ethnicity Background before becoming members of parliament Number of children (for women members)
<u>Part 1: Barriers to influence decision-making process and to mainstream gender equality</u>
Women legislators <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Tell me about the committees, <i>fraksi</i> or auxiliary bodies you are a member of ?• Describe your role at the committee, <i>fraksi</i> or auxiliary bodies.• What are the main agendas recently discussed at the committee, <i>fraksi</i> or auxiliary bodies you are a member of?• How do you perceive your own contributions or participation at the discussions?• What do you consider your strength and weaknesses in participating the discussions?• Tell me about your opinion on gender equity and gender mainstreaming.• To what extend do you perceive the committee, <i>fraksi</i> or auxiliary body as mainstreaming gender equality?
Men legislators <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Describe your role in the <i>fraksi</i>?• What do you think about the increase in the number of women legislators?• Do you think the women legislators face any specific challenges? If so why?• How do your <i>fraksi</i> respond?• To what extend do you think your <i>fraksi</i> is mainstreaming gender equality? (will probe with reasons and evidences)

Part 2: Barriers to gain leadership position

Women legislators

- How do you see the opportunities for women to gain leadership at parliament?

Men legislators

- What mechanism your *fraksi* used to appoint leaders at the Parliament?
- How do you see women as leaders?
- To what extent your *fraksi* support women as leaders?

Women leaders

- What leadership positions do you hold?
- Tell me about your motivation or inspiration for taking role as leader?
- Describe the process of your appointment as leader
- Tell me about your journey as leader?
- What pathways did you follow to assume such a position?
- To what extent does Parliament as an institution or as workplace respond to women as leaders?

Part 3: Support for women legislators

Women legislators

- Tell me about your involvement in the women parliamentary caucus.
- How do you see the role of women parliamentary caucus in supporting women members of Parliament?
- To what extent does the women parliamentary caucus support women members? In what ways?
- Do you have any concerns about the women parliamentary caucus and its role in the parliament?
- Tell me about your networking (formal and informal)
- To what extent does such networking benefit you as legislators?
- Tell me about the support provided from the parliamentary secretariats?
- To what extent does such support (if any) address your needs as legislators?

Men legislators

- Tell me about the supports available from your *fraksi* to its members (such as training, expert staff, networking, etc)
- How does your *fraksi* organise and distribute such supports?
- To what extent does the support address its members' needs (men and women)?

Senior staff from secretariat of parliament

- Describe the roles of the secretariat in supporting the members of Parliament

- Describe the organization of these supports
- How do you see the roles of the secretariat before and after the reform era? Have they changed? If so how?
- To what extent does the secretariat responds to the increasing number of women in parliament?
- To what extent does the secretariat mainstream gender equality?

Part 4: Strategies women legislators use to influence decision-making and to mainstream gender equality

Women legislators

- Describe your expectation of Parliament as a work place. Were these expectations met?
- Describe any strategies you undertook to achieve your expectations
- Describe your participation at committee, *fraksi* or auxiliary bodies
- Describe your strategies to maximise your participation
- Tell me about your concerns in mainstreaming gender equality at the Parliament
- Tell me your strategies to maximize gender mainstreaming at the Parliament

Appendix 4. List of potential women legislators approached for interviews

No	Name	Committee	Party caucus	Constituencies
1	Anonymous (interviewee)	Nine	Demokrat	Bengkulu
2	Usmawanie Peter	Five	Demokrat	Lampung II
3	Hj Melani Leimena Sukandis	None, acted as Deputy at MPR	Demokrat	DKI Jakarta II
4	Hj Himmatullah Alyah Setiawaty, SH,. MH	Three	Demokrat	Banten III
5	Anonymous (interviewee)	Eight	Demokrat	Jawa Barat I
6	Anonymous (interviewee)	Two	Demokrat	Jawa Tengah V
7	DR Nurhayati Ali Assegaf M.Si	One	Demokrat	Jawa Timur V
8	Anonymous (interviewee)	Six	Demokrat	Jawa Timur IX
9	Adji Farida Padmo	Eight	Demokrat	Kalimantan Timur
10	Anonymous (interviewee)	Nine	Demokrat	NTT
11	Anonymous (interviewee)	Eleven	Demokrat	Sulawesi Selatan
12	Bokiratu Nitabudhi Susanti	Two	Demokrat	Maluku Utara
13	Anonymous (interviewee)	Eight	Golkar	Kalimantan Tengah
14	Anonymous (interviewee)	Two	Golkar	Jawa Barat VII
15	Anonymous (interviewee)	Four	Golkar	Jawa Barat VIII
16	Anonymous (interviewee)	Five	Golkar	Kalimantan Timur
17	Nurokhmah Ahmad Hidayat Mus	Four	Golkar	Maluku Utara
18	Dra Oelah A Syahrullah	Ten	Golkar	Sulawesi

No	Name	Committee	Party caucus	Constituencies
	Harmanto			Selatan
19	Agustina Basik, MM	Two	Golkar	Papua
20	Irene Mabui	Eleven	Golkar	Papua Barat
21	Ismayatun	Seven	PDIP	Lampung
22	Rieke Diah Pitaloka	Nine	PDIP	Jawa Barat II
23	Ribka Tjiptaning	Nine	PDIP	Jawa Barat IV
24	Evita Nursanti	One	PDIP	Jawa Tengah
25	Anonymous (interviewee)	Three	PDIP	Jawa Timur VI
26	Anonymous (interviewee)	Nine	PDIP	Kalimantan Barat
27	Anonymous (interviewee)	Eight	PDIP	Nusa Tenggara Timur
28	Herlini Amran MA	Nine	PKS	Kepulauan Riau
29	Anonymous (interviewee)	Eight	PKS	Jawa Barat I
30	Dewi Coryati	Four	PAN	Bengkulu
31	Mardiana Indraswati	Two	PAN	Jambi
32	Yasti Soepredjo Mokoagow	Five	PAN	Sulawesi Utara
33	Okky Asokawati	Nine	PPP	DKI Jakarta
34	Reni Marlinawati	Ten	PPP	Jawa Barat IV
35	Norhasanah	Five	PPP	Kalimantan Tengah
36	Lili Chodidjah Wahid	One	PKB	Jawa Timur II
37	Masitah	Eleven	PKB	Jawa Timur IV
38	Ida Fauziah	Eight	PKB	Jawa Timur VIII
39	Anonymous (interviewee)	Eight	Gerindra	Jawa Tengah III
40	Anonymous (interviewee)	Eight	Gerindra	Jawa Timur
41	Anonymous (interviewee)	Eight	Hanura	Jawa Timur VIII

No	Name	Committee	Party caucus	Constituencies
42	Susningtyas Nefo Handayani Kertapati	One	Hanura	Jawa Tengah IV
43	Anonymous (interviewee)	DPD		

Appendix 5. Researcher letter of introduction and information sheet



Maryuni, MA
Centre for Development Studies
Faculty Social and Behavioural Sciences

Flinders University
Bedford Park

GPO Box 2100
Adelaide SA 5001

Tel: +61 411 367431
+62 21 567 1222

Mary0002@flinders.edu.au

CRICOS Provider No. 00114A

Dear Madam/ Sir;

I am a student undertaking program of Doctor of Philosophy by research at development studies, faculty of social and behavioural science, Flinders University, South Australia. Part of my study programme is conducting field research on my project of “women members of national parliament in Indonesia in decision making process”. The field research will be conducted at the national parliament of Indonesia – DPR RI – for approximately four to five months.

One method in data collection will be interview with female members of parliament, male members of parliament, and senior staffs of the secretariat of the house. I would be grateful if you would volunteer to participate in this project. The interview will covers issues on barriers women members faced in gaining leadership position and in influencing decision making process, supporting system available for women members, and strategies women members used in influencing decision making and in mainstreaming gender equality at the national parliament. The interview will take approximately one hour at your convenient of time and place.

Any information provided during the interview will be treated in the strictest confidence and none of the participants will be individually identifiable in the report. Data will be stored securely at Flinders University. Access to data will be gained only by the researcher and the university. Participants will be able to access the drafts of report and will be able to withdraw their participation from the research at the latest of six (6) months after the interview or after the access to drafts of report.

For your further information about this project, please find attached information sheet, letter of introduction from Flinders University, and informed consent. Any inquiries, you may have concerning this research should be directed to me at the address given above or by telephone on (+62) 21 567 1222/ (+61) 411367431 or by email on marv0002@flinders.edu.au.

Thank you for your attention and assistance.

Yours sincerely,

Maryuni, MA

inspiring
achievement



Maryuni, MA

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Faculty Social and Behavioural Sciences

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Tel: +61 411 367431
+62 21 567 1222
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CRICOS Provider No. 00114A

INFORMATION SHEET

Title: 'Barriers to Participation: women members of parliament and their role in decision making processes in the Indonesian national parliament'

Investigators:

Mrs Maryuni
Centre for Development Studies
Flinders University
Ph: (+61) 411367431

Description and purpose of the study:

This study is part of the project entitled '*Women members of national parliament in Indonesia in decision making process*'. This project will investigate how women members influence decision making process and mainstream gender equality at national parliament of Indonesia. The study adopts qualitative methodology and grounded theory in research design. The objectives of the study is to build theories grounded in women members experiences in issues of barriers women members face to effectively influence decision making process and to mainstream gender at parliament, barriers women members faced to gain leadership position, adequacy of supports for women members from inside and outside; and strategies women members used to influence decision making process and to mainstream gender equality at parliament. The result of study is intended to add literature on the journey of women members of parliament in Indonesia, and to be used as references to design strategies to address strategic needs of women members and to mainstream gender equality from parliamentary level. This project is supported by Flinders University, centre for Development Studies.

What will I be asked to do?

In order to accomplish the study, interview with women members, male members, and senior staffs of the secretariat of the parliament will be conducted. Interview will be conducted at the face to face basis with the researcher (Mrs. Maryuni). A few questions about your views on issues related with the purpose of the study as described above will be the main agenda of the interview. The interview will take about one hour. The interview will be recorded using a digital voice recorder to help with looking at the results. Once recorded, the interview will be transcribed (typed-up) and stored as a computer file at the Flinders University. Your participation is voluntary.

What benefit will I gain from being involved in this study?

inspiring
achievement

The sharing of your experiences will improve the planning and delivery of future programs in achieving gender equality in Indonesian society through parliamentary level.

Will I be identifiable by being involved in this study?

Your name will be anonymous and there will be no link directly to you at the report production. Audio recording and type up data will be stored at a password protected file that only the researcher (Mrs. Maryuni) will have access to.

Are there any risks or discomforts if I am involved?

Considering that you have high level of activities as members of parliament or as senior staffs at the secretariat, time and place allocation for the interview will be at your convenient.

Even though your name will remain anonymous at the report, other group members may be able to identify your contributions even though they will not be directly attributed to you. If you have any concerns regarding anticipated or actual risks or discomforts, please raise them with the researcher.

How do I agree to participate?

Participation is voluntary. You may answer 'no comment' or refuse to answer any questions. You are free to withdraw from the interview at any time during the interview or at the latest of six months after the interview without effect or consequences. A consent form accompanies this information sheet. If you agree to participate please read and sign the form.

How will I receive feedback?

If you would like to see the outcomes of the study, drafts of reports will be summarise and given to your through email by the researcher. If you disagree with the drafts of report, the researcher will conduct discussion with you. You are free to withdraw your participation from the research at the latest of six months after receiving the drafts.

Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and we hope that you will accept our invitation to be involved.

This research project has been approved by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee (5755). For more information regarding ethical approval of the project the Executive Officer of the Committee can be contacted by telephone on 8201 3116, by fax on 8201 2035 or by email human.researchethics@flinders.edu.au

Appendix 6. List of interviewees (names are aliases)

Women legislators

No	Name	Standing committee	Party caucus	Constituency	Date of interview in 2012
1	MsCindy	Committee 2	Demokrat	Central Java	17 September
2	Ms Ellia	Committee 4	Golkar	West Java	20 September
3	Ms Olga	Committee 2	Golkar	West Java	24 September
4	Ms Fany	Committee 8	Demokrat	West Java	26 September
5	Ms Dewi	Committee 8	PKS	West Java	26 September
6	Ms Emelia	Committee 8	PDIP	East Nusa Tenggara	27 September
7	Ms Jeihan	Committee 5	Golkar	East Kalimantan	2 October
8	MsKirana	Committee 8	Golkar	Central Kalimantan	5 October
9	Ms Hanifah	Committee 9	Demokrat	Bengkulu	9 October
10	Ms Gadis	Committee 9	Demokrat	West Kalimantan	10 October
11	MsBerta	Committee 9	Demokrat	East Nusa Tenggara	11 October
12	MsLinda	Committee 6	Demokrat	East Java	15 October
13	Ms Putri	Committee 8	Gerindra	Central Java	16 October
14	MsNisa	Committee 8	Hanura	East Java	18 October
15	Ms Ratu	Committee 8	Hanura	East Java	24 October
16	Ms Indah	Committee 3	PDIP	Central Java	26 October
17	Ms Ana	Committee 11	Demokrat	North Sulawesi	2 November
18	Ms Maya	Member of <i>DPD</i> (Regional Representative Assembly)			29 October

Men legislators

No	Name	<i>Fraksi</i>	Date of interview in 2012
1	Mr Dani	PKS	21 September
2	Mr Charles	PDIP	28 September
3	Mr Beny	PPP	26 September
4	Mr Anto	Golkar	4 October

Parliamentary staff

No	Name	Position	Date of interview in 2012
1	Ms Lely	Legislator staff	1 October
2	Ms Desi	P3DI staff	22 October
3	Ms Gina	Legislator staff	24 October
4	Mr Bandi	<i>Fraksi</i> staff	25 October
5	Mr Rusdi	<i>Fraksi</i> staff	25 October
6	Mr Utomo	Human resources staff	25 October
7	Ms Lani	Legislator staff	29 October
8	Mr Pasha	P3DI staff	1 November
9	Ms Pipit	Legislators staff	1 November
10	Ms Hilaliah	Legislator staff	5 November
11	Ms Utami	Standing committee staff	6 November
12	Mr Dani	KPPRI staff	24 October
13	Ms Geisa	KPPRI staff	5 November

Women activists

No	Name	Organisation	Date of interviews in 2012
1	Ms Tati	KPI	27 September
2	Ms Sinta	Puskapol UI	12 October
3	Ms Ratih	CWGI	1 November

Appendix 7. List of the observed standing committees

No	Standing committee	Meeting agenda	Date	Time
1	<i>Komisi 3</i>	Public hearing with community organisations from Papua	26 September 2012	10.00–12.00
2	<i>Komisi 6</i>	Working meeting with Ministry of BUMN	25 September 2012	10.00-12.00
3	<i>Komisi 7</i>	Public hearing with religious organisations of Muhammadiyah, NU and Ibnu Tahir on the Bill of Mineral and Energy Resources	24 September	10.00-12.00
4	<i>Komisi 8</i>	Hearing with Ministry of Education on Bill of Islamic Boarding School	27 September 2012	10.00-12.00
5	<i>Komisi 9</i>	Working meeting with the national board for family planning and population	19 September 2012	10.00–13.00
6	<i>Komisi 10</i>	Working meeting with Ministry of Education on annual budgeting planning	3 October 2012	10.00-14.20
7	<i>Komisi 11</i>	Public hearing with state industries	4 October 2012	10.00 - 12.30

Appendix 8. Distribution of women legislators in *DPR* across provinces for the period 2009-2014.

No	Provinces	Total seats	Women's seats	
			No	%
West Indonesia				
1	Nangroe Aceh Darussalam (Aceh)	13	0	0
2	Sumatra Utara	30	1	3
3	Sumatra Barat	14	1	7
4	Riau	11	1	9
5	Jambi	7	3	43
6	Sumatra Selatan	17	1	6
7	Bengkulu	4	2	50
8	Lampung	18	5	28
9	Bangka Belitung	3	0	0
10	Kepulauan Riau	3	2	67
11	DKI Jakarta	21	4	19
12	Jawa Barat	91	22	24
13	Jawa Tengah	78	8	10
14	DI Yogyakarta	8	1	13
15	Jawa Timur	87	22	25
16	Banten	22	5	23
17	Kalimantan Barat	10	1	10
18	Kalimantan Tengah	6	2	33
Total		443	81	18
Central Indonesia				
19	Bali	9	0	0
20	Nusa Tenggara Barat	10	0	0
21	Nusa Tenggara Timur	13	1	8
22	Kalimantan Selatan	11	0	0
23	Kalimantan Timur	8	2	25

No	Provinces	Total seats	Women's seats	
			No	%
24	Sulawesi Utara	6	3	50
25	Sulawesi Tengah	6	1	17
26	Sulawesi Selatan	24	4	17
27	Sulawesi Tenggara	5	1	20
28	Gorontalo	3	1	33
29	Sulawesi Barat	3	0	0
Total in the Central of Indonesia		98	13	13
East Indonesia				
30	Maluku	3	1	33
31	Maluku Utara	3	3	100
32	Papua Barat	3	1	33
33	Papua	10	3	30
Total in the East Indonesia		19	8	42

Source: tabulated from CETRO (2010)