# The Institutional Impact of Political–Criminal Alliances:
# A Transnational Perspective

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*For my beautiful son Alejandro.*

*You are an inspiration to all, my star soccer player.*

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# List of Acronyms

AUC            United Self-Defenders of Colombia

CCP            Colombian Communist Party

CIA            Central Intelligence Agency

COMINTER       FARC's International Committee

CPI            Corruption Perceptions Index

DEA            Drug Enforcement Administration Agency

DED            Drug Enforcement Department

DISIP          General Sectoral Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services

FARC          *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*

FIFA          *Fédération Internationale de Football Association*

IISS          International Institute of Strategic Studies

INTERPOL       International Criminal Police Organization

IRA            Irish Republican Army

ITAVU         Tamaulipas Housing Institute and Urbanism

LASO          Latin American Security Operation

MOU           Memorandum of Understanding

OPEC          Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

PCN            Political–Criminal Nexus

SNA            Social Network Analysis

SNAID         Social Network Analysis for Institutional Diagnosis

| | |
|---|---|
| SPC | Systemic Political Corruption |
| TOC | Transnational Organised Crime |
| UN | United Nations |
| US | United States |
| WGI | World Governance Indicator |

# Publications Associated with this Dissertation

The theoretical framework developed for this dissertation, as well as parts of the literature review of this work (Chapter 2), have been originally published in the following peer reviewed paper of the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana:

Domínguez, DA 2019, 'A brief review of the institutional impact of political-criminal alliances: In search of a suitable theoretical framework', *Papel Político*, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 1-21. https://doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.papo24-1.brii

# Abstract

This thesis investigates the capacity of transnational criminal organisations to affect the public institutions of states. This thesis contributes to the existing literature on the political influence of criminal organisations by providing a theoretical and methodological framework to measure institutional impact at a transnational level. In addition, this thesis devotes efforts oriented to providing alternative anti-crime policies for disrupting illicit networks.

Immense damage is inflicted on public office with the confluence of criminal agents and public officials. The adverse effects of this illicit association on public office can be observed in the deterioration of the criminal justice system and limiting the capacity of the state to provide basic functions such as security and public health. These are recognised by criminologists; however, little research has concentrated on developing tools for weighing and quantifying the influence of political–criminal alliances on the public establishment. In addition, in cases in which criminal organisations accomplish illicit objectives that are reflective of political corruption, it is assumed that processes of political corruption are accomplished by leaders of illicit networks.

From that perspective, the main objective of this research is to evaluate the adequacy of the theoretical framework of Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2009) for exploring the institutional effects of criminal networks and for measuring the transnational political influence of illicit networks. Further, this thesis examines the extent to which the leaders of transnational illicit networks possess the capacity to exert political influence on states.

This thesis relies on an exploratory case study that investigates the formation of political–criminal alliances between members of the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and public officials in various countries of Latin America such as Ecuador and Venezuela. Drawing on a comprehensive dataset of seized and declassified email correspondence between key rebels and public officials (2001–2008), this research applies social network analysis techniques to chart and measure FARC's political influence across borders and describes in detail the ability of top leaders to capture extraterritorial public institutions.

The findings of this thesis illustrate the existence of complex political–criminal alliances distributed across Latin American countries; Ecuador, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico and Venezuela. After quantifying the political institutional effects created by this illicit collaboration, the results indicate that the FARC network exerted high levels of political corruption upon states. In addition, the results demonstrate that the leaders of the FARC network were not always accountable for the institutional impact that FARC exerted upon the Latin American states.

The findings suggest implications in the context of governance of Latin American states such as the capacity of FARC to be awarded public contracts and to manipulate election results in Latin America. This thesis suggests further implications in the field of crime prevention, specifically for the successful disruption of illicit networks. Anti-crime policies that focus exclusively on targeting top leaders of criminal networks, instead of players involved in political corruption processes, will allow illicit networks to reorganise and strengthen their organisational and operational structures. Resilient illicit networks prove that such anti-crime efforts are ineffective, posing a significant threat to good governance.

These implications allow a hypothetical exercise to be conceived to develop theoretical propositions that can be considered by scholars and experts of crime prevention to successfully disrupt illicit networks. The final part of this thesis explores the applicability of such theoretical propositions by analysing the political impact of cocaine trafficking in the Americas. Although the analysis suggests great application potential, further research is encouraged to evaluate the applicability of the propositions presented here.

# Statement of Originality

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

All the material and resources included in the appendices of this thesis were either processed, manipulated, transcribed, or translated by the researcher. No archival or raw data has been included or quoted in that section.

13 November 2019

Signature                                                  Date

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# Chapter 1 Introduction

> This lethal cocktail, consisting of one part criminal, one part terrorist and one part weak or corrupt state, poses a formidable and increasingly powerful challenge to … global interests (Sanderson 2004, p. 59).

Political–criminal alliances have been reported in different places and at various points in time. For example, Kupatadze (2012, p. 29) acknowledges coordinated collaboration between criminals and politicians in various large cities of the United States (US), dating back to the nineteenth century. Kupatadze (2012) also states that political–criminal alliances have existed elsewhere, including China, Colombia, Mexico and Nigeria.

Criminologists are aware of the continuous manifestation of political–criminal alliances around the world, in which criminals domestically co-opt public officials. However, there has been lack of attention by criminologists on the political strategy of criminal organisations that account for high levels of criminal violence (Cockayne 2016, pp. 5-6). Godson (2003b) noted that criminal organisations have the potential to operate and exert political influence across borders. The causes (i.e., criminals willing to give money to politicians in exchange for protection from law enforcement) and challenges (i.e., difficulty conducting official investigations due to increasing cases of bribery of public officials) of domestic and transnational political–criminal alliances are widely acknowledged in the literature (Farah 2012; Godson 2003b; Hughes & Denisova 2001; Paoli 1997).

In addition, political–criminal alliances can have negative effects at various levels in society; that is, criminal justice systems can become compromised (Godson 2003a). What has been studied less is the amount of damage that the democratic institutions of a country present when political–criminal alliances arise. In that regard, there is a lack of conceptual frameworks in the existing collection of mostly descriptive research, oriented to estimate the institutional effects of political–criminal alliances.

Some scholars in the fields of economics and other social science disciplines have conceptualised the institutional effects of criminal organisations in terms of different forms of political corruption such as corruption and state capture (Hellman & Kaufmann 2001; Hellman & Schankerman 2000; Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann 2000; World Bank 1997). In addition, political corruption theorists, Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2009),

proposed that the extent to which criminal activities affect the democratic institutions of a country depend on the nature of the corruption. For example, payments to officials to obtain the performance of ministerial acts can be attributed to corruption practices. Instances in which politics have been ostensibly manipulated by the power of drug barons can be described as state capture processes. As such, Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2010) and Garay-Salamanca and Salcedo-Albarán (2012, 2015) operationalised a set of three theoretical concepts of political corruption: rampant corruption, state capture and co-opted state reconfiguration (further explained in Chapter 2). Such a theoretical framework allowed scholarship to weigh different levels of the institutional effects of criminal networks. Additionally, that body of research was able to portray the organisational structure of political–criminal alliances and develop an analytical framework to quantify the specific amount of damage that criminal organisations can inflict on public office.

The research presented here builds on the earlier work of Garay-Salamanca and colleagues (2010, 2012, 2015). By using theoretical concepts of political corruption, it analyses and measures the extent to which political–criminal alliances exert transnational political influence. This research also evaluates the extent to which leaders of illicit networks are accountable for exerting political influence on states. By adopting a theoretical framework around a case study methodology, this thesis advances comparative research and furthers theory building in the field of criminology and transnational organised crime (TOC).

This chapter introduces concepts and definitions that are essential for understanding the political scope of action of organised crime and political–criminal alliances. It provides specific examples of well-known cases of political–criminal alliances. The chapter continues with a brief summary of what has been reported by the literature on political–criminal processes and identifies gaps that allow for further research. This chapter then addresses the aims and significance of this research. Finally, this chapter provides a detailed outline of what is discussed in this thesis.

## 1.1 The Political Scope of Organised Crime

A 'criminal enterprise' or 'organised crime' can be defined as a group of individuals that operate outside the law and engage in criminal activities (Finckenauer 2005).[1] Among criminologists, there has been little consensus on an acceptable definition of organised crime. Albanese (2004, p. 9) compiled 11 aspects of organised crime that have been considered in definitions by various authors. Table 1.1 compiles these characteristics and the number of authors that have included them in their definitions.

**Table 1.1: Definitions of Organised Crime in the Research Literature**

| Characteristics | No. of authors |
| --- | --- |
| Organised hierarchy continuing | 16 |
| Rational profit through crime | 17 |
| Use of force or threat | 18 |
| Corruption to maintain immunity | 19 |
| Public demand for services | 20 |
| Monopoly over particular market | 21 |
| Restricted membership | 22 |
| Non-ideological | 23 |
| Specialisation | 24 |
| Code of secrecy | 25 |
| Extensive planning | 26 |

*Note.* Source: Albanese (2004, p. 9)

According to Albanese (2004, p. 9), the literature agrees that organised crime functions as a criminal enterprise that seeks to profit through illicit activities. In addition, there is considerably less consensus that organised crime has ideological or political reasons behind its activities. Finckenauer (2005) provides a general definition of organised crime, which he believes satisfies the views of many stakeholders such as legal practitioners, law enforcement officials, scholars and those who provide legal assistance across national borders:

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[1] For Finckenauer (2005, p. 64), offences committed by criminals acting in groups should not necessarily be regarded as criminal organisations.

> What is essential to the definition of organised crime is the ability to use, and the reputation for use of violence or the threat of violence to facilitate criminal activities, and in certain instances to gain or maintain monopoly control of particular criminal markets. (Finckenauer 2005, p. 81)

On the one hand, specialists in the areas of political science and strategic studies agree that organised crime lacks ideological or political motivations. With that in mind, some political scientists have assumed that, as organised crime is not strategic, it does not pursue political power (Cockayne 2016, p. 15). Kalyvas (2015, p. 1520) argues that 'criminal organizations lack both an ideological profile and an explicit political agenda. Furthermore, they do not seek to take over the government—indeed, they don't even pretend to be pursuing this goal'. Hence, in general, the concept of organised crime has been structured according to the conventional logic of economic gain and profit (Berdal & Serrano 2002, cited in Cockayne 2016, p. 15).

Conversely, other scholars are aware of the increasing political scope gained by organised crime in recent decades. The neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s, such as macro-economic stabilisation, deregulation and privatisation, sped up the process of globalisation, which brought higher levels of unemployment, scarcer resources, increased income disparity and increased migration flows (Kaldor 2012, p. 86). In addition, Kaldor (2012, pp. 1–2) states that with the advent of globalisation and technology, a new era of violence made it difficult to distinguish between war, organised crime and human rights violations.

Scholars from the fields of political science and criminology have acknowledged that, after globalisation 'interactions among the disparate criminal groups, insurgents, extremists, and the other non-state actors are poorly understood' (Oehme 2008, p. 90). This interaction threatens states, challenges the security and stability of democracies and presents difficulties to authorities, as association between dissimilar groups creates long-term strategies that harness each other's expertise (Dishman 2005, p. 249). Further, the opportunity to bond provides a hybridisation process that provides illicit groups with new strategic, structural and operative opportunities, making them difficult for legitimate governments to combat.

This new arrangement of actors performs actions that are difficult to categorise such as acts of crime or political war. Their operations are strategic and coordinated, as they possess the capacity to threaten security. Sullivan (2013, p. 173) calls these new configurations 'dark side actors' that, once organised, can produce different hybrid forms. One example is the

transnational Central American gangs (*maras*). Another example is the Albanian Mafia, which is linked to ideals, politics, military activities and terrorism (Makarenko 2004, p. 136).

In sum, the traditional approach that argues that criminal organisations do not pursue political goals is at odds with mounting evidence of political–criminal collaboration (Cockayne 2016, p. 16) and with the imminent political instability this collaboration poses to state governance and the global order. In a multi-author volume in 2003, Godson brought attention to the political–criminal nexus (PCN), a local and interstate phenomenon that presents an increasing threat to the rule of law in which organised crime is regularly involved. For Godson (2003b, p. 1), the PCN is the collaboration of the political establishment and the criminal underworld. This scholarship suggests that such a partnership undermines the rule of law, human rights and economic development. Contrary to organised crime, the PCN searches for partnerships, which criminals seek with public actors (e.g., law enforcement officials or politicians) to increase illicit opportunities for profit and to reduce the power of law enforcement (Kelly 1999, p. 86).

Reasons that PCNs (hereafter, political–criminal alliances) are formed are various. Collaboration among criminals and politicians brings benefits to both parties. When criminals collaborate with politicians, it can bring protection against law enforcement and competing criminals. Criminals can gain access to information from the police, intelligence and military agencies to help defeat their adversaries (Godson 2003b, pp. 8–9). Conversely, political elites search for collaboration primarily to obtain money for personal or political purposes. Criminals can help politicians by laundering money, providing intelligence on political rivals and helping them win elections by securing votes in particular areas (Godson 2003b, p. 9).

## 1.2 Infamous Political–Criminal Alliances

Political–criminal alliances have emerged in diverse regions of the world. In 2007, when former Colombian paramilitary commander Salvatore Mancuso provided his voluntary confession, he not only recognised his responsibility as perpetrator and co-perpetrator of hundreds of homicides and massacres in the 1990s in Colombia, but he also accepted that his paramilitary group received essential support from different public actors of the Colombian government. Among them were high-ranking military officers politicians—such as the brother of former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe, Senator Mario Uribe—and the police force. According to Mancuso, all of those who participated in the alliance obtained monetary gains derived from the market of cocaine (Saviano 2014, pp. 210–211).

In a different scenario, Maria Licciardi, also known as *La Madrina* (The Godmother) or *La Piccolina* (The Little Girl) rose to power as the head of one of the most powerful clans in Napoli (Italy) that was affiliated with the Camorra Mafia. Maria Licciardi was the first female to become the boss of the Licciardi after her brothers (Pietro and Vincenzo) and husband were arrested (Allum 2007, p. 15). The leadership of Licciardi helped to transform their organisation from a 'reservoir of cheap labour' into a transnational criminal enterprise dedicated to the narcotics trade. To accomplish that, the Licciardi clan co-opted, enrolled and got rid of many people in the Neapolitan political system (Saviano 2017, p. 85). In Napoli, the Camorra Mafia, unlike the Sicilian mafia, did not need to establish alliances with the public sector. It was the politicians who sought help from the system managed by the Mafia (Saviano 2017, p. 83). Thus, in the absence of a strong state, the Camorra created a system that distributed benefits (Di Gennaro 2016, p. 24).

In Mexico, through the use of corruption and intimidation, the Beltrán-Leyva cartel captured Mexico's political, judicial and police institutions. The Mexican cartel operates as a powerful drug trafficking cartel that is fed classified information, including information about anti-drug operations, by the authorities (Reveles 2011). In Mexico, the cartels have exerted significant influence on the public administration. Sometimes, the amount of control over the Mexican public institutions has been in proportion with the size of the coalitions among cartels (Astorga 2009). In 2014, the non-consolidated Beltrán-Carrillo-Zetas alliance threatened to give rise to the most powerful paramilitary apparatus in the drug trafficking arena (Astorga 2010, p. 355). According to Astorga (2009, p. 108), these alliances gave the cartels territorial control and the capacity to influence government decisions.

## 1.3 Research Aim and Scope

As discussed, scholars have acknowledged the existence of political–criminal alliances (Bailey & Godson 2001; Chin & Godson 2006; Farah 2012; Hughes & Denisova 2001; Williams & Godson 2002) and are aware of the institutional effects of this illicit partnership, including threats to the political, financial and social order (Briscoe & Kalkman 2016; De Danieli 2014; Ebbe 2003; Godson 2003b; Kelly 2003; Kupatadze 2008; Reitano & Shaw 2015; Shelley 1997; Solomon & Foglesong 2000). Although the challenges and effects of political–criminal alliances on public office have been widely debated in the criminology literature, no research has delivered a solid theoretical framework that allows the institutional impact of political–

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criminal alliances on the public establishment to be measured. In addition, little research has sought to map the confluence of criminal organisations and public officials capable of co-opting public office. Some exceptions have outlined the role of political–criminal alliances in the formation of illicit networks and have focused on examining the extent to which illicit associations infiltrate public institutions (Peoples & Sutton 2015; Szwarcberg 2012). This research flags the importance of applying network theory to the study of organised crime and demonstrates that associations of diverse type between criminals and politicians are recordable and assume the form of illicit networks.

Exceptionally, the work of Garay-Salamanca and colleagues (2010, 2012, 2015) relied on three theoretical concepts of political corruption; traditional corruption, state capture and co-opted state reconfiguration. These were already proposed by Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2009) as a theoretical framework to measure institutional impact. These scholars applied network analysis techniques to visualise and quantify the levels of impact that criminal groups exert on the democratic institutions of Latin American countries such as Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico. The work used a methodological framework based on social network analysis (SNA) techniques called social network analysis for institutional diagnosis (SNAID), which consists of analysing the social relationships and agents of a network to determine the extent of corruption in the public administration as a result of the collaboration of lawful and unlawful actors.

This work represents an important first step for estimating the extent to which political–criminal alliances affect states. Although for example, Salcedo-Albarán and Garay-Salamanca (2016b) account for the illicit connections of the FARC with public officials in Peru, the scope of this scholarship in measuring the public effect of these alliances at a transnational level is still scarce (i.e., number of countries affected by FARC in Latin America). Further, the work of Garay-Salamanca and colleagues (2010, 2012, 2015) has highlighted the existence of top leaders of illicit networks and recognised their ability to facilitate successful processes to co-opt public officials. While this scholarship acknowledges that illicit network's survival does not depend exclusively on the ability of leaders to capitalise relationships with public officials –but also upon clandestine connections of less centralised and important actors–, further work is required to examine and establish if illicit objectives reflective of political corruption are always accomplished through the activities of the observed leaders of the illicit network.

In this context, the objectives of this study are to:

1) Adopt and operationalise theoretical concepts of political corruption to measure the level of transnational political influence of illicit networks; particularly traditional corruption, state capture and co-opted state reconfiguration.

2) Evaluate the extent to which leaders of illicit networks are responsible for the political influence exerted by illicit networks upon states.

3) Considering the findings on the responsibility of leaders of illicit networks in corrupting states, formulate lessons and assess their applicability for illicit network disruption.

To accomplish the goals above, this thesis explores the formation of clandestine alliances between members of the rebel group *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and public officials in Latin America countries such as Ecuador and Venezuela. Drawing on a comprehensive dataset of seized and declassified email correspondence between senior leaders of the FARC's International Committee (COMINTER) and public officials between 1999 and 2008, this thesis uses SNA to chart and measure the extent of the FARC's political influence across borders and evaluates the extent to which the FARC's top players exert political influence on the public institutions of countries in Latin America.

The findings illustrate a complex structure comprising a multiplicity of political–criminal alliances of varying sizes and strengths. The findings reveal that the transnational FARC network exerted high levels of political corruption throughout Latin America. Moreover, the research reports the existence of various prominent illicit actors. In some cases, these actors are well-connected to every other actor in the network. In other cases, actors strategically position themselves in the network as intermediaries in the transaction of valuable resources (i.e., money and people) and sensitive information. However, the research shows that the most prominent actors are not always the ones that facilitate the development of activities in furtherance of corrupting public institutions overseas.

This research flags a need for further study using tools such as SNA to draw connections between criminals and state officials. A deeper understanding of the political role of crime in Latin America through 'more intense micro-level research into the operations of criminal organisations and the impacts that they have on state institutions and social groups' can offer solutions to the social violence that such regions face (Arias 2006, p. 325). Garay-Salamanca,

Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2009) argue that such an exercise is crucial to prevent future political–criminal alliances in other states. Further, studying the specific role of leaders of illicit networks, including their potential to exert transnational political influence, can provide valuable insights into wider debates about TOC and new perspectives for the disruption of illicit networks.

In specific, this research suggests that the findings, theoretical propositions and lessons obtained by studying the transnational political influence of FARC can be applied to study – and disrupt – other illicit networks. Hence, this thesis concludes by providing an initial exploration of the institutional impact of the traffic of cocaine in various regions of Latin America – one of the markets with the highest political influence in the world (Saviano 2014) – and examines the applicability of the theories drew in this thesis over the cocaine market.

From an interdisciplinary framework that mixes social network science, criminology, and political science, this research expands current theoretical concepts of political corruption from a national perspective to a transnational focus. Through a robust methodology that relies on SNA methods, this project calibrates the political influence of criminal networks upon public office to quantify institutional damage and to establish authority on co-opting officials in nation-states. Such process has significance both to scholars and practitioners to develop successful disruption measures based on detecting key corrupting players and relationships.

**1.4 Study Overview**

This thesis is presented in nine chapters including this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 canvasses the literature on political–criminal alliances, specifically the study on the institutional effects of political–criminal alliances. The review identifies gaps in the literature regarding the lack of an adequate theoretical framework to measure the institutional impact of political–criminal alliances. This chapter reviews a set of theories of political corruption originally proposed by Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2009) as an essential reference framework to assess the institutional effects of political–criminal alliances. The forms of corruption they discuss are rampant corruption, state capture and co-opted state reconfiguration. The third part of the chapter introduces important theoretical concepts of network theory and its applications for disrupting illicit networks. The chapter then presents the work of Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2010) and Garay-Salamanca and Salcedo-Albarán (2012, 2015) to describe an empirical application to visualise

and measure the domestic political influence of political–criminal alliances. The final part of the chapter highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the work and identifies opportunities for further research.

Chapter 3 introduces the case study. The chapter first discusses the advantages of a case study research and presents the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) as the object of study of this research. It elaborates on important aspects of this group such as its origins and evolution, transnational abilities, resilience and adaptability. This justifies why the FARC is a suitable case study to measure transnational institutional impact and to evaluate if its leaders are accountable for the political influence exerted upon states.

Chapter 4 describes the research design adopted in this thesis. First, this chapter elaborates on the data sources. Next, the chapter describes in detail the size of the population and the sampling procedures applied. The chapter then specifies the measurement framework of this research, which operationalised the theoretical concepts of political corruption and the role that top leaders of illicit networks play in political corruption processes. The limitations of the research approach are discussed in the final section of the chapter.

Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 present the findings of the analysis. Using SNA, Chapter 5 provides a detailed description and visualisation of the FARC network structure. The configuration of the FARC demonstrates the participation of FARC members and public agents in other Latin American countries. This includes disclosure of the most prominent players in the FARC network. The chapter reveals the magnitude of the political influence of the FARC network on the institutions of Latin American countries. Chapter 6 highlights the FARC actors involved in processes of transnational political corruption. Through the application of SNA, it documents the activities, roles and responsibilities of these actors to facilitate relations leading to political corruption processes in Latin American states.

Chapter 7 discusses the significance of the findings obtained in Chapters 5 and 6. First, through a theoretical exercise, implications from the previous chapter are generalised and provided as theoretical propositions worthy of future research and empirical analysis. Hence, the chapter draws out the theoretical and methodological contributions of this thesis by testing the theoretical propositions on additional covert networks of the FARC. Forthcoming research and future testing of the hypotheses in this chapter will allow researchers and practitioners to address the institutional impact perspective to combat illicit networks.

Chapter 8 explores the applicability of the theoretical propositions obtained in the previous chapter beyond the FARC case. It applies the general theoretical propositions presented in Chapter 7 to a well-known scenario of organised crime that affects institutions at a transnational level—cocaine trafficking in the Americas. The chapter describes the domestic and transnational institutional impact exerted by powerful cartels such as the Medellín and Cali in Colombia and the Sinaloa cartel in Mexico. The scenarios account for the damage that the multimillion dollar business of cocaine trafficking caused to the public institutions of Colombia, Mexico and the US, including situations of ungovernability. This chapter evaluates past and current anti-drug approaches to the problem of cocaine trafficking in the Americas and proposes new anti-drug lessons based on the theories formulated in Chapter 7.

Chapter 9 concludes the research. It critically reviews its purpose, process and findings. It summarises the implications derived from the research and ratifies how the continuous development and application of the theoretical concepts proposed by this research allow for new approaches to the disruption of illicit networks. Finally, the chapter acknowledges the limitations of this thesis and proposes strategies for future research.

# Chapter 2 Theoretical Background

… any country's vulnerability to the corrupting capacity of the illegal drug industry is related to the industry's need to launder money and to the relative size and concentration of those illegal funds (Lee & Thoumi 2003, p. 84).

## 2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to review the relevant literature pertaining to political–criminal alliances affecting the public institutions of states. This chapter begins with a critical review of the extant literature that addresses how the confluence of criminals and public officials can harm the public establishment by threatening the rule of law. This chapter then describes the limitations of the literature; a lack of theoretical frameworks to assess the political effects of political–criminal alliances. This chapter then presents three theoretical concepts of systemic political corruption (SPC); traditional corruption, state capture and co-opted state reconfiguration. This set of concepts was originally proposed by Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2009) as an essential reference framework to assess the institutional damage exerted by criminal networks. Following this, the chapter introduces important theoretical concepts of network theory including their applicability for disrupting illicit networks. Finally, this chapter focuses on the work of Garay-Salamanca and colleagues (2010, 2012, 2015) who measured the political influence of criminal networks in diverse contexts such as Mexico and Colombia. Section 2.6 explains how this thesis builds on that work.

## 2.2 The Governance of Organised Crime

Scholars, leading observers and analysts have raised serious concerns about the increasing control that criminal organisations are exerting over the public establishment in several regions of the world. Today, the exercise of power of some criminal organisations is not confined to the domestic level, but encompasses intrastate domains. In addition, criminal power is not limited to economics, but exists at social and political levels. For example, Albarracín (2018) highlights how criminal violence and clientelism are used together to influence electoral outcomes in Brazilian urban peripheries. Arias (2010) warns about the capacity of criminal groups in Colombia, Brazil and Jamaica to govern several spheres of society such as security, civil society, elections and policymaking. For Duncan (2015), in Colombia and Mexico, state

and criminal organisations have simultaneously shared and contended with the imposition of the institutions regulating society.

It is not difficult to observe the convergence of political and criminal activities in weak states suffering high levels of corruption such as in Latin America. Miraglia, Ochoa and Briscoe (2012, p. 2) argue that 'conflict-affected and fragile states are especially vulnerable to the dynamics of TOC' and the implications for those states are considerable such as eroding the state's capacity to deliver public goods, harming the state's legitimacy and affecting peace processes. The scope of political–criminal alliances to modify public institutions poses threats to the stability of strong states. In 2011, President Barack Obama warned the US government and the international community about the imminent capacity of criminal networks to expand their operations at a transnational level and forge alliances with corrupt elements of national governments. According to that statement, political–criminal alliances 'exploit these relationships to further their interests to the detriment of the United States' (White House 2011).

The capacity of criminal actors to acquire power in national and international spheres represents threats that risk the integrity and sovereignty of the state. Increasingly, criminal organisations can challenge and supplant the authority of the government. State erosion can reach a point in which criminal organisations can undermine the government's ability to govern, as observed in Colombia, Italy and Russia (Godson & Williams 1998, p. 67). In addition, criminalised states represent a serious challenge for politicians and international policy analysts. For Naím (2012, p. 101), mafia states dominated by political–criminal alliances blur the conceptual line between state and non-state actors. From that view, this illicit collusion presents a continuous threat to the international environment.

The traditional view of war and conflict by political scientists and international strategists has followed the Clausewitzian concept of war, which suggests that although war has many dimensions beyond the political, its eternal essence is merely political. 'If the force is not applied for political purposes, then it is not war. It may be sport, or crime, or banditry of a kind integral to local culture, but it is not war' (Gray 2006, p. 185). On that basis, those fields have traditionally ruled out the capacity of criminal groups to pursue political power. From that perspective, crime, although organised, is not strategic and pursues its objectives according to the logic of economic gain, not political power (Cockayne 2016, p. 15).

Conversely, some criminologists have resisted the orthodox position of scholars in world politics. The mostly unexplored area that deals with the capacity of criminal groups to achieve political power and control over public office, including governance risks (i.e., the deterioration of the rule of law), is well-known by criminologists who recognise that political corruption is part of the strategy of criminal groups to maximise economic and political benefits. Kenney (2009, p. 82) emphasises the value of political power for illicit enterprises. He believes that traffickers seek to reduce exposure to risk and uncertainty by forming social connections with government officials. Their ability to survive the application of law enforcement depends on the accessibility of political power.

For Kelly (2003, p. 104), the field of criminology is yet to adopt a coherent explanatory scientific tradition that makes sense of the extent of the political power of organised crime. However, there is extensive literature that explores the capacity of criminal organisations to influence the politics of states. Case studies have recorded the effect of political–criminal connections in various contexts. Based on primary data, Block (1983) delivers a comprehensive historical study that establishes associations between private violence and political, social and economic life in New York from 1930 to 1950. Andreas (2013) argues that smuggling has played a pivotal role in the birth, expansion to the west and economic development of the US. Although smuggling activities have dramatically impacted upon the government's police powers, Andreas believes that the effects of smuggling into the US have been double-edged; not only subverting but also empowering America, economically and politically.

There are comparative works and case studies that attempt to understand the role of organised crime in shaping the policies and regulations of states at a regional level. Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999) describe how African governments are today run by forces linked to international crime. They claim that, shaped by the pressures of globalisation and self-enrichment strategies, political–criminal activities in African states go beyond ordinary corruption. These governments regularly liaise with international criminal organisations that are involved in smuggling, drug trafficking and money laundering. Enrique Desmond Arias, an expert on security and politics in Latin America and the Caribbean, has been interested in understanding the political order of countries in that region. Arias (2010) describes how paramilitaries operating in Medellín city communes have successfully established local ownership through programs such as the city's participatory budget initiative and have gained control of state resources flowing into the neighbourhood. Using primary research, Arias (2006) develops a

network analysis model to illustrate how criminals operating in Rio de Janeiro's favelas (or shantytowns) have emerged as political actors able to gain access to state resources and power, which has allowed them to further support their activities. Criminals in Rio de Janeiro have consolidated strong local ties with leaders, politicians and police to build legitimacy and protection in that zone.

Protective economies, such as those described by Arias in Rio de Janeiro (or 'protective umbrellas'), have been studied by criminologists in various fragile states. Reitano and Shaw (2015, p. 5) observed how rebel separatist groups in Western Africa have access to illicit funds derived from cigarette smuggling, drug trafficking and kidnapping. From that view, these groups have acquired a great capacity to purchase arms, consolidate the monopoly on violence, corrupt state officials and capture state functions. Criminal organisations in Mali have built legitimacy with local populations and have become the dominant source of subsistence, security and, occasionally, the provision of public services. Similarly, Briscoe and Kalkman (2016, p. 3) account for different cases, such as the Ukraine and Mexico, that have fallen under the influence of criminal organisations that exert control over various state bodies, politicians, judges, police forces and territories.

According to Cockayne (2016, p. 17) what remains poorly understood is the dynamics and logic behind political–criminal interaction; the why, how and under what circumstances this illicit collaboration exists. Mandel (2011) attempts to explain when and how transnational organised criminal activities affect individual and state security. His central argument is the idea that criminal organisations use tactics of either corruption or violence or both, depending on whether these groups seek to accept or disrupt the status quo. Criminologists have ignored and underestimated the ideological links between criminals and political elites. Scholars such as Schulte-Bockholt (2006) and Wilson and Lindsey (2009) believe that non-state groups, such as gangs and militias, play an essential intermediation role between 'the informal politics of the street' and the world of formal politics to consolidate and legitimise localised territorial monopolies and protection economies. For Schulte-Bockholt (2006, p. 26), protection rackets emerge when political elites suffer a crisis of hegemony. Such a crisis can occur when states witness rapid economic change and instability.

## 2.3 Towards a Point of Convergence

Collier (2000, p. 2) concluded that the factors that account for the difference between failure and success in civil wars were not in the 'ideological cause' of rebel groups but in their radically different opportunities to raise revenue. This challenging perspective on the nature of civil wars was studied further by other scholars in the area of strategic studies who believe that rapid economic globalisation and market-driven free trade provided combatants with a new opportunity to access and transform natural resources into valuable sources of revenue (Ballentine & Sherman 2003, p. 2). With the opportunity to obtain a major source of war revenue that changed the rules of conflict, some scholars realise that modern wars erode the distinction between political conflict and violent organised crime, 'creating space on reflection on whether some criminal groups may, actually, be strategic actors' (Cockayne 2016, p. 18). For example, Duffield (2001), Elkus (2011), Felbab-Brown (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014), Kaldor (2012) and Sullivan and Elkus (2010) support the idea that hybrid groups (i.e., criminal insurgencies) have relied on activities of organised crime to gain political power.

From that perspective, scholars recognise the dynamics of this new pattern of criminal infiltration in public office. Multidisciplinary efforts include scholars from political and strategic studies, criminologists and practitioners in military fields such as police, intelligence, anti-crime and counterterrorism (Farah 2012; Gilman, Goldhammer & Weber 2013; Miklaucic & Naím 2013; Williams 2012). This scholarship has carefully studied transnational organisations that threaten states. These associations take hybrid forms and include actors participating in a variety of illicit activities such as drug trafficking, corruption, terrorism and religious extremism. New networked structures have demonstrated the ability to adapt, diversify and converge and reorganise to remain ahead of efforts to combat them. They have achieved a degree of global reach and collaboration through networks and horizontal diversification. Transnational criminal elements have recently been able to generate state capabilities. Through resource development and reorganisation, they now rival the capabilities of many states and surpass the capabilities of others (Stavridis 2013, p. vii).

A multi-author volume in 2003 revealed PCN scenarios in diverse regions of the world (Cockayne 2016, p. 16). It accounted for the myriad institutional effects that this illicit collaboration exerts on the public office of states. The following section describes in detail the findings of this scholarship.

## 2.4 Political–Criminal Alliances: Institutional Impact

For Godson (2003b), the PCN is a security threat that affects society at political, economic and social levels that must not be underestimated. For example, political–criminal alliances can affect the legal and health systems of a region. The infrastructure and governance of the rule of law can be risked through modification of institutional processes such as the appointment of executive and public figures, public investment decisions (i.e., procurement processes), tax policies, political coalitions in which criminals take part and judicial decisions (Godson 2003b, p. 12). Although political–criminal alliances are universal, the literature addressing the problems associated with the collision of the upper and underworlds focuses on the regions that are more severely affected by this illicit conspiracy. Hence, it concentrates on large parts of southern Italy, Colombia, Nigeria, Mexico, Russia, Ukraine, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Central Asia and some parts of Europe and the US.

The existence of political–criminal alliances can affect a state in several ways. Public officials in positions to advance the interests of criminal organisations can make states weak by limiting opportunities for the development of democratic institutions and free markets (Shelley 2003). Criminals influence sectors of the local economy, such as the credit market, the labour market and the construction sector, compromising free competition (Paoli 2003; Pimentel 2003). Public officials gain wealth by establishing agreements that favour criminals; for example, awarding public contracts to criminals before public bids are invited. When this happens, institutional democracy is compromised and public efficiency is undermined (Ebbe 2003; Kelly 2003).

Once political–criminal alliances have weakened a state, it is easier for criminal groups to penetrate its economy with illicit money (Moran 2001). The success of drug traffickers in Colombia in obtaining high-level political support was mainly due to the fact that the *narcos* were able to launder vast amounts of money in a relatively small Colombian economy (Lee & Thoumi 2003, p. 85). A weak state affected by political–criminal activities results in increased violence and institutions unable to provide basic functions, such as security and protection, to its citizens (Kupatadze 2008; Solomon & Foglesong 2000).

Another institutional problem created by political–criminal alliances is the weakness of the rule of law and the deterioration of the criminal justice system (Chin 2003; Shelley 2003). Criminal groups can obtain protection from political–economic elites by obtaining protective umbrellas

(De Danieli 2014). Hence, when criminal organisations are free to operate under the protective umbrella of law enforcement, the state experiences high levels of impunity. Laws are easily manipulated, inconsistently enforced and criminals rarely end up in prison and continue to operate (Kelly 2003; Kupatadze 2008; Wang 2011; Williams & Godson 2002). For example, in some regions of Mexico, criminality from drug traffickers was out of the reach of lawful authorities (Pimentel 2003). As another example, Nigerian society has experienced high levels of impunity given that almost the entire judiciary system has been corrupted at state and federal levels (Ebbe 2003).

The influence of political–criminal alliances not only compromises the efficient function of the law and order of a country but also makes criminals the de facto power in that territory. In those cases, criminals can influence elections, control public offices, manage public resources and collect taxes (Paoli 2003). When organised crime develops parallel government structures (Kupatadze 2008) or a 'second government' (Chin & Godson 2006), corrupt processes are legitimised. A criminalised state and economy uses its power and influence to shape laws in favour of illicit industries (i.e., prostitution and human and drug trafficking) that are under the control of criminal organisations (Hughes & Denisova 2001; Jamieson 2001).

Some countries, such as Mexico and Colombia, have gone through periods and levels of ungovernability due to the influence of narco-wealth on their economic and political systems (Lee & Thoumi 2003; Pimentel 2003). Criminal influence on governments able to institutionalise narco-mafias and corruption are not unique to Latin America. Central Asian economies have also established symbiotic relationships with drug-related networks in which powerful political figures have worked at the service of drug traffickers (De Danieli 2014).

**2.5 Estimating the Institutional Effects of Political–Criminal Alliances**

By the late 1990s, there were no comparable international measures to account for the effects of illicit activities such as corruption on governance. However, since 1995, the global civil society organisation Transparency International through the publication of its annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) has been influential in sharpening the focus on corruption (Andersson & Heywood 2009). Similarly, in 1996, the World Bank began a long research program on governance indicators, developing indicators, such as the World Governance Indicator (WGI), which are now available biennially and annually for the five-year period between 2002 and 2006 (Apaza 2009, p. 139). Such efforts permitted a more detailed

quantitative assessment of corruption, paying closer attention to the illicit role played by firms and less to organised crime such as mafias. However, some researchers, such as Van Dijk (2007), constructed specific indices, such as the Composite Organised Crime Index, to assess organised crime and its effect on societies and the rule of law.

Relying on governance indicators, such as the WGI and the CPI, to measure the institutional effect of illicit associations, has several drawbacks. First, although the data were gathered by respectable institutions, such as the World Bank, and are derived from questions 'increasingly specific, focused, and quantitative', they are based on perceptions of the corruption of individuals across different countries. The critiques suggest that subjective data might not reflect an objective reality, limiting its capacity to guide policymakers (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2007, pp. 2–3). Perhaps the most notorious limitation of international indices on corruption is that, for the most part, they are not oriented to measure the institutional impact of organised crime, but that of a private firm. Additionally, such indices are constructed by collecting data that evaluates the behaviour of a large sample of firms in various states; but to date, there is no scholarship that accounts systematically for the institutional effect a single criminal organisation exerts on a state.

In sum, to some extent, criminology and world politics scholarship has disregarded the political side of organised crime. From a criminology and multidisciplinary perspective, there are important efforts that address the dynamics of political–criminal collaboration through important case studies including comparative analysis, which explains the phenomenon at a regional level (i.e., Latin America and Africa). Although these efforts discover similar patterns of corruption and capture across different countries that explain how political–criminal alliances take place and affect the stability of states, the literature is descriptive and lacks a systematic framework to explain the logic underlying political–criminal interactions. According to Cockayne (2016, p 19), although some efforts in the literature (i.e., Farah 2012; Miklaucic & Naím 2013) come close to offering a broad framework for understanding the dynamics of political–criminal interactions, such a framework lacks sufficient research to answer questions such as: When do political and criminal actors collaborate? When do they compete? When does one become the other?

In addition, the literature studying the effect of political–criminal alliances on public institutions of states is, for the most part, descriptive. Although several works collect valuable

data from ethnographic works, interviews and field observations (Chin & Godson 2006; De Danieli 2014; Ebbe 2003; Hughes & Denisova 2001; Kupatadze 2008; Lee & Thoumi 2003; Pimentel 2003), in general the literature is merely descriptive. In addition, in the field of criminology, the magnitude of the political effect of political–criminal activities has not been systematically tested, as suggested by the literature on institutional impact. Although attempts to measure institutional impact suggests that the institutional effects are dramatic, there is no agreement among scholars to introduce a comprehensive theoretical and methodological framework to measure the institutional impact of political–criminal processes.

## 2.6 Conceptual Framework

The following section of this chapter introduces:

1) a set of theoretical concepts of political corruption proposed by Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2009) as an essential conceptual framework for measuring the institutional effect of political–criminal alliances
2) theoretical concepts of social networks that lay the foundations of the methodological approach of this thesis.

Essential concepts of political corruption and social networks comprise the theoretical foundations of this research. In Chapter 4, this thesis operationalises important elements of these theoretical concepts to measure the transnational institutional impact of the FARC network (the case study) and to evaluate the responsibility of leaders of such network in exerting political influence on states.

### 2.6.1 Theoretical Concepts of Political Corruption

### 2.6.1.1 Corruption

'Corruption' is defined by the World Bank (1997, pp. 8–9) as the abuse of public office for private gain. Public abuse exists:

1) when an official in the exercise of his duties accepts, solicits or extorts a bribe
2) when a private agent offers bribes to evade public processes to obtain profit
3) when circumstances of patronage and nepotism lead to theft of state assets or diversion of state revenues.

Corruption is a common activity in the private and public sectors but can include participation of illicit groups such as criminal bands, paramilitaries, guerrillas, drug dealers and gangs (World Bank 1997). Different factors can trigger corruption. Although the explanations are broad, the decision to corrupt can be interpreted as balancing the expected cost of a corrupt act—including psychological, social and financial costs—against the expected benefit (Treisman 2000, p. 402). In that case, different factors, such as the effectiveness of the legal system, religion, political systems, economic development and labour conditions, can potentially explain corruption.

Corruption is as old as organised human life (Klitgaard 1988, p. 7). The timeless nature of corruption goes back to the ancient world. There are historical records that describe corrupt activities in ancient China and India and in the Roman and Greek empires (Farrales 2005, p. 4). Now, it is not uncommon to hear of corruption scandals. In 2015, after several years of intense investigations, the Swiss authorities arrested various *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* (FIFA) officials attending the 65th FIFA Congress in Zurich. The arrests were made on behalf of US authorities on corruption charges (Gibson & Gayle 2015) and were based on the alleged use of bribery, fraud and money laundering to corrupt the issuing of media and marketing rights for FIFA games in the Americas, estimated at USD150 million (United States Department of Justice 2015).

One of the most notorious cases of recent corruption links to the Odebrecht organisation, Brazilian diversified businesses in the fields of engineering, construction and chemicals. An investigation carried out by the US Department of Justice in 2016 details how Odebrecht bribed public officials in various governments (Angola, Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, the US, Guatemala, Mexico, Mozambique, Panama, Peru, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela) for 20 years to obtain benefits from public contracting processes (Urdaneta 2016). The case could be considered the biggest corruption scandal in history. The vast network of kickbacks spread to four continents and several countries, implicating high-ranking public officials including, in some cases, heads of states such as former president of Brazil Dilma Rousseff (Gillespie & Brocchetto 2017).

### 2.6.1.2 State Capture

State capture exists when public officials in charge of formulating policies and laws are able to reconfigure the 'rules of the game' for their own benefit (Hellman & Kaufmann 2001, p. 31).

With that in mind, state capture is a more sophisticated form of corruption. It can be described as a 'specific form of systemic corruption at large scale' (Garay-Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán 2012, p. 179) in which private agents make fraudulent payments to public officials to alter the formation of norms, rules and regulations stipulated by the state (Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann 2000, pp. 6–7). The concept of state capture was formulated around the framework of the private firm in terms of its capacity to capture the public administration. Countries that experience high levels of state capture have a tendency to slow the effect of economic reforms and decrease the quality of governance (Hellman & Schankerman 2000, p. 553). In general, developing economies that have difficulty applying efficient economic reforms, awarding public contracts and executing public expenditures are an easy target for actors involved in state capture.

For example, consider the corruption scandal that broke out in Colombia when the former mayor of Bogotá, Samuel Moreno, was arrested in 2011 in relation to irregularities in awarding public contracts for the construction of the mass transit system '*Transmilenio*' (El Espectador 2011). Along with Moreno, senior officials and business executives were charged with corruption. Considering the vast amount of misused public funds (estimated to be the millions of US dollars) and the large number of people involved, this scandal was known as the 'contracting carousel' (BBC News 2011). The corruption activities reached a transnational level, including a firm in Miami and two companies in tax havens that were specifically created to hide the transfer of stolen public funds (Semana 2010). The Moreno administration embroiled in a corruption process at a large scale that eventually led to state capture. The officials that participated in the corruption were able to systematically alter public regulations stipulated by the state regarding public procurement. Aside from Moreno, the list of indicted public officials for offences of corruption included congressional representatives, governors and council representatives.

### 2.6.1.3 Co-opted State Reconfiguration

For Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2009, pp. 3–6) the concept of state capture falls short in explaining essential aspects intrinsically related to protecting the rule of law. In general, state capture only acknowledges the unlawful actions of private agents. However, illegal groups, such as criminal organisations, insurgents and terrorists organisations, also have the potential to participate in activities that lead to state capture. In addition, unlawful

groups may not only be interested in financial gain but also in obtaining judicial and legislative advantages. State capture only considers scenarios in which the corruption of public officials leads to the alteration of norms, rules and laws. However, state capture may not only occur at a legislative level but also at judiciary and executive levels.

Co-opted state reconfiguration is a more complex concept of political corruption. The concept of state capture stipulates that the capture process begins at the unlawful end (private actors) and finishes at the lawful end (public actors); that is, firms offering bribes to public agents. Co-opted state reconfiguration suggests that the co-optation process can happen in any direction; it is a two-way process or an alignment of interests between the two parties (Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán & De León-Beltrán 2010).

Co-opted state reconfiguration can be defined as 'the action of legal and illegal organisations, which through illegitimate practices seek to systematically modify from within the political regime and influence the formation, modification, interpretation, and application of the rules of the game and public policies' (Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán & De León-Beltrán 2009, p. 10). In sum, the main difference between state capture and co-opted state reconfiguration is that, in the latter, interests are coordinated and aligned, regulations are not only affected at the legislative level and unlawful entities can be represented by any unlawful group such as drug traffickers, guerrillas or paramilitaries. As with state capture, the objective of co-opted state reconfiguration is to modify the mechanisms that sustain the 'rules of the game' of the political regime, including the application of public policies. Hence, unlawful organisations could be interested in altering the state standards, regulations, activities and production of norms. If they succeed, they can obtain sustained economic and political benefits including social legitimacy (Garay-Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán 2012; Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán & De León-Beltrán 2010).

### 2.6.2 Theoretical Concepts of Networks and Analytical Tools for Disrupting Illicit Networks

### 2.6.2.1 Network Theory

Network theory has its origins dating back to the eighteenth century. Swiss mathematician and physicist Leonhard Euler used pictorial representations to solve the 'Konigsberg Bridges' mathematical problem by using vertices and edges as the only means of analysis. This approach

laid the foundation for graph theory. Later, mathematicians such as Cauchy, Hamilton, Cayley, Kirchoff and Polya contributed to the extension of graph theory by developing the mathematical foundations of ordered graphs. During the 1950s, the two Hungarian mathematicians Paul Erdős and Alfred Rény significantly revolutionised graph theory and raised important questions about how networks are formed (Barabási 2003). In 1929, Frigyes Karinthy wrote a volume of short humorous stories called *The Minden Masképpen Van* (*Everything is Different*). In one of the pieces titled 'Chains', a character challenges members of a group to choose only one person out of the '1.5 billion inhabitants of earth'. He bets the group that 'using no more than five individuals, one of whom is a personal acquaintance, he could contact the selected individual using nothing except the network of personal acquaintances' (Karinthy 2006, p. 22). This networking process gave rise to the idea of 'six degrees of separation' that was first empirically tested by Stanley Milgram (Harvard) to demonstrate that everyone is connected to everyone else on the planet by no more than six degrees of separation (Watts 2003).

### 2.6.2.2 Social Capital in Networks

Network theorists gave greater importance to the role of social capital in networks. The theory of the strength of weak ties by Granovetter (1983) states that individuals located in clustered networks possess strong ties with their pairs. However, individuals that are in a position to connect, or bridge, two dense clusters in a network (i.e., weak ties) have a strategic advantage, or improved social coordination, over the clustered individuals. This is because, by reaching new clusters, they have access, and an opportunity to connect in the future, to other individuals that can provide new ideas, labour market opportunities and better intellectual challenges.

Burt (1992) built on Granovetter's concepts but diverged from the idea that social capital in networks must be understood in terms of the potential qualities and resources that an individual can capitalise on relative to their contacts. For Burt, an individual must not be concerned with 'the quality of any particular tie but rather the way different parts of networks are bridged' (Granovetter 2005, p. 35). In other words, Burt suggested that social capital should not be measured as the potential of an individual to reach more people and their ability to establish a frequent number of ties with them. If that were the case, if successful, such an individual would be able to become part of a larger and better-connected, or dense, network. For Burt (1992, p. 65), such an apparent advantage may become a double-edged sword. Although more contacts

implies greater access to information and resources, it can also mean that in a very dense network, contacts lead back to the same people. They become redundant, as they would lead to the same information and resources every time. Burt (1992) considered that a less-connected network would provide more advantages to certain individuals within that network. Hence, an individual that possesses non-redundant contacts, or whose contacts are not closely tied to each other, will be able to receive information and resources from different sources and spheres of social activity. The strategic position of an individual that is surrounded by non-redundant contacts was defined by Burt (1992) as a spanning 'structural hole'.

Other scholars in network analysis agree with Burt's ideas. For Everton (2012, p. 254), individuals whose ties span such holes are at a competitive advantage, as they have an opportunity to 'broker the flow of resources'. For Borgatti, Everett and Johnson (2013, p. 276), an individual's social capital grows with the number of ties they possess but declines to the extent that their contacts are connected to each other.

For Gould and Fernandez (1989), differences in strategic advantages among individuals in a network depends on the possibility that some individuals differ in terms of their activities or interests. The amount of social capital in a network that individuals secure depends on their ability to strategically position themselves in a way that allows them to exchange resources among actors. However, as the strategic position of some individuals will be different depending on their interests, the exchanges between some actors will differ in meaning from exchanges between other actors (Gould & Fernandez 1989, p. 91).

Gould and Fernandez (1989, p. 91) analytically broke down the concept of exchange among actors into five distinct brokerage scenarios. For that purpose, brokerage is understood as a relationship involving three actors, two of whom are the actual parties (i.e., the principals) to the intermediation and one is the intermediary (i.e., the broker). Additionally, the network system is partitioned into a set of mutually exclusive (i.e., non-overlapping) subgroups of actors (see Figure 2.1). In the first case, the three actors (i.e., the two principals and the broker) belong to the same group and the brokerage relationship is internal to the group. An individual who occupies this role is called a broker or coordinator. In the second case, the two principals belong to the same subgroup and the intermediary belongs to a different subgroup. In this case, the intermediary is an outsider called an itinerant broker. In the third case, one principal and the intermediary belong to the same subgroup and the other principal belongs a different

subgroup. In this case, the intermediary can grant access to an outsider and is called the gatekeeper. In the fourth case, again, one principal and the intermediary belong to the same subgroup and the other principal belongs to a different subgroup. However, this time, the intermediary establishes contact with an outsider and is called the representative. In the fifth case, all three actors belong to different groups. Because the intermediary is an outsider with respect to both principals located in different groups, it is called the liaison.



**Figure 2.1: Structures of Mediation According to Gould and Fernandez (1989)**
**(Adapted from Soto Díaz & Lufin 2016, p. 14)**

**2.6.2.3 Network Analysis for Disrupting Dark Networks**

Globalisation, migration movements, ethnic conflicts, technology and transnational financial markets have provided illicit groups with an opportunity to obtain social, economic and political power, including the possibility of operating beyond borders (Sullivan 2000; Williams & Vlassis 2001). These versatile groups have grown a considerable capacity to resist pressure from law enforcement and government aggression such as military attacks. Scholars have defined these dynamic structures as illicit networks. After the September 11 attacks, researchers turned their attention to the destructive capabilities of networks. For example, the work by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001b) *Networks and netwars* received considerable attention, as it was published before the attacks and provided the basis for further research on illicit networks (Raab & Milward 2003, p. 419).

Network theory and its applications in the field of illicit networks have been of interest to scholars in the areas of international studies, terrorism and security (Brams, Mutlu & Ramírez 2006; Kinsella 2006; Krebs 2002; Montgomery 2005, 2008; Sageman 2004). In addition, criminologists have considered the significance of using network analysis to provide recommendations for disrupting criminal networks (Bunker & Sullivan 1998; Clarke & Brown 2003; Coles 2001; Eck & Gersh 2000; Sarnecki 2001). From its definition, a network is a collection of nodes interconnected by links. Although some nodes are popular (i.e., connected to many links) others are isolated (Sageman 2004, p. 137). For Morselli (2009, p. 4), a network is 'a finite set of actors and the relation(s) that define them'.

Scholars have discovered common features associated with illicit networks. For example, as networks are social entities, their members can base their relationships on matters of trust, mutual interests and common experiences (Kenney 2007; Sageman 2004; Williams 2001; Williams & Vlassis 2001). In addition, networks can embrace nodes at the core of the group while they can also affiliate nodes at the periphery of the structure. Networks can accommodate sub-networks or clusters. Each sub-network has its own core and periphery. Members located at the core have different roles compared to members located at the periphery. Networks benefit from its organisational structure, as peripheral nodes protect the core of the structure, making it difficult to penetrate. If a peripheral node is immobilised or targeted, it would not compromise the regular operation of the network (Kenney 2007; Williams 2001).

Illicit networks do not have a vertical hierarchical structure, but a flat hierarchical structure with less obvious bureaucratic arrangements. This arrangement is decentralised, dispersed, self-organised and leaderless (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001a; Gunaratna 2002; Williams & Vlassis 2001; Zanini & Edwards 2001). Researchers have discovered that networks possess significant advantages compared to traditional hierarchical structures. Networks are highly resilient, easily adapt to different contexts and are able to readily reorganise to new challenges (Gunaratna 2002; Sageman 2004; Stern 2003; Sullivan 2001; Williams 2001). Moreover, networks have been able to transcend the local sphere. They can take advantage of differences in laws and regulations across regions, allowing them to operate transnationally (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001a; Williams 2001; Williams & Vlassis 2001). As a result, researchers have identified the importance of using network analysis tools as a key technique for understanding illicit networks. According to McGloin (2005), SNA provides a comparative advantage over other analytical tools. It focuses more closely on the behaviours of individuals as part of a group.

When it comes to disrupting a network, law enforcement can decide to attack the network by either targeting the individual or the group. Similarly, law enforcement can decide that it is better to target individuals at the core of the network rather than at the periphery or vice versa.

### 2.6.3 Measuring the Institutional Effect of Political–Criminal Alliances

Based on three political corruption concepts: corruption, state capture and co-opted state reconfiguration (Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán & De León-Beltrán 2009), Garay-Salamanca and colleagues (2010, 2012, 2015) studied various illicit networks[2] and empirically determined the extent to which the confluence of criminal and public officials affects the structure and efficient operation of the institutions of various states. These authors argue that processes of political corruption entail interaction among agents that is either lawful or unlawful. Such interaction can be conceived in terms of social relationships or social situations. As a result, processes of political corruption can be constructed and portrayed as social networks. Thus, this scholarship used SNA to identify essential elements of the illicit networks that were studied. For example, the networks were graphically visualised, their shapes and densities determined and the leaders operating within the networks were identified; specifically, the agents that held greater levels of individual social capital and those that were capable of arbitrating high amounts of information through other agents. Subsequently, they proposed a methodological tool called SNAID to quantitatively measure the institutional effect of political–criminal processes. SNAID qualifies and then quantifies all actors (or nodes) and relationships (or edges) observed in an illicit network. By doing this, it is able to 'identify those sectors and levels of public administration that have been affected by the actions of lawful and unlawful agents and groups' (Garay-Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán 2012, p. 186). SNAID typifies every network as a process of corruption, state capture or co-opted state reconfiguration.

### 2.6.4 Furthering the Work on Measuring the Effect of Political–Criminal Alliances

Currently, the set of political corruption concepts proposed by Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2009) is the only theoretical framework available to assess the

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[2] *The Familia Michoacana in Mexico, the Autodefensas Campesinas del Casanare in Colombia and, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán & De León-Beltrán 2010; Garay-Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán 2012, 2015).

impact of political–criminal activities on the institutions of the state. Although this work is an innovative approach to measuring the institutional effect of political–criminal alliances, further theoretical and empirical research is essential to enhance the competency of this theoretical model. Eventually, this will benefit the scholarly community that is interested in better understanding the political effects of political–criminal processes. As such, this thesis:

1) constructs and portrays an illicit network exclusively comprises criminal agents actively involved in transnational political-criminal activities

2) applies SNA techniques to analyse a network involved in transnational political-criminal activities at individual and group levels

3) identifies actors or leaders and relationships in illicit network and informs about the specific behaviour of leaders including their ability to connect groups of individuals in different locations

4) typifies the criminal network as a specific political corruption process in terms of rampant corruption, state capture or co-opted state reconfiguration

5) identifies the actors and relationships associated with processes of corruption, state capture or co-opted state reconfiguration

6) describes the specific behaviour of actors that facilitate relationships that lead to political corruption processes

7) evaluates whether leaders of illicit networks are the same actors in a position to exert political influence upon states.

This thesis draws lessons from a dataset of declassified email correspondence of the FARC, a guerrilla organization involved in the Colombian armed conflict since 1964. The case study is presented in detail in the next chapter.

# Chapter 3 Case Study: The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

## 3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present the case study of this thesis. This research extends the existing theoretical and empirical research by using a case study approach. This thesis selected the FARC as the case study of this project. This chapter briefly introduces case study research as a valuable tool to enhance the study of the political impact of political–criminal activities. The chapter then elaborates on the FARC by drawing attention to four aspects: 1) origins and evolution, 2) transnational FARC, 3) the FARC as an illicit network, and 4) the FARC today and future perspectives. This information is useful for justifying why the FARC is a suitable case study of political–criminal alliances that can reconfigure states. Finally, the chapter elaborates on the military attack of the military forces of Colombia known as 'Operation Phoenix', which succeeded in killing second-in-command of FARC Raúl Reyes. At the time of his death, the Colombian forces seized Reyes' laptops, which held broad information about FARC, their activities and relations. The case study of this thesis is based upon information contained in Reyes' electronic devices.

## 3.2 Case Study Research

As discussed in Chapter 2, Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán 2009 proposed a theoretical framework to determine the potential effects of political–criminal processes on the institutions of states. Based on that framework, the work of Garay-Salamanca and colleagues (2010, 2012, 2015) studied cases (illicit networks) in various countries of Latin America and estimated the extent to which the convergence of criminal and public officials of each network affected the public institutions of the state.

Studying specific cases that account for the close observation of illicit networks is useful to gain in-depth knowledge of a particular phenomenon and to explore it in its real-life context (Merriam 1998; Thomas 2011; Yin 2014). Case study research is a helpful instrument for a variety of reasons. It can be quantitative, qualitative or a mix of both (Dooley 2002; Merriam 1998; Yin 2012). In addition, it can be used to either generate or test theories (Eisenhardt 1989; Merriam 1998). By conducting case study research, the investigator is interested in the

construction of the process of research and not only in the research outcomes. When selecting a specific case, the researcher is not necessarily interested in representing a wider population with that case. Instead, the researcher aims to discover as much information as possible about the object of the study to gain the best possible understanding of the situation (Merriam 1998; Thomas 2011).

As such, this research project draws on a comprehensive dataset of seized and declassified email correspondence between key rebels of the FARC and public officials in different countries of Latin America in 2000. The FARC's origins and evolution, transnational corrupting capacity, adaptability to operate and structure as an illicit network and future perspectives are presented below.

## 3.3 The *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*

### 3.3.1 Origins and Evolution

FARC was officially founded in 1966, with its origins dating back to the early twentieth century. The agrarian conflict that took place in Colombia in the 1920s was primarily a result of poor labour standards in the plantations, land ownership problems and indigenous reservation disputes (Pierre Gilhodes, cited in Pizarro Leongómez 1991, p. 29). At the time, agrarian unions were emerging and searched for support from socialist parties; specifically, The Revolutionary Socialist Party, the Agrarian National Party, the Revolutionary Leftist National Unit and later the Colombian Communist Party (CCP) (Pizarro Leongómez 1991, p. 30). The CCP proved to be essential in assisting the Colombian peasants (Pécaut 2008, p. 23). The new communist self-defence association became a strong resistance movement during times of *la violencia* (the violence).[3] During *la violencia*, the aggression led by the Colombian

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[3] *La violencia* was a time of civil conflict in Colombia that witnessed the greatest mobilisation of peasants in the contemporary history of the western hemisphere, only with the exception of the Mexican revolution (Hobsbawm 1983, p. 264). Although there is no agreement on when *la violencia* began in Colombia, the killing of the liberal *caudillo* (leader), Jorge Eliecer Gaitán (1948), marked a point of no return that struck Colombia for more than two decades (Pizarro Leongómez 1991, p. 39). *La violencia* also meant an unstoppable movement of masses that threatened the stability of the ruling power who, at the time, lay in the hands of two traditional parties: the conservative party and the liberal party (Pécaut 2008, p. 28). According to historians, *la violencia* can be broken into five periods: 1) 1946 to 1949: a great confrontation began between the conservative and liberal parties. 2) 1949 to 1953: guerrillas supported by the liberal party made alliances with communist self-defence peasants. 3) 1953 to 1955: the military dictatorship (conservative) emerged and a 'peace making' process began. 4) 1956 to 1960: a bipartisan liberal–conservative alliance commenced, marking the end of the military dictatorship and the

government on the communist self-defence peasants influenced that movement to initiate a process of resistance and transformation into mobile guerrillas (Pizarro Leongómez 1991, p. 47). Thus, the emerging guerrillas began to concentrate in the eastern plains and the Tolima regions of Colombia.

The guerrillas were also influenced by the Cuban Revolution (1959) that was based on Marxist–Leninist philosophy. As the ideas of the *revolution* spread across Latin America, governments began to implement anti-communist political and military resources (Pardo Rueda 2008, p. 499). In Colombia, military operations targeted the 'independent republics' or agrarian organisations recently created by the guerrillas (Pardo 2006, p. 376). The most significative attack was 'plan LASO' (Latin American Security Operation), which took place on 27 May 1964 in Marquetalia (Tolima). It consisted of a vast amount of Colombian military resources including the assistance of US forces. Although the operation retook the zone occupied by the insurgents, most of the communist self-defence forces escaped and settled in other zones (Pizarro Leongómez 1991, pp. 187–188).

In 1965, peasant self-defence groups constituted the 'General Staff of the Southern Guerrillas Bloc' and, in 1966, the 'Southern Bloc' took the name 'Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia' (Pardo 2006, p. 379). By 1978, the FARC had 1000 combatants and had gained access to the countryside and urban areas of Colombia. During the 1980s, the FARC experienced significant economic enrichment that was mainly derived from participating in the drug trafficking industry (Rochlin 2011, p. 720). The bilateral 'cease-fire' agreements signed under the Betancur administration[4] and the economic bonanza derived from extortion and kidnapping practices were two essential factors that provided the FARC with the opportunity to financially grow to establish a sound 'war economy' (Pizarro Leongómez 2006, pp. 183–184). By 1998, the FARC was continuing to strengthen its armies, reaching a total of 15,000 soldiers. Aside from drug trafficking activities, the FARC's rapid growth was explained by their unrestricted access to important resources, such as oil, carbon and gold, their capacity to exercise control over the finances of small municipalities and the development of illicit activities such as kidnapping, looting, pillaging and illegal taxation (Pataquiva García 2009, p.

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beginning of peasant colonisation (independent republics). 5) 1960 to 1964: a time characterised by a new 'peace making' process known as the 'landowners revenge' (Pardo 2006, p. 362).

[4] Belisario Betancur, President of Colombia, 1982 to 1986.

170). During the Pastrana administration,[5] the FARC obtained legitimate access to 42,000 square kilometres of demilitarised area originally destined for peace negotiations between the government and the guerrillas. This situation favoured the guerrillas who, by that time, were able to exert total control over the population, resources and commercial routes of the zone.

To regain control of several urban and rural regions of Colombia, the Pastrana administration strengthened relations with the US, resulting in strategic reinforcement of Colombian military forces (Pizarro Leongómez 2006, p. 193). On 20 February 2002, Pastrana formally broke off all talks and ordered the military to retake control of the demilitarised zone (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013, p. 170). The military strategy was continued by President Uribe[6] who opted for an 'iron-fist' confrontational military action against the FARC. Uribe was successful in regaining territories previously controlled by the FARC, guaranteeing his re-election as president in 2006 (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013, p. 178). However, Uribe's military approach was mired by a scandal involving the use of false positives. On occasions, the Colombian army used poor, mentally impaired civilians and peasants, killed them and presented them to authorities as *guerrilleros* to inflate body counts. Aside from the scandal, the government offensive forced the FARC to take a step back. By 2008, the Uribe administration had eradicated illicit crops in more than 80 per cent of the cultivated areas under control of the FARC. In addition, the Uribe administration reported a significant reduction of more than 50 per cent of members of illicit groups, taking into account casualties, captures and demobilisations (Pataquiva García 2009, p. 178).

Juan Manuel Santos (Uribe's former defence minister) ran as a candidate for the presidency of Colombia, supported by Uribe. Once elected, Santos–Uribe relations were severed, and tensions arose regarding the way the Santos administration[7] approached diplomatic relations with other Latin American countries. Uribe criticised Santos for re-establishing diplomatic relations with Venezuela, which had allegedly supported the FARC militarily and financially. In addition, Uribe opposed the peace process negotiations that began in 2012 between the FARC and the Colombian government. From that moment, the opposition strategy consisted of attracting public attention about the FARC's ability to regain strength and military

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[5] Andrés Pastrana, President of Colombia 1998 to 2002.

[6] Alvaro Uribe, President of Colombia 2002 to 2010.

[7] Juan Manuel Santos, President of Colombia 2010 to 2018.

capabilities. However, it is argued that the Santos administration considerably reduced the military potential of the FARC to a greater extent than the Uribe administration. According to *El Espectador* (2014), over the course of two years, the Santos government killed two FARC chief of staff members (Mono Jojoy in 2010 and Alfonso Cano in 2011) and 18 FARC senior front leaders in combat. Additionally, in 2016, Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts negotiating a peace treaty with the FARC in Colombia (Nobel Prize 2016). In 2017, the FARC ceased to be an armed group, disarmed and handed its weapons to the United Nations (UN) (Bocanegra & Cobb 2017).

### 3.3.2 Transnational Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

In the aftermath of the Cold War, revolutionary groups in Latin America lost the support of the Soviet bloc. Former insurgent groups reconsidered new forms of survival. Specifically, the FARC established new 'cooperation' strategies with other actors and states (Marshal 2000, cited in Stanislawski 2004, pp. 158–159). For example, the guerrillas provided 'protection' to drug cartels by charging illicit taxes on the production and distribution of coca. For Williams and Godson (2002, pp. 318–319), the guerrillas in Colombia are a clear example of a rebel organisation that resorted to criminal activities to finance their political struggle.

During the last few years, the FARC's participation in drug trafficking activities has not been collateral. On the contrary, they have taken control of the drug market in various regions of Colombia (Berry et al. 2002, pp. 50–51). This dimension of TOC has provided the FARC with more access to weapons, sophisticated technology and territorial control (Sanderson 2004, p. 51). Beyond drug trafficking, the FARC also established relations with licit and illicit actors around the world. According to the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives (2002), senior Irish Republican Army (IRA) members arrested in Colombia in 2001 would have been providing strategic support to Colombian guerrillas in exchange for drugs and money. To Murphy (2005, p. 81), the purpose of the IRA in Colombia was to instruct the FARC in 'urban warfare techniques, enabling them to move into a new face of their revolutionary war'. Moreover, the FARC established relations with Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), a Basque nationalist and separatist organisation. Such bilateral cooperation has long existed, permitting a regular exchange of personnel (Merlos 2009, p. 2). By 2009, FARC had an extensive global presence that was the result of arduous international relations work primarily driven by the late Colombian rebel Raúl Reyes. Reyes was not only a key senior

member of the FARC but also a prominent figure and spokesperson for the FARC. In 2009, the Colombian weekly *Semana* drew an electronic world map showing the most representative transnational points of influence of the FARC. The contents of the map are summarised in Table 3.1.

**Table 3.1: The World of the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia***

| Country | Points of influence |
| --- | --- |
| Canada | Network support cells |
| Mexico | 'Student circles' and urban militants |
| El Salvador | Political ties with the Farabundo Martí Front[8] |
| Nicaragua | The FARC's donations to political parties |
| Venezuela | Arms and financial support to the FARC from the government |
| Ecuador | Economic support from the FARC to Ecuadorian presidential candidate Rafael Correa |
| Peru | Training and support from the FARC to the Peruvian Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amarú and the Revolutionary Left Movement |
| Turkey | Communications and exchange of information with the Turkey Communist Party |
| Libya | Strategic contacts with members of the Muammar al-Gaddafi's government |
| Spain | Exchange of terrorist tactics between the FARC and ETA |
| Germany | Internet and technological support to the FARC from NGOs in that country |
| England | Internet and technological support to the FARC from NGOs in that country |
| Netherlands | Young Netherland citizens trained by the FARC to operate clandestinely in Europe |
| Norway | Sosialistisk Ungdom (Norway Socialist Youth) members trained militarily in Colombia by FARC militants |
| Australia | Australian traffickers who travelled to Colombia to deal arms |

*Note.* Source: Semana (2009)

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[8] A demobilised guerrilla. Today, a political party.

### 3.3.3 The *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* and Transnational Political–Criminal Alliances

### 3.3.3.1 The *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* and Bolivarianism in Latin America

FARC embarked on a process of international expansion led by the second-most senior man in the group's seven-person ruling secretariat[9], Raúl Reyes (Roblin 2016), in the quest for the FARC to be granted belligerent power[10] by the international community. As such, the help of important Latin American leaders was instrumental. The leftist political propaganda of late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez encouraged other Latin American countries, such as Nicaragua, Venezuela and Ecuador, to consider FARC a non-state actor with a sound political ideology. This support permitted the legitimate political participation of the FARC in international forums and conferences such as the Sao Paulo Forum in Brazil[11] (Delgado, Aristizábal & Botero n.d.; Ferro Medina & Uribe Ramón 2002; Pataquiva García 2009; Pécaut 2008; Pérez 2008).

During the late 1990s, the FARC changed its previous Marxist–Leninist principles to a Bolivarian philosophy. Bolivarianism was reintroduced in the region by Chávez who, from the beginning of his presidency, considered himself a Bolivarian patriot (Chávez & Ramonet

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[9] The Secretariat was the executive director of the FARC and made general and financial decisions when the superior organism of direction and control, 'the Central Major State', was not in place (Ferro Medina & Uribe Ramón 2002, p. 47).

[10] 'The concept of belligerency in International Law deals with occurrences of civil war. Certain conditions of fact, arising during such armed conflicts, classically gave rise to recognition of belligerency. These facts include: the existence of civil war within a state, beyond the scope of mere local unrest; occupation by insurgents of a substantial part of the territory of the state; a measure of orderly administration by that group in the area it controls; and observance of the laws of war by the rebel forces, acting under responsible authority. Traditionally, upon recognition of the status of belligerency, third party States assumed the obligations of neutrality regarding the internal conflict and treated the two parties to the conflict as equals—each sovereign in its respective areas of control' (Lotsteen 2000, p. 109). Reyes believed that, for the FARC to be granted belligerent status, important international entities had to be reached such as the European Parliament, the US Congress, the Latin American Parliament (PARLATINO), the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN), the Amazonian Parliament, the UN, the Sao Paulo Forum, the Bolivarian Congress of the Peoples, the Bolivarian Continental Coordinator, the Vatican, the World Social Forum, political parties from all over the world, universities, churches, media and journalists, unions, agrarian and popular movements, cooperative societies and indigenous and afro-descendant communities (Pérez 2008, p. 37). In addition, Reyes and the main delegates of the COMINTER were expected to continuously make strategic alliances with political leaders from all over the world (Pérez 2008, p. 43).

[11] The Sao Paulo Forum is a conference of leftist political parties and other organisations from Latin America and the Caribbean (Kilhof 2014).

2013), and enforced his perception of Bolívar's principles through his governance approach. At the time, Chávez was seeking supporters for his 'Bolivarian emancipation war' in Latin America (Rochlin 2011, p. 722), which proposed the US as the common enemy of the Latin American region (Garrido 2006, pp. 21–22). Those circumstances gradually strengthened the Chávez–FARC relationship to the point that, during Venezuela's National Assembly of 2008, Chávez publicly declared that FARC was a true army occupying real space in Colombia, deserving of political recognition. The Venezuelan president was convinced that FARC was an insurgent force with a legitimate political project.

With Bolivarian ideals gaining traction in Latin America, FARC saw an opportunity to justify its affiliation with the drug trafficking industry. Chávez had persuaded FARC and various Latin American leaders that the war on drugs was 'part of a US strategy to consolidate its hegemony in the region' (Fleischman 2013, p. xviii). Chávez not only opposed the US–Colombia anti-narcotics 'Plan Colombia'[12] agreement but also established strong alliances with the FARC, facilitating drug smuggling operations through Venezuela (Fleischman 2013, p. 71). However, relations between the FARC and Chávez were inconsistent. After the September 11 attacks, world and regional reactions led by the US took on a stance of zero tolerance towards terrorism. Since 1997, FARC had been on the US Department of State's list of terrorist organisations (Semana 2016). As such, the counterterrorism policies in Colombia were supported by Washington and became stronger. As a consequence, Chávez' support of the FARC became more clandestine. Although Chávez still considered the FARC a strategic ally, the cooling relations between the guerrillas and Venezuela created confusion among FARC senior leaders who questioned the loyalty of Chávez and his representatives (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011).

The FARC reached its peak in international influence during the administration of President Andrés Pastrana, during which time the FARC obtained access to, and control of, over 42,000 square kilometres of demilitarised zone (see Section 3.3.1). After the Colombian government reasserted sovereignty over that territory, hardline policies against the FARC announced the beginning of the weakening of the guerrillas. By the early 2000s, with a strong offensive against

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[12] Plan Colombia was the name of a United States foreign aid, military and diplomatic initiative developed in 1999 by Colombian President Pastrana and US President Bill Clinton as a six-year plan to end Colombia's long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic and social development (ABC News 2006; Veillette 2005).

the guerrillas, the FARC had become increasingly alone. Further, their political ambitions of obtaining belligerent status began to fade (Delgado et al. n.d., pp. 2–4).

**3.3.3.2 The *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* – Further Transnational Political–Criminal Alliances**

In 1999, the Iranian government was turned away from constructing a meat-packing plant and slaughterhouse in Colombia's demilitarised zone. Colombian farmers and media considered it suspicious that the Iranians were planning to trade 20,000 tonnes of meat in a zone exclusively controlled by the FARC. In addition, they argued that the projected area failed to fulfil such production capacities. In his defence, Iranian ambassador Hossein Sheikh Zeinedind explained that Iran had no economic interests in the initiative and only wanted to contribute to the peace process in Colombia. Allegedly, the truth behind the slaughterhouse project was to supply arms to the FARC in exchange for drugs (Berry et al. 2002; Semana 2000a). The FARC possessed connections with political leftist movements in Paraguay (Lee 2008). On various occasions, Cuba provided safe havens to FARC members (Murphy 2005). FARC members have been able to liaise with public officials and leftist political movements in the tri-border area of South America (Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil). According to Lee (2008), the FARC exchanged cocaine for weapons in this region in a black market in which Arabs are believed to generate funds on behalf of Islamic extremists in the Middle East (Lee 2008). Additionally, FARC has created connections with Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, Jordan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Ireland, Venezuela, Panama, Peru and Brazil. The connections include members of leftist political parties, public officials and political leaders (Gentry & Spencer 2010).

**3.3.4 The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia as a Network**

Aside from becoming a hybrid organisation able to behave as both a rebel–terrorist and criminal organisation (Farah 2012, p. 13), the FARC also became a versatile group with a significant capacity to resist pressure from law enforcement and government aggression. As such, the FARC developed dynamic structures no longer associated with rigid hierarchical

arrangements.[13] The FARC's networking structures changed and became more resilient when anti-crime and counterterrorism policies were in play.

Studies in counterterrorism suggest that over-reliance on confrontational military attacks is not an effective measure to defeat illicit networks. Henke (2009) believes that modern terrorist groups can survive against aggressive counterterrorist operations if their members have an opportunity to grow in power within the organisation. According to Henke (2009), the FARC's ability to survive rests on these ideas. From his perspective, counterterrorism disruption must be oriented to analyse the network structure of an illicit group and understand the internal dynamics of leader selection.

Cunningham et al. (2013) believe that confrontational attacks forced the FARC to operate in Colombia from safe heavens (i.e., Venezuela) and establish ties with drug cartels at different points in the production chain. For Hernández, Galeano and Escobar (2012), drug trafficking provided the FARC with the financial means and resources to make its networking structures resilient, allowing it to continue to function even if senior leaders were killed. From that perspective, confrontational operations in Colombia against the FARC were unsuccessful. Hernández and colleagues (2012) suggest that different strategies, such as demobilisation, require more time and patience but can prove to be a more cost-effective solution.

In line with Hernández and colleagues (2012), Eccarius-Kelly (2012) states that, in addition to funds obtained from drug trafficking, other factors that contributed to change FARC structures were military pressure and internal communication problems. Bakker, Raab and Milward (2012) found that when organisations such as the FARC have access to resources (i.e., profits from drug dealing), it stimulates an internal structural process that leads to resilience. Hence, to Bakker and colleagues (2012), the implementation of Plan Colombia in 1999 was a military 'shock' that made FARC remarkably resilient and did not prevent it from participating in the narcotics industry. On the contrary, coca cultivation increased.

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[13] A detailed description of the hierarchical structures of FARC can be appreciated in Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramón (2002).

**3.3.5 The End of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia?**

The Havana peace agreements were signed on 26 September 2016 between the government of Colombia and the FARC in Cartagena as a result of more than four years of dialogue between the parties. This ended the insurgent organisation that, from that moment, created its own political party (Sánchez 2016). Before the final agreement was signed, on 23 June 2016 in Havana, a definitive ceasefire was declared (El Tiempo 2016). However, due to the electoral victory of the opposition who voted 'NO' (not in favour of the peace agreements) in the plebiscite held on 2 October 2016, the agreements were modified and renegotiated, reaching a definitive agreement on 12 November 2016 (Vanguardia.com 2016). The agreements were signed and filed in congress on 24 November for its ratification and implementation. The text was approved in both the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives between 29 November and 30 November. With this ratification and implementation in congress, the process of demobilisation of insurgents and disarmament began including a process of reincorporation into civil life (El Espectador 2017).

To the historian Malcolm Deas, the FARC transitioned from a guerrilla, military organisation to a political party. He believes that the FARC has a political future although he does not think it will be easy for them. For Deas, peace with the FARC is a fact; they stopped fighting, they gave up their weapons and they have no intention of beginning to fight again (Cosoy 2017). However, the FARC is far from disappearing entirely. A member of the FARC secretariat, Jesús Santrich, in response to President Juan Manuel Santos, affirmed that with the abandonment of weapons, a group does not disappear but instead mobilises legally (RCN Radio 2017).

Other critics are not as optimistic. They believe the FARC are not finished, but transformed. They suggest that, despite the government's efforts to impose a peace plan to establish order in Colombia, police and military forces are now fighting against several armed criminal groups that are taking control of illegal territories and activities that were once under the influence of the FARC. When they agreed to demobilise, the FARC remained a powerful organisation that abandoned lucrative drug trafficking, extortion and illegal mining businesses. Those who have remained active in these illegal businesses are dissidents of the FARC, new bands and old rival groups such as the National Liberation Army (Acosta & Murphy 2018).

## 3.4 Conclusion

This chapter introduced case study research as an ideal research method to gain a thorough understanding of how transnational political–criminal processes affect the public institutions of a state. This research presented FARC as the object of study in this research. The adaptive organisational characteristics of FARC structures (i.e., hybrid and protean), in conjunction with a long trajectory, have allowed this group to leave a traceable path that has been strengthened with the help of strong partnerships at local, national and transnational levels. The chapter then elaborated on the FARC organisation considering important aspects such as its origins, evolution and capacity to operate beyond borders. The chapter then described the journey taken by the FARC to become an influential transnational entity and its capacity to reach international public actors. Strengthening ties and increasing cooperation with other countries allowed the FARC to consolidate international relations, which was primarily driven by the late key Colombian rebel Raúl Reyes. The tireless work of the COMINTER enabled the guerrillas to establish strong political–criminal alliances with important actors in Latin America and around the world. This chapter provided a brief picture of how the FARC organised and operated as an illicit network. Experts in the field of network analysis have already uncovered the FARC's networking structure and the strategic possibilities derived from its changing form such as an increasing capacity to succeed militarily based on its adaptability to hardline military positions. Although the FARC has officially surrendered its arms after peace negotiations with the Colombian government, critics remain sceptical about the complete disappearance of a group that was part of a civil and regional conflict for many decades.

# Chapter 4 Research Design

## 4.1 Introduction

Existing shortcomings in the literature on political–criminal processes suggest the need for a new theoretical framework to better understand and explain institutional impact. In line with the objectives of this research (see Section 1.3), this chapter tests the applicability of the theoretical framework proposed by Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2009) to assess institutional impact of illicit networks. This chapter specifies a suitable analytical framework for measuring transnational institutional and to reveal the responsibility leaders of illicit networks in co-opting the public office of other states.

As discussed in Chapter 3, this research applied a case study research approach using FARC as a case study. It draws lessons from a comprehensive dataset of email correspondence recovered by the military forces of Colombia in 2008, after Raúl Reyes was killed in a cross-border attack on a guerrilla camp in Ecuador. This chapter begins with a description of the data obtained for this research and continues with a complete description of the sampling procedures and measurement framework. The chapter concludes by identifying and addressing the methodological limitations of this research.

## 4.2 Collecting, Recording and Manipulating Network Data

### 4.2.1 Data Source

On March 2008, a FARC jungle camp located on the Colombian–Ecuadorian border was bombed by Colombian armed forces planes in a raid called Operation Phoenix (Organization of American States 2008, p. 6). Raúl Reyes was killed in the assault while he slept (Rico 2008). At the time of his death, Reyes assumed a leading role in the FARC's global operations as head of the COMINTER and was responsible for the FARC's network of foreign sympathisers and allies. In effect, he served as a de facto spokesman for the FARC and regularly received emissaries and journalists at the group's jungle camps in Ecuador (Romero 2008).

Following the attack, Colombian troops recovered Reyes' corpse and, with it, his metal briefcase. Contained in the briefcase were three laptops, two external hard drives and three USB flash drives (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 16). The devices

contained considerable digital information, including sensitive documents and a complete record of all email correspondence to and from Reyes (including emails forwarded to him by subordinates) from January 1999 to February 2008. Among the matters disclosed in the correspondence, the information reflected strong relationships between Reyes, other COMINTER actors and public servants of foreign governments, especially from Ecuador and Venezuela. According to the files, FARC members and Latin American politicians engaged with one another through distinct arrangements, which included illicit business-related agreements, non-aggression deals and diplomatic privileges. The email correspondence reflected three types of communications:

1) Correspondence between Reyes and other FARC operatives in Colombia or members of the secretariat.[14]

2) Correspondence between Reyes and other members of COMINTER, members of foreign governments, domestic and foreign collaborators and other contacts.

3) Correspondence between third parties, including messages between subordinates forwarded to Reyes, and messages to third parties including families and friends of FARC members (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 19).

Once seized by the Colombian military, the files were sent to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to verify the authenticity of the contents. Another copy was commissioned to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), which cleaned and catalogued 8832 digital files for further analysis. Later, the raw data were declassified and published in archival form. The IISS decided that all the material was of potential interest to the public and only omitted a small amount of information such as personal details of FARC members or passwords of the FARC's email accounts (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 20).

Together with the FARC files, the IISS also published a strategic dossier, 'The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of "Raúl Reyes"', which reflects a comprehensive investigation into the FARC's international affairs. The purpose of the investigation was to explore the nature of FARC activities in terms of its relations with Ecuador and Venezuela,

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[14] The Secretariat was the executive direction of FARC (Ferro Medina & Uribe Ramón 2002, p. 47).

considering their significance to regional and international security (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, pp. 17–18). The dossier uncovers different aspects related to the criminal activities of the FARC in their search for political acceptance in Latin America such as access to resources, diplomatic relationships, economic, political and social activities on land borders, relationship with public officials, access to arms and the drug trade and electoral presence. This thesis structured this correspondence into a viewable network and, by applying SNA techniques, applied measures that address the overarching objectives of this research. The process followed to achieve this is outlined below.

**4.2.2 Sample and Network Boundary Specification: The Political–Criminal Network**

The FARC correspondence contains information pertaining to the sender, recipient, date and email (in Spanish). Additionally, the IISS categorised all emails into mutually exclusive groups by reference country; Venezuela and Ecuador. Specifically, a table titled 'Venezuela' (n = 3052, labelled I.1-I.3052) dating from January 1999 to February 2008 and a table titled 'Ecuador' (n = 2778, labelled II.1-II.2778) dating from March 1999 to February 2008. There are n = 110 individuals in the email communications. To select a reliable sample of the population described above, this research pursued a three-step process as follows.

**4.2.2.1 Historical Considerations**

This research focused exclusively on the number of emails pertaining to the archived data corresponding to 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2000, Venezuela (n = 124, labelled I.3-I.126) and Ecuador (n = 95, labelled II.4-II.98). The year 2000 was selected in light of historical considerations that are important when studying processes of political–criminal alliances in Latin America. After the turn of the century, Latin American countries, including Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Ecuador, experienced considerable political sea change, with left-leaning political parties winning national elections (Reid 2015).[15] This new political climate provided considerable opportunity for illicit groups to exert political influence on various countries in the region. However, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, political sympathy for the FARC deteriorated, especially given Washington's focus on counterterrorism.

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[15] In Latin America this phenomenon is also known as 'neo-populism' or 'the pink tide'.

Moreover, in 2002, Álvaro Uribe was elected President of Colombia and had a strong mandate for contentious counterinsurgency against the FARC. This added to the failed Venezuelan coup d'état in 2002 in which President Chávez almost lost power, making the Venezuelan government reconsider his support for the FARC (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 84). Thus, in the correspondence, the year 2000 was selected, bearing in mind that from 2001, the FARC's extraterritorial political influence was on the verge of failure and external support for them began to display new dynamics that are also worthy of future research.

**4.2.2.2 Network Boundaries – Reyes' Ego Network**

The population that constitutes the FARC email correspondence, include actors that sent and received emails, and other actors mentioned in the content of the correspondence. As identified by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2011, pp. 7–12), the actors in the FARC network consist of individuals of different kinds or who belong to different neighbourhoods (i.e., senior key FARC members, senior COMINTER members, COMINTER operatives, FARC operatives, public officials, domestic and foreign collaborators, and groups of individuals[16]) and whose ties and affiliations do not seek the same goal. As such, from a realist perspective, this group does not exist as a collective that recognises common membership (Laumann, Marsden & Prensky 1992, p. 65). The population that comprise the correspondence does not constitute a social entity in which the natural or reasoned boundaries of the group permit the researcher to work with a complete network. Correctly outlining the boundaries of a network is important. Mis-specification and taking measures from a 'fuzzy bounded' population could lead to inappropriate strategies and recommendations (Everton 2010, p. 7).

The strategy used to take a sample that spoke for the totality of the FARC correspondence was an ego-network approach. In SNA, the ego-network strategy focuses only on the person studied—ego, their set of direct contacts (or alters) and the ties between their alters (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013; Wasserman & Faust 1994). Accordingly, from the email

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[16] Group emails. As with several computer-based mail systems, sometimes the FARC correspondence observed grouped emails that do not disclose the members of the group. For the sample considered here, that was the case of a group of military personnel located in Venezuela, and the group that comprised the direction of the COMINTER (led by Reyes). Because both groups represent important actors in the FARC network, they were not removed but instead considered as individuals (a high ranking official of Venezuela and a senior key FARC operative respectively).

correspondence in 2000, the subset of correspondence was selected that drew the ego network of Raúl Reyes. Specifically, such correspondence consists of Reyes' sent and received emails and email communications that took place among his subordinates (or alters).[17]

Statistically, the ego-centred cluster of Raúl Reyes allows correct inferences of the entire population that constitutes the FARC email correspondence, as:

- Reyes was the FARC member with the highest frequency of sent and received emails in the more than 8 years of correspondence.
- Reyes was the leader of the COMINTER and a senior key leader of the FARC (member of the executive direction of the FARC). Other members of the FARC, including senior leaders of the COMINTER, reported to Reyes.
- Reyes was the architect of the electronic correspondence. He decided to keep copies of all communications and documents of the COMINTER.

### 4.2.2.3 Snowball sampling: Political-Criminal Alliances

The ego network of Raúl Reyes specified above consists only of actors that link to each other through sending and receiving emails. However, an ego-network with any given actor at the centre can extend out an arbitrary number of degrees (Carrington et al. 2005, cited in Eckles & Stradley 2012). Hence, from the Reyes' ego network of electronic communications, a second round of actors and relationships was obtained by performing a content analysis of the conversations held in those emails (the second-degree ego-network of Raul Reyes). In that case, only the emails in which the conversations reflected political–criminal processes were considered.[18] Other conversations, such as conversations between FARC members about administrative issues or family matters, were not considered.

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[17] Interestingly, the Reyes correspondence also includes communications between his subordinates. Reyes was a meticulous commander who fastidiously kept copies of not only his own email correspondence, but also of all communications between subordinates (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 19).

[18] According to the definition presented in Chapter 1, a PCN or political–criminal alliance is the collaboration between the political establishment and a criminal group (see Section 1.1). In such a relationship, agents peacefully coexist to obtain mutual benefits (Wang 2011). As such, conversations were searched for evidence of agreements between licit and illicit actors such as business-related agreements, non-aggression deals and diplomatic privileges extended to FARC members.

When content analysis was performed on the Reyes' ego network of electronic communications, further actors and relationships reflecting political–criminal alliances were obtained. These actors were linked to each other in a variety of forms. It was possible to detect different types of relationships among the actors. They were classified according to the categories proposed by Knoke and Kuklinski (1991):

- Transactions of valuable resources (i.e., money) were detected.
- Various types of communication between actors were observed (i.e., personal, telephonic, verbal and written).
- Relationships of authority and power were present among FARC members considering their ranks within the organisation (i.e., assigning tasks to subordinates, obeying commands and reporting to superiors).
- Instrumental relationships between actors were identified. These types of relationships accounted for situations in which members discussed strategic aspects in the best interest of the parties (i.e., looking for or receiving political advice).

After performing the three-step sampling process on the FARC correspondence, the result is a final sample consisting of a set of n = 41 actors and n = 206 ties. The different actors that comprise the sample and the different ties reflected by the political–criminal alliances inform the research process; in that, they are the units of observation of this research. After recording the sample in a spreadsheet (see Appendix 1), it was possible to construct a complete network with clear boundaries called the FARC network.

After following the three-step process described here, the network analyst may not find surprising that once SNA metrics were calculated, Raúl Reyes would prove a high level of power in the FARC network (i.e., degree centrality). In fact, he is the ego of the electronic communication ties. However, it must be considered that Reyes' position in the FARC network is not only the result of being the ego of the electronic communications network. The reader must be mindful that further actors and relationships were retrieved from the emails in which Reyes' strategic position is no longer defined by being the ego of the network (the second degree of Reyes' ego-network). However, to avoid biased results, the logical next step was disconnecting or removing Reyes' electronic communication ties from the FARC network. This research tested this operation and discovered that SNA scores at all levels throughout the

FARC network did not vary significantly. As such, this research chose not to disconnect Reyes' electronic communication ties from the FARC network.

### 4.2.3 Data Recording

Illicit affiliations (all proof of political–criminal alliances – the FARC network), including email ties, were recorded on a spreadsheet, producing a 'relational square matrix' composed of as many rows and columns as actors. The relational square matrix comprises five types of relationships among the set of actors. As discussed above (see Section 4.2.2.3), all ties reflect political–criminal processes and are subdivided into five subgroups:

- electronic communications
- transactions
- other communications
- authority or power
- instrumental relationships.

It was observed that sometimes any two pairs of actors interacted more than once and occasionally in more than one category. Thus, the relational dataset originally comprised valued data. This means that every pair of actors can be counted the number of times they interacted. However, when important measures were taken from the relational square matrix (i.e., centralisation scores), the valued data were dichotomised and turned into binary data before estimating network metrics. Binary data informs either the presence or absence of a tie between two actors (Everton 2010, p. 40).

Additionally, in all cases, the ties demonstrate a two-way connection in which members could send and receive emails. For any two pairs of actors in the relational square matrix, transactions, communications, authority and instrumental relations occurred in both directions, meaning that there was no restriction on who was directing the tie. For the purposes of this research, all ties were taken as undirected ties so that metrics at network and individual levels did not consider who initiated contact when relations were established. The relational square matrix that carries the characteristics described above was constructed and plotted using the SNA software UCINET, which includes the NetDraw network visualisation tool (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman 2002).

## 4.3 Description

After recording the FARC network, by applying the SNA software UCINET and NetDraw (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman 2002), it was possible to provide a detailed top-down description and visualisation of the illicit network considering three basic aspects. First, network topography specified the shape of the network, its degree of centralisation and connectedness. Second, cohesion and clustering were specified. As the FARC is a transnational network, it was possible to consider its various non-overlapping subgroups of actors concentrated in different geographical locations: country 1, country 2 … country n. Third, actors were tagged and coded by location and role and analysed, making it possible to perform measures related to prestige and power (i.e., centrality and brokerage) including the different structures of mediation proposed by Gould and Fernandez (1989): coordinator, itinerant broker, gatekeeper, representative and liaison (see Chapter 2).

As studied in Chapter 2, social capital in a network extends beyond the potential of an individual to reach more people and their ability to establish a frequent number of ties with them (Burt 1992). Social capital also increases when an individual possesses non-redundant contacts (or their contacts are not tied to each other), as they have greater opportunities to broker the flow of resources within a network. For Gould and Fernandez (1989, p. 123), the concept of brokerage only makes sense if measures are not used in merely a descriptive, diffuse and unanalysed manner. From their perspective, brokerage positions must be measured to determine exactly what actors do, to what degree and, most importantly, in what form.

## 4.4 Analytical Framework and Measurement

The analytical framework considered the direction and purpose of the main objectives of this research. As outlined in Chapter 1, they are to:

1) Adopt and operationalise theoretical concepts of political corruption, particularly, traditional corruption, state capture and co-opted state reconfiguration, to measure the transnational institutional impact of illicit networks.
2) Evaluate the extent to which leaders of illicit networks are responsible for the political influence exerted by illicit networks upon states.

The analytical criteria are explained below in relation to each objective.

### 4.4.1 Objective 1

As suggested in Chapter 2, Garay-Salamanca and colleagues (2010, 2012, 2015) proposed the use of SNAID (see Chapter 2), which can be applied to illicit networks to identify the sectors and levels of public administration affected by the interaction of lawful and unlawful groups. SNAID determines whether a given social process (network) might be defined as a process of traditional corruption, state capture or co-opted state reconfiguration (Garay-Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán 2012, p. 186). In specific, it is possible to measure institutional impact by identifying, classifying and analysing the types of social relations and actors in a network (Garay-Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán 2012, p. 180).

**4.4.1.1 Identifying, Classifying and Analysing Types of Social Relations in the Political–Criminal Network**

According to SNAID, social relations in a criminal network characterised by political–criminal alliances can be categorised as consisting of bribery or political and administrative agreements. As such, social relations among actors can be categorised by creating a table specifying the tag of each social relationship as bribery or political-administrative agreements (Garay-Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán 2012, p. 187).

Hence, every relationship of the FARC network was categorised as either bribery, political and administrative agreement or none (see Appendix 1). Situations of bribery where present in the FARC correspondence. It was observed that FARC held a permanent influence over specific government departments of various Latin American countries (i.e., migration and registry offices) in order to obtain legal and falsified identification documents, including passports and travelling visas to FARC members. It was also possible to observe situations where the cooperation between FARC members and public officials went beyond the act of receiving preferential attention (i.e., processing documents) in exchange for some type of favour. Political-administrative agreements were observed and included explicit collaboration between FARC and public officials in various countries, oriented to promote illegitimate interests. In the case of FARC, it was possible to observe in the correspondence a desire to obtain access to arms, money, safe havens and publicity among other things. In the case of states, it was observed in the correspondence that public officials considered FARC a strategic allied which would improve their strategic position within the region.

In specific, every social relation of the FARC network was categorised as:

- Bribery, if a FARC member received preferential treatment from public officials in exchange for something of value (i.e., money, assets)

- Political-administrative agreement, if there was an explicit agreement between FARC members and public officials that promoted the interests of the parts. Such agreement will uplift the strategic (i.e., political, geographical) position of the parts.

- None, if any of the above-mentioned cases was present.

After all the social relations of the FARC network were categorised, the SNAID theoretical criteria were applied:

> Illicit networks where the predominant social relations are bribery denote symptoms of corruption. Illicit networks where social relations are evenly distributed between bribery and political-administrative agreements denote symptoms of state capture and illicit networks where the predominant relations are political-administrative agreements denote symptoms of co-opted state reconfiguration. (adapted from Garay-Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán 2012, p. 187)

By quantifying the prominent concentration of social relationships in the network, the results allowed one to locate the network closer to the corruption, state capture or co-opted state reconfiguration process.[19] According to Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2010, p. 114), diagnosing the institutional effect of social processes of political corruption only by analysing social relationships is insufficient. As such, distinguishing between different types of actors in an illicit network is also important as explained below.

### 4.4.1.2 Identifying, Classifying and Analysing Types of Actors in the Political–Criminal Network

According to SNAID, actors in a criminal network characterised by political–criminal processes can be categorised according to the duties actors conduct (i.e., whether they are a

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[19] For Garay-Salamanca and Salcedo-Albarán (2015, p. 23) after applying the SNAID criteria 'no discrete or parametric results are obtained. In this sense, results cannot be classified by a discrete scale but by a relative, comparative continuum between analyzed networks. Results only allow locating each network as *closer* to the [corruption, state capture] or the [co-opted state reconfiguration] benchmark'.

guerrilla leader or politician) and the places where they operate (i.e., the legislative branch) (Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán & De León-Beltrán 2010, pp. 114–117).

As such, actors can be categorised by creating a table specifying the tag of each actor as belonging to one specific role or activity. The strategic dossier published by the IISS (see Section 4.2.1) offered a list of characters of the FARC correspondence. According to that source, the following roles and sectors were observed: FARC operative, senior key FARC operative, public official, high-ranking public official, candidate and politician, security sector, public controller, journalist, legislative branch, judiciary branch, executive branch and NGO (International Institute of Strategic Studies 2011, pp. 7–12).

After all the actors of the FARC network were categorised, the SNAID theoretical criteria were applied:

> Illicit networks where actors neither concentrate around government branches (executive, legislative, and judiciary) nor around political parties, the civil society and the media, denote symptoms of corruption. Illicit networks where the predominant number of actors concentrate around government branches but not around political parties, the civil society and the media, denote symptoms of state capture. And, illicit networks where the predominant number of actors concentrate around political parties, the civil society, the media and the government branches, denote symptoms of co-opted state reconfiguration. (adapted from Garay-Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán 2012, p. 188)

By quantifying the prominent concentration of actors in the FARC network, the results allowed one to locate the network closer to the corruption, state capture or co-opted state reconfiguration process.[20] Determining this concentration of actors around their specific duties or operating sites was useful, as it identified the specific sectors of the public administration (of countries) that were affected by political corruption processes (Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán & De León-Beltrán 2010, p. 114). The results complemented information regarding the concentration of social relations and allowed confirming the location of the FARC network as closer to the corruption, state capture or co-opted state reconfiguration process.

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[20] Ibid.

**4.4.2 Objective 2**

By measuring the level of transnational political influence of the FARC network in objective 1, it was possible to identify the actors and relationships that actively participated in specific political corruption processes. Once the level of transnational institutional impact of the FARC network was established, it was also possible to:

1) Construct a new network only comprising the actors and relationships that participated in the political corruption process in which the FARC network was located. Actors and relationships that did not take part in that level of political corruption were not considered. Hence, a new smaller network in which actors relate to each other only through political corruption processes was studied: The Political Corruption Process (SPC) network.

2) Record illicit affiliations (proof of a political corruption process – the SPC), on a spreadsheet, producing a 'relational square matrix' composed of as many rows and columns as actors. Data recording of the SPC followed the same parameters described to record the FARC network (see Section 4.2.3).

3) Provide by applying the SNA software UCINET and NetDraw (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman 2002), as with the FARC network, a detailed top-down description and visualisation of the SPC considering network topography, cohesion and clustering, and prestige and power. In doing that, the analysis also allowed determining the key players that led exerting political influence upon states.

4) Analyse the qualifications and roles of the strategic players of the SPC network. The theoretical concepts of Gould and Fernandez (1989) (see Chapter 2) proved to be useful in this exercise. According to Gould and Fernandez (1989, p. 91) the interests of one particular player may be different to the interests of other players in a social network. The G-F scores of the key players identified in the SPC network were compared to their correspondent scores obtained in the FARC network to determine if their interests varied from one network to the other.

This analytical approach permitted the evaluation of the extent to which every actor of the SPC network facilitated successful processes leading to institutional impact. In addition, it determined whether key players of the SPC were the same leaders that were originally identified in the FARC network. This verified the accountability of the latter in political corruption processes.

Finally, qualitative reports via content analysis provided further explanation of the quantitative findings that were revealed. When information in the Reyes correspondence is resorted to or quoted, it is referenced according to the classification made by the IISS (see Section 4.2.1). As mentioned before, for the year 2000, the corresponding categorisation is Venezuela (I.3–I.126) and Ecuador (II.3-–I.98)[21] (see Section 4.2.2).

## 4.5 Limitations

This chapter has presented the research design of the project. Considering that this work is an attempt to theoretically and empirically expand the existing knowledge of the institutional effects of political–criminal alliances, all findings derived from here and presented in the following chapters must be considered with caution. Analysing the transnational capacity of illicit networks to affect states, including the study of the roles and behaviour of actors involved in such efforts, is new territory that deserves further empirical and theoretical work. As such, the initial conclusions derived from this research must be considered as an indicative point of reference for future research, rather than conclusive and definitive.

The FARC files have its flaws. First, it is a collection of mainly internal FARC material. In that, the content of the correspondence is embedded in the beliefs, assumptions and interpretations of the FARC. Second, a great part of the correspondence in the archive is deliberately confusing and circumlocutory. Reyes was aware of the risk of interception and discouraged explicit reference in email communications to activities that would otherwise compromise the FARC if discovered. Finally, the archive does not provide a complete guide to all the dimensions and details of FARC's international activity. Rather, it is a collection of information that Reyes managed to record (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 20-1).

After the Colombian armed forces recovered Reyes' files and Bogotá made the information that compromised many public officials in Latin America public, there was an imminent

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[21] It is important to note that the content of the correspondence is of a complex nature considering that it has been deliberately written in a confusing and circumlocutory manner. Reyes was aware of the risk of having the FARC correspondence intercepted, so criminal activities are not always explicitly referenced in the communications (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 20). In that sense, when information in the correspondence is resorted to or quoted, it has not been modified. All conversational errors (i.e., grammar, syntax, spelling and punctuation) have not been edited during the research and translation processes.

reaction from regional leaders who questioned the authenticity of the Reyes correspondence. Venezuelan President Chávez argued that it was impossible for a guerrilla leader, such as Reyes, to produce such an immense amount of information. Soon after the documents were disclosed, the Venezuelan government began to discredit and ridicule the FARC correspondence. A free book was circulated by the Venezuelan Ministry of Communications called *Las Patrañas de la Supercomputadora* (2008) (*The Lies of the Supercomputer*) (Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la Información 2008). Despite this, the authenticity of the Reyes files was confirmed by INTERPOL and the clues provided by the correspondence led to successful law enforcement operations around the world. In sum, the possibility of the archive having been contaminated after its capture on 1 March 2008 was dismissed by INTERPOL. Theories of fabrication prior to that date are unworthy of serious consideration. The volume and complexity of the correspondence suggest that such a forgery would have been exceeded the available time and resources of any government agency in the world (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 18).

Although the methodological technique used to construct a sample of the population implied working with a relatively small sample of actors from the FARC network, it is possible to credit the data that originated in Reyes' files to reveal important conclusions regarding the way in which the FARC networks developed its extraterritorial connections. The data used for this research represents exclusive information that discusses the covert connections of the FARC.

The continuous dynamics that FARC has experienced throughout time (paramilitary group, revolutionary organisation, narcotrafficking actor, and political party) has made this group difficult to define and understand by various parties such as the public opinion, the international community, law enforcement and groups outside the law. Although this thesis relies on the Reyes' files to study its criminality to establish political alliances with other countries, it is not interested in discussing the extent to which it needs to be considered either a criminal organisation or a rebel group. However, as studied in Chapter 3, it cannot be ignored that FARC originated as (at least) a partially politically-motivated insurgency and not just a criminal network.

The purpose of this research is not to make generalisations to other illicit networks involved in political–criminal processes about the findings revealed here. The conclusions obtained through this empirical exercise can be of use to other settings, helping to expose the intricate

structures of other illicit networks in their efforts to capture states beyond borders. It is important to note that every criminal network able to exert transnational political influence should be studied on a case-by-case basis, as the potential of every criminal group to transnationally weaken the public institutions of a country may also depend on different internal and external variables according to each case. In addition, this thesis does not ignore that additional (i.e., exogenous) variables may be the cause of institutional damage in various Latin American countries. For example, narcos may succeed in places or interact with players in places that were not well-governed. In this case, it would be reasonable to observe both networks and high corruption associated with each other. However, it is not the purpose of this thesis to identify further causes of corruption and to calibrate the institutional impact that these may have on public office. Key statistics calculated in this thesis speak solely on the level of corruption, institutional impact, and actors accountability of the sampled FARC group specified here over specific countries in Latin America.

# Chapter 5 Findings: The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Network

## 5.1 Introduction

Chapter 5 presents the first findings of the case study research. The chapter begins with a detailed description of how the FARC network is configured, charting the role of various FARC actors clustered around countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil. Next, the chapter estimates the transnational political influence of the FARC network. The findings are structured according to the analytical framework introduced in the previous chapter and individually addresses each element of the framework. Chapter 6 presents the results that discuss the responsibility of the key players of the FARC network for exerting political influence on states.

## 5.2 The FARC Network

The FARC network derived from the Reyes correspondence illustrates complex relationships between a diverse range of actors that established relations with FARC members. These included FARC members and members of the COMINTER, Venezuelan, Ecuadorian and Cuban politicians and other players such as journalists and trade unionists. The list of actors that sent and received emails totalled 16. Further actors and relationships actively involved in political–criminal alliances emerged from the content of these communications. A total of n = 41 actors were identified (see Table 5.1). The affiliations among these actors has given rise to a complex network of actors with ties linking each actor to the next (n = 206 ties). This set of actors and ties were coded into matrices and modelled using SNA techniques. The results of modelling the FARC network are visually represented in Figure 5.1.

**Table 5.1: Actors in the FARC Network**

| Actor | Role |
| --- | --- |
| **Venezuela** | |
| Alí Rodríguez Araque | Public official |
| Colonel Pulido | Public official |
| Eduardo Manuitt Carpio | Public official |
| General Márquez | Public official |
| General Medina | Public official |
| Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías | Public official |
| Ítalo González | FARC operative |
| Jesús Emilio Carvajalino | FARC operative |
| José Vicente Rangel | Public official |
| Miguel Quintero | Public official |
| Military personnel in Venezuela | Public official |
| Pompeyo Márquez | Public official |
| Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Public official |
| Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Senior FARC operative |
| **Ecuador** | |
| Alias Nohora | FARC operative |
| Arturo Llambay | Public official |
| Edgar Ponce | Other |
| Francisco Huerta | Public official |
| Fredy Heler | Public official |
| General Moncayo | Public official |
| General Villacis | Public official |
| Heinz Rodolfo Moeller Freile | Public official |
| Jorge Yepez | Other |
| Liliana López Palacio | Senior FARC operative |
| Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbua | Public official |
| Manuel Salgado | Other |
| Maria Augusta Calle | Public official |
| Nubia Calderón Iñiguez de Trujillo | FARC operative |
| Patricio Ortiz James | Public official |
| Raúl Reyes | Senior FARC operative |
| **Colombia** | |
| Eliana González | FARC operative |
| Emiro del Carmen Ropero | FARC operative |
| Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas | Senior FARC operative |
| Pedro Antonio Marín | Senior FARC operative |

| Actor | Role |
|---|---|
| Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Senior FARC operative |
| Secretariat | Senior FARC operative |
| Víctor Suárez Rojas | Senior FARC operative |
| **Cuba** | |
| Fidel Castro | Public official |
| Ovidio Salinas Pérez | FARC operative |
| **Mexico** | |
| Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | FARC operative |
| **Brazil** | |
| Orlay Jurado Palomino | FARC operative |

**Figure 5.1. The FARC Network**

**5.2.1 Topography of the FARC Network**

Considering the intricate structure of the networks, further explication is required. The different nodes, or diverse coloured shapes, represent individuals, triangles or green shapes denote FARC operatives, square or red shapes denote public officials and circular or blue shapes denote other types of actors, such as journalists and trade unionists. The lines that connect the nodes represent social ties indicative of sent and received emails and also political–criminal activities.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the relational ties of the FARC network were classified into five subgroups considering the more common types of relational ties proposed by Knoke and Kuklinski (1991) (see Appendix 1). These are:

1) transfer of material resources, denoted by green lines
2) electronic communication, denoted by red lines
3) communication, denoted by white lines
4) authority and power, denoted by blue lines
5) instrumental relationships, denoted by yellow lines.

In some cases, any two nodes that relate to each other through more than one relational form are considered multiple relations and are denoted by pink ties. In the case of multiple relations, the line width has been represented proportional to the number of ties or tie strength. Moreover, the relative size of the shapes representing actors are directly correlated with the number of connections with others. Hence, actors able to establish more connections were represented as larger than those able to connect with fewer actors.

In general, the arrangement of the FARC network sociogram assumes what network analysts describe as a 'hub star' or 'wheel network'. Such specific positioning of actors suggests that they are usually tied to a central node and more often must pass through that node to communicate and coordinate with each other (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001a, p. 7). As the leader of the COMINTER, it is not surprising that the FARC network is shaped around Reyes. In this case, Reyes is not only central among FARC members but also among public officials in various countries.

The network topography metrics confirm this. The FARC network has a network centralisation score of 54.7 per cent. When studying the hierarchical dimensions of a network, a greater

centralisation score indicates that it is more likely that only a few actors are central (Everton 2012, p. 152). Considering that this is a fairly centralised network, it was anticipated that the participation of the actors is subject to few central actors. In the FARC network, they are Raúl Reyes and key rebels Liliana López Palacio, located in Ecuador, and Rodrigo Granda Escobar, located in Venezuela.

Although relatively hierarchical, the FARC network is not a well-connected network. Raúl Reyes and the right-hand senior COMINTER members mentioned above exerted significant control over the email correspondence and political–criminal activities of the COMINTER. Hence, although the network consists of 41 actors, most of the communications and transactions took place through Reyes, Escobar and Palacio, the most connected members. The network density metric confirms this assertion. The FARC network demonstrates an average density of 0.1. This means that no more than 10 per cent of all possible relationships leading to political-criminal alliances processes took place. In network analysis, the higher that the density score of a network is, the greater number of ties that exist between actors (Everton 2012, p. 146).

This low degree of connectivity between nodes was also confirmed by the geodesic distance metric. On average, actors in the FARC network are separated by a geodesic distance of 2.3. This metric suggests that, on average, the shortest distance or path for an actor to reach another actor is through at least two intermediaries. In general, information, resources and orders in the FARC network do not travel quickly, as it usually flows through specific centre nodes such as Reyes, Escobar and Palacio. The network metrics suggest a low connected and considerably centralised environment in which the opportunities for relationships among nodes do not flow freely along the network but through senior players who are permanently monitoring and controlling the circulation of information and resources within the FARC network.

### 5.2.2 Clustering in the FARC Network

Although the FARC network exhibits a low density and centralised arrangement, it was possible to cluster actors based on their attributes (Everton 2012, p. 170). This research established a partition of the FARC network, considering its transnational dimension. Because the objective of the FARC International Commission was to continuously make strategic alliances with political leaders in Latin America and beyond, in the case of the FARC network, it observed a natural distribution of actors across Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. Thus, the FARC network was partitioned, around those six geographical areas. In general, the Colombian cluster is formed by members of the COMINTER. These FARC members are senior leaders and also members of the secretariat who are primarily located in Colombia. The Ecuadorian cluster comprises a mix of Ecuadorian politicians, senior members of the COMINTER and other external actors such as journalists that circulate FARC messages in the media and union leaders who identify with the principles and 'values' of the FARC, located in Ecuador. The Venezuelan cluster includes a mix of Venezuelan politicians and members of the COMINTER based on Venezuelan land. The Cuban cluster is only constituted by the late Cuban dictator Fidel Castro and a member of the COMINTER who was regularly positioned in Cuba. The Mexican and Brazilian clusters only possess one FARC member each.

These findings are significant, as they show a transnational portrait of the FARC network that is spread among various Latin American countries. Such a network has the potential to exert political influence on external actors in positions of power and public service. Although the FARC network depicts a low density and highly centralised structure, the network converges around a few nodes, which happen to be the leaders of each of the clusters detailed above. Hence, rather than centralised on a single leader, such as Raúl Reyes, the centres of control of the transnational FARC network are geographically dispersed all over Latin America.

Operating under this transnational strategic arrangement was challenging for the FARC, considering the difficulties that members encountered when physically moving or transferring resources from one location to another. They had to discover licit or illicit ways to obtain essential travel documents. Such limitations reflect a tendency of members to remain operational within their own domains. Conversations from the correspondence reflect the limitations of this geographical distribution:

> **From:** Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devia Silva]
>
> **To**: Alias Manuel Marulanda Vélez [Pedro Antonio Marín Marín]
>
> 27 September 2000
>
>
> I hope you can let me know, as soon as possible, what is the right way to go considering that I must take care of the visas, book air fares, and confirm appointments of the people we are visiting. The last thing I will do is Brazil, so I then come back to Ecuador and stay at home from the 20th onwards (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, II.59).

Nevertheless, FARC members were able to overcome their geographical limitations by establishing strategic contacts that allowed them to mobilise from one point to another. This process was only possible with the remarkable efforts of key actors who were strategically located to uplift their critical positioning in the network and create strategic bridges between network clusters. The next section introduces measures of power and brokerage to demonstrate how these key players, whose removal would compromise the capacity of the network to create political–criminal processes, facilitated the diffusion of information and resources.

### 5.2.3 Brokerage Capacity and Power in the FARC Network

The purpose of the following analysis is to use a variety of SNA metrics to identify the key players in the FARC network that are in positions of power, control and leadership. The analysis begins by identifying brokers or intermediaries and follows by recognising powerful actors. Actors are considered stronger based on how connected they are in the network.

### 5.2.3.1 Brokerage

As explained in Chapter 2, brokers are strategic players in an organisation who link two dense clusters of individuals in a network. Brokers play an essential role, as they act as strategic facilitators of processes and transactions between parties that lack trust in one another (Marsden 1982, p. 202). This research focused on two algorithms of SNA that identify actors in a position of intermediation: betweenness centrality and brokerage roles, or the G-F statistic. Specifically, betweenness centrality measures the extent to which each actor in a network lies on the shortest path between all other actors (Everton 2010, p. 15). Brokerage roles, as discussed in Chapter 2, are identifiable brokers with different roles and differentiate from each other based on their interests or activities (Gould & Fernandez 1989).

The metrics listed in Table 5.2 reveal the existence of pivotal brokers positioned in each of the clusters. The betweenness centrality statistic suggests that Reyes holds the most important brokerage role in the FARC network, which is confirmed by his ability to bridge existing divides between other members (53 per cent). Considering the G-F statistic, it is possible to observe that Reyes' brokerage role was the highest in the network across all levels. The metrics demonstrate that Reyes coordinated activities among actors in his own cluster, meaning that he directed all events and operations at the operations centre of the COMINTER in Ecuador; that is, he was the coordinator (score of 24).

Moreover, Reyes' strategic positioning allowed him to lead the transfer of information and valuable resources (i.e., information, people, money) between his location in Ecuador and clusters in every other region; that is, he also acted as the gatekeeper or representative (score of 101). For example, in May 2000, Reyes (Ecuador) asked Palacio (Ecuador), who was second in command to Reyes, to contact Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, Chávez government delegate for relations and Venezuela's Minister of the Interior in 2002 and 2008, to transfer money Chacín was holding for the FARC.

**Table 5.2: Measures of Brokerage and Degree of Centrality in the FARC Network**

**The FARC network**

| Degree centrality (norm. scores) | Betweenness centrality (norm. scores) | Gould and Fernandez Brokerage Roles | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | Coordinator | Gatekeeper/ representative | Consultant | Liaison |
| **Cluster: Venezuela** | | | | | |
| Rodrigo Granda Escobar (45.00) | Rodrigo Granda Escobar (25.74) | Rodrigo Granda Escobar (26.00) | Rodrigo Granda Escobar (61.00) | Rodrigo Granda Escobar (46.00) | Rodrigo Granda Escobar (64.00) |
| Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (23.00) | Ítalo González (5.03) | Ítalo González (8.00) | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (13.00) | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (8.00) | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (12.00) |
| Miguel Quintero (15.00) | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (4.63) | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino (6.00) | Miguel Quintero (4.00) | Military personnel in Venezuela (2.00) | Miguel Quintero (2.00) |
| Ítalo González (13.00) | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino (3.10) | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (4.00) | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino (2.00) | | Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (2.00) |
| Jesús Emilio Carvajalino (13.00) | Miguel Quintero (1.64) | Miguel Quintero (4.00) | Ítalo González (1.00) | | |
| Colonel Pulido (8.00) | Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (0.11) | | Pompeyo Marquez (1.00) | | |
| General Márquez (8.00) | Pompeyo Marquez (0.06) | | | | |
| General Medina (8.00) | Military personnel in Venezuela (0.04) | | | | |
| Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (8.00) | | | | | |
| Military personnel in Venezuela (8.00) | | | | | |
| Pompeyo Marquez (0.05) | | | | | |
| Alí Rodríguez Araque (0.03) | | | | | |
| Eduardo Manuitt Carpio (0.03) | | | | | |
| José Vicente Rangel (0.03) | 6 actors with score: (0) | 9 actors with score: (0) | 8 actors with score:(0) | 11 actors with score: (0) | 10 actors with score: (0) |

**The FARC network**

| Degree centrality (norm. scores) | Betweenness centrality (norm. scores) | Gould and Fernandez Brokerage Roles | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | Coordinator | Gatekeeper/ representative | Consultant | Liaison |
| **Cluster: Ecuador** | | | | | |
| Raúl Reyes (63.00) | Raúl Reyes (52.90) | Raúl Reyes (24.00) | Raúl Reyes (101.00) | Raúl Reyes (116.00) | Raúl Reyes (194.00) |
| Liliana López Palacio (40.00) | Liliana López Palacio (15.89) | Liliana López Palacio (14.00) | Liliana López Palacio (44.00) | Liliana López Palacio (52.00) | Liliana López Palacio (32.00) |
| Maria Augusta Calle (10.00) | Maria Augusta Calle (3.51) | | Maria Augusta Calle (3.00) | | Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbua (2.00) |
| Edgar Ponce (8.00) | Francisco Huerta (0.56) | | Francisco Huerta (1.00) | | |
| General Moncayo (8.00) | Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbua (0.29) | | | | |
| General Villacis (8.00) | | | | | |
| Jorge Yepez (8.00) | | | | | |
| Manuel Salgado (8.00) | | | | | |
| Alias Nohora (5.00) | | | | | |
| Francisco Huerta (5.00) | | | | | |
| Fredy Heler (0.05) | | | | | |
| Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbua (0.05) | | | | | |
| Arturo Llambay (0.03) | | | | | |
| Heinz Rodolfo Moeller Freile (0.03) | | | | | |
| Nubia Calderón Iñiguez de Trujillo (0.03) | | | | | |
| Patricio Ortiz James (0.03) | 11 actors with score: (0) | 14 actors with score: (0) | 12 actors with score: (0) | 14 actors with score: (0) | 13 actors with score: (0) |
| | | | | | |
| **Cluster: Colombia** | | | | | |
| Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas (10.00) | Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas (6.65) | | Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas (2.00) | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín (6.00) | Secretariat (6.00) |

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| The FARC network | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Gould and Fernandez Brokerage Roles** | | | |
| **Degree centrality (norm. scores)** | **Betweenness centrality (norm. scores)** | **Coordinator** | **Gatekeeper/ representative** | **Consultant** | **Liaison** |
| Pedro Antonio Marín Marín (10.00) | Secretariat (2.70) | | | Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas (4.00) | Emiro del Carmen Ropero (6.00) |
| Secretariat (10.00) | Emiro del Carmen Ropero (0.79) | | | Secretariat (4.00) | |
| Emiro del Carmen Ropero (8.00) | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín (0.19) | | | Víctor Suárez Rojas (2.00) | |
| Víctor Suárez Rojas (8.00) | Víctor Suárez Rojas (0.09) | | | | |
| Eliana González (5.00) | | | | | |
| Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri (5.00) | 2 actors with score: (0) | 7 actors with score: (0) | 6 actors with score: (0) | 3 actors with score: (0) | 5 actors with score: (0) |
| | | | | | |
| **Cluster: Cuba** | | | | | |
| Ovidio Salinas Pérez (8.00) | Fidel Castro (0.56) | | | | Fidel Castro (2.00) |
| Fidel Castro (5.00) | Ovidio Salinas Pérez (0.00) | 2 actors with score: (0) | 2 actors with score: (0) | 2 actors with score: (0) | Ovidio Salinas Pérez (0.00) |
| **Cluster: Mexico** | | | | | |
| Luis Alberto Albán Urbano (5.00) | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano (0.00) | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano (0.00) | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano (0.00) | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano (0.00) | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano (0.00) |
| **Cluster: Brazil** | | | | | |
| Orlay Jurado Palomino (20.00) | Orlay Jurado Palomino (15.79) | Orlay Jurado Palomino (0.00) | Orlay Jurado Palomino (0.00) | Orlay Jurado Palomino (22.00) | Orlay Jurado Palomino (16.00) |

*Gatekeeper* (Chacín➔*Reyes*➔Marín)

> **From:** Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devia Silva]
>
> **To:** Alias Ricardo [Rodrigo Granda Escobar] & Alias Olga Lucía Marín [Liliana López Palacio]
>
> 9 May 2000
>
> … In the possession of Ramón the Venezuelan there are some dollars and we must specify with him the amount so you tell me so we can agree on the move of that money … (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, I.39).

Reyes' arbitration capabilities and strategic positioning in the FARC network gave him a competitive advantage over other actors. From his centre of operations in Ecuador, Reyes demonstrated a unique ability to facilitate connections between members in different countries (liaison score of 194) and among members positioned in the same country, other than Reyes' location (consultant score of 116). For example, in April 2000, Reyes acted as a consultant between Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (Venezuela) and Rodrigo Granda Escobar, a senior COMINTER operative who was, at that time, moving between Ecuador and Venezuela. Reyes asked Chacín to issue a Venezuelan visa for Escobar who had to travel to Venezuela to coordinate the handover and job-related briefing of a COMINTER position in Caracas.

*Consultant* (Chacín➔*Reyes*➔Escobar)

> **From:** Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devia Silva]
>
> **To**: Ramón Rodríguez Chacín
>
> 22 April 2000
>
> Dear Ramón: accept my greeting with my best wishes for success in every task you undertake. I would like to ask you the favour of issuing a visa in Quito in the name of Rodrigo Granda Escobar. We still have not managed to resolve the documentation problems of the friend I introduced to you here [unknown COMINTER operative], for that reason I am not asking for the visa for him for now. We will be waiting for you on the date that you in the end propose to us, although the 25th would have been better for us just as we discussed in the last meeting. The message about the packet for Jorge [Víctor Suárez Rojas] is clear. With nothing more to add, goodbye until next time, Raúl (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 64).

After Reyes, it was possible to detect two other key brokers with the capacity to connect various members along the FARC network. Liliana López Palacio (senior COMINTER operative in Ecuador) and Rodrigo Granda Escobar (senior COMINTER operative in Venezuela) also

exhibited a considerable competence to reach many actors and bridge connections among the various members of the FARC network. The betweenness centrality statistic confirms the brokering potential of Palacio (16 per cent) and Escobar (26 per cent).

When considering the G-F brokerage statistic, Palacio and Escobar were pivotal in creating complex transnational connections. However, their brokerage roles differed to some extent. Although Escobar demonstrated a better ability to establish connections between members in different countries, Palacio proved to possess a better capacity to facilitate relations between individuals in the same country.

The consultant role of Palacio is evidenced in correspondence from July 2000. Reyes asked Palacio to support Escobar in a meeting with Miguel Quintero (Venezuelan Foreign Ministry) to obtain economic assistance to support presidential candidate Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador. According to the correspondence, in June 2000, Lucio Gutiérrez asked the FARC for financial assistance. However, Reyes was expecting that the Venezuelan government would share the financial 'burden' (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 167).

*Consultant* (Escobar➔*Palacio*➔Quintero)

> **From:** Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devia Silva]
>
> **To**: Ricardo [Rodrigo Granda Escobar] and Olga Lucía Marín [Liliana López Palacio]
>
> 15 July 2000
>
>
> The process of Lucio Gutiérrez and company is very similar to that of Chávez. Without being too trusting or getting too excited we can give some help. Later on I will say whether we supply the vehicle and the motorbike. We need to speak to Miguel Quintero so that they [the Venezuelan government] support the Ecuadorians. The comrade [Pedro Antonio Marín] agrees that on my next trip I should talk to the people from the Ecuadorian military (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 166).

It was also possible to observe an additional pivotal actor with a considerable capacity to arbitrate information and resources among the FARC network. Brazil-based COMINTER operative Orlay Jurado Palomino holds the fourth most important brokerage role in the network with a betweenness centrality score of 16 per cent. Although he was located in Brazil, Palomino intermediated a variety of relationships across the FARC network. The G-F statistic suggests that Palomino brokered relationships in a similar manner to Escobar and Palacio. Although confined in Brazil, he connected members that belonged to different countries. This situation

gave Palomino a unique transnational brokering advantage, considering that there were no other members in his cluster. The fact that Palomino was able to facilitate international relations across various vicinities from Brazil is not only proof of his significant mobility across the FARC network, but also of his high status within the FARC network.

In May 2000, Reyes asked Escobar to accompany Palomino to a trip to Cuba to receive important, but unknown, information from the Cuba-based COMINTER operative Ovidio Salinas.

*Liaison* (Salinas➜*Palomino*➜Escobar)

| |
|---|
| **From:** Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devia Silva] <br><br> **To**: Ricardo [Rodrigo Granda Escobar] and Olga Lucía Marín [Liliana López Palacio] <br><br> 19 May 2000 <br><br><br> … In any event, I would like you to accompany them [Orlay Jurado Palomino and Ovidio Salinas] in the delivery so no things are left out and then we start blaming any of them, because the direction would not have the information of what is sent and received specifically, as we already have some clear past experiences (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, I.45). |

Considered together, the transnational brokering capabilities of the four aforementioned actors have proven successful for establishing new channels of communication to circulate network resources across clusters. The actors that bridged relationships and assets among other actors in the FARC network are the leaders who held important positions of mediation in that criminal network.

### 5.2.3.2 Power

The power of an actor can also be measured by using the degree centrality metric of SNA. A central actor in a network is involved in many ties (Wasserman & Faust 1994, p. 172). As discussed earlier (see Section 5.2.1), the size of the nodes represented in Figure 5.1 are visually represented according to the score obtained in the degree centrality statistic. The degree centrality scores (see Table 5.2) confirm the leadership roles revealed through the analysis of brokerage in the previous section. Hence, beyond Raúl Reyes (63 per cent), the nodes with more connections in the FARC network are Rodrigo Granda Escobar (45 per cent) and Liliana López Palacio (40 per cent).

The distribution of centrality scores in the FARC network is not equal, aside from Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (23 per cent) and Orlay Jurado Palomino (20 per cent). The remaining actors of the FARC network have considerable low scores of degree centrality. This confirms the earlier assertion (see Section 5.2.1) that the FARC network is centralised and not a dense organisation clustered around a few main nodes.

## 5.3 Identified Leaders in the FARC Network

### 5.3.1 Rodrigo Granda Escobar

Also known as El Gallo (Cockerel), Ricardo González, Ricardo Téllez or RT (Cunningham et al. 2013, p. 493; International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 8), Escobar was a senior key member and second in command of the COMINTER. He served as the international spokesman and as a member of the general staff of the FARC (Cunningham et al. 2013, p. 493). He and his family's mining business were included in the so-called 'Clinton list' of terrorists and drug traffickers, declaring that Escobar was a partner at a company that was part of the FARC's money laundering cycle (Semana 2013c). Escobar frequented various countries, especially Venezuela and Ecuador. In 2004, he was captured in Venezuela by Colombian intelligence agents with the collaboration of Venezuelan bounty hunters. He was sent to Colombia where he was tried and sent to prison. In 2007, Escobar was released from prison into Cuban custody as a result of the persuasion of French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Later, Escobar returned clandestinely to Venezuela and resumed activities with the FARC (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 8). Escobar sat at the negotiation table during the peace processes between FARC and Colombia in 2012.

### 5.3.2 Liliana López Palacio

Also known as Olga Lucía Marín (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 9), Palacio was a senior key member and second in command of the COMINTER. In conjunction with Reyes and Escobar, Palacio founded and structured the COMINTER. They designed the working platform of the FARC's international office (Pérez 2008) and designated representatives in every country under the COMINTER's scope (Verdadabierta.com 2013). For a short period of time, Palacio was Reyes' romantic partner and carried one of his children (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 9). Palacio operated in various countries, especially Ecuador and Mexico.

### 5.3.3 Orlay Jurado Palomino

Also known as Hermes, Aníbal, Mauricio and Hermes Aguilera (Cunningham et al. 2013, p. 494; International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 9), Palomino was a leading member of the COMINTER and of the general staff of the FARC. Third in command of Raúl Reyes and the 'right-hand' man of Escobar, Palomino frequented various countries, especially Venezuela and Brazil (Cunningham et al. 2013, p. 494). In 2013, the Paraguayan justice issued an arrest warrant against Palomino for the abduction and homicide of former Paraguayan President Raúl Cubas' daughter, Cecilia Cubas. Palomino was the FARC member in charge of providing advice and direction to the group that kidnapped Cubas in Asunción (Semana 2013b). Palomino proved to be of vital importance to the FARC International Commission when Escobar was captured in Venezuela in 2004. Palomino took over from Escobar, becoming the new international spokesman of the FARC (*El Mundo* 2006).

### 5.4 Calculating the Transnational Political Influence of the FARC Network

In accordance with the analytical framework proposed in Chapter 4, the transnational political influence of the FARC network was calculated by measuring the type of social relations actors of the FARC network.

### 5.4.1 Transnational Political Influence of the FARC Network According to Social Relations

According to the analytical framework (see Section 4.4), all social relations of the FARC were categorised and quantified as bribery, political–administrative agreements or none. The results are presented in Table 5.3.

**Table 5.3: Political Influence of the FARC Network According to Social Relations**

| Type of relationship | Number of relationships |
|---|---|
| Political–administrative agreements | 51 |
| Bribery | 4 |

Result: social relations among actors reflect political or administrative agreements, almost substituting bribery.

The FARC network consisted of 206 relational ties. Of the total relational ties, several social relationships consisted of political and administrative agreements (51) and only a few isolated cases demonstrated bribery (4). Of the ties, 71 did not fall within the categories of political and administrative agreement or bribery and 80 corresponded to electronic communication.

The political and administrative agreements occurred between members of the COMINTER and public officials, primarily from Ecuador and Venezuela. They principally took place in the form of communications (i.e., verbal, personal and phone), transactions (i.e., money, travel documents and people) and instrumental relations (i.e., favours between the FARC and public officials). For example, in August 2000, FARC Commander-in-Chief Pedro Antonio Marín asked Reyes to meet with President Chávez to strengthen the relationship between the FARC and Venezuela. Marín's objective, aside from obtaining financial, military and political support from Caracas, was to obtain access to the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This would contribute to enlarging the FARC's range of international allies and supporters.

> **From:** Alias Manuel Marulanda Vélez [Pedro Antonio Marín Marín]
>
> **To**: Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devia Silva]
>
> (Day not specified) August 2000
>
> … From 22 September they are offering us their good offices as facilitators to talk with the OPEC countries senior delegate's presidents, who will be meeting these days in Caracas. Analyse (considering your current commitments at the negotiation table) the convenience of it for you in order to attend those interviews (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, I.68).

After the abovementioned meeting between Reyes and Chávez, which also included other public representatives,[22] Venezuela and the FARC agreed to work together for the purpose of confronting a 'global conspiracy'. According to Reyes, this conspiracy existed against both the Venezuelan government and the FARC.

> **From:** Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devia Silva]
>
> **To**: Ramón Rodríguez Chacín
>
> 13 December 2000
>
> Dear Ramón: … The campaign against you and us is significant, we are dealing with a conspiracy of huge dimensions which has the clear aim of blocking our common interests. We think that the new situation that has arisen demands of us greater levels of coordination and closeness in order to benefit both projects, which are similar. We are waiting for Ricardo [Escobar] to be able to settle with you the points defined in the conversation with the Boss [Hugo Chávez]. With nothing more for now I send you once more my Bolivarian greeting with a warm hug, Raúl (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 65).

The political–administrative agreements between FARC members and public officials took place in the form of transactions including money and human trafficking. In April 2000, the FARC released six Venezuelan hostages who had previously been kidnapped by the FARC in Venezuelan territory. According to Cristancho (2000), by April 2000, all Venezuelan hostages kidnapped by the FARC were released thanks to the new border security policy implemented by President Chávez. However, according to IISS (2011, p. 63), the true reason the Colombian guerrillas liberated the hostages was the result of two favours Venezuela did for the FARC: the

---

[22] The correspondence explicitly mentions a meeting between Reyes and important public high-ranking officials, such as the Minister of Mines and Energy of Venezuela (1999–2000) and the General Secretary of OPEC Alí Rodríguez Araque (2000–2002).

liberation of FARC key operative 'Samuel' who was imprisoned in Venezuela and a sum of USD239,666 that the Venezuelan government paid to the FARC.

> **From:** Ramón Rodríguez Chacín
>
> **To**: Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devia Silva]
>
> 9 January 2000
>
> January 07, 2000 Dear Raúl: Since I spoke to Juancho [unidentified COMINTER operative, possibly Jesús Carvajalino] the last time I have carried on going to the hotel but I haven't been able to get in touch with him again. For that reason I am sending you these ciphers. I continue to work with the prisoners of yours that remain here, but I won't have an answer until next week because the people who look after the prisoners are on holiday.
>
> Greetings to Manuel [Pedro Antonio Marín] and Mono [Víctor Suárez Rojas] and I look forward to hearing about my prisoners. RR (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 64).

In conclusion, the absence of bribery and noticeable concentration of political and administrative agreements denote the FARC network as a political corruption process of co-opted state reconfiguration. According to the analytical framework in Chapter 4, diagnosing the institutional effect of social processes of political corruption must take into account the types of agents in the network. The results are presented below.

**5.4.2 Political Influence of the FARC Network According to the Types of Agents**

In line with the analytical framework (see Section 4.4), all actors in the FARC network were categorised and quantified according to their functional or organisational characteristics. According to the ample range of possibilities of roles observed in the correspondence, every actor was categorised as belonging to one of the following possibilities: FARC operative, senior key FARC operative, candidate and politician, security sector, public controller, legislative branch, judiciary branch, executive branch and journalist and trade unionist. In the case of the FARC network, it was observed that from the 17 recognised FARC members, nine were key senior FARC operatives and eight were FARC operatives. From the 21 recognised public officials, nine belonged to the executive sector, seven belonged to the security sector and five were candidates and politicians (see Figure 5.2).

**Figure 5.2: Distribution of Actors in the Political–Criminal Network**

The concentration of actors suggests a concentration of actors belonging to the security and the executive sector, including other politicians and candidates. By reaching and establishing agreements with these types of public officials, the FARC not only demonstrated a capacity to influence their local institutions, such as political parties, civil society and the media, but also the ability to influence the modification of laws, decrees and regulations. For example, in June 2000, Escobar reported the outcomes of a meeting with presidential candidate for Ecuador Lucio Gutiérrez to Reyes. In the correspondence, Gutiérrez agreed with Escobar on the need for the removal of the US military base in Manta (Ecuador). This discussion evidenced the ability of the FARC to intervene in Ecuadorian political and international affairs.

> **From:** Alias Ricardo [Rodrigo Granda Escobar]
>
> **To**: Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devia Silva] and Alias Olga Lucía Marín [Liliana López Palacio]
>
> 29 June 2000
>
>
> Mr Lucio Gutiérrez …
>
> Proposes the following:
>
> … That he is [also] against the Manta base and that he cannot attack it deeply, in order to avoid a head-on confrontation with the gringos, for the moment (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, II.39).

In sum, the concentration of actors revolved around key FARC members and public officials from the executive and security sector, including other politicians and candidates. The correspondence corroborated the existence of an explicit collaboration among these two sets of actors leading to the establishment of political–administrative agreements. This analysis aligns with the analysis of social relationships (see Section 5.4.1), which also found that the FARC network mainly consisted of political–administrative agreements. Therefore, the analysis of the types of agents clarified the fact that the FARC network was under a political corruption process of co-opted state reconfiguration.

## 5.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has presented the findings of the FARC case study. The email correspondence revealed that the networked life at the FARC International Commission was profoundly complex, with coexistence between Latin American public officials and FARC members giving rise to transnational political–criminal partnerships. This research depicted the entangled structure of these political–criminal activities to understand the topography and functionality of the network across different regions. The first important finding is that the FARC network possessed a centralised, strongly hierarchical and semi-dispersed structure that revolved around six clusters or control centres; Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. Although apparently rigid, the FARC network communicated efficiently between its command posts. The network did not show major limitations to moving important assets and resources, including FARC personnel, between the regions in which it operated. This chapter has also acknowledged the existence of senior key players who held positions of power in the FARC network and provided an explanation of their leading roles. Raúl Reyes, Rodrigo

Granda Escobar, Liliana López Palacio and Orlay Jurado Palomino successfully established new channels of communication, enabling the FARC to successfully operate at a transnational level.

Once the structure and the leaders of the FARC network were identified, this chapter measured its level of transnational political influence. To achieve this, the analytical framework proposed in Chapter 4 was applied, which suggested studying the social relations and types of actors in the FARC network. In terms of social relations, this research discovered that there was a predominance of political and administrative agreements between senior key FARC members and public officials. In terms of actors, this work detected that the concentration of actors that comprise the FARC network are mostly key FARC members and public officials from the executive and security sector. The analysis of the social relations and types of actors suggests that the FARC network represents a social situation of co-opted state reconfiguration.

# Chapter 6 Findings: The Systemic Political Corruption Network

## 6.1 Introduction

So far, this research has illustrated the complexities of the FARC network. In addition, leaders, including intermediaries of information and valuable resources, have been revealed. The transnational political influence of the FARC network was measured and it was discovered that the network exerted elevated political corruption at a transnational level; specifically, a co-opted state reconfiguration process.

In line with objective 2 of this research, the purpose of this chapter is to identify the extent to which identified leaders of the FARC network (see Chapter 5) are responsible for the elevated political corruption that this network exerted upon Latin American states. As such, only relationships and actors involved in the political corruption process of co-opted state reconfiguration in the FARC network were selected. Hence, the social interaction of actors that participated in the co-opted state reconfiguration process produced a sub-network called the Systemic Political Corruption (SPC) network, which was also constructed using SNA techniques. From the SPC network, key players were identified and their role in co-opting public officials in other states was studied. The research compared whether key players of the SPC network were the same leaders in the FARC network. This finding will determine the institutional responsibility of the most powerful players of the FARC network.

## 6.2 The Systemic Political Corruption Network

As observed in the previous section (see Table 5.3), 55 relationships that were reflective of co-opted state reconfiguration between FARC members and public officials were recognised. The relationships, activities and actors that are evidence of the co-opted state reconfiguration process are summarised in Appendix 2. The activity described at the beginning of every communication reveals how FARC members were able to begin these processes through the public official they were connected to. Once the actors, relationships and activities were identified, a complex network of actors was constructed with ties linking each actor to the next. A set of actors (n = 24) and ties (n = 55) were coded into matrices and modelled using SNA techniques. The results of modelling the SPC network are visually represented in Figure 6.1.

**Figure 6.1. The Systemic Political Corruption Network**

The following section explores the SPC network in detail, first by addressing what the network looked like, second by identifying powerful players and finally by explaining the transnational corrupting capacity of these players. In sum, the analysis considers whether the leaders identified in the FARC network (Reyes, Escobar, Palacio and Palomino) also undertook important co-opting roles in the SPC network.

**6.2.1 Topography of the Systemic Political Corruption Network**

The SPC network portrays complex relationships between FARC members and public officials. The SPC network was distributed over four Latin American countries; Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil. It consisted of FARC members, including members of the COMINTER and Venezuelan and Ecuadorian public officials. In this network, FARC members and public officials engaged through well-defined collaborations that prove the FARC's political influence over those Latin American countries.

The 24 nodes identified in the SPC network are diverse coloured shapes that represent individuals. Triangular, green shapes denote FARC operatives and square, red shapes denote public officials. The relative size of the shapes that represent actors are directly correlated with the number of connections shared with others.

The 24 actors of the SPC network connect to each other through a diverse set of relational ties. As with the FARC network, the relational ties were classified according to the more common types studied by Knoke and Kuklinski (1991). These are:

1) transfer of resources, denoted by green lines
2) communication relations, denoted by white lines
3) authority or power relations, denoted by blue lines
4) instrumental relations, denoted by yellow lines
5) multiple relations, denoted by pink ties.

In the case of multiple relations, the line width is proportional to the tie strength. All the relational ties of the SPC network indicate a co-opted state reconfiguration process.

The arrangement of the SPC network assumes a hub star shape, denoting that the coordination of activities among the nodes must go through central nodes. The metrics reveal an average density of 0.14, which means that no more than 14 per cent of all possible relationships leading

to co-opted state reconfiguration processes took place. With a score of 51 per cent, the SPC network is a fairly centralised network. As with the FARC network, the SPC is centralised around a few actors. As such, (see Section 6.2.3), Reyes, Escobar and Palacio oversee the activities oriented to exert institutional impact upon states. The low density of the SPC network can be confirmed by the low degree of connectivity among nodes. For this network, connectivity among nodes scored an average geodesic distance of 2.33, suggesting that, on average, the shortest path for an actor to reach any other node connects through at least two intermediaries. This means that, in general, information and resources do not easily travel across the SPC network. Hence, any FARC member with the potential to exert political influence over a state was actively overseen by the most central actors of this network. This will be discussed in detail in the next section.

### 6.2.2 Clustering in the Systemic Political Corruption Network

As with the FARC network, this research established a partition of the SPC network by clustering actors according to their geographical location. The structure of the SPC network observed actors spread through Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. The first cluster was formed by key senior FARC members located in Colombia. The second cluster comprised a mix of Ecuadorian politicians and members of the COMINTER located in Ecuador. The third cluster included a mix of Venezuelan politicians and members of the COMINTER based in Venezuela. There was an extra cluster represented only by an isolated COMINTER member in Brazil.

The SPC network was centralised in a small number of key nodes, which operated as the heads of the domains. The SPC network operated transnationally from various command posts geographically spread across a few countries in Latin America. The strategic role of the members in charge of these centres of control were essential in bridging transnational connections that allowed successful corruption practices. The role of these key players of the SPC network is described below.

### 6.2.3 Brokerage Capacity and Prestige in the Systemic Political Corruption Network

SNA metrics were applied to identify the key players in positions of power, control and leadership in the SPC network. The analysis begins with the identification of brokers and follows with the recognition of powerful actors in the SPC network.

### 6.2.3.1 Brokerage

The analysis identified brokers in a strategic position to mediate connections successful for establishing SPC processes. As such, the research applied the SNA algorithms of betweenness centrality and brokerage roles or the G-F statistic (see Table 6.2). The metrics informed the presence of important brokers located within each of the clusters. With a betweenness centrality score of 44 per cent, Raúl Reyes was the most prominent broker in the SPC network. In general, all connections aimed at exerting political influence, such as transactions of resources, communications and meetings, were ordered or supervised by Reyes.

Interestingly, it could be observed that Reyes did not facilitate political connections among members of his own cluster in Ecuador. With a G-F coordinator score of zero, political–administrative agreements between FARC members and public officials in Ecuador were not overseen by Reyes. Instead, the only G-F coordinator score in the Ecuadorian cluster was obtained by Palacio (2). Although this is a low score, the metric indicates that, as a senior key member and second in command of the COMINTER, Palacio was in charge of coordinating all existing political agreements with the Ecuadorian government.

The correspondence provides evidence of Palacio's agreements with public officials in Ecuador. On 23 July 2000, Palacio reported the outcomes of her meeting with Maria Luisa Calle, an Ecuadorian journalist and politician, to Reyes. The meeting was about developing a miscommunications strategy, which Calle claimed to have learned from US President Clinton's staff when she worked for the UN. According to Calle, this strategy allowed her to exactly predict the fall of Ecuadorian President Mahuad in 2000. The FARC could apply the same strategy against the Colombian government.

**Table 6.2: Measures of Brokerage and Degree Centrality in the Systemic Political Corruption Network**

**The SPC network**

| Degree centrality (norm. scores) | Betweenness centrality (norm. scores) | Gould and Fernandez Brokerage Roles | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Coordinator | Gatekeeper/representative | Itinerant broker | Liaison |
| **Cluster: Venezuela** | | | | | |
| Rodrigo Granda Escobar (39.13) | Miguel Quintero (21.19) | Rodrigo Granda Escobar (20.00) | Rodrigo Granda Escobar (15.00) | Rodrigo Granda Escobar (6.00) | Rodrigo Granda Escobar (64.00) |
| Miguel Quintero (21.74) | Rodrigo Granda Escobar (18.43) | Miguel Quintero (6.00) | Miguel Quintero (5.00) | Military personnel in Venezuela (2.00) | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (12.00) |
| Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (21.74) | Ítalo González (8.20) | Ítalo González (6.00) | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (5.00) | | |
| Colonel Pulido (13.04) | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (8.15) | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (2.00) | Colonel Pulido (1.00) | | |
| General Márquez (13.04) | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino (7.91) | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino (2.00) | General Márquez (1.00) | | |
| General Medina (13.04) | Colonel Pulido (0.38) | | General Medina (1.00) | | |
| Ítalo González (13.04) | General Márquez (0.38) | | | | |
| Military personnel in Venezuela (13.04) | General Medina (0.38) | | | | |
| Jesús Emilio Carvajalino (8.70) | Military personnel in Venezuela (0.20) | | | | |
| Alí Rodríguez Araque (4.35) | 5 actors with score: (0) | 9 actors with score: (0) | 8 actors with score:(0) | 12 actors with score: (0) | 12 actors with score: (0) |
| **Cluster: Ecuador** | | | | | |
| Raúl Reyes (60.87) | Raúl Reyes (44.07) | Liliana López Palacio (2.00) | Raúl Reyes (8.00) | Raúl Reyes (82.00) | Raúl Reyes (56.00) |
| Liliana López Palacio (30.44) | Liliana López Palacio (10.97) | | Liliana López Palacio (5.00) | Liliana López Palacio (20.00) | |
| Fredy Heler (8.70) | | | | | |

**The SPC network**

| Degree centrality (norm. scores) | Betweenness centrality (norm. scores) | Gould and Fernandez Brokerage Roles | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | Coordinator | Gatekeeper/representative | Itinerant broker | Liaison |
| Heinz Rodolfo Moeller Freile (4.35) | | | | | |
| Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbua (4.35) | | | | | |
| Maria Augusta Calle (4.35) | 4 actors with score: (0) | 5 actors with score: (0) | 4 actors with score: (0) | 4 actors with score: (0) | 5 actors with score: (0) |
| **Cluster: Colombia** | | | | | |
| Víctor Suárez Rojas (13.04) | Víctor Suárez Rojas (0.46) | | | Víctor Suárez Rojas (2.00) | |
| Pedro Antonio Marín Marín (8.70) | | | | | |
| Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas (4.35) | 2 actors with score: (0) | 3 actors with score: (0) | 3 actors with score: (0) | 2 actors with score: (0) | 3 actors with score: (0) |
| **Cluster: Brazil** | | | | | |
| Orlay Jurado Palomino (13.04) | Orlay Jurado Palomino (1.43) | Orlay Jurado Palomino (0.00) | Orlay Jurado Palomino (0.00) | Orlay Jurado Palomino (2.00) | Orlay Jurado Palomino (0.00) |

*Coordinator* (Calle→*Palacio*→Reyes)

---

**From**: Alias Olga Lucía Marín [Liliana López Palacio]

**To**: Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devia Silva]

23 July 2000

We have been working with Maria Augusta on a communication strategy, considering the method she used in the United Nations. Her teachers were personnel sent by Clinton himself when they had to apply the strategy to Mahuad. They were able to diagnose the fall of the president and everything went as planned (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, II.47).

---

Although Reyes was not in charge of securing political alliances in Ecuador, from his centre of operations, Reyes was capable of facilitating important political–administrative agreements between members located outside Ecuador. According to the G-F statistic, Reyes was highly competent at connecting individuals in different countries (56) and members positioned in a single country (82). These metrics mean that, at a transnational level, Reyes had total control over every political arrangement between the FARC and other governments. Specifically, Reyes arranged and supervised the different activities that allowed the FARC to capture institutions overseas such as transference of resources, specific commands and executive orders and strategic communications and meetings including topics and policies to be debated.

For example, in July 2000, Reyes facilitated relations between Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (Chávez government delegate for relations with the FARC) and various FARC members located in Venezuela and Brazil. Chacín asked Reyes for assistance about the whereabouts of Venezuelan businessman Richard Boulton who had been abducted from his home in Tocuyito, Venezuela, on 15 July 2000. Boulton was kidnapped by the paramilitary group United Self-Defenders of Colombia (AUC) who held him hostage for two years (BBC News 2002). The Venezuelan government was confident that the significant political influence of Reyes over Latin America would help establish the whereabouts of Boulton.

*Liaison* (Chacín➔*Reyes*➔FARC)

> **From:** Ramón Rodríguez Chacín
>
> **To**: Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devia Silva]
>
> (Day and month not specified) 2000
>
>
> Dear friend, Please accept a friendly and revolutionary greeting, this message is to request your assistance with regard to any information you might have about Mr. Richard Boulton who was kidnapped in a Superking-90 plane with the numbers YV-465CP last Saturday 15th
>
> July in Valencia City. I assume that this action was carried out by paramilitaries or drug traffickers. Thank you in advance. Hugs. RAMON (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 65).

Two other pivotal brokers confirmed a significant ability to facilitate the formation of political–administrative agreements among existing members of the SPC network. Scoring the highest levels of betweenness centrality after Reyes, senior COMINTER operatives Rodrigo Granda Escobar (18 per cent) and Liliana López Palacio (11 per cent) played fundamental roles securing successful agreements among the FARC and various governments of Latin America. As already discussed, Palacio was key in facilitating the political connections in Ecuador. With a high G-F consultant score (20), from Ecuador, Palacio proved to be essential for facilitating consecution of political–administrative agreements among individuals in the same country, other than Ecuador. With a G-F liaison score of (64), located in Venezuela, Escobar was in a position of strength for building illicit political agreements between members located in different countries.

For example, in November 2000, Palacio travelled to Venezuela to participate with Escobar and Ítalo González, located in Venezuela, as spokespersons in a symposium organised by the Venezuelan deputies of the PARLATINO. The symposium took place at the headquarters of the National Assembly in Caracas and discussed the effect of Plan Colombia (see Section 3.3.3.1) on Latin America. The FARC's intervention at the symposium warned the Latin American governments of the risks posed by US imperialism, including their capacity to invade the region. The participation of members of the FARC received broad media coverage and was considered by the Colombian government a discourtesy from Venezuela (El Tiempo 2000).

*Consultant* (Quintero→*Palacio*→Escobar & González)

---

**From**: Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devia Silva]

**To**: Miguel Quintero

2 December 2000


Mr

Miguel Quintero

Foreign Affairs Ministry


Dear Bolivarian friend and brother Miguel Quintero. Through this letter, I wish to warmly salute you and thank you for the good offices that allowed the successful work of comrades Olga Lucía, Ricardo and Hernán in the notorious event that took place in Bolívar's hometown (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, I.103).

---

The ability of Palacio to facilitate international relations conducive to the successful establishment of political–administrative agreements in other countries such as Venezuela can also be explained by the fact that Palacio was in a privileged position in the FARC network. Palacio was not only a senior FARC member and second in command of the COMINTER but was also Reyes' romantic partner (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 9) and the daughter of the overall commander-in-chief of the FARC Pedro Antonio Marín. Palacio's privileged position in the FARC explains her continuous appointment to celebrate exclusive political agreements in different countries.

Escobar and Palacio's geographical and structural strategic positions allowed them to execute direct orders from Reyes that were exclusively oriented towards co-opting public officials in Latin America. Together with the fact that the SPC network was a relatively centralised network (see Section 6.2.1), this confirms the presence of stable hierarchical arrangements in which only a few nodes were powerful. There is nothing new about suggesting that the SPC network was characterised by strong hierarchical structures. As discussed in Chapter 3, in 1966, the FARC instituted a complex organisational structure with a well-defined chain of command. Based on this organisational structure, the FARC has been able to articulate its political, governing and military bodies (Ferro Medina & Uribe Ramón 2002, p. 42).

Regarding the FARC network (see Chapter 5), Brazil-based COMINTER operative Orlay Jurado Palomino scored the fourth highest level of brokerage (16 per cent). In the previous

chapter, it was concluded that Palomino had proved to be an exceptional broker, facilitating important transnational connections as the only member located in Brazil. However, his brokerage performance in the SPC network (one per cent) differed markedly from what was observed in the FARC network. This difference indicates that Palomino was not appointed to intervene strategically in political affairs, which implies the successful execution of co-opted state reconfiguration processes. Although Reyes, Escobar and Palacio facilitated relations leading to political–administrative agreements, Palomino's role in these affairs was non-existent. In sum, Palomino intermediated international relations from Brazil and was mobile across the network, reflecting his high status in the FARC network. However, in terms of relations with other states, he was of a poor status and had little capacity to exert political influence on other states.

Conversely, COMINTER operative Ítalo González improved his brokerage capacity compared to the FARC network. With a betweenness centrality score of 8.2 per cent, González increased his brokerage capacity in the FARC network by three per cent, meaning that his abilities to facilitate connections among various members were more powerful in the SPC network. Even though this is a small percentage increase, this is an important finding, suggesting that, although González was not a senior FARC leader, his duties were oriented towards facilitating political–administrative agreements with public officials in other states.

The participation of González in political agreements with the government of Venezuela is evidenced in the correspondence. In December 2000, González met with Chávez' government delegate regarding relations with FARC's Ramón Rodríguez Chacín. In the communication, González reported to Escobar and Palacio about the outcomes of his meeting with the high-ranking official of Venezuela. In the meeting, Chacín allowed González to know that all the relations and communications of the FARC with the Venezuelan government had to pass through him (Chacín).

> **From:** Alias Hernán Ramírez [Ítalo González]
>
> **To**: Alias Ricardo [Rodrigo Granda Escobar] & Alias Olga Lucía Marín [Liliana López Palacio]
>
> 3 December 2000
>
> … Yesterday I met with Ramón and he explained to me that our relations with the government were centralised and he was the only one authorized officially for it. That has always been the case, although it was changing and that is not convenient … (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, I.104).

The correspondence also confirms that the work of González was actively overseen by Reyes who always determined the extent of participation of González in political corruption activities. For example, in December 2000, Reyes apologised to Miguel Quintero, as COMINTER operative Ítalo González arrived at the Foreign Ministry of Venezuela with no warning. Reyes explained to Quintero that, as a general rule, all of the FARC's international affairs were attended by the director of the COMINTER.

> **From:** Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devia Silva]
>
> **To**: Miguel Quintero
>
> 2 December 2000
>
> On the other hand, and sincerely I want to offer my apologies for the impertinence of my comrade Hernán, reaching your office without your prior authorization … Long time ago we defined at the secretariat of the FARC-EP that all relations with governments must be taken care by the direction of the International Commission which represents the direction of the organisation (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, I.103).

### 6.2.3.2 Power

The positions of power in the SPC network can be confirmed by calculating the degree centrality statistic. After Reyes (61 per cent), the nodes with more connections are Escobar (39 per cent) and Liliana Palacio (30 per cent). In this analysis, Palomino ranked 12th on the list, with only 13 per cent. Compared to the original FARC network, Palomino decreased his score six per cent. Although not as dramatic as his brokerage change, the fall in degree centrality confirms Palomino's loss of power and lack of opportunities to participate in co-opted state reconfiguration activities.

On the other hand, Ítalo González (13 per cent) increased his power in the SPC network by one per cent compared to the FARC network. This score suggests that, although timidly, González was appointed to participate in activities to co-opt public officials in other states.

These findings are important, as they indicate that leaders of the FARC network were not always responsible for the political influence exerted by its network on other states. Further, in some cases, less visible players of the FARC network were active participants in processes of political corruption on other countries (see Table 6.3).

**Table 6.3: Participation of FARC Actors in Processes of Political Corruption**

| Political Influence | FARC players | Role | The FARC network | The Systemic Political Corruption Network | Responsibility variation % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Betweenness Centrality (norm. scores) | | |
| Co-opted state reconfiguration | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Senior FARC operative | 25.74 | 18.43 | -28% |
| | Raúl Reyes | Senior FARC operative | 52.9 | 44.07 | -17% |
| | Liliana López Palacio | Senior FARC operative | 15.89 | 10.97 | -31% |
| | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Senior FARC operative | 15.79 | 1.43 | -91% |
| | Ítalo González | FARC operative | 5.03 | 8.2 | 63% |

From the figures obtained in Table 6.3, it can be observed how senior FARC leaders scoring the highest scores – among the FARC network – in betweenness centrality, decreased their level of leadership in co-opting public officials in countries in Latin America. At the same time,

non-office-holding members of FARC such as Ítalo González increased their participation in corrupting public officials considerably.

## 6.3 Concluding Remarks

This chapter concentrated specifically on relationships and actors involved in co-opted state reconfiguration processes. For this purpose, the analytical framework reduced all relationships and actors derived from the FARC network to only those that demonstrated evidence of participation in co-opted state reconfiguration activities. The second part of this chapter constructed and illustrated the SPC network, which comprises the multiple actors and relationships that emerged when the FARC exerted political influence over other governments. This section also described the structures of the network and discovered that, although smaller, the SPC network structure was centralised, strongly hierarchical and arranged in a manner that allowed its members to effectively operate throughout Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.

When addressing the role of strategic players in the SPC network, the findings suggest that Reyes was the most powerful player in the network due to his ability to facilitate political–administrative agreements throughout Latin America. Similarly, Escobar and Palacio proved to be top-level players in the FARC network, capable of executing orders directed to co-opt officials in various states. Interestingly, this research highlighted the existence of a senior FARC leader, Palomino, who did not demonstrate an ability to promote relations conducive to establishing transnational political agreements. Similarly, the research observed that the existence of a COMINTER operative, although not a FARC leader, proved to be useful for facilitating political agreements. These conclusions are meaningful, as they sustain that leaders of illicit networks are not always responsible for the political influence exerted upon states. Further, the results showed that non-office-holding members of illicit networks have the capacity to exert political influence over states. In short, the political influence of illicit networks does not necessarily rely upon the most visible actors.

# Chapter 7 Discussion and Implications

## 7.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters presented the findings of the case study. They found that the FARC exerted significant institutional impact over various Latin American countries. In addition, the findings suggested that, although the FARC network exerted considerable political influence on other countries, not all leaders participated in co-opting foreign public administrations. Further, the results demonstrated the existence of non-senior leaders of the FARC able to exert political influence on other states.

This chapter describes policy implications in terms of disrupting illicit networks. Considering that illicit criminal networks, such as the FARC, sought to challenge the legitimacy of states, anti-crime policies today must take into consideration the exact way in which illicit organisations are capable of influencing public office. Therefore, this chapter proposes a set of theoretical propositions that will allow researchers and law enforcement officials to consider alternative methods for combating illicit networks. This chapter then tests the propositions presented here by analysing further information of the dataset of email correspondence of the FARC used in this thesis (see Chapter 4). The propositions and results that derived from testing the propositions here must be treated with caution and further research is recommended.

## 7.2 Policy Implications for Disrupting Illicit Networks

Policy implications regarding the capacity of countries to disrupt illicit networks were identified when considering the findings of this research project. After evaluating the responsibility of the leaders of the FARC network for exerting political influence on states, a significant revelation arose; that is, the leadership of transnational illicit networks and the political influence exerted by actors of illicit networks on states are independent. As previously stated (see Chapter 2), the survival and resilience of criminal networks are determined by the support they receive from other states and the ability of its structures to transnationally establish political alliances. However, to this day, disrupting criminal networks are studied and, in most cases, executed by targeting the 'higher in the ladder' actors of these organisations while disregarding internal operational and organisational factors. Hence, scholars have demonstrated that when anti-crime policies ignore the internal dynamics of networks, their

strategies are unsuccessful (Aguilar Villamariona 2006; Rabasa & Chalk 2001; Rodgers 2003; Rodgers, Muggah & Stevenson 2009). Although scholars are aware of the importance of network analysis for network disruption, there is a tendency to propose strategies based on structural features (i.e., degree centrality or betweenness centrality) without considering external variables such as the capacity of actors to capture public institutions. For example, Xu and Chen (2003) strongly argue that actors with the most connections in a network, or who have the highest degree centrality, are not necessarily the most influential in a criminal enterprise. Conversely, genuine leaders of a network may hide behind other members and use them to undertake important tasks. Establishing leadership positions in criminal organisations based solely on the number of connections of members is a risky strategy. Highly connected members must be cross-checked with other independent sources such as police databases (Xu & Chen 2003, p. 242). According to Salcedo-Albarán and Garay-Salamanca (2016a, p. 758) capturing the 'capo' of a criminal network does not imply that the criminal network will disappear. In their view, security agencies usually focus on capturing the boss, that is, the most well-known and most connected actor in the network, omitting the importance of intermediaries who, with few connections, facilitate the flow of important resources that are essential for the successful operation of the network. From that perspective, it is necessary to pay attention to other sources of resilience.

In sum, one of the main factors contributing to the structural restrengthening of criminal networks is the incorrect perception of stakeholders, such as intelligence officers and policymakers, that targeting visible heads will dismantle illicit networks. Criminal networks are difficult to detect and dismantle due to complex organisational dynamics that allow them to adapt to adverse circumstances and replace actors without compromising the mission. In some cases, even when 'leaders' of criminal organisations are neutralised, it does not mark the end of the network and its operations (Kenney 2007; Stern 2003). Counterterrorist and anti-crime policies must acknowledge that political–criminal alliances may allow for illicit networks' survival. Strategies must account for the ways illicit networks connect with public institutions. By assessing and measuring the behaviour of actors in terms of their ability to interact with the public office, scholars and practitioners must determine the transnational political influence that illicit networks exert over states. Above all, they must identify the relationships, individuals and structures that can be held accountable for institutional damage.

## 7.3 Combating the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

The FARC network was part of a large organisation that has been a target of the Colombian military, and occasionally the US military, for a considerable amount of time (see Chapter 3). However, up until now, the FARC has not been entirely subdued. Although the Colombian government and the FARC reached a peace agreement after a negotiation process that lasted more than seven years, it remains uncertain whether the guerrillas handed over their entire arsenal of weapons and if the group, in its illicit form, will completely disappear.

As seen in Chapter 3, academics have attempted to explain why illicit networks were able to survive after considerable periods of counterterrorist and anti-crime policies against them. Cunningham et al. (2013) collected information from the FARC's organisational structure such as fronts, companies and columns. They discovered that an essential factor behind the FARC's transformation was the government's 'improved' counterinsurgency policies that forced many key players to operate from outside Colombia. Interestingly, some of these players were essential in establishing strong ties with drug cartels.

Hernández, Galeano and Escobar (2012) studied a large collection of open-sourced data. They concluded that counterterrorist and anti-crime operations in Colombia against the FARC did not disrupt the guerrillas. Instead, the FARC became more resilient by multiplying their active members after the attacks. Further, Eccarius-Kelly (2012, p. 235) argues that the reason the Colombian government failed to completely dismantle the FARC network was due to its over-reliance on military power. For Bakker, Raab and Milward (2012, p. 43) the implementation of Plan Colombia in 1999 made FARC remarkably resilient and did not prevent the FARC from continuing its active participation in the Colombian narcotics industry.

In sum, researchers agree that, although the Colombian government attacked the FARC by aiming for its visible heads—several of whom were killed in combat—the group remained operational. This group of scholars argue that it is the 'hardline' nature of counterterrorist and anti-crime policies that are responsible for the FARC's ability to adapt and change. These scholars propose non-aggressive approaches such as demobilisation and reintegration into civil life after peace negotiations.

This thesis proposes that another possible reason for the FARC's ability to remain operative after suffering continuous attacks was the fact that the Colombian military focused on targeting

leaders and not the actors exerting political influence on states. This permits the deduction that the FARC developed resilience, strength and the ability to transform as a result of inefficient allocation of defence resources by the Colombian military. This anti-crime strategy did not prevent non-targeted FARC members from establishing political–criminal alliances with other countries. Further, non-targeted FARC members with political influence were key in receiving support from other countries and were essential to penetrate economies, intervene in judicial decisions and establish parallel structures. This allowed the guerrillas to act under protective umbrellas of impunity. Hence, the FARC continued to operate despite the size and strength of counterterrorist and anti-crime policies.

## 7.4 Theorising Anti-Crime Policies Based on Levels of Institutional Impact: A Theoretical Exercise

When formulating anti-crime strategies for disrupting illicit networks, scholars and practitioners need to take into consideration the sub-network that represent actors, key players and structures reflective of institutional impact in their analysis (as performed in Chapter 6). In Chapter 4, a sub-network was defined as one that only comprises actors and relationships that participated in political corruption processes.

Therefore, a hypothetical transnational political–criminal process was considered between a criminal organisation in country A and the public office of country B. In this theoretical example, authorities collected evidence that incriminated two public officials from country B in bribery cases, illicit awards of public contracts, controlling public offices and influencing elections using drug money. The evidence was collected by the hypothetical drug enforcement department (DED) of country B by the tapping phone calls of a cell of a criminal organisation dedicated to drug trafficking.

As mentioned above, when analysing an illicit network for disruption purposes, anti-crime policies must be adjusted depending on the level of institutional impact achieved by anti-crime agents and researchers. As previously examined, an illicit network can exert different levels of institutional impact. For the purpose of this theoretical exercise, if any given illicit network 'simply' corrupts the public office, there is low institutional impact (white ties). If the illicit network establishes state capture, there is a medium level of institutional impact. If the illicit network is established co-opted state reconfiguration, there is a high level of institutional impact (green ties).

### 7.4.1 An Illicit Network that Exerts Low Levels of Institutional Impact

Figure 7.1 represents an illicit network that comprises actors and relationships that are evidence of political-criminal alliances with ties linking actors together. The scenario demonstrates a transnational portrait of an illicit network able to spread between two countries. This network has the capacity to politically influence external actors in positions of power and public service. Although the illicit network clearly depicts clearly how relevant actors, such as the key players in country A, interact with public officials in country B, the level of institutional impact of the illicit network on country B is low (white ties). If drug enforcement agents are not aware of the level of institutional impact, anti-crime operations against the most visible actors (KP1 and KP2) may not guarantee that the criminal network will be dismantled.

When examining the illicit network, it can be observed that the actor in charge of liaising directly with public officials of country B is key player 2 (KP2). Although key player 1 (KP1) is equally visible in the network and holds a high position in the cell, their activities and relationships in the network do not directly involve them with the capture process of the public institutions of country B. In that case, anti-crime agents may concentrate their efforts on KP2, as this is the actor with greater institutional influence on country B. However, as the cell obtained little political support from country B, it is unlikely that this illicit network will strengthen its forces through KP2. From that perspective, the following theoretical proposition is stated.

**Figure 7.1: An Illicit Network that Exerts Low Levels of Institutional Impact**

*Theoretical proposition 1: When illicit networks present low levels of political corruption, anti-crime policies do not have to target the players that exert institutional impact on states. In that case, targeting the most visible key player, instead of the most politically influential, will allow for disrupting the illicit network.*

### 7.4.2 An Illicit Network that Exerts High Levels of Institutional Impact

Consider the same drug trafficking cell in country A. However, this time it is able to exert high levels of political influence on country B. Again, the illicit network is able to spread between two countries and has the transnational capacity to exert political influence on actors in positions of power and public service. This time, the level of institutional impact of the illicit network on country B is high (green ties). If drug enforcement agents are not aware of the level of institutional impact, anti-crime operations against the most visible actors (KP1 and KP2) may not guarantee that the criminal network is dismantled.

Here again, the actor in charge of liaising directly with public officials in country B is KP2. Although KP1 holds a high position in the cell and enjoys ample visibility, their activities and relationships in the network do not involve them directly with the capture process of the public institutions of country B.

**Figure 7.2: An Illicit Network that Exerts High Levels of Institutional Impact**

Again, anti-crime operations must concentrate their efforts on KP2, considering that this actor has the greatest institutional influence on country B. Additionally, as the cell obtained significant political support from country B through KP2, it is expected that this illicit network will strengthen its forces through KP2. From this perspective, the following theoretical proposition is stated.

> *Theoretical proposition 2: When illicit networks present high levels of political corruption, anti-crime policies must target players that exert institutional impact on states. Targeting the most visible key player, instead of the most politically influential, will not allow for disrupting the illicit network.*

**7.4.3 Testing the Theoretical Propositions on the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Network**

In order to test the theoretical propositions above mentioned, this research considered applying these hypotheses to the set of FARC correspondence recovered by the Colombian Military Forces in 2008 (see Chapter 4).

For this purpose, it focused on three different years (2001-2003) and the number of emails pertaining to the archived data corresponding to 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2003, Venezuela (n = 514, labelled I.127–I.640) and Ecuador (n = 622, labelled II.99–II.720). As with the data set used in Chapters Four, Five and Six, the correspondence contains information pertaining to the sender, recipient, date and email (in Spanish).

For every year, the strategy used to take a sample that spoke for the totality of the FARC correspondence consisted on a two-step process:

1) Year selection: 2001–2003

2) An ego-network approach. This time, only the Reyes' ego network of electronic communications (sent and received emails) were considered. No further rounds of actors and relationships were obtained from the conversations held in those emails.[23]

Thus, it was possible to construct three complete FARC networks with clear boundaries: 2001, 2002, and 2003. Respectively, the resulting networks consist of n = 20 actors and n = 632 ties; n = 15 actors and n = 691 ties; and n = 31 actors and n = 421 ties.

These illicit affiliations were recorded on a spreadsheet, producing three different 'relational square matrices' each one composed of as many rows and columns as actors. The relational square matrices comprise online relationships among the set of actors. Valued data were dichotomised and turned into binary data before estimating network metrics. All ties were taken as undirected ties so that it was not considered who initiated contact when relations were established. The relational square matrices were constructed and plotted using the SNA software UCINET (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman 2002).

Although, the actors in the three FARC networks consist of individuals of different kinds (i.e., senior key FARC members, senior COMINTER members, COMINTER operatives, FARC operatives, and public officials) the networks were arranged around two main non-overlapping subgroups of actors (FARC members and public officials).[24]

Following, in order to evaluate the extent to which the FARC network exerted institutional impact, SNAID was applied (see Section 2.6.3). As such, content analysis was performed to the online communications (e-mails) of the three FARC sample networks. Conversations were studied for evidence of corruption following the SNAID method. For those communications where the content was reflective of activities that involved political corruption, it was

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[23] No SNA metrics were calculated in this theoretical exercise. In that sense, Raúl Reyes did not have to be disconnected from the FARC network (2001–2003) to avoid biased metrics (i.e., degree, betweenness centrality).

[24] Other external actors that exchanged email communications with FARC members such as journalists and union leaders were removed from this theoretical exercise.

determined that such email communication was politically corrupted (or that a political corruption process existed among the sender and the receiver) (see Appendix 3). In addition, when content analysis was performed, special attention was brought to emails exchanged between publicly-known leaders of FARC and public officials in order to find additional actors and relationships that could have taken part in the corruption processes of the FARC.

In order to evaluate the extent to which leaders of FARC were responsible for the political influence exerted by their networks upon states, the research proceeded to construct a new network only comprising the emails (actors and relationships) that were reflective of political corruption process. Actors and relationships that did not take part in political corruption activities were not considered. Hence, for every FARC network, a new smaller network in which actors relate to each other only through political corruption processes was studied: The Political Corruption network. The illicit affiliations (proof of a political corruption process) were recorded on a spreadsheet, producing a 'relational square matrix' composed of as many rows and columns as actors.

Finally, by using the NetDraw software (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman 2002), a visualisation process allowed recognising all the players that exerted political influence upon states (i.e., FARC members that were connected to public officials or bridged connections among other FARC members and public officials).

### 7.4.4 The FARC Network 2001

The FARC network of 2001 is comprised of 20 nodes (see Figure 7.3). The relationships among FARC members and public officials represent online communications (sent and received emails). Table 7.1 illustrates the distribution of 17 FARC members, among which 8 are publicly-known leaders of FARC (bigger diamond shapes), and 3 are public officials (squares). When looking at how FARC members liaised with public officials in various Latin American countries in 2001 through sending and receiving emails, the data shows that, at this level, the only member of FARC that interacted with public officials was Raul Reyes.

**Figure 7.3: The FARC Network 2001**

**Table 7.1: The FARC Network 2001**

| Actor | Role |
| --- | --- |
| Alba Sepúlveda | FARC operative |
| Alberto Limonta | FARC operative |
| Aldo Manuel Moscote Fragoso | FARC operative |
| Alias Eliana González | FARC operative |
| Member of the COMINTER | FARC operative |
| Ítalo González | FARC operative |
| Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | FARC operative |
| Milton de Jesús Toncel Redondo | FARC operative |
| Nubia Calderón Iñiguez de Trujillo | FARC operative |
| Member of the PCMLE[25] | Public Official |
| Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Public Official |
| Roy Chaderton Matos | Public Official |
| Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas | Senior FARC operative |
| José Juvenal Velandia | Senior FARC operative |
| Liliana López Palacio | Senior FARC operative |
| Luciano Marín Arango | Senior FARC operative |
| Raul Reyes | Senior FARC operative |
| Noel Mata Mata | Senior FARC operative |
| Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Senior FARC operative |
| Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Senior FARC operative |

Furthermore, when looking at the network in which actors relate to each other only through political corruption processes, it can be observed a smaller network comprised only of 12 nodes (see Figure 7.4). This time, it is possible to see that other senior FARC members such as Rodrigo Granda Escobar liaise with public officials in corruption activities. In order to evaluate the extent to which the FARC exerted institutional impact in 2001, SNAID was applied and it was determined that the Political Corruption network of 2001 exerted high levels of institutional impact upon states. That is, a co-opted state reconfiguration process. In addition, it was possible to observe that FARC operative Ítalo González was able to facilitate important political relationships between Raul Reyes and Chávez government delegate for relations with the FARC, Ramón Rodríguez Chacín. In fact, according to the correspondence, the political and financial support of Chávez to FARC was important during the first few months of 2001. The funding paid to the COMINTER in April and May 2001, allowed this group to finance

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[25] Marxist–Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador.

**FARC**

Luis Alberto Albán Urbano

Nubia Calderón Iñiguez de Trujillo

Ítalo González

Alberto Limonta

Ramón Rodríguez Chacín

Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri

Member of the PCMLE

Raul Reyes

Luciano Marín Arango

Roy Chaderton Matos

Liliana López Palacio

Rodrigo Granda Escobar

**PUBLIC OFFICIALS**

**Figure 7.4: The Political Corruption Network 2001**

various COMINTER's general costs such as the renting of an 'apartment-office', the publication of a book on Simón Bolivar, and the printing of FARC's magazine *Resistance* (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 67).

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From: Alejandro [Ramón Rodríguez Chacín]

To: Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devia Silva]

9 April 2001


Dear Raúl

Receive an affectionate and revolutionary greeting. The purpose of this message is to greet you and to keep the means of communication that we have set up open. We had kept the radio channel silent over recent weeks for security reasons, but from tomorrow Tuesday 10th onwards we will be tuned in once more. Today I met with Hernán [Ítalo González] and we exchanged information and points of view on various aspects: I called Ricardo [Rodrigo Granda Escobar] some weeks ago but he was about to have an operation and it was not possible for us to speak.

With regard to the meeting with my boss that we have pending, it is authorised but it has not been possible to fix a date because of complications in his diary. As soon as I have a date I will tell you at a convenient moment in order to make the relevant arrangements. I would like to visit you again but prudence and security indicate that I shouldn't visit Colombian territory because both the army and the paramilitaries (who are becoming one and the same) threaten my physical safety. Please pass on a warm greeting to the other comrades of the Secretariat and in particular to Comrade Manuel [Pedro Antonio Marín].

Yours sincerely, Alejandro. (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 66).

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In order to apply the theoretical propositions to the FARC network of 2001, the findings described above need to be considered. In particular: 1) the level of institutional impact is high according to SNAID, and 2) Ítalo González, a non-publicly-known leader of FARC, was able to intermediate successful corruption activities between FARC and the government of Venezuela. From that perspective, because the FARC network of 2001 presented high levels of political corruption and anti-crime policies focused on the most visible key players, instead of the most politically influential, such strategy, did not contribute towards the successful disruption of the FARC network of 2001.

Not only the FARC correspondence demonstrates that FARC operative Ítalo González had a non-senior role within the organisation. Unlike senior FARC members such as Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas, José Juvenal Velandia, Luciano Marín Arango, Noel Mata Mata, Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri and Víctor Suárez Rojas, who the media has been tracking their steps

including military and counter-insurgency attacks (see for example: Davison 2011; El Tiempo 2009; Emol 2003; Lozano 2008; McDermott 2011; Penhaul 2010), there are no public records that account for the participation of Gonzalez in important FARC affairs. The political role of González described above confirms the results obtained in Chapter 6. At that point (FARC 2000), it was suggested that, although Gonzalez did not have a lead role on the FARC, he was appointed to participate in activities to co-opt public officials in other states. The same case applied for Gonzalez in 2001.

### 7.4.5 The FARC Network 2002

The FARC network of 2002 is comprised of 15 nodes (see Figure 7.5). The relationships among FARC members and public officials represent online communications (sent and received emails). Table 7.2 illustrates the distribution of 12 FARC members, among which 8 are publicly-known leaders of FARC (bigger diamond shapes), and 3 public officials (squares). When looking at how FARC members connect with public officials in Latin America in 2001 trough sending and receiving emails, the data shows that, at this level, the only member of FARC that interacted with public officials was Raul Reyes.

**Table 7.2: The FARC Network 2002**

| Actor | Role |
|---|---|
| Alba Sepúlveda | FARC operative |
| Alberto Limonta | FARC operative |
| Ítalo González | FARC operative |
| Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | FARC operative |
| Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbua | Public Official |
| Maria Augusta Calle | Public Official |
| Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Public Official |
| Liliana López Palacio | Senior FARC operative |
| Luciano Marín Arango | Senior FARC operative |
| Raul Reyes | Senior FARC operative |
| Noel Mata Mata | Senior FARC operative |
| Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Senior FARC operative |
| Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Senior FARC operative |
| Member of the secretariat | Senior FARC operative |
| Víctor Suárez Rojas | Senior FARC operative |

**Figure 7.5: The FARC Network 2002**

When looking at the network in which actors relate to each other only through political corruption processes, interestingly, it can be observed a network comprised of the same 15 nodes (see Figure 7.6). Compared to the FARC networks of 2001 and 2003 (developed further down), the FARC network of 2002 did not reduce its size when it was filtered by actors that relate to each other through corruption activities. In addition, no further senior or regular FARC members liaised with public officials in corruption activities. The reason that in 2002, the FARC network had limited communications and that all the corruption activities were in the hands of Raul Reyes can be explained by post 9-11 counter-insurgency events. As mentioned in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.2.2.1), after the terrorist attacks, political sympathy for the FARC deteriorated in the world. Washington's focus on counterterrorism was right in line with recently elected President Alvaro Uribe's agenda. Uribe's right-wing position in Colombia was supported by a strong ally of the United States. At that time, it was in the best interest of the two countries fighting the leftist rebels known as FARC. For Peña (2013, p. 101), after the events of September 11, the resources of the US–Colombia strategy Plan Colombia did not only concentrate upon the war against drug trafficking but on fighting counterinsurgency.

Although compressed and very covert, by evaluating through SNAID the extent to which the FARC exerted institutional impact in 2002, it was determined that the Political Corruption network of 2002 still exerted high levels of institutional impact upon states. Again, a co-opted state reconfiguration process.

In order to apply the theoretical propositions to the FARC network of 2002, the findings described above need to be considered. In particular: 1) the level of institutional impact is high according to SNAID, and 2) no other FARC members were able to intermediate successful corruption activities between FARC and other countries in Latin America. From that perspective, although the FARC network of 2002 presented high levels of political corruption, anti-crime policies focused on the most visible key players, in the absence of other more politically influential. Thus, anti-crime and disruption strategies were well focused, allowing for the successful weakening of the FARC network of 2002.

**Figure 7.6: The Political Corruption Network 2002**

### 7.4.6 The FARC Network 2003

The FARC network of 2001 is comprised of 31 nodes (see Figure 7.7). The relationships among FARC members and public officials represent online communications (sent and received emails). Table 7.3 illustrates the distribution of 24 FARC members, among which 10 are publicly-known leaders of FARC (bigger diamond shapes), and 7 are public officials (squares). When looking at how FARC members interacted with public officials in 2003 trough sending and receiving emails, the data shows that, at this level, senior members of FARC Raul Reyes, Rodrigo Granda Escobar and Liliana López Palacio interacted with public officials across Latin America.

**Table 7.3: The FARC Network 2003**

| Actor | Role |
|---|---|
| Alba Sepúlveda | FARC operative |
| Alberto Limonta | FARC operative |
| Alias Brújula | FARC operative |
| Argenis Rojas | FARC operative |
| Ariel Robespierre Devía Collazos | FARC operative |
| Member of the COMINTER in Argentina | FARC operative |
| Member of the COMINTER in Denmark | FARC operative |
| Francisco Cadena Collazos | FARC operative |
| Francisco Javier Prado Nieto | FARC operative |
| Lida Carmenza Devía Collazos | FARC operative |
| Liliany Patricia Obando Villota | FARC operative |
| Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | FARC operative |
| Nubia Calderón Iñiguez de Trujillo | FARC operative |
| Ovidio Salinas Pérez | FARC operative |
| Carlos Lozano | Public Official |
| Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías | Public Official |
| José Arbezú Fraga | Public Official |
| María Augusta Calle | Public Official |
| Martín Cala | Public Official |
| Member of the PCMLE | Public Official |
| Narciso Isa Conde | Public Official |
| Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas | Senior FARC operative |
| Liliana López Palacio | Senior FARC operative |
| Luciano Marín Arango | Senior FARC operative |
| Raul Reyes | Senior FARC operative |
| Noel Mata Mata | Senior FARC operative |
| Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | Senior FARC operative |

| | |
|---|---|
| Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Senior FARC operative |
| Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Senior FARC operative |
| Member of the Secretariat | Senior FARC operative |
| Víctor Suárez Rojas | Senior FARC operative |

**Figure 7.7: The FARC Network 2003**

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Furthermore, when looking at the network in which actors relate to each other only through political corruption processes, it can be observed a smaller network comprised of 25 nodes (see Figure 7.8). This time, it is possible to see that other senior FARC members such as Rodrigo Granda Escobar liaised with public officials in corruption activities. In order to evaluate the extent to which the FARC exerted institutional impact in 2003, SNAID was applied and it was determined that the Political Corruption network of 2003 exerted high levels of institutional impact upon states. That is, a co-opted state reconfiguration process. In addition, it was possible to observe that FARC operative Monica Granda was able to intermediate relations between former Ecuadorean Security Minister Gustavo Larrea and FARC. According to the correspondence, Escobar's niece Yamile Restrepo Londoño and daughter Monica Granda were able to establish themselves in Caracas with the help of the General Sectoral Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services (DISIP). This situation allowed the two women to intermediate relations among FARC public officials in other countries from Venezuelan domains, including shielding as many FARC assets in that country (International Institute of Strategic Studies 2011, p. 119). On April 2003, Monica Granda makes contact with Gustavo Larrea, who was assisting to an event in Caracas organised by the *Patria Para Todos* (Fatherland for All) political party (PPV). The Colombian authorities believe that the documents found on the Reyes' computers that account for these meetings in Venezuelan territory, indicate that Gustavo Larrea worked as an emissary of the Ecuadorian government to formalize government-guerrilla relations (Lozano & Creamer 2008).

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From: Alias Alicia Platos [María Augusta Calle]

To: Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devía Silva]

10 April 2003

Many greetings for you and the whole family. On Sunday, April 6, I received your message about my trip. As I informed Ricardo, who called on Wednesday, April 2, Juan [Gustavo Larrea] is in Caracas from April 4. He was invited by the PPT to participate in the activities of April 11. I understand that Juan's stay will be taken advantage of so he can meet with you. Ricardo gave us Camila's [Monica Granda] number and Juan called her immediately. According to what she told me on Monday, they met but, I'm not sure, if Camila did not arrive at the meeting or if she arrived, she did not have precise instructions. I understand that these days or before the weekend there will be some message. Juan travelled there willing to stay the necessary time and will mobilise according to the instructions. (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, I.554).

**Figure 7.8: The Political Corruption Network 2003**

> From: Alias Alicia Platos [María Augusta Calle]
>
> To: Alias Raúl Reyes [Luis Edgar Devía Silva]
>
> 10 April 2003
>
> Many greetings for you and the whole family. On Sunday, April 6, I received your message about my trip. As I informed Ricardo, who called on Wednesday, April 2, Juan [Gustavo Larrea] is in Caracas from April 4. He was invited by the PPT to participate in the activities of April 11. I understand that Juan's stay will be taken advantage of so he can meet with you. Ricardo gave us Camila's [Monica Granda] number and Juan called her immediately. According to what she told me on Monday, they met but, I'm not sure, if Camila did not arrive at the meeting or if she arrived, she did not have precise instructions. I understand that these days or before the weekend there will be some message. Juan travelled there willing to stay the necessary time and will mobilise according to the instructions. (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, I.554).

In order to apply the theoretical propositions to the FARC network of 2003, the findings described above need to be considered. In particular: 1) the level of institutional impact is high according to SNAID, and 2) Monica Granda, a non-publicly-known leader of FARC, was able to facilitate corruption activities between FARC and the government of Ecuador in Venezuelan territory. From that perspective, because the FARC network of 2003 presented high levels of political corruption and anti-crime policies focused on the most visible key players, instead of the most politically influential, this strategy did not contribute towards the successful disruption of the FARC network of 2003.

As with the FARC network of 2001, there are no public records that account for the participation of Monica Granda in important FARC affairs. The political role of FARC operative Granda described above also confirms the results obtained in Chapter 6. In sum, this theoretical exercise was able to illustrate how FARC members such as Gonzalez and Granda, who in 2001 and 2003 respectively did not have a lead role on the FARC, were appointed to participate in activities to co-opt public officials in other states.

In sum, when studying the results presented in this theoretical exercise in terms of the hypotheses presented for illicit network disruption, it can be affirmed that FARC was a stronger and resilient network in 2001 and 2003, because institutional impact was achieved through non-senior FARC leaders that were not under the radar of the Colombian authorities. In difference to 2002, which observed a weaker and less resilient network, because the institutional impact was delivered only through the leaders of the FARC organisation which are the same that the Colombian authorities had been targeting. As such, in 2002, FARC did not see the collaboration of less visible but clandestine actors able to liaise with public officials

in Latin America. These conclusions should be treated with caution and further research is recommended to confirm such assertions. However, the results obtained here are consistent with evidence that suggests that counterinsurgency operations against FARC in 2002 were stronger and successful to a certain extent. As it was mentioned before (see Section 7.4.5), from 2002, the operations against FARC intensified and the political support to FARC decreased in light of historical events (see Section 4.2.2.1) (International Institute of Strategic Studies 2011). It was in 2002 when the Colombian Armed Forces intensified the confrontation against the guerrillas, to levels never before known during the armed conflict. From that moment, the guerrillas abandoned territories in which they previously had a relative presence, retreated to some outlying areas, tried to maintain their mobility corridors and returned to the typical guerrilla warfare using the tactics of the ambush, sabotage, minefields and snipers (Peña 2013, p. 92).

As of 2003, the FARC began to lose territorial control and their possibility of reaching the condition of belligerence became increasingly distant. From that moment, the conditions for the FARC had changed to a point where they moved into a situation of retreat. Without remaining inactive, the guerrillas tried to erode the enemy by avoiding confrontational fighting, seeking to reduce operating costs and trying to reduce the number of casualties (Peña 2013, p. 97). According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (2011, p. 88), despite the negative impact of the 2002 coup d'état on relations between the FARC and the Venezuelan government, not everything changed, and not all the changes were negative for the FARC. In fact, relations continued and there is no evidence that President Chavez has stopped perceiving the FARC as an ally that could help reduce the perceived threats against Venezuela by the United States. Although it is possible that during this time high public officials have decided to grant less power to the FARC, for the guerrillas it also meant the opportunity to establish relations with lower ranking officers. Thus, after 2002, the activities of the FARC –from a strategic political perspective – continued and even increased over time (International Institute of Strategic Studies 2011, pp. 88–89). This is consistent with the results obtained for the year 2003, which speak of the existence of links between FARC and public officials of lower rank such as an unidentified member of the Marxist–Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador (PCMLE).

**7.5 Furthering the Current Theoretical Scholarship on Institutional Impact**

The findings of this thesis speak of the capacity of organised crime to impact upon the governance of states at various levels. The levels of institutional impact can be quantified and determined with precision. The scholarship that deals with how criminal organisations today interfere various domains of the Latin American societies (i.e., borders, social, economic and political spheres) (Albarracín 2018; Arias 2006, 2010; Duncan 2015) will benefit from theoretical and analytical frameworks that measured the extent to which the public office of these countries is compromised by political corruption activities that involve organised crime. Latin America is a region that has witnessed fragile states and that had experienced high levels of political corruption (i.e., co-opted state reconfiguration). Theoretical and analytical frameworks that work as thermometers of institutional impact will reframe the way scholars study these regions by providing a more accurate analysis of how and the degree to which the instances of public office are affected by the interaction of political-criminal alliances.

This thesis contributes to the small but growing set of literature that supports the idea that organised crime exerts political power. The capacity of organised crime to affect the governance of states must not be seen only as isolated cases reflected in fragile states of the third world. The scholarship that supports that conflicted regions such as African and Latin American states are protagonists in the capacity of organised crime to participate in the political life of these regions (Arias 2010; Bayart, Ellis & Hibou 1999; Briscoe & Kalkman 2016; Reitano & Shaw 2015), may not only implement new frameworks to assess institutional impact, but needs to encourage criminologists to study this phenomenon worldwide.

Important efforts today are trying to understand in detail the complexities of political-criminal collaborations (Cockayne 2016; Mandel 2011; Schulte-Bockholt 2006; Wilson & Lindsey 2009). Knowing the extent to which criminal organisations have captured the public office of a country and acknowledging the type of actors and relationships that account for co-opting practices that provide support and stability to criminal organisations is an enormous step in the understanding of how, when and under what circumstances the political-criminal collaboration prevail.

The important efforts to measure political corruption that are periodically made by prestigious institutions such as the World Bank through governance indicators and corruption indexes such as the CPI and the WGI need to make a clear difference between corruption processes initiated

through the private firm and those happening via political-criminal alliances. In addition to global governance indicators, practitioners need to focus on case by case approaches where the impact of distinguishable transnational criminal organisations such as FARC is assessed both in the home and host countries. Important efforts of government agencies across the world to combat transnational crime such as the Australian Crime Commission, the White House Strategy to Combat Transnational Organised Crime and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime need to include in their list of threatening illicit organisations the extent to which each illicit group have captured public offices, in what countries, and the specific governance risks that these countries face based upon the political corruption levels found in their analysis. Protocols for tracking and disrupting illicit networks based on conceptual frameworks of institutional impact must be implemented both by law enforcement and policy analysts. An illustration of the theoretical advancement proposed by this work is represented in Figure 7.9.



**Figure 7.9: Disrupting Illicit Networks Based on Institutional Impact**

Practitioners of agencies in charge of prosecuting key members of important trinational organised crime groups (i.e., Interpol, DEA) need to include in analysis based on graph theory (i.e., network analysis, link analysis), specific tools that allowed them to identify the key members of illicit networks that facilitate political corruption processes. In difference to strategies that seek to target leaders of illicit networks disregarding their corruption capacity; institutional impact tools will allow practitioners to target with precision the key players of illicit networks through which illicit organisations receive support and become resilient. This not only makes an important contribution to practitioners but to all the scholarship interested in further studying alternatives for disrupting illicit networks based upon SNA. For example, further research based on important works stated here, such as Garay-Salamanca and colleagues (2010, 2012, 2015), will be able to speak of the degree of responsibility that narco-leaders had on co-opting public officials in Mexico, and that of paramilitary leaders in capturing the Colombian state.

## 7.6 Concluding Remarks

Important conclusions were reached after obtaining a clear picture of how the FARC network created political alliances across Latin America. In terms of the objectives of this research, the results focused on two main aspects: the amount of institutional impact that the FARC network was able to exert over the public office of various countries and the specific roles of key senior players regarding their participation in co-opting public officials in other states. Specifically, the research discovered that the international committee of the FARC is a complex structure able to exercise high levels of political influence beyond borders. Although visible key senior players have a fundamental role in this accomplishment, not all operate to coerce public office.

The FARC is the oldest guerrilla group in the world and has evolved, adapted and reconfigured its political interests in a way that allows one to understand that the FARC's political influence in Latin America, and possibly beyond, must not be underestimated. This thesis acknowledged that, the advancement of political–criminal alliances risks the governance of a state. Clear examples, such as the Colombian and Mexican narco-mafias, have destabilised the democratic institutions of their countries to the extent that their public apparatus have been not only corrupted but also modified to suit the interests of criminals. It is imperative to examine in detail the complexities and dynamics of political–criminal structures to uncover the processes through which illicit networks capture the public administration of states. As such, this thesis

evaluated the response of the state and the appropriateness and applicability of anti-crime policies, considering that they are the key means of interrupting the resilience, adaptability and transformation of illicit networks. Specifically, a set of theoretical hypotheses subject to future research and study were proposed here. They suggest that anti-crime policies must first determine the levels of political impact of an illicit network. If an illicit network exhibits high levels of political corruption, anti-corruption agents must focus on the most politically influential actors, instead of the most visible, to guarantee network disruption.

# Chapter 8 Institutional Impact Beyond the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Perspectives for Disrupting Illicit Networks

## 8.1 Introduction

The previous chapter of this thesis addressed the implications derived from the findings of this research. The implications argue that key senior players of illicit networks are not necessarily in charge of executing political influence over the public offices of states. This is significant in terms of anti-crime and counterterrorism policies. Chapter 7 developed two theoretical propositions (subject to further research) that allow law enforcement and researchers to construct further theoretical and practical approaches to successfully dismantle illicit networks.

In line with objective 3 of this thesis, this chapter explores counter-crime perspectives from an institutional impact view, by examining one of the better examples of today's political–criminal scenario: the political effect of cocaine trafficking. Saviano (2014, pp. 97–102) argues that cocaine trafficking is the most lucrative business today. Above financial and stock markets, cocaine is the only 'good' able to survive economic slowdowns, while simultaneously, their traders can make greater profits than those derived from the oil trade. The power that drug traffickers have obtained through dealing cocaine includes the ability to conquer sectors of a state including its economy, political administration and institutions. Therefore, this chapter describes the institutional effects of the associations between cocaine traffickers in Colombia and public officials in Colombia, Mexico and the US. This chapter then questions current anti-cocaine policies to propose lessons in drug policy that align with the anti-crime theories in the previous chapter.

## 8.2 Cocaine: Institutional Impact in Colombia

### 8.2.1 The Cocaine Cartels and the Political Class in Colombia

Perhaps the most notorious sign of the immense political power that cocaine trafficking exerted on Colombia and abroad was Pablo Escobar's declaration of war on the Colombian government. In the late 1980s, Escobar sought to halt the pending extradition proceedings of Colombian narco-traffickers to the US. Escobar's activities escalated to a major spate of car

bombings and the assassination of judges, politicians and police. At the time, Escobar was not the only mafia boss with political influence over the Colombian government. Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha 'El Mejicano' (The Mexican) was a notorious Medellín Cartel leader who, along with landowners, cattle ranchers and some branches of the Colombian army, financed operations that aimed to eliminate the FARC and other guerrilla groups (Durán Nuñez 2013). These strategic alliances between the *narcos*, landowners and public forces proved useful against the different forms that the FARC used to capitalise on the product of its operations such as killings, abductions, extortions and increasingly greater participation in the cocaine trade.

Parallel to the Medellín Cartel, the Cali Cartel was formed by the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers, Gilberto and Miguel, José Santacruz Londoño and Hélmer Herrera. The success of the Cali Cartel in the cocaine trade, which in the 1990s controlled over 90 per cent of the world's cocaine market (Shannon 1991), was due to the ability of its leaders to dictate government policies. The eldest brother, Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela, was a visionary with strong entrepreneurial skills. He was known as '*el ajedrecista*' (the chess player). In opposition to Escobar's intimidatory acts and threats, he obtained protection umbrellas by buying politicians while adopting a low profile (Rempel 2014, p. 450).

Although the heads of the cartels in Colombia used different tactics to co-opt public office, the relationship between Escobar and the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers was positive and collaboration links existed between the Medellín and Cali cartels. Since the mid-1970s, New York was considered exclusive territory of the Cali Cartel. The Medellín controlled the markets in Miami and Los Angeles. However, an increasing supply of cocaine in New York, followed by a significant decrease in prices, prompted a new dispute between the cartels over control of the New York market (Sabogal 1988). This situation, coupled with other divisive factors, marked the beginning of a bloody confrontation between the Medellín and Cali cartels.

By 1990, Colombia was suffering an escalating onslaught on the civil population that was primarily led by Pablo Escobar. The paramilitaries were committing barbaric acts against peasant farmers, the guerrillas were adjusting their apparatus of organised violence and the political class was struggling in the middle of the crisis (Cardona Alzate 2011). Although the initiative to establish a new constitution in Colombia had been suggested long ago by President López (1974–1978), the desperate situation of the Colombian people was expressed through

the voices of students and called for the need to draft a new institutional order. Hence, on 5 February 1991, the Constituent Assembly of Colombia was formed to draft the Colombian Constitution of 1991. However, a new constitution was the perfect opportunity for the drug cartels to influence the constituents to declare the extradition of drug dealers unconstitutional. Pablo Escobar made an agreement with the Colombian government to turn himself in to the authorities and stop terrorist attacks against politicians, public officials and the civil population once the law prohibited the extradition of Colombians linked to drug trafficking activities.

Conversely, the Cali Cartel's offices were transformed into general headquarters where the Mafia bosses periodically met with politicians and government leaders who received significant sums of money from the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers (Rempel 2014, p. 1462). Hence, Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela indirectly participated in drafting the legislative bills of the new constitution that dealt with extradition issues. By hiring lawyers and US experts on constitutional law, Rodríguez Orejuela ensured the final draft of the extradition bill blocked any possibility of extradition of drug traffickers and paved the way for a full pardon of past crimes committed by the *narcos* (Rempel 2014, pp. 1474–1475).

Pablo Escobar kept his promise and turned himself in to the Colombian authorities. On 19 June 1991, the billionaire controlled the zone where *La Catedral* (The Cathedral) was built. Escobar strategically chose to be confined within the domains of a region he knew well. The cartel boss had also considered the possibility of escape in the event of attacks against him. With the help of the mayor of Envigado, Escobar and his other 'imprisoned' men obtained access to security guard uniforms. They ran the security systems inside *La Catedral* and ensured Escobar's safety by using their own guns. The members of the national police and the 'real' penitentiary guards were only allowed to work on the outskirts of La Catedral with no contact with Escobar's men. The security systems, prison gates, electric fences and escape routes were carefully designed before Escobar turned himself in (Cablenotocias 2012). Escobar continued to operate his drug business from the luxury and comfort of the jail he designed and built. A soccer field, sauna, waterbed, jacuzzi and a 60-inch screen television were among the amenities enjoyed by Escobar, his brother Roberto and 14 of his security guards. Aside from the luxuries of La Catedral, the cartel boss and his men had access to a radio communications system, arms, sound systems and a video recorder (Torres 1992).

When the President of Colombia, César Gaviria, discovered the atrocities taking place within the penitentiary, he was determined to move Escobar to a real penal institution (Univision 2016). Pablo Escobar and his men walked out of La Catedral using the escape route that the cartel boss had planned from the beginning. The military operation in charge of apprehending Escobar was a complete failure. The drug traffickers were superior to the Colombian army in intelligence, operations and telecommunications (Cablenoticias 2012).

The Cali Cartel took advantage of the critical situation of Escobar, who continued to run his business from his hiding places and detonate bombs aimed at the Colombian government. The heads of the Cali Cartel and the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers created the short-lived vigilante group called *Los Pepes* (The Pepes, persecuted by Pablo Escobar) who waged a small-scale war against the Medellín Cartel that ended in 1993 following the death of Escobar (Rempel 2014, p. 1874). Allegedly, *Los Pepes* had ties to members of the Colombian National Police, especially the *Bloque de Búsqueda* (the Search Bloc), with whom they exchanged information to execute their activities against Escobar (Human Rights Watch 1998).

With the death of Escobar and the end of the war between the Medellín and Cali cartels, the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers' main concern was negotiating the rendition and reduction of their sentences with the Colombian government. However, for the bosses of the Cali Cartel to receive perks, such as imprisonment in Colombian prisons for a short period of time and the promise of no expropriation of their assets, the Colombian government requested the complete surrender of all *narcos* associated with the Cali Cartel, including junior partners in the business. Considering several associate members of the Cali Cartel refused this sudden dissolution, the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers turned away from negotiations with the Colombian government and instead decided to bankroll the 1994 presidential election campaign of presidential candidate Ernesto Samper (Rempel 2014, pp. 2515–2516).

If successful, the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers could obtain more than a reduction of their sentences. The Cali bosses could have a president on their side who agreed with their objectives. Specifically, they launched *Proyecto Champaña* (Champagne Project) that consisted of offering massive financial donations to presidential campaigns in exchange for a *Sometimiento*-type amnesty. This would benefit the Cali bosses when the successful candidate was elected president (Lessing 2017, p. 154). Conversely, the project sought to exert control over the Congress of the Republic of Colombia. It was also important to control a portion of

the congress through the funding of congressional candidates to help them modify the laws on illicit enrichment in the future (Jaramillo 1997).

According to Federico (2012), in 1994, four days before Samper was elected President of Colombia, a meeting was held between emissaries of the Cali Cartel and the presidential candidate. This was confirmed by William Rodríguez Abadía, son of Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela, who suggests that the relationship between Samper and the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers had existed for a long time. The meeting, held in Spain, was attended by the congressional representative Eduardo Mestre (who was later convicted for his connection to the Cali Cartel), Samper and an emissary of the Cali Cartel (NTN24 2014a). There, they formally agreed that, in the event that Samper was successful in the presidential elections, the Cali Cartel would obtain de jure benefits when submitting to the justice (NTN24 2014b).

In exchange for the amnesty promise, the presidential campaign of Samper received USD10 million from the Cali Cartel (NTN24 2014a). In 1994, soon after Samper took office, information pointing to collaboration between Cali and Samper was leaked by Samper's opponent and future successor Andrés Pastrana. These events led the Colombian government to begin a legal investigation based on the possibility that Ernesto Samper's presidential campaign was funded by drug money. Among the members investigated were President Samper, workers of the presidential electoral campaign, some recently appointed members of government and representatives of the Colombian congress.

President Samper had no choice but to recognise the infiltration of narcotics money in his electoral campaign, although he admitted knowing nothing about how the money began circulating around the electoral campaign. He publicly stated that if drug money had entered the presidential campaign, it had done so 'behind his back'. With the scandal, the hopes for the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers to receive preferential treatment by the Samper government were fading (Rempel 2014, p. 2834). Despite this, the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers supported Samper until the end. The Cali Mafia bribed the congressional representatives who brought Samper to trial for the possible inflow of narco-trafficking money in his electoral campaign. According to William, the son of Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela, the Cali Cartel purchased the votes that absolved Samper before the Congress Constitutional Accusations Committee (Semana 2013a).

For the son of Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela, Samper was always aware of the influx of drug money to his presidential campaign. However, he stated that Samper came under intense pressure by the US to collaborate to defeat the most powerful drug cartel in the world. Hence, Samper turned his back on the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers and devoted his efforts to capturing the *capos* of the Cali Cartel (NTN24 2014a).

US pressure on the Samper administration did not end when the members of the Cali cartel were successfully captured and brought to trial in Colombia. In 1997, US-imposed trade sanctions to Colombia forced the Samper government to revive the discussion around the extradition of individuals for crimes related to drug trafficking. On 16 September 1997, the Congress of the Republic of Colombia confirmed the reintroduction of the extradition from Colombia of Colombian nationals to the US (Ramírez 2013).

After being elected in 2002, President Uribe resorted to extradition as his main method for combating narco-trafficking. In 2004, Uribe authorised the extradition to the US of Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela (Semana 2004) and, in 2005, of Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela (El Mundo 2005). However, the decline of the Medellín and Cali cartels led to a new generation of less powerful 'mini-cartels' (Otis 2014, p. 4) that turned to powerful rebel organisations, such as the FARC, to protect their drug trafficking operations. Over time, the FARC established links with international drug traffickers such as Mexico's Tijuana Cartel and Brazilian smugglers. Millions of dollars in drug money provided the FARC with high levels of control over the coca plantations, consolidating their power over the peasantry (Otis 2014, p. 5) and providing them with the military muscle to take power in Colombia.

The major goal of the Uribe administration was to combat and defeat the FARC. President Uribe was well-known as a hardline and authoritarian politician who sought to restore order in Colombia by aggressively confronting the FARC and other leftist guerrilla movements. His economic policies were orthodox and neoliberal (Dugas 2003, p. 1117). It is believed that, on 14 June 1983, FARC guerrillas killed Uribe's father, Alberto Uribe Sierra. Uribe's future hardline intransigence towards Colombia's insurgencies may be rooted in that unfortunate event (Dugas 2003, p. 1122).

President Uribe's political career has not been free from controversy. He has often been questioned about links with paramilitaries and narco-traffickers. According to Miller (2004), a 2004 declassified US military intelligence report suggests that Colombian President Álvaro

Uribe, one of the US' 'most steadfast allies in South America, was allegedly a "close personal friend" of slain drug lord Pablo Escobar' and collaborated with the Medellín cartel at high government levels. The unclassified report lists Uribe 82nd among 104 of the more powerful Colombian narco-traffickers:

> 82. Álvaro Uribe Vélez—a Colombian politician and senator dedicated to collaboration with the Medellín cartel at high government levels. Uribe was linked to a business involved in narcotics activities in the US. His father was murdered in Colombia for his connection with the narcotic traffickers. Uribe has worked for the Medellín cartel and is a close personal friend of Pablo Escobar Gaviria. He has participated in Escobar's political campaign to win the position of assistant parliamentarian to Jorge (Ortega). Uribe has been one of the politicians, from the senate, who has attacked all forms of the extradition treaty. (National Security Archive 2004)

The Colombian government and the US State Department condemned the contents of the intelligence report for being uncorroborated and contradicting Uribe's strong support for eradicating cocaine production in Colombia (Miller 2004). However, the allegations in the memo are consistent with complaints raised by policy-oriented media and Uribe's political opponents. They argued that President Uribe and his family had links with narco-traffickers; specifically, the Medellín cartel.

Colombian Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, was assassinated on 30 April 1984 under orders of the Medellín cartel due to his work prosecuting cocaine traffickers. Minister Lara Bonilla was in charge of the military operation *Yarí*. In this operation, on 11 March 1984, the Colombian military police dismantled the largest cocaine laboratory in Latin America until that day. The operation uncovered seven cocaine laboratories, sophisticated communication equipment and several power stations. 15 tonnes of coca paste and three tonnes of processed cocaine were seized in the cocaine refining complex dubbed '*Tranquilandia*'. All seized material was owned by Pablo Escobar, Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha and Jorge Luis Ochoa Vásquez. In addition, the military operation confiscated a Hughes-500 helicopter. The aircraft was registered to a company partly owned by Alberto Uribe Sierra, the late father of Álvaro Uribe. The Uribe family denied any links to the helicopter, suggesting that the aircraft had been sold one month before the raid (El Tiempo 2002).

Cecilia, sister of Lara Bonilla, disclosed on oath details connecting Álvaro Uribe with drug trafficking activities. According to Cecilia, weeks before being assassinated, the ex-minister of justice of Colombia complained incessantly, in public and in private, of the infiltration of drug

trafficking in all sectors of society. His accusations were not generic. They were accompanied by names, dates and places. As an example of this infiltration, the late minister mentioned Álvaro Uribe Vélez and his father Alberto Uribe Sierra, according to Cecilia Lara Bonilla's statement (Reyes 2007).

On several occasions, Uribe admitted that his father, Alberto Uribe Sierra, and Fabio Ochoa (the father of the Ochoa brothers, drug traffickers who were founding members of the Medellín Cartel alongside Pablo Escobar) were friends. He attributed that relationship to the fact that his father was *finquero y caballista* (farmer and horseman), just as Fabio Ochoa:

> What united us was not drug trafficking but horses. When I was a kid, horse riding in Antioquia was a source of pride. It did not have any of the connotations that it acquired later. My dad and Fabio Ochoa were friends and rivals in that environment. My brothers and I participated in all the horse shows competing against their children in the 60s and 70s. It was a healthy world, of farms, horses, treble, brandy and poetry. Then, by familiar circumstances, each family took different paths. In spite of that and even though my father was murdered by the FARC 19 years ago, the legend of the friendship between my father and Don Fabio Ochoa remained in the air. (Semana 2002)

Aside from his close nexus with the Ochoa clan, Uribe was appointed Director of the Civil Aeronautics Authority in Colombia in 1980. According to Castillo, a journalist of the Colombian newspaper *El Espectador* who has reported on the Mafia in Colombia in the 70s, 80s and 90s, Uribe as the Director of *Aerocivil* granted flight licenses to many narco-pilots. Being Rodrigo Lara, Minister of Justice, he ordered the aeronautics agency to suspend flights of ships to drug traffickers. However, Lara noted that that entity suffered from a passive and negligent attitude and that only a small part of the great air fleet of Medellín drug traffickers were immobilised (Contreras & Garavito 2002).

## 8.3 Cocaine: Transnational Institutional Impact

### 8.3.1 Manuel Antonio Noriega

After Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was assassinated by the order of Pablo Escobar, then Colombian President Belisario Betancur declared war on the Medellín cartel. The *capos* hid from the Colombian authorities in Panama (El Tiempo 1993). During his stay in Panama, Pablo Escobar discovered a new partner in the drug business, the late Panamanian dictator Manuel Antonio Noriega. As head of state, Noriega was in an advantageous position to

facilitate drug trafficking through Panama, considering its geo-strategic location, including the Panama Canal (Semana 2017).

In the mid and late 1980s, Colombian drug traffickers, with the complicity of Noriega, began to reorganise their routes through Panama, Central America, Mexico and subsequently via the US–Mexico border to the US. Although Noriega never accepted his connections to the Colombian drug cartels, he permitted the Colombian narco-traffickers to launder money using Panamanian banks (Anderson 2017). Juan Pablo Escobar, Pablo Escobar's son, states that Noriega received USD5 million from Escobar to allow the Medellín cartel to build cocaine laboratories and set-up money laundering operations in Panama. According to Juan Pablo Escobar, Noriega attempted to betray Escobar, considering that the Panamanian dictator also collaborated with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). According to his testimony, the great military capacity of the Medellín Cartel in those days forced Noriega to return the money to Escobar, who accused the dictator of treason (Semana 2017). President George HW Bush took office on 20 January 1989. On December of the same year, President Bush ordered the invasion of Panama. General Noriega was captured, putting an end to the participation of the dictator in cocaine trafficking (Bagley 2011, pp. 239–240).

### 8.3.2 From Colombia to Mexico

The fall of the Medellín and Cali cartels left a power vacuum in Colombia's cocaine trade. However, the narco-trafficking business entered a new phase that was even more difficult to fight and remained as profitable ever (Semana 2000b). Sophisticated, with improved education, gathered in small organisations, with a global vision and a low profile, the new drug traffickers began to operate and structure differently to the traditional cartels of the past (Semana 2000b). Hence, the vacuum was quickly taken over by a growing number of 'mini-cartels'. To avoid detection and arrest, the *cartelitos* assumed a less violent profile and were less involved in politics. By 2000, approximately 300 mini-cartels were operating in Colombia (Bagley 2011, p. 242). For example, the *Norte del Valle Cartel* (North Valley Cartel) operated principally in the north of the Valle del Cauca of Colombia. It catapulted the trade of cocaine after the Cali and Medellín Cartels fragmented and was one of the most powerful organisations in the illegal

drug trade. The *Norte del Valle Cartel* survived until 2008, until it succumbed to frantic persecution by Colombian and US forces (El Espectador 2012).

The surviving mini-cartels gave control of the cultivation and processing of coca in rural Colombia to the FARC guerrillas and paramilitaries such as the AUC. The FARC and the AUC began to control most of the areas of coca cultivation in rural areas of Colombia while sustaining a bloody war over territorial control. The mini-cartels were frequently destroyed and forced to forge commercial alliances with criminals and traffickers, inside and outside Colombia, creating new spaces and opportunities for the Mexican cartels. The latter quickly and enthusiastically expanded their power, dominantly positioning themselves in the business (Bagley 2011, p. 243).

During the second half of the 1990s, several Mexican organisations began to venture into the cocaine business, first in Juárez, under the direction of the Carrillo Fuentes family, and then in Tijuana, with the Arellano Félix family. In the first half of the 2000s, two relatively less prominent trafficking organisations—the Sinaloa cartel headed by Joaquín '*El Chapo*' Guzmán Loera and the cartel of the Gulf captained by Osiel Cárdenas Guillén—moved with considerable success against the Juárez and Tijuana cartels. They managed to forge links with the Colombian mini-cartels. The Gulf and Sinaloa cartels established new routes by air and land along the Pacific and Gulf coasts. By 2003, the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels became the most dynamic, powerful and brutal actors in the Mexican cocaine trade (Bagley 2011, pp. 235–236).

### 8.3.3 El Chapo Guzmán

On 23 February 2014, the boss of the largest and most powerful drug cartel in the world was arrested in Mexico. Joaquín Guzmán Loera, nicknamed *El Chapo*, was born in Sinaloa and, according to *Forbes*, was considered one of the richest men in the world. *El Chapo*'s narco-trafficking organisation became the largest in the world, operating in more than 50 countries, including markets such as the US and Spain. The Sinaloa cartel operated under the hegemony of a federation of Mexican mafias that exerted total control over the traffic of cocaine; specifically, transport routes from Colombia to the US (Cieza & Arias Henao 2014, pp. 3–4).

*El Chapo* was elevated to the category of the 'more wanted' and 'more persecuted'. However, for Reveles (2011), the Mexican government selectively targeted drug trafficking organisations. As a result, *El Chapo* was considered 'untouchable' by the *Partido de Acción*

*Nacional* (The National Action Party), the political party in Mexico under which President Fox (2000–2006) and President Calderón (2006–2012) ruled. From that perspective, the motivation of Fox and Calderón with drug traffickers was not only political but also criminal. Both knew that their respective administrations were involved in the network that facilitated the escape of *El Chapo* on 19 January 2001 and contributed to the consolidation of his criminal empire (Delgado 2014).

In 2001, *El Chapo* first escaped from a maximum-security prison, supposedly hidden in a laundry cart. In 2015, he escaped from another similar jail even more spectacularly; through a sophisticated 1.5 kilometre long tunnel that connected the shower of his cell to a secure house that was built without detection. At that time, *El Chapo* spent less than a year and a half in prison, while President Peña Nieto (2012–present) was publicly humiliated. As the leader of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, Peña Nieto boasted that an escape of *El Chapo* would not be possible under his command. In the escape, the complicity of authorities was clear, but responsibility was never attributed to the highest level. The second escape of *El Chapo* proved that the Sinaloa *capo*'s power remained intact and that Mexico had not won the battle against corruption and impunity (La Nación 2016).

### 8.3.4 The Drug Enforcement Administration Agency

### 8.3.4.1 Pablo Escobar and the Drug Enforcement Administration Agency

Money derived from drug trafficking has not only influenced the public institutions of Colombia and Mexico but also law enforcement agencies in the US, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration Agency (DEA), responsible for coordinating the US' drug control activities. According to Juan Pablo Escobar, Pablo Escobar's son, his father had contacts and business with the CIA and the DEA. In his own words:

> … I also discovered a route that my father called the train. It counted on the cooperation of DEA agents at the airport International of Miami to receive people that my father sent on commercial flights twice a week with 800 kilos of cocaine. The route lasted three years and never lost a single gram given the cooperation of the Colombian and the United States' authorities, who charged him US$3,500 for each kilo of cocaine allowed to enter the United States. (González 2017)

According to Conroy (2006), it is commonly thought that 'the narco-traffickers, crooked cops and thieving politicians in the drug war' are always in Latin America, while US law

enforcement officials 'are always the good guys battling these forces of evil'. However, evidence suggests that the US justice system was also capable of becoming corrupted by money derived from drug trafficking.

Thomas M Kent worked in the telephone recording unit of the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, to which the DEA is attached. In a secret memo written to his superiors, Jodi Avergun and Michael Walther, Kent revealed that federal agents with the DEA's office in Bogotá, Colombia, were corrupt players in the war on drugs. The detailed seven-page document sent by Kent contains serious accusations against members of the DEA who worked in Colombia. In the document, Kent states that DEA agents were on the payrolls of drug traffickers, were involved in murders of informants and helped members of the AUC with money laundering operations. Kent stated that these allegations were known and ignored by the control agencies of the Department of Justice (Semana 2006).

### 8.3.4.2 *El Chapo* and the Drug Enforcement Administration Agency

In 2014, the Mexican newspaper *El Universal* revealed that the US government was aware of clandestine meetings between agents of the DEA and Mexican drug traffickers. It is alleged that such meetings were carried out with the passive complicity of the Mexican authorities. The information suggests that the DEA regional office approved these meetings and allowed members of the cartel partners to continue their operations without hindrance. According to Gómora (2014), for a year, the newspaper gathered proof of these meetings. This evidence included official and judicial documents from Mexico and the US and interviews with more than 100 active and retired officials from both countries, including detainees, relatives of detainees and specialists. No Mexican authority reported these meetings to the General Congress of the United Mexican States and no investigation has been opened in Mexico about these meetings, which took place in Mexican territory. The official documents upon which *El Universal* based its accusations indicate that clandestine negotiations of the DEA with members of Mexican cartels—especially with Sinaloa—sought to obtain information from rival cartels to achieve cargo seizures and arrests. The clandestine collaboration that occurred during the administration of Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón only served to spark violence in Mexico (Gómora 2014).

**8.4 Cocaine: Drug Policy**

**8.4.1 Drug Policy in the Americas**

According to Paul Gootenberg, professor of Latin American history at the State University of New York, the bases for cocaine trafficking in the Americas was established during the 1950s and 1960s. From that perspective, several Latin American nationalities and regions were involved in cocaine trafficking long before the business was controlled by the Colombian and Mexican cartels. Chile operated as the base of the group of traffickers who led the cocaine circulation networks during the 1950s and 1960s. During that time, several nationalities and regions were involved: Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Panama and Colombia were the most notorious in the beginning. The real innovators, those who dominated the long-distance cocaine trade during the 1950s and 1960s, were the Chileans. They were the 'Colombians' of their time. Numerous contemporary documents recognise this, a memory that was lost during the Colombian boom in drug trafficking (Estefane 2012).

For Estefane (2012), Gootenberg also suggests that after the bloody coup of 11 September 1973, everything changed. By working closely with the DEA, Pinochet promoted an efficient anti-drug campaign that would win him the support of Nixon to prevent left-wing groups from using profits from trafficking to finance subversive activities. Using his military power and draconian police, Pinochet moved quickly and efficiently. Military forces expelled the 19 most important Chilean traffickers. Some were sent to trial in the US and others fled to Argentina. The main cocaine laboratory in the country was dismantled. The Junta unreasonably accused the entire Allende government and sympathisers abroad of complicity with the drug business. Hence, For Gootenberg, the repression of Pinochet was the key event that displaced the flow of cocaine to Colombia.

By the late 1970s, Colombia had become the primary producer and exporter of marijuana destined for the US for consumption. Colombian traffickers were involved in up to 65 per cent of the growing, shipping and marketing process (Menzel 1997, p. 18). The US has had considerable success in Mexico and Jamaica using herbicides and fumigation techniques to combat the growth of crops. However, although aligned with the anti-drug policies of the US, Colombian President Turbay (1978–1982) rejected this option and chose more conventional approaches to deal with the production of marijuana such as increased policing operations and

manual eradication. In addition, to support the US anti-drug policy, Turbay entered into a bilateral extradition treaty in 1979 (Menzel 1997, p. 19).

According to Menzel (1997), the extradition treaty also threatened the established traffic of cocaine, which grew stronger in Colombia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By that time, 10 per cent of Colombian congress was reported as partially elected through the use of narco-trafficking contributions. Annual exports of cocaine were estimated to be bringing Colombia between USD1.5 billion and USD4.1 billion. The effects of the cocaine money invested in the Colombian economy were positive for many local industries by increasing jobs for workers in the construction market. By the end of Turbay's administration, the position of Colombia in relation to the war on drugs was confusing for the international community. It oscillated between complete tolerance on one hand and strong repressive action on the other (Menzel 1997, p. 25).

According to Aristizábal Villada (2006, pp. 15–16), when Colombian President Betancourt took power in 1983, the US pressured Colombia to carry out fumigation of coca and marijuana crops. Initially, President Betancourt rejected this approach and assumed a position similar to his predecessor, President Turbay. However, the assassinations of well-known politicians, such as minister Rodrigo Lara, who declared a direct war on drug trafficking and supported extradition policies to the US, caused the government of President Betancourt to change its position on the war on drugs.

Thus, in the early 1980s, eradication methods with herbicides, such as glyphosate, were approved in Colombia. Peasant communities and the media expressed complaints and criticisms against this eradication mechanism. Although it is true that, in the beginning, the fumigation of illicit crops showed encouraging results, the eradication of coca crops with herbicides was neither satisfactory nor permanent. Although the dimensions of the cultivated fields were reduced, production did not decrease, but simply moved to small plots. By accepting the American demand to combat the problem through fumigation, the Colombian government accepted the argument that the problem of narcotics was located at the poles of production; violating the conception of the bilateral nature of drug trafficking (Aristizábal Villada 2006, p. 17).

Since the 1980s, Colombia has been at the centre of global efforts to combat cocaine trafficking. In 1986, when the US proclaimed the drug production and trafficking activities a

threat, Washington began to devote considerable resources to curb the production of cocaine at the source (Mejía 2015, p. 3). Hence, bilateral policing and eradication efforts funded by the US were increased in Colombia.

Mejía (2015, p.3) states that in response to a large increase in cocaine production and the rapid deterioration of security conditions, in 1999, Bogotá announced a joint US–Colombia strategy against illegal drugs and organised crime, known as Plan Colombia (see Section 3.3.3.1). There were two main objectives of this strategy attempted: To reduce the production and traffic of illegal drugs (mainly cocaine) by 50 per cent in a six-year period. To improve security conditions in Colombia by regaining control of large areas of the country that were in possession of illicit groups (Mejía 2015, pp. 3–4).

Up until 2002, the US measured the successful commitment of any country fighting the war on drugs through the issuance of an annual certificate. Prior to that date, a de-certified country was one that, to the government of the US, did not demonstrate a serious commitment in the fight against drugs. The Narcotics Certification Process ended as a result of the *Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2002–2003*, which was signed into law on 30 September 2002 (US Department of State 2018).

For RCN (2017), President Bill Clinton decided to make Colombia the first formally democratic country to be de-certified. For the White House, the most compelling reason to de-certify Colombia was the inability of its security forces to capture the *capos* of the Cali Cartel. In 1994, Colombia was the largest source of cocaine consumed in the US. A year later, the US de-certified Colombia again. The reason given by the Clinton government was that Colombia was the producer of 80 per cent of the cocaine imported to the US, including the antecedent of drug money revenues to the presidential campaign of Ernesto Samper.

For Colombia to obtain the certification, the US government demanded that Colombia re-establish the extradition of Colombians that had been made unconstitutional in Colombia from 1991. In 1997, Colombia signed a long-term anti-narcotics agreement with the US. The agreement approved an increase in penalties for cases of corruption of the high government, increased fumigations and re-established extradition. In 1998, when Andrés Pastrana ascended to the presidency, there was greater military cooperation in Colombia. Between 1998 and 1999, US intervention tripled and full certification was regained (RCN 2017).

In 2016, in an event in which the 15 years of Plan Colombia were commemorated, US president Barack Obama announced economic support to help Colombia end 'half a century of wrenching conflict' with more than USD450 million dollars for 2017. He also argued that, when Plan Colombia was launched, the country was on the verge of collapse, while now it is about to achieve peace (El Espectador 2016).

In 2018, President Trump expressed his concern about the increase in illicit coca crops in Colombia, which, in 2016, grew 18 per cent to reach a record of 188,000 hectares planted. According to White House calculations, these crops have a potential cocaine production of 710 metric tons. For Trump, in the bilateral US–Colombian relationship, nothing is more important than the joint efforts to end the drug crimes that plague the two countries (Infobae 2018).

## 8.5 Critiques of Current Anti-Drug Strategies: Mejía and Osorio Granados

Daniel Mejía is the Secretary of Security of Bogotá, Colombia. His research has focused on the effects of different anti-drug policies implemented under Plan Colombia. Mejía is considered one of the most knowledgeable Colombian experts for his contributions to the fields of drug policy and the economics of crime in Colombia (Mejía 2015, p. 15). For Mejía (2015, pp. 9–13), the effectiveness of the anti-drug strategies implemented under Plan Colombia can be analysed by studying four main approaches:

1) disrupting cocaine production by attacking the first step in the production chain (i.e., coca cultivation)
2) attacking the subsequent stages of production and trafficking (e.g., labs, cocaine shipments and distribution of precursor chemicals)
3) dismantling drug trafficking organisations by targeting their top leaders
4) Implementing alternative livelihood programs (i.e., switch to cultivating legal crops).

### 8.5.1 Aerial Spraying of Illicit Crops

Mejía states that eradication through aerial fumigation is one of the most costly strategies to reduce coca production. Mejía's research indicates that, for every kilogram of cocaine eliminated from the retail market through aerial spraying, the marginal cost is approximately USD240,000. For every hectare sprayed with glyphosate, coca crops are reduced by approximately 0.02 to 0.065 hectares. Therefore, to eliminate only one hectare of coca through aerial fumigation, 32 hectares of coca must be sprayed. The cost of spraying one hectare with

glyphosate is approximately USD2,400. This includes costs such as airplanes, herbicides and protection. With an efficiency rate of approximately 4.2 per cent, the cost of eradicating one hectare of coca through aerial fumigation is approximately USD57,150. Aerial spraying also has a negative effect on the environment, leading to deforestation, water contamination and damage to amphibian populations. In addition, the use of glyphosate adversely affects human health, with exposure leading to skin problems and miscarriages (Mejía 2015, p. 9).

**8.5.2 Interdiction**

For Mejía, during the presidential mandate of Álvaro Uribe, Minister of Defence Juan Manuel Santos gave less emphasis to aerial spraying and increased efforts to dismantle cocaine production and trafficking. As a result, the number of hectares subjected to aerial spraying decreased from 172,000 in 2006 to 104,000 in 2009, a 40 per cent reduction. Cocaine seizures increased from 127 metric tonnes in 2006 to 203 metric tonnes in 2009, a 60 per cent increase. The number of laboratories that were destroyed increased from 2300 in 2006 to 2900 in 2009, an increase of 26 per cent. Hence, the new anti-drug strategy reduced the net offer of cocaine by more than 50 per cent, which caused a supply shock affecting the entire region and even the street price of cocaine. In the US, the price of a gram of pure cocaine increased from USD122 in 2007 to USD186 in 2009. Mejía suggests that interdiction strategies pushed violence and cocaine bases away from Colombia and towards other places such as Central America and Mexico. In Colombia, a significant decrease in the supply of cocaine from 2006 to 2009 may account for an increase of 10 to 14 per cent in violence in Mexico during the same period (Mejía 2015, pp. 11–12).

**8.5.3 Interdicting Top Leaders**

Mejía suggests that another interdiction strategy regularly carried out in Colombia is the effort to dismantle drug trafficking organisations by pursuing their best leaders. Although hundreds of leaders of drug trafficking organisation have been captured or killed in Colombia, Mejía claims that there is not yet clarity about how this strategy affects the amount of drugs produced and trafficked. Mejía suspects that, by interdicting the top leaders of drug trafficking organisations, power gaps are created that lead to pronounced cycles of violence (Mejía 2015, pp. 12–13).

### 8.5.4 Alternative Livelihood Programs

For Mejía, alternative livelihood programs are designed to provide coca growing communities with new options for social and economic development. The programs encourage coca farmers to abandon coca cultivation and plant legal crops in exchange for government support. This includes training, monetary incentives and assistance with marketing products. Colombia has invested heavily in several alternative subsistence programs but the effectiveness of such programs remains questionable. Many of the programs have faced implementation problems and those that have been implemented have been limited to training or monetary incentives, without providing farmers with the resources to market their products and ensure that the projects become self-sustaining (Mejía 2015, p. 13).

Osorio Granados (2016) highlights the work of Pascual Restrepo, a research assistant at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Restrepo explains that Colombia's anti-drug policy has poor results. From that view, the anti-drug policies implemented under the framework of the war on drugs sought to increase the price of cocaine by reducing supply in the production and transit countries. For Restrepo, this strategy has been counterproductive for three reasons: First, by focusing on the least significant links in the production chain, the war on drugs fails to significantly increase the price of cocaine. Consumers do not react strongly to changes in price and, as a consequence, these policies fail to reduce consumption. For a consumer in New York or Madrid, paying USD1 more for a gram of cocaine that costs USD100 does not make a difference. That same dollar can almost double the price charged by a cocaine producer in the Colombian countryside. Second, as producers and actors react strategically to anti-drug policies, the willingness of consumers to pay higher prices allows traffickers and producers to invest in the necessary measures to minimise the effects of anti-drug policies on supply. To increase productivity, they will move operations to other areas of cultivation, open new routes or invest in new technologies. Third, the architecture of the war on drugs is designed to force producers to invest more resources and money into their business. However, consumers simply pay higher prices and, as a result, governments are forced to invest more resources in their interdiction efforts. These resources end up financing activities without any social value, or worse, with the high social costs of violence and corruption that affect many regions (Osorio Granados 2016).

## 8.6 A Call for New Approaches

### 8.6.1 Decriminalisation of Drugs

Restrepo believes that new alternatives must be implemented to address cocaine trafficking and that the US and consumer countries should fund prevention and treatment programs. Reducing demand is the most effective strategy that can be offered to Colombia. According to Restrepo, Colombia has begun to discuss a change in anti-drug policies. However, the debate has mostly focused on policies to mitigate the risks associated with domestic consumption (i.e., health and violence). Although the debate is heading in the right direction, it is an incomplete step when a prohibitionist approach to controlling supply is maintained (Osorio Granados 2016).

Additionally, Restrepo believes that making drugs illegal has not only failed to prevent the flow of drugs to consumers but has also put the business in the worst possible hands: armed groups, gangsters and rebels. In his opinion, violence and organised crime associated with illicit drug trafficking is one of the most serious problems in Latin America. Restrepo states that it is imperative to rectify the strategy of the war on drugs that has been applied in the region over the last 30 years. Prohibitionist policies based on repressing production, interdiction of traffic and distribution and the criminalisation of consumption have not produced the expected results (Osorio Granados 2016).

In 2009, former presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, César Gaviria of Colombia, Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico and 17 independent parties involved in combating the drug trade created the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy. This group evaluated the effects of the policies of the war on drugs and formulated recommendations for further strategies. The commission issued a report declaring the war on drugs a failure. The proposals presented in this declaration suggest a profound shift in understanding and attitude towards confronting the problem of drugs in Latin America (Gaviria et al. 2009).

From their perspective, the current model of drug repression is firmly rooted in prejudice, fear and ideology. The issue has become a taboo that inhibits public debate due to its identification with crime. This blocks information and confines drug users to closed circles in which they become even more vulnerable to organised crime. Breaking the taboo and recognising the failures of existing policies and their consequences is a precondition for discussing a new

paradigm of safer, more efficient and humane policies (Gaviria et al. 2009, p. 8). Specifically, the assessment indicates that:

- Latin America remains the world's largest cocaine and marijuana exporter.
- The region has become a producer of opium and heroin.
- The Latin American region has begun producing synthetic drugs.
- Consumption continues to expand in Latin America, while stabilising in North America and Europe.
- The in-depth review of current policies is more urgent in light of the significant human costs and threats posed to democratic institutions. (Gaviria et al. 2009, p. 7).

Considering the experience of Latin America in the fight against drug trafficking and the seriousness of the problem in the region, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy proposed a new paradigm supported by three major guidelines:

1) Treat drug use as a public health issue. The simple decriminalisation of consumption, if it is not accompanied by information and prevention policies, may exacerbate addiction problems.

2) Reduce consumption through information and prevention actions. The changes in society and culture that led to impressive reductions in tobacco consumption demonstrate the efficiency of information and prevention campaigns based on clear messages and consistent arguments.

3) Focus repression on organised crime. Public policies should prioritise fighting against the most damaging social effects of organised crime such as violence, corruption of institutions, money laundering, arms trafficking and control of territories and populations (Gaviria et al. 2009, pp. 11–13).

## 8.6.2 The Institutional Impact Approach

The Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy also argues that the current approach to drug trafficking in the Americas is leading to 'the corruption of public servants, the judicial system, governments, the political system and, especially the police forces in charge of enforcing law and order' (Gaviria et al. 2009, p. 7). As discussed in the previous chapter, the advancement of political–criminal alliances leading to political corruption scenarios risks the governance of states.

It is worth bearing in mind that the analysis of the results obtained in this research project conclude that illicit criminal networks (including transnational criminal networks) seek to challenge the legitimacy of states. The main implication derived from this research is that anti-crime policies today must consider the exact way in which illicit organisations are able to influence public office while risking its governance. In addition to potential solutions, such as decriminalising drugs, reflections on, and critiques of, the current approach to drug policy must consider factors pertaining to the capacity of illicit networks to affect the governance of a state.

The findings of this thesis explicitly argue that identifying leaders of transnational illicit networks does not imply that these leaders will exert political influence upon states. Anti-crime efforts must be oriented towards targeting actors in their capacity to exert political influence, disregarding their leadership position. By applying the first two theoretical hypotheses on counterterrorist and anti-crime policies (see Chapter 7) to drug trafficking in the Americas, the following assessment must be studied by anti-drug specialists:

> *Hypothesis 1: If drug trafficking organisations present low levels of political corruption, anti-drug policies do not have to target those key players who have the potential to exert institutional impact on states. Targeting the most visible key player, instead of the most politically influential, will allow for the successful disruption of the drug network.*

According to hypothesis 1, anti-crime policies must first determine the levels of political influence of illicit drug networks before deciding on actions of interdiction against top leaders in the network. If the drug network exhibits low levels of political corruption, anti-drug forces can target the most visible actor and the network will not produce a resilient effect. Hence, dismantling the network through this approach will be successful. Conversely:

> *Hypothesis 2: If drug trafficking organisations present high levels of political corruption, anti-drug policies must target key players that exert an institutional impact on states. Focusing on the most visible key players, instead of the most politically influential, will not allow for the successful disruption of the drug network.*

According to hypothesis 2, anti-crime policies must first determine the levels of political influence of the illicit drug network before deciding on actions of interdiction against top leaders in the network. If the drug network exhibits high levels of political corruption and anti-drug forces target the most visible actor instead of the most politically influential, the network will produce a resilient effect and dismantling the network be unsuccessful.

As discussed above, interdiction of top leaders of drug trafficking organisations (see Section 8.5.2) has been a common approach of anti-drug policies in Colombia and Mexico. In the case of drug trafficking organisations, such as the Colombian and Mexican drug cartels, it is possible that important actors – not necessarily leaders – that played a fundamental role in co-opting the public office of Colombia and Mexico had not been under the spotlight of the authorities. See for example (detailed below), the case of journalist and intermediary for the Cali cartel and various public officials in Colombia, Alberto Giraldo.

### 8.6.2.1 Alberto Giraldo

Alberto Giraldo was a veteran journalist from Antioquia (Colombia) who directed media in Colombia, including the informative spaces of RCN Radio and Todelar during the 60s and 70s. Giraldo held several important positions, including press secretary during the presidential campaign of Belisario Betancur (El País 2014). In 1994, Giraldo became infamous when his telephone conversations revealed his connections with the Cali Cartel boss Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela. In the conversations, they spoke about financing the presidential campaign of Ernesto Samper. That dialogue, which was baptised the 'narco-cassettes', triggered the 8000 Process, the unofficial name of the judicial process undertaken against the Colombian Liberal Party candidate Ernesto Samper's 1994, on charges of financing his presidential campaign with drug trafficking money (Semana 2005). After the scandal, in 1996, Giraldo voluntarily submitted himself to the authorities and was detained for five years and convicted for illicit enrichment. Giraldo confirmed that he served as the cartel's go-between for the campaigns (Wilkinson 1994).

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**Telephonic conversation between Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela and Alberto Giraldo**

- So, how's it going with Samper, man? (one of the brothers, thought to be Miguel Angel, says).

- It's in your hands, (Giraldo responds). Look, the truth is they need 5 billion (pesos), of which they have two. They need three, from you all.

- It's available, (Rodríguez Orejuela says). It's set.

(Later, Giraldo is more explicit):

- The presidency depends on you all (he tells Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela)

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*Note.* Source: Wilkinson (1994)

'*El Loco*', as Giraldo's friends called him, was related to the brothers Gilberto and Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela. In addition to facilitating relationships with Colombian politicians, Giraldo was responsible for paying expenses to public officials and politicians on behalf of companies linked to the Cali Cartel (El País 2014). Despite the fact that Giraldo was only a journalist and was not a top leader of the Cali Cartel, he acted for many years as a broker between the drug cartel and the Colombian political class.

In 2005, Alberto Giraldo conceded an interview to Colombian journalist Juan Carlos Giraldo. After Alberto Giraldo served his sentence in jail, he decided to give detailed information of his role in connecting drug trafficking with the Colombian political class. In his statements (tape recorded – see Appendix 4), Alberto Giraldo recounts how since the late 1970s, Colombian politicians including various elected Presidents used drug money to finance their presidential campaigns. According to Giraldo (2005), presidential candidate Belisario Betancur was facing a tight economic position to run his presidential campaign after being defeated in 1978 by President Turbay. The interview suggests that it was Alberto Giraldo who introduced Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela to Betancur. Giraldo promoted a friendship of several years between Gilberto Rodríguez and Belisario Betancur and declared that the latter received 50 million pesos for the campaign that took the conservative leader to the presidency of Colombia in 1982. Farah (1995) suggests that later Betancur acknowledged meeting the Rodriguez brothers on several occasions but ignored their links to drug trafficking. In specific, Betancur's stated that Rodriguez was introduced to the politician 'as a leading liberal banker, a prominent member of the economic ruling class of the department of El Valle', and clarified that, 'after two interviews, the candidate Betancur never again had direct or indirect contact with Mr. Rodríguez Orejuela or his family members' (García 1995).

Conservative candidate and journalist Álvaro Gómez Hurtado, son of former President of Colombia, Laureano Gómez, ran for president against the liberal candidate Virgilio Barco, who won the presidential elections of Colombia in 1986. According to Giraldo (2005), both Gómez Hurtado and Barco received money from the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers to finance their election campaigns at that moment. For Giraldo (2005), Alberto Giraldo had a personal conversation with Gómez Hurtado while flying to Medellín in the middle of a political tour. According to the interview, the politician accepted 10 million pesos from the Cali cartel to finance his political campaign.

**Personal conversation between Alvaro Gómez Hurtado and Alberto Giraldo according to the journalist Juan Carlos Giraldo**

- Check it out, listen to the thorny process the guy was telling me about. Then I, that had offered myself to offer a contribution to his campaign, on behalf of the Rodríguez brothers, I told him: Dr. Gómez, these gentleman that have always contributed to the political campaigns want to leave in your treasury 10 million pesos, how can I do to forward them to you? And he replied: 'You know that I do not deal with money, and I do not receive it; get in touch with Dr. Hernán Belz who is the manager of the campaign'…

- I gave money to Alvaro Gómez, from the Rodríguez. In the year 86 I gave him 10 million pesos.

*Note.* Source: Giraldo (2005, pp. 104–105)

According to Hypothesis 2, had the Colombian authorities had early access to information about Giraldo's—and other similar actors'—ability to connect the Cali Cartel with the public office (and not because conversations came to light later), more efficient investigations and subsequent anti-drug operations could have measured the institutional impact exerted by the drug cartel on the Colombian government. Anti-drug operations would have limited the capacity of the Cali Cartel to exert so much political influence at that time, also making it less resilient against the Colombian military and law enforcement offensive. However, the political power of the Cali Cartel was enormous. It had the ability to finance a presidential campaign as much as to modify the Colombian constitution of 1991. The DEA compared the Cali Cartel to the Soviet *Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti*, calling it 'one of the most powerful crime syndicates in history' (Rempel 2014, pp. 2782–2783).

# Chapter 9 Conclusion

This chapter will summarise the research in this dissertation, discuss its limitations and debate its contribution to the current understanding of the institutional effect of political–criminal alliances. This chapter begins by reviewing the key points of the research purpose, theoretical framework, methodology and findings. It then outlines the main implications derived from the research. Ultimately, this chapter critically reflects on the practical applications of this research, providing recommendations and stating the limitations.

The main objective of this research was to measure the transnational political influence of illicit networks and to evaluate the capacity of leaders of these networks to exert political influence on states. The institutional impact on states by political–criminal alliances is widely recognised in the literature. Little research has been undertaken to assess and measure the different levels of impact that the illicit confluence of criminal organisations and agents from public office can exert on the public establishment.

To accomplish that, this thesis built on the work of Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2010) and Garay-Salamanca and Salcedo-Albarán (2012, 2015), which relied on a specific set of theoretical concepts of political corruption to measure the institutional effect of political–criminal alliances in Latin American countries such as Colombia, Mexico and Guatemala. In addition, this set of literature used SNA techniques to portray the social relations and actors that configure an illicit organisation able to co-opt public officials and measure its political influence.

The theoretical set of concepts upon which Garay-Salamanca and colleagues (2010, 2012, 2015) based their research was originally proposed by Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2009). This suggested that institutional impacts derived from political–criminal alliances can be measured in terms of three concepts of political corruption: rampant corruption, state capture and co-opted state reconfiguration. Rampant corruption is the simplest form of institutional influence and occurs when public officials extort or accept bribes, usually from private or criminal agents, in an official capacity for personal gain. The second or middle-level form of institutional impact is state capture. State capture is a more sophisticated form of corruption, as it also implies the capacity of external agents to change and reconfigure policies and laws within states. The final and more advanced form of institutional impact is co-opted

state reconfiguration. This level of institutional impact includes the ability of criminals to not only modify regulations at the legislative level of a state but also at the executive and judiciary.

In addition to the extant scholarly contribution of institutional impact of political–criminal alliances, this thesis quantified the capacity of criminal networks to exert political influence at a transnational level. The thesis explored in detail the role of leaders of illicit networks to evaluate whether political corruption processes are always accomplished through the work of the most well-known actors of these illicit networks. To accomplish that, this thesis used the case study research method for an up-close, in-depth and detailed examination of an object of study. This thesis selected the FARC as the case study of this project. The FARC proved to be an ideal case to analyse and measure transnational political influence due to of a variety of reasons such as FARC's dynamic evolution, transnational capacity and network structure.

Officially founded in 1966, FARC has been involved in the Colombian armed conflict since the 1920s. From peasants to self-defence forces, the FARC originally identified as a communist resistant movement. By the end of the 1940s, the constant offensive of the Colombian government on the self-defence forces marked a dynamic transformation of the group into a mobile guerrilla force. By the end of the 1950s, the FARC was influenced by the Cuban revolution and adopted a Marxist–Leninist philosophy. Over time, the FARC has adopted different ideologies such as Bolivarianism and revolutionary socialism. Although the FARC has always claimed a far-left political position that sought to overthrow power in Colombia, the FARC has also been involved in terrorist activities and organised crime including drug trafficking, kidnapping and illegal taxing activities.

With the fall of the Medellín and Cali drug cartels in Colombia and the advent of globalisation, the FARC no longer played a superficial role in drug trafficking and assumed a leadership position. From taxing cartel crops through the funds derived from drug trafficking, the FARC acquired more funds and, as a result, access to more arms, technology and territorial control. The territorial expansion of the FARC was not limited to the Colombian borders but allowed the rebel group the possibility to achieve an extensive global presence led by the late key Colombian rebel Raúl Reyes. Reyes was not only a member of the central high command of the FARC but was also its spokesperson. Also known as 'the chancellor of the mountain', Reyes obtained political support from many countries across five continents.

Beyond the possibility of operating beyond borders and with greater opportunity to obtain social, economic and political power, the FARC evolved its organisational and operational structures. Assuming a less hierarchical structure, the FARC took on a network and protean configuration. The FARC's networking structures became more flexible and adaptable when law enforcement and government aggression came into play.

Because of those qualities of the FARC, this research applied a case study research approach. Specifically, it drew lessons from the FARC's dataset of email correspondence recovered by the military forces of Colombia. The documents were seized by Colombian government officials after a Colombian military operation on 1 March 2008 against a FARC encampment situated inside Ecuador. The documents were extracted from Reyes' laptop. Reyes and several FARC members were killed in the operation. The files informed about the internal functioning of the FARC and revealed several political alliances with various leaders in Latin America, including late President Hugo Chávez and members of the FARC International Commission under the authority of Raúl Reyes.

The correspondence described above revealed several scenarios in which the FARC had the potential to exert different levels of political corruption on various states. Political corruption processes are social processes in which licit and illicit actors relate to each other through different illegitimate agreements. From this, it was possible to determine: 1) a clear picture of a complete illicit network, 2) the structural position and responsibilities of the different actors that comprised the FARC network and 3) the network hierarchy, in which every actor of the illicit network had different levels of social capital relative to others. SNA techniques were applied to measure the transnational institutional impact of the FARC network over various states in Latin America and to describe the behaviour and potential of its leaders in co-opting the public office of these states.

The methodology aimed to obtain a complete network of actors and relationships reflective of political–criminal alliances with the potential to exert political corruption. From the 5830 email communications recorded in the FARC correspondence dating from January 1999 to March 2008, 219 emails were selected that corresponded to the year 2000 (1 January to 31 December). For historical reasons, this was considered the period of time when insurgencies were obtaining the greatest support from neighbouring countries such as Venezuela and Ecuador.

Considering that the total actors that comprised the FARC correspondence in 2000 did not constitute a social entity in which ties and associations pointed to the same goal (i.e., common membership), a process to establish clear boundaries of the FARC network was performed. In this case, the selected option was to work with an ego-network approach. Taking into account that Reyes, as a key leader of the COMINTER, was the creator, controller and storer—with the highest frequency of participation—of the correspondence, the research selected Reyes as the ego of the population. Hence, only the correspondence that drew on Reyes' ego network (i.e., Reyes' sent and received emails and all email communications among his direct subordinates) were selected. In addition, a content analysis from this correspondence was carried out and only correspondence in which the conversations proved illicit arrangements between licit and illicit actors was considered.

Once the FARC's sample was defined, it was recorded on a spreadsheet and produced a 'relational square matrix' that drew on a complete network with clear boundaries of FARC members collaborating with public officials in Latin America (the FARC network). Subsequently, to measure the level of transnational political influence of the FARC network (Objective 1), the research applied the analytical framework of Garay-Salamanca and colleagues (2010, 2012, 2015). This analysis measured institutional impact by identifying, classifying and analysing social relations and actors in the FARC network separately. The results located the FARC network closer to a co-opted state reconfiguration process, indicating high levels of political influence.

Later, to evaluate the capacity of leaders of the FARC network to exert political influence on states (Objective 2), only the specific relationships and actors of the FARC network that participated in the co-opted state reconfiguration processes were selected. This created a new sub-network of actors and relationships that participated in political corruption practices concentrated in different geographical locations (i.e., the SPC network). This research then applied the analytical framework of Gould and Fernandez (1989) to measure the capacity of every key leader of the SPC network to arbitrate essential information and resources that led to high levels of political corruption. The results showed that visible key players of the FARC network were not always responsible for the political influence exerted on other states. Further, the results showed that non-leaders of the FARC network had the capacity to exert political influence on states. Hence, leadership in illicit networks and the capacity to exert political impact on states must be studied independently.

The findings suggest strong implications in the context of governance for the Latin American countries affected by the FARC. This group developed the muscle to manipulate the public office of other countries by misleading public investment decisions and intervening in important sectors such as finance, construction, health, banking, agriculture and housing.

This thesis proposed that, in addition to the implications derived from the capacity of the FARC to exercise significant levels of political influence over the Latin American region, there are further implications. The most serious implication suggests that formulating anti-crime policies that target the leaders of an illicit network, instead of the most politically influential, will not halt the co-opting process of public institutions. As a result, states face a double dilemma: 1) The illicit network continues to receive geographical, financial and operative assistance from other states, allowing the network to reorganise and strengthen its organisational structures. 2) Unattended high levels of institutional impact can lead to serious governance issues.

From this perspective, this thesis presented two theoretical propositions worthy of future research and empirical analysis:

> *Theoretical proposition 1: When illicit networks present low levels of political corruption, anti-crime policies do not have to target the players that exert institutional impact on states. In that case, targeting the most visible key player, instead of the most politically influential, will allow for disrupting the illicit network.*

Conversely:

> *Theoretical proposition 2: When illicit networks present high levels of political corruption, anti-crime policies must target players that exert institutional impact on states. Targeting the most visible key player, instead of the most politically influential, will not allow for disrupting the illicit network.*

Finally, this research suggests that the theoretical propositions submitted here have practical applications for successfully dismantling illicit networks. This thesis explored the applicability of the theoretical propositions described above. The research suggested an ideal scenario for future testing of the abovementioned hypotheses: the political effect of cocaine trafficking in the Americas. Global cocaine trafficking has provided criminal organisations with immense political and economic power. This situation has indicated significant learning challenges to law enforcement, policymakers and scholars.

Cocaine trafficking has risked the governance of Latin American countries such as Colombia and Mexico. In Colombia, the Medellín and Cali cartels exerted enormous pressure on the government to prevent extradition proceedings of Colombian narco-traffickers to the US. The Constituent Assembly of Colombia was formed to draft the Colombian Constitution of 1991, which was significantly influenced by the drug cartels to the point that it decided in favour of prohibiting the extradition of Colombian nationals. Although Pablo Escobar resorted to violent acts, such as terrorist attacks against politicians, public officials and the civilian population, to manipulate public decisions, the leaders of the Cali Cartel, brothers Gilberto and Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela, used their money to make payments to members of the National Constituent Assembly to vote against the inclusion of extradition in the political charter. The power of the Cali Cartel was such that it had the capacity to fund the presidential campaign of candidate Ernesto Samper in 1994.

Scandals involving public figures in cocaine trafficking can grow to a transnational level. Late Panamanian dictator Manuel Antonio Noriega was a partner of Colombian drug traffickers in the 1980s including Pablo Escobar. The latter received permission from the de facto ruler to traffic drugs through Panama. Conversely, the extensive participation of Mexican drug lords in cocaine trafficking is the result of a transnational process that began in Colombia after the collapse of the Colombian drug monopolies. The late 1900s and early 2000s signalled the beginning of an era of the drug trade that would push the Mexican government to the verge of collapse. The boss of the Sinaloa cartel, Joaquín Guzmán Loera, known as *El Chapo*, co-opted a vast number of Mexican public officials, which allowed him to regularly escape the authorities and freely operate his multimillion-dollar drug business.

The transnational capabilities of the Colombian cocaine business did not only affect the institutions of Latin American countries such as Panama and Mexico. The corrupting effects of the cocaine trade neutralised US drug control activities. Both Escobar and Guzmán co-opted and contracted DEA members to carry out successful drug trafficking activities. Although Escobar relied on the cooperation of DEA officials to clear drug trafficking routes to the US where the cocaine was shipped, *El Chapo* benefited from the collaboration of the DEA and Mexican government, which sought to disrupt Sinaloa's rival cartels, prioritising Guzmán's operation and monopolising the Mexican cocaine markets.

The anti-drug policy approach in the Americas targeting cocaine trafficking and abuse has been riddled with holes and miscalculations. The leaders of the region have persistently ignored the transnational nature of the cocaine market. There has been little research on the origins of cocaine trafficking in Chile and how sociopolitical variables induced a change of territory (Colombia), actors and routes in cocaine trafficking. History repeated itself and, with the collapse of the Medellín and Cali cartels in Colombia, the structures of narco-traffic began to adapt and migrate to Mexico, where they regained their strength.

Drug policy experts in Latin America, such as Daniel Mejía and Pascual Restrepo, have identified essential factors that have resulted in the continued failure of domestic and international anti-drug approaches. When evaluating the cost-benefit ratio of aerial spraying of coca crops, the outcomes demonstrate that this is an inefficient strategy that does not consider the environmental impact and adverse effects on the health of the surrounding communities. The results have not been that disappointing when countries such as Colombia have decided to apply interdiction approaches. By concentrating on cocaine production and trafficking instead of eradication, the supply of cocaine has been reduced and the price of cocaine has increased. However, changes in the street price of cocaine has not discouraged consumption. In addition, the enormous profits made by narco-traffickers allowed them to invest in measures to minimise the effects of anti-drug policies on supply.

The limitations stated above add to the low social value and high social costs associated with the current approaches to the war on drugs and have made some Latin American leaders question prohibitionist policies based on the repression of production and interdiction and the criminalisation of consumption. Hence, in 2009, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy declared the current war on drugs a failure. It formulated recommendations and new strategies based on three main pillars: declare drug use a public health issue, reduce consumption through information and prevention actions and continue to focus on repressing organised crime (Gaviria et al. 2009, pp. 11–13).

Although the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy acknowledges the pervasive effect of cocaine trafficking on public institutions in the Americas, it does not propose addressing the problem from the perspective of political corruption. The theoretical propositions derived from the implications of the findings obtained in this thesis were applied to the case of cocaine trafficking in the Americas to produce further recommendations for

scholars and anti-drug specialists. In addition to a strategy of decriminalisation combined with repression of drug trafficking, specialists must first evaluate the capacity of drug cartels to affect state governance. They must develop a clear picture of the criminal network and identify the most visible players. Before deciding on strategies that aim to interdict top leaders or the most visible players, an analysis that applies the theoretical propositions above must be performed.

This research showed that, in the case of the Cali Cartel, veteran journalist Alberto Giraldo was key for connecting the leaders of the Cali Cartel and high-ranking public officials of the presidential campaign of Ernesto Samper. Giraldo was under the radar of the Colombian authorities once compromising conversations between Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela and Alberto Giraldo were publicly disclosed. However, for some time, the Cali Cartel benefited from Giraldo's collaboration and bridging capacity to connect the common interests of corrupt politicians and narco-traffickers. Politically influential actors with low visibility, such as Giraldo, provided the Cali Cartel with the opportunity to operate with impunity. Although the cartel continued to enrich itself, it invested large sums of money in communications technology and acquired a greater capacity to avoid disruption by the authorities.

Further research is recommended to test the validity of these theoretical propositions applied to the case of cocaine trafficking. It was assumed here that the Cali Cartel exerted high levels of institutional impact on the Colombian government considering the historical events that account for the capacity of this group to risk the governance of Colombia. It was interesting to highlight the role of players such as Giraldo who, although not visible or key, exerted high levels of political corruption on the Colombian government.

The research presented here used a case study research approach. As described above, the FARC was selected due to the appropriateness of this illicit group to measure transnational political influence and due to its potential to evaluate the co-opting capacity of its most visible leaders. In addition, variables, such as its long historical trajectory, transnational capacity, network composition and data availability, made it an ideal case for research. As discussed in Chapter 4, the findings derived from this empirical exercise, the theoretical implications and potential application subsequently proposed must be considered with caution.

Before making generalisations about the capacity of other illicit networks to exert political influence through political–criminal alliances, further empirical research is recommended.

Institutional impact must be studied on a case-by-case basis, including at a transnational level, as the potential of every criminal group to co-opt public office may be subject to internal and external variables that have not been addressed in this thesis. Instead, future research must be oriented to continue exploring the complex structures and operative configuration of illicit networks and evaluate their capacity to affect the public institutions of states. It is recommended that researchers continue to work on quantitative approaches to measure institutional impact. This research introduced the theoretical framework of Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán and De León-Beltrán (2009) as a starting point for that understanding. The seriousness and quality of the first applications derived from this framework (i.e., Garay-Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán & De León-Beltrán 2010; Garay-Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán 2012, 2015) provided this thesis with solid foundations to explore the transnational capacity of powerful criminal organisations to become politically involved. This, in addition to the reliability of the data, placed great value on the results obtained here.

Similarly, the findings demonstrate that key leaders of illicit networks are not necessarily responsible for institutional impact. Hence, the specialist must not assume that they are the most politically influential. As such, this thesis has suggested clear implications for the fields of anti-crime and illicit network disruption. The theoretical propositions developed from the results have significant application potential. However, anti-crime specialists and scholars must carefully revise the inferences presented. Future empirical tests are required to verify its potential. Such empirical exercises are encouraged for further theory building and to improve efforts concerning illicit network disruption.

Following the ideas of case study authorities such as Merriam (1998) and Thomas (2011), this research was not interested in representing a wider population. On the contrary, it aimed to discover as much information as possible about the FARC network selected to gain an in-depth understanding of a specific scenario to allow for the continuous research of the institutional impact potential of political–criminal alliances.

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# Appendices

## Appendix 1: The FARC Sample

| E-mail | Sender | Recipient | Type of relation | Political-Criminal Alliances | Political Corruption | Type of Political Corruption |
|--------|--------|-----------|------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|
| I.3 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.3 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Raúl Reyes | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.3 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Liliana López Palacio | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.4 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.4 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Liliana López Palacio | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.4 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.4 | Raúl Reyes | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.4 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.6 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.6 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.12 | Raúl Reyes | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.12 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.12 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.12 | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.13 | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.13 | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino | Miguel Quintero | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.13 | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino | Pompeyo Marquez | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.13 | Miguel Quintero | Secretariat | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.13 | Pompeyo Marquez | Secretariat | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.14 | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.14 | Liliana López Palacio | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.22 | Raúl Reyes | Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.23 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | e-communication | No | No | |

| E-mail | Sender | Recipient | Type of relation | Political-Criminal Alliances | Political Corruption | Type of Political Corruption |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| I.23 | Raúl Reyes | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.23 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.23 | Raúl Reyes | Alias Nohora | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.23 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Alias Nohora | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.30 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.30 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Authority | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.30 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Authority | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.31 | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.39 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.39 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.39 | Raúl Reyes | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.39 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Transference | Yes | No | |
| I.39 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Transference | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.39 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Transference | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.39 | Liliana López Palacio | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Transference | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.43 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.43 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Transference | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.43 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Transference | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.43 | Raúl Reyes | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Authority | Yes | Yes | Bribery |
| I.43 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Authority | Yes | Yes | Bribery |
| I.45 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.45 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.45 | Raúl Reyes | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.45 | Raúl Reyes | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.45 | Raúl Reyes | Military personnel in Venezuela | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |

| E-mail | Sender | Recipient | Type of relation | Political-Criminal Alliances | Political Corruption | Type of Political Corruption |
|--------|--------|-----------|------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|
| I.45 | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | Military personnel in Venezuela | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.45 | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Military personnel in Venezuela | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.45 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Ovidio Salinas Pérez | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.45 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.45 | Liliana López Palacio | Ovidio Salinas Pérez | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.45 | Liliana López Palacio | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.45 | Ovidio Salinas Pérez | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Authority | Yes | No | |
| I.48 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.48 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.48 | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.48 | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.48 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.48 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.57 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.57 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Raúl Reyes | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.59 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.59 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.61 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.63 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.63 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.63 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.68 | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.68 | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.68 | Raúl Reyes | Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.70 | Raúl Reyes | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | e-communication | No | No | |

| E-mail | Sender | Recipient | Type of relation | Political-Criminal Alliances | Political Corruption | Type of Political Corruption |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| I.70 | Raúl Reyes | Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.82 | Raúl Reyes | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.82 | Raúl Reyes | Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.82 | Raúl Reyes | Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.82 | Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías | Raúl Reyes | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.82 | Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.82 | Raúl Reyes | Alí Rodríguez Araque | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.82 | Raúl Reyes | José Vicente Rangel | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.87 | Raúl Reyes | Miguel Quintero | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.87 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.87 | Miguel Quintero | Liliana López Palacio | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.87 | Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías | Liliana López Palacio | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.97 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.97 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.100 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.100 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.103 | Raúl Reyes | Miguel Quintero | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.103 | Ítalo González | Miguel Quintero | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.103 | Miguel Quintero | Liliana López Palacio | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.103 | Miguel Quintero | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.103 | Miguel Quintero | Ítalo González | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.104 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.104 | Ítalo González | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.104 | Ítalo González | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.105 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | e-communication | No | No | |

| E-mail | Sender | Recipient | Type of relation | Political-Criminal Alliances | Political Corruption | Type of Political Corruption |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| I.105 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.108 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.108 | Ítalo González | Eduardo Manuitt Carpio | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.116 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.116 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.118 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.118 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.118 | Raúl Reyes | Miguel Quintero | Authority | Yes | Yes | Bribery |
| I.118 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Miguel Quintero | Authority | Yes | Yes | Bribery |
| I.120 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.120 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.120 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Communication | Yes | No | |
| I.122 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.122 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.122 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Ítalo González | Authority | Yes | No | |
| I.122 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Authority | Yes | No | |
| I.122 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Miguel Quintero | Authority | Yes | No | |
| I.126 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.126 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| I.126 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.126 | Raúl Reyes | General Márquez | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.126 | Raúl Reyes | General Medina | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.126 | Raúl Reyes | Colonel Pulido | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.126 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | General Márquez | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.126 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | General Medina | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |

| E-mail | Sender | Recipient | Type of relation | Political-Criminal Alliances | Political Corruption | Type of Political Corruption |
|--------|--------|-----------|------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| I.126 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Colonel Pulido | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.126 | Liliana López Palacio | General Márquez | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.126 | Liliana López Palacio | General Medina | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.126 | Liliana López Palacio | Colonel Pulido | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.10 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.10 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.10 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | General Villacis | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.10 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | General Moncayo | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.10 | Raúl Reyes | General Villacis | Instrumental | Yes | No | |
| II.10 | Raúl Reyes | General Moncayo | Instrumental | Yes | No | |
| II.10 | Liliana López Palacio | General Villacis | Instrumental | Yes | No | |
| II.10 | Liliana López Palacio | General Moncayo | Instrumental | Yes | No | |
| II.12 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.12 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.12 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Ovidio Salinas Pérez | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.13 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.13 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.24 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.24 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.24 | Raúl Reyes | Francisco Huerta | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.26 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.26 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.26 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Emiro del Carmen Ropero | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.26 | Emiro del Carmen Ropero | Fidel Castro | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.26 | Raúl Reyes | Fidel Castro | Instrumental | Yes | No | |

| E-mail | Sender | Recipient | Type of relation | Political-Criminal Alliances | Political Corruption | Type of Political Corruption |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| II.26 | Emiro del Carmen Ropero | Francisco Huerta | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.26 | Raúl Reyes | Francisco Huerta | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.27 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.39 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.39 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.39 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbua | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.39 | Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbua | Secretariat | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.41 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.41 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.42 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.42 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.42 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Miguel Quintero | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.42 | Liliana López Palacio | Miguel Quintero | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.46 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.46 | liliana López Palacio | Patricio Ortiz James | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.47 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.47 | liliana López Palacio | Maria Augusta Calle | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.51 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.51 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Fredy Heler | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.51 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.51 | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Fredy Heler | Instrumental | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.51 | Jorge Yepez | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.51 | Edgar Ponce | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.51 | Manuel Salgado | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.51 | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Jorge Yepez | Communication | Yes | No | |

| E-mail | Sender | Recipient | Type of relation | Political-Criminal Alliances | Political Corruption | Type of Political Corruption |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| II.51 | Edgar Ponce | Jorge Yepez | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.51 | Manuel Salgado | Jorge Yepez | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.51 | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Edgar Ponce | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.51 | Jorge Yepez | Edgar Ponce | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.51 | Manuel Salgado | Edgar Ponce | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.51 | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Manuel Salgado | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.51 | Jorge Yepez | Manuel Salgado | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.51 | Edgar Ponce | Manuel Salgado | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.52 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.55 | Raúl Reyes | Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.55 | Raúl Reyes | Maria Augusta Calle | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.55 | Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas | Maria Augusta Calle | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.55 | Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas | Eliana González | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.55 | Maria Augusta Calle | Eliana González | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.57 | Raúl Reyes | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.66 | Raúl Reyes | Secretariat | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.78 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.78 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.78 | Raúl Reyes | Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.78 | Heinz Rodolfo Moeller Freile | Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas | Communication | Yes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.83 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.83 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.84 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.84 | Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas | Maria Augusta Calle | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.90 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |

| E-mail | Sender | Recipient | Type of relation | Political-Criminal Alliances | Political Corruption | Type of Political Corruption |
|--------|--------|-----------|------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|
| II.90 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.90 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Arturo Llambay | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.90 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Nubia Calderón Iñiguez de Trujillo | Communication | Yes | No | |
| II.95 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.95 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.97 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.97 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | e-communication | No | No | |
| II.97 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Miguel Quintero | e-communication | No | No | |

*Note.* Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies (2011) – Processed by the researcher.

## Appendix 2: Actors, Relations and Activities that are Evidence of Co-opted State Reconfiguration

| E-mail | Sender | Recipient | Type of relation | Activity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| I.3 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Raúl Reyes | Instrumental | Chacín communicates to Reyes that he is dealing with the situation of FARC prisoners in Venezuela |
| I.4 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Instrumental | Chacín to resolve with Rojas the situation of FARC prisoners in Venezuela |
| I.6 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Communication | Reyes welcomes Chacín to come to Ecuador to sort out the issue of the prisoners and to discuss other aspects of mutual interest |
| I.13 | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino | Miguel Quintero | Communication | Quintero accedes to meet with the Secretariat (to discuss better ways of communication between FARC and Venezuela) |
| I.13 | Jesús Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino | Pompeyo Marquez | Communication | Márquez accedes to meet with the Secretariat |
| I.14 | Liliana López Palacio | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Instrumental | Palacio asks Chacín what to do with a prisoner |
| I.23 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Instrumental | Reyes deals with Chacín about the liberation of prisoners |
| I.30 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Authority | Reyes asks Chacín to issue a visa for Escobar |
| I.30 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Authority | Reyes asks Chacín to issue a visa for Escobar, |
| I.39 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Transference | Chacín is holding some FARC's money. Reyes asks Escobar and Palacio to coordinate a money transfer |
| I.39 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Transference | Escobar and Chacín coordinate a money transfer |
| I.39 | Liliana López Palacio | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Transference | Palacio and Chacín coordinate a money transfer |
| I.43 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Transference | Escobar to receive US247,288 from Chacín and send them to Mexico |
| I.43 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Transference | Escobar to receive US247,288 from Chacín and send them to Mexico |
| I.43 | Raúl Reyes | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Authority | Escobar to issue an identity card for Palomino so he can obtain a new passport |
| I.43 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Authority | Escobar to issue an identity card for Palomino so he can obtain a new passport |
| I.45 | Raúl Reyes | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | Communication | Reyes met with Marín and military personal (not specified) at the Venezuelan borders |
| I.45 | Raúl Reyes | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Communication | Reyes met with Rojas and military personal (not specified) at the Venezuelan borders |
| I.45 | Raúl Reyes | Military personnel in Venezuela | Communication | Reyes met with Rojas and military personal (not specified) at the Venezuelan borders |
| I.45 | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | Military personnel in Venezuela | Communication | Reyes met with Rojas and military personal (not specified) at the Venezuelan borders |
| I.45 | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Military personnel in Venezuela | Communication | Reyes met with Rojas and military personal (not specified) at the Venezuelan borders |
| I.48 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Instrumental | Chacín offered to Reyes transport him by helicopter to Venezuela |

| E-mail | Sender | Recipient | Type of relation | Activity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| I.57 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Raúl Reyes | Instrumental | Chacín asks for help from Reyes in order to identify someone kidnapped by paramilitaries or narcotraffickers |
| I.59 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Instrumental | Reyes replies to Chacín that he is willing to collaborate in finding information about the kidnapped person |
| I.82 | Raúl Reyes | Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías | Communication | Reyes met with Chávez and reports to Marín the outcomes of the meeting |
| I.82 | Raúl Reyes | Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías | Communication | Reyes met with Chávez and reports to Marín the outcomes of the meeting |
| I.82 | Raúl Reyes | Alí Rodríguez Araque | Communication | Reyes also met Araque who was the Ministry of mines and energy, |
| I.82 | Raúl Reyes | José Vicente Rangel | Communication | Reyes also met Rangel, the Foreign Minister who expressed his willing to support FARC |
| I.87 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Instrumental | Reyes asks Quintero to issue a visa for Palacio |
| I.87 | Miguel Quintero | Liliana López Palacio | Instrumental | Reyes asks Quintero to issue a visa for Palacio |
| I.97 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Communication | Escobar met with Chacín to discuss procurement (construction) contracts to be operated by FARC |
| I.103 | Miguel Quintero | Liliana López Palacio | Instrumental | Quintero gave permission to Palacio to conduct an event in Venezuela |
| I.103 | Miguel Quintero | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Instrumental | Quintero gave permission to Escobar to conduct an event in Venezuela |
| I.103 | Miguel Quintero | Ítalo González | Instrumental | Quintero gave permission to González to conduct an event in Venezuela |
| I.104 | Ítalo González | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Communication | González met with Chacín to discuss various aspects of the Venezuela-FARC relationship |
| I.108 | Ítalo González | Eduardo Manuitt Carpio | Communication | Gonzalez had lunch with the governor of the (PPT) in order to discuss public contracts authorised by Chávez |
| I.116 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Communication | Escobar to meet with Chacín to define aspects conversed with Chavez (public contracts) |
| I.118 | Raúl Reyes | Miguel Quintero | Authority | Reyes asks Escobar to meet with Quintero to obtain a visa for a FARC member (unknown) |
| I.118 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Miguel Quintero | Authority | Reyes asks Escobar to meet with Quintero to obtain a visa for a FARC member (unknown) |
| I.126 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Communication | Escobar met with Chacín. The latter suggests that he will be in charge of the Venezuela-FARC relationship |
| I.126 | Raúl Reyes | General Márquez | Instrumental | Chacín asked Escobar through which channels (Reyes, Escobar, Palacio) were able to liaise with some Venezuelan Generals |
| I.126 | Raúl Reyes | General Medina | Instrumental | Chacín asked Escobar through which channels (Reyes, Escobar, Palacio) were able to liaise with some Venezuelan Generals |
| I.126 | Raúl Reyes | Colonel Pulido | Instrumental | Chacín asked Escobar through which channels (Reyes, Escobar, Palacio) were able to liaise with some Venezuelan Generals |
| I.126 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | General Márquez | Instrumental | Chacín asked Escobar through which channels (Reyes, Escobar, Palacio) were able to liaise with some Venezuelan Generals |

| E-mail | Sender | Recipient | Type of relation | Activity |
|--------|--------|-----------|------------------|----------|
| I.126 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | General Medina | Instrumental | Chacín asked Escobar through which channels (Reyes, Escobar, Palacio) were able to liaise with some Venezuelan Generals |
| I.126 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Colonel Pulido | Instrumental | Chacín asked Escobar through which channels (Reyes, Escobar, Palacio) were able to liaise with some Venezuelan Generals |
| I.126 | Liliana López Palacio | General Márquez | Instrumental | Chacín asked Escobar through which channels (Reyes, Escobar, Palacio) were able to liaise with some Venezuelan Generals |
| I.126 | Liliana López Palacio | General Medina | Instrumental | Chacín asked Escobar through which channels (Reyes, Escobar, Palacio) were able to liaise with some Venezuelan Generals |
| I.126 | Liliana López Palacio | Colonel Pulido | Instrumental | Chacín asked Escobar through which channels (Reyes, Escobar, Palacio) were able to liaise with some Venezuelan Generals |
| II.39 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbua | Instrumental | Escobar met with Gutiérrez Borbua to discuss socio political issues of Ecuador including Ecuador-FARC affairs |
| II.47 | liliana López Palacio | Maria Augusta Calle | Instrumental | Palacios and Calle are working together in an information strategy to determine how to overtake power in Colombia |
| II.51 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Fredy Heler | Instrumental | Escobar and Heler worked in an Ecuadorian TV ad for FARC |
| II.51 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Instrumental | Escobar and Palomino worked in an Ecuadorian TV ad for FARC |
| II.51 | Orlay Jurado Palomino | Fredy Heler | Instrumental | Palomino and Heler worked in an Ecuadorian TV ad for FARC |
| II.78 | Heinz Rodolfo Moeller Freile | Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas | Communication | Vargas had access to a statement issued by Freile where the government of Ecuador expresses his wish to meet with FARC |

*Note.* Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies (2011) – Processed by the researcher.

## Appendix 3: The FARC Network 2001-2003 (Excerpt)

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Year 2001** | | | | |
| I.127 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | | |
| I.128 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.128 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.129 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.129 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.132 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.132 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.133 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.133 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.133 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.134 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.135 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.135 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.137 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.137 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.139 | José Juvenal Velandia | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.140 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.142 | Raúl Reyes | José Juvenal Velandia | No | |
| I.143 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | No | |
| I.144 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.145 | Milton de Jesús Toncel Redondo | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.146 | Alias Eliana González | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.147 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.147 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.148 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.150 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.152 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.153 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.155 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.156 | Ítalo González | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.157 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.158 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.159 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.160 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|--------|--------|----------|------------|-----------------|
| I.161 | Ítalo González | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.162 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.163 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.164 | Ítalo González | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.165 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.166 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.166 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.167 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.167 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.168 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.168 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.169 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | No | |
| I.170 | Alba Sepúlveda | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.171 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.172 | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.173 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.174 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.175 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.176 | Ítalo González | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.177 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.177 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.178 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.178 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.179 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.180 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.181 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.182 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.182 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.183 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.183 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.184 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.186 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.186 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.187 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.188 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.188 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.189 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.190 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|--------|--------|----------|------------|-----------------|
| I.191 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.191 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.192 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.193 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.194 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.194 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.195 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.195 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.196 | Raúl Reyes | Luciano Marín Arango | No | |
| I.196 | Raúl Reyes | Noel Mata Mata | No | |
| I.197 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.197 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.198 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.199 | Raúl Reyes | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.200 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.201 | Raúl Reyes | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.202 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.202 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.203 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.204 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.204 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.205 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.205 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.206 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.206 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.207 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Bribery |
| I.207 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Bribery |
| I.208 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.208 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.210 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.210 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.211 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.212 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.212 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.213 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.214 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.214 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.215 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|--------|--------|----------|------------|-----------------|
| I.216 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.217 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.217 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.218 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.218 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.219 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.219 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.220 | Ítalo González | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.221 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.221 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.222 | Liliana López Palacio | Ítalo González | No | |
| I.224 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.224 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.225 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.226 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.226 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.227 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.227 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.228 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.229 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.229 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.230 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.230 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.231 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.231 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.232 | Ítalo González | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.233 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.233 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.235 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.235 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.236 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.236 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.237 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.237 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.238 | Raúl Reyes | Roy Chaderton Matos | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.239 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.239 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.240 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|--------|--------|----------|------------|-----------------|
| I.240 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.241 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.241 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.242 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.242 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.243 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.243 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.244 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.244 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.245 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.245 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.246 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.246 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.247 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.248 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.249 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.250 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.250 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.251 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.251 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.252 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.252 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.253 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.254 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.255 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.256 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.256 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.257 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.258 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.258 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.259 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.260 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.260 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.261 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.262 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.262 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.263 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.263 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| I.264 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.264 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.265 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Ítalo González | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.266 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.267 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.268 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.269 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.269 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.270 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.270 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.271 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.271 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.272 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.273 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.273 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.274 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Bribery |
| I.274 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.275 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.275 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | No | |
| I.276 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.277 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.277 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.278 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.278 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.279 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.280 | Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.281 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.282 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.282 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.283 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.283 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.284 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.284 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.285 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.285 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.286 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.286 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.288 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|--------|--------|----------|------------|-----------------|
| **Year 2002** | | | | |
| I.327 | Raúl Reyes | Luciano Marín Arango | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.327 | Raúl Reyes | Noel Mata Mata | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.328 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.328 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.328 | Raúl Reyes | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.329 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.329 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.330 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.330 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.331 | Luciano Marín Arango | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.331 | Noel Mata Mata | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.332 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.332 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.333 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.333 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.334 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.334 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.335 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.335 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.336 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.336 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.337 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.337 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.338 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.338 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.339 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.339 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.340 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.340 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.341 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.341 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.342 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.342 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.343 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.343 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.344 | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | No | |
| I.345 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|--------|--------|----------|------------|-----------------|
| I.345 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.346 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.346 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.347 | Raúl Reyes | Ramón Rodríguez Chacín | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.349 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.349 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.350 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.350 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.351 | Luciano Marín Arango | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.351 | Noel Mata Mata | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.352 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.352 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.353 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.353 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.354 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.354 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.355 | Raúl Reyes | Luciano Marín Arango | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.355 | Raúl Reyes | Noel Mata Mata | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.356 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.356 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.357 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.357 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.358 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.358 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.359 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.359 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.360 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.360 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.361 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.361 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.362 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.362 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.363 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.364 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.364 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.365 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.366 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.366 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|--------|--------|----------|------------|-----------------|
| I.367 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.367 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.368 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.368 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.369 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.369 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.370 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.370 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.371 | Raúl Reyes | Luciano Marín Arango | No | |
| I.371 | Raúl Reyes | Noel Mata Mata | No | |
| I.372 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.372 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.372 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.373 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Member of the secretariat | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.374 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.374 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.374 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.375 | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.376 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.376 | Raúl Reyes | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.376 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.377 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.377 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.377 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.378 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.378 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.378 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.379 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.379 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.379 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.380 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.380 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.380 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.381 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.381 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.382 | Raúl Reyes | Víctor Suárez Rojas | No | |
| I.383 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.383 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| I.383 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.384 | Alberto Limonta | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.384 | Alberto Limonta | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.384 | Alberto Limonta | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.384 | Alberto Limonta | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.384 | Ítalo González | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.384 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.384 | Ítalo González | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.384 | Ítalo González | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.385 | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Member of the secretariat | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.386 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.387 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | No | |
| I.388 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.388 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.388 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.389 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.389 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.389 | Raúl Reyes | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.390 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.390 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.390 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.391 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.391 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.391 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.392 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.392 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.392 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.392 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.393 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.394 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.395 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.395 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.396 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.396 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.396 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.397 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.397 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.397 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|--------|--------|----------|------------|-----------------|
| I.398 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.398 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.398 | Raúl Reyes | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.399 | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.400 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.400 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.400 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.401 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.401 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.401 | Raúl Reyes | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.402 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.402 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.402 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.402 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.403 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.405 | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Member of the secretariat | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.406 | Luciano Marín Arango | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.406 | Noel Mata Mata | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.407 | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Member of the secretariat | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.408 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.409 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.410 | Raúl Reyes | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.411 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.412 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.412 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.413 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.413 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.414 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.415 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.415 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.415 | Raúl Reyes | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.416 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.417 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.418 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.418 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.418 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.418 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.419 | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Raúl Reyes | No | |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| I.420 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.421 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.421 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.421 | Raúl Reyes | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.422 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.422 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.422 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.423 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.424 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.425 | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.426 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.427 | Raúl Reyes | Víctor Suárez Rojas | No | |
| I.428 | Raúl Reyes | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.429 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.430 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.430 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.430 | Raúl Reyes | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.431 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.431 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.431 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.432 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.432 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.432 | Raúl Reyes | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.433 | Ítalo González | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.434 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.434 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.434 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.435 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.435 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.435 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.436 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.436 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.436 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.437 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.437 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.437 | Raúl Reyes | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.438 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.438 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Liliana López Palacio | No | |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Year 2003** | | | | |
| I.523 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.524 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.526 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | No | |
| I.527 | Luciano Marín Arango | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.527 | Noel Mata Mata | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.528 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.530 | Member of the PCMLE | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.531 | Ovidio Salinas Pérez | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.532 | Raúl Reyes | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | No | |
| I.533 | Ovidio Salinas Pérez | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.533 | Ovidio Salinas Pérez | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.533 | Ovidio Salinas Pérez | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.534 | Luciano Marín Arango | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.534 | Luciano Marín Arango | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.534 | Noel Mata Mata | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.534 | Noel Mata Mata | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.535 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.536 | Ovidio Salinas Pérez | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.536 | Ovidio Salinas Pérez | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.536 | Ovidio Salinas Pérez | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.537 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.537 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.537 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.538 | Raúl Reyes | Argenis Rojas | No | |
| I.539 | Raúl Reyes | Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.540 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.541 | Alberto Limonta | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.542 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.543 | Luciano Marín Arango | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.543 | Noel Mata Mata | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.544 | Alberto Limonta | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.545 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.545 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.546 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.547 | Ovidio Salinas Pérez | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.547 | Alberto Limonta | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.548 | Raúl Reyes | Alberto Limonta | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| I.549 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.550 | Raúl Reyes | Luciano Marín Arango | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.550 | Raúl Reyes | Noel Mata Mata | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.551 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.552 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.553 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.554 | María Augusta Calle | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.555 | Narciso Isa Conde | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.556 | Alberto Limonta | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.558 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.559 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.560 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.561 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.562 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.563 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.564 | Member of the COMINTER in Denmark | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.565 | Raúl Reyes | Member of the COMINTER in Argentina | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.566 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.567 | Alba Sepúlveda | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.567 | Alba Sepúlveda | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.568 | Raúl Reyes | Luciano Marín Arango | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.568 | Raúl Reyes | Noel Mata Mata | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.568 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luciano Marín Arango | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.568 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Noel Mata Mata | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.569 | Alberto Limonta | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.569 | Alberto Limonta | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.570 | Luciano Marín Arango | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.570 | Noel Mata Mata | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.572 | Francisco Cadena Collazos | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.572 | Francisco Cadena Collazos | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.573 | Raúl Reyes | Luciano Marín Arango | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.573 | Raúl Reyes | Noel Mata Mata | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.574 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Alberto Limonta | No | |
| I.575 | Alberto Limonta | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.576 | Raúl Reyes | Liliana López Palacio | No | |
| I.576 | Raúl Reyes | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | No | |
| I.577 | Alberto Limonta | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.577 | Alberto Limonta | Raúl Reyes | No | |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|--------|--------|----------|------------|-----------------|
| I.578 | Luciano Marín Arango | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.578 | Noel Mata Mata | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.579 | Francisco Cadena Collazos | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.580 | Luciano Marín Arango | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.581 | Raúl Reyes | Luciano Marín Arango | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.581 | Raúl Reyes | Noel Mata Mata | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.581 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Luciano Marín Arango | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.581 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Noel Mata Mata | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.582 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.583 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.583 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.583 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.583 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.584 | Luciano Marín Arango | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.584 | Noel Mata Mata | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.586 | Francisco Cadena Collazos | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.587 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Francisco Cadena Collazos | No | |
| I.589 | Francisco Cadena Collazos | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.590 | Luciano Marín Arango | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.591 | Raúl Reyes | Luciano Marín Arango | No | |
| I.591 | Raúl Reyes | Noel Mata Mata | No | |
| I.592 | Luciano Marín Arango | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.592 | Noel Mata Mata | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.593 | Liliany Patricia Obando Villota | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.594 | Luciano Marín Arango | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.595 | Luciano Marín Arango | Member of the secretariat | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.595 | Noel Mata Mata | Member of the secretariat | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.596 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.597 | Alba Sepúlveda | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.597 | Alba Sepúlveda | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.598 | Raúl Reyes | Member of the secretariat | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.599 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.600 | Luciano Marín Arango | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | No | |
| I.602 | Luciano Marín Arango | Member of the secretariat | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.603 | Raúl Reyes | Luciano Marín Arango | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.604 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.605 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.606 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|--------|--------|----------|------------|-----------------|
| I.606 | Liliana López Palacio | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.606 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.606 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.607 | Luciano Marín Arango | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.608 | Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.609 | Luciano Marín Arango | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | No | |
| I.610 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.611 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.612 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.613 | Raúl Reyes | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | No | |
| I.614 | Luciano Marín Arango | Member of the secretariat | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.615 | Raúl Reyes | Luciano Marín Arango | No | |
| I.616 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.617 | Francisco Cadena Collazos | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.618 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.618 | Francisco Cadena Collazos | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.619 | Raúl Reyes | Alberto Limonta | No | |
| I.620 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.621 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.622 | Raúl Reyes | Alberto Limonta | No | |
| I.623 | Luciano Marín Arango | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.624 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.625 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.626 | Raúl Reyes | Alberto Limonta | No | |
| I.627 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.628 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.629 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.630 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.631 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.632 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.633 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.634 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| I.635 | Raúl Reyes | Luciano Marín Arango | No | |
| I.636 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| I.637 | Raúl Reyes | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.638 | Luciano Marín Arango | Member of the secretariat | No | |
| I.639 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| I.640 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |

| E-mail | Sender | Receiver | Corruption | Corruption Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| II.467 | María Augusta Calle | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| II.468 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| II.468 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| II.469 | Raúl Reyes | Víctor Suárez Rojas | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.471 | Raúl Reyes | Carlos Lozano | No | |
| II.472 | Raúl Reyes | Alberto Limonta | No | |
| II.474 | Francisco Javier Prado Nieto | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| II.475 | Alberto Limonta | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.476 | Francisco Javier Prado Nieto | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.477 | María Augusta Calle | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.478 | Raúl Reyes | Francisco Javier Prado Nieto | No | |
| II.479 | Raúl Reyes | Member of the PCMLE | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.480 | Raúl Reyes | Pedro Antonio Marín Marín | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.481 | Raúl Reyes | Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.483 | Francisco Javier Prado Nieto | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.484 | Raúl Reyes | Member of the PCMLE | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.485 | Raúl Reyes | Alba Sepúlveda | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.486 | Francisco Javier Prado Nieto | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| II.487 | Francisco Javier Prado Nieto | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.488 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |
| II.489 | Raúl Reyes | Alba Sepúlveda | No | |
| II.490 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.490 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.490 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.491 | Alba Sepúlveda | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| II.492 | Raúl Reyes | Carlos Lozano | No | |
| II.493 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.495 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.495 | Liliana López Palacio | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.495 | Luis Alberto Albán Urbano | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.497 | Alba Sepúlveda | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| II.499 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.501 | Francisco Javier Prado Nieto | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Yes | Political Administrative Agreement |
| II.502 | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | Raúl Reyes | No | |
| II.503 | Raúl Reyes | Rodrigo Granda Escobar | No | |

*Note.* Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies (2011) – Processed by the researcher.

**Appendix 4: Interview with Alberto Giraldo Lopez by Journalist Juan Carlos Giraldo**

Tape (Side A) – Original.

*Interview and translation removed due to copyright restriction.*

*Interview and translation removed due to copyright restriction.*

*Interview and translation removed due to copyright restriction.*

*Note.* Source: Giraldo (2005) – Transcribed by the researcher.

Tape (Side A) – Translation.

*Interview and translation removed due to copyright restriction.*

*Interview and translation removed due to copyright restriction.*

*Interview and translation removed due to copyright restriction.*

*Note.* Source: Giraldo (2005) - Translated by the researcher.

Tape (Side B) – Original.

*Interview and translation removed due to copyright restriction.*

*Interview and translation removed due to copyright restriction.*

*Note.* Source*:* Giraldo (2005) – Transcribed by the researcher.

Tape (Side B) – Translation.


*Interview and translation removed due to copyright restriction.*

*Interview and translation removed due to copyright restriction.*

*Note.* Source: Giraldo (2005) - Translated by the researcher.

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