

**Democratic Sovereigntist and Revolutionary  
Internationalist Approaches to Foreign Policy:  
Identifying the Two Types of Approaches to  
Foreign Policy Adopted by European Left-wing  
Populist Parties**

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# Summary

This thesis addresses the problem of identifying the different types of foreign policy approaches adopted by European left-wing populist parties. An ideational approach to populism is taken, defining populism as a 'thin' ideology not substantive enough to address a broad set of societal issues. Due to the limited ambition of and scope of populism as a 'thin' ideology it attaches itself to more substantive 'full' ideologies. Although populism is a 'thin' ideology it does possess core concepts. Two of these core concepts are the existence of the 'people' and the 'elite' as two homogenous units of analysis and that there exists an antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite'. Populism is predicated on this antagonistic relationship.

Left-wing populism is a brand of politics that exhibits the central feature of populist 'thin' ideology of the 'people' pitted against the 'elite' in combination with the inclusiveness of left-wing ideological thought. Left-wing populism distinguishes itself from right-wing populism by having an inclusive conception of the people in contrast to right-wing populism's exclusive conception of the 'people'. It separates itself from mainstream centre-left politics through its rejection of neoliberal hegemony in its attempt to protect the social democratic 'heartland' that mainstream centre-left politics has abandoned.

The foreign policy approaches of six European left-wing populist parties are analysed in this thesis. They are differentiated and placed in a typology based on how close they resemble an ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered by this thesis. The ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered by this thesis is an approach to foreign policy predicated on a populist conception of an antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite' in combination with the inclusivity of left-wing ideological thought. These two core components are the exhibition of the first two core concepts of populist 'thin' ideology combined with 'full' left-wing ideological thought based on the dimensions of inclusivity.

Two types of foreign policy approaches adopted by European left-wing populist parties are identified. These two types are the democratic sovereigntist and revolutionary internationalist approaches. The main distinguishing differences between these two types of foreign policy approaches are the exhibition of core concepts of 'thin' populist ideology and the advocacy of national sovereignty. The democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy exhibits both core components of the ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy in that it exhibits both a populist conception of an antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite' and the inclusiveness of 'full' left-wing ideological

thought. The revolutionary internationalist approach to foreign policy only exhibits the second core component of the ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy, that being the inclusiveness of 'full' left-wing ideological thought. The democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy also advocates for national sovereignty in order to protect social democracy from global neoliberalism and correlates its populism with the advocacy of national sovereignty. National sovereignty has no role in the revolutionary internationalist approach to foreign policy.

## Declaration

I certify that this thesis:

1. does not incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university
2. and the research within will not be submitted for any other future degree or diploma without the permission of Flinders University; and
3. to the best of my knowledge and belief, does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.”

Matthew Armstrong

4<sup>th</sup> November 2022



# Introduction

When identifying the foreign policy approaches adopted by European populist parties Chrysogelos<sup>1</sup> classifies the foreign policy approaches of European left-wing populist parties under a singular type – anti-imperialist internationalist. This thesis investigates Chrysogelos' claim and argues that the foreign policy approaches of European left-wing populist parties can, however, be classified into two types – democratic sovereigntist and revolutionary internationalist. As such the hypothesis of this thesis is,

*'European left-wing populist parties adopt different approaches to foreign policy.'*

Since the mid-2010s there has been a rise of populism in Europe as in much of the liberal democratic world, with populist sentiment entering the realm of international relations. This has been the case for both right-wing and left-wing populism. Despite the extensive research on populism the foreign policy approaches of populist parties are a neglected area of scholarship. As such, there is much generalisation when discussing the topic. This thesis will address the topic of the distinctive foreign policy approaches European left-wing populist parties adopt. In order to do this, this thesis aims to address a major research question. The research question of this thesis is,

*'What are the types of foreign policy approaches adopted by European left-wing populist parties?'*

It is hoped that by addressing this question the research of this thesis will contribute towards the understanding of the foreign policy approaches adopted by European left-wing populist parties. The rationale behind the research of this thesis is that European populist political actors are now entering into government or are holding the balance of power in national legislatures. The success of the Brothers of Italy in the 2022 Italian general election and the Sweden Democrats in the 2022 Swedish general election are the two most recent examples at the time of the writing of this thesis. As a result, populist political actors are having more influence over major policy areas. One of these major policy areas is foreign policy. In order to effectively evaluate the implications of populist political actors influencing foreign policy, it is important to understand the types of approaches to foreign policy they adopt. Research on the foreign policy approaches of populist political actors is more oriented towards right-wing populist actors than left-wing populist actors. This is due to right-

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<sup>1</sup> A. Chrysogelos, *Is There a Populist Foreign Policy?*, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2021), 5.

wing populist actors having more electoral success than left-wing populist actors, therefore having more influence over foreign policy. Despite this fact, left-wing populist actors have entered government and as such influence foreign policy. The two most prominent examples have been that of SYRIZA in Greece as a major governing coalition partner between 2015 and 2019 and Podemos in Spain as a junior governing coalition partner since 2019. Their success may be replicated by other European left-wing populist parties.

In order to address the main research question of this thesis there are two sub-questions that need to be addressed. The first sub-question is,

*'What political parties are representative of European left-wing populist parties?'*

Addressing this sub-question requires identifying European left-wing populist parties that have met several criteria to be confidently referred to as representative of European left-wing populist parties. The second sub-question is,

*'What are the foreign policy approaches of European left-wing populist parties?'*

To address this question requires working out the best way to examine the foreign policies of the selected European left-wing populist parties and then examining them. These two sub-questions must be addressed before the thesis can address its main research question.

Chapter one explores the concepts of populism, left-wing populism, and populist approaches to foreign policy. The aim of the chapter is to lay out the conceptual background for this thesis. The chapter does this by reviewing key literature covering these topics. Firstly, the chapter explores important works in defining populism and makes the case for the ideational approach to populism, defining it as a 'thin' ideology that attaches itself to more 'full' ideologies. Secondly, the chapter explores the literature that defines left-wing populism, what distinguishes it from right-wing populism, and what distinguishes it from other forms of left-wing politics such as mainstream centre-leftism and Marxism. Thirdly, the chapter discusses populist approaches to foreign policy, the difference between the approaches to foreign policy taken by left-wing and right-wing populist actors, and the types of foreign policy approaches that have been identified among European populist parties by Chryssogelos. It is in the first chapter that the thesis identifies the research gap that exists in the literature on the approaches to foreign policy taken by European populist parties and explains how the research of this thesis fills this gap.



Chapter two discusses the choice of the six European left-wing populist parties whose foreign policies will be analysed by this thesis, engages in a quantitative and qualitative analysis of their foreign policy approaches, followed by a comparative analysis of their foreign policy approaches. The aim is to demonstrate that the six parties selected are a representative sample of European left-wing populist parties, that the foreign policy approaches examined are representative of the six selected parties' foreign policy agendas, and to determine the distinguishable differences among the foreign policy approaches of the selected parties. Firstly, the chapter begins by laying out the criteria that this thesis has set that the parties selected for this thesis have met in order to be considered a representative sample of European left-wing populist parties. The parties selected are SYRIZA, Podemos, La France Insoumise (FI), Die Linke, Socialistische Partij (SP), and Levica. Secondly, the chapter analyses the foreign policy approaches of these parties. This analysis involves a two-step process. The first step involves a quantitative analysis of the scores for the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) external relations codes for the selected election manifestos of the six selected parties. MARPOR is a project financed by the German Science Foundation (DFG) and is part of the Manifesto Project Database (MPD), a project that conducts quantitative content analysis of the electoral programs of political parties. The quantitative analysis of the MARPOR scores involves working out the average score for each MARPOR external relations code across all the selected national election manifestos of a party and then representing these averages in a bar graph. This is to show the foreign policy priorities of each party and where the qualitative analysis should be concentrated. The second step involves a qualitative reading of the sections of the selected election manifestos that have been coded by MARPOR as external relations, with a particular focus on sections coming under the three most prominent external relations codes. This is to offer a more detailed understanding of these coded sections beyond MARPOR's explanation of the codes in its code category scheme. This mix-method approach enables a broad understanding of the foreign policy approaches of the selected parties. Thirdly, the chapter conducts a comparative analysis of the foreign policy approaches of the six selected parties. The comparative analysis highlights the distinguishable differences among the foreign policy approaches of the parties so that they may be typologised in chapter three.

Chapter three lays out an ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy, and identifies two distinctive types of foreign policy approaches among the six selected parties. The aim of the chapter is to develop a typology of the foreign policy approaches of European left-wing populist parties and hence fill the gap in the research on the foreign policy approaches of European left-wing populist parties. This is important as the typology

Chryssogelos lays out of the foreign policy approaches of European populist parties omits the presence of populism in their foreign policies and hence misses an important distinguishing feature of the foreign policy approaches of European lefty-wing populist parties. Firstly, the chapter lays out an ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy based on the findings of the research that is reviewed in chapter one of what defines left-wing populism. Secondly, the chapter then places these parties in a typology of two distinctive types of foreign policy approaches these parties adopt along with a discussion on these types of foreign policy approaches. It is in chapter three that the main research question of this thesis is addressed, that democratic sovereigntist and revolutionary internationalist approaches to foreign are identified as the distinctive types of foreign policy approaches adopted by European left-wing populist parties. The thesis then ends with a conclusion summarising its key findings, its contributions to the research on the foreign policy approaches of European left-wing populist parties, and recommendations for further research.

# Methodology and Data

## *Methodology*

The type of analysis this thesis conducts is a comparative case studies analysis. This is a research approach that formulates or assesses generalisations that extend across multiple cases.<sup>2</sup> The goal of a comparative case studies approach is to identify similarities, disparities, or patterns across several cases.<sup>3</sup> Regarding this thesis, this entails identifying the disparities among the foreign policy approaches of six selected European left-wing populist parties concerning how closely they come to resembling an ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy that is offered by this thesis. A major strength of comparative methods is that they are a suitable approach to testing hypotheses.<sup>4</sup>

There are, however, two major weaknesses to the comparative case study approach. The first is the risk of selection bias. The second is comparing things that cannot really be compared i.e., comparing oranges with apples.<sup>5</sup> To overcome these drawbacks a mixed-methods analysis will be taken in this thesis. This involves both how the parties are selected and how their foreign policy approaches are analysed. The European left-wing populist parties whose foreign policy approaches are to be examined must meet several selection criteria relying on quantitative and qualitative data to make sure the parties selected are based on an objective procedure and are comparable. The foreign policy approaches of the six selected parties undergo both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of their national election manifestos to ensure that sections of their selected election manifestos have not been cherry picked and are comparable in the sense that they are the foreign policy priorities of the parties.

The mixed-methods approach of research design is one that combines more than one methodological approach within the same study.<sup>6</sup> Combining quantitative analysis with qualitative analysis is in line with Tashakkori and Creswell's broad definition of the mixed-methods approach as,

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<sup>2</sup> C. G. Knight, 'Human-Environment Relationship: Comparative Case Studies', in N. J. Smelser & P. B. Baltes, eds., *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), 7039.

<sup>3</sup> S. Campbell, 'Comparative Case Study', in A. J., Mills, G. Durepos & E. Wiebe, eds., *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2010), 175.

<sup>4</sup> C. Ruffa, 'Case Study Methods: Case Selection and Case Analysis', in L. Curini & R. Franzese, eds., *The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2020), 1144.

<sup>5</sup> Ruffa, 'Case Study Methods: Case Selection and Case Analysis', 1144.

<sup>6</sup> I. Harbers & M. C. Ingram, 'Mixed-Methods Designs', in L. Curini & R. Franzese, eds., *The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2020), 1118.

research in which the investigator collects and analyses data, integrates the findings, and draws inferences using both qualitative and quantitative approaches or methods in a single study or a program of inquiry.<sup>7</sup>

The type of mixed methods approach that is used in the analysis of the foreign policy approaches of the six selected parties is the sequencing method. The sequencing method refers to the temporal ordering of the methods i.e., starting with one method first and then complementing it with the other.<sup>8</sup> The quantitative analysis precedes the qualitative analysis in both the selection of the parties and the reading of their foreign policies.

In the selection of the parties, quantitative analysis of Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data is used to determine the ideological positioning and salience of anti-establishment/anti-elite rhetoric of the selected parties. CHES estimate party positioning on ideology and policy issues for national parties in countries across the world and the research behind it was conducted by 421 political scientists specializing in political parties and European integration. The CHES website is used to look at party scores of the selected parties on their ideological positioning and salience of anti-establishment/anti-elite rhetoric. According to the 2019 CHES codebook the scores relating to the ideological positioning of the parties are based on a left-right scale where 0 = extreme left, 5 = centre, and 10 = extreme right.<sup>9</sup> The scores relating to the salience of anti-establishment/anti-elite rhetoric are based on a scale where 0 = rhetoric is not at all important and 10 = rhetoric is extremely important.<sup>10</sup> These scores are displayed in bar graphs along with the scores of a mainstream European centre-left party for comparison. This quantitative analysis is then followed by a qualitative analysis of academic literature on the foreign policies of the selected parties. The aim of this sequencing method is to confidently claim these parties as left-wing populist.

In the analysis of the foreign policy approaches of the six selected European left-wing populist parties, a quantitative analysis of the scores of the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) external relations codes for the selected national election manifestos of each party is conducted before a qualitative analysis of those coded sections. The scores are the relative share of each MARPOR external relations code in relation to all coded statements in a particular election manifesto. For example, if a code has a score of

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<sup>7</sup> A. Tashakkori & J. W. Creswell, 'The New Era of Mixed Methods', *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 1/1 (2007), 4.

<sup>8</sup> Harbers & Ingram, 'Mixed-Methods Designs', 1124.

<sup>9</sup> Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 'Codebook: 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey', *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* (May 2020), 14, [https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5975c9bfdb29d6a05c65209b/t/5fa04ec05d3c8218b7c91450/1604341440585/2019\\_CHES\\_codebook.pdf](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5975c9bfdb29d6a05c65209b/t/5fa04ec05d3c8218b7c91450/1604341440585/2019_CHES_codebook.pdf), accessed 16 June 2022.

<sup>10</sup> Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 'Codebook', 19.

1.0 it means that the code comprises one percent of all coded sentences of the selected election manifesto. The Manifesto Project Data Dashboard on the Manifesto Project Data website is used to look at the score of a particular external relations code given for a particular national election manifesto of a party. The average score of an external relations code across all selected national election manifestos of a party is then worked out. These score averages are displayed in bar graphs and are aimed at revealing the foreign policy priorities of each party and where most of the qualitative analysis of the coded sections of a national election manifesto should be concentrated. In relation to the qualitative analysis of the six selected parties' foreign policies the MARPOR search engine is used to identify the sections in a party's national election manifesto that have been coded by MARPOR under one of ten external relations codes. Each of the external relations codes have been classified by MARPOR as coming under a particular foreign policy theme. For example, internationalism or anti-imperialism. These coded sections are then read and analysed with a particular focus on the top three most prominent codes based on averages across a party's selected national election manifestos. The aim is to give a more in-depth understanding of what is said in these coded sections beyond MARPOR's explanation of these codes in its code category scheme.

The mixed-methods approach has been chosen for this thesis as it allows for the harnessing of the strengths while reducing the weaknesses of both qualitative and quantitative approaches in a single study.<sup>11</sup> The quantitative analysis based on the CHES numerical data allows for a more systemic selection of which European left-wing populist parties to select for analysis than a qualitative analysis would. The qualitative reading of academic research identifying the selected parties as left-wing populist allows for a more nuanced understanding of how they are left-wing populist beyond the CHES numerical data. It is the same situation for the analysis of the selected parties' foreign policies. The quantitative analysis of the MARPOR numerical data allows for a more systemic identification of which sections of the various parties' election manifestos represent their foreign policy priorities than a qualitative analysis would, while a qualitative analysis of these coded sections allows for a more nuanced understanding of the selected parties' foreign policy priorities beyond the MARPOR numerical data. Despite the benefit of the mixed-methods approach there is a significant drawback. If problems arise in one phase of analysis then they may carry over into the other phase of analysis, undermining the whole purpose of using a mixed-methods approach.<sup>12</sup> This is why the sequencing model of mixed-

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<sup>11</sup> R. B. Johnson & A. J. Onwuegbuzie, 'Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come', *Educational Researcher*, 33/7 (2004), 14-15.

<sup>12</sup> Harbers & Ingram, 'Mixed-Methods Designs', 1119.

methods has been chosen with the quantitative analysis going first as it limits cherry-picking and enhances the claims of representativeness due to the transparency and replicability of the procedure.<sup>13</sup> The quantitative phase precedes the qualitative phase due to it being based on the work of professional surveyors and coders, minimising the risk of a biased selection of which parties to choose and which section of their national election manifestos to analyse as representative of their foreign policy approach and in particular which sections represent their foreign policy priorities.

In order to distinguish the types of foreign policies adopted by European left-wing populist parties the thesis will be constructing a typology. A typology is a set of categories or types.<sup>14</sup> It is used to allocate cases based on relevant distinguishing characteristics in order to enhance explanation by allowing the comparison of similar cases.<sup>15</sup> As such this thesis classifies the foreign policy approaches of the six selected European left-wing populist parties based on their relevant distinguishing characteristics. The relevant distinguishing characteristics of the foreign policy approaches of the six selected European left-wing populist parties will be based on how close they come to replicating an ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy that is offered by this thesis. This draws on Weber's concept of the ideal type. The ideal type is used to measure the degree that specific cases diverge from it.<sup>16</sup> This thesis is using an ideal type as it reduces a typology down from potentially vast amounts of types to single types for comparative purposes by comparing all empirical cases with a single ideal type, allowing the researcher to merely identify each individual case, measure the degree that it departs from the ideal type, and specify its place in the typology.<sup>17</sup> The benefits of typologies are that they act as a descriptive tool that allows for the provision of a comprehensive assortment of types which in turn allows a researcher to quickly find out how a particular type rates on a particular dimension and which types are contiguous to a particular type.<sup>18</sup> That being said typologies have been criticised for being too descriptive and lacking in explanatory and predictive value in comparison to other techniques such as a multiple regression.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> C. Elman, J. Gerring, & J. Mahoney, 'Case Study Research: Putting the Quant into the Qual', *Sociological Methods & Research*, 45/3 (2016), 383.

<sup>14</sup> E. Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research* (12<sup>th</sup> edn, Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage, 2010), 184.

<sup>15</sup> P. Shaffer, 'Typology Construction for Comparative Country Case Study Analysis of Patterns of Growth', *Research Gate* (2 Sept. 2020), 4, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344045337>, accessed 19 Aug. 2022.

<sup>16</sup> K. D. Bailey, 'Typology Construction, Methods and Issues', in K. Kempf-Leonard, ed., *Encyclopedia of Social Measurement* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 2005), 891.

<sup>17</sup> Bailey, 'Typology Construction, Methods and Issues', 891.

<sup>18</sup> K. D. Bailey, *Typologies and Taxonomies: An Introduction to Classification Techniques* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications Inc., 1994), 24.

<sup>19</sup> Bailey, 'Typology Construction, Methods and Issues', 897.

## Data

The data used in this thesis comprises both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are in the form of the programmatic documents of the selected parties for national elections in their respective countries. These programmatic documents are sourced from the Manifesto Project Database (MPD) website. The two most recent coded national election manifestos for each party available from MARPOR are selected. These documents are SYRIZA's January 2015 and September 2015 Greek legislative election manifestos,<sup>20</sup> Podemos' 2015 and April 2019 Spanish general election manifestos,<sup>21</sup> FI's 2017 French presidential election manifesto, Die Linke's 2017 and 2021 German federal election manifestos, the SP's 2012 and 2017 Dutch general election manifestos, and Levica's 2018 Slovenian parliamentary election manifesto. In the case of La France Insoumise and Levica only one of each party's national election manifestos is selected for analysis as only one from each party has been coded by MARPOR due to these parties being recently established. This thesis is focussing on the national electoral programmes of the selected parties as they allow for reliable comparative analysis due to their formality as policy preference documents.<sup>22</sup> The election manifestos were selected through the Manifesto Project Database search engine using a time frame of 2012-22, the countries the case studies are based in, and the party names of the case studies.

Secondary sources that involve quantitative analysis are derived from CHES data and MARPOR data available on the CHES and MPD websites. Those secondary sources that involve qualitative analysis are derived from academic research on populism, left-wing populism, and populist approaches to foreign policy in the form of peer reviewed academic journal articles and other scholarly publications. These sources are sourced from the Flinders University Library database. The peer reviewed academic journal articles and other scholarly publications are selected based on their relevance concerning the topics of populism, left-wing populism, populist approaches to foreign policy, and European left-wing

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<sup>20</sup> Although there was a national election in Greece in 2019 MARPOR has not coded SYRIZA's manifesto for this election. This may be because SYRIZA's 2019 Greek legislative election manifesto consists of a pamphlet. The omission of this document has no bearing on the research conducted in this thesis as the pamphlet contained no information on SYRIZA's foreign policy. This suggests that the foreign policy platform SYRIZA ran on in the 2019 Greek legislative election is the same as the foreign policy platform the party ran on in the previous Greek legislative election i.e., the foreign policy platform of the September 2015 Greek legislative elections.

<sup>21</sup> Podemos' 2015 and April 2019 Spanish general election manifestos have been selected as the party ran on the same platform in the 2016 Spanish general election as their 2015 Spanish general election platform and ran on the same platform in the November 2019 Spanish general election as their April 2019 Spanish general election platform. This was due to the 2015 and 2016 Spanish general elections and the April 2019 and November 2019 Spanish general elections being held so close together.

<sup>22</sup> N. Font, P. Graziano & M. Tsakatika, 'Varieties of Inclusionary Populism: Syriza, Podemos, and the Five Star Movement', *Government and Opposition*, 56/1 (2021), 167.

populist parties by first finding them through key search words and then reading their abstracts, introductions, and conclusions. The academic material was then analysed to evaluate its relevance to the thesis topic and if it was, then the findings were included in the research of this thesis.



# Chapter One: Literature Review

## *Introduction*

Ionescu and Gellner point out the slipperiness of populism as a concept,

As a doctrine or a movement, it is elusive and protean. It bobs up everywhere, but in many and contradictory shapes.<sup>23</sup>

This chapter lays out the conceptual background for this thesis by reviewing the literature on populism, left-wing populism, and populist approaches to foreign policy.

Firstly, the chapter makes the case for taking a singular approach to populism when discussing the concept in order to avoid confusing it with other related concepts. It discusses populism as a 'thin' ideology that attaches itself to more substantial 'full' ideologies. A case is made for the ideational approach to populism with a brief comparative analysis between the ideational approach and its two main rival approaches to populism, the political-strategic and the socio-cultural approaches. The four core concepts of populist 'thin' ideology are identified with an emphasis on conceiving the 'people' and the 'elite' as two units of analysis engaged in an antagonistic relationship. Populism is defined as a 'thin' ideology with an emphasis on the 'people' vs 'elite' dichotomy so that populist conceptual approaches can be identified in the foreign policy approaches of the selected European left-wing populist parties.

Secondly, the chapter gives a definition of left-wing populism as an approach to politics that combines populist 'thin' ideology to 'full' left-wing ideological political thought. It explains what separates left-wing populism from right wing populism based on the inclusive dyadic nature of left-wing populism and the exclusive triadic nature of right-wing populism. An explanation is also given on how left-wing populism differs from mainstream centre-left politics due to left-wing populism's rejection of neoliberal hegemony and how left-wing populism differs from Marxism due to the elitist nature of Marxist organisational doctrine and left-wing populism's post-class politics. The core characteristics of left-wing populism are highlighted so that it can form the basis of an ideal left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered latter on in the thesis.

Thirdly, the chapter explores how populist 'thin' ideology and the 'full' ideologies of populist actors act as determining factors in their foreign policy approaches. It explores the

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<sup>23</sup> G. Ionescu & E. Gellner, 'Introduction', in G. Ionescu and E. Gellner, eds., *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 1.

difference between left-wing populist approaches to foreign policy and right-wing populist approaches to foreign policy relating to the advocacy of national sovereignty. The work of Chrysosgelos identifying three types of approaches to foreign policy taken by European populist parties is looked at. The gap in Chrysosgelos' research is highlighted and an explanation is given of how the research of this thesis builds on and fills in the gap of Chrysosgelos' work by constructing a typology of the approaches to foreign policy adopted by European left-wing populist parties based on the exhibition of 'thin' populist ideological concepts. This is to illustrate the research that the thesis seeks to build on the and the research gap it intends to fill.

### *Defining Populism*

Canovan identifies exaltation of and appeals to the 'people' and anti-elitism as two universal elements of populism.<sup>24</sup> Although the identification of these two universal elements by Canovan does not form a solid enough base in which to define populism, it acts as a starting point for identifying and defining the concept. This is the starting point that this thesis takes in defining populism. Taggart argues that the 'people' are a construction of the populist imagination based on an idealised conception of the community they claim to represent.<sup>25</sup> According to Taggart populism identifies itself with this idealised version of the 'people' and an equally idealised world that embodies the 'people' which Taggart terms the 'heartland'.<sup>26</sup> Taggart's concept of the 'heartland' helps situate a place that a populist actor conceives of the people belonging to, a place to preserve and defend. The concept of 'the heartland' is being used by this thesis to identify the socio-economic homeland that left-wing populism considers the 'people' to belong to and that it seeks to preserve and protect in foreign policy.

Confusing populism with other related concepts is a common mistake among a lot of the research on the topic.<sup>27</sup> Populism is used as a buzzword and is often poorly defined and used incorrectly.<sup>28</sup> For example, the demotic politics of mainstream parties is often confused with populism.<sup>29</sup> Although defining populism is challenging, it has not prevented numerous

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<sup>24</sup> M. Canovan, *Populism*, (London: Junction Books, 1981), 294.

<sup>25</sup> P. Taggart, 'Populism and Representative Politics in Contemporary Europe', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9/3 (2004), 274.

<sup>26</sup> P. Taggart, *Populism*, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 3.

<sup>27</sup> M. Rooduijn, 'State of the Field: How to Study Populism and Adjacent Topics?: A Plea for Both More and Less Focus', *European Journal of Political Research*, 58/1 (2019), 365.

<sup>28</sup> C. Mudde & C. Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda', *Comparative Political Studies*, 51/13 (2018), 1668.

<sup>29</sup> L. March, 'Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 19/2 (2017), 292.

definitions being put forward by various scholars. Jansen defines populism as a movement of marginalised social sectors,<sup>30</sup> whereas according to Jagers and Walgrave populism is a style of political communication that makes references to the 'people'.<sup>31</sup> Hawkins defines populism as a Manichean discourse that associates good with the will of the 'people' and evil with a conspiratorial 'elite',<sup>32</sup> while Weyland defines populism as a political strategy utilised by personalistic political actors seeking or exercising governmental power.<sup>33</sup> Some even define populism as a form of political culture, such as Urbinati who argues that populism is a particular interpretation of democracy grounded in republican perspectives of government and politics.<sup>34</sup> With such a plethora of definitions it is tempting to take a pluralistic approach to populism. However, it is important to be precise, distinctive, and consistent when discussing populism in order to avoid confusing it with other related concepts.<sup>35</sup> This is important as mistaking populism for related concepts leads to confusion about what populism is and increases the likelihood of drawing invalid conclusions concerning it.<sup>36</sup>

Mudde offers a definition of populism that is now the most popular and widely used definition among scholars engaging in comparative analysis.<sup>37</sup> Mudde defines populism as,

an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people.<sup>38</sup>

Mudde's definition of populism as an ideology is the definition of populism that will be used throughout this thesis. By defining populism as an ideology Mudde takes an ideational approach to analysing and discussing the concept. As already highlighted in this chapter there are many different approaches to analysing and discussing populism, yet the ideational approach has traditionally played a large part in the study of the topic. As Laclau points out,

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<sup>30</sup> R. S., Jansen, 'Populist Mobilization: A New Theoretical Approach to Populism', *Sociological Theory*, 29/2 (2011), 82.

<sup>31</sup> J. Jagers & S. Walgrave, 'Populism as Political Communication Style: An Empirical Study of Political Parties' Discourse in Belgium', *European Journal of Political Research*, 46/3 (2007), 322.

<sup>32</sup> K. A. Hawkins, 'Is Chavez Populist?: Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective', *Comparative Political Studies*, 42/8 (2009), 1042.

<sup>33</sup> K. Weyland, 'Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics', *Comparative Politics*, 34/1 (2001), 14.

<sup>34</sup> N. Urbinati, 'The Populist Phenomenon', *Raisons Politiques*, 51/3 (2013), 142.

<sup>35</sup> Rooduijn, 'State of the Field', 369.

<sup>36</sup> Rooduijn, 'State of the Field', 369.

<sup>37</sup> G. Katsambekis & A. Kioupkiolis, 'Introduction: The Populist Radical Left in Europe' in G. Katsambekis & A. Kioupkiolis, eds., *The Populist Radical Left in Europe* (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2019), 10.

<sup>38</sup> C. Mudde, 'The Populist Zeitgeist', *Government and Opposition*, 39/4 (2004), 543.

We can single out four basic approaches to an interpretation of populism. Three of them consider it simultaneously as a movement and as an ideology. A fourth reduces it to a purely ideological phenomenon.<sup>39</sup>

This thesis adopts an ideational approach to populism as it is best suited for comparative research using either quantitative or qualitative methods.<sup>40</sup> As this thesis will be conducting a comparative analysis of the foreign policies of European left-wing populist parties using a mixed-method approach of both quantitative and qualitative methods the ideational approach is the most suitable approach. Ideational approaches are growing more popular among scholars engaging in comparative analysis and most scholars engaging in research on European populism are explicitly or implicitly employing ideational approaches.<sup>41</sup> Even scholars using non-ideational approaches in their research admit that the ideational approach is most suited to examining political parties in the European context.<sup>42</sup>

The ideational approach to populism does of course have its detractors, particularly among the proponents of its two main rival approaches – the political-strategic and the socio-cultural approaches. As mentioned earlier the political-strategic approach sees populism as a political strategy, while the socio-cultural approach sees populism as a political style. According to Weyland charismatic leaders strategically apply populism in order to appeal for direct, unmediated, and noninstitutionalised support from large unorganised followings in an attempt to gain or exercise governmental power.<sup>43</sup> Weyland criticises the ideational approach for ignoring the role of top-down leadership, which he claims to be the essence of populism.<sup>44</sup> A problem with this argument is that it places an overemphasis on individualistic leadership that is more the product of the presidential systems of the Americas and ignores variants of populism that don't rely on charismatic figures.<sup>45</sup> Ostiguy argues that populism flaunts a crude and unsophisticated 'low' style of politics in opposition to a more refined and sophisticated 'high' style of politics.<sup>46</sup> Ostiguy

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<sup>39</sup> E. Laclau, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, and Populism* (London: NLB, 1977), 144.

<sup>40</sup> Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective', 1668.

<sup>41</sup> C. Mudde, 'Populism: An Ideational Approach', in C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al., eds., *The Oxford Handbook on Populism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 28.

<sup>42</sup> B. Moffitt, 'Populism in Australia and New Zealand', in C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al., eds., *The Oxford Handbook on Populism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 122.

<sup>43</sup> Weyland, 'Clarifying a Contested Concept', 14.

<sup>44</sup> K. Weyland, 'Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach', in C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al., eds., *The Oxford Handbook on Populism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 53.

<sup>45</sup> Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective', 1672.

<sup>46</sup> P. Ostiguy, 'Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach', in C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al., eds., *The Oxford Handbook on Populism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 73.

criticises the ideational approach for neglecting the socio-cultural dimension of the political relationship between articulate 'high' and crude 'low' politics.<sup>47</sup> This argument ignores populist actors that don't display crude mannerisms and instead display articulate mannerisms such as Pim Fortuyn and Pablo Iglesias.<sup>48</sup> One of the problems with seeing populism as a style of politics in which charismatic leaders engage in simplistic sloganeering in a cynical attempt to gain power is that this behaviour is exhibited by many politicians at some time or another in their political careers. This does not mean that they have a populist understanding of the political. As March argues,

...charismatic authority, anti-institutional mobilization, simplistic language, and a reliance on slogans are features shared by many non-populist actors. The ideological focus on the 'corrupt elite' versus 'moral people' dichotomy is not.<sup>49</sup>

Although Mudde sees populism as an ideology, he refers to it as a 'thin' ideology that lacks the same level of intellectual sophistication of more substantive ideologies such as liberalism or socialism.<sup>50</sup> According to Freedon 'full' ideologies offer a broad and comprehensive range of solutions to complex political and societal problems,<sup>51</sup> whereas 'thin' ideologies lack a broad formulation of solutions to address major socio-political problems.<sup>52</sup> Freedon's theory of 'thin' and 'full' ideologies is being used by this thesis to construct an ideal type of populist approach to foreign policy in which to measure the foreign policy approaches of the six selected European left-wing populist parties against in order to distinguish them. The ideal type of populist approach to foreign policy offered by this thesis exhibits both the 'thin' and 'full' ideologies of left-wing populism. Due to the limited ambition and scope of 'thin' ideologies they attach themselves to more substantive 'full' ideologies.<sup>53</sup> The ability of 'thin' populist ideology to attach itself to more substantial 'full' ideologies allows populist actors to express grievances relevant to the political context in which they are active.<sup>54</sup>

Defining populism as a 'thin' ideology follows a minimal definition of populism that includes only its core conceptual attributes. A benefit of this approach is that it can be applied to analyse a wide range of cases due to it being based on a small number of

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<sup>47</sup> Ostiguy, 'Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach', 73.

<sup>48</sup> Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective', 1672.

<sup>49</sup> L. March, 'From Vanguard of the Proletariat to Vox Populi: Left-populism as a 'Shadow' of Contemporary Socialism', *The SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 27/1 (2007), 65.

<sup>50</sup> Mudde, 'The Populist Zeitgeist', 544.

<sup>51</sup> M. Freedon, 'Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?' *Political Studies*, 46/4 (1998), 750.

<sup>52</sup> M. Freedon, *Ideology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 96.

<sup>53</sup> Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective', 1669.

<sup>54</sup> Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective', 1670.

attributes.<sup>55</sup> It also allows for the theorizing of substantive policy positions, such as foreign policy, and prevents populism being conflated with related concepts like nationalism.<sup>56</sup> For example, the main distinction between populism and nationalism is populism's ideological focus on the 'people' vs 'elite' dichotomy. Populism concerns the vertical relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite', while nationalism concerns the horizontal relationship between the 'nation' and the 'other'.<sup>57</sup>

There are differences among scholars on what comprises the core concepts of 'thin' populist ideology. Mudde identifies four core concepts of populist ideology as (1) the 'people', (2) the 'elite', (3) the general will, and (4) ideology itself.<sup>58</sup> This list does not capture the full essence of populism however. Stanley captures the full essence of populist 'thin' ideology more comprehensively with his four core concepts of populist 'thin' ideology. Stanley's four core concepts are (1) the existence of the 'people' and the 'elite' as two homogenous units of analysis, (2) the antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite', (3) the valorisation of the 'people' and the denigration of the 'elite', and (4) the idea of popular sovereignty.<sup>59</sup> Stanley's list of four core concepts of populist 'thin' ideology captures the essence of populism more than Mudde's because it includes the antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite', which is so central to populist 'thin' ideology. As Stanley argues, populism is predicated on an antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite'.<sup>60</sup> The first two of Stanley's four concepts are being used by this thesis to form the first major component of an ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered later in this thesis.

According to Canovan populism thrives on the tension between two interdependent yet antagonistic poles, which she terms 'redemptive' and 'pragmatic' politics.<sup>61</sup> 'Redemptive' politics sees democracy as a means of salvation through politics in which the 'people' are the only source of authority, while 'pragmatic' politics sees democracy as a means of peacefully resolving conflicting interests within a society and is thus simply a form of government in which institutions are required to make it functional.<sup>62</sup> Institutions require technical skills that can be alienating to those that don't possess them, and hence breed

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<sup>55</sup> C. Mudde & C. Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Exclusionary vs Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America', *Government and Opposition*, 48/2 (2013), 149.

<sup>56</sup> B. Verbeek & A. Zaslov, 'Populism and Foreign Policy', in C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al., eds., *The Oxford Handbook on Populism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 385.

<sup>57</sup> Rooduijn, 'State of the Field', 365.

<sup>58</sup> Mudde, 'Populism: An Ideational Approach', 29.

<sup>59</sup> B. Stanley, 'The Thin Ideology of Populism', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13/1 (2008), 102.

<sup>60</sup> Stanley, 'The Thin Ideology of Populism', 96.

<sup>61</sup> M. Canovan, 'Trust the People!: Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy', *Political Studies*, 47/1 (1999), 8.

<sup>62</sup> Canovan, 'Trust the People!', 10.

mistrust,<sup>63</sup> thus creating the antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite'. When the 'people' see the political process as too isolated from their interests the pragmatic pole loses its legitimacy in the eyes of the 'people' and a gap then arises between the two poles, the void created by this gap is then filled by populism when it grows too wide.<sup>64</sup>

Despite Stanley's four core concepts capturing the essence of populism more fully than Mudde's, Stanley like Mudde labels the 'people' as homogenous which is being challenged by recent scholarship. Recent scholarship argues that populists can construct the 'people' from an array of groups, interests, and identities drawn together by their antagonism towards the elites.<sup>65</sup> This is an important point as it has relevance to the inclusivity of left-wing populism, the type of populism adopted by the parties whose foreign policy approaches are examined by this thesis.

### *Left-wing Populism*

March defines left-wing populism as a brand of politics that exhibits the central feature of populist 'thin' ideology of the 'people' pitted against the 'elite' in combination with left-wing ideological thought.<sup>66</sup> March's definition of left-wing populism as the combination of 'thin' populist ideology combined with 'full' left-wing ideological thought is the definition of left-wing populism adopted by this thesis. In this sense left-wing populism is a combination of two axes. The first axis is based on 'thin' populist ideology, while the second axis is based on 'full' left-wing ideology. The term 'left-wing ideology' is being used by this thesis as an umbrella term for all types of left-wing ideologies. These two axes will form the basis of an ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered later in this thesis in which to measure and distinguish the different types of foreign policy approaches adopted by European left-wing populist parties.

It is the 'full' ideology of left-wing populism that distinguishes it from right-wing populism, that being the inclusive egalitarianism of left-wing ideology. As March argues, it is the 'full' ideology of a populist political actor that defines their essence.<sup>67</sup> Due to its inclusive egalitarian nature left-wing populism is dyadic in that it pits the 'people' against the 'elite', whereas right-wing populism is triadic in that it pits the 'people' against the 'elite' as well as an outgroup.<sup>68</sup> The out group does not belong to the 'elite', yet is not considered by right-

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<sup>63</sup> Canovan, 'Trust the People!', 13.

<sup>64</sup> Canovan, 'Trust the People!', 11.

<sup>65</sup> Font, Graziano & Tsakatika, 'Varieties of Inclusionary Populism', 165.

<sup>66</sup> March, 'From Vanguard of the Proletariat to Vox Populi', 66.

<sup>67</sup> March, 'Left and Right Populism Compared', 285.

<sup>68</sup> March, 'Left and Right Populism Compared', 284-285.

wing populists as part of the 'people' either. Outgroups are usually marginalised and vilified societal groups. The dyadic/triadic contrast between left-wing and right-wing populism is based on the different conceptions of who the 'people' are. Left-wing populism has an inclusive conception of the 'people', while right-wing populism has an exclusive conception.

The exclusivity of right-wing populism and the inclusivity of left-wing populism are captured by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser<sup>69</sup> who employ a singular definition of populism as a 'thin' ideology in their comparative analysis between left-wing Latin American populist parties and right-wing European populist parties. The authors note that left-wing Latin American populist parties are inclusionary while right-wing European populist parties are exclusionary, concluding that the issue of inclusivity and exclusivity is the most important question raised in the scholarship on populism.<sup>70</sup> Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser's work highlighting the differences between right-wing populism and left-wing populism based on the inclusivity/exclusivity dimension is used in this thesis to differentiate right-wing populist approaches to foreign policy from that of left-wing populist approaches to foreign policy.

The analysis of Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser is based on the work of Filc who identifies three dimensions of inclusion/exclusion. These three dimensions are (1) the material, (2) the political, and (3) the symbolic. The material dimension concerns the distribution of resources. Inclusionary populism seeks to redistribute wealth to those excluded from it,<sup>71</sup> while exclusionary populism seeks to deny outgroups access to material resources.<sup>72</sup> The political dimension involves political participation and contestation of public offices. Inclusionary populism seeks to enable subordinated groups to become involved as active members in the political community,<sup>73</sup> while exclusionary populism seeks to deinstitutionalise the rights of outgroups and minorities.<sup>74</sup> The symbolic dimension refers to defining the 'people'. Inclusionary populism includes outgroups in their definition of the 'people',<sup>75</sup> while exclusionary populism defines the 'people' in nativist or organic terms.<sup>76</sup> Filc's work is used by this thesis to define the core trait of 'full' left-wing ideology as an umbrella term for the various left-wing ideologies. It is used to identify the dyadic inclusive nature of the foreign policy approaches of the six selected European populist parties examined in this thesis.

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<sup>69</sup> Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Exclusionary vs Inclusionary Populism'.

<sup>70</sup> Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Exclusionary vs Inclusionary populism', 158.

<sup>71</sup> D. Filc, *The Political Right in Israel: Different Faces of Jewish Populism* (London: Routledge, 2010), 130.

<sup>72</sup> Filc, *The Political Right in Israel*, 136.

<sup>73</sup> Filc, *The Political Right in Israel*, 132.

<sup>74</sup> Filc, *The Political Right in Israel*, 137.

<sup>75</sup> Filc, *The Political Right in Israel*, 131.

<sup>76</sup> Filc, *The Political Right in Israel*, 135-6.



Mouffe notes how left-wing populism positions itself in opposition to mainstream centre-left politics. According to Mouffe mainstream centre-left politics is a technocratic form of politics that has embraced a neoliberal consensus.<sup>77</sup> After the collapse of the Soviet Union mainstream social democratic parties embraced neoliberalism to create a brand of politics commonly referred to as 'third way' politics, transforming these parties from being social democratic to social liberal. This created a new neoliberal hegemonic consensus in which mainstream antagonism towards neoliberalism was eradicated, a condition that Mouffe refers to as 'post-politics'.<sup>78</sup> At the same time countercultural themes were appropriated by neoliberalism to create a post-modern brand of selfish individualism that neutralised counter culturalism as a systemic challenge to neoliberalism.<sup>79</sup> This post-political neoliberal hegemony has led to the demise of equality and popular sovereignty as values and the disappearance of the agonistic space of contesting societal visions, resulting in something Mouffe calls 'post-democracy'.<sup>80</sup> Mouffe argues that the objective of left-wing populism is to overthrow neoliberal hegemony in order to create a progressive hegemony.<sup>81</sup>

However, left-wing populism should not be perceived as a radical form of politics due to its divergence from mainstream centre-left politics. As March points out left-wing populism's 'heartland' is,

...an idealized version of a social democratic society before it began to 'rot' under the influence of 20 years of neo-liberalism and betrayal by 'mainstream' social democratic parties.<sup>82</sup>

March's identification of traditional social democracy as the 'heartland' of left-wing populism is used by this thesis to define the 'heartland' that the democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy seeks to preserve and protect from global neoliberal hegemony.

The 'people' versus 'elite' dichotomy of populist 'thin' ideology does resemble the dichotic nature of Marxism to an extent, yet there are differences between the two. One significant difference is the elitist nature of Marxism due to the role that a dedicated party of revolutionaries play in Leninist doctrine.<sup>83</sup> According to this doctrine the Party is the epicentre of politics,<sup>84</sup> whereas for left-wing populism it is the 'people' themselves. Another

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<sup>77</sup> C. Mouffe, *For a Left Populism*, (London: Verso, 2019), 4.

<sup>78</sup> Mouffe, *For a Left Populism*, 33.

<sup>79</sup> Mouffe, *For a Left Populism*, 33-4.

<sup>80</sup> Mouffe, *For a Left Populism*, 16.

<sup>81</sup> Mouffe, *For a Left Populism*, 50.

<sup>82</sup> March, 'From Vanguard of the Proletariat to Vox Populi', 67.

<sup>83</sup> L. March, *Radical Left Parties in Europe* (1<sup>st</sup> edn, Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2011), 120.

<sup>84</sup> March, 'From Vanguard of the Proletariat to Vox Populi', 66.

difference between Marxism and left-wing populism is that the foundations of Marxism are built on an emancipatory project based on class in which the international proletariat are to be liberated from the oppression and alienation of capitalism, whereas as left-wing populism moves beyond the labour/capital conflict and includes a multiplicity of popular demands to focus on a top/bottom conflict.<sup>85</sup> The populist left in this sense is post-class. Left-wing populism is post-class as it recognises the existence of a plurality of conflicts against the 'elites' and seeks to find a point of convergence with the demands advocated by various social movements.<sup>86</sup> The goal of left-wing populism is to confront all forms of inequality and foster greater inclusiveness in the material, political, and social dimensions.<sup>87</sup>

### *Populist Approaches to Foreign Policy*

From an ideational perspective populist antagonism towards domestic institutions can be expected to spill over into foreign policy, becoming an antagonism towards international elites and the institutions they represent.<sup>88</sup> Domestic populist antagonism towards elites and populist advocacy for popular sovereignty can underpin antagonism towards elites internationally and can help explain opposition to international institutions that undercut political representation and accountability.<sup>89</sup> This antagonism is reflected in Brexit and Donald Trump's withdrawal of the United States from international multilateral institutions and regimes such as the Paris Climate Agreement, the United Nations Human Rights Council, and the World Health Organization.<sup>90</sup>

The spillover of domestic populist antagonism towards elites is seen when foreign policy is used to promote domestic populist political agendas. Donald Trump exploited domestic anxiety about America's declining role in the world as a means of cementing his domestic populist agenda by blaming this decline on American elites' support for globalism.<sup>91</sup> He conflated the decline of the American 'heartland' with the decline of American global power.<sup>92</sup> Globalism was diagnosed by Trump as the cause of American decline and he

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<sup>85</sup> M. Damiani, *Populist Radical Left Parties in Western Europe: Equality and Sovereignty* (Milton: Taylor and Francis Group, 2020), 35.

<sup>86</sup> Damiani, *Populist Radical Left Parties in Western Europe*, 39.

<sup>87</sup> Damiani, *Populist Radical Left Parties in Western Europe*, 40.

<sup>88</sup> S. Destradi, D. Cadier & J. Plagemann. 'Populism and Foreign Policy: A Research Agenda (Introduction)', *Comparative European Politics* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, England), 19/6 (2021), 674.

<sup>89</sup> A. Chrysogelos, 'Populism in Foreign Policy', *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Politics* (27 July 2017), Empirical Challenges, Conceptual Responses, <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-467#acrefore-9780190228637-e-467-div1-5>, accessed 15 Apr. 2022.

<sup>90</sup> Destradi, Cadier & Plagemann. 'Populism and Foreign Policy', 674.

<sup>91</sup> R. Biegón, 'A Populist Grand Strategy?: Trump and the Framing of American Decline', *International Relations* (London), 33/4 (2019), 518.

<sup>92</sup> Biegón, 'A Populist Grand Strategy?', 526.

promoted his 'America first' brand of Jacksonian nationalism as the remedy.<sup>93</sup> By positioning themselves against the 'elites' populists present themselves as the saviours of their respective sovereign states. The term 'drain the swamp' was used by Trump as a reference to his antagonistic position against the liberal and neoconservative globalist establishment<sup>94</sup> while the phrase 'make America great again' (MAGA) was used to present himself as a D.C. outsider who will restore American life to order.<sup>95</sup>

Populism's inherent antagonism towards elites can lead to populists bypassing a country's foreign policy establishment in the policy making process, resulting in unpredictability in foreign policy trajectory and bottlenecks in foreign policy formulation.<sup>96</sup> This can lead to the foreign policy of a populist government being less comprehensive and consistent in the effective pursuit of interests and the cultivation of bilateral relations.<sup>97</sup> Although populists keep in mind the strategic logic of their country's national interests<sup>98</sup> they do at times contest norms and principles that have underpinned foreign policy.<sup>99</sup> For example the position of European populists on defence coordination is neither uniform nor distinctive and can instead overlap and diverge from both populist and non-populist actors alike.<sup>100</sup> Populist actors are likely to constrain defence coordination if their populist anti-establishment sentiment is given greater priority than national security concerns.<sup>101</sup>

Populism by itself, however, is an inadequate classification criterion for comparative analysis on the foreign policy approaches of populist political actors.<sup>102</sup> The 'full' host ideology of a populist political actor also plays a prominent role. The foreign policies of Poland's right-wing populist PiS and Hungary's right-wing populist Fidesz are built on the worldviews of Polish and Hungarian right-wing intellectual thought and manifest themselves in hostility towards key elements of the EU project such as refugee quotas and support for human rights.<sup>103</sup> 'Full' socialist ideology was a driving force in the foreign policy of

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<sup>93</sup> Biegon, 'A Populist Grand Strategy?', 529.

<sup>94</sup> Biegon, 'A Populist Grand Strategy?', 528.

<sup>95</sup> J. Sclafani, 'Talking Donald Trump: A Sociolinguistic Study of Style, Metadiscourse, and Political Identity' (1<sup>st</sup> edn, Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2018), 62.

<sup>96</sup> J. Plagemann & S. Destradi, 'Populism and Foreign Policy: The Case of India', *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 15/2 (2019), 298.

<sup>97</sup> Plagemann & Destradi, 'Populism and Foreign Policy', 298.

<sup>98</sup> D. Cadier & C. Lequesne, *How Populism Impacts EU Foreign Policy* (Barcelona: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, 2020), 6.

<sup>99</sup> Cadier & Lequesne, *How Populism Impacts EU Foreign Policy*, 5.

<sup>100</sup> M. Henke & R. Maher, 'The Populist Challenge to European Defence', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 28/3 (2021), 391.

<sup>101</sup> Henke & Maher, 'The Populist Challenge to European Defence', 393.

<sup>102</sup> A. Chryssogelos, *Old Ghosts in New Sheets: European Populist Parties and Foreign Policy* (Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2011), 5.

<sup>103</sup> M. Varga & A. Buzogany, 'The Foreign Policy of Populists in Power: Contesting Liberalism in Poland and Hungary', *Geopolitics*, 26/5 (2021), 1455-6.

Venezuela's left-wing populist Hugo Chavez, in which 'socialism of the twenty-first century' formed a key pillar of Venezuelan external relations as a revolutionary state.<sup>104</sup>

As argued earlier in this chapter the 'full' host ideology that populist 'thin' ideology attaches itself to gives a populist actor their essence. When left-wing and right-wing populist parties disagree over approaches to foreign policy it is often due to the 'full' ideology that they attach their 'thin' populist ideology to. This is because it is their 'full' ideology that determines how they define the 'people' and how international relations affects the 'people'.<sup>105</sup> A right-wing populist has a very different conception of the 'people' than a left-wing populist and as such their views on the foreign policy interests of the 'people' differ.

When left-wing populists and right-wing populists do agree on foreign policy, they do so for different reasons due to the 'full' ideology they attach their 'thin' populist ideology to. Chryssogelos<sup>106</sup> notes that although both left-wing and right-wing populists advocate for national sovereignty, they both do so for different reasons. Right-wing populists are hostile to any erosion of national sovereignty as they see it as an attempt to dilute the ethno-national character of the sovereign state.<sup>107</sup> Left-wing populists seek to preserve national sovereignty due to hostility towards neoliberalism and the removal of regulations that the erosion of national sovereignty entails.<sup>108</sup> Chryssogelos' work identifying the different reasons behind the advocacy of national sovereignty between left-wing and right-wing populism is used by this thesis to point out how the democratic sovereigntist advocacy for national sovereignty differs from that of right-wing populist approaches to foreign policy.

Chryssogelos differentiates the foreign policy approaches of European populist parties based on the 'full' ideologies they attach their populism to and their strategic cultures.<sup>109</sup> Based on these differences Chryssogelos identifies three types of approaches to foreign policy among European populist actors – continental nationalist, Atlanticist nationalist, and anti-imperialist internationalist. Continental nationalist parties tend to be right-wing populist parties who are critical of NATO and Western military adventurism and tend to be pro-Russia, although their anti-Atlanticism is dependable on the ideology of whoever occupies the White House.<sup>110</sup> Atlanticist nationalists are right-wing populist parties with dominant Atlanticist security traditions and are much more sceptical towards Russia

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<sup>104</sup> L. E. Wehner & C. G. Theis, 'The Nexus of Populism and Foreign Policy: The Case of Latin America', *International Relations (London)*, 35/2 (2021), 329-30.

<sup>105</sup> Verbeek & Zaslov, 'Populism and Foreign Policy', 392.

<sup>106</sup> Chryssogelos, *Old Ghosts in New Sheets*, 8.

<sup>107</sup> Chryssogelos, *Old Ghosts in New Sheets*, 8.

<sup>108</sup> Chryssogelos, *Old ghosts in New Sheets*, 8.

<sup>109</sup> Chryssogelos, *Is There a Populist Foreign Policy?*, 16.

<sup>110</sup> Chryssogelos, *Is There a Populist Foreign Policy?*, 16-17.

than continental nationalists due to threat perceptions.<sup>111</sup> Anti-imperialist internationalists are characterised by distrust of the U.S. and U.S.-led military organisations like NATO and opposition to military interventionism and like continental nationalists their attitudes towards the United States is dependable on whether whoever holds the U.S. Presidency is ideologically aligned or not.<sup>112</sup>

There are two main research gaps in Chryssogelos' work. The first is his comparative analysis does not involve the role populism plays in the foreign policy approaches of European populist parties. This may seem strange for a comparative analysis on the foreign policy approaches of populist parties. Chryssogelos omits the role of populism in his comparative study due to his position that populism has a limited impact on foreign policy.<sup>113</sup> The second gap is that Chryssogelos' work does not involve the position of European populist parties towards the EU. Again, this may seem strange for a comparative study on the foreign policy approaches of European populist parties. Chryssogelos omits the position of European populist parties towards the EU because his work focusses on the position European populist parties take on issues outside the EU, in particular their position on Atlanticism.<sup>114</sup> Based on his analysis Chryssogelos classifies European left-wing populist parties under one type of foreign policy approach, that being Anti-imperialist internationalist.

This thesis builds on the work of Chryssogelos by replicating his comparative approach to determine different types of foreign policy approaches among European left-wing populist parties. It does this by conducting a comparative analysis of the foreign policy approaches of European left-wing populist parties based on whether they exhibit populist core concepts in their foreign policy approaches and including their position towards the EU in this comparative analysis. Although populism's impact on foreign policy may be limited, as pointed out earlier in this chapter it still has an impact. Due to the primacy the EU has in the foreign policy of most European countries an analysis on any European political party's foreign policy approach, whether they are populist or not, would be incomplete without taking their position on the EU into account.

## *Conclusion*

Despite the 'elusive and protean' nature of populism Mudde provides a singular definition of the concept to work with. Although there are many different definitions of populism it is important to keep to a singular definition when discussing it in order prevent

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<sup>111</sup> Chryssogelos, *Is There a Populist Foreign Policy?*, 17.

<sup>112</sup> Chryssogelos, *Is There a Populist Foreign Policy?*, 17.

<sup>113</sup> Chryssogelos, *Is There a Populist Foreign Policy?*, 15.

<sup>114</sup> Chryssogelos, *Is There a Populist Foreign Policy?*, 3.

confusing the concept with other related concepts. This thesis adopts Mudde's definition of populism as a 'thin' ideology as it is the most widely used definition utilised in comparative analysis and avoids the drawbacks of the political-strategic and socio-cultural approaches. Although Mudde identifies four core concepts of populist 'thin' ideology, Stanley's version of the four core concepts of populist 'thin' ideology is more fitting as it includes the antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite' so central to populist 'thin' ideology. Recent scholarship challenges Mudde and Stanley's definition of the 'people' as homogenous due to populists constructing the 'people' from an array of groups, interests, and identities drawn together by their antagonism towards the 'elite', which is important when discussing left-wing populism.

Left-wing populism is the combination of populist 'thin' ideology with the inclusive egalitarianism of left-wing ideological thought. Although both left-wing populism and right-wing populism both share the same 'thin' populist ideology, it is their 'full' ideology that separates them with left-wing populism being dyadic in nature and right-wing populism being triadic. The inclusive dyadic nature of left-wing populism functions on three dimensions of inclusivity – the material, the political, and the symbolic. Left-wing populism distinguishes itself from centre-left mainstream politics through its rejection of neoliberal hegemony and from Marxism with its form of politics that goes beyond class-based conflict. Left-wing populism recognises the plurality of disaffected interests and tries to bring them together at a point of convergence to displace neoliberal hegemony and create a progressive hegemony.

Populist 'thin' ideology's antagonism towards elites can transcend into foreign policy leading to antagonism towards international elites and the institutions they represent. It can also cause disruption in consensus regarding foreign policy coordination. A populist actor's 'full' ideology can also impact a populist actor's foreign policy which can align itself with the intellectual principles of that 'full' ideology with distinctive differences between left-wing and right-wing populist approaches to foreign policy. Although Chryssogelos identifies three types of approaches to foreign policy adopted by European populist parties – continental nationalist, Atlanticist nationalist, and anti-imperialist internationalist – these have been identified with the omission of populist 'thin' ideology and their positions towards the EU. As such Chryssogelos identifies only one approach to foreign policy among European left-wing populist parties – anti-imperialist internationalist. This thesis seeks to fill in these gaps to include the presence of 'thin' populist ideological concepts in the foreign policy approaches of European left-wing populist parties and their position towards the EU in its analysis.

# Chapter Two: Analysing the Foreign Policy Approaches of European Left-wing Populist Parties

## *Introduction*

In the previous chapter the thesis reviewed the research on populism, left-wing populism, and populist approaches to foreign policy. In this chapter the thesis discusses the choice of parties whose foreign policy approaches will be analysed, conducts an analysis of each party's approach to foreign policy, and compares the foreign policy approaches of the parties. In order to identify the types of foreign policy approaches European left-wing populist parties adopt it is important to first identify what European parties are left-wing populist and what their foreign policy approaches are. The aim of this chapter is to address the two research sub-questions of this thesis and establish the basis of the typology that is constructed in chapter three.

Firstly, the chapter addresses the first sub-question of this thesis,

*'What political parties are representative of European left-wing populist parties?'*

This thesis' choice of parties of whose foreign policies will be analysed is explained based on how the selected parties have met the several criteria laid out by this thesis for them to be chosen as representative samples of European left-wing populist parties. This is to establish that the six selected parties have gone through a systematic selection process to identify them as left-wing populist parties.

Secondly, the chapter addresses the second sub-question of this thesis,

*'What are the foreign policy approaches of European left-wing populist parties?'*

The analysis of the foreign policy approaches of the six selected European left-wing populist parties comprises two stages. The first stage is a quantitative analysis of the average scores of the MARPOR external relations codes for each party's selected national election manifestos. The analysis will be represented through bar graphs setting out the data. This is to illustrate what foreign policy areas each party prioritises and where the qualitative analysis will be focused. The second step involves a qualitative analysis of the sections of the selected election manifestos that are coded by MARPOR as external relations with a particular emphasis on sections coming under the three most prominent external relations codes for each party. This is to offer a clearer picture beyond the quantitative analysis and hence allow a greater understanding of the parties' foreign policy.

This mixed methods approach combining quantitative and qualitative analysis is to offer a comprehensive understanding of each party's foreign policy approach.

Thirdly, the chapter conducts a comparative analysis of the foreign policy approaches of the six selected parties. The parties will be compared on the exhibition of 'thin' populist core ideological concepts in their foreign policy approaches. This comparative analysis is to form the basis of the typology that will follow in chapter three. The chapter will then conclude with its findings.

### *Selected European Left-wing Populist Parties*

The primary task of this thesis is to find out if there are different types of foreign policy approaches adopted by European left-wing populist parties. Six European left-wing populist parties have been selected as cases for examination. These parties are SYRIZA, Podemos, La France Insoumise (FI), Die Linke, Socialistische Partij (SP), and Levica. As two of the selected parties' names are the same when translated into English i.e., Die Linke and Levica (The Left), the selected parties are referred to in their original names in their respective languages to avoid confusion. The parties were selected based on them meeting a set of criteria to ensure that they are representative of left-wing populist parties in Europe. The set of criteria that the parties must meet are that they,

1. have some quantitative measurement of being left-wing and populist
2. be qualitatively identified in the academic literature as being left-wing populist
3. have electoral relevance
4. be geographically representative of Europe's three major regions of Northwestern Europe, Southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe.

The PopuList website, a peer-reviewed collaborative project between academics and journalists that identifies European populist parties, is used as a basis for selecting the six parties. PopuList identifies all six parties as being both left-wing and populist.<sup>115</sup>


Data from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) is used to quantify that these parties are left-wing and populist. CHES estimate party positioning on ideology and policy issues for national parties in countries across the world. The quantitative data from CHES is used as it was completed by 421 political scientists specializing in political parties and European integration. According to quantitative data from CHES all six selected parties are left-wing populist parties. **Figure 1.1.** shows the 2019 CHES scores of the six selected

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<sup>115</sup> M. Rooduijn, et al., *The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe* (2019), [www.popu-list.org](http://www.popu-list.org), accessed 18 Mar. 2022.



European left-wing populist parties and Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) concerning their overall ideological positioning i.e., where the parties stand on the left-right ideological spectrum. The SPD has been added to give a sample score of a European mainstream centre-left party for comparison. According to the 2019 CHES codebook the scores are based on a left-right scale where 0 = extreme left, 5 = centre, and 10 = extreme right.<sup>116</sup> As can be seen, SYRIZA is the party more towards the centre-left while Levica is the party that is more towards the extreme left. All six left-wing populist parties are to the left of the centre-left comparative sample. This demonstrates that the six selected parties are left-wing.




**Figure 1.1.** 2019 CHES scores for overall ideological positioning of selected parties and SPD.

**Figure 1.2.** shows the 2019 CHES scores for the selected parties and the SPD on the salience of anti-establishment/anti-elite rhetoric, which is being used by this thesis as a measurement for the populism of the selected parties. Again, the SPD has been added to give a sample score of a European mainstream centre-left party for comparison. According to the 2019 CHES codebook 0 = rhetoric is not at all important and 10 = rhetoric is extremely important.<sup>117</sup> As can be seen FI is the most populist while Die Linke is the least populist of the parties, with all six parties chosen for this thesis having a much greater salience of anti-establishment/anti-elite rhetoric than the SPD. This demonstrates that the six selected parties are populist.

<sup>116</sup> Chapel Hill Expert Survey, ‘Codebook’, 14.

<sup>117</sup> Chapel Hill Expert Survey, ‘Codebook’, 19.



**Figure 1.2.** 2019 CHES scores for salience of anti-establishment/anti-elite rhetoric of selected parties and the SPD.

What can be seen from the quantitative data provided by CHES is that the six selected parties are left-wing populist parties. It does however need to be pointed out that these metrics are not precise enough to explain the differences among the parties.

Academic research on these parties is used as a qualitative measurement in determining if the six selected parties are left-wing and populist. All six selected parties are identified in the academic literature as left-wing populist parties. Stavrakakis and Katsambekis have identified SYRIZA as a left-wing populist party that engages in a populist discourse due to its references of an antagonistic relationship between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’ and its inclusive and emancipatory conception of the ‘people’ as opposed to that of the populist right.<sup>118</sup> Kioupkiolis sees Podemos as representing one of two peaks of left-wing populism in Europe that deliberately enunciates a populist discourse against elites and promotes popular sovereignty and an inclusionary and egalitarian notion of ‘the common’.<sup>119</sup> Baloge and Hube have described La France Insoumise as a political party with a populist ideological core that holds an inclusive populism in stark contrast to the exclusiveness of the right-wing populist National Front.<sup>120</sup> Goodliffe points out that Die Linke repudiates neoliberal capitalism while presenting a populist discourse that is anti-elitist in which the

<sup>118</sup> Y. Stavrakakis & G. Katsambekis, ‘Left-wing Populism in the European Periphery: The Case of SYRIZA’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 19/2 (2014), 138.

<sup>119</sup> A. Kioupkiolis, ‘Podemos: The Ambiguous Promises of Left-wing Populism in Contemporary Spain’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 21/2 (2016), 99-100.

<sup>120</sup> M. Baloge & N. Hube, ‘How Populist are Populist Parties in France? Understanding Parties’ Strategies Within a Systemic Approach’, *European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology*, 9/1 (2022), 65.

ordinary ‘people’ are pitted against a corrupt ‘elite’.<sup>121</sup> Otjes and Louwerse have pointed out that the Socialistische Partij is a left-wing populist party<sup>122</sup> exhibiting anti-elitism and appeals to popular sovereignty.<sup>123</sup> Toplisek identifies Levica as a party with a socialist ideological core complimented by a populist ideological appeal of a strong anti-elite and anti-establishment position.<sup>124</sup>

The threshold for measuring the electoral relevance of the six selected parties is having representation in their respective national legislatures at the time of the writing of this thesis. The six selected parties have electoral relevance with all of them having representation in their respective national legislatures. **Table 1.** shows each party’s representation in their respective national legislatures.

**Table 1.** Selected parties’ representation in their national legislatures. *note\** - *national legislature contains only one chamber.*

Party	Representation in lower house of national legislature (seats held / total seats in chamber)	Representation in upper house of national legislature (seats held / total seats in chamber)
SYRIZA	85 / 300*	
Podemos	24 / 350	0 / 265
La France Insoumise	69 / 577	1 / 348
Die Linke	39 / 736	4 / 69
Socialistische Partij	9 / 150	4 / 75
Levica	5 / 90*	

The six selected parties are geographically representative and drawn from Europe’s three major regions of Northwestern Europe, Southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe. Northwestern Europe is represented by FI (France), Die Linke (Germany), and the SP (Netherlands). Southern Europe is represented by SYRIZA (Greece) and Podemos (Spain). Central and Eastern Europe is represented by Levica (Slovenia).

<sup>121</sup> G. Goodliffe, ‘The Price of Disengagement: Radical Populism in France and Germany’, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 20/2 (2012), 138.

<sup>122</sup> S. Otjes & T. Louwerse, ‘Populists in Parliament: Comparing Left-wing and Right-wing Populism in the Netherlands’, *Political Studies*, 63/1 (2015), 64.

<sup>123</sup> Otjes & Louwerse, ‘Populists in Parliament’, 66.

<sup>124</sup> A. Toplisek, ‘Between Populism and Socialism: Slovenia’s Left party’, in G. Katsambekis & A. Kioupkiolis, eds., *The Populist Radical Left in Europe* (Milton: Taylor & Francis Group, 2019), 82.

With all six parties being identified as left-wing populist by both quantitative and qualitative data, being electorally relevant, and being derived from all three of Europe's major regions, it can be confidently stated that they are a representative sample of European left-wing populist parties for this thesis to examine their foreign policy approaches.

### *Mapping the Foreign Policy Approaches of European Left-wing Populist Parties*


The thesis will now conduct both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the foreign policy approaches of the six selected European left-wing populist parties. The quantitative analysis involves looking at the scores of each of the MARPOR external relations codes for each of the selected election manifestos of a party and then working out the average score for each MARPOR external relations code across all the selected national election manifestos of a party. The results of this quantitative analysis are illustrated in bar graphs. The scores are the relative share of each MARPOR external relations code in relation to all coded statements in a particular election manifesto. For example, if a code has a score of 1.0 it means that code comprises one percent of all coded sentences of an election manifesto. These bar graphs are a visualisation of the main foreign policy focus of each party. This is useful in revealing the foreign policy priorities of the parties and which sections of the national election manifestos to concentrate the qualitative analysis. See **Appendix 1** for the full MARPOR code category scheme. It lists all the MARPOR external relations codes and a brief description of what each code means. The qualitative analysis involves a qualitative reading of those sections of the national election manifestos coded under the ten MARPOR external relations codes with an emphasis on sections coded under the three most prominent codes for each party. This gives a more nuanced and in-depth understanding of what is said in these coded sections beyond MARPOR's explanation of the codes in its code category scheme.

#### *SYRIZA*

**Figure 2.** are the average scores of the MARPOR external relations codes in SYRIZA's January 2015 and September 2015 Greek legislative election manifestos. The three most prominent MARPOR external relations codes are,

1. 103 Anti-Imperialism
2. 107 Internationalism: Positive
3. 110 European/Regional Integration: Negative.

Sections of SYRIZA’s selected national election manifestos coming under these three most prominent codes represent SYRIZA’s foreign policy priority areas and are the main focus of the qualitative analysis.



**Figure 2.** The average scores of the MARPOR external relations codes in SYRIZA’s January 2015 and September 2015 Greek legislative election manifestos.

SYRIZA’s economic-centric anti-imperialism is largely directed at the so-called ‘troika’, i.e. the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concerning Greece’s sovereign debt. The party states that the renegotiation of Greece’s debt and loan contracts are its number one foreign policy objective.<sup>125</sup> SYRIZA presents this renegotiation process in populist conceptual terms. It claims that its fight against Greece’s creditors is one against the ruling ‘elite’ of Europe<sup>126</sup> and that its struggle against this ruling ‘elite’ is emblematic of the ‘people’s’ struggle against neoliberal hegemony.<sup>127</sup> Here we see SYRIZA identifying the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’ as two units of analysis and the antagonistic relationship between the two. SYRIZA’s identification of itself as a protagonist against neoliberal hegemony shows its rejection of neoliberal hegemony.

The rejection of neoliberal hegemony imposed on Greece as part of the economic imperialism of the ‘troika’ is due to SYRIZA’s inclusive ‘full’ left-wing ideology. Inclusivity’s material dimension is evident in the party’s commitment to mitigate the impact of austerity

<sup>125</sup> SYRIZA, *iii elpida erxetai: iii ellada prodekt, iii europa allazei* [Hope is Coming: Greece is Progressing, Europe is Changing] (Athens: SYRIZA, 2015), 5.

<sup>126</sup> SYRIZA, *symmachia rizospastikis aristeras: shedio cybernetic programme* [Alliance of the Radical Left: Draft Government Program] (Athens: SYRIZA, 2015), 102.

<sup>127</sup> SYRIZA, *symmachia rizospastikis aristeras* [Alliance of the Radical Left], 9.

and implement a parallel social policy program on issues that do not fall within the scope of austerity agreements.<sup>128</sup> These policies are intended to preserve left-wing populism's social democratic 'heartland'. The party states that it is committed to securing the 'social character' of the Greek state in the face of neoliberal deregulation.<sup>129</sup> This may surprise those who view SYRIZA's signing onto to further austerity measures as tacit approval of EU austerity policy, yet the party explains why it did so. SYRIZA claims that the moment it took government the ECB weaponised the threat of Greece's financial collapse to pressure it to unconditionally capitulate and adopt the ECB's fiscal adjustment program.<sup>130</sup> The party states that it was forced into a dilemma of doing so or facing Greek bankruptcy due to various ECB threats such as cutting Greek bonds securing loans to Greece's central bank.<sup>131</sup>

Due to its experiences in dealing with EU financial institutions, SYRIZA has a policy of reforming the EU. These reforms are aimed at restraining what it calls EU 'neoliberal authoritarianism' and changing the EU's correlations towards the interests of the 'people' of Europe.<sup>132</sup> It intends to do this by creating a social and democratic Europe that respects both the national and popular sovereignty of its member states.<sup>133</sup> The advocacy of popular sovereignty. This policy displays inclusivity's political dimension as the policy is intended to extend the political participation of the 'people' of the EU.

SYRIZA's Euroscepticism resulting from the EU's enforcement of austerity on Greece and its advocacy of national sovereignty should not be taken that the party is isolationist and totally opposed to EU objectives. The party has a policy of strengthening both bilateral and multilateral inter-Balkan cooperation and supports the accession process of Western Balkan countries into the EU.<sup>134</sup>

In summary, SYRIZA's approach to foreign policy is guided by a populist conception of Greece's treatment by the EU austerity memorandums and an attempt to preserve the social democratic character of Greece from neoliberal hegemony within the EU. Its advocacy for national sovereignty is not an isolationist rejection of the EU or its objectives however.

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<sup>128</sup> SYRIZA, *symmachia rizospastikis aristeras* [Alliance of the Radical Left], 14.

<sup>129</sup> SYRIZA, *symmachia rizospastikis aristeras* [Alliance of the Radical Left], 15.

<sup>130</sup> SYRIZA, *symmachia rizospastikis aristeras* [Alliance of the Radical Left], 5.

<sup>131</sup> SYRIZA, *symmachia rizospastikis aristeras* [Alliance of the Radical Left], 6.

<sup>132</sup> SYRIZA, *symmachia rizospastikis aristeras* [Alliance of the Radical Left], 127.


<sup>133</sup> SYRIZA, *symmachia rizospastikis aristeras* [Alliance of the Radical Left], 127.

<sup>134</sup> SYRIZA, *symmachia rizospastikis aristeras* [Alliance of the Radical Left], 128.

**Figure 3.** are the average scores of the MARPOR external relations codes in Podemos' 2015 and April 2019 Spanish general election manifestos. The three most prominent MARPOR external relations codes are,

1. 107 Internationalism: Positive
2. 104 Military: Positive
3. 103 Anti-imperialism: Positive.

Sections of Podemos' selected national election manifestos coming under these three most prominent codes represent Podemos' foreign policy priority areas and are the main focus of the qualitative analysis.



**Figure 3.** The average scores of the MARPOR external relations codes in Podemos' 2015 and April 2019 Spanish general election manifestos.

The importance of taking a mixed methods approach in this thesis is shown by the qualitative analysis of Podemos' policies on the military. Based solely on a quantitative reading of the MARPOR data it would be assumed that Podemos' approach to foreign policy has a militarist orientation. Instead, these coded sections relate to Podemos' support for the rights of Spanish military personnel. An example of this is its policy of granting Spanish military personnel civil rights equal to those of ordinary Spanish citizens.<sup>135</sup>

<sup>135</sup> Podemos, *Programa de Podemos: Por un nuevo país* [Program of Podemos: For a New Country] (Madrid: Podemos, 2019), 71.

Podemos' foreign policy rejects neoliberal hegemony with its policy for the construction of a world system of economic and financial governance that is fairer and more representative. With this objective Podemos wants Spain to promote from within the multilateral organizations in which it participates the adoption of an international legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes based on responsible lending principles in line with the work of the UN Ad Hoc Committee.<sup>136</sup> This is exhibiting inclusivity's material dimension as the UN Ad Hoc Committee's goal is to create an international financial system that supports inclusive and equitable economic growth and sustainable development.<sup>137</sup> This policy can be seen in the context of a larger left-wing objective of making a more equitable and inclusive system of international governance. The most illustrative examples of this are Podemos' intentions to promote a Pact for Global Justice to articulate policy on international solidarity and cooperation<sup>138</sup> and the creation of a Ministry of Equality and Solidarity to implement policy on international cooperation and solidarity.<sup>139</sup>

Podemos' attempts to foster inclusivity's political dimension is visible in its anti-imperialism. This can be seen in its policy to support the right to self-determination of the Saharawi people through the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions for a resolution to the conflict via a referendum put to the Saharawi about their status.<sup>140</sup> Podemos wants to extend the political participation of the Saharawi people themselves in the process of resolving the dispute in Western Sahara.

Although Podemos' approach to foreign policy exhibits the inclusivity of 'full' left-wing ideological political thought and rejects neoliberal hegemony there is little evidence of it exhibiting any of populism's 'thin' ideological core concepts in its approach to foreign policy. This is the case for all sections of its 2015 and April 2019 Spanish general election manifestos that have been coded by MARPOR under its external relations codes.

To conclude, Podemos' approach to foreign policy rejects neoliberal hegemony and embraces left-wing 'full' ideological principles of international solidarity and cooperation, particularly around the issue of sovereign debt restructuring. However, the party's approach to foreign policy does not display any of the core concepts of 'thin' populist ideology.

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<sup>136</sup> Podemos, *Queremos, sabemos, podemos: Un programa para cambiar nuestro país* [We Want, We Know, We Can: A Program to Change Our Country] (Madrid: Podemos, 2015), 219.

<sup>137</sup> United Nations, 'Ad Hoc Committee on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes', *United Nations* 928 July 2015), <https://www.un.org/pga/69/ad-hoc-committee-on-sovereign-debt-restructuring-processes/>, accessed 20 May, 2022.

<sup>138</sup> Podemos, *Queremos, sabemos, podemos* [We Want, We Know, We Can], 229.

<sup>139</sup> Podemos, *Queremos, sabemos, podemos* [We Want, We Know, We Can], 231.


<sup>140</sup> Podemos, *Programa de Podemos* [Program of Podemos], 50.



**Figure 4.** are the average scores of the MARPOR external relations codes in FI's 2017 French presidential election manifesto. The three most prominent external relations codes are,

1. 107 Internationalism: Positive
2. 110 European/Regional Integration: Negative
3. 106 Peace: Positive.

Sections of FI's selected national election manifestos coming under these three most prominent codes represent FI's foreign policy priority areas and are the main focus of the qualitative analysis.



**Figure 4.** The average scores of the MARPOR external relations codes in FI's 2017 French presidential election manifesto.

FI adopts an anti-globalist internationalism that views international trade through a populist conceptual lens. The party rejects free trade and seeks to establish international solidarity based on protectionism and economic cooperation due to its view that globalisation only benefits multinational 'elites'.<sup>141</sup> FI seeks to organize world trade according to the general interest of the 'people' by taking France out of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and strengthening UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) as a

<sup>141</sup> La France Insoumise, *L'avenir en commun: le programme de La France Insoumise et de son candidat* [The Future in Common: The Program of La France Insoumise and Its Candidate] (Paris: La France Insoumise, 2017), 91.

legitimate global trading body.<sup>142</sup> Here we see FI identify the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’ as two units of analysis and acknowledge the antagonistic relationship between the two. We also see in this policy inclusivity’s material dimension. The party considers the ‘people’ as being largely excluded from the benefits of global trade and seeks to redirect those benefits towards them. Rejection of neoliberal hegemony is evident not only in the party’s rejection of free trade and international bodies that promote neoliberal principles like the WTO, but is also evident in its policy ambition to create a new world order built on cooperation and not subject to financial interests.<sup>143</sup>

FI associates France’s membership in the EU with a loss of national sovereignty and democratic control. The party believes that the reclamation of French national sovereignty is the first step in resisting what it sees as the EU’s ‘brutality against democracy’.<sup>144</sup> The party also views EU membership as incompatible with the preservation and advancement of left-wing populism’s ‘heartland’ of social democracy. FI does not see its progressive political program as being compatible with the rules of the European treaties due to the party’s perception that they impose budgetary austerity, free trade, and the destruction of public services.<sup>145</sup> This is best exemplified by FI’s policy to disobey the EU treaties as soon as it comes to power as a means of what it sees as safeguarding the sovereignty of the French ‘people’.<sup>146</sup> This is part of what the party calls ‘Plan A’ and ‘Plan B’. Plan A is a coordinated exit from the existing European treaties and negotiating a new set of treaties. FI plans to propose a social and democratic overhaul of the EU.<sup>147</sup> If ‘Plan A’ fails then ‘Plan B’ is for France to leave the European treaties unilaterally.<sup>148</sup> FI’s policy ambition of negotiating a democratic overhaul of the EU exemplifies inclusivity’s political dimension as it is intended to extend the political involvement of the ‘people’ in the EU’s governance.

The symbolic dimension of inclusivity is seen in FI’s pacifism. The party intends to withdraw France from NATO and forbid it to join any other military alliance.<sup>149</sup> This is intended to make France a universalist nation that champions peace.<sup>150</sup> This goal of making France a universalist nation is evidence of inclusivity’s symbolic dimension as defining the French nation as a universalist nation includes outgroups in that definition.

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<sup>142</sup> La France Insoumise, *L’avenir en commun* [The future in common], 92.

<sup>143</sup> La France Insoumise, *L’avenir en commun* [The future in common], 96.

<sup>144</sup> La France Insoumise, *L’avenir en commun* [The future in common], 17.

<sup>145</sup> La France Insoumise, *L’avenir en commun* [The future in common], 81.

<sup>146</sup> La France Insoumise, *L’avenir en commun* [The future in common], 81.

<sup>147</sup> La France Insoumise, *L’avenir en commun* [The future in common], 83.

<sup>148</sup> La France Insoumise, *L’avenir en commun* [The future in common], 83.

<sup>149</sup> La France Insoumise, *L’avenir en commun* [The future in common], 89.

<sup>150</sup> La France Insoumise, *L’avenir en commun* [The future in common], 15.


In sum, FI's approach to foreign policy is largely influenced by populist conceptions of the correlations of international trade. The party rejects neoliberal hegemony at both the global and European levels by seeking to reorder the international system along traditional left-wing principles. Although the party is willing to first try and negotiate a reform of the EU along social democratic principles, its willingness to withdraw France from the EU to preserve its social democratic domestic agenda means that the protection of the social democratic 'heartland' in France is more important to the party than preserving French membership in the EU.

*Die Linke*

**Figure 5.** are the average scores of the MARPOR external relations codes in Die Linke's 2017 and 2021 German federal election manifestos. The three most prominent external relations codes are,

1. 105 Military: Negative
2. 107 Internationalism: Positive
3. 106 Peace: Positive.

Sections of Die Linke's selected national election manifestos coming under these three most prominent codes represent Die Linke's foreign policy priority areas and are the main focus of the qualitative analysis.



**Figure 5.** The average scores of the MARPOR external relations codes in Die Linke's 2017 and 2021 German federal election manifestos.

Die Linke's anti-militarism and pacifism intersect with one another. These are policies shaped by German history. Due to Germany's war-like past Die Linke believes Germany has a special responsibility towards disarmament and peaceful conflict resolution and as such the party believes that peace and early conflict resolution must be the focus of German foreign policy.<sup>151</sup> The party also seeks to hinder any chances of Germany becoming a military power again. This is expressed in policies such as the gradual disarmament of the German military (Bundeswehr).<sup>152</sup>

It is in Die Linke's internationalism that the party displays its anti-capitalist left-wing credentials, particularly in its solidarity with the Global South. The party wants to implement what it calls a 'solidarity-based multilateralism'.<sup>153</sup> Die Linke's rejection of neoliberal hegemony is evident in the party's goal of overcoming neoliberal capitalism to reach worldwide social justice.<sup>154</sup> Inclusivity's material dimension is seen in the party's trade policies. Die Linke adopts a fairtrade policy that is intended to reshape both German and European trade policy to no longer be shaped by short-term interests that lead to the impoverishment of others.<sup>155</sup> It wants to see free trade agreements such as the European Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), considered by the party as cementing the Global South as a supplier of raw materials, to be replaced by fair trade agreements based on rules for production conditions that ensure proper working conditions and environmental protection measures along global production and supply chains.<sup>156</sup> It is through fairtrade policies that Die Linke wishes to redistribute the benefits of global trade to the Global South.

Although Die Linke' approach to foreign policy exhibits the inclusivity of 'full' left-wing ideological political thought and rejects neoliberal hegemony, the party does not exhibit any of populism's 'thin' ideological core concepts in its foreign policy approach. This is the case for all sections of its 2017 and 2021 German federal election manifestos that have been coded by MARPOR under its external relations codes.

To conclude, Die Linke's approach to foreign policy is influenced by a pacifism and an anti-militarism shaped by Germany's war-like history and the left-wing principle of

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<sup>151</sup> Die Linke, *Sozial gerechter Frieden für alle: Die Zukunft, für die wir kämpfen* [Socially Just Peace for All: The Future We Are Fighting For] (Berlin: Die Linke, 2017), 94.

<sup>152</sup> Die Linke, *Zeit zu handeln!: Für soziale Sicherheit, Frieden und Klimagerechtigkeit – Wahlprogramm zur Bundestagswahl 2021* [Time to Act!: For Social Security, Peace, and Climate Justice – Election Program for the Federal Election 2021] (Berlin: Die Linke, 2021), 134.

<sup>153</sup> Die Linke, *Zeit zu handeln!* [Time to Act!], 133.

<sup>154</sup> Die Linke, *Zeit zu handeln!* [Time to Act!], 139.

<sup>155</sup> Die Linke, *Zeit zu handeln!* [Time to Act!], 139.

<sup>156</sup> Die Linke, *Zeit zu handeln!* [Time to Act!], 140.


solidarity, especially with poorer parts of the world. The party’s approach to foreign policy, however, does not display any trace of the party’s ‘thin’ populist ideology.

*Socialistische Partij*

**Figure 6.** are the average scores of the MARPOR external relations codes in the SP’s 2012 and 2017 Dutch general election manifestos. The three most prominent external relations codes are,

1. 107 Internationalism: Positive
2. 110 European/Regional Integration: Negative
3. 106 Peace: Positive.

Sections of the SP’s selected national election manifestos coming under these three most prominent codes represent the SP’s foreign policy priority areas and will be the main focus of the qualitative analysis.



**Figure 6.** The average scores of the MARPOR external relations codes in the SP’s 2012 and 2017 Dutch general election manifestos.

The SP’s internationalism and pacifism have strong humanitarian overtones. International cooperation on resolving issues around refugee flows is a primary focus of the SP’s internationalism. The party is committed to respecting and implementing the Refugee Convention and fairly distributing refugees among all EU member states.<sup>157</sup> The SP’s

<sup>157</sup> Socialistische Partij, *Programma voor een Sociaal Nederland voor de Verkiezingen van 15 maart 2017* [Program for a Social Netherlands for the Elections of March 15 2017] (Amsterdam: Socialistische Partij, 2017), 57.

pacifism embodies itself in a non-interventionist policy for the Netherlands. The party has an expressed policy to limit the Netherlands' engagement in military missions abroad to those at the request of the United Nations and plans to reform the Dutch armed forces for peacekeeping deployments only.<sup>158</sup>

It is in the party's Euroscepticism that the SP shows its populism. The party considers 'elite' bureaucrats and not the citizens as in charge of Europe, and as such has an official policy position of holding a referendum on a new European treaty that grants more powers to EU member states and citizens so they can resist agreements that enforce the privatization of public tasks and the erosion of social services.<sup>159</sup> Here is evidence of the party identifying the 'people' and the 'elite' as two units of analysis and acknowledging their antagonistic relationship. The intention of the referendum to grant EU citizens the ability to reject neoliberal policies is a rejection of neoliberal hegemony. It is also an expression of inclusivity's material dimension as this new EU treaty is intended to protect social services and hence the social democratic 'heartland' of left-wing populism. The SP seeks to build a more social Europe with respect for national sovereignty so EU member states can decide for themselves decisions on issues concerning national budgets and social services.<sup>160</sup> The party believes that the EU has become tyrannical due to it granting too much freedom to financial markets and multinationals at the expense of national sovereignty and democratic oversight.<sup>161</sup> As such the SP intends to democratise the ECB as the party considers it too representative of the interests of banks and not the citizens of Europe.<sup>162</sup> This is an expression of inclusivity's political dimension as the party wants to extend the decision making process in EU financial institutions to the 'people'.

To summarise, the SP's approach to foreign policy expresses a humanitarianism and non-interventionism combined with a populist perception of the EU. The party rejects neoliberal hegemony and seeks to grant sovereign states more agency over their social spending while trying to reform it to include the participation of the people in its institutions.

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<sup>158</sup> Socialistische Partij, *Programma voor een Sociaal Nederland* [Program for a Social Netherlands], 59.

<sup>159</sup> Socialistische Partij, *Programma voor een Sociaal Nederland* [Program for a Social Netherlands], 53.

<sup>160</sup> Socialistische Partij, *Nieuw vertrouwen: Verkiezingsprogramma SP* [New Trust: Election Program SP] (Amsterdam: Socialistische Partij, 2012), 59.


<sup>161</sup> Socialistische Partij, *Nieuw vertrouwen* [New Trust], 59.

<sup>162</sup> Socialistische Partij, *Programma voor een Sociaal Nederland* [Program for a Social Netherlands], 18.

**Figure 7.** are the average scores of the MARPOR external relations codes in Levica's 2018 Slovenian parliamentary election manifesto. The three most prominent external relations codes are,

1. 103 Anti-Imperialism: Positive
2. 105 Military: Negative
3. 110 European/Regional Integration: Negative.

Sections of Levica's selected national election manifestos coming under these three most prominent codes represent Levica's foreign policy priority areas and will be the main focus of the qualitative analysis.



**Figure 7.** the average scores of the MARPOR external relations codes in Levica's 2018 Slovenian parliamentary election manifesto.

Levica's anti-imperialism is largely state-centric with anti-U.S. and anti-Western overtones. NATO is a particular focus of the party's anti-imperialism. Levica refers to NATO as a tool of American imperialism<sup>163</sup> and argues that Slovenian membership has turned Slovenia into a subcontractor of NATO and American imperialism.<sup>164</sup> This perception has led to Levica adopting an anti-militarism directed squarely at NATO and Slovenia's involvement in the organisation. This expresses itself in policies to oppose NATO

<sup>163</sup> Levica, *Blaginja za vse, ne samo za priročno: Program leve stranke za volitve v državni zbor 2018* [Prosperity for All, Not Only for a Handful: Left Party Program for the 2018 National Assembly Elections] (Ljubljana: Levica, 2018), 14.

<sup>164</sup> Levica, *Blaginja za vse, ne samo za priročno* [Prosperity for All, Not Only for a Handful], 12.

expansion<sup>165</sup> and to withdraw Slovenia from the organisation and make Slovenia a neutral country.<sup>166</sup>

Levica also takes a critical stance towards the EU. This is due to the party's perception of the EU pursuing a pro-American policy.<sup>167</sup> The rejection of neoliberal hegemony is also part of Levica's Euroscepticism. The party is opposed to Slovenia transferring fiscal and monetary sovereignty to the EU, as it sees the EU entirely subordinate to the interests of capital.<sup>168</sup> The party accuses the EU of enforcing the dictates of the free market and considers the ECB as the main lever of power of European neoliberalism and the cause of the disintegration of the welfare state.<sup>169</sup> As such Levica has pledged itself to fight for fundamental reform of the EU to ensure the preservation of the welfare state.<sup>170</sup> This pledge is evidence of inclusivity's material dimension as the welfare state is of vital importance to wealth redistribution. This is also an attempt to protect the social democratic 'heartland' of left-wing populism. The party views the EU in 'thin' populist ideological conceptual terms. The party states that in order to prevent the 'people' from inevitably resisting neoliberal policies the EU's centres of power have been made deliberately technocratic to shield it from democratic pressures.<sup>171</sup> Here the party identifies the 'people' and the 'elite' as two units of analysis and acknowledges the antagonistic relationship between them. But unlike its policy of withdrawing Slovenia from NATO Levica takes a different approach to the EU. Instead, the party calls for an EU based on common social and democratic standards<sup>172</sup> and for greater autonomy for EU member states so as not to have agreements forced upon them.<sup>173</sup> By calling for an EU based on common social and democratic standards Levica displays inclusivity's political dimension as it seeks to extend EU decision making to the people.

To sum up, Levica's approach to foreign policy is grounded in a state-centric anti-imperialism directed at Western international organisations. The party rejects the neoliberal hegemony within the EU and advocates for greater national sovereignty to preserve the Slovenian welfare state. Unlike NATO the party does not outright reject the EU, but seeks to reform it along left-wing social democratic principles.

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<sup>165</sup> Levica, *Blaginja za vse, ne samo za priročno* [Prosperity for All, Not Only for a Handful], 86.

<sup>166</sup> Levica, *Blaginja za vse, ne samo za priročno* [Prosperity for All, Not Only for a Handful], 89.

<sup>167</sup> Levica, *Blaginja za vse, ne samo za priročno* [Prosperity for All, Not Only for a Handful], 85.

<sup>168</sup> Levica, *Blaginja za vse, ne samo za priročno* [Prosperity for All, Not Only for a Handful], 12.

<sup>169</sup> Levica, *Blaginja za vse, ne samo za priročno* [Prosperity for All, Not Only for a Handful], 93.

<sup>170</sup> Levica, *Blaginja za vse, ne samo za priročno* [Prosperity for All, Not Only for a Handful], 14.

<sup>171</sup> Levica, *Blaginja za vse, ne samo za priročno* [Prosperity for All, Not Only for a Handful], 93.

<sup>172</sup> Levica, *Blaginja za vse, ne samo za priročno* [Prosperity for All, Not Only for a Handful], 93.

<sup>173</sup> Levica, *Blaginja za vse, ne samo za priročno* [Prosperity for All, Not Only for a Handful], 94.



## *Comparing the Foreign Policy Approaches of European Left-wing Populist Parties*

The foreign policy approaches of all six European left-wing populist parties exhibit the inclusiveness of 'full' left-wing ideological thought. The most common dimension of inclusivity in their foreign policy approaches is the material dimension. In the case of SYRIZA, the SP, and Levica this largely relates to the EU, whereas for Podemos and Die Linke this is largely at the global level. For FI this is both at the EU and global level. All six parties also reject neoliberal hegemony. Again, for SYRIZA, the SP, and Levica this is primarily at the EU level, for Podemos and Die Linke at the global level, and for FI both at the EU and global level. SYRIZA's, the SP's and Levica's rejection of neoliberal hegemony largely relates to protecting their welfare states and social programmes from the enforcement of neoliberal policies by the EU. Podemos and Die Linke largely reject neoliberal hegemony concerning the structures of global financial governance and global trade. Neoliberal hegemony is rejected by FI concerning both the correlations of global trade and the preservation of FI's social democratic political agenda from EU neoliberal policies and agreements.

The foreign policy approaches of the parties differ in two major ways. The first relates to the exhibition of 'thin' populist ideological core concepts. SYRIZA, FI, the SP, and Levica all exhibit 'thin' populist ideological core concepts in their foreign policy approaches. The identification of the 'people' and the 'elites' as two separate units of analysis and the antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite' being the most prominent. SYRIZA, the SP, and Levica all express 'thin' populist ideological core concepts in their foreign policy approaches towards the EU, whereas FI expresses it at both the global and EU level. There is no evidence that Podemos and Die Linke exhibit 'thin' populist ideological core concepts in their foreign policy approaches. This may not be surprising concerning Die Linke as it rates the lowest score of the six selected parties in the 2019 CHES scores on the salience of anti-elite/anti-establishment rhetoric. This is, however, surprising for Podemos who rates the second highest score.

The second major way the foreign policy approaches of the six parties differ is the advocacy of national sovereignty. Those parties that exhibit 'thin' populist ideological core concepts in their foreign policy approach i.e., SYRIZA, FI, the SP, and Levica, also advocate for national sovereignty. There is no evidence that Podemos and Die Linke, the parties that do not exhibit 'thin' populist ideological core concepts in their foreign policy approaches, advocate for national sovereignty. SYRIZA, FI, the SP, and Levica advocate for national

sovereignty so that the sovereign state can protect the social democratic 'heartland' of left-wing populism from the enforcement of neoliberalism by the EU. This is how their advocacy of national sovereignty differs from that of right-wing populist parties. They do so not as a filtering mechanism for future membership of the nation state, but to combat global neoliberalism. However, it needs to be pointed out that those parties that advocate for national sovereignty are not necessarily averse to international cooperation. This is seen in the internationalism of SYRIZA, FI, and the SP.

## *Conclusion*

The selection process for the six European left-wing populist parties whose foreign policy approaches are examined in this chapter involves a mixed methods approach that has addressed the first sub-question of this thesis,

*'What political parties are representative of European left-wing populist parties?'*

SYRIZA, Podemos, La France Insoumise, Die Linke, Socialistische Partij, and Levica are all representative of European left-wing populist parties. They are all identified by both quantitative and qualitative data as being left-wing populist, they all have electoral relevance by having sitting members in their respective national legislatures, and they are all drawn from Europe's three major regions of Northwestern Europe, Southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe.

The quantitative and qualitative analysis of the foreign policy approaches of the six selected European populist parties resulted in two main findings that addressed the second sub-question of this thesis,

*'What are the foreign policy approaches of European left-wing populist parties?'*

The first finding is that while all six selected parties' foreign policy approaches are influenced by the inclusiveness of 'full' left-wing ideological thought, not all of them are influenced by 'thin' populist ideology. The foreign policy approaches of SYRIZA, FI, the SP, and Levica are influenced by both their 'full' left-wing ideology and their 'thin' populist ideology. The foreign policy approaches of Podemos and Die Linke are influenced by their 'full' left-wing ideology but there is no evidence that they are influenced by their 'thin' populist ideology.

The second major finding is that those parties whose foreign policy approaches exhibit 'thin' populist ideological core concepts also advocate for national sovereignty. Those parties that do not exhibit 'thin' populist ideological core concepts also do not

advocate for national sovereignty. SYRIZA, FI, the SP, and Levica all advocate for national sovereignty as a means of resisting neoliberal hegemony and protecting the social democratic 'heartland' of left-wing populism. However, these parties do not necessarily reject international cooperation. Podemos and Die Linke only advocate for international cooperation and solidarity to combat neoliberal hegemony as there is no evidence that their foreign policy approaches advocate for national sovereignty.

So, in answer to the second sub-question of this thesis SYRIZA, FI, the SP and Levica all take an approach to foreign policy that exhibits both their 'thin' populist ideology and their 'full' left-wing ideology along with an advocacy of national sovereignty to protect left-wing populism's social democratic 'heartland' from neoliberalism. However, their foreign policy approaches are not necessarily antithetical to international cooperation. Podemos and Die Linke take an approach to foreign policy that only exhibits their 'full' left-wing ideology and not their 'thin' populist ideology. Their approaches to foreign policy do not advocate for national sovereignty and only call for international cooperation. This shows that populist parties can be selective in which policy areas they apply their 'thin' populist ideology.

# Chapter Three: Typologising and Understanding the Foreign Policy Approaches of European Left-wing Populist Parties

## *Introduction*

In chapter one the thesis laid out its conceptual background by reviewing literature on populism, left-wing populism, and populist approaches to foreign policy. In chapter two the thesis identified what parties are representative of European left-wing populist parties and what the foreign policy approaches of those parties are. This chapter typologises the foreign policy approaches of European left-wing populist parties and explains those identifiable types of foreign policy approaches. The primary aim is to understand the different types of approaches to foreign policy adopted by European left-wing populist parties and hence answer the research question of this thesis,

*'What are the types of foreign policy approaches adopted by European left-wing populist parties?'*

It is in this chapter that the thesis fills in the gaps in Chryssogelos' work on the different types of foreign policy approaches among European populist parties. Chryssogelos classifies European left-wing populist parties' approach to foreign policy under a singular type based on their 'full' ideology and their strategic cultures. By omitting the presence of 'thin' populist ideology and attitudes towards the EU in his analysis Chryssogelos misses a key distinguishing difference among the foreign policy approaches of European left-wing populist parties. This difference is the exhibition of 'thin' populist ideological core concepts.


Firstly, the chapter offers an ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy. This ideal type combines the inclusiveness of left-wing ideology with the first two core concepts of 'thin' populist ideology identified by Stanley, i.e., the 'people' and the 'elite' as two units of analysis and the antagonistic relationship between the two. The ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered by this thesis acts as a tool for the construction of the typology.

Secondly, the chapter constructs a typology of two identifiable types of foreign policy approaches adopted by European left-wing populist parties based on how close they resemble the ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered by this thesis. The two identifiable types of approaches to foreign policy identified are democratic

sovereigntist and revolutionary internationalist. The typology places each of the six selected parties into a type and then discusses each type in turn. The chapter finally concludes with its findings.

### *An Ideal Type of Left-wing Populist Approach to Foreign Policy*

This thesis proposes that an ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy is an approach to foreign policy predicated on a populist conception of an antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite' in combination with the inclusivity of left-wing ideological thought. This conceptual approach resembles what March<sup>174</sup> identifies as defining left-wing populism i.e., the fusion of 'thin' populist ideology to the inclusiveness of 'full' left-wing ideological thought. The combination of these two components is the basis in which to measure the degree that the foreign policy approaches of the six selected European left-wing populist parties depart from. **Figure 8.** are the two core components of the ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered by this thesis.



**Figure 8.** Components of an ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy.

<sup>174</sup> March, 'From Vanguard of the Proletariat to Vox Populi', 66.

## *Typology of the Foreign Policy Approaches of European Left-wing Populist Parties: Understanding the Democratic Sovereigntist and Revolutionary Internationalist Approaches to Foreign Policy*

Drawing on the analysis conducted in chapter two, this thesis identifies two distinguishable types of approaches to foreign policy adopted by European left-wing populist parties. These two approaches are (1) democratic sovereigntist and (2) revolutionary internationalist. The two approaches can be disaggregated on how close they resemble the ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered by this thesis. **Table 2.** displays the typology of the foreign policy approaches of the six selected European left-wing populist parties. The second column disaggregates the approaches on how close they come to meeting the ideal type of foreign policy offered by this thesis. The democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy exhibits a populist conception of an antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite' in combination with the inclusivity of left-wing ideological thought. The revolutionary internationalist approach to foreign policy exhibits only the inclusivity of left-wing ideological thought. The third column disaggregates the approaches concerning a feature not related to the ideal type. This feature is the advocacy of national sovereignty. The democratic sovereigntist approach advocates for national sovereignty, whereas the revolutionary internationalist approach does not.

**Table 2.** Typology of the foreign policy approaches of the six selected European left-wing populist parties.

Type of foreign policy approach	Distinguishing difference in relation to meeting ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy	Distinguishing difference not related to ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy	Parties whose foreign policy approach belongs to type
Democratic sovereigntist	Exhibits a populist conception of an antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite' in combination with the inclusivity of left-wing ideological thought	Advocacy of national sovereignty	SYRIZA La France Insoumise Socialistische Partij Levica
Revolutionary internationalist	Exhibits only the inclusivity of left-wing ideological thought	No advocacy of national sovereignty	Podemos Die Linke

### *Democratic Sovereigntist Approach to Foreign Policy*

Four of the six European left-wing populist parties chosen for this thesis adopt a democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy. These parties are SYRIZA, La France Insoumise (FI), Socialistische Partij (SP), and Levica. This type of approach to foreign policy comes the closest to the ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered by this thesis. It exhibits both core components of the ideal type in that it combines a populist conception of an antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite' with the egalitarianism of 'full' left-wing ideology.

The democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy exhibits a populist conception of an antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite' due to its premise being the 'people' claiming the right on decisional power for themselves against the 'elites' who want to remove state sovereignty in order to redirect politics towards their own interests.<sup>175</sup> In the case of SYRIZA, FI, the SP and Levica this entails the 'people' of their respective nation states asserting both their popular and national sovereignty against EU

<sup>175</sup> Damiani, *Populist Radical Left Parties in Western Europe*, 58.

'elites' who want to undermine national sovereignty as a check on their own power exercised through EU institutional power. Broadly speaking the concept of sovereignty refers to the notion of having control over the conditions of one's existence<sup>176</sup> and demands for popular sovereign control are often embedded in populist sentiment.<sup>177</sup> The ideal of popular sovereignty is one in which the 'people' are the supreme authority of a given state, the constituent power that authorises and creates the institutional arrangements under which they are governed.<sup>178</sup>

The democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy correlates popular sovereignty with a defence of national sovereignty. At the heart of sovereigntism is the concept of 'taking back control' which is the common political denominator for populist parties across Europe.<sup>179</sup> Kallis identifies four critical components of 'taking back control' – (1) *who* must take back control, (2) *from who/where* this control must be taken back, (3) *how* this control must be taken back, and (4) *where* this control will be brought to.<sup>180</sup> According to Kallis populist 'thin' ideology answers the first three components. It is the 'people' that must take back control from global 'elites' and their transnational interests through strategies that protect the 'people' from undesirable external forces.<sup>181</sup> State sovereigntism answers the fourth component of taking back control i.e., *where* this control must be brought back to. For democratic sovereigntism this control must be brought back to the 'people' represented by the nation state. State sovereigntism is a conception of sovereignty that involves the ability of a public body in the form of the modern nation state to be the uncontested authority within a particular territorial unit.<sup>182</sup> Contemporary conceptions of state sovereigntism argue in favour of political communities being able to tackle global challenges without surrendering their national sovereignty.<sup>183</sup> Globalisation in particular is viewed with suspicion as it is viewed as an 'elite' driven project that threatens the security and prosperity of the 'people'.<sup>184</sup>

The inclusivity of left-wing ideological thought is evident in the democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy due to its inclusive dyadic conceptions of the

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<sup>176</sup> J. Friedman, 'A Note on Populism and Global Systemic Crisis', *Economic Anthropology*, 5/1 (2018), 136.

<sup>177</sup> Friedman, 'A Note on Populism and Global Systemic Crisis', 137.

<sup>178</sup> L. Beckman, 'Popular Sovereignty Facing the Deep State: The Rule of Recognition and the Powers of the People', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 24/7 (2021), 955.

<sup>179</sup> A. Kallis, 'Populism, Sovereigntism, and the Unlikely Re-emergence of the Territorial Nation-state', *Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences*, 11/3 (2018), 286.

<sup>180</sup> Kallis, 'Populism, Sovereigntism, and the Unlikely Re-emergence of the Territorial Nation-state', 287.

<sup>181</sup> Kallis, 'Populism, Sovereigntism, and the Unlikely Re-emergence of the Territorial Nation-state', 287.

<sup>182</sup> S. Benhabib, 'The New Sovereigntism and Transnational Law: Legal Utopianism, Democratic Scepticism and Statist Realism', *Global Constitutionalism*, 5/1 (2016), 134.

<sup>183</sup> M. Minakov, 'Sovereignty as a Contested Concept: The Cases of Trumpism and Putinism', in M. Minakov, ed., *Inventing Majorities: Ideological Creativity in Post-Soviet Societies* (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2022), 293.

<sup>184</sup> Kallis, 'Populism, Sovereigntism, and the Unlikely Re-emergence of the Territorial Nation-state', 294.



'people'. Ferry coined the term democratic sovereigntism to define a type of national republicanism that promotes a state-centric nationalism in the name of 'true democracy'.<sup>185</sup> The national republicanism of democratic sovereigntism believes that in order for there to be a political community there must first be a moral community and that the nation is the only community of this type that exists as the basis for a shared destiny that is both singular and universal.<sup>186</sup> The universality of the democratic sovereigntist conception of the nation state means that it is compatible with any of the dimensions of inclusivity. It sees the nation state as the only means of effectively delivering democracy and transitioning from the *ethnos* to the *demos*.<sup>187</sup> SYRIZA, FI, the SP, and LeVica all view the nation state as a socio-economic project. The nation state to these parties is an instrument of delivering the three dimensions of inclusivity, particularly that of the material dimension.

This is how the democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy differs from right-wing populist calls for national sovereignty. It does so not as an exclusive filtering mechanism for future membership of the nation state, but to resist neoliberal global hegemony. The democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy advocates taking back national sovereignty to relaunch the social democratic project that was disrupted by global neoliberalism due to the fact that redistributive economic policies require national autonomy over monetary policy and the ability to finance public spending.<sup>188</sup> SYRIZA, FI, the SP, and LeVica all advocate for national sovereignty not to preserve the ethno-cultural characteristics of their respective sovereign states, but as a means of preserving the social democratic programmes of their nation states. The goal of the democratic sovereigntist approach is the reclamation of the national space as a political realm in which to manage the redistributive contest.<sup>189</sup> The nation state is seen as a means of preserving the social democratic 'heartland' of left-wing populism from the transgressions of neoliberal globalism. As such the model of governance advocated by democratic sovereigntism is one within the confines of the nation state, one intended to resist global neoliberalism in order to establish an economic democracy capable of implementing the left-wing principles of equality, freedom, and solidarity.<sup>190</sup> Democratic sovereigntist approaches to foreign policy are not antithetical to internationalism however. For example, proponents of democratic sovereigntism advocate for international cooperation between states to oppose the hegemony of economics and

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<sup>185</sup> J-M Ferry, 'The New European Question: The Problem of Post-national Integration', in A. Dieckhoff & C. Jaffrelot, eds., *Revisiting Nationalism: Theories and Processes* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 231.

<sup>186</sup> Ferry, 'The new European Question', 234.

<sup>187</sup> Ferry, 'The new European Question', 234.

<sup>188</sup> Damiani, *Populist Radical Left Parties in Western Europe*, 59.

<sup>189</sup> Damiani, *Populist Radical Left Parties in Western Europe*, 59.

<sup>190</sup> Damiani, *Populist Radical Left Parties in Western Europe*, 59-60.

markets over politics.<sup>191</sup> The democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy compliments the defence of national sovereignty with internationalism when it is advantageous.

### *Revolutionary Internationalist Approach to Foreign Policy*

Two of the six European left-wing populist parties chosen for this thesis adopt a revolutionary internationalist approach to foreign policy. These parties are Podemos and Die Linke. This type of approach to foreign policy only resembles the ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered by this thesis in that it exhibits only one core component of the ideal type. Although the revolutionary internationalist approach to foreign policy exhibits the inclusiveness of 'full' left-wing ideology it does not exhibit a populist conception of an antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite'. The revolutionary approach also does not feature other populist 'thin' ideological core concepts such as valorisation of the 'people' and the denigration of the 'elite', and the idea of popular sovereignty.

There are three core themes that run through the various definitions of internationalism – an objective process of increasing interaction, increasing collaboration in response to this interaction, and that these things are good because there is an interest that lies beyond that of the nation state.<sup>192</sup> In the case of the revolutionary internationalist approaches of Podemos and Die Linke the increasing transnational interaction and collaboration between those suffering under neoliberal hegemony is celebrated and encouraged. Halliday coined the term revolutionary internationalism to describe an appeal of oppressed groups to work together across national frontiers.<sup>193</sup> The inclusivity of 'full' left-wing ideology is evident through the encouragement of transnational solidarity of oppressed groups to work together to advance equality and all the dimensions of inclusivity. The transnational collaboration of oppressed groups is inclusive by nature as out groups excluded from the material, political, and symbolic dimensions of inclusivity are often oppressed. Although the revolutionary internationalist approach to foreign policy is adopted by Marxist parties, it does not have to be preconditioned on class struggle or the top-down role of a dedicated party of revolutionaries. Not all revolutions are Marxist and not all transnational struggles are class oriented. Like many theories in social science there is no

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<sup>191</sup> Damiani, *Populist Radical Left Parties in Western Europe*, 62.

<sup>192</sup> F. Halliday, 'Three Concepts of Internationalism', *International Affairs*, 64/2 (1988), 188.

<sup>193</sup> Halliday, 'Three Concepts of Internationalism', 195.

applicable general theory to internationalism as it is a cluster concept that has numerous ideas associated with it without any of them constituting its core meaning.<sup>194</sup>

The other fundamental difference between the revolutionary internationalist approach to foreign policy and the democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy, besides revolutionary internationalism's absence of a populist conception of an antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite', is the absence of the advocacy of national sovereignty on the part of revolutionary internationalism. There is no place for national sovereignty in the revolutionary internationalist approach to foreign policy. This is because in its most rudimentary conceptual form internationalism is the belief that people should belong to a broader community beyond that of a particular nationality or sovereign state.<sup>195</sup> Revolutionary internationalism is largely transnational in its understanding of conflict. Its proponents see struggles that occur within a society being determined by international factors, and as such internal and external struggles are linked.<sup>196</sup> Podemos and Die Linke combat global neoliberal hegemony over their own countries through foreign policy approaches that rely on transnational solutions such as reforming international financial governance institutions and advancing fair trade. Proponents of revolutionary internationalism see the solution to struggle in largely transnational terms. The revolutionary internationalist approach to foreign policy stresses the importance of collaboration and assistance between the struggles of various societies due to the belief that preconditions for stability within one society depend on that in others.<sup>197</sup>

## *Conclusion*

Two types of approaches to foreign policy are identified among the six selected European left-wing populist parties – democratic sovereigntist and revolutionary internationalist. The democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy comes closer to this thesis' ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy as it contains both core components of this thesis' ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy whereas the revolutionary internationalist approach to foreign policy only exhibits one core component i.e., the egalitarianism of 'full' left-wing ideological thought. The two types of approaches to foreign policy also differ in a different way that is not related to meeting the ideal type. The democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy advocates for national sovereignty as a

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<sup>194</sup> Halliday, 'Three Concepts of Internationalism', 188.

<sup>195</sup> Halliday, 'Three Concepts of Internationalism', 187.

<sup>196</sup> Halliday, 'Three Concepts of Internationalism', 195.

<sup>197</sup> Halliday, 'Three Concepts of Internationalism', 196.

means of combating neoliberal hegemony whereas the revolutionary internationalist approach to foreign policy relies solely on transnational solidarity among oppressed groups.

The implications of the identification of two types of foreign policy approaches among the six selected European left-wing populist parties is that the gap in Chryssogelos' research has been filled. Based on the exhibition of populist 'thin' ideological core concepts there are more than one type of approach to foreign policy that European left-wing populist parties adopt. This in turn leads to the main research question of this thesis being addressed. There are two distinctive types of foreign policy approaches among European left-wing populist parties – democratic sovereigntist and revolutionary internationalist.

## Conclusion

Populism is a poorly understood concept and is used loosely by commentators and academia alike. Despite the various definitions of populism, it is important to use a singular definition of the concept to avoid confusion. There is growing consensus on defining populism as a 'thin' ideology that attaches itself to more substantive 'full' ideologies. The ideational approach to populism lessens the risk of conflating populism with other related concepts, but more importantly defining populism as an ideology allows for the use of key concepts to determine its presence within policy. Although there are differences among scholars on what constitutes the core concepts of populism, the antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite' is the defining feature of populism.

Left-wing populism is a form of politics that combines 'thin' populist ideology to the 'full' ideology of left-wing political thought. The dyadic nature of left-wing populism is what distinguishes it from the triadic nature of right-wing populism. Left-wing populism seeks to expand the various dimensions of inclusivity. It distinguishes itself from the post-politics of the mainstream centre-left by rejecting the hegemony of neoliberalism. Although the 'people' vs 'elite' dichotomy of left-wing populism resembles Marxism the post-class orientation of left-wing populism and its horizontal nature distinguishes it from the hierarchical design of Marxist party politics and its concentration on class conflict

Populist 'thin' ideology influences a populist political actor's approach to foreign policy when domestic hostility towards political elites spills over into hostility towards international elites. This is particularly the case when populist political actors use foreign policy to push their domestic political agendas. The 'full' host ideology of a populist political actor influences their approach to foreign policy more, however, as the 'full' host ideology forms the core political identity of a populist political actor. This can be seen in Podemos' and Die Linke's 'full' left-wing ideology being exhibited in their foreign policy approaches but not their 'thin' populist ideology. Although both right-wing populism and left-wing populism seek to preserve national sovereignty, they do so for different reasons. Right-wing populism does so to preserve the exclusive ethno-cultural 'heartland' of the people whereas left-wing populism does so to preserve the inclusive social democratic 'heartland' of the people. This is evident in the foreign policy approaches of SYRIZA, La France Insoumise (FI), Socialistische Partij (SP), and Levica.

When it comes to identifying different types of foreign policy approaches adopted by European populist parties three types have been identified by Chryssogelos – continental nationalist, Atlanticist nationalist, and Anti-imperialist internationalist. A gap exists in this

research however as these types have been identified based on the 'full' host ideologies and the strategic culture of the populist parties. Chryssogelos' comparative analysis omits the presence of populist 'thin' ideology and the parties' attitudes towards the EU, and as such categorises European left-wing populist parties under single type – anti-imperialist internationalist. This thesis fills this gap by including the presence of populist 'thin' ideology and attitudes towards the EU in a comparative analysis of European left-wing populist parties to determine if they adopt different types of approaches to foreign policy.

SYRIZA, Podemos, La France Insoumise, Die Linke, Socialistische Partij, and Levica are all representative of European left-wing populist parties. The analysis conducted by this thesis of their foreign policy approaches reveals that the inclusiveness of 'full' left-wing ideological thought is evident in all of the six selected European left-wing populist parties' approaches to foreign policy, but the presence of 'thin' populist ideological core concepts is not. The foreign policy approaches of SYRIZA, La France Insoumise, Socialistische Partij, and Levica are all influenced by both their 'thin' populist ideology and their 'full' left-wing ideology. The foreign policy approaches of Podemos and Die Linke are only influenced by their 'full' left-wing ideology. The same parties whose approaches to foreign policy exhibit 'thin' populist ideological core concepts also advocate for national sovereignty.

In order to organise the differences among the foreign policy approaches of the six selected European left-wing populist parties into workable identifiable types, Weber's ideal type is applied by this thesis to make them more manageable. The ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered by this thesis combines the two axes of left-wing populism to form its two core components – a populist conception of an antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite' in combination with the inclusivity of left-wing ideological thought. The ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered by this thesis is used to identify the different types of foreign policy approaches of the six selected European left-wing populist parties based on how close they met the ideal type.

Two types of approaches to foreign policy adopted by European left-wing populist parties are identified by this thesis – democratic sovereigntist and revolutionary internationalist. The main distinguishing features between these two types of approaches is the exhibition of 'thin' populist ideological core concepts and the advocacy of national sovereignty. The democratic sovereigntist approach to foreign policy intertwines populism with national sovereignty as a means of rejecting neoliberal hegemony, showing that there is a strong correlation between the two. It seeks to preserve national sovereignty in order to protect the social democratic 'heartland' of left-wing populism. This type of approach to foreign policy most closely resembles the ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign

policy offered by this thesis as it combines a populist conception of an antagonistic relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite' with the inclusivity of left-wing ideological thought, the two core components of the ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered by this thesis. SYRIZA, La France Insoumise, Socialistische Partij, and Levica adopt this type of foreign policy approach. The revolutionary internationalist approach to foreign policy contains no exhibition of populist 'thin' ideological core concepts or the advocacy of national sovereignty. It relies on internationalist cooperation and solidarity to combat neoliberal hegemony. As such, it resembles the ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy offered by this thesis in that it exhibits only one of its core components, that being the inclusiveness of left-wing ideological thought. Podemos and Die Linke adopt this type of foreign policy approach.

This thesis has made three major contributions to the research on the approaches to foreign policy adopted by European left-wing populist parties. The first contribution is that it has filled a gap in the research on European left-wing populist approaches to foreign policy by identifying two distinct approaches to foreign policy adopted by European left wing populist parties – the democratic sovereigntist and revolutionary internationalist approaches. The second contribution is that it has established a methodological approach to comparing approaches to foreign policy that can be replicated to identify different types of approaches to foreign policy adopted by other populist parties both inside and outside of Europe. The third contribution is that it has offered an ideal type of left-wing populist approach to foreign policy. There is need for further research concerning the approaches to foreign policy among populist parties. Research needs to be done replicating the methodological approach of this thesis to identify different approaches to foreign policy among right-wing populist parties and other left-wing populist parties.

# Appendix

**Appendix 1.** The ten MARPOR external relations codes and the MARPOR code category scheme explaining the codes.

MARPOR Domain 1: External Relations Codes	MARPOR Code Category Scheme
101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	Favourable mentions of particular countries with which the manifesto country has a special relationship; the need for co-operation with and/or aid to such countries.
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	Negative mentions of particular countries with which the manifesto country has a special relationship.
103 Anti-Imperialism: Positive	<p>Negative references to imperial behaviour and/or negative references to one state exerting strong influence (political, military or commercial) over other states. May also include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Negative references to controlling other countries as if they were part of an empire;</li> <li>• Favourable references to greater self-government and independence for colonies;</li> <li>• Favourable mentions of de-colonisation.</li> </ul> <p>or</p> <p>Negative references and statements against international financial organisations or states using monetary means to assert strong influence over the manifesto or other states. May include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Statements against the World Bank, IMF etc.;</li> <li>• Statements against the Washington Consensus;</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Statements against foreign debt circumscribing state actions.</li> </ul>
104 Military: Positive	<p>The importance of external security and defence. May include statements concerning:</p> <p>The need to maintain or increase military expenditure;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The need to secure adequate manpower in the military;</li> <li>• The need to modernise armed forces and improve military strength;</li> <li>• The need for rearmament and self-defence;</li> <li>• The need to keep military treaty obligations.</li> </ul>
105 Military: Negative	<p>Negative references to the military or use of military power to solve conflicts. References to the 'evils of war'. May include references to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decreasing military expenditures;</li> <li>• Disarmament;</li> <li>• Reduced or abolished conscription.</li> </ul>
106 Peace: Positive	<p>Any declaration of belief in peace and peaceful means of solving crises – absent reference to the military. May include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peace as a general goal;</li> <li>• Desirability of countries joining in negotiations with hostile countries;</li> <li>• Ending wars in order to establish peace.</li> </ul>
107 Internationalism: Positive	<p>Need for international co-operation, including co-operation with specific countries other than those coded in 101. May also include references to the:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need for aid to developing countries;</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need for world planning of resources;</li> <li>• Support for global governance;</li> <li>• Need for international courts;</li> <li>• Support for UN or other international organisations.</li> </ul> <p><i>Note: This category is concerned with Regional Integration Organizations or Communities/Unions that manifest cooperation between countries of a region through common institutions and rules. Free Trade Agreements or other multilateral agreements or organisations are thus not included.</i></p>
108 European/Regional Integration: Positive	<p>Favourable mentions of European Community/Union or African Union; and regional integration within Latin American countries, e.g., CELAC, MERCOSUR, UNASUR; African countries, e.g., EAC, ECOWAS, COMESA, SADC. May include the:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desirability of the manifesto country joining (or remaining a member);</li> <li>• Desirability of expanding the specific Community/Union or regional integration;</li> <li>• Desirability of increasing the Community's/Union's competences;</li> <li>• Desirability of expanding the competences of the European Parliament or the Pan-African Parliament.</li> </ul>
109 Internationalism: Negative	<p>Negative references to international co-operation. Favourable mentions of national independence and sovereignty with regard to the manifesto country's foreign policy, isolation and/or unilateralism as opposed to internationalism.</p>

<p>110 European/Regional Integration: Negative</p>	<p>Negative references to the European Community/Union or African Union; and regional integration within Latin American countries, e.g., CELAC, MERCOSUR, UNASUR; African countries, e.g., EAC, ECOWAS, COMESA, SADC. May include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opposition to specific policies which are preferred by authorities of the Community/Union;</li> <li>• Opposition to the net-contribution of the manifesto country to the EU or AU budget.</li> <li>• Opposition to the manifesto country joining (or remaining a member);</li> <li>• Opposition to expanding or deepening the integration.</li> </ul>
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Source: Manifesto Project Dataset, 'Codebook', *Manifesto Project* (July 2020), 10-12, [https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/download/data/2020a/codebooks/codebook\\_MPDataset\\_MPDS2020a.pdf](https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/download/data/2020a/codebooks/codebook_MPDataset_MPDS2020a.pdf), accessed 16 June 2022.

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