Indonesia's Foreign Policy in the Making of Regional International Society in Southeast Asia

By

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Declaration

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and to the best of my knowledge and belief, does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Signed Aryanta Nugraha, November 2022

Acknowledgements

Abstract

Scholarship on Indonesia's foreign policy over the past five decades has conventionally understood it as being primarily intended to achieve domestic objectives, particularly security-strategic and economic interests. Even the quest for regional and international leadership has been seen substantially through the prism of domestic politics. Routinely overlooked are drivers that go beyond domestic functions, such as ideational, normative, and social dimensions of Indonesia's external relations. Also ignored is the influence of the social and normative dimension of Indonesia's foreign policy on international society as it has moved towards the establishment of accepted norms of international sociability and legitimate behaviour.

Against this background, this thesis aims to reappraise Indonesia's foreign policy in the context of the development of Southeast Asia regionalism. Using the International Society approach of the English School of International Relations, this thesis provides an analysis of Indonesia's foreign policy and how it has been driven by its ideational and normative perspectives in the shaping of regional international society, rather than being motivated solely or primarily by domestic politics and economic objectives. The analysis focuses on two interrelated aspects: first, Indonesia's actorness, understanding its preferences in terms of the knowledge, understanding, values, and identities by which it has sought to shape regionalism; and second, Indonesia's agency in the emergence and transformation of Southeast Asia regionalism.

This thesis argues that Indonesia's long encounter with international society resulted in a certain understanding and interpretation of the institutions, norms, and practices of international society. This subjective understanding, in turn, guided the principles and values

by which Indonesia sought to convey its own version of legitimate and rightful conduct in a regional context. Further, it is argued that Indonesia's efforts to shape regional international society could be discerned from its tenacity to influence two important components of international society: 1) the emergence and the development of regionally specific norms about rightful international conduct (the primary institutions of regional international society); and 2) the creation and development of norms, rules, and procedures of regional organisations (the secondary institutions of international society). Indonesia's sustained efforts to manage the regional environment have reflected Indonesia's agency as it seeks to engage with, and shape and reshape regional international society in Southeast Asia.

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List of Tables and Figures

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AEC	ASEAN Economic Community
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AICHR	ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, and the US Treaty
AOIP	ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APSC	ASEAN Political and Security Community
ARC	Asian Relations Conference
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASA	Association of Southeast Asia
ASC	ASEAN Security Community
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BPUPKI	Committee to Investigate the Preparations of Independence (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, or in Japanese, *Dokurisu Zyunbi Tyoosa Kai*)
CEPT	Common Effective Preferential Tariff
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
COC	Code of Conduct
Comintern	Communist International
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
DK	Democratic Kampuchea
DOC	Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
EAEG	East Asia Economic Group
EAS	East Asia Summit
EEC	European Economic Community
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EPG	Eminent Persons Group
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOIP	Free and Open Indo Pacific
FRETILIN	Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (*Frente Revolucionara do Timor Leste Independente)*
FUNCINPEC	National United Front for Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GMF	Global Maritime Axis or Fulcrum *(Poros Maritim Dunia)*
GOC	Good Offices Committee
GSP	Generalised System of Preferences
ICK	International Conference on Kampuchea (United Nations)
ICM	International Control Mechanism
ICWA	Indian Council of World Affairs
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IGGI	Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia
IMCs	Informal Meetings on Cambodia
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor

JIM	Jakarta Informal Meeting
KNIP	Central Indonesian National Committee (*Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*)
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front
LAI	League against Imperialism and for National Independence
LIPI	The Indonesian Institute of Sciences (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia*)
Maphilindo	Malaya, Philippines, Indonesia – regional framework
MFA	Multi-Fibre Agreement
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NEFOS	New Emerging Forces
Nekolim	neo-colonialism, colonialism, and imperialism (Neo-Kolonialisme-Kolonialisme-Imperialisme)
NICs	New Industrialising Countries
OLDEFOS	Old Established Forces
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P-5	Five Permanent members of the UNSC
PETA	Defenders of the Fatherland (*Pembela Tanah Air*)
PI	Indonesia Association *(Perhimpoenan Indonesia)*
PICC	Paris International Conference on Cambodia
PKI	Indonesia Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*)
PPKI	Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia,* or in Japanese *Dokuritsu Junbu Inkai*)
PPPI	*Indonesia* Indonesian Student Associations (*Perhimpoenan Peladjar-Peladjar Indonesia)*
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreement
Quad	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RUSI	Republic of United States of Indonesia
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
SCS	South China Sea
SEAARC	Southeast Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SOC	Senior Officials Committee
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
UN	United Nations
UNCI	United Nations Commission for Indonesia
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNSC	UN Security Council
US	United States
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality

Glossary of Terms

Adat	Customary law
Ajia kaizo-ron	Reform Asia
Ajia rentai-ron	Asian Solidarity
Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia	Indonesian Business Association
Badan Keamanan Rakyat	People's Security Corps
Badan Koordinasi Intelejen Negara	State Intelligence Coordination Agency
bebas dan aktif	Independent and active
Bebas-aktif	Free and active
Budi Utomo	Noble Endeavour
Dasa Sila Bandung	Principles or Rules (10 principles generated at the Bandung Conference)
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat	House of representative*s*
diplomasi	Diplomacy
Diplomasi Membumi	Down to earth diplomacy/pro-people diplomacy
Djawa Hokokai	Java Service Association
Ekonomi Pancasila	Pancasila Economy
Front Demokrasi Rakyat	People's Democratic Front
Ganyang	Crush
Genyōsha	Black Ocean Society
Gotong royong	Mutual service to others/mutual assistance/mutual cooperation/collective good (indigenous values of harmony)
Heiho	Auxiliary force attached to and under command of the Japanese military
Hindia	Indies
Indische Partij	Indies Party
Indonesia Merdeka	Indonesia Free (Journal)
Jawi	Indonesian community in the Middle East
Kamar dagang dan Industri Indonesia	Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Kekeluargaan	The principle of family system
Ketahanan Nasional	National Resilience
Kokuryûkai	Black Dragon Society
Kokutai	National community
Kopkamtib	*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban/* Operational Command for Restoration of Security and Order
Konfrontasi	Confrontation
Laut Natuna Utara	North Natuna Sea
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat	People's Consultative Assembly
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara	Provisional People's Consultative Assembly
Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia	Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslim
Majlisul Islamil Ala Indonesia	Great Islamic Council of Indonesia
Mufakat	Consensus
Musyawarah	Consultation/deliberation/consensus (indigenous value of harmony)

Negara Kekeluargaan	Family state/integralistic state/organicist
Nekolim	Neo-colonialism, colonialism, and imperialism *(Neo-Kolonialisme-Kolonialisme-Imperialisme)*
Nichi sin Kyōchō-ron	Sino-Japanese coalition
Pancasila	Five Principles
Panchsheel	Five principles of peaceful coexistence
Partai Komunis Indonesia	Indonesian Communist Party
Pemerataan	Equal distribution of wealth
Pemuda	Youth (Movement)
Perjuangan	Struggle
Persatuan Perjuangan	Struggle Front
politik mercusuar	Light house or megalomania politics
Pribumi	Indigenous
Pusat Kebudayaan	Education and Cultural Direction Centre
Pusat Tenaga Rakyat	Centre of People's Strength
Rechtsstaat	Constitutional
Sarekat Islam	Islamic Association
Sumpah Pemoeda	The Youth Oath
Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret	Order of Eleventh March
Volksraad	Dutch Colonial council
Wong cilik	Ordinary citizens/little people

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Introduction

This thesis aims to study the role of Indonesia in constructing a regional international society in Southeast Asia. Since the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967, the Southeast Asian region has been a consistent focus of Indonesia's foreign policy. However, Indonesia's focus on international society predates this development, and appeared in the earlier period of decolonisation and political independence as Indonesia took a leading role in the regional processes among the newly independent states across Asia and Africa. Their aim was to dismantle the practice of colonialism and to construct a normative basis in which to promote peaceful relations both among the new post-colonial states and between them and the rest of the world.

Indonesia's foreign policy focus on Southeast Asian regionalism, has over the past fifty years, been conventionally understood as primarily an instrument to achieve domestic functions such as security-strategic and economic interests. Indonesia's quest for regional and international leadership is substantially demonstrated through the prism of its domestic politics.[1]

This thesis seeks to challenge this orthodoxy. Without denying the reality that domestic politics and a narrow conception of the national interest are important drivers in Indonesia's foreign policy, this thesis will point to a pattern of behaviour wherein Indonesia seeks internationalist goals such as creating and maintaining rules, norms, and institutions of regional international society, and establishing them as the basis of legitimate conduct of international

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[1] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism,* ISEAS Singapore, 1994; Rizal Sukma, 'The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1995, pp. 304-315; Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership*, Times Academic Press, Singapore 1996.

relations in Southeast Asia. The focus of this thesis is thus on Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour in developing common interests, rules, norms and common institutions to promote regional cooperation and to mitigate the anarchic nature of the regional system. While Indonesia's purpose in doing so is often overlooked in the literature, this thesis will demonstrate that it is precisely the reason why Indonesia continues to pursue Southeast Asia regionalism as its first priority of foreign policy. Nevertheless, as it will be shown here, Indonesia has experienced a number of disappointments and has sometimes fallen short of its own ideals, as was the case when Indonesia invaded and occupied East Timor (Timor Leste).

This thesis applies an 'International Society' approach – the flagship idea of the English School of International Relations (hereafter the English School) – to the study of Indonesia's international relations. Bull and Watson define international society as–

> A group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institution for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.[2]

The existence of international society, as Bull argues, presumed that there is awareness of common interests and common values among a group of states and that the states envisage themselves to be bound by a common set of rules: that they share in the working common institutions.[3] It is important to note at the outset that the English School sees international institutions as not just formal or informal state arrangements that are established for specific

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[2] Hedley Bull & Adam Watson, 'Introduction', in Hedley Bull & Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society,* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 1.
[3] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics,* 4th edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 2012, p. 13.

purposes. Bull's usage of the term 'international institutions' includes 'habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals.'[4]

Within the body of works comprising the English School, the existence of international society is fundamental to the achievement of international order. To establish order, states need common rules, norms and practices that govern their interactions, providing regularity and predictability. There are norms, rules and practices that are explicit and observable, and which are embodied in a set of rules of international organisations and international treaties. Then there are 'deep' rules: norms and practices that become the normative foundation of those explicit and observable sets of norms and rules. Within the English School, the explicit rules are identified as secondary institutions and the deep ones are primary institutions.[5]

International society exists both at global and regional level. Regional international societies can be identified by the existence of specific regional primary and secondary institutions. Regional institutions do not follow a common template because each has grown from their historical particularities and in response to differing relations with global international society.[6] Hence, ASEAN and Southeast Asia have very little in common with, for instance, Europe and the European Union (EU). Recently, International Relations literature has provided some recognition of the existence of regional international society in Southeast Asia.[7] Regional international society in Southeast Asia is characterised by the presence of primary

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[4] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics*, p. 71.

[5] Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society: The English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004; Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2014.

[6] Aleš Karmazin, Filippo Costa-Buranelli, Yongjin Zhang, Federico Merke, *Regions in International Society: The English School at the Sub-Global Level*, Masaryk University, Brno, 2014; Yannis A. Stivachtis, 'The Regional Dimension of International Society,' in Cornelia Navari and Daniel M. Green (eds), *Guide to the English School in International Studies*, Wiley Blackwell, London, 2014, pp. 109-26.

[7] For example, Shaun Narine, 'The English School and ASEAN', *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 19, No. 2, June, 2006, pp. 199-218; Alan Chong, 'A Society of the Weak, the Medium and the Great: Southeast Asia's Lessons in Building Soft Community among States', in Alexander Astrov (ed.), *The Great Power (mis)Management: The Russian–Georgian War and its Implications for Global Political Order*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2011, pp 135-158; Linda Quayle, *Southeast Asia and The English School of International Relations: A Region-Theory Dialogue,* Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2013; Kilian Spandler*, Regional Organizations in International Society: ASEAN, the EU and Politics of Normative Arguing*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland, 2019.

institutions that are based on a certain understanding of sovereignty, great power management, diplomacy and economic development that has become manifest in ASEAN as the secondary institution.[8]

Yet, many questions remain under-explored, such as how Southeast Asian regional international society was constructed; how to understand the construction of the region's primary institutions; how do the primary institutions shape the ASEAN; and most importantly, what has been the role of particular states in the region, such as Indonesia, in shaping the regional international society? To contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the role of the social dimension in explaining Indonesian regional foreign policy, this thesis focuses on two interrelated aspects: first, Indonesia's actorness in terms of its knowledge, understanding, values and identities that shapes its preferences on certain modes of regionalism; and second, Indonesia's agency in the emergence and transformation of Southeast Asia regionalism.

1.2.   Existing Explanation: The Primacy of Domestic Function

Much academic analyses of Indonesia's foreign policies have focussed on domestic factors and the political functions that foreign policies serve, with domestic politics as the key determinant explanation. The principal argument is that foreign policy, rather than exclusively focused on external concerns, is strongly related to the domestic political realm. As such, foreign policy is perceived to serve multiple domestic functions, ranging from economic and security purposes to the strengthening and maintenance of the Indonesian government's political legitimacy as well as the quest for a prominent place on the regional and international

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[8] For example, Rosemary Foot, 'Boundaries in Flux: Secondary Regional Organization as Reflection of Regional International Society', in Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang (eds), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 188–206.

stage. The phrase, 'Indonesia's foreign policy is the function of domestic politics' eloquently captures the commonplace assumption of the primacy of the domestic context in shaping, making and implementing Indonesia's foreign policy.[9]

Among the earlier and influential studies that laid the foundation for the above point of view are Weinstein's book *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Soeharto* published in 1976 and Leifer's *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* published in 1983.[10] Both scholars sought to find explanatory devices to demonstrate the underlying continuities in Indonesia's foreign policy between such contrasting leadership and personalities of previous Indonesian Presidents in the revolutionary-flamboyant style of Sukarno and Suharto's developmentalist-modest type. Analysing Indonesia's foreign policy during the Sukarno and Suharto eras in the period between 1962–1970, Weinstein argued that the difficult choice between obtaining foreign aid and preserving independence best manifested the basic domestic factor that influenced Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour: a sense of weakness felt by Indonesian elites due to the country's underdeveloped condition and the awareness of the diversity of its domestic polity and polarised nature of domestic politics.[11]

Similarly, Leifer in examining Indonesia's foreign policy from Sukarno to Suharto era uncovered the continuing domestic weakness that he characterised it as intrinsic vulnerability as the determinant element. The source of vulnerability was thus rooted in its geographical fragmentation, economic underdevelopment and the history of Indonesia's independence, which was clearly marked with severe internal friction and aspects of external interference.[12]

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[9] The phrase is quoted from Rizal Sukma, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship*, Routledge, London and New York, 1999, p. 6

[10] Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Soeharto*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1976, pp. 354-357; and Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, George Allen & Unwin, London.

[11] Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Soeharto*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1976, pp. 354-357.

[12] From the early of independence Indonesia's political system had been featured by deep cleavage along political ideologies and religious division. The political competition also marked by internal military conflicts, for example

As Leifer notes,

> The experience of upholding independence in both domestic and international dimensions generated an abiding concern for the integrity of a state beset by social diversity and physical fragmentation. That concern was reinforced by a conviction about the country's attractiveness to external interests because of its bountiful natural resources and important strategic location. *A common and consistent theme of Indonesia's foreign policy has been the need to overcome an intrinsic vulnerability* (emphasis added).[13]

The works of Weinstein and Leifer were also significant in laying another aspect of the Indonesia's foreign policy: the function of foreign policy to serve domestic politics. In this regard, Weinstein identified three uses of Indonesia's foreign policy during the Sukarno and Suharto eras: 'defence of the nation's independence against perceived threats, mobilization of the resources of the outside world for the country's economic development, and achievement of a variety of purposes related to domestic political competition.'[14] Meanwhile, Leifer highlighted the utility Indonesia's foreign policy to cope with domestic vulnerability, which reflected the limitations of capabilities, the need to protect a vulnerable archipelago from potentially hostile external powers, and somewhat national ambitions for leadership.[15]

Interestingly, the continuous sense of weakness, reflects the insecurity and inferiority which has combined with an equally continuous sense of regional entitlement. Weinstein

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with Islamic groups DI/TII (*Darul Islam* (House of Islam)/ *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (Islamic Armed Force of Indonesia), the communist, and other rebellion from military group in outer Islands which demanded territorial independence separated from Indonesia. Some of the rebellion groups evidently had been supported by external power as happened to the case of America's support to PRRI/Permesta (*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republic Indonesia* or The Revolutionary Government of Republic of Indonesia/ *Piagam Perjuangan Semesta* or Charter for Universal Struggle) in Sumatra and Sulawesi.

[13] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1983, p. 173.

[14] Franklin B. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in Less Develop Countries', *World Politics,* vol. 24, No, 3, 1972, p. 366.

[15] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, p. 173.

writes, 'The great majority of Indonesian leaders saw their country as an important nation capable of playing a significant role in world politics and a leading role in Southeast Asia.'[16] Accordingly, Leifer notes that the strong sense of regional entitlement is based on 'pride in revolutionary achievement, a consciousness of vast territorial scale, an immense population, extensive natural resources, as well as strategic location.'[17] This brought on another function to Indonesia's foreign policy, namely to exercise its leadership, particularly in the Southeast Asia region.

The significance of domestic politics as a determinant factor and the function of foreign policy to serve domestic politics purposes, continues to influence the scholarship of Indonesia's foreign policy both in general themes and specific topics, such as Indonesia's participation in Southeast Asian regional cooperation. These become standard explanations for Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour from the Sukarno era to Suharto's New Order era, and even in today's democratic era. For example, in an article analysing Indonesia's domestic motivations through the 1955 Bandung Conference, Mackie argued that Indonesia's initiative to co-sponsor and co-organise the Conference was instrumental in diverting attention away from Indonesia's domestic political friction and economic calamity, enabling Sukarno to regain political support from both the elites and masses.[18] The interconnection between foreign policy and its function to support regime legitimacy in the Suharto era is clearly shown in Sukma's book, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship*, published in 1999. He argues that Indonesia's ruptured relationship with China in the 1960s and then restoration in 1990 were driven by a domestic function in promoting the political legitimacy of the New Order regime.[19]

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[16] Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: from Sukarno to Soeharto*, p.190.
[17] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, p. xiv.
[18] Jamie Mackie, 'The Bandung Conference and Afro-Asian Solidarity: Indonesian Aspects', in Derek McDougall & Antonia Finnane (eds), *Bandung 1955: Little Histories*, Monash University Press, Caulfield, 2010, pp. 9-26.
[19] Rizal Sukma, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship*, pp. 193-202.

Similar arguments have been recurrent in Indonesia's foreign policy analyses in the post-Suharto era. For example, in her study on the democracy agenda in Indonesia's foreign policy, Nabbs-Keller observes that democratisation has not changed the key determinant of Indonesia's foreign policy. It is still constrained by domestic weakness as its democratic status and is challenged by internal problems such as corruption, weak law enforcement, and growing religious intolerance. The sense of vulnerability also endures, characterised by the need to maintain its sovereignty over its territory, the ongoing separatism problem in Papua, and the problems of Islamic extremism. Moreover, Indonesia continues to aspire to maintain its leadership in ASEAN and an even bigger role in international affairs as one of middle power states. Based on this assessment, Nabbs-Keller argues that the pursuit of the democracy agenda in Indonesia's foreign policy is driven by domestic political functions in 'enhancing the legitimacy of democratic government and facilitating Indonesia's sense of entitlement in international affairs.'[20]

The domestic functions argument also has been applied in analysis of Indonesia's involvement in regional and international cooperation. For example, Anwar in her authoritative research on Indonesia's foreign policy in ASEAN during New Order regime, argues that:

> ASEAN served several interrelated political, military-security and economic
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> functions for Indonesian government elite [...] There were firstly the
>
> association's role in helping to preserve Indonesia's international credibility;
>
> secondly helping to preserve regional harmony; thirdly, its role as buffer for
>
> Indonesia's national security; fourthly, its aspiration in developing a more
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> autonomous regional order; fifthly, the association role as an international
>
> bargaining tool; and finally, its enhancement of Indonesia's international

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[20] Greta Nabbs-Keller, 'The Impact of Democratisation on Indonesia's Foreign Policy,' *PhD Thesis*, Griffith University, 2013, pp. 63-64.

stature.[21]

The argument that ASEAN serves politics, security, and military functions to Indonesia's national interests remains influential in analyses of Indonesia's foreign policy in ASEAN in the post-Suharto era. Recently, Indonesia's economic and diplomatic rise has been concomitant with its disappointment over ASEAN's lack of cohesion and progress. The sense of disappointment was clearly reflected in the discourse of a post-ASEAN Indonesian' foreign policy advocated by several of Indonesia's strategic thinkers. Although this discourse is not necessarily fully shared by Indonesia's Foreign Ministry, there have been arguments that ASEAN has become an impediment to Indonesia's progression from being a regional power to becoming a major player on the global stage.[22] Although there have been some suggestions that Indonesia's foreign policy should no longer put ASEAN as the first priority, Seng Tan maintains that ASEAN and its wider regional cooperative framework remains a useful modality for supporting Indonesia's strategic hedging as well as engagement with external regional and great powers.[23]

Indonesia, like other Southeast Asian states, is also commonly portrayed as pursuing a policy of hedging against the great powers. [24] Prevailing scholarship on hedging describes the

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[21] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, pp. 295-296; see also Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Indonesia, ASEAN, and Regional Stability,' *Inaugural Lecture as a Member of Social Science Commission of the Indonesia Academy of Science,* Jakarta, 16 February 2017, pp. 8-11.

[22] Rizal Sukma, 'Indonesia Needs a Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy,' *The Jakarta Post*, 30 June 2009; Rizal Sukma, 'Insight: Without unity, no centrality', *The Jakarta Post*, 17 July 2012; Jusuf Wanandi, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy and the Meaning of ASEAN', *PacNet* No. 27, 15 May 2008; Rizal Sukma, 'A Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy for a Post-G8 World,' *The Jakarta Post*, October 5, 2009; Barry Desker, 'Is Indonesia Outgrowing ASEAN?' *RSIS Commentaries*, No. 125, September 29, 2010.

[23] See Seng Tan, 'Indonesia Among the Powers: Will ASEAN Still Matter to Indonesia', in Christopher B. Robert, Ahmad D Habir, and Leonard Sebastian (eds.), *Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and The Regional Order,* Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2015, pp. 287-307.

[24] For literatures of Southeast Asian hedging strategy, see for example, Dennis Roy, 'Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2005, pp. 305-322; Evelyn Goh, 'Meeting the Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asia Regional Security Strategies,' *Policy Studies*, No. 16, East-West Centre, Washington D.C, 2005; Kuik Cheng-Chwee, 'The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2008, pp. 159-185; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, 'How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States' Alignment Behavior Towards China,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 25, No. 100, 2016, pp. 500-514; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, 'Getting Hedge Right: A

strategy as sitting in a middle position between balancing and bandwagoning. Goh, for example, defines hedging as 'a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality. Instead, they cultivate a middle position to forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another.'[25] The current literature argues that hedging strategies are driven by a desire to avoid undesirable risks, threats, and outcomes that stem from a country's limited capacity to influence the distribution of power in the regional system, by choosing multiple alternatives stances. Kuik, for example, argues that hedging is intended 'to offset risks by pursuing multiple policy options that intended to produce mutually counteracting effects under the situation of high-uncertainties and high stakes.'[26]

Looking specifically at Southeast Asia and Indonesia, many scholars argue that Indonesia's regional foreign policy demonstrates a hedging strategy both against China and the US. Mubah for example, claims that Indonesia's hedging strategy towards China is conducted through economic pragmatism, by pursuing deepening economic cooperation with China through collaboration of Jokowi's vision of Global Maritime Fulcrum with China's Belt and Road Initiative. Considering Indonesian policy towards the US, Mubah identifies a hedging strategy in its proposed 'ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific', which avoided challenging the

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Small State Perspective,' *China International Strategic Review*, Vol. 3, 2021, pp. 300-315; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, 'Variation on a (Hedging) Theme: Comparing ASEAN Core States Alignment Behavior,' in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), *Facing Reality in East Asia: Tough Decision on Competition and Cooperation*, Korea Economic Institute of America, Washington DC, 2015, pp. 11-28; John D. Ciorciari, *The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Power since 1975*, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, 2010; Jürgen Haacke, 'The Concept of Hedging and its Application to Southeast Asia: A Critique and a Proposal for a Modified Conceptual and Methodological Framework', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2019, pp. 375-417; Evelyn Goh, 'Meeting the Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asia Regional Security Strategies,' *Policy Studies*, No. 16, East-West Centre, Washington D.C, 2005; Evelyn Goh, 'Southeast Asian Strategies Towards Great Powers: Still Hedging after All These Years?' *The Asan Forum*, available at <https://theasanforum.org/southeast-asian-strategies-toward-the-great-powers-still-hedging-after-all-these-years/#2>, accessed 10 August 2022.
[25] Evelyn Goh, 'Meeting the Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asia Regional Security Strategies,' p. 2.
[26] Kuik Cheng-Chwee, 'The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China,' p. 163.

existing the US-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), and is designed to keep the US security commitment in the region.[27] In a similar fashion, Yoshimatsu contends that Indonesia is exhibiting a hedging strategy towards China, which he argues is indicated by its pursuit of contradictory policies: on the one hand pursuing economic pragmatism by attracting funds from China's Belt and Road Initiative, but on the other hand taking a firm stance in maritime security against China and pushing ASEAN towards the agreement on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.[28] Both analysts suggest that Indonesia's initiatives on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is a clear indication of the country's hedging strategy 'in response to conditions of uncertainty caused by a clash of America's Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and China's Belt and Road Initiatives'[29] as well as 'in reacting to the regional initiatives by extra-regional powers.'[30] Thus, the analysists above also suggest that Indonesia has been using ASEAN as a regional platform to advance its regional initiatives to balance the great power influence in Southeast East Asia.

In a slight variation from the above, other scholars argue that Southeast Asian states, including Indonesia, have been using regional policy and regional cooperation as tools for systemic balancing through multilateral institutions. Kai He, for example, argues that institutional balancing is a form of soft balancing or non-military balancing pursued by Southeast Asian states in countering pressures or threats from external great powers through initiating and utilising multilateral institutions aimed at preserving regional security. He argues that institutional balancing was chosen due to Southeast Asia's high level of economic interdependence, combined with a significant gap in the distribution of power. In this sense,

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[27] A. Safril Mubah, 'Indonesia's Double Hedging Strategy towards the United States-China Competition: Shaping Regional Order in the Indo-Pacific?' *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 55, No. 04, 2019, pp. 1-27.

[28] Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, 'Indonesia's Response to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo-Pacific: A Pivotal State's Hedging Strategy,' *Asian Politics and Policy*, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 2022, pp. 159-174.

[29] A. Safril Mubah, 'Indonesia's Double Hedging Strategy towards the United States-China Competition: Shaping Regional Order in the Indo-Pacific?' p. 7.

[30] Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, 'Indonesia's Response to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo-Pacific: A Pivotal State's Hedging Strategy,' p. 163.

various ASEAN initiatives, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and East Asia Summit (EAS) and indeed ASEAN itself manifested the logic of institutional balancing.[31] The geometry of ASEAN-led institutions has also been argued as providing balance against potential threats from China by facilitating the continued US security commitment in the region in a kind of 'omni-enmeshment' of major powers and complex balance of influence.[32] Seen from this perspective, Novotny posits that Indonesia's initiatives to foster a more inclusive regionalism in Southeast Asia are driven by its need to find room to manoeuvre between China and the US. As he puts it, 'Indonesia should establish and maintain at least workable relations with as many states as possible, whereby the Indonesian foreign policy elite finds it important to continuously strive for the maintenance of a balance of power among all these states with the aim of creating a safe space for maneuvering for Indonesia.'[33]

Despite the pervasiveness of the application of these two analytical tools, there seems to be little clarity in the difference between them. The concept of hedging and institutional balancing strategies overlaps, lacking precise boundaries, which reduces their value as mechanisms to aid in elucidating Indonesia's intentions. Take, for example, Kai He, who maintains that ASEAN multilateral initiatives constitute an institutional balancing strategy that 'facilitates ASEAN's ability to control the agenda and set up norms according to their interests in multilateral institutions'[34] amidst strategic uncertainties due to China's rise and uncertain US commitment in the region. Yet Kuik classifies the same ASEAN-based multilateral processes as important components of hedging, which he describes as forms of binding-

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[31] Kai He, 'Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2008, pp. 489-518.

[32] Evelyn Goh, 'Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,' *International Security,* Vol. 32, No. 3, 2007, p. 119.

[33] Daniel Novotny, *Torn between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2010, p. 302.

[34] Kai He, 'Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia,' p. 511.

engagement and dominance-denial.[35] This ambiguity is just one weakness in the deployment of these two concepts as analytical tools. More fundamental problems are discussed in the next section.

Notwithstanding its daunting domestic problems, Indonesia continues to consider that it is entitled to hold a leading position in shaping regional politics. This argument has been used to explain Indonesia's foreign policy, particularly in its involvement in regional and international associations. Observing Indonesia's activism in establishing ASEAN, Leifer argues:

> Indonesia's active and unprecedented participation in the regional cooperation constituted an attempt to realize longstanding ends through new means. ASEAN was seen as the most appropriate instrument with which to expunge the legacy of confrontation and also to promote a willing acceptance of Indonesia's political primacy within South-East Asia.[36]

The argument remains vibrant and surfaces repeatedly in the literature on Indonesia's foreign policy in the Suharto and post-Suharto eras. Suryadinata, in analysing Indonesia's foreign policy under Suharto, corroborated Leifer's argument, which he characterised as 'aspiring to international leadership' to highlight the limited achievement due to limited capabilities. Suryadinata argues:

> As a large and richly-endowed country in Southeast Asia, Indonesia understandably has aspired to become a regional leader and beyond, and the desires to be recognised as such. These aspirations have been significant factors in directing Indonesia's foreign policy, as reflected in its involvement

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[35] Cheng-Chwee Kuik, 'Variation on a (Hedging) Theme: Comparing ASEAN Core States Alignment Behavior,' pp. 13–14.
[36] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, p. 142.

in the Non-Alignment Movement [NAM], its desire to lead the Movement

and its prominent role in the APEC summit.[37]

As regards to the argument that Indonesia's ambition is for regional leadership and

leadership of ASEAN, some writers have attempted to rebut this claim. For example, Anwar

argued that Indonesia is not using ASEAN as a means to advance its leadership ambitions, but

its perceived position as the 'first among equals' is voluntarily attributed to it by other countries

in the region.[38] As she further argues, 'Indonesia's policy in ASEAN throughout New Order

period was largely attributed to the leadership style of President Suharto… of *tut wuri*

handayani (leading from behind).'[39]

Arguments that utilise the 'leadership' point of view to explain Indonesia's foreign

policy in the post-Suharto era are nevertheless repeatedly reproduced, for examples, in the

writings of Emmers and Sukma. Comparing Indonesia and Vietnam, Emmers argued that

Indonesia has a sense of entitlement over its immediate neighbourhood and since its

independence have sought to establish a hegemonic position among its neighbours, despite

limited success. He argued that during the Sukarno era Indonesia used coercive power, whereas

in the Suharto and post-Suharto eras, Indonesia employed benevolent power through

leadership, persuasion, and accommodation to attract its neighbours to subscribe and legitimate

Indonesia's preference of regional order. The use of benevolent power has been more intensive

in the post-Suharto era. As Emmers puts it:

> Jakarta has since then exercised benevolent power to best of its ability in light
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> of its domestic weakness and recently adopted a more active foreign policy

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[37] Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership,* Times Academic Press, Singapore, 1996, p. 3.

[38] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, ISEAS & Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Singapore-Jakarta, 1994, pp. 221-222.

[39] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Leadership in the History of Southeast Asian Integration: The role of Indonesia in ASEAN', in Bertrand Fort and Douglas Webber (eds.), *Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe: Convergence or Divergence?* Routledge, London and New York, 2006, p. 66.

in tune with its natural position of leadership in ASEAN. Yet, its current

attempt to use benevolent power has not brought it closer to its goal of

achieving hegemony.[40]

In other publications, Emmers argues that Indonesia has successfully exercised its

leadership in ASEAN even though it was restricted to specific sectors, particularly in politics

and security.[41] This is due to Indonesia's reputation in providing international public goods in

the political and security areas, engagement in conflict management, and promotion of

institution building, but reluctant to give all-out support for cooperation in other sectors,

notably intensive economic cooperation.

In a similar fashion, Sukma maintains that following democratisation, Indonesia

intended to project a new image by promoting itself as the world's third largest democracy, the

largest moderate Muslim-majority country and as a 'bridge-builder' and a 'problem-solver' on

the wider global stage. These newly installed identities served as brands for an Indonesia that

differentiated it from other members of ASEAN, and which also could be seen as a

manifestation of a sense of regional entitlement. [42]

1.3. Limitations

Although the above arguments have explanatory value regarding the drivers of

Indonesia's foreign policy, they suffer from the disadvantage that they explain Indonesia's

foreign policy exclusively in terms of the state as a rational actor engaged in purely utilitarian

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[40] Ralf Emmers, 'Regional Hegemonies and the Exercise of Power in Southeast Asia: A Study of Indonesia and Vietnam,' *Asian Survey,* Vol. 45, No. 4, 2005, p. 648.

[41] Ralf Emmers, 'Indonesia's Role in ASEAN: A Case of Incomplete and Sectorial Leadership', *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2014, pp. 543–562.

[42] Rizal Sukma, 'Domestic Politics and International Posture: Constraints and Possibilities', in Anthony Reid (ed), *Indonesia Rising; The Repositioning of Asia's Third Giant,* Indonesia Update Series, College of Asian and the pacific, the ANU, ISEAS Singapore, 2012, pp. 77–92. See also Rizal Sukma, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy Since *Reformasi*: Change and Continuity', *Southeast Asia Bulletin,* CSIS Southeast Asia Initiative, June 2008.

functions for the benefit of material security and economic interests. Specifically, in explaining Indonesia's foreign policy in Southeast Asia regionalism, there are several shortcomings in the various arguments identified above. First, some of them focus on domestic policy motivations to the exclusion of considering straightforward foreign policy motivations. Leifer and Anwar both point to this commonplace weakness, with each pointing to Indonesia's participation in regional cooperation, and arguing that it was motivated at least in part by the aspiration to establish a more autonomous regional order.[43] While Leifer framed this aspect in terms of its 'intention to assume the role of *primus inter pares* [first among equals] within a new concert of regional states,'[44] Anwar's perspective was more sanguine as she notes, 'Indonesian leaders had entertained the hope that Indonesia's entry into regional cooperation would enable the former to influence other members of the association to accept Indonesia's vision of a more non-aligned regional order.'[45] Yet the question of why Indonesia aspires to an autonomous regional order remains underexplored, as do related points of interrogation, such as: how such aspirations have been developed in the first place and continued to be ingrained in Indonesia's regional policy behaviour; and how Indonesia strives to influence and negotiate various ideas about how regional politics should be organised .[46]

Second, those lines of analysis based on identifying either a hedging strategy and institutional balancing are highly problematic. These analyses see the entire dynamics of the region through the prism of security, but this thesis argues that Indonesian foreign policy has

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[43] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, especially chapter 6, pp. 142-171; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, pp. 174-182.
[44] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, p. 143.
[45] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, p. 212.
[46] With exception of several works such as Linda Quayle, 'Power and Paradox: Indonesia and the 'English School' Concept of Great Powers,' *International Relations of the Asia Pacific,* Vol. 13, No. 2, 2013, pp. 301-330; Linda Quayle, 'The 'English School', South East Asia, and Indonesia: Locating and Defending Productive 'Middle Ground',' *Jurnal Hubungan International,* Vol. 2, No. 2, 2015pp. 92-105; Linda Quayle, 'Indonesia, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, and the Contingent Profile of Regional 'Great-Power Management,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 31, Issue 2, 2018, pp.131–150; I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana, 'International Society: The Social Dimension of Indonesia Foreign Policy,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 29, No. 5, 2016, pp. 741–759.

been generated through a much more nuanced set of priorities than just security. Indonesia's promotion of regional cooperation extends through many domains beyond that of military security. Hence, Indonesia's approach to Southeast Asian regionalism reaches far beyond dealing with the great powers' involvement in the region. Indonesia has for decades been involved in building a complex regional order in which management of great power relations is only one component. As Wicaksana argues, rather than conducting a hedging strategy or institutional balancing strategy, Indonesia's regional policy is best seen as fostering 'its concept of a rule-based interaction beyond the dominant great power politics, as potential agency enabling the construction of a pluralised Indo-Pacific order.'[47] It is intended 'to form common objectives and collective roles, so that no one will dominate the others.'[48] Thus, Indonesia's regional foreign policy is based on the expectation that its long-term foreign policy objectives can be realised through the creation of a regional international society, which could sustain a certain kind of a regional order.

Moreover, Indonesia's consistent, long-term foreign policy – which can be summarised as non-alignment plus engagement with the external great powers – is neither indicative of a hedging policy nor of systemic balancing. To quote Jones and Jenne, what has been describe as a hedging strategy by Southeast Asian states, including Indonesia, is nothing more than 'a counsel of prudence in the conduct of statecraft that fits strategic ends to limited means.'[49] Moreover, both hedging and balancing are tools of risk management, but as Wicaksana

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[47] I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana, 'How Does Indonesia Exercise Agency in the Contested and Complex Regional Environment?' p. 299.
[48] I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana, 'How Does Indonesia Exercise Agency in the Contested and Complex Regional Environment?' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2022, p. 313.
[49] David Martin Jones and Nicole Jenne, 'Hedging and Grand Strategy in Southeast Asian Foreign Policy,' *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 22, Issue 2, 2022, p. 207.

observes, there is no evidence in Indonesia's foreign and security policy documents of risk avoidance as an objective or a basis for planning.[50]

The third weakness of the arguments outlined in the previous section is that they inadequately address other domestic as well as international aspects of Indonesia's foreign policy such as ideas, beliefs, principles, values, and practices about appropriate behaviour in relations between states, particularly in regional context. This is despite the prevailing arguments that recognise Indonesia's role in the region based on ideas, opinion, and norms. Acharya, for instance, argues that Indonesia's recent emerging power status is the result of a combination of democracy, development and stability, whilst pursuing a foreign policy of restraint towards its neighbours and active engagement with the world in general.[51] Laksmana also claims that Indonesia's international standing has largely been formed by its normative and moral values derived from democratic credentials rather than its geographical size and military might.[52] Similarly, Davies and Harris-Rimmer maintain that 'one reason why Indonesia matters today, and may well continue to do so in the future, is its normative influence … [which] is peculiarly Indonesian'.[53]

The peculiarity has also been pointed out by Liow, who argues that Indonesia's contributions to regional order sometimes do not take form in 'big ideas or grand initiatives, but rather through low-key, discrete efforts, including mediation, dialogue facilitation, and the exercise of its good offices'.[54] Camroux similarly observes that Indonesia is 'doing normative

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[50] I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana, 'How Does Indonesia Exercise Agency in the Contested and Complex Regional Environment?', pp. 311-313.

[51] Amitav Acharya, *Indonesia's Matters*: *Asia's Emerging Democratic Power*, World Scientific, Singapore, 2014, pp. 1–2.

[52] Evan A. Laksmana, 'Indonesia's Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size Really Matter?' *Contemporary Southeast Asia,* Vol. 33, no. 2, 2011, pp. 157-158.

[53] Mathew Davies & Susan Harris-Rimmer, 'Assessing Indonesia's Normative Influence: Wishful Thinking or Hidden Strength', *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2016, pp. 80-81.

[54] Joseph Chinyong Liow, 'Can Indonesia Fulfill its Aspirations to Regional Leadership?*'* in Gilbert Rozman and Joseph Chinyong Liow (eds) *International Relations and Asia's Southern Tier: ASEAN, Australia, and India,* Palgrave, Macmillan, Singapore, 2018, pp. 195–189.

power differently': that it acts as a norm entrepreneur, bringing indigenous norms to the regional level.[55] The above arguments underline that Indonesia has achieved its prominence through its broader political and social values of its decision and policies built from certain ideas and norms, rather than its economic and military resources.

Yet, in many analyses, the ideas, values, and beliefs found in Indonesia's foreign policy are treated as a new currency and a source of soft power. Novotny, for instance, in his study on Indonesia's relation with the US and China argues that Indonesia's ideational and normative stance is often perceived as more 'a form than a substance' or only treated as a 'secondary motivating factor'. Furthermore, he notes that 'they are considered as effective foreign policy instruments only insofar as they complement and enhance what the elite perceives as a favourable balance in international system'.[56] Sukma, also notes that Indonesia's recent democratic projection through the Bali Democratic Forum and its promotion of 'moderate Islam' are most compelling as evidence of the usage of its soft power assets of foreign policy.[57] In a similar fashion, Rattanasevee, argues that in the complexity, fragmentation and multidimensional characters of leadership in ASEAN, Indonesia exercises intellectual/ideational leadership –

> derived from ideas, attractiveness as well as accommodative and persuasive
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> ability, [which] could help amplify international images and credibility,
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> toning down coerciveness and antagonism, transforming resistance into

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[55] David Camroux, 'Indonesia: Doing 'Normative Power' Differently', ISA Second Global South Conference, 9th January 2015, <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/GSCIS%20Singapore%202015/Archive/80d19277-25a6-4fc4-8097-1c55d62c1744.pdf>, accessed 9 May 2017.

[56] Daniel Novotny, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy: A Quest for the Balance of Threats (The Role and Relevance of Elite Perceptions in Explaining Indonesia's Foreign Policy Outcome)', *PhD Thesis*, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Sidney, 2007, p. 20.

[57] Rizal Sukma, 'Soft Power and Public Diplomacy: The Case of Indonesia', in Sook Jong Lee & Jan Melissen (eds), *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia,* Palgrave, Macmillan, New York, 2011, pp. 91-116.

acceptance and supplying a necessary source of soft power.[58]

Although this may be true, Indonesia's ideas and values in relation to the above arguments are regarded as alternative domestic instruments of foreign policy to offset its notorious lack of material military and economic capabilities. In other words, Indonesia's ideas and values are understood only as enabling factors rather than significant factors in Indonesia's foreign policy. Moreover, the tendency of analysing Indonesia in Southeast Asian regionalism from a leadership perspective primarily concerns Indonesia's success, or lack thereof, in providing solutions for current regional problems. They rarely account for the importance of an historical pathway and the path dependent nature of Indonesia's ideas on regionalism that are developed overtime, comprising persistence, adaptation and change in terms of how regional politics should be organised.

Based on the assessment above, what is still missing from analysis of Indonesia's foreign policy in Southeast Asia regionalism are deeper analyses on Indonesia's motivations beyond domestic functions and the role of its ideational factors in shaping the configuration of regional cooperation, that is not confined in the conventional approach of rational calculation in addressing regional politics problems. Tackling such questions moves the inquiry beyond analysis in terms of Indonesia's successes and failures in delivering domestic necessities and pursuing a prominent position in regional politics. Instead, it draws attention to the potential and the limits of Indonesia's efforts in shaping the Southeast Asia region as a political space to share common norms and rules. For this purpose, this thesis utilises the English School's perspective of International Society as a framework for examining this explanation.

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[58] Pattharapong Rattanasevee, 'Leadership in ASEAN: The Role of Indonesia Reconsidered', *Asian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2012, p. 124.

1.4. International Society

The purpose of this section is to provide the grounds for using the international society perspective as a framework for analysis. Chapter two below will provide a more detailed analysis of this perspective. Here, the thesis will highlight a few preliminary explanations related to how Indonesia's foreign policy in relation to Southeast Asia regionalism can be understood from an international society perspective.

International society as a primary object of analysis in international relations was pioneered by British or British-inspired political scientists known as the English School. [59] The literature within this school of thought seeks to understand state interests and state behaviour by investigating the social international structures rather than power *per se* or other material resources. According to Dunne for example, International Society is a socially constructed concept which can explain why there is a substantial level of international order, despite anarchy in the international system.[60] Given the absence of central authority or world government, states managed to establish common norms, common rules, and common institutions for the basic common goals, which are to achieve and maintain international order. As a group of states aware of and sharing common interests, they envisage themselves to be bound by a common set of rules and a share in the working of common institutions. As such they are said to constitute an international society or a society of states.[61] As international society is considered as an existing social structure, with its own shared norms and institutions,

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[59] The English School refers to a group of British or British-inspired political theorists. Originally it was pioneered by the British Committee of International Politics in the 1960s and 1970s and developed by writers based largely at Oxford and the London School of Economics. Its most prominent members include first generation or often referred as the classical scholars such as Herbert Butterfield, Hedley Bull, Martin Wight, John Vincent, Charles Manning, and Adam Watson. The more recent influential thinkers include Barry Buzan, Robert Jackson, Tim Dunne, Hidemi Suganami, Andrew Linklater, and Nicholas J. Wheeler. For the detail history of the thinkers see for example, Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of The English School*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1998.

[60] Tim Dunne, 'The Social Construction of Internatioal Society,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1995, pp. 367-389.

[61] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politic*, 4th edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 2012, p.13.

it then provides the framework within which its members interact that inform the prevailing conception of rightful membership and legitimate or appropriate conduct in international relations.[62] As a consequence, international society bears the capacity to socialise its members into particular orientations according to their shared norms and institutions. As Dunne notes, 'A central tenet of the English School is the belief that the agents are socialised by the structure.'[63] Moreover, international society also constitutes the particular identities of those members.[64] Thus, international society is ideational and normative in nature, but the existing social structures constrain states' actions as well as shape their identity.

Hence, states do not define their behaviour and interests in a vacuum. In formulating their foreign policies, states are constrained by the structure of international society (e.g., international law, legal principles, shared norms, and common practices) that require mutual expectation. As Dunne notes, 'states take into account the impact their decisions have on other members of their society'.[65] A state's foreign policy therefore is not only devoted to maximising material self-interest. It is also concerned with rules, norms, and the institutions of international society since they provide a more predictable social structure for relations between states. State behaviour is motivated by its broad national interests, not only for the sake of self-centred national interests but also for what Bull called a 'purpose beyond ourselves'.[66] So too, the state has a responsibility to the international order,[67] with a strong

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[62] Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 4-6.

[63] Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of English School*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1998, p.10.

[64] Ian Clark, 'International Society and China: The Power of Norms and Norms of Power', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol.7, No. 3, 2014, p. 320.

[65] Tim Dunne, 'The New Agenda', in Alex J. Bellamy (ed), *International Society and Its Critics'*, Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 2005, p. 66.

[66] Scott Burchill, *The National Interest in International Relations Theory*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005, p. 183.

[67] Robert Jackson argues that at least there are three distinctive conceptions of responsibility: national, international, and humanitarian. See Robert Jackson, 'The Political Theory of International Society', in Ken Booth & Steve Smith (eds), *International Relations Theory Today*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1995, pp. 110-128.

sense of the belief that it pays to make the system work ('*raison d'systeme*').[68] Thus, as a member of the international society, states should be seen as self-maximising actors as well as social actors in international society.[69]

The International Society perspective focuses on the social international structures in explaining state behaviour. The English School refers to the social international structure as international institutions. International institutions embody the English School's central claim that international order is possible even in the context of international anarchy. As mentioned earlier, the English School scholars classify international institutions into two categories, the primary and secondary institutions that establish the conception of institutional layers in international society. The distinction between the primary and secondary institutions offers a new perspective by establishing the notion of levels of international society: the global international society and the sub-global/regional international society. Recent scholarship from English School pays attention to the region level differentiation of international society particularly to find the social structures that exist at the regional level, to the history as well as the function of international society regionally in relations with the global international society.[70]

Not only have states been socialised by the international society, but states can also play agential roles in shaping, maintaining, or changing the international social structure. The basic

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[68] Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society; A Comparative Historical Analysis,* Routledge, London and New York, 1992, p. 14.

[69] David Armstrong, 'Globalization and Social State,' *Review of International Studies,* Vol. 24, 1998, pp. 461–478.

[70] For English School research that concentrated on regional level see for example: Barry Buzan & Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (eds), *International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2009; Barry Buzan & Yongjin Zhang (eds), *Contesting International Society in East Asia,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014; Yannis A. Stivachtis & Mark Webber, 'Regional International Society in a Post-Enlargement Europe', *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2011, pp. 101-116; Aleš Karmazin, Filippo Costa-Buranelli, Yongjin Zhang & Federico Merke*, Regions in International Society: The English School at the Sub-Global Level*, Muni Press, Brno, 2014. See also *Global Discourse*, Vol. 5, Issue 3, 2015 on special issue: 'Interrogating Regional International Society, Questioning the Global International Society'.

idea, as Buzan explains, is quite simple: 'Just as human beings as individuals live in societies which they both shape and are shaped by, so also states live in an international society which they shape and are shaped by.'[71] Similarly, Dunne also argues, 'international society is not ontologically prior to the practices of states', but it is a social construction of 'what states make of it'.[72] Thus, states have a degree of agency and have intention to put forward their own social structures that sequentially constitute and legitimate the behaviour of collective agencies. As Bellamy argues, 'states are not simply constituted by international society, states and other form of political community have a degree of agency and play an important role in constructing, sometimes deliberately, the societal structures that in turn constitutes and legitimate particular form of the agency.'[73] Nevertheless, while the notion that international society socialised its member states has been widely accepted, the discourse on how the state plays its agency to shape the international structure remains understudied.[74]

In light of the above, Indonesia's foreign policy in Southeast Asian regionalism will be examined. Although it is not easy to extrapolate a theoretical framework that derives from European/Western experiences in Southeast Asia's different cultural and historical setting, the international society perspective illuminates the resemblances in the experiences of states in their attempts to forge common interests, common values, and common institutions in establishing bases for cooperation. Using the notion above, Southeast Asia in this thesis is viewed as a regional international society with its discernible institutions, norms, and practices. In this context, therefore, ASEAN is understood as the organisational manifestation of regional international society in Southeast Asia. Using the English School perspective, Narine argues that ASEAN is a manifestation of 'a shared commitment to fundamental international

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[71] Barry Buzan, 'The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR,' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2001, p. 477.
[72] Tim Dunne, 'The Social Construction of International Society,' p. 384.
[73] Alex J. Bellamy, 'Introduction,' in Alex J. Bellamy (ed), *International Society and Its Critics*, p. 15.
[74] Tim Dunne, 'The New Agenda,' pp. 68-70

institutions and principles,' particularly commitment to national sovereignty and norms of the Westphalian system.[75] Correspondingly, Quayle argues, 'ASEAN is essentially a *symptom* of cooperation rather than a *cause*…. It is essentially the servant, not the master of the international society that underlies it.'[76]

At this stage the term Southeast Asian regional international society induces a sense of unfamiliarity. Nonetheless, we can reference the fundamental regional norms, values and regional identity that are routinely invoked by members of ASEAN such as sovereignty, non-interference, and diplomacy – which are embodied as the primary institutions of Southeast Asia's international society.[77] These primary institutions are fundamental normative structures that have legitimised the procedures, practices, and modus operandi of ASEAN, which is the regional secondary institution.

This thesis will scrutinise the social construction of regional international society in Southeast Asia, focusing on Indonesia's agency in contributing to the formation of the regional international society in Southeast Asia as a space where its values and norms converge. Such a purpose is clearly stated in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, which mandates the major values, basis, and goals of the independent Republic of Indonesia. The opening sentence of the Preamble provides explicit guidance on the conduct of its foreign policy, stating that 'independence is the inalienable right of all nations and thus all colonialism must be abolished in this world as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice'. The final paragraph of the Preamble lays out the goals of the Indonesian state, stating that in the conduct of relations

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[75] Shaun Narine, 'The English School and ASEAN,' pp. 205 & 199.

[76] Linda Quayle, 'The 'English School', South East Asia, and Indonesia: Locating and Defending Productive 'Middle Ground',' p. 95.

[77] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 2nd edition, Routledge, London & New York, 2009; Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2009; Alice D. Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2009.

between states, it must 'participate in the establishment of a world order based on freedom, perpetual peace and social justice.'[78] Although it is easy to eschew the significance of such a normative document, nevertheless, as Anwar argues, 'maintaining independence and playing an active role in promoting peace have remained dominant themes in the implementation of the independent and active Indonesian foreign policy doctrine.'[79]

In interviews with several Indonesian Foreign Ministry officials and academics, all the interviewees validate that Indonesia assumes a certain degree of agency to influence and to manage its external environment, with some of the interviewees emphasising ideal basis of the agency were the ideas, beliefs and values rooted in the state's ideology of *Pancasila* (Five Principles), *bebas dan aktif* foreign policy, the Declaration of 1955 Bandung Conference and the newly acquired values such as democracy and human rights.[80] This preliminary finding suggests that there is broad acknowledgement of Indonesia's sense of agency and that it has been has been developed upon its long-held values and beliefs as well as new values obtained from its relations with the world in general. This also affirms Sebastian and Roberts' opinion that Indonesia's activism also garners broad support from Indonesian elites and people, as they put it: 'Such support is ingrained in the Indonesian psyche and has its origin in Indonesian activism from 1950s'.[81]

This thesis builds upon earlier scholarship devoted to unravelling Indonesia's foreign

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[78] For the translation of the Indonesian constitution in English, see <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_174556.pdf>, accessed 7 September 2017.

[79] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Values in Indonesian Foreign Policy: Independence and Active Doctrine,' in Krishnan Srinivasan, James Mayall, Sanjay Pulipaka (eds), *Values in Foreign Policy: Investigating Ideals and Interests*, Rowman & Littlefield International, London, New York, 2019, p. 189.

[80] Interview with Dr. Yayan Ganda Hayat Mulyana, Head of Education and Training Center of Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Training Center of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Building, Jakarta, 30 January 2019, interview with Khasan Ashari, Director of Junior Diplomatic Training Unit, of Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Training Center of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Building, Jakarta, 30 January 2019, interview with Prof. Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Researcher at *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia*/LIPI (The Indonesian Institute of Sciences), 8 January 2019, and interview with Dr. Ganewati Wuryandari, Researcher at *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia/* LIPI, 15 February 2019.

[81] Leonard C. Sebastian & Christopher B. Roberts, ''Consensual' Regional Hegemony, Pluralist-Solidarist Visions, and Emerging Power Aspiration,' in Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D Habir, and Leonard C. Sebastian (eds.), *Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and The Regional Order,* Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2015, p. 336.

policy from the international society perspective. Wicaksana is one such scholar. He argues that the social dimension of Indonesia's external affairs beyond material national interests constitute as yet 'unexploited narratives' in Indonesia's foreign policy.[82] He reveals that there is a considerable proportion of Indonesia's elite worldview that is strongly in favour of establishing and maintaining international order, which was demonstrated by Indonesia's role in the 1955 Asian African Conference and also in Indonesia's foreign policy in establishing ASEAN. Other important contributions have been made by Quayle. In her publications, Quayle seeks to solve the puzzle of Indonesia's position in the regional politics in juxtaposition with the country's aspiration for regional leadership.[83] She characterised Indonesia's position as 'powerful-but-not powerful', as its regional leadership is 'unpredictable, differing by domain and administration.' For example, Indonesia is the regional leader in political and security cooperation, yet has been blamed for the lack of progress in economic cooperation. Indonesia's regional leadership has also more visible during the Yudhoyono era compared to the Jokowi era. Quayle argues that Indonesia's puzzling regional status is best defined as a resident great power in Southeast Asia, not because of its power and capabilities, but in its role in Southeast Asia's regional international society, in terms of 'to make the system work.' This role has been widely recognised by others as well as domestically conceived to have special right and duties or at least to do something to solve pressing problems in regional politics.[84] Indonesia's role in making the system work, as Quayle further argues, is clearly indicated –

by being part of ASEAN, but not steamrollering it; by not routinely

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[82] I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana, 'International Society: The Social Dimension of Indonesia Foreign Policy,' *The Pacific Review*, pp. 741–759.

[83] Linda Quayle, 'Power and Paradox: Indonesia and the 'English School' Concept of Great Powers,' *International Relations of the Asia Pacific,* pp. 301-330; Linda Quayle, 'Indonesia, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, and the Contingent Profile of Regional 'Great-Power Management', pp.131–150; also Linda Quayle, 'The 'English School', South East Asia, and Indonesia: Locating and Defending Productive 'Middle Ground',' pp. 92-105.

[84] Linda Quayle, 'Indonesia, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, and the Contingent Profile of Regional 'Great-Power Management', pp. 132-134; Linda Quayle, 'The 'English School', South East Asia, and Indonesia: Locating and Defending Productive 'Middle Ground',' pp. 99-101.

obstructing issues, or picking major quarrels with other member states, or overtly siding with any major power; by supplying some degree of central direction in terms of ideational leadership; and by wading into crises to attempt to maintain regional order. many of these qualities, it must be remembered, are conspicuously not displayed by other would-be regional great powers.[85]

Analysis of Indonesia's foreign policy using the international society approach offers new understandings in several ways, although the works of Wicaksana and Quayle as mentioned above, represent a limited minority in scope and number in the literature. First, both writers' explorations offer a more socially embedded interpretation rather than simpler rational and utilitarian thinking as frequently asserted by previous Indonesia's foreign policy analyses. They acknowledge that Indonesia's foreign policy in Southeast Asia regional cooperation is not solely driven by domestic functions, but also the consideration to create and maintain social aspects of the cooperation such as norms, rules, and principles on legitimate conduct of regional relations. Moreover, both writers also pay attention to the importance of social elements that circumscribed Indonesia's foreign policy, which imply that Indonesia's foreign policy is not implemented in a void since it is closely connected to the norms and overall rules of the game of international society in which it evolved.

Nevertheless, despite the exceptional contributions, their works are limited to their specific aspects on Indonesia's role in Southeast Asian regionalism. Yet, there remains a gap in understanding how historically Indonesia's ideas and principles on legitimate conduct of international relations emerged in the first place and evolved over time, and how Indonesia's endeavour to shape the international society at a Southeast Asian regional level has been

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[85] Linda Quayle, 'Indonesia, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, and the Contingent Profile of Regional 'Great-Power Management,' p. 135.

exemplified. This thesis aims at filling the gap as well as analysing the extent to which Indonesia's foreign policy in Southeast Asia regionalism seeks purpose beyond domestic functions such as creating and maintaining rules, norms, and institutions of regional international society, and establishing them as the basis of legitimate conduct of international relations in Southeast Asia.

1.5.   Thesis Argument

This thesis suggests that Indonesia's foreign policy in Southeast Asian regionalism can be considered as remarkably consistent if it is viewed as an attempt to construct a regional international society in which it is preeminent and has the leadership role and the status that it believes is its due. This thesis thus argues that rather than being driven primarily by domestic functionalism and a narrow understanding of national interests, Indonesia has been motivated by the aspiration to shape the regional international society in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's efforts to shape the regional international society can be discerned from its tenacity to influence the two important components of international society. First, it seeks to influence the emergence and the development of regionally specific context and fundamental norms about the rightful international conduct or what the English School coins as primary institutions. Simultaneously, it also seeks to influence the creation and the development of norms, rules, and procedures of regional organisation or what the English School calls secondary institutions, as the manifestation of the regional primary institutions. Altogether, Indonesia's sustained efforts to manage the regional environment reflect Indonesia's agency to engage, shape and reshape the regional international society towards a regionally derived understanding of order in Southeast Asia.

This thesis will also argue that Indonesia's sense of agency has been shaped by its long-

historical relations with the international society. Filtered by its culture, its history of state formation and political experiences, Indonesia's long encounter with the international society has resulted in certain understandings and interpretations on the institutions, norms, and practices of the international society. This subjective understanding, in turn, has become the guidance principles and values for Indonesia to convey its own version of legitimate and rightful conduct of international society at regional context. It is, therefore, a series of two-way interactions between Indonesia, its neighbors and international society more broadly (both globally and in its own region) in which Indonesia is both responding to the expectations of international society and at the same time trying to shape those expectations.

1.6.   Research Aim and Significance

This thesis pursues two main goals. First, it strives to provide a better understanding of how a particular normative context shapes Indonesia's understanding of the core institutions of international society. In doing so, it considers Indonesia's historical dynamic in its long interaction with the Western-dominated global international society, which started from a postulation of the path-dependence of Indonesia's ideas, values and understanding of the norms and institutions of the international society. A notable indication is in Indonesia's remarkable adherence to its free/independent and active (*bebas dan aktif*) foreign policy as an underlying spirit, a national identity as well as a sacred doctrinal basis for its foreign policy conduct. Another indication of path-dependence is its attachment to the spirit of anti-colonialism and non-interference that continues to survive the test of time.[86] By doing so, this thesis aims at providing a better understanding of how a particular historical and normative context shapes Indonesia's beliefs, values and ideas that express its understanding of the core institutions of

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[86] Rizal Sukma, 'The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 3, March 1995, p. 306.

international society.

The second goal of this thesis is to examine how, in turn, Indonesia has been undertaking an enterprise to influence the emergence and the development of regional primary and secondary institutions in Southeast Asia. The thesis will specifically focus on the following three episodes: the creation; the consolidation; and the maintenance of Southeast Asia's regional international society. These episodes can illuminate the historical route of the evolution of Southeast Asian regional international society and Indonesia's activism in the processes. At this point, it also aims at developing an understanding of how Indonesia plays its role in Southeast Asian regional international society through linking the primary institutions to be translated into rules and procedures of the secondary institution.

The significance of this research is situated both in its contribution to empirical research on Indonesia's foreign policy and to a wider theoretical analysis of Indonesia's agency in the constitution of regional international society in Southeast Asia. As most of the research on Indonesia's foreign policy has generally accepted that the country's foreign policy is largely determined by material domestic factors such as resources and capabilities to serve domestic politics functions, this thesis seeks to provide new insights on the role of other non-material domestic factors such as ideas, beliefs, and values in the country's foreign policy. Rather than considering these factors merely as sources of soft power, this thesis will present an understanding that Indonesia's ideas, beliefs, and values are also constitutive for the emergence and development of Southeast Asian regional international society. Furthermore, instead of taking Indonesia's ideas, beliefs and values as given, this thesis will explore the historical context of its long relations with the global international society. In this regard, it will provide insights as to how Indonesia's ideas, beliefs, and values continued to be sustained and how they might affect its current and future behaviour. Thus, it provides a more social-grounded interpretation of Indonesia's foreign policy.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

This thesis will also make a significant contribution to the International Relations literature from the perspective of the English School. There is a dearth of English School scholarship that takes states in Asia seriously. While there is a small amount of scholarship taking an English School approach to China,[87] Japan,[88] and Thailand,[89] Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, remains otherwise under-investigated by practitioners of the English School. To paraphrase Buzan, the English School is an 'underexploited resource' and 'the time is ripe to develop and apply its historicist, and methodologically pluralist approach' to the case of Indonesia and regional international society in Southeast Asia.[90] One of the new research agendas of the English School is set to discover whether or not international society exists in distinctive forms at the regional level. The concept of international society was initially established upon ideas that the European model of international society has expanded and imposed itself on the rest of the world through processes of encounter, colonisation, and decolonisation.[91] Recently, several important works set out to bring a geographical dimension into the discourse of international society through 'provincializing' the international society in the so-called regional international society.[92] It investigates how the regional international society can be differentiated from, and how it related to, the more commonly discussed global

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[87] For excellent studies of China from an international society perspective, see for example, Yongjin Zhang, *China in International Society Since 1949: Alienation and Beyond*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1998; Yongjin Zhang, 'China Entry into International Society: Beyond Standard of Civilization,' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1991, pp. 3-16; Yongjin Zhang, 'China and the Struggle for Legitimacy of a Rising Power', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 8, Issue 3, 2015, pp. 301-322; Ian Clark, 'International Society and China: The Power of Norm and Norm of Power,' *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 7, Issue 3, 2014, pp. 315-340.

[88] For excellent studies on Japan from international society perspective, see, Shogo Suzuki, 'Japan Socialization into Janus Faced European International Society, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2005, pp. 137-164.

[89] For the case of Thailand from international society perspective, see, for example, Neil A. Englehart, 'Representing Civilization: Solidarism, Ornamentalism, and Siam's Entry into International Society,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 16, Issue. 3, 2010, pp. 417-439; Gregory V. Raymond, 'War as Membership: International Society and Thailand's Participation in World War I,' *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 43, Issue 1, 2019, pp. 132–147.

[90] Barry Buzan, 'The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR,' p. 472.

[91] Kia Alderson & Andrew Hurrell (eds), *Hedley Bull on International Society*, Macmillan Press, London, 2000, p. 12.

[92] Among important works are Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzales-Pelaez, (eds), *International Society and The Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2009; Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang (eds), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*.

international society. For example, Buzan and Zhang have argued that regional international society exists in East Asia with a considerable degree of differentiation from global international society and neighbouring regional international society.[93]

Corresponding with the above research agenda, this thesis aims to examine Indonesia's agency as a post-colonial state in engaging with regional international society. Therefore, this research will fill the gap in the literature on post-colonial states' agency in international society. This does not mean a complete rejection of previous scholarship that underlines the importance of domestic functionalism and material logic in Indonesia's foreign policy. Rather, as stated, it contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the role of the social dimension in explaining Indonesian regional foreign policy.

1.7.   Thesis Methodology

The methodology adopted in this thesis is an historical approach which concentrates on the description and interpretation of the events. The need for such an historical approach can be justified by the fact that Indonesia's ideas, beliefs, and values on appropriate behaviour in international relations have been obtained from its long historical relations with other states and political entities, even before it became a sovereign nation-state. Specifically, the period under European colonialism, Japan occupation, and struggle to be recognised as an independent and sovereign state offered significant socialisation as well as learning processes to the norms and institutions of global international society. The historical narrative is also employed to explain the making of Southeast Asia's regional international society from 1967 up to 2020 and covers the few years that preceded the formation of ASEAN. It will be indicated in this thesis that Indonesia's behaviour in the crucial moments and developments in Southeast Asia

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[93] Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang, 'Conclusion: Contest over East Asian International Society,' in Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang (eds), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, pp. 207–222.

regionalism has been mostly influenced by its ideas, beliefs, and values rather than material logic of domestic interests. Consequently, the use of an historical narrative enables a thorough understanding of the role of Indonesia's social elements in Southeast Asia regionalism.

Data for this thesis has been collected from variety of resources. First, the primary data has been obtained from primary documents that include ASEAN declarations and statements, Indonesia's official documents and officials' statements and speeches, and news from daily periodic media both printed and online. Primary inputs were also gathered through interviews with Indonesian Foreign Ministry officials and with academics from various universities and research institutes interested in ASEAN and Indonesia's foreign relations in general. Most interviews were conducted during field research in Jakarta and Yogyakarta December 2018 to February 2019. Ethics approval for this research was granted by the Flinders University Human Research Ethics Committee (See Appendix A). This thesis also relied on numerous secondary sources that include books, monographs, articles published in scholarly journals, in newspapers, and in magazines, as well as unpublished PhD theses/ dissertations on the subject or related matters.

1.8.   Thesis Structure

This thesis addresses the research problems in ten chapters. This first chapter has introduced the thesis and provided a rationale for the study and the methodology. The argument was outlined, and the aims and significance of the research were justified.

Chapter Two examines the key analytical frameworks needed to explain how Indonesia, as a post-colonial state in Southeast Asia, has been shaped by international society, and how it has in turn helped build and shape the regional international society in which it exists, based on its own interpretation of the norms, rules and institutions of international society.

Chapters Three and Four provide the historical context for understanding the nature of Indonesia's ideas, beliefs and values in its conduct of international relations. These chapters trace back the process of Indonesia's socialisation into international society which took place during the struggle for independence and during its early experiences as a sovereign state up until the 1960s.

Chapter Five reappraises Indonesia's role in the creation of Southeast Asia regionalism. It argues that Indonesia played important parts in the emergence of the primary institutions of regional international society – matters related to the conception of rightful conduct. Indonesia also played important parts in specifying and reproducing the principles and practices of the regional primary institutions into norms, rules, and procedures or the secondary institutions such as ASEAN, ZOPFAN, the TAC, Bali Concord, and the PTA

Chapter Six and Seven examine Indonesia's role in the process of consolidation of Southeast Asian regional international society, which arguably took place in 1977-1992. Chapter Six examines Indonesia's role in dealing with the challenge faced by Southeast Asia's regional international society, namely, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea in 1978-1991. Chapter Seven examines Indonesia's role in dealing with the challenge faced by Southeast Asia's regional international society, namely, the global rise of trade liberalisation that took life in the early 1980s. Both chapters demonstrate that Indonesia played important roles in consolidating Southeast Asian regional primary and secondary institutions.

Chapter Eight examines Indonesia's role in maintaining the relevance of regional international society in Southeast Asia in relation to the changing US policy in Southeast Asia in the period between 1992-2010, through promotion of adjustment and adaptation of the regional primary and secondary institutions to solve the normative tension between democracy, human rights and non-interference.

Chapter Nine examines Indonesia's role in maintaining the relevance of regional international society in Southeast Asia from the China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) since 2009. It demonstrates how Indonesia's response through its role as an honest broker and confidence builder in this issue has been directed to maintain the relevance of the practice of management of great power as well as maintaining the unity and cohesion of ASEAN.

Chapter Ten summarises the findings and provides the overall conclusion.

Chapter 2: Regional International Society and State Agency: A Framework for Analysis

2.1. Introduction

This chapter develops an analytical framework to explain Indonesia's agency in the making of regional international society in Southeast Asia. It combines two new research agendas for the international society perspective of the English School – the regional international society and state agency – particularly from the non-European state perspective in promoting international society within their own regions. By exploring the English School's concepts of primary and secondary institutions of regional international society, it proposes a framework of Indonesia's potential agency in the process of institutionalisation of regional primary and secondary institutions enabling the construction of a regional international society and regional order-building in Southeast Asia.

2.2. International Society: A Brief Introduction

The English School's most valuable contribution to the study of international relations is that it seeks to unveil the historical development of the relations among states and independent political communities through the lens of international society.[1] International Society is a socially constructed concept which explains why there is a substantial level of international order within the anarchy of the international system. Although anarchy is an unavoidable feature, according to this approach, international relations neither plunge into

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[1] Hidemi Suganami, 'The English School in a Nutshell', *Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies*, Vol. 19, 2000, pp. 15–28; Andrew Linklater, 'The English School,' in Scott Burchill, *et. al, Theories of International Relations*, 3rd Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005, pp. 89-92.

enduring conflict and competition as depicted by the realist approach nor reach a cosmopolitan peaceful world community as pictured by the liberalism-idealism. The English School questions both realist and liberal accounts of international relations as a mechanical world where states as the primary actors act in rationally determined ways either by their domestic nature or the anarchic international system. According to the English School, the behaviour of states to a greater extent, is also shaped by social elements such common concerns, common rules and common institutions that shared by states for the basic common goals, and thus social elements in international relations have to be taken into account.[2]

The English School argues that the overarching problem in international politics is to find the way to strengthen the foundation of order. Bull defines international order as 'the pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or the primary goals of the society of states or international society.'[3] The primary goals of international society include the preservation of the system and the society of states itself; maintaining external sovereignty and jurisdiction of individual states; peace in terms of the limitation of war and violence among states; and the universal goals of all social life: security against violence, keeping promises and guaranteeing agreement (*pacta sunt servanda*), and stability of possession-based rules on property.[4]

These goals are deemed fundamental and universal. They help create stability and form the basis for relations between states, providing regularity and predictability in the interaction between states. From this insight, order is not the final end but an intermediate end and a means to achieve the ultimate objectives. It does not suggest that war and conflict between states are obsolete or non-existent. Conflict and war are restricted and controlled in international society,

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[2] Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, 'Introduction, The Editors,' in Hedley Bull & Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 1; Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2000, pp. 395-422.

[3] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics*, 4th edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 2012, p.8

[4] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics*, p.8 & pp. 16-18.

but if they occur there are rules and norms that are socially agreed between states to limit and contain them. In other words, the existence of an international society or a society of states is best demonstrated by the prevalence of order.

A good starting point to understand the idea of order is elaborating on the English School's rejection of 'the domestic analogy'.[5] English School theory builds an understanding that international politics are different from domestic politics, hence the rules of domestic politics cannot be clear cut as applied to international politics, since they have a different logic of explanation. The English School criticises both realism and liberalism as these perspectives tend to appropriate the logic of domestic politics into international politics. For example, viewed from a realist perspective anarchy is based on the Hobbesian thinking of the individual state of nature, which leads to 'war of all against all'. The English School rejects this realist logic of anarchy because it is based on individuals' perceptions of anarchy, while international anarchy should be based on the states' perceptions and understandings. Domestic society achieved order because individuals surrender their sovereignty to the highest authority (the *leviathan* or the state). As there is no such entity at the international level, states could achieve order by building elements of society, embodied in the basic rules and institutions in international politics. The English School also dismisses the liberal domestic logic of order in international politics. From a liberalist perspective, order is viewed optimistically as a result of the harmony of interests among individuals based on their common cultures or common moral foundations. In reality, there have been difficulties to reconcile severe differences in international politics with an underlying assumption of harmony of interests. However, according to the English School, although there is no harmony of interests, states could agree

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[5] Hedley Bull, 'Society and Anarchy in International Relations,' in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds) with a new introduction by Tim Dunne and Ian Hall, *Diplomatic Investigation: Essays in Theory of International Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1st Edition, 2019, pp. 55-70; Hidemi Suganami, 'Reflections on the Domestic Analogy: The Case of Bull, Beitz, and Linklater,' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1986, pp. 145-158.

on common interests and common values and uphold common rules and common institutions to avoid anarchy.[6]

States are self-conscious of common interests and common values, and they consider themselves to be bound by common rules and they work together on the basis of historically developed common institutions. Although self-interest is a key motivation of states' behaviour, states are bound by moral obligations in their relations with each other. In other words, states recognise rights and duties in their relations with each other.[7] The pursuit of national interests, thus can have a moral dimension. As Jackson argues, 'defending national interest makes sense only if that interest entails real value: the state being defended must give or at least be assumed to be expression to the good life'.[8] Henceforward, a state's foreign policy is not entirely based on rational calculations but that a state has a selection of choices in their foreign policy which in effect could impair or strengthen the normative foundation of the society of states.

According to the English School, the idea that states have common interests and follow common rules and norms is not just an abstract theoretical concept, but it is a concrete reality in the minds of the states' leaders or decision makers. For example, Bull argues that the significance of international law to states behaviour 'does not rest on the willingness of states to abide by its principle to the detriment of their interest, but in the fact that they so often judge it in their interests to conform to it'.[9] Similarly, patterns of practices in international relations such as the balance of power are not just fortuitous and the unintended result of states' rational calculations. They are also ideas shared by the states' decision makers. The social elements in international relations are constitutive of states' behaviour through social logic: socialisation,

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[6] Hedley Bull, 'Society and Anarchy in International Relations,' pp. 60-69.
[7] Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp.169–78.
[8] Robert H. Jackson, 'Martin Wight, International Theory and the Good Life,' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1990, p. 266.
[9] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics*, p. 134.

recognition and non-recognition, and status rewards.[10]

International Society according to English School should be understood as a conceptual framework, which allows for specific understanding of international life between states. It is a social construct in which states strive to alleviate anarchy by establishing more regular and predictable relations between each other. Linklater, referring to Vincent, suggests that 'international society is 'functional' or utilitarian rather than 'cultural' or moral in character'.[11] From this insight, an international society is not established to set up state interaction based on a particular standard of moral goodness. It is consciously founded by states as a mechanism to achieve order. Norms and rules do not exist based on morality of natural law, and thereby they are not always squarely just and fair. The standard of morality of international society emanates from reiterated interactions, which lead the members to have a shared understanding based on shared interests and values. This shared understanding of common interests and values explains why states accommodate and compromise with each other and adhere to common working institutions. Thus, to discern the existence of international society and its effects, one should pay attention to how international institutions inform the relations between states.

2.3. Primary and Secondary International Society Institutions

In the broadest sense, the English School examines the social construction of international society and the role of international institutions in this process. In building a theory of international society, the English School stresses the importance of institutions it identifies as fundamental. This section will trace the origins and the conceptual development

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[10] Kai Alderson, 'Making Sense of State Socialization,' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 27, No.3 2001, pp. 415-433; Li Xiaojun, 'Social Rewards and Socialization Effects: An Alternative Explanation for the Motivation Behind China's Participation in International Institutions,' *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2010, pp. 347-377

[11] Andrew Linklater, 'The English School,' in Scott Burchill, p. 90.

of international institutions within the English School, which is based on a general consensus that international society is based on primary and secondary institutions. The English School also acknowledges the ongoing tensions and contestation of the primary institutions which have become the drivers of the evolution and changes in international society.

Commonly, 'institutions' in international relations refer to formal or informal state arrangements that are established for specific purposes, with international organisations and international regimes being prominent examples.[12] The English School understands the concept of 'institutions' differently. In the language of the English School, international institutions are not only tangibles, such as formal organisations or bodies, but also the normative foundations that regulate and stabilise interaction between states to achieve international order, and upon which formal organisations and bodies are implicitly (and often, explicitly) built. According to the English School, international institutions represent fundamental norms, practices and understanding located in the deep fabric of international society. As Bull argues, 'we do not necessarily imply an organisation or administrative machinery, but rather a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals.'[13] From the beginning, the English School paid more attention to the more fundamental institutions, rather than formal organisations such as the United Nations (UN).[14]

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[12] The differences on the notion of institution between the English School and regime theory can be summarised as follows: regime theory focuses on contemporary events while the English School takes a historical perspective; regime theory is chiefly concerned with design human arrangement formally and informally at given time to address specific issues or to deal with specific purposes, while the English School is concerned with the evolving historically construction of normative structure; regime theory explanations started from actors' rationality in pursuing interests, while the English School commenced from the assumption that states turn to common interests and common values to achieve international order. For further discussion on this topic, see, Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, 'Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 21, Issue 3, 1992, pp. 329–351; Barry Buzan, 'From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School,' *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1993, pp. 327–352. For an excellent comparison on how international institutions has been understood by various International Relations theories, see, Christian Reus-Smit, 'The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions', *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1997, pp. 558–563.

[13] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics*, p.71.

[14] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics*, p. xxxvii

Adherents of the English School argue that the fundamental international institutions have been developed over time as 'historically constructed normative structures' that emerged from states' interaction, which at the same time inform that interaction by defining who can count as a legitimate actor and what is perceived as legitimate practice.[15] The classical English School scholars concentrate on both the normative dimension and historical evolution of international institutions. They have documented that international society existed throughout world history. Wight, for example, has argued that historically, states establish a system of states. Wight defined the system of states as 'the union of several contiguous states, resembling each other in their manners, religion and degree of social improvement, and cemented together by a reciprocity of interests'.[16] The Graeco-Roman system, the Hellenistic Kingdom, Greek city states, the European Family of states, and the Chinese of the Warring States were among examples of international societies operating in the past. Wight further shows how the development of Christendom in Western Europe into the Westphalian system in 16-17th century feature as the origins of today's international society.[17] Through a process that is often understood as the expansion of European international society, the classical English School believes that there has been a global transmission of a core set of cooperative and cooperation norms that originated from Europe, well known as the Westphalia norms and institutions. These norms and institutions have expanded over the past three centuries through the processes of encounter, colonisation and decolonisation.[18] Once these countries comply with these norms and rules, there will be reciprocal recognition among states meaning that non-European states

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[15] Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society: The English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 161-162.
[16] Martin Wight (edited by Hedley Bull), *System of States*, Leicester University Press for the London School of Economic and Political Science, London, 1977, p. 22.
[17] For good interpretations of Wight's idea of system of states, see, Adam Watson, 'System of States,' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1990, pp. 99-109; Adam Watson, *Hegemony and History*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, pp. 14-26.
[18] Adam Watson, 'European International Society and Its Expansion,' in Hedley Bull & Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society,* pp. 13-32; Kia Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (eds), *Hedley Bull on International Society*, p. 12.

were incorporated and involved in the structure of coexistence and cooperation of the expanded European international society.

Bull identified a list of relatively fixed fundamental institutions that have been historically regulating modern Western international society and critical in sustaining its order: diplomacy, international law, the balance of power, the managerial role of great powers, and war.[19]

Diplomacy is the fundamental institution of international society, and it facilitates communication among states and other polities. It is the lifeblood of cohesion, coordination, and the capacity to reach any agreement among states. International law not only refers to formal agreements and rules but in Bull's rendition it includes norms and other moral principles. Acting in accordance with international law is essential for the society of states to guarantee predictability and stability of relations between each other. Balance of power refers to 'a state of affairs such as that no one power is in position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others.'[20] Unlike realism, which presents balance of power as a merely a fortuitous outcome as a consequence of relative distribution of power, Bull maintains that in international society, balance of power is a result that states contrive to achieve.[21] As states share a sense and understanding of the balance of power as a well-established doctrine, it becomes a continuing practice and an essential institution of international society and order. Great power management refers to the role of a few powerful states that are widely acknowledged as having the prerogative and responsibility of managing international society. The great powers arrangement is deemed as a chief institution in promoting order in international society. The role of the great powers is not just defined in terms of their greater

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[19] For detail explanation on international institutions, see, Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics*, Part 2, pp. 95–222.

[20] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics*, p. 97.

[21] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics*, pp.101–127.

power and capacities, but also in their perceived legitimacy to act on behalf of others. The maintenance of international order, therefore, is seen as contingent on great power management. The great powers could maintain the society and order through management of their relations and interests with each other, preserving general balance of power, and crisis management function such as to avoid crises carrying the danger of war with one another, or to control it when the war occurs.[22] The last institution, war is defined as 'organised violence carried on by political units against each other'.[23] According to Bull, war has dual functions.[24] It is a manifestation of disorder in international society, which needs to be limited and contained within the bounds of rules laid down by the international society itself. On the other hand, war is also a means in enforcing the international law, maintaining the balance of power, and bringing about just change. At this point, Bull argues the development of modern war as an international institution was a result of a process of limitation and confinement of violence.

From the beginning, however, there is a problem with the ontology of the international institutions. Despite providing lists of fundamental institutions, the classical English School – usually very concerned with historical context – neglected to focus on the emergence of these institutions, or the mechanisms of continuity and change: in other words the ontology of the international institutions.[25] Moreover, although the classical English School wanted to distinguish the understanding of international institutions from more tradition usage of the concept (international organisation, international regimes and so forth), the relationship between the two notions of international institutions remains unclear.[26]

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[22] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics*, pp. 203–219.
[23] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics*, p. 178.
[24] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics*, pp. 181-182.
[25] Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society: The English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, pp. 167-170.
[26] Tonny Brems Knudsen, 'Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Theorizing Continuity and Change', in Tonny Brems Knudsen and Cornelia Navari (eds), *International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland, 2019, pp. 23–25.

Recent English School theorists sought to explain the notion of institutional layers or a hierarchy of institutions between the deeper and more constitutive—what is often referred to as the fundamental, foundational, or primary institutions, and the less deep that is often referred to as the procedural or secondary institutions. The theorists also began to discuss the continuity and change of international institutions to remedy the notion of fixed international institutions found in the classical English School as well as attempting to explain the relationship between international organisations and the concept of international institutions.

Reus-Smit, for example, separates international institutions into three layers. The first and the deepest one is what he defines as constitutional structures. It consists of three deep hierarchical constitutive values: moral purpose of the state, an organising principle of sovereignty, and a norm of procedural justice. These constitutional structures are central in ordering international societies since they define the legitimate actors and statehood and define the rightful conduct of state action. The second tier is what he calls fundamental institutions: basic rules of practice, such as bilateralism, multilateralism, and international law. The third layer of international institutions is the issue specific regime, which refers to international organisations or international regimes.[27]

In the same vein, Holsti discerns international institutions as falling into two types: the foundational institutions and the procedural institutions. Both embody three essential elements – patterned practices, coherent sets of ideas and/ or beliefs, and norms, including rules and etiquette in varying combinations – but they serve different functions. The foundational institutions define the fundamental principles, rules, and norms upon which states' mutual relations are based. It relates to the question of 'who are we?', 'how do we become?', and 'how do we claim status and legitimacy?' The procedural institutions refer to repetitive practices,

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[27] Christian Reus-Smit, 'Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions,' *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1997, pp. 566–570

ideas and norms that underlie and regulate interactions and transactions between the separate actors related to more instrumental issues of 'how we behave towards one another in the conduct of both conflict and normal intercourse.'[28] Included in the foundational institutions are sovereignty, territoriality, and international law, while the procedural institutions are diplomacy, trade, colonialism and war.[29] In Holsti's account, international organisations are also important for the normative order, but they serve as operationalisations of the foundational institutions.

Taking cues from the above works, Buzan clarifies the layers or hierarchical international institutions and the connection between them in his seminal distinction of primary and secondary institutions. The primary institutions refer to the English School's treatment of institutions as long-standing habits or deep structure of international society.[30] Buzan sets up a list of primary institutions of contemporary international society such as sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, equality of people, market, nationalism, and environmental stewardship.[31]

The secondary institutions, on the other hand, are defined as specific rules and decision-making procedures that are routinised and formalised in international organisations, agreements, and regimes that constitute governance structure of international society. The term refers to material-physical institutions. While the primary institutions are evolved and not necessarily the result of states' deliberate actions, the secondary institutions are consciously designed as offshoots of actors' self-interest. The secondary institutions, therefore, are considered as empirical indicators as well as reflections of specific primary institutions or

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[28] K.J. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politic*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 25.
[29] K.J. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*, pp. 25 & 27.
[30] Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society: The English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, p. 181.
[31] Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society: The English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, p. 187.

specific types of international society.[32] In this sense, the secondary institutions are based on the primary institutions, which means the primary institutions shape the forms of the secondary institutions (governance structure) of international society over time.

Recent English School scholars have even gone further by investigating the relations between the primary and secondary institutions as well as the role of international organisation, as the one of the embodiments of the secondary institutions in international society. In discussing the relations between international organisations and the primary institutions, Brems Knudsen[33] and Navari,[34] for instance, argue that not only do the international organisations embody and express the primary institutions, but they also specify the principles and practices of primary institutions, and thereby they reproduce and maintain the primary institutions. Moreover, international organisations could also play a role in changing the practices of primary institutions. Knudsen, for example, argues that both institutions are mutually constitutive, in which each institution has certain consequences in relations to the other.[35] The primary institutions shape, enable and at the same time constrain the secondary institutions whereas the secondary institutions 'embody, specify and reproduce the constitutional principle' and thus socialise states into the norms, principles and orderly and habitual of states' interactions that are generated by primary institutions.[36]

Spandler further elaborates on the relationship between the primary and secondary

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[32] Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 30

[33] Tonny Brems Knudsen, 'Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Theorizing Continuity and Change', in Tonny Brems Knudsen and Cornelia Navari (eds), *International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order*, pp. 23-50.

[34] Cornelia Navari, 'Modelling the Relations of Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations,' in Tonny Brems Knudsen and Cornelia Navari (eds), *International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order*, pp. 51-76.

[35] Tonny Brems Knudsen, 'Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Theorizing Continuity and Change,' pp. 43–45

[36] Tonny Brems Knudsen, 'Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Theorizing Continuity and Change,' pp. 40–43.

institutions through the processes of constitution and institutionalisation.[37] Spandler argues that primary institutions are constitutive of international society by defining the legitimate actors and conduct as well as inform the general rationality of actors. The secondary institutions are constitutive by defining membership, differentiating roles and defining specific interactions. Although both primary and secondary institutions are constitutive of international society, they are institutionalised in different modes.[38] The primary institutions consist of general norms, rules and principles of rightful behaviour and are institutionalised through reiterated practices and discursive processes. This is not necessarily deliberative; the institutions might have developed through habit and practice. Discursive processes through iterated speech, conferences and meetings can be important mechanisms of socialisation and social learning that shape expectations about identities and behaviours of actors. Diplomacy, for instance, is one of the primary institutions that has largely been built upon long-established practices among states, although today it is more organised and regularised. By contrast, the secondary institutions consist of formal agreements, treaty making, creation and reform of international regimes and international organisations, and these are institutionalised through the conscious adoption of rules and procedures and formal institution building.

In relation to the processes of constitution and institutionalisation, the creation of primary institutions and the translation of the fundamental normative ideas into secondary institutions and organisational forms are a matter of political contestation among actors.[39]

The emergence of the R2P regime in the UN clearly illustrates Spandler's assessment.

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[37] Kilian Spandler, 'The Political International Society: Change in Primary and Secondary Institutions,' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 41, Issue 3, 2015, pp. 609–614.

[38] Institutionalisation according to Spandler, refers to the process of constructing the primary and secondary institutions based on social relations between actors, for example through social learning, compromise, and accommodation.

[39] Kilian Spandler, 'Primary Institutional Dynamics and the Emergence of Regional Governance in Southeast Asia: Constructing Post-Colonial International Societies,' in Tonny Brems Knudsen and Cornelia Navari (eds), *International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order*, p. 327.

The emergence of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was an upshot of tensions and contestation in the established ideas of international society effecting the institutions of sovereignty, international law, war, and great power management which underwent significant transformation.[40] As a result, the R2P as an international regime (secondary institution) is still often viewed as a controversial idea with an ambiguous implementation record.[41] Thus, inherent in the contestation of the idea of primary institutions is the assumption that the institutions are malleable and change over time, while the creation of the secondary institutions, rather than simply embedded in a normative context, are politically contested in a more complex normative context. However, rather than seeing them as shortcomings, tension and contestation of institutions are seen as the drivers of change in international society.[42]

The discussion above shows that the English School scholars agree that primary institutions capture the evolving and enduring social practices between states that shape international relations, and conceptually could be distinguished from the physical international organisations or the secondary institutions. The English School scholars also acknowledge that there has been institutional ambiguity that reflected the tension and contestation of institutions in international societies. 'Tension' and 'contestation' are thus recurring themes in much of the literature from the scholars of the English School. For example, Bull has laid the groundwork for a debate between pluralist and solidarist types of international society.[43]

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[40] For example, Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention,' pp. 463-487; Tonny Brems Knudsen, 'Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Solidarist Architecture,' pp. 175-202.

[41] For the discussion on controversy and ambiguous implementation of the R2P, see for example, Noele Crossley, 'Is R2P still Controversial? Continuity and Change in the Debate on 'Humanitarian Intervention',' *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 5, 2018, pp. 415-436; Wesley W. Widmaier & Luke Glanville, 'The Benefits of Norm Ambiguity: Constructing the Responsibility to Protect Across Rwanda, Iraq and Libya, *Contemporary Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2015, pp. 367-383.

[42] Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society: The English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, pp. 250-251.

[43] Pluralist refers to international societies with relatively low degree of shred norms, rules and institutions, while solidarist refers to the kind of international society with relatively high degree of shared norms, rules and institutions. See for example, Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics,* p.83; Alex

The concept of primary and secondary institutions and the acknowledgement of institutional ambiguity also paves the way for studying international society at the regional level. It started from the presumption that regional international societies have been developed along different pathways, in which the regional international societies may share certain primary institutions with the global level, but they might exclude certain others. Inherent in the study of regional international societies is the contestation, competition, and different interpretations of the primary institutions due to their historical relations with the global international society as well as political contestation among states in a certain regional international society in translating their fundamental ideas into regional agreements, regional regimes, and regional organisations or the secondary institutions.

2.4.   Regional International Society

The study of international society at the regional level has been an important contribution from a later generation of English School scholars.[44] Compared to the classical scholars of the English School, the more recent scholars address the topic of regional international society differently. The classical scholars were interested in finding the evidence of the existence of regional international societies prior to the emergence and evolution of European international society, and their interactions with various regional international societies during their expansion. Wight[45] and Watson[46] for example, have suggested that before

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J. Bellamy, 'The English School,' p. 79; Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach*, p.16.

[44] Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society: The English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, chapter 7; Yannis A. Stivachtis, 'Regional Dimension of International Society,' in Cornelia Navari and Daniel M. Green (eds.), *Guide to the English School in International Studies*, Wiley Blackwell, West Sussex, 2014, pp. 109-125; Peter Wilson, 'The English School in Retrospect and Prospect: Barry Buzan's An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach,' *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2016, pp. 95-136.

[45] Martin Wight (edited by Hedley Bull), *System of States*, Chapter 4.

[46] Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, Routledge, London and New York, 1992, Chapter 2-21.

and during the establishment of the European society of states, the world was divided into many regional state systems or regional international societies. Wight focused on social institutions including cultural affinities that constituted the social dimension of inter-relations among political entities in certain geographical proximity. He provided specific examples of the history of those parts of the world, to demonstrate that in the past some city-states and or empires were able to create and sustain some kinds of rules of conduct among themselves aimed at creating order among the system of states.[47] In the same vein, Watson provided historical analysis of regional international society, but he focused on the evolution of the European international society, from the city-states of the Renaissance age, to the great empires of the 19th century, the break-up of the empires in the 20th century, in explaining the evolution of a specific regional international society (European) into a single global international society.[48] Bull and Watson are interested in the historical dimension of regional international society, but analyse and trace the expansion of European international society into other parts of the world, rather than explaining the regional international society in its own right, before and after encountering the Europeans.[49]

Unlike the previous studies, recent English School scholars view regional international societies as simply not existing as a stage in the evolution towards global international society. Instead, it commences from the presumption that there has been parallel existence of regional and sub-global international societies within the confines of a global international society. Inherent in the parallel existence is the degree of differentiation of international society into global and regional level as well as differentiation between one region to other regions. Buzan depicts the coexistence of global international society and regional international societies by

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[47] Martin Wight(edited by Hedley Bull), *System of States*, Chapter 2 and 3.
[48] Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, especially the second part of the book (chapter 13-25).
[49] Hedley Bull & Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*,

using the metaphor of 'eggs', as he argues:

> Although nearly all the states in the system belong to a thin, pluralist interstate society (the layer of egg-white), there are sub-global and/ or regional clusters sitting on the common substrate that are both much more thickly developed than the global common, and up to a point developed separately and in different ways from each other (the yolks).[50]

Thus, contemporary global international society, is culturally heterogenous, and yet includes a number of culturally homogenous regional international societies that exist side-by-side.[51]

The new agenda on regional studies in English school, thus seeks to understand the concurrent existence between global and regional international society, and seeks to explain how they are similar or different and how they relate each other. Buzan and Zhang for example, suggest uncovering the differences in their primary institutions, which are the fundamental attributes of international societies, and which define their social structures. According to Buzan and Zhang, a regional international society can be identified from three possible modes of difference: (1) contains one or more primary institutions that are present at the global level; (2) lacks primary institutions present at global level; (3) adopts one or more primary institutions at the global level but interprets them differently and thus has significant different practices associated with them. Buzan and Zhang clearly pronounce that differentiation between global and regional international societies is the effect of the contestations about primary institutions, and different practices within the same institution.[52]

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[50] Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society: The English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, p. 208.

[51] Yannis A. Stivachis, 'Interrogating Regional International Societies, Questioning Global International Society,' *Global Discourse,* Vol. 5 Issue.3, 2015, p. 331-332.

[52] Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang, 'Introduction: Interrogating Regional International Society in East Asia,' in Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang (eds), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 7.

The renewed attention to regions has resulted in a growing study of regional international societies in their specific characteristics. For example, Whitman and Diez on their research on the EU, argue that it has evolved into a deeper and thicker regional international society, which marches towards a solidarist type of international society by possessing a particularly solid set of common rules and institutions based on ongoing discourse of common history, common values (such as human rights and social liberal market), and transnational activities among civil society actors at the EU level.[53] In examining the primary institutions in the European regional international society, Diez, Manner and Whitman argue that the primary institutions in European society of states have departed from Bull's five primary institutions (as above) and still prevalent in the rest of the world, into new primary institutions such as: pooling sovereignty; the cumulative body of EU laws, objectives, rules etc (French terminology: *acquis Communautaire)*; multi-managerialism; pacific democracy; member state coalitions; and multiperspectivity.[54]

On their study on the Middle East society of states, Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez argues that in a predominantly shared Islamic tradition and Arab culture region, the Middle East society of states is characterised by its adoption of global international society institutions such as: diplomacy; balance of power; and sovereignty but lacks global international society institutions such as democracy. The Middle East society of states has distinctive institutions of patrimonial ruling elites, which highlights its differentiation of state-society relations with the Western-global international society. Moreover, the Middle East society of states has a weaker practice of sovereignty, a more transnational view of nationalism and fewer constraints on

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[53] Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman, 'Analysing European Integration, Reflecting on the English School: Scenarios for an Encounter,' *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2002, pp. 43-67.

[54] Thomas Diez, Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, 'The Changing Nature of International Institutions in Europe: The Challenge of the European Union,' *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 33, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 117-138.

war.[55]

Recent English School scholars have also investigated the differences in the dynamic of the regional secondary institutions, particularly the regional organisations. From an international society perspective, regional organisations are understood from their historical ideational context within which they develop, rather than capturing the specific distribution of power, states' preferences, and the role of domestic coalitions within them. From this view, power politics, states' preferences and other domestic factors must have an impact on the development of regional organisations. Yet, they have also been built upon and shaped by certain normative deep structures (primary institutions) of regional international society rather than power politics and other domestic factors.[56] Regional organisations and regional regimes are not only taken for granted as the 'expressions',[57] 'representations'[58] or manifestations of regional international societies, but they also embody the nature of regional international societies and play a role in their relations between regional international societies and global international society and relations between international society in a region with another.

Using Knudsen's logic,[59] regional organisations, similar to international organisations, play a role in specifying the principles and practices of regional primary institutions, and thereby reproduce and maintain the primary institutions. Moreover, like international organisations that have a role in the changing practice of primary institutions, regional organisations also play this role by specifying international norms in more detail and adjust

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[55] Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, 'Conclusion,' in Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (eds), *International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2009, pp. 226-250.

[56] Kilian Spandler, *Regional Organizations in International Society: ASEAN, the EU and the Politics of Normative Arguing*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland, 2019, pp. 18-19.

[57] Georgeta Pourchot, 'The OSCE: A Pan-European Society in the Making?' *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 33, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 179-195.

[58] Yannis A. Stivachtis & Mike Habegger, 'The Council of Europe: The Institutional Limits of Contemporary European International Society,' *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 33, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 159-177.

[59] Tonny Brems Knudsen, 'Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Theorizing Continuity and Change,' pp. 43–45.

them to be more compatible with regional norms and practices. The normative agency of regional organisations is also explained by Acharya from a constructivist point of view, in what he calls 'norms localisation' and 'norms subsidiarity.' Norm localisation refers to a process whereby certain regional organisations reconstruct external (supposedly global or universal) ideas and norms to make them compatible with locally existing beliefs and practices.[60] The end result of constitutive localisation is newly amalgamated norms that blend the external ideas and local existing norms in a new sense of legitimacy, although in many cases the final result is closer to the regional orthodoxy rather than the external ideas. Regional organisations also engage in norm subsidiarity which is 'a process whereby local actors create rules with a view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors'.[61] The ultimate objective of subsidiarity is local autonomy vis-à-vis global encroachment.[62] Thus, just like international organisations, regional organisations are the manifestation of the variation in meaning and practices of primary institutions in a regional context, as well as important means and drivers of change in the regional primary institutions.[63]

2.5. The Agency of Non-European States

The agency of non-European states could explain why there have been differences both in substance and interpretation of the primary institutions between European/Western core-global international society and the regional international societies, as well as between one

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[60] Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism,* Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 2009. For a shorter account see, Amitav Acharya, 'How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norms Localization and Institutional Change in Southeast Asia,' *International Organization*, Vol. 58, Issue 2, 2004, pp. 239-275.

[61] Amitav Acharya, 'Norms Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism, and Rule Making in the Third World,' *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2011, p. 97.

[62] Norm localisation refers to a process of selecting foreign norms that are imported for local functionality, and therefore inward-looking. Norm subsidiarity, on the other hand, is outward looking to regulate interaction between local actors and external powers, in the sense that it is a response to a fear of domination of powerful states against the weaker. Amitav Acharya, 'Norms Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism, and Rule Making in the Third World,' pp. 97–98.

[63] Brems Knudsen, 'Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Theorizing Continuity and Change,' p. 43

region and another. This agency may also explain the differences between regional organisations, particularly those developed in Europe and in post-colonial regions. Historically, the agency of non-European states can be traced back to the expansion of European international society across the world. Instead of outright acceptance of the wholesale European norms and institutions, there have been contestations and creative engagements through adaptation and localisation, which illustrate the agency of non-European states.

The classical English School's thesis of the expansion of international society has provided a grand historical narrative of a gradual adoption of a core set of cooperative and cooperation norms that originated in Europe. These are commonly known as the Westphalia norms and institutions that expanded globally through the processes of encounter, colonisation and decolonisation over the past three centuries. Through these processes, many regional international societies that included either the Arab-Islamic system, the Indian subcontinent, China and the Mandala system in Southeast Asia, had collapsed by the end of nineteenth century and their member states had been co-opted into an emerging global international society dominated by Europeans. Thus, according to the expansion thesis, today's global international society is the result of the expansion of European international society in the nineteenth century.[64] The thesis, however, has been widely criticised for neglecting colonialism and imperialism as important institutions of European international society. In the process of the expansion of international society, many non-European polities had been incorporated into European international society as a result of colonialism and imperialism, which often involved military clashes and violence. Criticising this thesis, Keene argues that as colonialism and imperialism became a fundamental institution in the nineteenth century, the moral purpose,

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[64] For expansion of international society see, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, 'Introduction, The Editors,' pp. 1-12; Adam Watson, 'European International Society and its Expansion,' in Hedley Bull & Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*, pp. 13-32; Hedley Bull, 'The Emergence of a Universal International Society,' in Hedley Bull & Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*, pp. 117-126.

patterns and objectives of European international society was bifurcated.[65] On the one hand, European states dealt with one another as members of 'a family of civilised nations', the pattern of which was based on the Westphalian system of recognising mutual territorial sovereignty and preserving mutual equality and independence. This mode of relations was based on their identity as civilised states, promoting toleration of European political differences and maintaining peaceful coexistence among them. On the other hand, European international society promoted its 'civilising' order beyond Europe by introducing 'civilisation' into 'backward' political communities, believing 'that some of the sovereign prerogatives of indigenous rulers ought to be held by more advanced Europeans in order to introduce the economic, political and judicial benefits of civilized life.'[66] Hence, rather than European international society being expanded, it would be more correct to say that the Europeans built a stratified system whereby full sovereignty stopped at the edge of Europe. Beyond the European peninsula, Europeans imposed 'divided sovereignty' wherein European powers exercised the central core of sovereignty.[67] By this reading, non-Europeans were never part of the same international society as the Europeans, but were subject to it.[68]

As unequal sovereignty become the fundamental practice in the process of expansion, there was no linear process by which European international society was adopted beyond Europe. Suzuki for example, argues 'a simplistic transfer of the cooperative norms of European International Society may not have taken place' due to many non-European polities experiencing aggressive behaviour from the Europeans aiming to bring them closer towards

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[65] Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics*, LSE Monographs in International Studies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002 pp. 6–7.

[66] Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics*, p. 147.

[67] Edward Keene, 'Standard of 'Civilisation', The Expansion Thesis and the 19th-Century International Space,' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2014, pp. 651-673

[68] For similar argument, see for example, Paul Keal, *European Conquest and The Rights of Indigenous People: The Moral Backwardness of International Society,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003; John M. Hobson, 'The Eastern Origin of the Rise of the West and the 'Return' of Asia,' *East Asia*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2015, pp. 239-255.

European civilisation.[69] In the case of Japan, Suzuki demonstrates that Japan was not only learned about cooperative and cooperation norms of European international society institutions and practices, but 'to become a full 'civilized' member of the Society […] they would have to construct a strong, imperialistic state and take […] on the identity of a powerful 'civilized' state.'[70] Zhang, writing on the experience of East Asia, argues that rather than simply reflecting European institutions and norms, non-European polities engage in processes of accepting, adapting and localising Western-global international society institutions, suiting them to their particular contexts.[71] These findings point to the importance of the agency of non-European polities beyond passive internalisation in negotiating the expansion of international society within their own region.

The newer English School scholars further elaborate the role of regional actors (regional states and regional leaders that act on behalf of the states) in the process of constitution and institutionalisation of regional primary and secondary institutions.[72] It started from the proposition that regions are socially constructed entities, and there is always a political dimension in the process of their definition and redefinition.[73] Regions are not merely exogenously given but are constructed socially through historically contingent interactions. Hence, the role of regional actors refers to the fact there have been politics in the process of the institutionalisation of primary and secondary institutions at regional level. The politics here

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[69] Shogo Suzuki, 'Japan's Socialisation into Janus-Faced European International Society,' in *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2005, p. 147.
[70] Shogo Suzuki, 'Japan's Socialisation into Janus-Faced European International Society,' p. 154.
[71] Yongjin Zhang, 'Regional International Society in East Asia? A Critical Investigation,' *Global Discourse*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2015, pp. 360-373.
[72] For example, Kilian Spandler, *Regional Organizations in International Society: ASEAN, the EU and the Politics of Normative Arguing*, especially Ch 2, pp. 15-50; Robert Yates, 'The English School and Postcolonial States Agency: Social Role and Order Management in Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific,' *International Theory,* Vol.13, No 1, 2021, pp. 68–96; also Cornelia Navari, 'Modelling the Relations of Fundamental Institutions and Regional Organizations,' in Brems Knudsen and Navari (eds), *International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order*, pp. 66-72.
[73] Björn Hettne, 'The New Regionalism Revisited,' in Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (eds), *Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reading,* Palgrave, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003, p. 27; Iver B. Neumann, 'A Region-Building Approach,' in Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (eds), *Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reading*, p. 166.

denotes how states in certain geographical proximities negotiate the normative foundation of order and how order will be managed within a socially defined region.

Spandler for example, argues that decolonisation has not simply led to an absorption of all newly independent states into the global international society. Decolonisation has also led to a process whereby the local actors actively construct regionally specific post-colonial identities and norms in order to renegotiate hierarchies and boundaries within a global context.[74] In the case of Southeast Asia, as Spandler further explains, the role of regional actors has clearly demonstrated that anti-colonial movements questioned the stratification of international society through discursive strategies, and thus emphasised the tension in global primary institutions between national self-determination and other institutions such as unequal sovereignty, international law and even human rights and democracy. The new states in the region sought to establish parameters of practices in post-colonial international society. Through meetings and conferences, such as the 1947 Asian Relations Conference (ARC), the 1954 Colombo Conference, and the 1955 Bandung Conference, the regional actors forged regionally specific post-colonial identities and a normative basis upon which peaceful relations among the new post-colonial states and between them and the great powers, and thus renegotiated hierarchies and boundaries within a global context. This argument suggests that the regional primary institutions emerged from a regionally specific historical context that was actively constructed by regional leaders in their processes of building specific regional identities (in the case of Southeast Asia post-colonial identities) and norms to define legitimate actors and behaviour.

It is in the regionally specific context of primary institutions that the regional secondary institutions have been developed by regional actors in translating the primary institutions into

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[74] Kilian Spandler, 'Primary Institutional Dynamics and the Emergence of Regional Governance in Southeast Asia: Constructing Post-Colonial International Societies,' pp. 339-341.

rules, procedures and organisational forms. The fundamental understanding about rightful conduct and legitimate actors in a regional space set the elementary parameters to the forms that regional organisations can take. As Spandler argues, regional organisations such as the EU, ASEAN, and the African Union 'display persistent differences, because their rules and procedures—what the English School of IR calls "secondary institutions"— are developed by political actors in regionally specific context of fundamental norms or "primary institutions".'[75] This point explains, why regional governance structures between one region and another differs in organisation style, mode of cooperation, and in the pace of integration process. For example, the differences on the interpretation and practice of sovereignty in Europe and other regions could explain why the EU arrived at the formal and 'pooling of sovereignty' mode of cooperation, while regional organisations in non-European regions such as ASEAN — despite its dynamic integration that is often pointed out as mimicking or referring to the EU's model of integration[76] — is seemingly not marching towards formalisation and pooling sovereignty.

The discussion above suggests that in the making of a regional international society, all actors, including the weaker non-European states involved in the process, and hence find their own distinct ways of shaping and sustaining the regional international society based on regional ideas and practices. In the context of Southeast Asia, Eun, Acharya and Thalang argue that the relatively weak states in the region could actualise and exercise their agency in the regional system in shaping the most favoured regional order that is legitimate and endorsed by the whole states in the region. They further postulate, weak states' agency can be 'sourced through a variation of means, including non-material and ideational forms of power, and exercised in

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[75] Kilian Spandler, *Regional Organizations in International Society: ASEAN, the EU and the Politics of Normative Arguing*, p. 5.

[76] For example, see, Anja Jetschke, 'Institutionalizing ASEAN: Celebrating Europe through Network Governance,' *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 22, Issue 3, 2009, pp. 407-426; Rueben Wong, 'Model Power or Reference Point? The EU and the ASEAN Charter, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 25, Issue 4, 2012, pp. 669-682.

multiple ways […] and via bilateral and multilateral diplomatic settings.'[77] These regional ideas, practices and institutions may not be same with the global international society as there have been processes of acceptance, negotiation, and adaptation of the global primary and secondary institutions. The outcome is a more pluralistic and decentralised regional order. Once the regional primary and secondary institutions are institutionalised, accepted, and endorsed by the whole states in the regional, the regional order becomes legitimate. It does not mean that the regional primary and secondary institutions are constant and unchanged. Instead, they evolve as there always be norm contestation from both within and without the region, which could affect the historical trajectories of the regional international society. That said, the agency of regional actors also recounts their ability to accommodate change and be ready to negotiate with resistances and opposition from others.

Taken together, this understanding provides the basis to unfold the agency of regional actors, particularly the weaker non-European states, in the construction of a regional international society. Seeing from the concept of regional primary and secondary institution, the agency of weaker non-European states can be discerned from their foreign policy ideas and practices in process of institutionalisation of the regional primary and secondary institutions in several ways. First, their role in the process of creative interpretation and localisation of global international society's norms and institutions to be adapted to regional context. Second, their role in translating and specifying the regional primary institutions into regional secondary institutions. Not least, the agency of regional actors is also displayed in their roles in mediating tensions between one primary institution and another, as well as introducing change in the primary institutions and reform in the secondary institutions to underpin their vision of regional order.

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[77] Yong-Soo Eun, Amitav Acharya and Chanintira na Thalang, 'Unpacking the Dynamics of Weak States' Agency,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2002, p. 230.

2.6.   An International Society Perspective

2.6.1.   Southeast Asia

Studies of Southeast Asia from an international society perspective are few in number,[78] but those that do exist provide legitimate grounds to understand Southeast Asia as a regional international society, with ASEAN as a manifestation as well as an outwards expression of its primary institutions. Southeast Asia is regarded as a regional international society as there is an agreement on membership and social and geographical boundaries of Southeast Asia, as well as a clear representation of its secondary institutions that could be delineated by which states are full members or external to it. Quayle for example, argues that Southeast Asia is a distinctive regional society of states because it already has established common interests such as, maintaining independence and sovereignty; resisting hegemony from inside and outside the region; and promoting political stability and economic growth; and common values such as, consultation; non-aggression; and a sense of cultural distinctiveness.[79] Similarly, Narine argues that the Southeast Asia society of states manifested in ASEAN, symbolises the shared commitment of its members to the fundamental institutions of international law, diplomacy, and state sovereignty.[80]

Four regional primary institutions appear to be most important when interpreting the

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[78] For example, Shaun Narine, 'The English School and ASEAN,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2006, pp. 199-218; Alan Chong, A Society of the Weak, the Medium and the Great: Southeast Asia's Lessons in Building Soft Community among States,' in Alexander Astrov (ed.), *The Great Power (mis)Management: The Russian–Georgian War and its Implications for Global Political Order*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2011, pp. 135-158
Linda Quayle, *Southeast Asia and The English School of International Relations: A Region-Theory Dialogue,* Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; Linda Quayle, 'The 'English School,' South East Asia and Indonesia: Locating and Defending Productive 'Middle Ground',' *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional*, Vo. 2, No. 2, 2013, pp. 92-105; Kilian Spandler*, Regional Organizations in International Society: ASEAN, the EU and Politics of Normative Arguing*; Kilian Spandler, 'The Primary Institutions Dynamics and the Emergence of Regional Governance in Southeast Asia: Constructing Post-Colonial International Society,' pp. 321-365.
[79] Linda Quayle, 'The 'English School,' South East Asia and Indonesia: Locating and Defending Productive 'Middle Ground',' p. 95.
[80] Shaun Narine, 'The English School and ASEAN,' p. 200 & p. 212.

underlying social structures of the Southeast Asia society of states. The four regional primary institutions are: 1) sovereignty; 2) management of great power; 3) economic development; and 4) diplomacy. These four institutions are identified on the basis that they are fundamental elements of stable regional order. More importantly, they have developed as a result of creative adaptations and localisations that have allowed Southeast Asia as a distinctive regional international society to emerge. Each of these institutions have also been central to the scholarly writings on this region from various theoretical perspectives.[81] Another important primary institution is international law, which emphasises the rights and obligations of the sovereign state. However, for the purposes of this thesis international law will not be further discussed as it has not been contested or adapted into regional practices and is generally adhered.

Sovereignty is the most important primary institution in Southeast Asia that exerts influence on other institutional practices. In Southeast Asia, sovereignty embodies the common understanding of the Westphalian territorial state but 'takes on a different meaning and significance.'[82] A particular understanding and practice of sovereignty is associated with the institutional practice of state self-determination, nationalism and non-interference, which is deeply entangled with the contending process of state formation and the consolidation as a nation-state.[83] In most Southeast Asian states, state sovereignty was born out from the national self-determination struggles against European colonialism. Moreover, in their infancy, the newly independent states, to different degrees, experienced many civil wars, insurgencies,

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[81] The four institutions are discussed by for example, Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*, Routledge Curzon, London 2003; Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, Routledge Curzon, London 2003; Mark Beeson, *Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007; Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2009; Alice D. Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2009.
[82] Alice Ba, 'Outside-In and Inside-Out: Political Ideology, the English School and East Asia,' in Barry Buzan & Yongjin Zhang (eds), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, p. 128.
[83] Yongjin Zhang, 'Regional International Society in East Asia? A Critical Investigation,' p. 361.

rebellions and numerous religious, racial and ethnic conflicts, which made them internally insecure. They also had to face problems related to redrawing territorial boundaries between one state and another. These experiences have helped the emergence of 'statist ideologies' and the 'unitary state mentality' as guiding values in states' policies both at domestic and international political levels.[84] In this way, nationalism and state self-determination have contributed to produce a statist conception of sovereignty in Southeast Asia in contrast to popular sovereignty in Europe.[85] The spirit of nationalism and self-determination also informed the entanglement between sovereignty and the practice of non-intervention and non-interference. The notion of non-intervention was adapted to non-involvement of external great powers in domestic and regional affairs, which sustained the undertones of anti-colonialism. Non-intervention has been further interpreted in the new terms of non-interference, which required non-involvement in the formulation and conduct of each state's foreign policy by other states both within and outside the region.[86] The sources and the salience of the interpretation of non-intervention and non-interference rested in the need for regional societies to preserve their own sovereignty. Thus, in Southeast Asia, sovereignty is not only understood as a fundamental idea for state policies and relations, but also as the objective of state policies.

As there is no indigenous great power, instead of great power management, the second primary institution in Southeast Asia are the 'socially organised strategies of management of great powers and balance of power.'[87] Chong refers to the management of great power as the practice of small/weak states and medium powers within Southeast Asia to shape the norms and rules for great power behaviour in search of regional order.[88] This institution is deeply

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[84] Alice Ba, 'Outside-In and Inside-Out: Political Ideology, the English School and East Asia,' p. 127.
[85] Yongjin Zhang, 'Regional International Society in East Asia? A Critical Investigation,' p. 361.
[86] Kilian Spandler, 'Primary Institutional Dynamics and the Emergence of Regional Governance in Southeast Asia: Constructing Post-Colonial International Societies,' pp. 341-344.
[87] Linda Quayle, 'The 'English School,' South East Asia and Indonesia: Locating and Defending Productive 'Middle Ground',' p. 95.
[88] Alan Chong, 'A Society of the Weak, the Medium and the Great: Southeast Asia's Lessons in Building Soft Community among States,' pp. 136-137.

connected in the institutional practices of sovereignty and non-interference in the collective efforts by Southeast Asian states to 'deny the opportunity for extra-regional political predators to fish in troubled waters.'[89] Hence, like non-intervention, management of great power becomes the institutional practice to shield Southeast Asian states against the intrusion of great powers, which also has a clear anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism resonance. Moreover, management of great power underpins the Southeast Asian states' endeavours to establish peaceful and non-confrontational settlements of dispute and proprietary role in managing regional order without unnecessary interference by external powers, which expressed in 'regional solutions to regional problems' to preserve regional autonomy.[90]

Another primary institution of Southeast Asia society of states is economic development. It is a distinguished institutional practice that is shared in wider East Asia region but not present at the Western-global level.[91] In Southeast Asia, the practice of economic development embodies Western capitalist market-oriented economy that is creatively adapted in the historical, social, and economic context of the region. This institution is understood as an important practice not only for development *per se*, but most importantly it reflects the widely held belief among political leaders in the region that there is a strong complementary relationship between economic growth and the promotion of regime and state security. Economic development is also seen as a common objective that the economic growth, stability, and resilience in each member state would sustain state and regime legitimacy and security that in turn determinative to the overall regional stability.[92] Hence, economic development plays an

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[89] Michael Leifer, 'ASEAN's Search for Regional Order,' in Chin Kin Wah & Leo Suryadinata (eds), *Michael Leifer: Selected Works on Southeast Asia*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2005, p. 101.

[90] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 2nd edition, Routledge, London and New York, 2009, p. 62.

[91] Mark Beeson and Shaun Breslin, 'Regional and Global Forces in East Asia's Engagement with International Society,' in in Barry Buzan & Yongjin Zhang (eds), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, p. 101.

[92] Rosemary Foot, 'Boundaries in Flux: Secondary Regional Organization as Reflection of Regional International Society,' in Barry Buzan & Yongjin Zhang (eds), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, pp. 198-196; Alice Ba, 'Outside-In and Inside-Out: Political Ideology, the English School and East Asia,' pp. 134-136.

important role in determining how the members of the Southeast Asia society of states interact with the global international society and the rest of the world. The institutional practice of economic development is strongly embedded in the understanding of nationalism, state self-determination and the historical processes of nation and state building. These understandings have allocated a prominent role for the state in economic development that in turn strengthen state-centric conceptions of sovereignty and self-determination.

Diplomacy as a primary institution in Southeast Asia follows and reproduces principles and practices of European models of diplomacy. However, the institution of diplomacy has been adapted and localised to be associate with the deeply rooted cultures of communication, negotiation, dialogue and dispute settlement in the region. Overall, the distinctiveness of diplomacy in Southeast Asia is characterised by informality, non-intrusiveness and stresses the virtue of self-restraint. Decision making is based on the processes of consultation (*musyawarah*) and consensus (*mufakat*) that apparently originate from the practice of Indonesian village democracy.[93] The institutional practice of diplomacy in Southeast Asia is also strongly connected to the institutional practice of sovereignty. As Acharya and Tan argue, 'legalistic and formal organisations […] might constrain state sovereignty, an important consideration for countries that had just gained sovereign statehood.'[94] The practice of non-intrusiveness and self-restraint is also clearly reflected in the institutional practice of non-interference, as the practice of diplomacy in Southeast Asia makes 'a conscious effort to consider each other's interests and sensitivities, even in making collective decision that could

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[93] Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, p. 4; Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, pp. 79-84.
[94] Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, 'Introduction: The Normative Relevance of the Bandung Conference for Contemporary Asian and International Order,' in See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds), *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order*, National University of Singapore Press, Singapore, 2008, p. 10.

be described as affecting "internal affairs"'.[95]

It is within the regionally specific primary institutions, that the secondary institutions in the Southeast Asian society of states have been institutionalised by regional political actors. The emphasis on sovereignty, non-intervention and non-interference, with a strong sense of nationalism and self-determination, are central to the regional organisation (i.e., ASEAN), while the overall regional rules and procedures avoid the pooling of sovereignty towards any form of supra-national organisation and bureaucratic structures. Similarly, the interplay between sovereignty institution and consensus decision making in regional diplomacy sets the limits of regional secondary institutions to develop into a greater formalisation and legalisation of dispute settlement mechanisms, 'leaving transborder conflicts subject at best to management rather than resolution.'[96] For example, although ASEAN in its 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) has established a formal mechanism for resolving disputes among its members, the provision has never been applied.

In relation to extra-regional powers, ASEAN's position has been translated into the 1971 Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the 1976 TAC and also the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (adopted in Bali 1976.) These documents reiterated ASEAN's stand as firm on the principle of sovereignty and non-interference, neutralism and nonalignment. Meanwhile, the need to shield themselves from the involvement of external powers in the management of great power has made it impossible for any great power to become an ASEAN member. For this reason, ASEAN prefers to bind the power of the extra regional great powers that have a presence and interest in the region in different organisations and forums such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum

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[95] Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, p. 6.
[96] Rosemary Foot, 'Boundaries in Flux: Secondary Regional Organization as Reflection of Regional International Society,' p. 194.

(ARF), ASEAN Plus Three, and East Asia Summit (EAS). Although these forums are designed as a management of great power and balance of power mechanism, there has sometimes been an uneasy coexistence between those regional organisations and forums often described as institution racing.[97] For ASEAN however, the institutional differentiation is also meant to preserve its geographical and social boundaries, and a clear membership of the Southeast Asia's society of states, that is determining which states are the full members and which states are actually external to it. Thus, the continued relevance of Southeast Asia will be maintained and any chance of it being dominated by Asia's great powers such as China and/or Japan will be removed.

The primary institution of economic development is translated into the secondary institutions, which are constructed to 'establish control over one's economy and development as a defensive measure against foreign economic forces' as well as facilitating 'the pursuit of government-led development projects designed 'to encourage identification with state and regime'.[98] As a consequence, the regional secondary institutions from the 1977 PTA, the 1992 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and recently the ASEAN Economic Community are less guided by liberal logics than by state-centric developmental logics. This helps to explain why Southeast Asian countries are generally wary and ambiguous towards trade liberalisation and deeper economic integration, as economic cooperation mainly based on 'political motives not economic factors.'[99]

The primary institution of diplomacy is clearly manifested in what Stubbs has called

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[97] For example, Evelyn Goh, 'ASEAN-Led Multilateralism and Regional Order: The Great Power Bargain Deficit,' in Gilbert Rozman and Joseph Chinyong Liow (eds), *International Relations and Asia's Southern Tier: ASEAN, Australia, and India*, The Asan Institute of Policy Studies and Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore, 2018, pp. 45-62.
[98] Alice Ba, 'Outside-In and Inside-Out: Political Ideology, the English School and East Asia,' p. 134.
[99] Jörn Dosch, 'The ASEAN Economic Community: What Stands in the Way?' *Analysis from the East-West Center*, No.119, September 2015, p. 3.

the 'ASEAN way' diplomacy[100] – usually described as a decision-making process that features a high degree of consultation and consensus, prioritising processes of interactions based on discreteness, informality and non-confrontational diplomacy – and is often contrasted with the adversarial posturing and legalistic decision-making procedures of diplomacy practices of Western/ European society of states. The ASEAN way diplomacy serves as a mechanism of mediating tensions that might arise from different interpretations of the primary institutions among members of Southeast Asia's society of states, such as the limits of non-interference and the limits of security and economic cooperation with external powers.[101] The ASEAN way diplomacy also plays an important role in mediating its tensions with the external pressures such as in the issue of human rights, democracy, and economic liberalisation.

With all these characteristics, it is often argued that the regionalism in Southeast Asia is weak, less institutionalised, and ineffective in contrast to the EU that is depicted as the goal standard of regionalism.[102] Such a description is frequently accompanied with the prognosis that regional governance in Southeast Asia is only 'making process not progress' as there have been continuing gaps between rhetorical commitments and implementations.[103] While this characterisation is, to some extent, accurate, seeing Southeast Asia's regional governance as an institutional failure also clearly shows a European-centric bias. As Spandler argues, the making of Southeast Asia's regional governance remains contradictory and ambivalent 'because of persisting contestation of and tension between certain primary institutions.'[104] For example, the promotion of democracy and human rights as regional norms has been in

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[100] Richard Stubbs, 'Signing on to Liberalization: AFTA and the Politics of Regional Economic Cooperation,' p. 312

[101] Kilian Spandler, 'Primary Institutional Dynamics and the Emergence of Regional Governance in Southeast Asia: Constructing Post-Colonial International Societies,' p. 346.

[102] Anja Jetschke, 'Institutionalizing ASEAN: Celebrating Europe through Network Governance,' pp. 407-414.

[103] David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, 'Making Process Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order,' *International Security*, Vol. 32, Issue. 1, 2007, pp.148-184.

[104] Kilian Spandler, 'Primary Institutional Dynamics and the Emergence of Regional Governance in Southeast Asia: Constructing Post-Colonial International Societies,' p. 324.

contestation with the institution of sovereignty and non-interference. However, as Spandler indicates, change is possible if 'actors find strategies to question the legitimacy of established primary institutions and improve their own positional power' without undermining the stability of the society of states.[105]

To summarise, from an international society perspective, Southeast Asia is considered as a regional international society as it has social agreements about the rightful membership and the legitimate and appropriate forms of their conduct. It also has secondary institutions that clearly delineate its social and geographical boundaries with other regions. Although the structure of regional governance (secondary institutions) in Southeast Asia is often criticised as weak and less effective, this does not necessarily mean that regional international society in Southeast Asia is in stasis and inflexible. Continuity and change in Southeast Asia's society of states happens due to persisting ambiguity and contestation of primary institutions, which in turn shape the regional secondary institutions. At this point, the role of regional actors is critical in the political processes to negotiate the institutional tensions as an opportunity to reform or change the structures of the regional international society.

2.6.2. Indonesia and Southeast Asia Regionalism

The argument that Indonesia plays a role in shaping international relations and order in Southeast Asia is not new. Among Southeast Asian states, Indonesia is always considered as the 'first among equals', which is mostly determined by its normative and moral values, rather than its geographical size and its military capabilities.[106] As Sebastian and Roberts argue, much

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[105] Kilian Spandler, 'Primary Institutional Dynamics and the Emergence of Regional Governance in Southeast Asia: Constructing Post-Colonial International Societies,' p. 328

[106] For example, Amitav Acharya, *Indonesia's Matters*: *Asia's Emerging Democratic Power*, World Scientific, Singapore, 2014; Evan A. Laksmana, 'Indonesia's Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size Really Matter?' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 33, no. 2, 2011, pp. 157-182.

of Indonesia's power and influence in the region have been obtained from its 'managerial or order producing role within its region'.[107] Using the English School perspective, Quayle characterises Indonesia as a resident great power in Southeast Asia due to acknowledgement by its regional peers to have not only special rights but also special duties in the regional society or at a minimum to have the responsibility to do something to solve pressing problems in regional politics and thus to 'make the system work'.[108]

Although Indonesia's role as a norm builder in Southeast Asia regionalism has been widely recognised, what rarely has been explored is a set of interrelated questions: What kinds of norms and institutions have been promoted by Indonesia at regional context?; What particular understanding of rightful and legitimate conduct of relations between states drive Indonesia in promoting certain norms and institutions?; How has Indonesia acquired that particular understanding of norms and institutions?; and How has Indonesia handled its role as norm builder, particularly in the Southeast Asia region?

The International Society perspective is useful in the examination of Indonesia's role as a norm and institution builder in Southeast Asia. From this perspective, Indonesia is one of the most important regional actors in the process of institutionalisation of regional primary and secondary institutions in Southeast Asia's society of states. This observation is in line with Buzan's assertion that 'international society is constructed by the units, and particularly by the dominant units, in the system and consequently reflects their domestic character'.[109] The above discussion on the agency of regional states and regional leaders suggests that there has been

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[107] Leonard C. Sebastian & Christopher B. Roberts, ''Consensual' Regional Hegemony, Pluralist-Solidarist Visions, and Emerging Power Aspiration,' in Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D Habir, and Leonard C. Sebastian (eds.), *Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and The Regional Order*, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2015, p. 341.
[108] Linda Quayle, 'Power and Paradox: Indonesia and the 'English School' Concept of Great Powers,' *International Relations of the Asia Pacific*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2013, pp. 301-330; Linda Quayle, 'Indonesia, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, and the Contingent Profile of Regional 'Great-Power Management',' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 31, Issue 2, 2018, pp.131–150; also Linda Quayle, 'The 'English School', South East Asia, and Indonesia: Locating and Defending Productive 'Middle Ground',' pp. 92-105.
[109] Barry Buzan, 'The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 27, 2001, p. 487.

political contestation in the historical processes of institutionalisation of regional primary and secondary institutions. Hence, it allows us to ask about Indonesia's roles and its purposes in the politics of institutionalisation of the regional primary and secondary institutions.

The theoretical discussion above provides the footing to analyse Indonesia— as a relatively weak actor in international system in terms of material capabilities — in its role and participation in the making of regional international society and regional order-building in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's agency in the making of regional international society and regional order-building in Southeast Asia, thus, can be observed from several important patterns of its foreign policy at regional level. First, its vital role in the process of creative interpretation and localisation of global international society's norms and institutions to be adapted to regional context. Second, its crucial role in translating and specifying the regional primary institutions into regional secondary institutions. Lastly, its leadership roles in mediating tensions between one primary institution and another, as well as introducing change in the primary institutions through the processes of adaptation, innovation and reform in the secondary institutions that underpin the regional order in Southeast Asia. Not least, Indonesia's attitude of self-restraint and accommodative in dealing with resistance and opposition from other members were also important in the construction of the regional society of states, which denounced its less ambition to be a hegemonic power, while stressing the spirit of equality and shared leadership at regional level.

In examining Indonesia's agency in Southeast Asia regionalism from the International Society perspective, there are two important analyses should be taken into account. The first analysis is of Indonesia's process of acquiring the idea norms, rules and institutions of international society that shaped its understanding and interpretation of the rightful and legitimate conduct of relations between states. This must be taken into account to answer the questions: How does Indonesia acquire that particular understanding of norms and

institutions?; and how has this understanding evolved overtime?.

For this purpose, this thesis will demonstrate how Indonesia has learned and developed its understanding of international society through two important stages: (1) pre-socialisation (in Chapter Three), and (2) socialisation (Chapter Four). Both pre-socialisation and socialisation refer to the process of obtaining understanding of norms and rules of international society from the Europeans, but here, the thesis will differentiate them on the grounds that pre-socialisation took place before Indonesia became an independent state, while socialisation happened after Indonesia became independent, or at least claimed itself to become an independent state. However, during the socialisation process, Indonesia also attempted to shape the norms and rules of international society, with its share of trials and errors, demonstrated in its key role as the co-sponsor of the Bandung Conference and the policy of confrontation in the early 1960s. Thus, rather than a one-way socialisation, Indonesia has undergone a two-way socialisation, as the country also sought to affect the development of international norms and rules.

All these processes have resulted in Indonesia's understanding and interpretation of international society, which has guided its appropriate and legitimate conduct in the society of states in which it lives. It has also shaped Indonesia's social identity and character which has remained remarkably stable, despite the passage of time and some drastic changes in its regimes and regime types. Indonesia's understanding and interpretation of norms and rules of international society could be used to identify the aspirational values to which it might gravitate when it comes time to build the primary and secondary institutions of international society, whether at the global or the regional level.

The second analysis aims to scrutinise Indonesia's agency in the making of Southeast Asian regional international society, and thus trace its role in the processes of creation,

consolidation, adjustment and maintenance the regional primary and secondary institutions in Southeast Asia's society of states. This analysis is important to assist us in understanding what kinds of norms and institutions have been promoted by Indonesia in the regional context; and how Indonesia has been striving to endorse them.

2.7.   Summary

This thesis argues that Indonesia has played an important role in the process of creation of Southeast Asia's society of states both in institutionalising primary institutions and translating them into a regional organisation (ASEAN) and other norms and procedures, such as ZOPFAN, TAC and the PTA. Indonesia also played an important part in the consolidation of the regional society of states. By mediating the tensions among regional states on the interpretation of primary institutions such as sovereignty and non-interference, management of great power, diplomacy, and economic development that sought to be translated and practiced by ASEAN in facing pressing regional problems. The Vietnam intervention of Kampuchea (1979-1990) and the establishment of AFTA will be employed as case studies here to support the above argument. Indonesia's role is also central in the adaptation/adjustment of the regional international society in facing the external shock following the end of the Cold War that put tensions on both regional primary and secondary institutions. An important case has been selected to support this argument: the promotion of democracy and human rights in the region through ASC/APSC, ASEAN Charter and AICHR as an adaptation of liberal norms into its long-established institution of sovereignty and non-interference. Lastly, this thesis will demonstrate that Indonesia played an important role in maintaining the primary and secondary institution of Southeast Asia's society of states. The case of China's assertiveness in the SCS will be employed to demonstrate that despite being criticised as lukewarm and ambivalent in

responding to China's assertiveness, Indonesia seeks to maintain the unity of ASEAN as well as the primary institution of management of great power and diplomacy.

From an International Society perspective, the analysis of Indonesia's agency in Southeast Asia regionalism began when Indonesia acquired a certain understanding of the norms and institutions in international society, followed by its involvement in the historical process surrounding the institutionalisation of regional primary and secondary institutions in Southeast Asia. Hence, Indonesia's agency is situated in the process of creative interpretation and localisation of global international society's norms and institutions to be adapted to the regional context. Indonesia's agency is also nested in the contestation over regional principles and norms, and the contestation to translate regionally specific primary institutions into rules, procedures, and organisational forms. This thesis therefore ventures towards a more historical and socially embedded interpretation rather than simpler rational and utilitarian thinking as frequently asserted by previous analyses on Indonesia's foreign policy in Southeast Asia regionalism.

Chapter 3: Indonesia's Pre-Socialisation into International Society

3.1. Introduction

No country's understanding of international society – its own place in the world, in relation to it neighbours and powers further afield – originates from a clean slate (*tabula rasa*). Nations and their ruling elites approach their roles in the world from understandings that are peculiar to their own national histories. They are formed by both past experiences and an understanding of the contemporary world in which they find themselves. Such understandings do not determine a country's final vision of international society or its place in the world. Indeed, it is doubtful that such a 'vision quest' can ever be thought to be final, since the country is continually responding to both external and domestic stimuli, even as it might be playing an active role in generating those changes in its environment.

Yet to build an understanding of Indonesia's vision of regional international society, we cannot avoid beginning at the point where these understandings were being shaped, and in the case of Indonesia, this takes us to a starting point before it became a sovereign polity – when it was still a Dutch colony. This chapter therefore provides an analysis of the development of Indonesia's vision of international society, albeit with an initial, almost intuitive, set of ideas, norms, and practices that have guided the leaderships towards their understandings of what is considered appropriate and legitimate in Indonesia's foreign relations.

As has been discussed above, the classical account of the expansion of international society by the English School maintains that the source of understanding international society in the non-European states was the European state system, which was deemed to have expanded to the rest of the world, eventually becoming today's global international society. The account,

however, has been widely criticised for omitting the dark side of European colonialism and imperialism, and the ways in which this profoundly affected the process of transfer and the internalisation of European values, norms, and institutions. Moreover, this expansion thesis overlooked the agency of the non-European states in their selection of ideas and their potential variations in the contextualisation of the European norms and institutions, suiting them to their local conditions.[1]

Extending this critique to the case of Indonesia provides a second pathway to the point made at the opening of this chapter: that we need to begin our study of the development of Indonesia's understanding of international society in the late-colonial period – towards the end of the nineteenth century and continue it forward to the cusp of independence. This chapter thus argues that Indonesia's process of acquiring its understanding of international society had begun before it became a sovereign state, while it was colonised by the Netherlands and occupied by Japan. This early stage is best described as a pre-socialisation process, which is the term applied by Beasley and Kaarbo to the socialisation process prior to acquisition of statehood.[2] Although often neglected, this process is crucial because during this period actors not only learn and internalise norms, but it allows actors to interpret the existing international society and begin identifying what roles are possible, appropriate, and desired if and when their colony achieves sovereignty. In Beasley and Kaarbo's words, 'pre-socialisation is what makes

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[1] For criticism of the expansion thesis, see, Edward Keene, *Beyond The Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism, and Order in World Politics*, LSE Monograph in International Studies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004; Edward Keene, 'Standard of 'Civilisation', The Expansion Thesis and the 19th-Century International Space,' *Millennium Journal*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2014, pp. 651–673; Paul Keal, *European Conquest and The Rights of Indigenous People: The Moral Backwardness of International Society*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003; John M. Hobson, 'The Eastern Origin of the Rise of the West and the 'Return' of Asia', *East Asia*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2015, pp. 239–255; Shogo Suzuki, 'Japan's Socialization into Janus-Faced European International Society', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2005, pp. 137–164; Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China's and Japan's Encounter with International Society*, Routledge, London & New York, 2009.

[2] Theories on socialisation in international relations commonly assume that the socialisation process began with the existence of a sovereign nation-state, but recent research argues that socialisation begins before the acquisition of full statehood. See, especially, Ryan K. Beasley and Juliet Kaarbo, 'Casting for a Sovereign Role: Socialising an Aspirant State in the Scottish Independence Referendum,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2018, pp. 8–32.

sovereign states.'[3] In the context of Indonesia, this chapter claims that the pre-socialisation stage took place in the late nineteenth century until the declaration of independence.

At this point, it is important to highlight the agency of Indonesia's nationalist leaders (at that time, non-state actors) in the process of acquiring, understanding, and interpreting international society in the context of colonialism and imperialism. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, Indonesia, personalised by the anti-colonial nationalist leaders, obtained an understanding of international society from multiple important sources. First, in the last stage of Dutch colonialism and imperialism it was introduced to the model of European nation-states with their legal rules and norms and international institutions. Second, the nationalist leaders also acquired alternative visions of international society through their involvement in networks of international anti-colonial movements. And lastly, during the short period of Japanese occupation, the nationalist leaders were exposed to a regionalist vision of international society, embodied in the idea of pan-Asian regionalism.

The experience of pre-socialisation of international society had shaped Indonesia's viewpoint on communitarian behaviour based on the idea of familial state. This, in turn, would become the foundation of why Indonesia sees Southeast Asia nations and ASEAN as being part of its family tied by the spirit of nationalism, harmony and togetherness, in which the country sought to exert its agency to shape the regional politics and development.

In substantiating the argument, this chapter is organised in three sections. The first section outlines the pre-socialisation process by tracing Indonesia under the Dutch colonialism and the involvement of Indonesia's nationalist leaders in the network of anti-colonialism. The second section examines the anti-colonial movement and drive for self-determination. The third section focuses on Indonesia's learning process under Japanese occupation. The final

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[3] Ryan K. Beasley and Juliet Kaarbo, 'Casting for a Sovereign Role: Socialising an Aspirant State in the Scottish Independence Referendum,' p. 12.

summary of this chapter highlights several important results from the pre-socialisation process to Indonesia's nationalist leaders' vision of Indonesian state as well as the vision and role of the state in international relations.

3.2.   Dutch Colonialism

The most important phase of Indonesia's pre-socialisation into international society was its experience under Dutch Colonialism. In the last stage of Dutch colonialism and imperialism, Indonesia was introduced to the idea of European nation-states with their legal rules and norms and international institutions. The nationalist leaders' ambiguous attitude towards their colonisers might have deflected the wholesale adoption of the coloniser's ideas on international society so that the end result of the pre-socialisation process did not fully replicate the ideas and patterns that had been transmitted by the colonisers. Critically, the nationalist leaders selected from an assemblage of ideas and interpreted the social environment so as to advance their nationalist aspirations. In that process, the construction of national identity went hand in hand with the construction of their vision of international society.

3.2.1. Modern Nation-States

Without historical antecedent within its contemporary territorial bounds, Indonesia as a political form was created by the Netherlands through territorial expansion and the imposition of administrative unity, beginning in the late-nineteenth century and continuing into the early decades of the twentieth century.[4] During that period, informed by the changing norms and

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[4] Benedict R. O'G Anderson, 'Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective,' *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1983, p. 479; J.D. Legge, *Indonesia*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1964, p. 81; Anthony J.S. Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution 1945-50*, Longman, Hawthorn, Victoria, Australia 1974, pp. 1-2; Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London,1983, p. xiii

practices of colonial international society, the practices of Dutch colonialism shifted from a commercial focus into a focus on the establishment of a modern empire through territorial ambition and driven by liberal economic expansion.[5]

Parallel with territorial expansion, the formation of a colonial state also marked the changing of the Netherlands' mode of governance in the colony. The Netherlands consolidated its governance of the Netherlands Indies' colonial government in Batavia, moving away from the settled principle of suzerainty that previously had been implemented through the manipulation of treaty provisions and military expeditions. It ruled both directly through the colonial government and indirectly through local rulers who operated under auspices of the colonial government. In 1916, the Dutch colonial administration established a popular representation council, known as *Volksraad*, which mainly functioned as an advisory body. In the revision of the Netherlands Constitution in 1922, The Hague gave more legislative power to the colonial government in Dutch Indies so that it could regulate the internal affairs of the colony.[6] Moreover, the Dutch laid the foundations of the modern economy and social change by introducing the Liberal Policy in 1870 and Ethical Policy in 1901.[7] The Ethical Policy grew from the newly emerging humanitarian and welfare concerns of the Dutch public and parliament. The idealistic aim of the Ethical Policy was 'to include Indonesian people into the

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[5] For discussion of Dutch as modern imperialism see, Maarten Kuitenbrouwer, *The Netherlands and the Rise of Modern Imperialism: Colonies and Foreign Policy, 1870-1902*, Berg Publisher, New York and Oxford, 1991, p. 199; Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, 'Dutch Expansion in the Indonesian Archipelago around 1900 and the Imperialism Debate,' J*ournal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1994, pp. 91–111; Remco Raben, 'A New Dutch Imperial History? Perambulations in Prospective Field,' *BMGN-Low Countries Historical Review,* Vol. 128, No. 1, 2013, pp. 9–11

[6] Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism, and Order in World Politics*, pp. 88–89.

[7] The liberal policy replaced the infamous policy known as *Cultuurstelsel* (Culture System; forced plantation work or *tanam paksa*) in 1830–1870 and allowed a free flow private capital in several sectors such as plantation, banking, extractive, and insurance enterprise to Netherlands East Indies economy to share profits that used to be monopolised by the government., see, C. Fasseur, 'The Cultivation System and its Impact on the Dutch Colonial Economy and the Indigenous Society in Nineteenth-Century Java,' in C.A. Bayly & D.H.A. Kolff (eds), *Two Colonial Empires: Comparative Essays on the History of India and Indonesia in the Nineteenth Century*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1986, pp. 137–154.

cultural orbit of the ruler, making them possess Western civilization'.[8] Pragmatically however, it was based on consideration that the Netherlands' international status, and legitimacy in the Netherlands Indies, depended on the condition of the colony's welfare. Taken together, territorial expansion, the sovereign prerogative of the colonial government in Batavia and the administrative unity of the colony manifested the establishment of a fully-fledged colonial state of Netherlands East Indies.[9]

The changing pattern of Dutch colonial policy through the imposition of effective territorial occupation and administrative unity marked an important stage of socialisation into the idea of the European modern nation-state that had never hitherto existed in the Indonesian archipelago. Paradoxically, rather than being introduced to the liberalism that was dominant in Europe at that time, Indonesia was introduced to the illiberal and conservative sides of European civilisation, particularly the concept of the organicist state.[10] This however, was not peculiar to Indonesia. In fact, as Wiarda has argued, organicist ideas (as well as corporatist ideas) were Europe's most successful idea-exports, with Southeast Asia and Latin America being the most successful 'markets' for these concepts.[11] The exposure to the idea of the organicist state influenced the shape of Indonesia's national identity, the foundation of Indonesia's worldview, and provided the legal-constitutional foundation of the future Indonesian state.[12]

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[8] *De Gids*, 1940, p. 27 as cited by Sartono Kartodirdjo, 'Some Problems on the Genesis of Nationalism in Indonesia,' *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1962, p. 87.

[9] Maarten Kuitenbrouwer, *The Netherlands and the Rise of Modern Imperialism: Colonies and Foreign Policy, 1870-1902*, p. 199; Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, 'Dutch Expansion in the Indonesian Archipelago around 1900 and the Imperialism Debate,' pp. 91–111. For more on administrative reform, see, for example, Harry J. Benda, 'The Pattern of Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia,' *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1966, pp. 589–605.

[10] David Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, Oxford, New York, 1985; David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, Routledge, London and New York, 2015.

[11] Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and comparative politics: the other great 'ism'*, M.E Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 1997.

[12] For organicist thinking in Indonesia's worldview see, Jürgen Rüland, 'The Limit of Democratizing Interest Representation: ASEAN's Regional Corporatism and Normative Challenges,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2014, pp. 242–243.

Chapter 3: Indonesia's Pre-Socialisation into International Society

Organicist state philosophy emerged from German, French and Dutch romanticist philosophers as a reaction to liberal constitutionalism in the 19th century. This philosophy gained more popularity in the wake of the First World War, which saw the collapse of parliamentary government throughout Europe. Economic liberalism and parliamentary government based on individual rights were widely held responsible for inflaming conflict between social classes, between ethnic groups, and for causing ideological polarisation that led to war. Attacking liberal individualism, the organicist state theory sees the state as a living organism in which the relations between the state and the individual is akin to an organism and its organs and cells. The state therefore is not merely an aggregation of individuals based on a social contract, but like an organism, it was presumed to have grown in a quasi-evolutionary fashion, guided by the particular historical characteristics and the *volksgeist* (authentic spirit) of the society. The fundamental condition for social harmony, according to this thinking, is a society that is not structured based on the basis of individual interests, but vertically managed based on functional division as when different body parts each perform their designated functions properly; effectively a corporatism system.[13] Based on this vision, the state could exercise legal authority and attract a genuine sense of obligation from the people. At the heart of the argument, organicist-state thinking rejects liberal parliamentary democracy based on individual rights, laissez faire individualism and separation of powers. Instead of individual liberty, organicist thinking is in favour of management of individual freedom on behalf of the higher interests of the society, and above all, of the state.[14]

Although organicist-state thinking was not really influential in the Netherlands itself, the influence of this thinking was remarkably striking in the constitution of the Netherlands Indies colonial state. As the highest priority of the Netherlands Indies government at that time

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[13] Phillip C. Schmitter, 'Still the Century of Corporatism,' *Review of Politics*, Vol. 36, No.1, 1979, pp. 85–131.
[14] David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, pp. 11-18; also see G.R.G Mure, 'The Organic State,' *Philosophy*, Vol. 24, No. 90, 1949, pp. 205–218.

was to establish social order – known and idealised as '*rust en orde'* (tranquillity and order) – the methods by which this order was achieved were based on 'paternalism' and 'moral guardianship' towards its subject the colonies. These methods were considered more effective than a liberal policy based on individual freedom.[15] The establishment of colonial administrative in Netherlands Indies was then influenced heavily by organicist-state thinkers of the Leiden School, such as Jacques Oppenheimer, Snouck Hurgronje, and Cornelis van Vollenhoven, who were involved in the Commission for Constitutional reform concerning colonial administrative autonomy in 1921. Their influence was evident in the creation of a regional administration in outer islands based on a combination of 19 customary laws and a new *Volksraad* membership based on functional representation. Citing an influential Dutch lawyer, Bourchier notes that the composition of the Netherlands Indies colonial legislature in the 1920s was 'a pure manifestation of organicist thinking' and *Volksraad* was truly a practical application on organicist thinking.[16]

Another influence of organicist thinking in the colonial administration was the implementation of customary law (*adat*) for the indigenous population, working in parallel with the European legal system that regulated the Europeans. The focus on *adat* originated in a debate over how the colonial state's legal foundation should be established so that it would channel the liberal policy and Ethical Policy.[17] *Adat* was particularly important in the matter of land ownership, since control of land under *adat* was mostly based on communal rights rather than individual ownership. On the one hand, legal experts associated with Utrecht University argued that colonial administration should be based on Dutch law, so that the Netherlands

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[15] John. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967 (Reprinted), pp. 122–116; J.D. Legge, *Indonesia*, pp. 90–93; Francis Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in Netherlands Indies 1900–1942*, Equinox, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, 2008, p. 89.

[16] David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, p. 20.

[17] For detail of the debate, see for example, C. Fasseur, 'Colonial Dilemma: Van Vollenhoven and the Struggle between Adat Law and Western Law in Indonesia,' in Jamie S. Davidson and David Hindley (eds), *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism*, Routledge, London, New York, 2007, pp. 50–67.

would be the sovereign owner of the lands, and the hierarchical *adat* legal order would be abolished. Thus, the colonial subjects would be brought under the wing of a unified liberal-capitalist legal system. On the other hand, legal experts from Leiden University contended that the legal foundation of the colonial state should incorporate the long-standing customary law as a complement to Dutch law to protect natives from the destructive impact of Western law and liberal capitalism.[18] The underlying spirit of this school of thought was that a political order could not be established from rational rules, but must be allowed to grow organically, guided by the peculiar historical characteristics of the society – an obvious reflection of organicist thinking.[19] Cornelis van Vollenhoven was the key person in the implementation of *adat* in Netherlands East Indies. He and his fellow scholars at the Leiden Law School researched and documented hundreds of *adat* local communities in Netherlands East Indies, resulting in a codification of the principle of *adat* into a single system of Indonesian *adat*, which then passed into modern Indonesian law.

Seen from organicist thinking, the Ethical Policy was an act of paternalism and guardianship by the Dutch to bring civilisation to indigenous people. In Europe, society was considered as the parent of the state, but in Netherlands Indies, as Furnivall has noted, 'the pressing burden on the state [was] the creation of society' through educational and social development,[20] though the Ethical Policy was focussed more overtly on profitability and the efficiency of the colonial administration than the education and social welfare of the natives. It resulted in a much deeper penetration of colonial government into the daily life of the people in the villages, with economic reforms and modernisation provoking widespread disruption of established customs, but without improving the welfare of the indigenous people. The

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[18] David M. Bourchier, 'The Romance of *Adat* in the Political Imagination and the Current Revival,' in Davidson and Hindley (eds), *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics*, p. 114; Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society*, p. 88.

[19] David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, pp. 19, 23.

[20] John S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy*, p. 457.

upheavals in the social pattern of life in the villages began to awaken discontent and awareness as never before, along with a much more pervasive awareness and resentment of the foreign power standing behind the local rulers, with whom villages had regular contact. At the same time, the growth of the cities and urbanisation produced a new urban culture that was substantially unhooked from tradition and ethnic loyalties.[21] Moreover, the Ethical Policy was fostering social division, ethnic segregation, and racial stratification within society. The Europeans governed the colony and controlled the capitalist economy activities, while the Chinese worked in retail, trade and intermediary economic function, and the indigenous people were the peasants and labourers, sitting at the lowest, poorest echelon of society, with the least control over their own destinies. Consequently, as Furnivall has argued, these policies had transformed the Netherlands Indies into multiple and distinct social orders, which he labelled a 'plural society'.[22] Thus, not only did the Dutch introduce the idea of the modern nation-state and its political institutions, but they also helped to recreate Indonesian society, which in turn became the genesis of the new nation. Among the unintended consequences of the Ethical Policy was the creation of very small class of educated native elites who were able and willing to give voice to the mass dissatisfaction being generated by the social disruption and forge a new vision of an Indonesian nation.[23] Although small in numbers, they had become what

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[21] J.D. Legge, *Indonesia*, pp. 90–95.

[22] Furnivall describes a plural society as a society 'comprising of two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit'. Although plurality in society existed in many other countries in the world, the type of plurality in Netherlands Indies, according to Furnivall, was more extreme because society was severely segregated according to race, culture, skin colour, and economic function, with no common will or commonality in social cognition. Hence there was no practical substitute for the overarching order imposed by the colonial government. See, Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy*, p. 446. See also J.S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparison Study of Burma and Netherlands India*, New York University Press, New York, 1956, pp. 304–305.

[23] The small size of the class of educated leaders is demonstrated in the numbers; in 1940, with an indigenous population of around 60 to 65 million, the literacy rate was only 6%; only 88,223 Indonesians were enrolled in primary education, and only 240 had received a high school education. See J.D. Legge, *Indonesia*, p. 105. See also George. McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1952, pp. 33. The indigenous elite consisted of 200-1,000 persons. See, George McTurnan Kahin, 'Indonesia,' in George McTurnan Kahin (ed), *Major Governments of Asia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1958, p. 526. See also Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1962, p. 108.

Benedict Anderson describes as the intelligentsia's vanguard, in which with their literacy and competence of bilingualism meant that they had access to modern Western culture in the broader sense, particularly to the idea of modern nation-states, nationalism and nationhood, gave rise to the notion of a nation as a newly 'imagined community'.[24]

3.2.2. National Identity

The birth of Indonesian nationalism thus was a repercussion of the changing practice of Dutch imperialism in its later stage. Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, the nationalist organisations were concerned with the social and cultural development and education of indigenous people rather than independence. They still identified themselves as people of 'Indies' (*Hindia*) and were identified by the colonial government simply as *inlanders.* Meanwhile, the idea of 'Indonesia' was still being contested. The early national movements such as Noble Endeavour (*Budi Utomo*), Islamic Association (*Sarekat Islam*), and Indies Party (*Indische Partij*) were central in the process of 'national awakening', although they had little success in generating a sense of national identity. It was among Indonesian students in the Netherlands that the use of the label 'Indonesia' as a common marker of identity began to flourish for the first time. Being different from the society around them seems to have triggered their collective sense of identity, which later became a political identity. It was not clear who first took 'Indonesia' to signify people who inhabit the Netherlands East Indies, but the term was circulated throughout 1917–1918 in the meetings of the Indies Association (*Indische Vereeniging*), an association of Netherlands East Indies students in the Netherlands.[25] After a

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[24] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (revised Edition), Verso, London, New York, 2006, p. 140.

[25] For the contestation over the term, Indonesia, see, Robert E. Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 13–48. The word 'Indonesia', used as an ethnographic expression was first mentioned by George Samuel Windsor Earl, a traveler and social observer from England. Adolf Bastian, a famous Germany ethnographer, published his five-volume *Indonesien oder die Inseln des Malayischen Archipel* (Indonesia or the

few years of contestation, Indonesia as an imagined nation-state had been widely accepted amongst nationalist students, a transition that was marked by the renaming of the Indies Association to Indonesian Association (*Indonesische Vereeniging,* in Dutch*;* and later *Perhimpoenan Indonesia* – in Indonesian language), which in the early 1920s was under the leadership of Mohammad Hatta.

In the 1920s–1930s, the concept of Indonesia as a national identity continued to take hold and developed a more 'solid' form. Since only a very few Indonesians had received a Western education, the idea of liberating Indonesia lived in the minds of just a very small group of educated youths – and only among those who studied both in the Netherlands and in Netherlands East Indies. They were affected by a sense of humiliation and civilisation dislocation, and they sought explanation and found comfort first of all in universal ideologies. Religious modernism (pan-Islamism), communism, and socialist democracy were among the more significant sources of comfort, but beyond ideology there was a dire need to find a common identity that could both distinguish themselves from the European imperialists and unite a culturally diverse collection of peoples living across thousands of islands. Interestingly, organicist-state thinking and Vollenhoven's discovery of *adat* was very influential among Indonesian law students at Leiden university. Vollenhoven's research on *adat* not only paid attention to the details of various local customs and practices, but also tried to discern the unifying traits among Indonesia's different cultures. According to Vollenhoven, despite having miscellaneous cultures and practices, Indonesia as a society was unified in an organic relationship built in part on a strong family orientation in which disputes were solved through conciliation and mutual consideration, enabling the community to live in harmony and balance.[26] Other Dutch scholars such as de Kat Angelino argued that the practices of Indonesian

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Islands of the Malay Archipelago) in 1884–1894, and this influenced Dutch academics to begin employing the term broadly. See, Robert E. Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia*, pp. 1–3.

[26] David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, pp. 21–22.

villages represented a model of 'eastern democracy', which was much more lively and contextual compared to individualistic and mechanistic liberal democracy found in the Europe.[27] Indonesian law students at Leiden were deeply impressed by the documentation of Indonesian *adat*, since they shared a profound distrust of liberalism, and took pride in the notion that the values and practices in Indonesia's village cultures might be worthy of praise. The identification (or construction) of basic similarities across the diverse practice of *adat* by van Vollenhoven and the Leiden School equipped Netherlands East Indies students at the Leiden Law School to conceptualise Indonesia as a single national entity. This encounter then shaped the conviction among Indonesian nationalists that Indonesia national identity should be based on both a spiritual and fundamental structure (*volkgeist*) of Indonesian society. Indonesian law students identified deep-rooted 'Indonesian' characteristics that were articulated in the *adat*: a society based on harmony, reciprocity and balance expressed in as a notion of a collective good (*gotong royong*), which they contrasted with supposed European values, based on individualism and capitalism.[28]

Under the influence of Supomo, a student of van Vollenhoven who later took the lead role in writing Indonesia's 1945 Constitution, the organicist idea was translated into the idea of family state (*Negara Kekeluargaan*) as the philosophical basis of the Indonesian state. According to Supomo, the family state of Indonesia was established to serve the interests of the whole society (the state), not that of an individual or a group of people.[29] A genuine state of Indonesia was depicted as a harmonious family, with the nation's leaders playing the role as benevolent parents. The constituent parts of the state were conceived based on their

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[27] David M. Bourchier, 'The Romance of *Adat* in the Political Imagination,' pp. 114–115.

[28] David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, pp. 25–31.

[29] For the idea of family state, see, David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, Ch 1 and ch 4; Marsillam Simanjuntak, *Pandangan Negara Integralistik: Sumber, Unsur and Riwayatnya dalam Persiapan UUD 1945* (The View of the Integralistic State: Sources, Elements and Its History in the Preparation of 1945 Constitution), Pustaka Utama Grafiti, Jakarta, 1994.

functionality, so the state could accommodate their aspiration suitably. As a family unit, Indonesians highly value the spirit of harmony and collectiveness, well-known as *gotong royong* (mutual service to others/ mutual assistance). Harmony and togetherness should be operated and maintained by *musyawarah* (deliberation/consensus) rather than individual competition or voting. Based on this idea, Indonesia's governance was built upon the idea of sharing of power instead of separation of power. This is later clearly manifested in Indonesia's highest state institution, the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*) that subscribes to a consensus decision making process. Half of its members are also members of the House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*), elected through the general election, and the other half are representatives of different regions or provinces, professional associations, and other functional associations.

The idea of family is influential, evidenced particularly during Suharto era, which in the 1980s officially declared itself as an integralist state underpinned by state ideology of *Pancasila* (Five Principles) and the 1945 Constitution.[30] In the post-Suharto era, although no longer acknowledged as a state ideology, the idea of a family state is still ingrained in ideological contestation among Indonesian elites, political parties and even common in public between those who favour the push for universal principles of human rights and democracy and those who argue that the Indonesian state should continue to be informed by the indigenous values of harmony *gotong royong* and *musyawarah*.[31] Debate over these issues was clearly visible during the presidential elections between supporters of Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto in 2014 and again in 2019.

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[30] Marsillam Simanjuntak, *Pandangan Negara Integralistik: Sumber, Unsur and Riwayatnya dalam Persiapan UUD 1945* (The View of the Integralistic State: Sources, Elements and Its History in the Preparation of 1945 Constitution), p. 64; David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, p. 2.

[31] David M. Bourchier, 'Two Decades of Ideological Contestation in Indonesia: From Democratic Cosmopolitan to Religious Nationalism,' *Journal of Contemporary Asia,* Vol. 49, No. 5, 2019, pp. 713-733.

Moreover, beyond being instrumental in shaping the form of the Indonesian state, the idea of the family state also influences the conduct of Indonesia's foreign relations. Wicaksana for example, argues that Indonesia's behaviour in Southeast Asia through ASEAN is a clear example of the influence of the family state idea in foreign policy, such as stressing a stable and harmonious region underpinned by strong cohesion, resistance to the involvement of external parties, and maintaining family-like politics through informal, interpersonal, non-binding, and consensual methods of intergovernmental relations and decision making.[32] This corroborates Rüland's argument that organicist and corporatist ideas 'have been crucial in reviving, reproducing, modernising and re-legitimising' what is considered to be appropriate and legitimate in the Southeast Asian political practises.[33]

In sum, during the last half-century of its colonialism, the Dutch introduced the European ideas of modern nation-state and political institutions, as well as recreated Indonesian society. Among the unintended consequences of the last stage of Dutch colonialism was the creation of very small class of educated native elites who were able and willing to give voice to the mass dissatisfaction being generated by the social disruption and forge a new vision of an Indonesian nation. At this stage, the agency of the nationalist leaders was crucial. While they were imagining a modern nation-state modelled substantially on the European states, they skilfully mixed and contextualised the organicist ideas and the self-claim of deep-seated indigenous values to conceptualise a nationalism and a worldview that contested the hierarchical status of sovereignty as it was being practiced by the coloniser, thus legitimising a distinctively different version of a modern, nation-state project.

As will be discussed in the next section, by the end of the First World War, along with

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[32] I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana, 'The Family State: A Non-Realist Approach to Understanding Indonesia's Foreign Policy,' *Asian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2019, pp. 308-329.
[33] Jürgen Rüland, 'The Limit of Democratizing Interest Representation: ASEAN's Regional Corporatism and Normative Challenges,' p. 241.

the spreading idea of self-determination, Indonesia's nationalist movements, both in the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies began envisioning Indonesia as an autonomous, and even as an independent state.

3.3. Anti-Colonial Movements and Self-Determination

Another important source of Indonesia's pre-socialisation of international society was the involvement of the prominent nationalist leaders in the transnational network of the anti-colonial movements. These Indonesian nationalist leaders learned from many of the anti-colonialist movements across the world, and were capable of selecting ideas, values and orientation in defining their political identity. Hence, Indonesia's nationalist leaders acquired an alternative vision on the idea of nationalism and the rights of self-determination. Their involvement in the network of anti-colonial movements was crucial for gaining international recognition for Indonesia's aspiration to establish a sovereign nation-state based on the idea of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, and the emerging norm of the rights of self-determination. Equally important, the involvement in the transnational anti-colonial movement would inspire Indonesia after gaining its sovereignty to maintain solidarity among other post-colonial states in their struggles against the hierarchical sovereignty in international society embodied in the practice of colonialism and imperialism.

In the late 19th century, the mutation of classical colonialism into modern imperialism occurred with the effective occupation and exportation of European civilisation and bore paradoxical consequences to the colonies with the emergence of anti-colonial nationalist movements, and the erosion of the legitimacy of the concept of Europe as a single universal model of civilisation and modernity. As the period saw the peak of European imperialism in the rest of the world, at the same time, it was also the period of the formation of alternative

universal visions in the non-Western world.[34] These alternative universal visions were grounded in socialism, communism and Pan-Islam and Pan-Asia ideologies.

This section will thus discuss how Indonesian nationalist leaders learned alternative visions of international society and became involved in transnational networks of the anti-colonialist movement. By highlighting the contradiction between hierarchical sovereignty and the emerging norms of self-determination, it will show how the contestation of the practice of colonialism in international society emerged.

In the beginning of the 20th century, the change in European-colonial international society began to take form. The Europeans gradually lost control of the international system by the early of twentieth century due to the First World War and the settlement of this war.[35] The First World War brought an abrupt destruction to the European society of states that had developed and endured for over four centuries.[36] It ended the central role of the Concert of Europe, which had played an important role in creating peace and order in Europe, as well as performing an informal coordination of inter-colonial/imperial relations to prevent uncontrolled competition amongst them in expanding and protecting their colonies.[37] In fact, the European powers, though still dominant in international system, had to share their ascendency with the United States and to some extent with Japan which also comprised part of the allied victors in the war, particularly as it took over Germany's territory in China's Shandong province. The First World War also helped trigger the Russian Revolution in 1917, after which the new Bolshevik regime withdrew itself from the War, and then positioned itself

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[34] Cemil Aydin, 'Beyond Civilization: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Asianism and the Revolt against the West,' *Journal of Modern European History*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2006, pp. 204-233.

[35] Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis,* Routledge, London and New York, 1992, p.278.

[36] Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, pp. 280-281.

[37] Concert of European was a key institutional foundation that formed the basis of diplomacy, balance of power, and international law in European international society in the post-Napoleon War until the First World War. For detail on Concert of Europe, see Richard B. Elrod 'The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System', *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1976, pp. 159–174, see also, Carsten Holbraad, 'The Concert of Europe', *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 25, No.1, 1971, pp. 29-44.

mostly outside the European society of states.

The Paris Peace Conference (also known as Versailles Settlement) was convened in January 1919 to set up the terms of the peace after the World War. The Treaty also aimed at restoring international order through the establishment of the League of Nations, which would act as a universal international organisation for the existing international society. The design of the new initiative for global international society was built-in almost all rules and practices of the European international society such as its basic notion on sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, and balance of power.[38] Nevertheless, the League of Nations represented a significant departure from the previous international order. First, under the influence of US President Woodrow Wilson, the League replaced the principal balance of power based on joint hegemony into collective security mode. The collective security functioned as an overarching body that would restrain the anarchical nature of the equal sovereign states system from turning into uncontrolled or outlawed war. All member states would agree to collaborate against any aggressions, and therefore it would prevent any disturbance of the peace, particularly to protect the weaker states against the strong and included the special responsibility of the great powers to provide collective protection.[39] Second, in order to construct global international order, it also provided a permanent forum in which the small and weaker states could taking part in many international decision making issues and shape the legitimacy of international society.[40] More importantly, the membership of the League of Nations was open to all states, including newly recognised states in the post-First World War.

One of the important aspects in the debate of the Paris Peace Conference was the

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[38] Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, p. 282.
[39] David Armstrong, 'The Evolution of International Society', in John Baylis, Steve Smith & Patricia Owens, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 6th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, pp.43-44, see also Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, pp. 283-284.
[40] Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, p. 284.

attempt to apply the principle of 'self-determination'. Although the genesis of self-determination dated back to the Age of Enlightenment and the French and American Revolutions, the introduction of the precise phrase in English and in international politics and law discourse was due to both Vladimir Lenin and President Woodrow Wilson.[41] Due to the influence of Wilson, the right of self-determination was given to the previous territories of Russia Empire (Poland) and Austro-Hungaria (Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia), by involving the three polities in the Conference. In the case of these three polities, the right of self-determination applied by relying on the 'consent by the governed' as a basic recognition of a new state, particularly in Europe. It departed from the previous practice that a new state had to fulfil various requirements of *de facto* statehood, and largely a recognition from the European great powers.[42] The good spirit of the right to self-determination was to delegitimise war or conquest as a means of creating a new state. Nevertheless, the Conference never made a clear distinction on the formulation of what kind of groups of people were entitled to self-determination rights, and what procedure was needed to verify the will of the people to independence when self-determination and a territorial border has been granted.[43]

The debate on self-determination in the European domain was heated around the destabilising consequences of the existence of new, small states related to the problems of territorial boundary settlement and the changing landscape of European balance of power. These difficulties thwarted the inclusion of self-determination in the final text of the League of Nations Covenant. Against this backdrop, no attention was given to the fate of the people in

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[41] Rita Augestad Knudsen, *The Fight Over Freedom in the 20th- and 21st-Century International Discourse: Moments of 'Self-Determination*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland, 2020, p. 15.
[42] Mikulas Fabry, *Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 118.
[43] Mikulas Fabry, *Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776*, p. 117.

the colonies, with the exception of the ex-German and Ottoman empire colonies.[44] Self-determination thus was only implicitly recognised and pertinent to limited cases particularly to territories under the Mandate System.[45] The Mandate System was established under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to govern a former German and Turkish colonies in Asia and Africa, which were judged not yet ready to govern themselves, and therefore to be guided by advanced nations among the victorious Allied powers. It was agreed to replace the long-held practice of imperialism in terms of delegitimising the acquisition of colonies after the First World War.[46] For this reason, the victorious powers did not annex German and Turkish colonies but put them under League of Nations Mandates. It became clear that the Paris Peace Conference never had any intention to apply broader self-determination rights to the people in the colonies.

While the settlement of the First World War had little direct impact to the fate of the colonies in Asia and Africa, the idea of self-determination had turned into a wider discourse that echoed far beyond European audiences. Lenin's and Wilson's two ideas of self-determination had both spread onto the world stage in the final years of the War, shaking the foundations of pre-War European international society. Both leaders had called for self-determination as the chief principle of the post-War settlement. However, there was a vast difference in what each meant with the term, especially related to the question of 'self-determination for whom'. In his famous 1914 text *The Rights of Nations to Self-Determination*, Lenin had made it clear that self-determination is the right of any culturally or historically

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[44] The Japanese proposal to include a clause of racial equality as the basis of self-determination was rejected, as civilization was continued to be the basis of recognition and membership in the family of (civilized) nations. See Nele Matz, 'Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of Nations as Origin of Trusteeship', in A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum, (eds.), *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law,* Volume 9, Koninklijke Brill N.V. The Netherlands 2005, pp. 63-64, available at <https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf2/mpunyb_matz_9_47_95.pdf>, accessed 5 August 2019.

[45] Martin Griffiths, 'Self Determination, International Society, and World Order,' *Macquarie Law Journal*, Vol. 13, 2003, p. 33.

[46] Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, p. 294.

defined ethnic nation to have its own state.[47] Wilson's version, on the other hand, did not specifically refer to a nation or ethnic groups, but suggested that the population of a given territory should be ruled by 'the consent of the governed'.[48] He also advocated a condition that such a population be politically 'civilised' enough to be offered that consent.

Indonesian anti-colonialist activists, particularly Indonesian students in the Netherlands fervently learned and wanted to seize the opportunities provided by the emerging norms of self-determination in international society. There is a common view among scholars that Indonesia's nationalism began to take shape as an ideology that moved beyond regionalism and religious affiliation in the 1920s, which was first articulated by these Indonesian students in the Netherlands.[49] Although small in number, the role of these students was pivotal in the struggle for the independence of Indonesia.[50] Moreover, the members of the student's organisation – such as Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir, Ali Sastroamidjojo — to name a few, were very influential among Indonesian nationalists upon returning to the colony and took a leading role in Indonesia's early post-colonial state formation. Mohammad Hatta was Indonesian Vice President (1945-1956), Sutan Sjahrir was the first Prime Minister (1945-1947), and Ali Sastroamidjojo served as Prime Minister who played central role in the 1955 Bandung Conference.

By the end of the First World War, new cohorts of Indonesian students in the Netherlands had begun to steer the student organisation on a new political path towards a

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[47] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 'The Rights of Nation to Self-Determination,' available at <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/ch01.htm>, accessed 20 November 2020.

[48] Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self Determination and the Origin of Anticolonial Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 22.

[49] For example, Robert E. Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia*, pp. 44-45; George. McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, pp. 88-89; John Ingleson, *Road to Exile: The Indonesian Nationalist Movement 1927-1934*, Heinemann, Singapore, 1980, pp. 1-18; Sartono Kartodirdjo, 'Some Problems on the Genesis of Nationalism in Indonesia,' pp. 83-84; Justus M. van der Kroef, 'Indonesian Nationalism Reconsidered,' *Pacific Affairs*, Vo. 45, No. 1, 1972, pp. 46-48.

[50] Klaas Stutje, 'To Maintain an Independence Course. Inter-War Indonesian Nationalism and International Communism on a Dutch-European Stage,' *Dutch Crossing*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2015, 204-220.

conscious nationalism, away from any previous organisational paths that were mostly loyal and had confidence in the benevolence of the Dutch colonial administration towards people in the Netherland Indies. As mentioned, this was clearly shown in the discreet name changes of the student organisation from the Dutch terms *Indische Vereeneging*, which took a moderate stance on seeking development in the Netherland Indies within the realm of Dutch colonialism, to *Indonesiche Vereeneging* in 1922, and significantly then in 1924 when it was translated into the Indonesian words *Perhimpoenan Indonesia*. This was followed by the publication of monthly journal called as 'Indonesia Free' (*Indonesia Merdeka*) in 1924 that replaced the previous periodical of 'Sons of the Indies' (*Hindia Poetra*).[51] Choosing names for their activities clearly indicated their political stance of non-cooperation with the Dutch and their aim of complete independence for Indonesia. [52]

For the purposes here, the role of Indonesia's students in the Netherlands, particularly the PI was crucial in shaping the development of Indonesia's nationalism and the right for self-determination. Through their publications in the *Indonesia Merdeka* journal, the PI covered and discussed the emerging nationalist liberation movements, particularly in British India, Turkey, China, and Egypt away from previous publications that mostly covered situations in the Netherlands Indies. According to Stutje, Indonesian nationalists were enthusiastic about Gandhi and the Indian National Congress' tactics to unite Indian people, but less interested with Gandhi's spiritual emphasis on non-cooperation and self-sacrifice. Indonesia's nationalists also admired the teaching of Mustapha Kemal Pasha on harmonious patriotism but dismissed the Ataturk authoritarian leadership in their coverage.[53] Mohammad Hatta also praised the success of Turkey in defeating Greece in 1922 and regarded Ankara as 'the Mecca

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[51] Klaas Stutje, 'Indonesian Identities Abroad: International Engagement of Colonial Students in the Netherlands, 1908-1931,' *BMGN Low Countries Historical Review*, Vol 128, No.1, 2013, pp. 157–159.

[52] Leo Suryadinata, 'Indonesian Nationalism and the Pre-War Youth Movement: A Reexamination,' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1978, p. 105.

[53] Klaas Stutje, 'Indonesian Identities Abroad: International Engagement of Colonial Students in the Netherlands, 1908-1931,' p. 158.

of new nationalism which teaches as its basic principle a belief in one's own capability'.[54] This suggests that Indonesia's nationalists had learned from many other anti-colonial nationalist movements around the world through their coverage in the *Indonesia Merdeka* journal. Moreover, they selected the values and orientations of other nationalist liberation movements to be suited with their causes, and thereby was essential in the learning process of defining political identity of Indonesian nationalist movements. Among the important lessons learned from India and Turkey were the principal of unity in the movement and principal of non-cooperation against colonial ruler. The PI were among the first of Indonesia's anti-colonial organisations to realise that divisions along ethnic, religious and social associations prevented them from being recognised as a nationalist movement that could effectively pressure the colonial ruler. In his inaugural speech as the Chair of the PI in January 1926, Hatta stated:

> [...] we need a very strong reliant organization to enable us to form a state
>
> within a state that in orderly manner. That is, to create our Indonesia next to
>
> the Netherland Indies.[55]

On the non-cooperation principle, Hatta argued: 'It sharpens the colonial antithesis, marks division between ruler and ruled, and outwardly serving as a repellent and inwardly as a unifier'.[56] As such the PI, albeit positioned far away from their homeland, had become the advocate of the unity of Indonesia's anti-colonial movement to form the basis of a nation and non-cooperation towards the colonial authorities.

The role of the PI was also pivotal in skilfully navigating the course of Indonesia's struggle for independence by seeking international recognition of its causes towards self-

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[54] Mavis Rose, *Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta*, Monograph Series, Publication no. 67, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1987, pp. 23-24.
[55] C.L.M. Penders (ed), *Mohammad Hatta, Indonesian Patriot: Memoirs*, Gunung Agung, Singapore, 1981, pp. 104-105.
[56] Mavis Rose, *Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta*, p. 21.

determination. In his article in *Indonesia Merdeka* in November 1926, Hatta expressed his concern for the lack of awareness among Europeans of the existence of the anti-colonial nationalist movement in Indonesia. He wrote:

> […] foreign countries know so little of our national cause. This unfamiliarity leads as a rule to unfavourable opinion about our existence and our ability to exist as a nation… In Europe, one often hears talk — if we restrict ourselves to Asia — the Chinese, the Indian, the Philippines, the Annamite problem, etc; but of Indonesia one scarcely hears anything at all.[57]

To spread the idea of Indonesia and the plight of its populations, the PI began to involve itself in international networks of anti-colonial activists centred in European cities such as Paris and Berlin. For Indonesian anti-colonial activists, this involvement provided a crucial learning process while simultaneously developing and legitimating their cause for nationalism and independence.

The importance of their involvement in these networks of anti-colonial activists was that they were able to capture the opportunity provided by — as historian Erez Manela called it — 'the Wilsonian moment'., which according to Manela, presented the anti-colonial activists around the world with 'unprecedented opportunities to advance claims in the name of emerging national identities and thus bolster and expand their legitimacy at home and abroad.'[58] However, Lenin's idea of the right of self-determination was also clearly attracting various anti-colonial movements around the world to assert their right for independence, as it provided the possibility of the creation of a new state as an internal right rather than waiting for self-

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[57] Mohammad Hatta, *Portrait of a Patriot: Selected Writings*, Mouton Publisher, The Hague and Paris, 1972, p. 144.
[58] Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self Determination and the Origin of Anticolonial Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 8

determination to be granted by its colonial interference.[59]

In 1926 for example, the PI with other Asian anti-colonial activists formed an 'Asian bloc' at the Bièrville International Democratic Congress of Peace in France, which was attended by many other groups and politicians from Germany and France.[60] At the congress, the name of 'Indonesia' was officially used and was represented by the PI. In his speech at the Congress, Hatta stated:

> This is doubtless the first time you have heard of Indonesia; I hope it will not
>
> be the last. Indonesia is the name of the Sunda Archipelago, composed of
>
> Sumatra, Java, Borneo, the Celebes, and other islands, with population of
>
> more than 50 million inhabitants, situated between the continent of Asia and
>
> Australia, near the Philippines.[61]

The speech purposely introduced Indonesia to the foreign public by delineating the geographical location of the country on the world map, as well as advancing the claims of Indonesia's anti-colonial activists from their country.

The PI also sought to capture the opportunity provided by the Soviet Union, which had given flesh through the Communist International (Comintern). In the Second Comintern and Baku Congress of 1920, the Comintern adopted a new strategy for lending support to the anti-colonial struggles by urging its network of communist parties in the colonies to cooperate with non-communist nationalist movements.[62] At this stage, the attitude of the PI towards the Soviet

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[59] For comprehensive discussion on Lenin's idea of self-determination and its influences, see, Rita Augestad Knudsen, *The Fight Over Freedom in the 20th- and 21st-Century International Discourse: Moments of 'Self-Determination*, ch 2, pp. 33-64.

[60] The Asian bloc delegations at the Bièrville International Democratic Congress of Peace were Duong Van Giao (Annam), Toptchybachy (Azerbaijan), Tung Meau (China), K.M. Panikkar (India) and Mohammad Hatta (Indonesia). Mohammad Hatta, *Portrait of a Patriot: Selected Writings*, p. 152.

[61] Mohammad Hatta, *Portrait of a Patriot: Selected Writings*, p. 152.

[62] Duncan Hallas, *The Comintern*, Bookmark, London, 1985. See also Duncan Hallas, 'The Communist International and the United Front,' *International Socialism*, No. 74, January 1975.

Union and the Comintern was crucial. From the beginning, the PI realised that the alliance between nationalist activists and the communist network was temporary and functional, as written in *Indonesia Merdeka* in 1925, 'provisionally, our roads run parallel to each other, and our goals are the same: to liberate our People from brutal oppression'.[63] However, the PI admitted that the communist network could facilitate the aspiration of the Indonesian nationalist to advance their cause internationally.[64]

The peak of the Indonesian nationalists' involvement in international networks was their participation in the International Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism in Brussels, January 1927. This conference was organized by Willi Münzenberg, a German communist and member of the German parliament, who had a close relationship with the Comintern. Attended by 174 activists, and representing 135 associations from 34 countries, it resulted in the creation of the League against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI), to 'lead the struggle against capitalism, imperialist rule, in support of national self-determination and independence for every people'.[65] Moreover, the Indonesian delegation achieved a central position in the LAI, as Hatta and Semaun were appointed to the executive committee, enabling them to maintain regular contact with other anti-colonial leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru. This network introduced the Indonesian nationalists to the international stage and provided Hatta and his colleagues with a sense of authority and legitimacy as representatives of the Netherlands Indies peoples, both among other anti-colonial movements and among Indonesian nationalists.[66]

The experiences of the PI and its transnational activities suggests that the process of

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[63] Quoted in Klass Stutje, 'To Maintain an Independence Course. Inter-War Indonesian Nationalism and International Communism on a Dutch-European Stage,' p. 204.

[64] Mavis Rose, *Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta*, p. 39.

[65] Fredrik Petersson, 'Hub of the Anti-Imperialist Movement: The League Against Imperialism and Berlin 1927–1933,' *Interventions*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2014, p. 50.

[66] Klaas Stutje, 'To Maintain an Independent Course. Inter-war Indonesian Nationalism and International Communism on a Dutch-European Stage,' p. 211.

learning of the idea of nationalism and self-determinism did not only obtain from its colonial ruler, but was also inspired by various sources such as from other anti-colonial movements and anti-colonial networks backed up by the Soviet Union. It does not necessarily mean that the PI was the only Indonesian nationalist organisation that was involved in transnational networks. There were also other Indonesian nationalist groups, not just the PI, with transnational activities, such as the Indonesian communist organisation, which had close contacts with the international communist world[67] and the Indonesian community in the Middle East often referred to as the *Jawi*, which established close interactions with the Islamic world centred at Al Azhar University in Cairo.[68] However, compared to other Indonesian anti-colonial organisations, the PI was considered the 'vanguard of Indonesian nationalism'.[69] Many of PI's activities affected the course of the Indonesian nationalist movement in general, such as the use of Malay language and its Red-White flag as unifying symbols. The ideas of the PI spread to the Netherland Indies through its monthly journal and the return of ex-members to the colony, who helped establish a number of study clubs in major cities such as Bandung and Surabaya, in which PI's ideas were disseminated among nationalist activists.[70] The PI also inspired the formation of the Indonesian Student Associations (*Perhimpoenan Peladjar-Peladjar Indonesia*) founded by university students in Jakarta,[71] whose members consisted of students from various regions in Indonesia, became the brainchild for the Indonesian Youth Congress on 28 October 1928 later known as the Youth Oath *(Sumpah Pemoeda)*. The Youth Oath called for the unity of Indonesia as one 'motherland' and as one nation unified by the Indonesian language, which marked the widespread acknowledgement of nationalism in Indonesia.

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[67] Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1965.
[68] Michael Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds*, Routledge, London and New York, 2003.
[69] Leo Suryadinata, 'Indonesian Nationalism and the Pre-War Youth Movement: A Reexamination,' p. 105.
[70] George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, p. 90.
[71] Leo Suryadinata, 'Indonesian Nationalism and the Pre-War Youth Movement: A Reexamination,' pp. 104-110.

The PI was also influential in shaping the future of Indonesia's worldview. While still under Dutch colonialism, the exponents of the PI had imagined the abolishment of the practice of colonialism in international society. As Hatta stated in his inaugural speech as the chair of the PI in January 1926:

> The colonial relationship will be replaced by a world society consisting of free nations of equal standing. Finally, we will reach a 'brotherhood among the nations'.[72]

This aspiration continued to be forged through the PI's involvement in the LAI as the embodiment of international solidarity among anti-colonial nationalists in the world in their struggle against the hierarchical sovereignty of international society to attain the right of self-determination. The experience in the LAI was also valuable for Indonesian leaders in visioning a role in building regional post-colonial solidarity, which decades later became manifest at the Bandung Conference in 1955 and through the Non-Alignment Movement.

3.4.   Japanese Occupation

Japan was another major source of Indonesia's pre-socialisation of international society. Historians are of a consensus that the Japanese occupation was a turning point and a decisive factor that led for Indonesia's independence and shaping political development after 1945.[73] Little attention has nevertheless been paid to the effect of the Japanese occupation on the shape of Indonesia's worldview, whereas Japanese colonialism was critical in planting the pan-Asia idea, which introduced Indonesian elites to a regional vision of international order.

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[72] C.L.M. Penders (ed), *Mohammad Hatta, Indonesian Patriot: Memoirs*, p. 105.
[73] Anthony J.S. Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution 1945-50*, p. 10; Harry J. Benda, 'The Beginning of the Japanese Occupation of Java, *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1956, p. 541.

Chapter 3: Indonesia's Pre-Socialisation into International Society

Under the Meiji Emperor (1868-1912), Japan embarked on a major adjustment of the state's domestic political structure and identity to conform with the Western Model. For example, Japan reorganised the military to imitate the French, constructed a centralised bureaucracy and other innovations including compulsory schooling, a police force, central banks and a network of railways inspired by Bismarck's Prussia. In 1889, Japan also adopted a constitution and a civil administration that mirrored the nineteenth century German constitutional (*Rechtsstaat*) model. Under this constitution Japan established a bicameral parliament but the powerful monarch was at the helm of the state. This had been combined with the issue of Imperial Rescript on Education by the Emperor in 1890. Central to this Rescript was the idea of national community (*kokutai*).[74] The *kokutai* had been used to inspire national feeling and loyalty to the emperor. Following the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 that uplifted the national confidence, the *kokutai* was increasingly described as a national identity that defined Japanese superiority to other nations.[75] What emerged from the fusion of the Western model and the Imperial Rescript was the ideology of a 'family state', which held that 'there was a deep spiritual bond between the emperor and its subject' and 'to build up the Japanese population's patriotism and nationalism'.[76]

Not only did it adjust its domestic political structure, Japan also embraced imperialism as an important feature of European international society. As Suzuki notes, 'the Japanese elites concluded that to become a full 'civilized' member of the Society […] they would have to construct a strong, imperialistic state and take on the identity of a powerful 'civilised' state.[77] Henceforth, Suzuki further argues, rather than motivated by economic factors, Japanese imperialism in the Nineteenth Century was deeply intertwined with its socialisation into

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[74] For a good source on *kokutai*, see, Joseph M. Kitagawa, 'The Japanese 'Kokutai' (National Community) History and Myth,' *History and Religion*, Vo. 13, No. 3, 1974, pp. 209-226.
[75] David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, p. 39.
[76] David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, p. 39.
[77] Shogo Suzuki, 'Japan's Socialisation into Janus-Faced European International Society,' p. 154.

European international society and the quest for great power status within European dominated international order.[78] Becoming a strong imperialistic state would not only protect Japan militarily, but it would also help Japan be recognised as a full member of the 'civilised' international society. In the late of Nineteenth Century, Japan began its imperialism by sending its military to Taiwan 1874, waging war with China in 1894-1895, annexing Taiwan in 1895, occupying Korea in 1910 and later occupying most parts of East and Southeast Asia in the Second World War until 1945.

Along with its course of imperialism, in the period between 1920s and 1930s, Japan saw a surge of nativist nationalist thinking, which increasing edged towards militancy and chauvinism. One of the most influential thinking was the idea of the Pan-Asian movement. The term Pan-Asia was ambiguous as whether it constitute a belief, thought, ideology or a movement.[79] The involvement of a number of movements, groups, and individual Japanese thinkers promoting differing doctrines of Pan-Asianism renders difficulties in drawing a generalised and consistent picture of this idea. Nevertheless, there are at least two fundamental strands within Pan-Asianism. First is the idea that there is a cohesive 'Asia' in terms of geography, culture, and race. Second, there is a belief that Western imperialism was a common threat, and Japan as the strongest and most modern Asian power, should provide leadership to bring about Asian solidarity against the West. These two strands could be interpreted from popular catch phrases from Pan-Asian movement during the Meiji era, such as Asian Solidarity (*Ajia rentai-ron*), Sino-Japanese coalition (*Nichi sin Kyōchō-ron*), and Reform Asia (*Ajia kaizo-ron*).[80] Pan-Asianist groups, represented by ultranationalist movement such as the Black

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[78] Shogo Suzuki, 'Reimagining International Society through the Emergence of Japanese Imperialism,' *Working Paper 2003/3*, Department of International Relations, RSPAS, Australia National University, Canberra, 2003, pp. 2-3.

[79] Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Vision of World Order in Pan Islamic and Pan Asian Thought*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007, p. 180.

[80] Rustin B. Gates, 'Pan-Asianism in the Pre-War Japanese Foreign Policy: The Curious Case of Uchida Yasuya,' *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2011, p. 5.

Dragon Society (*Kokuryûkai*) and the Black Ocean Society (*Genyōsha*) began to promote a conservative, anti-liberal nationalism and Japanese expansionism. At the heart of Pan-Asianism was the rejection of European ideas on race and universal civilisation and in favour of Asian civilisation, which was regarded as aesthetically and morally superior. Although Japan's position as leader in this vision was clearly the result of its appropriation of European modernity, Pan-Asianism could be understood as an effort by Japanese thinkers to delegitimise European colonial international society and order through a discourse of East-West and racial differences.[81]

Prior to the 1930s, the idea of the Pan-Asian vision was marginal in Japanese foreign policy, and Japan pursued a pro-Western, liberal internationalist foreign policy, following the establishment of Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, since it symbolised equal status between Japan and European powers. Yet a series of disappointments changed the Japanese perception. Japanese disappointment towards the Western countries began developing when Russia, Germany and France forced Japan to return the already-occupied Liaodong Peninsula to China in 1895, only to see the peninsula leased to Russia three years later. Japan also faced international isolation following the Manchuria incident in 1931. Although it had already gained special rights in Manchuria, Japan was alarmed by the success of China's unification in the 1920s led by the nationalist Chiang Kai-shek and the Russian pressures in the north. In that year the Japanese troops seized Manchuria and established a Japanese dominated state in Manchuria. Tension increased in 1932 when Japan withdrew its membership from the League of Nations following the organisation's report recommending Japan to withdraw its troops from Manchuria and restore the territory to Chinese sovereignty.[82] In the same period, the Great

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[81] Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Vision of World Order in Pan Islamic and Pan Asian Thought*, pp. 55–56; Cemil Aydin, 'Beyond Civilization: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Asianism and the Revolt against the West,' p. 206.

[82] Thomas W. Burkman, 'Japan and the League of Nations: An Asian Power Encounters the 'European Club',' *World Affairs*, Vol. 158, No. 1, 1995, pp. 45-57; Thomas W. Burkman, *Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914-1938*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2008, especially ch. 7.

Depression in the late of 1920s delegitimised liberal capitalism in the eyes of many. This was followed by the rise of Nazi Germany and Communist Russia, each of which abandoned the liberal style of capitalist economy. This turn of events made regionalism and the vision of a Japan-led regional order more feasible. The Pan-Asian vision began to overshadow the pro-Western liberal stance and was officially adopted in Japan's foreign policy with the declaration of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in 1940, which was then used as a justification for Japanese imperialism in East and Southeast Asia.[83]

In the process, Japan became a symbol and inspiration among Indonesia's nationalist leaders, a development that was aided by an ancient Javanese myth about a yellow race from the north one day forcing out white overlords.[84] Japan's victory over Russia's Baltic Fleet at Tsushima Straits in 1905 had already destroyed the myth of European invincibility and cast abroad a powerful image and symbol of Asian, and indeed, Japanese triumph.[85] Equally, Japan's rapid economic growth and successful industrialisation showed that an Asian race could compete with Europeans on their own terms. Throughout the 1920s and the 1930s, Japan's commercial expansion in the Netherlands East Indies intensified and Japan's presence was much more palpable.[86] With the spread of global economic depression in 1929, Japanese commercial interests expanded into the Indonesian archipelago. The flood of inexpensive

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[83] Cemil Aydin, 'Japan's Pan Asianism and the Legitimacy of Imperial World Order, 1931–1945,' *Japan Focus*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2008, pp. 1–33.

[84] David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, p. 45; The Indonesian view of the coming of Japan in 1940s was also influenced by Javanese mystical foretelling (*ramalan*) of ancient Kediri King Jayabaya. According to the prophecy, there will be people of yellow race from the north that would one day force out the white people ruler. They would not stay long (only as long as a season for a corn to be harvested) and becomes the harbinger of the coming of *Ratu Adil* (Just King) in Indonesia. Even Sukarno mentioned this prophecy when he read his plead in front of the Dutch colonial court in 1929. See, George Sanford Kanahele, 'The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: A prelude to Independence,' PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1967, pp. 2–3. For detail account on Jayabaya prophecy, see, Nancy K. Florida, *Writing the Past, Inscribing the Future: History as Prophecy in Colonial Java*, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1995, especially ch. 3.

[85] Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Vision of World Order in Pan Islamic and Pan Asian Thought*, especially Chapter 4.

[86] Howard Dick, 'Japan's Economic Expansion in the Netherlands Indies between the First and Second World Wars,' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,* Vol. 20, No. 2, 1989, pp. 244–272. See also Shigeru Sato, 'Indonesia 1939–1942: Prelude to Japanese Occupation,' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2006, pp. 225–248.

Japanese goods dominated and pushed European goods from the local market. More importantly, as Sutan Sjahrir notes, the Japanese won the sympathy of ordinary Indonesian people, for being polite and civilised in their general manners in contrast to the Europeans and Chinese people, who were commonly regarded by Indonesians as impolite and abrasive.[87]

Along with its economic penetration, Japan actively promoted its positive image to the Indonesian population. Initiated by the *Kokuryûkai*, Japanese propaganda of Asian solidarity was directed to both students and nationalist groups. Not only did it promote its military triumphs and successful economic and industrialisation, but the Japanese idea of Pan-Asian solidarity began to attract the attention of Indonesian nationalist leaders. A number of nationalist leaders built close connections with the Pan-Asianist organisations in Japan, based on the belief that they would support the Indonesian nationalist cause. The Pan-Asianist organisations also provided scholarships for a number of Indonesian students to Japan and facilitated visits to Japan for Indonesian journalists, teachers and other nationalist leaders, including Hatta, who was praised by Japanese propagandists as 'the Gandhi from Java'. This account is not to suggest that all nationalist leaders were sympathetic to Japan. Top nationalist leaders such as Sukarno and Sjahrir – and even Hatta himself – were cautious, if not fearful of Japanese fascism and imperialism in Asia, since they were well aware of Japan's own imperial conquests in Formosa, China and Korea. However, at that time Sukarno was exiled by the Dutch in Bengkulen, while Hatta and Sjahrir were ousted in Banda Island. In reality, the 'second echelon' nationalists, such as Subarjo, Gatot Mangkuprojo, Supomo, Maramis and the Japanese alumni network were in charge and either collaborated with or supported the Japanese invasion of Indonesia based on the belief that Japan could help Indonesia gain independence. After returning from the exile, both Sukarno and Hatta then chose to cooperate with the

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[87] Sutan Sjahrir's account, cited in George Sanford Kanahele, 'The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: A prelude to Independence,' footnote no. 9, Chapter 1.

Japanese, while Sjahrir decided not to cooperate.[88]

Nevertheless, disillusionment among Indonesian nationalists with the Netherlands – particularly in the light of Dutch colonialist persistence, even after the fall of Netherlands to Germany in May 1940 – pushed many nationalists to lean towards Japan. The nationalists, particularly among the members of *Volksraad* had already pledged cooperation to the beleaguered colonial government in the hope of winning political concessions in return. Nevertheless, the colonial government maintained that they would maintain the 'status quo' of the state and the society while rejecting the demand for self-government. In 1941, Queen Wilhelmina also promised reform, but these moves culminated in the refusal of the Netherlands to sign the Atlantic Charter, which would have provided a legal foundation for self-government. The Netherlands argued that the Charter did not apply to Indonesia. [89]

Japan's occupation of Indonesia began on 8 March 1942, but the reality proved to be a far cry from any nationalists' expectations that Japan might arrive as liberators. In contrast to the propaganda before occupation, the Japanese banned the red and white Indonesian nationalist flag and anthem and imposed political censorship. Most importantly, Japanese imperialism proved itself to be driven overwhelming by the need for economic resources, necessitating the wartime mobilisation of the population.[90]

The mass mobilisation of the Indonesian population was conducted through Japanese-sponsored mass movement organisations and a vast cultural propaganda based on the pan-

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[88] Elly Touwen-Bouwsma 'The Indonesian Nationalists and the Japanese 'Liberation' of Indonesia: Visions and Reactions,' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1996, pp. 1–18

[89] See George Sanford Kanahele, 'The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: A prelude to Independence,' pp. 16–17.

[90] Anthony J.S. Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution 1945–50*, pp. 10–11. Shigeru Sato explains that the objective of Japanese administration in Indonesia was the 'Japanization' of Indonesian society, the construction of an economic and social structure that would provide maximum mobilisation of human resources and natural resources to support Japan. Included in the Japanization process was the elimination of Western presence and influence in Indonesia. See, Shigeru Sato, 'Japanization in Indonesia Re-examined: The Problem of Self-Sufficiency in Clothing,' in Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb (eds), *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945*, Routledge, London and New York, 2003, pp. 270–295.

Asiatic vision. Many nationalist and religious organisation activists, including Sukarno and Hatta, dominated the leadership of the major mass mobilisation organisations. The nationalist leaders believed that their involvement in such movements provided them with a momentous opportunity to connect with the Indonesian population from the rural areas to the centre of political powers in the capital, raising consciousness of Indonesian national identity and the ideal of independence.[91] The first mass movement created by the Japanese was the Triple A movement with its slogan: Japan the light of Asia, protector of Asia, and leader of Asia. The movement was not appealing for popular support, since it was strictly pro-Japanese, but it did touch the nationalist sentiment of the public. With the return of Sukarno from the exiled, Japan created another organisation called the Centre of People's Strength (*Pusat Tenaga Rakyat*) led by Sukarno and Hatta, to cultivate nationalist sentiment in the public. This organisation was then replaced by the Java Service Association (*Djawa Hokokai*) to include the role of Javanese bureaucratic elites, and therefore integrated the mass organisations in the administrative system. According to Bourchier, *Djawa Hokokai* consisted of mass organisations representing occupations, industries, sports, women, and youth, hence embodied a corporatist pattern of political representation that was to be imitated in Indonesia's system after its independence.[92] Aware of the possibility of using Islam as a vehicle to mobilise the Muslim community, Japan also established the Great Islamic Council of Indonesia (*Majlisul Islamil Ala Indonesia*), which was then reconstituted into the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslim (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*) to attract the support traditional Muslims.[93] Another crucial part of the mobilisation effort was the creation of indigenous militias such as *Heiho* and Defenders of the

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[91] Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation, 1944–1945*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1961, p. 46; Anthony J.S. Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution 1945–50*, p. 13.
[92] David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, p. 54.
[93] See, for example, Harry J. Benda, 'Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–45,' *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1955, pp. 350–362. For more detail, see Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945*, W. van Hoeve, The Hague, 1958.

Fatherland (*Pembela Tanah Air* [PETA]).[94] As a result, parallel with Japanese's mass mobilisation, Indonesian nationalism turned into a mass movement.

Japanese mass mobilisation helped to strengthen the Indonesian identity, altering the way Indonesians thought about themselves and reinforced the nationalists' long-imagined worldview based on indigeneity and what might be vaguely termed 'eastern-ness'. Japanese propaganda obliterated most Western influence and replaced it with the presumption of Japanese cultural superiority, which was conflated into the idea of Pan-Asian solidarity. The Japanese banned the use of the Dutch language, dissolved discriminative Dutch schools and abolished the plural European-Native legal system. As a replacement, in all levels of teaching and through mass publications, the Japanese disseminated its state philosophy which highlighted its collective and spiritual character, to be contrasted with liberal and the corrupt-liberal West.[95] When the content of propaganda of exclusive Japanese culture failed to convince the Indonesians, the focus shifted to an exploration of Indonesia's indigenous identity, which was presented as being kindred to the idea of pan-Asia and Japanese cultural traits. An important step was made through the creation of the popular Education and Cultural Direction Centre (*Pusat Kebudayaan*) in 1942. Much of the works in the Centre were directed at forging the concept of national identity inspired by anti-liberal political and legal philosophies and linking them to Japan's idea of an Asian regional order struggling to replace individualism and liberalism.[96] Parallel with the efforts to draw a congruency between Japanese

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[94] *Heiho* was an auxiliary force attached to and under command of the Japanese military, while PETA was based on the spirited desire of the Indonesian people to defend their fatherland. The Japanese also recruited into various paramilitary groups: a youth militia (*Seinendan*), a young student militia (*Gakutotai*), and an adult vigilante corps (*Keibodan*). Their combined membership grew to around a half a million and a million people. Aside from the militias, other paramilitaries were established, such as Hizbullah (paramilitary wing of Masjumi), *Barisan Pelopor* (Pioneer Troops), and *Barisan Berani Mati* (Brave to Death Troops). These militias and paramilitaries became the genesis of Indonesian military forces. See, Robert E. Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia*, pp. 102–103.
[95] David Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System*, p. 60.
[96] David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, p. 57.

culture and Indonesian culture,[97] the Japanese colonial authorities also set up the Council on *Adat* and Past State Organisation, which was a research body comprised of prominent nationalist leaders, some of whom were Leiden alumni lawyers. In order to advise the Japanese administration, the Council was tasked to research the pre-modern history of Indonesian kingdoms, indigenous-traditional customs and institutions before they were damaged by European influences.[98] Indonesian history was re-written to portray Indonesia before the coming of European powers and turned figures and local leaders who were considered by the Dutch as the rebels and bandits into national heroes. One of the leaders of the Council, a well-respected educator, Ki Hajar Dewantoro, contributed an important point in this matter by highlighting the virtues of 'eastern democracy' and the 'feeling of a family' as an important collective characteristic of Indonesian identity, to be contrasted with Western values of individualism, materialism and capitalism.[99] The result of the discourses of Indonesia's nativist identity in the Council significantly resembled the conception of Indonesia's identity proposed by the Leiden alumni lawyers.[100] What was new, however, was the justification of this cultural and national identity of a wider context of Asian values and 'Eastern cultures'. Thus, during the Japanese occupation, Indonesia was exposed to Japanese ideas of Pan-Asianism, which deepened and strengthened the indispensability of Asian values and eastern qualities vis-à-vis the Western values, which carved deep-seated aspirations after it gained independence.[101]

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[97] For example: the Japanese *kukotai* and the Javanese *manunggaling kawulo gusti* refer to similar notions of the unity between the ruler and the ruled; the Japanese spirit of *Bushido* and the Javanese spirit of *Ksatria* both refer to the warrior spirit; Japanese *hara kiri* (suicide ritual) is similar to the Javanese concept of *Suduk saliro.* For details of the use of cultural propaganda to draw links between Indonesian culture and Japanese culture, see Ethan Mark, *Japanese Occupation of Java in Second World War: A Transnational History,* Bloomsbury, London, 2018, especially chapter 6.

[98] David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, pp. 58–59.

[99] Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System*, p. 64.

[100] David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, pp. 59-60

[101] Robert E. Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia,* p. 101.

3.5. Summary

In criticising Benedict Anderson's thesis of an imagined community, Partha Chatterjee contends, 'if nationalists in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain 'modular' forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?'[102] He suggests that to understand anti-colonial nationalism, one must not look only at what was borrowed from the colonial powers (the material domain), but also how 'colonial difference' was constructed (the spiritual domain). The most powerful and creative results of the anti-colonial nationalists' imagination, as Chatterjee notes, did not rest on identity, but on 'difference' from the tutelage propagated by the West, 'to fashion a modern project that is nevertheless not Western'.[103]

Chatterjee's argument confirms Indonesia's pre-socialisation international society experiences before it became an independent and sovereign country. Of course, the notion of socialisation of international society at this stage is not strictly nor directly dealing with transmission of norms and institutions of international society such as balance of power, diplomacy, international law, and other practices in relations between states since Indonesia was not a sovereign state. It was rather related to a complex process of national identity and nation building. Interestingly, Indonesia's national self-identity was built upon negative references of Western liberalism, capitalism, and above all imperialism, as the essential 'other'. It did however allow the nationalist movements to challenge the colonial international society by contesting the primary institution of hierarchical sovereignty with the emerging norm of self-determination. Equally important, the dichotomous worldview of the colonial and the subject, the Asian and the European, or the East and the West, was internalised as the reality of international society within which Indonesia attempted to insert itself into and to be socially

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[102] Partha Chatterjee, 'Whose Imagined Community?' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1991, p. 521.
[103] Partha Chatterjee, 'Whose Imagined Community?' p. 522.

appropriate. It also revealed the nature of the roles that it would seek in international society after assuming sovereignty.

The result of Indonesia's international society pre-socialisation was reflected in the 1945 Constitution.[104] The draft of the constitution was prepared between 29 May to 17 July 1945 by the Committee to Investigate the Preparations of Independence (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha Kemerdekaan Indonesia* [BPUPKI], or in Japanese *Dokurisu Zyunbi Tyoosa Kai*)— a committee that was established in April 1945 by the Japanese military authority in Java. There were 68 members of BPUPKI from a range of ethnic and ideological backgrounds and comprised a fair and quite representative sample of pre-independence nationalist leaders. Most prominent among them were Sukarno, Hatta, Supomo, and Mohammad Yamin. However, nationalist leaders who did not cooperate with the Japanese were not included, such as Sjahrir, although he was one of the prominent nationalist leaders. Nevertheless, the constitutional debate represented the clarity of ideas and minds of many educated nationalist leaders that derived their views from their experiences of Dutch colonialism and Japanese occupation.[105]

The Constitution embodied Indonesian nationalist leaders' agreement on the state ideology of an independent Indonesia, the philosophical foundation of political institutions of the state, as well as the vision and role of the state in international relations. The state ideology – Five Principles (*Pancasila*) – embodies the spirit of a belief in God, internationalism and humanitarianism, nationalism, representative government, democracy, and social welfare. The *Pancasila* was first proposed by Sukarno in the meeting of BPUPKI on 1 June 1945 and

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[104] The BPUPKI was then replaced by the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, PPKI or in Japanese *Dokuritsu Junbu Inkai*) on 7 August 1945, to prepare the transfer of authority from the Japanese to Indonesia. It was the PPKI that ratified the 1945 Constitution as Indonesia's constitution on 18 August 1945.

[105] For good sources of the constitutional debate in 1945, see, RM A.B. Kusuma, *Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945: Memuat Salinan Dokumen Otentik Badan Oentoek Oesaha-2 Persiapan Kemerdekaan (The Born of 1945 Constitution: Containing Copies of Authentic Documents of the Committee to Investigate the Preparations of Independence)*, Badan Penerbit Fakultas Hukum, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, 2004.

continues as Indonesia's state ideology to date.[106] In the philosophical base for the construction of political institutions, the nationalist leaders rejected the individualism and liberal democracy and instead adopted Supomo's idea of the integralistic state (*negara kekeluargaan* or family state/organicist) idea. As mentioned earlier, based on this idea, the Indonesian state was established to serve the interests of the whole society (the state), not that of an individual or a group of people based on the spirit of unity between the leaders and the people, on harmony, and mutual assistance. The democratic system was interpreted in the familial notion, expressed in the principle of sharing or power among the political triad (*trias politica*) bodies instead of the separation of powers, and the principles of *musyawarah* and *mufakat* continue to constitute the most important procedures in Indonesian democracy. The idea of the integralistic state paved the way for a statist conception of sovereignty rather than popular sovereignty.[107] It also promoted the dominant role of the state in economic development, as the Constitution, chapter 33(2) stresses: 'Sectors of production which are important for the country and affect the life of the people shall be under the power of the state.' While chapter 33(3) stipulates that 'The land, the waters and the natural resources within shall be under the powers of the state....'[108]

Regarding the conduct of international relations, the Constitution also expresses the national leaders' agreement on Indonesia's ideational aspects and beliefs that would govern the future foreign policy of the state. The first principal belief is the strong emphasis of independence against all form of colonialism and imperialism. As the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution states, 'independence is the inalienable rights for all nations, therefore, all colonialism must be abolished in this world as it is not in conformity with humanity and

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[106] For a good source on the debate of who proposed the idea of Pancasila in the first place, see A.B. Kusuma and R. E. Elson, 'A Note on the Sources for 1945 Constitutional Debate in Indonesia,' *Bijdrgaen tot de Tall-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, Vol. 167, No. 2-3, 2011, pp. 196-209.

[107] Koichi Kawamura, 'The Politics of the 1945 Constitution: Democratization and Its Impact on Political Institution in Indonesia,' *IDE Research Paper*, No. 3, 2003, p. 11.

[108] For the translation of 1945 Indonesian Constitution in English, see, <https://jdih.bapeten.go.id/unggah/dokumen/peraturan/116-full.pdf>, accessed 20 January 2020.

justice.' The second core belief is the ideal aspiration to support and uphold world peace, for the Preamble mandates that Indonesian government shall play an active role towards 'the establishment of a world order based on freedom, perpetual peace and social justice.' The significance of such a normative document is clearly significant as the two principals continue to become core values of Indonesia's foreign policy to date.[109]

The Indonesian nationalist leaders' ambiguous attitude towards their colonisers might have deflected the wholesale adoption of the colonisers' ideas on international society so that the end result of the pre-socialisation process did not fully replicate the ideas and patterns that had been transmitted by the colonisers. Indeed, the nationalist leaders were capable of selecting from an assemblage of ideas and interpreting the social environment so as to advance their nationalist aspirations. In that process, the construction of national identity went hand in hand with the construction of their vision of international society. Of great importance for the nationalist leaders were their experiences of revolutionary struggle for independence and international recognition which were expressed in their social thinking on the idea of Indonesian state. Moreover, these influences retain their significance and continue to underpin Indonesian political elites' social, political, and international relations thought.

Lastly, pre-socialisation of international society has had a long-lasting impact on the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy at regional level. As mentioned, Indonesia's behaviour in Southeast Asia reflected the influence of the family state idea, strong sense of nationalism, and ambiguous attitude towards external major powers in foreign policy. The next chapters will demonstrate that Indonesia's agency is displayed by its penchant for creating a stable and harmonious region underpinned by strong cohesion, maintaining family-like regional organisation through informal, interpersonal, non- binding, and consensual methods of

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[109] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Values in Indonesian Foreign Policy: *Independence and Active Doctrine*,' in Krishnan Srinivasan, James Mayall, Sanjay Pulipaka (eds), *Values in Foreign Policy: Investigating Ideals and Interests,* Rowman & Littlefield International, London, New York, 2019, pp. 175-192.

intergovernmental relations and decision making, and opposition to the involvement of external

parties in the region.

Chapter 4: 'Learning By Doing': Indonesia's Socialisation into International Society

4.1.   Introduction

Following the pre-socialisation stage, Indonesia's understanding and interpretation of international society was further shaped by the process of socialisation into international society. This chapter aims to examine Indonesia's socialisation into international society and its impact on Indonesia's interpretation to institutional practices of international society. This chapter will illustrate how Indonesia's socialisation into international society took place during the period between the Declaration of Independence in August 1945 until the mid-1960s, when the country was struggling for international recognition and navigating its foreign policy as a newly independent state. Furthermore, this chapter will demonstrate how the experiences of dealing with international society during that period have engendered Indonesia's understanding and interpretation of international society, which by the passage of time, have shown more continuity rather than change.

Broadly speaking, the socialisation of a state refers to a process by which it learns the norms, values and behaviour according to the manner and sustained compliance based on the internalisation of these new norms.[1] The classical English School scholars, such as Bull and Watson mention that the adoption of international law and participation in the European diplomatic system are evidence of socialisation and the entry of non-European states into European international society.[2] In a more detail Gong uses the term 'standard of civilization', which includes political and economic criteria both as basic rules of foreign relations conduct

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[1] For example, Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,' *International Organization*, No. 59, No. 4, 2005, p. 804.

[2] Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, 'Introduction, The Editors,' in Hedley Bull & Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 1.

in accordance with European diplomatic practices, international law and domestic administrative and governance.[3] Countries, which are able to achieve such standards could be considered 'civilised' and therefore eligible to join international society and vice versa. Other English School scholars Linklater and Suganami, introduce the term 'good international citizenship' to explain states' reference of standard behaviour to preserve international norms and institutions.[4]

One problem with the notion of socialisation from the English School scholars is that it is mostly conceptualised as unidirectional or a one-way process: from the socialiser to the socialisee.[5] The common theme of socialisation is when a group of states or dominant group in international society tries to persuade other states to internalise certain norms, institutions and practices. Following this line, the socialisee or the targeted party of the socialisation process is the place of change. Rarely does socialisation speak about the changes in the context of interaction and the group of states or international institutions that are affected by the socialisee.[6] At this point, the notion of socialisation from the English School is not only Western/European biased — based on centuries of Western powers socialising non-western countries into Western-dominated international society — but it also incomplete and ignores states' agency in the selection of ideas and their actions renegotiating the rules of the Western/European norms and institutions based on their historical relations with the international society.[7] In reality, non-Western states do not always conform to external norms.

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[3] Gerrit Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society,* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, pp. 14-15.

[4] Andrew Linklater & Hidemi Suganami, *The English School of International Relation: A Contemporary Reassessment,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 223-258.

[5] Maximillian Terhalle, 'Reciprocal Socialization: Rising Powers and The West,' *International Studies Perspectives,* Vol. 12, Issue 4, 2011, pp.341-361; Pu Xiaoyu, 'Socialisation as Two-Way Process: Emerging Powers and the Diffusion of International Norms,' *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 5, Issue 4, 2012, pp. 341-367.

[6] Alice Ba, 'Who Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-ASEAN Relations,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2006, p.159

[7] For example, Shogo Suzuki, 'Japan's Socialization into Janus-Faced European International Society', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2005, pp. 137–164; Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China's and Japan's Encounter with International Society*, Routledge, London & New York, 2009, especially Ch 1, pp. 11-34.

In many cases, they also actively renegotiate the norms by contextualising external norms to their local context, and/or challenge the socialised norms in many ways, from covered resistance to open rejection through collective norm opposition.[8] Hence, states are not merely the receiver of the imposed external norms and institutions, but 'they could also act as proactive agents who could influence the content and outcome of the socialisation process.'[9]

Despite the above noted reservation, this chapter suggests that the socialisation into international society forwarded by the English School still offers a useful perspective for examining the emergence of Indonesia's ideational aspects and beliefs about rightful and legitimate conduct in international relations. In particular, the analysis of socialisation into international society is also useful to identify the aspirational values to which Indonesia might gravitate when it comes time to build the primary and secondary institutions of international society, whether at the global or the regional level. However, it needs to incorporate other sources and experiences of socialisation aside from its relations with European/Western states that also influential in shaping Indonesia's interpretation of international society.

This chapter thus suggests that Indonesia's socialisation into international society is best described as a 'learning by doing' process. The term of 'learning by doing' is borrowed from the education and pedagogical approaches, as 'the process whereby people make sense of their experiences, especially those experiences in which they actively engage in making things and exploring the world.'[10] The term also presumes that new learners participate in activities before they have a full understanding and competence of it. In this sense, doing activity leads the way for developing new knowledge and understanding.

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[8] Charlotte Epstein, 'Stop Telling us How to Behave: Socialization or Infantilization?', *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 13, Issue 2, 2012, pp. 135-145.

[9] Pu Xiaoyu, 'Socialisation as Two-Way Process: Emerging Powers and the Diffusion of International Norms,' p. 347.

[10] Bertram C. Bruce and Naomi Bloch, 'Learning by Doing,' in Norbert M. Seel (ed) *Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning*, Springer, New York, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, 2012, p. 1821.

Applying the 'learning by doing' socialisation process into Indonesia's the context, this chapter argues that the period between the Declaration of Independence in 1945 until the transfer of sovereignty in 1949 was a stage in which the first generation of national leaders were not yet *de jure* in power, but nevertheless were dealing with the colonial, the regional states and the great powers as if they were. During this period, Indonesia's nationalist leaders learned the craft of governing and international relations while working cooperatively with its former colonial power, great powers, and other members of international society to secure international recognition for its independence and sovereignty on the basis of the right of self-determination. Indonesia was introduced to and involved with the norms and institutions of international society such as diplomacy, international law and great power management, in which the nationalists learned their lessons the hard way. This experience during this period left distinctive imprints on the nationalist leadership's understanding of international society, by which they were able to accept and select the practices and institution of international society to be suited to their earlier understanding.

The final stage of Indonesia's 'learning by doing' socialisation of international society took place in the period between 1950s to the mid of 1960s. Indonesia in this period was no passive actor, as it also sought to articulate its earlier understanding through actual measures. The early period of Indonesia's foreign policy was preoccupied by the problems of national territorial integration. For example, the issue of West Papua was one of the most important issues between Jakarta and The Hague relations between 1949-1962. Another diplomatic priority related to territorial integrity was Indonesia's diplomatic campaign to gain recognition as archipelagic state following the 1957 Djuanda Declaration. This Declaration asserted that the whole (Indonesian) archipelago along with the sea lying within must be regarded as one total unit under exclusive sovereignty of Indonesia, and the delimitation of the territorial sea is

measured from the baseline connecting the outermost points of the islands of Indonesia.[11] Indonesia's diplomatic campaign to gain international recognition as an archipelagic state spanned a further 25 years, marked with strong opposition by major maritime powers such as the US, the UK and Japan, until the concept was enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982.[12]

Not only focused on domestic interests, the leaders of the now fully-fledged nation-state also attempted to shape the norms and rules by challenging the existing practices and institutions of international society. Two cases will be employed to validate this claim: the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the policy of confrontation from 1960 to 1966. These experiences had positive and negative consequences for Indonesia and yet the lessons from these experiences cemented its interpretation of the legitimate and rightful conduct of international relations. The Bandung Conference was the first major international event held by Indonesia. It is lauded as a pinnacle point of Indonesia's foreign policy, which became the forerunner of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) established in Belgrade in 1961, that elevated its position as one of the leaders of the post-colonial states. From the Bandung Conference, Indonesia learned important normative lessons and settled Indonesia's interpretation on the principle of sovereignty and non-interference, the basic principles of relations with great powers as well as the procedures in the conduct of diplomacy.[13]

Meanwhile, during the policy of confrontation (1960-1966) Indonesia under President Sukarno embarked on a militant policy against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism,

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[11] For full text of the Djuanda Declaration in English, see, Dino Patti Djalal, *The Geopolitics of Indonesia's Maritime Territorial Diplomacy*, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 1996, p. 146.

[12] For an excellent source, see, John G. Butcher and R.E. Elson, *Sovereignty and the Sea: How Indonesia Became an Archipelagic State*, National University of Singapore Press, Singapore, 2017. See also, John G. Butcher, 'Becoming an Archipelagic State: Juanda Declaration of 1957 and the 'Struggle' to Gain International Recognition of the Archipelagic Principle,' in Robert Cribb and Michele Ford (eds), *Indonesia Beyond the Water Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State*, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, 2009, pp. 28-48.

[13] Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, 'The Normative Relevance of the Bandung Conference for Contemporary Asian and International Order,' in See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order*, NUS Press, Singapore, 2008, pp. 1-18.

both in a general international stance and its relations with its neighbours, particularly Malaysia. The policy resulted in international isolation, which further deteriorated its already troubled economy. The negative impacts of this policy of confrontation had led Suharto's government to reorientate Indonesia's foreign policy into a more moderate direction. Nonetheless, Indonesia's attitude during Sukarno era in opposing the great powers' military bases in the region and the intervention extra regional power in regional politics, in general, becomes the important lesson to be taken by the next governments and continue to survive.

Indonesia's 'learning by doing' process of socialisation into international society added another layer of its early understanding that had already been garnered in the pre-socialisation stage. Indonesia's understanding and interpretation of international society was characterised by strong preferences towards several important fundamental/primary institutions such as, a strong sense of nationalism, the principle of sovereignty, non-interference and non-intervention, and the preference to take relative equidistance position with great powers or non-alignment by refusing to join the military pact or defence alliance. Indonesia also prefers the practice of diplomacy based on informality, consultation and consensus.

These interpretations of fundamental institutions of international society have influenced what Indonesia considers to be appropriate and legitimate conduct in the society of states in the Southeast Asia, thus giving its agency form and direction. Indonesia had since become the promoter of regional order based on important regional norms and values such as sovereignty, non-intervention and non-interference, principle of non-alignment aimed at avoiding great powers competition at regional politics, and rules and procedures of diplomacy based on consultative and consensus decision making.

In substantiating the argument, this chapter is organised in two main parts. The first part examines the hard lessons experienced by Indonesia through its socialisation into

international society that took place alongside its struggle for independence. The second part will discuss the lessons learnt about international society by Indonesia, after independence. The first part thus discusses Indonesia as a receiver of norms and institutions of international society, while the second part examines Indonesia's active involvement in norms making and challenging norms as exemplified in the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference and the *Konfrontasi* policy.

4.2. Struggle for Independence

In the process of gaining sovereignty and international recognition in the period between 1945 to 1949, Indonesia had to formally deal with the institutions of international society for the first time. Hence, Indonesia had been socialised into international society. To a certain extent, the process was a 'learning by doing' socialisation: Without any legitimate foreign policy and not yet having gained a full understanding and competence of it, Indonesia's leaders had to follow and conform to the rules, norms and institutions of international society. This process was fundamentally critical in shaping Indonesia's interpretations of the institutions of international society, in particular sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, and great power management.

4.2.1. Diplomacy

On 17 August 1945, Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. It marked the beginning of rapidly changing situations in Indonesia. The day after proclamation, Sukarno and Hatta were appointed as President and Vice President by the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia [PPKI]). This was followed by the promulgation of the 1945 Constitution as Indonesian

Constitution, which stipulated that the country would follow the presidential system, and the establishment of the Central Indonesian National Committee (*Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat* [KNIP]) as an advisory body. The new government sought to establish an administrative control to the former territory of the Netherland Indies, by dividing it into eight provinces headed by a governor for each province assisted by provincial Indonesian National Committee.[14] Not least, it established the People's Security Corps (*Badan Keamanan Rakyat*), an army that was organised from pro-independent militias such as PETA units and several youth organisations in late August 1945. In short, the independent Republic of Indonesia swiftly began its existence.

The newly proclaimed republic urgently needed international recognition. As early as 23 August, the need for international recognition had been stressed by Sukarno in a speech broadcast on the radio.[15] However, instead of international recognition, the South East Asia Command led by British forces, landed in Jakarta on 29 September 1945 to disarm and accept the surrender of the Japanese and release Allied prisoners of war and to maintain law and order in Indonesia until the Netherlands administration in Indies could be reinstated. When they arrived, the revolutionary youth movement (*pemuda*) attempted to seize weaponry and civil authority from the Japanese which resulted in an outburst of violence across many big cities in Java. From this, the Indonesians secured temporary control of Bandung, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta.[16] From the beginning, however, there were misgivings among Indonesians about the intentions of the British due to the formation of the Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs Administration and Netherlands troops led by Lt. Governor General H.J. van Mook under

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[14] The division of provinces, which was based on the PPKI decree on 19 August, consisted of West Java, Middle Java, East Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan (Borneo), Sulawesi (Celebes), Maluku (the Moluccas), and Sunda Kecil (Lesser Sunda).

[15] L.M. Efimova, 'Towards the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the USSR and the Republic of Indonesia 1947-1948,' *Indonesia and the Malay World*, Vol. 26, No. 76, 1998, pp. 184.

[16] For an excellent source of this period see, Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1972.

British auspices. For Indonesians, particularly among the youth organisations and militias, Indonesia's independence was being challenged, which precipitated further revolutionary activities.[17]

In the period between the late October and December 1945, the British and the Netherlands in their effort to gain control of many cities in Java, Sumatra, and Bali faced intense resistance from the *pemuda*. The most intense battle happened in Surabaya, in which the Indonesian youth and militias fought against the British troops, killing British General, Brigadier Mallaby.[18] This battle was an important turning point for both the British forces and Indonesia's struggle for independence. The British realistically sought the cooperation of the Republic's administration and urged the Indonesians and the Netherlands to hold a negotiation on the future of Netherlands Indies. The Dutch initially refused to hold talks with Sukarno and his colleagues, as the latter were regarded as Japanese collaborators that occupied the Netherlands Indies.[19]

This stage had become the first 'hard' lesson for the Republic's leader before entering into the diplomatic forums. Taking seriously suggestions from the British, Indonesia adjusted its position to be accepted as a party of diplomacy and negotiation with the Dutch. First, the Republic's leader determined to pursue international recognition through diplomatic means, despite internal resistance from parts of the nationalist leadership that preferred a strategy of struggle (*perjuangan*) than diplomacy (*diplomasi*). Ensuing the violence in Surabaya, the priority for a diplomatic strategy was in part to avoid the image as a revolutionary aspirant state

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[17] For comprehensive studies of Indonesia during this period, see, Anthony J. S. Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution 1945-50*, Longman, Victoria, 1974; George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1952, especially Ch IV and V.

[18] For interesting analysis of the killing of Mallaby, see, J.G.A. Parrot, 'Who Killed Brigadier Mallaby?', *Indonesia*, No. 20, 1975, pp. 87-111.

[19] Marc Frey, 'The Indonesian Revolution and the Fall of the Dutch Empire: Actors, Factors, and Strategies,' in Marc Frey, Ronald W. Pruessen, and Tai Tan Yong (eds), *The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization*, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, London, 2003, pp. 88-89.

and thus sought to gain sympathy from the great powers.[20] Another important step in preparation for international diplomacy was the promulgation of Vice-Presidential Edict No. X on 16 October 1945, which transformed the presidential system of governance into a parliamentary system with the KNIP, which initially was set up as an advisory body functioning as a temporary parliament.[21] This edict paved the way for the appointment of Sutan Sjahrir in November to set up an administration to conduct the talks with the Netherlands. The appointment of Sjahrir was an important adjustment for the Republic to be accepted as a party in international negotiations with the Dutch. Unlike Sukarno and Hatta, who had reputations as Japanese collaborators, Sjahrir had no such taint, therefore, was acceptable to the Dutch and the Allied negotiators.[22] Not least to convince the Dutch, on 1 November 1945, Hatta issued a Political Manifesto, which assured Indonesia's commitment to project a peaceful solution and pledging to protect the Dutch interests and properties and would not affect Dutch capital or Dutch lives.[23]

Without external recognition or support, the Republic and the Dutch embarked on their negotiations from November 1945, under the mediating aegis of the British military authorities. After long negotiations, both parties agreed on the Linggajati Agreement on 15 November 1946 and signed it on 25 March 1947. In this agreement, the Republic relinquished the demand of the Republic's sovereignty over ex-Netherland Indies and accepted the Netherlands' recognition of the Republic as the de facto authority in Java, Sumatra, and Madura. The Republic also agreed to cooperate with the Dutch to form a sovereign state on a federal basis to be called the United States of Indonesia, comprising the Republic, Borneo and the Great

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[20] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Boston, Sydney, 1983, p. 7.

[21] Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1973, pp. 8–9

[22] Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1973, pp. 8–9.

[23] Mohammad Hatta, *Portrait of a Patriot: Selected Writings*, Mouton Publishers, The Hague and Paris, 1972, pp. 511-512.

East, which was established within a Netherland Indonesian Union under the Dutch monarchy before 1 January 1949.[24]

The Linggajati Agreement had become another lesson for the Republic in the practice of diplomacy: first, without any external recognition up until that time, while the armed struggle had been ruled out, they did not have much alternative to advance their cause. Furthermore, the negotiation of the Linggajati Agreement had provoked political opposition, particularly from a group of *pemuda* and alienated politicians, called 'Struggle Front' (*Persatuan Perjuangan*) led by Tan Malaka, an influential nationalist-communist leader. The Front espoused a militant strategy of *perjuangan* against the Dutch and demanded that negotiations be premised on a demand for full independence and the expulsion of all Dutch military from Indonesia. The Struggle Front could have forced Sjahrir to resign in February 1946 but failed to secure support to form an alternative coalition government. With the support of Sukarno, Sjahrir secured a renew mandate to form a government, so he could continue the negotiation process until the signing of the Linggajati Agreement. Nonetheless, after the signing of the Linggajati Agreement, due to internal pressures, Sjahrir was forced to resign, and he was replaced by Amir Sjarifudin in July 1947, a leftist politician who was more internationally acceptable due his anti-fascist reputation.

Although the Agreement led to a political crisis, internationally, the Agreement was a major success for the Republic, as the Dutch gave de facto recognition, although it did not conform to the original claims of the Republic. It was a major step towards gaining international legal standing for the Republic leaders, since hitherto they had been dismissed as no more than a Japanese-inspired revolutionary group. The Republic leaders were fully aware that any recognition of the Republic of Indonesia could be used as a steppingstone to achieve the final

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[24] For a full transcript of Linggajati Agreement see, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, Mouton & Co, The Hague, Paris, 1973, pp. 548-551.

goals of independence and sovereignty. Following the conclusion of the Agreement, the Republic received de facto recognition from several countries, such as Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Australia, Burma and India, including from the great powers such as the UK and the US.

The Netherlands objected to international recognition of the Republic, arguing that the existence of a de facto government did not correlate to sovereign status. It asserted that the Netherlands still held *de jure* sovereignty while the former colony transitioned to a federal state.[25] The Dutch also raised an objection to the Republic conducting foreign relations, which had been its practice since the initial proclamation of independence as the Republic sought to gather international support. The Dutch objections became moot however, when Sjahrir attended the ARC, a meeting of 25 representatives of Asian nations, convened by Nehru in New Delhi in March-April 1947. Representing the new Republic alongside other national representatives, Sjahrir appealed for the solidarity and unity of Asian nations and won both Indian and broader Asian support for the cause of Indonesian independence.[26]

Accusing the Republic of breaching the Agreement, the Dutch launched a full-scale military attack on Republican territory in July 1947, which became known as 'the first police action'. In a short time, the Dutch forces took control of many cities in Sumatra and Java, though they were unable to conquer the Republic's armed forces, which engaged them in guerrilla warfare. The police action by the Dutch led to a debate in the UN Security Council (UNSC) which passed a resolution on 1 August calling for a cease fire and to settle their dispute through third party mediation or by other peaceful ways. Based on the US suggestion, the UNSC did not set up a third-party mediation, but instead formed the Good Offices Committee (GOC) to facilitate the negotiation. The GOC consisted of the Belgian and Australian representatives (nominated by the Netherland and the Republic, respectively) and was headed

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[25] Marc Frey, 'The Indonesian Revolution and the Fall of the Dutch Empire: Actors, Factors, and Strategies,' p. 92.

[26] Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, pp. 23–25.

by Frank Graham from the US.

Indonesia entered into new negotiations from a weak and vulnerable position. By late August 1947, right before entering the next round of negotiations, the Dutch had already established a definitive border of their territory within the Republic of what they called the 'Van Mook line', which left the Republic jurisdiction of one third of Java Island, half of Madura Island and the Western part of Sumatra. With separated territory of the Republic Indonesia, the Dutch were able to easily exercise military operations and also create economic blockades by cutting off the source of arms, food and clothing to the Republic. The negotiations held on board the US warship Renville, resulted in the Renville Agreement, signed on 17 and 19 January 1948. The new Agreement reaffirmed the original spirit of the Linggajati Agreement that until the establishment of the United States of Indonesia, the sovereignty of the Netherlands Indies was to reside with the Netherlands. The status of the Republic (in an undefined area due to 'Van Mook line') was to be one of the constituents of the United States of Indonesia, but there will be an internationally supervised plebiscites in Java, Sumatra, and Madura to determine whether the populations wanted to be part of the Republic or wished to establish another state within the United States of Indonesia.[27] Although the Renville Agreement brought a cease fire, it confirmed a shrinking territory of the Republic. Thus, instead of being condemned, the Dutch's achievement from the military action was legalised through the Renville Agreement. The Republic, nonetheless, felt compelled to sign because of assurance from the US representative of GOC that it continued to assume its status as a de facto sovereign state over the territory of the republic of Indonesia, although its territory had substantially

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[27] For full transcript of the Renville Agreement, see, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, '22 Renville Agreement,' available at <https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-13/22-renville-agreement>, accessed 15 January 2020.

reduced.[28]

The Agreement was a serious test of the Republic's commitment to diplomacy, being the second time it had accepted a disappointing outcome under the strategy of *diplomasi*. The acceptance of the Renville Agreement provoked a political crisis that ended Amir Sjarifudin's cabinet on 23 January 1948, which was quickly succeeded by a cabinet led by Vice President Mohammad Hatta. The internal political crisis increased when Musso, one of the leaders of the aborted communist rebellion in 1926, arrived in Indonesia, after years of exile in Moscow. Musso swiftly integrated the left-wing of the Republic's political spectrum, including Amir Sjarifudin's People's Democratic Front (*Front Demokrasi Rakyat*) under the flag of Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*). Under his leadership, the party called for an alliance with the Soviet Union as a new road to gain sovereignty. As the polarisation of domestic politics could not be mitigated, it led to a communist uprising in the city of Madiun in September 1948, which was only suppressed by the end of September.

Watching closely what was happening in the Republic, the Dutch were convinced that the Republic was weakened by internal conflict, and they began to put strong political and military pressures on the Republic. The Dutch announced that a federal government would be created within weeks to prepare the establishment of a new commonwealth. For that purpose, it abolished the Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs Administration office led by lt. Governor General van Mook was to be replaced by High Representative of the Crown headed by Dr. Beel in November 1948. Indonesian considered the moves a violation to the Linggajati and Renville Agreements. Facilitated by the new US representative of the GOC, H. Merle Cochran, a meeting between the Dutch Foreign Minister Stikker and Hatta was held in Yogyakarta in October 1948. In the negotiation, the Republic made several concessions such as agreements:

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[28] George McTurnan Kahin Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, pp. 227–228; Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, p. 17; Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, p. 39

to incorporate the Republic's armed forces within a federal body; and on Dutch authority over the foreign relations during the interim period before the establishment of the United States of Indonesia; and recognition of the High Representative of the Crown, who would have 'powers for emergency cases and the right of Veto and of promulgation in certain cases to be specified later.'[29] However, the powers of High Representative of the Crown during the interim period remained disputed. Hatta, in a written letter dated 13 December 1948 to the Dutch government, stated that the Republic was prepared to recognise the power of the High Representative of the Crown but wanted a clear standard of it.[30] For the Dutch, this was interpreted as the refusal of the Republic to acknowledge the Dutch sovereignty, and it would revoke its recognition to the Republic. Meanwhile, in a cabinet meeting on 13 December 1948, the Dutch had already prepared another military action. However, the Dutch gave an ultimatum until 18 December for the Republic to clarify its position. When no reply was received for this ultimatum, the Dutch launched a military action well-known as the 'second police action' on 19 December 1948.

Directly launched in the capital of the Republic, Yogyakarta, during this second police action, the Dutch captured and detained the principal leaders of the Republic including Sukarno and Hatta, after which they announced that the government of Indonesia no longer existed. The government of Indonesia however, survived, since Hatta had given a mandate to the Minister of Finance Sjafrudin Prawiranegara, to establish a temporary government in Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra. Although the Dutch military considered the offensive as a success, it triggered international opposition. On 28 December, the UNSC released a resolution calling for a cease fire, the withdrawal of the Dutch military and the release of the Republic leaders. Opposition

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[29] Mavis Rose, *Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta*, Monograph Series, Publication no. 67, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1987, p. 153; Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, pp. 49-50.
[30] Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, p. 52

also came from India. Nehru in New Delhi on 20–23 January 1949 held a Conference on

Indonesia that recommended a firmer stand by the UNSC against the Dutch police action.[31]

Not least, the US showed its opposition. A day after the second police action, the Truman

administration cancelled the Marshall Plan aid for the Dutch colony.[32] On 28 January 1949, the

UNSC issued another resolution to install a federal government before 15 March 1949 and

urged Indonesia and the Netherlands to commence negotiations for the transfer of sovereignty

before 1 July 1950. For this purpose, The UNSC transformed the GOC into The United Nations

Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) and gave it wider authority, including the authority to make

recommendations to both parties if needed.

Under these growing international pressures, particularly from the US at this stage, the

negotiations eventually resumed and a new agreement, known as the Roem-Royen Agreement,

was signed on 7 May 1949. Both parties agreed to attend the proposed Round Table Conference

at The Hague, the Dutch agreed to restore the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to

Yogyakarta, and the Republic promised to cease waging guerrilla warfare. The UNCI

facilitated long and protracted negotiations at The Hague Round Table Conference (from 23

August-2 November) that eventually reached an agreement. The Dutch agreed to transfer its

sovereignty over the Netherlands Indies territory to the Republic of United States of Indonesia

(RUSI) no later than 30 December 1949, with the exception of Western Guinea, which was the

subject of further negotiations within a year. Both parties also agreed that the RUSI should

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[31] The conference was attended by Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. For the result of The Conference on Indonesia, New Delhi 1949, see, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945-1965,* appendices, pp. 545–547.

[32] The US's decision to temporary stop Marshall Plan aid was based on economic reasons, not because of the aid was misused for military purposes. It was considered as a symbolic act meant appeal to the discontent of American public opinion and Congress. Moreover, it was only affected the small remainder of the aid that already disbursed. See, Pierre Van Der Eng, 'Marshall Aids as a Catalyst in the Decolonization of Indonesia 1947-1949,' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1988, p. 345; Cees Wiebes & Bert Zeeman, 'United States' 'Big Stick' Diplomacy: The Netherlands between Decolonization and Alignment, 1945–1949,' *The International History Review*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1992, pp. 45–70; Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism*, *1920–1949*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2002, p. 298.

become part of Netherlands-Indonesia Union headed by the Dutch Queen.[33] In addition to the agreement, the RUSI accepted to take over a debt of 4,300 million Dutch Guilders (then equivalent to US$1,130 million), which incorporated the entire internal debt of Netherlands Indies government plus the cost of Dutch military intervention in Indonesia.[34] Despite resentment and disillusionment, particularly in the case of Western Guinea and the debt burden, the KNIP ratified the agreement, and on 27 December 1949 the transfer of sovereignty was conferred from the Netherlands to the RUSI. The RUSI did not, however, last long. Dissatisfied with the federal system, a unitarian movement broke down the Dutch-created federal structure and reinstated the unitary Republic on 17 August 1950. Shortly after gaining full sovereignty, most of the major countries presented *de jure* recognition and on 29 September 1950 Indonesia was admitted as the sixtieth member of the UN.

The experiences of diplomacy in acquiring a recognised status as a sovereign state was a clear example of Indonesia's socialisation into the institution of diplomacy. They were critical in shaping Indonesia's interpretation of diplomacy. First, it shaped the belief that diplomacy is the first and ultimate principle to settle disputes or conflicts with external parties above the use of force, although the latter is not being ruled out. Mohammad Roem, a diplomat that became one of the key players in the agreement leading to the Round Table Conference, described Indonesia's diplomacy for independence as 'a sad story in spite of its happy ending.'[35] It was sad because Indonesia had to go through experiences of long, bitter and filled with obstructions and military clashes. However, it worked progressively in part due to the skills of Indonesian leaders in advancing their cause and winning the support many other nations and international public opinion. Eventually, it had come to happy ending when finally, its sovereignty was

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[33] 'Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty over Indonesia, Signed at the Round Table Conference, The Hague, November 2, 1949,' *International Organization*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1950, pp. 176-177.
[34] Mavis Rose, *Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta*, p. 160; George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, pp. 433–442; Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, p. 24.
[35] Mohamad Roem, 'A Sad Story, In Spite of Its Happy Ending: A Review of Anak Agung's Book,' *Indonesia*, Vol. 31, 1981, pp. 163-170.

affirmed. In particular, the experience of diplomacy for independence has given Indonesia a certain feeling of confidence in their ability to stand up against more powerful countries.

Second, the experience of diplomacy for independence produced the strong spirit of nationalism and independency. As Hatta has noted, 'the history of negotiations in the past has taught us that the basic problem lies in the matter of sovereignty.'[36] Indeed, the costly and bitter experiences of diplomacy for independence strengthened accordingly to the attachment of the concept of state sovereignty. That said, maintaining its independence and sovereignty is the ultimate objective of Indonesia's diplomacy. Moreover, the strong commitment to the institution of equal sovereignty developed out of moral struggle against the institution of hierarchical sovereignty of the colonial international society that denied the rights and discriminate the idea of self-determination. This experience reaffirmed an early attachment of pre-socialisation process of negative impression and ambivalence towards European colonial international society particularly on the primary institutions of hierarchical sovereignty. This stance would inspire Indonesia in joining the movement among post-colonial states to delegitimise the practice and institution of colonialism in the international society and a deliberation to influence the structure of a genuine international society at regional level.

4.2.2. International Law and Great Power Management

In the process of acquiring recognised status as a sovereign state, Indonesia had also been socialised in the institutions of international law and great power management. The first problem for Indonesia's Declaration of Independence on 17 August 1945 was its status in international law. The Netherlands rejected the proclamation as illegal, and considered it a treacherous act by a group of unelected nationalists and dictated by an enemy occupying force

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[36] Mohammad Hatta, *Portrait of a Patriot: Selected Writings*, p. 507.

(Japan), which had already surrendered, and which in any case never had legal authority over the territory.[37] From the Indonesian perspective, however, it was the result of the abandonment of control by the Dutch colonial state and its failure to safeguard the Indonesian people against the aggression of the Japanese military. Indonesian independence was therefore claimed as the outcome of Indonesian people's efforts to wrest power from Japan, thus removing the Netherlands from the calculation.[38]

Different legal interpretations also manifested in the *de facto* recognition of the authority of the Republic in Java, Madura and Sumatra by the Dutch based on Linggajati Agreement. While the Netherlands believed the *de facto* recognition was given to the government, it did not necessarily mean that the Republic was a sovereign state, but more like a province or a state in a federation with no sovereignty. According to the Netherlands, the creation of a newly independent state would be known as the United States of Indonesia, not the Republic of Indonesia since it was only one part of it, to which the sovereignty was to be transferred from the Netherlands as parent state, at a later time. The Netherlands also believed that it still held sovereignty of the ex-Netherlands Indies prior to the transfer. The Republic on the other hand, believed that the recognition of the parent state of the Republican government also implies the recognition of the state. As the provision of Linggajati Agreement also stipulated cooperation between governments with respect to the establishment of the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands Indonesia Union, the Republic understood that although the Netherlands still possessed the supreme sovereignty over the whole of Indonesia,

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[37] H. J. van Mook, 'Indonesia and the Problem of Southeast Asia,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1949, pp. 561–575; Charles Cheney Hyde, 'The Status of the Republic of Indonesia in International Law,' *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 49, No. 7, 1949, p. 956.

[38] This position was projected in Political Manifesto promulgated by Hatta on 1 November 1945. See, Mohammad Hatta, *Portrait of a Patriot: Selected Writings*, pp. 511-512. See also, Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism*, *1920–1949*, p. 124.

such sovereignty could not encroach the independence and sovereignty of the Republic.[39]

The Indonesian question had become internationalised and led to the involvement of the great powers when the 'first police action' was brought to attention of the UNSC by Australia and India on 30 July 1947. Australia submitted a draft of the UNSC resolution, which suggested that the conflict between the Netherlands and the Republic was a breach of peace under Chapter VII, Article 39 of the UN Charter.[40] The opinion of the Dutch was to characterise the dispute as a matter for domestic affairs in its jurisdiction and it was set aside.I International status for the Republic increased considerably, when Sutan Sjahrir, representative of the Republic, was invited to the participate in the UNSC's deliberations, without voting rights.[41] As such, the conflict was assumed as an international conflict between two parties, each with international status. In the UNSC meeting, Sjahrir pleaded with the UN to arbitrate the dispute and send a supervisory commission to oversee the ceasefire as had been called by Australia. However, due to the US and other Western states' proposal, the UN only agreed to set up the GOC to facilitate the negotiations but without a formal power of arbitration.

The Republic was disillusioned with the outcome, as it hoped that the US would support the Republic's rights for self-determination against colonialism.[42] The Republic again, had to swallow another bitter pill from the result of the Renville Agreement: another domestic political crisis which forced Prime Minister Amir Sjarifudin to step down. However, before he

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[39] For the debate on legal status of Indonesia as a state following the de facto recognition, see, Ali Sastroamidjojo & Robert Delson, 'The Status of the Republic of Indonesia in International Law,' *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 49, No. 3, 1949, pp. 344–361; also, Charles Cheny Hyde, 'The Status of Republic Indonesia in International Law,' *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 49, No. 7, 1949, pp. 955-966.

[40] Article 39 of the UN Charter states, 'The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.' available at <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art39.shtml>, accessed 20 January 2020.

[41] For a good account on the involvement of Indonesian representation in the debate in the UN Security Council, see, Jennifer L. Foray, 'The Republic at the Table, with Decolonisation on the Agenda: The United Nations Security Council and the Questions of Indonesia Representation, 1946-1947,' *Itinerario*, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2021, pp. 124-151.

[42] George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,* p. 215.

left office, Sjarifudin, in January of 1947 had sent Suripno, a member of the PKI, to the Soviet Embassy in Prague to establish diplomatic relations and a mutual assistance agreement with the Soviet Union.[43] It is important to note that as early as November 1945, the Soviet Union had demanded the issue of Indonesia to be discussed in the UN. In January 1946, brought by representatives from Ukraine, Indonesia's question was discussed in the UNSC, in which Ukraine demanded the UN to investigate Indonesia's problems, and the withdrawal of foreign military to end colonial war in Indonesia. However, Ukraine's proposal was vetoed by the Western powers.[44] Hence, the Soviet Union could have become a countervailing power against the Dutch and an alternative source of international support for Indonesia's independence.

Information about the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic and the Soviet Union raised predicaments for Hatta's government, which replaced Sjarifudin. He was concerned that this information would make impressions of the West of communist expansion in the Republic. Meanwhile, the radical left wing, including Amir Sjarifudin's *Front Demokrasi Rakyat* had been consolidated into the PKI, led by Musso. Hatta faced intense pressures from the radical left of his government, which demanded the termination of negotiations with the Dutch and alignment with the Soviet Union. Refusing to comply with the demand, Hatta made a foreign policy statement before the Working Committee of the Provisional Parliament, the KNIP on 2 September 1948. In a speech entitled 'rowing between two reefs' (*mendajung antara dua karang*), Hatta stated:

> But must we the Indonesian nation, who are fighting for our independence,
> only choose between being pro-Russia or pro-America? Is there not another
> stance that we can take to achieve our aspirations? The government is of the

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[43] L.M. Efimova, 'Towards the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the USSR and the Republic of Indonesia 1947-1948,' pp. 188-191.
[44] For the meetings in the UNSC on Indonesia's question brought by the Ukraine, see <https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL4/605/14/PDF/NL460514.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed 24 January 2020.

opinion that the stance we must adopt is not to become an object in international political competition, but rather to remain a subject with the right to determine our own position, the right to pursue our own objective, namely Indonesia that is wholly independent.[45]

In this famous statement, Hatta had made clear that Indonesia is taking no sides in the rivalry between the Western and Eastern blocs. It was driven, on the one hand by domestic consideration to overcome the division among different political factions in looking for different sources of international support. Instead of taking sides between the contending superpower blocs, Hatta asserted that Indonesia should chart its own course, becoming a subject not an object in international politics, to be able to pursue its national objectives. On the other hand, there was an awareness that the ultimate goal to be a fully sovereign state would only be legitimised through international law and should be pursued in line with the norms and institutions in the existing international society, not by a revolution inspired by communism. There was also an understanding that involving itself in either side of the Cold War would plunge the Republic into a continuing conflict between political groups stirred by great power interests. Equally, there was a presentiment that the practice of colonialism in international society was still backed up by Western great powers. In this sense, Indonesia's message of taking no position between great powers was also intended to seek *quid pro quo* from the US. This was a pragmatic as much as a principled strategy, since Indonesia could not expect any more from the GOC and the UNSC, except to continue negotiations with the Netherlands.[46] This standpoint explains why Hatta and other nationalist leaders preserved the strategy of diplomacy rather than other options, despite their sense of disillusionment.

In the wake of the PKI's coup, the external circumstances changed in favour of

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[45] Mohammad Hatta, *Mendajung Antara Dua Karang* (*Rowing between Two Reefs*), Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Ministry of Public Information), Jakarta, February 1951, p. 9.
[46] George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, pp. 228–229.

Indonesia's diplomacy. The success of curbing the communist rebellion demonstrated that the Republican leaders were a real government that gained loyalty from major parts of the political leadership and armed forces, while it also clearly positioned the Republic in the non-communist bloc. On the other hand, the US also began to fear that by not granting meaningful concessions to the Republic, the communist might gain another foothold in Asia, as it saw the Chinese Communists had made substantial gains in the civil war against the Chinese Nationalists, and meanwhile in Vietnam, the French were engaged in a lengthy military conflict with the communist-led by Ho Chi Minh.[47] The US sympathy for the Republic was clearly shown in the US *aide mémoire* of 7 December 1948 that handed to the Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker. In the *aide mémoire*, the US warned the Dutch of dire consequences of the use of force to weaken the Republic, threatening to resign from the GOC and discontinue economic aid under the Marshall Plan.[48] As mentioned earlier, the Truman administration cancelled Marshall Plan aid for the Dutch colony, a day after the second police action.

The US position on the debate in the UNSC regarding the Indonesian question also changed considerably. The US sponsored a UNSC resolution on 28 December 1948 calling for a ceasefire and the release of the Republic's political leaders that had been arrested a couple of weeks earlier in mid-December. Other Western powers however, had divided views over Indonesia's question. France, Belgium and the UK were shocked with the 'second military action' by the Dutch, and the former three nations claimed that the UNSC were not competent to solve Indonesia's question, because Indonesia was not qualified as a state according to the

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[47] Gerlof D. Homan, 'The Netherlands, the United States, and Indonesia's Questions, 1948,' *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1990, p. 130; Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920–1949*, pp. 298-299.
[48] Gerlof D. Homan, 'The Netherlands, the United States, and Indonesia's Questions, 1948,' p. 133; Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920–1949*, pp. 290-293.

UN Charter.[49] The US again sponsored the UNSC resolution on 28 January 1949, as the Dutch did not comply to the previous solution. This resolution also called for further negotiations between both parties and replaced the GOC with the UNCI, which had authority to make recommendations in the negotiations.[50] The latest UN resolution set in train the resumption of negotiations that were mounted in the Round Table Conference in The Hague from 23 August-2 November that eventually led to the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the Republic of United States of Indonesia. Thus, the Indonesian question was resolved through processes of management of great power, in particular due to the changing of the US position on the Indonesian question.

The issue of the Indonesian question in the UNSC could be seen as an example of Indonesia's socialisation into the institution of international law and great power management. In terms of international law, Indonesia's efforts to gain sympathy and goodwill for independence sovereignty based on the ideal right of self-determination had to face harsh reality that the rules of the game were in favour of the colonial powers, rather than the genuine rights of Indonesian people to determine their rights. Nonetheless, Indonesia's participation in the UNSC debates had provided the Republic opportunity to defend its cause based on the references of the UN Charter on self-determination of the people. Although it was not yet a member, Indonesian leaders believed that the UNSC provided 'a semipublic and neutral setting for both parties (the Republic and the Netherland) to formalise the terms of their colonial divorce.'[51] The UNSC's involvement in the Indonesian-Netherland conflict did not immediately result in Indonesian independence, but it successfully internationalised the Indonesian question that was in favour of Indonesia's position. The early involvement in the

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[49] UN Security Council 'Security Council Resolution 64, 1948 (The Indonesian Question),' 28 December 1948, S/RES/64/1948, available at <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1193c.html>, accessed 25 January 2020.
[50] UN Security Council, 'Security Council Resolution 67, 1949 (The Indonesian Question),' 28 January 1949, S/RES/67 (1949) available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f242c.html, accessed 25 January 2020.
[51] Jennifer L. Foray, 'The Republic at the Table, with Decolonisation on the Agenda: The United Nations Security Council and the Questions of Indonesia Representation, 1946-1947,' p. 144.

UN set Indonesia's positive attitude towards international law and the UN as the embodiment of the international community. With the exception of a short period in early 1965 to September 1966 when Indonesia withdrew its membership from the UN during the Sukarno era, Indonesia put its confidence in the institution of international law and the UN process to settle its disputes such as in the case of West Irian in 1963, the case of Indonesia's claim as an archipelago through Djuanda Declaration since 1960-1982, and the settlement of the dispute over sovereignty of Sipadan-Ligitan Islands with Malaysia since 1998 to 2002.

Although in general Indonesia has a positive attitude towards the international law and the UN process, it showed a lack of trust towards the role of the great powers. The experiences of dealing with great powers during diplomacy for independence had made the Republic's leaders aware that the critical role of great powers in solving the Indonesian question, instead of being guided by the ideal of self-determination, was determined by real political interests. For example, although the Soviet Union was the first country which called the Indonesian question to be discussed in the UN, there were indications that the PKI uprising in Madiun had a direct link with international communism led by the Soviet Union. First, the uprising was endorsed by Moscow radio.[52] Second, Musso, who had just arrived from Prague with Suripno, held a mandate to help the PKI to reform its policies.[53] Similarly, the US stance on the Indonesian question from Indonesia's perspective were conspicuously driven by Cold War logic of containment of the spreading of communism rather than on a moral ground of the rights of self-determination.[54] Along with its long history of colonialism, the experiences in dealing with great powers had inculcated Indonesia's foreign policy elites a deep feeling of distrust towards great powers and a seemingly hostile external world, which induced a

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[52] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, p. 21.
[53] Harry A. Poeze, 'The Cold War in Indonesia, 1948,' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2009, pp. 497-517.
[54] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, pp. 25-26.

profound sense of vulnerability.[55]

The experiences then set the foundation of Indonesia's belief in the conduct of foreign policy pertaining overall management of its great power relations. Such an approach to managing its relations with the great powers had been laid by Hatta in his 'rowing between two reefs' speech. Hatta further elaborated the principle of Indonesia's foreign policy in his article in the *Foreign Affairs* Journal in 1953, rejecting the view that there could not be a middle position in the Cold War which does not necessarily have a neutral position. He coined it as an independent and active foreign policy. He wrote:

> Western nations tend to hold that there is no middle position for weaker countries, and they must choose between the one bloc or the other…. the policy of Republic of Indonesia is not one of neutrality, because it is not constructed in reference to belligerent states but for the purpose of strengthening and upholding peace. Indonesia plays no favourite between the two opposed blocs and follows its own path through the various international problems. It terms this policy 'independent', and further characterizes it by describing it as independent and 'active'. By active it meant the effort to work energetically for the preservation of peace, through endeavours supported if possible by the majority of the members of the United Nations.[56]

As an approach to the management of great power relations, the idea of independence was directed to maintain a sufficient space and favourable position vis-à-vis great powers and other states. It also expressed the idea of engaging great powers in various forms of cooperation from economic, politics to security and defence areas. This stance would inspire Indonesia in

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[55] Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Soeharto*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1976.
[56] Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia's Foreign Policy,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1953, p. 444.

a deliberation to promote independent position for regional states, which closely associated with the term of strategic autonomy as one of important norms in international society at regional level.

4.3. Learning about International Society After Independence (1955-1966)

Indonesia's understanding and interpretation of international society was learned from the lessons learned from its attempts to shape the norms and rules of international society. After independence, rather than one-way socialisation, Indonesia experienced two-way socialisation, as the country also absorbed lessons from its experiences affecting the development of international norms and rules. This second part of the chapter thus demonstrates how Indonesia has learnt norms and rules of international society through both its key role as the co-sponsor of the Bandung Conference 1955 and from its policy of confrontation in 1960-1966.

4.3.1. Asian-African Conference Bandung 1955

For Indonesia, the 1955 Bandung Conference was not only significant in terms of its achievements and impacts. Equally important, it also served as a learning process of normative foundations upon which relations with each other, relations between post-colonial states, the great powers and the world at large could be advanced. The Bandung Conference was the first major international event held by Indonesia that could be regarded as a high point in its foreign policy, against which all future achievements would be measured. The Conference gave birth to the Bandung Spirit, which led to solidarity and more concerted international efforts by Asian and African countries to end colonialism. The height of its success was in the drafting and adoption of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and

Peoples on 14 December 1960.[57] The achievements of the Bandung Conference also signalled the desire and confidence of Asian and African countries to play more autonomous roles in international politics especially during the Cold War, thus establishing the precedent for the emergence of the NAM in 1961. Furthermore, from the Bandung Conference, Indonesia learned, articulated and promoted the principles of rightful conduct in international relations, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, pluralism and not the least rules of procedures in the conduct of diplomacy.

The initiative to organise a conference for newly independent states in Asia and Africa was firstly proposed by Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamijoyo during the first meeting of the so-called Colombo Powers, which was attended by Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Held in Ceylon between 28 April and 2 May 1954, the main agenda of the Conference was to find solutions to the problems of decolonisation in Indochina. This meeting was initially aimed to influence the course of the Geneva Conference that took place between 26 April and 21 July 1954, which aimed to settle the Indo China conflict. In Ceylon, Ali Sastroamijoyo proposed the idea of a larger conference of independent and aspiring states in Asia and Africa to be held in Indonesia, jointly sponsored by the Colombo Powers,[58] to bring together coordinated responses to the continuing struggle against colonialism, as well as to relieve the Cold War tensions in the two continents.[59] This conference was considered indispensable.

The Bandung Conference, which was took place on 18-24 April 1955, was attended by representatives of 29 newly independent and aspiring states, and as such was the first of its

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[57] The draft is mostly based on previous resolutions of the Afro-Asia meeting in the Asian-Africa Conference in Bandung 1955 and the All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra, Ghana 1958. For details of the Afro-Asia group in the decolonisation process see, David A. Kay, 'Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations and the United Nations Political Process,' *International Organization*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1967, pp. 786–811.

[58] Cindy Ewing, 'The Colombo Powers: Crafting Diplomacy in the Third World and Launching Afro-Asia at Bandung,' *Cold War History*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2019, pp. 1-19.

[59] Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, p. 387.

kind. The Conference resulted in a Final Communique that clearly expressed the participants' position against colonialism, racism and socio-economic inequality. The most significant part of the communique was the adoption of ten principles of international relations (*Dasa Sila* Bandung).[60] Phillips succinctly explains that the significance of the Bandung Conference in relation to the post-cold war era was varied: from order challenging; order affirming; and order transforming.[61] The most powerful messages arising from the Conference that were 'order challenging' were the anti-colonialism, anti-racist hierarchy and included strong criticisms of asymmetrical politics, and the economic and security relations between Western/European states and newly independent Asian and African states. As such, the Conference was a reaction to the existing Western/European international order that underpinned by the practices of colonialism and imperialism and demanded the realisation of a society of states based on equal sovereignty.

Yet rather than initiating a separate Afro-Asian bloc to rival the UN, the Conference affirmed many of the existing key organising principles and practices of international order, in a similar spirit to the UN Charter. It was clearly stated in the first principle of the *Dasa Sila* Bandung, 'Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.' The Bandung Principles also corresponded to some of the most established doctrines found in the UN Charter. The idea of mutual respect of sovereignty and non-interference of the Bandung Principles number 2 and number 4, are found in the UN Charter article 2(4), which prohibits the use of force against the territorial sovereignty of a state and article 2(7), which prohibits interference by the UN in a matter within jurisdiction of a state. The Bandung Principle number 3 on equality of all races and nations large and small corresponds to UN charter article 2(1), which holds that all sovereign states are equal.

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[60] 'Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference,' *Interventions*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2009, pp. 94-102.
[61] Andrew Phillips, 'Beyond Bandung: the 1955 Asian-African Conference and its Legacies for International Order, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 4, 2016, pp. 329-341.

Moreover, The Conference also endorsed the nation-states, rather than other models of political organisation as the objective of political liberation of the colonised people, and thus confirmed the international order based on system of states.[62]

The Bandung Conference did not just passively endorse the existing key organising principles and practices of the international order. The Conference validated the concept of sovereignty and non-interference that was relevant to the interests of the newly and nascent nations, and promoted a broad-inclusive participation among differing political systems and ideologies. The involvement of the People's Republic of China along with other Asian and African communities accentuated an important consensus that the rule of conduct in international society should accommodate the differences in political systems and ideologies. In this regard, the Conference also contributed to the transformation of the international order by strengthening the pluralist conception of international society to better accommodate political and cultural differences among different states.[63]

Beyond its systemic significances, for Indonesia as a newly sovereign state, the Bandung Conference also served as a process of learning to navigate itself into the system of states. It was clearly stated by Sukarno in his opening speech of the Conference:

> In 1945, the first year of our national revolution, we of Indonesia were confronted with the question of what we were going to do with our independence when it was finally attained and secured […] Then we suddenly confronted with the necessity of giving content and meaning to our independence. Not material content and meaning only, but also ethical and

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[62] Joseph Hongoh, 'The Asian-African Conference (Bandung) and Pan-Africanism: The Challenge of Reconciling Continental Solidarity with National Sovereignty, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 4, 2016, pp. 374-390.

[63] Richard Davetak, Tim Dunne, & Ririn Tri Nurhayati, 'Bandung 60 Years on: Revolt and Resilience of International Society', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 4, 2016, pp. 359-373.

moral content, for independence without ethics and morality would be indeed a poor imitation of what we sought. The responsibilities and burdens, the rights and duties and privileges of independence must be seen as part of ethical and moral content of independence.[64]

Hence, for Indonesia, the Conference was also projected as an avenue for dialogue and socialisation among post-colonial countries and the establishment of a normative basis upon which relations with each other, relations between post-colonial and the great powers and the world at large could be advanced. As Ruslan Abdulgani the secretary general of the Bandung Conference stated, the purpose of the conference was to: 'determine […] the standard and procedure of present-day international relations' and to contribute to 'the formulation and establishment of certain norms for the conduct of present-day international relations and the instruments for practical application of these norms.'[65]

The Bandung Conference was not only significant in articulating a normative basis for regional and international order, but it also provided an educational platform for the nascent states in Asia and Africa to navigate their inter-regional and international relations. In this sense, for Indonesia at that time, the Bandung conference served as a 'learning by doing' event encapsulating norms and practices of international society in four important ways. First, Indonesia learned, articulated and promoted the *Dasa Sila* Bandung which epitomised a standard for regulating their relations and bringing about an 'agreement on general principle' of conduct in international affairs.[66] The most pressing questions among participants at

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[64] Sukarno's Speech at Bandung Conference, available at <https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/9/5/88d3f71c-c9f9-415a-b397-b27b8581a4f5/publishable_en.pdf>, accessed, 20 December 2019

[65] Abdulgani's statement is cited in Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, 'The Normative Relevance of the Bandung Conference for Contemporary Asian and International Order' in See Seng Tan & Amitav Acharya (eds), *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of 1955 Asian-African Conference for Internalional Order*, NUS Press, Singapore, 2008, p. 4.

[66] Amitav Acharya, 'Why There is No NATO in Asia? Normative origins of Asian Multilateralism', Paper No 05-05, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, July 2005, p. 26.

Bandung were: what was the most urgent threat to their sovereignty?; and how should sovereignty be protected and defended? The Bandung Conference agreed on the vision of sovereignty and international relations that was largely based on the idea of the 'five principles of peaceful coexistence' (*Panchsheel*) suggested by Indian Prime Minister Nehru, to protect the interests of the newly independent states in Asia and Africa in the external realm in relation to international affairs.[67] These principles are: (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) non-aggression; (3) non-interference in internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. The *Panchsheel* formed the basis of agreement between India and China in June 1954 to alleviate tensions caused by their border disputes with regard to Tibet.

The *Panchsheel* relied heavily on the importance of non-interference/non-intervention. As Acharya argues, the notions of sovereignty and non-interference/non-intervention are not only a translation of the rights of self-determination and freedom from colonialism but also requires freedom from outside interference or intervention, especially at that time when superpower rivalry had begun to intrude into Asia and Africa.[68] In particular, the participants of the Bandung Conference were apprehensive about the problem of external aggression and indirect pressures from the great powers affecting the independency of their states. Thus, sovereignty and non-interference/non-intervention were understood as two sides of the same coin. For Indonesia, the vision of sovereignty and non-interference/non-intervention affirmed and legitimated its early understanding of sovereignty that borne out from the experiences of the struggle for independence, which was marked by Dutch military aggressions.

The second important lesson learned from the Bandung Conference was the belief that

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[67] Antony Anghie, 'Bandung and the Origins of Third World Sovereignty,' in Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah (eds), *Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Past and Pending Future*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 535-551.

[68] Amitav Acharya, 'The Evolution of Norms: The Social Construction of Non-Interference in Asian Regionalism,' Paper for the *Provincializing Westphalia* Conference at Oxford University, 18-19 April 2008.

the norms and institutions of international society should accommodate diversity and pluralism in political systems, ideologies, race and religiosity. Diversity was one of the important aspects of Sukarno's opening speech at the Conference:

> Yes, there is diversity among us. Who denies it? Small and great nations are represented here with people professing almost every religion under the sun […] But what harm is in diversity, when there is unity in desire? This conference is not to oppose each other, it is a conference of brotherhood […] Rather it is a body of enlightened, tolerant opinion, which seeks to impress on the world that all men and all countries have their place under the sun – to impress on the world that it is possible to live together, meet together, speak to each other, without losing one's individual identity; and yet to contribute to the general understanding of matters of common concern, and to develop a true consciousness of the interdependence of men and nations for their well-being and survival on earth.[69]

This belief departed from the Western/European conceptions of international society, which promoted shared values and cultural commonality based on liberalism as the fundamental basis for international order. The experience of the Bandung Conference left Indonesia with 'a tendency to favour diversity and pluralism-even when they are at odds with other tenets of liberalism.'[70] It has endured to date, as Indonesia continues to promote diversity and pluralism in international and regional order-building. For example, after democratisation, Indonesia promoted the agenda of human rights and democracy without promoting liberalism

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[69] Sukarno's Speech at Bandung Conference, available at <https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/9/5/88d3f71c-c9f9-415a-b397-b27b8581a4f5/publishable_en.pdf>, accessed, 20 December 2019

[70] Andrew Phillips, 'Beyond Bandung: the 1955 Asian-African Conference and its Legacies for International Order, p. 339.

such as demonstrated in the APSC and Bali Democracy Forum.[71]

The third lesson learned from the Bandung Conference was the non-alignment principle aimed at eluding great power politics at the regional level. In debating the existence of a military alliance and collective defence pact between Asian and African states with the great powers, the Conference reached a consensus that constituted a middle way between the pro- and contra- alliance camps. The Conference agreed that involvement in military alliance or collective defence is a matter of the right of individual state, but they also agreed, as stated *Dasa Sila* Bandung Principle number 6 (a) that it should be based on 'abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.' Involvement of the contra alliance-camp along with Egypt, Burma, Ceylon and India inspired Indonesia to venture towards a non-alignment stance in the following years.[72] Again, it also confirmed and legitimated its basic principle of independence and an active foreign policy that articulated its position to remain outside the sphere of the two conflicting blocs, which later sought to be promoted in Southeast Asia regionalism

The fourth lesson from Bandung Conference for Indonesia was the idea of rules of procedure in the conduct of diplomacy. One of the key achievements of the Bandung Conference was the rule of procedure of diplomacy. As Acharya and Tan note, the Bandung Conference adopted procedures of decision-making based on non-intrusive, informal, flexibility and consensus-based diplomacy while avoiding legalistic and formal organisations. The adoption of these procedures was based on consideration that formal and legalistic

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[71] For interesting account on this theme, see, Morgan Brigg, Lee Wilson, Frans de Jalong, and Muhadi Sugiono, 'Diversity, Democratisation and Indonesian Leadership,' *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 4, 2016, pp. 407-421.

[72] Anthony Reid, 'The Bandung Conference and Southeast Asian Regionalism,' in See Seng Tan & Amitav Acharya (eds), *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order*, NUS Press, Singapore, 2008, p. 23.

procedures would constrain sovereignty of the newly independent states.[73] For Indonesia, it gave an acknowledgement of and legitimated the deep-rooted decision-making principle of *musyawarah* and *mufakat*. These consultative and consensus making procedures adopted at the Bandung Conference manifested the rise of consensus-based diplomacy among Asian states and were later adopted in ASEAN, giving rise to the so-called 'ASEAN way'.

4.3.2. Policy of Confrontation (1960-1966)

Another important source of Indonesia's 'learning by doing' socialisation of international society was its experience of foreign policy during the period of 'Guided Democracy' from 1959 to 1965 when Indonesia embarked on a policy of confrontation against 'imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism' (*Nekolim*) both in a general international stance and in its relations with neighbours.[74] It was mainly determined by Sukarno's revolutionary nationalism motivated by a combination of his self-assertion of world view, national ascendancy as an Asian-African leader, as well as a response to domestic politics pressures to keep in check two contending forces, the army and the PKI.[75] Whether the course of the policy of confrontation departed from the independent and active doctrine is a matter for debate among Indonesian scholars.[76] Some scholars characterise Sukarno's foreign policy as a violation of the principles of non-alignment that were the basis of Indonesia's foreign policy

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[73] Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, 'The Normative Relevance of the Bandung Conference for Contemporary Asian and International Order' in See Seng Tan & Amitav Acharya (eds), *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order*, pp. 10-11.

[74] *Nekolim* was an acronym in Indonesian language of *Neo-Kolonialisme-Kolonialisme-Imperialisme* (neo-colonialism, colonialism, and imperialism), firstly coined by General Ahmad Yani, that soon became part of fundamental jargon of Indonesia's foreign policy in Guided Democracy period.

[75] For example, Frederick P. Bunnell, 'Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965 President Sukarno Moves from Non-Alignment to Confrontation,' *Indonesia*, No. 2, 1966, pp. 37-36; J. D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography*, 3rd edition, Archipelago Press, Singapore, 2003, ch 14; also, Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, pp. 54-57.

[76] Rizal Sukma, 'The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1995, p. 310.

since its independence,[77] and as an example of deviation from the ideal of an independent and active foreign policy.[78] Sukma however, notes that 'Sukarno put too much emphasis on the character of anticolonialism so that the independent component became somewhat ignored' and thus 'bec[ame] too "active" at the expense of "independen[ce]".'[79] Apart from this, the policy of confrontation during Sukarno era, as Armstrong notes, is an example of 'socialisation, albeit of rather unusual kind.'[80] Although the lesson would only be taken after domestic political changes, the experience of policy of confrontation led to reorientation of Indonesia's foreign policy into a more moderate direction. However, many of the underlying spirits of confrontation, in particular the wary perceptions of the role of great powers in regional politics continue to be important values of its foreign behaviour.

The term of policy of confrontation (*konfrontasi*) was much more well-known in Indonesia's policy in opposing the establishment of Federation of Malaysia in 1963-1965. However, confrontation towards Malaysia was only a manifestation of the overall policy of confrontation, as Indonesia also confronted the Western states in general, including the UN and its subsidiaries, on the grounds of *Nekolim* domination towards new nations. [81] Two important characteristics of the policy of confrontation stand out. First, a militant foreign policy based on Sukarno's doctrine of a dialectic view of international relations that perceived a contradiction and a constant struggle between the old established order and the new emerging forces, eventually bringing the latter as the winner.[82] Second, the use of foreign policy as an instrument

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[77] Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, p. 506.

[78] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Values in Indonesian Foreign Policy: *Independence and Active Doctrine*,' in Krishnan Srinivasan, James Mayall, Sanjay Pulipaka (eds), *Values in Foreign Policy: Investigating Ideals and Interests*, Rowman & Littlefield International, London, New York, 2019, pp. 179-180.

[79] Rizal Sukma, 'The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1995, p. 310

[80] David Armstrong, *Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 173.

[81] For example, Frederick P. Bunnell, 'Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965 President Sukarno Moves from Non-Alignment to Confrontation,' pp. 45-71; Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, ch 11, 12 &16.

[82] George Modelski (ed), *New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy*, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1963, pp. ii-viii.

for revolution, and thus drew a close link between international and domestic struggle. As Subandrio, Indonesia's Foreign Minister during Guided Democracy era, stated:

> Our diplomacy has another aspect, and that is diplomacy as an instrument of revolution. Diplomacy as an instrument of involving three quarters of mankind that moves the building of a new world, based upon common justice and prosperity.[83]

The policy of confrontation had been developed in progression since 1960, as Indonesia intensified its efforts to solve the West Irian issue, and to establish the country as an Asian-African leader. Disgruntled with the failure to submit the West Irian issue for discussion in the UN General Assembly in December 1957 and the Dutch military build-up in the West Irian, Indonesia's foreign policy embarked on a new emphasis and different character. The case of West Irian was perceived as a continuation of colonialism and imperialism. Moreover, the fact that Indonesia's trade dependence on the international capitalist economy and the experiences of regional rebellion in the late 1950s that involved the US and its Asian states allies, had added the sentiment of it being threatened by neo-colonialism and imperialism.[84] In his speech on the occasion of Independence Day 1960, Sukarno stated: 'we are putting the emphasis on the struggle to liberate West Irian, because in West Irian imperialism-colonialism is lodged in our flesh and blood.'[85] Further, Sukarno introduced Indonesia's militant foreign policy against colonialism and imperialism in his speech at the UN General Assembly on 30 September 1960, entitled 'To Build the World Anew':

> Imperialism and colonialism and the continued forcible divisions of nations

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[83] Subandrio, *Indonesia on the March. Vol. II, A Collection of Addresses by Dr. Subandrio, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia,* Department of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Indonesia, Djakarta, 1963, pp. 267-268.
[84] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Indonesia's Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara and Hankamrata*', Australia-Asia Papers* No. 75, Centre for The Study of Australia Asia Relations, Griffith University, Queensland, 1996, p. 1-2.
[85] Cited in Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, p. 285.

— I stress those words — is at the root of almost all international and threatening evil in this world of ours. Until these evils of a hated past are ended, there can be no rest or peace in all this world […] Build the world anew. Build it solid and strong and sane. Build that world in which all nations exist in peace and brotherhood. Build the world fit for the dreams and the ideals of humanity. Break now with the past, for the day is at its dawning. Break with the past, so we can justify ourselves with the future.[86]

A more explicit example of Sukarno's criticism to the structure of the international system was presented in Belgrade, September 1961 at the first NAM Conference. In his speech, Sukarno interpreted the mounting tensions of international politics not as a result of ideological conflict, but resulting from conflict between new emerging forces and the old established order:

The prevailing world opinion today would have us believe that the real sources of international tensions and strife is the ideological conflict between the big powers. I think that is not true. There is a conflict which cuts deeper into the flesh of man, and that is the conflict between the new emergent forces for freedom and justice and the old forces for domination, the one pushing its head relentlessly through the crust of the earth which has given it its blood, the other striving desperately to retain all it can […] do not obsessed with the conflict of ideologies […] recognize that the conflict between the new emergent forces and the old established forces is coming more and more into prominence and this is not fortuitous […] precisely because the new emergent forces are thrusting themselves more and more persistently upon the world, while the old forces still strive to preserve the

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[86] Cited in George Modelski (ed), *New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy*, pp. 10 & 31.

old equilibrium, based upon the exploitation of nation by nation.[87]

With this speech, Sukarno sought to influence the direction of NAM from being a third force that could avoid being entangled in the Cold War and serve as a medium for moderating the international tension, into a vehicle for the struggle against anti-colonialism and imperialism. This speech was also a milestone for the gradual move from a traditional independent and active foreign policy into a confrontational foreign policy.[88] By 1963, in his annual speech commemorating Indonesia's proclamation of independence, Sukarno confirmed the division of the world between the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) and the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS). Without clear explanation, the NEFOS were interpreted as being composed of the Asian, African, Latin American and the socialist countries, as 'the peoples and movements emerging from subjugation who seek to create a new world order of social and economic justice free from the fetters of alien domination and cultural suppression.'[89] Similarly, the OLDEFOS had not been clearly defined, but in general, it pointed to the affluent-capitalist countries in North America, Western Europe and presumably Australia.[90]

At the regional level, two foreign policy issues dominated the policy of confrontation. First, the policy to re-claim West Irian which led to military clashes with the Dutch before it resolved peacefully in 1962, and secondly the confrontation against the federation of Malaysia in 1963-1966. For Sukarno and most of the Indonesian political leaders, the case of West Irian represented the perception that the Dutch still had intentions to re-colonialise Indonesia. The protracted negotiations with the Dutch since 1950 and Indonesia's failure to bring the case of West Irian to the agenda of the ninth session of the UN General Assembly in 1957, precipitated

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[87] Cited in George Modelski (ed), *New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy*, p. 35 & pp. 36-37.
[88] Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, pp. 314-315.
[89] Donald Weatherbee, *Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution*, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, New Haven, 1966, p. 2
[90] George Modelski (ed), *New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy*, p. iii.

Indonesia's use of military force using the arms purchased from the Soviet Union. Indonesia's close relations with Moscow finally persuaded Washington to intervene and brought Indonesia and the Netherlands to the conference table. The conflict was finally solved through mediation by the US, with the New York Agreement on 15 August 1962, for the return of West Irian to Indonesia in May 1963.

After the conclusion of the West Irian issue, Indonesia ventured into another episode of confrontation with Malaysia. It started with Malaya's proposal to incorporate the North Borneo states (Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei) and Singapore into the Federation of Malaysia with the support of the British. At first, Indonesia did not raise any objection to the proposal. Indonesia's opposition to the proposal came after the outbreak of rebellion led by Azahari in December 1962 that aimed at creating an independent state comprising Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei. Following Indonesia's opposition, at a meeting in Tokyo in May 1963, Sukarno and the Malaya leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman agreed on a plebiscite to be carried out before the federation would be formed. This was followed by a meeting between the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines in Manila, which resulted in the Manila Accord signed on 31 July 1963. In article 10 of the Accord, Indonesia and the Philippines stated that 'they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary General of the United Nations or his representative.' Another important point, from article 3, was that 'the three countries share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion of any form or manifestation in order to preserve their respective national identity.'[91] The Manila Accord was a success for Indonesia's diplomacy as it could recommend to the two countries, which were in alliance with Western powers and had indicated supports

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[91] 'Manila Accord between the Philippines, the Federation of Malaya and Indonesia, Signed at Manila on 31 July 1963,' available at <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20550/volume-550-i-8029-english.pdf>, accessed 20 December 2020.

to regional rebellion in Indonesia in 1950s, 'a prescription of regional order which excluded a role for outside states.'[92]

Indonesia's opposition to the Federation reawakened when Tunku Abdul Rahman signed the London Agreement on 9 July 1963, which decided that the Malaysia Federation would be formed on 31 August 1963. In an attempt to mitigate the tension, the Philippines initiated a summit between Sukarno, Tunku Abdul Rahman and President Macapagal from 30 July to 5 August. In that meeting, the leaders of the three countries affirmed the Manila Accord and agreed to cooperate in a loose regional cooperation called the Maphilindo (an abbreviation of Malaya, Philippines, Indonesia). In the event, Indonesia could ensure the spirit of the Bandung Declaration in Maphilindo, particularly as they agreed on the commitment of procedure of *musyawarah* as the basis for reconciling differences and dispute settlement among member states and that foreign military bases would not be employed to subvert member states' sovereignty.[93] Again, with the two points of the joint declaration of the summit, Indonesia had introduced its important values as prescriptions of regional order.

The compromise with Manila failed when Malaya on 29 August 1963 announced that the Federation of Malaysia would come into being on 16 September, before the result of the plebiscite was known. On 16 September, the Federation was formed, but Brunei decided not to join in it. For Indonesia, the announcement was a contravention of the Manila agreement. It led Indonesia to intensified propaganda against Malaysia through the slogan '*Ganyang* (crush) Malaysia' as well as military and economic measures intended to advance its conditions of acceptance to the Federation. Interestingly, Sukarno used the case of Malaysia to accuse the United Kingdom of engaging in neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. The Federation of

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[92] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, p. 86.
[93] Article 10 & 11 of Joint Statement by the Philippines, the Federation of Malaya and Indonesia. Signed at Manila on 5 August 1963, available at<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20550/volume-550-i-8029-english.pdf>, accessed 20 December 2020.

Malaysia, according to Sukarno was 'a manifestation of neo-colonialism' and it was considered as 'an encirclement' towards Indonesia.[94] The suspicion was deepened by the fact that the British still maintained its military bases in Malaya and Singapore as well as held economic influences over both territories. Hence, for Sukarno, the Federation of Malaysia was perfect evidence of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism, in which he presented himself as the leader of NEFOS in combating the OLDEFOS' creation of a 'puppet state' in Malaysia.

The efforts to rebuke the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia had led Indonesia to line up with the radical elements within the Afro-Asian countries, particularly China and North Korea, through the formation of Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Beijing-Pyongyang axis, by 1965. Moreover, Indonesia also shifted into confrontational postures against the representation of OLDEFOS, including the US. In his speech on 17 August 1964, entitled 'A Year of Living Dangerously', Sukarno identified his government as 'anti-America', while condemning the US aggression against North Vietnam. Furthermore, in 1964, in front of Howard P. Jones the US Ambassador in Jakarta, Sukarno said 'go to hell with your aid' (the US demanded that the condition for its aid was stopping confrontation against Malaysia).[95] The culmination of Indonesia's confrontation against the OLDEFOS came at the beginning of 1965 when Indonesia withdrew its membership from the UN as a protest of the inclusion of Malaysia as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. Sukarno regarded the UN as 'a product of Western state system.'[96]

One of the consequences of Indonesia's policy of confrontation was international isolation. Indonesia had alienated the West and international organisations such as the UN,

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[94] Sukarno's Speech at the opening of the conference of National Front Committee, Jakarta, 13 February 1963, entitled 'We are being Encircled', cited in George Modelski (ed), *New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy*, p. 74 & p. 75.

[95] 'Defiance of U.S Repeated,' *New York Times*, 4 May 1964, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/05/04/archives/defiance-of-u-s-repeated.html>, accessed 20 January 2020.

[96] David Armstrong, *Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society*, p. 172.

IMF and the World bank. Indonesia also detached itself from the more moderate countries in the NAM, due to its close relations with the communist and revolutionary countries such as China.[97] Moreover, in Southeast Asia, Indonesia was seen as an aggressive and expansionist state because of its confrontation with Malaysia.[98] The policy of confrontation also had disastrous effects on the Indonesian economy, which was already failing, and then suffered a further blow when Western countries and creditors that had previously agreed to provide finance for an economic stabilisation policy planned by First Minister Djuanda in 1963, suspended their commitment for economic assistance to Indonesia. Moreover, the policy of '*Ganyang* Malaysia' had diverted the budget away from economic development into military expenditure, which by 1965 reached almost 10 percent of Indonesia's GNP, while its foreign debt amounted to US$ 2.4 billion, and inflation reached over 600 percent.[99]

Nonetheless, the policy of confrontation constituted a 'learning by doing' for Indonesia's socialisation into international society. Through the experience of this militant foreign policy of confrontation, Indonesia's subsequent leaders learned from both the negative and positives sides of this policy of confrontation. From the negative side, the policy of confrontation exposed fundamental questions about Indonesia's foreign policy: whither Indonesia in the international society? This is particularly important since Indonesia had started its international relations with a strong anti-colonial outlook, but without radical foreign policy orientation, identifying itself as part of the NAM. The policy of confrontation had turned Indonesia's foreign policy into a more assertive tone and drawn itself into closer relations with a small group of revolutionary states, which damaged its reputation as a non-aligned state.

The lessons were clearly well-taken by the New Order regime under President Suharto,

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[97] Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, especially ch. 17.
[98] For example, Bernard K. Gordon, 'Potential for Indonesian Expansionism,' *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1963-1964, pp. 379-393.
[99] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1994, pp. 22, 27 & 37.

which replaced Sukarno after the failure of the PKI's coup against the army in September 1965. Suharto denounced the policy of confrontation as a diversion from Indonesia's economic crisis by mobilising the energy of domestic public against the *nekolim* and its neighbour and portrayed it as 'light house' or 'megalomania politics' (*politik mercusuar*).[100] After confrontation against Malaysia was officially terminated in August 1966, Indonesia under Suharto abandoned the militant and ideological-based foreign policy and transformed it into a pragmatic, moderate and low-profile role in promoting a good neighbourhood policy and regional cooperation. Instead of continuing the struggle towards the *nekolim*, Indonesia's foreign policy under Suharto sought to attract international capital and foreign assistance for the country's economic development. Moreover, Indonesia started to promote regional stability as *sine qua non* for economic development to flourish. With this pragmatic outlook and yet low-profile posture, Suharto brought Indonesia back into the NAM and became more oriented towards Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as well as developed countries to positioned itself as a prominence state in the region.

The policy of confrontation also had a positive spirit particularly in relation to Malaysia. This was seen in the opposition to the role of great powers in the regional affairs in Southeast Asia, including the caution that foreign military bases would not be employed to subvert member states' sovereignty. This was clearly insisted by Indonesia in the joint declaration between Sukarno, Tunku Abdul Rahman and President Macapagal in Manila in August 1963. Notwithstanding the changing foreign policy outlook into a pragmatic one, Indonesia's foreign policy under Suharto continued to be based on this key fundamental belief and value that had been learned from the practice of the policy of confrontation. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this positive spirit became one of the important conditions for Indonesia in the

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[100] Budiawan, 'How Do Indonesian Remember *Konfrontasi*? Indonesia-Malaysia Relations and the Popular Memory of 'Confrontation' after the Fall of Suharto,' *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2017, p. 370.

negotiations for the establishment of ASEAN in 1967.

4.4.   Summary

This chapter has forwarded a claim that Indonesia's understanding and interpretation of international society were the result of a process of 'learning by doing' socialisation. It has demonstrated how Indonesia, which had no legitimate foreign policy, nor a full understanding or the competence needed, followed the practices, rules and institutions of international society in the process of gaining independence and sovereignty. This chapter has demonstrated how Indonesia as a relatively new independent state sought to shape the rules and norms of international society in searching for a basis of peaceful coexistence and relations both among new independent states in Asia and Africa and between these new countries and more developed countries in the world, particularly with the great powers. As a result, Indonesia's understanding of international society was characterised by a mix of acceptance of the norms and institutions of European society of state and regionally derived values, from which Indonesia developed specific interpretations of institutions of international society, particularly sovereignty, non-alignment with the great powers, and diplomacy.

Regarding sovereignty, diplomacy to attain status as a sovereign state against colonialism has shaped a particular understanding of how sovereignty embodies the common understanding of the Westphalian territorial state that is associated with the strong sense of nationalism based on the rights of self-determination. Moreover, during the diplomacy process, Indonesia experienced military clashes with the Dutch, and domestic political crises, marked with rebellion, which made it insecure internally. Implicated by the Linggajati and Renville Agreements, Indonesia also had to face problems related to redrawing territorial boundaries due to the Dutch incursions. These experiences have helped the emergence of the 'unitary state

mentality' as guiding values in Indonesia's policies both at domestic and international politics.[101] The spirit of nationalism and self-determination also informed the entanglement between sovereignty and practice of non-intervention and non-interference. From 1955 Bandung Conference, Indonesia learned about the norms of non-intervention/non-interference, which required non-involvement in the formulation and conduct of each state's foreign policy by other states both within and outside the region. Thus, for Indonesia, the experiences of diplomacy for independence have helped to contribute to different meanings and the significance of the institutions of sovereignty, in which it is not only understood as a fundamental idea for inter-state relations, but also become the objective of its foreign policy.

Related to the practice of non-alignment, Indonesia's experiences in dealing with the great powers in the process of attaining sovereignty has taught the country on the potentially adverse effects of the great powers' politics in its domestic politics. The experiences of dealing with the great powers combined with the long experience of colonialism had ingrained the elites' feeling of distrust with the great powers, which produced a sense of vulnerability. Hence, Indonesia sought an independent foreign policy, meaning non-siding with either bloc in the Cold War era, which aimed to maintain a sufficient space and favourable position vis-à-vis great powers and other states. From the 1955 Bandung Conference, Indonesia had learnt to institutionalise the practice of non-alignment, together with like-minded countries in Asia and Africa to shield them against the intrusion of great powers. Not least, the policy of confrontation also taught Indonesia another important lesson: the spirit to allude the role of great power's politics in its immediate region should not result in alignment with revolutionary states. For the next stage, it would inspire Indonesia to promote the institutional practice of states in Southeast Asia to shape the norms and rules for great power behaviour in search of

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[101] Alice Ba, 'Outside-In and Inside-Out: Political Ideology, the English School and East Asia', Barry Buzan & Yongjin Zhang (eds), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 127-128.

regional order.[102]

The experience of diplomacy for independence the Bandung Conference had resulted in a mixed interpretation of the institutions of diplomacy. Indonesia follows and reproduces principles and practices of European models of diplomacy. However, learning from the Bandung Conference, the institution of diplomacy has been adapted and localised, characterised by informality, non-intrusive and stressing the virtue of self-restraint, and the decision making based on the process of *musyawarah* and *mufakat* that are seen to originate from the practice of Indonesian village democracy. The practice of non-intrusiveness and self-restraint were also informed by the principles of non-interference, as a deliberate effort to consider other countries' sensitiveness that could affected others' internal affairs.[103]

Indonesia's socialisation into international society had shaped its ideas on what was considered appropriate and legitimate conduct in the society of states that could serve as the basis of meaningful interactions and formation of political associations to achieve common interests. Indonesia's interpretation of the institutions of international society manifested Indonesia's values and preferences to the primary institutions of international society in which it wants to build and join in. Moreover, Indonesia experiences in shaping the norms and rules of international society for the post-colonial states in Asia and Africa had deep impacts for its agency in promoting localised ideas and norms such as sovereignty, non-intervention and non-interference, non-alignment, informal diplomacy marked by consultative and consensus decision making in its immediate region. Although never clearly stated in the foreign policy blueprint, the spirit to promote local ideas and norms into regional and global level

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[102] Alan Chong, 'A Society of the Weak, the Medium and the Great: Southeast Asia's Lessons in Building Soft Community among States', in Alexander Astrov (ed.), *The Great Power (mis)Management: The Russian–Georgian War and its Implications for Global Political Order*, Ashgate: Aldershot, 2011, pp. 136-137.
[103] Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, Routledge Curzon, London, 2003, p. 4; Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, 'Introduction: The Normative Relevance of the Bandung Conference for Contemporary Asian and International Order,' p. 10.
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continuously govern Indonesia's approach to international social relations. As we will see in the following chapter, Indonesia's agency in Southeast Asia regionalism, guided by its interpretations of the institutions of international society was clearly exercised by Indonesia's New Order regime in its attempt to construct an international society at regional level.

Chapter 5: The Creation of Southeast Asian Regional International Society

5.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to reappraise Indonesia's role in the creation of Southeast Asia regionalism. Through historical analysis, it investigates how Indonesia, from the beginning, has aspired to construct a regional international society, not just for rational and functional reasons, but importantly as an endeavour to shape the normative basis to transform the anarchic nature and character of international politics into a society of states at the regional level. This chapter focuses on the period between the end of the Pacific War and the mid-1970s, following the conclusion of regional rules and procedures within ASEAN, such as the 1971 ZOPFAN, the TAC, the Declaration of Bali Concord in 1976, as well as the PTA in 1977. This period was the critical moment marking the emergence of regional international society in Southeast Asia, which is indicated by the institutionalisation of shared primary institutions such as sovereignty, management of great power, diplomacy and economic development and the institutionalisation of ASEAN, a major regional secondary institution, underpinned by a collection of new regional norms, rules and practices. The period thus marked the changing of Southeast Asia from a regional space whose activities were overwhelmingly determined by outsiders, into a regional society in which the pattern of social interaction is shaped by locally constructed ideas about legitimate and appropriate behaviour.[1]

This chapter argues that Indonesian agency in early Southeast Asian regionalism was demonstrated in its shaping of both regional primary and secondary institutions. First, along

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[1] For arguments on the exogenous factors that shape the idea of Southeast Asia, see, for example, Russel H. Fifield, 'The Concept of Southeast Asia: Origin, Development and Evaluation', *South-East Asian Spectrum*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1975, pp. 42-51; Tim Huxley, 'Southeast Asia in the Study of International Relations: The Rise and Decline of a Region', *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1996, pp. 199-228.

with its learning process in international society, it participated in the emergence of the primary institutions of regional international society – matters related to the conception of rightful conduct. Moreover, this chapter puts on display Indonesia's role in institutionalising the regional primary institutions through its repeated behaviour in the discursive process over regional fundamental principles and practices. Second, informed by its interpretations of international society, it highlights how Indonesia played an important role in specifying the principles and practices of the regional primary institutions and reproducing them as norms, rules, and procedures through secondary institutions such as ASEAN, ZOPFAN, the TAC, Bali Concord and the PTA. This chapter also argues that Indonesia's role in the creation of regional international society in Southeast Asia was motivated less by material factors (serving utilitarian and domestic political functions), than by the social motives of wanting to build a system that works towards the realisation of regional states' common goals.

To substantiate the argument, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first part analyses Indonesia's role in the institutionalisation of regional primary institutions, such as sovereignty, management of great power, diplomacy and economic development. The second part explains Indonesia's role in the institutionalisation of the regional secondary institutions such as ASEAN, ZOPFAN, the TAC, Bali Concord, and the PTA as a specification and reproduction of the regional primary institutions.

5.2. Indonesia and the Emergence of Regional Primary Institutions

This section analyses Indonesia's role in the emergence of regional primary institutions: sovereignty, management of great power, diplomacy and economic development. Three of these primary institutions—sovereignty, management of great power, diplomacy—were the result of regional processes among post-colonial states between 1947-1955 in their efforts to

construct a normative basis upon which peaceful relations among the new post-colonial states and between them and the rest of the world could be advanced, but the primary institution of economic development emerged as a regional focus later, with the establishment and subsequent institutionalisation of ASEAN. Indonesia's role in the creation of Southeast Asian regional international society was not so much that of launching bold new initiatives as working persistently to produce a shared understanding of the basic principles of regional inter-state relations.

5.2.1. Sovereignty

Sovereignty is the most important of the primary institutions in Southeast Asian regional international society, being the bedrock of other institutional practices. In Southeast Asia the institution of sovereignty is understood not only in terms of the Westphalian territorial state. It is also closely associated with the principles of state self-determination, nationalism, and norms of non-intervention and non-interference: a safeguard against interference from neighbouring states as well as a shield against intrusion by outsiders, complete with an implied denial of the legitimacy of great power politics. Thus, sovereignty is practiced as both a fundamental principle as well as an objective of interstate relations in the region.

Indonesia was one of the key players in the process of developing and transmitting a regional interpretation of sovereignty shaped on discursive processes and debates among Asian and African leaders. A series of conferences, starting with the ARC in New Delhi 1947 and 1949, the Colombo Powers Conference in Ceylon in 1954, the meeting of the Colombo Powers in Bogor in December 1954, and the Bandung Conference 1955, provided discursive arenas not only for building solidarity to challenge the continuing practice of colonialism, but also in sowing the seeds of a normative foundation for regional relations for post-colonial states in Asia.

Indonesia's role began before it gained independence. Even as its anti-colonial nationalist movement was inspired by aspirations of building a sovereign state within the territorial boundaries of Netherlands Indies, Indonesia's nationalist leaders were involved in a transnational movement against colonialism that expressed solidarity with other colonised peoples. It was intimately tied to the moral discourse on the abolition of the of colonialism, and its hierarchical construction of international society.[2] The involvement of Indonesia's leaders in the short-lived LAI in 1927 was a good example of a serious attempts to build a global anti-imperialist movement. Moreover, when its right of self-determination and aspiration for equal sovereignty through the 1945 declaration of independence was denied, Indonesia became involved in the discourse of de-hierarchisation of sovereignty in international society brought together by nationalist leaders in Asia as they internationalised their respective national struggles.

Before it became a fully sovereign state, Indonesia had participated in the ARC, which was held between 23 March and 2 April 1947. It was a non-governmental meeting organised by the non-governmental Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) several months before the country was granted independence. Of the nine participating countries from Southeast Asia, only the Philippines and Thailand had already achieved full independent status. Indonesia was represented by, among others, Ali Sastroamijoyo and Agus Salim. Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir missed the opening ceremony because he was signing the Linggajati Agreement on 25 March in which Indonesia (which won de facto recognition from the Netherlands), but he arrived in time for the closing ceremony.

Although informal in nature, the ARC was the first expression of imagining a postcolonial Asia. The purpose of the Conference was to discuss common problems among

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[2] Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics*, LSE Monographs in International Studies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.

Asian countries on 'how to terminate foreign domination, direct or indirect, and to achieve freedom to direct their affairs in accordance with the will of the people [….]' [3] Hence, sovereignty was the foremost agenda of the Conference that was united by a common opposition to colonialism, while endorsing the UN principles of self-determination, sovereign equality, and racial equality. In his inaugural address, Nehru highlighted the emergence of Asia's awareness to cooperate and build a common solidarity against foreign domination. He stated:

> For too long have we of Asia have been petitioners of Western courts and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We stand on our legs and to cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with us. We do not intend to be the playthings of others. [4]

On that occasion, Indonesia's Prime Minister, Sjahrir made his first foreign policy statement on the Republic of Indonesia in front of an international audience. He emphasised the ideal of establishing independent states for Asian nations based on the spirit of humanism and justice, as he stated:

> We have cultivated that Asian sentiment with such fervor that it is now a powerful force – and a powerful force for good I believe – which wisely used should help us realize not only the vision of ONE WORLD we have been striving for, but also the dream of the oneness of mankind. I am of the opinion what has impelled the nations of Asia to struggle for independence is not

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[3] Maurice T. Price, 'Review of Asian Relations: Being Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March-April 1947,' *Social Force*, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1950, pp. 349-350.
[4] Cited in Arndt Michael, *India's Foreign Policy and Regional Multilateralism*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2013, p. 29.

only based on truth but also in keeping with dictates of humanity.[5]

At this stage, the principle of sovereignty was discussed from an inward-looking perspective, with collective support for independence movements in the region. Other issues discussed at the 1947 ARC were domestic, related to preparing for the independence of Asian countries such as race, migration and socio-cultural development. With all its limitations as a non-governmental conference, the 1947 ARC was a bazaar of ideas that would shape the discourses and debates for the subsequent conferences.

The Indonesian question was the main agenda item at the second ARC which was held in New Delhi on 20 January 1949. It was an immediate reaction to the Dutch police action in Indonesia in December 1948. Unlike the previous Conference, it was an official intergovernmental meeting hosted by Prime Minister Nehru and attended by many government representatives from Asia and Africa.[6] Focusing on Indonesia's case, this Conference called on the UN Security Council to grant colonial people sovereignty and self-determination.[7] Thus, the two ARC conferences in New Delhi offered expressions of sovereignty in terms of domestic affairs of the Asian states and were concerned primarily with de-hierarchisation of sovereignty through the rights of self-determination and racial equality for all citizen. At this point, they did not promote any distinctive regional interpretation, but rather endorsed global primary institutions of equal sovereignty and self-determination.[8]

Furthermore, Indonesia played a part in the emergence of the norm of non-intervention as a distinctive characteristic of the regional institution of sovereignty. It was first discussed at

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[5] Cited in Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, Mouton & Co, The Hague, Paris, 1973, p. 24

[6] The attendees of the Conference were Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. Representatives from China, Nepal, New Zealand, and Siam (Thailand) were participated as observers.

[7] International Organization, 'Resolution adopted by Conference on Indonesia Held in New Delhi, January 22, 1949,' *International Organization*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1949, pp. 389-391.

[8] Kilian Spandler, *Regional Organizations in International Society: ASEAN, the EU and the Politics of Normative Arguing*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland, 2019, pp. 84-85.

the Colombo powers Conference in Ceylon. From the Colombo Powers' perspective, the crisis in Indochina had been escalated after the US intensified its military engagement to support the French forces as part of the effort to stop the communist expansion. As the Colombo Powers were also concerned that the US had begun to pursue collective security arrangements with Southeast Asian states, some of the regional states reconsidered their interest in the alliance. Faced with these circumstances, the Colombo Powers, for the first time, endorsed a solution for the Indochina crisis utilising the principle of non-intervention.[9] The idea of non-intervention was a brainchild of Indian Prime Minister Nehru. He had advocated the principle of non-intervention as one of the five *Panchsheel* in the ongoing negotiations between India and China related to the border territorial dispute in Tibet. In the Joint communique of the Colombo Conference that was brought to the Geneva Conference, the Colombo Powers called for non-intervention from external powers. In a modest tone, the joint communique stated:

> The Prime Ministers felt that a solution of the problem required direct negotiation between the parties directly concerned—namely France, the three Associated States of Indo-China and the Vietminh […] The success of such direct negotiation will be greatly helped by agreement on the part of all countries concerned, particularly China, The United Kingdom, the United States, and Soviet Union, on steps necessary to prevent a recurrence or resumption of hostilities.[10]

Although the norm was derived from the global primary institution of sovereignty enshrined by the UN, the non-intervention advocated by the Colombo Powers Conference carried regionally specific interpretations. The Colombo Powers observed that the conflict in

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[9] Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2009, pp. 37-38.

[10] Full text of Joint Communique by the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, issued at Colombo 1954 can be seen in, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, pp. 571-573.

Indochina was being heightened by the involvement of major external powers, so they concluded that insulating regional affairs from great power politics was central in the quest for regional stability. At this stage, non-intervention was interpreted as an indispensable norm to protect the sovereignty of the newly independent states in Asia from external powers, and it had a strong anti-colonial and anti-hegemony nuance.[11]

Indonesia also played a role in the further interpretation of the regional understanding of sovereignty based on the non-interference principle. This principle was first articulated at the Bogor Conference in December 1954 in preparation for the detailed arrangements for the subsequent Bandung Conference. In Bogor, the Colombo Powers agreed that that the objectives of the Bandung Conference would be 'to promote goodwill and cooperation between nations of Asia and Africa, to advance their mutual as well as common interests and to establish and further friendliness and neighbourly relations.' The principle not to interfere in each other's internal affairs became one important criterion for which countries would be invited to the upcoming Conference. The Colombo Powers decided that 'acceptance of the invitation by any one country would in no way involve or even imply any change in its views of the status of any other country.' The Colombo Powers also stated that 'the principle that the form of government and the way of life of any one country should in no way be subject to interference by any other.'[12] Equally important, they determined not to invite any representatives of independence movements in countries that still under colonialisation, as such an invitation would suggest an interference in the internal affairs of other states.[13] Hence, at the Bogor Conference, another norm related to sovereignty— non-interference of each other domestic affairs— emerged as a

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[11] Antony Anghie, 'Bandung and the Origins of Third World Sovereignty,' in Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah (eds), *Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Past and Pending Future*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 535-551.

[12] For full text of Joint Communique of the Bogor Conference, December 29, 1954, see, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, pp. 574-576.

[13] Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*, p. 38.

new principle for inter-regional relations.

As the host of the Bandung Conference, Indonesia played an important part in institutionalising a regional specific interpretation of sovereignty as one of the regional primary institutions. It was in Bandung that the emerging interpretation of sovereignty was comprehensively and explicitly stated as a regional institution. Unlike the previous conferences and meetings, the concerns of the participants related to sovereignty were no longer about the rights of self-determination but on how these newly independent states could best protect their sovereignty. The debate on the issue of sovereignty was not only connected to colonialism and imperialism but also increasingly related to the issue of the Cold War and the threatened spread of communism. However, the process of arriving at the resolution was marked by heated debates as well as compromises. At this point it was India, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon, in particular, whom advocated for the non-alignment norm as further interpretation to the notion of non-intervention by outside powers. In advancing its view, India's Nehru stated:

> It is an intolerable thought to me that the great countries of Asia and Africa
> should come out of bondage into freedom only to degrade themselves or
> humiliate themselves in this way […] every pact has brought insecurity and
> not security to the countries which have entered into them.[14]

Sukarno strongly endorsed the principle of non-intervention by great powers in the affairs of post-colonial countries. Particularly, he praised the result of the Colombo Conference for endorsing the solution of the Indo-China conflict based on the non-intervention principle as a regional 'fresh approach'. In the opening address of the Bandung Conference, as he stated:

> […] They [the Colombo Powers] spoke on a subject of immediate concern

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[14] 'Jawaharlal Nehru: World Peace and Cooperation' Speech in closed session of the Asian African Conference, Bandung, 22 April 1955, p. 5 available at <https://pdcrodas.webs.ull.es/anglo/NehruWorldPeaceAndCooperation.pdf>, accessed 22 January 2020.

to Asia, and in doing so made it quite clear that the affairs of Asia are the

concern of the Asian peoples themselves. The days are now long past when

the future of Asia can be settled by other and distant peoples.[15]

On the other hand, the countries that already committed to collective defence pacts such as Central Treaty Organization (Pakistan, Turkey, Lebanon) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (Philippines Pakistan and Thailand) held that such collective defence was necessary against the threat of communism particularly from the Soviet Union, which they regarded as a form of colonialism. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali stated: 'it has no reference of China [which also attended the Asian African Conference] but only to Soviet Union imperialism that brought so many people under their iron heel.'[16] Pakistan, backed up by the Philippines, proposed another principle to defend and maintain sovereignty: the right to self-defence alone or collectively.[17] For that reason, Pakistan and the Philippines rejected the connection between the norm of sovereignty with non-alignment. They argued that joining in a collective defence pact was the right of individual states to pursue their own national interests mainly against the interference of communism. It thus invoked the norm of non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.[18] Accordingly, prohibiting one country's right to join military alliances with a western country would contravene the very idea of non-intervention itself.

The resolution of the Conference marked an important reinterpretation of sovereignty by channelling the norm of non-intervention and norm of non-interference as two sides of the same coin. These two norms were then used interchangeably as a reference not only to their

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[15]   Sukarno's   Speech   at   Bandung   Conference,   available   at <https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/9/5/88d3f71c-c9f9-415a-b397-b27b8581a4f5/publishable_en.pdf>, accessed, 20 December 2019.

[16] Cited in Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, p. 233.

[17] 'Summary of the Introductory Speeches at Bandung Conference (18-19) April 1955,' available at <https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2015/10/20/831656d3-62e4-4978-a44f-c043c8fb9011/publishable_en.pdf>, accessed 22 January 2020.

[18] Kilian Spandler, *Regional Organizations in International Society: ASEAN, the EU and the Politics of Normative Arguing*, pp. 88-89.

relations with external major powers but also intra-regional relations. At this point, sovereignty was understood not only as a fundamental principle for equal recognition of authority to a self-governing state, but also requires non-intervention and non-interference both from extra-regional global powers and one country and another within the region, and thus to protect the weaker state from the stronger state. It was thus clearly stated in 2nd of the *Dasa Sila* Bandung that there would be: 'Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;' and 4th from the same document was the idea of 'abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.'

Although the *Dasa Sila* Bandung principles on sovereignty could also be found in Article 2(1) and 2(7) of the UN Charter, the Bandung Conference helped to extend and contextualise them into the Asian-African context. As Acharya has pointed out, non-intervention and non-interference, derived at the Bandung Conference, was different to similar norms in the European system. Europe's great powers sometimes reached agreement on non-intervention towards each other and weaker allies to maintain the stability of the balance of power. That said, non-intervention in the European system was underpinned by strategic consideration. By contrast, in Asia and Africa, non-intervention/non-interference was fortified by the need to safeguard the weaker states from the stronger states, both from outside and inside the region, and thus based on moral consideration.[19]

In summary, sovereignty emerged as a distinct institutional practice as the result of long regional discursive process among Asian and African states that generated at the Bandung Conference. As a primary institution, sovereignty becomes the foundation for regional international society in Southeast Asia that helped to constitute a regional international society

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[19] Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, 'Introduction: The Normative Relevance of the Bandung Conference for Contemporary Asian and International Order,' in See Seng Tan & Amitav Acharya (eds), *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order*, NUS Press, Singapore, 2008, p. 4; Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*, p. 73.

that was differentiated from global international society as well as other regional international societies. Although Indonesia's role was not so much in advancing the idea of non-intervention and non-interference, its role as one of the proponents of the regional processes and the fact that it successfully held the Bandung Conference was significant in helping the emergence of, and institutionalisation of sovereignty as a regional primary institution.

5.2.2. Management of Great Power

Another important primary institution in Southeast Asian regional international society is management of great power. Rather paradoxically, this institution refers to the role of small Southeast Asian states in playing a larger role in shaping norms and rules for great power behaviour in searching for regional order.[20] The institutional practice of management of great power underpins the Southeast Asian states' endeavours to hold a proprietary role in managing regional order without unnecessary interference by external powers, which was expressed in the search of regional autonomy.[21] With this institution, Southeast Asia emerged as an autonomous regional society that more or less can be differentiated from surrounding regional security complexes and from the global international society.

The emergence of the regional practice of the management of great powers can be traced to the challenges that were faced by the newly independent states in Asia and Africa and related to two important developments in international politics during the Cold War. First, the escalating superpower rivalry, which was accompanied by the tendency of their competition to

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[20] Alan Chong, 'A Society of the Weak, the Medium and the Great: Southeast Asia's Lessons in Building Soft Community among States,' in Alexander Astrov (ed.), *The Great Power (mis)Management: The Russian–Georgian War and its Implications for Global Political Order*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2011, pp. 135-158; Evelyn Goh, 'East Asia as a Regional International Society: The Problem of Great Power Management,' in in Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang (eds), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 181.

[21] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 2nd edition, Routledge, London and New York, 2009, p. 62.

expand their spheres of influence. Second, the communist takeover in China in 1949, which spelled new potential danger of communist subversion to national and regime security of its Asian neighbours. Corresponding to these developments, the practice of management of great power was forged in regional discursive processes along with other norms such as non-intervention, non-interference, and non-alignment.

Indonesia played an important part in the regional discourses that led the emergence of the regional practice of management of great power. In the 1947 ARC in New Delhi, while making an appeal to Asian leaders to work for harmony, Indonesia's Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir indicated the first sign of Indonesia's non-alignment position was its effort to bridge the increasing tensions between the superpower rivalry to 'realise [...] the vision of one world.'[22] Further, in 1948, Indonesia's foreign policy was declared to be non-aligned based on its independent and active (*bebas dan aktif*) status. The rationale behind this policy was both domestic and international. Domestically, as Indonesia faced internal consolidation challenges, it sought to avoid escalation of domestic conflict, which might intensify with the presence of foreign intervention. As Hatta has explained: 'Internal consolidation is the primary task [...] A foreign policy that aligned the country with either of the Great Powers would render this internal task infinitely more difficult.'[23] Internationally, the policy was seen as an instrument for gaining sympathy from the great powers for Indonesia's struggle for independence, as well as a tool for preserving its independence and attracting resources for economic development from both sides, while preventing dominance from either. Most importantly, *bebas dan aktif* foreign policy had become an approach of Indonesia's management of great power relations, through maintaining equidistance while engaging great powers in various forms of cooperation. It reflected Indonesian leaders' aspirations to resist pressures and domination by outside

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[22] Cited in Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, p. 24
[23] Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia's Foreign Policy,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1953, p. 449.

powers, a desire that was deeply embedded in the sentiment of nationalism and anti-colonialism.

An early implementation of Indonesia's non-alignment stance immediately after it gained its sovereignty was its rejection to involve itself in a regional body of cooperation among Asian nations with strong anti-communist and pro-Western tones as proposed by President Quirino of the Philippines at the Baguio Conference held in May 1950. Indonesia also took a neutral position during the Korean War, which broke out in June 1950, while backing up India in seeking a ceasefire compromise. Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Mohammad Roem explained Indonesia's position during his visit to the US in November 1950, as he said:

> Our unwillingness to join either of the two great world blocs should not be interpreted to mean that we shall remain aloof […] we are determined to live our own lives, to grow in the direction of our own national needs and interests, as we were determined to wrest that right from our colonial rulers.[24]

In advancing its non-alignment stance, Indonesia worked together with similar minded countries, particularly India and Burma. India's Prime Minister Nehru and Burma' s leader U Nu had developed a foreign policy of neutralist, non-involvement, and non-alignment to each bloc in the Cold War. Meanwhile, mooted by Secretary of States John Foster Dulles, the US advanced a strategy to build regional collective defence pacts in Asia-Pacific. After the settlement of the US-Japan Alliance and the Australia, New Zealand, and the US Treaty (ANZUS), the US sought to establish similar pacts, in Southeast Asia and Central Asia, which led to the establishment of SEATO in September 1954 and the Central Treaty Organization in February 1955. Brought together by their non-alignment foreign policy beliefs, at the Colombo

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[24] Quoted in Justus M. van der Kroef, 'Indonesia and the West,' *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1951, p. 41.

Powers Meeting in Ceylon in April 1954, Indonesia, India, Ceylon, and Burma voiced suspicions of regional pacts for collective defence frameworks in Asia. For these countries, the defence pacts were a threat to national sovereignty as it encouraged great power intervention in the internal affairs of the newly independent states in Asia, which was reminiscent to the experience of colonialism. As mentioned, in the Colombo Conference they promoted the idea of non-intervention as closely linked to the non-alignment norm to protect the sovereignty of the newly independent states in Asia from major external powers.

Further, the Colombo Powers states, except Pakistan, refused the offer from the US to join SEATO, arguing that such a defence pact was inconsistent with their principle of non-intervention and non-alignment. It increased the risks of superpower intervention and domination, as well as being contradictory with the will of Asian nations not to be drawn into the Cold War as they desired to establish an independent voice in international relations.[25] Indonesia, in particular refused to join SEATO since it would be deleterious to its independent and active foreign policy. Indonesia's Prime Minister Ali Sastroamijoyo argued that such a collective defence arrangement in Southeast Asia 'should be avoided since it would add a new element to the causes of tension in that area that eventually could lead to war.'[26] Later in the opening address at the Bandung Conference, Sukarno framed the collective defence arrangement as a new form of colonialism of Asia-Africa by the West, as he stated:

> Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation […] We cannot indulge in power politics. Diplomacy for us is not a matter of big stick. Our statesmen, by and large, are not back up with

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[25] Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*, pp. 50-54.
[26] C.L.M. Penders (ed), *Milestones on My Journey: Memoirs of Ali Sastroamijoyo*, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1979, p. 271.

serried ranks of jet bombers. [27]

The question on management of the relations between the newly independent states and external great powers in the context of dual fears of communist subversion backed up by China and superpower rivalry, become one of contested issues at the Bandung Conference. While Indonesia, India, Burma and Egypt promoted non-alignment and non-intervention as guidelines for extra-regional relations, several states such as Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines, as they were concerned with the threat of communism had participated in a defence pact with the Western countries and even hosted foreign bases on their territories. In defending their defence arrangements with the West, these countries called for the non-interference norm, in which the formulation of foreign policy must not be subject to interference by other states both within the region and without the region. At this point, new tensions vis-à-vis the guidelines on the relations among the newly independent states and their relations with external great powers emerged between the norm of non-alignment and the norm of non-interference. [28]

It was at the Bandung Conference where a compromise between the contradictory norm of non-alignment and norm of non-interference was concluded. The compromise was formulated in the Principles number 5 and 6 of the *Dasa Sila* Bandung, which stated that the states would 'respect the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively [….]' but put a limitation to such a right by declaring 'abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers,' and 'abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.' Thus, at the heart of the principle of managing relations with external great powers was the rejection of great power domination through collective defence arrangements. Although appearing to be ambiguous, the principle

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[27] Sukarno's Speech at Bandung Conference, available at <https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/9/5/88d3f71c-c9f9-415a-b397-b27b8581a4f5/publishable_en.pdf>, accessed, 20 December 2019

[28] Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*, pp. 57-59.

above was important in laying the foundation for managing the Asian-African states' relations with the great powers. First, it helped to identify the external other that is, the great powers; and second, it served as a common approach of the Asian-African states in managing their relations with the great powers as an alternative to the global primary institutions of balance of power and great power management.[29] This principle constituted a distinct institutional practice that could not be found in the global international society and other regional international societies.

Not only did it play an important part in the regional discourses that led to the emergence of the regional practice of management of great powers, but Indonesia was also the first country that sought to channel the principle of management of great power relations as stated in Bandung Declaration, into the regional secondary institutions. It was Indonesia's insistence that this principle was accommodated in the Joint Statement of the Philippines, Federation of Malaya and Indonesia, signed on 5 August 1963. Article 10 and 11 of this Joint Statement declared:

> […] the responsibility for the preservation of the national independence of the three countries and of the peace and security in their region lies primarily in the hands of the governments and the peoples of the countries concerned [….]

> The heads of Government further agreed that foreign bases—temporary in nature—should not be allowed to be used directly or in directly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the Bandung Declaration, the three countries will

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[29] Kilian Spandler, *Regional Organizations in International Society: ASEAN, the EU and the Politics of Normative Arguing*, p. 89.

abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers. [30]

As will be further discussed in the next section, Indonesia also managed to propose the above point in the negotiations for the preamble of ASEAN's founding Bangkok Declaration of 1967.

5.2.3. Diplomacy

As a primary institution in Southeast Asia, diplomacy reproduces the principles and practices of the European model of diplomacy but is imbued with the deeply rooted culture of communication, negotiation, dialogue and dispute settlement in the region. The distinctiveness of diplomacy in Southeast Asia is characterised by informality, non-intrusive and stressing the virtue of self-restraint, and the decision making based on the process of *musyawarah* and *mufakat*.[31] This distinctiveness is strongly related with the institutional practice of sovereignty in an effort to make a collective decision that takes into account each other's interests and sensitivities and without interfering in each other internal affairs.

Indonesia played an important part in the process of the emergence of diplomacy as a primary institution. Similar to the sovereignty and management of great powers, the regional characteristics of diplomacy were forged in regional processes among the newly independent states in Asia and Africa, in which Indonesia was involved. The seeds of a regional mode of diplomacy had been planted in the 1947 ARC. In that Conference, Indian Prime Minister Nehru set up a procedure based on a 'friendly spirit' without any attempt to enforce their preference

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[30] Article 10 and 11 of Joint Statement by the Philippines, the Federation of Malaya and Indonesia. Signed at Manila on 5 August 1963, available at<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20550/volume-550-i-8029-english.pdf>, accessed 20 December 2020.

[31] Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, Routledge Curzon, London 2003, pp. 3-7; Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, pp. 79-84.

on one another and conducted in an atmosphere of 'mutual equality and respect amongst its members,' and accepted differences in mutual respect and tolerance.[32]

The procedures of the ARC had set a precedence for the following regional conferences. In the meeting of the Colombo Powers at the 1954 Bogor Conference, the details of the arrangements including the process of decision making in the upcoming Bandung Conference were thoroughly discussed. Among fundamental considerations related to the overall procedure and decision-making process for the Bandung Conference were the state sovereignty and non-interference principles. The Colombo Powers were sensitive to the conduct of the Conference, which could have constrained state sovereignty or intruded upon participant states' internal affairs. Based on those considerations, the Joint Communique of the Bogor Conference stated: 'Any view expressed at the Conference by one or more participating country would not be binding on or be regarded as accepted by any other, unless the latter so desired.'[33] To guarantee that the Bandung Conference would not interfere in the internal affairs of the participants, the Bogor Conference Joint Communique also stated that: 'The Conference will determine its own procedure and agenda[….]'[34]

As a result of the Bogor Conference, two important features of conference procedures and decision-making process for the Bandung Conference were adopted. First, based on Prime Minister Nehru's suggestion, any sensitivities to the participants countries' contentious issues would not be discussed at the Conference. Hence, the Conference selected non-intrusive issues and would only discuss broad subjects that affected the nascent countries in Asia and Africa.[35] Second, instead of following European procedures of a formal and legalistic conference mode,

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[32] Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*, p. 79.
[33] Point 9 Joint Communique of the Bogor Conference, December 29, 1954, see, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, p. 575.
[34] Point 8 Joint Communique of the Bogor Conference, December 29, 1954, see, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945–1965*, p. 575.
[35] Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*, p. 80.

the rules of procedures adopted in the Bandung Conference were informal and included mutual respect and consensus-based diplomacy. The system of decision-making based on *musyawarah* and *mufakat* was proposed by Indonesia's Prime Minister Ali Sastroamijoyo as an alternative to the decision-making based on majority vote.[36] According to Ruslan Abdulghani, the Secretary General of the Bandung Conference, *musyawarah* and *mufakat* were practices deeply rooted in not only Indonesia but also in Southeast Asia, 'to reach an acceptable consensus of opinion, and one which not only (does not hurt) the feeling or the position of (any member, but reinforces) the feeling of community.'[37] The rules of procedures at the Bandung Conference, therefore not only considered state sovereignty and non-interference principles but were also derived deeply entrenched regional practices of decision-making.

More than just simply a procedure, the informal consultation and consensus decision-making were truly effective in resolving the division of opinion among participants at the Conference due to tensions between non-alignment and non-intervention/non-interference principles. The compromise taken at the Conference, that countries have the right for either individual or collective self-defence, while cautioning on the use of regional collective defence arrangements to serve particular interests of the great powers, marked a distinctive achievement of informal, non-intrusive and decision making based on *musyawarah*. As Ruslan Abdulghani maintained, the principle of *musyawarah* and *mufakat*, 'were one of the keys to the success of the (Afro-Asian) Conference.'[38]

In sum, Indonesia played an important part through its participation in regional conferences, and through hosting the 1955 Bandung Conference helped to evolve and transmit the distinct characteristics of regional diplomacy. As a regional primary institution in Southeast

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[36] C.L.M. Penders (ed), *Milestones on My Journey: Memoirs of Ali Sastroamijoyo*, pp. 288-299.
[37] Cited in Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*, pp. 80-81.
[38] Cited in Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, 'The Normative Relevance of the Bandung Conference for Contemporary Asian and International Order,' p. 10.

Asian regional international society, diplomacy characterised by conventional modern principles of interstate relations as well as regional specific modes of socialisation and decision-making became prevalent in Southeast Asian social practices. This institution helped constitute regional international society in Southeast Asia as distinct from both the global level as well as other regional international societies. Further, Indonesia sought to channel the principle of *musyawarah* and *mufakat* as rehearsed in the Bandung Declaration into the regional secondary institutions. This principle was accommodated in the Joint Statement of the Philippines, the Federation of Malaya, and Indonesia, as signed on 5 August 1963, which stated: 'The three Heads of Government emphasized the responsibility for the preservation of the national independence of the three countries […] and that the three governments undertake to have close consultation (*mushawarah*) among themselves in this matter.'[39]

As will be further discussed in the next section, Indonesia advocated for the additional operationalisation of the primary institution of diplomacy into the secondary institution in Treaty of Amity and Cooperation concluded in Bali 1976.

5.2.4. Economic Development

In Southeast Asia, the institution of economic development is understood as an important practice not only for development *per se*, but most importantly as it reflects the widely held belief among political leaders in the region that there is a strong complementary relationship between economic growth and the promotion of regime and state security. Economic development was regarded as essential to preserve national and regional stability, while at the same time national and regional stability was deemed as a *sine qua non* for national

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[39] Article 10 of Joint Statement by the Philippines, the Federation of Malaya and Indonesia. Signed at Manila on 5 August 1963, available at<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20550/volume-550-i-8029-english.pdf>, accessed 20 December 2020.

and regional economic development. Hence, economic development is a distinguished institutional practice that is shared in Southeast Asia and the wider East Asia region but as Beeson and Breslin argue, not present at Western-global level.[40]

Unlike other regional primary institutions discussed above, the regional primary institution of economic development emerged in the period surrounding the establishment of ASEAN. One of the turning points that contributed to the emergence of regional understanding of the primary institution of economic development was the regime change in Indonesia beginning in 1966. After gaining the Order of the Eleventh of March *(Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret)* a letter of command and authorisation signed by President Sukarno, Suharto rose to the top of the power elite as he was given far-reaching powers to restore order and stability after the 1965 failed coup. By March 1967, Suharto was appointed Acting President and in March 1968, he was appointed by the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara*) as the new President of Indonesia, which marked the beginning of the New Order regime.

Under Suharto, Indonesia's outlook on both foreign and domestic policies changed drastically in several aspects; it was a pragmatic foreign policy with an anti-communist tone and commitment to domestic stability and economic development.[41] In terms of foreign policy, Suharto gave high priority to the termination of its confrontation against Malaysia and to normalise relations between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. It was followed by the official recognition of Singapore, which had been separated from Malaysia. The Suharto government also renounced Sukarno's ideological-guided foreign policy, by abandoning both the NEFOS versus OLDEFOS ideologies, and replaced these with an attempt to improve relations with

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[40] Mark Beeson and Shaun Breslin, 'Regional and Global Forces in East Asia's Engagement with International Society,' in in Barry Buzan & Yongjin Zhang (eds), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, p. 101.
[41] Rizal Sukma, 'The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1995, pp. 310-312; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1994, pp. 33-46.

Western countries, aiming squarely at economic recovery. Indonesia also re-entered the UN and restored its membership in the UN agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank in September 1966. Due to the allegations of its involvement in the failed coup of 1965, Indonesia froze its diplomatic relations with China in 1967. Indonesia's relations with the communist states also became less intense.

Domestically, the Suharto government paid serious attention to domestic political stability and economic development, as they were regarded as indivisibly intertwined. He believed that the primary problems of stability and security both for state and regime were from within the state such as internal cleavages along political, ethnic, ideological, and religious lines that shook the foundations of the state. At this point, Indonesia had experienced several secessionist and rebellion movements.[42] For that reason, Suharto sought to initiate a new basis for state and regime legitimacy through maintaining political stability and economic development. To achieve political stability and economic development as ultimate national objectives, the New Order government imposed depoliticization of both domestic and international affairs, by tightening up popular political participation that might derail Indonesia's efforts for economic development. With the military as the backbone, the New Order regime employed organicist and corporatist state ideology to organise politics along functional and consensual lines, instead of competitive politics.[43] Central to the new initiative was the doctrine of National Resilience *(Ketahanan Nasional).* The doctrine emphasises a comprehensive security approach to achieve state stability and economic development as the major instruments to those ends. Suharto defined the doctrine as:

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[42] For example, The Communist unrest in Madiun 1948, the DI/ TII (*Darul Islam/ Tentara Islam*-House of Islam/ Islamic Army of Indonesia) led by Kartosuwiryo in 1950s-1960s, the RMS (*Republik Maluku Selatan/* South Moluccas Republic) in 1950 and the PRRI/ Permesta *Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/ Perang Rakyat Semesta*; Revolutionary Government of Indonesia Republic/ Universal People's war) rebellions in 1958.

[43] David M. Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*, Routledge, London and New York, 2015, especially ch 6.

Internally: the ability to ensure the necessary social changes while keeping one's own identity, with all its vulnerability, and externally, it is the ability to face all external threats, regardless their manifestation. 'National resilience' therefore, covers the strengthening of all the component elements in the development of a nations in its entirely, thus consisting resilience in ideological, political, economic, social, cultural and military fields.[44]

As a crucial foundation of Indonesia's new basis for state and regime legitimacy based on political stability and economic development, the state became deeply involved in economic activities that promoted industrialisation and modernisation. Interestingly, the state's intervention in economic and industrial policy was not only built upon the basis economic or market consideration, but also political stability.

In parallel, the international environment offered new opportunities for the New Order leaders in their pursuit of political stability and economic development. The US anti-communist policy in Southeast Asia provided political support for anti-communist political groups and elites and helped to justify the growing strong state capacities in the process of internal securitisation against communist groups and other political rivals. Moreover, it also provided economic benefits from the US war spending and developmental effects, particularly in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and to some extent the Philippines. Economic development, then, was envisaged as an important means to tackle problems of insecurity and legitimacy of the states and regimes in the region. Thus, political and economic effects of the US anti-communist intervention in Southeast Asia contributed to lend an additional legitimacy state-based economic development and even the emergence of authoritarian regime in the region.[45]

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[44] Quoted in Heiner Hänggi, *ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept*, ISEAS, Singapore, 1991, p. 121.
[45] Richard Stubbs, 'Geopolitics and the Political Economy of Southeast Asia,' *International Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 3, 1989, pp. 517–540; Richard Stubbs, 'War and Economic Development: Export-Oriented Industrialization in

The successful economic model of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, also contributed greatly to the change of economic policy in Southeast Asian countries.[46] The three countries in North Asia had built the model of state-led economic development well-known as the 'developmental state'. In broad terms, the developmental state refers to the role of the state or government in actively intervening in economic policy and directing the course of development, rather than as left to market forces.[47] Stubbs summarises crucial features of the developmental state to include: a cohesive set of institutions, which have a relatively autonomous capacity to implement strategy for economic growth and ideational aspects of combination between nationalism, neo-mercantilism, and rapid industrialisation and economic growth.[48] In short, in this model of economic development, economic policy occupied an important place in the conceptualisation of domestic order, security, and regime legitimacy. As Ba puts it: 'The developmental state institutionalizes communitarian ideologies that privilege the state, as well as comprehensive notions of security that make economics a key foundation of regime legitimacy'.[49] Southeast Asia has seen the spread and adaptation of the developmental state model from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Southeast Asian states reproduce the strategies of the North Asian states and employ a range of industrial policy to promote development.[50] Production networks have played an important part in the industrial policy and economic development. The pattern of production networks, horizontally and vertically incorporated by multinational corporations, particularly from Japan, Korea, and

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East and Southeast Asia,' *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1999, pp. 337–355; Stephen Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrialising Countries*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1990.

[46] For example, see, Richard Stubbs, 'Reluctant Leader, Expectant Follower: Japan and Southeast Asia,' *International Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 4, 1991, pp. 649-667.

[47] For example, Mark Beeson, *Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007, p. 141.

[48] Richard Stubbs, 'Whatever Happened to East Asian Developmental State? The Unfolding Debate,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2009, pp. 5-6.

[49] Alice D. Ba, 'Outside-In and Inside-Out: Political Ideology, the English School and East Asia,' in Barry Buzan & Yongjin Zhang (eds), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, p. 135.

[50] For example, Jomo K.S, *et. al.*, *Southeast Asia's Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Policy and Economic Development in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1997.

Taiwan, have created particular comparative advantages to Southeast Asia countries.

The change of political regime in Indonesia from Sukarno to Suharto's New Order, marked a transformation not just in domestic political-economy but also set the stage for a new regional political-economy in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's politics and economic policy orientation became similar to its immediate neighbours marked by anti-communist domestic politics, prioritising domestic stability, pro-capitalist economy and leaning towards the Western countries. While this was intended to achieve full state consolidation and at the same time securing the political power of the state apparatus, inexorably it set a similar minded authoritarian style of governance in the region.[51] The new orientation in Indonesia's domestic and foreign policies produced 'a critical mass of similarly minded' states in the inter-state relations in Southeast Asia, 'about the decision to prioritize economics and economic development as a critical source of regime legitimacy.'[52] Thus, Indonesia's later turn to economic growth and industrialisation strategies helped to bring together the practice of state-led development in Southeast Asia. The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 further formalised the regional practice of state-led economic development. As an inter-regional primary institution, which also shared in a wider East Asia region, economic development is seen as vital as a source of economic growth, economic stability and economic resilience in each member state that would sustain state and regime legitimacy and security that in turn was a determinant in the overall regional stability.[53]

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[51] Richard Robison, 'Indonesia: Tensions in State and Regime' in Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison & Garry Rodan (eds), *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism*, Allen & Unwin, 1993, Sydney, pp. 41-43,

[52] Alice D. Ba, 'Out-side in and Inside-out: Political Ideology, The English School and East Asia,' p. 136.

[53] Rosemary Foot, 'Boundaries in Flux: Secondary Regional Organization as Reflection of Regional International Society', in Barry Buzan & Yongjin Zhang (eds), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, pp. 198-196; Alice D. Ba, 'Outside-In and Inside-Out: Political Ideology, the English School and East Asia,' pp. 134-136.

5.3. Indonesia and the Institutionalisation of Regional Secondary Institutions

The period between 1967 and the late 1970s was crucial for the emergence of regional international society in Southeast Asia. After the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, the five members of ASEAN agreed on further norms, rules and procedures such as the ZOPFAN, the TAC, Bali Concord, and the PTA, thus the regional secondary institutions were created by the mid-1970s. As secondary institutions, ASEAN, ZOPFAN, TAC, Bali Concord and PTA, embody, manifest and specify the regional primary institutions, and hence marked the emergence of the Southeast Asian regional international society.

This section thus discusses Indonesia's role in the institutionalisation of regional secondary institutions. It argues that the process of institutionalising the regional secondary institutions in Indonesia was informed by its interpretation of international society and guided by the regional primary institutional practices that emerged and was institutionalised at the 1955 Bandung Conference. Moreover, Indonesia sought to reproduce and specify the principles and practices of the regional primary institutions into norms, rules and procedures or the regional secondary institutions, such as ASEAN as a regional organisation and other regional regimes such as the ZOPFAN, the TAC, Bali Concord and the PTA.

5.3.1. Indonesia and the Establishment of ASEAN

The idea for the formation of a new regional organisation sprang up as another upshot of the 1966 Indonesia-Malaysia normalisation talks in Bangkok in April and May 1966. These meetings had led to the Agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia to end *Konfrontasi* in August 1966. Moreover, in these meetings, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, and Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat

Khoman, agreed to initiate closer regional cooperation to prevent the recurrence of conflict between countries in Southeast Asia region. This development brought the opportunity to establish a new regional organisation with a solid basis and with a broader membership than the earlier efforts. Before 1967, Indonesia had declined to join the regional organisations in Southeast Asia such as SEATO, citing its independent and active foreign policy and its non-alignment principles. Indonesia also refused to join Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand in forming the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in July 1961, because it feared that the proposed arrangement would become an adjunct of SEATO and an extension of Western powers' interests in the region, which might provoke China's resentment.[54] The only regional framework that Indonesia joined before 1967 was the short-lived Maphilindo, which was seen as a failure because of its inability to harmonise relations between Indonesia and Malaya.

From mid-1966 to mid-1967, Indonesia proposed the resurrection of Maphilindo and turned down the invitation to join the expanded ASA mooted by Malaysia.[55] There were both domestic and idealistic considerations in this stance. Domestically, the revival of Maphilindo was directed to generate support from Sukarno's supporters, since it was the only regional organisation to which Indonesia had been a party. On the contrary, joining the new scheme of ASA would incite domestic criticism within Indonesia because it had previously been accused by Indonesia as being an adjunct of SEATO and thus an extension of Western powers' interests in the region. Thus, for Indonesia to join ASA seemed to be in deliberate violation of its *bebas dan aktif* foreign policy.[56] Most importantly, however, Indonesia's stance was informed by the ideas of sovereignty, national self-determination, and non-intervention as the basis of regional

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[54] Michael Leifer, *Dilemmas of Statehood in Southeast Asia*, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1971, pp. 137-138; Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, London, 1982 p. 20-21.

[55] For detail the exchange of ideas between leaders in Southeast Asia regarding the new regional organisation, see, Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia*, pp. 30-38.

[56] Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia*, p. 32; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, ISEAS, Singapore, 1994, p. 50.

cooperation. Although Indonesia's foreign policy under Suharto embraced an anti-communist stance, the overtone of an anti-communist spirit among the members of ASA perturbed Indonesia as it may attract great powers intervention which could impinge on its independence, sovereignty and national self-determination. By contrast, the declaration of Maphilindo, despite its membership, was defined in relation to the Malay race and culture and therefore excluded Singapore and Thailand. It also mentioned important points related to sovereignty, national self-determination, non-intervention and regional security that should primarily remain the responsibility of the member states.[57] More than just domestic political issues, Indonesia's inclination toward Maphilindo rather than ASA, therefore, showed the continuities of its understanding on how associations between states should be based.

When the resurrection of Maphilindo was judged impossible and the prospect of ASA was still considered unbearable, Adam Malik proposed a new regional organisation that would blend the ideas of ASA and Maphilindo and yet be inclusive to all states in Southeast Asia. Indonesia thus brought forward a proposal for a new regional organisation initially known as Southeast Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC) in December 1966. It was followed by an Indonesian diplomatic tour promoting the SEAARC idea to other Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, Burma and Cambodia,[58] giving witness to the new Indonesian regime's enthusiasm for a new regional association.

The SEAARC proposal in February 1967, however, contained two controversial assertions:

> Believing that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility
> *for ensuring the stability and maintaining the security of the area* (from

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[57] For detail, see, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20550/volume-550-I-8029-English.pdf>, accessed 3 April 2020.

[58] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, p. 55

external interference) [….]

> Being in agreement that foreign bases are temporary in nature and should not
>
> be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national
>
> independence of Asian countries, and that *arrangements of collective defense*
>
> *should not be used to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers*
>
> [...] (emphasis added).[59]

Clearly the first clause was taken from the Manila Declaration (3 August 1963), while the second mirrored Article 11 of the Joint Declaration of Maphilindo (5 August 1963) and Bandung Declaration of 1955.

The proposal sparked objections and disagreements from other states in the region. Malaysia and the Philippines, which still had extensive defence ties with external powers, and regarded these sections as open criticisms of their security policies.[60] Finally, a compromise was reached by deleting the words, 'arrangements of collective defense which should not be used to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers' while the words, 'to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation' was retained, but with security declared as the responsibility of individual states rather than a shared responsibility.

Thus, on 8 August 1967 the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia signed the establishment of ASEAN. This name and its familiar acronym was, in fact, coined by Adam Malik on the eve of the Declaration, because the acronym 'SEAARC' was rejected on the basis that it sounded too much like the word 'shark'.[61] As a result of the compromise, the preamble of the Bangkok

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[59] Cited in Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia,* p. 36.
[60] Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia,* p. 37-38; Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, p. 57.
[61] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, pp. 51, 55-56.

Declaration for the establishment ASEAN stated as follows:

> **CONSIDERING** that the countries of South-East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples;
>
> **AFFIRMING** that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development (emphasis in original)[62]

This episode clearly illustrated that from the beginning Indonesia had been working to sustain normative continuity with the Bandung Declaration and Maphilindo in its vision of ASEAN, thus articulating a conception of international society in the new regional association. Indonesia explicitly connected the idea of a new regional association with the safeguarding of sovereignty, self-determination and non-intervention. Indonesia's approach in winning the trust of its neighbours and the spirit of self-restraint was pivotal in the establishment of ASEAN. It affected the standpoint of other member countries, particularly the Philippines and Malaysia, bringing them around to finally agree on the establishment of ASEAN instead of trying to revive the ASA.

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[62] For ASEAN Declaration, see < https://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967/ >, accessed 3 April 2020.

5.3.2. Indonesia and the Formation of other Secondary Institutions

After the establishment of ASEAN, Indonesia played a further important role in the formation of the association's rules, norms and procedures, mainly in the ZOPFAN, the TAC, Bali Concord, and the PTA. These norms, rules and procedures were a further translation of the regional primary institutions into regional secondary institutions. This section thus discusses Indonesia's role in the discourse of connecting and specifying the four regional primary institutions into rules and procedures in the secondary institutions.

In the period between 1968 to 1971, major developments had been occurring in the international and regional environment. First, in 1968 the British announced its withdrawal of forces from East of the Suez Canal, ending the Anglo-Malaya Defence Agreement, as well as closing the naval base in Singapore by 1971.[63] Second, in 1969 President Nixon announced the 'Guam Doctrine' that signalled the US would not in the future be committed to the conduct of regional wars in Southeast Asia and put the responsibility for regional security problems on the regional states themselves.[64] This announcement was made amidst the growing offensive of the North Vietnamese forces towards the South. Moreover, the Vietnam War further escalated to Laos and Cambodia, which raised concerns in Thailand and the Philippines of potential Vietnamese vengeance due to their role in supporting the US in the Vietnam War. Third, the change in orientation of Chinese foreign policy in 1969 marked the beginning of 'Ping-Pong diplomacy' which replaced the era of isolation and xenophobia.[65] China's new foreign policy orientation had produced a new rivalry with the Soviet Union and spread the fear of revolutionary propaganda that could encourage liberation movements in Southeast Asia. These

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[63] See for example, Chin Kin Wah, *The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security System 1957-1971*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.

[64] See, for example J. L. S. Girling, 'The Guam Doctrine,' *International Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1970, pp. 48–62.

[65] For interesting source behind the ping-pong label, see, Ruth Eckstein, 'Ping Pong Diplomacy: A View from behind the Scenes,' *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1993, pp. 327–342.

developments had become new security challenges for the weak states in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, there were also opportunities for them to shape the new pattern of relations between countries in the region and the major powers.

From the beginning, Indonesia's vision of regional organisation was one with a greater degree of regional autonomy with less of a role for external powers in regulating regional interactions and order. Although many aspects of its vision were accommodated in ASEAN, at the outset, a greater degree of autonomy was unrealistic due to the four members of the association's alliance connections with great powers. Indonesia's vision of regional autonomy was encapsulated in the concept of *Ketahanan Nasional*.[66] The concept of 'regional resilience' was then brought into the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1969 to respond to the changing geopolitical landscape in the region. On that occasion Adam Malik stressed that the pullback of great powers involvement in Southeast Asia was a chance for ASEAN countries to determine regional stability on the basis of their own political and economic strength.[67] President Suharto himself, further promoted this concept at the regional level. During an official visit to Kuala Lumpur in 1970, he explained this concept:

> I feel that the national resilience concept is the only answer to the challenges posed by a world still dominated by tension. National resilience encompasses ideological resilience based on a nation's own identity which receives the full support of the entire nation, economic resilience capable of meeting the nation's own basic needs, social resilience which ensures the feeling of solidarity and harmony among the peoples, and an appropriate military resilience to face aggression from outside. Without national resilience we

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[66] According to Dewi Fortuna Anwar, the concept *Ketahanan Nasional* was developed by the LEMHANAS (*Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional* /Institute for National Resilience) since 1968 that then adopted as state policy in 1973, see, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara and Hankamrata*, Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Griffith University, Queensland, 1996, p. 34.
[67] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, p. 176.

shall always be afraid.[68]

Malaysia, however, proposed the concept of Asia's neutralisation. Declared in various international fora in 1970, Malaysia favoured the neutralisation of Southeast Asia guaranteed by the US, Soviet Union, and China.[69] At the beginning this idea sparked disagreement, particularly from Indonesia regarding the question of the major powers' guarantee. Adam Malik expressed disapproval since the term of guarantee would easily invite external intervention during unstable regional conditions. It then practically provided the opportunity for external interference rather than containing it.[70] Clearly Indonesia was of the opinion that ASEAN's fate was in its own hands. As none of the great powers endorsed the idea of neutralisation, it then modified a draft prepared by Thailand. When the ZOPFAN was declared in Kuala Lumpur, it accommodated Indonesia's idea that ZOPFAN was a political commitment to realise the zone of neutrality rather than being a legally binding concept.[71] The declaration well-articulated Indonesia's vision on sovereign equality and non-interference both internally and externally as basic rules to organise international relations in Southeast Asia.[72]

A guideline definition of ZOPFAN was created by the Senior Official Committee in 1972. In this guideline the idea of neutralisation was narrowed into neutrality, which implied that it was just a means to achieve ZOPFAN instead of the fundamental objective. Thus,

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[68] This speech cited in Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Indonesia: Domestic Priorities Defines National Security', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed), *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influence*, Stanford University Press, California, 1998, pp. 477.

[69] Muthiah Alagappa, 'Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: Going Beyond ZOPFAN,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1991, pp. 271-272; Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, Routledge Curzon, London 2003, pp. 53-55.

[70] Kei Koga, 'Institutional Transformation of ASEAN: ZOPFAN, TAC, and the Bali Concord I 1968-1976,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 27, Issue 5, 2014 p. 11; Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, pp. 56.

[71] Kei Koga, 'Institutional Transformation of ASEAN: ZOPFAN, TAC, and the Bali Concord I 1968-1976,' p. 12; Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, p. 58.

[72] Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, p. 58.

neutrality was on par with freedom and non-interference.[73] As the emphasis of ZOPFAN had retreated from the idea of 'neutralisation' with an external guarantor into an indefinite concept of a 'zone of neutrality, it was criticised as vague and ambiguous both in its objectives and the means to achieve it.[74] Nonetheless, ASEAN countries had achieved a certain degree of compromise on the need to realise ZOPFAN, although there was still serious disagreement on how this objective would be attained.[75]

Indonesia and the other four members, all had different perceptions on the best mechanism to achieve ZOPFAN. For Indonesia, it could only be achieved through collective self-reliance instead of through major power guarantees. As ZOPFAN aimed purposefully to diminish the political and military involvement of non-regional powers, Adam Malik continued to advise that regional resilience should be applied to the regional context as a guiding principle towards regional peace and stability.[76] Finally, Indonesia's concept of regional resilience was incorporated in TAC 1976 (in Article 12). Thus, instead of pursuing military alliances with extra and non-regional great powers, ASEAN members committed to regional resilience as the ultimate ASEAN mechanism to achieve regional security and order. The TAC also explicitly allowed the accession of non-ASEAN Southeast Asian states. Indonesia's vision would embrace all Southeast Asian nations. More importantly, from the early stage, ASEAN documents have focused on the inclusion of all regional states as indicated in the formal name

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[73] Heiner Hänggi, *ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1991, pp. 22-24.

[74] Tim Huxley, 'ASEAN Security Cooperation: Past, Present and Future, in Alison Broinowski (ed), *ASEAN into the 1990s*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, London, 1990, pp. 85-86; Tim Huxley, *Insecurity in The ASEAN Region*, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London, 1993, p. 16; Alice D. Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2009, p. 76.

[75] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, pp. 178-182; Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, p. 63; Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, pp. 67-68; Alice D. Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, pp. 73-75.

[76] Kei Koga, 'Institutional Transformation of ASEAN: ZOPFAN, TAC, and the Bali Concord I 1968-1976', p. 17.

of Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Suffice it to say here that the TAC embodies the code of conduct of international relations in Southeast Asia that soon became one of the most important norms and rule of procedures that govern the international behaviour of Southeast Asian states.

The adoption of the diplomatic style based on *musyawarah* and *mufakat* in the TAC was further evidence of Indonesia's influence in the rules and procedures of ASEAN. Inherited from the diplomacy process of the Bandung Conference 1955, Indonesia continued to promote this principle in the Maphilindo scheme in 1963 and in ASEAN. Similarly, the institution of economic development was framed in nationalism in which Indonesia's idea on national resilience as a precondition of regional resilience was well articulated in the Bali Concord and the PTA. Thus, the agreements and declarations of ZOPFAN, TAC, and PTA not only marked the important point of the formation of ASEAN as a regional organisation complete with norms, rules and organisational procedures, it also symbolised the emergence of the regional secondary institution that specified, clarified and defined the important substances of the four regional primary institutions of the society of states in Southeast Asia.

5.3.2.1. Sovereignty

Arguably the most important institution in Southeast Asian regional international society is the respect of equal sovereignty. It is not peculiar to Southeast Asia, since this norm is also found in the UN Charter and other founding documents of numerous regional organisations. Sovereignty in Southeast Asia, however, was conceived based on mixed meanings of non-interference, nationalism and self-determination.[77] The meaning and practice

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[77] Alice D. Ba, 'Out-side in and Inside-out: Political Ideology, The English School and East Asia,' p. 129; Yongjin Zhang, 'Regional International Society in East Asia: A Critical Investigation,' p. 366.

of sovereignty in Southeast Asia was specified and elaborated in the three ASEAN documents.

As mentioned above, at the outset the only reference to the protection of sovereignty could be found briefly in the Bangkok Declaration, which underlined the rejection of interference both from external and internal regions in the affairs of their neighbours. It also mentioned the temporary condition of all foreign military bases. This short reference could be understood as ASEAN wanting to disguise the security considerations under economic and social cooperation. Following the changing strategic environment, sovereignty related security issues become a topic of debate during the enactment of ZOPFAN in 1971. The ZOPFAN document clarified and sharpened the concept of sovereignty by showing the conditions essential to uphold it. First, it acknowledged that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference were constituted by the norms at the global level stated in the UN Charter. Further, the declaration illuminated the concept of non-interference by putting forward non-interference from 'within' the region to add non-interference from 'outside' the region. The Declaration of ZOPFAN states that: [78]

> INSPIRED by the worthy aims and objectives of the United Nations, in particular by the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, abstention from threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal rights and self-determination and non-interference in affairs of States.

> RECOGNISING the right of every state, large or small, to lead its national existence free from outside interference in its internal affairs as this interference will adversely affect is freedom, independence and integrity

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[78] Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration, Malaysia, 27 November 1971, available at <https://www.pmo.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ZOPFAN.pdf>, accessed 3 April 2020.

(emphasis in original).

Sovereignty and non-interference were again reinstated as fundamental principles of intra-regional relations in TAC 1976. Article (2) of the TAC states: (a) Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; (b) The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; (c) Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another.

The ZOPFAN and TAC declaration clarified that the source of interference could come from both inside and outside the region. Since the substance of external interference was tacit and relatively unquestionable, these documents put a greater emphasis of the threats from within the region rather than from outside the region. Hence, these documents made clear operational obligations on its members to avoid interference in any issues which could be regarded as the domestic affairs of other members as well as subversive activities directly and indirectly against each other. Along with those, the threat and the use of force towards one another was strictly non-acceptable.

Aside from non-interference, the notion of nationalism, self-determination was also lucidly mentioned in the ZOPFAN guidelines that were agreed by the Senior Officials Committee (SOC) in 1972. According to the SOC:

> Freedom means […] the right of Zonal States to solve their domestic problems in terms of their own conditions and aspirations, to assume primary responsibility for security and stability […] on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual benefit. [79]

Freedom, hence, underlines the right of states to adopt and establish their own domestic

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[79] Quoted in Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, p. 60.

political system rather than the individual freedom associated with civil rights. This definition, therefore, was just another expression of nationalism and self-determination that guaranteed non-interference attitudes of intra and extra regional states.

While it is true that the principle of sovereignty and non-interference was affected by norms at the global level, the operational practice of these principles was understood in the particular context of Southeast Asia. Ultimately, the elucidation of sovereignty in these documents was aimed at specifying basic principles of sovereignty as the foundation of intra-regional conduct and a broader normative foundation for relations between Southeast Asian states and other states outside the region, particularly the external major powers. Above all, there was a strong message from these documents that ASEAN's member states 'share understanding that domestic issues should be managed domestically'.[80]

5.3.2.2. Great Power Management

At the outset, the issue of the role of great powers in the regional security order had become a source of tension among ASEAN members. The Declaration of Bangkok 1967 stated that foreign military bases were generally understood as temporary arrangements, and only allowed with the expressed agreement of countries involved, based on non-interference principles. While the statement reflected a settlement to give a way for the establishment of the organisation, the Declaration contained ambiguity on the existence and continuation of ASEAN members security relationships with extra regional great powers. Following the changing of the regional strategic environment where great power rivalries and bipolarity was shifting toward multipolarity with the prospect of China as emerging dominant force in the region, there was a cognizance among ASEAN states that despite their dependence on the great

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[80] Sanae Suzuki, 'Why is ASEAN not Intrusive? Non-interference Meets state Strength,' *Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2019, pp. 159.

power's security guarantee, the regional organisation may become imperilled.[81]

Against this background, the institution of great power management was further clarified and specified in the ZOPFAN and TAC documents. As regards to the issue of the declaration of ZOPFAN, this served an important purpose to reaffirm regional unity and neutrality from the influence of the great powers. Paragraph 9 of ZOPFAN states:

> […] that the countries of South East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples. [82]

The SOC document gave a clearer definition and content on ZOPFAN related to neutralisation. The SOC document also showed a swing of emphasis from being neutral from great-power influence to the deliberation of ASEAN agency in managing their own security and stability (regional order) and non-aligned political stance towards great power roles in the region. As defined by the SOC:

> A 'zone of peace, freedom and neutrality' exists where national identity, independence and integrity of the individual states within such a zone can be preserved and maintained, so that they can achieve national development and well-being and promote regional cooperation and solidarity, in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples and the purposes and

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[81] Kei Koga, 'Institutional Transformation of ASEAN: ZOPFAN, TAC, and the Bali Concord I 1968-1976,' pp. 5-7 & 12-14; Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, pp. 63-64.

[82] Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration, Malaysia, 27 November 1971, available at <https://www.pmo.gov.my/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ZOPFAN.pdf>, accessed 3 April 2020.

principles of the UN Charter, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers.[83]

Neutrality means […] that the Zonal States shall undertake to maintain their impartiality and shall refrain from involvement directly and indirectly in ideological, political, economic, armed or other forms of conflict […] shall not interfere in the domestic and regional affairs of the Zonal States.[84]

This shift of emphasis was pivotal since ASEAN leaders found a common understanding on the means to achieve the ZOPFAN objective through the ability of the regional countries to manage their own affairs and relations among themselves. As these measures would create a stable regional environment, the regional countries would have their own strength to prevent intervention from the great powers. By defining freedom and neutrality more clearly, ASEAN began to draw a distinct line between the grouping and its external environment and created a capacity for collective action towards external powers.[85] In other words, the regional countries began to deliberately rely more on their own resilience and self-determination rather than dependence on great powers' commitments and assurances.[86]

The idea of regional resilience was then solidified and further clarified in Articles 11 and 12 of the TAC declaration:[87]

(Article 11) The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to strengthen their respective national resilience in their political, economic, socio-cultural as

[83] Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, p. 60.
[84] Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, pp. 58-59
[85] Kei Koga, 'Institutional Transformation of ASEAN: ZOPFAN, TAC, and the Bali Concord I 1968-1976,' p. 4.
[86] Alice D. Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, pp. 77-78; Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, p. 63; Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, p. 68.
[87] ASEAN, *Text of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and in Southeast Asia and Related Information,* ASEAN Knowledge Kit, 2005, vailable at <http://www.navedu.navy.mi.th/stg/databasestory/data/community-asian/ASEAN%20Charter/TAC.pdf>, accessed 20 April 2020.

well as security fields in conformity with their respective ideals and aspirations [….]

(Article 12) The High Contracting Parties in their efforts to achieve regional prosperity and security, shall endeavour to cooperate in all fields for the promotion of regional resilience, based on the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, cooperation and solidarity which will constitute the foundation for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia.

As this document asserted, regional resilience would only be achieved by enhancing the national resilience of member states in various aspects of political, economic, socio-cultural, and security areas. For these weak countries, such a comprehensive approach was necessary as a mechanism to improve their bargaining power *vis-a-vis* non- and extra-regional major powers. As Acharya has noted, regionalism might not enable the ASEAN states to prevent the great powers from interfering in the affairs of the region. Nonetheless, it would keep such intervention at a minimum while at the same time trying to impose on the great powers to take consideration of the regional states' interests.[88] More importantly, the TAC was not only intended as a code of conduct for the five founders of ASEAN but the whole of Southeast Asia region as indicated in the name of the document.[89]

Thus, in the ZOPFAN and TAC documents, ASEAN made a clear position against the great powers' managerial role by bringing in the norm of regional autonomy. The notion of regional autonomy does not indicate autarchy, but reflects an endeavour by the members of ASEAN to keep the leadership of the region in the hands of regional countries, rather than

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[88] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, p. 64.

[89] The official name of the document is Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

accepting dictation from external powers, including from other Asian powers.[90] It also incorporated wishful thinking in that solid relations among member states would result in a 'regional solution for regional problems.' The documents provide an operational code of conduct for the member states to take a proprietary role in managing regional problems and regional order. At the same time, the documents also demonstrated that the regional grouping of weak states and medium powers within Southeast Asia have shaped the norms and rules for great power behaviour.[91]

5.3.2.3. Diplomacy

ASEAN has developed a distinctive institution of diplomacy. The basis of diplomacy was constituted in the UN Charter in the non-interference and non-use of force requirements, in addition to upholding the institution of sovereignty with particular concern on the moral purpose of the state in maintaining state security. The particular elements of diplomacy have been specified in the documents of the TAC. For example, in Article 2, TAC stipulates:

> In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental principles: (1) Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; (2) The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; (3) Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; (4) Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; (5) Renunciation of the threat or use of force; (6) Effective cooperation among themselves.

In a brief glance at the text above, nothing peculiar arises from these principles of

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[90] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, p. 63.
[91] Alan Chong, 'A Society of the Weak, the Medium and the Great: Southeast Asia's Lessons in Building Soft Community among States,' pp. 135-158.

diplomacy. What makes it unique, however, is how these principles have been interpreted, operationalised, and practiced in the Southeast Asian context. Undeniably, the underlying spirit of diplomacy is to manage domestic problems internally and find regional solutions to regional problems. To enable a well-functioning diplomacy, certain mechanisms must be shared from the beginning, particularly in finding peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms and decision-making processes for effective cooperation. The TAC states:

> **CONVINCED** that the settlement of differences or disputes between their countries should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative attitudes which might endanger or hinder cooperation (emphasis on original).

Two important elements of ASEAN diplomacy emanated from the above understanding.[92] The first is the preference for a more informal approach with less degree of institutionalisation. The fact that ASEAN was founded upon a declaration rather than a treaty and as an association rather than organisation were the first clues for the predilection for informal and flexible cooperation. This informality was believed to be able to accommodate diversity of opinion and interest. This principle was also considered neither intrusive nor to constrain member states sovereignty compared with a formal legalistic approach. Equally, this method promotes mutual trust and creates an atmosphere of comfort between parties. Another advantage of informality is being able to avoid sensitive issues that could breach other member states' internal affairs. Any sensitive issue could be better discussed bilaterally not multilaterally, through direct consultation and dialogue, so it would respect other members and keep the conflicting issues localised. This practice is well-known as 'quiet diplomacy'. As

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[92] This part is synthesised from Hiro Katsumata, 'Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict Adherence to the 'ASEAN Way',' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 25, No. 2003, pp. 104-121; Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order,* pp. 77-85*;* Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospect*, pp. 2-11.

Katsumata has noted, the principle of quiet diplomacy provides a 'comfort level' as an important precondition for the success of multilateral diplomacy.[93]

The tendency for informality was particularly evident in the dispute settlement area. In contrast to the Western understanding of dispute settlement and non-use of force which implies a legally binding means, ASEAN members prefer a more informal approach. Although the TAC in Article 14 and 15 makes a provision in the High Council for dispute settlement, it has never been implemented. Singapore Foreign Minister, Jayakumar in 1998, outlined the mechanism succinctly as 'stress informality, organization minimalist, inclusiveness, intensive consultations leading to consensus and peaceful resolution of disputes.'[94] The inclination to the informal approach and disclination of institutionalisation of dispute settlement was aimed at avoiding escalation of conflict and serious confrontation recognised as a potential repercussion of a legal-formal approach. Informality was believed to nurture confidence building and mutual trust that would lead to free choice and the spirit of consensus. Although the informal approach was a laborious conflict management rather than a conflict resolution, it was preferred due to the potential danger of a legal-formal dispute settlement on ASEAN spiritual values and togetherness. As there was cognizance that the sense of unity in identity and purpose did not exist yet, while relations between countries remained fragile the informal approach was meant to set a cautious and pragmatic approach that would made the regional organisation work.

The second important element of ASEAN diplomacy is the principle of decision-making through consensus. While the principle to avoid decision-making by majority vote has also been practiced by other regional organisations, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the notion of consensus in the Southeast Asian context is

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[93] Hiro Katsumata, 'Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict Adherence to the 'ASEAN Way',' p. 107.
[94] Quoted in Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, p. 78.

not with the same as other understandings elsewhere in the world.[95] As mentioned above in Southeast Asia, the process of consensus building is related to two components: *musyawarah* and *mufakat*. As Acharya has described the *musyawarah* refers to a process of consultation in the pre-negotiation stage that is based on equality, tolerance and kinship in a non-hostile environment. Differences in proposals and initiatives were discussed extensively behind closed doors, to ensure that a consensus on certain issues could be reached before it was put forward in the formal discussions and negotiations. Important practices in this process include renouncing any divulgence of the differences in public and never making other parties lose face.[96] *Mufakat*, on the other hand, refers to a pragmatic way of making consensus despite reluctance from some of the members on certain cooperation or issues. Consensus in the ASEAN context is not similar to unanimity. Consensus in ASEAN represents a commitment to finding a 'way of moving forward by establishing what seems to have broad support'.[97] As not every member would always be required to achieve consensus if it contravened their basic national interest the member would not need to participate while other members pursue cooperation. The principle of consensus in the ASEAN context thus also serves as a safeguard mechanism to protect the members' uncompromised national interests as well as a mechanism to conceal national differences that cannot be resolved at a multilateral level.

Taken together, the two elements above constitute the norm of the 'ASEAN Way' diplomacy.[98] As distinctive social practices that are embedded in a specific culture, and this norm of diplomacy is intimately related to ASEAN norms such as non-interference, non-use

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[95] In the OSCE rules of procedure, consensus 'shall be understood to mean the absence of any objection expressed by a representative and submitted by him as constituting an obstacle to the taking of the decision in question.' 'Rules and Procedures of the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe' <https://www.osce.org/mc/22775?download=true >, accessed 25 April 2020

[96] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, pp. 82-83.

[97] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, p. 84.

[98] ASEAN Way has been given label differently. Katsumata refers ASEAN way limited to diplomacy practice, Haacke refers ASEAN Way as diplomatic and security culture, while Acharya refers it as socio-cultural norms.

of force, peaceful settlement dispute, regional autonomy and regional resilience.[99] More importantly, the ASEAN Way diplomacy maintains and specifies the primary institution of diplomacy in Southeast Asia as distinctive habits and practices that are not easily incorporated within the style of diplomacy in other parts of the world.

5.3.2.4. Economic Development

Despite being mentioned as an important objective of ASEAN, the norm of economic cooperation was not clearly defined until the Declaration of Bali Concord 1976. It appeared that ASEAN members were hesitant to push untimely economic cooperation due to its potential dangers to national stability that could risk the regional association. It was because the substitutive characters of economic resources, strong nationalist economic orientation expressed in an Import Substitution Industrialisation strategy combined with domestic economic insecurities, that economic cooperation became a sensitive issue in ASEAN's early years. Following the process of normalisation of relations between a number of countries including the Indochinese states and China, ASEAN reconsidered its deficit of economic cooperation and expressed a new interest in developing a regional economic arrangement.[100]

The new commitment in economic cooperation was then demonstrated in the 1976 Bali Concord. In particular, the Concord explicitly mentioned the priority agenda of ASEAN economic cooperation such as cooperation in basic commodities (especially food and energy); industrial cooperation; cooperation in trade; a joint approach to international commodity problems and other world economic problems; and the machinery for economic cooperation.[101] The Declaration also provided the machinery of cooperation including the ASEAN Economic

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[99] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, pp. 58-85.

[100] Alice D. Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, p. 88 & 94; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, pp. 61-66.

[101] For Declaration Bali Concord I see <https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-of-asean-concord-indonesia-24-february-1976>, accessed 20 April 2020.

Minister Meeting in the decision making process as well as the agreement to establish an ASEAN Secretariat. Following the Declaration, the first economic agreement signed by ASEAN members was the Agreement on a PTA on 24 February 1977. Yet, the first priority on intra-ASEAN trade arrangements was puzzling, due to lack of complementary economic structures. With the lack of pre-conditions for trade liberalisation, it seemed that this agreement was driven to serve political-security objectives, rather than the economic itself.[102] The 1977 PTA stated:

> EMPHASIZING that preferential trading arrangements among ASEAN Member States will act as a stimulus to the strengthening of national and ASEAN economic resilience and the development of the national economics of the Member States by expanding investment and production opportunities, trade and foreign exchange earnings (emphasis in original)[103]

This agreement reflected a compromise between states who favoured free trade and those who defended protectionist policies.[104] There was also an awareness that ASEAN external economic cooperation was more important than intra-ASEAN cooperation, particularly in the trade area owing to the similarity of economic resources and comparative advantages, which practically put each other as competitors. In this regard, the logic of economic cooperation in ASEAN was basically driven by the logic of regional resilience. As Ba has noted, the Bali Concord and the agreement on PTA was not only aimed at promoting economic cooperation, but more importantly to strengthen the national economy of member

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[102] Alice D. Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, p. 93.
[103] Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trade Agreements, available at <http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140119163517.pdf>, accessed 20 April 2020
[104] Singapore and the Philippines favoured for ASEAN free trade area through cutting the tariff, while Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand preferred a gradualist approach to protect their market and industries. See, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, pp. 69-70.

states that would uphold ASEAN regional economic resilience.[105] The documents also showed a strong indication that the forms and the processes of ASEAN economic cooperation were framed by economic nationalism as a precondition for regional resilience. Other indications could be observed from the institutional body of economic decision making in ASEAN. The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting continued to be the final decision maker for ASEAN activities and policies, while the ASEAN Economic Minister Meeting is only a semi-independent decision-making organ, under the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. This institutional architecture suggested that economic cooperation served a greater political purpose.[106] While the benefit of economic cooperation offered by the intra-ASEAN economic cooperation was not promising due to a strong spirit of nationalism, the ASEAN economic cooperation served as a bargaining tool for the member states towards external partners to attract funding and investment as well as trade in raw commodities.[107] Finally, these documents maintained and specified the primary institution of economic development in Southeast Asia. The normative message was clear, that economic development is spirited by nationalism, and that nationalism is vital not only for the sake of economic development *per se*, but is imperative to uphold each member's national economic resilience as an important component of overall regional resilience.

5.4. Summary

This chapter examines Indonesia's role in the creation of Southeast Asian regionalism. It argues that its role went beyond simply bringing together the states in the region into a

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[105] Alice D. Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, pp. 92-93.

[106] Alice D. Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, p. 95.

[107] For example, in negotiating preferential treatment for raw-material trade with the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1970s, ASEAN acted as a group. ASEAN also acted as a group in the case of synthetic rubber with Japan and civil aviation policy with Australia. See, Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia,* pp. 145-148; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, pp. 107-112.

utilitarian-functional cooperation to achieve their national interests. Rather, Indonesia's agency in the creation of the Southeast Asian society of states has been characterised by its introduction of elements of society by shaping practices, habits and the normative basis of regional international relations. It also played an important part in reproducing and translating the regional normative basis into a regional organisation complete with regional norms, rules and procedures.

This chapter has demonstrated how Indonesian leaders, far from being leaders of a fully formed sovereign state, had constructed a distinctly regional process among post-colonial states. Their efforts were to construct a normative basis for the promotion of peaceful relations among the new post-colonial states and between them and the rest of the world. During that process Indonesia was taking part in promoting a regional understanding of sovereignty, self-determination, nationalism, diplomacy and the role of great power management. Regime change in Indonesia also paved the way for the consensus in economic development as a regional primary institution. So too, Indonesia played an important part in the creation of regional secondary institutions. The primary vehicle, or secondary institutions, through which this vision was given life was ASEAN, which was formally created in 1967 but which had very little presence or institutional presence until 1976, the year of the First ASEAN Summit in Bali. With the signing of the TAC at this summit, the regional society had spelled out the basic rules of conduct for regional international relations. The signing of the Bali Concord by heads of government at the Summit also affirmed a commitment to political cooperation, which had been conspicuously absent in the Bangkok Declaration. It laid down the framework for regional economic cooperation, provided for a centralised ASEAN structure through the creation of the ASEAN secretariat and established machinery to carry out regional cooperation by institutionalising the involvement of ASEAN economic ministers in the decision-making process.

Although one may cast doubt whether Indonesia's behaviour was purposeful in creating regional international society, in fact, there has been continuity in the formulation and in the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy to certain principal ideas and values, despite being interpreted and applied variably during different periods.[108] In the case of the creation of Southeast Asia regionalism, there was continuity of ideas and values that were promoted by Indonesia during the Sukarno and Suharto eras. Indonesia, during the Suharto era, could establish an alliance and seek support from great powers if it wanted to, due to its authoritarian domestic rule. However, despite the Suharto government leaning toward the West, it strived to guarantee to its regional counterparts that Indonesia would continue to uphold an independent and active foreign policy and ignore alliances to the Western powers. Moreover, Indonesia's need for state security and regime legitimacy was shared by the ASEAN members as part of 'the game in town' instead of solely as Indonesia's unilateral zero-sum interests. Also worth noting is that despite being the largest country in the region, Indonesia shunned dominance in the organisation. In crediting the role of Suharto in bringing ASEAN together, Mahbubani and Sng note:

> Indonesia is by far the largest and most powerful member state of ASEAN. Unlike the US and India, Indonesia showed extraordinary wisdom in not trying to dominate ASEAN. Instead, Suharto allowed the 'smaller member states—Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore—to exercise leadership within ASEAN. […] This helped ASEAN to develop a real and organic sense of community.[109]

Despite the different styles demonstrated by the Sukarno and Suharto regimes, ideas

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[108] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Values in Indonesian Foreign Policy: Independent and Active Doctrine', in Krishnan Srinivasan, James Mayall & Sanjay Pulipaka (eds), *Values in Foreign Policy: Investigating Ideal and Interests*, Rowman & Littlefield International, London, New York, 2019, p. 175.

[109] Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffrey Sng, *The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace*, Ridge Book, Singapore, 2017, pp. 150-151.

such as preserving sovereignty through the spirit of self-determination and nationalism, non-interference, non-alignment continue. Similarly, the inclination towards informal processes based on consultation and consensus also continue, as seen by the ongoing use of the Declaration of Maphilindo as a point of reference in Indonesia's involvement in the new regional association. For Indonesia, it constituted the foundations for a meaningful and legitimate interaction between states in the region. It suffices to say here that Indonesia's role in the early creation of regional international society in Southeast Asia, rather than being motivated by material factors, it was motivated by the articulation of ideas and values regarding appropriate regional conduct based on its own understanding of international society. Indonesia's prime motivation for the early processes of regionalism in Southeast Asia were thus social rather than material. They for wanted to build a system that worked towards the realisation of the regional states' common goals.

Chapter 6: Vietnam's Invasion of Kampuchea

6.1.   Introduction

Having appraised Indonesia's role in the creation of Southeast Asian regional international society, this chapter turns to the examination of Indonesia's role in the period between 1978-1991, which has been identified by many analysts as the period of consolidation of Southeast Asia regionalism.[1] In this period, Southeast Asia's regional international society faced external challenges that tested the commitment of the member states to forging a common approach to the regional primary institutions. The most notable of these challenges was the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea in 1978.[2] This challenge impinged upon three of the primary institutions — sovereignty and non-interference, management of great power and diplomacy — all were central to the health of international society in Southeast Asia, but which member states took starkly contrasting approaches to tackle them. Despite many points of difference between member states, ASEAN's active contributions to the settlement of the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict had given impetus for a final peace resolution in Paris in 1991. By 1991 ASEAN could be said to have successfully survived this challenge and emerged the stronger for it.

On the issue of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, ASEAN's official position, orchestrated by Thailand and Singapore, sought an internationalist-confrontational approach to put pressure on Vietnam and Heng Samrin's regime in the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) by mobilising external resources particularly from non-

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[1] For example, Amitav Acharya, *The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2013, especially Chapter 6; Yukawa Taku, 'Transformation of ASEAN's Image in the 1980s: The Cambodian Conflict and Economic Development of ASEAN Members Countries,' *Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2011, pp. 240-267.

[2] The name 'Kampuchea' is generally used in this chapter, since it was the generic name of the country until the name changed back to Cambodia in 1989.

communist major powers. ASEAN's response to the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea in 1978 was in contradiction to its response to Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in December 1975. ASEAN collectively supported Indonesia in resisting the UN-backed international coalition that deplored Indonesia for violating international norms of sovereignty and self-determination for the people of East Timor.[3] One of the important reasons was that other ASEAN members did not want to interfere in Indonesia's domestic affairs. They also saw the case of Indonesia's invasion in East Timor, which was not a sovereign state, as a crucial move for Indonesia to prevent the territory falling to the communist camp under the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (*Frente Revolucionara do Timor Leste Independente* [FRETILIN]), making it a vital component for achieving Indonesia's security.[4] In short, Indonesia's invasion of East Timor did not create a dilemma for the regional society.

By contrast, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea posed serious security threats to Thailand as one of the frontline states, as Vietnamese troops were also involved in small cross-border operations in Thailand. Moreover, on the Kampuchean conflict, the external great powers were deeply involved supporting the parties of the conflict, with Vietnam supported by the Soviet Union, while the ousted Khmer Rouge group, which was toppled by the Vietnamese was being supported by China. Thailand also developed an informal alliance with China and the US to contain the Vietnamese and Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. Hence, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea was regarded as a problematic issue that threatened the regional society, potentially violating ASEAN's norms of sovereignty and regional autonomy as well as challenging the unity of ASEAN in building a

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[3] Singapore, which initially abstain in the UN General Assembly voting on East Timor issues in 1975, voted in support of Indonesia in the similar voting in 1976, in part of showing ASEAN solidarity. See, Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership*, Times Academic Press, Singapore, 1996, pp. 56-57.

[4] Laura Southgate, *ASEAN Resistance to Sovereignty Violation: Interest Balancing and the Role of the Vanguard State*, Bristol University Press, Bristol, 2019, Ch. 2.

common response.[5]

Indonesia's approach towards the challenge of Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea was noticeably different from those of other member states. Indonesia, although officially went along with ASEAN's position, was in favour of a more regionalist-accommodative approach towards Vietnam. As Indonesia was also under international pressures on the East Timor issue, it was keen to restrict the influence of great powers and external parties in the management of order in the region and regarded this as the key to managing the conflict. When ASEAN's international-confrontation approach resulted in a diplomatic impasse, Indonesia took the opportunity to moot the idea of informal initiatives aimed at making progress towards resolution of the conflict. It successfully proposed the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs) and Informal Meetings on Cambodia (IMCs), which paved the way for the Paris Peace Accord in 1991 that finally ended the twelve years conflict in Indochina.

In the case of Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, Indonesia's agency in the regional international society of Southeast Asia was demonstrated by its ability to deal with resistance from other ASEAN members, while continuing to promote its ideas to find a solution of the conflict based on its interpretation of regional norms and practices. Indonesia also recognised and accommodated the interests of its counterparts and at the same time persuaded them to find the regional solutions to the conflict, which pave the way to the consolidation of the regional international society in Southeast Asia.

By examining Indonesia's roles in this problematic and divisive challenge, this chapter thus argues that Indonesia's behaviour in relation to Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, whether or not it was the driver of the eventual peace settlement or even if it was somewhat

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[5] Alice D. Ba, *(Re) Negotiation East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism and The Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 2009, p. 86; Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 2nd edition, Routledge, London & New York, 2009, p. 116; Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, Routledge Curzon, London, 2003, p. 82

ambivalent, its motive was nonetheless driven by a vision of a regional international society that rested on a well-considered, though not inflexible approach to each of the three pillars of regional international society: sovereignty, management of great power, and diplomacy. Domestic political-security factors were never ignored, but they were not the primary drivers in foreign policy. Furthermore, it demonstrates a willingness on the part of Indonesia – and on the part of other members of ASEAN – to avoid intra-ASEAN confrontations that risked the cohesiveness of the nascent regional international society.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part analyses ASEAN's response to Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, and the challenges this posed to Southeast Asian regional international society. The second part examines Indonesia's response to the invasion, while the third part offers a reappraisal of Indonesia's role and its contribution to the process of consolidation of Southeast Asian regional international society

6.2.   ASEAN's Response

The December 1978 invasion and subsequent ten-year occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnam posed the most serious challenges to the existence of a Southeast Asian regional international society since its establishment. Not only did Vietnam's invasion result in a security threat to ASEAN member states, particularly Thailand, differences among ASEAN members on how to deal with the issue also gave rise to intramural challenges that forged a common approach in line with its regional primary institutions, which in turn tested the intra-ASEAN relations. This section will show that ASEAN's response — which was to pursue a confrontational strategy against Vietnam — had induced normative tensions as well as disunity in the association. The strategy led the following: it involved ASEAN in the internal affairs of Kampuchea; it entangled ASEAN in the great-power intrigues of the region; and resulted in

ASEAN turning its back on the pathways of non-confrontational and informal processes of diplomacy, which went against the regional institutions of sovereignty and non-interference, management of great power and non-confrontational diplomacy. The result was a prolonged stalemate in diplomacy arena up until the late of 1980s.

6.2.1. Challenges

On Christmas day of 1978, Vietnam invaded the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) which was at the time controlled by the Khmer Rouge, led by the infamous Pol Pot. By deploying 150,000 to 220,000 troops Vietnam acted to support the National Salvation Front for the National Liberation, a dissident wing of the Khmer Rouge led by Heng Samrin.[6] After forcing Pol Pot out on the 8th January 1979, Vietnam installed a new regime led by Heng Samrin and established the PRK, which marked the beginning of Vietnam's ten-year occupation of Kampuchea.

There are several reasons why Vietnam invaded Kampuchea. First, it was triggered by the Khmer Rouge's atrocities towards Vietnamese settlers in Kampuchea and the Khmer Rouge's military and territorial intrusion into Vietnam, which killed thousands of civilian Vietnamese.[7] The Khmer Rouge justified its military and territorial encroachment to reclaim the territory in the southwestern border of Vietnam, which it considered a territorial part of Kampuchea. The second reason related to Vietnam's sense of strategic vulnerability. Ever since the Khmer Rouge seized power in Kampuchea in April 1975, tensions grew between Vietnam and the anti-Vietnam and pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge had long been

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[6] William S. Turley and Jeffrey Race, 'The Third Indochina War,' *Foreign Policy*, No. 38, 1980, p. 92; John Funston, 'The Third Indochina War and Southeast Asia,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 1, No, 3, 1980, p. 268.

[7] Zachary Abuza, 'The Khmer Rouge and the Crisis of Vietnamese Settlers in Cambodia,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1995, pp. 433-435.

suspicious of Vietnam's leadership ambitions in Indochina, especially after Vietnam secured a 25-Year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Laos in 1977. The Khmer Rouge sought to prevent Vietnam's efforts to exercise its influence in Kampuchea by declaring a termination of diplomatic relations with Vietnam in December 1977. At the same time, aggravated by the Sino-Soviet tension, China increased its support for the Khmer Rouge after Vietnam joined the Moscow-led economic cooperation of Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in August and November 1978 respectively.[8] Thus for Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge regime of the DK, supported by China, posed a serious threat for its security and induced a perception of being encircled by both its neighbouring countries.

As Vietnam and Kampuchea were not ASEAN members at the time, the invasion, subsequent Kampuchean crisis and the quest for political settlement were outside ASEAN's framework. Nonetheless, these became serious and urgent issues for ASEAN for several reasons.

First, ASEAN had aspirations to be able to socialise the Indochinese countries into a Southeast Asian regional society and entice them into ASEAN membership.[9] Even if Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea did not want to become ASEAN members, the association had hoped the three countries would accept ASEAN's norms and vision of regional order. As a part of the response to the rise of communism in Indochina in 1975, collectively ASEAN had managed to protect its fundamental normative structures by devising a rule of conduct, in part to mediate

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[8] Laura Southgate, 'ASEAN and the Dynamics of Resistance to Sovereignty Violation: The Case of Third Indochina War (1979-1991),' *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2015, p. 207 & 210.

[9] This hope was clearly expressed in ASEAN joint statement in February 1973, in the aftermath of Paris Agreement on 27 January 1973 that ended the Vietnam War. See, **'**Joint Press Statement The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting To Assess The Agreement On Ending The War And Restoring Peace In Vietnam And To Consider Its Implications For Southeast Asia Kuala Lumpur, 15 February 1973**'**, <https://asean.org/?static_post=joint-press-statement-the-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting-to-assess-the-agreement-on-ending-the-war-and-restoring-peace-in-vietnam-and-to-consider-its-implications-for-southeast-asia-kuala-lumpur-15-f>, accessed 10 August 2020.

and accommodate their relations with the Indochina states. ASEAN members had signed two pivotal documents at the Bali Summit back in February 1976: the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the TAC. In the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, ASEAN member states agreed that strengthening national and regional resilience was imperative in dealing with the potential threats of communist Indochina. Concurrently, the TAC was an expression of a modus vivendi upon which it was hoped that the relations between non-communist and communist states in the region could be accommodated and mediated, eventually providing Indochinese states an opportunity for accession to membership. Although at the outset Vietnam and Laos criticised ASEAN as 'a front for Western imperialism' and thus showed no interest in joining ASEAN, by the late 1970s Vietnam's attitude towards ASEAN had changed.[10] Vietnam launched a peace offensive diplomacy towards ASEAN states, which started with the visit of Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh to ASEAN member states (except Singapore) between 20 December 1977-12 January 1978. Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien then followed up with visits to ASEAN states' capitals in July 1978, which then culminated in Premier Pham Van Dong's visitations to all capitals of the ASEAN states in September-October 1978. In his visitations, Pham Van Dong assured ASEAN states that Vietnam's acknowledgement of ASEAN as regional organisation meant that it would not interfere in the domestic affairs of any states in the region.[11] Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, a few months after this peace offensive diplomacy thus shattered ASEAN's hopes to establish a partnership with the Indochinese countries.

Second, Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea aimed at overthrowing the Pol Pot regime

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[10] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, p. 99.

[11] K.K. Nair, 'ASEAN-Indochina Relations since 1975: The Politics of Accommodation,' *Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence,* No. 30, 1984, pp. 101-103; Donald E. Weatherbee, 'The Diplomacy of Stalemate,' in Donald E Weatherbee (ed), *Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis*, Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1985, pp. 9-10; Carlyle A. Thayer, 'ASEAN and Indochina: The Dialogue,' in Alison Broinowski (ed), *ASEAN into the 1990s*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, London, 1990, pp. 145-146.

and install a new political regime was a serious violation to the norm of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-interference. Since its establishment ASEAN had promoted these principles as the foundation for interstate relations in the Southeast Asia region. In the 1976 TAC, ASEAN provided a more detailed code of conduct based on these principles that not only directed its members but also persuaded all countries in the region to follow the practices as an important basis for regional order. ASEAN saw Vietnam's action as a grave set back to uphold these principles in Southeast Asia and as endangering its conception of regional order.

Third, ASEAN saw that Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea would overturn its own hopes for a reduced role for the great powers in Southeast Asian affairs. From ASEAN's perspective, Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea was not only a homegrown conflict but was also influenced by Sino-Vietnam, Sino-Soviet and US-Soviet rivalries. On the one hand, the Soviet Union backed Vietnam through a military alliance based on the 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which allowed it to acquire a strategic foothold in the region by building military facilities in Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. On the other hand, China strongly opposed the invasion by launching a punitive attack between February-March 1979, while it also provided support to the Khmer Rouge as its remaining forces waged guerrilla war against the Vietnamese occupation. The Soviet Union and China were also in competition to fill the power vacuum in Southeast Asia following the retreat of the US from Vietnam. Meanwhile the US had expanded its military presence and increased military arms sales to ASEAN countries. The US also supported China's position against Vietnam to contain Soviet influences in Southeast Asia, although it distanced itself from the Khmer Rouge.[12] This high level of great power engagement directly undermined any notion that the regional international society was

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[12] For detail account of great power powers responses of Vietnamese invasion in Kampuchea, see, Michael Hass, *Genocide by Proxy: Cambodian Pawn on Superpower Chessboard,* Praeger, New York, 1991, especially Ch. 6, pp. 72-87. See also William S. Turley, 'More Friends Few Enemies: Vietnam's Policy Towards Indochina-ASEAN Reconciliation' in Sheldon W. Simon (ed), *East Asia Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1993, pp. 167-193.

going to manage, let alone exclude great-power involvement in Southeast Asian affairs.

6.2.2. Involvement

On the surface, ASEAN showed solidarity and consensus in responding to the issue of Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea. Under the surface however, the responses from ASEAN individual member states were influenced by political-security concerns and a sense of moral anger propagated by Vietnam's violation of ASEAN's conception of regional principles of inter-state relations. As a result, a decade of ASEAN's involvement in the Vietnam-Kampuchean conflict in seeking a political settlement was characterised by internal tension between those who supported the confrontational and coercive diplomacy against Vietnam, namely Thailand and Singapore and others who supported a more accommodative and conciliatory towards Vietnam, such as Indonesia and Malaysia.

As Vietnam and Kampuchea were not members of ASEAN, the regional association's reaction needed to be framed with reference to the article 2(4) and article 2(7) of the UN Charter. An initial response was made by Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja on behalf of ASEAN Standing Committee on 9 January 1979. In his statement, Mochtar called on both parties to respect each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity to restrain from the use of force and to refrain from interference in each other's internal affairs.[13] Several days after the establishment of the PRK, ASEAN deplored Vietnam's military intervention as it threatened the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Kampuchea. It demanded the withdrawal of the invading forces to respect Kampuchean self-

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[13] For ASEAN Statement on Indochina, January 9, 1979, see Donald E. Weatherbee (ed), *Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis*, p. 97,

determination without external interference.[14] The call was reiterated after the launching of China's punitive attack on Vietnam in February 1979.[15] These statements marked the beginning of ASEAN's intense diplomatic activity for more than ten years with aim to urge the withdrawal of Vietnam from Kampuchea on the ground of the rights of self-determination and non-interference norm.

From the outset, however, there were conflicting interpretations of the causes of the Kampuchean crisis between Vietnam and the PRK on the one hand, and ASEAN on the other hand.[16] For Vietnam, the Kampuchean crisis was a consequence of a domestic power struggle between the Pol Pot Regime and the National Salvation Front for National Liberation. Vietnam's military deployment in Kampuchea aimed to support the Heng Samrin government and was justified by a Treaty of Friendship between the PRK and Vietnam on 18 February 1979. Vietnam rejected the notion that it was a direct party to the Kampuchean conflict, based on the claim that its military presence in the country was at the request of the PRK government. Moreover, Vietnam also justified its invasion as a defensive move to counter the threat from China. Vietnam was thus of the position that the situation in Kampuchea was irreversible and non-negotiable. By contrast for ASEAN, instead of domestic political struggle, the central problem of the Kampuchean conflict was Vietnam's invasion that violated the norms of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-interference. Hence, in ASEAN's view a political settlement of the conflict was needed.

Although in its initial response ASEAN displayed political and diplomatic solidarity, a

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[14] Joint Statement Joint Statement The Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting On The Current Political Development In The Southeast Asia Region Bangkok, 12 January 1979, <https://asean.org/?static_post=joint-statement-the-special-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting-on-the-current-political-development-in-the-southeast-asia-region-bangkok-12-january-1979>, accessed 10 August 2020.

[15] For ASEAN Statement on the Vietnam-China Border War, February 20, 1979, see, Donald E. Weatherbee (ed), *Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis*, p. 101.

[16] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, pp. 101-103; Donald E. Weatherbee, 'The Diplomacy of Stalemate,' p. 6

complex mix of security concerns and political considerations on the part of individual ASEAN members engendered differing views of how to approach the Kampuchea situation. Thailand, which shares a land-border with Kampuchea, regarded Vietnam as an immediate and potentially existential security threat. This view was shared by Singapore, which as the smallest state in the region, was perturbed by the precedent set by Vietnam's use of force to violate the territorial integrity of a sovereign state.[17] Indonesia, Malaysia and to some extent the Philippines, were less concerned. Indonesia, in particular, was most concerned about great-power involvement in the conflict – particularly by China, which responded to the occupation of Kampuchea with an invasion of Vietnam in February 1979. As a result, a decade of ASEAN's involvement in Vietnam-Kampuchean conflict was characterised by internal tensions between these two approaches.[18] Thailand and Singapore instigated a strategy of confrontation, most publicly at the level of international diplomacy, but ultimately including military and economic dimensions, to raise the cost to Vietnam of maintaining its occupation of Kampuchea. This approach clearly needed the direct support and involvement of external major powers to be feasible. Although they were also concerned about the principle of state sovereignty, Indonesia and Malaysia were also perturbed about the potential danger of a confrontational approach triggering even more unwelcome great-power interference in the region. Indonesia's approach therefore was a continuation of its well-established trajectory of working to build an internally cohesive regional international society that was relatively insulated from the interference of great powers.

Events conspired, however, to push ASEAN into a more muscular response. In June 1980, the Vietnamese military launched an incursion into Thailand that took it two kilometres

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[17] For Singapore foreign policy on Vietnam's invasion in Kampuchea, see for example, Peter Schier, 'The Indochina Conflict from the Perspective of Singapore,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1982, pp. 226-235.

[18] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, pp. 100-101; Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, p. 96.

past the border. ASEAN was thus left with little choice but to lean into a highly confrontational and coercive diplomacy and set aside – at least temporarily – any talk of accommodation. The ultimate goals of ASEAN's efforts were to prevent the legitimacy of the Vietnamese-sponsored regime or recognition of the PKR, to call for the complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, to ensure the right of self-determination of Kampuchea, and to prevent the encroachment of conflict into Thailand.[19] The coercive diplomacy was conducted through the combination of political-diplomatic, economic and military pressures, isolating Vietnam from the international society and delegitimising the PRK. The key elements of this strategy were to put the Kampuchean conflict on the international agenda, structure the international debate in the terms articulated by ASEAN and mobilise international public opinion and the resources of external powers in support of ASEAN's strategy.

The main platform for this strategy was engagement through international forum, beginning with ASEAN's successful sponsorship of UN resolution A/RES/ 34/22 on 14 November 1979, which called for a cease fire and the withdrawal foreign troops from Kampuchea. ASEAN also sought to prevent the PRK from replacing the DK as Kampuchea's recognised representative in the UN General Assembly.[20] In June 1980, at the 13th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the association decided to propose the UN General Assembly to convene of the International Conference on Kampuchea, which was approved at the 35th UN General Assembly as resolution A/RES/35/6. The UN's International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) was held on 13-17 July 1981, and it proposed the pursuit of a 'comprehensive political solution' that would include: (a) total withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea under UN

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[19] Muthiah Alagapha, 'Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict,' *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 46, no. 2, 1993, p. 454; Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, p. 100.
[20] For the discussion on the debate of Democratic Kampuchea's seat in the UN, see for example, Ramses Amer, 'The United Nations and Kampuchea: The Issue of Representation and Its Implication,' *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholar*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1990, pp. 52-60.

supervision; (b) self-determination for Kampuchea through free elections under the supervision of the UN; (c) appropriate measures to maintain law and order and human rights in transitional period of Kampuchea; and (d) a non-aligned, neutral Kampuchea, without foreign troops or military bases in the country.[21] The ICK however, was only partially successful, since it was conducted in the face of a boycott by Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the elements that were enshrined in the ICK served as the legal and moral basis for a settlement that become the basis for future negotiations with ASEAN in the process of a peace settlement that was established through the Paris Peace Agreement 1991.

An integral element of ASEAN's efforts to deny legitimacy to the PRK was its success in maintaining the DK's seat at the UN. The growing concerns of Western countries to the record of human rights violations by the DK urged ASEAN to pressure all Kampuchean factions to build a more internationally acceptable representation, or ASEAN could not sustain the effort to maintain the DK's seat in the UN. ASEAN's more obvious and yet skilful direct involvement in the conflict was the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in June 1982. The CGDK was comprised of three anti-PRK political factions: the Khmer Rouge, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by former Prime Minister Son Sann, and Prince Sihanouk's National United Front for Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC). The CGDK acted as a Kampuchean government-in-exile, with Prince Sihanouk as the President, Khieu Samphan as Vice President and Son Sann was the Prime Minister. For ASEAN, the formation of CGDK served a double purpose.[22] First, it was designed to end the domination of the Khmer Rouge over the resistance forces and second, to present to the world a more acceptable alternative to

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[21] For the ICK declaration see, United Nations: International Conference on Kampuchea Declaration, *International Legal Materials,* Vol. 20, No. 6, 1981, pp. 1503-1505.
[22] Carlyle A. Thayer, 'ASEAN and Indochina: A Dialogue,' p. 151; Donald E. Weatherbee, 'The Diplomacy of Stalemate,' pp. 3-4.

Heng Samrin's regime than that offered by the Khmer Rouge. This part of the ASEAN strategy met with immediate short-term success: the UN General Assembly accepted the CGDK's credentials as the legitimate government of Kampuchea in 1982, replacing the DK and sidelining the PRK.

Thus far, ASEAN had been successful in isolating Vietnam diplomatically and preventing the consolidation the PRK, but its efforts to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiation table for conflict resolution were singularly unsuccessful. In March 1983, Malaysian Foreign Minister Tan Sri Mohammad Ghazali Shafie, after an informal meeting with Vietnam Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach on the sidelines of the Seventh Summit of NAM Conference in New Delhi, proposed an informal regional meeting between the five ASEAN countries on the one side and Vietnam and Laos on the other (known as the 'five plus two' formula) but excluding the PRK. The proposal was an important breakthrough since for the first time Vietnam indicated the willing to discuss the Kampuchean issue in a conference scheme. While Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia had supported the proposal as a mechanism of exchanging ideas between ASEAN and both Vietnam and Laos, Thailand and the Philippines rejected the proposal on the ground that such a conference would only legitimate Vietnam's presence in Kampuchea.[23] Despite the initial differences, in ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in March 1983 in Bangkok, ASEAN once again closed rank behind Thailand and withdrawn the proposal because it considered as outside the ICK framework. Thus, ASEAN's initiative to bring Vietnam to the diplomatic table was unsuccessful due to differences among ASEAN members, which preferred an inclusive-international conference mechanism, and Vietnam that endorsed a limited-regionalist type of conference.

In order to recapture the diplomatic initiative that seemed to have been lack of success

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[23] Donald E. Weatherbee, 'The Diplomacy of Stalemate,' p. 15.

due to Vietnam's preference of a limited-regional conference, ASEAN launched 'An Appeal for Kampuchean Independence' prior to the 1983 UN General Assembly session. The Appeal was intended to change the focus of international opinion on the restoration of Kampuchean independence and sovereignty and the plight of Kampuchean people rather than political contest between ASEAN and Vietnam and its broader great power connections. In this Appeal, ASEAN drafted a document to find a comprehensive political settlement, and call on the international community, particularly Vietnam, the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and other concerned states, to join together in an effort to achieve solutions for Kampuchea's problems.[24] The key point of the Appeal was the call for the beginning of a phased withdrawal of Vietnamese troops on a territorial basis, starting from the area of Thailand-Kampuchea border. After the withdrawal, a cease fire could be put in place and allow humanitarian assistance and resettlement of Kampuchean refugees in territories that had been vacated by the Vietnamese, under UN supervision. This would be followed by the introduction of peacekeeping and observation forces to verify the withdrawal and to monitor the ceasefire, ensued by international economic assistance in these zones. Vietnam, however, dismissed ASEAN's Appeal for Kampuchean Independence, since it was silent on the armed Khmer Rouge even as it expected Vietnam's unilateral withdrawal from the west and had little to say on its vital security interests in relation to China. In a meeting of Indochinese Foreign Ministers in Vientiane in January 1984, Vietnam and other Indochina countries remained persistent on the regionalist format of 'five plus two' formula as a mechanism to discuss the Kampuchean problems.[25] Vietnam's dry season offensive from November 1984-July 1985 along the Thai border set the next the stage for a new ASEAN initiative. In its aftermath Malaysia proposed 'Proximity Talks' between the CGDK and the PRK with a neutral intermediary, but Thailand

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[24] For detail of the Appeal, see, 'An Appeal for Kampuchean Independence,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1983, pp. 379-380.
[25] Donald E. Weatherbee, 'The Diplomacy of Stalemate,' p. 19.

insisted that Vietnam replace the PRK in the talks. The ASEAN proposal was amended according to Thailand's preferences, but then Vietnam rejected it.

6.2.3. Normative Tensions

ASEAN's efforts to bring Vietnam to the negotiation table in its effort to find a political settlement for the Kampuchean conflict failed in part because of its internal divisions over strategy and objectives: confrontation and accommodation. These approaches might have been able to work together as a 'stick' and 'carrot' if they had been applied as two strands of the one approach, but in fact they were the result of divisions between members, and were being applied in an ad hoc and counter-productive manner. The division was not only pertinent to the divergent security threat perceptions but also reflected the disagreement among member states on normative principles of ASEAN's involvement in the conflict. ASEAN's confrontational approach against Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea was intended to uphold regional principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-interference, but this approach was conducted at the expense of other regional fundamental principles of management of great power and diplomacy. At this stage, instead of upholding the whole package of regional primary institutions, ASEAN encountered normative tensions between upholding principle of sovereignty and sustaining the principle of management of great power and diplomacy.

Related to the principle of management of great power, in 1971 and again in 1976, ASEAN had declared Southeast Asia as a neutral zone aspiring regional autonomy in the management of regional order. By pursuing a confrontational approach in order to mobilise the international community against Vietnam, however, ASEAN became highly dependent on the support of great powers – especially China and the US – whose interests converged with those of the association. In several cases, ASEAN had to relinquish its ideals because it found that

its external allies disagreed with ASEAN. The first instance of such a rupture was at the 1981 ICK, which exposed sharp frictions between ASEAN, China and the US.[26] ASEAN's original draft of the declaration had called for total withdrawal of Vietnam from Kampuchea, disarming all Kampuchean resistance factions and dispatching a UN peacekeeping force and UN temporary administration to supervise the elections in Kampuchea. China and the US however, rejected ASEAN's draft of disarming the Kampuchean resistance factions as keeping the resistance factions armed would serve as bargaining chip towards Vietnam. China also insisted that the DK was capable of holding the free election without the UN supervision.[27] As a result, the plans to disarm the Kampuchean factions and impose a temporary administration were removed from the final version of the ICK Declaration.

There was also evidence of an intensifying informal alliance between Thailand (with reluctant support from other ASEAN members) and China in balancing Vietnam militarily. Thailand allowed China to funnel weapons and supplies to Kampuchean resistance forces through the 'Deng Xiaoping trail' and in return China provided assurances in relation to Thailand's security against Vietnamese aggression.[28] This development marked a temporary surrender of ASEAN's ZOPFAN objective of excluding great powers from Southeast Asian affairs, even as talks continued for the closing of the US military base in Thailand and the Philippines. China was also instrumental in the formation of the CGDK, since its support was necessary to secure the cooperation and participation of the Khmer Rouge. China's sponsorship of CGDK emerged in October 1980, after Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond consulted China on ASEAN's plan to create a coalition to include the non-communist resistance

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[26] Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, p. 91; Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, p. 106, Carlyle A. Thayer, 'ASEAN and Indochina: A Dialogue,' p. 149.

[27] Gareth Porter, 'China in Southeast Asia, *Current History*, September 1, 1986, pp. 250-251.

[28] Michael R. Chambers, ''The Chinese and the Thais are Brothers': The Evolution of the Sino–Thai Friendship,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 14, No. 45, 2005, pp. 615-617.

alongside the Khmer Rouge.[29] Moreover, on several occasions China and Thailand impeded the informal initiatives by other ASEAN members to hold direct dialogue between CGDK and the PRK, such as in the case of Malaysia's 'five plus two' formula on the grounds that such a dialogue would provide legitimacy for both Vietnam's invasion and the PRK regime. As such, the confrontational approach made ASEAN dependent on external powers, such as China and the US to punish Vietnam for its invasion on Kampuchea that violated the norm of sovereignty, but this goal could be realised only at the expense of ASEAN's vision of regional autonomy as the basic principle of management of great power.[30]

Another ASEAN normative tension induced by ASEAN's confrontational approach was pertinent to principle of regional diplomacy. At this stage, there were tensions between the desire to punish Vietnam for its violation to the norms of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-interference and the necessity to seek a peaceful settlement for the Kampuchean conflict through regional states without too much involvement of external powers. As mentioned, the focal point of the confrontational approach was mobilising international support by using the UN and other international forums as vehicle to exert pressures to Vietnam and the Heng Samrin regime to agree to a political settlement on the conflict. While the confrontational approach was considered vital to denounce Vietnam's and the PRK's legitimacy and to limit Vietnam's diplomatic options, it did little to advance settlement of Kampuchean conflict. Although with a confrontational approach ASEAN could bring forward the 1981 ICK declaration as the legal and moral basis for a settlement of Kampuchean conflict, this internationalist diplomacy exposed the limits of ASEAN's diplomacy. First as mentioned, this strategy gave external powers, such as China and the US a great deal of influence over the

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[29] Michael R. Chambers, ''The Chinese and the Thais are Brothers': The Evolution of the Sino–Thai Friendship,' p. 618.
[30] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, pp. 101-103.

terms of political settlement, as evidenced in the case of the issuance of the 1981 ICK Declaration. Second, with the confrontational approach, ASEAN's diplomacy on Kampuchea's problems was conducted to support certain members' specific agendas such as Thailand as the frontline state and Singapore, rather than aimed at finding cultivable efforts to find a settlement for the Kampuchean conflict.[31] By insisting on this approach, Thailand and Singapore rejected regional meeting proposals such as the 'five plus two' formula and proximity talks advanced by Malaysia, as such meetings would have been tantamount to accepting Vietnam's military intervention and the legitimacy of the Heng Samrin regime. The result was a prolonged stalemate in the diplomacy arena. As Carl Thayer has observed, prior to 1985, none of ASEAN's diplomatic initiatives and Vietnam's responses were considerably devised to find a peaceful settlement for the Kampuchean conflict.[32] Thus, while the desire to rebuke Vietnam for its violations to the norms of sovereignty and the need to find a peaceful settlement for the Kampuchean conflict were not mutually exclusive, ASEAN's confrontational approach had made little progress to thaw the diplomatic stalemate to find a political solution of Kampuchean conflict.

6.3.   Indonesia's Response

Indonesia's position on Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea was one of ambivalence between supporting ASEAN's consensus on a confrontational approach and seeking a conciliatory approach towards Vietnam. There were at least two reasons that were pertinent to this ambivalent position. The first factor underlying Indonesia's ambivalent position was that it identified the major problem of the Kampuchean conflict, that is the great power penetration of Southeast Asia, instead of Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea. It saw that the overthrow of

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[31]Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, p. 91.
[32] Carlyle A. Thayer, 'ASEAN and Indochina: A Dialogue,' p. 154.

the Pol Pot regime by Vietnam was a conspicuous violation to the cardinal principle of sovereignty and contrary to the 1976 TAC that was conceived as code of conduct for regional states in Southeast Asia. Yet, Indonesia was more anxious about the great powers' backing of both Vietnam and the Kampuchean resistance forces, since they involved external powers in Southeast Asia. It was President Suharto's belief that 'if the Chinese push too hard in Vietnam, then Vietnam will have no other option but to rely more heavily on the Soviet Union.'[33] Expressing Indonesia's view, Ali Moertopo, one of Suharto's closest aides, wrote in 1980, 'ASEAN's responses to the Indochina conflict should be viewed primarily in the framework of containing the Sino-Soviet rivalry from moving further into Southeast Asia.'[34] The great power involvement in the conflict would distract ASEAN's long range vision for insulation of the region from the great power rivalry as defined in 1971 ZOPFAN. In Indonesia's assessment, China's use of force towards Vietnam would only fortify the latter's position in Kampuchea while imported Sino-Soviet rivalry as well as US-Soviet competition would increase in Southeast Asia. Moreover, in Indonesia's interpretation, ASEAN support for China's strategy to weaken Vietnam would only benefit Beijing, particularly, if Thailand deepened its alliance with China, it would then drive further growth of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.

Given these concerns, Indonesia saw that accommodating Vietnam's security concerns with respect to China was one of the most realistic measures to reduce if not to stop Soviet influence in Vietnam, which in turn would lessen the diffusion of Sino-Soviet and US-Soviet rivalry in Southeast Asia. Jakarta perceived that instead of Vietnam, China posed a long-term security threat to Indonesia.[35] It has its roots in the support of Beijing to the PKI and the alleged

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[33] Cited in Andrew J. Macintyre, 'Interpreting Indonesian Foreign Policy: The Case of Kampuchea, 1979-1986,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 27, No. 5, 1987, p. 516.

[34] Ali Moertopo, 'Great Powers Configuration in Asia Pacific: An Indonesian View,' *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1980, p. 17.

[35] Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership*, p. 127.

involvement of Beijing in the 1965 PKI attempted coup, which led Indonesia to suspend its relations with Beijing in October 1967.[36] This perception again was brought to the fore by China's punitive attack on Vietnam in February 1979 and reinforced the existing suspicions of Indonesia about China's longer term intentions in Southeast Asia.[37] Compared to China, Vietnam was not regarded as a potential security threat to Indonesia. In the past, relations between Jakarta and Hanoi had become impaired in the aftermath of 1965 PKI attempted coup and the dissolution of Jakarta-Hanoi-Phnom Penh-Beijing-Pyongyang axis initiated by Sukarno. Indonesia was also suspicious of Vietnam's dual policy in supporting FRETILIN and opposing Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, but Jakarta never froze the relations with Hanoi. A major easing of relations between Indonesia and Vietnam occurred when the latter, which used to be a strong supporter of FRETILIN, abstained from the UN General Assembly Votes on East Timor issue in 1978.[38] This in turn, convinced Jakarta to believe that communist Vietnam did not constitute a serious subversive threat to Indonesia and the region. Moreover, the Indonesian military was reported to have seen Vietnam as a buffer for a possible expansion of China into Southeast Asia.[39] As a consequence of this outlook, Indonesia's position on the solution of the Kampuchean conflict was one which accommodated Vietnam's security interests in Kampuchea. Strategically speaking, such a solution aimed to weaken China's influence in Kampuchea and its possible expansion activities in Southeast Asia.

Second, Indonesia did not want to jeopardise ASEAN unity, if it openly rejected ASEAN consensus to put diplomatic pressures on Vietnam and the PRK. From the outset, Indonesia perceived ASEAN as the vehicle through which the country and its cooperating

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[36] Leo Suryadinata, 'Indonesia-China Relations: A Recent Breakthrough,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 30, No. 7, 1990, pp. 682-696.

[37] Donald E. Weatherbee, 'The View from ASEAN's Southern Flank,' *Strategic Review*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1983, pp. 56-57.

[38] Leo Suryadinata, 'Indonesia-Vietnam Relations Under Suharto,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1991, pp. 335-336.

[39] Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership*, p. 46.

neighbour could establish a system of regional order untrammelled by dependence on outside power.[40] At a rational interest level, Indonesia perceived membership in ASEAN to have significantly raised its regional and international stature.[41] During that period Indonesia required diplomatic support from other ASEAN states in dealing with international criticisms on Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. Indonesia also had benefited from ASEAN membership, which had proven to be a useful instrument for bargaining with the developed countries on trade, economic cooperation and economic development assistance.[42] Thus, Indonesia went along with other ASEAN members on the issue of Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea as opposing the association's consensus would impair its vision of regional order as well as political and economic interests.

Although ambivalent, Indonesia was reasonably consistent in the pursuit of its ideal of a regional international society in Southeast Asia based upon its understanding of regional primary institutions of sovereignty, management of great power and diplomacy. At this point, Indonesia's attempted to provide the leadership needed to resolve normative tensions by upholding the primary institution of sovereignty and maintaining the institution of great power management, and by using the case of Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea to promote habits and practices of cooperation, compromise, and dialogue towards resolution of the issue.

When Thailand and Singapore insisted on pursuing a confrontational approach against the PRK and Vietnam, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, aired his concern that the conflict would then become a head-to-head tussle between ASEAN and Hanoi. He stated, 'there have been attempts at drawing ASEAN into one certain side (of the conflict)

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[40] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Allen & Unwin, London, 1983, p. 142.
[41] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1994, pp. 196-224.
[42] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, pp. 59-60.

and bringing about confrontation between ASEAN and Vietnam.'[43] Indonesia tried to persuade other ASEAN members to reorient the confrontation approach into a more accommodationist attitude. In a meeting between President Suharto and Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn, the two countries issued the Kuantan Declaration in March 1980. The Declaration called for a 'political solution' of the conflict to forestall the prospect of regional destabilisation and express that great power intervention was unwelcome. Such a political solution was intended to give some recognition to Vietnam's security interests in Kampuchea in return for which Hanoi would agree to weaken its alliance with the Soviet Union and thus reduce China's angst about Vietnam's policies in Indochina.[44] The Declaration however, failed to find support either in ASEAN or Vietnam.

Indonesia was frustrated because the failure of the Kuantan Declaration left ASEAN in strategic coordination with an external power, China. From Indonesia's strategic view, military efforts and an economic blockade of Vietnam could weaken its occupation of Kampuchea, but a weakened Vietnam would have more trouble to fending off China.[45] Moreover, Indonesia was disappointed a year later when China (backed by the US) forced ASEAN to delete reference to 'disarming the Kampuchean faction' from the 1981 ICK statement. For Indonesia, it showed that China retained its ambition to maintain its hold on Kampuchea through its client, the Khmer Rouge.[46] ASEAN's coercive measures towards Vietnam, from Indonesia's perspective, would only lead to unpleasant outcomes for the region: either Vietnam subjected

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[43] Quoted in Andrew J. Macintyre, 'Interpreting Indonesian Foreign Policy: The Case of Kampuchea, 1979-1986, p. 517.

[44] For further detail on Kuantan declaration, see for example, Justus M. van der Kroef, 'ASEAN, Hanoi and Kampuchean Conflict: Between 'Kuantan' and A 'Third Alternative',' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 21, No. 5, 1981, pp. 516-517.

[45] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, p. 189; Leo Suryadinata, 'Indonesia-Vietnam Relations Under Suharto,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1991.

[46] Justus M. van der Kroef, 'Kampuchea: The Endless Tug of War,' Occasional Paper in Contemporary Asian Studies, School of Law, University of Maryland, No. 2, 1982, pp. 11-12.

to China's domination or Vietnam as the client of the Soviet Union.[47] Indonesia was convinced that continuing external intervention in the region, characterised by China's invasion of Vietnam in February 1979, and the continuing support of the Soviet Union to Vietnam, would be detrimental for its vision that Southeast Asia should be established by the collaborative endeavour of resident states to the exclusion of great powers rivalry and external intervention.[48]

Indonesia began to embark on a dual policy towards Vietnam.[49] Indonesia continued to support and honour ASEAN's stand while it also sought a conciliatory approach to cultivate close bilateral relations with Hanoi. It supported ASEAN's efforts to find a solution to the Kampuchea conflict within the framework of the ICK resolution. It also acquiesced to ASEAN's initiative to form the coalition of Kampuchean resistance forces into CGDK. Indonesia nevertheless openly contested Singapore's proposal in December 1981 for ASEAN to supply arms to the non-communist Kampuchean resistance forces[50] and it pursued a softer approach designed to find a solution that satisfied Hanoi's security interests without obstructing ASEAN's consensus. Meanwhile Vietnam insisted that the Kampuchea situation was a civil war, and that its military presence was at the invitation of the PRK government and intended to prevent the return of Pol Pot's clique into power. On this basis, Vietnam refused to acknowledge that it was a direct party in the conflict and refused to participate in any negotiations.[51]

In Indonesia's view, the diplomatic stalemate would be difficult to resolve without some element of conciliation, so it attempted to implement confidence-building measures

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[47] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Allen & Unwin, London, 1983, p. 168; Andrew J. Macintyre, 'Interpreting Indonesian Foreign Policy: The Case of Kampuchea, 1979-1986, p. 517.

[48] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, p. 170.

[49] Leo Suryadinata, 'Indonesia-Vietnam Relations Under Suharto,' pp. 337-342.

[50] Andrew J. Macintyre, 'Interpreting Indonesian Foreign Policy: The Case of Kampuchea, 1979-1986, p. 521; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism,* p. 187.

[51] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, pp. 101-102.

through informal channels. Indonesia's move began with a series of low-key, unpublicised visits to Hanoi by Lt. General Benny Murdani, to meet Vietnam Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Tach. These occurred in May 1980 and in September 1981. The visits were diplomatically peculiar because Murdani's position at that time was deputy head of the State Intelligence Coordination Agency (*Badan Koordinasi Intelejen Negara*), allowing the impression that the visits were private and unofficial. The seemingly unofficial nature of the visits blunted any inclination that other ASEAN members may have had to criticise the visits, but still allowed serious discussions to take place in Hanoi, thanks to Murdani's known role as one of Suharto's closest aids and his 'trouble shooter'.[52] The result of the meetings was not made public, but they definitely seemed to be driven by strategic concerns.[53] The Indonesian military was alarmed by China's use of force to settle the conflict with Vietnam and the scenario of a possible Chinese expansion to the south prompted the Indonesian military to extend its amity with Vietnam. Murdani's diplomatic adventures also attracted speculations of institutional competition between the Indonesian Department of Defence and Security and the Department of Foreign Affairs, especially since Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, was not informed about the visits. Nevertheless by 1984, the two Ministries were in agreement that Indonesia's diplomacy on the Kampuchean conflict should be directed primarily towards preventing the unwelcome involvement of the great powers, and that this should be achieved by accommodating Vietnam without sacrificing Indonesia's commitment in ASEAN.[54]

Murdani paid his first official visit to Vietnam in February 1984 in his new role as Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, and this time Mochtar was informed in advance.

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[52] Guy Sacerdoti, 'The Trouble Shooter's' Trip,' *Far Eastern Economic Review,* 25 September 1981, p. 12. For a short article on Murdani's profile see, David Jenkins, 'Charismatic, Sinister, Soeharto Man, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 September 2004.

[53] Leo Suryadinata, 'Indonesia-Vietnam Relations Under Suharto,' p. 337; Andrew J. Macintyre, 'Interpreting Indonesian Foreign Policy: The Case of Kampuchea, 1979-1986,' p. 521

[54] Andrew J. Macintyre, 'Interpreting Indonesian Foreign Policy: The Case of Kampuchea, 1979-1986,' pp. 530-532; Leo Suryadinata, 'Indonesia-Vietnam Relations Under Suharto,' p. 338.

After the visit, Murdani publicly stated that Vietnam did not pose any threat to Southeast Asia. This statement dismayed Thailand and Singapore, but it confirmed that Indonesia was pushing ahead with its accommodationist approach towards Hanoi. Murdani's breakthrough visits were followed by a visit from Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach to Indonesia in March 1984 and in August 1985, during which Suharto received him personally. Although the meetings failed to persuade Vietnam to agree to ASEAN's appeal to thaw the diplomatic impasse, they paved the way for alternative modes of communication with Vietnam and close personal relationship between two countries key personalities that planted trust and confidence for the next stage of conflict resolution.

Indonesia's attempt to approach Vietnam also employed non-governmental actors. In this instance, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Jakarta-based think-tank close to Suharto and the Indonesian Department of Defence and Security, sponsored a seminar held in Hanoi in February 1984. The importance of the seminar was seen by the attendance of Vietnamese high-ranking officials including Nguyen Co Thach and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. A second seminar held by CSIS in Jakarta in February 1985, likewise, attracted high-ranking Vietnamese leaders. Although the seminars were of minor importance in finding a resolution to the Kampuchean conflict, they opened up further alternative lines of communication for both countries. The bilateral relations during the period of 1985-1987 continued to be nurtured with, for example: meetings of Indonesian and Vietnamese journalists; the signing of a trade agreement between an Indonesian business delegation and the Vietnamese Ministry of agriculture and Foodstuff Industry; and the visitation of a Vietnamese delegation to study Indonesia's Five-Year development that might be applicable to Vietnam.[55]

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[55] Ngoc-Diep tri Trinh, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam,' Dissertation University of Hawaii, 1995, pp. 209-211.

To dissipate any misunderstanding among ASEAN members, particularly from Thailand and Singapore, President Suharto himself, in an informal meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers held in Jakarta in May 1984, explained Indonesia's intention to seek a conciliatory approach towards Vietnam to break the diplomatic stalemate on the Kampuchean conflict, while affirming Indonesia's continued support to ASEAN's comprehensive political settlement on the Kampuchean conflict that was already agreed at the 1981 ICK.[56] In this gathering, Indonesia was appointed as ASEAN's interlocutor with Vietnam.

After officially being designated as interlocutor with Hanoi, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja proposed the idea of 'Cocktail Party' diplomacy in November 1985. Van Der Kroef described the term as 'not so much to an occasion of festive libation, but rather an image of mixture, contained a single entity, of quite diverse ingredients, in short the different Cambodian factions.'[57] The idea of 'Cocktail Party' had been voiced earlier by Prince Sihanouk in May 1983 and reiterated in September 1985 in New York when he attended the UN General Assembly Meeting, but Mochtar's idea was different. Sihanouk's proposal included an informal meeting to be attended by all parties involved in the Kampuchean conflict, including the four Khmer factions, Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, China, and all ASEAN members. Mochtar argued that Sihanouk's idea was not feasible, as he stated that the 'Kampuchean conflict should be resolved by the Kampuchean themselves.'[58] Hence, Mochtar's idea of 'Cocktail Party' diplomacy involved holding informal meetings with all Kampuchean parties (the PRK, the Khmer Rouge, the KPNLF and the FUNCINPEC). However, according to

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[56] The Informal Meeting of The ASEAN Foreign Ministers to Discuss the Recent Political and Military Developments With Regards To The Kampuchean Problem Jakarta, 8 May 1984, <https://asean.org/?static_post=the-informal-meeting-of-the-asean-foreign-ministers-to-discuss-the-recent-political-and-military-developments-with-regards-to-the-kampuchean-problem-jakarta-8-may-1984 >, accessed 10 August 2020

[57] Justus M. van der Kroef, 'Cambodia: The Vagaries of 'Cocktail' Diplomacy,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1988, p. 303.

[58] '*Cocktail Party' dari Mochtar untuk Selesaikan Kamboja* ('Cocktail Party' from Mochtar to Resolve Kampuchean Conflict),' *Kompas*, 7 December 1985.

Mochtar, ASEAN, Vietnam, and Laos could possibly hold a subsequent 'Cocktail Party' after the first 'Cocktail Party' among the Kampucheans was realised.

After securing support from both Thailand and Singapore, the proposal of 'Cocktail Party' diplomacy was endorsed in the Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Minister in April 1986.[59] Indonesia's close relations with Vietnam bore fruit as Mochtar secured support for the 'Cocktail Party' diplomacy from Vietnam on 29 July 1987, based on a common understanding held by Mochtar and Thach (also well-known as the Ho Chi Minh City Understanding). Both agreed that the proposed talks between Kampuchean conflicting parties would be held in an informal way on the basis of equal footing, without preconditions and with no political labels. They also agreed that while a first stage of the process was only to involve the Kampuchean conflicting parties, the subsequent stage would involve participants from other countries including Vietnam.[60]

Indonesia's success in persuading Vietnam, however, faced resistance from Thailand and Singapore, which questioned the stage at which Vietnam would join in the 'Cocktail Party'. Once again, both Thailand and Singapore were apprehensive that the scheme agreed in the Ho Chi Minh City Understanding would lend the PRK legitimacy. At the ASEAN special ministerial meeting held in August 1987, Indonesia's proposal was reviewed, and revised that the informal meeting initially among Kampuchean parties was to be followed immediately by Vietnam's participation, instead of two stages of meetings. ASEAN also supported the CGDK's Eight-Points Peace Plan, which was formulated in March 1986 but had already been

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[59] ASEAN Foreign Ministers Joint Communique, Bali 29 April 1986,' available at <https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/380-1986-04-29.pdf,>, accessed 29 March 2020.
[60] For Joint Press Release on Indonesian Foreign Minister's Visit to Vietnam, Hanoi, 29 July 1987, see, M. Nagendra Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem*, Ashgate, Aldershot, England, 2001, Appendix 3, pp. 190-191.

rejected by Vietnam, as the basis of discussion of the 'Cocktail Party' meeting.[61] Vietnam objected to the ASEAN's revision of the 'Cocktail Party' as the country insisted its involvement in the meeting based on the Ho Chi Minh City Understanding. Although facing disagreement from its ASEAN counterparts, Mochtar continued to endorsed Indonesia's initial version of the Cocktail party without dismissing ASEAN unity. On the eve of the UN General Assembly Meeting in September 1987, ASEAN's foreign ministers met in New York and issued a 'joint explanatory' note on the 'Cocktail Party' proposal. In the note that circulated to the UN Secretary General and members of UN General Assembly, ASEAN fully endorsed the Mochtar-Thach Cocktail meeting concept, an informal meeting among Kampuchean parties, followed by a second stage meeting to include Vietnam and ASEAN members.[62] ASEAN' s joint explanatory note was crucial to show the unity of the members in front of the international community in finding a peaceful resolution to the Kampuchean conflict.

Indonesia's proposal of a 'Cocktail Party' had contributed to a momentum of thawing relations among Kampuchean conflicting parties. In August 1987, the new PRK's Prime Minister, Hun Sen announced a policy on national reconciliation, in which for the first time the PRK called for talks with the CGDK but without Pol Pot and its close associate. Hun Sen also unveiled his five-point peace plan for political settlement.[63] More importantly, the readiness of the PRK to compromise, paved the way for historic meetings between Prince Sihanouk and

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[61] The CGDK's Eight-Points Peace Plan called for (1) negotiation of gradual withdrawal of Vietnam's troops; (2) cease fire between all Kampuchean rival parties; (3) negotiation between CGDK and the PRK to set up coalition government headed by Prince Sihanouk; (4) the UN supervision for the ceasefire and the withdrawal of Vietnam's military; (5) general election supervised by the UN; (6) restoration of Kampuchea as a liberal democratic and peaceful, neutral and non-aligned country; (7) readiness to accept aids from all countries to rebuilt Kampuchea; (8) signing non-aggression pact with Vietnam. See, Justus M. van der Kroef, 'Cambodia: The Vagaries of 'Cocktail' Diplomacy,' p. 307.

[62] Justus M. van der Kroef, 'Cambodia: The Vagaries of 'Cocktail' Diplomacy,' p. 310.

[63] The five-point peace plan were (1) peace talks among rival Kampuchean camps and promising Sihanouk and the highest position in the future Kampuchean government (2) Vietnamese withdrawal in conjunction with the stopping of external aids for Kampuchean resistance forces (3) general elections organised by the PRK after the withdrawal of Vietnamese (4) the formation of a new four-party coalition (5) negotiation with Thailand for zone of peace along the borders and repatriation of Kampuchean refugees. See, 'The Sihanouk-Hun Sen Meeting,' <http://countrystudies.us/cambodia/86.htm>, accessed 20 March 2020.

Hun in Paris in December 1987 and January 1988, resulting in a communique which called for political settlement by the Kampuchean themselves that would then be ratified by the international community.[64] Meanwhile, Vietnam in May 1988 pledged to withdraw part of its troops that would be followed by full repatriation in early 1990. The Vietnamese announcement was also influenced by the changing relations between the US, China and Soviet Union that created favourable conditions for the peace process. The Soviet Union under Gorbachev had improved its relations with the US, which resulted in a gradual thawing of the US-Soviet Cold War. This was followed by rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China. Related to the Kampuchean issue, the Soviet Union, which sought to reduce its economic problems related to supporting its clients in the Third World, agreed with China to push Vietnam to end its occupation in Kampuchea, while the Chinese complied that it would distance itself from the Khmer Rouge.[65]

Under the new Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, who replaced Mochtar in March 1988, the idea of 'Cocktail Party' diplomacy soon developed into something more structured, if still officially 'informal', and this was the first JIMs as mentioned above held in Bogor on 25-28 July 1988, which was an important diplomatic breakthrough in terms of a symbolic point of view. In accordance with 1987 Ho Chi Minh City Understanding, the structure of the JIM I was as follows: the Kampuchean parties met in the morning and only later in the afternoon were they joined by ASEAN members, Vietnam and Laos. Another breakthrough was that the PRK and the Khmer Rouge agreed to meet each other after their previous refusals to deal with one another. It was also critical for the position of the conflicting Kampuchean parties as well as ASEAN, Vietnam and Laos, that the elements of settlement

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[64] Elizabeth Becker, 'The Progress of Peace in Cambodia,' *Current History*, Vol. 88, No. 537, 1989, pp. 170-171; Chang Pao-min, 'Kampuchean conflict: The Diplomatic Breakthrough,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1988, p. 431.

[65] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, p. 113.

were openly discussed. Given the nature of the informality of the meeting, one could expect not to achieve any political settlement of Kampuchean conflict over the four days of talks. Nonetheless, the participants at this JIM I agreed on two interlinked issues for the basis for political settlement: 1) the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea; and 2) the prevention of the recurrence of the genocidal policies of the Pol Pot regime. However, they failed to agree on the timetable of the withdrawal of Vietnam troops, the setting up of international forces for peacekeeping, ensuring the cessation of foreign interference and external arms supplies for the Kampuchean resistance forces, and the reconvening of the ICK. As a result of these disagreements, the JIM I could only produce a Statement by the Chair as presented by Ali Alatas at the end of the meeting, rather than a joint statement which was commonly the product of ASEAN Meetings.[66]

JIM I was followed by a second meeting, JIM II, on 19 February 1989. Unlike the JIM I, the second JIM produced a consensus statement across several important issues, although differences persisted that need to be further discussed. The participants agreed on the international aspects of the Kampuchean conflict: the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and the stopping of external arms supplies to Kampuchean resistance forces, but again the schedules needed to be further synchronised. The participants also agreed on the establishment of and International Control Mechanism (ICM), but the composition of the ICM needed further discussions. The PRK wanted it to be composed of six nations which consisted of two communist countries, two Western countries and two non-aligned countries, while the CGDK wished the ICM to be under the auspices of the UN. The participants also agreed on the need to convene an international conference to obtain guarantees of full compliance from the participants, to get international endorsement for Kampuchean status as independent, neutral

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[66] For Chairman statement of JIM I, see, M. Nagendra Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem*, p. 101.

and non-aligned state, and to gain international support for the international funding of Kampuchean rehabilitation. Although there was consensus on the external aspects of the problems, the JIM II was unsuccessful in achieving an agreement on the internal aspects on the establishment of interim quadripartite authority of national reconciliation under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk. The CGDK was of the opinion that the PRK and the DK should be dismantled prior to the establishment of the four-party of provisional government, but this was rejected by the PRK. As a result, the consensus statement of the JIM II urged the Kampuchean parties to settle internal aspects within two months or sooner and informed the result to the chairman of the JIM.[67]

The holding of JIM I and JIM II were significant for the role of ASEAN in the regional conflict in several ways. First, the Jakarta-sponsored informal meetings reinstated ASEAN as the leading manager instead of becoming an actor in Kampuchean conflict. Previously, in pursuing a confrontational strategy ASEAN was seen as an actor in the conflict and deeply involved in changing the structure of the conflict by backing up the non-communist Kampuchean faction and mobilised international public opinion to isolate Vietnam and the PRK. These informal processes also restored ASEAN to the driver's seat of the management of regional order by limiting the influences of the great powers. Second, rather than prearranged as forums to find a speedy political settlement, the Jakarta-sponsored informal meetings served as mechanisms of socialisation of Indochina states into Southeast Asia society of states. The JIMs were the forum for the conflicting parties, which had earlier declined outright to meet each other to discuss their problems on equal footing. The meetings emphasised the social obligations rather than formal or legal commitments. It became evident after the JIM I, that there had been an ongoing restructuring of relations between Southeast Asian countries

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[67] 'Consensus Statement of the Chairman of The Jakarta Informal Meeting, Jakarta, February 21, 1989,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1989, pp. 107-111.

between ASEAN, Vietnam and all Kampuchean factions. In particular, the JIM process eventually changed the relations between ASEAN and Vietnam. ASEAN gave up its confrontation against Vietnam, which became its common position after a decade. The references to TAC and ZOPFAN in the JIM II statement provided assurances for Vietnam that it would be able to join ASEAN, which would provide it a way out of isolation.[68] In this regard the JIM, as the embodiment of the conciliatory-accommodationist approach, succeeded in dealing with the external aspects of the conflict, particularly the involvement of Vietnam in the conflict.[69] Indonesia's role in particular was significant in breaking Vietnam's intransigence as the Jakarta sponsored regional process served as a face-saving exit for Vietnam from the protracted conflict and international isolation.

The JIM II paved the way for convening the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) in July 1989 (later known as PICC I). Although there was a shift from the centre of the Kampuchean peace process from Jakarta to Paris, Indonesia remained the focal actor as the country and France co-sponsored it. However, due to persisting differences among Kampuchean parties on the issues of Vietnamese forces withdrawal and international supervision on it, and differences over the process of national reconciliation, the PICC I failed to make progress on the peace process. The failure of the PICC I encouraged the US and Australia to propose a peace plan for the Kampuchean peace process. The US, for example suggested a UN supervised interim government in Kampuchea instead of a quadripartite interim government. In July 1990, the US announced its decision to withdraw its support to the CGDK to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power.[70] Australia, on the other hand proposed a peace plan that emphasised the implementation of a cease fire under supervision of

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[68] 'Consensus Statement of the Chairman of The Jakarta Informal Meeting, Jakarta, February 21, 1989,' paragraphs 14 & 15.
[69] Eero Palmujoki, 'Diplomacy over Kampuchean Question,' in Ng Chee Yuen and Chandran Jeshurun (eds), *Southeast Asian Affairs 1990*, Routledge, New York, 2019, p. 136.
[70] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, p. 114.

the UN peace keeping forces, vacating Kampuchea's seat at the UN, general elections under international supervision, and an international program for the reconstruction of Kampuchea.[71]

Indonesia, however, remained engaged in the attempt to arrive at a political settlement for the Kampuchean conflict through a regional process led by ASEAN. For this purpose, Indonesia organised a series of IMCs held in Jakarta in February and August 1990. The IMCs was held in the framework of the PICC to resolve unsettled problems at an earlier PICC in August 1989. In terms of participants, the IMCs were more inclusive as they were attended by the four factions from Kampuchea, Vietnam, Laos, six members of ASEAN, France, Australia and the representative of Five Permanent members of the UNSC (P-5). The first IMC held on 26-28 February 1990 resulted in a joint communique that called for the UN presence at interim periods at 'appropriate levels' and the establishment of a 'supreme national body'. Following the first IMC, significant progress was reached when the P-5 proposed a 'Framework for Comprehensive Political Settlement on the Cambodian Conflict' on 28 August 1990. The P-5 Framework document called for a compromise on the power sharing arrangement and a UN supervised, general, free and fair election for Kampuchea. Responding to the P-5 Framework document, the second IMC, held on 9 September 1990 resulted in agreement among Kampuchean factions to establish a Supreme National Council headed by Prince Sihanouk. The SNC consisted of twelve members, with six members from the State of Cambodia,[72] and another six from the FUNCIPEC, KPNLF and the Khmer Rouge.[73] The final stage of the Cambodian conflict was finally reached at the second PICC in 21-23 October 1991, as the Agreements on Comprehensive Political Settlement on Cambodian Conflict were signed by

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[71] Gareth Evan, 'Cambodia: The Peace Process – and After,' *Presentation by Professor The Hon. Gareth Evans AC QC, Chancellor, The Australian National University, to Cambodia Roundtable, Monash University*, 2 November 2012, available at <https://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech498.html>, accessed 21 March 2020.
[72] In May 1989, the PRK renamed the country as the State of Cambodia.
[73] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, p. 111; Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, p. 109.

four factions of Cambodian and nineteen other countries.[74]

In summary, since the outbreak of the Kampuchean conflict marked by Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, Indonesia was consistent in its pursuit of a policy of accommodation and engagement towards Vietnam, rather than isolating and punishing the latter. However, this policy had been conducted without sacrificing the unity of ASEAN, which was pursued as a confrontational policy against Vietnam for the violation of the fundamental principle of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-interference. Indonesia saw that protracted and diplomatic stalemate on the Kampuchean conflict could jeopardise the newly established Southeast Asian regional international society both in regional primary institutions, namely management of great power and diplomacy as well as the unity of ASEAN as regional secondary institution. The next section analyses how Indonesia, through its consistent efforts in pursuing a policy of accommodation to find political settlement of the Kampuchean conflict had contributed to the consolidation of both primary and secondary institutions of Southeast Asian regional international society.

6.4. Management of Great Power and Diplomacy

ASEAN's decade long dealings with the Kampuchean conflict and Vietnam's intervention set the stage for the consolidation of regional primary institutions, in particular sovereignty, great power management and diplomacy as well as strengthening ASEAN as the main secondary institution of Southeast Asian regional international society. In this respect, Indonesia's attitude and behaviour in conceiving an accommodationist approach helped the process of consolidation of both primary and secondary institutions, particularly management

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[74] 'Framework for Comprehensive Political Settlement of Cambodian Conflict, 23 October 1991,' available at <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KH_911023_FrameworkComprehensivePoliticalSettlementCambodia.pdf>, accessed 21 March 2020.

of great power and diplomacy.

Indonesia's behaviour was particularly significant in changing the realist character and anarchic nature of the Kampuchean conflict by drawing the attention of the members of e regional society to the normative and ethical basis of rightful regional conduct. It acted with self-restraint and patience, and was persistently active in finding alternative options to resolve the diplomatic stalemate on the Kampuchean conflict. Indonesia had also been active in the full consideration of ASEAN unity and consensus. Even when ASEAN's collective decision was against its own, Indonesia successfully gained the trust and support from the Kampuchean factions and Vietnam at the so-called 'Cocktail Party' diplomacy meetings. Indonesia acted in accordance with the ASEAN consensus decisions, while it was persistent in persuading other ASEAN members to facilitate informal talks among the conflicted Kampuchean parties and between ASEAN and other Indochinese states to find a political settlement on the Kampuchean conflict.

From the beginning, Indonesia balked at adopting a confrontational strategy as it could lead to direct involvement of the external great powers and signal their continuing stay in this region.[75] Paradoxically, the confrontational strategy had increased ASEAN's dependence on external powers and eroded the norm of regional autonomy.[76] If this had of happened, it would have distracted ASEAN's long-range vision for insulating the region from great power rivalry as defined in the 1971 ZOPFAN. Indonesia worked to persuade its ASEAN partners to pursue an accommodationist approach at the regional level in the hopes of limiting the influence of the great powers. For instance, despite facing a challenge to his idea of a two-stage set of meetings using the 'Cocktail Party' diplomacy, with other ASEAN members, particularly

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[75] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, p. 169.
[76] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, p. 109.

Thailand and Singapore, at the ASEAN Special Ministerial Meeting in August 1987, Foreign Minister Mochtar, dismissed other ASEAN members' opinion and underlined the importance of resolving the Kampuchean conflict without external interference. He stated,

> Whatever is the interpretation, the reality is that the Indonesian proposal is accepted. We are on the way to situation (*sic*) in which Southeast Asian problems are resolved by Southeast Asian nations, without interference from outside, and this of course is very good for the future of Southeast Asia.[77]

Thus, by its persistence to purse an accommodationist-regionalist approach, Indonesia was trying to use the Kampuchean dispute to steer ASEAN towards accepting habits and practices of preventing, or at least reducing, the influence of great powers and external parties in the management of conflict in the region. Moreover, Indonesia also sought to use the Kampuchean conflict to shape collective behaviour in ASEAN on the practice of management of regional order that was crafted by the resident states in the region, as was envisioned in the 1971 ZOPFAN and 1976 TAC. Through the holding of the JIMs and the IMCs, ASEAN continued to become the driver of the Kampuchean peace process, even after the discussions was shifted to an international conference in Paris. Although the forum for resolving the Kampuchean conflict had been moved from the regional level of JIM into the international level at the Paris Conference on Cambodia, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, continued to focus on the importance of regional processes in conflict resolution. He stated, 'In a regional conflict the primacy of efforts towards its solution should rightly reside with the countries of the region themselves.'[78] Undeniably, Indonesia's and ASEAN's efforts in convening informal meetings among four Kampuchean factions, and between ASEAN and Indochina states opened the door

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[77] Cited in M. Nagendra Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem*, p. 88.
[78] 'The Opening Statement as Co-Chairman of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia, Paris, 30 July 1989,' in Ali Alatas, *A Voice of a Just Peace: A Collection of Speeches*, Gramedia Pustaka Utama in Cooperation with Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Jakarta and Singapore, 2001, p. 287.

for The Agreements on Comprehensive Political Settlement on Cambodian Conflict reached in Paris in 1991.

By consistently pursuing an accommodationist approach, Indonesia also sought to employ the Kampuchea conflict to coordinate ASEAN and to socialise the conflicting parties to accept the habits and practices of regional diplomacy, based on a process of dialogue, accommodation, informality, and consensus-based decision making as spelled out in the 1976 TAC. This was clearly stated by Ali Alatas at the JIM I:

> Our meeting today in effect conveys a signal to the world that in accordance
> with their age-old traditions and cultural values the Southeast Asia nations
> are indeed able to begin solving their problems amongst themselves, and in
> their own way, through what we in Indonesia call '*Musyawarah untuk*
> *Mufakat*', deliberations in order to arrive at consensus.[79]

Indonesia's constant focus on dialogue and accommodation was reiterated by Ali Alatas, when he opened the Paris International Conference on Cambodia in 1989:

> We all realize that a problem of such complexity (the Kampuchean issue)
> cannot be solved through a single meeting. But we also know that unless we
> begin to replace armed conflict and confrontation with political dialogue and
> negotiation, a solution that is both comprehensive and just will remain
> elusive.[80]

In regards to the secondary institutions of Southeast Asia – notably ASEAN – Indonesia engaged in behaviour that on the surface seemed to threaten ASEAN's principles of operating

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[79] 'Statement as Chairman of the Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) on Cambodia (afternoon session), Bogor Palace, 25 July 1988, in in Ali Alatas, *A Voice of a Just Peace: A Collection of Speeches*, p. 276.
[80] 'Chairman's Statement of the Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) on Cambodia (afternoon Session), Bogor Palace, 25 July 1988, in Ali Alatas, *A Voice of a Just Peace: A Collection of Speeches*, p. 274.

through consensus: for instance in the cases of the Kuantan declaration and Murdani's visit to Vietnam in 1984, where he declared Vietnam was not a threat to regional peace.[81] Yet this threat never fully eventuated because Indonesia always stopped well short of breaking the ASEAN consensus, and indeed was an outspoken critic of Thailand's late-1980s rapprochement with Vietnam precisely because it crossed that line. Furthermore, as it was pushing the limits of consensus on dealing with Vietnam, Indonesia considered that it was doing so in the context of defending other elements of the regional norms: it was afraid that ASEAN's strategy of confrontation against Vietnam and the PRK had been made the association dependent on external powers and a pawn in Sino-Soviet rivalry.[82] Indonesia was also perturbed with the fact that Thailand committed informal alignment with China and some members of ASEAN sought to arm non-communist Kampuchean factions. As the repercussions of the confrontational strategy were contradicted by the ZOPFAN declaration, Indonesia's determination to seek an accommodationist approach also emanated from the conviction that without peace in Indochina the ideal of ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia could not be materialised.[83] The underlying conception of ZOPFAN was a principle that collaborative endeavours of regional states would have an insulating political effect and thereby, to quote Leifer, 'would deny the opportunity of extra regional predators to fish in troubled water'.[84] Unlike, the confrontation approach, the accommodationist approach proposed by Indonesia also intended to maintain ASEAN centrality among great powers and other external major powers in the process of Kampuchea conflict settlement, and thus put ASEAN in the driver's seat for managing regional conflict. Although the final settlement of the Kampuchean conflict

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[81] Nayan Chanda, 'ASEAN's Odd Man Out,' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1 March 1984; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, p. 187.

[82] Michael Leifer, 'ASEAN's Search for Regional Order, in Chin Kin Wah and Leo Suryadinata (eds), *Michael Leifer: Selected Works on Southeast Asia*, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore, 2005, p. 105.

[83] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, p. 187.

[84] Michael Leifer, 'ASEAN's Search for Regional Order, in Chin Kin Wah and Leo Suryadinata (eds), *Michael Leifer: Selected Works on Southeast Asia*, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore, 2005, p. 101.

was signed in Paris on 23 October 1991, with initiatives sponsored by Jakarta such as the JIMs and other informal meetings about Kampuchea, ASEAN attained international recognition. ASEAN initiatives on the Kampuchean conflict shaped its reputation as a distinctive regional entity that manifested the existence of regional society in Southeast Asia.

Another important contribution from Indonesia was the practice of diplomacy in ASEAN. The case of the Kampuchea conflict enabled for the first time, the informal, incremental and non-interference methods and procedures, and a focus on confidence building measures based on consultation-consensus which were practised outside the ASEAN grouping. The fact that all conflicting Kampuchean parties and Vietnam accepted and were willing to undergo the 'cocktail party' diplomacy, inspired by the JIMs and other informal meetings, was the crowning achievement of ASEAN. Indeed, as Buszynski has argued, 'the procedures and methods that governed ASEAN were developed over the Kampuchean issue.'[85] The challenge of dealing with the Kampuchean conflict became a significant stage of development of the term of 'ASEAN Way', as the embodiment of the ASEAN principle and decision-making process, which then was widely used and gained international attention in the 1990s.[86]

6.5.   Summary

The period between1978 to 1991 was pivotal in ASEAN's development, taking the regional body from being little more than a headline without substance, to being a substantial organisation able to work as a cooperative regional grouping on diplomatic and conflict resolution. Indonesia's contribution to this outcome was pivotal, and this chapter has argued that it was motivated less by a narrow understanding of its national interests, than by its quest

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[85] Leszek Buszynski, 'Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 32, No. 9, 1992, p. 831.
[86] Taku Yukawa, 'ASEAN Way as a Symbol: An Analysist of Discourse on the ASEAN Norms,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2018, pp. 298-314.

to pursue its national interests through the construction of a regional international society. When we consider the major regional issues of this period – the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea – we can see that Indonesia did not have a strong stake in either outcome in terms of its own narrow national interest. Yet, Indonesia showed self-restraint and perseverance with a definitive agenda. Indonesia's agency in this case had been demonstrated by its willingness to accommodate other ASEAN members' interests while continued pursuing regional solutions based on its own preferred regional norms and practices. This chapter has thus argued above that Indonesia's responses to this challenge are best understood as a conscious effort to consolidate the primary institutions of a regional society, particularly sovereignty, non-interference, diplomacy and management of great power, so that Indonesia could find security and stability for itself and other members of the society of states in the region.

In the case of Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, Indonesia's indifference to the confrontational strategy pursued by ASEAN was reflected in its concerns for a regional appropriate conduct in dealing with the conflict. In this case, Indonesia was a staunch believer that regional conflict should be managed by the resident states without external interference - and thus employ a regional approach of diplomacy. Indonesia's initiatives paved the way to a final settlement for the conflict at the Paris Peace Agreement 1991. This experience not only showed ASEAN unity, coherence and its organisational capacity in dealing with protracted conflict, but it also strengthened the belief that its primary institutions of sovereignty, management of great power and diplomacy worked and would likely continue to be relevant into the future. Most importantly, Indonesia's approach to dealing with the Kampuchean conflict became one of the most important of ASEAN's distinctive approaches that in the future would become one of the most important precedents of ASEAN's approach to conflict management, often dubbed the ASEAN way of conflict resolution.

Chapter 7: The Trade Liberalisation Issue (1986-1992)

7.1. Introduction

From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s Southeast Asia's regional international society faced external challenges that tested the commitment of the member states to forge a common approach to the regional primary institutions of economic development. Among the more notable of these challenges was the global rise of trade liberalisation, which began in the early 1980s. The issue of deeper regional economic cooperation through trade liberalisation was another divisive issue, as it tested the ASEAN states' shared understanding of the rightful conduct of regional economic relations and the unity of regional organisation. The need for a more substantial regional economic cooperation, primarily on enhancing intra-ASEAN trade was more pressing than before as the result of two interrelated factors: the changing global political economy and the competing ideas of extra-regional economic cooperation between APEC and the East Asia Economic Group (EAEG). All these challenges had put ASEAN's purpose to pursue regional economic resilience in peril. It sparked fears of losing relevance for ASEAN's economic cooperation in the changing international political economy, and therefore ASEAN members was in dire need of a common approach to keep the association together.

On this issue, Indonesia was once again the outlier. Other ASEAN members were enthusiastic about deepening intra-ASEAN trade as a response to global trade liberalisation, but Indonesia was a most reluctant partner in this enterprise. From the beginning, Indonesia saw economic cooperation in the ASEAN framework as little more than a regional bulwark to reduce the pressure from major economic powers, as well as a means of increasing its own bargaining position in trading with other ASEAN countries. More so than the other members

of ASEAN, it began from a premise of emphasising national economic resilience and feared that creating an open market within the ASEAN market would harm its infant and protected industries, allowing Indonesia's market to be swamped by other member countries' products. It also feared that regional economic liberalisation would lead to a 'beggar thy neighbour' behaviour that would damage regional economic resilience. For these reasons, Indonesia agreed on the PTA signed in 1977 but insisted that it be restricted to a specific set of listed commodities, rather than creating an open market for most or all intra-ASEAN.[1]

By 1992 ASEAN could be said to have successfully survived this challenge and emerged as a stronger regional economic association. Despite many points of difference between member states, ASEAN had settled on a common and thoroughly cooperative response to the arrival of trade liberalisation through the signing of the Framework Agreement on Enhancement of Economic Cooperation in January 1992. This Framework document opened the door for regional trade liberalisation of AFTA and established Southeast Asia as a distinct and dynamically cohesive economic region.

Indonesia was not a leader in this transformation, but it played a key role by modifying its position dramatically and quickly, transforming its position from reluctant participation in regional free trade to becoming a full supporter of liberalisation arrangements. This shift was critical to the successful consolidation of the principle of regional resilience and establishing ASEAN's relevance in the process of global market integration. In the end, it was Indonesia that proposed the idea of Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT), which became the main instrument of trade liberalisation in AFTA. Indonesia's changing behaviour from being reluctant about regional trade liberalisation into a full supporter of the project was pivotal for the direction for the region as whole. The consensus on AFTA was another important episode

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[1] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1994, p. 60

that marked the consolidation of the regional international society in Southeast Asia.[2]

By monitoring Indonesia's roles, this chapter argues that Indonesia's behaviour and motives on the issue of ASEAN trade liberalisation, whether it was a driver of reform or a somewhat reluctant follower, were driven by a vision of a regional international society that rested on a well-considered approach to the pillar of regional international society of economic development. Indonesia's spin in supporting intra-ASEAN trade liberalisation in AFTA, rather than a function of domestic politics and economic interests, was driven by the changing of external environment, notably its perceived sense that extra-regional trade arrangements such as APEC or EAEG would pose existential and identity threats to ASEAN. Domestic economic and political factors were never ignored, but they were not the primary drivers in foreign policy. Furthermore, it demonstrates a willingness on the part of Indonesia – and on the part of other members of ASEAN – to avoid intra-ASEAN confrontations that risked the cohesiveness of the nascent regional international society. Thus, Indonesia's sudden turn was motivated by the desire to strengthen the habits of cooperation in economic development as well as securing ASEAN's identity and centrality that urgently needed to maintain its relevance in the changing global trend towards free trade economic areas. In this case, Indonesia's agency was shown by its readiness to change its position to accommodate other ASEAN members, thus denoting its willingness to recognise other ASEAN members' ideas towards the consolidation of the regional practice of economic cooperation.

To substantiate the argument, this chapter is divided into four parts. The first part establishes an analysis on how the issue of trade liberalisation presented a challenge to the Southeast Asian Society of States on both primary and secondary institutions. The second part

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[2] Yukawa Taku, 'Transformation of ASEAN's Image in the 1980s: The Cambodian Conflict and Economic Development of ASEAN Members Countries,' *Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2011, pp. 240-267; Michael Antolik, 'ASEAN's Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another Summit?' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1992, pp. 142-153.

analyses ASEAN's response to the issue of trade liberalisation. The third part examines Indonesia's response, and the fourth part examines Indonesia's role in consolidating the primary and secondary institution of economic development.

7.2.   Challenges

By the mid to late 1980s, two interrelated factors disturbed economic growth in individual ASEAN states: the changing international political economy and the competing ideas of extra-regional economic cooperation between APEC and EAEG. These external economic environment changes had put challenges on ASEAN states' shared understanding of the rightful conduct of regional economic relations — the concept of regional economic resilience based on national economic resilience. They also challenged the relevance of the regional organisation to facilitate economic growth and economic development of its member states. Hence, ASEAN members was in urgent need to build a common approach to address the negative impact of the changing of external economic environment.

Before discussing the changes in the mid-1980s that encouraged moves towards intra-regional trade arrangement, it is important to note the past experiences of intra-ASEAN trade cooperation. Despite being clearly stated as the first priority for the establishment of the association, the first steps towards this goal were not taken until nearly a decade had passed.[3] At the first summit in Bali 1976, ASEAN leaders agreed to lay down the framework for ASEAN economic cooperation and provided the machinery to implement it by including economic ministers through the ASEAN Economic Ministerial Meeting in the ASEAN decision making processes. The summit was also particularly important as ASEAN agreed to implement the Kansu Report that recommended the adoption of regional trade liberalisation

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[3] In the Bangkok Declaration 1967, it is stated 'that the aims and purposes of the association shall be: (1) To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations.' See, <https://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967/>, accessed 10 August 2020.

and regional scale of import-substitution industrialisation to compensate for the imbalance in the gains of intra-trade liberalisation.[4] As a result, a series of preferential tariff schemes under the PTA and joint industrial projects were implemented regionally by ASEAN shortly afterwards.

The PTA was the first attempt by ASEAN to encourage regionalised growth. The agreement was a compromise between proponents of free trade (Singapore and the Philippines) and those who supported protectionist policies (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand). Instead of an open-ended commitment to establish free trade, the PTA was implemented through intra-ASEAN tariff reductions on selected commodities as listed by each member. As four of the largest ASEAN members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) had pursued an import substitution industrialisation, the PTA was attractive to all members since it offers a prospect of a larger market to support domestic industries that enable them to attain scale economies in production and therefore offered the stability for individual growth strategies. In early 1985, nearly 20,000 commodities had been included under the PTA which seemed to indicate potential for a significant expansion of intra-ASEAN trade. However, despite the large number of commodities listed under the PTA, its impact on intra-ASEAN trade remained low, at 19% of total trade of ASEAN members, compared ASEAN members total trade to Japan (23%), the US (18%), and the European Economic Community (EEC) (13%).[5]

Various factors both economic and political were responsible for the lack of progress

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[4] In 1969, ASEAN commissioned a United Nations study to recommend a regional economic cooperation and development strategy. The study was well known as the Kansu Report as it was led by Professor G. Kansu. The report was released in 1972 and published in 1974 in Journal of Development Planning entitled 'Economic Cooperation among Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,'. See, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, p. 65.

[5] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, p.73; Tan Kong Yam, Toh Mun Heng, and Linda Low, 'ASEAN and Pacific Economic Cooperation,' *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1992, pp. 311

in intra-ASEAN trade.[6] The competitive character of ASEAN economies, and their lack of complementarity, was the fundamental problem. Leaving aside the manufacturing and service-oriented Singapore economy, the four ASEAN states were producing similar primary commodities, such as tin, rubber, palm oil, rice, copra, coffee and other mineral products such as oil and natural gas. In terms of secondary products, the four members were pursuing import-substitution industrialisation, which protected selected industries – mainly the manufacture of consumer goods for domestic consumption. More importantly, the prime markets for ASEAN exports were the industrialised-developed countries rather than in the region itself. As Naya and Plummer have noted, up until 1987, if petroleum was excluded intra-ASEAN trade was far less than one-fifth of total ASEAN trade.[7]

Politically, a similar economic character created obstacles to reaching a consensus decision because of the adverse impact on individual members' short-term national interests. Indonesia for example, was cautious about the PTA scheme on the grounds that it would result in an imbalance of benefits amongst members, since ASEAN states were at different stages of industrialisation.[8] As Ravenhill has noted, by 1984 trade in products granted preferences under the PTA accounted for only 0.04% of Indonesia's import from the rest of ASEAN, while of the thousands of items for which Indonesia had nominally granted preferences, only nine were actually imported.[9] However, Indonesia's protectionist tendency was unchallengeable due to

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[6] For comprehensive analysis on the inertia of intra-ASEAN trade, see, Jose L Tongzon, *The Economies of Southeast Asia: Before and After the Crisis*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2002, especially Chapter 3; Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, 'ASEAN's External Trade Relations in 1987: Entering a Growing Environmental Turbulence,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1987, pp. 113-119; Seiji Naya and Michael G. Plummer, 'ASEAN Economic Co-operation in the New International Environment,' *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1991, pp. 261-276; Janamitra Devan, 'The ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement: Some Problems, Ex Ante Result, and a Multipronged Approach to Future Intra-ASEAN Trade Development,' *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1987, pp. 197-212; Bernardo M. Villegas, 'The Challenge to ASEAN Economic Co-operation,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1987, pp. 120-128.

[7] Seiji Naya and Michael G. Plummer, 'ASEAN Economic Co-operation in the New International Environment,' p. 264.

[8] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, p. 92.

[9] John Ravenhill, 'Economic Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Changing Incentives,' *Asian* Survey, Vol. 35, No. 9, 1995, p. 853.

ASEAN's consensus decision making process. This lack of political will was attributed to the focus of individual members on their own national interests even as they were avoiding any attempt to push the pace of trade cooperation for fear it might lead to unnecessary friction.[10]

By the mid-1980s, two factors coalesced to open up the debate on the promotion of regional trade liberalisation: (1) the changing international political economy environment; and (2) the competition of ideas on extra regional trade arrangement between APEC and EAEG.

7.2.1. Changing Global Political Economy.

Throughout the 1980s, ASEAN's role in facilitating economic growth and economic development for its members was challenged by the changing of global economy. The world economic slowdown in 1970s followed by economic recession and international debt crisis in 1982, the purportedly growing of protectionist policy among developed countries particularly from the US and the EEC and the deadlock on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) round of negotiations, had put pressures on ASEAN countries to reconsider their economic development policy as well as intra-ASEAN trade cooperation. Concurrently, the international financial institutions became more influential in supplying capital for economic development, while international support for development associated in the North-South capital transfer was in decline. All ASEAN countries needed to maintain and increase their exports while attempted to capture the opportunity offered by international financial institutions, particularly the flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) from Japan and the East Asian New Industrialising Countries (NICs).

The contraction of the economies of ASEAN's Western trading partners caused by

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[10] Bernardo M. Villegas, 'The Challenge to ASEAN Economic Co-operation,' pp. 122-123; Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, 'ASEAN's External Trade Relations in 1987: Entering a Growing Environmental Turbulence,' p. 117; John Ravenhill, 'Economic Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Changing Incentives,' pp. 850-851.

global economic recession in 1982 hit the Southeast Asian region hard and prompted regional

economic recession in 1985-1986. Maizels notes that the commodity prices fell around 35% in

the period between 1970-1980 and 1986-1988.[11] This was caused by the combination of the

slow-down of commodity demand while at the same the commodity supply was in sharp rise,

the invention of synthetic products and technology innovations that changed the economic

structures in industrialised countries.[12] This also resulted in the continued slowdown of global

economy growth, which was averaging from 5% in 1960s, then declined to 4% in the second

half of 1970s and dropped again to only 2% in the first half of the 1980s.[13] The downwards

trends in commodity prices exposed the vulnerability of developing countries, including

ASEAN economies as a commodity-dependent exporter to developed countries. As Estanislao

and Kng have argued, as a result all ASEAN economies suffered a downturn in GDP growth

sharp fall of export growth in 1985 although in different rates (see Table 7.1).[14]

Table 7. 1 GDP and Export growth rates of ASEAN Countries 1984-1986

	GDP Growth rates (%)			Export growth (%)		
	1984	**1985**	**1986**	**1984**	**1985**	**1986**
Indonesia	6.5	1.0	3.0	10.8	-11.1	-2.7
Malaysia	7.3	4.0	4.5	19.3	3.0	5.0
Philippines	-5.5	-3.5	2.0	7.7	-7.0	7.0
Singapore	8.2	-3.1	1.5	10.2	-6.0	-2.0
Thailand	6.0	4.0	4.2	16.4	0.1	5.0

Source: Adapted from J.P. Estanislao and Chng Meng Kng, 'ASEAN Economies in the Mid-1980s (with Comment),' p. 2 & 3.

The prospect of export downturn was also aggravated by the trade policy adjustment of

many developed countries, particularly the US and the EEC, in response to their trade deficits.

For example, ASEAN countries, along with other developing countries, faced long term

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[11] Alfred Maizels, *Commodities in Crisis: The Commodity Crisis in 1980s and the International Political Economy of International Commodity Policies*, Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 1992, pp. 9-10.
[12] Alfred Maizels, *Commodities in Crisis: The Commodity Crisis in 1980s and the International Political Economy of International Commodity Policies*, pp. 14-17.
[13] Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, 'ASEAN's External Trade Relations in 1987: Entering a Growing Environmental Turbulence,' p. 118.
[14] J.P. Estanislao and Chng Meng Kng, 'ASEAN Economies in the Mid-1980s (with Comment),' *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1986, p. 2.

impacts from a string of new trade barriers erected by the US, such as the 1985 Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) (which allowed the US to impose a two-year quota for all textile products), the 1985 Food Security Act (which enabled the US to subsidise American farmers), and the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (which allowed the US to examine trade with countries with large surpluses with the US and impose sanctions for supposed unfair trade practices).[15] ASEAN was fearful of the uncertain future of its export following the new non-tariff barriers imposed by the US.

Similarly, the EEC had begun imposing non-tariff protectionist barriers since the 1960s, particularly in the agriculture sector. Since the implementation of Common Agricultural Policy in 1962, the EEC had been open for the intra-EEC agricultural trade but restricted the quantity of extra-EEC trade. The EC also imposed a MFA in 1974 to allow it to adjust its level of imports from developing countries.[16] In 1980s, The EC also introduced quotas on many other products such as vehicle, footwear, electronic equipment and toys. Although ASEAN export was less dependent on the EEC market, such non-tariff barriers would hamper ASEAN's options to promote its export-led development strategies.[17]

The changing international political economy also opened new opportunities for developing countries to pursue economic development. The opportunities arose from the growing importance of capital movements as the driving force of the global economy. The importance of mobile capital took on new importance after the signing of the Plaza Accord in September 1985. The Plaza Accord of September 1985 was an agreement by the G-5

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[15] Alice D. Ba, *(Re) Negotiation East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism and The Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 2009, pp. 134-135; Leszek Buszynski, 'ASEAN: A Changing Regional Role,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 27, No. 7, 1987, pp. 777-780.

[16] Since 1 January 2005, the agreement on clothing and textile was regulated under the WTO. See, Christoph Ernst and Alfons Hernández Ferrer and Daan Zult, 'The End of Multifibre Arrangement and its Implication for Trade and Employment,' *Employment Strategy Paper*, No. 16/ 2005, <http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_elm/documents/publication/wcms_114030.pdf>, accessed 20 November 2020.

[17] Seiji Naya and Michael G. Plummer, 'ASEAN Economic Co-operation in the New International Environment,' p. 266.

industrialized nations — France, West Germany, Japan, Britain and the US — that called for the depreciation of the US Dollar against the Japanese Yen and the German Mark in order to reduce the US trade deficit.[18] As a result of the Plaza Accord, the Japanese Yen appreciate against the US dollar, from average ¥235 per US dollar to ¥167 in 1986. One of the effects of the yen appreciation implied by the Plaza Accord, was that Japanese companies needed to find lower-cost production sites. Japanese companies relocated their direct investments overseas, notably to Southeast Asia. As Bowles and Maclean note, Japan's FDI had grown at annual average rate at 62% in 1985-1989 period, which was largely distributed to the Asia region. The Asian region's share of Japanese FDI that was directed to developing countries had risen from 50% in 1975-1979, to 80% in the period between 1985-1988.[19] Concurrently, the rise in value of their currencies and the ending of the general system of preferences tariff by the US at the end of the1980s had driven the NICs such as South Korea, Hongkong and Taiwan to relocate their labour-intensive manufacturing industry (i.e., garments, footwear, toys, consumer electronics) to the ASEAN-4 countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.[20] As Bowles had noted, FDI share of the NICs in the ASEAN-4 increased from 20% in 1980 to 28% in the early of 1990s.[21]

In the mid-1980s, these four ASEAN states began to adopt FDI-friendly economic policies to replace their nationalist-protectionist policies (noting that Singapore had already implemented this strategy).[22] As a result of this trend, the speedy rise of FDI inflow to ASEAN

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[18] For example, Jeffrey Frankel, 'The Plaza Accord, 30 Years Later,' NBER Working Paper no. 21813, December 2015.

[19] Paul Bowles and Brian MacLean, 'Understanding Trade Bloc Formation: The Case of the ASEAN Free Trade Area,' *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1996, p. 333.

[20] Paul Bowles and Brian MacLean, 'Understanding Trade Bloc Formation: The Case of the ASEAN Free Trade Area,' p. 334.

[21] Paul Bowles, 'ASEAN, AFTA and the 'New Regionalism',' *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 70. No. 2, 1997, p. 231.

[22] Alasdair Bowie and Daniel Unger, *The Politics of Open Economies: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997; Masami Ishida, 'Attracting FDI: Experiences of East Asian Countries,' in Hank Lim and Yasuhiro Yamada (eds), *Economic Reforms in Myanmar: Pathways and Prospects*, BRC Research Report No.10, Bangkok Research Center, IDE-JETRO, Bangkok, 2012, pp. 91-94.

countries facilitated the shifting economic development strategy of the four ASEAN members into FDI-driven export led growth. As shown by Bowles and Maclean, the inflow of FDI to Malaysia increased dramatically from US$ 934 million in 1980 to US$ 3,545 million. Thailand followed with inward flow of FDI increasing from US$187 million in 1980 to US$ 2,014 million in 1991; then Indonesia, which rose from US$180 million in 1981 to US$1,482 million; while the Philippines increased steadily from US$ -102 million in 1980 to US$544 million in 1991. In total, the inflows of FDI to the ASEAN-4 grew significantly from US$1,195 million in 1980 to US$7,494 million in 1991. If Singapore is included, the total figure grew rapidly from US$2,233 in 1980 to US$11,078 million.[23]

The flood of new FDI not only offered Southeast Asia much-needed capital, but it also encouraged regional economic integration through trade-investment linkage. Many multinational corporations from Japan, the US, and other European countries had been implementing a regional division of labour by locating different activities in different neighbouring host countries according to each country's comparative advantages. In Southeast Asia, these multinational companies built regionally integrated production complexes — regional operations which are vertically integrated in ASEAN region.[24] One of the implications of the regional division of labour was the increasing intra-firm trade arranged by multinational corporations. According to Naya and Imada, although intra-ASEAN trade was low, the composition of the manufacturing sector increased from around 28% in 1980 to just above 61% in 1990, which arguably demonstrates the consequences of the intra-trade firm and multinational corporation activities.[25]

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[23] Paul Bowles and Brian MacLean, 'Understanding Trade Bloc Formation: The Case of the ASEAN Free Trade Area,' p. 335.

[24] Linda Y.C. Lim, 'ASEAN's New Mode of Economic Cooperation,' in David Wurfel and Bruce Barton (eds), *Southeast Asia in the New World Order: The Political Economy of a Dynamic Region*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 1996, p. 31.

[25] Seiji Naya and Pearl Imada, 'The Long and Winding Road Ahead for AFTA,' in Pearl Imada and Seiji Naya (eds), *AFTA: The Way Ahead*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1992, p. 57

Individual efforts by ASEAN member countries to attract FDI, however, faced a new reality of fierce global competition for scarce global capital. In the late 1980s it became apparent that ASEAN had to face the prospect of a European Single Market, which came into effect on 1 January 1993, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which entered into force in 1994, and the emerging low-cost production centres such as China, Eastern Europe and Indochina. The emergence of trading blocs such as the European Single Market and NAFTA threatened ASEAN's export to those regions due to the implementation of new non-tariff barriers and new competition from commodity exports from the members of those trade blocs. ASEAN was also concerned over competition for FDI, since the other blocs offered bigger integrated markets.[26] In addition to the worry over the emergence of competing trading blocs, by the late of 1980s, ASEAN countries were concerned over the deadlock in the Uruguay Round negotiations that began in September 1986. If the Uruguay Round ended in failure, ASEAN would need an alternative plan to anticipate the breakdown of the multilateral trading system.[27]

The changing international political economy renewed serious efforts at fostering intra-ASEAN trade. There was an awareness for ASEAN to forge a coordinated policy to attract foreign investment and to consolidate export-led growth strategy to compensate for a fall of commodity prices and replace import-substitutions industrialisation strategy. Together, ASEAN could offer complementary advantages – a combination of cheap labour, raw material in ASEAN-4 with high skills and good infrastructure (i.e., Singapore) – to multinational corporations to proliferate their operations and help to integrate industries of ASEAN countries.

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[26] Jose L Tongzon, *The Economies of Southeast Asia: Before and After the Crisis*, especially Chapter 7; Paul Bowles and Brian MacLean, 'Understanding Trade Bloc Formation: The Case of the ASEAN Free Trade Area,' p. 336; Seiji Naya and Michael G. Plummer, 'ASEAN Economic Co-operation in the New International Environment,' p. 269

[27] Chia Siow Yue, 'The ASEAN Free Trade Area, *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1998, p. 218.

7.2.1. Competition

ASEAN faced another challenge from the growing ideas of extra-regional economic arrangements which threatened its relevance as an organising principle of regional economic cooperation in Southeast Asia. The global economic uncertainty, the emergence of regional trading arrangements in Europe and North America, and the deadlock of the Uruguay Round due to prolonged debates on agricultural subsidies in developed countries also sparked debate among ASEAN members on the necessity of establishing wider regional economic cooperation in Asia. Two rival vehicles for such cooperation emerged as proposals: APEC and EAEG. Both ideas were directly related to the deadlock of the Uruguay Round and the changing trade policies in developed countries, namely the US and the EEC, which generated the apprehension of being excluded from key markets and global trade arrangements. These two ideas however, challenged ASEAN as the regional organisation aimed at facilitating economic cooperation, as there were opinions that ASEAN itself was no longer adequate to face the changing of global economy.[28]

The idea of APEC was first publicly proposed by former Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke in Seoul in January 1989. It envisioned a market-led economic integration in the Asia-Pacific in response to the growing interdependence of the Asia-Pacific economies and the emergence of regional trade blocs in Europe and North America. During the ten months until the establishment of APEC in November 1989, ASEAN was unsure whether or not it should participate in it, torn between the opportunities and challenges on offer. APEC initially planned that its membership would include six ASEAN states, plus Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Canada and the US. The idea provided the opportunities for ASEAN to have

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[28] Alice D. Ba, *(Re) Negotiation East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism and The Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, p. 139.

continued access to several developed countries in the Asia Pacific region. In particular, the market access to the US was desirable in the light of the US protectionist trade policy since the mid-1980s. However, the prospect of the involvement of several other developed countries, particularly the US, also inflamed ASEAN uneasiness of it being dominated by a larger economic arrangement. Prior to APEC, ASEAN had already been involved in the existing two-track Asia Pacific economic dialogues, such as Pacific Basin Economic Council (formed in 1967), Pacific Trade and Development Conference (established in 1969) and Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (formed in 1980s). However, despite the benefits of the involvement in the Asia-Pacific cooperation, ASEAN in the 1980s was not interested in institutionalising the existing cooperation into governmental or regional organisation. ASEAN feared that great power dominance would result from such an economic association in the Asia-Pacific, with the US and Japan as more powerful actors, they would overwhelm the ASEAN states across the broader organisation. [29] At this stage however, further institutionalisation of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific could pose challenges to ASEAN as a key regional organisation in Southeast Asia, as well as its primary principle of economic cooperation as the basis of regional stabilisation. Hence, the idea of APEC gave ASEAN only a difficult choice between reaping the benefits associated with the Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, or as was their persistent concern, being dominated by a greater economic power.

In December 1990, just after the suspension of the Uruguay Round, Mahathir Mohammad proposed the EAEG. This idea was conveyed in Mahathir's meeting with the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng in Kuala Lumpur, projecting a pooling resources of East Asia economies into a formal trade and investment bloc to act as a counterbalance to the EEC and

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[29] Donald Crone, 'Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of The Pacific Political Economy,' *World Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1993, pp. 515-517; Alice D. Ba, *(Re) Negotiation East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism and The Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, pp. 140-141.

NAFTA.[30] It envisioned an exclusive East Asia regionalism led by Japan, as the country was seen to be able to offer an alternative leadership in the face of the US changing trade policy and the inadequacy of individual ASEAN economies. Japan was also seen to be able to provide public goods for advancing economic cooperation in East Asia. Hence, the explicit assumption of the EAEG was that ASEAN was no more sufficient to coordinate economic cooperation in the region in facing global economic change. Other developments also provided reasons to think beyond Southeast Asia and particularly to the East Asia region. First, the growing importance of the role of the NICs in boosting investment in the region, and secondly, the rise of the Chinese economy also gained fascination as an engine of growth for ASEAN economy. The EAEG also envisaged the spirit of independence from Asia's voice against what he defined as the North's dictate of economic policy in the region, which could not be materialised within a formation such as APEC due to the involvement of the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.[31] As indicated by the name, its projected members were East Asian states and therefore excluded the US and Australia.

For ASEAN, these two ideas confronted the association with the question of how the existence of ASEAN should be preserved and what role ASEAN could play in the growing contestation definition of region in Asia Pacific.[32] The possibility of the emergence of such an economic-trading bloc in the future, forced ASEAN to reconsider its own economic and trading arrangements agenda to anticipate the changes that might occur in its extra-regional context. This became urgent amidst the idea of the extra-regional trading arrangements of both APEC and EAEG and the fear that they would marginalise ASEAN in regional economic affairs as

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[30] Linda Low, 'The East Asian Economic Grouping,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1991, pp. 375-382.

[31] Richard Higgott and Richard Stubbs, 'Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific,' *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1995, pp. 523-524.

[32] Richard Higgott and Richard Stubbs, 'Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific,' pp. 516-517; Alice D. Ba, *(Re) Negotiation East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism and The Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, pp. 139-152.

well as damaged the relations between ASEAN members due to their divergent position on these ideas.[33]

7.3.   ASEAN's Response

As early as 1982, at the Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in June, ASEAN expressed its concerns about continuing recession on industrialised countries and their growing protectionist trends that affected the North-South dialogue for international economic recovery.[34] This was followed by the appointment of a high-level ASEAN Task Force consisting of three members of each ASEAN member state, chaired by Anand Panyarachun (who became Thailand's Prime Minister in 1991-1993). One of the important recommendations from the Task Force was the concept of the AFTA. Narongchai Akrasanee, one of the ASEAN Task Force members from Thailand, testified that the idea of AFTA, however, gained little interest until the end of the 1980s. He wrote:

> […] when ASEAN was about to deliberate on these proposed economic cooperation schemes, the world economic event turned positive. Oil prices fell and interest rate fell. The Plaza Accord of September 1985 led to depreciation of the US dollar […] exchange rate turns in favour of ASEAN. these developments led to economic recovery in most of ASEAN countries started in 1986/1987. By the time of ASEAN Summit in 1987, there was little interests in ASEAN economic cooperation schemes. This lack of interests

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[33] Paul Bowles and Brian MacLean, 'Understanding Trade Bloc Formation: The Case of the ASEAN Free Trade Area,' p. 340

[34] 'Joint Communique of The Fifteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Singapore, 14-16 June 1982,' <https://asean.org/?static_post=joint-communique-of-the-fifteenth-asean-ministerial-meeting-singapore-14-16-june-1982>, accessed 20 November 2020.

continued until 1990.[35]

Indeed, by the middle of the 1980s, ASEAN member states were preoccupied with their own internal economic policy adjustment to capture the booming inflow of FDI. For example, in 1986 Malaysia deregulated the FDI policy by approving 100% foreign ownership in projects that exported 50% or more its production and employed at least 350 full-time Malay workers. It replaced the 1975 regulation that stipulated the majority ownership should be in the hands of Malaysian capital (up to 70% in extractive industry with certain share to *Bumiputera* or indigenous Malaysia (up to 30% in extractive industry).[36] Similarly, Thailand scrapped the 1972 'alien business law' that classified business into 3 three sectors and prohibited foreign investors, except in several sectors of services and manufactures with prior permission from related authorities. Starting in 1983, Thailand deregulated foreign ownership regulation, and in 1986 it approved 100% ownership if at least 80% of the product was exported.[37] Starting in 1985, Indonesia deregulated its foreign ownership policy that required a foreign ownership maximum of 49% with an initial domestic share of at least 20% at the establishment and an increase to 51% within ten years. Through the December Package in 1987, Indonesia approved an initial domestic share of at least 5%, to be increased to 20% in ten years and completed domestic share of 51% in 15 to 20 years.[38]

Additionally, ASEAN's biggest concern during the period between 1985-1986 was the changing trade policies of the industrialised world, in particular the US. Encountered with its own economic slowdown and increasing trade deficits with Southeast and East Asian countries,

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[35] Narongchai Akrasanee, 'ASEAN in the Past Thirty-Years, Lesson for Economic Cooperation,' in (Simon S. C. Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao, Hadi Soesastro (eds), *Reinventing ASEAN*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2001, pp. 37-38

[36] For example, Prema-chandra Athukorala, 'Malaysia Economy in Three Crises,' ANU Working Paper in Trade and Development, No. 2010/ 12, October 2010.

[37] Masami Ishida, 'Attracting FDI: Experiences of East Asian Countries,' pp. 92-93.

[38] For example, George Fane, 'Deregulation in Indonesia: Two Steps Forwards, One Step Back,' *Agenda*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1996, pp. 241-350.

the US made important changes in its trade policy. Under the Reagan Administration, the US sought to adjust its trade policy with greater emphasis on free market aimed at creating an equal and fairer terms of trade, which in conflict with Southeast Asian expectation for preferential treatment. For example, the US pressed the negotiation for a more stringent MFA in Geneva in July 1985. Under the new 1985 MFA, the US was allowed to negotiate bilateral agreement with textile exporters. The new MFA also allowed the importing countries to impose two-years quotas on all varieties of textiles, instead of the previous one-year restriction. The new MFA in particular, impacted Indonesia, because the MFA countries (the US, the EEC-12, and Canada, Norway, Finland, and Austria) were the main destinations of Indonesia's clothing and textile exports.[39] Further, the US approved the Food and Security Act in December 1985, which allowed the country to create a series of price support schemes for a variety of food products, such as rice and sugar by giving subsidies to American farmers. This new act irritated Thailand as a major producer of rice. For ASEAN countries, the changing US policy had removed the basis of preferential treatment of developing economies by raising, as stated by Thailand Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila, 'a demand for reciprocity where reciprocity was not required previously.'[40]

In response, an ASEAN special meeting was held in Bali, in April 1986. The meeting was to commemorate the 'Tenth Anniversary of the First ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting' as well as took the opportunity to have a meeting with President Reagan. In that meeting, ASEAN appealed to the US to support a price stabilisation scheme that would strengthen the price of commodities. ASEAN also requested greater access to the US market through preferential treatment under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). ASEAN

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[39] Ilyas Saad, 'The Impact of Multifibre Arrangement on Indonesian Clothing Export: A Multi-Country Trade Model,' *Economic Division Working Paper*, No. 93/3 Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1993, pp. 3-4.

[40] Quoted in Leszek Buszynski, 'ASEAN: A Changing Regional Role,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 27, No. 7, 1987, p. 780.

tried to convince the US of the importance of economic development in upholding the stability of the region, in which continued support from developed countries, mainly the US was central in maintaining both regional economic and political stability, but the US responded that price stability should be determined by market forces. Moreover, in response to ASEAN's request for greater market access under the GSP, the US demanded in return, that ASEAN open up its market for American products. [41]

The year 1986 was one of the important turning points in ASEAN economic cooperation. The changes to the international economy had seriously threatened ASEAN countries rapid growth. Economic declines and perception of growing protectionist in the developed countries eroded trade and financial flow, while the price of commodities was at the lowest point since 1950s. The downturns of economic growth of its members had raised criticisms and awareness as well as appeals for more intensive economic cooperation from both ASEAN leaders and private sector bodies.

Earlier in February 1985, Mahathir Mohammad, in front of the ASEAN Economic Ministers lamented that ASEAN's performance in economic and trade cooperation was 'mediocre or worse' attributing it to a lack of serious commitment on the part of the member states.[42] In April 1986, Indonesia Foreign Minister, Mochtar requested for a comprehensive review of ASEAN economic cooperation and called for an open discussion on how far ASEAN has succeeded in this area of cooperation.[43] Then, somewhat candid and critical remarks came from the newly elected President Corazon Aquino of the Philippines. Perhaps due to a lack of experience in the ASEAN circle, in her opening address to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in June 1986, in Manila, she stated:

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[41] Leszek Buszynski, 'ASEAN: A Changing Regional Role,' pp. 777-781.
[42] Hans H. Indorf, 'ASEAN in Extra-Regional Perspective,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1987, p. 88.
[43] Donald Crone, 'The ASEAN Summit of 1987: Searching for New Dynamism,' *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 1988, p. 40.

It is lamentable that, despite our experience, we continue to look outwards
from the Region for the revival of its progress and the fulfillment of its
promise […]. After 19 years of existence, ASEAN should already be
evaluating the impact of regional economic cooperation instead of endlessly
discussing how to get it off the ground. […] it is time to re-examine our
present position, consider how far short of ASEAN's goals we have fallen,
and renew more firmly our commitment to achieve those goals.[44]

Although this did not sit too well with ASEAN's cautious verbiage style of public
speaking, Aquino's statement expressed the awareness of ASEAN's leaders. As Crone
observes, in 1986, there was a widespread recognition among many of ASEAN's Foreign
Ministers of the need to look to ASEAN's own resources for economic growth through regional
cooperation rather than depending on developed countries.[45] The criticisms and appeals also
came from private sector bodies. For example, the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and
Industry, in a meeting in Jakarta, July 1986, criticised the slow progress of ASEAN intra-trade
and investment and urged ASEAN to take measures towards integrating ASEAN markets.[46]

The year 1986 also saw recommendations and a proposal to address the slow pace of
economic cooperation. Two important ideas of deepening economic cooperation came up. The
first was the idea of an ASEAN common market. This idea was firstly spelled out by Thailand's
Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj in 1985 when he called for an ASEAN Summit to draw up an
ASEAN economic integration based on three phases of development—free trade area, custom

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[44] **'**Speech of Her Excellency Corazon C. Aquino President of the Philippines At the ASEAN Conference, 23 June 1986,' <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1986/06/23/speech-of-president-corazon-aquino-at-the-asean-conference/>**,** accessed 29 November 2020.
[45] Donald Crone, 'The ASEAN Summit of 1987: Searching for New Dynamism,' p. 42.
[46] Hans Christoph Rieger, 'ASEAN Economic Cooperation: Running in Circles or New Directions?' *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 1987, p. 38.

union, and common market.[47] The idea was supported by Malaysia and also from private sectors, particularly the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry on the grounds that ASEAN needed a consensus to envision the future path of economic integration.[48] However, Indonesia objected to the idea of a common market as it was concerned that a common market could be interpreted in a more stringent sense, which not only referred to the removal of internal trade barriers and establishing a common external market, but also the opening of free labour mobility and capital.[49] Singapore and Brunei also reportedly rejected the idea of a common market, as they feared, as expressed by Prince Mohammad Bolkiah of Brunei, that the small states would have to go along with the view of the large states.[50]

The second idea as an alternative for a common market was a free trade area. In the Third ASEAN Summit held in December 1987 in Manila, the issue of intra-ASEAN trade liberalisation dominated the economic cooperation agenda for several reasons. First, intra-ASEAN trade would link and have impacts on all ASEAN major economic cooperation agenda of ASEAN Industrial Projects, ASEAN Industrial Complementation, and ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture, as these cooperation agendas led to regional specialisation and naturally, they have to trade the products they produced. Secondly, many individual governments, along with the ASEAN Task Force, regional think tanks, and private sector bodies such as the ASEAN CCI advocated ASEAN economic integration. They saw that formalisation of a comprehensive intra-ASEAN trade became crucial as the regional expression of economic cooperation. As regards to the free trade area, there were many proposals that suggested a road map to towards a free trade are for ASEAN countries.[51] For example, the Economic Research Unit of the

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[47] Hans Christoph Rieger, 'The Market Economies of Southeast Asia in 1985: ASEAN pays the Price,' *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 1985, p. 27.
[48] Hans Christoph Rieger, 'The Market Economies of Southeast Asia in 1985: ASEAN pays the Price,' p. 28.
[49] Donald Crone, 'The ASEAN Summit of 1987: Searching for New Dynamism,' p. 43; Hans Christoph Rieger, 'ASEAN Economic Cooperation: Running in Circles or New Directions?' p. 42.
[50] Donald Crone, 'The ASEAN Summit of 1987: Searching for New Dynamism,' p. 43.
[51] Hans Christoph Rieger, 'ASEAN Economic Cooperation: Running in Circles or New Directions?' pp. 42-43; Donald Crone, 'The ASEAN Summit of 1987: Searching for New Dynamism,' pp. 43-45.

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, in March 1987, proposed the AFTA, through a gradually harmonising custom union with internal free trade and common external tariff Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, linked to Singapore and Brunei by a free trade area limited to ASEAN goods. Another proposal advanced by the ASEAN Task Force suggested the development of a free trade area by using the existing PTA and minimising the exclusion lists. However, the 1987 ASEAN Summit did not produce a consensus on the future economic and trade cooperation. The idea of a free trade area, although widely discussed, was still unacceptable for some ASEAN members, particularly Indonesia.

By 1989, the rapid external economic changes had created a nearly unstoppable drive towards regional trade liberalisation. It provided the impetus for ASEAN to hasten to strengthen economic cooperation and to take a new and strong initiatives. At their meeting in July 1989, ASEAN Foreign Ministers raised their concerns about the emergence of trading blocs and other regional economic arrangements, as well as the adverse effects on developing countries of the macroeconomic policies of some developed countries.[52] The increased integration in European states in 1992 and the projected formation of NAFTA in 1993 had sparked fear among ASEAN member states that trade and investment would be diverted towards the two regions,[53] but none expressed a pressing need for ASEAN to respond, instead simply calling for continued support for the GATT Uruguay Round.

Furthermore, the competing ideas of APEC and EAEG in its own backyard intensified ASEAN to seek a further response. The two ideas of extra-regional economic cooperation posed a huge risk of ASEAN losing identity and lost its relevance, as the dynamic regional economic cooperation will be controlled by extra regional great powers. These circumstances

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[52] 'Joint Communique of the 22nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Bandar Seri Begawan, 3 – 4 July 1989,' <https://asean.org/?static_post=joint-communique-of-the-22nd-asean-ministerial-meeting-bandar-seri-begawan-3-4-july-1989>, accessed 25 November 2020.

[53] Paul Bowles and Brian MacLean, 'Understanding Trade Bloc Formation: The Case of the ASEAN Free Trade Area,' p. 336.

represented a sense of dependency, insecurity and existential threat that threatened ASEAN regional resilience.[54] The joint communique of ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1990 stated: 'The Foreign Ministers felt that it was imperative for ASEAN, in taking cognizance of the above developments, to adopt a more flexible and forward-looking approach to prepare itself for the challenges of the 1990s, and in particular to strengthen itself and intensify intra-ASEAN cooperation.'[55] This statement marked a realisation for ASEAN countries that the extra-regional arrangement should not undermine ASEAN's existence.

The idea of APEC put ASEAN in dilemma. On the one hand, there was considerable concern that ASEAN would be diluted in a larger arrangement dominated by great economic powers, mainly the US. Moreover, the spirit of ASEAN economic cooperation to respond to the changing international political economy was to lessen its dependence and vulnerability on developed countries' economies. On the other hand, APEC promised a larger external market access, which could become the remedy in the time of growing trading blocs. To resolve the dilemma, in February 1990, ASEAN's Joint Ministerial Meeting in Kuching Malaysia adopted a common position on its participation in APEC, which became known as the Kuching consensus. The consensus was affirmed again at ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1990,[56] and contained several principles such as maintaining ASEAN identity and cohesion in APEC, insisting that APEC should not become a trading bloc but an open multilateral trading system, and that APEC should be based on a flexible and inclusive framework, without a new formal body.[57] To reassure ASEAN members, APEC finally agreed to adopt the ASEAN style of a

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[54] Alice D. Ba, *(Re) Negotiation East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism and The Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, pp. 137-138.

[55] 'Joint Communique of the 23rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Jakarta, 24-25 July 1990,' <https://asean.org/?static_post=joint-communique-of-the-23rd-asean-ministerial-meeting-jakarta-24-25-july-1990>, accessed 25 November 2020.

[56] See, '1990 Joint Communique of the 23rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, issued in Jakarta on 25 July 1990,' p. 9, available at <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1990-23rd-AMMJC.pdf>, 25 November 2020.

[57] For detail Kuching consensus see, Hadi Soesatro, 'ASEAN and APEC: Do Concentric Circle Work?' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1995, pp. 483-484

loose institutionalism such as informal decision making, voluntarism, and consensus.[58] As a result, in 1990, APEC turned into a loose consultative forum for high level economic representative of countries in Asia Pacific and ASEAN's concern of being absorbed by extra-regional economic cooperation was relieved.

ASEAN's success in positioning its relations with APEC exaggerated the need to address its intra-ASEAN trade arrangement. Renewed support for the idea of a free trade area emerged when in 1991, Thailand Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun proposed the plan which called for the implementation to be in ten years. This idea received endorsement from Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. Surprisingly, Indonesia, which has long been reluctant to open markets, proposed the CEPT, a scheme aimed at phasing down an intra-regional tariff to be applied to goods originating within ASEAN with the range tariff rate of 0-5%.[59] Under this scheme, ASEAN member countries could set out comprehensive timetables for the phased reduction of intra ASEAN tariff on nominated goods. Indonesia's idea on CEPT was developed from the PTA, but different in several features. First, while the PTA was aimed to reduce tariff based on individual item (item-by-item), the CEPT reduced the tariff collectively. Second, the PTA allowed differences between a preferential tariff rate, while the CEPT applied a common tariff. Third, with the PTA, the tariff was granted only by the nominating country and there was no reciprocity, but under the CEPT scheme there was a reciprocity, once the good is accepted under CEPT, all member countries must provide the preferential tariff.[60] Indonesia's idea on CEPT marked a change in its regional economic and trade policy. As will be analysed in the next section, Indonesia's important shift in accepting the idea of free trade area was pivotal for ASEAN to arrive at agreement on the intra-ASEAN

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[58] Mark Beeson, *Institution of the Asia Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and Beyond*, Routledge, London, 2009, pp. 42-43.
[59] For detail see, 'Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA),< https://asean.org/?static_post=agreement-on-the-common-effective-preferential-tariff-cept-scheme-for-the-asean-free-trade-area-afta>, accessed 25 November 2020.
[60] Hadi Soesastro, 'The ASEAN Free Trade Area: A Critical Assessment,' *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2002, pp. 34-35.

trade liberalisation. As a result, ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1991 recommended the move towards AFTA to be discussed at the coming summit in Singapore in 1992.

Moreover, in 1991, differences among ASEAN members related to the competing ideas between APEC and EAEG finally reached a compromise. Malaysia was advocating for EAEG, but faced strong opposition from the US, which put pressure on Japan and South Korea to rebuff this idea.[61] In any case, Japan, which was projected to be the leader of the EAEG, was ambivalent since it would damage its relations with the US. Within ASEAN, Indonesia was more inclined to go with APEC, since Indonesia was more interested in external market access rather than a regional trade arrangement. Singapore also preferred APEC, as APEC was more inclusive with the involvement of the US, Canada and Australia.[62] A compromise was reached at the ASEAN Economic Ministerial Meeting in October 1991, in which Malaysia modified its proposal into the East Asia Economic Caucus, which would be no more than a forum for ASEAN members to prepare for meetings in the APEC forum.

Finally, the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992 ratified the 'Singapore Summit Declaration of 1992,' and consisted of an 'Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area,' and the 'Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation.' ASEAN leaders also had reached an agreement to implement the AFTA scheme with the ultimate effective tariffs ranging from 0% to 5% within 15 years, beginning from 1 January 1993. However, the CEPT scheme allowed any members which were unable to participate in line with agreed timetables to delay the implementation. The AFTA agreement was an important milestone in ASEAN economic cooperation as it marked a catalyst for a greater economic integration. It also renewed

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[61] Richard Higgott and Richard Stubbs, 'Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific,' p. 522.
[62] Michael Antolik, 'ASEAN's Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another Summit?' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1992, p. 146.

the legitimacy of the principle of regional resilience in responding to the challenges in their external environment.

7.4. Indonesia's Response

From Indonesia's perspective, regional economic cooperation was a means to achieve regional peace, stability, and prosperity. For Indonesia, ASEAN was an economic and political association aimed at developing a kind of society among the neighbouring states in Southeast Asia.[63] It justified its stance by the principle of regional resilience, which underpinned the belief that if each member-country could develop its own national resilience, a regional economic resilience might gradually emerge. The terms of resilience broadly encompassed politics, social-cultural, ideology, and not least the area of economics. The search to translate this principle in economic cooperation, however, often confronted Indonesia with a difficult choice between enhancing intra-ASEAN economic cooperation and pooling diplomatic resources to deal with ASEAN's major trading and economic partners.

From the outset, intra-ASEAN trade and ASEAN economic cooperation in general were not Indonesia's first priority. Instead, it put far greater importance on employing ASEAN as a regional platform to build solidarity against external economic pressures; to increase its bargaining position with ASEAN economic partners; and to use it as a negotiating bloc in international economic forums, such as the North-South Dialogue and the GATT.[64] Conversely, Indonesia lacked interest in intra-ASEAN economic cooperation, particularly in the area of trade. At the First ASEAN Summit in 1976, Indonesia declined Singapore's and the Philippines's proposal for a free trade agreement, and instead promoted the 1977 PTA. The

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[63] Hadi Soesastro, 'The ASEAN Free Trade Area: A Critical Assessment,' p. 21
[64] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, pp. 59-60.

then Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik argued that the hasty implementation of free trade would be disadvantageous to other members of ASEAN. Further he argued that the first priority for ASEAN cooperation should be on developing national industries and expanding ASEAN trade with industrialisation rather than on intra-ASEAN trade.[65]

Indonesia's reluctant position to embrace intra-ASEAN trade was conditioned by its domestic economy politics context. During the period of 1967-1982, Indonesia underwent fundamental changes in economic organisation and foreign trade policy. Indonesia enacted a new foreign investment policy in 1967 that marked the beginning of an open-door economic policy to foreign investment. In the following years it adopted a market-based exchange rate and devalued Rupiah. Following the sharp increase in oil prices in 1973, Indonesia experienced a decade of rapid economic growth, on average 7.5% per year. The inflow of oil revenue allowed Indonesia to commence import substitution industrialisation and subsidise strategic industries such as aircraft manufacturing and shipyards. However, the open-door economic policy also contributed to the practice of corruption within Indonesian elites. Collusion and corruption practices by elites in the military and bureaucracy with foreign investors, enabled the former to tap financial benefits by giving preference to the latter to win control over key economic sectors. It most noticeable among Japanese companies in partnership with Indonesian ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, as they took over many businesses from indigenous owners, and dominated Indonesia's industrial and manufacturing sectors. Hence, the corruption and collusion among elites along with negative sentiments towards foreign investors and the role of ethnic Chinese in business met widespread criticism and a nationalistic reaction. This criticism came particularly from student groups and some elites within the military, particularly General Sumitro, the head of the Operational Command for Restoration of Security and Order

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[65] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, p. 93.

(*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban/Kopkamtib*).

In January 1974, on the occasion of a visit to Jakarta by Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, a student protest (which became known as the Malari riots, abbreviated from Fifteen of January Disaster – *Malapetaka Lima belas Januari*) was mobilised by General Sumitro. University students rallied in Jakarta and destroyed some of the Toyota company's showrooms and burned down some markets.[66]

Although the student protest was successfully curbed before it became too violent, this incident forced Indonesia's government to wind back foreign investment regulation and become more protectionist. Regulation of foreign investment was changed to become a joint venture model, with the share of Indonesian capital to be increased within a certain period of time, while the government also began to limit the sectors that were open for foreign investment.[67] Hence, much of the energy of economic and trade policy was aimed at fostering import substitution in food and manufacture sectors. The steady flow of oil revenue allowed the government to increase its intervention in the economy, through the operation of new state-owned companies created in industries such as fertilisers, cement, and other strategic sectors. As a consequence, the Indonesian government needed to escalate the protection to domestic infant industries, unavoidably using tariff and non-tariff instruments. These new policies also gave new opportunities to elites and crony capitalists to forge their corruptive and collusive relations within the politics of economic development in Indonesia. Thus, Indonesia's disinclination to support an ASEAN free trade scheme in the mid-1970s could be understood in this context.

When the world recession struck in the early 1980s, followed by the fall of oil and

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[66] William Case, *Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less*, Curzon, Richmond, 2002, pp. 35-36.
[67] Mari Pangestu, *Economic Reform, Deregulation, and Privatization: The Indonesian Experience*, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta 1996; M. Chatib Basri, 'Indonesia's Role in the World Economy: Sitting on the Fence,' in Anthony Reid (ed), *Indonesia Rising; The Repositioning of Asia's Third Giant*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2012, pp. 36-37.

commodity prices in the mid-1980s, Indonesia, like other ASEAN states, embarked on a policy of deregulation and trade liberalisation reform. The first priority was to attract foreign investment, which was imperative to support export-oriented industrialisation and to reduce the government's dependence on revenue from oil and gas sales. This was followed by serious deregulation and trade reforms to reduce the high costs of doing business, increase access to international inputs market and remove distortions caused by protectionist policies. The first step was financial liberalisation, which began in June 1983,[68] followed by reform of the custom union in 1985, by contracting a Swiss surveyor company, Société Générale de Surveillance. Indonesia also reformed its trade policy through a policy of deregulation in October 1986 to eliminate the approved import licence, reduce the tariffs needed for production and phase down the non-tariff barriers, aimed at improving the investment climate and boosting investment for export-oriented sectors. More reforms followed. Foreign investment deregulation in December 1987 opened up more economic sectors to foreign investment, including the tourist industry; a set of deregulations in November 1988 removed import monopolies of steel and plastic and increased the competition in real economic finance.[69] All of these deregulations had strong effects in increasing the confidence of foreign investors about the seriousness of Indonesia's commitment to liberalising its economy.

While embarking on serious economic deregulations, up until 1987, Indonesia remained hesitant towards the ideas of a freer intra-ASEAN trade. Despite this, there were various proposals from other ASEAN members and regional think-tanks, to adopt a more liberal regional trade arrangement. For example, at the 'Towards the Making of an ASEAN Common Market' conference hosted by the Malaysian National Chamber of Commerce and Industry in

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[68] For Indonesia's financial liberalisation see, Umar Juoro, 'Financial Liberalization in Indonesia: Interest Rates, Market Instruments and Bank Supervision, *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1993, pp. 323-337.
[69] Mari Pangestu, Sjamsu Rahardja & Lili Yan Ing, 'Fifty Years of Trade Policy in Indonesia: New World Trade, Old Treatment, *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2015, pp. 246-248; Hary Aswichayono, Titik Anas, 'Towards a Liberalised Trade Regime: Indonesia Trade Policy Review,' *Economic Working Paper Series*, CSIS, Jakarta, 2001.

October 1986, there was widespread support for the idea of a free trade area complete with a road map proposed by ASEAN-CCI. At that meeting, Indonesian delegates attempted to change the agenda of intra-economic and trade cooperation issues into external matters. For example, they suggested that ASEAN's common marketing strategy should penetrate the global market with its products rather than thinking about ASEAN's common market.[70] This position clearly demonstrated that at that point, Indonesia remained the least enthusiastic about the idea of a common market or free trade area.

Conversely, in the second half of the 1980s, Indonesia saw criticism and resistance towards a liberalisation policy from various domestic groups, particularly around the idea of people-centred development or a so-called 'Pancasila Economy' (*Ekonomi Pancasila*).[71] A backlash against deregulation and liberalisation policy was sparked by the widening social gap between the conglomerates— a term in Indonesia that refers to clusters of big domestic companies, mainly owned by rich ethnic Chinese, which cover a wide range of business interests — and ordinary citizens (*wong cilik*/little people). The conglomerates were initially supported by the government through subsidies, import licences and monopolies during the import substitution industrialisation era. They were the main beneficiaries of the deregulation policy, which were those in a good starting position able to reap the benefits of the new opportunities when the government opened up for more business available to the private sectors. Moreover, with their size of businesses, they could easily access foreign capital due to financial liberalisation. Meanwhile, devaluation and other economic adjustment such as reduction to fuel subsidies resulted in increasing prices and inflation, which badly affected the population. The deregulation and liberalisation, therefore, criticised as being a deviation from

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[70] Hans Christoph Rieger, 'ASEAN Economic Cooperation: Running in Circles or New Directions?' p. 42.
[71] Among the respected personalities of *Ekonomi Pancasila* were Prof. Sri Edi Swasono from University of Indonesia and Prof. Mubyarto from Gadjah Mada University, who founded *Pusat Studi Ekonomi Pancasila* (Centre of Study Pancasila Economy) based at the same university.

the ideal of a just and prosperous society as stipulated by the *Ekonomi Pancasila* and article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, which was often cited by Suharto's regime to legitimise its economic policy.

The idea of liberalisation itself was widely regarded as incompatible with the normative foundation of Indonesia's economy as it referred to the inimical 'free fight liberalism' and 'individualism' that conflicted with Indonesia's spirit of the principle of family system (*kekeluargaan*) and *gotong royong*. Moreover, the philosophy of Indonesia's economy based on *Ekonomi Pancasila* was also seen as the result of Indonesia's struggle for independence against liberal capitalism which was the idea that underpinned colonialism and imperialism. From the *Ekonomi Pancasila* point of view, therefore, instead of adopting the Western idea of liberalism, which became the source of poverty and injustice, Indonesia should honour its economic values and principles such as *gotong royong, kekeluargaan* and to work towards the equal distribution of wealth (*pemerataan*).[72]

Although the criticisms of the liberalisation policy came from outside the government, mainly from academics, whom formed a moral movement rather than a political coalition, the Indonesian government could not easily evade them. Their views divulged the government's deviation from the normative principle of economic development that ironically has been used by the government as the bedrock of its legitimacy. The government now was under public pressure to work within normative principles of economic development, which were unfriendly to the idea of liberalisation. Within this domestic context, it was not surprising that Indonesia continued to resist the idea of regional trade liberalisation until the end of 1980s.

Despite growing criticism of domestic economic liberalisation, by 1990, Indonesia's perspective on the idea of ASEAN free trade arrangement swiftly changed. It was caused by

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[72] For an excellent account on the criticism of Indonesia's deregulation and liberalisation policy, see, Armin Taubert, 'Liberalism Under Pressure in Indonesia,' *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 1991, pp. 122-138.

the competing ideas of APEC and EAEG. There were two opposing views on these ideas, on the one hand, there was an argument that ASEAN was no longer sufficient for meeting the global challenge ahead. [73] On the other hand, there was also an opinion that extra-regional trade arrangements such as APEC or EAEG would weaken ASEAN. In other words, the two competing ideas posed existential and identity threats to ASEAN.

Indonesia was inclined to the idea of economic liberalisation and open regionalism in the Asia-Pacific as manifested in APEC rather than in Mahathir's idea of EAEG. The reason why Indonesia supported APEC was related to external market access. The origin of both APEC and EAEG ideas arose out of the concern of the changing international political economy, particularly the US trade adjustment policy. Unlike EAEG, which openly challenged US economic interests in the region, the involvement of the US in APEC provided opportunities for Indonesia to maintain and expand its exports to the US, one of its largest trading partners. Indonesia was nevertheless concerned that APEC would be dominated by large economies. In an APEC meeting in November 1989, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas expressed ASEAN's view on APEC as it related to ASEAN identity:

> In any enhanced Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, ASEAN's identity and cohesion should be preserved and its cooperative relations with its dialogue partners and with other third countries should not be diluted […] Enhanced Asia-Pacific economic cooperation should not be directed towards the formation of inward looking economic or trading bloc […] As to the eventual institutional structure, ASEAN's known preference is to start with and utilize

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[73] Alice D. Ba, *(Re) Negotiation East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism and The Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, p. 139.

the existing ASEAN mechanism […].[74]

Ba points to Indonesia's position on APEC institutional development:

> We don't want institutionalisation. We want to be ASEAN centred not the
>
> other way around.[75]

With the adoption of ASEAN-style institutionalisation in APEC, Indonesia was of the opinion that involvement in APEC would strengthen ASEAN cooperation with dialogue partners rather that dilute it.[76]

By contrast, Indonesia opposed the idea of EAEG for several reasons. First, Indonesia was not sympathetic to the idea of an East Asia trading bloc that it viewed as being hostile towards international trade as it implies exclusivity of East Asia that potentially disintegrated ASEAN rather than integrating it from the world economy.[77] Moreover, the EAEG was dubbed as a trading bloc to represent 'the voice of East Asia'. For this purpose, the EAEG would need to incorporate Japan, China, and South Korea to make the East Asian voice heard. For Indonesia, this idea conversely implied that ASEAN was no longer adequate to navigate the member countries in facing external economic challenges.[78] Another reason was the bad timing of the EAEG. An ASEAN common position on APEC was formulated in February 1990, in Malaysia (the Kuching consensus), but the idea for the EAEG was only delivered in December 1990. Moreover, an ASEAN caucus was already created in preparation for the Second APEC

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[74] Statement at the initial Exploratory Meeting on Asia Pacific Cooperation, Canberra, 6-7 November 1989 in Ali Alatas, *The Voice for a Just Peace: Collection of Speeches*, Gramedia Pustaka Utama and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Jakarta, Singapore, 2001, pp. 343-344.

[75] Alice D. Ba, *(Re) Negotiation East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism and The Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, p. 148.

[76] Hadi Soesatro, 'ASEAN and APEC: Do Concentric Circle Work?' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1995, p. 484.

[77] Michael Antolik, 'ASEAN's Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another Summit?' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1992, p. 146.

[78] Alice D. Ba, *(Re) Negotiation East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism and The Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, p. 145.

meeting hosted by Singapore in 1990. This chain of events suggested that Mahathir's proposal on the EAEG was made without prior consultation with ASEAN and potentially bypassed the Kuching consensus. Not least, there was also 'prestige contestation' between President Mahathir of Malaysia and President Suharto of Indonesia, because the latter felt offended as he was not consulted beforehand.[79] Indonesia nevertheless remained opposed to the EAEG, despite a consultative meeting between Suharto and Mahathir in March 1990, because Suharto perceived the EAEG could endanger intra-ASEAN solidarity and the existing forums of regional economic cooperation.

The perceived challenges from APEC and EAEG towards the existence of ASEAN shifted Indonesia's position on Intra-ASEAN trade liberalisation. It was the cautious sense of ASEAN fragility, triggered by the competing ideas of APEC and EAEG that drove Indonesia to enhance regional economic resilience by supporting the intra-ASEAN trade liberalisation idea, and it was this shift that ended the divisions among ASEAN members on this issue. As Indonesia's Minister of Trade Arifin Siregar clearly put it: 'If ASEAN does not rapidly form the AFTA, it is feared that ASEAN countries might join other planned free trade zones outside ASEAN which would only weaken ASEAN unity.'[80] In October 1990, Indonesia proposed the CEPT scheme, a progressive tariff reduction within certain time schedule as a mode to boost intra-ASEAN trade. It seems that Indonesia chose to refer to the CEPT– instead of 'free trade' or 'liberalisation', to avoid domestic political problems, but it is just as clear that the reason for the shift was a response to changes in the international environment. Indonesia's proposal marked a radical transformation of its position, since it had consistently been the main stumbling block for earlier discussions about intra-ASEAN trade liberalisation. The idea of

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[79] Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations*, Routledge Curzon, London and New York, 2005, pp. 141-143; Kai He, I*nstitutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic Interdependence and China's Rise*, Routledge, London and New York, 2009, pp. 141-142.

[80] Quoted in Michael Antolik, 'ASEAN's Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another Summit?' p. 145.

CEPT was discussed and negotiated in the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1991, in tandem with Thailand's idea of AFTA. Both ideas were finally agreed in the Fourth ASEAN Singapore Summit in 1992.

Conversely, domestic politics and economic interest were not the primary drivers in Indonesia's decision to agree on AFTA, because Indonesia continued to face domestic resistance from various groups. Many political elites were unconvinced about the purpose of AFTA, while some economic actors, such as the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (*Kamar dagang dan Industri Indonesia*) and the Indonesian Business Association (*Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia*) raised the concern of the unreadiness of many sectors in the free trade scheme.[81] The resistance also came from intellectuals who advocated *Ekonomi Pancasila*. They saw that the Indonesian economic liberalisation policy, since the mid-1980s, had contributed to the widening gaps between the haves and the have nots, and they concerned that opening market for ASEAN countries would only worsen the existing gaps. Chandra reports that some non-state actors accused the government of being more concerned about the country's global position than the welfare of its people.[82]

It is clear from the above discussion that Indonesia's changing responses to the idea of intra-ASEAN trade liberalisation was driven by the priority to ensure the existence and the relevance of ASEAN in the changing international geopolitical economy, rather than motivated by domestic economic or political calculations and interests. In agreeing to AFTA, Indonesia pursued a foreign policy objective centred on upholding ASEAN centrality, rather than for economic reasons and in the face of unfavourable domestic politics condition. Moreover,

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[81] Alexander C. Chandra, 'Indonesia's Non-State Actors in ASEAN: A New Regionalism Agenda in Southeast Asia, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2004, pp. 163-167; Jürgen Rüland, 'Why (most) Indonesian Business Fear the ASEAN Economic Community: Struggling with Southeast Asia's Regional Corporatism, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 6, 2016, p. 1136.

[82] Alexander C. Chandra, 'Indonesia's Non-State Actors in ASEAN: A New Regionalism Agenda in Southeast Asia, p. 166.

Indonesia showed its persistent attitude and behaviour to shape a habit of cooperation and compromise to make the regional economic cooperation work to fasten regional international society to face external challenges. For Indonesia, building international society was a multi-decade project and was the most important consideration. This shines through in this episode when the Indonesian government put the welfare of regional society ahead of both its own economic preferences and its own political advantage.

7.5.   Consolidation of Primary and Secondary institutions of Economic Development

Indonesia had long had a reputation of showing defiance to a freer intra-ASEAN trade. As the largest market in ASEAN, its orientation to regional trade cooperation has been pivotal in future regional trade arrangements. By the early 1990s, it became clear that Indonesia played the most important role in the decision as to where ASEAN trade cooperation would go. After consistent indifference to the idea of free trade, Indonesia's changing position was decisive with the signing of AFTA, as the agreement could not be advanced without consensus, particularly from Indonesia that was considered 'first among equals' by ASEAN members. As Narongchai Akrasanee, one of the architects of the AFTA concept paper, testified, in September 1991:

> Everywhere, the meetings were easy and smooth, except in Indonesia where
>
> a little bit of persuasion was needed. (Indonesian) Minister (of Economic and
>
> Industry Coordinator) Hartarto did not like the concept of free trade at first,
>
> preferring instead the CEPT. […] The ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting
>
> in Kuala Lumpur on 7–8 October 1991 was to make the final decision
>
> whether to accept AFTA. I was to present the proposal, with emphasis on the

words 'free trade'. After my presentation, Minister Rafidah, who chaired the

meeting, asked Minister Hartarto for his comment, particularly on calling the

agreement AFTA. After a brief but suspenseful moment, he answered,

'Indonesia agrees'. […] As I often observe, ASEAN can go only as far as

Indonesia allows it to go. So, when Minister Hartarto said 'Indonesia agrees',

the rest became history.[83]

Indonesia's decision to agree to AFTA was particularly important in helping to transform the rationale of Southeast Asian economic cooperation in the changing international political economy environment, particularly the emergence of trading blocs in the world economy. As Bowles and Maclean observed, 'the fear of many developing and peripheral region of the world is now not dependence upon but *exclusion from* the global economy.'[84] This had led to the formation of many regional trade arrangements as important mechanisms for strengthening bargaining positions vis-à-vis developed countries and other regional trade arrangements and to increase their attractiveness for foreign investment, hence increasing their ability to remain a part of the global economy. The formation of AFTA can be understood from the above logic. In particular, AFTA signified the significant change of ASEAN's attitude towards free trade, to ensure their participation in the global economy and multiple regionalisms in the region, such as APEC. Reflecting Indonesia's thinking on this transformation, Hadi Soesastro argues, 'The ASEAN Free Trade Area […] is seen as providing a training ground for the ASEAN countries in their multilateral trade liberalization […] it is possible that cooperation in the wider regional setting, such as APEC, could stimulate and

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[83] Narongchai Akrasanee, 'ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: A Major Milestone in 50 Years of ASEAN,' in Surin Pitsuwan, Hidetoshi Nishimura, Ponciano Intal, Jr., Kavi Chongkittavorn, and Larry Maramis (eds), *The ASEAN Journey: Reflections of ASEAN Leaders and Officials*, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, 2017, pp. 151-152.
[84] Paul Bowles and Brian MacLean, 'Understanding Trade Bloc Formation: The Case of the ASEAN Free Trade Area,' p. 341.

strengthen ASEAN cooperation.'[85]

Indonesia's support for AFTA was also determinative in setting the stage for a new sense of legitimacy to the normative foundation of regional resilience — the shared understanding of appropriate conduct in regional economic cooperation. The prolongation of the global political economy changes and uncertainties, particularly with the growing concern about the deadlock at the GATT Uruguay Round made it difficult for ASEAN countries to rely on global solutions. Moreover, with the emerging idea of extra-regional free trade arrangements, which took form in APEC and the EAEG, challenged the regional resilience as the basic principle of regional economic cooperation as well as the unity of ASEAN. As ASEAN has already incorporated in APEC in 1989, while EAEG envisioned an East Asia trading bloc, there was a genuine concern that ASEAN would be peripheralized in the larger regional and global economic system. This exposed ASEAN's weakness – its ongoing relevance – which would need determined and new actions to ensure its survival. As Ba observes,

> In debating APEC and the EAEG, ASEAN itself became the focal point of debates. Just as resilience provided the legitimating frames for intra-ASEAN cooperation, ASEAN itself—in other words, preserving ASEAN as an institution, process, practice, even identity.[86]

In this sense, AFTA manifested a political consensus among ASEAN members that gave the association new political purposes and provided a new foundation for Southeast Asian regionalism in the changing global economic environment. In this way, the AFTA renewed the shared understandings of the old notion of regional economic resilience *against* dependence on

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[85] Hadi Soesatro, 'ASEAN and APEC: Do Concentric Circle Work?' p. 475.
[86] Alice D. Ba, *(Re) Negotiation East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism and The Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, p. 156.

the world economy into regional economic resilience *towards* interdependence in the global economy. With this new understanding, all ASEAN members, including Indonesia which was known to have a distaste for the terms 'free trade' and 'liberalisation', found greater legitimacy in ASEAN's new regional activities. The deep-rooted normative principle of regional economic resilience found new interpretation and new legitimacy, confirmed its continuing relevance in the regional society of states in Southeast Asia, despite changes to domestic and external political economic circumstances. Hence, AFTA marked the consolidation of the regional primary institution of economic development that gave ASEAN new relevance.

Regarding the secondary institutions, Indonesia's swift change to agree on AFTA resolved ASEAN's long debate over the issue of trade liberalisation. More than just political will, Indonesia's idea on CEPT was a momentous breakthrough that paved the way for AFTA. As Antolik has argued:

> The CEPT agreement represents a politically astute compromise. With strong support for some sort of economic co-operation coming from other ASEAN partners—the Philippines proposed a treaty, Thailand held out AFTA, and Malaysia worked for an Asian trade grouping—Indonesia had to permit some progress in this area.[87]

The importance of compromise reflected the distinctive approach of the conduct of regional relations that often contrasted with open contestation and legalistic procedure of Western style decision making process. It proved that the longstanding spirit of *Musyawarah* and *mufakat* continued to be applicable, not only in routine affairs but also in resolving divisive regional issues. The flexibility and gradual character of the approach of CEPT was also important. Aware of the different levels of states' capacity to implement AFTA, this approach

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[87] Michael Antolik, 'ASEAN's Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another Summit?' p. 145.

allowed AFTA to move forwards, even though some members were not on board. Originally, this principle was proposed by Singapore using the 'five minus X' formula (when ASEAN was still five members). Thus, the agreement on AFTA succeeded through the employment of the 'ASEAN way'. While subsequent development of AFTA might generate new tensions among member states in regulating detailed implementation of the agreement, at this stage Indonesia's deference to AFTA helped to resolve the tensions and dilemmas faced by ASEAN members states on trade liberalisation issues and the possible future of economic integration.

7.6.   Summary

The period between the mid-1980s to 1992 was pivotal in ASEAN's development, to being a substantial organisation able to work as a cooperative regional grouping and economic area. In the case of regional trade liberalisation, Indonesia's last-minute change from reluctance to support over this issue was decisive in moving the regional international society forward. Indonesia's changing position of AFTA was pivotal at a time when ASEAN's relevance in meeting global economic challenges was considered inadequate. This chapter has thus argued that Indonesia's responses to this challenge are best understood as a conscious effort to consolidate the primary institutions of economic development, so that Indonesia could find a prosperous and secure place for itself as a substantive partner in its own region.

In the case of trade liberalisation, Indonesia's agency was not so much shown in promoting new ideas and practices, but rather in its readiness to accommodate other ASEAN members' interests. Indonesia's decision was made amidst discouraging domestic public reactions, indicating continued popular resistance to the opening of the market. Indeed, the development of an intra-ASEAN free trade agreement was contrary to the government's narrow domestic political interests. Indonesia's decision put the interests of the regional society

of states as their first priority. Indonesia's move not only gave new relevance to ASEAN in the competing regional trade liberalisation of the wider Asia Pacific region, but also provided a new sense of meaning and legitimacy to the normative foundation of regional economic cooperation in the region, defined as regional resilience. Moreover, the agreement that AFTA was particularly significant as it gave new confidence to ASEAN's processes, practices, and values as it sought to become a principal rallying point in wider Asia Pacific regionalism. At this point, the agreement on AFTA was an imperative action to strengthen ASEAN unity and cohesion to reassure themselves that they could exist within larger economic arrangements without losing their identity and purposes. Thus, AFTA gave new purpose to ASEAN in navigating regional economic cooperation in the changing world. Together with the final resolution of the Kampuchean conflict in 1991, the AFTA agreement in 1992 marked the phase of consolidation of the society of states in Southeast Asia, and in which both processes Indonesia played a decisive role. As Evans has argued, by 1993 'the idea of 'Southeast Asia' was no longer being imposed by outside powers nor [was] it being undermined by national rivalries, ideological divides or great power conflict.'[88]

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[88] Paul M. Evans, 'Economic and Security Dimension in the Emerging Order in Asia Pacific,' in in David Wurfel and Bruce Barton (eds), *Southeast Asia in the New World Order: The Political Economy of a Dynamic Region*, p. 4.

Chapter 8: United States' Pressure: Democracy and Human Rights (1992-2009)

8.1. Introduction

As argued in two previous chapters, in the early of 1990s, Southeast Asian regional international society was consolidated after the conclusion of the Kampuchean conflict and the finalisation of AFTA. In these cases, ASEAN demonstrated unity and cohesion in giving priority to collective interests over the interests of individual members and successfully brought together habits and practices that associated with its regional principles such non-interference, consensus decision making and reducing the influence of external power in facing external challenges. Buszynski judged that Southeast Asia in the early 1990s was 'the most successful case of regionalism outside Europe'.[1] Even if true, however, this status was short lived. Following the end of the Cold War, ASEAN faced new challenges that tested the relevance of its regional primary institutions that demand changes that the regional society has habitually practiced, as well as the cohesion of ASEAN as the main secondary institution. Over more recent years, it has become commonplace for primary institutions underpinning the Southeast Asian regional international society to be used to explain the region's ineffectiveness in addressing the various problems in the region. For example, the principle of non-interference has often been identified as a liability in dealing with problems of human rights, disaster management, terrorism, and border issues. Similarly, ASEAN as a secondary institution, seemed in disarray in managing these problems, which further damaged its international credibility and prestige.[2]

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[1] Leszek Buszynski, 'ASEAN's New Challenges,' *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 4, 1997, p. 555.
[2] For example, John Funston, 'Challenges Facing ASEAN in the Coming Age,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1999, pp. 205-219.

The demise of the Cold War marked the intensification of the US's pursuit of assertive liberal policies, to preserve its preeminent position in the global international society. This strategy was closely identified with the 'Washington Consensus,'[3] or more broadly with the US led-liberal international order.[4] Subsequently, one of the most formidable challenges to the Southeast Asian regional international society came from the United States in the form of pressure on other countries and regional organisations to factor in the concepts democracy and human rights into their actions and policies. One of the important characteristics of the US assertiveness was the promotion or imposition of democratisation, human rights, and neo-liberal economic development as a normative policy setting on the rest of the world. During the Cold War, the US had no reservation about the authoritarian political systems of ASEAN states, as the individual members of the association and ASEAN collectively supported the US in containing the Soviet Union's influence in the region.

After the Cold War, however, the US agenda on democracy and human rights began to challenge the regional institutional practices of sovereignty and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs and the ASEAN Way diplomacy has long underpinned social relations between them. Southeast Asian states particularly in Myanmar and Indonesia, had to deal with the US's pressures on the issue of democratisation and in particular human rights violations. The US also used its influence in the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to link economic recovery packages to domestic political-economic reforms, particularly towards Indonesia

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[3] The term, 'Washington Consensus', was coined by John Williamson in 1989. It embodied a set of ten policy prescriptions to address economic crisis in Latin America in the late 1980s. The term, then became widely used to describe standard reform package, developed by the US and international financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank for countries (particularly the developing ones) under economic crisis. In overall, the Washington Consensus policy prescriptions are macro-economic stabilisation, open economy related in both trade and investment, and domestic economic governance reform towards liberal economy. For short account of Washington Consensus, see, John Williamson, 'The Strange History of Washington Consensus,' *Journal of Post Keynesian Economic*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2004/2005, pp. 195-206.

[4] For liberal international order, see Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'The Nature and Source of Liberal International Order,' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1999, pp. 179-196. See also, G. John Ikenberry, 'The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, issue 1, January-February 2008, pp. 23-37.

during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. Inevitably, ASEAN became the target of these pressures due to its silence and inaction in relation to democracy and record of human rights violations among its member countries. The US opposed the mode of intra-interaction of ASEAN member states and interaction between the Southeast Asian states and the Western liberal countries, with expectations linked to the new global norms of democracy and human rights.

The US pressures regarding democracy and human rights represented serious challenges to the Southeast Asian regional international society in both primary and secondary institutions. ASEAN states had long regarded the US as a benign power, which had provided ASEAN states external security as well as generous market access to the US. The US presence in the region was also central to sustain its approach of management of great power in terms of upholding favourable configuration of power in Southeast Asia. In terms of primary institutions, the US pressures generated normative tensions between maintaining the principle of sovereignty, non-interference, and ASEAN Way diplomacy and adhering to the norms of democracy and human rights, which necessitate ASEAN to affect the domestic affairs of its members and thus amounted a form of interference, in which ASEAN has long aimed to prevent. Moreover, the US pressures over democracy and human rights also tarnished the credibility of ASEAN as the region's main secondary institution. The US pressures exposed the limitations of ASEAN in dealing with the issue of democratisation and human rights violations in the association's member countries. Thus, the US pressures on democracy and human rights threatened to marginalise ASEAN members in the global international society and unravel the society's cohesion.[5] On this basis, Narine has argued that without significant changes to its approach to regionalism, 'ASEAN will likely fade into irrelevance in the twenty-

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[5] Greg Felker, 'ASEAN Regionalism and Southeast Asia's Systemic Challenges,' in James C. Hsiung (ed.), *Twenty First Century World Order and the Asia Pacific: Value Change, Exigencies, and Power Realignment*, Palgrave, New York and Basingstoke, 2001, pp. 213-256.

first century.'[6]

Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to examine Indonesia's foreign policy in responding these US pressures on democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia. Indonesia has played important role in initiating a regional response to the issue of democracy and human rights such as through the idea of ASC in 2003, the formulation of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 and the establishment of the AICHR in 2009. These new initiatives arguably have successfully retained the Southeast Asian regional society's core principles and ASEAN's relevance amid external pressures in Southeast Asia's international relations. Therefore, this chapter will show that Indonesia's attitudes and behaviour on Southeast Asian regionalism in this period, as in earlier periods, is best explained by reference to its commitment to building international society in its immediate neighbourhood.

Furthermore, this chapter argues that in response to the changing US policy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia's agency in the Southeast Asian society of states was clearly shown in its endeavour to promote adjustment and adaptation of the regional primary and secondary institutions to embrace liberal norms such as democracy and human rights as 'new values' in ASEAN without repudiating the existing regional principles of sovereignty, non-interference and diplomacy. Hence, it demonstrates that Indonesia's agency was crucial in finding solutions of normative tensions between existing regional principles and new global norms of democracy and human rights.

It also argues that Indonesia's initiatives have been directed to maintain internal cohesion and to increase external confidence of ASEAN as a secondary institution, as well as to encourage the adjustment of primary institutions in the long run, in terms of socialising new meaning of the existing primary institutions, in particular sovereignty and non-interference.

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[6] Shaun Narine, 'ASEAN into Twenty-First Century: Problems and Prospects,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1999, p. 358.'

Although domestic political-security and economic motivations were present and significant, the prime drivers of Indonesia's promotion of democracy and human rights in ASEAN were aimed at maintaining the existence and the relevance of the Southeast Asian regional international society in the changing global norms post-Cold War era,

To support the argument, this chapter is divided into four parts. The first part analyses the challenges from the US in its focus on democracy and human rights for the Southeast Asian society of states. ASEAN's response will then be examined in the second part. Part three analyses Indonesia's response, while Part four will analyse Indonesia's role in maintaining the relevance of the primary and secondary institutions of Southeast Asian society of states.

8.2.   Challenges

The US hold a preeminent position in international relations in Southeast Asia which implies that the changing US behaviour and policies towards the region could not easily be ignored or evaded, and they had profound impacts to the economic, security and overall stability of Southeast Asia. Despite declaring the Southeast Asia region as a zone of neutrality to insulate themselves from the interference of external major powers in the 1971 ZOPFAN, ASEAN perceived the US as a benign external power that did not harbour any territorial ambitions that directly threatened the ASEAN states' interests.[7] The US had provided external security in the latter phase of Cold War for ASEAN states, and had also been seen as, to quote Yahuda, 'the only provider of the common, or public goods that made trade and economic interdependence viable.'[8] Indeed, the US had provided external security to ASEAN members, particularly Thailand and the Philippines, and for many years they have been part of the US

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[7] Evelyn Goh, *The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, & Transition in the Post-Cold War Order*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 6

[8] Michael Yahuda, *International Politics of the Asia-Pacific*, (Second and revised edition), Routledge Curzon, London and New York, 2004, p. 164.

alliance partners. Other ASEAN countries, although not member of the US alliance, have been engaging military and security cooperation in many forms. The US also provided benevolent access to the US market, which helped the ASEAN states to achieve economic growth, particularly before the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, the US were the key state for ASEAN in implementing its principle of management of great power. The US security engagement in Southeast and East Asia was essential in providing public goods in security and as an outside arbiter to reduce the competition between the two indigenous great powers, Japan and China that could destabilise the region.[9]

The end of the Cold War was celebrated as the coming of a new world order, in which liberal democracy and market economy prevailed against socialist-communist ideology. As a corollary, in the post-Cold War period, the US began to assertively promote liberal values of democracy, human rights neo- and liberal economic development in particular territories to build a liberal democratic governance. In Southeast Asia, the foremost target of the US pressures on human rights and democratisation was Myanmar.[10] The US had condemned the Burmese military regime of the State Law and Order Council for its violent suppression of popular protest in 1988 and its refusal to acknowledge the result of the May 1990 election that was won by the National League for Democracy led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. In the following years, the US increased its pressure through the imposition of an arms embargo, suspended economic aid, excluded Myanmar from the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), and discouraged foreign investments.[11] The US also intercepted any financial assistance

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[9] Evelyn Goh, 'East Asia as Regional International Society: The Problem of Great Power Management,' in Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang (eds), *Contesting International Society in East Asia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 167-187.

[10] After a suppressing popular uprising that killed thousands of people in 1988, ruling military junta in Burma changed the country official name from Union of Burma into Union of Myanmar in 1989, including the name of the capital city from Rangoon to Yangon (in 2005 the capital moved to Naypyidaw). However, the US and other Western countries refuse to use the new legal name and continue recognise the country as Burma.

[11] Michael Ewing-Chow, 'First Do No Harm: Myanmar Trade Sanction and Human Rights,' *Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2007, pp. 156-160.

from international institutions and persuading the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Commission to issue strong human rights resolutions against Myanmar.

The US pressures towards the military regime in Myanmar in the aftermath of the Cold War were not a challenge to ASEAN until the US began to criticise the association's approach to 'constructive engagement' as a pathway to admit Myanmar into the association. This approach was an extrapolation of Thailand's practice of engagement with the military regime of Myanmar.[12] The most important reason for the constructive engagement towards Myanmar was aimed at maintaining stability the country. ASEAN Foreign Minister Meeting in July 1993 affirmed that stability in Myanmar was crucial for regional security.[13] There was also a strategic reason from some ASEAN countries. Indonesia, in particular saw constructive engagement towards Myanmar as a counterbalancing of the State Law and Order Council regime's increasing dependence on China, although other ASEAN members did not necessarily share the view, particularly the Philippines.[14] Nevertheless, constructive engagement was formally agreed as an ASEAN's collective approach towards Myanmar in 1992.

In using this approach, ASEAN also sought to counter the US's strategies of condemnation and confrontation against Myanmar. Instead of confrontation, ASEAN pursued a policy of accommodation and non-isolation with the hope to socialise the Myanmar military regime into the regional society norms and practices. In ASEAN's view, the US confrontational policy against Myanmar SLOC regime which amounted to political and economic isolation was not effective. Instead of succumbing to the US pressures, in ASEAN's point of view, Myanmar would seek alternative international backing, particularly from China and had already sealed military and trade agreements with Myanmar in August 1988.[15] Under the

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[12] Leszek Buszynski, 'Thailand and Myanmar: The Perils of 'Constructive Engagement',' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1988, pp. 290-305.
[13] Leszek Buszynski, 'ASEAN's New Challenges,' p. 563.
[14] Leszek Buszynski, 'ASEAN's New Challenges,' pp. 562-563.
[15] Leszek Buszynski, 'ASEAN's New Challenges,' p. 562.

constructive engagement approach, ASEAN sought to open Myanmar from isolation and approached the country to stimulate political change, albeit not necessarily in democracy and human rights terms but to maintain the stability of the country. Under the policy of constructive engagement, ASEAN invited Myanmar to participate in an ASEAN meeting as a guest, and this was soon followed by the country signing the TAC as an important condition of ASEAN membership. In the following years, Myanmar became a member of the ARF in July 1996 and ASEAN in July 1997. Thus, ASEAN's constructive engagement towards Myanmar was built on the ASEAN institutional practices of sovereignty, emphasised non-interference, and ASEAN Way diplomacy.

ASEAN faced strong pressures from the United States to defer Myanmar's admission to the ARF and ASEAN until the regime had fulfilled certain conditions towards the restoration of democracy and respect to human rights. The US Foreign Secretary Madeleine Albright reportedly wrote to all ASEAN heads of government to postpone Myanmar admission. It followed by the signing of an executive order by President Clinton in 1997 that prohibited new American direct investment in Myanmar that would only be lifted if Myanmar showed major progress in human rights.[16] The EU, Canada, Australia, Japan and South Korea also began to impose sanctions against Myanmar – including arms embargoes, visa bans for Myanmar military leaders, and the freezing of assets of the junta leaders. As these measures failed to produce any political impact, Madeleine Albright, at the ARF meeting and ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conference meeting in Malaysia, in July 1997, openly challenged the ASEAN decision of admitting Myanmar into its membership, calling it 'an anomaly to ASEAN'.[17]

As a consequence, ASEAN faced strong criticism from outside the region for

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[16] For summary of the US economic sanctions on Myanmar see, Larry A. Niksch and Martin A. Weiss, 'Burma: Economic Sanctions,' *Congressional Research Service*, 3 August 2009.

[17] Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, Routledge Curzon, London 2003, p. 145.

incorporating the Myanmar military regime into ASEAN. As a result ASEAN thus demonstrated that it was an elite-centred association that was reluctant to embrace the norms of democracy and human rights.[18] In defending its decision, ASEAN leaders argued that the incorporation of Myanmar into the association would expand the zone of cooperation in the region and could facilitate the country into the process of political modernisation and economic development. Yet, the issue of Myanmar soon became one of the most contentious of ASEAN's external diplomatic agenda. Since the accession of Myanmar into its membership in 1997, ASEAN continued to suffer from international pressures, as Myanmar's unrelenting record of human rights violations – such as the Myanmar military campaigns against ethnic minority populations in its border regions and the suppression of the Monk-led protest, known as the 'Saffron Revolution' in September 2007. These resulted in condemnation from various Western government and international organisations. In 2005, the US Secretary of States, Condoleezza Rice refused to attend the ARF meeting and sent her deputy, Robert Zoellick instead. Her absence from the ARF meeting was closely related to the continuation of US dissatisfaction with the ASEAN's handling of the contentious issue of Myanmar's scheduled assumption of the Chair of ASEAN in 2006-2007.[19] The US Senate in 2007 also voted unanimously to pressure ASEAN to suspend Myanmar's membership until the regime showed respect for human rights.[20]

These US pressures on the importance of human rights and democracy were also directed towards Indonesia. Following the Santa Cruz Massacre (or Dili Massacre) in East Timor on 12 November 1991, when Indonesia's army opened fire and killed more than two

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[18] Greg Felker, 'ASEAN Regionalism and Southeast Asia's Systemic Challenges,' p. 232.
[19] 'Condoleezza Rice's Unfortunate Decision,' *Japan Times*, 25 July 2005, available at <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2005/07/25/commentary/condoleezza-rices-unfortunate-decision/>, accessed 20 April 2021.
[20] Geert De Clercq, 'Myanmar Set to Sign ASEAN Rights Charter,' *Reuter,* 18 November 2007, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-myanmar-idUSSIN624520071117>, accessed 20 April 2021.

hundred pro-independence protesters, Indonesia came under increased international pressures. The US resented the use of its military weapons in the massacre and issued a restriction on Indonesia's military access to International Military Education Training in 1991 and delayed the delivery of nine F-16 fighter jets until Indonesia showed progress in upholding human rights.[21] The US also co-sponsored a Resolution 1993/97 in the UN Human Rights council to condemn the human rights violations in East Timor.[22] The relations between Suharto's government and the US under the Bill Clinton administration worsened as Washington pursued a policy of promoting strategic, economic and business interests in Southeast Asia, while simultaneously insisting on the importance of democracy and human rights improvement in Southeast Asia. The Clinton administration for example, advised Indonesia to reform its electoral system and relax the rules on the freedom of expression and association. During the 1994 APEC Summit in Bogor, President Bill Clinton warned Indonesia that the two countries' friendly relations could only be maintained if the latter showed progress in human rights and democracy.[23]

As will be further discussed in the next section, Indonesia again became the target of the US's criticisms of human rights violation following the outbreak of violent conflict in the aftermath of East Timor referendum in August 1999.

ASEAN has been long backed Indonesia in repudiating international criticisms of its invasion in East Timor. Since the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia in 1975, ASEAN refused to interfere in Indonesia's internal affair. ASEAN member states complied with

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[21] Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership*, Times Academic Press, Singapore, 1996, pp. 142-143.

[22] This resolution condemned the human rights violations in East Timor by Indonesian government. It also urged Indonesia to implement the recommendations presented by the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture in the report he submitted following his visit to Indonesia and East Timor in 1992. See, UN Commission on Human Rights, *Situation in East Timor,* 11 March 1993, E/CN.4/RES/1993/97, available at <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f0bb3b.html>, 20 March 2021.

[23] Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origin, Development and Prospect*, p. 148.

Indonesia's invocation to prohibit non-government organisations from holding meetings or conferences related to the East Timor issue in their territories.[24] Malaysia even reportedly concealed information that one of its citizens had been killed in the 1991 Dili Incident, out of respect for Indonesia's sensitiveness.[25] ASEAN's muteness over Indonesia's invasion of East Timor pointed to their inconsistency in the practice on non-interference: for example and as mentioned above, ASEAN had demonstrated a strong opposition to Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea in 1978. ASEAN's credibility as a collective actor in regional security subsequently suffered a severe setback following the outbreak of violence and conflict in the aftermath of the East Timor referendum held in August 1999. The Indonesian military and its military auxiliaries had launched terrifying attacks in East Timor, to express their refusal to accept the result of referendum, Indonesia was under international pressures to accept the referendum results supported by the UN international peacekeeping mission. Initially, Indonesia refused to accept the UN peacekeeping force from outside the region, but did suggest at one point that it would accept an Asian or ASEAN-led peacekeeping force. ASEAN however, played no role in seeking a solution, as the association feared violating the norm of non-interference. Only after Indonesia acquiesced, an Australian-led peace keeping force, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore joined in the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), as they feared that the peacekeeping mission would become a precedent for external intervention that would prevent ASEAN from being involved in any resolution to the problems.[26] These fears were triggered by the Australian Prime Minister John Howard in 1999 when he remarked that Australia, in leading the peacekeeping mission in East Timor

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[24] Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership*, Times Academic Press, Singapore, 1996, pp. 56-57.

[25] Herman Kraft, 'The Principle of Non-Intervention: Evolution and Emerging Challenges,' *Working Paper*, No. 344, Strategic and Defence Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, January 2000, p. 5.

[26] Alan Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis,' *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No, 2, 2000, pp. 163-170.

served as the US's 'deputy sheriff' in security affairs in East Asia region.[27]

The US was putting pressure on Indonesia and other Southeast Asian states to support democratic processes and uphold the notion of human rights, and they exerted this pressure through economic policies. The Clinton administration brought a new doctrine of democratic enlargement to replace the Cold War containment policy. One of the important characteristics of this doctrine was, to quote US national security adviser Anthony Lake, 'enlargement of the world's free community and market democracy.'[28] The US pressures being exerted through economic policies towards Southeast Asian states were clearly demonstrated during the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. Instead of providing economic assistance to help Asian nations, the US pointed to the failures of the Asian model of development that featured heavy state intervention in the economy, and thus resulted in a lack of transparency, weak prudential practices in the management of financial liberalisation, combined with moral hazards such as crony capitalism, rent seeking economics and corruption.[29] At the early phase of the crisis, the US and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) opposed the Japanese idea to establish an Asian Monetary Fund in 1997 to help bailout Thailand, which potentially could have prevented the crisis from spreading across the region. The US imposed an IMF leading role in the management of the Asian financial crisis to ensure that the 'Washington Consensus' would be paramount in the policy prescriptions of the World Bank and the IMF in their budget deficit

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[27] 'Howard Dubbed 'Deputy Sherriff,' *The Sidney Morning Herald*, 3 December 2002, available at <https://www.smh.com.au/national/howard-dubbed-deputy-sheriff-20021203-gdfwl4.html>, accessed 20 March 2020.

[28] Anthony Lake, 'From Containment to Enlargement,' *Remark by Anthony Lake, Assistant to President for National Security Affairs*, School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkin University, Washington DC, September 21, 1993, available at <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html>, accessed 20 April 2020.

[29] For argument that the Asian financial crisis was a failure of Asian development model, see for example, Jomo K.S., 'Introduction: Financial Governance, Liberalisation and Crises in East Asia,' in Jomo K.S. (ed), *Tigers in Trouble: Financial Governance, Liberalisation and Crises in East Asia*, Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, 1998, pp.1-32; Bruce Cumings, 'The Asian Crisis, Democracy and the End of 'Late' Development,' in T.J. Pempel (ed), *The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1999, pp. 17-44.

adjustment policies for developing countries.[30] Among other influences of the 'Washington Consensus' in adjustment policy were the pressures to impose competitive exchange rate and to urge countries to liberalise their capital account.[31]

Moreover, instead of employing APEC as a regional mechanism to mitigate the crisis, the US continued to censure the Asian development model put pressures on Southeast Asia states to embrace free market economy and good governance based on democracy. For example, in a pre-APEC business meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1998, US Vice President Al Gore brought the issue of democracy and human rights as key foundations of economic prosperity. Implicitly he denounced Malaysia's authoritarianism following the case of the arrest and detention of opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, and criticised Malaysia's efforts to maintain capital control and a managed exchange rate system that contrasted with the IMF policy suggestions.[32] The unfavourable US responses to the Asian financial crisis raised frustrations among Southeast Asian nations and fuelled 'the politics of resentment' towards the US.[33] As New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark pointed out, Southeast Asian states were frustrated with the US:

> There are terribly bitter feelings in Asia from the US response to the Asian
> economic crisis […] What they saw was when Russia and Brazil had their
> crisis, they (the Americans) rushed in, and they didn't do that for Asia, and
> yet these countries in Asia had been, they (the Asians) considered, very loyal

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[30] For example, Stanley Fischer, 'In Defense of the IMF: Specialized Tools for a Specialized Task,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, Issue 4, 1998, pp. 103-106.

[31] According to Williamson, who firstly coined the term of Washington Consensus, these two prescriptions were deviations of his original version. See, John Williamson, 'The Strange History of Washington Consensus,' p. 200.

[32] Shaun Narine, 'ASEAN in the Aftermath: The Consequences of East Asian Economic Crisis,' *Global Governance,* Vol. 8, 2002, p. 188; Jürgen Haacke, 'The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interaction: Intramural Challenges to the 'ASEAN Way',' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1999, pp. 603-604.

[33] Richard Higgott, 'The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment,' *New Political Economy*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1998, pp. 346-350.

friends.[34]

The US was pressuring Southeast Asian states to accept and embrace the norms of democracy and human rights, as a reaction to their domestic politics and practices and examples of human rights abuses among various individual ASEAN nations, and this pressure directly challenged both the regional primary and secondary institutions. As regards to the primary institutions, the US pressure challenged the regional interpretation of sovereignty and non-interference as well as the regional institution of diplomacy. Southeast Asian states staunchly adhered to the Westphalian conception of state-centred sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in their relations with each other. On the contrary, the US promotion of the liberal agenda of democracy and human rights shifted the strict interpretation of state sovereignty to accommodate popular sovereignty. Within this new notion, the issues related to domestic governance and human rights violations could not be considered merely internal states' affairs, as they were considered universal issues that needed to be tackled by the international community, and collectively. By pressuring Southeast Asian states and ASEAN to accept the norms of democracy and human rights, the US sought to challenge the significance of sovereignty, non-interference and the ASEAN style of diplomacy that had become the primary foundations of the regional society in mediating political and security estrangement between Southeast Asian countries. At this point, the US pressures challenged viability of the Southeast Asian regional international society to adapt to the shifting normative parameters in international society associated with democracy, human rights and complex interdependence, including the erosion of the principle of sovereignty and the rise of international civil society. Hence, the US pressures on democracy and human rights created normative tensions between maintaining ASEAN principles of state-centred sovereignty, non-interference and diplomacy

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[34] Quoted in Douglas Webber, 'Two Funerals and a Wedding? The Ups and Downs of Regionalism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific after the Asian Crisis,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 14, Issue 3, 2001, p. 355.

that have long underpinned social relations between them, and addressing the issue of democracy and human rights that are at odds with a collective understanding of the Southeast Asian regional primary institutions.

The pressure coming from the US also damaged the credibility of ASEAN as the main secondary institution. By stressing the importance of democracy and human rights on several individual members of ASEAN, and indeed the whole collective, the US sought to push ASEAN into make adjustments on their approach of intramural relations towards each other and extramural relations towards external major powers to be linked to the norms of democracy and human rights. In the case of the admission of Myanmar to both the ARF and ASEAN, it was clear that the US attempted to push ASEAN to consider political criteria for ASEAN membership, which up until that point had not been a condition for membership. The 1967 Bangkok Declaration mentioned that ASEAN is open for participation by all states in the Southeast Asia region that subscribe to the association's principles – notably commitment to multilateralism, international law, peaceful dispute settlement, non-interference and self-determination.[35] Moreover, as democracy and human rights were increasingly represented as new standard bearers and recognition of membership in global international society in the Post-Cold War, the issues of democracy and human rights were problematic for the ASEAN external diplomacy agenda that affected the association's position in international society.

As will be discussed in the next section, these US pressures sparked ASEAN's internal disagreements on how best to respond to the pressures that threatened to disentangle the association's unity and cohesion

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[35] For interesting discussion of standard criteria of membership, see Kilian Spandler, 'Regional Standard of Membership and Enlargement of The EU and ASEAN,' *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol. 16, 2018, pp. 183-198.

8.3.   ASEAN's Response

The increasing US pressure to accept democracy and human rights opened up a long debate among ASEAN members on how best to adapt their regional principles to meet the changing global norms. Initially, ASEAN states had resisted the US pressures to improve democracy and human rights. By the late 1990s, however, there were growing voices within the region that began to argue that the region needed a new and more substantive basis for regional and international cooperation to respond to the region's growing interdependence and the global changing values. The debates opened several ideas and initiatives that were marked by disagreements. It was only after ASEAN accepted Indonesia's idea of the ASC in 2003, that ASEAN was able to manage the external pressures insisting on democracy and human rights within Southeast Asian states. The agreement on the ASC opened the door for further reforms within ASEAN, such as the formulation of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 and the establishment of AICHR in 2009. These agreements marked a drastic shift in policy, from previously rejecting and denying notions of democracy and improvements to human rights, to then formally acknowledging the importance of democracy and human rights as central issues for the future of ASEAN institutional building.

Before the financial crisis in 1997, ASEAN states were indifferent to and resisted US criticisms about the absent of democracy and human rights in their institutional principles. There are several reasons that underlie ASEAN's indifference to these pressures coming from the US. First, some ASEAN governments perceived the US pressures on the issue of democracy and human rights as potential threats for their own regime security.[36] In the 1990s, regime security increasingly became a strong concern among several ASEAN members as a result of the fear of possible social and political consequences of economic modernisation,

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[36] Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origin, Development and Prospect*, p. 149.

industrialisation and rapid economic growth. This had been the case for Thailand in May 1992, when student protestors and public demonstrations overthrew the military regime led by General Suchinda Kraprayoon. Some ASEAN governments were also alarmed that the US agenda on democracy and human rights could inflame the existing domestic tensions that might potentially undermine the legitimacy of the political regimes in some ASEAN governments and affected the achievement towards regional resilience.

In rejecting the pressure from the US pressures in relation to democracy and human rights, ASEAN states, particularly Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, masterminded by Lee Kuan Yew, exercised cultural politics by juxtaposing Asian and Western values. Although there was no single uniform view, due to the diversity in histories, religions, cultures and traditions, Asian values was built on the premise of cultural relativism to embody a set of values that are intrinsic and specific to the whole of Asia to counter the hegemonic discourse of universality of Western liberal and social democratic values.[37] With this line of thinking, democracy and human rights were considered as Western ideologies and practices that were considered inappropriate for Asian people. Within this discourse, ASEAN states emphasised values such as communitarianism, hierarchy and paternalism, respect for authority, social harmony, and family ties that were shared regional values and provided a basis for regional cooperation. These values were believed to have help the region to achieve regional stability and economic growth. For critics however, the terms had been used as an excuse for authoritarian governments, prone to corruption and crony capitalism, to insulate their position from domestic and international critics to preserving their power, rather than showing a genuine

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[37] Michael D. Barr, *Cultural Politics and Asian Values: The Tepid War*, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, pp. 4-7; Diane K. Mauzy, 'The Human Rights and 'Asian Values' Debate in Southeast Asia: Trying to Clarify the Key Issues,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1997, pp. 215-219.

Asian position for democracy and human rights.[38] The Asian values ideology, however, never achieved a similar acceptance across ASEAN members. The Philippines and Thailand, which were the only two fully democratic states in the ASEAN group in the early 1990s, were willing to engage in dialogue on democracy and human rights issues with the US. However, their voices were overwhelmed by Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia which were all committed to promoting Asian values. After the financial crisis and the fall of Suharto in 1998, however, Asian values had lost one of its strong supporters.

The second reason for ASEAN's indifference to the US pressures was the manner in which the US exercised these pressures. Following its close cooperation with the US and the economic success in the 1980s and early 1990s, most ASEAN leaders demanded more equal relations with the Western states in the Post-Cold War, at least as a collective body. In contrast to this expectation, ASEAN individual states and ASEAN collectively became the target for the US criticisms on their democratic record and human rights issues. Moreover, the US exerted its pressures through threats of sanctions and public criticisms that embarrassed ASEAN's leaders, and dashed their hopes for a more equal relationship.[39] There was also a widespread suspicion that the liberal model being promoted by the Western states was predominantly a US model aimed at serving the dominant Western power interests, which was reminiscent of the practice of colonialism and therefore undesirable in Asia. The US appeared to be trying to subordinate ASEAN states with their promotion of liberal values. When the US and other Western liberal states claimed that liberal values and institutions such as democracy, human rights and neo-liberal economic development should be used as the new criteria to determine the rightful conduct and membership of the global international society, these new norms were

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[38] For example, Diane K. Mauzy, 'The Human Rights and 'Asian Values' Debate in Southeast Asia: Trying to Clarify the Key Issues,' pp. 210-236; Richard Robison, 'The Politics of 'Asian Values',' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1996, pp. 309-327.

[39] Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origin, Development and Prospect*, p. 147.

thus perceived as a reproduction of a new hierarchy of social interaction in international society. This was clearly illustrated by Anwar Ibrahim in his 1994 statement:

> [….] to allow ourselves to be lectured and hectored on freedom and human rights after 100 years of struggle to regain our liberty and human dignity, by those who participated in our subjugation, is to willingly suffer impudence.[40]

Nevertheless, the US pressures over democracy and human rights has put ASEAN into normative tension over the principle of non-interference, and this has opened intramural debates within ASEAN. On the one hand, the principle of non-interference has served as the most important pillar of regional harmony, solidarity, and stability, as it has refrained one ASEAN member state and another to criticise each other domestic governance. The non-interference principle also has been invoked by ASEAN countries to ward off international criticisms over their domestic governance and human rights records. On the other hand, the principle had arguably become a stumbling block keeping ASEAN from moving forward in accordance with the evolving norms of democracy and human rights. The staunch adherence to principle of non-interference on human rights issues also harmed ASEAN's standing with its Western partners and in international financial institutions as well as the recognition as a potent diplomatic actor in wider regional affairs.[41]

This tension had led to several initiatives to revitalise the principle of non-interference in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. At the same time, disaffection with non-interference principle also arouse from transborder effects of domestic policies of ASEAN individual members. For example, since the mid of 1990s, forest fires in Indonesia have blanketed its neighbours, Singapore, Malaysia and some parts of Thailand, with dangerous haze. Despite

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[40] Quoted in Diane K. Mauzy, 'The Human Rights and 'Asian Values' Debate in Southeast Asia: Trying to Clarify the Key Issues,' p. 212.
[41] Herman Kraft, 'The Principle of Non-Intervention: Evolution and Emerging Challenges,' pp. 6-7.

ASEAN had drafted plan of action to prevent the recurrence of transborder haze problems, Indonesia seemed unwilling to take strong measures to prevent the problems. The economic crisis in 1997-1998 also demonstrated another reality of the interrelated of domestic policies of ASEAN members. Some governments reportedly conceal negative economic data that affected other government's effort to manage the financial markets. Moreover, Suharto's and Mahathir's criticisms against the IMF as a representation of Western domination has affected Thailand and the Philippines efforts to engage with the IMF and other Western states in seeking financial assistance to curb the economic crisis.[42]

The first idea to review the non-interference principle came from Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. He wrote in a short essay published in *Newsweek* magazine on 21 July 1997, coined the term 'constructive intervention'.[43] His idea was triggered by the political crisis in Cambodia in early of July 1997, when Prime Minister Hun Sen initiated a violent coup by ousting Prince Norodom Ranariddh faction to put an end of the coalition government, which was resulted from the UN administered election in 1993.[44] The coup happened in just a few days before Cambodia's scheduled admission into ASEAN, together with Laos and Myanmar. This violent coup has embarrassed ASEAN members and led the association to suspend Cambodia's membership in ASEAN. The coup was perceived as deteriorating years of peace effort in the country led by ASEAN and other third party. Related to the political crisis in Cambodia, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim contended, 'Our noninvolvement in the reconstruction in Cambodia actually contributed to the deterioration and final collapse of national reconciliation (in Cambodia).'[45] For that reason, he called for 'constructive intervention' in Cambodia and ASEAN's latecomer members to achieve political

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[42] Greg Felker, 'ASEAN Regionalism and Southeast Asia's Systemic Challenges,' pp. 235-236.
[43] Anwar Ibrahim, 'Crisis Prevention,' *Newsweek*, 21 July 1997, pp. 38-39.
[44] For a good account on Cambodia political crisis in 1997, see, Sorpong Peou, 'Cambodia in 1997: Back to Square One,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1998, pp. 69-74.
[45] Anwar Ibrahim, 'Crisis Prevention,' p. 38.

stability and economic development. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's idea represented a call for ASEAN to be more proactively intervene in certain domestic problems within member countries that have immediate harmful effects on their neighbours and ASEAN as a whole.[46] This idea, however, was never really undertaken seriously by ASEAN as most of its members as the question on how ASEAN can 'intervene' without violating its own cardinal principle of non-interference in one another's domestic affairs, remained unanswered.[47]

Another heated debate in ASEAN occurred after Thailand's Prime Minister Surin Pitsuwan officially advocated ASEAN to adopt policy of 'flexible engagement' in ASEAN ministerial meeting in July 1998. Similar to Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's idea, Surin Pitsuwan suggested ASEAN should change the absolute interpretation of non-interference into a greater flexibility to collectively discuss internal policies of ASEAN members that both could have adverse effects to other members and regional implications as well as to enhance democracy and human rights in ASEAN countries. However, a proposal of flexible engagement encountered opposition from other ASEAN members, except the Philippines. The opposition was caused by the fear that flexible engagement would challenge the practice of quiet diplomacy and pave the way for uninvited involvement in the domestic affairs of other states. As Haacke has observed, ASEAN suspected that not only did flexible engagement conflicted with the principle of non-interference, but once practiced, it would allow open criticisms of each other internal affairs that in contrast with long-held quiet diplomacy practice

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[46] Jürgen Haacke, 'The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interaction: Intramural Challenges to the 'ASEAN Way',' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1999, p. 582; Herman Kraft, 'The Principle of Non-Intervention: Evolution and Emerging Challenges,' p. 8.

[47] ASEAN responded the political crisis in Cambodia in 1997 by reaffirmed the principle of non-interference, while at the same time offering ASEAN's good offices to Cambodia's conflicting parties. Such effort manifested in the formation of ASEAN Troika, consisted of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand to broker a deal with Hun Sen. The brokerage of ASEAN Troika, with the help of Japan has resulted in internationally observed election in 1998. The election won by Cambodia People's Party (CPP) led by Hun Sen by 41%, while FUNCINPEC (*Front Uni National Pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, pacifique et Cooperatif*/ the national United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia) party led by Ranariddh acquired 32%. A new coalition of government was formed by CPP and FUNCINPEC. See, Robin Ramcharan, 'ASEAN and Non-Interference: A Principle Maintained,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2000, pp. 67-68.

in settling differences or conflict without arousing public outrage or perception of interference. It was because, as Ramcharan has argued 'ASEAN governments have adhered to the principle of non-interference without always strictly abiding by the principle.'[48] In other words, the principle of non-interference has been ambiguously practiced by ASEAN countries despite non-interference rhetoric.[49] Historically, ASEAN has tolerated the practice of interference conducted by individually and collectively towards its neighbours, such as ASEAN's interference in Kampuchean-Vietnam Conflict in 1980s, ASEAN's interference in Myanmar through constructive engagement, Indonesia's involvement in mediating conflict between the Philippines government and Mindanao National Liberation Front in the mid-1980s, and ASEAN involvement in Cambodia political conflict following Hun Sen coup against Ranariddh in 1997 through ASEAN's troika mission. However, these interferences were mostly conducted quietly, behind the scenes and without adverse posturing to resolve issues causing tension between states.[50] The proposal of flexible engagement, thus rejected by other ASEAN members since such idea could potentially open-up adversarial relations that would jeopardise intramural stability.

Instead of a flexible engagement, at the Ministerial Meeting in July 1998, ASEAN informally agreed to the practice of 'enhanced interaction'. It is not clear who firstly proposed this idea, but the idea was regarded as a compromise and accepted by ASEAN member states to address the concerns on certain domestic problems of member states that could affected its neighbours and ASEAN. The 'enhanced interaction' concept reaffirmed ASEAN's adherence to the principle of non-interference, resolved dispute bilaterally, and possibility to involve third party for mediation in case the conflict cannot be resolved bilaterally. However, it allowed

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[48] Robin Ramcharan, 'ASEAN and Non-Interference: A Principle Maintained,' p. 81.
[49] Lee Jones, *ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia*, Palgrave Macmillan, London and New York, 2012.
[50] Robin Ramcharan, 'ASEAN and Non-Interference: A Principle Maintained,' p. 80.

individual states to voice their opinion over problems in other member states that could affect them or have a regional repercussion.[51] There was vague but significant difference between flexible engagement and enhanced interaction. According to Haacke, the flexible engagement concept suggested that internal politics of ASEAN members that could have adverse effects to other members should be openly discussed collectively in ASEAN forum, while the enhanced interaction only implied that individual member states could comments on other members' domestic affairs, although ASEAN collectively should not.[52]

The enhanced interaction was tested in the case of the detention of former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. President Joseph Estrada of Philippines met privately with Anwar Ibrahim's wife and daughter in Manila and made a remark of the possibility of not attending 1998 APEC Summit in Kuala Lumpur. Similarly, President Habibie, who has close personal relations with Anwar Ibrahim, openly opposed the detention. Habibie cancelled his plan to visit Malaysia and threatened not to attend the 1998 APEC summit.[53] Malaysia regarded these behaviours as a serious offence and violating the principle of non-interference. The Malaysian government responded to Habibie by attacking the legitimacy of his presidency while warning that it might take serious measures against Indonesian illegal migrants in Malaysia. Similarly, Malaysia dubbed Estrada as a 'new kid on the block'. The diplomatic rows finally mitigated by Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, who suggested that the concerns were more a personal opinion that were not represented formal position of both Indonesia and the Philippines and therefore did not considered as intervention

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[51] Jürgen Haacke, 'The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interaction: Intramural Challenges to the 'ASEAN Way',' p. 582; Robin Ramcharan, 'ASEAN and Non-Interference: A Principle Maintained,' p. 81.

[52] Jürgen Haacke, ''Enhanced Interaction' with Myanmar and the Project of Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with its Diplomatic and Security Culture?' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2005, pp. 189-190.

[53] Estrada and Habibie finally attended APEC Summit as Anwar was released from detention and held under house arrest. See, Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origin, Development and Prospect*, pp. 184-185.

in another state's domestic affairs.[54] Although it failed to reconcile the issue of democratisation and human rights with the non-interference norms, the debate on flexible engagement and enhanced interaction indicated ASEAN's awareness on the adverse impacts of the issue democracy and human rights to regional stability and ASEAN overall standing in international society if they were not further responded.

It was clear from the debate above that despite external pressures on democracy and human rights norms, ASEAN were unwilling to replace or modify the principle of non-interference and quiet style of diplomacy. There was a widespread conviction that once open criticism towards each other was allowed, it spread misgivings and resentments among ASEAN members that endangered solidarity and unity of the association. What was needed by ASEAN was addressing the issue of democracy and human rights without pretension to impose the norms to the member states that would be spreading the thought of interference domestic affairs. The heart of the matter was how to find a of appropriate balance for ASEAN to address the issue of democracy and human rights without pretensions to impose the norms to the member states that would be spreading the thought of interference in internal affairs of member states.

The most important innovations that ASEAN has undertaken in response to the above dilemma have been the declaration of Bali Concord II as the result of ASEAN Summit in October 2003, in which the Southeast Asian states envisioned the establishment of ASEAN community with three pillars: ASC, ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.[55] Other important steps taken by ASEAN was the ratification of ASEAN Charter in 2007 and the establishment of AICHR in 2009. These important steps exhibited

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[54] Herman Kraft, 'The Principle of Non-Intervention: Evolution and Emerging Challenges,' p. 13; Jürgen Haacke, 'The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interaction: Intramural Challenges to the 'ASEAN Way',' pp. 598-603.

[55] In 2007, ASC was renamed as ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) to include Indonesia's original proposal of ASC that listed political development as one of the agenda towards a security community.

ASEAN's intention to move forward towards a more normative rule-based and people-centred regionalism, which indicated a gradual transformation of the regional international society in Southeast Asia towards global liberal agenda. In the ASC plan of action, for example, ASEAN emphasised the promotion of democracy as a legitimate objective of the regional organisation.[56] It was reiterated in the ASEAN Charter, which stated the reference to the necessity of ASEAN states to promote democracy and to protect human rights.[57] In a similar spirit, the AICHR was mandated 'to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of ASEAN'.[58] These agreements were marked an important turning point in the Southeast Asian regional international society. Over previous decade, ASEAN members states were the vanguard of Asian values debate that rejected democracy and human rights as Western values and thus not suitable to Asian people. Now, ASEAN formally approves democracy and human rights as important values in directing the future of ASEAN institutional building.

These agreements have raised question whether they were entirely genuine normative standards to be realised in the regional society or merely an institutional volte-face.[59] Nonetheless, the agreement to include democracy and human rights in the ASC, ASEAN Charter and AICHR were important breakthrough to solve the dilemma between the attempt to pursue democratisation and human rights agenda and to maintain regional security and stability in the region without directly imposing them to the member states that would trigger interstate tensions and damaging regional unity and solidarity. Most importantly, the ASEAN's rights agenda manifested the association's efforts to accommodate and to mediate external pressures,

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[56] 'ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action,' <https://asean.org/?static_post=asean-security-community-plan-of-action>, accessed 20 March 2021.

[57] Article 1 (7) of ASEAN Charter. Text of ASEAN Charter is available at <https://asean.org/storage/images/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf>, accessed 20 March 2021.

[58] ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (Terms of Reference), available at <https://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/publications/TOR-of-AICHR.pdf>, accessed 25 April 2021.

[59] For example, Avery Poole, *Democracy, Rights and Rhetoric in Southeast* Asia, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland, 2019.

particularly from the US on democracy and human rights. As Hiro Katsumata has argued, ASEAN's adjustment to liberal agenda was driven by 'the intention of securing ASEAN's identity as a legitimate institution in the community of modern state.'[60] Thus, by pursuing an agenda on democracy and human rights, not only could ASEAN skilfully exercise appropriate measures to mitigate the destabilising impacts of external pressures, but more importantly it could maintain its international standing to reclaim recognition and respect for its regional identity.

8.4.   Indonesia's Response

Compared to other Southeast Asian states, Indonesia was targeted more heavily by the US with its emphasis on democracy and human rights especially after the Indonesian military's action in East Timor in 1991. In addition to military sanctions the US threatened to suspend economic assistance unless there was progress on the issues of democratisation and human rights. The US also criticised Indonesia for its treatment of labour issues and threatened to review Indonesia's eligibility for trading privileges under the GSP.[61] This was followed by harsh criticisms from other Western countries, for example from Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation Jan Pronk, the chair of Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI).[62] Furthermore, international pressure on Indonesia, albeit symbolic, came from the Nobel Peace Prize which was awarded jointly to the Bishop of East Timor, Carlos Belo and

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[60] Hiro Katsumata, 'ASEAN and Human Rights: Resisting Western Pressure or Emulating the West,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22, No. 5, 2009, p. 625.

[61] Two cases of Indonesia's suppressions of labour movement that drawn international attention were the murder of young woman independent union activists, Marsinah, allegedly by military forces in 1993, and the imprisonment of Muchtar Pakpahan the leader of the first independent labour union, the SBSI (*Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia*/Indonesian Workers' Welfare Union), in 1994.

[62] Established in 1967, IGGI was an international consortium of official donors to coordinate the provision of foreign assistance to Indonesia, chaired by the Dutch government. Indonesia reacted strongly to Jan Pronk criticism by dissolving the IGGI in the early 1992. The IGGI was replaced by the CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia) chaired by the World Bank. In 2007, President Yudhoyono announced that Indonesia no longer needed CGI as an agency to coordinate donors, as Indonesia wanted to coordinate directly with the donors.

Jose Ramos Horta, the leading international spokesperson for the East Timorese, in 1996. These pressures pushed Indonesia to the fringes of international society, as a state with a deficit of democracy and human rights.

Confident with its own diplomatic and economic achievements, the Suharto government defied the US criticisms and pressures. The Suharto regime accused the US of having a hidden and harmful agenda towards Indonesia through its promotion of human rights and democracy, which was deemed incompatible with Asian values.[63] The strained relations with the US and other Western states over human rights and democracy issues were also ironic, as the early 1990s was praised as the 'peak year of Indonesia's diplomacy' by the daily *Kompas*, one of the influential newspapers in Indonesia.[64] Indonesia was the Chair of the NAM in the 1992-1995 period and played a crucial role in redefining the NAM's *raison d'ètre* due to the end of bipolar conflict. The 'Jakarta Message' as the result of The Tenth NAM summit in Jakarta in 1992 was acclaimed as an historical milestone, which transformed the confrontational style of NAM into engagement and cooperation towards developed countries, embodied in North-South dialogue.[65] It was also the period of the conclusion of the Cambodian conflict with the signing of the Paris Agreement in 1991, in which Indonesia played an important role as an honest broker. Indonesia was also successful in promoting one of the APEC's flagship initiatives of the 'Bogor Goals' in the 1994 Summit in Bogor, which set the deadline for free and open trade in Asia Pacific no later than 2020. Moreover, Indonesia's economy during the period between 1988-1991 was at a peak with annual GDP growth around 9% and was listed as one of High Performing Asian Economies in that be part of Asian

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[63] Ann Marie Murphy, US Rapprochement with Indonesia; From Problem State to Partner,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2010, p. 366.

[64] See, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy After the Cold War,' *Southeast Asian Affairs*, Vol. 26, January 1994, p. 156.

[65] Indonesian Foreign Ministry, '*Gerakan Non-Blok* (Non-Alignment Movement),' <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/142/halaman_list_lainnya/gerakan-non-blok-gnb>, accessed 25 March 2021

economic miracle in the 1990s.[66]

The US pressures on Indonesia were also clearly exemplified during the financial crisis in 1997-2000. In contrast to the Thai case, in which the US did not take an active part in the IMF recovery package, the US actively intervened in the process of economic recovery in Indonesia. The US committed $3 billion as part of a $43 billion bailout package led by the IMF, conditional on the acceptance of a Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). The SAPs demanded that Indonesia restructure its financial sector, deregulate its economy, cut subsidies, reform trade and industrial policies, and improve transparency of relations between government and business.[67] Although Indonesia signed the Letter of Intent with the IMF in October 1991, Suharto was reluctant to implement the reforms in exchange for international funding. As the economic crisis stirred up into a political one, Suharto announced his readiness to serve a seventh term in office and gave a strong signal that his candidate for the next vice president was B.J. Habibie, best known as the Minister of Research and Technology and championing nationalistic economic policies. Following the announcement, the Indonesian currency, Rupiah, fell to nearly 17,000 to the dollar, having been 2,400 per dollar before the financial crisis began. In responding to the fall of the Rupiah, instead of implementing the SAPs, Suharto showed enthusiastic interest in creating a currency board system that would limit the domestic money supply to Indonesia's foreign currency reserves at a fixed exchange rate to the US dollar. The US viewed that Suharto was determined to avoid following the IMF's conditions as it would harm the interests of Suharto family's and his cronies' business. Moreover, the US saw that Suharto was determined to maintain the authoritarian political system in Indonesia. In this instance, the US put pressure on Indonesia to accept the IMF

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[66] World Bank, *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993.
[67] For detail, see IMF, 'Indonesia Letter of Intent, 31 October 1997', available at <https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/103197.htm>, accessed 30 April 2020.

economic rescue plan. President Clinton reportedly made a direct call to Suharto threatening to cut off the aid if the currency board system-plan went on. [68] Clinton also dispatched former Vice President Walter Mondale to Jakarta in March 1998 to push Indonesia to comply with the SAPs required by the IMF. When Suharto was adamant, as a result, the IMF then delayed the disbursement of $ 3 billion on March 1998, causing the international agency to suspend their loans. The worsening economic and political crisis led to widespread social and political unrest and ultimately resulted in the fall of Suharto in 1998. [69]

Upon replacing Suharto, Habibie enacted a vast political liberalisation and democratisation agenda to secure international assistance for economic recovery. [70] Habibie amended relations with the IMF and the World Bank, which then resumed the economic package disbursement that was suspended in Suharto era. The US welcomed Indonesia's political liberalisation and provided technical and financial supports for the June general election 1999, which was dubbed as the first free election in Indonesia since 1955. [71] However, Habibie was under pressure from the US for failing to prevent human rights violations in the post-1999 East Timor referendum. The US demanded Indonesia's parliament ratify the referendum result and welcome the international peacekeeping force. The US also used its influence on international financial institutions, which resulted in the delay of the IMF and World Bank some part of the disbursement of the rescue package loan at the expense of Indonesia's government to accept the INTERFET. [72] Habibie's government had no choice but

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[68] John Bresnan, 'The United States, IMF, and Indonesian Financial Crisis,' in Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris (eds), *The Politics of Post-Suharto* Indonesia, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1999, pp. 87-112.
[69] For detail IMF role in Indonesia during financial crisis, see, for example, Shalendra D. Sharma, 'The Indonesian Financial Crisis: From Banking Crisis to Financial Sector Reforms, 1997-2000,' *Indonesia*, No. 91, 2001, pp. 79-110.
[70] Indonesia's economy plunged into the lowest point marked by the lowest point of Rupiah to Dollar at Rp. 16,800, inflation running at around 70 percent per year and the income per capita dropped from $ 1,000 to only $400. Hendra Friana, '*Bagaimana Habibie Kendalikan Dolar dari Rp. 16.800 ke Rp. 7.500* (How Habibie Controls Dollar from Rp. 16,800 to Rp. 7,500),' *Tirto.id,* 12 September 2019, available online at <https://tirto.id/bagaimana-habibie-kendalikan-dolar-dari-rp16800-ke-rp7500-ehVR>, accessed 25 March 2021.
[71] Ann Marie Murphy, US Rapprochement with Indonesia; From Problem State to Partner,' pp. 367-368
[72] Kai He, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy After Suharto: International Pressure, Democratization, and Foreign Policy,' *International Relations of Asia Pacific*, Vol. 8, 2008, pp. 59-60.

to garner international support and funding to cope with the economic crisis and political reform unless to conform to the new liberal interventionist under the US leadership.

During Abdurrahman Wahid's Presidency (1999-2001), legacy problems of the East Timor referendum again created problems for Indonesia's engagement with the US. It precipitated by the UN office in Atambua (a district in West Timor) was attacked by militias who killed three UN workers in September 2000. The US Defence Secretary William Cohen expressed the US's concern that the failure to disarm and disband the army-supported militias could result in the suspension of aid from international financial institutions and further possible economic sanction from the international community.[73] This pressure exacerbated Indonesia's economic and political crises as it also had to deal with domestic conflicts on religious, ethnicity and geography as these spread to many areas such as Aceh, Kalimantan, the Moluccas, and West Papua.

The designation of Southeast Asia as 'the second front' of the US Global War on Terrorism in 2001, ushered another strong pressure from the US towards Indonesia. At the beginning, due to the rise of political Islam, the US-led invasion to Afghanistan was widely condemned by Indonesian population as a violation of international law. Political leaders, including Vice President Hamzah Haz, repeatedly denied that Indonesia was a base for terrorists.[74] President Megawati nevertheless visited the US on 19 September 2001 and vowed Indonesia's support for war against terrorism amid widespread anti-American sentiment at home calling for *jihad* against the US.[75] After the Bali bombing in October 2002 and a series

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[73] Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 'Cohen warns Indonesia could face suspension of aid Jakarta,' 18 September 2000, <https://etan.org/et2000c/september/17-23/18cohen1.htm>, accessed 25 June 2019.

[74] Hamzah Haz: Keberadaan Teroris di Indonesia Baru Sebatas Wacana (Hamzah Haz: The Existence of Terrorists in Indonesia is Still a Discourse), *Tempo.co,* 5 December 2003, available at <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/32882/hamzah-haz-keberadaan-teroris-di-indonesia-baru-sebatas-wacana>, accessed 20 April 2021.

[75] For Indonesia's public opinion regarding the joining of the Government of Indonesia in the Global War on terror, see, Lena Kay, 'Indonesia's Public Perception of the U.S. and Their Implication for U.S. Foreign Policy, *Issues and Insight*, Vol. 5, No. 5, Pacific Forum CSIS, Hawaii, August 2005.

attack on Australian Embassy and Marriot Hotel in 2003, Indonesia's support for the Global War on Terror gained wide support from the domestic moderate Muslim population as evidently terrorism had become a serious threat for the country.

Joining in the war against terrorism became an important turning point in Indonesia's relations with the US and other Western states.[76] The US then changed its domineering pressures on the issue of human rights into low pressures and a policy of cooperation. The US also provided financial aid for counter terrorism and loosened its military embargo.[77] The weakening pressures from the US accompanied with good relationships with the IFIs had become important modalities for the Megawati government to deal with domestic politics and economic problems such as economic recovery, sectarian conflict, and separatism. Under Megawati domestic politics became more stable and the economy began to recover.

Along with its stable condition, Indonesia's foreign policy revived in the era of President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004). It was the 9th ASEAN Summit held in Bali October 2003, which heralded in the Bali Concord II (ASEAN Concord II), Indonesia successfully promoted the idea of the ASC. Moreover, under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Presidency (2004-2014), Indonesia further projected its democratic identity abroad.[78] At a regional level, the democratic identity was translated into detailing the road map of ASC, and later the APSC, the formulation of ASEAN Charter and the establishment of AICHR.

It is important to note that during the Megawati presidency, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda assumed a greater authority

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[76] Ann Marie Murphy, US Rapprochement with Indonesia; From Problem State to Partner,' p. 372.

[77] Kai He, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy After Suharto: International Pressure, Democratization, and Foreign Policy,' p. 67.

[78] For example, Avery Poole, 'The Foreign Policy Nexus: National Interests, Political Values, and Identity,' in Christopher B. Robert, Ahmad D. Habir & Leonard C. Sebastian, *Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and Regional Order*, Palgrave Macmillan, London and New York, 2015, pp. 155-176.

to formulate Indonesia's foreign policy and diplomacy.[79] As an analyst has noted, 'Hassan Wirajuda was the architect of many of the key changes in Indonesia's Post-Soeharto foreign policy.'[80] Not only reforming the internal structure of the ministry and involving broader civil society in the foreign policy formulation, Hassan also brought the idea of ASC to tackle the problems that made the association loss its credibility both in the face of its members and the world.

In an interview with *Republika,* a popular newspaper in Indonesia, Hassan mentioned that he already introduced the idea of ASC since early 2002, at an ASEAN-Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) meeting in Manila. The idea was precipitated by Singapore's proposal to build an ASEAN Economic Community, which emphasised further economic integration in the region. Hassan viewed that economic development itself, without political development, was not sustainable to uphold the state's legitimacy. Learning from the Indonesia's lesson, in which economic slowdown and crisis had led to social and political crises, ASEAN at the regional level needed to create a balance between economic progress and cooperation in the political-security area. For this reason, he proposed the idea of ASC to promote political and security development in the region among other by embracing democracy and human rights norms.[81] In the interview Hassan also revealed that the idea of security community, at the beginning, was faced with strong opposition particularly from Singapore. However, Indonesia continued to forge the idea of security community by involving thinkers

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[79] The prominent role of Indonesian Foreign Ministry in formulating foreign policy under Megawati era could be contrasted with the role of Indonesian Foreign Ministry under President Yudhoyono, 'who often dubbed himself as a 'foreign policy President' and very often directly involved in formulating and directing the foreign policy agenda.' Personal interview with Dr. Yayan Ganda Hayat Mulyana, Head of Education and Training Center of Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign, Training Center of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Building, Jakarta, 30 January 2019.

[80] Gretta Nabbs-Keller, 'Reforming Indonesia's Foreign Ministry: Ideas, Organization and Leadership,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2013, p. 58.

[81] 'Hassan Wirajuda, Pendiri and Pembina Bali Democracy Forum: Demokrasi tidak Bisa Dipaksakan (Hassan Wirajuda, Founder and Trustee of Bali Democracy Forum: Democracy Cannot be Forced), 3 February 2016, available at <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/o1ym473/hassan-wirajuda-pendiri-dan-pembina-bali-democracy-forum-demokrasi-tak-bisa-dipaksakan>, accessed 25 April 2021.

and experts, which resulted a concept paper of the ASC conceived by Sukma, the then executive director CSIS Jakarta.[82]

Indonesia officially proposed the idea of ASC at ASEAN Senior Official Meeting in Phnom Penh, June 2003. In the proposal, Indonesia elucidated five elements of ASC: political development, setting norms, preventing conflict, resolving conflict, and post-conflict peace building. According to Sukma, the term of political development was used as a less controversial term for a democracy agenda. Although in the political development, Indonesia listed several requirements such as promoting people participation, the conduct of regular general elections, implementation of good governance, strengthening judicial and legal institutions and promoting human rights, which was otherwise advocating a democratic agenda in ASEAN.[83]

In the 9th ASEAN Summit in October 2003 in Bali, ASEAN states committed to the building of ASC as one of the pillars of ASEAN Community along with Singapore's idea of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the Philippines initiative of ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. In the Declaration of Bali Concord II that formally approved the ASC, the element of political development was excluded and left the ASC with four elements: setting norms, preventing conflict, resolving conflict, and post-conflict peace building. Moreover, the Declaration also stated that ASEAN committed to uphold the traditional principles of ASEAN as stated in the ZOPFAN and TAC.[84] Indonesia's effort to reinsert political development in the ASC took place in Vientiane Summit in November 2004. The Summit adopted Vientiane Action Programme, which detailed the guidance to achieve ASEAN Community 2020,

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[82] Rizal Sukma, 'The Future of ASEAN: Towards a Security Community,' Paper presented at a Seminar on 'ASEAN Cooperation, Challenges and Prospect in the Current International Situation,' New York, 3 June 2003.
[83] Rizal Sukma, 'Political Development: A Democracy Agenda for ASEAN,' in Donald K. Emmerson (ed), *Hard Choices: Security Democracy and Regionalism in Southeast Asia*, The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, Stanford, 2008, p. 137.
[84] 'Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II),' available at <https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-of-asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii>, accessed 25 April 2021.

including ASC Plan of Action.[85] Both documents restored the phrase of political development as key element of the ASC. Indonesia's original idea of political development was diluted as the need for regular general elections and wider political participation were missing. The ASC Plan of Action, however, mentioned that 'ASEAN member countries shall promote political development in support of ASEAN Leaders' shared vision of common values to achieve peace, stability, *democracy* and prosperity in the region (emphasis added).'[86]

Following the agreement of the Bali Concord II, at the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN decided to conceive an ASEAN Charter as the 'legal and institutional framework' and 'to codify all ASEAN norms, rules and values', and 'be legally binding.'[87] For this purpose, the Summit also assigned an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to directing the formulation of the Charter, while the writing was entrusted to High-Level Task Force. The Charter was agreed on August 2007 then ratified and put in force in December 2008. Although watered down, Indonesia's idea for democracy and human rights was stated in the preamble of the Charter and article 1(7),[88] which stated, 'Adhering to the principle of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedom.' In article 1(7) it stated, 'to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedom (…).'[89]

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[85] Text for Vientiane Action Program available at <https://asean.org/storage/images/archive/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf>, accessed 25 April 2021.

[86] 'ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action,' available at <https://asean.org/?static_post=asean-security-community-plan-of-action>, accessed 25 April 2021.

[87] 'Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter,' available at <https://asean.org/asean/asean-charter/kuala-lumpur-declaration/>, accessed 25 April 2021.

[88] Although retaining democracy and human rights as legitimate objectives of the association, the Charter was a little disappointed to Indonesia as the EPG had recommended that ASEAN should respect, protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedom, and rejecting unconstitutional and undemocratic change of government. In the process of writing, the High-Level Task Force omitting the EPG recommendation and only mention democracy and human rights as general reference without equip it with instrument to achieve them. for comparison of the reference to democracy between the EPG recommendation and the ASEAN Charter, See, Jörn Dosch, 'Sovereignty Rules: Human Security, Civil Society, and the Limits of Liberal Reform,' in Donald K. Emmerson (ed), *Hard Choices: Security Democracy and Regionalism in Southeast Asia*, pp. 80-81.

[89] ASEAN Charter, available at <https://asean.org/storage/November-2020-The-ASEAN-Charter-28th-Reprint.pdf.>, accessed 25 April 2021.

After the signing of the Charter, as stipulated by the article 14 of the Charter, ASEAN must establish an ASEAN human rights body. The idea of regional human rights body stirred debate in ASEAN. While Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand were supportive to an extensive mandate of a regional human rights body, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam were opposing, while Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei only agreed to a narrow mandate of the body. These countries were anxious that a regional human rights body that could conduct regional investigation of human rights practices would become divisive issues and could interfere in a member states' domestic affairs.[90] As a result the AICHR represented a compromise between ASEAN member states. The primary function of the AICHR was to raise awareness and promotion of human rights rather than conducting investigations on human rights violation and protection.[91] Thus, the AICHR would not posit a challenge to sovereignty of member states in which human rights violations may take place.

While from the beginning supporting the importance of including democracy and human rights and regional human rights with an extensive mandate, Indonesia accepted the compromise of the ASC/APSC, the ASEAN Charter as well as the AICHR. Although the APSC, the ASEAN Charter and the AICHR watered down Indonesia's initiative to promote a broader adherence to democracy and human rights norms, Indonesia has partially successful in mainstreaming democracy and human rights norms into the ASEAN glossary of norms. Moreover, by reaffirming ASEAN core norms of non-interference, sovereignty and ASEAN way diplomacy, Indonesia agreed that the democratic agenda could go hand in hand with the established norms.

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[90] Jörn Dosch, 'Sovereignty Rules: Human Security, Civil Society, and the Limits of Liberal Reform,' pp. 84-85.
[91] 'ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission of Human Rights (Terms of Reference),' available at <https://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/publications/TOR-of-AICHR.pdf>, accessed 25 April 2021.

8.5.   Maintenance of Southeast Asian Regional International Society

This section analyses how Indonesia's responses to the US pressures on democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia has driven by its aspiration to maintain the relevance of regional primary institution of sovereignty and non-interference, as well as to maintain the credibility and unity of ASEAN in the Post-Cold War. Existing explanations maintain that Indonesia's promotion of democracy and human rights at the regional level were driven by two important factors. First, Indonesia's promotion of a democratic agenda was as a reflection of the transformation of Indonesia's foreign policy into democratic identity.[92] Many Indonesian scholars and Indonesian foreign policy officials were convinced that after the fall of Suharto, democracy would become Indonesia's new value and identity. For example, Anwar stated:

> The most important impact of democratisation in Indonesia on the substance
>
> of its foreign policy has been the emerging of democracy and human rights
>
> as new values (along with other classical values of independence and peace
>
> values). They no more be seen as external (Western) norms and therefore
>
> Indonesia sought to mainstreaming democracy and human rights in foreign
>
> policy agenda, in particular towards ASEAN.[93]

Ganewati Wuryandari, another researcher at The Indonesian Institute of Sciences (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia* [LIPI]) also stated that democracy and human rights were amongst important new normative sources of Indonesia's foreign policy, that reached at peak at Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono era.[94] These opinions were shared extensively within

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[92] For example, Avery Poole, 'The Foreign Policy Nexus: National Interests, Political Values, and Identity'; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia,' *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities,* Vol. 3, pp. 37-54; Muhammad Hadianto Wirajuda, 'The Impact of Democratisation on Indonesia's Foreign Policy: Regional Cooperation, Promotion of Political Values and Conflict Management,' *PhD Thesis*, Department of International Relations, the London School of Economic and Political Science, London, 2014.
[93] Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, LIPI Building Jakarta, 8 January 2019.
[94] Interview with Ganewati Wuryandari, LIPI Building Jakarta, 15 February 2019.

Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Policy. Dian Triansyah Djani, Indonesia's representative in the High-Level Task Force of ASEAN Charter noted that 'the quest to have a Charter that reflects the norms and values of the new Indonesia became more and more evident.'[95] Similarly, Dr. Yayan Mulyana also stated that 'by embracing democracy, Indonesia gradually reached a point of confidence that democracy became an important normative foundation of our foreign policy and projected it abroad.'[96] Thus, Indonesia's internalisation of liberal democratic norms has shaped the interconnection between new democratic identity, political values and national interests in post-Suharto Indonesia's foreign policy.[97]

In contrast to the first explanation, the second explanation argues that Indonesia's promotion of democracy and human rights in the region, rather than reflection of new values or new identity, has been seen as a new role conception in Indonesia's foreign policy. An anonymous interviewee doubted democracy has become Indonesia's identity by saying, 'due to Indonesia remained in procedural democracy, Indonesia's promotion of democracy could not go far beyond image projection.'[98] Moch Faisal Karim, an academic from Bina Nusantara University Jakarta also contends that democratic promotion reflected democratic identity. He argues that Indonesia's aspiration to project democracy and human rights in ASEAN started in 2003 was best understood as roles being taken and performed by foreign policy elites, since there was little evidence of pressures from civil society or other domestic political actors for democratic promotion.[99] The new role as democratic promoter would serve Indonesia's interests to revamp tarnished democracy and human rights Indonesia's image as well as regain its leadership in ASEAN. As for leadership in ASEAN, Dr. Yayan Mulyana describes

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[95] Dian Triansyah Djani, 'A Long Journey,' in Tommy Koh, Rosario G. Manalo and Walter Woon (eds), *The Making of the ASEAN Charter*, World Scientific Publishing Company, Singapore, 2009, p. 141.
[96] Interview with Dr. Yayan Ganda Hayat Mulyana, Jakarta, 30 January 2019.
[97] Avery Poole, 'The Foreign Policy Nexus: National Interests, Political Values, and Identity,' p. 156.
[98] Interview with an academician from Bina Nusantara University Jakarta, Jakarta 13 February 2019.
[99] Moch Faisal Karim, 'Role Conflict and the Limits of State Identity: The Case of Indonesia in Democratic Promotion,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 30, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 385-404. He also mentioned this argument in the interview with the author in Jakarta 13 February 2019.

Indonesia's new role as 'an intellectual leadership' to build regional architecture of cooperation as exemplified in the case of Indonesia's role in establishing ASEAN community in 2003.[100] Indeed, as Sukma has argued, Indonesia's diplomatic credibility in promoting democracy abroad has limited by the existing democratisation problem at home such as such as corruption, terrorisms and communal tensions and lack of enthusiasm from the regional counterparts which still hold tight the principle of non-interference. 'Nonetheless, Indonesia has succeeded in projecting the image of a stalwart democracy to the rest of the world.'[101]

Although these analyses were accurate, they are insufficient in explaining why Indonesia's started to promote the agenda in 2002 and why Indonesia finally accepted the compromise of democracy and human rights agenda in the APSC, the ASEAN Charter and the AICHR. The above analyses focused on Indonesia's domestic dynamics on how Indonesia's foreign policy has been influenced by the new norms in international society and how Indonesia strived to re-claim its status as good international citizen in international society. While being attentive to the way the new norms in international society have shaped Indonesia's foreign policy, the analyses above neglected the question of how Indonesia, in turn, aspired to shape the international society, particularly in Southeast Asia.

There were at least the two interrelated external factors that precipitated Indonesia's initiative to promote democracy and human rights in ASEAN started in the early of 2000s. First, the determination of Indonesia in promoting democracy and human rights in the region cannot be separated from the harsh lessons that it experienced from the US pressures since the Suharto era. Although during the Suharto era, Indonesia had become closely aligned with Western interests, it could not save Indonesia from severe Western criticisms on their authoritarianism and human rights violations. Indonesia again experienced hard pressures from

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[100] Interview with Dr. Yayan Ganda Hayat Mulyana, Jakarta, 30 January 2019.
[101] Rizal Sukma, 'Do New Democracies Support Democracy: Indonesia Finds a New Voice,' *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2011, p. 121.

the US through its influence in the World Bank and the IMF on the way the former handled its economic crisis. The pressures mounted, when George W. Bush stated on the eve of the global War on Terror after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, with his famous statement, 'every nation in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.'[102] While the statement made a clear demarcation of inclusion and exclusion from the US-led global international society, Indonesia was at risk of being excluded as Western countries regarded it as 'the weakest link' in the global war of terrorism.[103] For the above reasons, Indonesia was aware of the risks of continuing pressures from US and other international institutions towards Indonesia's democratic transition, economic recovery and its overall international standing. Indonesia's transforming image into the third largest democracy in the world with a modern and moderate majority Muslim population, proved effective to remove the old label of non-democratic and non-liberal states and alleviate the risks deeper interference from Western countries, particularly the US.[104]

Thus, the timing of incorporation of democracy and human rights in Indonesia's foreign policy in the early of 2002, in part, also directed to put an end of the US pressures on these issues towards Indonesia.[105] Indonesia clearly wanted to persuade ASEAN countries to learn from its own lessons to include liberal agenda cooperation in mitigating external pressures. As Hassan Wirajuda has highlighted:

> It worth contemplating how Indonesia transformed itself in relatively short
>
> time from a country with a democracy deficit and with gaps in political

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[102] 'Transcript of President Bush's Address,' 21 September 2001, available at <https://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>, accessed 25 April 2020.

[103] Mark Fineman and Richard C. Paddock, 'Indonesia Seen as 'Weakest Link' in Anti-Terror War,' *Los Angeles Times,* 16 February 2002, available at <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-feb-16-mn-28395-story.html>, accessed 25 April 2020.

[104] The campaign of the image of Indonesia as the third largest democracy in the world and the example of how democracy and majority Muslim population can co-exist, firstly started from Hassan Wirajuda's address before the UN General Assembly on 15 November 2001, under the title 'The Democratic Response'. See, N. Hassan Wirajuda, 'The Democratic Response,' *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2002, pp. 15-21.

[105] Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, LIPI Building Jakarta, 8 January 2019.

development and in the promotion and protection of human rights, as such,

a pariah in the eyes of international community into a full-fledged

democracy as well as promoter democracy. At the same time, we have taken

a leadership role in the restructuring of ASEAN cooperation from one that

almost totally oriented to economic cooperation to one that strikes a balance

between economic and political cooperation (emphasis added).[106]

By inserting democracy and human rights in the regional documents and regional cooperation agenda, ASEAN demonstrated its willingness to adopt new global norms of democracy and human rights and be ready to handle these issues through ASEAN process, without external interference. As Aizawa has noted, 'to have an agreement over human rights and democracy was a buffer against the external normative challenge posed namely by the US.'[107] In this sense, it was clear Indonesia's initiative was manifested a strategic choice to alleviate external pressures towards ASEAN.

Second, Indonesia's initiative to promote democracy and human rights was also in conjunction with ASEAN's lowest point in the eyes of international community. As Poole has noted, democracy and human rights deficit have eroded how international community viewed the legitimacy of ASEAN.[108] Indeed, during the period between 2002-2007, Myanmar's records of human rights continued to become the reason of Western countries to embargo the country. In that period only Indonesia and the Philippines were categorised as 'free', while Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand were rated 'partially free' and Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar

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[106] Hassan Wirajuda, 'Democracy and Diplomacy,' *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 37, Issue 2, 2012, p. 10.
[107] Nobuhiro Aizawa, 'Beyond the Non-Interference Dilemma: The Indonesian Initiative on ASEAN Charter, Nargis Crisis and Regionalism, *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 65, No. 3, 2019, p. 421.
[108] Avery Poole, ''The World is Outraged': Legitimacy in the Making of the ASEAN Human Rights Body,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2015, pp. 364-365.

and Vietnam countries were rated 'not free'.[109] By adopting APSC, ASEAN Charter and the establishment of AICHR, ASEAN has shown its intention to pursue liberal agenda despite a discrepancy between the jargon and the actual institutional development. For Katsumata, 'ASEAN has been "mimetically adopting" democracy and human rights from the Western countries with the intention to secure ASEAN's identity as a legitimate institution in the community of modern states.'[110] This implies that Indonesia as the main promoter of democracy and human rights norms has become the orchestrator of ASEAN deliberateness in adopting the new norms. Seeing from international society perspective, Indonesia's initiative to promote democracy and human rights norms was also propelled by consideration to maintain the credibility and legitimacy of ASEAN as the secondary institution of the regional international society. As Hassan Wirajuda has argued, embracing democracy and human rights norms could become an 'obvious remedy' for the crisis of credibility and international standing of ASEAN.[111]

Yet, as mentioned above, despite fervently promoting democracy and human rights norms, Indonesia also eager to compromise with regional realities. As other ASEAN states saw that the liberal agenda could altogether disrupt ASEAN's long-established norms such as sovereignty, non-interference and quiet diplomacy, Indonesia accepted the agreement of the APSC, the ASEAN Charter and the AICHR in compliance with these norms. Thus, as Sukma has explained:

> The agreement to include democracy in the rationale of the ASC and the
>
> Charter is hardly a license to intervene. It is less a basis for policy than an

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[109] Maneroo Yeedum, 'The Political Development in Southeast Asia: The Reflection of Freedom in the World' Index by the Freedom House,' *PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 358-368.

[110] Hiro Katsumata, 'ASEAN and Human Rights: Resisting Western Pressure or Emulating the West,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22, No, 5, 2009, p. 621.

[111] Hassan Wirajuda, 'Democracy and Diplomacy,' p. 8.

attempt, in effect, to encourage and remind ASEAN's members that they need to embrace democracy values [….] Democracy promotion inside ASEAN will, in other words, take place within the limits of, and in line with, its long-established commitment to non-interference and conflict avoidance.[112]

Indonesia's willingness to compromise on the above agreements, according to Dr. Yayan Mulyana, has become 'Indonesia's entrenched diplomatic style that sought to find a middle way in many difficult situations faced by regional states.'[113] Dian Triansyah Djani, Indonesia's representative in the High-Level Task Force of ASEAN Charter also noted that Indonesia needed 'to balance of the interests' of Indonesia stakeholders with regional realities,' and 'balancing a step by step/ building block approach with the need to move faster to achieve an ASEAN Community,' as well as balancing 'external pressures on specific issues in changing world with regional conditions/ limitations.'[114] Despite wanted to advance its new values at regional level, Anwar was reminiscent of the need to balance between the new values and the ASEAN long held norms, as she stated, 'Indonesia was aware that the unity, cohesiveness and peace and stability in Southeast Asia have been determined by the ASEAN Way.' Thus, by agreeing to preserve the long-established norms of sovereignty, non-interference and ASEAN's style of diplomacy while adopting the new norms, Indonesia helped to solve the dilemma between non-interference and new liberal norms. From an international society perspective, therefore, Indonesia played considerable role in maintaining the primary institutions of sovereignty, non-interference, and diplomacy as the deep rules of the society of

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[112] Rizal Sukma, 'Political Development: A Democracy Agenda for ASEAN,' p. 136.

[113] Interview with Dr. Yayan Ganda Hayat Mulyana, Jakarta, 30 January 2019.

[114] Dian Triansyah Djani, 'A Long Journey,' in Tommy Koh, Rosario G. Manalo and Walter Woon (eds), *The Making of the ASEAN Charter*, World Scientific Publishing Company, Singapore, 2009, p. 144. This was also confirmed by an interview with Dr. Yayan Ganda Hayat Mulyana, who said that 'it was represented Indonesia's diplomatic style which emphasised 'a middle way' to underline that Indonesia did not want to take an extreme approach'. Personal interview, Jakarta, 30 January 2019.

states in Southeast Asia, as well as ASEAN as secondary institution amidst the transformation of global norms induced by the US-led international order.

8.6.   Summary

This chapter has examined the challenges of the pressure put on Southeast Asian regional primary and secondary institutions by the US in its drive to promote democracy and human rights. The reason for the pressure being exerted on the international stage was the absence of democracy and human rights in the approach of Southeast Asian intramural relations towards each other and extramural relations between Southeast Asian countries and external major powers. The US pressures on democracy and human rights induced normative tensions between maintaining ASEAN principle of states-centred sovereignty, non-interference and regional diplomacy that has long underpinned social relations between them and addressing the issue of democracy and human rights. The US pressures also deflated the credibility of ASEAN due to its ambiguity on the new global values.

In facing the US pressures on democracy and human rights, Indonesia's agency was clearly demonstrated in its promotion of democracy and human rights as new regional principles, which it pursued without abandoning the existing regional principles of sovereignty, non-interference and diplomacy, thus accommodating the fact that some ASEAN members were undemocratic to varying degrees. Indonesia played an important role in initiating a regional response to the issue of democracy and human rights such as through the idea of ASC in 2003, the formulation of ASEAN Charter in 2007 and the establishment AICHR in 2009. With these new initiatives, ASEAN arguably had succeeded in accommodating the US pressures for democracy and human rights. It is by no means assumed that the US and global institutions such as the UN would not continue to pressure particular Southeast Asian countries

for their human rights violations, but ASEAN as a regional body has equipped itself with a common framework on democracy and human rights that could be improved and refined in the long run. At least, to have regional agreements over democracy and human rights became important safeguards against external pressures as well as common regional framework to address the problems related to democracy and human rights.

This chapter has also argued that in bringing the above initiatives, rather than driven by domestic interests, Indonesia was determined to maintain the relevance of the regional primary institutions as well as to restore ASEAN's credibility and legitimacy. This is demonstrated by two points. First, Indonesia promoted an incremental adjustment and adaptation of the regional primary and secondary institutions to embrace liberal norms such as democracy and human rights as new values in ASEAN without renouncing the existing regional principles of sovereignty, non-interference and diplomacy. Secondly, Indonesia's willingness to compromise, despite its ideas to promote a broader adherence to democracy and human rights norms on the APSC, ASEAN Charter and AICHR were watered down. The readiness to compromise was a long-standing habit of Indonesia's and practiced to maintain unity and cohesion of ASEAN. It suffices to say that at this stage Indonesia contributed to the solutions for normative tensions by persuading ASEAN to make meaningful changes on its agenda for democracy and human rights.

Chapter 9:   China's Assertiveness in the South China Sea Since 2009

9.1.   Introduction

The relationship between Southeast Asian states and China has become closer over the past 25 years, but the South China Sea (SCS) disputes between China and ASEAN claimant states (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) have emerged as a problem, not only for the deepening ASEAN-China ties, but also for security and peace in the region. Since 2009, the SCS disputes have tended to heighten tensions rather than lessen them. This is despite ASEAN and China agreeing on the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in November 2002 and both parties exhibiting increasingly closer institutional engagements within ASEAN-led multilateral forums such as the ARF, the Asia-Europe Meeting, the ASEAN Plus Three, the EAS and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement.

Arguably, the escalation of tensions in the SCS since 2009 was caused by China's assertiveness. Although the terms of China's assertiveness have been hotly debated, scholars agree that China's greater activism in the SCS since 2009 is an unquestionable example of its assertiveness.[1] After submitting a document of preliminary declaration of claim in the SCS that

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[1] There have been long lists of scholarly debate on China's assertiveness, for example, Michael D. Swaine, 'Perception of an Assertive China,' *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 32, 2010, pp. 1-19; Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, 'China's Assertive Behaviour-Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,' *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 35, 2011, pp. 1-29; Michael D. Swaine, 'China's Assertive Behaviour-Part Three: The Role of The Military in Foreign Policy,' *China Leadership Monitor,* No. 36, 2011, pp. 1-17; Michael D. Swaine, 'China's Assertive Behaviour-Part Four: The Role of The Military in Foreign Crises,' *China Leadership* Monitor, No. 37, 2012, pp. 1-14; Andrew Scobell and Scott W. Harold, 'An 'Assertive' China? Insight from Interviews,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2013, pp. 111-131; Dingding Chen and Xiaoyu Pu, 'Correspondence: Debating China's Assertiveness,' *International Security*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2013/ 2014, pp. 176-183; Aaron L. Friedberg, 'The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing Assertiveness,' *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 37, Issue 4, 2014, pp. 133-150; Some scholars argue that China's assertiveness narrative has been exaggerated. See for example, Alastair Ian Johnston, 'How New and Assertive is China's New Assertiveness?' *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2013, pp. 7-38; Björn Jerdén, 'The Assertive China Narrative: Why Is It Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It?' *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2014, pp. 47-88; Richard Q. Turcsányi, *China's Assertiveness in the South China Sea: Power Sources, Domestic Politics, and Reactive Foreign Policy*, Springer International Publishing, Cham, Switzerland, 2018.

included the map of the nine-dash line to the UN in May 2009, China began to embark on a confrontational approach and with a threatening attitude to defend its claims over territories and waters in the SCS. China also increased its activities to expand its occupation in the disputed areas through massive reclamation, constructing artificial islands, and reportedly constructing air strips in several reefs in the SCS, allegedly for military purposes. China's assertiveness in the SCS has incited several incidents with ASEAN claimant states, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines. It also instigated reactions from individual ASEAN claimant states to strengthen their claim in the SCS through various measures such as increasing military and naval capabilities, cooperation with extra-regional major powers, and submitting the dispute to the International Tribunal as has been done by the Philippines. Moreover, China's assertiveness in the SCS has provoked extra-regional major powers, such as the US, the UK, Australia, and France to increase their presence in the SCS, justified by their interest to uphold sea lines of communication and safety on navigation across the SCS. The growing involvement of extra-regional major powers in the SCS disputes, particularly the US, was also the result of a hedging strategy practices by ASEAN states, namely the Philippines and Vietnam. Hence, the SCS conflict has become an arena for indirect great power rivalry that complicates ASEAN to manage and find resolution on the disputes.

This chapter suggests that China's assertiveness in the SCS represents an existential threat to the Southeast Asian regional international society, in both to its primary and secondary institutions. In terms of primary institutions, China's assertiveness in the SCS poses challenges to ASEAN's fundamental practice of management of great power. At this point, China's assertiveness challenges ASEAN's centrality and leadership in the management of disputes, while its regional security-led initiatives, particularly the ARF and the EAS, are seen as

inadequate to cope with the increasing great power competition in the SCS disputes.[2] Moreover, the growing competition between China and the US in the SCS has eroded the ability of ASEAN member states not to take sides with either of the great powers, due to their dissimilar interests on the SCS conflict as well as towards China and the US. In relation to the secondary institutions, China's assertiveness in the SCS has disrupted the unity and cohesion of ASEAN that needed to uphold a common stance in negotiating the conflict on the SCS with China.[3] As Jones and Jenne put it, 'the South China Sea disputes […] ultimately demonstrate how more powerful actors can manipulate ASEAN's soft norms to advance grand strategic interests.'[4]

In dealing with China's assertiveness, Indonesia continues to maintain its long-standing approach in the SCS disputes as a non-claimant, an honest broker, and a confidence builder.[5] Despite China's assertiveness, this has incited several maritime incidents between Indonesia and China in the period between 2009 and 2020. For example, Chinese fishing vessels have repeatedly intruded into the waters around Natuna Islands, which are not part of the disputed area of the SCS but it overlaps with China's nine-dash line and is claimed by China as its traditional fishing ground. The maritime incidents with China in the Natuna waters have also

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[2] For example, Mark Beeson, 'East Asia's Institutional Inadequacies and Great Power Rivalry in the South China Sea,' in Huiyun Feng and Kai He, *US-China Competition and the South China Sea Disputes*, Routledge, London and New York, 2018, pp. 134-151; Leszek Buszynski, 'The South China Sea: An Arena for Great Power Strategic Rivalry,' in Tran Truong Thuy, John B. Welfield and Le Thuy Trang (eds), *Building a Normative Order in the South China Sea: Evolving Disputes, Expanding Options*, Edward Edgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2019, pp. 68-92.

[3] For example, Christopher B. Roberts, 'ASEAN: The Challenge of Unity in Diversity,' in Leszek Buszynski and Christopher B. Roberts (eds), *The South China Sea Maritime Dispute*, Routledge, London and New York, 2015, pp. 130-149; Malcolm Cook, 'Southeast Asia's Developing Divide,' in Gilbert Rozman and Joseph Chinyong Liow (eds), *International Relations and Asia's Southern Tier: ASEAN, Australia, and India*, Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore, 2018, pp. 63-77.

[4] David Martin Jones and Nicole Jenne, 'Weak States' Regionalism: ASEAN and the Limits of Security Cooperation in Pacific Asia,' *International Relations of Asia Pacific*, Vol. 16, Issue 2, 2016, p. 231.

[5] Evan A. Laksmana, 'Drifting Towards Dynamic equilibrium: Indonesia's South China Sea Policy Under Yudhoyono, in Ulla Fiona, Dharma Negara & Deasy Simandjuntak (eds), *Aspirations with Limitations: Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono*, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, 2018, pp. 153-175; Prasanth Parameswaran, 'Delicate Equilibrium: Indonesia' Approach to the South China Sea, in Enrico Fels and Truong-Minh Vu (eds), *Power and Politics in Asia's Contested Waters: Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea*, Springer, Switzerland, 2016, pp. 319-336; Dave McRae, 'Indonesia's South China Sea Diplomacy: A Foreign Policy Illiberal Turn?' *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 49, No. 5, 2019, pp. 759-779.

sparked criticisms and pressures from Indonesia's domestic actors and public that have insisted that the government take sterner measures against China.[6] Yet, Indonesia's approach has remained largely unchanged.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine why Indonesia persists with its approach as a non-claimant, honest broker and a confidence builder in the SCS disputes, despite domestic pressures to take stronger measures against Chinese assertiveness. This chapter argues that rather than domestic political considerations, Indonesia's continuing approach on the SCS disputes has been driven by its concerns about preserving the primary institutions of management of great powers on the quintessential basis of maintaining ASEAN's centrality and position as a legitimate party in the dispute's management. In this case, Indonesia's agency was demonstrated through its persistent role as an honest broker and confidence builder, to maintain the regional primary institution of management of great power based on principles of neutrality and impartiality to preserve regional autonomy and regional resilience as fundamental principles in managing and resolving the disputes. Indonesia's continuing approach also has been determined by the aspiration to sustain the unity and the cohesion of ASEAN to forge its common interests and common position in the SCS conflict, which indispensable to maintain the existing norms, rules and practices of the regional international society beyond hard power politics.

To support the argument, this chapter is organised as follows. The first part briefly discusses China's assertive behaviours in the SCS from 2009 to the time of writing. The second part analyses it's the subsequent challenges to the unity ASEAN as well as the regional primary

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[6] For example, Hans Nicholas Jong, Tama Salim, and Nina Afrida, 'Indonesia Urged to Adopt Stronger Stance with China,' *The Jakarta Post,* 30 March, 2016, available at <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/30/indonesia-urged-adopt-stronger-stance-with-china.html>, accessed 25 June 2021; Evan A. Laksmana, 'A Post-Non-Claimant South China Sea Policy,' *The Jakarta Post*, 20 June 2016, available at <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/06/20/a-post-non-claimant-south-china-sea-policy.html>, accessed 25 June 2021

institutions of management of great power. The third part discusses Indonesia's response and initiative in relation to Chinese assertiveness in the SCS. It is followed by analysis on how Indonesia's response has been driven by an aspiration to preserve the primary institution of management of great power and the unity of ASEAN as a legitimate player in the dispute management of the SCS disputes.

9.2.   China's Assertiveness

Despite enormous progress in relations between ASEAN states and China over the past of quarter century, the SCS disputes remain a growing source of diplomatic tension between China and ASEAN member states.[7] The disputes over who has the sovereignty on the land features and the rights of the adjacent waters in the SCS have been increasing since 1970s.[8] In response to these disputes, ASEAN issued Declaration on the SCS in July 1992, which called for the parties to the dispute to exercise self-restraint based on the TAC code of conduct.[9] Although China subscribed to the Declaration principle, it defied its commitment by occupying Mischief Reef in 1995, a reef that was also claimed by the Philippines.[10] The row between

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[7] For example, in 2017, China was ASEAN's largest trading partners constituted of 17.2 per cent of its total external trade and FDI source accounting for US$11.3 billion. China also the largest source of tourism industry in Southeast Asia equivalent to 20.1 per cent of total foreign arrivals to the region. See, Hoang Ting Ha, 'Understanding China's Proposal for an ASEAN-China Community of Common Destiny and ASEAN's ambivalent Response,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2019, pp. 231-232, and p. 234. ASEAN-China economics relations grow even closer with the involvement of ASEAN members in China's new institutions and projects, notably the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative. Indonesia is the biggest recipient projects under BRI at around US$93 billion followed by Malaysia, and Vietnam at US$70 billion and US$34 billion respectively. See, Jonathan Stromseth, 'The Testing Ground: China's Rising Influence in Southeast Asia and Regional Response,' *Global China: Assessing China's Growing Role in The World*, Brookings, November 2019, p. 3 available at <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-testing-ground-chinas-rising-influence-in-southeast-asia-and-regional-responses/>, accessed 2 June 2021.

[8] There are four major island groups in South China Sea, that disputes by six surrounding littoral states. The Paracel islands have been disputed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, but since 1974 effectively occupied by China. Various parts of Spratly Islands have been claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei, while Scarborough Shoal has been disputed by China, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The Pratas Islands have been the subject of quarrels between China and Taiwan, and occupied by Taiwan, but have not become an ASEAN-China issue.

[9] '1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea,' available at <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/1992-ASEAN-Declaration-on-the-South-China-Sea-1.pdf>, accessed 30 April 2021.

[10] Rodolfo C. Severino, 'ASEAN and the South China Sea,' *Security Challenges*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2010, p. 42.

China and the Philippines marked for the first time, that China's claim in the SCS were in dispute with ASEAN member countries.[11]

The strategic environment in the 1990s was markedly different from the late 2000s. During the 1990s ASEAN was devoting its attention to the expansion of its membership and building new regional multilateral arrangements (such as ARF, APEC, and the Asia-Europe Meeting) in response to the changing global contexts in the aftermath of the Cold War. Since 1990, ASEAN's efforts to manage the SCS conflicts relied on confidence building and functional cooperation through an annual workshop on 'Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea' that was initiated by Indonesia in 1990. When tension between China and the Philippines escalated in the second half of 1990s, other ASEAN members were more preoccupied with the Asian financial crisis. ASEAN chose not to irritate China as the latter was an important partner to deal with the crisis. Thus, during the 1990s, China was successfully 'capitalising on opportunities' in exerting its jurisdiction claim over the SCS, while ASEAN states were weak in response or distracted by the economic crisis.[12] Even so, ASEAN persuaded China to negotiate on a code of behaviour to prevent the outbreak of armed confrontation and resulted in the adoption of a DOC in November 2002.[13] However, the DOC failed to make a binding agreement. In the DOC, ASEAN and China committed to norms and principle under 1982 UNCLOS by setting up general principles for the peaceful settlement of disputes, a set of norms of conduct to maintain the status quo, a platform for maritime cooperation and confidence building, and the need for the adoption of code of conduct based

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[11] For good sources on the development China-the Philippines dispute over South China Sea during 1995-1999, see for example, Ian James Storey, 'Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines, and the South China Sea Dispute,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1999, pp. 95-118.

[12] Ang Cheng Guan, 'The South China Sea Dispute Revisited,' *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2000, p. 202.

[13] The DOC was not devised to resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes in the SCS. It only set up general principles for peaceful settlement of disputes, a set of norms of conduct to maintain the status quo, a platform for maritime cooperation and confidence building, and a direction towards a future code of conduct. See, 'Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea' available at <https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2>, accessed 30 April 2021.

on the spirit of TAC but was not devised to resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes in the SCS.[14]

By the late 2000s, China showed greater activism in the SCS. In May 2009, China submitted a document of preliminary declaration of claim in the SCS that included the map of nine-dash line to the UN. The map that was initially drawn by the Nationalist Chinese Government in 1947, and forms a U shape that includes the Spratly and Paracel islands, while some of the dashes lie close to Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines coasts. The submission of the map was in response to Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, who already submitted their claims as required by the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelves of the UNCLOS, that overlapped with China's claim.[15] Yet, that was for the first time China communicated its claim internationally and demonstrated its greater confidence.

China's assertiveness also has been indicated by its growing confrontational approach and threatening attitudes to defend its claim over territories and waters in the SCS. Since 2007, China functioned the Maritime Law Enforcement agencies to conduct 'rights protection' mission in the SCS.[16] The most important of these included strengthening its administrative authority of the fishing in the SCS and increasing its activities of maritime patrol to demonstrate its effective control.[17] Since 1999 China has imposed an annual unilateral fishing ban in the SCS for the months of June and July, but since 2009 this ban has applied to foreign ships in about two-third of disputed waters. This ban was followed by a more regular deployment of

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[14] The COC was expected to serve as a rules-based framework to promote confidence building and prevent and manage conflicts between China and the Southeast Asian claimants. See, '1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea,' available at <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/1992-ASEAN-Declaration-on-the-South-China-Sea-1.pdf>, accessed 30 April 2021; Rodolfo C. Severino, 'ASEAN and the South China Sea,' pp. 41-42.

[15] Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, 'China's Assertive Behaviour-Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,' pp. 2-4.

[16] Scott Bentley, 'Implication of Recent Incidents for China's Claim and Strategic Intent in the South China Sea (part 2), *The Strategist*, 28 November 2013, available at <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/implications-of-recent-incidents-for-chinas-claims-and-strategic-intent-in-the-south-china-sea-part-2/>, accessed 21 April 2021.

[17] Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, 'China's Assertive Behaviour-Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,' pp. 5-6.

patrol ships that not only targeted foreign fishing ships, but also hydrocarbon seismic exploration vessels of Vietnam and the Philippines. Moreover, China has significantly increased the presence of its military – the PLA Navy – and paramilitary, as well as civilian activities to achieve de facto control of the SCS.[18] It was designed to boost domestic support to China's policy in the SCS, while sending strong signals to the other claimant states, and to external powers, particularly the US, which became alarmed with the freedom of navigation and open access of Asia's maritime common.[19]

Furthermore, between 2011-2016, China increased its confrontational and threatening activities to expand its occupation in the disputed areas, allegedly to change the current status quo of the SCS. It was indicated by its responsibility in inciting several incidents with Vietnam and the Philippines in the overlapping claimed of waters and reefs. For example, on three occasions China has cut the seismic cables of commercial oil exploration vessels operating within Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).[20] In May 2014 China deployed the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig in the disputed waters near the Paracel Islands, which is claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam.[21] In this incident by deploying maritime police and fishery protection ships, Vietnam tried to prevent the oil rig from establishing a position to drill. Their efforts failed. Vietnam's boats were outnumbered, and the Chinese boats fired high-powered

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[18] China employs five paramilitary maritime law enforcement agencies: the coast guard, the Chinese maritime safety administration, the Chinese marine surveillance, the Chinese Fisheries Law Enforcement, and the General Administration of Custom. These agencies own their own patrol ships and work independently. For deep analysis see, Lyle J. Goldstein, 'Five Dragon Stirring Up the Sea: Challenge and Opportunity in China's Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities,' *CMSI Red Book*, No. 5, US Naval War College, 2010 available at <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=cmsi-red-books>, accessed 21 April 2021.

[19] For example, Kuik Cheng-Chwee, 'China's 'Militarisation' in the South China Sea: Three Target Audiences,' *East Asia Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2016, pp. 15-24.

[20] The first cutting cable incident happened on 26 May 2011 in 80 miles within Vietnam' EEZ. The second incident occurred on 9 June 2011, when China's patrol ship lifted the survey cable of Petro Vietnam Ship, and the third incident happened on 3 December 2012 in Vietnam's side of Tonkin Gulf, when again China's patrol ship cut seismic cable of Petro Vietnam Ship. See, Tran Troung Thuy, 'Politics, International Law and the Dynamics of recent Development in the South China Sea,' in Clive Schofield, Seokwoo Lee and Moon-Sang Kwon (eds), *The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden and Boston, 2014, footnote no. 13, p. 255.

[21] See for example, Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas, 'Counter-Coercion Series: China-Vietnam Oil Rig Stand-off,' available at <https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-oil-rig-standoff/>, accessed 20 April 2021.

water cannons at the Vietnamese vessels, damaging several of them. Six Vietnamese citizens were also injured. This incident then sparked five consecutive days of anti-Chinese protests in Vietnam in front of the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi, and the Chinese Consulates and in cities across Vietnam. Approximately 10,000 people participated in the demonstrations, the largest anti-China protest to have occurred in Vietnam.[22]

Between 2012-2013, two incidents happened in the SCS that involved China and the Philippines. The first incident is well-known as the Scarborough Shoal incident that occurred between April and June 2012. The Scarborough Shoal is a triangle shaped reef claimed by both the Philippines and China, located around 220 km from the nearest landmass of Luzon, within the Philippines' EEZ in the SCS. In the Scarborough shoal, the Philippines warship *Gregorio del Pilar* tried to arrest Chinese fishers, but it was blocked by thirty-three Chinese surveillance and fishery agency's vessels.[23] This incident raised tensions, in which Manila sought to maximise the US involvement in the dispute. China escalated the conflict by using economic pressures among other tools by issuing travel warnings to Chinese tourists visiting the Philippines and without prior announcement, also cut banana imports.[24] After a two-month stand-off, both sides finally pulled out of the area following private negotiations mediated by the US.[25]

Another incident between China and the Philippines was the Second Thomas Shoal incident in 2013. Since 1999, the Philippines had stationed a small crew of navy personnel in

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[22] Phuong Hoang, 'Domestic Protest and Foreign Policy: An Examination of Anti-China Protests in Vietnam and Vietnam Policy Regarding the South China Sea,' *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, Vol. 6, no. 1, 2019, pp. 14-16.

[23] Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas, 'Counter-Coercion Series: Scarborough Shoal Stand-Off,' available at <https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/>, accessed 21 April 2021.

[24] 'Philippines Seeks New Market amid Sea Dispute with China,' <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-philippines-china-idUSLNE84G02520120517>, accessed 21 April 2021. After the stand-off China reopened banana import from the Philippines.

[25] Ely Ratner, 'Learning the Lesson of Scarborough Reef,' *The National Interests*, 21 November 2013, available at <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/learning-the-lessons-scarborough-reef-9442>, accessed 21 April 2021.

the aging ship *Sierra Madre* – to maintain a presence in the Shoal. In May 2013, Chinese surveillance vessels blocked the Philippines' supply boats approaching the *Sierra Madre.* This was the first time the Chinese had accused the Philippines of supplying infrastructure materials.[26] The stand-off continued into 2014 when the Philippines used civilian ships to resupply its crew in the Second Thomas Shoal. As a response the Philippines submitted a formal plea to the UN's Permanent Court of Arbitration on 30 March 2014 to clarify the definition of certain aspects of the land features (island, rock, and reef) of the SCS according to the UNCLOS.[27] On 12 July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that: (1) none of the features in Spratly Island[28] are island under the UNCLOS, hence these features will not generate EEZ; (2) the Court ruled that China's maritime claim based on historical rights is not in line with UNCLOS.[29] China refused to abide this decision.

Since 2014 China has caused further tensions in the SCS with its massive reclamation and artificial islands construction projects. Although other claimant states have pursued similar works, China's terraforming has been pursued with unprecedented scale and speed. China's construction activities in the SCS amounted to a total of 2,900 acres in the Spratly Islands area, while Vietnam has reclaimed only about 80 acres, Malaysia 70 acres, the Philippines 14 acres, and Taiwan has 8 acres. [30] Moreover, this race for reclamation has raised the militarisation

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[26] For detail the incident in the Second Thomas Shoal, see for example, Bonnie S. Glaser and Alison Szalwinski, 'Second Thomas Shoal Likely the Next Flashpoint in the South China Sea,' *China Brief*, Vol. 13, Issue 13, 2013, available at <https://jamestown.org/program/second-thomas-shoal-likely-the-next-flashpoint-in-the-south-china-sea/>, accessed 25 April 2021.

[27] The Philippines has already registered its case to the arbitration on 22 January 2013. See, Permanent Court of Arbitration, 'South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v the People's Republic of China),' available at <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/>, accessed 21 April 2021.

[28] The Spratly Islands are the matter of disputed between the Philippines and China, and therefore the Permanent Court of Arbitration did not rule for Paracel Islands.

[29] Permanent Court of Arbitration, 'PCA Press Release: The South China Sea Arbitration (the Republic of Philippines v the People's Republic of China,' available at <https://pca-cpa.org/en/news/pca-press-release-the-south-china-sea-arbitration-the-republic-of-the-philippines-v-the-peoples-republic-of-china/>, accessed 21 April 2021.

[30] Gordon Lubold, 'Pentagon Says, China Has Stepped Up Land Reclamation in South China Sea,' *The Wall Street Journal*, 20 August 2015, available at, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/pentagon-says-china-has-stepped-up-land-reclamation-in-south-china-sea-1440120837>, accessed 21 April 2021.

concerns in the SCS. For example, China has constructed an airfield and naval base in Fiery Cross Reef seemingly to project its military power in the SCS.[31] In January 2015, China reportedly carried out a trial of the newly constructed airstrip on Fiery Coast Reef using civilian airplanes, but there is little doubt China could also use the new airstrip to deploy military aircraft.[32] Media reports confirmed by Taiwan and the US also stated that China had deployed a missile system in Woody Island.[33] China also allegedly use its artificial outposts in Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef to deploy naval vessels. This increasing construction of facilities in the SCS poses a potential military threat by China and has instigated reactions from Southeast Asian states and major powers outside the region. Extra-regional major powers such as the US, the UK, Australia, France, India, and Japan have been increasing their military presence in the SCS. These countries also have initiated joint military exercises among themselves and with Southeast Asian countries and upholding freedom of navigation operations.[34]

China's recent assertiveness was also triggered by actions of other disputants in reinforcing their sovereignty claims in the SCS. As Swaine and Fravel have argued, China's submission of a document of preliminary declaration of claim in the SCS that included the map of nine-dash line to the UN in 2009 was a reaction to the joint submission to the UN's Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf made by Malaysia and Vietnam in May

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[31] Richard Q. Turcsányi, *China's Assertiveness in the South China Sea: Power Sources, Domestic Politics, and Reactive Foreign Policy*, p. 50.

[32] Andrew S. Erickson, 'Lengthening Airstrip May Be Pave the Way for South China Sea ADIZ,' *The National Interests,* 27 April 2015, available at <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/lengthening-chinese-airstrips-may-pave-way-south-china-sea-12736>, accessed 21 April 2021; 'Chinese Civilian Airlines Jet Landed at Disputed South China Sea Island-State Media', <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/07/chinese-civilian-jet-airliners-land-at-disputed-south-china-sea-island-state-media>, accessed 21 April 2021.

[33] 'WRAPUP3-China Sends Missiles to Contested South China Sea Island-Taiwan, U.S. Officials,' <https://www.reuters.com/article/southchinasea-china-idUSL3N15W1JP>, accessed 21 April 2021.

[34] Derek Grossman, 'Military Build-Up in the South China Sea,' available at <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/external_publications/EP60000/EP68058/RAND_EP68058.pdf>, accessed 22 April 2021.

2009.[35] China's activities to demonstrate effective occupation and land reclamation in the SCS has also triggered the Philippines' plea to the Permanent Arbitration Court in 2013.[36] Another external factor is the growing presence of extra regional major powers, particularly the US in the SCS disputes as the result of hedging strategy practices by ASEAN states, namely the Philippines and Vietnam.[37] Nevertheless, the scope and the degree of activities has combined with its advantageous hard power over ASEAN member countries, and is 'a critical test of China's intention towards Southeast Asia.'[38]

9.3.   Challenges

China's assertiveness in the SCS is a test of both the primary and secondary institutions of the society of states in Southeast Asia. In terms of secondary institutions, China's assertiveness in the SCS challenges ASEAN unity, solidarity, and its centrality in dealing with China. ASEAN disunity is often attributed to a diminishing belief among ASEAN members to its long-held practice of informal, non-confrontational and consensus-based diplomacy. Equally, the differences over the extent and degree of the involvement of extra-regional powers in the disputes often be regarded as the winding down of regional management of great power based on fundamental principles of regional resilience, neutrality, and autonomy, which are often expressed in the mantra of regional solutions for regional problems. As such, China's

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[35] Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, 'China's Assertive Behaviour-Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,' p. 3.

[36] Richard Q. Turcsányi, *China's Assertiveness in the South China Sea: Power Sources, Domestic Politics, and Reactive Foreign Policy*, pp. 152-153.

[37] ASEAN's Hedging strategy towards China is a combination of constructive bilateral and multilateral engagement through ASEAN process, while seeking soft balancing measures through variety of third-party relations and multilateral process to offset their vulnerable relations with China. This strategy aimed at transformation of relationship through constructive engagement and institutional enmeshment. See, Evelyn Goh, 'Meeting the China Challenge: The US in Southeast Asia Regional Security Strategies,' *Policy Studies*, No. 16, East-West Center, Washington DC, 2005.

[38] Alice D. Ba, 'The South China Sea: The Primary Contradictions in China-Southeast Asia Relations,' in Ian Storey and Cheng-yi Lin (eds), *The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions*, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, 2016, p. 114.

assertiveness also represents a challenge to the regional primary institutions, particularly the management of great power.

9.3.1. Challenges to ASEAN Unity

China's assertiveness in the SCS has eroded the unity and cohesion of ASEAN that are needed to uphold the common position in negotiating the conflict on the SCS with China. Prior to China's growing assertiveness in the late of 2000s, ASEAN had remarkably arrived at a joint position and solidarity on the problems of the SCS. First, in 1992, ASEAN (with six members) adopted the Declaration on the South China Sea. The Declaration was pushed by the Philippines, which was facing looming questions on sovereignty and jurisdiction in the SCS, and the withdrawal of the US military bases. The Declaration, therefore, also manifested ASEAN solidarity towards the Philippines, which necessitated ASEAN to demonstrate its unity in the changing of regional environment. Second, ASEAN also showed its unity and solidarity in responding to the case of China's construction in the Mischief Reef in 1995. ASEAN issued a joint statement in July 1995, which expressed their 'serious concern' and recommended the concerned parties to use peaceful means and 'to refrain from taking actions that de-stabilize the situation'.[39] Thus as Roberts has asserted, the period between 1992-1995 represented 'the height of ASEAN solidarity' over the SCS disputes.[40]

Early disunity became evident in the negotiations of the DOC in 2002. China insisted on negotiating bilaterally with claimant states because ASEAN itself was not a party to the dispute, while ASEAN preferred a multilateral approach, in which ASEAN would negotiate with China after consultations with member states. ASEAN members were divided, with Malaysia siding with China in endorsing bilateral negotiation while Vietnam and the

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[39] 'Joint Communique of the Twenty-Eight ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 29 and 30 July 1995,' paragraph 9, available at <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-178007/>, accessed 20 May 2021

[40] Christopher B. Roberts, 'ASEAN: The Challenge of Unity in Diversity,' p. 132.

Philippines endorsed multilateral negotiations.[41] This division has inhibited ASEAN from pushing for a binding 'Code of Conduct' that had already been drafted by the Philippines, but resulted in only a non-binding DOC. Nevertheless, the DOC manifested ASEAN's shared interest and common position in the disputes. The DOC has become the point of departure to manage the dispute through an ASEAN-led approach towards the establishment of Code of Conduct in the SCS, to avoid the escalation of the disputes while still maintaining favourable relations with China, and to avert external major power involvement that could embroil the region into a great power rivalry. While the signing of the DOC in 2002 did contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the SCS, this only lasted until China became more assertive.

Beyond shared interests and a common position as reflected in the DOC, each ASEAN member has developed their own position and policies, whether due to their status as a claimant or not, or because of their bilateral relations and economic interests with China and other external major powers, particularly the US. Some ASEAN members have been heavily influenced by their close relations with China. For example, as Ciorciari has suggested, the patchy patron-client Sino-Cambodia relations gives China the security of occasional political support such as in the SCS disputes, in exchange for their political and economic support to Cambodia.[42] China is now the largest trading partner, the ultimate source of investment, foreign aid and even for Hun Sen's regime survival.[43] Laos is also perceived as 'China's most trusted

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[41] Leszek Buszynski, 'ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea,' pp. 351-352; Christopher B. Roberts, 'ASEAN: The Challenge of Unity in Diversity,' p. 133.

[42] See, John D. Ciorciari, 'China and Cambodia: Patron-Client?' *International Policy Center Working Paper*, No. 121, Gerald Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, 14 June 2013, pp. 22-28; John D. Ciorciari, 'A Chinese Model for Patron-Client Relations? A Sino-Cambodia Partnership,' *International Relations of Asia Pacific*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2014, pp. 245-278.

[43] Sino-Cambodia trade increase 26 percent annually, accounted at US$4.8 billion in 2018. Chinese foreign investment stood at 30 percent of all total foreign investment in Cambodia at around US$1 billion. Cambodia also received a huge amount of foreign aid from China, reached at US$4.2 billion in the forms of grants and soft loans. See, Sovinda Po and Christopher B. Primiano, 'An 'Ironclad Friend': Explaining Cambodia's Bandwagoning Policy Towards China,' *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2020, pp. 444-464.

political allies in Southeast Asia, '[44] and China is Laos's largest trade partner and aid provider.

For example, China funded the US$7 billion railway project from Vientiane to Kunming and

provided US$49 million grant and US$32.6 million free interest loans in 2013.[45] With the high

degree of dependency to China, there have been concerns the latter will use its economic

leverage to influence the two countries' position in the SCS dispute.

China's assertiveness has exacerbated ASEAN intramural differences on two matters.

First, differences over the need to have a strong standing against, to name or to blame China

due to its excessive activism, and second, different positions among members in the need to

internationalise the conflict by involving external major powers to backup ASEAN's standing

against China. The Philippines and Vietnam as claimant states that perceive the SCS as a major

national security issue and call ASEAN to have a strong standing against Beijing. Dissatisfied

with ASEAN non-confrontational towards China, the two countries shared an interest in

internationalising the SCS dispute. For example, it was under Vietnam's role as Chair of

ASEAN in 2010, that the SCS became an issue when the US confronted China in the ARF.[46]

In a similar vein, Manila sought to find a non-ASEAN option, and thus submitted its dispute

with China to the International Tribunal in 2013 without consulting other ASEAN members.

The case of ASEAN's failure to issue a joint communique at the 45th Annual ASEAN

Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh July 2012 clearly showed the disparity of position and

policy between some ASEAN members in the disputes. At that meeting, ASEAN members that

were mostly affected by China's claim on the SCS urged for a unified message in the joint

communique. Several ASEAN members sought for language directed to China for possible

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[44] Edgar Pang, ''*Same-Same but Different'*: Laos and Cambodia's Political Embrace to China,' *Perspective*, No. 16, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 5 September 2017.

[45] 'China Becomes the Largest Investor in Laos,' *The Economist Intelligent Unit,* 15 November 2013, available at<http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1171209901&Country=Laos&topic=Politics&subtopic=For_1>, accessed 20 May 2021.

[46] Mark Landler, 'Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands,' *The New York Times*, 23 July 2010, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html>, accessed 10 September 2021

violations of UNCLOS, and the need for a regional code of conduct. Vietnam and the Philippines, even further requested a provision expressing 'serious concern' over possible violations by China of the UNCLOS related to their EEZ and the need for discussions about Scarborough Shoal, following the Sino-Philippines incident in that site in April-June 2012. Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, who chaired the meeting, refused to accept the proposed wordings, arguing that strong words could escalate the tensions.[47] Cambodia also reportedly breached ASEAN's protocol by showing the draft of the communique to China, which objected to the draft unless the reference to the SCS was completely dropped.[48] Cambodia asked for an amendment, but negotiations to revise the draft communique failed and led to the failure of the ASEAN meeting to issue a joint communique for the first time in 45 years. The Phnom Penh joint statement fiasco was saved by Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, who conducted shuttle diplomacy to Cambodia, Vietnam and the Philippines. Finally, in lieu of a joint statement, on 20 July 2012, ASEAN publicly released the 'six principles' of ASEAN's common position on the SCS. The failure showed the effect of China's political clout with Cambodia. The influence of China over Cambodia was not only evident in Cambodia's consultation with Beijing during the negotiations for the joint statement, which breached ASEAN protocol, but the country also reportedly accepted US$500 soft loans and a grant of US$24 million from China two months later.[49]

China also employs a 'dual-track' diplomatic strategy, by simultaneously engaging direct negotiations with other claimant states and works together with all parties in the ASEAN process.[50] For example, although it announced its willingness to commence discussions with

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[47] Carlyle A. Thayer, 'ASEAN's Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building,' *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, Vol. 30, Issue 34, No. 4, 19 August 2012, pp. 11-12, available at <https://apjjf.org/site/make_pdf/3813>, accessed 20 May 2021.

[48] John D. Ciorciari, 'A Chinese Model for Patron-Client Relations? A Sino-Cambodia Partnership,' p. 264.

[49] Christopher B. Roberts, 'ASEAN: The Challenge of Unity in Diversity,' p. 137.

[50] Wang Lina and Zhai Kun, 'China's Policy Shift on Southeast Asia: To Build a Community of Common Destiny,' *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2016, pp. 81-100.

ASEAN on a Code of Conduct (COC) in 2013, bilaterally, Beijing approached Kuala Lumpur to agree on joint development in the SCS and for the first time Malaysia held naval exercises with the People's Liberation Army – Navy in 2014.[51] Malaysia also reportedly purchased a Chinese coastal patrol ship in 2016.[52] Beijing also courted Brunei as the two countries agreed on a joint exploration between Brunei's state owned National Petroleum Company Sendirian Berhard and China National Offshore Oil Company in October 2013.[53] Although Malaysia and Brunei's recent attitudes towards China cannot be simplistically regarded as moving to the Chinese camp, the above agreements ironically took place when Vietnam and the Philippines were in tensions with Beijing. Beijing's further success in gathering support from some ASEAN members was also demonstrated in its announcement of 'a four-point consensus' with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos, following Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi's tour of the three countries during 22-24 April 2016 in anticipating the announcement of the Philippines arbitration case against China's nine-dash line.[54] By supporting China's four-point consensus, Brunei, Cambodia, and Laos have expressed their position not to join Vietnam and the Philippines in the disputes against China in the SCS.[55]

China's new diplomatic strategies further eroded ASEAN unity as shown in the Special ASEAN and China Meeting in Kunming in June 2016. The idea of a special meeting between

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[51] Prashanth Parameswaran, 'Malaysia, China Begin First Joint Military Exercise,' *The Diplomat*, 24 December 2014.

[52] Simon Denyer, 'On Duterte's Heel, Malaysia is the Next Asian Country to Embrace China: Prime Minister Najib Razak is Expected to Sign a Deal for Chinese Naval Vessels,' *Washington Post*, 31 October 2016.

[53] Li Xiao Kun and Zhou Wa, 'China Strengthen Ties with Brunei,' <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013livisiteastasia/2013-10/12/content_17025988.htm>, accessed 20 May 2021.

[54] The four-point consensus are: (1) China and the three countries all agree that disputes over Spratly Island are not an ASEAN-China issue and should not have any implications on China-ASEAN relations; (2) China and the three countries all agree that every sovereign state is fee to choose their own way to resolve rows and no unilateral decision can be imposed on them; (3) China and the three countries also agree that dialogues and consultations under article 4 of the DOC are the best way to solve the SCS dispute; and (4) China and the three countries believe that China and ASEAN together can effectively maintain peace and security in the region. See, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 'Wang Yi Talks about China's Four-Point Consensus on South China Sea issue with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos,' 23 April 2016, available at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1358478.shtml, accessed 21 may 2021.

[55] Sampa Kundu, 'China Divides ASEAN in the South China Sea,' *East Asia Forum*, 21 May 2016.

ASEAN and China was brought by Malaysia's Foreign Minister, Anifah Aman to address broader issues of ASEAN-China relationships and to commemorate the 25 years anniversary of their dialogue partnership. At the meeting, China reportedly warned ASEAN not to issue a statement on the SCS on the upcoming verdict of the Arbitral Tribunal's South China Sea in the Hague. Disappointed with China's conduct, ASEAN initially decided to issue a statement of their own, instead of a joint statement with Beijing—an unprecedented effort in ASEAN history. The statement reportedly contained strong wording on the SCS issues. Knowing ASEAN's plan, China warned ASEAN not to do so and instead proposed a ten-point consensus at the meeting. China also reportedly ask Cambodia and Laos (the ASEAN Chair in 2016) to block ASEAN's consensus on the statement. As a result, ASEAN failed to issue a statement of the meeting, while Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi presented a statement on the ten-point consensus.[56] Another indication of ASEAN disunity happened again in the 49th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Vientiane in July 2016. Laos and Cambodia refused to include the reference of the 12 July Arbitral Tribunal's South China Sea ruling in the joint statement as requested by the Philippines.[57] After being delayed for a day, ASEAN finally issued a statement that pointed to a serious concern on the development in maritime areas without mentioning the decision of the Arbitration ruling. The two meetings above reinforced the account that ASEAN's internal unity was heavily challenged by China as Laos and Cambodia broke with the others and sided with China, taking action that went against the rest of the ASEAN countries.

ASEAN disunity has exposed the weakness ASEAN's long-held principle of consensus-based diplomacy. China has been able to prevent any collective regional actions

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[56] For detail of the meeting, see, Prashanth Parameswaran, 'What Really Happened at ASEAN-China Special Kunming Meeting,' *The Diplomat*, 21 June 2016, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/what-really-happened-at-the-asean-china-special-kunming-meeting/>, accessed 30 May 2020.

[57] 'ASEAN Deadlock as South China Sea Split Deepens at Laos Summit,' *The Strait Times,* 24 July 2016, available at <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/asean-pushes-for-south-china-sea-breakthrough-at-laos-summit>, accessed 20 May 2021.

directed against it by inciting mutual distrust that has instigated disunity among ASEAN members to block consensus decision-making process.[58] Emmerson, for example, has noted, 'in the South China Sea, the ASEAN Way of multilateral consensus is losing badly to the "Chinese Way" of unilateral expansion.'[59] Moreover, instead of constraining China, the principle of consensus has lent legitimacy to China as a trustworthy party in the disputes. As Beeson writes, 'China seems to be able to live quite comfortably with an ASEAN style of diplomacy that its adherents are under no obligation to comply with, and yet which confers of fig leaf legitimacy, just from being a responsible stakeholder.'[60]

Due to this, many have called for the improvement of the decision-making process in ASEAN. Tang, head of ASEAN research centre at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak institute of Singapore, for example, asserts that ASEAN must reassess its consensus decision making by removing 'the power to veto' of one or any member state and extending the adoption of 'ASEAN Minus X' principle, not only in economic affairs but also on political issues.[61] Similarly, Manning opines that ASEAN should adopt majority decision making or at least by two-third majority as remedy to improve 'ASEAN's functionality and relevance as regional organization' particularly in the context of the SCS disputes.[62] Other scholars have also called for institutional innovations, not just changes in decision making processes. Roberts for example, has suggested the establishment of a sub-ASEAN working group (ASEAN-X) only involving the claimant states to 'minimise the chance of disunity in broader ASEAN forum' and 'increase the chances

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[58] Huong Le Thu, 'China's Dual Strategy of Coercion and Inducement towards ASEAN,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2019, pp. 27-29.

[59] Donald K. Emmerson, 'ASEAN between China and America: Is It Time to Try Horsing the Cow?' *TRaNs: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2017, p. 5.

[60] Mark Beeson, 'The Great ASEAN Rorschach Test,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 33, No. 3-4, 2020, p. 579.

[61] Tang Siew Mun, 'ASEAN Must Reassess its 'One Voice' Decision Making,' *Today*, 25 July 2016, available at <https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/asean-must-reassess-its-one-voice-decision-making>, accessed 2 June 2021.

[62] Robert A. Manning, 'Time to Rethink ASEAN,' *Nikkei Asia*, 6 September 2016, available at <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Robert-A.-Manning-Time-to-rethink-ASEAN>, accessed 2 June 2021.

of reaching consensus.'[63]

Proponents of consensus decision making, however, maintain that the principle remains central to preserve ASEAN unity. Singapore's Ambassador-at-Large, Bilahari Kausikan argues that a consensus on always having a consensus has been fundamental in managing mistrust between member states. He notes:

> As an interstate organisation with a very diverse membership with different national interests, in practice ASEAN can only operate by consensus. Any other mode of decision-making could escalate even minor differences into major splits and risks the organisation breaking up entirely.[64]

Indeed, as Matthew Davies argues, the commitment for consensus is imperative to ASEAN in serving the 'impression of unity in the absence of other unifiers.'[65] A consensus may not necessarily result in compliance, as there always gap between declaration and reality, but former ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo Severino has warned that if the ASEAN Minus X formula is used arbitrarily in many issues, 'it could also undermine the fragile sense of community in ASEAN.'[66]

In short, China's assertiveness has eroded ASEAN unity and sparked the debate on the validity of consensus-based diplomacy in dealing with the SCS disputes. Although mainly debated in academic circles, it began to unsettle the belief on the long-held practice of diplomacy in facilitating communication, coordination and to put up coherence among ASEAN

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[63] Christopher B. Roberts, 'ASEAN: The Challenge of Unity in Diversity,' p. 143.
[64] Bilahari Kausikan, 'Consensus, Centrality and Relevance; ASEAN and the South China Sea,' Speech at this week ASEAN Summit 2016, organised by RHTLaw Taylor Wessing and RHT Academy, *The Strait Times*, 6 August 2016, available at <https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/consensus-centrality-and-relevance-asean-and-the-south-china-sea>, accessed 2 June 2021.
[65] Mathew Davies, *Ritual and Region: The Invention of ASEAN*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018, p. 6.
[66] Rodolfo C. Severino, *Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insight from the Former ASEAN Secretary-General*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2006, p. 353.

members towards realisation of common goals. So far, only Vietnam been open to discuss the innovation in decision making process over the SCS dispute. Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang, during the 38th Singapore lecture suggested ASEAN could establish 'supplementary mechanisms' to allow some level of flexibility to better manage the challenges from the 'newly emerging issues', particularly related to the SCS disputes.[67]

9.3.2. Management of Great Power

China's assertiveness has incited the involvement of external major powers that increased the difficulties of ASEAN in upholding its long-held practice of management of great power. A particular challenge, as Ba asks, is 'how to engage both the United States and China in ways that do not increase a sense of zero-sum competition between them and reassure that they have a place in East Asia.'[68] A fundamental institutional practice of ASEAN to deal with great power competition has been impartiality, that is, by not taking sides to great powers antagonism and rivalry.[69] China's assertiveness and the US's response to harden their position against China have eroded the ability of ASEAN states not to take sides. Evidently, some ASEAN states (i.e., Cambodia) have been inclined to support China to save their deepening economic relations, while other countries have welcomed the US rebalance to the Asia Pacific, such as Vietnam and the Philippines. Moreover, the competition between the US and China in shaping the evolving regional order through their regional initiatives confronting the Southeast Asian states, has challenged its underlying belief of neutrality, impartiality to achieve regional autonomy. Based on these principles, a group of small and or weak Southeast Asian states has

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[67] Le Hong Hiep, 'Vietnam, ASEAN and 'Consensus Dilemma,' ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, 31 August 2016, available at <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/media/commentaries/vietnam-asean-and-the-consensus-dilemma-a-commentary-by-le-hong-hiep/>, accessed 2 June 2021.

[68] Alice D. Ba, 'The South China Sea: The Primary Contradictions in China-Southeast Asia Relations,' p. 123.

[69] Ralf Emmers, 'Unpacking ASEAN Neutrality: The Quest of Autonomy and Impartiality in Southeast Asia,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2018, pp. 349-370.

enjoyed a marked degree of influence in shaping southeast and wider East Asia. The diminishing commitment to the practice of management of great power could risk the Southeast Asia region in securing the assurance of extra regional major powers to respect the grouping's norms, practice, and institutions.

Related to the involvement of external major powers, the Philippines and Vietnam have been seeking to strengthen their relations with the US and other extra-regional major powers. For example, the Philippines still maintained its alliance with the US based on the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty and the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation. This agreement allowed the increasing presence of US military personnel on rotational basis complete with supplies and equipment to the Philippine's military bases.[70] Similarly, Vietnam also has established close ties with the US such as through the 2005 International Military Education and Training Agreement in 2005, annual US-Vietnam Security Dialogue on Political Security and Defence Issue and the complete lifting ban of the US's arms embargo towards Vietnam in 2016.[71] Vietnam also approached India and Japan. For example, India has supplied intermediate range ballistic missiles, the Indian Prithvi and Brahmos Cruise missile to Vietnam.[72] In August 2020, Vietnam and Japan signed a loan agreement, amounting to USS$345 million to enhance its maritime law enforcement capabilities.[73] Moreover, after visiting Hanoi in October 2020 Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga agreed to supply military equipment to Vietnam, which indicated the

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[70] Maria Ortuoste, 'The Philippines in the South China Sea: Out of time, Out of Options?' *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2013, pp. 242-245; Carl Thayer, 'Analysing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,' *The Diplomat*, 2 May 2014.

[71] Joseph M. Siracusa and Hang Nguyen, 'Vietnam-U.S. Relations: An Unparalleled History,' *Orbis*, Vol. 61, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 415-419.

[72] David Brewster, 'India's Strategic Partnership with Vietnam: The Search for Diamond on the South China Sea?' *Asian Security*, Vol. 9, No. 1 2009, pp. 24-44.

[73] 'Japan and Vietnam Ink First Maritime Patrol Ship Deal as South China Sea Row Heats Up,' *The Japan Times*, 11 August 2020, available at <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/08/11/national/japan-vietnam-patrol-ships-south-china-sea/>, accessed 1 June 2021.

deepening security cooperation between two countries.[74]

Another impact of China's recent assertiveness in the SCS has been the growing presence of extra regional major powers, particularly the US in the SCS disputes. Two important developments have contributed to the US's increasing involvement in the SCS disputes. First, the incident in March 2009 was connected to the US Navy Surveillance ship Impeccable, which conducted surveillance of the 75 miles south of the China EEZ but was harassed by a Chinese vessel. This was regarded as an aggressive act by China.[75] The second was the US pivot in Asia during the time of the Obama administration. This policy manifested the US's efforts to rebalance its diplomatic and strategic interests in the region that China perceived as neglected. Related to the SCS, in the ARF meeting in Vietnam in 2010, the then US Secretary of state Hillary Clinton voiced concerns about freedom of navigation in the SCS and offered to work with China and ASEAN to manage the disputes.[76] The US, together with Australia have also agreed on the establishment of a marine base in Darwin in 2012, with the presence of up to 2,500 marine personnel on a six-month rotational basis.[77] The US has forged an informal security meeting in the Quadrilateral alliance framework (the Quad) together with Japan, Australia, and India.[78] The Quad seeks to promote a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) to maintain liberal rules of international order, which stressed a military and strategic approach

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[74] Drake Long, 'Japan and Vietnam Agree on Defense Export Pact, Discuss South China Sea,' *Radio Free Asia,* 19 October 2020, available at <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/japan-arms-scs-10192020175622.html>, accessed 1 June 2021.

[75] For detail of the Impeccable incident, see for example, Mark Valencia, 'The Impeccable Incident: Truth and Consequences, *China Security,* Vol. 5, No. 2, 2009, pp. 26-32

[76] Mark Landler, 'Offering Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Island,' *New York Times*, 23 July 2010, available at, <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html>, accessed 30 May 2021.

[77] Megan Eckstein, 'Marines Reach 2011 Goal of 2,500 in Darwin, with Addition of HIMARS Platoon, More to Current Rotation,' *USNI News*, 25 July 2019, available at <https://news.usni.org/2019/07/25/marines-reach-2011-goal-of-2500-in-darwin-with-addition-of-himars-platoon-more-to-current-rotation>, accessed 10 September 2021.

[78] For example, Antonio Henrique Lucena Silva and Wellington Dantas de Amorim, 'Australia, India and Japan: The Three 'Worried Outsiders' and Their Strategies Towards the South China Sea,' in Enrico Fels and Truong-Minh Vu (eds), *Power Politics Asia's Contested Water: Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,* Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2016, pp. 441-468.

aimed at countering China.[79]

Although the hardening position of the US against China is appealing to a majority of ASEAN members to serve as a balance of power option, there have been concerns that this could have opposite effects such as provoking Beijing and driving the region towards a zero-sum great power competition.[80] Moreover, despite being in the early stages, the FOIP epitomised the intention of extra regional major powers to determine the shape and the importance of the nascent geostrategic of the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, China has already taken important steps to shape the regional order in wider Asia through its vision of regional order, promoted as the 'ASEAN-China Community of Common Destiny'.[81] China has already promoted sponsored intergovernmental and semi-official forums targeting constituencies with new structures that extend China's influence: the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Central Asia; the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, also in Central Asia; Bo'ao Forum (as alternative to APEC); Xiangshan Forum (as alternative to Shangri-La Dialogue); and the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative in wider Asia.[82] Thus, the competition between China and the US to shape the regional order in wider Asia poses crucial challenge for ASEAN to sustain its regional-led arrangements such as the ARF and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus in Indo-Pacific cooperative multilateralism.

In summary, China's assertiveness has exacerbated ASEAN disunity as the country has

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[79] For example, Derek Grossman, 'The Quad is Poised to Become Openly Anti-China Soon,' *The Rand Blog,* 28 July 2020, available at <https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/07/the-quad-is-poised-to-become-openly-anti-china-soon.html>, accessed 20 September 2021.

[80] Michael D. Swaine, 'Creating Unstable Asia: The US 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,' *Foreign Affairs*, 2 March 2018, available at <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/02/creating-unstable-asia-u.s.-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy-pub-75720>, accessed 30 June 2021.

[81] For example, Stephen N. Smith, 'Community of Common Destiny: China's 'New Assertiveness' and the Changing Asian Order,' *International Journal*, Vol. 73, No. 3, 2018, pp. 449-463; Denghua Zhang, 'The Concept of 'Community Common Destiny' in China's Diplomacy: Meaning, Motives and Implication,' *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2018, pp. 196-207.

[82] Evelyn Goh, 'Contesting Hegemonic Order: China in East Asia', *Security Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2019, pp. 614-644.

successfully exploited ASEAN member's divergent interests through strategy that an analyst called it as 'a divide and rule'.[83] This has led to scepticism that ASEAN is capable of creating a coherent response to the management of the SCS disputes. Moreover, ASEAN's lack of unity could erode ASEAN leadership in the disputes as there has been wariness that China could use its advantage as the most powerful claimant to control the pace and direction of the negotiations of the COC.[84] Additionally, China's assertiveness has increased the involvement of extra regional major powers that risks Southeast Asia and the wider region to become an arena for great power competition and potentially diminish ASEAN centrality in the evolving regionalism in the Indo-Pacific.

9.4.   Indonesia's Response

The protracted overlapping maritime claims in the SCS has become one of Indonesia's long-standing strategic challenges because of the proximity of the disputed areas to Indonesia's territory in resource rich Natuna Islands[85] as well as its concern on regional peace and stability. Indonesia is a non-claimant state, which means that it does not have any claim in the disputed islands and waters in the SCS. Indonesia also refused to acknowledge having an overlapping claim on maritime rights with China in the SCS, but since the outbreak of the SCS disputes,

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[83] Huong Le Thu, 'China's Dual Strategy of Coercion and Inducement towards ASEAN,' pp. 20-36.

[84] Hoang Thi Ha, 'From Declaration to Code: Continuity and Change in China's Engagement with ASEAN on the South China Sea,' *Trends in Southeast Asia*, No. 5, 2019.

[85] The Natuna Islands consist of 154 islands, with only 30 islands are inhabited. The islands scattered around more than 262 thousand km square and only around 2,000 km square of land. The population is just under 80 thousand people (in 2019). The island also one of the richest area of fisheries with potential around 500 thousand tons annually. See, 'Profil Kabupaten Natuna Provinsi Riau (Profile of Natuna Regency of Riau Province),' available at <https://disparbud.natunakab.go.id/profil-kabupaten-natuna/>, accessed 2 June 2021. See also 'Profil Kabupaten Natuna (Profile of Natuna Regency,' <https://dpmptsp.natunakab.go.id/profil-kabupaten-natuna/>, accessed 2 June 2021. According to Natuna regency official website the islands are estimated to have more than 14 million barrels of oil reserve and more than 112 million barrels of liquified natural gas. However according to Indonesia's State-Owned Oil Company (Pertamina), the East Natuna Block (also known as Block D-Alpha) potentially contains 46 billion cubic feet recoverable natural gas, which amounts 41% of Indonesia's total reserve. See, 'Punya Cadangan 46 Triliun Cubic Feet, Blok East Natuna Tak Kunjung diKembangkan (Containing 46 billion Cubic Feet, East Natuna Block Has not yet been Exploited),' <https://industri.kontan.co.id/news/punya-cadangan-46-triliun-cubic-feet-blok-east-natuna-tak-kunjung-dikembangkan>, accessed 20 June 2021.

Indonesia has been playing an importance part to peacefully manage the disputes through its self-claimed role as an honest broker and a confidence builder.[86] Through these roles Indonesia has mainly focused on preventive diplomacy by promoting confidence building measures, building regional norms on the SCS issues, as well as establishing a ground for management of the SCS conflict through ASEAN-led regional process. One of the important parts an ASEAN-led regional process in managing the SCS conflict is to ensure that the regional principle of management of great power remains intact, by cautiously engaging Beijing and other extra-regional major powers bilaterally and multilaterally. For this reason, China's increasing assertiveness in the SCS did not affect Indonesia's overall approach to the SCS conflict, instead it continued to play a role as an honest broker and a confidence builder aimed at preserving ASEAN unity and ASEAN centrality in the management of the SCS conflict.

One of Indonesia's earliest initiatives was a series of annual informal workshops called the 'Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea' first held in January 1990.[87] Through the workshops, Indonesia initially planted the central role for ASEAN as manager of the SCS conflicts. Conceived by renowned Indonesian diplomat and international law expert, Hasjim Djalal, the workshops aimed to manage the disputes in the SCS through informal meetings in which various claimants and interested states would be comfortable with one another and hence provided a conducive atmosphere to alter the potential conflicts into cooperative projects.[88] The workshops functioned as a track two initiative attended by officials

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[86] Evan A. Laksmana, 'Drifting Towards Dynamic equilibrium: Indonesia's South China Sea Policy Under Yudhoyono,' pp. 153-175; Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, 'Out of Its Comfort Zone, 'Indonesia and the South China Sea,' *Asia Policy*, Vol. 21, 2016, pp. 21-28.

[87] The first Workshop held in Bali, attended only by representatives from ASEAN member states. starting from the second Workshop in Bandung in 1991 and the ensuing workshops were more inclusive, participated by representatives from China, Cambodia, Laos, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

[88] Hasjim Djalal, 'Indonesia and the South China Sea Initiative,' *Ocean Development & International Law*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2001, pp. 97-103; Hasjim Djalal, 'The South China Sea: The Long Road towards Peace and Cooperation,' in Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers (eds), *Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime*, Routledge, London and New York, 2009, pp. 178-179.

in a private capacity, academics and observers.[89] The workshops have been recognised for facilitating a non-confrontational and informal dialogue, to explore alternatives avenues for cooperation.[90] Although mainly a forum to discuss the non-sensitive issues, the successes of the workshops have impacted the official levels. For example, it has been widely acknowledged that the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea adopted in Manila in 1992 and the 2002 DOC originated from the principles set out in the second workshop held in Bandung in 1991.[91]

China's more recent assertiveness has put Indonesia in an uneasy relationship as it continues its traditional approach in the SCS disputes. China's increased activities have threatened Indonesia's own interests in the Natuna Islands – as several fisheries incidents involving Indonesia's patrols or naval vessel and Chinese fishing boats or patrol vessels have occurred. During the period of the Yudhoyono government for example, Indonesia arrested 17 vessels from China, Taiwan, and Vietnam in 2008. In June 2009, Indonesia arrested eight Chinese vessels and detained 75 fishers. After bilateral talks, Indonesia released the 59 fishers and return them to China, yet they detained the remaining16. The incidents happened again in May 2010, June 2010 and March 2013. In these three latter incidents, the efforts of Indonesia's maritime authorities to seize Chinese fishing boat were interrupted by Chinese patrol vessels

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[89] Most of the annual workshops have been done in various Technical Working Groups, Groups of Experts, and Study Groups meetings such as in marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, safety navigation, shipping and communication, resources assessment, and technical working group on legal matters. See, Hasjim Djalal, 'Indonesia and the South China Sea Initiative,' *Ocean Development & International Law*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2001, pp. 97-103; Hasjim Djalal, 'The South China Sea: The Long Road towards Peace and Cooperation,' in Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers (eds), *Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime*, Routledge, London and New York, 2009, pp. 178-179.

[90] For example, Ian Townsend-Gault, 'Contribution of the South China Sea Workshops: The Importance of a Functional Approach,' in in Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers (eds), *Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime,* pp. 189-206; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Resources Issues and Ocean Governance in Asia Pacific: An Indonesian Perspective,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia,* Vol. 28, No. 3, 2006, p. 481.

[91] Evan A. Laksmana, 'Drifting Towards Dynamic equilibrium: Indonesia's South China Sea Policy Under Yudhoyono, p. 163; Prasanth Parameswaran, 'Delicate Equilibrium: Indonesia' Approach to the South China Sea,' p. 326.

which intervened to release the arrested fishing boats.[92]

The Yudhoyono government handled the incidents carefully to avoid a hostile reaction from China as well as criticisms from the domestic Indonesian public. Indonesia maintained its policy of refusing to acknowledge either territorial or maritime disputes with China, although the military began to question this position. Armed Forces Commander, General Moeldoko, for example, wrote an opinion piece published in the *Wall Street Journal* that named China's assertiveness in the SCS as a source of dismay and called for a strengthening of Indonesia's military forces in the Natuna Islands.[93] To accommodate domestic pressures, Indonesia held two military exercises around the Natunas in June 2008 and in October 2013.[94] In 2008, Yudhoyono announced the plan to achieve a Minimum Essential Force by 2024 to improve minimum defence strength and to increase deployments to border areas including in Natuna. These military policies, however, have been indirect and preventive in nature. A slight change arguably was Indonesia's *note verbale* to the UN submitted on 8 July 2010 that seemingly departed from previous practice of silent diplomacy. In the *note verbale*, Indonesia protested the legitimacy of China's nine-dash-lines map as it 'clearly lacks international legal basis and is tantamount to upset the UNCLOS 1982'.[95]

These unilateral policies, however, accompanied a series of conciliatory policies meant to avoid outright confrontation with Beijing. The Yudhoyono government continued to

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[92] I Made Andi Arsana and Clive Schofield, 'Indonesia's Invisible Border with China,' in Bruce Elleman, Stephen Kotkin and Clive Schofield, *Beijing's Power and China's Border: Twenty Neighbors in Asia*, Routledge, London and New York, 2012, pp. 68-70; Scott Bentley, 'Mapping the Nine-Dash Line: Recent Incidents Involving Indonesia in the South China Sea,' *The Strategist*, 29 October 2019.

[93] Moeldoko, 'China's Dismaying New Claims in the South China Sea,' *The Wall Street Journal*, 24 April 2014, available at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304279904579515692835172248>, accessed 25 June 2021.

[94] Dave McRae, 'Indonesia's South China Sea Diplomacy: A Foreign Policy Illiberal Turn?', pp. 771-772.

[95] See, point a and d, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nation, No. 480/POL-703/VII/10, point no. 1. The *note verbale* was a response to the note from the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China No. CLM/17/2009, 7 May 2009, submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which attached the nine-dash line to justify its claim of undisputable sovereignty over the islands in the SCS and the adjacent waters. available at <https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e.pdf>, accessed 22 June 2021.

intensify relations with China. For example, despite domestic opposition of unreadiness, the Yudhoyono government agreed to involve the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement as a way to increasing economic relations with China.[96] Only several months after the fisheries incident, in October 2013, Indonesia upgraded its bilateral relations between from a 'Strategic Partnership', signed in 2005, into a 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership', marked by Chinese President Xi Jinping address in front of the Indonesian Parliament. The fact that the occasion dismissed the discussion on the Natuna issue and the incidents between Indonesia's patrol ships and Chinese patrol vessels that happened during 2009-2013, clearly indicated Indonesia's expectation to ensure that the incidents would not escalate the strategic tensions while they continued to build a strong relationship with China.[97]

China' assertiveness did not affect Indonesia's long-standing position in the SCS disputes, as an honest broker and a confidence builder. For these roles, the COC was one of key priorities of Indonesia's chairing of ASEAN in 2011. President Yudhoyono at the 44th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2011 stated that 'the regional states should finalize the long overdue guidelines because we need to get moving to the next phase, which is identifying elements of the Code of Conduct.'[98] Under Indonesia's chairing, ASEAN persuaded China to agree on the adoption of the 'Guidelines for Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea'.[99] However, China pushed back and only when it was ready spoke of ASEAN's draft COC as it continued to avoid multilateral talks with ASEAN, while

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[96] 'Public Thinks China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement a Disadvantage,' *Jakarta Post,* 31 July 2010, available at <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/07/31/public-thinks-aseanchina-free-trade-a-disadvantage.html>, accessed 22 June 2021.

[97] 'Indonesia, China Forge Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in Various Field,' *Antara,* 7 October 2013, available at <https://en.antaranews.com/news/91035/indonesia-china-forge-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-in-various-field>, accessed 25 June 2021.

[98] Quoted in Sheldon W. Simon, 'Conflict and Diplomacy in the South China Sea: The View from Washington,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 52, No. 6, 2012, p. 1002.

[99] 'Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC,' available at <https://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/documents/20185-DOC.pdf>, accessed 25 June 2021.

pushing bilateralism.[100] The process to push China towards a COC was hindered by a lack of ASEAN unity that clearly illustrated the failures of the ASEAN meeting in Cambodia in 2012. As mentioned earlier, through a personal shuttle diplomacy by Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, ASEAN agreed on a Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea, and among the important points was the full implementation of the DOC in the SCS and the early conclusion of regional COC in the SCS.[101] This event illustrated Indonesia's role as an 'honest broker' and more importantly Indonesia's commitment on shaping the regional norms to manage the conflict.

To further push the conclusion of the COC, in the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2012, Natalegawa also proposed a so called 'zero draft' for a COC that took the DOC as the foundation.[102] This proposal however, was suspended, to wait for China to soften its stance on future discussions of the COC. ASEAN's effort to sway China on the negotiations for the COC once again faced an obstacle when the Philippines, without consultation with ASEAN, lodged a formal legal claim at The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration in January 2013. If anything, Indonesia's insistence on the negotiation of COC bore fruit when Chinese new Foreign Minister, Wang Yi as Foreign Minister, in April 2013, officially announced its commitment to discussed COC with ASEAN after start-stop discussion held in 2000 and 2002.

Another important effort by Indonesia during the Yudhoyono administration was to

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[100] Greg Torode, 'ASEAN Summit Unlikely Seal Code of Conduct With China,' *South China Morning Post,* 18 November 2012, available at <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1084951/asean-summit-unlikely-seal-code-conduct-china>, accessed 25 June 2021.

[101] The six principles are: (1) the full implementation of the DOC in the SCS; (2) the guidelines for the implementation of the DOC in the SCS; (3) the early conclusion of regional COC in the SCS; (4) full respect of the universally recognized principles of international law including the 1982 UNCLOS; (5) the continued exercise of self-restraint and non-use of force by all parties; and (6) the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the universally recognised of international law including the 1982 UNCLOS. 'Statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers (Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 20 July 2012),' available at <https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/AFMs%20Statement%20on%206%20Principles%20on%20SCS.pdf>, accessed 20 May 2021.

[102] For analysis on the 'zero draft' see, Mark J. Valencia, 'What the 'Zero Draft' Code of Conduct of the South China Sea Says (and Doesn't Say),' *Global Asia*, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2013.

maintain ASEAN centrality to further enmesh major powers including China and the US in the broader ASEAN-led framework. For this purpose, Marty Natalegawa proposed Indonesia's concept of 'dynamic equilibrium'. According to Natalegawa, Indonesia sought to shape the ongoing power transition in the region by convincing the great powers that they have interests of stable and peaceful Southeast Asia.[103] To achieve this objective, all parties that have interests in the region should make up part of a web in mutually beneficial relationships to work towards common security despite trust deficits and differences. Natalegawa also noted that dynamic equilibrium is to replace the traditional concept of balance of power, as no power is dominant or excluded in the 'management of the exercise of power and the promotion of predictability of interstate behaviour based on commonly agreed principles and norms.'[104]

Central to the concept of dynamic equilibrium is that the emerging regional security architecture needs to be inclusive and involve all middle powers and great powers in the region. In the creation of EAS for example, in 2005 Indonesia ensured that membership included India, Australia, New Zealand. In 2011, Indonesia supported the admission of the US and Russia in the EAS, all of which went against China's preference to exclude the US, Australia, and New Zealand. Nonetheless, Indonesia also sought to ensure China that dynamic equilibrium was not meant to make China uncomfortable in the regional security cooperation. For example, Indonesia reacted negatively and warned about the US plan to station thousands of US marines in Darwin, Australia, so as not 'to provoke reaction and counter reaction […] a vicious cycle of tensions and mistrust or distrust.'[105] The dynamic equilibrium, thus, sought to ensure that ASEAN plays a central role, as no power is dominant or excluded and all parties involves in a

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[103] Marty Natalegawa, 'Aggressively Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Asia Pacific,' *Strategic Review: The Indonesian Journal of Leadership, Policy and World Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2011, p. 44.
[104] Marty Natalegawa, *Does ASEAN Matter: A View from Within*, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, 2018, p. 101.
[105] Ashley Hall, 'Indonesia Voices Concerns Over Marines Deal,' *ABC News*, 17 November 2011, available at <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-11-17/indonesian-foreign-minister-hopes-for-positive-result/3676902>, accessed 25 June 2021.

web of mutually constructive relationship in the region such as in the ARF, the EAS and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus.

Jokowi nevertheless indicated a foreign policy break from his predecessor after he was sworn in as Indonesia's President in 2014. He abandoned Yudhoyono's slogan of a 'thousand friends zero enemies' and said he would prioritise foreign relation with countries 'who give the most benefit to the people.'[106] He also rejected Yudhoyono's focus on summit diplomacy, which he replaced with 'down to earth diplomacy' (*Diplomasi Membumi*) also known as 'pro-people diplomacy'. In contrast to Yudhoyono, who had aspired for Indonesia to play a much bigger role in international forums, Jokowi declared that he would focus on domestic affairs, with particular emphasis on strengthening Indonesia's maritime infrastructure and reasserting the authority of the state in the maritime domain. At the heart of this emphasis was his vision of Indonesia as a Global Maritime Axis or Fulcrum (*Poros Maritim Dunia* [GMF]).[107]

The maritime and fisheries incidents that occurred in the Indonesian EEZ in the Natuna waters inevitably became the first test of the implementation of the GMF vision. Jokowi showed Indonesia's intention to protect its EEZ against the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing through a new hard-line policy of sinking foreign fishing boats found to be illegally operating in Indonesian waters.[108] Led by the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, Indonesia began to widely publicise the sinking and/or blowing up of arrested

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[106] He also stated 'what's the point of having many friends if we only get the disadvantages?' see, Robertus Wardhy, 'Jokowi Signals to break with 'Thousand Friends' Foreign Policy', *The Jakarta Globe*, 17 November 2014, available at <http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/jokowi-signals-break-thousand-friends-foreign-policy> accessed 5 June 2017.

[107] With this vision, Jokowi pledged to seriously utilise Indonesia's maritime assets and strengthen its control over its maritime area based on five policy pillars: rebuild maritime culture, manage maritime resources, develop maritime infrastructure and connectivity, advance maritime diplomacy, and improve maritime defence. Rendi A. Witular, 'Jokowi Launches Maritime Doctrine to the World,' *Jakarta Post,* 13 November 2014, available at <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/13/jokowi-launches-maritime-doctrine-world.html>, accessed 25 June 2021.

[108] The issue of illegal fishing has attracted attention of domestic public with the country claimed to be losing up to US$20 billion per year. Adhitya Himawan, 'Kerugian RI Akibat Pencurian Ikan 20 Miliar Dolar per Tahun (Indonesia's Loss of Illegal Fishing 20 Billion Dollar per Year)', <https://www.suara.com/bisnis/2016/09/17/132314/kerugian-ri-akibat-pencurian-ikan-20-miliar-dolar-as-per-tahun>, accessed 25 June 2021.

foreign vessels caught for illegal fishing. From November 2014 to April 2016, 174 foreign

vessels from Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have been sunk.[109] Yet, incidents

involving Indonesian patrol ships and Chinese vessels continued sporadically, even though

more provocative. In March 2016, an Indonesia's patrol ship, KP Hiu 11, reportedly seized a

300-ton Chinese fishing boat, Kway Fei 10078 in the Natuna EEZ and towed them away, but

two Chinese coastguard vessels entered Indonesia's territorial sea and forced the release of the

fishing boat. Other incidents happened in May 2016, when the Indonesian naval ship, KRI

Oswald Siahaan arrested Chinese fishing boat Gui Be Yu and in June 2016 when Indonesian

naval ship, KRI Imam Bonjol chased 12 Chinese fishing boats after firing two shots and seized

one of the boats.[110] After a relative hiatus for three years, in late December 2019 to January

2020, a further incident occurred when the Indonesian naval ship, KRI Tjiptadi-381 reportedly

forced out the Chinese fishing boats that were escorted by the Chinese coast guard.[111]

Ostensibly, the Jokowi government discarded the Yudhoyono government's approach

to maritime incidents in the Natuna waters. For example, after the incident in March 2016, Susi

Pudjiastuti held a press conference accusing China of arrogance when it attempted to obstruct

Indonesia's efforts to enforce the law against Illegal, Underreported, and Unregulated

fishing.[112] After the incident in June 2016, Jokowi took symbolic action by convening a limited

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[109] Donald E. Weatherbee, 'Re-Assessing Indonesia's Role in the South China Sea,' *Perspective*, No. 18, 2016, p. 29.

[110] Anggi Kusumadewi, 'Kemelut Indonesia-China di Sepanjang 2016 (Disruption between Indonesia-China in Natuna in 2016), *CNN Indonesia*, 21 June 2016, available at <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160621100151-20-139694/kemelut-indonesia-china-di-natuna-sepanjang-2016>, accessed 25 June 2021.

[111] 'Kapal TNI AL Usir Kapal Penjaga Pantai China di Perairan Natuna, China Klaim Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif (Indonesian Navy Ship Force Out Chinese Coast Guard Vessel in Natuna Waters, China Claims Exclusive Economic Zone),' *BBC News Indonesia*, 1 January 2020, available at <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia-50966528 >, accessed 25 June 2021.

[112] Hans Nicholas Jong, Tama Salim, and Nina Afrida, 'Indonesia Urged to Adopt Stronger Stance with China,' *The Jakarta Post*, 30 March, 2016, available at <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/30/indonesia-urged-adopt-stronger-stance-with-china.html>, accessed 25 June 2021; Rina Atriana, 'Menteri Susi Panggil Dubes Cina Terkait Illegal Fishing di Natuna (Minister Susi Summons Chinese Ambassador Related to Illegal Fishing in Natuna), *Detik News*, 20 March 2016, available at <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3169065/menteri-susi-panggil-dubes-china-terkait-illegal-fishing-di-natuna>, accessed 25 June 2021.

cabinet meeting aboard the *KRI Imam Bonjol,* the ship that had captured the Chinese fishing boat in the Natuna Besar. In October 2016 and May 2017 Jokowi again visited Natuna Island to observe the Indonesian Air Force's exercise.[113] The series of confrontation with China coast guard also led the government to announce further military presence in Natuna and military upgrade to generate a deterrent effect to conflicting parties in the SCS. For example, Indonesia sent seven of its warships to intensify naval patrols of the Natuna, supported by fighter jets from three air bases in Kalimantan, Jakarta, and Pekanbaru. In January 2020, Indonesia also announced it would modernise the coast guard unit base in the Natuna by planning to purchase submarines, Corvette Gowind, as well as Rafale Jets from France, as Indonesia's deal with Russia on purchasing 11 SU-35 fighter jets in February 2018 was postponed due to US sanctions following Russia's annexation to Crimea.[114] Another important policy of the Jokowi government was renaming the northern part of Indonesia's EEZ in the Natuna Sea where these incidents occurred as the North Natuna Sea (*Laut Natuna Utara*), despite China's strong protest.[115] With all these current policies, observers interpreted that the Jokowi government exhibited greater overt nationalism and a more unilateral approach in handling the maritime incidents, and even demonstrating a 'soft assertive' approach.[116]

Yet, as tumultuous as the responses have been, Indonesia sought to ensure that the tensions generated by the incidents would not jeopardise its relationship with China. Jokowi

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[113] Bagus Prihantoro Nugroho, 'Jokowi Saksikan Latihan Perang TNI di Natuna (Jokowi Observes Military Exercise in Natuna), *Detik News*, 19 May 2017, available at <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3505559/jokowi-saksikan-latihan-perang-tni-di-natuna>, accessed 25 June 2021.

[114] Aditya Jaya Iswara, 'Daftar Belanja Alutsista Indonesia: Jet, Kapal Selam, dan Kapal Perang (List of Indonesia's Defence Expenditures: Jet, Sub Marines and Warship),' <https://www.goodnewsfromindonesia.id/2020/01/27/daftar-belanja-alutsista-indonesia>, accessed 25 June 2021

[115] In response to China's protest, Indonesia confirmed to China that the changed name only applied to the area along the Indonesia's EEZ and does not reach any part of the South China Sea. Sheany, 'Indonesia, China and the North Natuna Sea,' *Jakarta Globe*, 8 September 2017, available at <https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-china-north-natuna-sea/>, accessed 25 June 2021.

[116] Dave McRae, 'Indonesia's South China Sea Diplomacy: A Foreign Policy Illiberal Turn?', pp. 759-779; Aaron L Connelly, 'Indonesia in the South China Sea: Going It Alone,' *Analysis*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, December 2016; Senia Febrica and Scott N. Romaniuk, 'A Wary Warrior: Indonesia's 'Soft Assertiveness' in the South China Sea,' in Gordon Houlden, Scott N. Romaniuk and Nong Hong (eds), *Security, Strategy, and Military Dynamics in South China Sea: Cross-National Perspectives*, Bristol University Press, Bristol, 2021, pp. 170-172.

and his top aides in foreign and defence policy making continued to assure that China was a friend and strategic partner, despite the incidents.[117] The flexing muscle policy in the Natuna was also complemented by a series of clarifications meant to assure Beijing that there were no hostile intentions against China. For example, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi released a statement that neither the air force military exercise nor the plan to strengthen defence in Natuna were directed to confront China, as Indonesia has been taking similar actions in border areas in other parts of Indonesia.[118] Similarly, the then Minister and Coordinator of Politics and Security, General Wiranto stated that the 2016 military exercise was not aimed at confronting a perceived threat from a particular country.[119] With all these, Jokowi administration shows that Indonesia's stern responses to the maritime incidents did not intend to confront nor conduct a balancing act against China.[120]

Jokowi, similar to all of Indonesia's Presidents who came after Suharto, put great attention on forging closer economic and political relations with China.[121] Moreover, the Jokowi's government placed additional importance on China's investment, particularly in infrastructure. Jokowi's vision of a global maritime fulcrum and ambitious infrastructural projects met with China's willingness to provide funding for such projects. Indonesia participated in the China's Belt and Road Initiative and joined in the China-led Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank. The Jokowi government also opted for Chinese investment in major infrastructure projects such as the US\$ 5.5 billion high-speed rail Jakarta-Bandung,

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[117] Sikap Jokowi, Luhut, Hingga Prabowo Soal Klaim China di Natuna (Jokowi's Position, Luhut, to Prabowo on China's Claim in Natuna)', *CNBC Indonesia*, 5 January 2020, available at <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20200105112647-4-127712/sikap-jokowi-luhut-hingga-prabowo-soal-klaim-china-di-natuna>, accessed 27 June 2021.

[118] Sekretaris Kabinet Republik Indonesia, 'Menlu: Tidak Ada Konflik Perbatasan dengan RRT (Foreign Minister: There is no Border Conflict with PRC),' available at <https://setkab.go.id/menlu-tidak-ada-konflik-perbatasan-dengan-rrt/>, accessed 27 June 2021.

[119] Ian James Storey, 'Indonesia's China Policy in the New Order and Beyond: Problems and Prospects,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2000, pp. 159-160.

[120] Emirza Adi Syailendra, 'A *Nonbalancing* Act: Explaining Indonesia's Failure to Balance Against Chinese Threats, *Asian Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3. 2017, pp. 247-248

[121] See for example, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Indonesia-China Relations: Coming Full Circle?' *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2019, pp. 145-160.

while declined a bid from a Japanese firm that had already conducted the feasibility studies for this project. By 2019 China had doubled its investment in Indonesia from US2.4 billion in 2018 to US$4.7 billion and overtaken Japan as the second largest foreign investor in Indonesia after Singapore.[122] China is now Indonesia's largest trading partner with total exports in 2020 at around US$31.8 (19.5% of total Indonesian export) and a major source of foreign investment of Indonesia.[123]

In a broader context, rather than change, there have been extensive continuities in the Jokowi government's approach on the SCS disputes. First, Indonesia maintains its neutral position as a non-claimant state in the SCS disputes. China has added another justification for its maritime incursions and poaching in Indonesia waters through its claim of 'traditional fishing grounds'. While denying China's claims as have no basis of international law, to reduce further regional tension Jokowi administration treated the maritime incidents as a bilateral problem with China and disconnect it broader territorial issues in the SCS disputes. To defuse the clash with China, Indonesia referred the incidents as a fisheries dispute rather than a clash of sovereignty claims.[124] As such, Sukma, Jokowi's foreign policy advisor, noted that bilateral relations between the two countries are 'too important to be derailed by a dispute over fishing rights.'[125]

Second, Indonesia continues to play the honest broker in the SCS disputes. Sukma has

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[122] Indonesia Economic Forum, 'Top 10 Foreign Direct Investors in Indonesia over past 5 Years in Million US Dollar,' available at <https://www.indonesiaeconomicforum.com/top-10-foreign-direct-investors-in-indonesia-over-the-past-5-years-in-million-us-dollars/>, accessed 20 June 2021.

[123] Daniel Workman, 'Indonesia's Top Trading Partners,' available at <https://www.worldstopexports.com/indonesias-top-15-import-partners/>, accessed 20 June 2021.

[124] ' Kepala Staf TNI AL: Insiden Natuna Masih Konflik Perikanan (Navy Staff Commander: Incidents in Natuna are Still Fisheries Conflict,' *Tempo.co,* 22 March, 2016, available at <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/755977/kepala-staf-tni-al-insiden-natuna-masih-konflik-perikanan>, accessed 25 June 2021; Rizal Sukma, 'Fishing Rights the Crux of Issue,' *The Jakarta Post*, Reprinted in *The Straits Times,* 2 April 2016, available at <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/aseans-love-hate-relationship-with-china>, accessed 27 June 2021.

[125] Rizal Sukma, 'Indonesia and China Need to Combat the IUU Problem,' *The Jakarta Post*, 31 March 2016, available at <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/31/indonesia-and-china-need-combat-iuu-problem.html>, accessed 27 June 2021.

argued that by sustaining good bilateral relations with China, despite recent fishing disputes, Indonesia could maintain its position as an honest broker in the SCS dispute not only for the benefit of both countries but also China-ASEAN.[126] The position was particularly important as the talks on COC between ASEAN and China since September 2013 to July 2016 have been slow moving, due to China's buying time strategy.[127] Indonesia realised that an ASEAN-driven COC approach would not be effective without China's participation. As China is the most powerful disputant and makes the most maritime claims, China's approval to continue to negotiate on the COC is central in maintaining ASEAN centrality and leadership in the management of the disputes. This suggests that Indonesia's non-confrontational act against China was also meant to avoid the escalation of the SCS disputes that could disrupt China's approval in the COC talks.

Third, Indonesia maintains its position as the confidence builder in seeking to peacefully manage the disputes through regional process. Like previous governments, Jokowi government continues to believe in the importance of the informal workshop on the SCS. At the time of writing the 29th and latest workshop had been held in September 2019. Although there has been little follow up to the agreed cooperation initiatives due to a lack of funding and strategic trust,[128] the workshops play a significant role in showcasing Indonesia's approach in the SCS disputes. Similar to its predecessor, the Jokowi government also continued to believe that finalisation of the COC is fundamental in managing the disputes. As such, Indonesia continued to maintain ASEAN unity in reaching agreement between ASEAN and China. For example, after being criticised for not showing leadership in ASEAN-China Ministerial

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[126] Rizal Sukma, 'Indonesia and China Need to Combat the IUU Problem,' *The Jakarta Post*, 31 March 2016, available at <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/31/indonesia-and-china-need-combat-iuu-problem.html>, accessed 27 June 2021.

[127] Hoang Thi Ha, 'From Declaration to Code: Continuity and Change in China's Engagement with ASEAN on the South China Sea,' *Trends in Southeast Asia*, No. 5, 2019, pp. 21-22.

[128] Sam Bateman, 'Building Cooperation for Managing the South China Sea without Strategic Trust,' *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, Vol.4, No. 2, 2016, pp. 251-259.

Meeting in Kunming, in June 2016, when ASEAN failed to issue its own statement, while Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi issued China's 10 points consensus,[129] Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi exhibited a high profile role in pushing other ASEAN members towards a consensus communique at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Laos in July 2016.[130] Almost similar to Natalegawa's shuttle diplomacy, Foreign Affairs Minister Retno Marsudi ran a three-day diplomatic marathon to consolidate a consensus after once again Cambodia blocked the Philippines and Vietnam's demand of the grouping's joint communique to refer to the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling. After Marsudi succeeded in convincing other ASEAN members, she stated that: 'this agreement is a proof that in difficult times, ASEAN is able to unite to progress in order to protect its home and common interests.'[131] Retno Marsudi's efforts have been praised as avoiding repeated embarrassment in Phnom Penh 2012 and Kunming 2016.[132] Other efforts to call for a united stance was also made by President Jokowi at 30th ASEAN Summit in Manila April 2017, as he remarked, 'the most important is that ASEAN internally needs to have a mutual agreement on the issue, then and only then can we communicate with China.'[133]

Indonesia under Jokowi government also play role as a confidence builder when it advocated regional norm of the Indo Pacific Cooperation that formally endorsed at the 34th

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[129] Aaron L. Connelly, 'Indonesia and the South China Sea under Jokowi,' in International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (ed), *Asia Pacific Regional Security Assessment: Key Development and Trends,* Routledge, London, 2020, p. 108.

[130] In the joint communique released after several days delayed, ASEAN addressed the SCS in eight paragraphs, with mentioning ASEAN's concern on the inclusion of land reclamation and escalation of activities in the SCS, calling for non-militarisation and the need for substantive progress of the implementation of the DOC and the early conclusion of the COC. See, 'Joint Communique of the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Vientiane, 24 July 2016,' point 174-180, available at <https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Joint-Communique-of-the-49th-AMM-ADOPTED.pdf>, accessed 29 June 2021.

[131] Embassy of The Republic of Indonesia Washington DC, 'Indonesian Diplomacy Convinces ASEAN Members to Unite,' available at <http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/indonesian-diplomacy-convinces-asean-members-to-unite/>, accessed 29 June 2021.

[132] Prasanth Parameswaran, 'Assessing ASEAN's South China Sea Position in Its Post-Ruling Statement,' *The Diplomat*, 25 July 2016, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/assessing-aseans-south-china-sea-position-in-its-post-ruling-statement/>, accessed 29 June 2021.

[133] Quoted in Cal Wong, 'After Summit: ASEAN Still Divided on South China Sea,' *The Diplomat*, 3 May 2017.

ASEAN Summit in Bangkok, in June 2019 as the 'ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific' (AOIP).[134] The AOIP was a response to the idea of the FOIP from the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad). As Retno Marsudi writes, the AOIP was set to reaffirm ASEAN centrality in shaping the emerging architecture, norms, and cooperation initiatives of the emerging Indo-Pacific region through 'ASEAN-led mechanism, particularly the EAS with other non-ASEAN regional mechanism in Indo-Pacific.'[135] The emphasis on inclusivity and transparency, was an attempt by Indonesia and ASEAN to avoid strategic mistrusts and great power rivalries by involving all relevant parties, particularly China, which perceived of being contained in the Quad's of FOIP. Jokowi government's idea Indo-Pacific Cooperation was a continuation Marty Natalegawa's idea of Indo-Pacific Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation articulated in May 2013. However, different with the previous idea, which proposed a treaty the AOIP relies on ASEAN norms and mechanism and 'Indonesia does not intend to introduce new regional architecture but wants to optimize the existing structures.'[136] Indonesia's initiative of AOIP is seen as an effort of diplomatic and political assertion from ASEAN, that the Southeast Asian states have its own way of developing the Indo-Pacific idea and do not want the external powers dominate the discourse on Indo-Pacific, including the SCS disputes.[137]

9.5.   ASEAN Unity

There has been a noticeable continuity in Indonesia's approach to the SCS disputes for more than 40 years. Dominant arguments view Indonesia's persistent approach as sourced in

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[134] 'ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,' available at <https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf>, accessed 29 June 2021.

[135] Retno LP Marsudi, 'Insight: Time to Deepen Indo-Pacific Cooperation,' *The Jakarta Post,* 20 March 2019, available at <https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/03/20/insight-time-to-deepen-indo-pacific-cooperation.html>, accessed 30 June 2021.

[136] Telly Nathalia, 'Indonesia Presents Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept at ASEAN Ministerial Meeting,' *Jakarta Globe*, 2 August 2018, available at <https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-conveys-indo-pacific-concept-asean-meetings/>, accessed 30 June 2021.

[137] Amitav Acharya, 'Why ASEAN's Indo-Pacific Outlook Matters?' *The Strategist*, 12 August 2019.

domestic politics, that can be summarised as follows:

First, as a function of the ambivalence of Indonesian elites' perceptions towards China.[138] That is, on the one hand China is seen as a source of threat, while on the other hand it is perceived as an opportunity for economic and security cooperation.

Second, the ambivalent perception towards China leads to disagreement among Indonesia's decision makers regarding how to respond to China's assertiveness in its multi-faceted bilateral relations. As Syailendra observes, 'there is a general consensus that China poses some kind of threat to Indonesia, but elites are in disagreement about the nature of risk posed by China.'[139] Among the risks that hindered Indonesia to challenge China's assertiveness are, economic, demographic and strategic:[140] economically, challenging China would risk Indonesia's chances to avail of opportunities presented by China as it is the largest trading partner and the second largest foreign investor in Indonesia; demographically, Indonesia worries that confrontational stance against China could upset the interracial harmony and ignite indigenous (*pribumi*) sentiments and violence against Chinese- Indonesians, as according to Tjhin, 'anti-Chinese Indonesian sentiments are always linked to bilateral relations with mainland China';[141] strategically, a stronger stance against China would inevitably put Indonesia in opposition with China and consequently could limit Indonesia's Independence and Active foreign policy and its options to gain maximum possible benefits from cooperation with all major powers. The last domestic factor that affected Indonesia's persistent approach

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[138] For example, Rizal Sukma, 'Indonesia-China Relations: The Politics of Re-engagement,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2009, pp. 591-608; Daniel Novotny, *Torn Between America and China: Elites Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy*, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore, 2010; Evan A. Laksmana, 'Variations on a Theme: Dimensions of Ambivalence in Indonesia-China Relations,' *Harvard Asia Quarterly,* Vol. 13, No. 1, 2011, pp. 24-31; Evi Fitriani, 'Indonesia's Perception of the Rise of China: Dare You, Dare You Not,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2018, pp. 391-405.

[139] Emirza Adi Syailendra, 'A *Nonbalancing* Act: Explaining Indonesia's Failure to Balance Against Chinese Threats, p. 248.

[140] Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, 'A View from Indonesia,' *National Commentaries*,The Asan Forum, 28 April 2016, available at <http://old.theasanforum.org/a-view-from-indonesia/>, accessed 30 June 2021.

[141] Christine Susanna Tjhin, 'Indonesia's Relations with China: Productive and Pragmatic, but not yet a Strategic Partnership,' *China Report*, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2012, p. 313.

to the SCS is Indonesia's strategic culture that puts much emphasis on domestic political stability, which prevent it to pursue a more confrontational policy against China.[142] In short, these domestic factors have inhibited Indonesia from inventing novel responses towards Beijing's assertiveness in the SCS disputes, aside from its traditional position.

Although the domestic political considerations have some explanatory power, they cannot completely explain the largely unchanged approach to the SCS disputes, especially as Indonesia has shifted from an authoritarian to more democratic political system over that 40-year history.

Missing from the analysis is how regional norms and principles have exerted influence on Indonesia's approach, with its consistent and persistent role as an honest broker and confidence builder and working through the ASEAN processes. That said, the often-overlooked aspect of Indonesia's role for decades in the SCS disputes is its enthusiasm for the development and maintenance of Southeast Asia's regional international society. These efforts have been conducted by designating and maintaining ASEAN-led framework as a legitimate party in the dispute management of the SCS.

9.5.1. The South China Sea Disputes

Indonesia's continuous approach to the SCS disputes has been essential in maintaining the primary institutions of Southeast Asia's regional international society. This claim can be appraised by assessing how Indonesia has conducted its initiatives and sustained the long-held practices and management of the great powers as the fundamental principles in managing and resolving the disputes.

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[142] Yohanes Sulaiman, 'What Threat? Leadership, Strategic Culture, and Indonesian Foreign Policy in the South China Sea,' *Asian Politics & Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2019, pp. 602-622.

Indonesia has been consistently holding to the regional principles of management of great power in managing the SCS conflict between ASEAN and China. The series of informal workshops on the SCS clearly reflected Indonesia's continuing belief to the values of regional solutions for regional problems and thus, the workshops had laid the foundation of legitimacy of ASEAN leadership in managing the disputes. One of the goals of the workshops, as Djalal maintained, was 'to avoid 'internationalizing' the issues by limiting the discussion to participants from around the South China Sea region.'[143] On the importance of the workshops, former Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa argued:

> The workshop series has proven useful in building the habit of cooperation among littoral countries and entities in the South China Sea and, indeed, in identifying principles for the management of potentials for conflicts--all of which would prove useful for ASEAN's management of the issues of the South China Sea.[144]

Indeed, of particular importance was that whilst ASEAN-China linkages in the 1990s was still relatively limited, the informal method could bring China's participation in the workshops and smoothed relations between China and other parties through technical cooperation to avert tensions and conflicts. An analyst argues that the informal workshops became one of the key mechanisms for safeguarding the fragile peace in the SCS during 1990s.[145] After the signing of the 2002 DOC and the subsequent negotiation for the COC, the workshops were no longer in the limelight as they were in the 1990s. Nonetheless, Indonesia continues to believe in the importance of the workshops, evident by their convenorship for almost three decades (with the only hiatus in 2020-21 due to COVID-19 pandemic). However,

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[143] Hasjim Djalal, 'Indonesia and the South China Sea Initiative,' p. 99
[144] Marty Natalegawa, *Does ASEAN Matter: A View from Within*, p. 118.
[145] Mikael Weissmann, 'Why is There a Relative Peace in the South China Sea?' in Pavin Chachavalpongpun (ed), *Entering Unchartered Waters? ASEAN and the South China Sea Dispute*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2014, pp. 36-64.

it does seem likely that Indonesia will continue to convene the informal workshops as complementary to the conclusion of the COC. As Djalal wrote in an opinion/editorial in 2020, 'the Indonesia-initiated workshop process on managing potential conflict in the SCS that lasted more than 25 years should continue as already agreed by all relevant authorities in the SCS.'[146]

Indonesia's efforts to sustain the fundamental social practice of management of great power is also clearly shown in Indonesia's persistent behaviour to avoid confrontational diplomacy and adversarial posturing against China. Indonesia has been indifferent to any legalistic and adversarial posturing from ASEAN claimant states towards China. When the Philippines submitted its disputes with China on the SCS to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2013, Natalegawa commented that the Philippines' move was 'unhelpful and undermined his COC diplomacy'.[147] Although supporting the ruling could benefit Indonesia to defend its sovereignty in the Natuna EEZ, Indonesia has also only just 'sat on the fence' and not formally called for the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling in 2016.[148] Clearly, Indonesia maintains its stance to avoid confrontational diplomacy and adversarial posturing against China that could reverse the ASEAN-China negotiation on COC. First, Indonesia avoids pushing China and preventing it from taking more assertive actions in defending its claims and recede from its commitment in COC negotiation. Second, Indonesia seeks to avoid intensification of great powers competition, as the US and its allies have pressed regional countries to make strong statement on the ruling.[149]

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[146] Hasjim Djalal, 'The Way Forward on the South China Sea Issues, *Jakarta Post*, 27 August 2020, available at <https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/08/27/the-way-forward-on-the-south-china-sea-issues.html>, accessed 5 July 2021.

[147] Quoted in Donald E. Weatherbee, 'Re-Assessing Indonesia's Role in the South China Sea,' p. 10.

[148] Indonesia has not explicitly called on China to comply, except calling all parties for the full compliance to international law, including the UNCLOS 1982, self-restraint, and continue to common commitment to peaceful, free, and neutral Zone in Southeast Asia. see, Evan A. Laksmana, 'The Domestic Politics of Indonesia's Approach to the Tribunal Ruling and the South China Sea,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2016, p. 382.

[149] So far, countries that called for the ruling are Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, the UK, and the US. Only two ASEAN members that support the ruling, the Philippines and Vietnam

From Indonesia's perspective, the COC has been seen as the most reasonable means to manage the SCS disputes that allows ASEAN members to reach consensus as well as putting the ASEAN-led process as the core dispute management mechanism. Indonesian diplomat and international law expert, Arif Havas Oegroseno maintains that the prospect of settling the SCS disputes through adjudication or arbitration is minimal.[150] Compared to the case of territorial disputes such as Sipadan and Ligitan between Indonesia and Malaysia, and Pedra Branca between Malaysia and Singapore, which were settled through international arbitrary, the SCS disputes are much more complex. The claimant states have claimed hundreds of features in the SCS, with most of them overlapping between one claimant and another. Moreover, over the course of the disputes, there has been enduring mistrust among claimant states as well as among ASEAN members that prevented ASEAN from conducting conflict resolution and restricted its ability to set up stronger mechanisms, including legal instruments to settle the disputes.[151] To ensure peaceful management of the conflict, from the beginning, Indonesia has been using the 1976 TAC as a basis for its role as well as fundamental principle in managing the disputes. From Indonesia's perspective, 'the TAC is the only viable legal framework for the claimants of the South China Sea dispute.'[152]

From Indonesia's perspective, the COC is seen as the most feasible dispute management mechanism based on TAC. There are several reasons for this. First, the COC is an ASEAN-driven process, which reflected ASEAN centrality and leadership in managing the

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'Japan, US Urge China to Comply with Tribunal Ruling on South China Sea,' *The Japan Times,* 12 July 2021, available at <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/07/12/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-us-south-china-sea-ruling/>, accessed 10 September 2021

[150] Arif Havas Oegroseno, 'State Practices in Southeast Asia: Possible Collaboration amongst Claimants in the South China Sea Dispute,' *International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law,* Vol. 32, 2017, p. 368.

[151] Ralf Emmers, 'Enduring Mistrust and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia: An Assessment of ASEAN as a Security Community,' *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and-National Studies of Southeast Asia*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2017, pp. 86-93.

[152] Arif Havas Oegroseno, 'ASEAN as the Most Feasible Forum to Address the South China Sea Challenges,' *Proceeding of Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law*, Vol. 107, International Law in Multipolar World, 2013, p. 292.

disputes. Second, the COC is the only binding mechanism that agreed by both ASEAN claimant states and China to avoid escalation of conflict, while improve their relations, and third, the COC potentially reduces the involvement of external power and great power competition in the SCS.[153]

Indonesia's initiatives through dynamic equilibrium and the AOIP have not only been vital in ensuring ASEAN's centrality in the emerging of regional architecture in wider region, but they are also essential in preserving the regional primary institution of management of great power. Take for example, a statement of Indonesian Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu in 2015 in responding the US's balancing act in East Asia, as he stated, 'if regional countries can manage the SCS on their own, there is no need to involve others.'[154] For one thing it implies that Indonesia's is adhering to the 'free and active' (*bebas-aktif)* foreign policy. For another, Indonesia also sought to ensure that the fundamental principles of management of great power that were founded on the belief of an independent and neutral Southeast Asia are still capable of maintaining its autonomy and neutrality in the face of competition of influence among extra-regional powers in the face of competition of influence among extra-regional powers.

9.5.2. Unity of ASEAN

Indonesia's role in maintaining ASEAN's unity can be judged from how Indonesia has been advocating common interests and a common position within the regional association to manage the disputes through regional process. The first and the longest initiative to facilitate common interests and common policy are the informal Workshops on Managing Potential

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[153] Le Hu, 'Examining ASEAN's Effectiveness in Managing South China Sea Disputes,' *The Pacific Review,* (forthcoming), published online 29 June 2021, p.8.
[154] Prashanth Parameswaran, 'The New U.S.-Indonesia Strategic Partnership after Jokowi's Visit: Problems and Prospects,' *Brookings*, 8 December 2015, available at <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-new-u-s-indonesia-strategic-partnership-after-jokowis-visit-problems-and-prospects/>, accessed 10 September 2021.

Conflict in the SCS. This series of informal workshops on the SCS clearly reflected Indonesia's continuing belief in the values of informality, consultation, and non-confrontational bargaining style social practices in regional diplomacy. Indonesia initiated the informal workshops based on its experience in managing the Cambodian-Vietnam conflict through the so-called 'Cocktail diplomacy' and the JIMs in the 1980s.[155] The informality has been the most important mechanism that help to create platform for social process through communication channels and personal networks in which the relevant policy makers have been able to meet.

Critics might argue that the informal nature of the workshops lacked political consequences as they only focussed on technical issues, while avoiding the sensitive issues such as sovereignty. [156] However, the informal workshops were the only mechanism for dialogue and the only feasible forum through which ASEAN could engage and cooperate with China on the SCS issues before China agreed to hold talks with ASEAN to follow up the 2002 DOC. Moreover, the Second Workshop in Bandung in 1991 resulted in important principles that later incorporated by formal ASEAN Declaration in Manila 1992 and evidently in the paragraph 4 of the 2002 DOC.[157]

In conducting diplomacy on the SCS, Indonesia's also continues to sustain the unity of ASEAN, despite experiencing disappointment. For example, facing the failure of the ASEAN Meeting in Cambodia 2012, Marty Natalegawa showed his discontent by remarking, 'I think it is utterly irresponsible if we cannot come up with a common statement on the South China

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[155] Hasjim Djalal, 'Indonesia and the South China Sea Initiative,' p. 98.

[156] See for example, Mark Valencia and Jon. M. Van Dyke, 'Comprehensive Solutions to the South China Sea Disputes; Some Options,' in Sam Bateman & Stephen Bates (eds), *The Seas Unite: Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region*, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1996, p. 223.

[157] Among the principles are: (1) any territorial and jurisdictional dispute in the SCS should be resolved by peaceful means through dialogue and negotiation; (2) force should not be used to settle territorial and jurisdictional disputes; (3) the parties involved in such disputes are urged to exercise self-restraint in order to avoid complicating situation. See Hasjim Djalal, 'Indonesia and the South China Sea Initiative,' p. 100.

Sea.'[158] As mentioned, Indonesia's role in facilitating ASEAN unity at that meeting has been demonstrated in the Six-Point Principles consensus on the South China Sea proposed by Marty Natalegawa, in lieu of the usual joint statement that failed to be agreed in ASEAN Meeting in Cambodia 2012. According to Bilahari Kausikan, the Six-Point Principles, have been considered as ASEAN's core consensus on the SCS conflict.[159]

Indonesia also proactively promoted the conclusion of the COC amid China's reluctance and ASEAN's disunity. Although the COC has become ASEAN's common policy since the agreement on DOC,[160] the efforts to translate the DOC into COC faced challenges both from China and from internal ASEAN members. For example, in 2012 Indonesia presented a Zero Draft of COC to bridge differences among ASEAN members on a workable draft of COC before formally discussing it with China, despite the fact that it did not pass.[161] Moreover, under Jokowi, Indonesia continues to endorse a '3+1' formula as the basis of drafting the COC, consisting of promoting confidence, conflict prevention, mitigating the risk of an accident at the sea, plus creating a conducive environment through early harvest measures, such as maintaining hotline communications.[162] Not least, President Jokowi also reassured that Indonesia continued to be neutral and offered to act as an honest broker in the

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[158] Quoted in Christopher B. Roberts and Erlina Widyaningsih, 'Indonesian Leadership in ASEAN: Mediation, Agency and Extra-Regional Diplomacy,' in Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D. Habir and Leonard C. Sebastian, *Indonesia's Ascent: Power Leadership, and The Regional Order,* Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2015, p. 268.
[159] Bilahari Kausikan, 'ASEAN's Commitment to Consensus, *Australian Outlook,* 24 September 2020, available at <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/aseans-commitment-to-consensus/>, accessed 2 June 2021.
[160] The parties to the DOC reaffirmed, 'the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.' See, point 10 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, available at <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125380/5066_South_China_Sea.pdf>, accessed 2 June 2021.
[161] 'Indonesia Seeks Rules of Road for South China Sea,' *Associated Press,* 26 September 2012, available at <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/2033490>, accessed 20 June 2021.
[162] The formula was firstly proposed in ASEAN Minister Meeting Retreat in Hua Hin and ASEAN-China Special Foreign Minister Meeting in August 2013. See, Christopher B. Roberts and Erlina Widyaningsih, 'Indonesian Leadership in ASEAN: Mediation, Agency and Extra-Regional Diplomacy,' p. 269; Iis Gindarsah, 'Indonesia's Strategic hedging and The South China Sea,' available at <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2017/e-02.pdf>, accessed 10 September 2021

disputes.[163] Indonesia's cautious response to maritime incidents with China in its Natuna EEZ could be understood in terms of its efforts to convince China of its continuing neutral position in the disputes and its persistence to finalise the COC.

Indonesia's non-confrontational approach to recent Chinese provocation has been based on a consideration of the negative impacts of a broader range of bilateral interests that Indonesia has in its relations with China. This is not a special case, as most ASEAN states continue to not openly oppose China by favouring a hedging strategy.[164] What is more relevant as to why Indonesia persistently maintains its position and roles in the SCS disputes is maintaining its consistency on ASEAN's common interest and common policy, in which it has long invested. If Indonesia changed its approach to the SCS disputes and responds to China's assertiveness by confronting and antagonising China, it would be detrimental to the ongoing process of negotiations on the COC. A recent study found that Indonesia's cautious response to the recent maritime skirmishes has resulted in continuing good perceptions of China towards Indonesia, which could become Indonesia's modality to convince China to finalise the COC.[165] By contrast, Indonesia's changing approach to the SCS disputes would jeopardise Indonesia's commitment to ASEAN's common interests and common policy that it has long promoted and perhaps would risk Indonesia's long diplomatic endeavour through various regional forum since 1990. Thus, Indonesia's continuous approach has been governed by its efforts to uphold ASEAN's shared interests and common policy which central in maintaining its unity and centrality in the SCS disputes.

In August 2018, ASEAN and China agreed on a Single Draft Negotiating Text of the

[163] 'Jokowi Clarifies Indonesia Still Neutral in the South China Sea Dispute,' *Jakarta Globe*, 5 March 2015, available at <https://jakartaglobe.id/news/jokowi-clarifies-indonesia-still-neutral-s-china-sea-dispute/>, accessed 30 June 2021.

[164] For example, Denny Roy, 'Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2005, pp. 305-322; Vibhanshu Shekhar, 'ASEAN's Response to the Rise of China: Deploying a Hedging Strategy,' *China Report*, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2012, pp. 253-268.

[165] Ardina Kartikasari, 'Indonesia's Image from China's Perspective on South China Dispute,' *Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2019, pp. 176-197.

South China Sea COC. Both parties agreed to finalise the COC within three years from 2019. However, the negotiations were still marked with continuing differences on several issues: (1) the undefined geographical scope of the SCS; (2) disagreement over dispute settlement mechanism; (3) different approaches to conflict management; and (4) the legal status of the COC.[166] China has committed to accelerate the COC negotiations after it had completed its land feature reclamation, consolidated its occupation in the SCS, and then wanted to rescue itself from the arbitration awards, which were otherwise evidence of ASEAN's weakness.[167] However, in the continuing negotiations on the Single Draft Negotiating Text of the South China Sea COC it became evident that ASEAN gained recognition from China as a legitimate player in the SCS dispute management and would accept the ASEAN-COC approach, as opposed to its previous insistence on a bilateral approach.[168]

9.6.   Summary

This chapter has explained why for almost four decades, Indonesia's approach to the SCS disputes has remained largely unchanged, despite increasing Chinese assertiveness in the SCS. The findings of this chapter capture a different angle of International Society from the dominant perspective. First, China's assertiveness in the SCS has not only challenged ASEAN unity and centrality, as a secondary institution, but also unsettled the underlying regional primary institutions of great power management. China's assertiveness, therefore, represents an existential threat for the regional international society and order in Southeast Asia. Second, Indonesia's continuing approach on the SCS disputes, rather than being guided by domestic

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[166] Carlyle A. Thayer, 'A Closer Look at the ASEAN-China Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct,' *The Diplomat*, 3 August 2018, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/a-closer-look-at-the-asean-china-single-draft-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct/>, accessed 30 June 2021.

[167] For example, Toru Takahashi, 'What Beijing Really Wants from South China Sea Code of Conduct,' *Nikkei Asia,* 12 August 2019, available at <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/What-Beijing-really-wants-from-South-China-Sea-code-of-conduct>, accessed 30 June 2021.

[168] Le Hu, 'Examining ASEAN's Effectiveness in Managing South China Sea Disputes,' pp. 17-18.

political functions, has been driven by its concerns to maintain the relevance of both ASEAN as secondary institution and the regional primary institutions. By preserving its position and roles as a non-claimant, an honest broker, and a confidence builder, Indonesia has facilitated the formation of common interest and common policy of ASEAN states towards China, despite differences of individual members' policy and interests in the disputes. Moreover, preserving its roles also help to reinforce the continued validity of the long-held practices of management of great power as common working fundamental principles not only in managing the disputes but also in obtaining other common goals.

Indonesia's approach to the SCS disputes thus demonstrates its agency in sustaining the regional norms, rules and practices of the regional international society when facing potential conflict with external major powers. Indonesia has promoted ideas that proactively maintain equidistant relationship with external great powers with the objective of retaining regional autonomy while at the same time reaping economic benefits in relations with the great powers. This case also displayed that Indonesia's foreign policy has been driven more by its concern for the regional principles of management of great power and ASEAN unity rather than a calculation of its domestic interests. For Indonesia, the stakes of the SCS disputes involve its credibility and its leadership as well as the belief to make the Southeast Asian regional society remain relevant in the face of China's assertiveness. Indonesia certainly would not be able to salvage ASEAN unity and centrality, but through the regional association Indonesia has been able to stay on the top of the day-to-day developments of the SCS issues. Moreover, Indonesia would not sacrifice the regional primary institutions of management of great power as they have become an established framework for social action among ASEAN members. This regional primary institution so far has regulated the Southeast Asian states' behaviour, stabilised sets of expectations, and inspired attachment to the regional international society in managing and resolving the disputes.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

This thesis set out to examine an aspect of Indonesia's foreign policy in Southeast Asia regionalism that has not often been discussed in theoretical and empirical studies—a pattern of behaviour beyond domestic politic functions wherein Indonesia seeks to create, develop and maintain rules, norms, and institutions of regional international society, and establishing them as the basis of legitimate conduct of international relations in Southeast Asia. Thus, in conclusion this chapter will critically reflect upon the strengths and limitations of the thesis and point to the lessons for future research in analysing Indonesia's foreign policy in Southeast Asia regionalism.

It was observed above that conventional accounts of Indonesia's foreign policy have commonly focussed on domestic drivers as key determinants. This thesis builds upon the existing literature related to provide some important indications as to alternative sources of Indonesia's motivations, and concluded that the drivers do go beyond domestic functions. For example, the existing literature rightly points to Indonesia's participation in regional cooperation being motivated by aspirations to establish a more autonomous regional order.[1] Furthermore, it recognises Indonesia's role as a norm entrepreneur in shaping norms and practices at regional level.[2] The literature also acknowledges that Indonesia has achieved its prominence in regional politics through its broader roles and policies that built upon certain ideas and norms, rather than its economic and military resources.

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[1] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1983, especially chapter 6, pp. 142-171; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, ISEAS & Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Singapore-Jakarta, 1994, pp. 174-182.

[2] For example, Amitav Acharya, *Indonesia's Matters*: *Asia's Emerging Democratic Power*, World Scientific, Singapore, 2014; Mathew Davies & Susan Harris-Rimmer, 'Assessing Indonesia's Normative Influence: Wishful Thinking or Hidden Strength,' *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2016, pp. 83-91; Pattharapong Rattanasevee, 'Leadership in ASEAN: The Role of Indonesia Reconsidered,' *Asian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2012, pp. 113-127.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

While appreciating these insights, this thesis identified certain shortcomings in Indonesia's foreign policy literature. First, it has been assumed that Indonesia's role is that of a regional norm builder and its aspirations are to establish a more autonomous regional order as evidence of the usage of its soft power assets of foreign policy aimed at achieving a prominent position, if not a leadership role in the regional politics. But Indonesia's role as a regional norm entrepreneur is driven by its determination to shape the regional international society in Southeast Asia and influence how regional politics should be organised. Second, there have been no clear historical explanations in the literature as to why Indonesia aspired to shape these regional norms and to seek an autonomous regional order or to what kind of regional order it aspired. Insufficiently explored is the question of how such an idea of regional order was developed in the first place and continued to be ingrained in Indonesia's regional policy behaviour. The question of how Indonesia has tried to influence and negotiate various ideas about how regional politics should be organised has also been mostly overlooked.

In order to answer these questions and thus fill the gap in the literature, this thesis developed an analytical framework that explained Indonesia's behaviour in Southeast Asian regionalism in shaping the regional international society in Southeast Asia by combining two research agendas from the English School of International Relations International Society perspective, that is regional international society and state agency. It is argued that the International Society perspective is not only useful in examining Indonesia's role as a norm and institution builder in Southeast Asia, but it is also advantageous in revealing the kinds of norms, and institutions that have been promoted by Indonesia in the regional context. Drawing on the English School's conception of primary and secondary institutions of international society, this thesis has demonstrated that Southeast Asia is considered as a regional international society because it has a social agreement on regional the primary institutions within its geographical boundaries. These agreements are based on a certain understanding and

different practices about rightful membership and the legitimate and appropriate forms in their conduct such as sovereignty and non-interference, management of great power, diplomacy and economic development. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN is the main regional secondary institution as a translation and a manifestation of the shared commitment of its members in the four primary institutions.

Indonesia's foreign policy in Southeast Asian regionalism can be considered as significantly consistent if it is viewed as an attempt to influence the emergence and the development of the regional primary institutions. Simultaneously, it also seeks to influence the creation and the development of norms, rules, and procedures of regional organisation or the secondary institutions. An important driver of Indonesia's foreign policy in Southeast Asia regionalism is its aspiration as well as its persistent efforts to manage the regional environment towards a regionally derived understanding of order in Southeast Asia.

Chapter 3 and 4 examined the question of Indonesia's particular ideas and understanding of rightful and legitimate conduct of relations between states and how they have been developed and conveyed in the regional context. This question is particularly important and according to Hurrell, is central in studies of foreign policy, especially in the 'uncovering of actors' understandings of international politics and the ways in which these understandings have been gathered into intelligible patterns, traditions, or ideologies.'[3] Indonesia's understanding of international society was the result of multistage and multifaceted processes of interaction with international society. These chapters challenged the argument about the expansion of international society from the perspective of the classical English School. First, Indonesia acquired an understanding of international society long before becoming a state

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[3] Andrew Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 17.

through the role of non-state actors: the national independence leaders. Second, the sources of Indonesia's learning process about international society were not only the European states, but also Japan, the League of Anti Imperialism and other new post-colonial states in Asia and Africa. The result of the learning processes was that Indonesia's understanding of international society was characterised by a mix of acceptance of the norms and institutions of European society of state and regionally derived values, from which Indonesia developed specific interpretations of institutions of international society, particularly sovereignty and non-interference, rejection of great powers politics and non-alignment with the great powers, and diplomacy typified by informal and consensus-based procedures. All these interpretations constituted Indonesia's social identity and the values that became guiding principles for appropriate and legitimate conduct in the society of states. They also serve as the basis of meaningful interaction and form political associations to achieve common interests. These understandings in turn become the guidance principles and values for Indonesia to convey its own version of legitimate and rightful conduct of international society at regional context. By delving into Indonesia's pre-socialisation and socialisation into international society, this thesis provides an analysis of how a particular historical and normative context shaped Indonesia's beliefs, values and ideas that expressed its understanding of the core institutions of international society. It also reveals Indonesia's preference of social structures by which a regional international society should be built upon. Thus, it contributes to ameliorating the absence in the literature of the historical process of how particular beliefs and values in Indonesia's regional policy have been developed, how regional politics should be organised and the kind of regional order that it aspires to.

Chapter 5 focused on the social process that generated a set of values and norms shared by members in the region, through historical analysis of the emergence of regional primary institutions and secondary institution. It concluded that in the creation of Southeast Asia

regionalism, Indonesia played a part in introducing elements of society by shaping practices, habits, and the normative basis of regional international relations based on its historically rooted subjective conception of legitimate conduct of interstate relations. It traced back Indonesia's efforts to shape regional international society that predates the establishment of ASEAN. Prior to the establishment of ASEAN, Indonesia was involved in regional process among post-colonial states in Asia and Africa in their efforts to construct a normative basis for the promotion of peaceful relations among the new post-colonial states and between them and the rest of the world. During that process Indonesia was taking part in promoting a regional understanding of sovereignty, self-determination, nationalism, informality and consensus rules of procedures of diplomacy, and the rejection of great power politics. Regime change within Indonesia – from Sukarno to Suharto – also paved the way for the consensus in economic development as a regional primary institution, in which economic development was seen as the basis of national resilience to uphold regional resilience. Indonesia also played an important role in translating and specifying all these regional primary institutions into regional secondary institutions. The main secondary institution, through which these normative underpinnings were given life was ASEAN, which was formally created in 1967 but which had very little institutional presence until the 1971 ZOPFAN, 1976 TAC, and 1977 PTA, in which the regional society had spelled out the basic rules of conduct for the regional international relations. By analysing the creation of the Southeast Asian regional international society, this thesis has drawn attention to Indonesia's role in developing common interests, rules, norms and common institutions that are crucial, in the words of Haacke, 'to mediate the estrangement and insecurity in Southeast Asia'.[4]

The case studies analysed in this thesis focused on Indonesia's responses to external

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[4] Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects*, Routledge Curzon, London 2003, p. 214.

challenges that directly and indirectly put a strain on the validity of the dominant interpretation of the regional primary institutions as well as the unity and cohesion of ASEAN as the main regional secondary institution. In general, the thesis concludes that in responding to external challenges that pose existential threats to the Southeast Asian regional international society, rather than solely motivated by rational and functional considerations, Indonesia's responses were driven by its determination to strengthen and maintain the relevance of the regional primary institutions as well as working for ASEAN's unity and coherence.

Chapter 6 and 7 has explored Indonesia's role in the process of consolidation of Southeast Asian regional international society that took place in the period of 1976-1992. In consideration of two of the major regional issues in this period – the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the ASEAN quest for regional trade liberalisation – it was demonstrated above that Indonesia did not have a strong stake in either outcome in terms of narrow national interest. Yet on both fronts, Indonesia played a critical role with a definitive agenda. Indonesia's contribution to both of these outcomes was pivotal, and this thesis has argued that in both fields it was motivated less by a narrow understanding of its national interests, than by its quest to pursue its national interests through the consolidation of a regional international society. In the case of Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, Indonesia's indifference to a confrontational strategy pursued by ASEAN was reflected its concern on regional appropriate conduct related to sovereignty, management of great power and regional diplomacy in dealing with the conflict. Indonesia was a staunch believer that regional conflict should be managed by the resident states without external interference by employing regional approach of diplomacy. Through its initiatives – Jakarta's informal meetings and other related informal meetings held to break the diplomatic impasse, demonstrated that Indonesia was aiming not only for ASEAN unity, coherence and its organisational capacity in dealing with protracted conflict, but also for a strengthened belief in the primary institutions of sovereignty, management of great power and

diplomacy, to show that they do work and would likely continue to be relevant in the future.

In the case of ASEAN trade liberalisation, the development of intra-ASEAN free trade was contrary to Indonesia's narrow domestic political interests. Indonesia's last-minute change from reluctance to support over this issue was decisive in the agreement of AFTA. Amidst discouraging domestic public reactions, indicating continued popular resistance to the opening of the market, Indonesia set out to put the interests of the regional society of states as the first priority. The AFTA was significant for ASEAN since it gave new legitimacy to the regional primary institutions of economic development as a principal rallying point for wider Asia Pacific regionalism. It also strengthened ASEAN unity and cohesion as they could exist within larger economic arrangements, such as APEC, without losing their identity and purpose.

Chapter 8 explored Indonesia's response to the challenges posed by the pressure from the US as it emphasised the importance of democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia. These US pressures posed serious challenges to the Southeast Asian regional international society in both primary and secondary institutions. In terms of primary institutions, the US pressures generated normative tensions between adhering to the norms of democracy and human rights and maintaining the principle of sovereignty, non-interference and ASEAN Way diplomacy. The impact on ASEAN members and their domestic affairs was tantamount to a form of interference. Moreover, the US pressures also tarnished the credibility of ASEAN, as the pressures exposed the limitations of ASEAN in dealing with the issue of democratisation and human rights violations in the association's member countries. The above thesis has shown that the US pressures encouraged Indonesia to promote democracy and human rights as new regional principles, through several initiatives such as the ASC in 2003, the formulation of ASEAN Charter in 2007 and the establishment AICHR in 2009. Rather than being driven by domestic interests, Indonesia was determined to maintain the relevance of the regional primary institutions as well as to restore ASEAN's credibility and legitimacy. Thus, Indonesia

promoted the democracy and human rights agenda in the absence of domestic pressures. Moreover, Indonesia's willingness to compromise despite its ideas of democracy and human rights at the regional level was watered down by other ASEAN members, and thus demonstrated that Indonesia's initiatives were not purely motivated by its penchant to spread democratic norms regionally but was also accommodating the US pressures for democracy and human rights to restore ASEAN's credibility and legitimacy.

Chapter 9 examines Indonesia's responses to the challenges posed by China's assertiveness in the SCS that has not only challenged ASEAN unity and centrality, as a secondary institution, but also unsettled the underlying regional primary institutions of great power management. Indonesia's approach to the SCS disputes was consistent. Indonesia acted as an honest broker and a confidence builder despite the increasing domestic pressures that pushed the government to take sterner measures towards China. Thus, Indonesia's foreign policy was driven more by its concern for the regional principles of management of great power and ASEAN unity rather than a calculation of its domestic interests. Indonesia has maintained its stance to avoid confrontational diplomacy and adversarial posturing against China that could reverse the ASEAN-China negotiation on COC. The COC is seen as the most realistic dispute management mechanism based on TAC as it reflected ASEAN centrality, which potentially reduces the involvement of external power and great power competition in the SCS. Indonesia's initiatives through dynamic equilibrium and the AOIP have not only been vital in ensuring ASEAN's centrality in the emergence of the regional architecture in the region, but they are also essential in preserving the regional primary institutions of the management of great power.

This thesis thus makes a case for using the International Society perspective of the English School of International Relations in Indonesia's foreign policy in Southeast Asia regionalism. It shows two-way interactions between international society and Indonesia:

uncovering Indonesia's understandings of international society and the ways in which these understandings have been gathered into intelligible patterns, traditions, or ideologies in foreign policy behaviour at regional level. The focus on Indonesia's role in shaping the primary institutions and institutionalisation of the secondary institutions may also help to explain some open questions in the existing literature of Indonesia's foreign policy in Southeast Asia regionalism, such as why domestic function explanations seem to work well in some cases but less so in other cases.[5] The approach also provides an explanation as to why Indonesia continues to prioritise the Southeast Asia region as the first concentric circle in Indonesia's foreign policy despite disappointment from the domestic public and also noted by strategic thinkers that ASEAN has become an impediment to Indonesia's progression from a regional power to becoming a major player on the global stage.[6] A focus on Indonesia's role in shaping the primary and secondary institutions can also disclose the basic elements of continuity in Indonesia's foreign policy despite major changes in domestic political system and leadership — the desire to promote norms and values that would allow Indonesia and other countries in the region to achieve autonomy in their own region rather than merely following the direction of the more powerful states. From this perspective, Indonesia's foreign policy in Southeast Asia regionalism is not gauged through the prism of power but how Indonesia recorded success promoting sociability and society of states in Southeast Asia and managing threats from the

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[5] Ralf Emmers, 'Indonesia's Role in ASEAN: A Case of Incomplete and Sectorial Leadership', *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2014, pp. 543–562; See Seng Tan, 'Indonesia Among the Powers: Will ASEAN Still Matter to Indonesia', in Christopher B. Robert, Ahmad D Habir, and Leonard Sebastian (eds.), *Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and The Regional Order,* Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2015, pp. 287-307; Linda Quayle, 'Power and Paradox: Indonesia and the 'English School' Concept of Great Powers,' *International Relations of the Asia Pacific,* Vol. 13, No. 2, 2013, pp. 301-330; Linda Quayle, 'Indonesia, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, and the Contingent Profile of Regional 'Great-Power Management,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 31, Issue 2, 2018, pp.131–150; I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana, 'International Society: The Social Dimension of Indonesia Foreign Policy,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 29, No. 5, 2016, pp. 741–759; Felix Heiduk, 'Indonesia in ASEAN: Regional Leadership between Ambition and Ambiguity,' *SWP Reseacrh Paper*, RP. 6, Berlin, April 2016.

[6] Rizal Sukma, 'Indonesia Needs a Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy,' *The Jakarta Post*, 30 June 2009; Rizal Sukma, 'Insight: Without unity, no centrality', *The Jakarta Post*, 17 July 2012; Jusuf Wanandi, ''Indonesia's Foreign Policy and the Meaning of ASEAN', *PacNet* No. 27, 15 May 2008; Rizal Sukma, 'A Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy for a Post-G8 World,' *The Jakarta Post*, October 5, 2009; Barry Desker, 'Is Indonesia Outgrowing ASEAN?' *RSIS Commentaries*, No. 125, September 29, 2010.

external environment to achieve regional security and stability, while also becomes a significant party and achieve self- respect from its regional counterparts. That said, Indonesia's long-standing concern for regional stability, security and autonomy has not changed. This raises the possibility that Indonesia is unlikely to alter its reliance on the relevance of the primary and secondary institutions of the Southeast Asian regional international society.

Despite stating positive contributions, this thesis has also acknowledged the limitations. For example, the framework and the analysis are somewhat complex, as it utilises a multilayered approach that makes empirical substantiation challenging. However, by analysing Indonesia's role in the development and maintenance of regional primary and secondary institutions, the merits of Indonesia's foreign policy on Southeast Asia regionalism are revealed.

Empirically, this thesis represents a small beginning in the task of more fully assessing Indonesia's agency in the context of Southeast Asian regional international society. More research on more case studies that capture the social practices of Indonesia's foreign policy in general and in Southeast Asia in particular are needed to continue the analysis and understanding of the dynamics of foreign policy and the domestic or foreign influences that drives it. What already seems clear, however, is that beyond utilitarian and functional interests, Indonesia has conceived broad national interests that incorporate maintaining regional international society to achieve regional order and in return it will result in the uttermost prospect for its survival, its security as well as social recognition for its regional leadership.

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Interviews

Prof. Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, interview, Jakarta, 8 January 2018.

Dr. Yanyan Ganda Hayat Mulyana, interview, Jakarta 30 January 2019.

Khasan Ashari, interview, 30 January 2019.

Dr. Moch Faisal Karim, interview, Jakarta 13 February 2019.

Anonymous academician, interview, Jakarta, 13 February 2019.

Dr. Ganewati Wuryandari interview, Jakarta, 15 February 2019.

APPENDIX A : RESEARCH ETHICS

APPROVAL NOTICE

Project No.:	8147		
Project Title:	Indonesia's Foreign Policy and the Making of Regional and Sub-Global International Society		
Principal Researcher:	Mr Aryanta Nugraha Nugraha		
Email:	arya0014@flinders.edu.au		
Approval Date:	12 September 2018	Ethics Approval Expiry Date:	19 March 2022

The above proposed project has been **approved** on the basis of the information contained in the application, its attachments and the information subsequently provided.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF RESEARCHERS AND SUPERVISORS

1. Participant Documentation

Please note that it is the responsibility of researchers and supervisors, in the case of student projects, to ensure that:

- all participant documents are checked for spelling, grammatical, numbering and formatting errors. The Committee does not accept any responsibility for the above mentioned errors.
- the Flinders University logo is included on all participant documentation (e.g., letters of Introduction, information Sheets, consent forms, debriefing information and questionnaires – with the exception of purchased research tools) and the current Flinders University letterhead is included in the header of all letters of introduction. The Flinders University international logo/letterhead should be used and documentation should contain international dialling codes for all telephone and fax numbers listed for all research to be conducted overseas.
- the SBREC contact details, listed below, are included in the footer of all letters of introduction and information sheets.

This research project has been approved by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee (Project Number 'INSERT PROJECT No. here following approval'). For more information regarding ethical approval of the project the Executive Officer of the Committee can be contacted by telephone on 8201 3116, by fax on 8201 2035 or by email human.researchethics@flinders.edu.au.

2. Annual Progress / Final Reports

In order to comply with the monitoring requirements of the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (March 2007)* an annual progress report must be submitted each year on the (approval anniversary date) for the duration of the ethics approval using the report template available from the Managing Your Ethics Approval SBREC web page. *Please retain this notice for reference when completing annual progress or final reports.*

If the project is completed *before* ethics approval has expired please ensure a final report is submitted immediately. If ethics approval for your project expires please submit either (1) a final report; or (2) an extension of time request and an annual report.

<u>Student Projects</u>
The SBREC recommends that current ethics approval is maintained until a student's thesis has been submitted, reviewed and approved. This is to protect the student in the event that reviewers recommend some changes that may include the collection of additional participant data.

Your first report is due on or on completion of the project, whichever is the earliest.

3. **Modifications to Project**
   Modifications to the project must not proceed until approval has been obtained from the Ethics Committee. Such proposed changes / modifications include:
   - change of project title;
   - change to research team (e.g., additions, removals, principal researcher or supervisor change);
   - changes to research objectives;
   - changes to research protocol;
   - changes to participant recruitment methods;
   - changes / additions to source(s) of participants;
   - changes of procedures used to seek informed consent;
   - changes to reimbursements provided to participants;
   - changes / additions to information and/or documentation to be provided to potential participants;
   - changes to research tools (e.g., questionnaire, interview questions, focus group questions);
   - extensions of time.

   To notify the Committee of any proposed modifications to the project please complete and submit the *Modification Request Form* which is available from the Managing Your Ethics Approval SBREC web page. Download the form from the website every time a new modification request is submitted to ensure that the most recent form is used. Please note that extension of time requests should be submitted <u>prior</u> to the Ethics Approval Expiry Date listed on this notice.
   <u>Change of Contact Details</u>
   Please ensure that you notify the Committee if either your mailing or email address changes to ensure that correspondence relating to this project can be sent to you. A modification request is not required to change your contact details.

4. **Adverse Events and/or Complaints**
   Researchers should advise the Executive Officer of the Ethics Committee on 08 8201-3116 or human.researchethics@flinders.edu.au immediately if:
   - any complaints regarding the research are received;
   - a serious or unexpected adverse event occurs that effects participants;
   - an unforeseen event occurs that may affect the ethical acceptability of the project.