Indonesian Women's Involvement in Islamist Movements: From *Da'wa* To Women's Empowerment

by

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ABSTRACT

This original fieldwork study investigates the participation of Indonesian women in the Islamist movements Hizbut Tahir and WI in terms of their motives, objectives, challenges, and the pursuit of social change. A qualitative inquiry involving in-depth one to one interviews, observation, and analysis of literature was conducted with the both male and female members of HTI and WI in Makassar. Data analysis was guided by thematic analysis, and piety politics and a women's empowerment framework were used to analyse the data. Research findings show that there are a variety of incentives, benefits, and challenges which Islamist women have and face. HTI and WI women believe that what they do is a form of embodiment of religious observance or worship to God, as they conduct *da'wa* which is believed to be God's project. *Da'wa* based on collected information, can be divided into two categories: personal and public *da'wa.* the former is to transform selves into a pious individual, while the latter is work that engages individuals in the true faith and orientates to create a transformation of Islamic social order. It is the contention of this research that such *da'wa* activities carried out by women in HTI and WI to reform themselves and society has made a direct and significant contribution to the women's empowerment.

DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate, without acknowledgment, any material previously submitted for a degree or a diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMI	Angkatan Mujahidin Indonesia-the Jihad Fighters Group of Indonesia
BPUPKI	Badan Penyidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia-Commission of Inquiry into Preparatory Measures for Indonesian Independence
DDII	Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia-Indonesian Islamic Predication Council
FPI	Front Pembela Islam - Islamic Defence Front
GOLKAR	Golangan Karya-Functionalist Group
GERWANI	Gerakan Wanita Indonesia-Indonesian Women's Movement
GERWIS	Gerakan Perempuan Sedar-Sedar Women's Movement
GBHN	Garis-Garis Besra Haluan Negara-Broad Oulines of State Direction
HT	Hizb ut Tahrir - Party of Liberation
HTI	HTI-Indonesian Party of Liberation
ITB	Institut Teknologi Bandung-Bandung Institute of Technology
ICMI	Ikatan Cendikiwan Muslim Indonesia-Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals
JI	Jamaah Islamiyah- Islamic Unity
JIL	Jaringan Islam Liberal-Liberal Islam Network
KOMNAS	Komisi Nasional - National Commission
KTI	Kawasan Timur Indonesia-Indonesian Eastern Region
KWI	Kongres Wanita Indonesia-Indonesian Women's Congress
LJ	Lasykar Jihad - Jihad Troops
LIPIA	Lembaga Ilmudan Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab-Institute for Islamic and Arabic Sciences
MHTI	Muslimah HTI-Women's Indonesian Party of Liberation

MWI	Muslimah WI-Women's Unity of Islam
Masyumi	Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia-the Consultative Assembly of Indonesia Muslim
NU	Nahdhatul Ulama- Ulama's Revival
PAS	Partai Islam SeMalaysia-Malaysian Islamic Party
PNI	Partai National Indonesia-Indonesian Nationalist Party
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia-Communist Party of Indonesia
Parmusi	Partai Muslim Indonesia-Indonesian Muslim Party
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan-United Development Party
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Indonesian Democratic Party
PERSIS	Persatuan Indonesia-Islamic Association
PERWARI	Persatuan Wanita Indonesia-Indonesian Women's Association
PKK	Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga- Program of Family Well-Being
PERDA	Peraturan Daerah-Regional Regulations
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera-Prosperous Justice Party
TI	Tabligh-I Jama'at- Islamic Community for spreading faith
UIN	Universitas Islam Negeri-State Islamic University
UGM	Universitas Gadjah Mada-Gadjah Mada University
UNHAS	Universitas Hasanuddin-Hasanuddin University
WI	WI - the Unity of Islam

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Al-qa'idah al-fikriyah	Basis of thinking
Aqidah	Islamic creed
Amr' ma'ruf nahi mungkar	Enjoining goodness and forbidding badness
Akhi	Brother
Aurat	Part of body which should be covered
Cadar	Long headscarf covering body and face
Da'wa	Promulgation
Dai	Male preacher
Daiyyah	Female preacher
Fikri	Ideas
Ghazwu ats-tsaqafi wal fikr	Battle for Civilisation and Thinking
Halaqa	Study circle
Hadhanah	Custody
Jilbab	Hijab
Islam Rahmatan Lil Alamin	Islam as mercy for earth
Ibuism	A concept referring to domestication of Indonesian women as dependent wives who exist for their husbands, their families, and the state
Kaffa	Comprehensive
Mabda	God-made ideology
Mushrifah	Female mentor or supervisor
Mushrif	Male mentor or supervisor
Muhrim	Chaperons consisting on father, mother, brothers, sisters, children, nephews, nieces, uncles, aunts.
Murabbi	Male teacher

Murabbiyah	Female teacher
Pancasila	Five pillar of the Indonesian state
Radaha'ah	Breast-feeding
Reformasi era	A period after Suharto's v
Thariqoh)	Methods
Tabliqh Akbar	Great teaching session
Salaf as-Salih	Pious ancestors (specifically the first generations known as the *Sahabah, Tabi'un* and *Tabi' al-Tabi'in* respectively)
Ummu wa rabbul baith	Housewives
Ukhti	Sister
Ummah	Islamic community
Ulama	Islamic Scholars
Wiladah	Delivery

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines women's involvement in two Islamist movements: Wahdah Islamiyah (the Unity of Islam, WI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Indonesian Party of Liberation, HTI), in terms of why and how women get involved, how do they benefit and the challenges they face. Most pertinent here is the question of whether women's engagement results in their empowerment or disempowerment. My personal interest in this issue arose from my personal experience of Islamist organisations through the membership of two female members of my family. I have three brothers and one sister, we grew up within Islamic traditions introduced by the Islamic organisation, Nahdahtul Ulama (NU) appreciating local culture and traditions. For example, we used to commemorate the birth of the prophet Muhammad, which is known as *Maulid*, or read a book containing story of the prophet Muhammad, which is known *Barazanji*, in special traditional events where Muslims offer thanks to God. In 1998 when my sister was in high school, she began to take an interest in WI's activities and wanted to get involved, at that point this was not a fully committed, serious endeavour for her. But in 2001, my sister enrolled in the Medical Faculty at Hasanuddin University (Universitas Hasanuddin, UNHAS) in Makassar where she met female activists of WI and she decided to join the organisation. Consequently, she had a different understanding and practice of Islam than the rest of the family. Feeling confident in her new religious knowledge, she was brave enough to criticise our father, when reading *Barazanji* on a special occasion, by telling him that such rituals are unacceptable religious innovation (*bid'ah)*, having never been practiced by the prophet Muhammad and his companions. Her change in attitude was also reflected through her unwillingness to shake hands with male relatives outside of the immediate family such as father, brothers, and uncles, and she would wear the hijab when extended family or other visitors came to our house. This behaviour made our mother surprised

and angry who considered her daughter's attitude culturally impolite, because it did not respect the family and embarrassed her in front of extended family members. But my sister argued that shaking hands with extended family or others had no religious obligation. Likewise, she was reluctant to be a member of the congregation *(makmum*) when I, as a cleric (*imam*), led prayers at the mosque since, according to her, I am a liberal, studying philosophy. Philosophy for her is not compatible with Islam. One day I accidentally found her diary where she stated that she felt more comfortable and calmer with her sisters (*ukhti*) in WI than with us. Suddenly, I was wondering how could feel like that? How could a strong family bond established over time suddenly be seized by organisational affiliation? How did WI indoctrinate my sister to having such feelings? These were just some of my questions at the time.

My sister's change in behaviour really surprised us and made us wonder what was going on with her? After my sister graduated from UNHAS and reached an age to marry, our mother looked for a potential husband for her. She eventually found a man who is a lecturer in Islamic university in Gorontalo province and also my brother's colleague. The man had no affiliation with any Islamist groups. Conflict again took place between our mother and my sister, as she did not agree with our mother's choice. Actually, my sister had a prospective spouse who was a member of WI. But due to our mother's persistence, eventually she was obliged to accept our mother's decision but made two requests: there would be no traditional reading *Barazanji,* as was customary the afternoon before the bridal party and that the bride and groom and male and female guest should be segregated with a curtain. After considerable discussion, our mother denied the first request and agreed to the second. My sister married in 2004 and she followed her husband living in Gorontalo province until now. She is still member of WI, but not active anymore and her husband is not concerned about his wife's involvement.

In 2012, I returned from Australia after finishing my Master's degree at Flinders University, I was surprised by a change in our mother's appearance as she had begun to wear a

long headscarf *(jilbab*). Apparently, our mother who had battled with my sister over her association with WI had become interested in joining WI's religious meetings (*pengajian)*. These meetings take place regularly in homes which are offered by participants and WI women wearing the *cadar* (long headscarf which covering women's body including their face) act as teachers or preachers. Although our mother is not a member of WI, she often attends WI's *pengajian* and our parents' house is sometime used for *pengajian*. This offered a certain familiarity with WI but I still had little knowledge about what exactly WI' women do, why they want to do it, how women equip themselves so as to be able to teach Islamic, teaching including teaching female participants to recite al Qur'an, and why no men attend their *pengajian*. Based on my existing knowledge that women who wear the *cadar*, commonly stay at home but this was not the case with WI women. They are active outside the home, acting as preachers or educators. Many questions were raised for me after my experience with respect to the women in my family which prompted me to investigate women's involvement in Islamist movements by conducting fieldwork research and undertaking a PhD on the subject.

Before embarking on further postgraduate study, I read several related works and found that the phenomenon of women's active involvement in Islamist movements was both significant and fundamentally under researched. Moreover, there is an ongoing debatable about whether such participation merely perpetuates male domination over women. This is still relevant question, given the fact that Islamist movements remain male-dominated organisations, with seclusion between men and women, women's obligation to wear hijab, complementarity in gender relations, and a defined gender division of labour. Omayma Abdellatif and Marina Ottaway conclude that some scholars and women's organisations believe that women in Islamist movement in the Arab world, experience oppression, discrimination and their rights are violated. One reason for this contention is the belief that Islamist women always wear a hijab and it is evidence of women's

subjugation.[1] Marieme Hélie-Lucas, Co-founder of organizations of Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML)[2], says:

> To impose a veil on a minor is, strictly speaking, to violate her, to use her body, to define it as a sexual object for men... The shame of inhabiting a body full of shame, a veiled body, the anguish of inhabiting a body full of guilt, guilty of existing... Far from representing a 'return to tradition,' the 'Islamic dress' has no ground in most of our cultures: it largely kills them.[3]

Other scholars, however, argue that Islamist women do not experience oppression, for example, they have central roles in Islamist movements, so their position is dynamic.[4] Even Abdellatif and Ottaway detect that in Lebanon, Egypt, and Morocco, Islamist women contribute not only to the fulfilment of organization's objectives but also, they begin to question women's rights, quality of life and even demand a place in organisation's leadership.[5]

In the Indonesian context, according to Pieternella van Doorn-Harder, women's movements can be categorised into three streams: secular, Islamic, and Islamist. Secular feminism is a women's movement that is not underpinned by religion references. It addresses issues of women's discrimination, oppression, and injustice. It advocates women's rights and gender equality. Islamic feminism is a women's movement combining both religious perspectives and

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[1] Omayma Abdellatif and Marina Ottaway, 'Toward an Islamist Model of Women's Activism', *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, number 2, June 2007, pp. 2-3

[2] Nine women from Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Iran, Mauritius, Tanzania, Bangladesh and Pakistan were agreed to establish WLUML in 1984. WLUML is an 'international solidarity network providing information, support and a collective space for women whose lives are shaped, conditioned or governed by laws and customs said to derive from Islam.' Further information about the WLUML, see its official website which is available online in http://www.wluml.org/node/5408, accessed on 14 January 2019

[3] Omayma Abdellatif and Marina Ottaway, *Op. Cit.*, p. 4

[4] *Ibid.*, p., 5

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 1. Compared to Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, Indonesian Muslim women have for some time assumed public roles, enjoying better social and political positions. They have played a pivotal role in the fight for Indonesian independence which will be explored in the next chapter. In contrast, women in Arab Saudi remain tied by certain restrictions in the economic and political arenas in which purdah is enforced. For further reading, see Mirjam Lucking and Evi Eliyanah, 'Images of Authentic Selves: Gendered Moralities and Constructions of Arab Others in Contemporary Indonesia', in *Social Science article*, 6, 103, 2017, pp. 10-13, and Yusuf Sidani, 'Women, Work, and Islam in Arab Societies', in *Women in Management Review*, Vol.2, No. 7, 2005, p. 500

"secular ideas", in the sense that ideas comes from outside Islamic tradition and texts.[6] In other words, Islamic feminism seeks to combine Islamic principles with ideas of feminism-gender and human rights.[7] Furthermore, she says that Islamic feminism tries to reinterpret Islamic sources in the light of both a gender-sensitive paradigm and Islamic studies combined with 'secular' sciences such as sociology, anthropology, psychology, history, and medicine.[8] Like secular feminism, Islamic feminism also struggles for promoting 'gender sensitivity' and induce awareness of existing gender bias as well as ideas of gender equality and social justice'.[9] By contrast, Islamist feminism, is a women's movement recognising male privilege and tending to argue that women and men have complementary, rather than equal roles in society.[10]

Representation of each of the above standpoints can be traced back to the Suharto era which was known as the New Order (*Orde Baru*) in the 1980s onwards. Secular feminism was commonly represented by Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) such as Women's Solidarity (Solidaritas Perempuan in Jakarta), Women's Mardika Foundation (Yayasan Perempuan Mardikain Jakarta); Centre of Improvement of Women's Resources (Pusata Pengembangan Sumberdaya Perempuan, PPSW in Jakarta); Women's Association for Justice (Asosiasi Perempuan untuk Keadilan,APIK in Jakarta); Study Centre for Women's and Children's Improvement (Lembaga Studi Pengembangan Perempuan dan Anak, in Yogyakarta); and Group of Gender Workers of the Eastern Network (Kelompok Kerja Gender Jaringan Timur) .[11] Islamic feminism was represented by Muslim women's organisations that were wings of NU and Muhammadiyah: Muslimat NU and

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[6] Pieternella van Doorn-Harder, *Women Shaping Islam: Reading the Qur'an in Indonesia*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 2004, p. 7

[7] Parvanova, Dayana, 'Islamic Feminist Activism in Indonesia', in *Austrian Studies in Anthropology Sondernummer,* No. 1 / 2012 (ISSN 1815-3704), p. 11

[8] Pieternella van Doorn-Harder, *Op. Cit*., p. 8

[9] Parvanova, Dayana, *Op. Cit*., p. 23

[10] Pieternella van Doorn-Harder, *Op. Cit*., pp. 7-8

[11] Tyas Retno Wulan, 'Pemetaan Gerakan Perempuan di Indonesia dan Implikasinya terhadap Penguatan Public Sphere di Pedesaan (Mapping out Women's Movement in Indonesia and Its Implication toward Publis Sphere's Strengthen in Village)', *Jurnal Studi Gender dan Anak*, Vol. 3, No. 1, January-June 2008, pp. 4-5

Aisyiyah,[12] although both groups existed before Indonesian independence. This orientation was also supported through the establishment of women's studies centres in Islamic universities in the 1990s. For example, Women's Studies Centre of State Islamic Religion Institution, Lampung province (Pusat Studi Wanita, PSW IAIN), which was formed in 1997, aims to uphold the rights of women and men, to create gender justice and equality, and to promote equal recognition and appreciation for both women and men.[13] Meantime, Islamist feminism was epitomized by *da'wa* (proselytisation) movements which were centred on secular campuses such as Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung, ITB). This movement consisted on different variants including HTI, Darul Arqam, and Tarbiyah (education). For example, Tarbiyah which has been inspired by religious movements in the Middle East, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, has reformed religious understanding and knowledge self-representing as the united force of *ummah* (Islamic community). Examples of religious reform was to suggest Muslim women wear the hijab and segregation between men and women.[14]

Under Suharto's authoritarian regime, women's movements had little freedom to move and even campus-based Islamist movements operated clandestinely. This was because Suharto stipulated that there should be a "normalisation of campus life" (*normalisasi kehidupan kampus*). This aimed to eliminate political activities across campuses through a series of restrictions on student organisation.[15] However, after Suharto's downfall, which was known as the *reformasi era*, the alteration of socio-political and religious opportunities paved the way for the clandestine

[12] Although operating under male-dominated organisation, both groups understand that women are entitled 'to interpret Islamic teachings. See Saskia E Wieringa, 'Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists' Discourses', *Signs*, Vol. 32, No. 1, Autumn 2006a, p. 5

[13] Pusat Stude Wanita, available in its official website, https://metrouniv.ac.id/?page=konten&&cur=c01b93b12b1d1d81632067c9da1f3cb4, accessed on 24 June 2019

[14] Diah Ariani Arimbi, 'Politicizing Piety: Women's Rights and Roles in the Tarbiyah Movement in Indonesia', in *Religious Studies and Theology,* RST 36.2, 2017, pp.228-230

[15] Porter, Donald J., *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia*, Routledge Curzon, London, 2002, p. 2

Islamist movements, which began publicly promulgating its faith and ideology. Islamic aspirations in the public domain have been channelled through a variety of means such as the establishment of Islamist parties, of forums calling for the formalization of Islamic sharia, and the proliferation of Islamist organisations such as Lasykar Jihad (Jihad Troops), Front Pembela Islam (FPI, or Islamic Defence Front), Hizb ut Tahrir (Party of Liberation), Angkatan Mujahidin Indonesia (the Jihad Fighters Group of Indonesia)[16] and WI (WI, the Unity of Islam).

Likewise, this atmosphere of freedom prompted the emergence of women's activism and participation at various levels in society. Women's active role proliferated, their voices have been raised and are more critical than in the past. This was marked by state recognition of women's rights. Through Presidential Decree No. 181/1998, BJ Habibie, the third president after Suharto, formed the National Commission on Violence against Women (*Komisi Nasional Anti kekerasan terhadap Perempuan*, Komnas Perempuan). The Commission aims to eradicate violence against women and to ensure the absence of discriminatory policies that have the potential to violate women's rights. Women's activism has been successful in urging the government to enact policies to ensure women's rights. Eventually, in 2004, the Regulation for the Elimination of Violence in Households (*Undang-undang Penghapusan Kekerasan dalam Rumah Tangga*, KDRT) was enacted.[17] At the level of non-government women's organisations, the proliferation of women's secular, Islamic, and Islamist groups throughout Indonesia, had taken place. For example, in Bone, South Sulawesi, there was secular group; the Women's Empowerment Organisation (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Perempuan, LPP) which focusses its activities on women's political education. Women's Voice (Suara Perempuan), established in Manado, North Sulawesi, addresses voting

[16] Azyumardi Azra, 'Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia', in Virginia Hooker and Amin Saikal (eds.), *Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), pp. 133-34.

[17] Neng Dara Affiah, Gerakan Perempuan di Era Reformasi: Capaian dan Tantangan (Women's Movement in Reformasi Era: Achievements and Challenges, available in http://www.komnasperempuan.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/GERAKAN-PEREMPUAN-DI-ERA-REFORMASI_Neng-Dara-Affiah-21-April-2014.pdf, accessed on 26 April 2016

education for women, and has formed women's learning parks for mothers living in Timoho and Bajo.[18] Islamic feminism was, for example, represented by Rahima which was formed on 5 August 2000 in Jakarta, as an NGO addressing women's empowerment from an Islamic perspective. In its early work, Rahima's program of critical education and providing information on women's rights was confined to the Islamic boarding school *(pesantren*)'s neighbourhoods. In response to demand, Rahima extended its program's scope, reaching a variety of groups outside the *pesantren,* including local schools, teachers in both Islamic and non-Islamic schools, Islamic study groups, Muslim women's organisations, and student organisation.[19]

The *Reformasi* era, therefore, was marked by the ongoing contestation between the feminist and gender orientated groups, and the anti-feminist and anti-gender groups. Neng Dara Affiah argues that the current women's movement meets the paradoxical condition between the establishment of women's rights, and the abolition of these, through the perpetuation of women's discrimination in the name of religion and culture.[20] This anxiety makes sense, as Islamist women's movements, as mentioned above, believe women's principal roles as mothers and wives whose tasks are confined to the domestic realm. Regarding women's sexuality in marriage, they argue that married women must serve their husbands sexually[21] and reject feminism and a gender specific agenda.

In the Indonesian context, there are some reasons, therefore, why the participation of women in the organization of Islamist movements appears as an important issue to be taken into

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[18] Neng Dara Affiah, Gerakan Perempuan di Era Reformasi: Capaian dan Tantangan (Women's Movement in Reformasi Era: Achievements and Challenges, available online: http://www.komnasperempuan.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/GERAKAN-PEREMPUAN-DI-ERA-REFORMASI_Neng-Dara-Affiah-21-April-2014.pdf, (viewed: 26 April 2016), pp. 4-5

[19] See Rahima's official website: http://www.asienhaus.de/public/archiv/PaperPERDASHARIA.pdf, accessed on 27 February 2017.

[20] Neng Dara Affiah, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 9-10. See also Saskia E Wieringa, 'Women Resisting Creeping Islamic Fundamentalism in Indonesia', in *Journal for Women in Culture and Society*, Vol. 32, No. 1, Autumn 2006b, p. 21

[21] Saskia E Wieringa, 2006b, *Ibid.*, p. 21

account; firstly, generally speaking, it seems to me that there is a somewhat puzzling view of the fact that Islamist women's movements strictly reject feminism and gender specific agendas when they are part of the Western hegemonic project.[22] The ideas of justice, equality, and gender are viewed as a further conspiracy of the West to dismantle Islamic civilization. This conspiracy can be clearly seen through its programs such as those that focus on women's empowerment which 'challenge' male leadership in the family and society as well as eliminate mothers' pivotal role in creating the excellent Muslim generation.[23] This is because through women's empowerment, many women, particularly mothers, go outside of their homes to work in public areas and earn an income. As a result, they leave their primary responsibilities at home as mothers and the principal educators of their children.[24] But on the other hand, Islamist women are very active publicly such as taking part in previously male-defined spheres like *da'wa (*proselytisation or preaching of Islam) activities and street demonstrations. Moreover, both HTI and WI have women's sections in their organizations. Secondly, in the Indonesian context, although there have been many works regarding Islamist movements as well as Islam and gender, there is still very little study which focuses on women's actual involvement in Islamist movements. In fact, women play a significant and pivotal role in supporting Islamist agendas and in the recruitment process.[25] Due to the dearth of academic and other work in this area, this research proposes to make a distinctive contribution to the literature on Islamist movements, with respect to women's participation in particular and the women's movement in general. Thirdly, still related to the discourse of women's participation in Islamist movement in Indonesia, the pre-existing literature tends to view Islamist women's

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[22] Manneke Budiman, 'Treading the Path of the Shari'a: Indonesian feminism at the Crossroads of Western Modernity and Islamism', in *Journal of Indonesia Social Science and Humanities*, Vol. I, 2008, pp. 73-93

[23] Triantini, Zusiana Elly, Terpinggirkan di Tengah Perjuangan: Studi terhadap Peran Politik Perempuan HTI (Marginalized in the Middle of Struggle: Study on Political Role of Women in HTI), p., 49, available in http://www.scribd.com/doc/26537745/Peran-Politik-Perempuan-Hizbut-Tahrir-Indonesia, accessed at 9 February 2016.

[24] Triantini, Zusiana Elly, Terpinggirkan di Tengah Perjuangan:, p., 49

[25] Eva Nisa F. '*Cadari* of WI: Women as Dedicated Actors of Ultra-Conservatism,' in *Intersection: Gender and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific Issue*, November 2012, and see also Rachel Rinaldo, *Mobilizing Piety: Islam and Feminism in Indonesia*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013)

activism as a predominant obstacle to improvements in women's lives and the furtherance of women's rights. This is also one of the intellectual gaps that I wish to help fill by conducting research on the participation of women in Islamist movements.

Aim of the Thesis

This thesis aims to critically explore women's involvement in Islamist movements by focusing on two Islamist organisations which operate in Makassar, South Sulawesi: HTI whose women's wing is called as Muslimah HTI (Women's Division of HTI, MHTI), as well as WI whose women's wing is called as Muslimah WI (Women's Division of WI, MWI). In particular, this thesis seeks to understand why these women join in Islamist movements, the way in which they participate, and the constraints they deal with. It identifies advantages and challenges women gain and face during their participation. The views of male members are also considered with respect to the active involvement of their female counterparts. Furthermore, this thesis aims to investigate the presence of forms of women's empowerment within women's involvement in both organisations.

Significance of the Study

The research will contribute to enriching the literature on Islamist movements with respect to women's participation. In the Indonesian context, although there have been many works regarding Islamist movements, there is still very little study which focuses on women's actual involvement in Islamist movements. In fact, women have a significant role in supporting Islamist agendas and in the recruitment process. The research will offer more empathetic and comprehensive ways to understand the phenomenon of women's participation in Islamist movements. By using piety politics as a theoretical framework in analysing the collected information, this research wants to point out that women's involvement is grounded in religious consciousness or realisation to being true Muslim. The research also will contribute to enrich variable in measuring women's empowerment by considering religious factors.

Research Methodology

This project is a qualitative research. This design is deemed to be appropriate to explore the issue of women's participation in Islamist groups, rather than mainly to rely on accounts documented in literatures or on results of previous studies. Furthermore, this research may obtain comprehensive and detailed understandings about the issue by direct conversation with informants, allowing them to express what they think and feel.[26] Fieldwork was undertaken from May to October 2016 in Makassar, South Sulawesi[27], Indonesia. Makassar is the capital city, which has a strategic socio-economic importance. The province is geographically located in the middle of the Indonesian archipelago, and, as the capital city, Makassar is a main gateway to the Indonesian Eastern Region (*Kawasan Timur Indonesia, KTI*), and central to one of the main international shipping lanes.[28]

This research employs case study methodology, focusing on two Islamist movements that operate in Indonesia: WI (WI, Unite of Islam) and HTI (HTI, Liberation Party of Indonesia). HTI is a transnational Islamist movement which was born in Jerusalem. It was landed to Indonesia, specifically in West Java in the 1980an through Australia. It has a women's wing which is known as Muslimah HTI (MHTI). HTI/MHTI operated throughout Indonesia and its branches also existed in South Sulawesi province. MHTI at level province does not need to have coordination with its male administration, but it must be responsible directly to the centre of the women's wing in Jakarta, capital city of Indonesia. Although HTI is a transnational Islamist organisation, it still is concerned with national and local issue taking place in Indonesia such as responding the increased price of oil. Meantime, WI is a local Islamist movement emerged from community aspirations in Makassar. It also has a women's wing although it remains under the control of male dominated

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[26] John W Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, London, Sage Publication Ltd., 2007, pp. 39-40

[27] The province is in the South of Sulawesi archipelago, with an area around 46.000 km2. It consists of 21 districts, 3 cities, 304 sub-districts, and 2.953 villages. See LKJ SULSEL, 2014, available in https://sulselprov.go.id/upload/files/580f7d18ec4a4.pdf, accessed on 25 March 2017, p., 1

[28] LKJ SULSEL, p., 1

administrative structure. WI addresses both national and international issues such as the call for independence for Palestine from Israeli's attacks.

Fieldwork research with respect to women's involvement in Islamist movements was very challenging. Firstly, there is a regulation in Islamist movements including in WI and HTI that men and women are segregated so I must be accompanied by a female chaperone (*muhrim*) when carrying out interviews with female informants. Moreover, that woman would need to be a close relative rather than a stranger to conform to Islamist principals and expectations. Thus, my wife agreed to accompany me in my fieldwork which facilitated my access and contact with women in Islamist organisations. Thus, wherever I went to do interviews, my wife accompanied me, including when I went to Jakarta, capital city of Indonesia, to attend the third Islamic Conference of WI. Although, I am an Indonesian Muslim, both organisations were suspicious of me some believing I might be a 'spy' or a 'Western agent', as I was undertaking my postgraduate study in a Western country. Likewise, obtaining the permission of the organsaitions to do my research was difficult especially due to the fact that my research is predominantly about women and I am a male person. In the case of WI, it took around a month and half to get permission and cultivate trust. To do so, I strategized. Firstly, I obtained help from a colleague at my State Islamic University where I am a lecturer. My colleague has a close relationship with WI, because he has conducted research about WI and has written several books on the subject. WI itself often asks his advice and recommends his books to those who want to know history and political development of WI. Through my colleague, I got the phone number of some male elites of WI. Secondly, I often went to the WI mosque which is connected to its office building to Friday's prayer. I did it to become a familiar presence, mingling with WI activists. Thirdly, when I introduced myself, I would often mention that I have a sister and female cousin who are members of WI and that my parents' house was quite often used to WI's *pengajian.* These strategies worked, and eventually I gained permission and trust. I was even allowed to attend WI's third Islamic Conference in Jakarta and

carry out interviews there. In the last meeting with leader of Women's division of WI, Ummu Khalid apologised to us for the delay in granting permissions, saying that they needed time to investigate not only myself but also my wife. This was deemed necessary because there had been attempts in the past to infiltrate the movement. For example, a person who feigned interest in joining WI, but was, in fact, a police officer who had been assigned to collect information about WI's activities.

Meantime in HTI's case, I needed about three weeks to get permission from the women's division, as they had to first coordinate this with the central women's division in Jakarta. The challenges I faced were that HTI has a rule that the only person who can speak to people outside of the organisation is the appointed spokesman and spokeswoman. HTI also is more exclusive than WI as reflected from one of its members saying to me that 'HTI cannot be treated as an object of research'.[29] But the spokesman of HTI in Makassar, advised me to get involved in HTI's meetings or events in order to be able to get informants, and his suggestion worked, although respondents I obtained through these contacts were not many. Thus, I had to be proactive to search for information about upcoming religious meetings and events. HTI interviewees were really enthusiastic if they were asked to discuss their ideological and religious views, as they want to convince other people that what they believe is the only true understanding of Islam and others should follow their pathway. Fortunately, my educational background is based on Islamic study so that I find it easy to discuss with HTI members and obtain significant narratives.

[29] Interview with Budi (name changed to protect identity), an activist of HTI's *da'wa*, on 15 August 2016

Data Collection

To collect data, I used the method of triangulation: unstructured interview; observation; and analysis of Islamist literature. For WI, I interviewed five male key figures and fifteen females. Most of them are *da'wa* activists as well as holding a position in the organisation's administration, and some are only *da'wa* activists without holding responsibility in the organisation's structure. Some interviews were undertaken in Makassar and others in Jakarta, when *Muktamar* III (Islamic Conference III) was held from 17 July to 20 July 2016 in Jakarta. For HTI, I interviewed five females and four male members which consist of activists of *da'wa* and caretakers of the organisation. Most of the HTI respondents' names have been changed to protect their identity, except its spokesman and spokeswoman. I found that there was a uniformity in the way of thinking from HTI's informants. This is more likely to be caused by the mode of indoctrination, in which a potential cadre must learn HTI's specific books written by its founder, Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, under a senior's supervisory. Issues I discussed with female respondents about their motives, ways to participate in the group, challenges, and benefits that they get after joining. I was also concerned with their view with respect to a set of women's restrictions. Meanwhile, for male informants I focused more on their insights about women's presence in the organisation, whether women's involvement brings positive impacts to the development of organisation. I also asked about domestic consequences, when women should go public, leaving their homes, as the group holds belief that women's main role is in the home.

Second method to collect data is observation. Observation is crucial to an effective understanding of both the political activities and the political actors as much as possible from their own perspective and the rationale of the activities in specific situations. Furthermore, participant observation permits an examination of reliability between what participants say and what they do. This study looks at the nature of Islamist women's activities and programs, the procedures of some events such as regular Islamic meetings taking place at home. I and my female chaperon attended

the third Islamic Conference of WI to do some interviews as well as observation, looking at directly what happened in the biggest event. Likewise, I attended some gatherings and meetings including regularly doing Friday prayer in WI's mosque. When I conducted fieldwork, I deliberately rented a house which is near WI and HTI's office in order to be able to approach them easily. As mentioned above, I was advised by HTI's spokesman to participate to a variety of events or meetings conducted by HTI, this chance gave me a great of opportunities to look at directly what happened in practice world. What I observed from these meetings, includes the issues Islamist women discuss, whether those issues address women's interests, how other meeting participants respond to those issues, how male and female interact each other, and how women express their ideas in a meeting which male members also attend. The last research method revolved around the analysis of Islamist literature. These included books, reports, organisational documents, official website of the organisations, and bulletin.

Data Analysis

Collected fieldwork data were processed carefully through transcribing and typing them. The transcripts were sorted and arranged into various data categories. This process was guided by thematic analysis.[30] By this strategy, each new chunk of information is analysed in light of a particular research question for formulating a preliminary answer to the question. Then, these answers are classified into different themes which would be supported by information taken from various sources. For example, when the research question addresses the issue of women's motive to get involved in WI or HTI, I found a variety of responses from this matter, ranging from religious intention to social reason. So, I categorised these different answers into religious and social themes.

Dawson R. Hancock & Bob Algozzine explain that during the classification process takin

[30] Dawson R. Hancock & Bob Algozzine, *Doing Case Study Research: A Practical Guide for Beginning Researchers*, Teachers College Press, New York, 2006, p. 61

place, 'the case study researcher may elect to refine the question if the information is disconfirming or retain the question if the information supports the question's viability'.[31] By looking at carefully the dynamic of fieldwork records and literature, I reconstructed my research questions by keeping them which are still relevant, omitting some question, as well as adding them with other concerns. For example, after collecting fieldwork information, I added the research question with respect to issue of women's empowerment, as many female informants acknowledged that they feel empowered after joining Islamist movements, particularly taking part in a range of *da'wa* activities.

Eventually, after all information from various sources is entirely reviewed and analysed, these themes which have supported by the reliable and convinced information are reported as research findings. These findings, then, are analysed further in light of conceptual framework used in this thesis: the politic of piety and women's empowerment perspective. Through this process, it was found that in general, women's involvement in Islamist movement, particularly in *da'wa* project is a form of self-reform as well as social-transformation. Likewise, the participation contributes to women's empowerment.

Ethical Issues

This research was conducted in line with Ethical Approval issued by Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee (SBREC) at Flinders University on 26 February 2016.[32] Under this Ethical Approval, this research-maintained confidentiality, voluntariness, and informed consent. Prior to the interviews, I informed participants the aim of the research and that their participation was voluntary. I convinced them that there were no any consequences if they did not want to be interviewed or disconnected ongoing interview when feeling uncomfortable. Likewise, I let

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[31] Dawson R. Hancock & Bob Algozzine, *Ibid*., p. 61

[32] This research project has been approved by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee – Project No 7135

participants know that the interviews would take around 90 minute, and results of the interviews would be recorded by using a tape recorder.

The participants were also informed that all information they delivered would be confidential and their names would be changed to protect their original identity. But all informants from WI did not mind being mentioned their real name in this research. They, even, revealed that their participation to this research is a form of *da'wa* in order that public would know what they are doing. In contrast, most informants of HTI asked me to change their real name. In addition, places of the interviews were recommended by participants and using Bahasa in the interviews.

Outline of the Thesis

The thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter Two lays the foundation of theoretical framework used in this thesis. It discusses the definitions of the idea of Islamist movement and the explanation of why both organisations: HTI and WI can be deemed as Islamist movement. The chapter also explores the issue of women's participation in Islamist movements in the existing literatures in outside and inside Indonesian context.

Chapter Three analyses the historical trajectory of the dynamic and fluctuating relationships between the Indonesian state and Islam from before and after the early period of Indonesia's independence. This historical framework considers how the Indonesian state contributed to the emergence of the various Islamist movements, so it is impossible to generalise by offering a universal typology or to view them through a single perspective. This chapter then explores the history of the Indonesian women's movement, by focusing on women's involvement both before and after the Indonesian independence. Based on this historical overview, I found that the women's

movement in Indonesia is dynamic and has made a significant contribution to Indonesia's independence and development.

Chapter Four examines local factors that underpin, and advance Islamist thought and movements in Makassar, South Sulawesi, by considering how Islam came to and was developed in the region. This chapter then discusses women's status and how gender relations have been shaped by *adat* (local customs) in Bugis-Makassar culture. It also puts forward the overview of both organisations which are the case studies of this research.

Chapter Five analyses women's involvement in WI. It considers reasons why women are interested in joining the organisations, why they aspire to become activists, and what benefits the organisation gains from women's participation as well as what benefits women achieve after joining. This chapter also scrutinises what is required of women before they take part in the organisation.

Chapter Six explores women's involvement in the other Islamist movement - HTI. It addresses why women are interested in joining *da'wa* movement advocated by HTI, what benefits women achieve after joining, and what restrictions women should consider if they choose to join. It also reflects on how HTI defines Islam and frames the condition of current Islamic community (*ummah*) and how HTI understands the meaning of *da'wa*. This chapter also investigates similarities and differences between HTI and WI.

Chapter Seven discusses the possibility of women's empowerment in both organisations: HTI and WI. Whether women's involvement in the both organisations can contribute to women's empowerment is the key question addressed in this chapter. This chapter emphasises that there is no universal meaning of women's empowerment, but it has multiple meanings and interpretations. The definition of women's empowerment is contextual and historical. Following this framework, this chapter argues that women's involvement in HTI and WI contributes to women's

empowerment. It also examines the views of male activists of both organisations with respect to women's public presence and contribution to the development of the organisations. Chapter Eight considers the conclusion, contribution, and limitation of this research. This chapter begins with thesis statement that that women's involvement in the Islamist movement is underpinned by piety politics, in which women aim to create pious selves as well as a transformation of the wider social order. The activities carried out by women in HTI and WI to reform themselves and society determines the process of women's empowerment, as women are actively engaged in these twin projects.

CHAPTER TWO

THE MEANING OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF WOMEN: A LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL REVIEW

Introduction

There are three broad understandings of women's involvement in Islamist movements.[33] Firstly, some scholars argue that the participation of women in Islamist movements is a form of gender oppression and exploitation.[34] Haideh Moghissi argues that Islamist fundamentalist organisations feel threatened by the shift of Islam-ruled gender relations, which have been influenced by the spread of capitalism and feminism. So how to assume control over women and how to revitalise 'the authority of the patriarchal family' are important agendas of these organisations, and all members are required to be involved in its achievement.[35] This means that women's participation in Islamist movements is to perpetuate patriarchal social structure. Secondly, there are those which assert that women's socio-political engagement usually acts as a catalyst for women to exercise agency and to empower themselves.[36] For example, Mahmood – as cited by Salwa Ismail - noted

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[33] Santi Rozario, 'The New *Burqa* in Bangladesh: Empowerment or Violation of Women's Rights?', in *Women's Studies International Forum,* 29, 2006, p. 369.

[34] Haideh Moghissi, *Feminism and Islamic fundamentalism: The limits of postmodern analysis*, The University Press Ltd, Dhaka, 2000. See also, Bronwyn Winter, 'Fundamental misunderstandings: Issues in feminist approaches to Islamism', in *Journal of Women's History*, 13 (1), 2001, pp. 941.

[35] Haideh Moghissi, *Ibid*., p. 73

[36] See Fatima Mernissi, *The veil and the male elite: A feminist interpretation of women's rights in Islam,* (Reading/New York: Addison-Wesley Publ. Co, 1991). Ziba Mir-Hosseini, 'Stretching the limits: A feminist reading of the Shari'a in post-Khomeini Iran', in Mai Yamani (Ed.), *Feminism and Islam: Legal and literary perspectives* (pp. 285-320), (London: Ithaca Press, 1996). Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and The Feminist Subject*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005) & 'Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival', *Cultural Anthropology* 16(2), 2001, pp., 202-236. Lara Deeb, Piety and the Role of a Transnational Feminist Analysis, in *the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Islam, Politics, Anthropology,* vol. 15, pp. S112-S126, 2009. Rachel Rinaldo, *Mobilizing Piety:* Eva, Nisa F. '*Cadari* of WI: & 'The internet subculture of Indonesian face-veiled women', in *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 16(3), 2013, pp. 242-245.

that active women in mosque movements in Egypt can attend religious meetings that offer the opportunity for Islamic discussion or learning. They are able to directly access and confidently interpret Islamic texts like the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* rather than rely on the interpretation of male Islamic scholars**.** In short, Islamic activities advocated by these Islamist women may lead to women's empowerment.[37] Thirdly, there are other authors who contend that women's engagement in Islamist movements underpins the emergence of Islamist feminism.[38] Dunya Maumoon argues that although Islamist women's movements such as in Iran and Egypt criticise Western feminism, to some extent they may be regarded as feminist movements, particularly 'religiously based feminism', because they have the same aspirations and ideas to Western feminism. On the one hand, Islamist women's movements hold a belief that main women's role according to the *Qur'an* and *hadith* is in the home as housekeepers, mothers, and wives, as well as that women should be under male's leadership. But, on the other hand, they encourage women to pursue the high level of education so as to be educated mothers and to get professional occupations including female teachers, doctors, and businesswomen in separated society.[39] Further, Maumoon reveals that:

> although the voice of overt feminism (in Western terms) is absent in many Muslim communities, the entry of women into the universities, the professions and public life in unprecedented numbers and the availability of education and professional occupations to women from a broad segment of the population is indicative of 'pro-feminist' ideals and aspirations.[40]

Scholars supporting the second and third argument such as Mahmood, Deeb, Rinaldo and Eva have discussed the issue of women's involvement in Islamist movements using a piety and politics approach. In anthropology, this approach has constituted two theoretical orientations. The

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[37] Salwa Ismail, 'Islamism, re-Islamization and the fashioning of Muslim selves: Refiguring the Public Sphere', in *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights*, *The Transnational Muslim World, Human Rights, and The Rights of Women and Sexual Minorities*, Volume 4, Issue 1, article 3, 2007, p. 15-16

[38] Doorn-Harder, *Women Shaping Islam: Reading the Qur'an in Indonesia*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 2004. Dunya Maumoon, 'Islamism and gender activism: Muslim women's quest for autonomy', in *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 19:2, DOI: 10.1080/13602009908716442, 2007. Rebecca Foley, 'Muslim Women's Challenges to Islamic Law The Case of Malaysia', in *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 6:1, DOI: 10.1080/1461674032000165932, 2010

[39] Dunya Maumoon, *Op. Cit.*, p. 275

[40] Dunya Maumoon, *Ibid.*, pp. 275-276

first is an emphasis on the creation of 'pious subjectivity and ethical selves through the cultivation of embodied disposition, where moral reform is itself a political project of ethical self-fashioning'.[41] The second orientation is the idea of the 'Muslim public'. The Muslim public or public piety notion concerns an Islamic approach to public issues such as politics, advanced technology, and international discourses like gender, and Islam. [42]

This study tends to agree with the second and the third argument. This is partly because my case study shows that most women who are involved in HTI and WI are educated individuals who have a university background, usually in science or medicine. My educated female informants told me that they were not compelled by external forces to join the organisations. Their involvement is based on their own decision. To some extent, they exercise their agency and are not mere 'victims' of patriarchal structural domination. This is supported by the research findings of previous studies conducted by scholars who have deliberated about women in the Islamist movement, particularly in the Indonesian context.[43] For example, Rinaldo in her work on women's role in secular and Muslim organisations as well as the Islamist party in Indonesia, found two forms of agency, namely 'pious critical agency' and 'pious activating agency', which she describes as follows:

> Pious critical agency is based on a critical engagement with religious text and emphasizes the interpretation of texts to make claims for political and social change. Pious activating agency is based on the deployment of religious texts to make claims for political and social change.[44]

Furthermore, Eva in her account of *cadari*[45] women's role in the ultra-conservative WI, also found that *cadari* women exercised agency. She argues that although the ultra-conservative movement is widely accepted as a movement that discriminates against women, evidence to the contrary is

[41] Lara Deeb, *Op. Cit*., p. 113
[42] Lara Deeb, *Ibid*., p. 113
[43] Suzanne Brenner, 'Reconstructing Self and Society: Javanese Muslim Women and "The Veil"', in *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Nov., 1996), pp. 673-697. Nancy J. Smith-Hefner, Javanese Women and the Veil in Post-Suharto Indonesia, in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (May, 2007), pp. 389-420. Rachel Rinaldo, *Op. Cit.,* & Eva Nisa F., 2013, *Op. Cit*. 2013
[44] Rachel Rinaldo, *Ibid*., pp. 22-23
[45] In the Indonesian context, there are two kinds of veil; "*cadar"* is veil covering head and face and "*jilbab*" is veil covering head

apparent among women in WI, who are important political agents in supporting the organisation's development.[46]

This study uses the piety politics approach to examine women's participation in HTI and WI. The reason for this is that both organisations take religion as the ideological foundation of the movement. The engagement of women in HTI and WI is a religious phenomenon by nature, although social and political factors are also certainly influential. However, it should be noted that the piety politics approach in this study acts as the initial critical underpinning of the study in the development and analysis of fieldwork data. This chapter firstly defines the term 'Islamist movement' and explains why HTI and WI can be categorised as Islamist movements. Secondly, it elaborates on the meanings of 'piety politics' and 'Muslim public'. Thirdly, it explores how the issue of women's participation in Islamist movements is considered in the existing literature.

Islamist Movement

The term Islamism or Islamist is almost always interchangeable with other terms such as Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic revivalism, the *da'wa* movement, Islamic activism, *Salafism,* political Islam, and the piety movement.[47] However, in this thesis, the term Islamist or Islamism will be applied[48] with reference to three definitions having convergence. The first explanation comes from Wiktorowicz who defines Islamism or Islamic activism as:

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[46] Eva Nisa F., 2013, *Op. Cit*., 2012, p. 1

[47] Saba Mahmood, Op.Cit., 2005. *See also:* Quintan Wiktorowics, (ed.), *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2004, & 'Anatomy of The Salafi Movement', in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29: 2006. Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia (Radical Salafi Movement in Indonesia),* PT Raja Grafindo Persada, Jakarta, 2004. Asep Bayat, 'Islamism and Social Movement Theory', in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 6, 2005. Bubalo, Anthony, & Greg Fealy, 'Between the Global and The Local: Islamism, The Middle East, and Indonesia', in *The Brooking Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World*, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brooking Institution, 2005. Lara Deeb, *Op. Cit.*, Armajani, Jon, *Modern Islamist Movements History, Religion, and Politics,* Wiley-Blackwell, UK, 2012

[48] I prefer to use the term Islamist than other terminologies such as Salafism, as the former has a more general significance than the latter. The term Islamist covers all social movements which utilise Islam as the guiding political ideology and basis of movements, whereas Salafism mainly refers to Islamic social movements that have key characteristics which require their followers and others to understand and

> The variety of contention that frequently emerges under the banner of Islam, including propagation movements, terrorist groups, collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and identities, explicitly political movements that seeks to establish an Islamic state, and inward-looking groups that promote Islamic spirituality through collective efforts.[49]

The second definition from Mehdi Mozafarri refers to Islamism as:

> … activism where Islam forms the ideological basis of an organisation. In such organisations, Islam structures the organisations diagnosis and critique of society and its visions for social, cultural and political change.[50]

Mozaffari further states Islamism or Islamist is 'a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means'.[51] From this definition, there are some concepts which should be clarified. Firstly, Islamism is a religious ideology and the term Islamism is a composite of two words: 'Islam' and 'ism'; the former points to a religion with its own traditions and history and the latter refers to ideology.[52] Mozaffari signifies 'ideology' as 'sets of ideas by which men explain and justify the ends and means of organised social action, with the aim of preserving or reconstructing a given reality'[53] Therefore, Islam is not only a set of beliefs and private or collective rituals but also a comprehensive and complete way of life that encompasses whole lives, including political, economic, and social conduct. In other words, Islamism involves ideological and religious dimensions at the same time so that all actions carried out by Islamists are regarded as religious responsibilities.[54]

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practice the Islamic tenets according to the prophet Muhammad and *al-salaf al-saleh,* which designates the first three generations including *sahabah* (his companions); *tabi'un* (their successors); and *tabi' tabiin* (the successors of the successors). Seeking to return to Islam's authenticity, Salafism rejects any sorts of improper innovation (*bid'ah*) in Islam, which was never implemented by the prophet Muhammad and *al-salaf al-saleh.* Related to such features, some scholars, therefore, categorise WI as Salafist movement and I agree with that. But it is inappropriate if HTI is deemed as Salafist organisation, because it does not emphasize the method of *al-salaf al-saleh or* problematise innovations in Islam. See Jacob Hoigit, 'Prophets in Their Own Country? Hizb al-Tahrir in the Palestinian Context', in Politics, Religion and Ideology, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2014, pp. 504-520, pp. 510-514

[49] Quintan Wiktorowics, *Op. Cit*., p. 2

[50] Thomas, Olesen, 'Social Movement Theory and Radical Islamic Activism', in *Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation (CIR),* Department of Political Science Aarhus University, Denmark May 2009, p. 9

[51] Mehdi Mozaffari, 'What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept', in T*otalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2007*, p. 21

[52] Mehdi Mozaffari, *Ibid*., p. 21

[53] Mehdi Mozaffari, *Ibid*., p. 22

[54] Mehdi Mozaffari, *Ibid*.,

Secondly, a 'holistic interpretation of Islam' is constructed upon an eternal and permanent doctrine that there is no separation between religion (*din*), way of life (*dunya*), and government/politics (*dawlah*). As a result, Islam organises all aspects of life without exception. Thirdly, 'conquest of the world' means that the existing world should be Islamised. The efforts to Islamize the world arise from the basic assumption that the current world has been occupied by non-Muslims and therefore is not in line with Islamic principles proclaimed by the prophet Muhammad and the classical period of the Caliphate.[55] Consequently, Islamists believe that the potent breakthrough to get rid of existing world chaos is the re-establishment of the Caliphate or Islamising public sphere. Lastly, 'by all means' refers to the explanation that to achieve the above ultimate goal Islamists use various means, ranging from 'propagation, peaceful indoctrination and political struggle to violent methods such as terrorist acts.[56]

Mahmood identifies three typologies of Islamism: firstly, those who activate Islam's political direction through the formation of formal Islamic parties or non-formal parties. This strand is characterised as state-oriented. The second is militant Islamist such as al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah that justify terrorist acts to achieve their goals. Lastly is 'a network of socio-religious non-profit organisations.[57] The latter is also named the '*da'wa* movement' or 'the piety movement'.[58] In a similar vein, Wiktorowicz also recognises three typologies of Islamist movement, namely the purist, the politicos, and the jihadists. The purist movement eschews violence, conducting activities such as dissemination, education and purification, and it disagrees when religion is brought into the political arena. Conversely, although the politico's movement is similar to that of the purist to cultivate peaceful means of Islamification, the politicos regard it necessary to get involved in the political arena, as it has more influence on the wider social. They

[55] The Caliphate is the longest Islamic political institutions in Islamic history, lasting from the death of the Prophet Muhammad (June, 8, 632 A.D) to its closing by Mustafa Kemal in 1924. See Mehdi Mozaffari, *Ibid*., p. 23. It means that the Caliphate period lasted for 1292 years.
[56] Mehdi Mozaffari, *Ibi*d., pp. 23-4.
[57] Saba Mahmood, 2005, *Op. Cit., p. 3*
[58] See Saba Mahmood, *Ibid*., p. 3

argue that God's law should be politically implemented through the formation of either formal or informal Islamist parties or the Islamic state. The jihadists take a similar line to the politicos, wanting to take part in the political realm, but are more militant because, according to the jihadists, the current situation justifies the use of violence and revolution.[59]

HTI and WI

HTI is an organisational branch of Hizbut Tahrir that was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqiuddin an-Nabhani.[60] Hizbut Tahrir declares that Islam covers all aspects of daily life without exception.[61] An-Nabhani argues convincingly that the Qur'an and the *Hadith* provide an adequate foundation for legal decisions about all aspects of life. The remaining role of authoritative scholars is to interpret basic Islamic norms.[62] Thus, Hizbut Tahrir's main political objective is to revive the Islamic Caliphate which existed in Islamic history, for example, during the Ottoman Empire.[63] To achieve its main goal, the organisation proposes a three-stage process for what Hizbut Tahrir claims is the 'Islamic peace revolution'. [64] Meanwhile, unlike HTI, a transnational movement imported from outside Indonesia, WI, was established on June 18, 1988 in Makassar, and is a

[59] Quintan Wiktorowics, (ed.), '*Islamic Activism:',* p. 208.
[60] He was born (1909) in Ijizm, a village near Haifa, in e Northern Palestine. He passed away in 1977 and is buried in Auza'i, Beirut. After finishing his study at al-Azhar University*,* Cairo, al-Nabhani went back to Palestine and worked in the Ministry of Education as a teacher at a junior high school in Haifa. During studying at al-Azhar, he has been member of the Muslim Brotherhood. See David Commins, ' Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani and The Islamic Liberation Party', in *The Muslim World journal*, vol. LXXXI, No. 3-4, 1991, p, 194. Syamsul Arifin, *Ideology dan Praksis Gerakan Sosial Kaum Fundamentalis: Pengalaman Hizbuut Tahrir Indonesia', (ideology and Praxis of Social Movement of Fundamental Group: The Experience of Hizbuut Tahrir Indonesia*), (Malang: UNM Press, 2005), p. 89. Frank Schneider, **'**Threat Behind a Legal Façade?', Unpublished M.A, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2006, p., 13. Greg Fealy, 'Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia: Seeking A "Total" Islamic identity', in Akbarzadeh & Mansouri, *Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West*, London, Tauris Academic Studies, 2007. P.153.
[61] Greg Fealy, 2007, *Op., Cit*., p. 153.
[62] ICG, 'Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizbut-Tahrir', *ICG Asia Report No 58*, p. 3
[63] Fahlesa Munabari, 'Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia: The Quest for the Caliphate and Shariah', A paper presented at International Workshop on Islam and Middle East: Dynamics of Social and Political Transformation, Kyoto, University, August 2-3, 2008, p, 9.
[64] Muhammad Muhsin Rodhi, *Tsaqofah dan Metode Hizbut Tahrir dalam Mendirikan Negara Khilafah Isamiyah* (Civilization and Method of *Hizbut Tahrir* in Establishing the State of Islamic Caliphate), (Bangil: Al-Izzah, 2008), p., 40

locally inspired and developed organisation emerging from Indonesian cultural tradition.[65] WI, like HTI, considers Islam to be the universal way, organizing all human activity without differentiation between spiritual and worldly affairs.[66] If HTI's ultimate goal is the establishment of a Caliphate, for WI the Islamising of the social sphere[67] through the implementation of Sharia Law[68] is its major objective. From the above brief explanation, it might be argued that both WI and HTI can be categorised as Islamist organisations which constitute a social movement, in view of their ideology, objectives and means by which to achieve their goals. Based on those typologies, it might be said that WI is an Islamist organisation that represents the purist or *da'wa* movement, while HTI represents the politicos, or state-oriented branch of Islamists.

Based on the above explanation, I note the following points about the Islamist phenomenon, as it relates to this study. Firstly, the term Islamist or Islamism, in my case, uses these three definitions to refer to a socio-religious movement advocating religion of Islam as the ideology of the movement which aims to Islamise the public sphere or to establish an Islamic state. Secondly, the term Islamist movement is very complex, since there is diversity in at least **'**the scope, extent, and process of its institutional expression, for Islamism might originate from different causes and serve different purposes in each particular instance**'**.[69] Further, it is very dynamic because the current social and political context has significant influence in the development of Islamism.[70] A monolithic approach, therefore, is unhelpful when attempting to explain the phenomenon of Islamism.

Piety Politics

[65] Syarifuddin Jurdi, 'Pertautan Gerakan WI dan Gerakan Transnasional (Link between WI and the Transnational Movement), in *Al-FIKR* journal, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2012, p. 3
[66] Syarifuddin Jurdi, *Ibid*., p. 7
[67] Syarifuddin Jurdi, *Ibid*., p. 10
[68] Eva Nisa F., 2012, *Op. Ci*t., p. 4
[69] Joseph Chinyong Liow, *Piety & Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p. 7.
[70] Joseph Chinyong Liow, *Ibid*., p. 7

The term "piety" originates in the Latin "pietas", referring to respect and observance or devotion. According to Turner, piety is the 'habitual acts of reverence and obedience'.[71] Citing Bourdieu's sociology, he recognises that the notion of *habitus* 'means the everyday practices that embody a set of dispositions which in turn determine taste, in this case a taste for particular religious beliefs, practices and object'.[72] In her study, Mahmood found that the meaning of piety as defined by the women of the mosque movement[73]in Egypt refers to 'the quality of being close to God: a manner of being and acting that suffuses all of one's acts, both religious and worldly in character'.[74] In more detail, she describes piety as attainable:

> …through practices that were both devotional as well as worldly in character, it required more than the simple performance of acts: piety also entailed the inculcation of entire dispositions through a simultaneous training of the body, emotion, and reason as sites of discipline until the religious virtues acquired the status of embodied'.[75]

For Egyptian women in the grassroots piety movement, religion is not merely a set of doctrines or beliefs or a political identity that is anti-western culture and norms, but most importantly, that religion, with all practices and rituals, is embodied as a medium of self-discipline as well as moral reform over an individual's lifetime. Mahmood states that 'part of the aim of the mosque movement is to restore this understanding of worship by teaching women the requisite skills involved in its practice'. [76]

Furthermore, Mohamed Nasir, Alexius A. Pereira, and Bryan S. Turner, in their book exploring Muslims in Singapore, define the practice of piety as **'**a set of practices rather than a set

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[71] Bryan S Turner, 'Acts of Piety: The Political and the Religious, or a Tale of Two Cities', in E F Isin, G M Nielsen (Eds*.), Acts of Citizenship,* Zed Books, United Kingdom, 2008, p. 124
[72] Bryan S Turner, *Ibid*., p. 124
[73] The mosque women movement is part of the Islamic Revival, referring to activities that orientate to establish an Islamic state as well as implement religious values in all aspects of life. The mosque women's movement has existed for twenty-five to thirty years in Egypt. Firstly, these women initiated Islamic meetings conducted in their homes, and then in mosques. They learned religious texts; *Qur'an* and *hadith*, see Saba Mahmood, 2005, *Op. Cit*., p. 4
[74] Saba Mahmood, *Ibid.,* p. 122.
[75] Saba Mahmood, *Ibid*., p. 212
[76] Saba Mahmood, *Ibid*., p. 48.

of beliefs that embody the dispositions of social actors within their everyday world or habitus'.[77] Joy Kooi- Chin Tong and Turner, in their article about the measurement of the degree of pietization of PAS, (Partai Islam SeMalaysia, Malaysian Islamic Party), an Islamist party founded in 1951, studied elite women in Malaysia, discussing their adoption of veiling, polygamy, and child-rearing, to demonstrate that pious practice is not only typically individualistic or conducted solely in the private sphere, but also, more importantly, occurs within a collective movement that has created new styles of thinking and practising Islam different to that practised by their parents.[78] In short, piety politics is a combination of individual and collective practice. At the individual level, piety consists of personal belief in Islam and a commitment to apply Islam to all aspects of life. Piety as a collective practice refers to religious acts performed collectively in the public sphere.

Moreover, the term "politics" after the word piety suggests the nature of social transformation. Mahmood argues that although the Egyptian women of the mosque movement emphasise the formation of the pious self, it would be wrong to assume that the movement ignores the issue of politics. Rather, Islamist women aspire to realise the pious self as well as social transformation, in the relationship between the pious self and society. This can be seen from diverse Islamic activities cultivated by those women, ranging from new styles of clothing and speech to Islamic financial and household management, including social charity for the poor[79] In a similar vein, Connie Caroe Christiansen (2003), cited by Salwa Ismail, when investigating women's Islamic activism in Morocco, identified a close interrelationship between the project of piety practices, cultivated pious self- reform, and the project of social transformation. This might be interpreted to mean that the core of Moroccan women's activism is to target wider society by providing religious teaching and advisory services.[80] Salwa argues that 'we cannot isolate the

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[77] Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir, Alexius A. Pereira and Bryan S. Turner, *Muslims in Singapore: Piety, politics and policies*, Routledge, London and New York, 2010, p. 16.
[78] Joy Kooi- Chin Tong & Bryan Turner, 'Women, Piety and Practice: A Study of Women and Religious Practice in Malaysia', in *Cont Islam*, 2:41, 2008, pp. 57-58
[79] Saba Mahmood, 2005, *Op. Cit.*, p. 4
[80] Salwa Ismail, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 4-5

moral selves from the political selves. The project of re-Islamisation should not be constructed as apolitical because of its social and cultural orientation'.[81] In addition, she suggests:

> Subject-forming processes are power laden. We are only able to see the power relations that underpin subject formation and subjectivities, if we situate them in their socio-historical context and take account of the complex interplay of what is at stake for individuals in subject formation.[82]

Maimuna Huq, in her work in Bangladesh, showed that the Islamist female student organisation attached informally to Jamaah Islami (BICSa) rejected the assumption that religion should be detached from politics or the state, as well as the idea there is no contradiction between state and religion. Rather for BICSa individual piety in the private sphere of the home would only be attained when a broader social ordering of the public domain is Islamised first. The state, particularly the Islamic state, should make regulations or policies supporting the cultivation of pious social selves such as the refusal to spread norms and ideas that are not in accordance with Islamic values and thought, mainly from Bollywood and the USA, and the formation of a national Islamic curriculum.[83]More generally, an examination of politics and religion comes from Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori in their book entitled *Muslim Politics*. After drawing out the complex problem of veiling in France and Egypt, particularly in schools and at universities, whereby government has intervened to ban the veil, both authors conclude that the question of veiling is political. This is partly because veiling questions the extent to which state authority should played a role in regulating the social sphere, and also because, in the case of veiling, there is a contestation or debate in the understanding of what comprises true Islamic teaching.[84]

Thus, the operating hypothesis of my thesis is that women's involvement in the Islamist movement is a process of piety politics, in which women aim to create pious selves as well as a

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[81] Salwa Ismail, *Ibid*., pp. 4-5
[82] Salwa Ismail, *Ibid*., p. 16
[83] Maimuna Huq, 'Talking jihad and piety: reformist exertions among Islamist women in Bangladesh', in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (N.S.), S163-S182, 2009, p. 176
[84] Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey,1996, pp. 3-4.

transformation of the wider social order. The activities carried out by women in HTI and WI to reform themselves and society demonstrate the operations of women's empowerment, as women are actively engaged in these twin projects. This position is elaborated through a consideration of the critical literature exploring the role of women in Islamist organisations, below.

Islamist Women in the Existing Literature: Outside the Indonesian Context

A key concern is how the existing literature explores women's participation in Islamist movements. Based on the initial framework of this project, the aim is to consider how piety operates as an explanatory framework in terms of pious subjectivity and public piety, and how this relates to the development of Islamic feminism. To begin, I consider the useful and relevant study conducted by Saba Mahmood of the grassroots women's mosque movement in Egypt.[85] Through the use of ethnographic research, she sought to rethink several concepts such as moral agency, freedom, and autonomy that have long existed in feminist thought, particularly in Western feminist writing, and found that women involved in the mosque movement exhibited both agency and autonomy.

To understand Mahmood's logic, it is important to consider her theoretical approach, influenced by Judith Butler and Michel Foucault in defining the concept of power and the subject. Citing Foucault, she acknowledges the relationship between power and subject:

> Power, according to Foucault, cannot be understood solely on the model of domination as something possessed and deployed by individuals or sovereign agents over others, with a singular intentionality, structure, or location that presides over its rationality and execution. Rather, power is to be understood as a strategic relation of force that permeates life and is productive of new forms of desires, objects, relations, and discourses. Secondly, the subject, argues Foucault, does not precede power relations, in the form of an individuated consciousness, but is produced through these relations, which form "the necessary conditions of its possibility". Central to his formulation is what Foucault calls the paradox of subjectivation: the very processes and conditions that secure

[85] The women's mosque movement is part of the Islamic resurgence or revival, and emerged twenty-five or thirty years ago. Their main activity is weekly religious meetings conducted at first in the home and then in mosques. In such meetings, they read the *Quran* and *hadith* and 'associated exegetical and edificatory literature'. See Mahmood, 2005, *Op. Cit.*, , p 3.

> a subject's subordination are also the means by which she becomes a self-conscious identity and agent.[86]

From this standpoint, Mahmood argues that the presence of the subject with a set of abilities or capabilities attached to an individual is the product of the process of power relations. The existence of the subject is 'not the residue of an undominated self that existed prior to the operation of power'.[87] Further, she proposes that agency is 'not simply as a synonym for resistance to relations of domination, but as a capacity for action that specific relations of subordination create and enable'.[88] According to Mahmood, the most important point that should be considered in understanding agency is:

> …neither to invoke a self-constituting autonomous subject nor subjectivity as a private space of cultivation. Rather, it draws our attention to the specific ways in which one perform a certain number of operations on one's thoughts, body, conduct, and ways of being, in order to attain a certain kind of state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality in accord with a particular discursive tradition.[89]

Thus, the question of women's agency in the mosque movement, for Mahmood, is embodied in their submission. For example, although women must cover their entire body and wear the veil, which for many non–Muslim outsiders remains a symbol of women's exploitation, for Mahmood the veil is a 'disciplinary practice that constitutes pious subjectivities'.[90] Therefore, although women are willing to submit to and obey an organisation's rules, it does not mean that they are passive.

The meaning of agency in Mahmood's research is certainly different from the articulations of agency promoted by the humanities and social sciences research since the 1970s, where human agency was understood in the light of subordination, and feminists were preoccupied with a search for ways to resist male domination, overthrow the hegemonic significance of cultures, norms, and

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[86] Saba Mahmood, *Ibid*., p. 17.
[87] Saba Mahmood, *Ibid*., p.17
[88] Saba Mahmood, 'Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival', *Cultural Anthropology* 16(2), 2001, p. 210.
[89] Saba Mahmood, *Ibid*., p. 210
[90] Saba Mahmood, 2005, *Op. Cit*., p. 195.

traditions, and to replace them with a construction more in line with women's interests and agendas.[91] Although this study is influenced by Mahmood's ideas, there are two questions that arise. Firstly, Mahmood has paid little attention to Islamist men's views of women's participation in the Islamist movement. This study enriches the narrative explanation of women's involvement in HTI and WI by scrutinising the reaction to, and perceptions of Islamist men with respect to women's political engagement. This point must be considered in order to understand the gender and power relations operating in HTI and WI. Secondly, Mahmood only researched one strand of the Islamist movements, what she identifies as a the *da'wa* movement. However, there are diverse and distinct characteristics in Islamist movements, as discussed above. This study explores Islamist women's participation in two Islamist organisations which have different goals and strategies to achieve an Islamic social order.

Following Mahmood's framework, Lihi Ben Shitrit[92] argues that agency should not always be understood in the light of western feminism, whereby agency is regarded as an individual's capacity to determine their own activities without restriction from external influences such as customs, traditions, and religions. However, Shitrit does not separate the concept of agency from the ideas of the autonomous self as Mahmood does. Agency, according to Shitrit, is an intrinsic capability that can lead to the autonomous self. This capacity enables a person to identify and accept critically 'what might be considered oppressive customs and traditions or to subvert them'.[93] In Shitrit's case study, Islamist women in Israel led a 'resistance to unexamined customs and traditions.[94] The notion differs from Mahmood's findings, in which the agency of women of the mosque movement arises from within the 'customs and traditions' of the society in which they

[91] Saba Mahmood, *Ibid*., p. 6
[92] Lihi Ben Shitrit, Women, Freedom, and Agency in Religious Political Movements: Reflections from Women Activists in Shas and the Islamic Movement in Israel', in Journal *of Middle East Women's Studies,* Vol. 9, No. 3, 2013, p. 89.
[93] Lihi Ben Shitrit, *Ibid*., p. 92
[94] Lihi Ben Shitrit, *Ibid.,* p. 92

live.[95] She demonstrates that women's agency operates through submission rather than resistance. Another difference between them is that Shitrit's study shows that Islamist women are able to distinguish Islamic values that can liberate them, of course within 'Islamic boundaries and limitations',[96] from customs, traditions, norms, and social coercion being the internal and external elements that prevent them from achieving true self-realisation.[97] Genuine self- realisation in this context refers to self-realisation arising from Islamic guidance. Islamist women in Shitrit's study are able to differentiate between self-realisation based on Islamic interests and that which builds upon *adat* (custom). This can be seen from her informants' accounts when explaining the differences between *adat* (custom) and *ibadah* (worship). Her informants argued that some women who adopt the veil do so because it is a religious obligation for women as set down in the *Qur'an*, but other women wear the veil because local *adat* (custom) requires it. Others wear it to conform to family norms or because they are accustomed to wearing it.[98]

A critique of Mahmood's ideas comes also from Rozario (2011) who studied young women involved within Hijaz community[99] and Jama'at-i Islami.[100] Her study takes Bangladesh and UK as places for fieldwork and focuses on the different tactics deployed by Islamist pious women in resistance to parental authority and cultural and social constraints. Like Mahmood, Rozario also finds that agency is exercised by young Muslim women. In understanding and applying Islam, they were able to make their own decisions and choices. Participating in these Islamist movements enables them to learn and achieve different understandings and knowledge of Islam from their

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[95] Lihi Ben Shitrit, *Ibid.,* p.
[96] Lihi Ben Shitrit, *Ibid*., p. 90 [97]
Lihi Ben Shitrit, *Ibid.,* p. 92 [98]
Lihi Ben Shitrit, *Ibid.,* p. 92
[99] Hijaz community is a Sufi institution was established by Pakistani Sufi teacher Shaykh Abdul Wahab Siddiqi (1942-1994). The Hijaz community is located at the Hijaz College in the British Midlands. See Santi Rozario, 'Islamic piety against the family: from 'traditional' to 'pure' Islam', in *Cont Islam* (2011) 5: p. 289
[100] Jama'at-i Islami (JI) is a kind of Islamist movements, whose political orientation established in Lahore in the 1940s by Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979). In some countries such as in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India, the JI is represented by religion-based political parties. Jama'at-i Islami. See Santi Rozario, *Ibid*., p. 299.

parents'. With these new understandings, they feel confident to challenge their parents since they see that what their parents understood and practised in relation to Islam is not in line with the 'true' Islam as they understand it. Further, these young women feel empowered to criticise the lifestyles of their families, friends, and other Muslims as not being in accordance with their Islamic values.[101] Yoginder Sikand in her research observed the participation of women and the question of agency in Tabligh-I Jama'at in South Asia. Women in the Tabligh-I Jama'at are recognised as active agents. The reason for this is that Tabligh-I Jama'at determines that men and women have thesame responsibility and religious obligation to foreground *da'wa* for both themselves and others. Before undertaking *da'wa*, proselytising Islam to other Muslim women, Tablighi women are required to equip themselves with a broad knowledge of Islam and a strong commitment to continuously apply it through active participation in the organisation. However, although Tablighi women have a religious responsibility like men do to perform *da'wa*, they are expected to simultaneously maintain their other religious responsibilities as women: namely; they should wear the veil in both private and public space and should not neglect their main role as wives and mothers whose principal task is to teach their children about Islamic teachings and to create a pious next generation.[102]

With a different emphasis, Lara Deeb uses transnational feminist analysis as a framework when conducting research on Shi'i Muslim gender activists in Lebanon. She explores the presence of pious Shi'i women in the public sphere, particularly examining their response to transnational discourses such as gender, as well as the negative image of Muslim women. From her work, she argues that both political and social factors significantly contribute to piety formation and offers 'multifaceted and non-reductive analyses that incorporate transnational discursive and political-

[101] Santi Rozario, *Ibid.,* p. 299
[102] Yoginder S. Sikand, 'Women and the Tablighi Jamaat', in *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations*, 10:1, 1999, p. 49.

economic contexts into discussions of piety politics in ways that are not necessarily constitutive and that are always contextually contingent'.[103] Deeb's transnational analysis which means:

> When I refer to 'transnational analysis', I am referring not to multi-sited research, but rather to the ways in which we can attend to our interlocutors' engagement with discourses that emerge in and travel through a transnational context of power, capitalism, and militarism, most obviously nowadays with regard to US interventions in the Middle East and elsewhere.[104]

This approach aims to reveal how piety is practised in the current context and its response to national and international political discourses. Deeb shows how Muslim gender activists affiliated to Hezbollah in Beirut have engaged with transnational discourses in a seminar about Muslim and Western women. From the seminar, Deeb found that there has been an encounter between the significance of Muslim or Islamist women's public engagement to shape a positive image of women's status in the international world, and that religious awareness of women's public participation is a form of religious obligation and of embodied piety.[105] In short, although the practice of piety is closely related to religion or the spiritual sphere, when religion is exercised in the public realm it cannot be fully detached from broader social and political contexts.

Some scholars view women's participation or activism in Islamist movements as a form of feminism, particularly Islamic feminism. Ziba Mir-Hosseini states that it is difficult to arrive at a common definition of Islamic feminism, partly because there is disagreement about what the intended form of justice and equality mean, and also of the best means to pursue them. However, the search for gender justice and equality has become the shared feature of Islamic feminism.[106] Similarly, Margot Badran states that Islamic feminism initiated by both women and men assumes that the religion has been exploited to reinforce inequalities and injustices. Rather, Islamic feminism has two orientations: to deconstruct the ideas and practices of patriarchal structures that have long been naturalised by religion as something given, as well as to reconstruct a new

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[103] Lara Deeb, *Op. Cit*., p. 112
[104] Lara Deeb, *Ibid*., p. 114
[105] Lara Deeb, *Ibid*., pp. 123-4
[106] Ziba Mir-Hosseini , 'Muslim Women's Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and Feminism', in *Critical Inquiry* 32, Summer, 2006, p. 640.

interpretation of Islam in the sense of gender equality that is in line with the human equality in general.[107]

According to Badran, in the early emergence of Islamic feminism there was a clear demarcation between Islamic feminism and Islamist women's activism, in which the latter was not regarded as Islamic feminism. But the current situation, particularly in Arab countries, shows that there is a convergence between Islamic feminism and Islamist feminism.[108] The presence of women leads to diverse demands for women, which range from organisational leadership to attendance at prayers in mosques. In short, Islamist women's involvement has resulted in feminist awareness amongst Islamist women.[109] For example, Iranian and Egyptian Islamist women are currently more radical in publicising their agendas, working to eradicate the influence of patriarchal interpretive hegemony in religion and to liberate women from within Islam itself. They also criticise western feminism, arguing that it is irrelevant to women in Islamic countries and the non-western world because western women have discriminated against and colonialized women in the third world.[110]

Rebecca Foley, in her an article entitled "Muslim Women's Challenges to Islamic Law: the Case of Malaysia', offers an interesting and useful examination of two broad strategies used by Malaysian Muslim women to reform the interpretation and understanding of the *Qur'an* and *hadith* and the Islamic legal system or the sharia: concepts of equity and equality. The equity approach, employing conservative interpretations of the principal Islamic sources, argues that men and

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[107] Margot Badran, 'Islamic Feminism Revisited', available in file:///Volumes/MujaDidink%20/PHD%20THESIS/Readings%20of%20Phd%20Thesis/LT/Islamic%20Feminism/Islamic%20Feminism%20Revisited%20By%20Margot%20Badran.webarchive, accessed at 15 June 2015, p. 1

[108] Margot Badran, 'Gender Activism: Feminists and Islamists in Egypt', in Valentine M. Moghadam (ed), *Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminism in International Perspective*, Westview Press, United States of America, 1994

[109] Dunya Maumoon, 'Islamism and gender activism: Muslim women's quest for autonomy', in *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 19:2, DOI: 10.1080/13602009908716442, 2007, p. 207

[110] Dunya Maumoon, Ibid., pp. 274-5, see also Haleh Afshar, 'Why fundamentalism? Iranian women and their support for Islam', in *Women: A Cultural Review*, 6:1, 18-33, DOI: 10.1080/09574049508578217, 2008, pp. 18-19.

women have distinctive characteristics that are innate, so that they also have different and separate roles and duties. Women are ideally mothers and wives whilst men are providers.[111] They have different rights, but the difference is based on fairness. The equality approach uses a more progressive interpretation to disagree with the notion of the inherently different natures of women and men, instead affirming that 'their rights must be equal'.[112] This strategy emphasises the discourse of women's rights to contend that men and women have 'complete equality'. [113]

The equity strategy argues that women are able to take part in public activities and even exercise political leadership as long as their responsibilities at home are not neglected.[114] This assumption is based on the 'perfect model' of Prophet Muhammad's wife Khadija in early Islamic history was a successful businesswoman and a good wife.[115] In contrast, the equality strategy maintains that women and men should be equally respected in all aspects of life. All domestic and public duties should be equally shared.[116] This column below shows briefly the main differences between both strategies:

The Equity Strategy	**The Equality Strategy**
Conservative method in interpreting the Islamic sources	Progressive method in interpreting the Islamic sources
Women and men are different	Women and men are the same
Separate but equal role	No separate roles
Patriarchal bargain as solution	Replacing patriarchal bargain with equal rights

[111] Rebecca Foley, 'Muslim Women's Challenges to Islamic Law: the Case of Malaysia', in *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 6:1, DOI: 10.1080/1461674032000165932, 2010, pp. 53-84, p. 59.
[112] Rebecca Foley, *Ibid*., p. 59
[113] Rebecca Foley, *Ibid.,* p. 59
[114] Rebecca Foley, *Ibid.,* p. 60-61
[115] Rebecca Foley, *Ibid.,* p. 60-61
[116] Rebecca Foley, *Ibid.,* p. 61

The existing literature helps clarify the objectives of this study. Firstly, it affirms that the Islamist movement is a complex and dynamic phenomenon that cannot be analysed using a unitary perspective. For example, in understanding the complexity of agency exercised by Islamist women, a binary model of thinking which argues that possessing agency is acquired only through resistance or submission is neither very useful nor applicable. Secondly the participation of women in Islamist movements is a form of religious or Islamic pious practice that not only represents a project of self-transformation, but also one of social and political transformation. Islamist women are also aware of global issues which address feminism and gender. Thirdly, although the Islamist women's movement is a religious movement, it does not mean that social, cultural, and political factors are less influential. Rather, religion, in this context, is viewed as not only a set of beliefs or a doctrine or ritual, but most importantly religion is an ideology, way of life, and worldview organising and arranging all aspects of life. Therefore, the specific contexts surrounding the Islamist women's movement certainly need to be considered.

The Indonesian Context

In general, Indonesian Muslim women's movements might be categorized into three streams; secular, Islamic/Muslim feminism, and Islamism. Secular feminism refers to women's movements advocating agendas and issues that are not related to religious tendencies. The second stream is Islamic feminism, which generally refers to women's movements that employ Islamic teachings as a general frame in their activism, trying to reinterpret the *Qur'an* with female-oriented insights and the use of secular sciences such as social science, psychology, history, anthropology, and medicine as tools. Lastly, Islamist stream advocates 'male authority over women and complementarity rather than equality between men and women'[117].

[117] See Doorn-Harder, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 7-8 & Rachel Rinaldo, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 5-7.

Although there have been many academic writings that have alluded to the issue of women and Islam, particularly regarding secular and Islamic women's movements, there are still very few works that are concerned primarily with the role and participation of women in Islamist movements in terms of grassroots organizations and Islamist parties. Due to the dearth of work in the area my study will make a significant contribution to knowledge offering an insight into women's actual and significant participation in Islamist movements.

Eva and Rinaldo's[118] works are relevant for my study since firstly, they use piety politics –albeit with a somewhat different emphasis – as a perspective, offering an intellectual pathway into understanding women's engagement in Islamist organizations. Secondly, the work of Eva and Claudia Seise [119] offers preliminary information about WI and HTI, a useful starting point and background from which to carry out my research. Eva's article entitled "Cadari of WI: Women as Dedicated Actors of Ultra-conservatism" is useful for this study. She concluded that the women's public activism such as performing *da'wa,* is the embodiment of religious obligations ordered by God and the Prophet Muhammad.[120] WI's women are expected to embody public piety at both individual and community level. As an individual, WI women are expected to be a good role model especially for women who are targeted to receive *da'wa*. Wearing the veil (*cadar*) is one aspect of individual piety which must be embodied. Meanwhile as part of the community, WI's women should invite (*da'wa)* other Muslim women to learn and enhance the religious knowledge as understood by WI and to constantly apply it in order to be a true Muslim.[121] The public participation of face-veiled women can be also seen from their active and creative usage of the Internet to disseminate teachings of true Islam. They acknowledge that their internet engagement

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[118] See Eva Nisa F. '*Cadari* of WI: & 'The internet subculture of Indonesian face-veiled women', in *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 16(3), 2013, pp. 242-245. Rachel Rinaldo, Mobilizing Piety: & 'Pious Islam and Women's Activism in Indonesia', in *working paper: Women and International Development*, Center for Gender in Global Context Michigan State University, May 2008.

[119] Claudia Seise**,** Muslimah HTI: An Introduction to its Thoughts and Activities, *Südostasien Working Papers* No. 44 Berlin 2011

[120] Eva Nisa F., 2012, *Op. Cit*., p. 5

[121] Eva Nisa F. *Ibid*., p. 6

is a form of religious obedience so that they not only spread Islamic values, but also educate other internet users about how to use it in accordance with religious guidance. *Cadari* (women wearing face-veil) women's Internet usage is a sign of their active public presence.[122]

Rinaldo focuses on social or public piety in her research about public piety of women activists in Indonesia, particularly whose participants of Rahima and Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)[123]. In her article, she uses Mahmood's theoretical framework of piety. Rinaldo argues that there are two defining elements: the institutional aspect of Islamic piety and the redefinition of private piety into public piety, which leads to the increasing participation of Muslim women in public sphere.[124] The institution of Islamic revival in Indonesia has led to greater opportunities for an education and a career for Muslim women, particularly after the downfall of Suharto. Rinaldo found that women who became involved in the Islamic revival including in Rahima and the PKS, had benefitted from a tertiary education and professional opportunities. From these benefits, Muslim women have social capital to take part in public activism.[125] Piety is not only to be central to a person's life, but also should be applied to and is part of being a good Muslim socially.

Another useful and relevant aspect of Rinaldo's work is her findings with respect to agency: the pious critical agency and pious activating agency. Rahima Muslim women exercise the pious critical agency whilst PKS women advocate the pious activating agency. Both modes of agency have similar objectives to develop the pious subject as well as to institute political and social change but have a different means of achieving these aims. The differences are illustrated below:[126]

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[122] Eva Nisa F, 'The internet subculture of Indonesian face-veiled women', in *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 16(3), 2013, pp., 241-255, pp. 242-245

[123] Rahima is a NGO that is closely related to the largest grassroots organization in Indonesia, Nahdatul Ulama (NU). Rahima advocates issues of gender equality by means of the corporation between Islamic perspective and western feminism thoughts, while PKS is Islamist party, which was founded in 1999. See Rachel Rinaldo, 'Pious Islam and Women's Activism in Indonesia', in *working paper: Women and International Development*, Center for Gender in Global Context Michigan State University, May 2008, p. 3&6

[124] Rachel Rinaldo, 2008, *Ibid*., p. 2

[125] Rachel Rinaldo, 2008, *Ibid*., 2008, p. 11

[126] Rachel Rinaldo, 2013*, Op. Cit*., pp. 22-23

Category	Pious Critical Agency	Pious Activating Agency
Actor	Rahima	PKS
Method	Critical engagement of religious texts by using method of contextual interpretation of religious texts	Deployment of religious texts by using method of textualist interpretation of religious texts
Field[127]	Gender Politics[128]	Islamic Politics[129]
Goal	Political & social change marked by the establishment of human rights	Political & social change marked by Islamising public sphere.[130]

As opposed to scholars who employ the public piety framework, Seise introduces descriptively HTI's thoughts and activities related to women, gender, family, and education. She argues that Muslim women in HTI play a pivotal role in developing and implementing the organisation's plan to build an Islamic state in the world. Women and men in HTI's perception are obliged to take part to struggle for the achievement of these goals: the establishment of a Islamic caliphate and the implementation of sharia law.[131] However, Seise's work is only a descriptive explanation with respect to HTI women, so it has not explored some issues including what is the nature and extent of Muslim women's participation in the HTI's political movement?, How women are recruited into the HTI?, How do HTI women mean their participation?, and whether women's involvement in HTI can empower them?.

[127] Field in Rinaldo's work refers to 'a social arena in which people maneuver and struggle in pursuit of resources', see Rachel Rinaldo, 2008, *Op. Cit.,* p. 21
[128] 'Gender politics' in this context is 'the field of political contestation around gender relations and include women's rights activists influenced by feminist thought and those who seek a return to more traditional gender arrangements', see Rachel Rinaldo, *Ibid*., p. 21
[129] 'Islamic politics' is 'the field of actors who strive to bring about a more Islamic society, via electoral politics or cultural change', see Rachel Rinaldo, *Ibid*., p. 21
[130] See Rachel Rinaldo, Ibid., p. 21
[131] See Claudia Seise**,** *Op. Cit.,* pp. 10-11

This research, inspired by this existing literature, intends to show that in order to comprehend women's participation in Islamist movements such as in HTI and WI, there are at least three factors which should be considered, namely the religious factor such as how Islamists understand religious texts, the socio-political contexts, and the nature of Islamist movement itself. I argue that these factors have an important influence on the nature and extent of women's participation in terms of form of participation, women's motives in participation, and challenges and benefits of such participation. By recognising these factors, a comprehensive understanding of women's participation in Islamist movements, particularly women's involvement in HTI and WI will be gained.

Conclusion

From the above exploration, it may be noted that, firstly, there is ongoing considerable debate among scholars with respect to whether women's involvement in the Islamist movement can be regarded as a form of oppression. Some argue that women's participation is a form of women's oppression through the enforcement of religious doctrines. Others, by contrast, contend that engagement in Islamist organisations may bring positive impacts to women's lives. This thesis seeks to test both propositions by conducting fieldwork research in two Islamist organisations which have been operating in Indonesia: HTI and WI. Secondly, this thesis applies the idea of a politics of piety as a theoretical framework, following Saba Mahmood. From this perspective, women's involvement in the Islamist movement views the movement as one oriented to reforming both self and society according to Islamic prescriptions. Thirdly, in the Indonesian context, there are three strands of the secular women's movement: which does not take religion as the core of its movement, Islamic referring to a movement which combines Islamic literature and secular sciences such as sociology and tends to reinterpret religious texts following feminist-gender perspective, and Islamist which applies a textual religious understanding which rejects feminism. While some scholars argue that the Islamist movement is not likely to be in line with the aims and

objectives of the secular and Islamic women's movement. However, this thesis resists constructions of women involved in Islamist organisations in Indonesia as simply oppressed by both patriarchal and religious structures. Rather, the empirical work of studying HTI and WI as Islamist organisations with specific roles for women as active agents in Islamic work reveals the socio-political and cultural factors at play in the emergence of an Islamist women's movement. The next chapter traces the historical relationship between Islam and the Indonesian state, to discuss how the emergence of the women's movement had been shaped by the interplay of these factors.

CHAPTER THREE
THE EMERGENCE OF THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AND THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

Introduction

Following Rinaldo's argument that the 'relationship between religion and the state have consequences for how religion is understood, as well as for gender and women's movement',[132] in this chapter, I would like to draw out the dynamics and fluctuating relationships between the Indonesian government and Islam from the early period of Indonesia's independence, and even before it. Through this historical trace, I argue that the state is one factor that has contributed to the emergence of the Indonesian Islamist movement. Also, the Indonesian Islamist movement is multi-faceted, thus it is impossible to offer a universalistic view of Islamist organisations or a unitary perspective. Within the movement, there are complicated interplays and sophisticated dynamics so that careful analysis is necessary. Likewise, this chapter explores the history of the Indonesian women's movement, to examine women's involvement both before and after Indonesian independence. Based on this historical overview, I argue that the Indonesian women's movement is very dynamic and has made a significant contribution to Indonesia's independence and development. I also note that the Indonesian state has acted to both weaken and to strengthen the women's movement.

Dynamic Relationship between the Indonesian State and Islam: Pre-Independence

The history of Indonesia's anti-colonial struggle and creation as an independent nation with basic foundations of state structures, sovereignty and borders cannot overlook the pivotal role of Islam. Debates about the involvement of Islam in Indonesia's pre-independence political landscape have

[132] Rachel Rinaldo, 'Envisioning the Nation: Women Activists, Religion and the Public Sphere in Indonesia', in *Social Forces*, Vol. 86, No. 4, June 2008, pp.1784

centered on the relationship between the state and Islam. This is seen in the debate in the journal *Panji Islam*[133] during the early 1940s between Sukarno, the leader of the Indonesian Nationalist Party and later first President of Indonesia, and Mohammad Natsir, subsequent leader of the Islamic *Masyumi* Party.

Sukarno's support for Mustafa Kemal's initiative to eliminate the Islamic Caliphate in the 1920s in Turkey triggered the debate. Although Sukarno claimed that his writing was only an academic contribution to understand the political changes taking place in Turkey, some of the political and intellectual elite at that time regard it as a different view to that promoted by Natsir. For Natsir, Sukarno's stance supported the separation of Islam and state.[134]

Sukarno did not acknowledge the integration of Islam and the state because he thought it was inappropriate to do so in a country like Indonesia. This is because the population is exclusively Muslim. Forcing unification could lead to discrimination against non-Muslims:

> Thus, reality show us, that the principle of the unity of religion and the state in which its inhabitants are not 100% Muslim, could not be in line with the principle of democracy. For such a country, there are only two alternatives, there are only two choices: the unity of the state and religion, but without democracy; or democracy, but the state is separated from religion! The unity of the state and religion, but disobeying democracy and creating dictatorship, or: adhering democracy, but taking off the principle of the unity the state and religion.[135]

However, this does not necessarily mean that Sukarno completely rejected religion's role in the state. He disagreed, rather, with a formal legal relationship between religion and the state, as enshrined in a Constitution. Through his substantial interpretation of religious thought, Sukarno

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[133] Arskal Salim,'Discourse on Democracy within Debates on State-Islam Relations in Indonesia', *Journal of Indonesian Islam,* Vol., 2, no., 01, June, 2008, p. 113

[134] Noer, 'Pengantar ke Pimikiran Politik,' pp. 187-205, in Arskal Salim, 'Discourse on Democracy within Debates on State-Islam Relations in Indonesia', *Journal of Indonesian Islam,* Vol., 2, no., 01, June, 2008, p. 113

[135] Seokarno, "Saya Kurang Dinamis," *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, h. 452 in Bahtiar Effendi, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia (Islam and the State: The Transformation of Islamic Political ideas and Practices in Indonesia),* Paramadina, Jakarta,1998, p. 75-76

argued that Islamic values would be included in government policies through parliamentary consensus. In view of being in the majority, Indonesian Muslims could set and determine the state's agenda to coincide with the zeal of Islamic values. Therefore, for Sukarno, the authenticity of an Islamic state was not indicated by formal or legal acceptance of Islam as a sole basis of the state, but rather as the embodiment of the flame and the spirit of Islam in state policies.[136]

Conversely, Natsir was a defender of the concept of the unity of religion and the state in the form of legal and formal structures to position Islam as its ideological and institutional basis. Natsir, like other Muslims in Indonesia, accepted the idea of holistic Islamic precepts encompassing all aspects of life, including the political realm. For him, Islam not only contains ritual practices such as prayer, fasting and so forth, but also outlines general principles guiding relations between individuals and society.[137]

However, he realised that the traditions of the Qur'an and Prophet Muhammad did not have the wherewithal "hands and legs" to insist authoritatively that individuals and society abide by the rules of Islam. As a result, Islam needed the power of the state as an instrument to enforce the implementation of Islamic laws in society.[138] Therefore, Natsir claimed that Islam and the state were two religiopolitical entities that could not be separated. Acknowledging that Islam provided general guidelines only, rather than detailed instructions as to how the state should be organized and ruled, he argued that the Islamic state depended on the ability of its leaders to make their own *ijtihad* ('independent judgment') based on democratic principles.[139] By doing so, Islam could meet the challenge of modernity. [140] Basically, Natsir agreed with democracy, as did Sukarno.

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[136] Bahtiar Effendi, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia (Islam and the State: The Transformation of Islamic Political ideas and Practices in Indonesia),* Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003, pp. 75-76
[137] Bahtiar Effendy, *Ibid.,* pp. 25-26
[138] Bahtiar Effendy, *Ibid.,* pp. 25-25
[139] Luthfi Assyaukanie, 'Democracy and the Islamic state: Muslim Arguments for Political Change in Indonesia', *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies*, 2004, pp. 36-8
[140] Bahtiar Effendy, *Op. Cit*., pp. 25-26.

However, their understanding of democracy was limited to a procedural, or "electoral" democracy, which had three main functions: to elect leaders, monitor the leader through parliament, and encourage people's participation. However, they overlooked the substantive values of democracy such as political equality or minority rights [141].

The debate between Sukarno and Natsir was interrupted by the Japanese invasion and occupation of the archipelago in 1942,[142] but it recommenced during sessions of *BPUPKI*, the Commission of Inquiry into preparatory Measures for Indonesian Independence. BPUPKI was established on 29 April 1945 to prepare for Independence.[143] The Commission met twice, from 29 May to 1 June and 10 to 17 July 1945. [144] In addition to the central issue of the relationship between the state and Islam, several other issues were hotly debated in these meetings, such as whether the president should be a Muslim, whether Islam had to be the state religion, the necessity of having a state apparatus and agencies to apply the rule of Islam, and whether Friday should be a public holiday.[145] There was no agreement, especially with respect to the relationship between the state and Islam. Thus, on 10 July 1945, a sub-committee called the "Committee of Nine" was established to consider these issues and give advice. After intense discussion, both the secular nationalist and Islamic nationalist groups reached a compromise by accepting Sukarno's initial concept of *Pancasila,* or the Five Pillars of the state. These are: (1) Indonesian nationalism, (2) Internationalism or humanitarianism, (3) deliberation or democracy, (4) social welfare, and (5) belief in God.[146] However, there was a significant change to its original content. A document resulting from the Committee of Nine's deliberations was the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*),

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[141] Luthfi Assyaukanie, Op. *Cit.,* pp. 32-46
[142] Bahtiar Effendy, *Op. Cit*., p. 27
[143] Arskal Salim,' *Op. Cit*., pp. 116-7, and Moch Nur Ichwan, Secularism, Islam and Pancasila: Political Debates on the Basis of the State in Indonesia, article presented at the Section for Islamic Area Studies, Institute of Asian Culture, Sophia University, 25 February 2011.
[144] Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, 2009, p. 89
[145] Bahtiar Effendy, *Op. Cit.,* p. 29.
[146] Moch Nur Ichwan, Op. *Cit.,* pp. 8-9

which was proposed as Preamble for the new Constitution. This a second version of *Pancasila* was as follows: 1) Belief in God with an obligation to carry out the Islamic *sharia* for believers; 2) Just and civilized humanity; 3) Unity of Indonesia; 4) Democracy guided by inner wisdom in unanimity arising from deliberation amongst representatives; and 5) Social justice for all of the people of Indonesia.[147]

However, because of disagreements among non-Muslims living in eastern Indonesia about the obligation to observe the Islamic *sharia* for believers, the Jakarta Charter version of the Preamble was dropped before the 1945 Constitution was promulgated. Thus, the final draft of *Pancasila,* in the Preamble of the Constitution, underwent minor changes to the first principle making it: "Belief in One Almighty God".[148] Debates over the Jakarta Charter and its implementation surfaced quite often in the subsequent political history of Indonesian independence.

The State and Islam: Sukarno's Government

In order to understand how the Indonesian government at the time responded to Muslim aspirations, as represented by Islam-based political parties, mass-based Islamic organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah[149], and fundamentalist Islamic movements such as

[147] Moch Nur Ichwan, *Ibid.,* pp. 8-9
[148] Moch Nur Ichwan, *Ibid*., p. 9.
[149] Muhammadiyah was formed in 1912 by a reformist Islamic scholar, KH. Ahmad Dahlan. Through this organisation, he intended to clean Islamic worship from the influences of local traditions that are not in accordance with Islamic tradition. Meantime, NU was established in 1926 in East Java by a traditionalist Islamic scholar (*kiyai*), KH. Hasyim Asy'ari. In its early emergence, NU aimed to counter two ideological streams of Islamic movements: the reformists who critique Islamic traditionalists and the political Islamic organisations which NU deemed these parties have been contaminated by Marxist ideas. Both groups played a significan roles in Indonesian independence, even if they utilised different ways against colonials. Furthermore, these organisations have women's wings; Muhammadiyah has Aisyiyah and NU has Muslimah NU. Pieternella Van Doorn-Harder, *Op. Cit*., pp. 72-81. Aisyiyah was established on 19 May 1917 and the existence of Muslimah NU was recognised by male leaders of NU in the 1930s, but NU women initially were only ordinary members and not entitled to be part of the leadership. In 29 March 1946, however, Muslimat NU was officially formed and became autonomy or an independent organisation. See Aisyiyah, Sejarah Aisyiyah, available in http://www.aisyiyah.or.id/en/page/sejarah.html, and MNU online, Sejarah Muslimat NU, available in https://www.muslimat-nu.com/sejarah-muslimat-nu/, accessed on 29 June 2019

Darul Islam[150], it is necessary to divide Sukarno's era into two phases: from 1949 to 1957, in which the government ruled with a liberal, or parliamentary, democracy as the system of administration; and from 1959 to 1965, which was the era of "Guided Democracy". There were significant differences between the state's attitudes toward Muslim aspirations during the two phases.

During the first 'parliamentary democracy' period, Islam was appreciated more by the state. In the political sphere, political parties based on Islam emerged. In the first national elections for the House of Representatives and Constitutional Assembly held by the new government in 1955, ten Islam-based political parties took part, though only two were successful in the Constitutional Assembly: Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, or the Consultative Assembly of Indonesian Muslims), with 20.6 percent of the vote, and NU (Nahdlatul Ulama or the Revival of Islamic Scholars Party) with 18.5 percent.[151] The result was significant and influenced the Constitutional Assembly because it created a balance between Islamic parties supporting Islam as the basis of the state and secular parties such as PNI (Partai National Indonesia or Indonesian National Party) and PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia or Communist Party of Indonesia), promoting a separation between Islam and the state, and arguing that *Pancasila* was the sole basis of the Indonesian state.[152] As a result, old, prolonged, and unresolved debates about the state's ideological basis resurfaced.[153] Islam also experienced a process of institutionalisation in the creation of the Ministry of Religious of Affairs, the Islamic Educational Institution, [154] and 'the nationwide proliferation of Sharia courts'.[155]

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[150] The *Darul Islam* movement was operated in West Java. It wanted to establish Islamic state as opposed to Indonesian government in 1940s. Kartosuwiryo led this group.
[151] Anies Rasyid Baswedan, 'Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory,' *Asian Survey*, pp. 670-671.
[152] Arskal Salim, *Op. Cit.,* p. 15
[153] Anies Rasyid Baswedan, *Op. Cit.,* p. 671
[154] To get the complete explanation of two both institutions, see B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, Hijhoff, The Hague, 1971, pp. 105-122
[155] Andreas Ufen, Mobilising Political Islam: Indonesia and Malaysia Compared, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 3, July 2009, p. 315

The second stage of the Sukarno era created strained relations between Islam and the state, as the system of parliamentary democracy was transformed into one of 'guided democracy'. Sukarno's leadership was characterised as dictatorial and authoritarian[156] because he closed the Constitutional Assembly, which is where the institutions of Islam were important politically and formally as a means of channelling aspirations such as calls to struggle for an Islamic state, or at least the re-establishment of the "Jakarta Charter", which detailed the obligation of all Muslims to obey sharia law. Dissolving the Constitutional Assembly meant that Islamic-based political parties lost a constitutional or formal channel for their struggle. This was exacerbated by the dissolution of Masyumi in 1960 based on the unproven accusations by the government[157] that it was involved in the rebellion. [158] The only Islamic party that survived in the era was NU; the other Islamic parties were paralysed.[159]

Another factor contributing to tensions between Islam and the state was the central role of the PKI, (the Communist Party), which pretended to acknowledge *Pancasila* as justification for fighting the Islamic bloc [160] in Indonesian politics. This alarmed many Muslims since in their view, the Communist Party with its strong ethnic and international Chinese connections was a major enemy,[161] although some Muslims and even *Ulama* (Islamic clerics) were Communist. Initially, Sukarno's system of Guided Democracy gained the support of the military, the Indonesian

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[156] Arskal Salim, *Op. Cit.,* p. 119, and Andreas Ufen, Mobilising Political Islam: Indonesia and Malaysia Compared, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics,* p, 314

[157] Arskal Salim, *Ibid*., p. 119

[158] On February 1958, *Masyumi* got involved in 'creating an alternative government under the name of the Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic (*PRRI, Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*)' for saving democracy from Sukarno's authoritarian system of 'Guided Democracy'. It called for the Jakarta Government to implement consistently the Constitution and democracy and used radical act due to the failure of negotiating method in the call for their objectives. Luthfi Assyaukanie, 2009, *Op. Cit.,* p. 76

[159] Anies Rasyid Baswedan, *Op. Cit.,* p. 671

[160] Luthfi Assyaukanie, 2009, *Op. Cit*., p. 93

[161] Martin Van Bruinessen, 'Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of State-Islam Relations in Indonesia' in Ingrid Wessel (ed.), *Indonesian am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts*, (Hamburg: Abera-Verlag), pp. 19-34. Available at http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/let/2007-0323-200437/bruinessen_96_islamicstateorstateislam.pdf. Accessed on 18 April 2012

Communist Party and the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI). In addition, Sukarno paralysed the Islamic rebellion by capturing Kartosuwirjo, the leader of Darul Islam, in West Java in 1962, and crushing the rebellion in South Sulawesi led by Kahar Muzakkar after he was shot in early 1965. [162] In this regard, suffice to say that Muslim aspirations, as demonstrated by various actors and institutions, were paralysed during the late Sukarno era.

The State and Islam: Suharto's Government

The New Order Era under Suharto can be divided into two distinct phases, regarding his arrangements for relations between the state and Islam. The first period was one of 'restriction' of Muslim aspirations between 1968 and 1980, while the second was one of 'accommodation', between 1990 and 1998.[163] Efforts to accommodate Islam during his late Presidency, however, were motivated by political considerations. He had come to realise that military support for his regime was decreasing, forcing him to seek support from other sources. Because Muslim political aspirations were growing, Suharto tried to encourage these interests in the hope of gaining their support.

With the ascension of Suharto in 1966 as the second President of Indonesia, leaders and activists of political Islam saw a glimmer of hope that the new regime would accommodate Muslim aspirations. These hopes were based on Suharto's release of many former Masyumi leaders and other members who had been jailed during Sukarno's era of Guided Democracy. Unfortunately, they miscalculated Suharto's political manoeuvres because he himself made it clear that there was no question of rehabilitating Masyumi *as a* political movement. Effendi quotes Harold Crouch who argued that 'the army would not countenance the revival of the party (Masyumi)'.[164]

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[162] Martin Van Bruinessen, *Ibid.,* and Andreas Ufen, Mobilising Political Islam: Indonesia and Malaysia Compared, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*.
[163] Donald J. Porter, *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia*, Routledge Curzon, London, 2002, p. 3
[164] Bahtiar Effendi, *Op. Cit.,* p, 45

With this statement, reinvigorating Masyumi was far from a reality. The military-style leadership of the new regime ruled with heavy-handed regulation of political Islam, to establish Islam as a state ideology. Given the unfavourable response of the military regime to the aspirations of political Islam. Masyumi leaders initiated a new Islamic party with the same character, spirit, and goals of Masyumi, but under a different name. This party would become a receptacle *(wadah)*[165] to accommodate Muslim aspirations. On 7 April 1967, a committee to negotiate with the new regime was founded, and on 20 February 1968 Partai Muslim Indonesia (Parmusi, the Indonesian Muslim Party) was established.[166] Suffice to say that the state's response and policies related to political Islam contributed to the setting up of an alternative strategy from an Islamic political party, and the movement more generally.

Heavy-handed regulations imposed by the military regime are evidence of the suppression of the diversity of political aspirations both for secular political parties and also Islamic parties. This became even clearer when Suharto announced a "party fusion" policy after the first general election of the New Order Era in 1971. The policy necessitated all Islamic parties to be united in one party, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, the United Development Party) with nationalist and Christian parties united in the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI, the Indonesian Democratic Party). The Government itself used the Golongan Karya (Golkar, the Functionalist Group),[167] a party established by Suharto's regime as a new political vehicle. Thus, formally and practically, only three parties were acknowledged by the regime.

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[165] "Wadah, literally translated, means bowl or receptacle. *A Wadah* will *menampung* (catch or receive) the contents of whatever is placed or poured into it. Politically, the term wadah is used to refer to a formal political entity which receives and retains the aspirations of similarly oriented people grouped within it", see Allan Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics", *Asian Survey* 8, no. 12, 1968, p. 1006

[166] Bahtiar Effendi, *Op. Cit.,* p, 45.

[167] Noorhaidi Hasan, 'Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Suharto,' *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities,* Vol. 1, 2008, p. 25

Regarding non-political organisations such as the Islamic or *da'wa* (proselytization) movement, mainly on secular campuses, Suharto's regime in the late 1970s conducted a program called "normalisation of campus life" (*normalisasi kehidupan kampus*). This aimed to depoliticise or 'clean up' activities and campus life from through a series of restrictions on student organisations.[168] This did not necessarily shut down student activities on campus, even though these activities were both frequent and significant. Nonetheless, as Donald J. Porter argues, student activists were forced to rethink their movement and activities:

> The policy of campus normalization forced student activities underground as students joined a proliferating number of unmediated Islamic organisational cells and study group. Mosques, both on and off campus, became a new focus of religious-political activities and discussion groups and helped fuel an Islamic awakening.[169]

In the 1980s, the regime again demonstrated its authoritarian management of various interests and demands, through a policy that required all political parties, mass-based organisations and Islam-based organisations to adopt "*Pancasila*" as their "*asas tunggal*" (sole principle).[170] This attempt at ideological uniformity forced Islamic parties and Islamic organisations such as NU to change their basic ideology, from religious to secular *Pancasila.*[171]

It can be argued, therefore, that the resurgence of the Islamist movement in terms of both the radical and non-radical forms in post-New Order Indonesia was a product of Suharto's dictatorship. Donald J. Porter argues that the presence of educated activists and campus-based organisations was caused by Suharto's repressive policies toward Islam. These policies were 'part of a de-politicisation of society and emasculation of the political party system'.[172] The campus-based movement began in Bandung, West Java in the 1970s, mostly in ITB (Bandung Institute of

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[168] Donal J. Porter, *Op. Cit.,* p. 2
[169] Donal J. Porter, *Ibid.,* p. 2
[170] Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslim and Democratization in Indonesia*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J, 2000, p. 121
[171] Bahtiar Effendi, *Op. Cit*., p., 132.
[172] Donal J. Porter, *Op. Cit.,* p. 2

Technology), in the *Salman* mosque on campus. The *da'wa* progress started in the mosque and was conducted by an electrical engineer, M. Imaduddin Abdulrahmin. His degree was from ITB, and he had a Master's degree from Iowa State University. After completing his study, he returned to ITB as a lecturer. According to him, ITB is a very secular campus, so he was prompted to get involved in a series of Islamic training activities.[173] In the 1970s, with assistance from the Kuwait-based International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations (IIFSO), of which Imaduddin was General Secretary, he set up on Islamic training program, the so-called 'Training of *Da'wa* Fighters' (*Latihan Mujahid Dakwah*, LMD) at ITB. This program was intended for preachers and openly followed of other campuses. Those preachers would be taught that Islam not only encompasses doctrines, rituals and worship, but also comprises social, economic, and political principles. This idea is called Islam *kaffa* (comprehensive Islam).[174] Training took the form of '*Mentoring Islam* (Islamic Course) and *Studi Islam Terpadu* (Integrated Study of Islam)'.[175]

The LMD program successfully spread to several campuses partly due to DDII's[176] sponsor. DDII initiated a project called Bina Mesjid Kampus (Campus Mosque Training), that is, creating mosques and Islamic centres in a number of Universities such as the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, the Andalas University in Padang, the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, the Dipenogoro University in Semarang, the 11 March State University in Solo, and

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[173] James J. Fox, 'Currents in Contemporary Islam in Indonesia', paper presented at Harvard Asia Vision 21, 29 April- 1 May, 2004, p.10

[174] Din Wahid, 'The Challenge of Democracy in Indonesia: The Case of Salafi Movement', *Islamika Indonesiana*, 1:1, 2014, p. 54

[175] Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia, Dissertation at Utrecht University, 14 June 2005, p. 36

[176] Due to a policy of party fusion and a series of Suharto's pressure, some former leaders of Masyumi, particularly Muhammad Natsir, initiated a *da'wa* organisation in 1967, that is, Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, DDII). This organisation became a non-political instrument for Natsir and some former Masyumi's leaders in struggling for the enactment of the Jakarta Charter containing Muslim's obligation to fulfill Islamic law. Natsir argues that 'before we used politics ad way to preach, now we use preaching as a way to engage in politics. Within his *da'wa* activities, Natsir targeted Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*), mosques, and university campuses as objects of *da'wa*. See, Noorhaidi Hasan, Ibid., p. 32, and International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix, 13 September 2004, p. 6

others. DDII's cadres who had mostly graduated from Middle Eastern universities, promoted the use of these mosques and centres as a medium to 'offer Islamic training programs to university students and introduce them to the thinking of the main Islamist ideologues.[177] Zeal to learn Islamic thought also reached Hasanuddin University (Unhas) in Makkassar, South Sulawesi.[178]

However, there was a significant shift in Suharto's policies in the 1990s to one of accommodating Islam or the "*program penghijauan*" (greening), which allowed female students to wear headscarves (*jilbab*) at school, enhanced state financial support for the building Islamic Universities and mosques, and established the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI).[179] The policy was not driven purely by Suharto's appreciation of the importance of the diversity of Muslim demands or interests, but rather, was motivated more by Suharto's political calculation; according to Andreas Ufen:

> …. state-led Islamisation was both a reaction to the embracing of religious ideals within society and a means of weakening the opposition: a conservative Islam is easily employable against alleged 'westernisation' and against pro-democratic forces. Furthermore, in Suharto's neo patrimonial system, 'greening' served the purpose of weakening a military faction around the intelligence chief Benny Murdani. [180] [181]

Forms of Islamic radicalism or fundamentalism emerged as a consequence of Suharto's dictatorship between the 1970s and the early 1980s. An official report from the government was delivered by Sudomo, a former Commander of the Command for Restoration of Security and Public Order (*Pangkokamtib*). In a meeting between Sudomo, Minister of Religion, Alamsyah and

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[177] Noorhaidi Hasan, *Ibid.,* p. 36
[178] Din Wahid, *Op. Cit.,* p. 54
[179] For complete information about this matter, see Noorhaidi Hasan, *Op. Cit*., 2008, *and,* Donal J. Porter, *Op. Cit.,* and Andreas Ufen, *Op. Cit.,*
[180] Benny Murdani whose full name is Leonardo Benjamin Moerdiono was a former Defense Minister and Commander of the Armed Forces Indonesia from 1983-1988 and also was former Commander of the Command for Restoration of Security and Public Order (*Pangkokamtib*). As a former commander of the *Pangkokamtib* in the New Order Era, through intelligence channel he was in charge of the control of the State's security and stability. Republika News, 'Hong Gie, 'Arsitek Intelejen itu Telah Pergi', 30 August 2004. Available in http://www.polarhome.com/pipermail/marinir/2004-August/000356.html, accessed on 14 June 2012.
[181] Andreas Ufen, *Op. Cit*., p. 318

a number of *ulamas*, intellectuals and religious leaders on 20 April, 1981,[182] five Islamist groups were identified as conducting terrorist activities. The first group was Komando Jihad (Jihad Commando), led by Haji Ismail Pranoto. It had conducted a series of bombings in several places in Indonesia, such as Bukit Tinggi, Padang, and Medan in 1976. The second was Front Pembebasan Muslim Indonesia (Front of Indonesian Muslim Liberation), led by Hasan Tiro in 1977. This group committed terrorist acts in Aceh in support of an independent Aceh state.[183] The third was *Pola Perjuangan Revolusioner Islam* (the Model of Revolutionary Islamic Struggle), led by Abdul Qadir Jaelani. It attacked the People's Consultative Council Assembly building during its general session in March 1978.[184] The fourth was Warman, also known as "*Terror Warman*", or *Komando Jihad,* which committed a series of assassinations and robberies between 1978 and 1980. The last organisation, known as Dewan Revolutionary Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Revolutionary Council), was led by Imran M Zein, and was active between 1980 and 1981. It destroyed 'a number of government facilities' and hijacked a Garuda Indonesia airplane on 28 March 1981.[185]

The efforts of the New Order Era under Suharto to marginalise and suppress Islam through a number of policies to first depoliticise, and then to accommodate, political Islam's aspirations resulted in strong resistance from radical Islamist groups advocating violence. The Indonesian state's repressive and intolerant policies started with Sukarno and continued under Suharto, resulting in the radicalisation of some Islamic groups. Greg Fealy points out that one of the factors

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[182]Tempo Online,'Komando Jihad sudah Selesai', 25 April 1981, available in http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/1981/04/25/NAS/mbm.19810425.NAS50941.id.html, accessed on 15 June 2012.
[183] Tempo Online, *Ibid*.
[184] M Zaki Mubarak, *Genealogi Islam Radikal di Indonesia: Gerakan, Pemikiran, danProspekDemokrasi, (Genealogy of Radical Islam in Indonesia: Movement, Thought, and Prospect of Democracy)*, LP3ES, Jakarta, 2008, p. 67
[185] M Zaki Mubarak, *Ibid.,* p. 67, and Noorhaidi Hasan, *2008, Op. Cit.,* p. 27.

contributing to the rise of Islamic extremism was 'the lack of political opportunity and justice'[186] under both regimes.

Islam in the Reformasi Era

Suharto's overthrow due to pressure from several elements in society, such as student associations and Islamic groups, brought new hope for better social, economic and political outcomes and resulted in many changes to all levels of life, including freedom of the press, openly critical social movements, democratic elections in 1999, [187] and the setting up of political parties and organisations. [188] It is interesting to note that up to 15 April 1999, the Department of Information (Deppen, Departemen Penerangan) issued 852 broadcasting licenses (SIUPP, Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers). This number had increased sharply compared to Suharto's regime, when during the New Order Era lasting 32 years, the Department issued only 321 *SIUPP.*[189]

During the nine months after the fall of Suharto, more than 800 newspapers and magazines gained permission for publication.[190] Thus, it is not surprising that the mass media played a pivotal role in reporting information ranging from political issues and the *reformasi* agenda to social and religious issues. Equally important the mass media was becoming a favourite means by which political and religious leaders and intellectuals expressed different views on particular problems. The mass media became a forum in which diverse views and opinions were both interchangeable and competing.[191]

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[186] Greg Fealy, 'Can Indonesian Democracy Tame Radical Islamism', in Arnaud de Borchgrave, Thomas Sanderson, and David Gordon (ed), *Conflict, Community, and Criminality in Southeast Asia,* Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, 2009, p. 16. For further explanation about how some Islamic extremists were radicalised, see this book.
[187] M Zaki Mubarak, *Op. Cit., p. 109*
[188] Luthfi Assyaukanie, 2009, *Op. Cit*., p. 178.
[189] Candra Gautama, *Pers Indonesia PascaSoeharto: Setelah Tekanan Penguasa Melemah,* (Jakarta: LembagaStudiPersdan Pembangunan, 1999), p. 2
[190] Luthfi Assyaukanie, 2009, *Op. Cit.,* p. 178
[191] Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Ibid*

Another form of freedom ensured by post-Suharto transition governments was freedom of assembly and association, which encouraged the setting up of more than 200 mass organisations and political parties, [192] representing various forms of Islamic thought both conservative and liberal.[193] Freedom of assembly gave clandestine groups such as HTI the strategic momentum to freely and openly express their political views. The old debate about the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*) reappeared in Parliament, and the implementation of sharia and the founding of an Islamic state were advocated openly by Islamic movements and parties.[194]

Furthering the development of the role of political Islam, democracy in the *reformasi* era generated the democratic public sphere, [195] with competing Islamic political thought and debate occurring among various Islamist groups. Although there are many variants of Islamic thought and organisations, in general they are categorised by two features; cultural and political Islam. Cultural Islam is mainly moderate, tolerant, multi-cultural, pluralist, non-radical,[196] and avoids ideologising Islam at the state level.[197] This stream is represented by mainstream Islamic organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah. Among political Islam's characteristics is the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate or at least the implementation of sharia law[198]. These ideological characteristics are represented by Islamic groups or radical organisations

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[192] Candra Gautama, *Op. Cit*., p. 2
[193] Luthfi Assyaukanie, 2009, *Op. Cit*., p. 178
[194] Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Ibid*
[195] Jurgen Habermas, the German sociologist, introduced the concept of public sphere. He recognized that the public sphere is: first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed... Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion—that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions—about matters of general interest.' Habermas, Jürgen, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, translated by Thomas Burger, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 220
[196] Greg Fealy and Sally While, 'Introduction', in Greg Fealy and Sally While (ed), *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, ISEAS, Singapore, 2008
[197] Noorhaidi Hasan and Irfan Abubakar (ed), *Islam di Ruang Public: Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Demokrasi di Indonesia,* Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, 2011, p. 8
[198] For a little bit comprehensive features of political Islam, please see chapter two regarding the main characteristics of fundamentalism.

such as the Defenders of Islam Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), Jihad Troopers (laskar Jihad, LJ), Indonesian Council of Mujahidin (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI), HTI, and the Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII). [199]In this regard, Indonesian democracy resulted in two faces of the same sword; Islamist moderation, which adjusts to the values and principles of democracy, and radicalism, or militancy, which rejects even the use of the term 'democracy' to achieve implementation of sharia or establishment of an Islamic state.

Middle East's Influences in the dissemination of Islamist ideas in Indonesia

Although the internal political conditions of Indonesia have contributed to the emergence of Islamist ideas and movements, this might also be caused by external forces. I argue, therefore, that the development of the Islamist ideas and movements in Indonesia has been led by the simultaneous interplay between external and internal factors. Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy identify, at least, three external factors which have contributed to the transmission of Islamist thought, and these have then been channelled through the form of diverse collective movements: 'human movement, education and propagation, and publishing and the Internet'[200]. Firstly, human movement includes the departure of some Indonesian people to the Middle East to seek Islamic knowledge, which has lasted since the 16th and 18th centuries; the scholarships provided by Middle Eastern countries by government, non-government organisations, and rich individuals; and the training of some Indonesian people in Afghanistan.[201]Azyumardi Azra argues that the orthodoxy paradigm to understand Islam in Indonesia had partly resulted from the intensive communication between Indonesian students who were studying in the Middle East as well as haj (pilgrimages), especially in Haramayn (Mecca and Medina), and religious teachers and scholars (*ulama*) in these

[199] M Zaki Mubarak, *Op. Cit*., p., 110
[200] Anthony Bubalo & Greg Fealy, 'Between Global and the Local: Islamism, the Middle East, and Indonesia', the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution, 2005a, pp. 16-25
[201] Anthony Bubalo & Greg Fealy, *Ibid*., pp. 16-19

places.[202] Indonesian students have long travelled to the Middle East, particularly to Egypt and Saudi Arabia to attain the religious knowledge from the primacy sources of Islamic thinking, and also because of the excellent supervisory relationships under credible and authoritative teachers. Basically, those who went to the Middle East did not deliberately take Islamist ideas as their core concern or subject of discussion, but applied for courses in Islamic studies such as *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) and *usul ad-din* (theology). Possibly, it was their long-term living in these places that gave them knowledge of, and the sense of being informed by Islamist thought. This can be proven with the acknowledgment by two Indonesian students who studied at al- Azhar University, Cairo, one of whom admitted that Indonesian students socialised with the Brotherhood group. Another confessed that while in Egypt, Indonesian students read books and viewed broadcasts of one of the key think-tanks of the Brotherhood, Yusuf al-Qaradawi[203]. Such influences have politically equipped those students to take part in the democratic process in Indonesia.[204]

The large number of Indonesian students in the Middle East seeking Islamic knowledge has been encouraged by a wide range of scholarships provided by both Indonesian and Middle Eastern governments as well as individual donors. According to Bubalo and Fealy, full scholarships offered by the Saudi government have reached about 170 awardees annually, but this figure derives from three years ago[205]. In addition, universities are becoming study destinations include the most popular, al- Azhar University, Cairo, as well as the Islamic University in Madinah, Umm al-Qora University in Mecca, Al-Imam Mohammed bin Saud University in Riyadh, King Abdul Aziz University and King Fahd University in Dahran[206]. Additionally, the increase in study opportunities in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia, according to

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[202] Azymurdi Azra, 'Islam in Southeast Asia: Tolerance and Radicalism, paper presented at Miegunyah Public Lecture, The University of Melbourne, Wednesday 6 April, 2005, p. 8
[203] Anthony Bubalo & Greg Fealy, 2005a, *Op. Cit*., p. 17
[204] Anthony Bubalo & Greg Fealy, 'Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism, and Indonesia', in *the Lowy Institute for International Policy*, 2005b, p. viii
[205] Anthony Bubalo & Greg Fealy, 2005a, *Op. Cit*., pp. 17-18
[206] Anthony Bubalo & Greg Fealy, *Ibid.,* p. 17

Zachary Abuza, forms part of the Saudi way to disseminate Wahhabism[207] throughout Islamic countries as a counter to the spread of influence of the Shiite Iranian revolution in 1979.[208]

This form of human movement is also marked by evidence that around three hundred to six hundred Indonesian people have visited or undertaken orientation at the 'foreign mujahideen training camps in Afghanistan from the early 1980s until the mid-1990s',[209] and built networks with al-Qaeda's key figures and activists. These vanguards initiated the establishment of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group, advocating a terrorist approach to achieve its objectives.[210] It is worth noting, therefore, that Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Islamic Youth Movement (GPI) were two of the organisations playing a pivotal role in helping to send Indonesian mujahideen to Afghanistan.[211]

The Second means of disseminating Islamist ideas in Indonesia is through education and preaching (*da'wa*). Saudi funding support that comes either from its government or non-government sources has been directed to three Indonesian organisations whose core activities are *da'wa* (religious preaching): the Indonesian Islamic Predication Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII) that was established in 1967; the Islamic Association for Enlightenment (Jamiat Islam wal-Irsyad, well-known as al-Irsyad) that was launched in 1913; and lastly, the Islamic Association (Persatuan Islam, Persis) which was founded in 1924. Both al-

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[207] Wahhabism is 'a theological reform movement which was founded by Muhammad Bin Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). Its main goals are the call for people to return the purity of *tawhid*'s teachings (oneness of God or monotheism) and the reform, even the eradication, of arguably deviated traditional practices in the history of Islam such as going to charismatic figure's graves. Such practices are regarded as *shirk* (polytheism), *kufr* (unbelief in God), *ridda* (apostasy), and *bid'a(*innovations). Wahhabism is the use of 'a very strict and literal interpretation of monotheism to fight *shirk*'. For more detail, see Ahmad Moussalli, 'Wahhabism, Salafism, and Islamism: Who Is the Enemy?', Conflict Forum: Beirut-London- Washington, January 2009, p., 4.

[208] Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, p. 18

[209] Anthony Bubalo & Greg Fealy, 2005a, *Op. Cit*., p. 18

[210] Anthony Bubalo & Greg Fealy, 2005b, *Op. Cit.,* p. viii.

[211] Anthony Bubalo & Greg Fealy, 2005a, *Op. Cit.,* p.18

Irsyad and Persis have Islamic education institutions and are mostly characterised by Islamist teaching, while DDII is more focused on preaching (*da'w*a) activities. Through its leader, Mohammad Natsir who was one of the leaders of the prohibited Masyumi Islamic Party, DDII became as a vital vessel for the Saudi funding stream to Indonesia in the 1970s and 80s. Mohammad Natsir was a central figure at that time, highly venerated by Wahhabis and Salafist[212] in the Middle East[213].

Meanwhile, Middle Eastern countries such as Kuwait, Egypt, and other Gulf countries have played a significant role in the development of Islamic education in Indonesia. The real example of Saudi support to spread Islamist ideas through Islamic educational institutions is the establishment of the Indonesian Institute for Islamic and Arabic Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab or LIPIA). The institution was formed in 1980 and is an offshoot of Al-Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh. LIPIA is under the control of Saudi Arabian academics and administrators which, in practice, are managed by the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Jakarta.[214] It provides subjects in Arabic language and Islamic studies and postgraduate scholarships to the Al-Imam University for students of excellence. Most academic staff at LIPIA are from the Middle East and its school principal is always Saudi. In addition, the school also provides student tuition fees and a stipend in Indonesian currency. [215]

Although the institution acknowledges that its curriculum is inclusive, Wahhabi- Salafist ideas are clearly present. Ulil Abshar Abdallah (the founder of Indonesia's Liberal Islam Network,

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[212] Salafist or *salafi* is a transnational movement that is in the belief that the purest Islamic teachings and practices are what had been enacted by the Prophet Muhammad and two generations after him. Methodologically speaking, *Salafi* uses *tasfiyah*, applying method's purification of Islam from baseless innovation (*bid'ah*), idolatry (*syirik*), superstition (khurafat), and other deviant matters. For more detail see International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism mostly don't mix, 13 September 2004, pp., 2-3

[213] Anthony Bubalo & Greg Fealy, 2005a, *Op. Cit*., pp, 22-23

[214] Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia, Dissertation at Utrecht University, 14 June 2005, p. 42

[215] Anthony Bubalo & Greg Fealy, 2005a, *Op. Cit*., p. 21

JIL), an ex-student of LIPIA from 1988-1993, noted that the curriculum was 'in the nature' of Al-Imam University's, and Ibn Taymiyyah's ideas were taught. Furthermore, Ulil identified that a curriculum was inimical to Indonesian local customs and diverse religious performances. Another former student of LIPIA conceded that Wahhabi-Salafist thought was central.[216] Moreover, the teachings of authoritative Islamist figures such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyed Qutb, and Abu A'la al-Mawdudi may also have existed in the curriculum.[217] LIPIA has played a pivotal role, therefore, in the distribution of Wahhabi-Salafist ideas around Indonesia. According to ICG's investigation, there was no institution like LIPIA that had such an influence in disseminating Salafist ideas in Indonesia. This can also be seen from some alumnus of LIPIA becoming heads of Salafist Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) such as Yusuf Baisa and Ja'fat Umar Thalib. Salafist *pesantren* in the early 1980s comprised only a handful of educational institutions, but the number has currently increased to hundreds[218].

Lastly, Islamist teachings that came into Indonesia have been also channelled through the publication of Middle Eastern pamphlets, newspapers, and books.[219] DDII and LIPIA, for example, for the sake of their teaching and its propagation, have translated books authorized by Yusuf Qaradawi, Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Banna. Further, Islamic books translated from Arabic languages are commonly found in bookstores such as Gramedia book shop. Even the number of Salafist publishers has significantly increased.[220] Alongside this, the women's movements has developed because of the democratization of Indonesia in the *reformasi* era, and women have also become active in the Islamist movement.

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[216] Anthony Bubalo & Greg Fealy, *Ibid*., p. 21
[217] Noorhaidi Hasan, 2005, *Op. Cit*., p. 43
[218] International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism mostly don't mix, 13 September 2004, p. 10
[219] International Crisis Group, *Ibid*., p. 12
[220] Anthony Bubalo & Greg Fealy, 2005a, *Op. Cit*., p. 25-26

The Muslim Women's Movement in Indonesia

An exploration of the Muslim women's movement in Indonesia requires a definition of the term 'women's movement' used in this chapter, drawn from Elizabeth Martyn's work:

> Women's movements are… female-membership groups plus individual women who seek to represent women's interests, including practical and strategic[221] gender issues, as well as nationalist, class, ideological, religious and other identity issues. They have women-centred objectives and are involved in articulating women's demands, documenting women's conditions and endeavouring to make changes to society that are beneficial for women.[222]

Using the above definition, I consider the women's movement as the articulation of women's interests performed either individually or collectively. At the individual level, the emergence of the women's movement started with pioneers at the late nineteenth century, such as Raden Adjeng Kartini from Jepara (1879-1904). Some scholars recognised her as the first woman who struggled for women's rights. She was an Indonesian woman who was lucky, permitted to undertake education in the Dutch elementary school. Through this opportunity, she gained both Dutch and Indonesian friends, and kept in touch with them by means of letters, within which she frequently discussed 'the importance of education for girls and the predicament women faced because of the customs of polygyny and arranged child marriages.[223]

Kartini's letters were published in the form of a book entitled *Door Duisternis Tot Licht* in 1911, and her ideas spread once it had been translated into Indonesian by Armijn Pane, when it

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[221] Molyneux differentiates between practical gender interests and strategic gender interests. Strategic interests contain the analysis of women's subordination as well as the formulation of alternative and satisfied solution in resolving sort of women's subordination such as 'the abolition of the sexual division of labour and the alleviation of the burden of domestic labour and childcare'. Practical gender interests are originated from the real situation of women's positioning within gender-based society and the response of realised and current needs. So, in general the practical interests do not involve 'a strategic goal such as women's emancipation or gender equality'. See Maxine Molyneux, 'Mobilisation without Emancipation? Women's Interests, the State, and Revolution in Nicaragua', *Feminist Studies* 11(2), 1985, p.240

[222] Elizabeth Martyn, The Women's Movement in Post-Colonial Indonesia: Gender and Nation in a New Democracy, Routledge Curzon, London and New York, 2005, p.12

[223] Pieternella van Doorn Harder, *Women Shaping Islam: Reading the Qur'an in Indonesia*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 2004, p.31

was re-published under the title of *Habis Gelap Terbitlah Terang* (*From Darkness to Ligh*t).[224] Unlike radical feminists, Kartini never wanted to marginalise men, but rather asked them to work hand in hand with women in the struggle to improve women's rights and status. This is captured in a letter sent to her Dutch friend, Ny. Ovink-Soe,r in the early 1990s:

> …we will shake the Feudalism Building with all the power available to us, and if only there is only one piece of rock that falls down, we will perceive our lives are not in vain. But before that, we will try to obtain cooperation, even if it is only from the most excellent and educated men in Java. We will contact our educated and progressive men. We will try to gain their friendship and assistance, since we are not struggling to fight against men, but to oppose old-fashioned opinions and customs which are no longer useful to Java in the future. [225]

As well as Kartini, there have been other female figures who fought against colonialism and imperialism including Dewi Sartika from West java (1884-1947), Maria Walanda from North Sulawesi (1827-1924), and Tjut Nyak Dien from Aceh, Rahmah El Yunusiya (1901-1970), Nyai A. Dahlan from Yogyakarta (1912-1936), Rasuna Said from West Sumatera (1920), and several other female figures from throughout Indonesia.[226] Although this was before the formation of Indonesia as a nation-state, the presence of influential female figures had long existed in the archipelago such as Queen Sima of Tarumanegara, Sultanah Seri Tajul Alam Safiatuddin Johan from Aceh, and Siti Aisyah We Tenriolle from South Sulawesi.[227] Siti Aisyah, for example, became the governor of Sulawesi and its occupied regions around 1826. She replaced her grandfather, La Rumpang Megga Matinro Eri Moetiara. Not only was she capable of government, she also had a wide knowledge of Bugis literature, and during her rule, established the first public school for both boys and girls in 1908.[228]

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[224] Laely Armiyati, 'Perempuan Berjuang, Bukan Menantang: Studi Gerakan Perempuan Indonesia Menuju Kesetaraan (Women's Struggle, Not Resistance: Study of Indonesian Women's Movement toward Equality)', the paper written for the inauguration of Prof. Dr. Suswandri, M.Pd., as a professor of social science at the University of Muhammadiyah Prof. Dr. HAMKA, Jakarta, 29 November 2014, p. 6
[225] William H Frederick and Soeri Soeroto, *Pemahaman Sejarah Indonesia, Sebelum dan Sesudah Revolusi*, LP3ES, Jakarta, 2005, p. 243
[226] Wahyuddin Halim, Gender, Culture, and Development: Muslim Perspectives from South Sulawesi, Master thesis, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 2001, pp., 26-27
[227] Laely Armiyati, *Op. Cit*., p. 5
[228] Laely Armiyati, *Ibid.,* p. 5

Meanwhile, at the level of women's organisations, the first group that can be identified is the Putri Mardiko (Independent Women), founded in 1912 in Yogyakarta. Soon after this, several women's organisations were established, such as Putri Indonesia (Young Women), and Wanita Taman Siswa (Women in Education).[229] Similar to Kartini's concerns, these women's organisations also struggled for recognition of the importance of education for girls, and campaigned against child and forced marriage and other issues such as the practice of polygamy, as well as, trafficking of women and children.[230] Alongside these "secular" women's associations, religious Islam-based women's organisations were created from their central organisation such as Yong Islamieten Bond (a Young Muslim Women's Group)[231] and Muhammadiyah, establishing the autonomous unit for women Aisyiyah, in 1917 in Yogyakarta.[232]

The women's movement, therefore, might be split into the two streams: secular-nationalist and religio-nationalist. The former is represented by groups such as Putri Mardiko, and Wanita Taman Siswa, and the latter with groups such as Aisyiyah. Although both orientations of the women's movement had differences, to some extent they also had certain ideas in common. Both streams recognised that women play a pivotal role in improving the standard of national and religious life, and more importantly, in struggling for Indonesia's independence. However, these differences can be clearly seen in the first women's gathering held in 22 December, 1928 in Yogyakarta.[233] The Women's Congress was attended by around six hundred women as delegates of thirty women's organisations. At this meeting, the secular-nationalist groups proposed freedom of interaction and assembly between men and women whereas, the religious groups represented by Aisyiyah, rejected such suggestion, arguing that unrestricted mingling and dancing between

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[229] Wahyuddin Halim, 2001, *Op. Cit*., pp. 26-27 [230]
Pieternella van Doorn Harder, *Op. Cit*., p. 32 [231]
Wahyuddin Halim, 2001, *Op. Cit*., pp. 26-27
[232] Susan Blackburn, 'Indonesian Women and Political Islam', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 39(1), February 2008, p. 88
[233] Wahyuddin Halim, 2001, *Op. Cit*., p. 27

men and women was not in accordance with Islamic values, being regarded unethical. Furthermore, Aisyiyah, through its representative, Siti Moendjiah, agreed with polygamy, while most participants of the congress appealed against it. She argued that polygamy could possibly become a mechanism to protect for married men from infidelity, and unmarried women from free sex or prostitution.[234]

Apart from the different issues sounded by both streams in the first Women's Congress, the Congress was also a kind of declaration from diverse women's groups to be unified in fighting for national independence, and in advocating for women's problems at the national level. Before the Congress, women's movement had only addressed local issues or operated at the local level. In addition, one of significant outcomes of the national Congress was the establishment of the Federation of Indonesian Women' (Persatoean Perempoean Indonesia, PPI). Subsequently, the Federation's name was changed to the Indonesian Wives' Association (Perikatan Perhimpoenan Isteri Indonesia, PPII) which had varied programs, such as publishing magazines containing educational issues, and it set up the committee for abolition of trafficking in women and children.[235] The association consisted of several women's organisations, including Aisyiyah, the women's branch of Jong Islamieten Bond, Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union-Persis), and PSII, Sarekat Putri Islam (League of Muslim Women), Permi. The association also organised regular conferences.[236] The first conference was in 1935 in Jakarta, then in Bandung (1938), and later in Semarang (1941). The first conference created a new women's institution which was called the Indonesian Women's Congress (Kongres Perempuan Indonesia, KPI), to replace PPII. The new Congress functioned as an umbrella for all women's organisations at that time andpredominantly

[234] Pieternella van Doorn Harder, *Op. Cit*., p. 32
[235] Saskia E Wieringa, 'Pasang Surut Gerakan Perempuan Indonesia (Up and Down of Indonesian Women's Movement)', in Komnas Perempuan, *Perempuan dalam Relasi Agama dan Negara* (Women in Relation of Religion and State), Komnas Perempuan, Jakarta, 2010, p., 28. See also Wahyuddin Halim, 2001, *Op. Cit*., pp. 26-27
[236] Susan Blackburn, *Op. Cit.,* p. 88

focused its program on empowerment of women and poor, though most of its members were from the middle class, and consequently, there were middle class women's interests to be addressed. These women's meetings continued. A national women's meeting was held in December 1945 in Klaten, and the following year, the gathering was in Solo (1946). As an outcome of the both meetings, the Indonesian Women's Congress (Kongres Wanita Indonesia, KWI) was established as a federation for all women's organisations who supported Indonesian independence.[237]

The active political roles of the women's movement continued after Indonesian independence was won after the extended liberation war against the Dutch in 1949. As the first president, Sukarno enthusiastically encouraged and appreciated the important contributions of the women's movement in 'the national struggle'.[238] At that time, women played diverse roles in the struggle, such as founding public kitchens, giving medical aid, helping to build networks with several guerrilla groups, assisting in the smuggling of weapons, and so on.[239] Under Sukarno's new Constitution, women and men were treated equally in terms of legal and political rights. There were even women representatives in the Cabinet of Sukarno's regime: Maria Ulfah as Minister of Social Affairs and SK Trimurti as Labor Minister.[240] It does necessarily follow, however, that all the rules and systems regarding women have been entirely in their favour. The Marriage Law, for example, has not been changed.[241]Also in this period, awareness of Islam was more intensified, to become the nationalising spirit in which Muslims took part in the struggle for Indonesian independence.[242]

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[237] Saskia E Wieringa, 2010, *Op. Cit*., p. 29
[238] Saskia E Wieringa, 'Ibu or the Beast: Gender Interests in Two Indonesian Women's Organisations', in *Feminist Review*, No., 41, Summer 1992, p. 99
[239] Saskia E Wieringa, *Ibid* and see also Anton Lucas and Robert Cribb, 'Women's Role in the Indonesian Revolution: Some Historical Reflection', in *The Heartbeat of Indonesian Revolution*, ed., Taufik Abdullah, PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta, 1997, pp. 70-93
[240] Laely Armiyati, *Op. Cit*., p. 10
[241] Saskia E Wieringa, 1992, *Op. Cit*., p. 99
[242] Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town*, Gadjah Mada University Press, Yogyakarata, 1993, pp. 103-105

However, after Indonesian independence, particularly since the last decade of the 1950s, the unity of the Indonesian women's movement that had been its key characteristic during the national struggle, was gradually broken. This can be easily seen from the first democratic general election in 1955, in which various political parties formed their own women's wings. The unavoidable tension between nationalism and Islam emerged.[243] Indeed, within the national Islamic movement, there were two distinct orientations. On the one hand, the so-called moderate stream affirmed the nation-state system and felt it unnecessary to struggle for the implementation of sharia law, even less to set up an Islamic state. On the other hand, the so-called radical orientation rejected the notion of the nation-state and wanted to establish an Islamic state within which sharia law would be enacted. The latter was represented by Darul Islam, in its 'rebellion spanning the late 1940s to the early 1960s'. [244] Moreover, each of these orientations, after independence, were also distinctive in relation to women's involvement in public political activities. While the moderate stream has given wider support to women's participation in political arena, women in the radical stream, have vanished.[245]

Still in the last decade of the 1950s, it is also interesting to pay attention to look at the significant roles of leftist women's organisations, such as the Indonesian Women's Movement (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Gerwani). Gerwani was born from the previous women's organisation, Sedar Women's Movement (Gerakan Perempuan Sedar, Gerwis). Gerwis was established on 4 June 1950 in Semarang, and was a coalition of six women's organisations: the Indonesian Daughter Assembly (Rukun Putri Indonesia, Rupindo) from Semarang; Sedar Women Association (Persatuan Wanita Sedar) from Surabaya; *Istri Sedar* from Bandung; Indonesian Women's Movement (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Gerwindo) from Kediri; Madura Women; and the Indonesian Republic Daughters' Struggle (Perjuangan Putri Republik Indonesia) from

[243] Saskia E Wieringa, 2010, *Op. Cit*., p. 30
[244] Susan Blackburn, *Op. Cit*., p. 91
[245] Susan Blackburn, *Op. Cit.,* p. 90

Pasuruan. Gerwis consisted of members who were from different social backgrounds, but all took part in the national struggle. Indonesian independence and the abolition of feudal practices became the common ultimate objective of all members of Gerwis's members. Although the understanding of communist ideas was not equally spread throughout Gerwis's members, this notion was the ideological basis of their struggle in building the women's movement. Gerwis has often been supported by member's husbands, who were affiliated with Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI).[246]

At the first Congress in December 1951, Gerwis changed its name, becoming Gerwani. With this change, the organisation's membership became more inclusive, as religious and ethnic groups could be involved.[247] Gerwani then organised its program by publishing two magazines: *Kartini's Fire* (*Api Kartini*) and *Gerwani News* (*Berita Gerwani*). The former targeted the growing middle class and addressed issues, such as cooking, parenting, and fashion, but also examined feminist questions and leftist ideas such as the critique of imperialism. Meanwhile, the *Gerwani News* was an internal magazine which contained news in relation to the organisation's activities, such as conferences and reports of other women's organisations in socialist countries. While the former was published to attract middle class women's attention and assure them that Gerwani cared about women's traditional interests, the latter was more radical in its purpose of supporting cadres in the districts in their political tasks.[248]

Enter Suharto's government, the so-called New Order (*Orde Baru*, Orba) in 1966, and the women's movement landscape significantly changed. Saskia argues that Suharto's rule was not only characterised by women's suppression, but also by 'anti-communist, and Islamic

[246] Mustaqim, 'Gerwani: Sejarah Gerakan Perempuan yang Hilang (Gerwani: Women's Movement History Which is Lost)', in *PALASTRen*: Vol. 4, No. 2, December, 2011, p. 388
[247] Mustaqim, *Ibid*
[248] Saskia E Wieringa, 2010, *Op. Cit.*, p. 31

sentiment'.[249] Women's organisations which had hoped the second president of Indonesia would appreciate and give more space to women's political roles as Sukarno had, were sorely disappointed. For example, the roles and activities of women's Islamic organisations, slowly but surely, came under political pressure from Suharto's government. Although they were able to hold religious meetings and conduct charity work for the poor, they were prohibited from exposing unjust issues taking place under the New Order.[250] Another example of Orba's suppression of the women's movement is that in 1978, the Indonesian Women's Association (Persatuan Wanita Indonesia, Perwari)[251] was forced to officially merge into the government party (Golkar). In short, women's organisations which were not in line with the rules of the game enacted by the Ministry for the Role of Women and the Ministry for Social Affairs, as well as of Home Affairs, were at risk.[252]

According to Doon Harder, Suharto's policy in relation to women was driven by 'a combination of Javanese and Islamic idealizations of the perfect wife'.[253] Furthermore, she argues that Suharto tried to restrict women's roles to the domestic sphere by means of setting up women's organisations whose concerns were mainly centered on domestic activities. These organisations were Dharma Wanita (the Civil Servants' Wives Organisation), established in 1974); Dharma Pertiwi, which refers to Association for Wives of men working in the military, established in 1964;

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[249] Saskia E Wieringa, 'Islamization in Indonesia: Women Activists' Discourses', *Signs*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Autumn 2006a), p. 2
[250] Saskia E Wieringa, 2010, *Op. Cit*., p. 33
[251] *Perwari* is the amalgamation of two women's organisation; Indonesian Women's Association (Persatuan Wanita Indonesia, Perwari) and Women's Indonesian State (Wanita Negara Indonesia, Wani). The fusion occurred once the first women's organisations congress in 17 December 1945 in Klaten. Perwari is a social organisation based on the belief in the Supreme God, nationality, and citizenship. All members of Perwari had been given the political education in order that they were aware of their rights and responsibilities as citizen and mother. See Suratmin, Alfiah Muridan Noto: Tokoh Kongres Perempuan Indonesia 1 (Alfiah Muridan Noto: The Figure of Indonesian Women's Congress 1), available in http://bpad.jogjaprov.go.id/public/article/605/ALFIAH_MURIDAN_NOTO.pdf, accessed on 21 February 2017, p. 3
[252] Saskia E Wieringa, 2010, *Op. Cit*., p. 33
[253] Pieternella van Doorn Harder, *Op. Cit*., p. 43

[254] and an organisation for the program of family well-being (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, PKK). Dharma Wanita was formed to cater to the needs of men in their duties as part of the nation's apparatus. It 'espouses the ideology of "state Ibuism"[255], which defines women as the appendages of their husbands and casts female dependency as ideal'.[256]

Meanwhile, the PKK that had been established in 1957 was officially recognised by the New Order as an organisation under state regulations. During Sukarno's era, PKK functioned to resolve problems faced by an Indonesian society that was in the process of development. Its purpose was initiated in a seminar in Bogor conducted by the Department of Health in 1957. To follow up PKK's agenda, a working committee consisting of the departments of health, education, agriculture, religion, and some workers and women activists was formed. This committee drafted ten programs for PKK, which were first implemented in Central Java in 1960. However, this program was stopped due to the military coup to depose Sukarno. Under Sukarno's government, the PKK was an institution that was beneficial for grass roots or poor people, but the PKK in Suharto's era promoted state interests.[257]

In the mid-1960s, the PKK was reactivated by the wife of the Governor of Centre Java, Kardinah Supardjo Rustam, who initiated the project of PKK as part of a local development effort. The PKK was set up throughout Indonesia, and its programs encompassed government agendas and policies for women. These programs were developed and coordinated by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry for the Role of Women. The Home Affairs Minister's wife was

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[254] Pieternella van Doorn Harder, *Ibid*., pp. 32-33

[255] The term means that "the domestication of Indonesian women as dependent wives who exist for their husbands, their families, and the state'. See Julia I. Suryakusuma, 'The State and Sexuality in New Order Indonesia, in *Fantasizing the Feminine in Indonesia*, Ed. Laurie J. Sears., Duke University Press, Durham, N.C, 1996, p. 98

[256] Julia I. Suryakusuma, *Ibid.*, p. 98

[257] Ruth Indiah Rahayu, Militerisme Orde Baru dan Ideologi *Koncowingking*: Pengukuhan Ideologi Perempuan Indonesia secara Pemaknaan Kesatria Jawa, paper presented in Conference of Authoritarian Heritage in Indonesia, in 50th Anniversary of Sanata Dharma in collaboration with ELSAM-PUSDEP Sanata Dharma, Yogyakarta, 17-19 November 2005, p. 13

automatically appointed as chair of the PKK while the Minister became its adviser.[258] Its core program was education for family welfare. The PKK had been formed to accommodate, mobilise, and control women who were not the wives of military personnel or civil servant.[259] In practice, PKK activities included making wreaths, sewing, cooking. Following workshops for state ideological indoctrination, the PKK was ready to assist the government at any time. Through PKK, women were taught that they were not needed to conduct revolutionary activities like Gerwani had. Questioning and criticising women's subordination and suppression, and other political critiques meant to hold the government to account was reframed by the Suharto government as 'subversive'.[260]

The main duties of women's organisations that Suharto government had created mirror the Five Functions of Women, as outlined in *Panca Dharma Wanita* (Five duties of women). Suharto regarded *Panca Dharma Wanita* as a normative system, which underpinned the existence of Dharma Wanita, Dharma Pertiwi, and PKK. The Five Duties outlined *Panca Dharma Wanita* are: (1) women are men's companions; (2) women are mothers giving birth and caring for children for the nation's future generation; (3) women are managers of the household economy; (4) women are complementary to the household's main income; (5) women are active members of social organisations and good citizens.[261] In short, with *Panca Dharma Wanita* acted as the philosophical and normative basis of New Order-formed women's organisations, so it can be argued that Dharma Wanita, Dharma Pertiwi, and PKK are organisations through which the Suharto government defined and framed women as wives, as mothers, and as mothers of the state.[262] In other words,

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[258] Saskia E Wieringa, 2010, *Op. Cit*., p. 33
[259] Dwi Wulandari & Mytha Candria, 'Pemahaman Kader PKK terhadap Panca Dharma Wanita dalam Konteks Critical Discourses Analysis', Paper presented in the Seminary of National Culture in North Coast of Java, at the Department of Culture Science at Diponegoro University, 2012, p., 2
[260] Saskia E Wieringa, 2010, *Op. Cit*., p.34
[261] Ruth Indiah Rahayu, *Op. Cit*., p. 15
[262] Dwi Wulandari & Mytha Candria, *Op. Cit*., p. 1

the women's empowerment efforts under Suharto are reflected through his *housewife-isation*[263] and state *Ibuism* programs.

This does not necessarily mean, however, that there was no women's movement outside Suharto's arrangements. In the 1980s onwards, women's organisations in the form of non-political organisations or Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) emerged, as well as female Muslim and non-Muslim activists.[264] Their emergence was a critical response to Suharto's programs. Examples of non-political organisations include Annisa Swasti Foundation (Yayasan Annisa Swasti, Yasanti), established in 1982, and two years later, the Kalyanamintra Foundation was established. NGOs included Women's Solidarity (Solidaritas Perempuan in Jakarta), Women's Mardika Foundation (Yayasan Perempuan Mardikain Jakarta); Centre of Improvement of Women's Recourse (Pusata Pengembangan Sumberdaya Perempuan, PPSW in Jakarta); Women's Association for Justice (Asosiasi Perempuan untuk Keadilan, APIK in Jakarta); Study Centre for Women's and Children's Improvement (Lembaga Studi Pengembangan Perempuan dan Anak, in Yogyakarta); and Rfika Anisa in Yogyakarta. Also, several organisations used the term "gender" in their name's group such as Forum Setara, Group for Gender Awareness (Kelompok Sadar Gender in Surakarta); Group of Gender Workers of the Eastern Network (Kelompok Kerja Gender Jaringan Timur); and Group for Gender Transformation (Kelompok Kerja Transformasi in Aceh).[265] As well as these organisations, there were Muslim women's organisations that were wings of NU and Muhammadiyah: Muslimat NU and Aisyiyah[266]. Both groups existed before the

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[263] *Housewife-isation* program aims at to domesticate women's roles and 'the consolidation of a patriarchal state as part of an overall policy to "functionalize" the entire population'. See Pieternella van Doorn Harder, *Op. Cit*., pp. 43-44

[264] Rachel Rinaldo, 'Envisioning the Nation: Women Activists, Religion and the Public Sphere in Indonesia', in *Social Forces*, Vol. 86, No. 4, June 2008, pp., 1785-1786

[265] Tyas Retno Wulan, 'Pemetaan Gerakan Perempuan di Indonesia dan Implikasinya terhadap Penguatan Public Sphere di Pedesaan (Mapping out Women's Movement in Indonesia and Its Implication toward Publis Sphere's Strengthen in Village)', *Jurnal Studi Gender dan Anak*, Vol. 3, No. 1, January-June 2008, pp. 4-5

[266] Although operating under male-dominated organisation, both groups understand that women are entitled 'to interpret Islamic teachings. See Saskia E Wieringa, 2006a, *Op. Cit*., p. 5

1980s.[267] Meanwhile, at the level of individual, there were women activists such as Marcoes-Natsir, Farhak Ciciek, Musda Mulia, Wardah Hafidz.[268]

These women's organisations were generally characterised by their efforts to advocate for issues of women's rights and equality. Many in the 1990s were very active in setting up gender training to increase women's awareness of gender-based discrimination and the need to reform women's status in society. Gender issues were talked about the context of human rights and democracy. Likewise, many women's organisations-built relationships with other NGOs working on 'social justice, pluralism, political reforms, and human rights' issues.[269] Such ideas were more common in Indonesian society, both in general, and specifically among the women's organisations that had been supported by Western agencies. Western support took the form of either funding Indonesian NGOs, or inviting NGOs' members to attend a variety of international conferences on women's issues, such as an event initiated by United Nations in Beijing in 1995. Many NGOs were part of 'transnational feminist networks.[270]

Advocacy for women's rights and equality is not monopolised by "non-religious women's organisations but is also supported by the Muslim women's movement. As explained above, there is a Muslim women's movement, which includes both organisations and individuals taking part in the struggle for gender equality. Figures such as Musda Mulia usually gained their education from state Islamic campuses, through which they were introduced to Islamic thought and ideas appreciating that women ' were emerging globally and in Indonesia from the 1980s onwards'.[271]

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[267] Saskia E Wieringa, *Ibid.*, p. 5
[268] Saskia E Wieringa, *Ibid*., p. 5, and Susan Blackburn*, Op. Cit*., p. 95
[269] Suzanne Brenner, 'Private Moralities in the Public Sphere: Democratization, Islam, and Gender in Indonesia', *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 113, No. 3, p. 481
[270] Suzanne Brenner, *Ibid*., p. 481
[271] Susan Blackburn, *Op. Cit*., p. 95

At the level of the individual, Musda Mulia and Shinta Nuriyah[272] for example, are concerned about issues such as 'women's political leadership, women's position in the household and in marriage, and women's right to interpret the Qur'an and the hadiths'[273] (sayings, actions, and affirmations of the prophet of Muhammad). Furthermore, they have criticised the dominant understanding of women's *kodrat* (religiously determined nature). They argue that *kodrat* for women and men is only restricted to their physical attributes, that giving birth or menstruation relate only to women, and any arrangements about caring for children are socially constructed, including the gender division of labour.[274] At the organizational level, Rifka Annisa is an NGO formed in 1993 in Yogyakarta, which bases its ideas and activities on Islamic perspectives. Its activities range from providing advice and advocacy to women who have been abused, publishing counselling advice to 'public education and policy change regarding gender-based violence at the national level'.[275]

Even before the 1990s, there were Islam-based NGOs established in 1983, was the Association of Pesantren and Community Development (Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat, P3M), whose main goal is to promote social justice and transformation. To achieve this, P3M employs Islamic perspectives in collaboration with socio-cultural approaches. Early in its work, P3M addressed the issue of inappropriate use of Islam to justify a socioeconomic monopoly by certain classes in society. In the 1990s, P3M began to pay attention to women's issues by means of setting up workshops dealing with questions of 'women's sexuality, reproductive health, and rights; domestic violence; and women's treatment in *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence)'[276]. Masdar Mas'udi, director of P3M in 1997, when interviewed by Brenner,

[272] Musda Mulia is a lecturer at in series of Universities in Indonesia and former vice of general secretary of Fatayat-Muslimat NU and Shinta Nuriyah is wife of former Indonesian president, Abdurrahman Wahin (Gus Dur).
[273] Saskia E Wieringa, 2006a, *Op. Cit*., p. 7
[274] Saskia E Wieringa, *Ibid*
[275] Suzanne Brenner, *Op. Cit*., p. 482
[276] Suzanne Brenner, *Ibid*., p. 483

argued that democracy refers to 'respect for the equal rights of all persons":

> In democratic life, each person must have room to participate in collective life. But it's not just limited to public life. There's another. Some people, especially women, not only don't have a say in decisions about public affairs- it's still a problem for them even to make decisions that concern their own lives. Concerning their own bodies. How can we talk about the problem of democracy that is outward, public, while for them it's still so hard even to make decisions that involve their own selves? That's the issue. For women, reproductive rights themselves are something that's extremely fundamental if we want to talk about democracy in full, as a totality…We want to rebuild a religious discourse that is more empowering toward rights that until now have been diverted, that's all. (interview, Masdar Mas'udi, August 18, 1997).[277]

Together, the women's movement contributed to the democratic movement to overthrow Suharto's authoritarian regime in 1998. Phase after Suharto's downfall, that was known as *Reformasi* era, it gained significant momentum. This is partly because the new Indonesian government, under Habibie's presidency, recognised women's rights and allowed a wide range of women's organisations to appear. Under Habibie's government, the National Commission on the Elimination of Violence against Women (Komisi National Penghapusan Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan, KOMNAS Perempuan) was established as the state's response to women's demands for the abolition of women's violence, and for a voice in every state policy regarding women's matters, in order that such regulations did not encourage women's abuse.[278] Habibie also ratified the Law of Human Rights no. 39 in 1999, within which it was explained that state recognised women's rights as an essential part of human rights that must be protected. Articles 48 and 49 of the law states that (1) women are entitled to achieve the education they need; (2) women are entitled to elect and to be elected to work professional occupations, and political positions; (3) women are entitled to health and safety at work; and (4) special rights which are inherent to women

[277] Suzanne Brenner, *Ibid*

[278] Neng Dara Affiah, 'Gerakan Perempuan di Era Reformasi: Capaian dan Tantangan', paper dedicated to the commemorating of Kartini's day, 21 April 2014. Available in http://www.komnasperempuan.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/GERAKAN-PEREMPUAN-DI-ERA-REFORMASI_Neng-Dara-Affiah-21-April-2014.pdf, accessed on 27 February 2017

due to their reproductive function are ensured and protected by law. [279]

Moreover, the *Reformasi* government stipulated several policies that benefited women, such as Presidential Instruction (*Instruksi Presiden*, Inpres) no. 9 in 2000 issued by the President Abdurrahman Wahid, which advocated gender mainstreaming in a variety of development programs. This policy means that in making government regulations, gender considerations must be considered. Further change included the shift in terms from the "role of women" in the Broad Outlines of State Direction (*Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara*, GBHN)[280] into "women's empowerment". This change created the following shift in the name of Minister of the Role of Women" to the Ministry of "Women's Empowerment".[281]In 2004, Law on the Elimination of Domestic Violence No. 23, 2004, was enacted by the Indonesian government. This law aimed at to prevent all forms of violence against women in the household, to protect domestic violence victims, and to provide punishment for perpetrators of domestic violence.[282]

Alongside the *Reformasi* government's efforts to ensure women's rights, in this era, there were many religious and non-religious women's organisations established in many regions throughout Indonesia. For examples, the SAPA institute was established in 2007 in Bandung, to eradicate women's abuse, to ensure teenagers' reproductive rights, and to work towards village women's empowerment. In Semarang, Central Java, the Legal Research Center for Gender Justice and Human Rights (Pusat Penelitian Hukum untuk Keadilan Gender dan Hak Asasi Manusia, LKJHAM) focuses on violence against women, and women's economic rights, especially for migrant workers and former sex workers. In West Sumatra, Nurani Perempuan's programs

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[279]Undang-Undang No. 3 Tahun 1999 : Hak Asasi Manusia (Human Rights' Rule no. 39 Year 1999), available in http://tcsc-indonesia.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/134_UU_20No_2039_20Tahun_201999.pdf, accessed on 27 February 2017.
[280] GBHN is the second highest Indonesian law after UUD 45. It should be enacted by all state's executive departments such as People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), president, and vice president.
[281] Neng Dara Affiah, *Op. Cit*., p.6
[282] Neng Dara Affiah, *Ibid*., p. 6

advocate for victims of women's violence, help them to get justice, to lobby for policy to protect women, and to educate as well as to campaign publicly about the need to eliminate all forms of violence against women. In Bone, South Sulawesi, the Women's Empowerment Organisation (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Perempuan, LPP) focusses its activities on women's political education. Women's Voice (Suara Perempuan), established in Manado, North Sulawesi, addresses voting education for women, and has formed women's learning parks for mothers living in Timoho and Bajo.[283]

Regarding Muslim women's organisations, several groups were established in the 2000s. Rahima was formed on 5 August 2000 in Jakarta, as an NGO addressing women's empowerment from an Islamic perspective. In its early work, Rahima's program of critical education and providing information on women's rights was confined to Islamic boarding school *(pesantren*)'s neighbourhoods. In response to demand, Rahima extended its program's scope, reaching a variety of groups outside the *pesantren,* including local schools, teachers in both Islamic and non-Islamic schools, Islamic study groups, Muslim women's organisations, and student organisation.[284] Another is Fahmina[285]*,* which was formed in November 2000. It is an NGO whose vision is the establishment of human dignity and just civilization based on critical awareness of the *pesantren* tradition. To realise this vision, Fahmina set up five concrete programs: (1) improving religious critical discourse and transformative and liberated science; (2) strengthening the Islamic cultural movement for social transformation from Cirebon; (3) creating a conducive educational environment through which progressive and critical Islamic thinkers would be generated; (4)

[283] Neng Dara Affiah, *Ibid*., pp. 4-5

[284] See Rahima's official website, available in http://www.asienhaus.de/public/archiv/PaperPERDASHARIA.pdf, accessed on 27 February 2017.

[285] Fahmina consists of two words: "Fahm" and "Ina". "Fahm" is taken from Arabic word which means "understanding, reasoning, and perspective", while "Ina" refers to "Indonesia and We", So Fahmina signifies to our understanding, insights, or our perspective about religious texts and Indonesian social reality. Fahmina's profile in official website, available in http://fahmina.or.id/profil-yayasan-fahmina/, accessed on 12 November 2018

providing responsive, effective, and sustainable advocacy for Islamic groups; (5) strengthening and advancing Fahmina's capacity as an organisation.[286] Lastly, the Women's Islamic and Social Discussion (Perempuan Kajian Islam dan Sosial, LKIS) was established in 2006, to initiate deep discussions about, and training on women's rights in Islam. It publishes books about women's rights and advocates for victims of violence against women, particularly within the *pesantren* community and Islamic study groups.[287]

Affiah identifies some common issues that both the local and national women's movement addresses. They focus on the abolition of violence against women, women's voting education, women's participation in decision-making through promoting women's political leadership, village women's empowerment, justice for women victims of violence, the strengthening of women's economic rights in the form of cooperatives, particularly for migrant workers and former sexual workers, and lastly, campaigning for gender sensitive government funding.[288] The emergence of women's organisations advocating various concerns and different perspectives is a reflection of the r*eformasi* government's stated commitment to encourage women to take part in the Indonesian development and to ensure women's rights.

The *Reformasi* era is marked by increased freedom, democracy, and globalization; however, it also paved the way for Muslim women's organisations who are not in line with feminist ideas about gender. These groups are part of the conservative and fundamentalist Islamic movement.[289]The fundamentalist or Islamist women's movement is inclined to define women's principal roles as mothers and wives whose tasks are confined to the domestic realm. Regarding

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[286] See Fahmina's profile in official website, available in http://fahmina.or.id/profil-yayasan-fahmina/, accessed on 27 February 2017.
[287] Neng Dara Affiah, *Ibid*., p. 3
[288] Neng Dara Affiah, *Op. Cit*., p. 5
[289] Rachel Rinaldo, *Mobilizing Piety, Islam and Feminism in Indonesia*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, p. 183. See also Saskia E Wieringa, 'Women Resisting Creeping Islam Fundamentalism in Indonesia, *Sign, Journal for Women in Culture and Society*, vol. 32, No., 1, Autumn, 2006b, p. 21

women's sexuality in marriage, they argue that married women must service their husbands sexually.[290] According to Wieringa, the conservative and fundamentalist orientation in the Muslim women's movement has been exacerbated by impacts of the decentralization policy. The policy was enacted in 1999, and its implementation began in 2001, to give more autonomy to regional governments to arrange and to manage their own social and economic sectors, including making their own regulations.[291] Between 2000 and 2006, many provinces enacted local regulations based on Islamic law which are well-known as Regional Regulations (*Peraturan Daerah,* PERDA). Most of these regulations target women, for example the necessity to wear *hijab* (veil) for women, and the prohibition for women to go out, particularly at night, without their male chaperones.[292]

According to reports of National Women's Organisation Komnas Perempuan*,* the *Perda* contained gender discrimination until 2013, was present in 342 regional regulations, more than 200 of which have impacted on women, both directly and indirectly. The discrimination includes the regulation of women's dress, of seating arrangements in a vehicle, and restrictions on going out at night. One of the assumptions underlying the issuance of these rules is that women have been regarded as the bearers of responsibility for society's morality.[293] Examples of these regulations are seen in regulations enacted by the regional government of South Sulawesi. The Muslim Padang village in Bulukumba district enacted Regulations No. 5, 2006, regarding the implementation of caning. This rule states that (1) women and men are not allowed in an isolated space except if their chaperone is present; (2) women are not permitted to go out with a male stranger who is not her chaperone, except with her parents' permit or guardian's permission. Komnas Perempuan criticises such rules because, firstly, it is a form of direct discrimination and restriction, because women's freedom to move is restricted and there is discriminatory treatment

[290] Saskia E Wieringa, *Ibid.*, p. 21
[291] Saskia E Wieringa, 2006a, *Op. Cit*., p. 4
[292] Rachel Rinaldo, Op. Cit., p. 183.
[293] Neng Dara Affiah, *Op. Cit*., p. 9

of women since these rules only apply to women. Furthermore, Komnas Perempuan argues that women's rights to move and to act freely as women are restricted at certain times and because of the requirement for a chaperone to be present. A second example is *Perda* No. 16, 2005 regulating Muslim dress codes in Maros district. The rule declares that every male and female employee in the local government neighbourhood, as well as Muslim students, are required to wear Islamic dress. According to Komnas Perempuan, this is a form of state control over women's bodies. Making women the subjects of control is a form of direct discrimination, and neglects plurality within society.[294]

Examining the above explication, it may be said that the women's movement in the *Reformasi* era is characterised by ongoing contestation between the feminist and gender orientated groups, and the anti-feminist and anti-gender stream. Affiah argues that the current women's movement meets the paradoxical condition between the establishment of women's rights, and the abolition of these, through the perpetuation of women's discrimination in the name of religion and culture. Evidence of this atmosphere can be clearly seen in the increase of Islamist organisations, whose women's agendas are not in accordance with women's rights, such as HTI rejects gender perspective and women's empowerment, and Islamist party; Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) which supports polygamy.[295]

Accordingly, Brenner argues that there are two different stances in relation to women's rights and gender issues. While liberal women's groups struggle for the transformation of a social order that is not favourable to women, conservative ones, by contrast, disrupt such reforms. The latter quite often use the democratic argument about freedom of expression in promoting their

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[294] Komnas Perempuan, 10 Tahun Reformasi: Kemajuan dan Kemunduran Bagi Perjuangan Melawan Kekerasan dan Diskriminasi Berbasis Jender (10 years after *reformasi*: Progress and Setback to Fight against Gender-Based Violence and Discrimination), Jakarta, 8 Maret 2008, available in: http://tcsc-indonesia.org/wp-ontent/uploads/2012/08/134_UU_20No_2039_20Tahun_201999.pdf, accessed on 27 February 2017, pp., 94-96

[295] Neng Dara Affiah, *Op. Cit*., pp. 9-10. See also Saskia E Wieringa, 2006b, *Op. Cit*., p. 21

views.[296] In addition, the ongoing contest has led to three different strands of the women's movement in Indonesia, as Doon – Harder identifies[297]. She, furthermore, maps women's movements into secular, Islamic, and Islamist feminism. Secular feminism is a women's movement that does not base its agenda on religious references. Religion for them is a private matter. Islamic feminism is a women's movement combining both religious perspectives and "secular ideas", in the sense that ideas comes from outside Islamic tradition and texts. It is not surprising that Islamic feminism and secular feminism have common aspirations. Both movements advocate women's rights, gender equality, and feminism. By contrast, Islamist feminism is a women's movement recognising male privilege and tending to argue that women and men have complementary, rather than equal roles in society. These categories do not necessarily mean that there is no encounter between each paradigm. Following Doon Harden's category, it can be argued that both Muslimah HTI (MHTI) and Muslimah WI (MWI) use the Islamist paradigm, but this does not mean that both organisations are entirely different to secular and Islamic feminism. Nevertheless, as we shall see in the following chapters there is still the possibility for collaboration and dialogue between these groups.

Conclusion

This chapter has underlined the internal and external factors contributing to the presence of the Islamist movement in Indonesia. Internal factors come from the responses by the Indonesian state to activities performed by Islamist groups. External factors include the transmission of Islamic knowledge from Middle Eastern countries to Indonesia because of long existing networks. While the state has influenced Islamist movement's ways to promulgate and achieve their objectives, the Middle East's influence is largely directed to framing the Islamist movement's ideology and Islamic thought. Such influences have led to different strategies and ideologies, and differences in

[296] Suzanne Brenner, *Op. Cit*., pp. 484-485
[297] Pieternella van Doorn Harder, *Op. Cit*., pp. 7-8

Islamic thought advocated by Islamist groups. This chapter has also examined the active contribution of Indonesian women to the establishment of Indonesian independence and to Indonesian development after liberation. Similar to the state's influence on the Islamist movements, the state was able to both weaken women's movement during the Sukarno regime and Suharto regimes, as well as to encourage the women's movement through policies enacted by the *reformasi* government. Through this historical account, I note that the presence of influential women in Indonesian history is common. I now wish to complement this historical account by delving further into the particularity of the Islamist orientation, influencing responses to women's issues in Makassar, South Sulawesi.

CHAPTER IV

ISLAM, GENDER, AND THE WOMEN IN ISLAMIST ORGANISATIONS IN MAKASSAR, SOUTH SULAWESI: AN OVERVIEW

Introduction

This chapter scrutinises local factors that encourage, disseminate and support Islamist thought and movements within the context of Makassar, South Sulawesi. It traces historically Islam's arrival and development in that region. From such historical account, it will be drawn as to how Islam has been accepted as well as how Islam has been understood and expressed. This chapter also highlights women's status and gender relations as shaped by *adat* (local custom) embedded in Bugis-Makassar culture. These matters are significant to be disclosed, as, according to Chandra Talpade Mohanty, that the notion of politics of location in feminist discourse cannot be overlooked. This idea argues that the politics of location tries to consider and to appreciate the specificity of every place such as 'historical, geographical, cultural, psychic, and imaginative boundaries.[298]

Makassar: Overview

Geographically, South Sulawesi[299] province that Makassar is its capital city has strategic social-economic position. It is because the province is located in the middle of Indonesian archipelago. And also Makassar as its capital city is determined as a main gate of Indonesian Eastern Region (*Kawasan Timur Indonesia, KTI*) and as one of international shipping lanes.[300] Such strategic

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[298] Chandra Talpade Mohanty, 'Feminist Encounters: Locating the Politics of Experience', in Carole R. McCann & Seung Kyung Kim (eds.), *Feminist Local and Global Theory: Perspective Reader*, Routledge, New York & London, 2003, p. 460

[299] The province is located at South part of Sulawesi archipelago with area length around 46.083.94 km2. It is consisted on 21 districts, 3 cities, 304 sub-districts, and 2.953 villages. See LKJ SULSEL, 2014, available in https://sulselprov.go.id/upload/files/580f7d18ec4a4.pdf, accessed on 25 March 2017, p. 1

[300] LKJ SULSEL, *Ibid*., p., 1

position, then, is translated into vision of South Sulawesi, that is, 'South Sulawesi is as Principal Pillar in the National Development and as Networking Knot in the Acceleration of Welfare in 2018 (*Sulawesi Selatan sebagai Pilar Utama Pembangunan Nasional dan Simpul Jejaring Akselerasi pada Tahun 2018*'.[301] "The Principal Pillar of the National Development" refers to the future of projection of South Sulawesi in 2018, in which Sulawesi is going to contribute to the embodiment of food security and self-reliance and to the establishment of ideal religious life, religious tolerance and security as well as to the acceleration of improving democratic life. "The Networking Knot" means that Sulawesi becomes as tie of goods and services distribution, of education and health services, and of the nexus of land, sea, air outside Java, particularly in Indonesian Eastern. Meanwhile, "the Acceleration of Welfare" denotes that South Sulawesi is predicted in 2018 to have entered early economic maturity.[302]

The total area of Makassar is about 175.77 km2[303], containing 14 sub-districts and 143 villages. The topography of Makassar's area is generally a low-lying and coastal areas and the dominant area is lowland. But Makassar also has an archipelago which can be seen along Makassar's coastlines. This island is a group of 12 coral islands such as Lanjukang which is the farthest island, Barrang Lompo island, Lae-lae island, and Kayangan being the closest island.[304] Based on the report of the Central Bureau of Statistics (*Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS*), of South Sulawesi province, the population growth in 2014 reached 1,13%. The total population in 2014 was 8,432,163, most of whom are concentrated in Makassar city which has 1,429,242 inhabitants, in which the female population is 722, 428 and higher than that of men at 706,814. Makassar is a

[301] LKJ SULSEL *Ibid*., p., 4

[302] It will be marked by Human Development Index in the medium level. Economic development is above the national average, per capita income around IDR 30 million (about $ 3000 AUS). The rate of poverty and unemployment is below the national average and agro-industry and service increase rapidly. See LKJ SULSEL, *Ibid*., pp. 4-5

[303] Pemerintah Kota Makassar, (Makassar Lokal Government), 'Geografis Kota Makassar', available in http://makassarkota.go.id/110-geografiskotamakassar.html, accessed on 24 March 2017.

[304] Pemerintah Kota Makassar, (Makassar Lokal Government), 'Makassar Kota Anging Mammiri', available in http://makassarkota.go.id/125-makassarkotaangingmammiri.html, accessed on 25 march 2017

multi-ethnic city that is mostly inhabited by Bugis and Makassar ethnic groups and the rest are from the Toraja, Mandar, Buton, Tionghoa, and Javanese ethnic groups.[305] Additionally, most of the population of Makassar are Muslims and as such Islam is the dominant religion in Makassar. Islamic history shows that Makassar was a key city in the spread of Islam in Eastern Indonesia to places such as such as Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, and Maluku.[306]

The Story of Islam's Coming and Development in Makassar, South Sulawesi

Islamization of South Sulawesi in general and Makassar in particular, without revealing the vital role of three Islamic clerics (*ulama*) from Minangkabau, Kota Tengah, West Sumatra. Those ulama are *Abdullah Ma'mur Chatib Tunggal*, *Dato Ri Bandang; Chatib Sulaiman, Dato Ri Pattimang*; and *Chatib Bungsu, Dato Ri Tiro* who landed in Makassar at the end of the sixteen centuries. Their important role might be seen from their successful efforts in converting the king of Gowa, his uncle, and adviser, as well as the king of Tallo into Islam.[307] Both kingdoms were

[305] Dinas komunikasi & Informasi kota Makkassar, (Department of Communication & Information of Makassar City), available in http://makassarkota.go.id/107-pendudukkotamakassar.html, accessed on 24 March, 2017

[306] Profil Kabupaten/Kota Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan, available in http://ciptakarya.pu.go.id/profil/profil/timur/sulsel/makassar.pdf, accessed on 25 March 2017

[307] Barbara Sillars Harvey, Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950-1965, thesis of Cornell University for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 1974, p. 36

allied. In 22 September 1605, king of Tallo, *I Malingkang Daeng Manyonri Karaeng Tumenang ri Bontobiraeng*, was the first king who embraced Islam as his religion and was followed by conversion of the king of Gowa*, I Mangarangi Daeng Manrabbia*. The former changed his name to an Islamic name, *Sultan Abdullah Awalul Islam* and the latter was *Sultan Alauddin*, their interpretation means those who were the first person in converting into Islam. From 1605 to 1607, through the role of both Gowa - Tallo kings, almost all folks of both kingdoms held Islam as their belief or religion. Due to enforcement from the king of Tallo, *Karaeng Matowaya*, eventually the king of Gowa recognized Islam as an official religion of both kingdoms of Gowa-Tallo. Since the conversion of these two kings, Islam through their initiative had spread throughout the territory of South Sulawesi from 1605-1612.[308] Such spreading based on the agreement between these kings in South Sulawesi, that 'whoever finds a new way of life has to tell the other rules'.[309] But this treaty was not followed entirely by the kingdoms in that area. It was only small kingdoms which accepted Islam as an official religion in their own monarchy. Because of other rulers' refusal, the king of Gowa declared a holy war against those kingdoms which rejected Islam, particularly against these big kingdoms such as Bone, Wajo, and Soppeng. Gowa had been eventually successful to subdue nearly entire regions except places which were difficult to reach such as mountainous regions and isolated areas like Toraja, Bawakaraeng, and Lompobattang. The acceptance of Islam by the larger kingdoms occurred respectively, thus Soppeng was in 1609, Wajo in 1610, and Bone in 1611.[310]

Another reason as to why Islam's the spread of Islam accelerated was in view of Sufist Islam or Sufism introduced by the Minangkabau ulama.[311] This mystical Sufist version of Islam

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[308] Susmihara, 'Kemajuan Budaya Masyarakat Makassar Abad XVII', The Cultural Development of Makassar in the Century 17', in *Jurnal Adabiyah*, Vol. 16 No., 1/2016, pp. 64-5
[309] Andi Faisal Bakti, *Communication and Family Planning in Islam in Indonesia: South Sulawesi Muslim Perceptions of a Global Development Program*, INIS, Leiden-Jakarta, 2004, p.179
[310] Barbara Sillars Harvey, *Op. Cit*., pp. 36-37
[311] Barbara Sillars Harvey, *Ibid*., p. 39

became the first dominant approach in the early *da'wa* in archipelago such as in Java islands, including in South Sulawesi. Such an approach did not overlook the pre-existing customs, traditions, and beliefs in the archipelago so that Indonesian people would not be uprooted from their own cultures and traditions.[312] The conformity between the Sufism and the local beliefs and traditions embedded in the society of South Sulawesi, especially in Makassar, had contributed to the ease of Islam's transmission.[313] In this regard, Harvey explained that:

> There were no sharp breaks with these older beliefs and practices, as people selected from the new religion- which shared many of these mystical undertones-elements which seemed appropriate or convincing to them. Islam provided alternatives to customary ways of doing things: sometimes Islamic prescriptions replaced what had been done before, sometimes the new rules were ignored, and sometimes a new synthesis was created. In this way Islamic practices and beliefs blended with those already present, and portions of Islamic law became amalgamated with the customary practice of the community.[314]

Islam's accommodation with the pre-existing local traditions and beliefs in Makassar society might be, for example, seen within the reading of *barazanji*[315] ritual. This occurs when a person's wish is granted and a s a sign of gratitude to God the believer would read pages from certain books such as *La Galigo*[316] but when Islam arrived, this was replaced by reading a book containing the story of the Prophet Muhammad's life.[317] Another example was that Makassar and Bugis people, before the introduction of Islam presence believed that there were many Gods named their God as *Patotoqe'*. But after their contact with Islam, they then changed the concept of multiple God into the oneness of God and replaced *Patotoqe'* into *Dewate Seuawae* (One God). Beside this, the idea of *siri'* (it will be discussed below) in Makassar and Bugis society was

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[312] Syamsuri, 'Sejarah Dakwah di Makassar', the History of Da'wa in Makassar, in Al-Mishbah, Vol., 10, no., 1. 2014, pp. 8-9
[313] Andi Faisal Bakti, *Op. Cit*..181
[314] Barbara Sillars Harvey, *Op. Cit*., p, 40
[315] A book was authored by Syaikh Ja'far bin Hasan al-Barzanji that explains the life story of the prophet of Muhammad. This book is quite often read in specific events such as *aqiqah* (a thanksgiving event for baby's birth).
[316] La Galigo is an art work containing poetic stories about the past of Bugis people. Christian Pelras, The Bugis, Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, 1996, p.33
[317] Anzar Abdullah, 'Islamisasi di Sulawesi Selatan dalam Perspektif Sejarah, Islamization in South Sulawesi in Historical Perspective', *Paramita*, Vol., 26, No., 1, 2016, p. 91

compatible with the jihad notion within Islam. Eventually, adaptation was achieved when Islamic values had been integrated into the system of the pre-existing philosophical worldview or customary law of South Sulawesi which was the so-called *Pangngaderreng*.[318] Originally it consisted of four pillars but due to Islam's influence, it became five pillars, namely: *wariq* (system of kingdom protocols), *adeq* (customs), *bicara* (justice system), *rapang* (law), and *saraq* (Islamic law). The first four elements of the *Pangngaderreng* were under the control of *Pampawa Adeq* (the committee for the implementation of custom) whilst the *saraq* was organized by *Parewa Saraq* (sharia committee). [319] That is why, according to Rahman, current religious life in Makassar and South Sulawesi in general may be mapped out into three features, namely; (1) Islamic militants, those who are implementing and practicing Islam consistently and truly; (2) syncretism, those who are practicing Muslims but they also still adhere to traditional cultural mores at the same time; (3) proselytes of indigenous religion, those who follow the local religion such as *To Lotang*, and *To Kajang*.[320]

However, the process of Islam's adaptation with local values did not entirely run smoothly. Like Java and Sumatra, Islamization in South Sulawesi, also faced friction between groups who aspired to implement sharia formally and legally and others who felt that this was not necessary or desirable. Such contention then led to the emergence of two patterns of Islamic movements which were well known as the reformist-purist and the traditionalist. Between 1631 and 1644, the efforts to apply sharia were undertaken by the Sultan Bone kingdom, La Ma'deremmeng, but it created resistance from the internal kingdom elites itself. In 1645, the similar attempt – implementation of sharia- also had been initiated by the Prince Sheikh Yusuf of Gowa kingdom. After his return from seeking Islamic knowledge in Mecca, he enthusiastically announced the

[318] *Panngadereng* is customary laws (*hukum adat)* containing originally four norms and rules before Islam's arrival. See Mattulada, 'South Sulawesi, Its Ethnicity and Way of Life', *Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol., 20, No., 1, June 1982, p. 12
[319] Nurhayati Rahman, Agama, Tradisi dan Kesenian dalam Manuskrip La Galigo, sari 26, 2008, p. 215
[320] Nurhayati Rahman, *Ibid*., p. 216

introduction of sharia to Gowa.[321] The existence and tension between both orientations in understanding Islam - reformist-purist and traditionalist- existed until the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Evidence for this is that in 1923, a reformist organization inspired by Wahhabism emerged and operated in South Sulawesi. This group was founded by Abdullah Abdurrahman, who had stayed in Mecca for ten years to study, and his movement was named as the *Shirat al-Mustaqim* (straight pathway). The main objective of this group was to purify Islamic values from perceived un-Islamic elements. But this movement had been tackled by a traditionalist movement pioneered by a *Bugis* Islamic cleric, Haji Asad, who established *Darul Da'wa Wal Isryad* (DDI) and *Assadiyyah* movement.[322]

Although reformist-purist movements in the historical trajectory of Islamization in South Sulawesi has always been challenged, yet the zeal of struggling for the implementation of sharia and even the foundation of an Islamic state has never faded. In the early Indonesian independence era, Islamist movements demanded that the new Indonesian government give special authority for the local government of South Sulawesi to apply sharia.[323] From 1950 to 1965, a revolt which was commanded by Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar[324] erupted in South Sulawesi. According to some scholars this rebellion was one of the harshest after the struggle for Indonesian independence.[325] This rebellion had been partly triggered by Qahhar's disenchantment with the new Indonesian government's failure to meet his demands. First, that the government formally incorporate

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[321] Farish A. Noor, 'Mapping the Religious and Secular Parties in South Sulawesi and Tanah Toraja, Sulawesi, Indonesia', *RSIS Working Paper*, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Singapore, 12 November 2010, p. 4

[322] Farish A. Noor, *Ibid*., p., 4

[323] Farish A. Noor, I*bid*., p., 4

[324] Abduh Kahar Mudzakkar whose given name from his parent is Ladomeng was born and grown in Lanipa. Lanipa is an isolated hamlet located at Palopo district, South Sulawesi province. For further information, See Muhammad Hasbi,'The Band of Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar: Biographical Sketch of Rebellious Leaders of Islamic State-Indonesian Islamic Army (DI/TII) of Sulawesi', in *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol., 8, No. 2, December 2014, pp.,266-268.

[325] Lauren Halligan Bain, 'Performances of the Post-New Order', thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at University of Tasmania, October 2005, p. 51

Sulawesi's former guerrillas, who participated in the struggle for Indonesian independence, into the Armed Forces of the new Federal Republic of Indonesia (*Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat,* APRIS). Second, that the government give recognition for the guerrillas' significant contributions and participation in the fight for independence.[326] In response, the central government eventually established A National Reserve Corps (*Corps Tjadangan Nasional*, CTN) in 24 March 1951.[327] The corps functioned as a transitional institution within which all local militia would be accommodated. As members of the corps, they then were given the choice of staying in the military or not. If they decided to remain in the military, they would be formally trained but if not, they would be supported in their search for employment or to enrol in education. [328] The formation of this reserve corps was, however, was not supported by Qahhar and the guerrillas. They aspired to full incorporation into the CTN as the Hasanuddin Brigade, South Sulawesi division that was led by Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar. Due to this disagreement, Qahhar and his troops decided to continue their resistance against the central Indonesian government and the military by means of a guerrilla warfare. But it does not necessarily mean that all the former independence soldiers of South Sulawesi followed Qahhar and his troops into the forest to fight against the government's policy. Some guerrillas, particularly the forces of those paramilitaries under the leadership of Andi Selle Mattola and Andi Sose, chose to join APRIS. [329]

I think such a disagreement contributed to the decline of support for Qahhar and his troops. As a result, he was forced to look for backing from other potential allegiances. Not surprisingly then, in 20 January 1952, he decided to officially join *Darul Islam*/Islamic Army of Indonesia

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[326] C. Van Dijk, Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia, Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-en Volkenkunde, Leiden, the Netherlands, 1981, pp. 169-171
[327] Jayadi Nas, 'Konflik antar Elite Politik Lokal di Sulawesi Selatan: Sebuah Perspekti Sejarah, Conflict between Local Political Elites in South Sulawesi: a Historical Perspective', *in SOSIOHUMANIKA: Jurnal Pendidikan Sains Sosial dan Kemanusiaan*, 7(2) November 2014, p. 207
[328] Barbara Sillars Harvey, *Op. Cit*., p. 231
[329] Jayadi Nas, *Op. Cit*., p. 207

(*Tentara Islam Indonesia*, TII).[330] Not too long after Kartosuwirjo's proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia*, NII), in 7 August 1953, Qahhar also declared NII in Sulawesi and in other places surrounding Sulawesi such as West Irian. In the same year, he also named his troops the Islamic Army of Indonesia. Actually, his intention to struggle under the banner of Islam had long existed within him but due to challenges from other elements, his wish was not realized. This is clear from Qahhar's letter being sent to Kartosuwirjo, as drawn by C. Van Dijk, as follows:

> …by stating that he (Qahhar) had wanted to start an Islamic revolution as early as August 16th, 1951 and had had everything planned with his sub-commanders Saleh Sjahban and Abdul fatah, but that the latter had proved inconsistent so that the plan had fallen through. He had been thwarted, he said, by a more powerful force with greater influence in society, namely "the feudalists and the common people". About the Islamic population of South Sulawesi, he observed that "it would take time to implant and cultivate the true Islamic spirit in them.[331]

In addition, to attract local people's attention to the Islamic state, Qahhar also involved Islamic clerics and preachers into the Islamic state setting so that it had been filled by both religious leaders or figures and military elements. While espousing the idea of the Islamic state, within the Sulawesi population who were mostly Muslim, recruitment of those religious figures and scholars was also helpful in giving religious recommendations, instructions, and any religious issues. Qahhar also established Islam- based education institutions, ranged from elementary to college. The latter was named Islamic College of Al Qashas which its arrangement had been delegated to

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[330] *Darul Islam* which literally means "home of Islam" refers to Islamic movements after the Indonesian independence which advocated the formation of Islamic State of Indonesia or Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). It was counter-discourse with the ideal of Indonesian Republic. This movement geographically started in West Java and had been initiated by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo. He had been active in the nationalist movement putting Islam as their base of movement between 1920s-1940s. In January 1948, he formed the Islamic Army of Indonesia (*Tentara Islam Indonesia*, TII). A year and five months after that, precisely on 7 August 1949, he officially declared the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII). To maintain the existence of the Islamic state and to spread his ideas throughout Indonesia, Kartosuwirjo along with his troops were in the rebellion against the Indonesian republic for the thirteen years. C. Van Dijk, *Op. Cit.,* p. 10 and see also, Chiara Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation: Kartosuwirjo and Political Islam in twentieth-century Indonesia,* KITLV press, Leiden, 2012, p. 6, and ICG, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia, 2002, pp. 3-4

[331] C. Van Dijk, *Op. Cit*., p. 188

an outstanding, charismatic and authoritative Islamic cleric in South Sulawesi, KH. Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle. Aside from educational activities, Qahhar obligated the population who were living within *Darul Islam* neighbourhood to learn and to read al-Qur'an.[332]

The religious fervour that aspired to Islamize the public sphere or to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, particularly in Makassar, South Sulawesi, is still sparking until now. In the Makassar case, it is partly marked by the proliferation of Islamist movements such as HTI and WI, the emergence of the Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Sharia (*Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariah Islam,* KPPSI), and the enthusiasm of municipalities and districts government to pass local regulations based on Islamic sharia (*Peraturan Daerah Shariah Islam*, Perda SI). KPPSI[333] aimed mainly at setting the preparation of enacting sharia in South Sulawesi by means of the use of national government's policy regarding regional autonomy which was introduced in 1999. Through such policy, KPPSI insisted the special autonomy like Aceh so the province of South Sulawesi was able to implement sharia under the same legal guarantee.[334] According to a report of an official agency of the Indonesian government that focus on combating terrorism, National Commission for Combating Terrorism (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme*,

[332] Muhammad Hasbi, *Op. Cit*., pp. 265-266

[333] KPPSI was established in 2000 in Makassar after a series of meetings. First meeting was held in Yogyakarta, which had been attended by activists of Islamic organizations and parties and scholars form campus entirely Indonesia. Participant from Makassar was represented by Abdurrahman A. Basamalah who was rector of Indonesian Muslim University in Makassar. This meeting took objective for incorporating ideas and strategies of Mujahidin (Arabic language which means fighters of jihad) in implementing sharia. The follow-up meeting had been conducted in August 2002 in Makassar for three days. The important issue meeting's attendees discussed was about 'Special Autonomy for the Implementation of Shari'ah in South Sulawesi'. One of the conference's outputs was the establishment of KPPSI. KPPSI has two main bodies; the Majelis Syuro (a Largely Advisory Council) and Majelis Lajnah (the Executive Council). The former mainly consists of campus-based intellectuals and Islamic clerics. While the latter is led by son of Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar, that is, Abdul Aziz Qahhar Muzakkar. He is entitled to handle and organize KPPSI. Due to such link with a former fighter of DI/TII, some view that KPPSI's struggle in implementing sharia is basically a continuation of DI's movement. But KPPSI is different with DI/TII, in which the former refrains to use violence. But instead it advocates peaceful way in establishing Islamic public sphere. See Erwin Nur Rif'ah, Women Under Sharia: Case Studies in the Implementation of Sharia-Influenced Regional Regulations (*Perda* Sharia) in Indonesia, dissertation at Victoria University, 2014, p.,72. See also Wahyuddin Halim, 'Shari'ah Implementationin South Sulawesi: An Analysis of the KPPSI Movement', available in http://www.futureislam.com/inner.php?id=NTM4, accessed on 19 April 2017,

[334] Wahyuddin Halim, *Ibid*

BNPT)[335] KPPSI with its ideal to implement sharia offered convincing evidence that Islamist discourse in South Sulawesi is strongly rooted. Its achievements in inviting almost all Islamic organizations as well as different sectors of society to get involved in the struggle for materialising several religion-influenced regional regulations show that the movement of sharia implementation in South Sulawesi is more popular and getting support from wider society.[336]

Mujiburrahman argues that there are at least three reasons as to why KPPSI is very excited to enforce the application of sharia, namely ideology, history, and the economy crisis. The question of ideology refers to KPPSI's belief that Islam is not only related to religious rituals but the most important that Islam is an ideology that rules all aspects of life. The second reason is that the sharia implementation in South Sulawesi is a historical necessity. This is because, historically the three biggest kingdoms in South Sulawesi, Tallo, Gowa and Bone, had adopted Islam as the official religion of these kingdoms in the seventeenth century. Considering this historical fact, KPPSI asserts that what they require is historical continuity. Lastly, KPPSI views the crisis of economy, society, and politics faced by Indonesia, which was started from the end of Suharto's era until the present. In other words Islam, in the view of KPPSI, can be an alternative solution to a variety of catastrophes encountered by Indonesia in general and Makassar, South Sulawesi in particular.[337]

The implementation of sharia in South Sulawesi is extensive. Some districts such as Bulukumba, Bone, Maros, Enrekang, and Gowa have formalised the sharia into the regional

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[335] BNPT is an Indonesian government agency that was founded in 2010 based on the presidential regulation No. 12 of 2012. It is mentioned in this rule that three main tasks of BNPT, namely to set policy, strategy, and national program regarding combating terrorism; to coordinate all government agencies connected to the realization of counterterrorism policy; lastly, to apply such policy by forming sub-divisions of work consisting of government elements according to their own responsibilities, functions, and competencies. Yeni Handayani, Peranan BNPT dalam Penanggulangan Terorisme, in *Rechtsvinding Journal*, 2016, p. 2

[336] BNPT, Civil Society dan Kearifan Lokal dalam Pencegahan Radikalisme dan Terorisme di Sulawesi Selatan, Civil Society and Local Wisdom in Counter for Radicalism and Terrorism, by Laily Hidayah, p.1

[337] Din Wahid, 'Kembalinya Konservatisme Islam Indonesa, the Return of Indonesian Islamic Conservatism', in *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2014, p. 385

regulations or Perda Sharia Islam (Perda SI).[338] For example, Bulukumba was the pioneer of sharia formalization followed by Maros districts. In 1998, the regional government established Qur'anic study groups, mosques, and Islamic schools. In 2003, four Perda SI had been stipulated, namely Perda 2/2003 about zakat's organizing; Perda 3/2003 regarding the ban of distribution and consumption of alcohol; Perda 5/2003 related to Muslim dress for civil servants; and Perda 6/2003 required that students who want to go University must be able to read Qur'an as well as betrothed couples. Patabai Pabokori as the regent of Bulukumba at that time, also launched the program of Muslim Villages (Desa Muslim). 12 villages had been set as pilot project of the Desa Muslim within which sharia would be implemented. After his success in formalizing sharia, Patabai Pabokori was required by KPPSI to help other districts in replicating his programs and policies. Maros district has been inspired by emulating the four religion-influenced regional regulations and the Desa Muslim. [339] In general, Salim argues that Perda addressed three key issues; (1) public concerns such as prostitution, alcoholic beverages, and gambling; (2) religious abilities and responsibilities such as Qur'an literacy, Friday praying, and alms *(zakat*); (3) religious identity or symbolism such as Muslim clothing.[340]

There are at least three factors contributing to the emergence of sharia-inspired bylaws. The first is historical in that some regions enacting the Perda SI would find it difficult to separate itself from own Islamic history.[341] The second aspect is related to politics in that there is a strong

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[338] Umi Sumbulah, Fundamentalisme, Formalisasi Syari'at Islam dan Marjinalisasi Perempuan, in International Seminar Proceeding on *the Implementation of Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesian Context*, 2011, p. 72

[339] See Robin Bush, 'Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?', in Expressing Islam: Religion Life and Politics in Indonesia, edited by Greg Fealy and Sally White, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2008, p. 10

[340] Arsal Salim, 'Muslim Politics in Indonesia's Democratisation,' in R. McLeod and A. MacIntyre (eds), *Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance*, ISEAS, Singapore, 2007, p. 126

[341] In case of Bulukumba, South Sulawesi, those fighters of Sharia recognize that the struggle of sharia's formalization into Perda is a historical necessity. The historical evidence has shown that since the fourteenth century Islam in South Sulawesi had been embraced by its kings and inhabitants and become way of life. Islam has been a values system of life. See Syafuan Rozi & Nina Andriana, Politik Kebangsaan dan Potret Perda Syariah di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Bulukumba dan Cianjur, available in

assertion that support for the drafting the sharia supported by the electorate could not be omitted from the political support of commitments undertaken by their local political representative. Conversely the implementation of Sharia would be an effective way to increase a candidate's votes in an election.[342] Lastly, the religious commitment to formalise sharia-inspired regional regulations have also been influenced by the presence of Islamist movements. But such influences do not work automatically, partly depending on the proximity of Islamist movements to the local government as well as community affiliation or support to them. In his work entitled "Save Indonesia with Sharia", spokesman of HTI, Ismail Yusanto argues that unsuccessful management of the Indonesian government has been caused by following the capitalism mechanism. Therefore, according to him, the formalisation of sharia into Perda is a breakthrough of such failure.[343] However, the formalisation of sharia-inspired bylaws is still an ongoing debatable issue. The sharpest critique is mainly from women's organisations such as NGOs. In their view, such implementation is more likely to violate women's rights. They base their arguments mainly on legal reasons. The Perda SI is basically not accordance with Indonesia's International obligations as a signatory of Conventions and Treaties which support gender equality.[344]

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http://www.academia.edu/19602031/POLITIK_KEBANGSAAN_DAN_POTRET_PERDA_SYARIAH_DI_INDONESIA_STUDI_KASUS_BULUKUMBA_DAN_CIANJUR,accessed on 12 November 2018, p. 6.The formalisation of the sharia in Makassar, South Sulawesi, for example, is still closely linked historically with the Islamic rebellion. See Elizabeth Pisani & Michael Buehler, why do Indonesian Politicians Promote Shari'a Laws? An Analytic Framework for Muslim-Majority Democracies, *THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY*, 2016, P. 10

[342] It might be seen clearly seen from the case of Bulukumba in which in 2008, one of sharia-inspired regional regulations was the obligation of every Muslim, particularly civil servants, to pay zakat (alms). Such duty was based on the Perda of Bulukumba No 2/2003, Chapter 7, Article 16. Beside zakat, there were other forms of donation which should be paid, *infaq* and *sadaqah*. Evey Muslim living in Bulukumba must pay IDR 1,500 per month (around AUD 15 cent). Revenue from these charities was used by head's district at that time, Patabai Pabokori, to maintain linkages at the sub district area. Giving money to prospective voters was a way that must be taken if being wanted to win direct election. He realized that 'these days, the people are already smart. They know that once you become regent, you are going to have a lot of money'. For further explanation, see Michael Buehler, 'The Rise of Shari'a bylaws in Indonesia districts: An Indication for Changing Patterns of Power Accumulation and Political Corruption', *South East Asia Research*, 2008, p. 272.

[343] Umi Sumbulah, Fundamentalisme, Formalisasi Syari'at Islam dan Marjinalisasi Perempuan, pp. 77-78

[344] '(1) CEDAW (Convention of the Elimination Discrimination Against Women's Right) which is ratified

Gender Relations in Makassar

The majority of Makassar's populations are migrants from other districts around South Sulawesi and even from other regions and Islands in Indonesia. Makassar as a municipality of South Sulawesi province is a city which has been inhabited by different ethnic groups and the two largest of which are Bugis and Makassar. Thus, to understand women's situation and condition in Makassar, I will mainly focus on these two ethnic groups. There is widely known proverb within Bugis and Makassar culture saying that "*bura'ne mallempa, makkunrai majjujun*" (Bugis language) or in Makassar language "bura'ne allembara, bainea a'jujung". This proverb generally implies that men have more responsibility than women have in household tasks. 'Men always respect women in a job-sharing ratio of 2:1'.[345] Within Bugis and Makassar society, the gender division of labour is based on complementarity. Traditionally, men are expected to work outside the home and provide for their families such as food, clothes, a house and other family related needs including the children's education costs. Whereas women are expected to priorities and organise household activities such as looking after their children, cooking, washing, cleaning, and shopping for family's needs. Both women and men have specific domestic roles, in which a woman is an organizer of the household activities and finance whilst a man is a provider of family's income.[346] Even Pelras observes that the Bugis people recognize gender relations as more

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in Indonesia in Undang-Undang No 7 Tahun 1984. (2) International Convention on Civil and Politic Rights which is ratified in Undang-Undang No 12 Tahun 2005. (3) Undang-Undang Hak Asasi Manusia (Human Rights Law) No 39 Tahun 1999. (4) International Convention on Economic, Social, Cultural Rights which is ratified in Undang- Undang No 11 Tahun 2005 that the state should protects workers' rights, family rights, right to health and an adequate standard of living, educational rights and cultural rights. The limitation of women's access to economic activities at night after 22.00 pm in several District regulations is criticized as violating women workers' rights. Dewi Candraningrum, 'Perda Sharia and the Indonesian Women's Critical Perspective', in a working-paper presented at the conference on "Neue Willkuer gegen Frauen in Indonesien: Kontroversen um die Umsetzung der Regionale Scharia-Gesetze Perda Syariah (New Arbitrary against Women in Indonesia: Perda Sharia and Women's Rights)", Saturday 11 November 2006, held by SOAI (Suedostasien Informationsstelle, Asienhaus) and MATA Asien in Blick, at ÜBERSEEMUSEUM Bremen, Germany, Saturday 11 November 2006, p. 7

[345] Andi Kasirang, 'Gender Dimension of Ethnic Bugis and Makassar Women Empowerment', *World Applied Sciences*, Journal 26, 2013, p. 19

[346] Murni Mahmud, The Roles of Social Status, Age, Gender, Familiarity, and Situation in Being Polite for Bugis Society, p. 60

flexible as drawn in the saying '…although a man, that has female qualities, is a woman; and a woman, who has male qualities, is a man.[347] Hence, although women's primary role is considered to be in the home, this does not necessarily mean that women are totally unable to work to earn cash income. Another meaning is that despite an existing gender division of labour in Bugis and Makassar society, such division is neither understood nor implemented literally and rigidly. Within Bugis-Makassar culture, the norm of *sipurepo* which means that if either partner finds it difficult to meet her/his tasks, another is able to help or to share responsibilities.[348]

In the past, many women gained a cash income from work that could be carried out within the house such as knitting or running small stall from or near their home.[349] For example, this was apparent as early as the sixteenth century, although the main duties were considered to be in the home, they also engaged in the public domain as traders in local markets. If those women had to travel long distances, they had a male family member to accompany them. At that time, women were publicly visible and able to do short trip without a male companion.[350] However, there were changes when Islam was embraced by Bugis-Makassar people in 1608.[351] Most especially the practice of purdah whereby many women used fully body and facial covering when out in public. There was a noticeable difference between Islamic values and custom (*adat*).[352] Following strict interpretations of Islamic law women were less likely to attend school hence a rise in illiteracy as women were not allowed to write, 'lest their ability to write was used to send love letters'.[353] This was exacerbated by the arrival of the Dutch in Indonesia, conquering and ruling South Sulawesi

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[347] Christian Pelras, *Op. Cit*., p. 163
[348] Andi Kasirang, Op. *Cit*., p. 19
[349] Susan Bolyard Millar, 'On Interpreting Gender in Bugis Society', *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1983, p. 486
[350] Rachel M. Silvey, Diasporic Subjects: Gender and Mobility in South Sulawesi, *Women's Studies International Form*, Vol.23, No. 44, 2000, pp. 504-505
[351] M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300, Second edition, the Macmillan Press, London, 1993, p. 48
[352] Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680; Volume Two, Expansion and Crisis,* Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1993. p. 164
[353] Rachel M. Silvey, *Op. Cit*., p. 504

in the early sixteenth century. During colonial rule it was mostly men that were hired as bureaucrats and women were excluded and ignored except as wives and mothers of male officials. Moreover, the colonial period introduced the gender ideal that women's main task was as housewife.[354] Women's public roles appeared once again when nationalist movements appeared in 1920s, and women engaged in political activism as their involvement in national life.[355]

Women and Siri'

Siri' literally means "shame" or "honour". For Bugis and Makassar people, siri' is soul, spirit, and worldview. La Side, a Bugis scholar, identifies that the term siri' encompasses many diverse meanings, namely shame, humility, fear, disgrace, envy, self-esteem, honour, and morality. [356] For Bugis-Makassar people, the pattern of their behaviour, thinking, and even their social system is based on siri'. Bugis-Makassar people are ready to sacrifice whatever they have, even their lives and soul, in upholding siri' especially when their siri' is violated by others.[357] As a result, for Bugis -Makassar people death in defending siri' is far more valuable than the life without siri'.[358]

Every Bugis-Makassar family shared one *siri' (masse'di siri).* So *siri'* must be maintained by every member of a family by means of acting accordingly and defending it if someone else want to harm it. Abdullah notes that within Bugis and Makassar tradition women have been regarded as the epitome of family's *siri'* so they should continuously be under surveillance which are not only from their parents but also from their adjacent and extended kin.[359] A single woman of any age will be protected by her father, her brother if any, or other male family. If she has got

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[354] Rachel M. Silvey, *Ibid*., p. 504
[355] Rachel M. Silvey, *Ibid*., p. 505
[356] Nurul Ilmi Idrus, Siri', Gender, and Sexuality among the Bugis in South Sulawesi, *Antropologi Indonesia*, Vo. 29, No. 1, 2005, p. 39
[357] Hamid Abdullah*, Manusia Bugis Makassar: Suatu Tinjauan Historis terhadap Pola Tingkah Laku dan Pandangan Hidup Manusia Bugis Makassar* (The Bugis-Makassar People: Historical Perspective to the Pattern of Behavior and Worldview of Bugis-Makassar People), Inti Idayu Press, Jakarta, 1985, p. 37
[358] Nurul Ilmi Idrus, *Op. Cit*., p. 40
[359] Hamid Abdullah*, Op. Cit,, p.* 115

married, such defence will switch to her husband. Parental custody is transferred on marriage. Since the existence of women who should be under the protection and of men as protector, both women and men have equal responsibilities. And sometime both are under pressure if one of them are unable to enact or to defend *siri'*. Moreover, if a woman, for instance, is annoyed by a man, it is equally meaning that her entire family is also under threat. Hence the honour and dishonour of family depends on its commitment and defence of *siri* irrespective of whether they are male or female. .[360]

At first glance, from an outsider view, women's protection would seem to be limiting women's liberal expression. According to Abdullah, to care about women's honour with respect to their working environment is to caution women with respect to improper interactions which may not be in line with *adat* custom. This does not inhibit women to take public roles, the question of customary law is about 'suitability'. For as long as women are able to maintain *adat* values whenever and wherever they are, there is no cultural barrier as such for women to get involved in public domain.[361] Similarly, Millar argues that:

> these women were able to manage formal and assertive roles as rajas because all their interactions with men were regulated by detailed and stylised deference patterns as dictated by *adat.* Now, assertive behaviour among professional women is considered appropriate, as dictated by the emerging code of modern Indonesian government and business.[362]

From the above elucidation, suffice it to say that within Bugis-Makassar tradition women are able to take on public roles as long as they are able to act according to *adat'*s expectation. Therefore, the visible women in the public domain within the society of Bugis-Makassar is not entirely at odds with adat or *siri*.

Regarding implementing and defeating *siri*', there is different cultural expectations for

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[360] Nurul Ilmi Idrus, *Op. Cit*., p. 43
[361] Hamid Abdullah,*Op. Cit., p.* 115
[362] Susan Bolyard Millar, *Op. Cit*., p. 488

both women and men. Women should maintain not only the blood of the family but also family's *siri*'. As a defender of *siri'*, women are supposed to have inward qualities such as calmness or modesty and patience that both represent the attitude of *malebbi*' and it is an essential element of *siri*'. Meanwhile, men are responsible for providing family subsistence as well as expanding kinship ties.[363] In a similar vein, Miller argues that 'women are expected to act passively, not because it is their nature to do so but in order to prevent threats to family *siri'*. Men are expected to act aggressively, not because of hormonal impulse but in order to correct any doubts cast upon family *siri'*.[364] In short, the existence of different inward qualities is based on distinct positions or functions and roles identified with women and men.

An Introduction to WI

WI is a mass and male dominated Islamic organization that is centred in and based on Makassar region, South Sulawesi province. Originally WI was the Fathul Muin[365] foundation (Yayasan Fathul Muin, YFM) established in 18 June 1988 in Makassar. Its activities include firstly, the formation of Dinul Islam Study Forum (Forum Studi Dinul Islam, FOSIDI) functioned as a media where students in Hasanuddin university (UNHAS) were able to discuss about Islam. FOSIDI has been centred on agriculture faculty at UNHAS, as its founders were students from the faculty. Secondly, the foundation also formed campus-based *da'wa* institution under name of *Ashabul Kahfi*[366] in 1998 at the Indonesian Muslim University (UMI). Both campuses are in Makassar.

[363] Nurul Ilmi Idrus, *Op. Cit*., p. 46
[364] Susan Bolyard Millar, *Op. Cit*., p. 488
[365] Fathul Muin is a name of an Islamic cleric whose complete name is KH Fathul Muin Dg Magading. According to Saguni (one of founders of WI) KH Fathul Muin is the first teacher of WI' cadres. Interview with Qasim Saguni 01 June 2016. KH Fathul Muin was also the chairman of *Ta'mirul* Mu'minin which was the center of Muhammadiyah's (the second biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia which was existing since 1912) activities. For further information, See Eva F. Nisa, *Cadari* of WI: Women as Dedicated Actors of Ultra-Conservatism,' in *Intersection: Gender and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific Issue*, November 2012
[366] The rector of UMI at that time, Prof. Dr. Basalamah, asked assistance of YFM to train and to educate his students about Islamic thoughts. This was because one of rector's programs was to create Islamic campus. To do so, YFM formed *Ashabul Kaffi* as learning and training media. Such chance also had been exploited by YFM to recruit cadres so members of YFM was increased. Interview with Qasim Saguni on 01 June 2016

Thirdly, the YFM is also concerned with Islamic training for students in senior high school. In doing so, the foundation has established Islamic Study Club (Kelompok Kajian Islam, KKI) for these students in learning Islam. The Study Club is also a means exerted by YFM to recruit these pupils.[367] According to one of founders of YFM[368], there were many social-political and religious situations in 1980s that encouraged the creation of YFM. First is Suharto's policy that all parties and mass organisations must put *Pancasila* as their sole principle. This policy is unacceptable, as YFM's founders acknowledge that Islam is the only principle of life including the basis of organisation, not others. Secondly, according to YFM's Islamic understanding, current Islamic practices are not in accordance with al-Qur'an and hadith direction such as superstition and *bid'ah* (inappropriate innovations within Islam). Third was crisis of role model in Islam (*qudwah khasanah)*. It was too difficult at that time to look for an Islamic figure who could be followed. Those founders of YFM found ideal characteristic attached to self of KH Fathul Muin dg Magading who could be regarded as ideal Islamic figure. This was because he was intelligent, brave, and consistent between what he said and what he did. Fourth was that the initiators of YFM aspired to generate Islamic preachers (*da'i*) and scholars who had deep Islamic knowledge, high zeal in struggling for Islam as well as they would be good examples among society. [369]

In 19 February 1998, the name of Fathul Muin Foundation was changed to the WI Foundation (Yayasan WI*,* YWI) which means Islamic unity. Reasons for the change of name was to avoid the cult of KH. Fathul Muin Dg. Magading and in order that YWI would be a pioneer in unifying the Muslim community (*ummah*) as literal meaning of Wahdah Islamiya.[370] Besides this, the change of name was also caused by critics from Muhammadiyah regarding the use of KH

[367] Buku Panduan Muktamar III WI (Manual Book for the Meeting III WI), Jakarta, 17-20 July 2016, p.11
[368] There were three founding fathers of YFM, Zaitun Rasmin (now he is the central leader of WI), Qasim Saguni, and Haris Abdurrahman. They were activists of Muhammadiyah youth organisations (Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah, IPM). Eva F. Nisa, *Op. Cit.*, p. 2
[369]I nterview with Qasim Saguni in 01 June 2016. He was one founder of YFM and the former leader of M2A. When the interview was taking place, he was leader of advisory council (*majelis syuro*)
[370] WI, 'Sejarah Singkat Berdirinya WI', available in http://muktamar.wahdah.or.id/sejarah-singkat-berdirinya-wahdah-islamiyah/, accessed on 25 April 2017

Fathul Muin's name. Muhammadiyah claimed that the *ulama* (KH Fathul Muin) was one of the stakeholders of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi. If YFM still used Fathul Muin as the name of its organisation, people would perceive that YFM was part of Muhammadiyah[371] when in fact, there was no such link. By its new name, YWI hoped to be able to contribute to the creation of Muslim unity. In 25 May 2000, YWI changed its name once again to Islamic School of the WI Foundation (Yayasan Pesantren WI, YPWI). The shift of name is partly intended to attract public's attention that the YPWI is not only operated in *da'wa* movement but also provides public Islamic educational institutions including Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*). For example, YPWI has a College of Islamic Science and Arabic Language (Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Islam dan Bahasa Arab, STIBA). The main aim of the STIBA is to provide Islamic preachers and scholars who have a good understanding of sharia sciences and a high motivation in doing *da'wa.* Since the development of YPWI's *da'wa* activities increased and more widespread, at a large national meeting in 14 April 2002, YPWI officially transformed from a foundation to a mass organisation hence its name became WI.[372] By transforming into an organisation, WI is able to be more flexible, as it can legally open branches everywhere.[373] According to Indonesian legislation regarding mass-based organisations, particularly article 8 of the law, mass organisation can establish its subsections/branches in provinces or districts.[374] Not surprisingly, update report in 2016 shown that now WI has 124 District Leaders Council (*Dewan Pimpinan Daerah*, DPD) entire Indonesia and 10 Regional leaders council (*Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah*, DPW).[375]

WI has two main aims, namely firstly, setting and educating pious society believing Allah as well as spreading Islamic thoughts that is in line with the way of *as salaf ash-shalih* (a method

[371] Interview with Qasim Saguni in 01 June 2016
[372] Buku Panduan Muktamar III WI (Manual Book for the Meeting III WI), p. 12
[373] Interview with Qasim Saguni in 01 June 2016
[374] Indonesian Regulation regarding Mass Organisation, No. 17, 2013, available in http://www.dpr.go.id/dokjdih/document/uu/UU_2013_17.pdf, accessed on 14 November 2018
[375] Selayang Pandang WI (Overview of *WI*), 2016, p. 3

of *ahlussunnah wal jama'ah*) in understanding al-Qur'an and hadith. The second is to enforce *tawheed* (Oneness to God) and Sunnah as well as to maintain Islamic brotherhood for the sake of the embodiment of the life of society, nation and state that is approved by God. To implement these objectives, WI set several missions of the organisation encompassing the cultivation and the spread of the correct Islamic theology accorded with al-Qur'an and hadith as being comprehended by *as salaf ash-shalih;* the enforcement Islamic *da'wa* and the deployment of the true Islamic thoughts; the establishment of *ummah* centred on cooperation (*ta'awun*) and mutual advising (*tanasuh*); the formation of Islamic and excellent education and economics institutions; lastly, the creation of pious generation who become pioneer in any kind of fields of life. WI is engaged in a variety of sectors such as *da'wa*, education, social, womanhood, information, health, and environment.[376]

Women's participation within WI can be traced back to the 1990s, at which time YWI formed the Women's (*Muslimah*) Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Musyawarah Akhwat,* M2A). Due to the lack of women cadres at that time, the assembly was led by a male cadre. Men's intervention in M2A was to supervise and to train the few female recruits existing at the time. *Da'wa,* training, and Islamic teaching (*tarbiyah*)[377] were the main programs set by M2A. As time goes by, M2A has been more developed in terms of their activities and number of members, increasingly women who were interested in getting involved, YWI eventually established the *Muslimah* Institution (*Lembaga Muslimah*, LM), allowing *Muslimah* to have its own leader and management. But it is still only semi-autonomous since LM was still under male structure as its mother organization. Many districts in South Sulawesi have a District Leaders Council (*Dewan Pimpinan Daerah*, DPD) of WI in which its organization committees are entirely male. Every DPD had their LM. LM in the level of districts are named as LM branches that must coordinate

[376] Selayang Pandang WI (Overview of *WI*), *Op. Cit*., pp. 1-2

[377] *Tarbiyah* is weekly meeting that every member of WI is compulsory to attend it. This meeting mainly functions to improve Islamic knowledge and to recharge spirit and commitment of every member.

with their own DPD except in three regions in South Sulawesi, namely Makassar, Maros, and Gowa. These areas are under their own DPP's control, but their coordination is directly linked to the central LM in Makassar. This is because they are technically categorised as areas that are able to be visited by *Muslimah* even without an accompanying male relative (*muhrim*).

In 2005, based on a decree (*Surat Keputusan*, SK) issued by the WI central board No. D. 157/QR/PP-WI/IV/1426, the Makassar-based central LM was established.[378] It is the authority over all LM branches.[379] Its role is to give supervision, communication, consultation, and coordination to LM branches and its mentored regions. It is also in charge of drafting national programs[380] used by the central LM, its branches, and its mentored regions as a guide to achieving WI's vision and mission. One achievement of the central LM is to collect membership data. According to the data, until 2006 the number of female cadres was 6729 across 21 LM branches and these mentored regions.[381] Relatively new update of members' number is 5000 LM cadres in Makassar and 25,000 throughout Indonesia and most of them are students from the foremost universities[382] such as UNHAS in Makassar. In this regard, Saguni acknowledges that the female membership has tripled compared to that of their male counterparts. With such large numbers, it is not surprising that the LM is more active and progressive than the male institution.[383] In general all the LMs have a mission consisting of the training as well as the development of LM branches and the regional *Muslimah* forum. This is aimed at the acceleration of Islamic *da'wa* activities in the centre and the regions by conducting religious training (*daurah*) and short-term Islamic

[378] WI, 'Kiprah Lembaga Muslimah WI Pusat', available in http://wahdah.or.id/kiprah-lembaga-muslimah-wahdah-islamiyah-pusat/, accessed on 25 April 2017
[379] WI, 'Meretas Perjalanan Lembaga Muslimah', available in http://wahdah.or.id/lembaga-muslimah/, accessed on 24 April 2017
[380] WI, 'Kiprah Lembaga Muslimah WI Pusat,' available in http://wahdah.or.id/kiprah-lembaga-muslimah-wahdah-islamiyah-pusat/, accessed on 25 April 2017
[381] WI, 'Meretas Perjalanan Lembaga Muslimah', available in http://wahdah.or.id/lembaga-muslimah/, accessed on 24 April 2017
[382] Eva F. Nisa, 2012, *Op. Cit*., p. 1
[383] Interview with Qasim Saguni in 01 June 2016

schooling that would teach participants the tenets of Islamic such as basic rituals in Islam, *tawheed*, and bad and good conduct (*akhlak*). Furthermore, the aim is to educate and to improve Islamic study groups (*majelis ta'lim*) throughout Indonesia.[384] Additionally, the central LM as a semi-autonomous wing of the WI, have their own committee structure and activities which are almost the same as those of their male counterpart in WI.[385]

An introduction to HTI

Hizbuut Tahrir (HT) was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqiuddin an-Nabhani. He was born (1909) in Ijizm, a village near Haifa,[386] in Northern Palestine. He passed away in 1977 and was buried in Auza'i, Beirut.[387] After finishing his study at al-Azhar *University,* Cairo, al-Nabhani went back to Palestine and worked in the Ministry of Education as a teacher at a junior high school in Haifa.[388] During his study, he became involved in the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). He also read literature authored by MB's thinkers and activists.[389] Not surprisingly, when he returned home to Haifa, he was a key figure in the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood until the establishment of Israel in 1949.[390] His contact with the organization in turn affected the way he thought and looked at social-political problems facing the Islamic world.

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[384] WI, 'Profil Lembaga Muslimah,' available in http://wahdah.or.id/profil-lembaga-muslimah/, accessed on 24 April 2017
[385] Interview with Qasim Saguni in 01 June 2016
[386] David Commins, ' Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani and The Islamic Liberation Party', in *The Muslim World journal*, vol. LXXXI,No. 3-4, 1991, p, 194.
[387] Syamsul Arifin, *Ideology dan Praksis Gerakan Sosial Kaum Fundamentalis: Pengalaman Hizbuut Tahrir Indonesia', (ideology and Praxis of Social Movement of Fundamental Group: The Experience of Hizbuuttahrir Indonesia*), UNM Press, Malang, 2005, p. 89.
[388] Frank Schneider, 'Threat Behind a Legal Façade?', Unpublished M.A, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2006, p.13
[389] Greg Fealy, Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia: Seeking A "Total" Islamic identity', in Akbarzadeh & Mansouri, *Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West*, Tauris Academic Studies, London, 2007, p. 153.
[390] David Commins, '*Op. Cit*., p. 194.

In 1938 Taqiuddin an-Nabhani quit his teaching career and started workingas a judge in *Sharia* courts, such as in the Islamic court in Ramleh, after studying law at *al-A*zhar University[391]. He expressed dismay that the Western values had infiltrated the educational institution and altered the curriculum.[392] By engaging in the *Sharia* court, he wanted to keep his distance from the Education Ministry in order to have greater opportunities to implement his knowledge of sharia law.[393] He was concerned with the implementation of sharia law that was not entirely applied in the daily lives of citizens. Though Islamic family law (*ahwal al-shakhsiyah*) and its derivations had been applied, other aspects had become secular, or *kafir* (out of Islam).[394] He was anxious and criticized the conditions experienced by Muslims, offering solutions not only when he became a teacher and judge, but also when he took advantage of the pulpit and preached at the mosque al-Aqsa and al-Ibrahim al-Khali.l[395] It was his contention that the main problems faced by Muslims were political, so that building a strong political institution was the solution. As a result, in 1953 the Islamic Liberation Party *(*Hizbut Tahrir) was established with the foremost aim of revitalising the Muslim world, liberating Muslims from secular thoughts and laws, and restoring the Islamic caliphate.[396]

Like Muslim Brothers, Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbut Tahrir declares that Islamic values cover all aspects of daily life without exception.[397] An-Nabhani believed that the al-Qur'an and the *hadiths* provided adequate foundations for legal decisions covering all aspects of life. The remaining role of authoritative scholars is to interpret the basic norms.[398] Islam is a religion which

[391] Frank Schneider, *Op. Cit*., p.13
[392] SyamsulArifin, *Op. Cit.,* p. 91
[393] Arief Ihsan Rathomy, *Op. Cit*., p. 81
[394] SyamsulArifin, *Op. Cit*., pp. 91-92.
[395] Syamsul Arifin, *Ibid*., pp. 93-94.
[396] Mohammed Nawab Mohammad Osman, 'Reviving the caliphate in the Nusantara: HizbutTahrir Indonesia's Mobilization Strategy and Its Impact in Indonesia', *Working Paper*, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, 2009, pp. 1-2.
[397] Greg Fealy, 2007, *Op. Cit*., p. 153.
[398] ICG, 'Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizbut-Tahrir', *ICG Asia Report No 58*, p. 3

is both spiritual and social in its ideology. Thus, Hizbut Tahrir's main political objective was to revive the Islamic caliphate which existed previously in Islamic history, for example, the Ottoman Empire.[399]The obligation to restore the Islamic caliphate for HTI rests on three arguments: (1) a normative principle, in that this compulsion is based on what the Holy Koran and *Sunnah* declared. HTI argues 'that to establish *khilafah* is compulsory for every Muslim (and) even is considered as the noblest religious duty';[400] (2) an historical precedence argument which refers to what the Prophet Muhammad applied in Medinah and events after his death, followed by a group of caliphs, known as *khulafa al-rasyidun,* which replaced the Prophet.[401] (3) and the factual conditions of Muslim pain and misery, such as the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the repression of Muslims in Southern Thailand, the Philippines, Kashmir, Somalia, and so on.[402]

To achieve its main goal, the organization proposes a three-stage process for what Hizbut Tahrir claimed was an 'Islamic peace revolution'[403]. The first was the culturing stage (*marhalah at tatsqif*). This stage aimed to establish cadres who believe in the truth of thoughts and methods of Hizbut Tahrir to form a group which can carry out the party's ideas[404]. The second was the interaction stage with the *ummah* (*marhalahtafa'ulma'a al ummah*). It aims at encouraging the *ummah* to carry out the Islamic *da'wa* obligation to implement an Islamic perspective in life, the

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[399] Fahlesa Munabari, 'Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia: The Quest for the Caliphate and Shariah, A paper presented at International Workshop on Islam and Middle East: Dynamics of Social and Political Transformation, Kyoto, University, August 2-3, 2008, p, 9.
[400] Agus Salim, 'The Rise of Hizbut-Tahrir (1982-2004): Its Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization, and Collective Action Frames', unpublished thesis at UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, 2005, p. 212.
[401] Agus Salim, '*Ibid*., p. 214.
[402] Burhanuddin Muhtadi,' The Quest for *HizbutTahrir*in Indonesia', in *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 2009, p. 631.
[403] BurhanuddinMuhtadi, *Ibid*., p. 630
[404] Muhammad Muhsin Rodhi, *Tsaqofah dan Metode Hizbut Tahrir dalam Mendirikan Negara Khilafah Isamiyah* (Civilisation and Method of *HizbutTahrir* in Establishing the State of Islamic Caliphate), Al-Izzah, Bangil, 2008, p. 40

state and society. The last stage was accepting power or the takeover of power (government)[405]. This stage intended to implement Islam totally and completely and to spread the Islamic message over the world.[406] Hizbut Tahrir claimed that the use of violence was an inappropriate way of reaching the third step.

HTI is a branch of Hizbut Tahrir that came from Australia in the early 1980s. In Australia,[407] Abdullah bin Nuh, an Islamic teacher and preacher who owned al-Qazahali-*pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in Bogor, West Java[408], was acquainted with *hizbiyyin* in Sydney. One of the *hizbiyyin* that Abdullah met was Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, a Palestinian activist of Hizbuut Tahrir who emigrated to Australia in the 1960s. Bin Nuh invited al-Baghdadi to disseminate the teachings of Hizbut Tahrir.[409] When al-Baghdadi arrived in Indonesia in 1982, he utilized Bin Nuh's *pesantren* as HTI's headquarters to disseminate Hizbut tahrir's teachings, which expanded along with recruitment. *Halaqah* (study circles) and *daurah* (religious training) were introduced as intensive methods of recruitment.[410]*Both* al-Baghdadi and Bin Nuh tried to attract recruits across several university campuses, particularly the Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB), the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), and the University of Indonesia (UI). HTI also recruited in many Mosques across Java.[411]

Under Soeharto's regime, HTI was a clandestine organization seeking to avoid Suharto's intimidation. HTI never referred to Hizbut Tahrir terminology in its documents, waiting until after

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[405] Mateen Siddiqui, 'The Doctrine of Hizbut Tahriri', in Zeyno Baran, (ed.), *The Challenge of Hizbut Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamic Ideology'*, Conference report, the Nixon Center, September 2004, p., 4, available in http://www.islamawareness.net/Deviant/Hizb/confrephiztahrir.pdf, accessed on 3 July 2012.
[406] MAJ Daniel J. Ruder, 'the long War in Central Asia: Hizbut tahrir's Caliphate', *a Monograph*, 2006, p 22. Available at: www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA450614. *Accessed on: 24 May 2012.*
[407] Abdullah came to Sydney, Australia, where his son was being educated.
[408] Masdar Helmy, *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism*, ISEAS, Singapore, 2010, p. 118
[409] Alexander Horstmann, 'Transnational ideologies and Actors at the level of Society in South and Southeast Asia', in *NBR Project report*, 2009, p. 47.
[410] Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Op. Cit.,* p. 626.
[411] Greg Fealy, 2007, *Op. Cit*., p. 155.

Suharto's fall in 1998 to disseminate its teachings.[412] HTI was encouraged to come into public view[413]. Therefore, in early 2000, for the first time the organisation hosted an international conference in Jakarta which aimed at introducing the goal of the Islamic caliphate. In 12 August 2007, HTI organized a second 'caliphate conference' at Bung Karno stadium in Jakarta which attracted approximately 100,000 Muslims who were mostly members or sympathizers. This event was reported widely by both the national media, such as *Kompas Cyber Media,* and the international media such as Reuters and the BBC News.[414] HTI established several branches located mainly in urban areas.[415]

The presence of HTI in Makassar, South Sulawesi in 1990s could not be separated from the role of Campus *da'wa* organization (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK) that have existed on every campus throughout Indonesia. According to Hasanuddin Rasyid, the former committee of HTI in South Sulawesi, LDK of Indonesian Muslim University (Universitas Muslim Indonesia, UMI) had a significant role in introducing and disseminating the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir in Makassar. Rasyid explained that he and other friends who were from UMI LDK undertook an Arabic course in Malang, East Java. They apparently not only learned the Arabic language but also were introduced to a series of ideas of Islamist movements including HTI. Before arriving in Makassar, they visited Surabaya where they had the opportunity to be acquainted with several HTI activists and HTI's ideas. To develop and to intensify the discussion of HTI's interesting notions when they arrived in Makassar, they formed a religious discussion forum in 1995. It was the embryo of HTI's emergence and unfolding in Makassar. Since they then realized that HTI's

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[412] Ken Ward, 'Non-Violent Extremists? HTI', in *Australian Journal of International Affair,* 63:2, 2009, pp. 150-151.
[413] Masdar Helmy, *Op. Cit.,* p. 120
[414] Fahlesa Munabari, 'HizbutTahrir Indonesia: The Rhetorical Struggle for Survival', in Ota Atsushi, Okamoto Masaaki, and Ahmad Suaedy (ed), *Islam Contention: Rethinking Islam and State in Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Wahid Institute- CSEAS-CAPAS, 2010), p. 174.
[415] Alexander Horstmann, 'Transnational ideologies and Actors at the level of Society in South and Southeast Asia', in *the National Bureau of Asian Research*, NBR Project Report, 2009, p. 47.

objectives are to build Islamic society and an Islamic state, eventually they disseminated HTI's ideology outside of the campus. [416]

The Structure of HTI South Sulawesi consists of District Leaders Council I (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah, DPD I) for province, DPD II for district, and a Branch Leaders Council (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang, DPC) for the sub-district. It also has several departments, namely Lajnah Tsaqafiyyah (the Department of Culture), Lajnah Siyasiyyah (the Department of Politics), Lajnah Maslahiyyah (the Department of Benefits), Lajnah Fa'aliyyah (the Department of Administration), and Lajnah I'lamiyyah (the Department of Information).[417] A similar structure and set of departments also existed in *Muslimah* of HTI. Since HT's establishment, women have been encouraged to get involved in HT's movement though they are ascribed different roles than their male counterparts. HT see women's natural role as mother and housewife but they are still allowed to take political roles as long as they follow Islamic sharia principles and do not involve a -leadership position[418] such as being *khalifah* (person who leads an Islamic state). *Muslimah* of HT have their own department that organises women's interests.[419] In Indonesia, *Muslimah*'s division is called Muslimah HTI (MHTI). According to Yusanto (spokesmen of HTI) one of reasons as to why *Muslimah's* chapter should be formed is that there is a request from female members of HTI who also desire to participate in organising activities orientated towards women.[420] Julia Pratma Sulandari, coordinator of Lajnah Siyasi of Centre Leader Council of MHTI (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, DPP MHTI) argues that women should place their political activities and household tasks in parallel according to Islamic rules. Further Islam teaches that relations between women and men

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[416] Syamsul Rizal, 'Jaringan HTI di Kota Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan (HTI's Network in Makassar, South Sulawesi)', in Perkembangan Paham Keagamaan Transnasional di Indonesia, by Ahmad Syafi'I Muid (ed.), Pustlitbang, Jakarta, 2011, Pp. 27-29
[417] Syamsul Rizal, *Ibid.,* p. 31
[418] Zeyno Baran, Hizb Ut- Tahrir: 'Islam's Political Insurgency', in *The Nixon Center*, 2004, p. 32
[419] Zeyno Baran, *Ibid*., p. 32
[420] Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, 'Reviving the Caliphate in the Nusantara: HTI's Mobilization Strategy and Its Impact in Indonesia', in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2010, p. 611

should be cooperative rather than competitive.[421] In other words, MHTI is of the view that women and men have equal responsibility regardless of gender, in performing *da'wa* and other public roles while following Allah's guidance.[422] In addition, one strategy of MHTI in propagating their ideology and addressing women's interests is to institute a section in HTI's website dedicated to talking about women. This addresses issues identified by MHTI such as, women and violence, gender equality, and women's rights.[423]

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the introduction and development of Islam in South Sulawesi. The existence of Islamist orientation and organization has historical roots in the distance past and continues until the present day. The spirit of the establishment of an Islamic state pioneered by Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar is still advocated by Islamist movements that came after him. It is clear seen from the presence of KPPSI, that the call for sharia's formalization and the proliferation of Islamist organizations such as WI and HTI struggling for the Islamization of public sphere and even the founding of an Islamic state. The emergence of such Islamist groups with their own women's wing has increased the vibrancy of women's movement in Indonesia in general and Makassar, South Sulawesi in particular. This chapter also notes that a public role for Bugis-Makassar women is considered acceptable, not something improper. Even *adat* (local custom) justified and encouraged such public responsibilities. Moreover, Bugis-Makassar tradition is respectful to the different roles of women and men. I continue the examination of the Islamist

[421] MHTI DPD I, *Aktivitas Politik Perempuan Dalam Tinjauan Islam* (Women's Political Activities in Islamic Perspective), Jakarta, 2013, available in http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2013/10/07/kajian-politik-mhti-dpd-i-jakarta-bahas-aktivitas-politik-perempuan-dalam-tinjauan-islam/, accessed on 24 April 2017.
[422] Claudia Seise, Muslimah HTI: An Introduction to Its Thoughts and Activities, *Working Papers*, No. 44, 2011, p.10
[423] Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 611-612

women's movement by analysing two Islamist organisations, WI and HTI, as "new comers" in the Indonesian women's movement.

CHAPTER FIVE
WOMEN'S INVOLVEMENT IN WI

Introduction

This chapter discuses women's involvement in the Islamist movement through WI. It considers why women choose to participate in WI, why they aspire to get involved, and what benefits women offer the organisation, as well as how their involvement benefits their own lives as women. It also scrutinizes what is required of women before they take part in the organisation. The results of my research show that there are several motives and reasons, as well as various benefits for women's participation, but religious reasons and benefits for women tend to be the standard answer they give. This research also depicts that women's participation is channelled into both the individual level and the public level of *da'wa*. The former refers to systematic and sustainable processes of self-training and self- education to be pious or a true Muslim woman, while the latter is the extension of these processes to create social piety. In this sense, it is not enough to be a pious individual, but also importantly, to call for other women to be pious as well. Public da'wa aims to transform the current social system into an Islamic social order.

As the previous chapter has underlined, the presence of women in WI[424] began in the 1990s, but, at that time due to the lack of women's involvement, the Women's Assembly was led by a man. In 2005, since the number of women taking part in WI[425] activities has significantly increased, WI transformed the Assembly into a dedicated women's section of the movement called

[424] As a legal organisation, WI has an official licence from Indonesian Government No. 57/D.III.2/VI/2008 and No. 220/465-I/BKB-SS. Wahdah Islamiyah, 'Legalitas Formal, available in https://wahdah.or.id/legalitas-formal/ , accessed on 26 June 2019

[425] WI has 193 branches at regency level throughout Indonesia and 34 branches at province level, available in Wahdah TV- published on December, 26, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wFW_GYA2nA4, accessed on 24 June 2019. If WI has 34 branches at province level, it means that there is only one province left without WI's presence, because the total number of provinces in Indonesia is 35.

the women's division of the WI (*Lembaga Muslimah*[426] WI, LM). This change has meant that women have been able to organise their programs and activities as well as to have a female. In 2016, LM changed its name to WI Women (Muslimah WI, MWI). The alteration came after the third Islamic Conference (*Muktamar*[427] III) held by WI, lasting from 17 to 20 July 2016 at Hajj dormitory, Jakarta. This event underlined several fundamental shifts. Two of these were the name change of the Assembly and written recognition of women as WI created specific clauses about women in its Constitution. The inclusion of special articles with respect to women in WI's Constitution was proposed by WI women themselves, which signals a fundamental shift, because before the third Islamic conference, there was no constitutional recognition of women in WI.[428]

This is a noteworthy change for several reasons. Firstly, the changes suggest that the women's institution within WI is both adaptable and dynamic. The name shift, and lively structural formation of the women's department show that WI is responsive to organisational needs and rapid social change. Secondly, the proposal to transform the name from LM to MWI arose from women's initiatives, which could be contested in the *Muktamar*. Women proposed the change, as the old structures of LM were deemed as ineffective and inefficient because of its long and complicated bureaucracy, which meant problems identified by women were not addressed in a timely manner.[429] Further, the name shift was needed because people quite often call the former assembly Muslimah Wahdah Islamiyah (MWI), following the trend of other Islam-based women's

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[426] Muslimah refers to female in Islam. In this thesis I will use Muslimah interchangeable with women to refer WI's women.

[427] The Islamic Conference (*Muktamar*) is held once every five years for both male and female cadres. But MWI has an annual meeting to arrange and plan their programs and budget for one year. Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga WI (WI's Constitution), 2016-202, pp. 27-34. Although the *Muktamar* is for all cadres of WI and MWI, men and women are separated at the venue. When I visited the Muktamar, women were able to question ad give their opinion directly.

[428] Interview with Ummu Khalid (Leader of Muslimah WI), on 30 August 2016. This clause stipulates the procedures for election of leaders, stewardship, and membership of MWI. For further and comprehensive information, see Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga WI (WI's Constitution), 2016-202., pp. 27-32

[429] Interview with Ummu Khalid, on 30 August 2016

movements such as NU and Muhammadiyah, where the women's branches of both groups are known as Muslimah NU or Muslimah Muhammadiyah.[430] Thirdly, the shift from LM into MWI has had significant consequences. MWI is now able to communicate more effectively and directly with the highest leadership of WI, as the Chair of MWI is now equal to the male-dominated chairs of other departments. The Chairmen of the individual departments help the leader to run the organisation. Another corollary is that MWI is stronger than before as they currently have a strong bargaining position.[431] Fourthly, although MWI is more powerful now, this does not mean that MWI is an autonomous institution, not bound by the coordination lines that structure men's leadership. According to Ummu Khalid (chairman of MWI), from an institutional point of view, MWI is not autonomous but rather, it operates very independently. She argues that:

> ….to be honest, the way Muslimah works is autonomous, as our male counterparts rarely comment on what we do. So, *de jure,* we are not autonomous but *de facto,* we are very independent: we can determine things, even being able to give a different slant to things. That is why we do not need autonomy organisationally. At least, it is enough if there is specific clause about women in WI's Constitution.[432]

Ummu Khalid's assertion is supported by some female members of MWI who acknowledge that they do not want to become completely independent, because being free to lead and act is difficult, as it means that they need to do everything by and for themselves and in fact, they occasionally need their male counterparts' support and assistance.[433] Others argue that autonomy is not in line with sharia, which stipulates that men are leaders over women[434]. Also, not being independent or becoming semi-autonomous is a typical feature of MWI, differentiating it from other Islamic women's organisations[435] such as Muslimah NU. In addition, working within WI offers safeguards

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[430] Interview with Ummu Hasan (Member of Regeneration Department of MWI) and Ummu Ammar (Member of Human Resource Department of MWI), on 16 July 2016, as well as Faridah (Treasurer of Muslimah WI), on 19 July 2016
[431] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016
[432] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016
[433] Interview with Ummu Hasan on 16 July 2016
[434] Interview with Yuyun (*da'wa* activist of Muslimah WI), on 19 July 2016
[435] Interview with Yuyun on 19 July 2016

for Muslimah Wahdah Islamiyah (MWI), because being autonomous is too high risk, in the sense that it is more likely to infringe sharia's rule that men are leaders over women, as acknowledged by Faridah.[436]

Why Women Choose WI?

Based on my empirical findings, there were various answers to this question. Some participants picked WI because of its method of Islamic teaching, that is consistent, systematic, and comprehensive. One informant states:

> I joined WI in 1989 when I was a student at Hasanuddin University (UNHAS). *Ustadz* (teacher) Qasim was my teacher from the beginning. He really taught systematically. In a sense, we directly felt that this was what we have been looking for. He was very nice in introducing God and His prophets. We joined eventually, and God guided us. We did not feel we had been indoctrinated, but that there was a significant change in ourselves.[437]

Similarly, Ummu Hana felt that:

> I think the cadre system in WI is really different. Several years ago, when I was in a previous organization (al-Markas mosque), although I was a Chair of the particular department, I was still unable to speak. But in WI, fortunately, there were changes for me as I was very seriously trained. I was not forced but learned how to speak. Also, I was taught how to read the *Qur'an* correctly. When in al-Markaz I was very confident to teach reading the *Qur'an*. But after joining WI, the ways I read the *Qur'an* have been reformed, I must learn again.[438]

Ummu Miftah argued that;

> Wahdah is an organisation whose arrangement is terribly neat. For example, religious lectures and regular events are arranged. If we have joined, we have to follow the rules. We could not attend the religious lecture for example, only for a few days, and after that, we were absent. We could not arbitrarily go to a lecture today, and three months later come again. So, the first thing we have been taught is that we have to be committed, follow the rules. We were trained to feel that we should change, and we did not want to be like this. We did not want to wear hijab improperly. We should understand the limitations of women's *aurat* (part of the body required by Islam to be covered). We fully realised it without any outside forces since the explanation of *aurat* is from God (Allah) through His sacred verses in the *Qur'an*.[439]

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[436] Interview with Faridah on 19 July 2016
[437] Interview with Ummu Saniawati on 17 July 2016
[438] Interview with Ummu Hana (*da'wa* activist of Muslimah WI), on 18 September 2018
[439] Interview with Ummu Miftah (*da'wa* activist of WI), on 19 July 2016

From the above information, it is interesting to note, firstly, that WI's system of introducing and teaching Islam is different to other Islamic organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah. Such distinctions become interesting, particularly for young people seeking their identity. Naturally, it is only human for young people to wish to try something new and unique. Ummu Khalid told me that she decided to join WI, partly because of the social and political environment in the 1980s, and the search for self-identity. Under Suharto's regime, religious freedom was restricted. However, within this atmosphere, there was an organisation that bravely criticised the dictatorship.[440] This group was certainly different from other organisations at the time. Ummu Khalid reasoned that 'because of caring about the social condition at that point, I was looking for something else, especially at a young age, and that was invariably the search for self-identity'.[441]

WI members also have different ways from their parents in learning Islam, which leads to the differences in understanding and practicing Islam. This quite often sparks disagreements or disputes between members and their parents. When I asked about the external challenges faced by the participants in this study, some of them stated that a parents' refusal to accept their children's affiliation to WI is one of the challenges which confronted them. Ummu Hana recounted to me that in the beginning, because of different understandings and performances of Islam, there was turmoil in her family. She notes: 'if I go to my mother's house, she asks me to take off my long hijab when we wanted to eat since the hijab made me hot. I came for the second time by wearing long black hijab, and my mother mocked me saying I looked like a crow.'[442] Another participant

[440] The charismatic Islamic scholar where some WI's elites learned from him, KH. Fathul Muin Dg. Maggadding, disagreed with Suharto's policy regarding the sole principle of Pancasila, in which Pancasila should be taken as the basis of organisation. Fathul Muin was one of Muhammadiyah's elites in Makassar and he resigned from *Muhammadiyah* since it accepted Suharto's policy. According to him, *Muhammadiyah* should maintain Islam as the basic of organisation, not Pancasila. He then made Islamic study club and his students were mostly founders of WI.
[441] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016
[442] Interview with Ummu Hana on 18 September 2016

was asked by her parents to stop attending University..[443] Secondly, because of its systematic and sustainable methods in which members learn Islam, the understanding and practice performed by WI members are not solely inherited from their parents or the wider environment. They embrace Islam through a critical, mindful, and long process. For them, WI's approach to comprehending and applying Islam should be considered the true method. In this sense, learning Islam comprises a valid argument based on the Qur'an and the hadith as well as following the development of sciences. One participant explained that religious lectures delivered by WI's speakers must be based on valid and authoritative arguments from the Qur'an and the hadith. They are not advised to use weak and unclear postulates. Likewise, apart from the use of the Qur'an and the hadith, lectures need to be supported by the results of sciences[444] Billah[445] reminds us that:

> the Qur'an urges humanity always to search for the truth and always to question the truths that have been received from the ancestors, always to be open to correction of mistaken beliefs and to test that which in the past has been considered as truth.[446]

The question of the differences between young Muslimah and their parents is also related to the idea of the relationship between the past and the present, which has become the concern of modernity. Habermas' conception of modernity is that:

> modernity can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another epoch; it has to create its normativity out of itself. Modernity sees itself cast back upon itself without any possibility of escape.[447]

One of modernity's features is the assumption that there is a discontinuity between the past and present. Regarding Habermas's idea, Brenner suggests it means that:

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[443] Interview with Samhariyani in 19 June 2016

[444] Interview with Hamid Habbe (Chief of Financial Supervisory Department of Wahdha Islamiyah), on 17 Mey 2016

[445] Billah M. M. Gerakan Kelompok Islam di Yogyakarta (The Islamic Group Movement in Yogyakarat), in Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia (The Contemporary Islamic Movement in Indonesia), Abdul Aziz et. al, eds, Pustaka Firdaus, Jakarta, 1991, p. 316

[446] Suzanne Brenner, *Op. Cit*., p. 681

[447] Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 7

> modernity is characterized by the self-consciousness of those who define themselves and their age against the past and in anticipation of the future; to turn toward the future is simultaneously to deny the past's hold on the present.[448]

Thus, following this framework, it might be said that the different methods employed by WI members in learning Islam which has resulted in a distinctive understanding and differentiation of implementing Islam from their parents' and mainstream society, is to some extent in accordance Habermas's understanding of modernity. But the modernity, according to Brenner, of the Islamist movement, is from an Islamic perspective. She argues that:

> the modern structure of the movement's organizations and its emphasis on the intellectual exegesis of Islamic texts in order to apply them to modern life demonstrate that the movement is committed to a rational program of religious and social transformation.[449]

Some participants have been interested in joining WI because the group offers a balance between the study of religion and success in learning at school or university. WI encourages its cadres to pursue high levels of formal education. It is not surprising that most members of WI are educated people with high levels of intellectual qualifications. Ummu Hasan acknowledges that WI is probably the only *da'wa* movement encouraging its members to go university. WI has many cadres who are postgraduates with Masters and Ph.D. degrees.[450] 'What make me stay in WI is partly the existing balance between religion and study. Even we are urged to prioritize our study, of course, without the neglect of the spirit to learn religion'.[451] Members take advantages from this equilibrium, through which they are able to fill their daily lives with useful and valuable activities: almost no day passes without learning: either religion or studying at school or university. Such condition makes recruits, particularly young recruits, different from the average female teenagers who have not felt the need to learn religious teachings seriously. These recruits are able to gain excellent achievements at school and university that make their parents happy and manage

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[448] Suzanne Brenner, *Op. Cit*., p. 681
[449] Suzanne Brenner, *Ibid*., p. 682
[450] Interview with Ummu Hasan on 16 July 2016
[451] Interview with Sumarni (Regional Executive Member of Muslimah WI), on 17 July 2016

their time to arrange a scale of priority in their lives. These recruits have understood this balance as the equilibrium between worldly affairs and the hereafter, which is a fundamental tenet of Islam.[452]

Another reason why women are interested in joining WI is the presence of a sense of sisterhood as well as of brotherhood or fraternity (*ukhuwah*). This creates an egalitarian environment within WI, seen from Ummu Ibra's experience:

> In the beginning, when I joined, there was no gap between seniors and juniors (newcomers). I felt I have been affiliated for a long time and didn't feel shy. I was a newcomer, but these seniors were very friendly and quick to embrace or accept me. Then these seniors did not dictate to me. At that time, I came not wearing socks and with a short hijab and they did not directly tell me, not putting me in the category of wrong behaviour. My consciousness of the use of proper dress appeared through a long process.[453]

The sense of *ukhuwah* is also manifested in daily social interactions, whereby recruits help one another. Even small things are attended to, such as finding accommodation for new students who come to Makassar city to study at university and helping them to settle in the new environment in the capital and on campus. Such assistance was described as very useful to new students who came from districts and villages. The practice of mutual assistance can resolve problems that are complicated to resolve individually. For example, Yuyun told me that there was a member that had a motorbike accident and she needed money, around $6000-$10000 for hospital treatment. Then WI shared this concern with other recruits via WhatsApp, within only a few minutes, the money had been collected. Her problem was sorted out. Yuyun added, 'I thought this could not happen if we did not live in the Islamic friendship way'.[454] Indeed, WI holds to the principle that religious sisterhood is bigger and stronger than kinship or brotherhood. Hasmiaty acknowledges:

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[452] Interview with three participants: Rini (Provincial Executive Member of Muslimah WI), on 17 July 2016, Saniawati on 09 August 2016 ,and Ummu Hasan 16 July 2016

[453] Interview with Ummu Ibra on 30 July 2016.

[454] Interview with Yuyun on 17 July 2016

> I felt my sisters and I in WI were like a big family. Honestly, I have a home at Makassar, but after joining WI, I mostly lived in the MWI office. I only went back to my house if my parents phoned me to ask me to go home.[455]

Da'wa and Tarbiyah: a 'Divine Project'

To know why and how women get involved in WI movement, it is necessary to examine the concepts of *da'wa* and *tarbiyah* (Islamic education). WI's Constitution declares WI is both a *'da'wa* and *tarbiyah* movement, based on the Qur'an and *As-sunnah,* in accordance with *Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah's* (*Ash-Shalaf Shalih*)[456] understanding'.[457] It is important to know how WI defines and understands the concept of *da'wa*. To do so, it is necessary to discuss what is written in WI's Constitution and how WI members understand both *da'wa* and *tarbiyah.*

WI argues that Indonesia's existing Muslim society is not in line with Islamic sharia, so Indonesians are not true Muslim yet. Reform is necessary to create an Islamic society. To achieve this, therefore, WI offers *da'wa* as the means.[458] Literally, the term d*a'wa* is from the Arabic language, which means 'the call for'. The meaning of *da'wa* for WI is both the call for individuals to be faithful and pious Muslims, and to invite others to do this as well. *Da'wa* is one of the main religious obligations for Muslims. Regardless of gender and sexual identity, any individual who has embraced Islam should conduct *da'wa*. As a religious obligation, the position of *da'wa* amongst other religious duties such as praying *(sholah*), fasting during Ramadan, and making a

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[455] Interview with Hasimiaty on 19 July 2016

[456] *Ahlusssunah Wal Jamaah* is *manhaj* (religious methodology) that is not rigid and enclosed. *Ahlusunnah* refers to al Qur'an and Hadith as understood by *Salaf as Salih* (pious ancestors). They were the first generation in Islam known as Sahabat (companions), *Tabi'in,* and *Tabi'ut Tabi'in*. Interview with Qasim Saquni in 01 June 2016. From *aqidah* (Islamic creed) point of view, *As-Sunnah* signifies the direction modelled and patterned by the prophet Muhammad and his companions in terms of religious knowledge, belief, sayings, and conducts of the Muhammad. Such pathway must be followed. Meanwhile, *Wal Jamaah* refers to the first generation of Muslim community encompassing Sahabat, *Tabi'in, Tabi'ut Tabi'in,* and those complying with them (the first generation).Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, *Syarah Aqidah Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah* (The Elucidation of the Aqidah of Ahlus Sunnah *wal Jama'ah*, Psutaka Imam Asy-Syafi'I, Jakarta, 2014, p. 37

[457] Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga WI, p.1.

[458] Pola Dakwah dan Kaderisasi WI dalam Rencana Strategis (RENSTRA) WI, p., 19

pilgrimage Hajj is a form of worship and observance of Allah (God).[459] Likewise, *da'wa* is one of the ways of constantly maintaining connection to God by being 'God's worker', as reflected by one female member:

> *Da'w*a for me is an exciting job. So, I hope my children will also get involved in *da'wa*. Because we take part in a great and outstanding project designed directly by God. We are God's workers. When we are driving a motorbike, for example, going to teach Islam to others, we must believe that we are working on God's project. Life without *da'wa* will be meaningless and useless. It seems to me that we are not part of the prestigious and tremendous project. Allah provides us with the great opportunity to be His workers, but we prefer to design our own.[460]

Although *da'wa* has much to do with spiritual and transcendental matters, this does not mean that *da'wa* underemphasises secular and worldly matters, such as how to recruit potential followers through the conduct of *da'wa*. In this regard, Chaplin, following the framework of Eickelman and Piscatori,[461] argues that the articulation of *da'wa* cannot be detached from the influences of time and place whereby *da'wa* operates. He further explains that *da'wa* is often 'utilised as an explicit ideology of propagation under different Islamic movements and dynamics'.[462] Hirschkind also points out that *da'wa* in the current context seems like a 'particular way of linking public activism with moral reform' for enlisting prospective adherents.[463]

WI holds that *da'wa* is not only the main form of observance to God, but also of constructive activities having particular goals. Regarding methodology, *da'wa* consists of two forms: planned and comprehensive activities. The former refers to the planned and arranged transformation of existing Islamic values within society, while the latter refers to activities covering all aspects of life.[464] *Da'wa* must be designed as it has both particular short and long -

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[459] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016
[460] Interview with Ummu Ibra (*da'wa* activist of Muslimah WI), on 30 July 2016
[461] Eickelman D, and J. Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, USA,1996, p.35
[462] Christopher Jan Chaplin, *The Evolution of a Salafi Movement in Indonesia: Global Networks, Local Activism, and the Cultivation of Urban Piety in Yogyakarta*, unpublished dissertation at St. Edmund's College, 2015, p. 150
[463] Christopher Jan Chaplin, *Ibid*., p. 150
[464] Pola Dakwah dan Kaderisasi WI dalam Rencana Strategis (RENSTRA) WI, p. 19

term targets and/or objectives. If *da'wa* is left to operate in an unplanned way or naturally, it would be too difficult to achieve these ends.[465] *Da'wa* should be packaged nicely, systematically, and interestingly. Learning Islam is not solely about how to understand Islam correctly, but, also about how to deliver this understanding to others. WI through its MWI, therefore, has formed a department called the Centre of Human Resources (*Pusat Sumber Daya Manusia*, PSDM), which partly functions to empower members' skill in supporting the *da'wa* movement.[466]

As a movement by design, *da'wa* has a set of strategies and methods. Based on the aims of *da'wa*, this can be divided into two forms: public and individual *da'wa.* The public form is an invitation to wider society to understand and perform Islam comprehensively. It aims to disseminate the notion of the *Ahlusssunah Wal Jamaah* methodology throughout society, as the first step of Islam's introduction, to let people know that learning Islam intensively and systematically is exceedingly important, but it also functions to socialise WI as an organisation.[467] It is interesting to note that public *da'wa* is not solely related to religious objectives such as how to create an Islamic social order, but also concerned with how to enlarge and to strengthen the organisation by recruitment. This is what I mean when I observe that *da'w*a activities include both religious and secular or worldly matters. One of the reasons why WI members must perform public *da'wa* is that Islam defines the best human as the one most useful to others. Islam encourages its adherents to be true believers and simultaneously, to invite other people to faith.[468] WI members have been indoctrinated to be pious both individually and socially. As one participant notes:

> We do not learn Islam only for ourselves, we must deliver to others. We do not personally implement Islam, we must share. For us, this is non-negotiable. We are not allowed only to be a pious individual.[469]

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[465] Interview with Ummu Hasan on 16 July 2016
[466] Interview with Saniawaty (Chief of Advisory Assembly of Muslimah WI), on 09 August 2018
[467] Pemetaan Obyek Dakwah dan Strateginya in Rencana Strategis (RENSTRA) WI, p. 19-20
[468] Interview with Ummu Hasan on 16 July 2016
[469] Interview with Ummu Miftah (*da'wa* activist of Muslimah WI), on 19 July 2016

Public *da'wa* is delivered in various ways such as book discussions and teaching sessions (*Tabligh Akbar*), routine religious lectures in schools, on campuses, and in government as well as private institutions, workshops, and seminars.[470] This recalls Mahmood and Salwa's observation that women's involvement in Islamist movement, particularly in *da'wa* project, has an impact on both religious and social transformation. Islamist women aim to cultivate piety for themselves through self-reform and the project of social reform.[471] As Salwa argues, 'we cannot isolate the moral selves from the political selves. The project of re-Islamization should not be constructed as apolitical because of its social and cultural orientation'.[472] Therefore, I argue that public *da'wa* performed by WI is a planned effort to generate a membership who share a sense of social care, which I term public piety. This form of piety is marked by getting involved in *da'wa,* and calling for other people to be true Muslims in order for a true Islamic society to be established. Arranged, systematic, measured, and sustainable attempts are very significant in the manifestation of this intended or aspired Islamic society.

Meanwhile, the personal *da'wa* is also a designed process of self-discipline and self-reform. Members need to undertake various kinds and stages of training and education with commitment, both understanding and practising Islam in daily life. This training aims to create self-piety, or pious subjects, who act as true Muslims. Following Foucault's framework of power and the subject,[473] within WI, power takes the form of training and education to follow the

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[470] Pemetaan Obyek Dakwah dan Strateginya in Rencana Strategis (RENSTRA) WI, p., 19-20

[471] Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and The Feminist Subject*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2005, p. 4

[472] Salwa Islamil, Islamism, Re-Islamization and the Fashioning of Muslim Selves: Refiguring the Public Sphere', in *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights*, *The Transnational Muslim World, Human Rights, and The Rights of Women and Sexual Minorities*, Volume 4, Issue 1, article 3, 2007, pp. 4-5

[473] Power and Subject in Foucault's point view is that;

> 'Power, according to Foucault, cannot be understood solely on the model of domination as something possessed and deployed by individuals or sovereign agents over others, with a singular intentionality, structure, or location that presides over its rationality and execution. Rather, power is to be understood as a strategic relation of force that permeates life and is productive of new forms of desires, objects, relations, and discourses. Secondly, the subject, argues Foucault, does not precede power relations, in

guidance of the *Qur'an* and *the hadith*, and this should be carried out consistently by a member in the process of becoming a pious subject or individual. Thus, discipline is important in the creation of pious Muslim subjects. The achievement of becoming a pious subject is the result of members following and abiding by the operation of power. Mahmood reminds us the that the presence of the subject with a set of abilities or capabilities attached to an individual is a product of the process of power relations. The existence of the subject is 'not the residue of an undominated self that existed prior to the operation of power'.[474] Personal *da'wa* as a process of self-discipline and self-reform is reflected in the following section.

Individual *da'wa* is directed 'to those who have realised the importance of knowing and practising Islam consistently and comprehensively'. [475] It comprises attending intensive and structured religious lectures that is called *Tarbiyah Islamiyah* (Islamic education), which are explored in more detail later in this chapter. Individual *da'wa,* also known as the process of cadre-making, is training to create militant, firm, creative, pious cadres who have a sense of leadership, to resolve any problems appearing in their families, society, nation, or state. These cadres are formed to maintain the existence of WI. The specific aim of this training is to generate ideal Muslims (*al-Syakhsiyyah al-Muslim al-Mutamayyiz*) who are marked by five qualities (*muwashafat*): *Mukmin, Muslih, Mujahid, Muta'awin*, and *Mutqin,* abbreviated as the 5M.[476] *Mu'min* refers to a Muslim (female or male) who holds a strong and true creed (*aqidah*), is sincere in worship, loves Allah, has good conduct, and implements Islamic tenets in all aspects of her/his life. *Mushlih* requires a Muslim to be sensitive to her/his surrounding environment, to be an enthusiastic pioneer in reform, and to have a high commitment to *da'wa. Mujahid* is a Muslim

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the form of an individuated consciousness, but is produced through these relations, which form the necessary conditions of its possibility'. Central to his formulation is what Foucault calls the paradox of subjectivation: the very processes and conditions that secure a subject's subordination are also the means by which she becomes a self-conscious identity and agent'. See Saba Mahmood, 2005, *Op. Cit*., p. 17

[474] Saba Mahmood, *Ibid*., p.17

[475] Pemetaan Obyek Dakwah dan Strateginya in Rencana Strategis (RENSTRA) WI, p. 19-20

[476] Pemetaan Obyek Dakwah dan Strateginya in Rencana Strategis (RENSTRA) WI, p. 23

whose key feature is readiness for sacrifice in self and social reform, maximising her/his potential in *da'wa* for the will of Allah. *Muta'awin* refers to an individual who shows spirit, awareness, and belief in the importance of cooperation in the efforts of reform and *da'wa*. A Muslim with the quality of *Muta'awin* should be proactive in *da'wa,* is able to lead, and can also be led. The last requirement is *Mutqin*. This Muslim quality is marked by having competency, capability, credibility, and expertise in her/his field. Whether male or female the good muslim should be trustworthy and fully responsible for their role and for *da'wa*.[477] These qualities must be attained by both male and female members of WI by undertaking particular process of discipline ruled by the organisation. Vice Leader of WI, Ikhwan Jalil, argues that men and women are equal to get knowledge. They are entitled to access knowledge resources, so all 'taps' of information must be disclosed for them. Because *Tarbiyah Islamiyah* is a media to seek knowledge, all members of WI, regardless of different gender, must follow the *Tarbiyah.* He, further, states that many verses in the *Qur'an* declares that women and men have the same opportunities to be good Muslim and to take part in pious activities including *da'wa* and *Tarbiyah Islamiyah.*[478]

The personal *da'wa,* as explained above, is taken through the program of *Tarbiyah* (Islamic education). *Tarbiyah* is 'a gradual and continuing process in the form of weekly Islamic study circles (*halaqah*)'[479] It becomes a means through which Islamic knowledge and moral values are transmitted,[480] playing a pivotal role in maintaining and augmenting cadres' zeal and commitment. Ummu Khalid [the head of the Women's section?] acknowledges;

> In addition to a media knowledge and values, *tarbiyah* is 'driving spirit'. When such zeal is absent, cadres will be powerless. For us in WI, *tarbiyah* becomes necessary. To measure whether a cadre is still active or not, this can be recognised through the extent to which she/he attends *tarbiyah*. We cannot hope from a cadre whose spirit is loose. How to carry the mandate if she/he is feeble? *Tarbiyah* also strengthens and reminds each other to form a sisterhood or fraternity outside the bloodline. In a sense within social life, we have to advise one another. So, in attachment and interconnection feelings for each other are powerful (…). In other words, *tarbiyah* functions as a

[477] Rencana Strategis (RENSTRA) WI, p. 3
[478] Interview with Ikhwan Jalil on 10 June 2018
[479] Pola Dakwah dan Kaderisasi WI in Rencana Strategis (RENSTRA) WI, p. 25
[480] Interview with Samhariyani (chief of Human Resource Department of MWI), on 19 July 2016

> recharger of knowledge and commitment, and as refreshment, releasing emotional burdens. That is why, although dealing with any challenges to attend to *tarbiyah,* such as hot weather, feeling sleepy, or our children, we are fastidious, we force ourselves to attend.[481]

To achieve these five qualifications (5M), *tarbiyah* is separated into three forms of training or education. The first is *tarbiyah ruhiyah* which is a series of training aiming to purify the heart (*tazkiyah*) from any diseases that can damage it, and to soften and train the heart's sensitivity so as to easily absorb guidance from God.[482] The second is *tarbiyah tsaqafiyah*. This takes the form of the intensive and systematic lectures about the *Qur'an* and *the hadith*.[483] The third is *tarbiyah jasadiyah*. This is physical training to form and increase corporeal strength, dexterity, and endurance.[484] Furthermore, every form of tarbiyah has six levels (*marhalah*) that every member must undertake if they want to be active in the movements, particularly in *da'wa*: *marhalah al-ta'rif al-ula*, *marhalah al-ta'rif tsaniyah, marhalah al-takwin al-ula, marhalah al-takwin tsaniyah, tanfidz,* and *itqan*. While all levels have same forms of training, each level has different content or materials, duration, and output. The first level creates the first degree of *Mukmin* and lasts one- and- a- half years. The second level is the second degree of *Mukmin,* and its duration is also eighteen months. The third level runs over one- and- a -half to two years and generates the *Mushlih* qualification. The next level aims to form *Mujahid* characteristics and runs for one- and- a- half to two years. Level five, to create *Muta'awin*, and takes two to three years. The period of the last stage is a lifetime, as it builds the *Mutqin* personality.[485]

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[481] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016

[482] Some Qur'anic verses explain this matter. One states that *"Is not the time ripe for the hearts of those who believe to submit to Allah's reminder and to the truth which is revealed, that they become not as those who received the scripture of old but the term was prolonged for them and so their hearts were hardened, and many of them are evil-livers*", QS. 57:16, Quran Majeed, www.pakdata.com

[483] The *Qur'an* states that "*He it is Who hath sent among the unlettered ones a messenger of their own, to recite unto them. His revelations and to make them grow, and to teach them the Scripture and wisdom, though heretofore they were indeed in error manifest*", QS. 62:2, Quran Majeed, www.pakdata.com

[484]The *Qur'an* explains "*make ready for them all thou canst of (armed) force and of horses tethered, that thereby ye may dismay the enemy of Allah and your enemy, and others beside them whom ye know on. Allah knoweth them. Whatsoever ye spend in the way of Allah it will be repaid to you in full, and ye will not be wronged'*, QS. 8:60, Quran Majeed, www.pakdata.com

[485] Pola Dakwah dan Kaderisasi WI in Rencana Strategis (RENSTRA) WI, pp. 25-26

Additionally, the values and spirit of *da'wa* have to be continuously manifested in all aspects of a member's life. The responsibility of *da'wa* is a 'full-time job'. For both women and men, regardless of place, time, and professional occupation, *da'wa* should inform a member's life. It is driven by the idea that Islam is universal, governing the whole life. Islam, in this context, is not solely a series of rituals, doctrines, and beliefs, but most importantly a practical value to be embodied as a medium of cultivating the reform of self and society. It is similar to what Mahmood observed in the Egyptian women's movement, when she states that 'part of the aim of the mosque movement is to restore this understanding of worship by teaching women the requisite skills involved in its practice'.[486] Ummu Saniawati explains that:

> For example, a Muslimah cadre of Wahdah may choose to become a career woman with a profession suitable under sharia, since we have invariably instilled that wherever we work is part of the project of *da'wa*. My friend who is a dentist in the public hospital, *Wahidin*, finds it easier to do *da'wa* than I do, because I am the outsider. It is easy for her to ask her colleagues to learn the *Qur'an*. So, I tell her not to leave the hospital as staying there is a form of *da'wa*. Eventually some Qur'anic study circles have opened. We, therefore, implant in cadres, that your presence outside WI is to reform yourself and others.[487]

Another participant, Qasim Saquini explains that:

> …if they are a doctor, they should practice as a Muslim doctor. Their utterance and conduct should reflect good behaviour. No matter what their profession is, they have to perform as a Muslim. (…). Although no human is perfect, without sin, at least they have the essential features of a Muslim (…). They apply Islamic values which have been learned. They must become an individual who is most beneficial to others through their own occupation.[488]

Qasim here makes clear that whatever careers a cadre has, she must be professional, responsible, an expert in her field. She also must recognize that her career is a medium of worship which has

[486] Saba Mahmood, 2005, *Op. Cit*., p. 48.
[487] Interview with Ummu Saniawati on 17 July 2016
[488] Interview with Qasim Saguni (Chairman of Advisory Assembly of WI), on 01 June 2016

implications in the hereafter. This does not mean that a woman does not need a salary from her profession, but that payment cannot be the first motivation, above obedience to God.[489]

Women's Participation in Public Da'wa

Before considering this issue, I would like to briefly outline WI's view with respect to the main roles of women. Both male and female participants that I interviewed have similar responses with regards to the issue of the role of women. They argue that women's essential task is at home as mothers, wives, daughters, and managers of household affairs, while men's role is as breadwinners and leaders of the family. As mothers, women become the first educators (*madrasah ula*') of their children. As wives, women must respect and serve their husbands, and as daughters, they should be under their parents' guardianship, particularly their fathers, as well as showing respect for them. As household managers (*rabbul bait*), women are responsible for managing and arranging all things with respect to the household, including managing a husband's income for the family's needs. Such roles are based on the direction of the Qur'an and the hadiths. For example, the Qur'an states:

> And stay in your houses and do not display not yourselves with the display of the time of ignorance. Be regular in prayer, and pay the zakat, and obey Allah and His messenger. Allah's wish is but to remove uncleanness far from you. O folk of the Household and cleanse you with a thorough cleansing. [490]

Although there are different interpretations of this verse, the participants I spoke to understand this verse as a command for women to stay at home, as clearly stated by the sentence 'and stay in your houses'. Another verse explains that 'men are in charge (leaders) of women.[491] Both verses are referenced by WI to justify the division of labour between men and women. Alongside the Qur'an and the hadith, the participants also validated the gender divide in terms of these responsibilities with the argument that biological distinctions between men and women lead

[489] Interview with Qasim Saguni on 01 June 2016
[490] Al-Qur'an Majid, QS 33: 33
[491] Al-Qur'an Majid, QS 4: 34

to different consequences in terms of the division of tasks, and psychological inclinations.[492] The idea of gender relations is in line with existing cultural understandings in Makassar society, as explained in the chapter four. According to my observations during fieldwork and some participants' statements, however, I think 'loose' and 'negotiable' best describes the concept of the gender division of labour and the way this is applied, within WI in the specific situation of the family and the society. In this sense, such pre-determined positions are influenced by individual economic conditions and by agreements between a wife and her husband. These are negotiable because, although according to sharia, women must work inside the home, religious obligations cannot be isolated from other sharia duties for women such as social responsibilities. There is an entanglement of religious and social commitments, as Ummu Saniawati explains:

> So, the concept of balance (household tasks and public *da'wa* responsibility) should exist. But I don't know, it depends on each, since one individual is different to another. As well, it depends on the agreement with the husband. If a spouse is a recruit of WI like my husband, he also helps at home, washing and drying clothes, and going to market. (…), So, we share tasks at home, but some household duties are under my husband's control. [493]

Turning now to the question of women's participation of *da'wa* in the public sphere, it must be noted that public *da'wa* for Muslim women is a religious obligation that complements their main religious responsibility in the home. Public *da'wa* is an additional religious commitment, which means that Muslim women may take it up, or choose not to. But Muslims are recommended to participate in public *da'wa*. This is different to individual *da'wa* which is compulsory for both female and male members. There were various reasons why Muslim women desired to take part in the project of public *da'wa*[494]. Firstly, some participants argue that the

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[492] This will be explored in more detail later in this chapter

[493] Interview with Ummu Saniawati on 09 August 2016

[494] To be public preachers, women, of course, must follow *tarbiyah* and pass some levels of *tarbiyah* as well as being insightful in sharia, meanings and laws in al-Qur'an and hadith. Moreover, they should have faith that can bring them to love Allah, to fear His punishment, to be optimistic about His mercy, and to comply with prophet Muhammad's prescriptions. They must continuously keep connection with Allah and to ask His help. They should be of good character and understand clearly what *da'wa* is. They must be capable of organising strategy and management of *da'wa* as well as to be well prepared, including having good time management, and to know priority in *da'wa*. Lastly, women should be aware that *da'wa*

motive behind their participation is *ibadah* (worship or devotion to God), as Ummu Khalid emphasises;

> My intention to get involved in *da'wa* is *ibadah* (an act of worship). Such public involvement is not a form of competition and contestation with men which happens within the gender and feminist movement. So, although our participation in a movement is the same on the surface in taking a role in the public sphere and leaving domestic affairs, we have different motives and intentions.[495]

Ibadah means submission to the will of God. One of the obligations that God commands Muslims to perform is *da'wa* as explicitly stated in the Qur'an and the hadith. By participating in public *da'wa*, WI Muslim women are fulfilling their religious commitments. *Ibadah* also refers to the continuous maintenance of the connection to God. This is because, as mentioned before, *da'wa* is God's project and individuals involved in it function as God's 'employees'. WI women engaging in public *da'wa,* therefore, act as God's servants working to achieve the divine project. As employees of God, a sense of connection and closeness to God is something felt by WI women. Such feelings might be partly marked by what Ummu Ibra explains are the benefits of being a worker for God. She delineated that these benefits include many facilities God has given.[496] *Ibadah* also creates a sense of the pious self, as admitted by Rini, who states that after getting involved in WI's programs such as *tarbiyah*, she felt that she is pious.[497] Mahmood reminds us that 'the women I worked with described the condition of piety as the quality of "being close to God": a manner of being and acting that suffuse all of one's acts, both religious and worldly in character.'[498]

Moreover, *ibadah*, in this context, can also mean that the worldly life is oriented to benefits in the hereafter. Yuyun argues that 'principally, the virtue of involvement in *da'wa* activity is that when we are in the hereafter, in front of God, we are able to say to God that we have done

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is a religious obligation and how to do it has been regulated by Islam so improper conduct of *da'wa* is unacceptable. Wahdah Islamiyah, Kiprah Muslimah di Kancah Dakwah (Muslimah's Roles in Da'wa Arenas), available in https://wahdah.or.id/kiprah-muslimah-di-kancah-dakwah/, accessed on 25 June 2019

[495] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016

[496] Interview with Ummu Ibra on 30 July 2016

[497] Interview with Rini 19 July 2016

[498] Saba Mahmood, *Op. Cit*., p. 122

da'wa'.[499] So, 'the ultimate motive is hereafter interests'.[500] But this does not mean that WI female members do not need, or ignore, worldly interests, as they also have basic needs as human beings who are living on Earth. This refers to the scale of priorities in earthly life. For instance, being a female doctor in a hospital, who also performs *da'wa* in her work environment by means of calling for her colleagues to learn religion, or at least becoming a role-model with good and professional behaviours, will be appreciated by salary. However, for WI, economic gain is not the principal goal. Qasim elucidates:

> It is not denied that there are professions that need gratitude due to their professionalism, but their foremost intention is part of *ibadah* and of acts of beneficence complying with God's will (*amal sholeh*). If they get income, it is a form of appreciation of their expertise and they also have needs, even if such thankfulness is not the leading motive. So, we hope that all good deeds become assets for life in the hereafter.[501]

WI's worldview about worldly life offers an alternative idea to secularism, separating between the profane and sacred, or religious life, rather than being a radical Islamic right that ignores the worldly being. What WI offers is to frame the worldly life in a religious orientation, so that being a Muslim is compatible with being modern. Islam, according to WI, covers all aspects of life.

Secondly, some participants argue that, through their participation in public *da'wa*, they desire to share knowledge, skills, experiences, and spiritual serenity with other women. They aspire to become part of the Islamic social reform agenda, like their male counterparts in WI. Although women's principal role is in the home, they are also responsible for social life. Regarding women's social role, Ummu Khalid explains:

> What we always see and discuss among Muslimah is the misunderstanding of Muslimah' roles. People tend to dichotomize as to whether or not women can take a social role. Some disagree with a public role for women, and others agree such as gender activists. In our view, Muslimah cannot be separated from the social role since they are social creatures (...), but how women participate should be under Islam's arrangement. In the sense that, in spite of the Qur'an's demand that women should be at home is a fundamental law outlining women's tasks, we cannot deny, particularly with

[499] Interview with Yuyun on 17 July 2016
[500] Interview with Faridah on 19 July 2016
[501] Interview with Qasim Saguni on 1 June 2016

> the current advancement in the world, that social needs mean that women are more or less contributing to social affairs, even if they are only housewives. For example, we make a comparison with Saudi Arabian women, who are widely known as isolated women, restricted to the home, but due to technological advances, they are also involved in social life through social media. Physically, they are not enmeshed in social media, but their money, ideas, comments, and petitions influence social life. We are, therefore, more convinced that as humans, as social individuals, men and women cannot be isolated from their social roles. Nonetheless, once again, Islam determines that women's place is at home as the basis of the law. (…). Only *da'wa* is a social role which is demanded and obligated for men and women.[502]

Muslimah's participation in public *da'wa* is a manifestation of their social responsibilities as Muslims, which should also be enacted by WI's female recruits. This social commitment is also supported by the Qur'anic arguments that humans have been mandated as *khalifah*[503] (God's representation on Earth). As *khalifah*, human beings are obligated to engineer the Earth through the maximum use of their own expertise.[504] How to reform the existing un-Islamic society into an ideal Islamic order is one of the duties of *khalifah*. To be *khalifah*, individuals must learn, equipping themselves with knowledge, expertise, and skills. That is why WI is seriously engaging in a format of education, learning, and training. Interestingly, the process of learning in WI is not only intended to empower individuals, but also to empower them to teach and to build society. Yuyun describes:

> We learn to get rid of our ignorance and also others'. If learning is only for ourselves, we can merely stay at home, reciting the Qur'an and doing other good deeds, but we do not want to be like that. We must share piety with others since a country whose folks are pious will be protected by God.[505]

WI's Muslimah have been indoctrinated that what has been achieved from the disciplinary process of learning must be applied from the self, and the sphere of the family to be shared with wider society. Muslimah have to take a social role by means of, at least, sharing knowledge.[506] Rini states

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[502] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016
[503] The Qur'an declares that 'And when thy Lord said unto the angels: Lo! I am about to place a viceroy in the earth…'QS 2: 30. The Qur'an Majid
[504] Interview with Ummu Saniawati on 9 August 2016
[505] Interview with Yuyun on 19 July 2016
[506] Interview with Faridah on 19 July 2016

that *da'wa* is not only for ourselves, as the prophet Muhammad demonstrates, because the prophet called on his companions, and then his companions also invited their friends, and so on, disseminating Islam through sharing.[507]

WI's desire, and particularly Muslimah Wahdah Islamiyah (MWI) is to engender socio-religious reform in Indonesia as a contribution to Indonesian development in the religious field, on the one hand, and a way for WI to gain government recognition of their existence on the other. It is not surprising, one of the programs set by MWI is the Qur'anic literacy for the wider society in Makassar. This agenda supports the policy of Makassar's local government to eradicate the Qur'anic illiteracy.[508] The third Islamic Conference (*Muktamar*) of WI in 2016 in Jakarta took 'a million of love for Indonesia' as the theme of the conference. Before the biggest conference, MWI held some pre-*muktamar* events such as great teaching sessions (*tabligh akbar*), on the same theme. The general leader of WI, Zaitun Rasmin stated that '*tabligh akbar* aims to disseminate peaceful Islam. This is also a means for WI to combat the terrorism that has discredited Islam'.[509] Furthermore he said that Indonesia currently deals with these problems, and WI must contribute to take real action to maintain Indonesia's stability: 'We wish to be able to sustain Indonesia's solidarity or cohesion and to advance awareness of nationalism.'[510]

Thirdly, women's involvement in the *da'wa* movement is a consequence of Indonesian current social conditions, which, according to Muslimah Wahdah Islamiyah (MWI), is rooted in

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[507] Interview with Ririn on 19 July 2016

[508] Tribun News, Ingin Belajara Mengaji? Ada Program Ngaji Rong Pemkot Makassar (Want to Learn the Qur'an reciting? There is a Program of Let us to recite the Qur'an), available in, http://makassar.tribunnews.com/2015/11/16/ingin-belajar-mengaji-ii-ada-program-ngaji-rong-pemkot-makassar, accessed on 25 September 2017

[509] Republika News, 'WI akan Gelar Muktamar Ketiga', *(*WI will hold the third Muktamar), available in http://khazanah.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/16/07/13/oa8zci384-Wahdah-islamiyah-akan-gelar-muktamar-ketiga, accessed on 4 August 2017

[510] Republika News, 'WI: Permasalahan Bangsa Jadi Fokus Muktamar', (WI: Nation's Problems become Muktamar's Focus), available in http://www.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/16/07/13/oa8txf319-Wahdah-islamiyah-permasalahan-bangsa-jadi-fokus-muktamar, accessed on 4 July 2017.

disequilibrium between virtuousness and badness. Current society has been far from the true and right comprehension and practice of Islam as taught by the prophet Muhammad and his comrades and the generations that came after them. As Ummu Khalid elucidates:

> Knowledge we learn from the Qur'an and the hadith is that *amr ma'ruf nahi mungkar* (enjoining good and forbidding wrong) is compulsory for every Muslim with *hasadi* (according to their own abilities). Based on this understanding, we are encouraged to take part in *da'wa*. Besides that, we go into the public sphere since there is an asymmetry between *haq* (rights) and *bathil* (wrongs). It cannot be denied that the number of the female population of Indonesia is more than male's. This means that more women live in un-Islamic environment than men. Thus, we get involved in public *da'wa*, not because women experience discrimination or oppression, but many women do not understand and apply Islam in the right way. As a result, actors who are expected to do reform are women themselves.[511]

From this quote, public *da'wa* advocated by MWI is the follow-up to the framing of un-Islamic current circumstances, as well as a response to Islam's demand to take part in socio-religious transformation. This differs to what Mahmood found in her work in Egypt. She argues that the women's mosque movement was because religious tenets functioned as guidance in daily behaviour, and such activities have been 'increasingly marginalized under modern structures of secular governance'.[512] Mahmood's findings coincide with reasons for the emergence of Muslimah HTI, discussed in Chapter Six. Muslimah Wahdah Islamiyah (MWI)'s case places more emphasis on the wider society's religious conception, and its implementation is perceived not to be in accordance with WI's understanding. When I asked participants about disadvantages and drawbacks specific to women, they generally responded that the poor condition of women, particularly Muslimah, is the absence or lack of understanding of religious and general knowledge ranging from not knowing how to recite the Qur'an correctly, a lack of understanding of daily Islamic laws, of their roles within the domestic and public realm, to the illiteracy of children, parenting, and health. Why women have been deprived of such knowledge is partly because men have dominated the *da'wa* movements, targeting only male audiences so that *da'wa* did not reach

[511] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016
[512] Saba Mahmood, 2005, *Op. Cit.*, p. 4

women. Muslimah Wahdah Islamiyah (MWI), therefore, needs to target other women in their *da'wa*. Getting involved in public *da'wa* as *murabbiah* (female educators) for instance, is a logical consequence of the disproportion between the increasing number of women who do not have Islamic teaching and the lack of female *daiyat* (female preacher), as Hasmiaty points out:

> If Wahdah women only want to t stay at home, who will call for outside women?. Hence, we should take the role in *da'wa* with the provision of still complying with sharia corridor. For example, if we decide on doing public *da'wa,* we must consider first whether such verdict is in line with sharia or not. When the choice contains more disadvantages than advantages, we will leave it.[513]

Regarding women's described conditions, I did not find evidence from the women I worked with, of women experiencing discrimination or exploitation in religion, the social sphere, or politics. It made me more convinced that what Muslimah Wahdah Islamiyah (MWI) do in public *da'wa* is not a form of the women's or feminist movement, which intends to liberate women from the trap of discrimination normalized by the social structures they live in. However, this does not mean that their action does not entail a form of women's empowerment, which is explored in more detail in Chapter Seven.

From Ummu Khalid's description above, it is clear that public *da'wa* enacted by Muslimah Wahdah Islamiyah (MWI) is only proposed for other women. The next question is why Muslimah Wahdah Islamiyah (MWI)'s *da'wa* only targets female audiences. The answer to this question becomes another reason for MWI's participation in public *da'wa*. This is closely related to another rule of sharia, which stipulates that women and men are not allowed to mix, or should be segregated. Ummu Khalid stated that MWI's involvement is a way of preventing *fitnah* (adverse impacts of intensive interaction between men and women, such as having affairs). Thus, women's performance of public *da'wa*, targeting only female audiences, intends to ward off the possibilities of an undesirable consequence of mixed interactions between women and men. She argues:

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[513] Interview with Hasmiaty 19 July 2019

> We in Wahdah have fully realised that no one among us is certainly able to avoid *fitnah* (defamation). That is why, Muslimah are educated and trained, so they are also able to call for other women. We learned from other women's organisations which justify mixed interaction between women and men; even if they are married, improper relationships between them quite often take place. Therefore, preventing *fitnah* (defamation) is our obligation that is commanded by sharia (Islamic laws). Although God determines the result of such efforts, the most important thing is that we have gone through the process of prevention. [514]

The last motive or reason for MWI's participation in public *da'wa* is self-protection. As explored before, one aim of the private *da'wa* or *tabiyah* is to create true and pious Muslimah. This piety should be maintained during her lifetime. The Muslimah Wahdah Islamiyah (MWI) that I interviewed acknowledged that their contribution to call for other women is one way to maintain their individual piety. It also means that the benefit of their involvement is personal. Sumarni acknowledged that she and her friends' participation in MWI brings personal benefits. It is a way of retaining consistency (*istiqamah)* in being a pious self.[515] Calling other women to true faith is essential to ensure consistent behaviour in line with sharia. It is inconsistent conducts, for instance, if we invite others to comprehend and apply Islam steadily and truly, while we are unable to do so. Ummu Khalid emphasises that within *tarbiyah,* all recruits are invariably reminded of the danger of the call for people to do good deeds, while they neglect them.[516] Similarly, one informant told me:

> For me, I have an individual mission that getting involved in MWI is indirectly a form of self-protection. It is the difference between only being active in *tarbiyh* and following it as well by being on the staff within MWI's organisational structure. This is because being staff paved the way for me to interact (*mulasamah*) between staff+. It is, of course, different if there are other people around us than their own. Maybe I personally feel fine, but others will remind me that I have done things wrong. It may make us *istiqamah* (consistent). Before being on the staff, I lived alone in a rented house, but I have move to MWI's office, living together with other staff.[517]

The awareness that public *da'wa* is a means of self-protection for MWI emerges in two ways. Firstly, being part of and active in an organisation such as MWI is a mechanism for MWI's recruits

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[514] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2106
[515] Interview with Sumarni on 17 July 2016
[516] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2106
[517] Interview with Samhariyani on 19 July 2016

to maintain religious consistency and commitment, since there are external reminders from friends. Communal living also ties recruits together through strong social, religious, and friendship bonds is more likely to provide mutual protection and supervision of individuals, such as the case of the recruit injured in a motorcycle accident receiving the money for medical fees, as mentioned earlier. Secondly, being active in public *da'wa* to call others to true faith is fundamentally inviting the self to fulfil religious commitments. This is a mechanism enacted by MWI's members to maintain piety, a being a pious individual is a full-time job for a lifetime.

The Involvement of Muslimah in Public Da'wa?

The obligation for Wahdah women to take part in the *da'wa,* particularly in public *da'wa* movement, should not contradict with other obligations regulated by sharia. In short, all religious commitments are mutually inter-connected or entwined. WI, therefore, through its sharia department,[518] regulates the rules and preconditions for women's participation in the *da'wa* movement. There are some requirements for Muslimah to consider when they may participate in the *da'wa*. It is important to pay attention to Ummu Khalid, leader of MWI's explanation in respect of women's activism in the *da'wa*. She argues that to avoid the impression of women's exploitation within the religious field, MWI and the sharia department of WI stipulate that women's public involvement should be approved based on the Muslimah's situation and based on their individual aptitudes (*bihasadi*).[519] Nevertheless public *da'wa* is a conditional religious obligation for women. For example, the general rules of WI state that the tenure of leadership within WI's structure is five years, but due to the circumstances of women, female leadership within MWI on average lasts only two years. They are able to resign from their leadership role if there is a crucial obstacle. Another specific rule to women is that women who have children under two years old are not

[518] WI consists of five units. Sharia department is one of them. Its one of functions is to determine whether sharia permits an action or event or not.
[519] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016

required to conduct *da'wa* outside Makassar city. They are only allowed to undertake *da'wa* outside Makassar[520] twice a month and are only expected to stay away for no more than two days. Ummu Khalid makes it clear that '*da'wa* activities must comply with family obligations'.[521] Furthermore, she clarifies that such regulation is inspired from the Qur'anic information that the breastfeeding period lasts two years, and this is the attachment phase between mothers and their children. Although parents are very busy conducting *da'wa*, they also need time for their children.[522]

A female activist[523] in MWI is unable to become a leader of WI. It is one of the constraints that women must accept. This is because Ummu Khalid explains:

> We in Wahdah still hold the belief that the highest leadership, though there are debatable arguments among Islamic scholars with regards to the issue, must be men. Based on our understanding, as long as there is a man who is capable of running leadership, the leader will be a man. A woman can only be a leader if there are only the old, the weak, or children within a community. It is in line with to Islamic leadership laws.[524]

There are other reasons which support this belief. Faridah explains that God did not appoint women to be prophets. This proves that women are not allowed to be leaders. She believed that part of this is related to the fact that women, menstruate, and hormonal imbalance, and this unable to control their emotions, and therefore when women are angry the reason is not always clear.[525] Yuyun says that early pregnancy may also trigger unstable moods that may lead to a decline women's productivity.[526] Wahdah women acknowledge that according to sharia, menstruating

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520 There is no restricted distance for doing *da'wa*, as long as women are accompanied by a chaperone. Ummu Khalid, for example, has conducted *da'wa* in Ternate, North Maluku province, but she went with her second son. Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016

521 Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016

522 Interview with UmmuKhalid on 30 August 2016

523 What I mean by activist in this thesis is a very active Muslimah within any activities of MWI and becomes or not a committee in WM's structure.

524 Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2106

525 Interview with Faridah on 19 July 2016

526 Interview with Yuyun on 19 July 2016

women are not allowed to touch the Qur'an, to read it, or to pray so that the quantity and quality of religious practices (*ibadah*) are significantly decreased. Thus, women are believed to have a less consistent application to their faith and religious practice which is different from that of men. All of which is said to support the belief that women are unable to be leaders.[527]

Another reason given, according to some informants, is the saying 'women have one mind and nine feelings'. This means that women's consideration and decisions about something are mostly based on their emotions, rather than on reason, while leadership requires rationality as the basis for management.[528] When I debated these ideas with my informants, arguing that these beliefs are biased and myths, not only discrediting women's rational capabilities, but groundless in terms of scientific evidence, the participants replied that such ideas are grounded in their understanding of religious literature as well as their own daily experiences and social interactions with other women.[529] Furthermore, although my informants know that there are different explanations with respect to the verse (QS 3:34)[530], as reflected by Ummu Khalid's admission above, they neglect these differences. In fact, some Islamic scholars argue that the verse (QS 3:34) cannot be used as a basis for rejecting women's leadership since this verse refers to domestic issues not the political domain as well as the term "men and women" in this verse refers to different quality of them culturally and sociologically. It is more likely that there is sexually man but he does not have capabilities and qualities in leadership and vice versa, so he is unable to become a leader. [531]

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[527] Interview with Yuyun on 19 July 2016
[528] Interview with Yuyun and farida on 19 July 2016
[529] Interview with Farida and Yuyun on 19 July 2016
[530] The Qur'an mentions that "Men are in charge of women by (right of) what Allah has given one over the other and what they spend (for maintenance) from their wealth". Surah An-Nisa, verse 34.
[531] See Nella Lucky, Penafsiran Emansipatoris dalam Al-Qur'an (Perspektif Pemikiran Nasaruddin Umar), Emancipatory Interpretation in Al-Qur'an (Nasaruddin Umar's Perspective), in marwah Vol.xii no. 2, Desember, 2013, p. 169

Furthermore, Muslimah who aspire to be active in the *da'wa* need to seek their husbands 'approval. 'Sharia teaches us that it is necessary to get a husband's approval. It is not a rule of the organisation. If sharia declares that it is allowed, it is permissible, and vice versa'.[532] The responsibilities the group places on women are matters for a husband's consideration, such as if a female recruit is appointed chair, she has to gain her husband's support.[533] However, practically speaking, women can ask their husbands' consent through mobile phone, when their husbands are outside the home. From observations of women's practice in this regard women would just let their men know what they are doing with regard to outside activities.

There is also a requirement for women and men to be segregated. This does not necessarily mean that there is no collaboration or cooperation between them. This physical separation is a way to prevent the possibility of inappropriate social interaction. After attending some WI events, I noted that there was usually a curtain acting as a barrier between the women's meeting place and men's. For instance, when I attended the third Islamic conference in Jakarta: the venue was divided into two spaces by a temporary wall. In the women's site, there were some big screens providing information about activities in the men's space, and women were able to deliver any inquiries by microphone so that all attendees could hear their voices. For WI, women's voice is not a part of *aurat.*

Another thing Muslimah must take into account in *da'wa* is that they need to be accompanied by male chaperones (*mahram*), usually close kin such as their husbands or fathers, if they do *da'wa* in a long-distance trip. Ummu Hasan reveals that sharia states that women should not travel too far without the company of *mahram,* so they are able to perform *da'wa* in any district as long as a chaperone is with them.[534] Lastly, Muslimah may take part in *da'wa* as long as they

[532] Interview with Faridah on 19 July 2016
[533] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016
[534] Interview with Ummu Hasan on 16 July 2016

are able to balance *da'wa* with family commitments. Yuyun argues that successful women are those who are capable of managing their household while also practicing *da'wa*. But if they are unable to do so, they are considered unsuccessful women.[535] When asked how they were able to do this when both *da'wa* and family interests are urgent and in conflict with one another some informants replied that it depends on the case. However, in general, they argued that those affairs that could not be delegated to others would take priority. Rini explains:

> It depends on priority. It is not absolute that family comes before *da'wa*. For example, when our child was sick, and at the same time there was an urgent meeting with respect to significant policy of the organisation, which I could not delegate to my friends to be in charge of the meeting, I had to choose the session first. Our son could be looked after by my husband while I was at the meeting, or I gave my son medicine before I left. But if my presence in the assembly can be substituted, I have to prioritise my family. So, it is about a priority scale. I have commitments to my husband and my family and I think every recruit has different agreements with their family.[536]

Such requirements above may not really be challenging and rigid in practice, as there is still room to negotiate. For instances, in the case of requiring a husband's permission, as outlined before, because of advancements in technology, women may use their cellular phone to let their husbands know. Broadly, my informants did not find it difficult to gain permission from their husbands they too are members of WI, so they already understand what their wives need to do outside the home and why their wives need to go out. There are men who actively encourage their wives to participate in *da'wa*. Ummu Hana stated that her husband helps her to get involved in *da'wa*. Since she could not ride a motorbike, her husband would take her so she could give religious lectures. Her husband also asked her to finish her studies at university.[537] Likewise, in the case of family affairs, sharing household duties in WI is very common. Ummu Khalid explains:

> Every family has its own plan. Men determine its vision and wives run the mission. Fortunately, my husband has been ready to wash dishes and to look after our baby. Yesterday, my second son and I went to Ternate[538], leaving our baby (18 months old), and my husband looked after him.[539]

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[535] Interview with Yuyun on 19 July 2016
[536] Interview with Rini on 19 July 2016
[537] Interview with Ummu Hana on 18 September 2016
[538] Ternate is an Island in Eastern Moluccas province. To get there by airplane needs around 3-4 hours from Makassar.
[539] Interview with Ummu Khlaid 30 August 2016

Although female and male members of WI share household tasks, they still support the patriarchal culture existing within Makassar society. As Ummu Khalid points out, although there is cooperation at home, the Makassar culture positions the husband as the leader in the household, and this should be maintained. Husbands only take on some of the wife's household tasks, and vice versa.[540]

However, some informants find it difficult to share household tasks, as their husbands spend more time in the workplace. Rini says: 'I cannot share household tasks with my husband, since he goes out in the early morning and comes home in the evening. So, I handle all domestic duties, there is no helper (*pembantu*)'.[541] She admitted this is a double burden of having domestic and public responsibilities. But she very enjoys such duties, and her public role does not make feel tired.[542] Farida confessed:

> When other women have already slept and when at night we should rest, we who are planning tomorrow finish our domestic tasks at midnight. We sleep late and wake up early. This is certainly hard. But we understand what we do is for our rewards in the hereafter. Although such duties are burdensome, and sometimes may make us cry, these are our responsibilities which we should bear. We try not to be whining to our husbands, and try not to look tired and exhausted in front of our spouse.[543]

I also encountered Muslimah that experienced difficulties in communicating with their husbands, particularly men who are not members or recruits of WI. The case of Ummu Miftah, for example, shows that although her husband often supports her to perform public roles, her husband sometimes complains about WI activities and practices.[544]

Public Da'wa – a Beneficial Relationship for Women?

[540] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016
[541] Interview with Rini on 19 July 2016
[542] Interview with Rini on 19 July 2016
[543] Interview with Farida on 19 July 2016
[544] Interviewh with Ummu Miftah 19 July 2016

There are two significant contributions of women's involvement in public *da'wa* contributing to the development of WI. Women's public activism becomes an important mechanism for potential female recruitment and provides financial support for the maintenance of the organisation. As a new Islamic organization, compared with its predecessors: Muslimah NU and Aisyiyah Muhammadiyah, WI need progressive, and substantive militant efforts to recruit members as well as to establish new branches of the organization throughout Indonesia. Likewise, such attempts certainly need funding support.

As a part of the recruitment machine, Wahdah women's roles in the organisation is substantial, but the acceleration of recruitment through MWI[545] activism has greater significance. It is aggressive, progressive, as well as structured. MWI's real contribution is not only to the younger female generation but also to their mothers.[546] It is not surprising that the number of women recruits throughout Indonesia is more than threefold that of their male counterparts. In some regions or districts in South Sulawesi such Wajo and Palopo, and beyond, MWI recruits preexisted male recruitment. These female recruits were trained and educated in Makassar city, and returned to their own regions to establish and to develop WI. MWI has creative ways of recruiting new female members, much more creative than their male members. Surprisingly, MWI has mobilised thousands of people to attend the great teaching session (*tabliqh akhbar*) in the Mattoangin soccer stadium in Makassar. Also, it held a conference in the biggest hall in Makassar, Triple C, and seminar participants were apparently overwhelmed. Events conducted by MWI are well-organised. Qasim suggests that MWI is more detailed and comprehensive in drafting and

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545 Ummu Khalid acknowledged that in the early presence of WI/MWI, they were very exclusive, less socialising with wider society. Even some female cadres did not know or socialise with their neighbours. But overtime they learned the disadvantages of such an exclusive way of life, and changed it. They currently are very welcomed in broader society (interview on 30 August 2016), and even support Indonesian government initiatives by taking part in development from religious aspects such as getting involved local government's initiative to eradicate Qur'anic illiteracy. Furthermore, MWI are supervising and educating around a hundred of women's Islamic teaching communities (*majlis ta'lim*) in Makassar city, where the *majlis ta'lim* are not originally from MWI

546 Interview with Hamid Habbe on 15 June 2016

setting a program and are fully responsible in carrying out such tasks. He added that 'while a male meeting only needs two hours, MWI needs around three to four hours for their meeting'.[547]

Within WI, in general, leadership functions are ceded to men, while managerial affairs come under women's responsibility. As the manager, MWI handles WI's business activities. There is even a Muslimah entrepreneur community. For example, they superintend chemist franchises as Ummu Saniawati explains;

> This Wahdah chemist I think functions as financial support. Fortunately, we donate around AUS $ 1500 per month to WI to pay electricity and water bills of the Wahdah office. Some chemists we handle are entirely funded by WI, and others are semi-franchises that also donate their small incomes to WI. I seek to establish several chemists in different spots in Makassar and outside of Makassar. I think such business will never collapse as long as it is well organised. That is why I invite other female members to collect funds to establish chemists under Wahdah's brands, so that people will see that we are able to manage not only *da'wa* matters, but also economic affairs. I plan even to build a distribution chain for medicine, since we have already a lot of chemists.[548]

Also, MWI supervises women and children. Although the hospital is still under WI control, its management is operated by MWI. According to Ummu Khalid, doctors and all administrative staff of the hospital are female, except for security personnel. She admitted that WI plans to entrust the management of the hospital entirely to MWI. As well as these businesses, MWI runs other commercial activities such as small restaurants, a bread factory, and a mineral water production facility. '*Da'wa* cannot be isolated from economics affairs', stated Ummu Khalid.[549] These active recruits have been invariably encouraged to become entrepreneurs in order to have an income, at least for themselves. One reason why MWI is very active in entrepreneurship is to maintain the independence of the organizations, and minimise the need for outside funding. WI must be autonomous in terms of its finances, but this does not necessarily mean that WI rejects donations.

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[547] Interview with Qasim Saguni on 1 June 2016
[548] Interview with Saniawati on 9 August 2016
[549] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016

Donations are welcomed as long as those who want to donate funds have a similar orientation to that of WI.[550]

Meanwhile, the benefits that women get from their involvement in the organisation vary. The spiritual satisfaction which women feel after becoming involved in the *da'wa* movement is one of the key advantages. The following insights underline the triumphs and tribulations for women balancing their public and private lives in their search for spiritual fulfilment through religious commitment:

> Whatever we do is needed by us. We need a feeling of peace so that satisfaction does not refer to material meanings, but how to share is a real happiness. Equally important, that what we conduct is for our life in the hereafter.[551]

> I told my husband that I felt tired after teaching religious concerns in the morning and the afternoon, but the feelings of tiredness are different to when I came back from administering the kindergarten. While handling the kindergarten made me stressful and really tired, I felt inner peace after lecturing in religious fields, even if exhausted. I felt satisfied. My physical body is tired, but my feelings are peaceful, and my life is meaningful and useful (*berkah*). One form of *berkah,* if we want to count our income by worldly calculation, people will say that our family revenue is much. They assume our public activities in *da'wa* are paid, but not in salary. Our life has never been so hard. I got this house from my friend in *tarbiyah*. So, there is much easiness God gives if we conduct *da'wa*.[552]

> I felt happy. It was God's gratitude. We regarded our participation in the *da'wa* movement as a divine direction (*hidayah*). We got benefits for ourselves, our families, and for outside women. Thanks to God, we sense that the more people know Islam through us, the more satisfaction we feel. Individual conversions into being a good person due to our *da'wa* made us feel delighted, and it definitely cannot be measured by materialism (money). It is about inner pleasure.[553]

> Its benefits are too much: if we aspired to account for them in a piece of paper, it is not enough. Evidence for this was that we have understood Islam correctly. Our ultimate aim, indeed, is to enter paradise by means of comprehending and implementing the right Islam, complying with Islamic sharia and being a pious Muslimah. If I was not affiliated with this organisation, I might not wear the hijab. It was divine direction (*hidayah*). Our religious knowledge has been mainly implemented in our family and wider society. We have conducted *da'wa* to educate other Muslimah who before *da'wa* could not read the Qur'an.[554]

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[550] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016
[551] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016
[552] Interview with Ummu Hana on 18 September 2016
[553] Interview with Rini on 19 July 2016
[554] Interview with Hasniawati on 19 July 2016

From the narratives above, women's satisfaction is visible in the feelings they express about being useful and the pious self. Being a helpful individual is manifested through calling for other women to be true Muslimah, to understand and perform Islam correctly, consistently, and comprehensively. Taking part in Islamic social transformation is a vehicle to achieve the stability of inner feelings, since this participation is one form of maintaining submission and connection to God. It is widely accepted by Muslims, mainly WI, that sustainable obedience to God is a way to gain His worldly and hereafter rewards. Moreover, being a pious self reflects the belief that Wahdah Muslimah have comprehended and implemented the 'true' Islam, which is not tainted with un-Islamic local practices, and is derived from an authoritative resource, that is, *as-salafu saleh'*s (the first generation of Islam) understanding of the Qur'an and the hadith.

The social advantages of women' participation in WI were also revealed in the interviews. The various programs set by MWI, such as religious lectures, seminar, *tarbiyah*, workshops, and *tabliq akbar* (a big meeting), allow women to socialise and meet with many diverse people, and thus to extend their social networks. Ummu Saniawati explains:

> I think there are many benefits of involvement in *da'wa* because of meeting and knowing many people. Extensive networks will bring about a lot of fortunes. In the past, I supervised the group going to the holy land of Mecca to do *Umroh*.[555] I found it easy to collect folks. I am used to supervising a hundred people every Ramadhan month. This is because I invariably teach and deliver religious lessons in different events, so I have interacted with many individuals, and they trust me. Although I do not receive money directly, having wider networks and knowing a lot of people are unlimited resources for me. Quite often, I meet a doctor whom I have trained and educated, and they give me consultations free of charge, etc.[556]

The social networks developed and maintained by MWI apparently create other benefits. The quotation above shows that wider social linkages are profitable in material ways. Although Ummu Saniawati does not receive cash directly, she gains the gratitude of people who have been trained, educated, and supervised, in the form of services free of charge. This is real wealth for her. The

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[555] Umroh generally refers to visiting Mecca, especially to the kaba, for doing a series of religious rituals, and such visits can be any time

[556] Interview with Ummu Saniawati on 09 August 2016

social interactions through which she is able to conduct *da'wa* made her trusted by society. This trust is marked by the fact that she finds it easy to mobilise the masses whom she supervises to do *umroh.* This trust is also important, as doing *umroh* has become a trend among Indonesian people, and the number of travel agents offering cheap *umroh* packages has increased. But, unfortunately, many of these agents are inconsistent with their promises in the advertisements, so many people seeking to do *umroh* have been disappointed and frustrated.[557]

Within their social networks, women also receive social recognition and approval, because of their capacity to combine religious and secular knowledge, approaching an issue through both Islamic and scientific perspectives. Ummu Saniawati explains:

> People are quick to accept our *da'wa* when we are capable of conjoining religious knowledge and sciences which we got from campus. For example, when the convener of meetings such as religious lectures or seminars introduces me as a speaker who is also a pharmacist and manager, those audiences are excited and appreciative. I have always been empaneled with dermatologists and obstetricians and deliver papers from an Islamic perspective. But, quite often, I discuss a topic from both health and sharia point of view. So, we seek to integrate general sciences and religion.[558]

Not only do they gain social admiration and support, WI's recruits also learn from such social interactions. Iskandar admitted that the WI strategy for *da'wa*, including MWI's own, experiences shifts from time to time. Three factors, at least have caused such modifications: (1) the continuous learning of Islamic references, as the more Islamic literature WI members read, the wider knowledge they gain; (2), the advice of WI's teachers who are living in Saudi Arabia; and (3) the results of social interaction.[559] For example, the shift in name from LM to MWI was partly because of the effect of interaction effect with other Islamic women's organisations using the word Muslimah in their organizations names, such as Muslimah NU. Another example is that intensive social interaction has led to robust social networks between MWI and wider society, as well as

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[557] For further information about this concern, see Dewi Masita, 'Dinamika Bisnis travel Umroh se Kota Pasuruan di Era Globalisasi (The Dynamic of Umroh Travel Business in Pasuruan City in the Era of Globalism)', in *Iqtishadia*, Vol. 2, No. 2, December 2015, pp., 1-2

[558] Interview with Ummu Saniawati on 09 August 2016

[559] Interview with Iskandar Kato (Secretary-General of WI), on 19 June 2016

makes Muslimah Wahdah Islamiyah (MWI) to be aware about current social and political conditions. They then feel responsible for taking part in social reform that aims to bring about the perceived Islamic social order.[560]

In addition, living with communal ways in an organisation, has created a sense of protection, which emerges from feelings of belonging, of being associated with the organizations, and having the same vision, mission, and ultimate objectives. Similarly, as Kim has found in her research into women's involvement in Hizbut Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia, one of the benefits of women's participation in the Islamist movement is the creation of a social network which leads to women's sense of protection. She cites Ahmed, who 'refers to such feelings as a sense of community, mutual support, and commonality of values'.[561] Farida similarly explains that communal life is stronger than the individual, as a sheep is more easily attacked by wolves than when sheep gather. Therefore, the sense of commonality offers protection and safety.[562]

Besides these spiritual and social advantages, women's involvement in the Islamist movement is also a form of women's knowledge and skill development. Women obtain relatively new understandings and applications of Islam, different to their parents. So, the Islamic religiosity of these women is not mostly inherited from past generations. In other words, women's Islamic awareness has been grounded in a long and systematic process of Islamic learning and education. One informant said that 'with our involvement, we already know about the true Islam'.[563] In more detail, Ummu Miftah explains:

> How to interact with our husband, how to generate our children according to the Qur'an and the hadith's direction, how to cover our *aurat*, how to maintain prayer, how to recite the Qur'an properly, how to deliver our *da'wa* to other mothers, and how to take ablution *(wudhu*) correctly are things that we have understood.[564]

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[560] Interview with Farida and Yuyun on 19 July 2016
[561] Elena Kim, *Op. Cit.*, p. 9
[562] Interview with Farida on 19 July 2016
[563] Interview with Hasmiaty on 19 July 2016
[564] Interview with Ummu Miftah on 19 July 2016

Women in MWI are encouraged to pursue higher education, ranging from Bachelor to Doctoral degrees, and are not restricted to study in religious fields. Jalil argues that *ibadah* (religious practice) consists of specific (*mahdah*) and general (*amma*) religious practices. The latter refers to how to be the most useful person to others. One manifestation of the general *ibadah* is the profession of nurse or doctor. Being a doctor, for instance, is required by society.[565] Furthermore, he explains:

> For example, we have many female doctors, and we insist that folks really need you. Maybe you have to spend more time in this duty (…). We also hold the notion of *fardu ain* and *kifayah*. The former relates to *minhajul haya* (way of life) while the latter has to do with *wasailul haya*, how people can live adequately and sufficiently if there is no a doctor within a community. When you learn medicine and become a doctor, it means that you have represented our communal religious obligation as human beings. The existence of female doctors is necessary in order to service women's needs'. [566]

As married women (*ummuhat*) in MWI being a skillful and thoughtful mother is important, partly because women are the first educators of children, so creating a high Islamic generation, and being such a mother differentiates them from mainstream or ordinary mothers who are unable to educate their children or to spend their time productively. Rini explains:

> For instance, I am a housewife. I felt limited in exploring and actualising my potential. But after joining Wahdah to be a staff of its organisational structure, I have been able to express myself. I can interact with different people and different characteristics. I can learn and have wider knowledge from such interface. This is a tremendous blessing. I cannot obtain this if I did not join in the organisation. I do not want to be a common housewife who lack of knowledge and only gossip with neighbours. The most benefit I felt is to have deep insights. I can easily arrange my family. WI provides us with the knowledge of parenting presented by experts through which we learn to how to treat children properly. I never gained this anywhere else. My family, and others, are certainly the same, figuring out any problems, but I have a different way of resolving these issues, as well as a different method in educating children. (..). We educate our children based on religious principles and the modern sciences of parenting.'[567]

[565] Interiview with Ikhwan Jalil (Vice Leader of WI), on 10 June 2016
[566] Interview with Ikhwan Jalil in 10 June 2016
[567] Interview with Rini on 17 July 2016

WI also teaches and trains its members with regard to how to define a problem philosophically and how to resolve it gently. In other words, the knowledge and skill of problem-solving has been provided by WI. As Samhariyani describes:

> In Wahdah, we learn about ways to face and to solve a conundrum. The problem is the gap between the ideal and reality. Not all that is difficult is a problem, but it will be a problem when there is no synergy between idealism and reality. For example, an un-knowledgeable person who broke up with his girlfriend would regard it as a serious issue, since this makes him sad. But when we question whether we should ideally have a girlfriend or boyfriend, the answer is that we don't have to. Islam teaches us that dating is something wrong. So, the case of the broken relationship is to be close to ideal. It is certainly not a problem. How to define a problem is a subject which we learn so that when we deal with affairs, we know whether they are a problem or not, and also their solution. Therefore, we are able to solve every problem, and the solution is in Islam.[568]

From the explanation above, one can identify the benefits women obtain from their participation in the Islamist movement. These are: religious or spiritual feelings; internal (between members of WI) and external (members with wider population) networks; the development of knowledge and skills; and material benefits. Regarding the last benefit, although women conducting individual and public *da'wa* is unpaid and voluntary, they may gain other advantages including a wider social network, new knowledge and skills. Through their capacity to read the Qur'an accurately and correctly according to the science of *tajwid* (a set of rules for proper pronunciation and recital of the Qur'an based on oral recitation of the Prophet Muhammad), women can offer their services in teaching the Qur'an to wider society, through which they can gain payment. As Yuyun confessed, one reason why her parents eventually accepted her affiliation to WI, is the fact that she was able to be financially independent.[569]

Conclusion

Women's participation in WI is motivated by a range of factors, and has brought constructive changes, both for the organisation's development, and for women's condition. These positive

[568] Interview with Samhariyani on 19 July 2016.
[569] Interview with Yuyun on 19 July 2016

changes pertain to increasing the number of recruits as well as to improving religious-spiritual, psychological, social, and economic aspects of women's lives, giving women knowledge as well as skills. Moreover, women's involvement is channelled in two main directions: individual and public *da'wa*. In general, both kinds of *da'wa* aim to create recruits whose personal and social piety operate simultaneously. Likewise, women's participation is not in line with the broader women's organizations which seeks to liberate women from discrimination and oppression or to resist and to subvert patriarchal norms. In this study women did not claim to experience such subjugation. Rather, the real problem they claimed to face is the lack of religious knowledge and the corrupt practices of Islam in daily life.

CHAPTER SIX
WOMEN'S INVOLVEMENT IN HTI

Introduction

This chapter explores women's involvement in the Islamist movement, using HTI as a case study. It addresses why women are interested in joining the *da'wa* movement advocated by HTI, what benefits women achieve after joining, and what restrictions women need to take into account if they aspire to join. It also considers how HTI defines Islam to frame the current condition of the Islamic community (*ummah*), and explains how HTI understands the meaning of *da'wa*. Further, this chapter also investigates the similarities and differences between HTI and WI. My fieldwork research shows that women express various motives for, and benefits of, their participation in the Islamist movement, particularly in the *da'wa* project, but religious factors tend to be the general answer they provide when asked why they join Islamist organisations. Furthermore, this research seeks to find the existence of resemblances and differences between HTI and WI, although both are Islamist organisations cultivating Islam as the basis of their movement.

As the previous chapter has shown, HTI is a chapter of the transnational Islamist movement Hizbut Tahrir (HT) centered in Jerusalem where HT was born. HTI was imported to Indonesia from Hizbut Tahrir Australia in the 1980s. HTI, like its counterparts in other countries, has a women's wing called Muslimah HTI (the Women's Division of HTI, MHTI). MHTI is an autonomous body within HTI's organisational structure. According to Dirwan, spokesperson of HTI Makassar, MHTI has its own agendas and structure, and does not need to coordinate with the male-led organisational structure in Makassar. Nevertheless, MHTI's Makassar branch is directly responsible to the central management of MHTI in Jakarta. He said that although these organisational structures are different, both HTI men and women hold the same ideology and

objectives and refer to the same books in their struggle.[570] This is different to the Women's Division of WI (MWI), in which the female organisational structure sits under the male-led over-arching structure.

Islam as Ideology

It is important to know how HTI defines and frames Islam. Understanding how HTI defines Islam makes it possible to comprehend what HTI strives for, and why, and what different emphases of objective exist between HTI/MHTI and WI/MWI. I have argued that WI/MWI emphasises the purification of secular life through religious ritual and practice as part of its objective to implement sharia at in daily life. By contrast, HTI/MHTI aims to implement sharia at the state level, whereby all aspects of life will be administered according to sharia law. In this regard, the founder of Hizbut Tahrir (HT), Taqiuddin An Nabhani, introduces in his book entitled *Nizam al-Islam*, that Islam is a God-made ideology (*mabda*), that consists of ideas (*fikri*) and methods (*thariqoh*)[571]. This means that Islam provides a set of ideas or concepts set by God, with respect to God, human beings, the universe, and the hereafter, as well as methods to implement these ideas by complying with the prophet Muhammad's detailed prescriptions. This ideology is comprehensive, universal, enduring, and rational, not constrained by time, place, and social conditions. It acts as the basis of thinking (*al-qa'idah al-fikriyah*) in generating other sub-fields, ranging from affairs of politics, government, economics, law, and education, to matters such as family conduct and responsibilities and Islamic dress. For HTI, the Islamic ideology must become the basis of an Islamic state.

HTI contends that the Islamic ideology has been contaminated by a wide range of external elements which do not come from Islam itself, such as ideologies of socialism, capitalism, and democracy, as well as by Western culture in general. Historically speaking, these un-Islamic

[570] Interview with Dirwan (a spokesman of HTI in Makassar), on 25 July 2016
[571] Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, *Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam* (Life's Rules in Islam), HTI, Jakarta Selatan, 2013, pp. 7

components can be traced back since the 2nd century (in Islamic calendar, AH), or 9th century AD, when Islamic thinking was polluted by philosophical notions including Indian, Persian, and Greek philosophies. These negative influences led Muslims to misunderstand the 'true' Islam, as they compromised Islam through philosophy, which diverges from Islamic faith and practice. Alongside this, according to HTI, the contamination of Islam since the eleventh century AH, or 17th century AD until the present day means, that contemporary Muslims have lost 'life orientation', as they do not know what the objective of life is. This condition is different to Muslims' awareness in the outset phase of Islam, in which they understood their existence in the world for Islam itself, to implement Islamic laws through an Islamic state, and to spread Islam outside Islamic territories. For HTI, Islam has been under attack by Western culture and thought (*ghazwu ats-tsaqafi wal fikr*) and by the Christianisation of Islamic territories under colonialism.[572]

Ghazwu ats-tsaqafi wal fikr can be partly seen in the spread of capitalist ideology through imperialism, i.e. by force through political domination or a military presence, or through more subtle influences on the culture and economies in countries such as the Middle East, North African countries, and Indonesia, whose majority populations are Muslim.[573] For example, according to HTI, the Indonesian government has adopted capitalism as its economic system, and democracy as its political structure. The acceptance of capitalism and democracy, as well as other Western discourses such as feminism or gender equality, they argue, has brought disadvantages to Indonesian society. Practices such as conventional Indonesian banks charging interest, which Islam does not allow, exploitation of the lower class by the upper class, corruption by political elites, the rising prices of basic needs, rampant promiscuity amongst teens, high economic

[572] Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir*, (Understanding to Hizbut Tahrir), HTI, Jakarta Selatan, 2011, pp. 7-8
[573] Taquyiddin An-Nabhani, *Konsepsi Politik Hizbut Tahri* (Concepts in Hizbut Tahrir's Politics), HTI Press, Jakarta, 2009, pp. 13-17

dependence on foreign parties, and many women leaving their homes to be career women, are undesirable impacts of the application of un-Islamic rules, discourses and systems.[574]

Therefore, to return Islamic thinking and methods (*fikri* and *thoriqah*) into the true and genuine form of Islam, as stated in the *Qur'an* and the *hadith*, and practised by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, Muslims must struggle for the creation of an Islamic state. For HTI, it is not necessary to purify Muslims' daily religious rituals; rather, the most important and real fight is to establish a state within which Islamic thought and values can be implemented. This understanding must become a creed (*aqidah*) for every Muslim. All Muslims must fight for Islam to be a system of government or the state. According to Mutia, most Muslims today tend to recognise that Islam has been reduced to merely talking about humans' conduct of their relationship with God or other human beings or providing moral guidance. Contemporary Muslims have only a religious spirit, without the deep understanding that Islam is an ideology. The key challenge that Islam faces today, according to HTI, is that most Muslims do not share this creed. They feel it is not necessary to fight for the establishment of an Islamic state.[575]

In the same vein, another informant explains that Islam must be imbued within the social and political system. This is because individual virtue will be eradicated by an un-Islamic system or environment. She illustrates that religious education for children at home can be useless and meaningless, if the neighbourhood is not an Islamic environment, and if television shows that children watch is not religiously regulated by government. Television, according to her, is a system through which information comes from everywhere. Thus, people need a system regulating television shows by filtering them. For her, individual righteousness and an Islamic system, in the form of an Islamic state, should be simultaneously formed. She argues that it is utopian to believe

[574] Interview with Mawar (name changed to protect identity, and she is an activist of MHTI's *da'wa*) on 18 August 2016, and with Mutia on 29 July 2016
[575] Interview with Mutia, (spokeswoman for MHTI's Makassar branch), 29 July 2016

that an Islamic state will be automatically created when each individual is pious and good. Rather, the Islamic state must intentionally strive to set itself up. [576] This differs from WI, which believes that if everyone understands and applies Islam truthfully, then an Islamic social order will automatically manifest itself. For WI, the question of how to reform self and society is more important than fighting for the formation of an Islamic state, and Islam does not need this state. Furthermore, as Andi explains, Hizbut Tahrir (HT) recognises three kinds of Islamic obligation. The first is individual duties, including praying and fasting. These can be performed even if an Islamic state has not been formed. The second refers to communal obligations such as building mosques, which does not require the existence of an Islamic state, as these exist without Islamic state. The third concerns religious responsibilities that must be administered by the state, encompassing enforcement of Islamic trade rules and criminal law. These require an Islamic state so that some religious obligations can be maintained.[577]

From the explanation above, it can be noted that Islam, in the view of HTI, experiences cultural, economic, and political attacks from the West which is presumed as un-Islamic element. Islam has been polluted by external elements which have blurred Muslims' understanding about true and authentic Islamic teaching. Consequently, this distorts Muslims' spirit to strive for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. To return Islam to its original form, as revealed in the *Qur'an* and the *hadith*, and performed by the Prophet Muhammad and his adherents in the early emergence of Islam, HTI considers the formation of an Islamic state as the only breakthrough. Hence, women's participation in HTI aims to support this foremost objective.

[576] Interview with Mawar (name changed to protect identity) on 18 August, 2016
[577] Interview with Andi (name changed to protect identity, and he is an activist of HTI's *da'wa*) on 29 July 2016

The Practice of *Da'wa*

Like WI, HTI employs *da'wa* as a means to achieve its main goal. Both organisations acknowledge *da'wa* as an individual religious obligation, like prayer or fasting. However, HTI extends the meaning of *da'wa*, referring not only to inviting other people to comprehensively understand Islam and to consistently perform specific religious rituals such as prayer, but to ask people to take up a broader social and political awareness that the current social order is not in line with Islamic prescription. Thus, social reform is needed. HTI understands the necessary reform as requiring the establishment of an Islamic caliphate within which Islamic tenets and values will be implemented. This is reflected by different narratives offered by HTI respondents. Andi (not his real name) explains that the responsibility of *da'wa* includes the struggle to establish an Islamic state:

> Regardless of having a different gender, every Muslim must perform *da'wa* as stated by the *Qur'an* and the *hadith*. The *Qur'an* reveals that each individual has an obligation to conduct *da'wa, while* the *hadith* commands us to deliver at least a verse from the *Qur'an* to others. Although many people deem the call for people to do prayer is already enough to fulfil the task of *da'wa,* this has been not enough for us. We need reform of the system so that our *da'wa* is more directed to the establishment of social reform and structural transformation. We are not required only to invite people to believe in God, but also to create an Islamic order in the form of a state. We must have an Islamic state because it has huge power. Women must take part in this struggle to form an Islamic Caliphate, even if they face certain restrictions when the Caliphate is established.[578]

Mawar also notes the political importance of this religious duty:

> There are three ways to form an Islamic state: *jihad* with or without terror; as a political party in parliament; and *da'wa*. We use *da'wa*, which refers to the reform of society through creating change in their ways of thinking, as the Prophet Muhammad had done. At the time, for example, he challenged the dominant thinking about infidel groups, as well as the concept of idols and the practice of female infanticide[579]

Similarly, Mutia notes that the practice is inculcated in recruits' children:

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[578] Interview with Andi (name changed to protect identity) on 29 July 2016
[579] Interview with Mawar (name changed to protect identity) on 18 August 2016

> What we have gained from HTI, we embed in our children so that they have a strong belief in God and a philosophy of care for other people. In this sense, at an early age, they have the awareness to perform *da'wa.* At least, they were anxious about the practices of despotism.[580]

Finally, Melati considers da'wa a precursor for social reform:

> Women are *ummu wa rabbul baith* (housewives) and needed by society. We must complete our domestic tasks first, and then turn to another religious obligation, performing public *da'wa*. *Da'wa* is an individual responsibility to God, not a collective responsibility. So, we cannot only reform ourselves to become pious; we must create a pious society.[581]

These extracts from the interviews, particularly the last excerpt, reveal that HTI, like WI, recognises the obligation to perform both personal and public *da'wa. Da'wa* refers to both the responsibility to call the self and others to the comprehensive faith, and comprises both self-reform and social reform, although there is a different emphasis on the aims of *da'wa*. WI pays more attention to purifying religious rituals such as prayer and fasting from local traditions which are perceived as un-Islamic, and to form pious individuals. This is because WI argues that the social reform to an Islamic social structure will be achieved if individuals reform themselves to be pious Muslims. In other words, social change begins with a change of self. By contrast, HTI pays more attention to promoting Islam as an ideology and political system, to orient Indonesians to the need to change the social structure to an Islamic state. HTI believes that to be a truly pious Muslim, it is necessary to reform the social and political system, in the sense of forming an Islamic state. This is because some religious obligations or regulations cannot be implemented in daily lives without the presence of an Islamic state. Thus, HTI is a political movement, as reflected by its name, and more accommodating of different ways to practise religious rituals than WI. HTI criticises WI, as it believes that WI and other Islamist organisations do not pay enough attention to the need to change the existing system. As Mutia explains:

> We regard our friends in WI and Hidayatullah [another Islamist organisation in Makassar], not to care or to have a different level of care, and we hope that they can have the same attention as

[580] Interview with Mutia on 29 July 2016

[581] Interview with Melati (name changed to protect identity, and she is an activist of MHTI's *da'wa* as well as a *da'wa* coordinator for a Tallo district), on 11 August 2016

> us to reform the current condition of Muslims. This transformation cannot be achieved only by doing prayer or evolving people's creed (*aqidah*); rather, we need to change the system.[582]

Turning back to the concept of *da'wa*, both HTI and WI define personal *da'wa* as a process of self-discipline in understanding Islam and implementing it into daily life. This process occurs in the form of a weekly *halaqa* (study circle)[583]. Taji-Farouki explains that *halaqa* is 'a small unit of party members and new recruits formed for the intensive study of the party ideology under the supervision of an experienced member.'[584] The study circle consists of four or five recruits and one supervisor (*mushrifah* for female and *mushrif* for male) and takes place once a week. Recruits study texts adopted by Hizbut Tahrir (HT).[585] Anggrek (not her real name) explains:

> For deep understanding about Hizbut Tahrir's ideas, I was asked to study HT texts, and the first book I had to learn was *The System of Islam* (*Nidham al- Islam*).[586] Learning begins when I read the book, and then my supervisor (*mushrifah*) explains the meaning of the book. After finishing the book, I undertake an examination in the last meeting, which aims to know to what extent I have understood the book's content. If I passed, I could progress, to learn another book. The process is long and heavy, so some new recruits are unable to complete, and eventually they leave HTI.[587]

Self-discipline and patience are needed to undertake this learning process. Based on my informants' acknowledgment, it can take more than one year of study to finish a book. This long process makes sense, as through *halaqa,* recruits are expected to comprehend the ideological, political, and religious beliefs of HTI, and simultaneously to implement the learning they have gained in their daily lives. Minds and actions must align. As Mawar states:

> The training teaches us that the personality of an individual can be measured through two factors: her mind and behaviour. For example, there is a person who has Islamic conduct, but does not have Islamic ways of thinking, and the reverse is also true. So, between theory and practice, it is not synchronous. Finally, I contend that we must be consistent in what we say or think and how we

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[582] Interview with Mutia on 29 July 2016

[583] In WI, the study circle is called *Tarbiyah* and has a different scheme.

[584] Syamsul Rijal, 'Indoctrinating Muslim Youths: Seeking Certainty Through An-Nabhanism', in *Al-Jami'ah*, Vol.49, No. 2, 2011, p. 261

[585] Hizbut Tahrir has both adopted texts (*thaqafa al-mutabanna*) and non-adopted texts (*thaqafa ghayr al-mutabanna*). The former provides guidance of thinking and action to all members, whilst the latter are for both HT members and all Muslims. Syamsul Rijal, *Ibid*., p. 260

[586] This book talks about life's guidance according to Islam in general. It discusses faith, how to perform *da'wa*, sharia law, and the need for an Islamic state.

[587] Interview with Anggrek (name changed to protect identity, and she is an activist of MHTI's *da'wa*) on 16 August 2016

behave.[588]

These findings confirm previous research. Syamsul Rijal, in his work, found that:

> *Halaqa* serves to inculcate HT ideology to the new recruits and members both in mind and in their everyday behaviour. The HT supervisor has the important duty of maintaining the members' understanding in accordance with the approved HT interpretation. (…). Their task is not only related to *halaqa* supervision, but they also help members to enhance their basic knowledge of Islam and religious practices (*ibada*) such as prayer, fasting and reciting the *Qur'an* correctly. They also monitor the daily behaviour of members away from the *halaqa* cells.[589]

Following Michel Foucault's theory about subjectivity and power, these facts explain that the subject, in this case a pious Muslim affiliated to HTI, is a product of the operation of power relations. This power works by involving the *mushrif or mushrifah's* supervision, HT texts, and a set of *halaqa* rules, including examinations. To be pious Muslims, they must abide by the apparatus of power. Likewise, Bourdieu's concept of habitus, habitus refers to 'the everyday practices that embody a set of dispositions which in turn determine taste, in this case a taste for particular religious beliefs, practices and object',[590] can be used to understand Islamist efforts to synchronise minds and actions by habituating recruits to live everyday lives according to Islamic rules. By undertaking the long process of *halaqa* as well as working to consistently apply Islamic knowledge in their daily lives, these recruits develop an inclination or a taste for a particular religious understanding, in this case HTI's tenets, and begin to embody these. This is reflected by various benefits gained by recruits, which I explore later.

Meanwhile, public *da'wa,* which refers to an invitation to wider society to change the current social order which is perceived to be un-Islamic, occurs by making a variety of activities available to recruits, including seminars, workshops, teaching sessions (*Tabliqh Akbar*), intelligent discussions and debates, monthly religious meetings, and mass demonstrations. Mass demonstrations offer a means to critique any government system which does not take Islam as

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[588] Interview with Mawar (name changed to protect identity) on 18 August 2016
[589] Syamsul Rijal, *Op. Cit*., pp. 261-262
[590] See Bryan S Turner, 'Acts of Piety: The Political and the Religious, or a Tale of Two Cities', in E F Isin, G M Nielsen (Eds.*), Acts of Citizenship,* Zed Books, United Kingdom, 2008, p. 124.

state ideology, including the Indonesian government:

> *Da'wa* is a religious obligation including the critique of the Indonesian government through mass demonstration. For example, I have conducted a demonstration entitled *Islam Rahmatan Lil Alamin* (Islam is for throughout the world). One of our demands is to call on the government to use God's system, as God is our creator who knows best what we need. If we use man-made systems, it will certainly bring disadvantages because men have different interests, which are more likely to generate conflict.[591]

As Andi (not her real name) explains, women participate in these demonstrations:

> Women can participate in mass demonstrations to criticise the government. This critique can be carried individually or collectively. For example, Aisyah (wife of the Prophet Muhammad) criticised Ali [the fourth Caliph of Islam]; she even fought against Ali. Likewise, Umar [the second Caliph of Islam] was challenged or corrected at the point of a sword. Thus, the critique of rulers to uphold righteousness is a past tradition practised by companions of the Prophet Muhammad.[592]

When I asked my participants about whether women participating in mass demonstrations know why they must participate in the rallies and what they demand, women I worked with reveal that they clearly understand what they do. As Ros (not her real name) explains:

> Yes, we have to know what we do. We cannot uncritically join the demonstration. We know what we do. We must appreciate the demands on our time. Things we do certainly have a purpose. When an individual does something but she does not know its aim, it will be in vain or useless. If we do not understand what we perform, we will feel bored and uncomfortable, especially if the event takes place in hot weather. After all, as women, we also think about our skin which will burn under the weather. But if we know the reason behind our acts, we can have spirit.[593]

This shows that HTI women understand and realise the reasons why they participate in mass demonstrations. They are able to organise themselves, and to determine what they want to do.

Regarding mass demonstrations, both WI and HTI have different views about this strategy. As explored above, HTI considers that the facts of Islamic history, in which female companions of the Prophet Muhammad actively critiqued rulers, affirms that women can and do participate actively in mass demonstrations and protest rallies. Conversely, WI disagrees that both women

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[591] Interview with Anggrek (name changed to protect identity) on 16 August 2016
[592] Interview with Andi (name changed to protect identity) on 29 July 2016
[593] Interview with Ros (name changed to protect identity, and she is an activist of MHTI's *da'wa*), on 18 August 2016

and men can do so. This is because WI does not recognise women's involvement in mass demonstrations.[594] In other words, because WI never found references in Islamic literature permitting women to protest by taking part in mass demonstrations, it does not recognise this activity.

Women's Role in HTI

According to the founder of HT, Taqiuddin Nabhani, in his work, *Sistem Pergaulan dalam Islam* (*Social System in Islam*), Allah, as creator of human beings, has determined both different responsibilities for women and men, as well as shared obligations for Muslims, regardless of gender. As creator, God knows best whether affairs are suitable for women or men. That is why, according to Nabhani, the division of labour and gender roles must follow sharia. Nabhani rejects every rational and logical effort to innovate or reform sharia-based task divisions, as these constitute an abuse of sharia which would be harmful and damaging. Sharia law stipulates that women's main tasks are *ummun wa rabbh al-bayt* (to be mothers and housewives). To implement these roles, sharia sets out rules with respect to pregnancy, delivery (*wiladah*), breast-feeding (*radaha'ah*), and custody (*hadhanah*). In the matter of children's custodianship, for instance, sharia regulates women's duties from the beginning of pregnancy until giving birth, as well as educating their children once they are born. These roles are more important and greater tasks for women than other responsibilities, commitments, and activities. This is because these activities maintain the continuity of human life, and as such, are only devoted to women.[595] The division of labour, therefore, is taken for granted, rather than being considered a social construction. This notion is confirmed by my informants. As Andi (not his real name) explains:

[594] Interview with Qasim (a member of WI) on 1 June 2016

[595] Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, *Sistem Pergaulan dalam Islam* (Social Interaction System in Islam), HTI Press, Jakarta, 2014, p. 135

> Women Muslims' (Muslimah) main tasks are as housewives. Domestic duties must be prioritised. Since the beginning, we have explained the essential responsibility of women.[596]

Similarly, Dirwan states:

> The key duty which women must put first is to nurture children. They must act seriously to prioritise their obligations. So HTI women are strong, as after completing domestic tasks, they have to perform public *da'wa* as well.[597]

Mutia, Makassar MHTI branch spokeswoman also notes:

> Women have domestic and public responsibilities. Women are firstly mothers, family managers, and wives, and then are in charge of committing to the principle of *amr' ma'ruf nahi mungkar* (enjoining goodness and forbidding badness).[598]

These narratives are reinforced in the Women's Division (MHTI) campaigns, as shown in this image from the women's demonstration in Makassar:[599]

Both HTI and WI share this idea of women's roles. Women's domestic roles play a pivotal role to create the future generation. Family is the first and foremost institution to generate piety.

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[596] Interview with Andi (name changed to protect identity), 29 July 2016
[597] Interview with Dirwan, 25 July 2016
[598] Interview with Mutia, spokeswoman of MHTI Makassar branch on 29 July 2016.
[599] Tribun News, 'Ini Tuntutan Perempuan HTI di Flyover', (The Demand of HTI's Women in Flyover), available in http://makassar.tribunnews.com/2015/03/08/ini-tuntutan-perempuan-hti-di-flyover, accessed on 12 October, 2017.

One of the issues often addressed by the Women's Division (MHTI) is how to establish *sakinah* (the good family). The good family is marked by the consistent implementation of Islamic values, in which every member of the family knows their own duties as ruled by Islam.[600] A woman, for example, who wants to get married, has to fulfil a set of preparations. The first is that she has to know how to become a mother, how to arrange her household duties, and how to run her public commitments. Second is physical preparation. She must be physically healthy to be able to give birth and educate the next generation in the qualities of Islam. Thirdly, she must be mentally healthy, as life after marriage is different to life before. In family life, she will be together with her husband and children, and the challenges she faces will be very complicated.[601] El-Diina Center[602] explains:

> Mothers play a vital role in the educational process of children because they are the first person to interact with children, to provide them with feelings of safety or security, and to be trusted by and to be listened to by children. That is why El-Diina concludes that mothers are considered the first teachers (*madrasah ula*') for children. Mothers' role determines the quality of future generations who will establish an Islamic state. El-Diina also argues that women are pillars of the state.[603]

Given the importance of these domestic roles, it is a demand placed on women that they have religious knowledge with respect to these responsibilities before getting married. Mothers, for instance, must know to how to educate their children from the moment they conceive. Women have to understand that they are the first educators of children and are required to create the next excellent generation having robust religious commitments and dedication. As Mutia explains:

> We have embedded in my children from the beginning to have belief in God and the need to care for the Islamic community. In this sense, the awareness of the importance of *da'wa* has existed from an early age. Therefore, they are unlike other people in seeing a problem. They will have upheavals in their soul when seeing tyranny, and although our people have the true belief and faith, other people do not have it. What makes these children worried is because the Islamic concepts and ideology have been rooted in their selves. If Islamic ideology has been

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[600] Claudia Seise, 'Muslimah HTI: An Introduction to its Thoughts and Activities', in *Working Paper*s, No. 44, Berlin, 2011, p. 11

[601] Zulia Ilmawati, 'Muslimah Juga Wajib Berpolitik', (Muslim Women must also be involved in politics), in *Hizbut Tahrir*, 2008, available in http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2008/07/25/dra-zulia-ilmawati-spsi-muslimah-juga-wajib-berpolitik/, accessed on 25 January 2017, p. 4

[602] El Diina Centre is a group linked to MHTI. The organisation is partly concerned with issues of motherhood and educating the next generation.

[603] Claudia Seise, *Op. Cit*., p. 11

> strongly embedded in our self, surely, we will be worried with the current conditions.[604]

In this regard, the Women's Division (MHTI) often criticises one of the main Western ideas imported to Indonesia in the context of modernisation and development: gender and feminism. Mutia explains:

> Women's roles as mothers and managers of the home cannot be regarded as a form of gender injustice. Women's role in Islamist faith is different to the gender and feminism movement, which argues that these duties are a kind of discrimination. For us, these roles may be shared. In my view, the gender and feminism movement demands equality in all domestic and public aspects of life. Although many women do not know the original insight of gender ideas, they still follow it, saying that women are free to do whatever they want to do. These women do not recognise the jeopardy when a gender equality agenda is issued by the government. It would be harmful for our family. For example, in the Indonesian regulation of domestic violence, it is conveyed that women are entitled to their body, having the right to decide whether they want to be pregnant or not, and also whether they want to have sexual relations with their husbands. So, if a wife does not have clear reason for refusing to service her husband and the husband forces her to get his rights, the matter will be dangerous for family unity if it proceeds to court. (..). It damages the harmony of family life, and it can even break up the family.[605]

MHTI argues that the gender and feminism agenda which tends to measure women's empowerment from three aspects: women's participation in paid employment, political participation in parliament, and power over economic resources, as reflected in Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) used by UNDP,[606] is a deliberate Western conspiracy to devastate the Islamic family structure, in which the traditional division of domestic labour, and the notion of husbands as household leaders and wives as household managers, will be deconstructed. From a feminist point of view, as MHTI understands it, women's worth is measured through economic contribution. Women are prompted to enter the public arena to get paid jobs.[607] Conversely, MHTI recognises that women's value can be assessed by the extent to which they obey God's

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[604] Interview with Mutia on 29 July 2016
[605] Interview with Mutia on 29 July 2016
[606] UNDP, 'Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World', *UNDP*, New York, 2004, p. 270
[607] Mujahiduddin, 'Women's Political Role in Islamic Fundamentalism (Case Study of Hisbut Tahrir Indonesia)', in *Sulesana*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2012, p. 5

commands.[608] This recall's Bryan Turner's argument that the fundamentalist movement taking place in some Abrahamic religions including Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, offers a different way of measuring the dignity of human beings. In this context, he argues that worth can be assessed by acts of piety. In this sense, Islamist norms can be understood as acts of obedience to God, ranging from individually pious activities such as adhering to Islamic dress codes,[609] to acts in the social field, including calling others to the true faith.

MHTI's criticism of feminism's ideas about gender may be summarised in the following ways. Firstly, the notion of an over-arching patriarchal system that is deemed by gender activists as the key catalyst in women's subjugation is not entirely true, as women's poverty, discrimination, violation, and malnutrition are matters that men also experience, particularly in developing countries. Secondly, the notion of gender as a cultural construction is questionable, as this goes against natural arrangements, in which women and men have diverse roles due to being biologically different. In this regard, MHTI argues that the constructivist perspective ignores God's role in creating the arrangements and religious explanations for the division of labour. For MHTI, culture and the social do not construct these roles; rather God determines these, as he knows best what benefits his creatures. Lastly, MHTI criticises Western ideas of gender and feminism because they simplify solutions to women's issues by emphasising only the need for women's political participation in parliament, to get involved in policy-making. According to MHTI, this does not work in the Indonesian context, as Indonesia has been led by women, but women's problems remained unresolved.[610]

However, this does not necessarily mean that women do not have public responsibilities. Women can take up public roles. In the political field for example, when the Islamic Caliphate has

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[608] Interview with Mutia on 29 July 2016
[609] Bryan Turner, 'Acts of Piety: The Political and the Religious, or a Tale of Two Cities', in Engin F. Isin & Greg M. Nielsen (ed.), *Acts of Citizenship*, Zed Books, London & New York, 2008, pp. 123-124
[610] Mujahiduddin, *Op. Cit*., pp. 5-6

been established, women will have four key political roles. The first is that women are entitled to vote and inaugurate a caliph (leader) of the caliphate. This right is historically justified, as it was practised in the era of the prophet Muhammad, so HTI sees it as a religious duty.[611] Secondly, women can vote and be elected as members of the *ummah* assembly[612]. The *ummah* assembly refers to an institution in Islamic state whose members consist of female and male Muslims and non-Muslims. The assembly functions to deliver people's needs to the caliph as well as to report practices of injustice and deviation from Islamic law by rulers.[613] Thirdly, as member of the *majelis ummah,* women and men have the same rights and responsibilities, including the right for women to give voice about a case. Lastly, women are entitled to delegate whomever they want to express their concerns and to represent people. [614] Furthermore, women are able to advise and criticise government, even if an Islamic state has not been established.

Furthermore, women can take up professional work such as being lecturers, doctors, Islamic scholars, or study overseas. Andi states:

> HTI has many female doctors. Some female members continue their study overseas and are accompanied by their husbands as chaperones (*muhrim*). Whatever professions HTI women have, the ideology of HTI must be maintained. So, we are required to consistently comply with sharia law. Muslim women are able to work publicly, as our society accepts women in the public sphere and sharia law does not prohibit women from taking up public roles as long as they commit to sharia. HTI also facilitates women to be Islamic scholars. Female companions of the prophet Muhammad, who narrated *hadith* from him can be categorised as Islamic scholars. For example, Aisyah or Ummu Atiyyah narrated many *hadiths*, and many Muslim men learned from the Prophet's female companions.[615]

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[611] I. Kemal, 'Pemberdayaan Politik Perempuan dalam Pespektif Islam, (Political Empowerment of Women in Islamic Pespective)', in *Suara Muhammadiyah*, no. 15, 2003, p. 1

[612] *Majelis ummah* in the political system of the Islamic state is different to the representative assembly in the democratic system. The Assembly is part of the government, and is entitled to appoint and dismiss rulers as well as to make laws, while the *Majelis ummah* has no right to do so. Therefore, HTI encourages its male and female cadres not to become members of the democratic Assembly as representatives of the people. If they have, they are not allowed to make laws in the Islamic state. See Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, *Sistem Pergaulan dalam Islam, Op. Cit*., p., 143

[613] Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, 2013, *Op. Cit.,* p. 188

[614] Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, 2014, *Op. Cit.,* pp. 145-6

[615] Interview with Andi (name changed to protect identity) on 29 July 2016

However, the most important public responsibility before the establishment of an Islamic state, is to perform *da'wa,* which requires asking other people to struggle to form the state. This task is a religious obligation, and its status in sharia law is equal to prayer and fasting. According to my informants, this obligation is based on the *Qur'an* and *hadith*, as well as on Islamic history. Mutia has illuminated that women and men have the same religious commitment to conduct public *da'wa*, as the *Qur'an* states that all Muslims regardless of gender, are required to enjoin goodness and forbid badness. Furthermore, Mutia reveals:

> This [enjoining goodness and forbidding badness] is a religious obligation for both men and women. They are obligated to conduct *da'wa*. Women's duties to do this are not alternative but mutual. In a sense, women have to fulfil both their domestic and public requirements simultaneously. Women cannot choose only one and ignore another. Both responsibilities will be judged in front of God in the hereafter.[616]

Similarly, Pakistan's branch of Hizbut Tahrir acknowledges women's public responsibility as stated in the *Qur'an*, and encourages women to take part in *da'wa,* even if they suffer torture. According to Hizbut Tahrir Pakistan, Islamic history evidences that in the emergence of Islam, women played a significant role in its spread. The first woman who embraced Islam was Khadijah, the first wife of the prophet Muhammad, and the first martyr to defend Islam was a woman, Sumayya. Another important woman in Islam is Umm-Habiba, who was a married woman who converted from her previous belief to Islam together with her husband, while her father was a pagan. Due to their conversion, they were exiled from their family. In exile, she was left by her husband, who abandoned Islam for Christianity. Her husband sought to persuade her to do as he had, but she was faithful in holding to Islam as her belief system. A female slave, Zunairah Al Romiyah, experienced violence from her lord because she defended her Islamic belief. She suffered torture and was blinded as a result.[617] These women provide role models for adherents in

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[616] Interview with Mutia on 29 July 2016

[617] Hizb ut Tahrir Wilaya Pakistan, *The Role of Muslim Women in Re-establishing the Islamic Khilafah State*, available: http://www.khilafah.com/images/images/PDF/Books/pk-Role-of-Muslim-Women-English.pdf, accessed 25 August 2018, pp. 6-7

Islamist organisations today. For example, Hizbut Tahrir Australia's branch recognises that both men and women have roles in creating social change:

> There is no difference, in origin, in the responsibility of men and women towards working for societal change in Islam. It is a communal obligation that applies to both, within their capacities. Women in Hizbut Tahrir play an active role, undertaking intellectual and political work such as calling the rulers of the Muslim world to account and struggling against oppression and injustice. Many female members of Hizbut Tahrir have been imprisoned for their beliefs and activism by a number of regimes in the Muslim world. In accordance with the Islamic etiquette, women's activities are mostly separate or segregated from men's activities.[618]

Like WI, HTI holds the belief that the division of labour between men and women is a given, rather than being a social construction. This division is based on natural differences between men and women. Despite their main task being in the home, as mothers, wives, and housewives, women can take up public roles, and conducting public *da'wa* is the most important public responsibility.

It can be argued, therefore, that women's participation in HTI is an attempt to introduce the distinct concept of the Islamic ideal woman to Indonesian audiences. In the view of HTI, women are obligated to play domestic and public roles. These duties are indisputably mandated by God so that they are part of the religious commitments that are compulsory to enact. Domestically, women are required to be wives, mothers, first educators for their children, and housewives, but publicly, they take up roles as preachers who call for other women to understand Islam comprehensively as well as to struggle for the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate.

The notion of the ideal woman that MHTI introduces and offers is relatively different to what majority of Indonesian Muslims have understood and applied, particularly in the teaching they received from their parents. It is also distinct from what gender activists or the secular women's movement advocate. Turner reminds us that religious revivalism's aim to cultivate and

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[618] Hizbut Tahrir Australian, *Media Information Pack*, June 2011, available: http://www.hizb-australia.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/HTAus-media-pack.pdf, accessed 25 August 2018, p. 5

habituate daily acts of piety 'represent a challenge to the secular world, but also the traditional world of taken-for- granted religiosity'. [619]

Why Do Women Participate in Da'wa Activities?

Women's involvement in public *da'wa* is an embodiment of religious obligation. Both men and women are obligated to command virtuousness as well as to forbid badness, as stated in the *Qur'an*.[620] Mutia explains that performing *da'wa* is compulsory, regardless of gender. Melati argues that *da'wa* is a religious command applied to individuals[621]. In this sense, every Muslim is commanded to conduct *da'wa* and commits a sin by ignoring it. A Muslim is not allowed to be pious only for herself but must act to create a pious community.[622] Other informants reveal that the main factor that prompts them to perform *da'wa* is religious impetus. As Ros explains:

> *Da'wa* is a religious obligation. Women have responsibilities to do public *da'wa* and to organise households. *Da'wa* as a religious obligation means that this is essential and fundamental. It cannot be rendered just as an additional or secondary responsibility that is performed when there is available time or we are in the mood. But *da'wa* must become the priority of life and be conducted in managerial ways. Whatever professions HTI women have, they should advocate *da'wa* in their daily lives. [623]

Mawar also points out:

> We are involved in *da'wa* for the sake of God. Getting God's blessing is an ultimate goal of life. Performing religious commands is unlimited happiness. Whoever assists God's religion will be undoubtedly helped by God as well. God will not support our lives, if we never conduct good deeds in Allah's name. Helping God's religion means that we must fulfil our religious duties. As women, our tasks are not only to look after children, but also to struggle to establish an Islamic system throughout the world. Human beings are created to comprehensively (*kaffa*) worship God.[624]

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[619] Bryan Turner, *Op. Cit*., p. 123

[620] Several verses in the *al-Qur'an* call for people to spread goodness and to prevent badness. One of them is 'and there may spring from you a nation who invite to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency. Such are they who are successful', QS: 03: 104, in *Quran Majeed*

[621] In Islam, there are two kinds of obligations: individual (*fardhu 'ain*) and collective (*fardhu kifayah*). The first outlines what each Muslim must do and will be responsible individually for, whilst a collective religious responsibility will arguably be fulfilled when some Muslims have done it.

[622] Interview with Melati (name changed to protect identity) on 11 August 2016

[623] Interview with Ros (name changed to protect identity) on 5 September 2016

[624] Interview with Mawar (name changed to protect identity) on 18 August 2016

Another reason why women take part in *da'wa* is that women want to be agents of social change. Both in Indonesia in particular, and throughout the world in general, female activists or preachers who are able to teach other women about the true Islam are needed. Although there are many male preachers, many women's affairs remain unresolved or unelaborated. There are matters specific to, and only for, women, which their male counterparts do not understand clearly. As Melati states:

> My intention to get involved in *da'wa* is because I aspire to educate other women so as to comprehend the true Islam. I often find many divorce cases in the middle of society. I see that divorces take place partly because women do not understand their domestic roles such as being wives and mothers.[625]

Mawar also explains her desire to be active in establishing the Islamic state:

> I am in HTI, because I aspire to take part in the struggle for the establishment of God's religion. This is my vision, so I joined HTI.[626]

HTI women frame the current Muslim community (*ummah*) as still being far from a comprehensive understanding and practice of Islam. Most Muslims, particularly in Makassar, and in Indonesia generally, only understand and apply some of the Islamic teachings. This is marked by fact that Muslims have not recognised the significance of the establishment of an Islamic state. The absence of desire to form this state is a result of the Islamic community (*ummah*) being under Western attack in terms of ways of thinking, ideology, and culture.

[625] Interview with Melati (name changed to protect identity) on 11 August 2016
[626] Interview with Mawar (name changed to protect identity) on 18 August 2016

The picture above is a silent campaign held by MHTI's State Islamic University (UIN) branch, Makassar. It aimed to socialise the agenda of the Women's Conference in Jogjakarta, shifting public opinion that Muslim youth are currently experiencing an identity crisis. This 'crisis', according to a campaign participant, occurs partly because of the onslaught of liberal ways of thinking and the behaviour of Muslim youth in response to the inclusion of secular Islamic theology throughout the curriculum, and the proliferation of liberal culture through entertainment and media. As a result, Muslim youth are more interested in following a hedonistic and apathetic lifestyle. To reform this un-Islamic condition, Muslim women are expected to take part, as they are agents of essential or real change. [627]

[627] http://makassar.tribunnews.com/2016/05/04/mhti-chapter-uin-alauddin-gelar-silent-campaign-dan-pembagian-flyer, accessed on 3 November 2017

My informant, Mawar, also told me that she became involved in the *da'wa* movement advocated by HTI due to her passion to seek knowledge. She explains:

> I am a curious person. I always inquire about what other people say until I can understand their explanation. I think many people only look at the outward, judging by physical appearances, including assessing whether a woman is pious due to donning the hijab, even though it is not necessarily true. I did not want to do so, so I learned, integrating the reading of books and seeing facts in the social field, such as free sex, drug addiction, and poverty. (…). I keep studying HTI's books which talk about many things ranging from life's objective to faith in God. With critical reading of these books and facts in the field, I eventually contended that the absence of a unity of Muslims is because of the absence of an Islamic state that can unite Muslims wholly throughout the world. (…). Thus, seeking knowledge is compulsory for both women and men. This is the reason why I wanted to join HTI's *da'wa* movement. Through this learning process, I know my creator, what life is like, and know whether my behaviours are religiously appropriate. But seeking knowledge is not enough, we must perform *da'wa*, enjoining goodness and forbidding badness **(***amr' ma'ruf nahi mungkar***).**[628]

Based on my observations, both the male and female members of HTI that I met not only understand religious sciences but are also familiar with secular knowledge and contemporary issues, including national and international political issues such as democracy, capitalism, liberalism, pluralism, feminism, global politics and the economy, and social movements. Likewise, they are vocal critics of the policies of the Indonesian government. I did not find this phenomenon in WI members, as they are more focused on religious purification.

Benefits of Women's Participation

From the informants, I received a range of narratives with respect to the advantages women gain after joining *da'wa* movement. Ros argues that to know these benefits, depends on how to define the meaning of happiness. Contentment, for her, is when she is able to be observant to God's orders:

> When I obey God, I feel there is a sense of happiness that cannot be converted into material assessments. This feeling makes me stronger to struggle to inform life according to Islamic sharia. I can figure out challenges I face. God will not let me falter to uphold the religion of Allah. God is everything to me. Atheists, no matter to what extent they deny the existence of God, in a specific situation will need God, although they have different ways of expressing

[628] Interview with Mawar (name changed to protect identity) on 18 August 2016

> spiritual needs, through idolising figures such as Karl Marx.This attitude is a kind of expression of the need for the supreme being.[629]

For HTI women, obeying God's commands, particularly by being involved in the *da'wa* project, is a way to create infinite happiness, as they live their lives in accordance with sharia prescriptions, and thus, can gain God's blessings and mercy. These divine blessings or mercy become a key prerequisite to achieve both worldly advantages and those in the hereafter. Worldly benefits are marked by the presence of God's help or intervention.

Getting God's blessing also means that HTI women have a constant attachment to God, because they exercise a robust commitment to fulfil God's orders in their daily lives, including by conducting *da'wa*. In other words, the feeling of attachment to God is maintained by knowing the main purpose of the creation of human beings and living life accordingly. This way of life is a form of piety, that is, the purpose of life is only to worship God. This is similar to Mahmood's findings in her work, in that women's participation in the *da'wa* movement has produced pious women marked by a sense of closeness to God. Therefore, according to Mahmood, piety, as understood by her female interlocutors, is the quality of being close to God: 'a manner of being and acting that suffuses all of one's acts, both religious and worldly in character'.[630]

Regarding the worship of God, HTI women acknowledge that this concept has a wide scope. Anggrek clarifies:

> The meaning of worship in the view of HTI is broader, encompassing matters of dress, social interaction, foods, and even neighbourhood. Meanwhile, in WI, the concept of worship tends to be restricted to individual rituals such as prayer and fasting. HTI includes all aspects of life,

[629] Interview with Ros (name changed to protect identity), 18 August 2018. Before joining HTI, Ros was involved in WI and Muhammadiyah, but decided to leave both organisations, as saw there is a gap between what she learned and what happens in practice, particularly about marriage, women and men's relationship or separation

[630] Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and The Feminist Subject*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2005, p. 122.

> comprising the relationship with God, the self, and society. So, HTI accepts different outlooks in Islamic jurisprudence.[631]

Some informants discuss benefits from their participation in *da'wa* in the form of changes in understanding and applying Islam, or self-reform. For example, Mutia explains:

> The most benefit I felt after joining HTI is that there was a shifting paradigm in understanding Islam. Before my involvement in HTI, my knowledge about Islam was only as a religion encompassing a set of rituals and beliefs of God's oneness. But in HTI, I found the differences: that Islam is a religion containing and organising all aspects of life. Muslims should not only believe in God, but more importantly also have to pay attention to the social conditions and situation of the Muslim community (*ummah)*. This new paradigm was strongly embedded in my mind and attitude, so this has become a sort of rooted worldview or ideology. This ideology has a robust spirit and power that can enable me to be more enthusiastic to carry out *da'wa*. The shifting of the paradigm and application of Islam is a meaningful experience we gain and this can never be substituted by anything else. This is a power and belief in God. Belief is internalised through sustainable training and education.[632]

Similarly, Anggrek admits:

> The benefit I got from joining HTI is that I feel there is self-reform. This is indicated by the change in my situation, from unknowing something to knowing it. I can also implement Islamic teachings with good understanding. Being religiously thoughtful is important to me, as my neighbourhood is not supported.[633]

Self-reform also includes time management. Because HTI women need to synergise domestic and public roles, they have to know how to share their time cross both arenas, as Mawar explains:

> In the beginning, I did not aspire to join HTI's *da'wa* movement because I am a villager and a housewife. I just wanted to learn very basic Islamic teachings. I asked myself: why must I join HTI, while I must look after my children, why do I have to struggle to learn many aspects of Islam? My sister-in-law, who is a member of HTI, assured me that this is just about time management. (…). Life is a process. In the early times after I first joined HTI, I found it difficult to allocate time for family, learning, and *da'wa*. But through this long process, these difficulties can be sorted out.[634]

Another advantage of women's participation in HTI's *da'wa* movement is the formation of a religious-based sisterhood, or solidarity. Anggrek admits that one factor that made her interested in joining the *da'wa* program advocated by HTI is the sense of sisterhood. She tells me:

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[631] Interview with Anggrek (name changed to protect identity) on 16 August 2016
[632] Interview with Mutia on 29 July 2016
[633] Interview with Anggrek (name changed to protect identity) on 16 August 2016
[634] Interview with Mawar (name changed to protect identity) on 18 August 2016

> I feel the sense of sisterhood in HTI is more pronounced than in WI. The sense of sisterhood in WI is only felt when we are in Islamic teaching (*pengajian*), whereas in HTI the feeling can be found in the *pengajian* and social life. For example, if we behave improperly, we are immediately reprimanded by other friends. So, in WI, the relationship to God (*hablun minallah*) is strong, but in HTI, the relationship to human beings (*hablun minannas*) is solid.[635]

This strong sense of sisterhood can also function as way to manage feelings of frustration or alienation, particularly for HTI women from districts, villages, or other provinces, who come to Makassar city to continue their studies at universities.

The sense of sisterhood has also been found by Rijal in his work. He records one of his informants, who says:

> I am from Ternate, Maluku (a province in Indonesia) and feel secure with my membership of HTI. I am the only daughter in my family. My family trusts me to pursue my studies here (in Makassar). I have no family here. Because of the strong "Islamic brotherhood ties" (*ikatan ukhuwah*) in HTI, my family believes that I can take care of myself and maintain my right behaviour. Besides, the social interaction (*pergaulan*) in HTI is also good. [636]

Furthermore, Rijal found that a sense of sisterhood and brotherhood exists among youth recruits of HTI. The friendship is indicated by the use of term 'brother' (*akhi*) for male members and 'sister' (*ukhti*) for female.[637] The strength of this sense of belonging among HTI members may be a result of the existence of similar methodologies and a focus on the ideology of *da'wa* advocated by Hizbut Tahrir throughout the world. In this regard, Dirwan explains that Hizbut Tahrir uses the same methodology and ideology of *da'wa* globally. HT, including in Indonesia, has adopted the Prophet Muhammad's method for *da'wa.* In addition, based on my observations, the feeling of sisterhood and brotherhood is stronger than a mere kinship relationship.

Women's Restrictions

Although HTI women have the same right as their male counterparts to struggle for the

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[635] Interview with Anggrek (name changed to protect identity) on 16 August 2016
[636] Syamsul Rijal, 'Indoctrinating Muslim Youths: Seeking Certainty Through An-Nabhanism', in *Al-Jamiah*, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2011, p. 267
[637] Syamsul Rijal, *Ibid*., p. 268

maintenance of Islamic life and the establishment of an Islamic state, women have to meet a set of requirements before their involvement. Firstly, like the Women's Division of WI (MWI), the Women's Division of HTI (MHTI) is obligated to fulfil domestic tasks before going out in public to perform *da'wa*. However, in practice, these household duties may be shared with men. My male informant argues that Islam commands husbands to provide household help for wives who are unable to meet their domestic tasks such as cooking. If men are not able to hire a helper (*pembantu*), in sharia's view, they are obligated to help their wives in the home.[638] Dirwan confesses that he often arranges his own domestic affairs without asking his wife to help him, as he wants to give his wife the chance to take part in public *da'wa*. Furthermore, Dirwan acknowledges that although the main responsibilities of women are in the home, men need to understand that women also have public duties and religious obligations, so husbands should not overburden their wives with domestic tasks. [639] Mutia explains this sharing of household tasks:

> What we practise at home should comply with sharia guidance, in that women are in charge of household duties. Our commitment to establish a quality family according to Islam is partly marked by the clear division of domestic labour. But this division still has space to be negotiated. A wife, for example, occasionally sacrifices her right, and a husband does so too. This happens without force from either the husband or wife. The Prophet Muhammad himself sewed his own clothes, although this was an obligation for his wife. The Prophet was sincere to do it and we seek to emulate what the Prophet did. I sometimes let my husband go out for d*a'wa* when I needed him at home, and I was sincere to let him go. Likewise, when my public responsibilities really need me to get there, my husband sincerely encourages me to do it, as long as our public engagements are not against the rules of the game stipulated by sharia.[640]

Women's domestic and public responsibilities, according to Mutia, cannot be deemed as a form of injustice for women, as argued by some gender and feminist activism. This is partly because these tasks may be negotiable[641], depending on the situation and condition of each family.

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[638] Interview with Iwan (name changed to protect identity, and he is an activist of HTI's *da'wa*) on 29 July 2016
[639] Interview with Dirwan (Spokesmen of HTI Makassar) on 25 July 2016
[640] Interview with Mutia on 29 July 2016
[641] Interview with Mutia on 29 July 2016

The second requirement for women is that women who want to take up a public role should ask permission from her husband's just as WI women do. Mawar justifies that women must have permission from their husbands if they want to conduct *da'wa* or other public activities. She explains that when asking for approval to leave the home, she usually persuades her husband by arguing that the search for religious knowledge is mandatory. If a husband has limited understanding of religion, he ought to allow his wife to go outside to seek information about Islam.[642] Another informant argues:

> Wives are not allowed to join an Islamic study group (*halaqah*), if they do not get permission from their husbands. This is based on a *hadith* telling that the Prophet Muhammad asked a woman who wanted to visit her sick parent to wait first for her husband's return so that she could ask him. But men who share the same ideology as their wives will not arbitrarily use the *hadith*. (…). So, the basic law is that wives are prohibited to leave home without their husbands' approval. The prohibition by the Prophet in the *hadith* example is actually that there is no other way for the wife to ask him except when he has returned home. But in the modern era, there is the mobile phone that can become a tool of communication and confirmation. How to ask permission, therefore, depends on current developments.[643]

From the above excerpt, some interesting points might be noted. Firstly, the *hadith* is not understood literally or rigidly applied. This is because wives do not necessarily need to ask their husband's permission directly in person when he is at home. Rather, it is possible to do so using a phone. Secondly, it seems that asking men's permission occurs just as a form of confirmation, that is, women letting their husbands know that they will go out. Thirdly, getting men's approval is easy, when husbands and wives are members of the organisation, as they have the same ideology. As members of HTI, they share the view that *da'wa* is compulsory for both female and male Muslims, and women's involvement in *da'wa* is needed to achieve the goals of HTI. Indeed, women's involvement is able to accelerate the achievement of this goal.[644] However, although HTI couples have the same ideology, some cases of family divorce show a lack of mutual

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[642] Interview with Mawar (name changed to protect identity) on 18 August 2016. Although HTI women do not hold a feminist ideology, to some extent they reveal a feminist awareness such as negotiating with their husbands to take up public roles

[643] Interview with Andi (name changed to protect identity) on 29 July 2016

[644] Interview with Dirwan on 25 July 2016

understanding. Dirwan admits that there have been cases of separation, and that some husbands have banned their wives from taking part in public activities such as *da'wa*. He notes, 'we try to achieve the ideal, but as human beings, we have weaknesses'.[645]

The third thing women should take into account is that women must comply with *aurat,* meaning parts of body must be covered. Unlike the Women's Division of WI (MWI), MHTI does not regard women's faces and hands as part of *aurat* to be hidden under the hijab (*cadar*).[646] MHTI views that within general society consisting of men and women, there are many forms of cooperation and social interaction which should involve both genders, such as trading and interaction between doctors and patients. These forms of interaction will be difficult, if women's faces must be covered. For example, a buyer pays with counterfeit money, and the seller knows that the money is fake after the buyer has left the shop. The seller would find it difficult to recognise the buyer if her face was hidden by the hijab. In this case, business can be compromised by the obligation of veiling.[647] Fourthly, women carrying out public roles, particularly performing *da'wa* long distances from their homes, must be accompanied by male chaperones (*muhrim).*

Separation between men and women has become a concern for HTI. Women's and men's lives should be segregated, according to sharia. A Nabahani argues that the *Qur'an* and *hadith* explicitly explain that segregation should be implemented in both the domestic and public spheres.[648] In this sense, there are different and specific affairs for both males and females, even if some are also shared. Sharia does not obligate women to pray collectively including Friday prayers, or to perform *jihad*, which men must do. It necessitates men to be family breadwinners,

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[645] Interview with Dirwan on 25 July 2016

[646] For further elucidation, see Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, *Sistem Pergaulan dalam Islam*, *Op. Cit*., pp. 85-117

[647] Interview with Mutia on 29 July 2016

[648] Interestingly, Andi defines private space as including a woman and a man meeting in places that are inaccessible by others, even though the meeting takes place in the public area such as in café or restaurant. Interview with Andi (name changed to protect identity) 0n 29 July 2016

whilst women do not have to contribute financially to the home. Likewise, the Prophet Muhammad practised the line division in the mosque, where the women's line was behind the men's line. This arrangement is strong evidence for a Nabahani to argue that there is certainly separation between women and men in daily life.[649] However, there are exceptions in social interactions between women and men in terms of private and public realms. Sharia allows women to conduct business transactions such as between buyers and sellers. Sharia also obligates[650] women to do *hajj* (pilgrimage), as this an Islamic principle that is compulsory for all Muslims. Men and women can mix in the event of the *hajj* at Mecca.[651]

Segregation of men's and women's business has consequences in praxis. For example, at the level of organisational administration, the Women's Division of HTI (MHTI) in Makassar has its own organisational structure which is not accountable to the central male administration. Rather, MHTI has a direct coordination relationship to the Women's Center Administration in Jakarta. Dirwan states this is because both male and female structures have different programs and responsibilities which must be carried out, and therefore, they do not mutually intervene.[652] Similarly, Andi explains that in HTI, women have the authority to set their own activities. This is because women's freedom to arrange their own programs will make them more effective. They are unimpeded in managing and resolving women-specific issues. This relative freedom means that there is no intervention from male counterparts, except when women need help from men to conduct physical activities such as installing banners on the streets. Furthermore, Andi conveys

[649] For further elucidation, see Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, 2014, *Op. Cit*., pp. 51-55
[650] In Islamic jurisprudence, there are different forms of command: *wajib* is an obligated act to perform, and Muslims who ignore it will be punished; *Sunnah* is a recommended act to perform, and Muslims who do it will be rewarded, but if they neglect it, they won't be punished; *makruh* is an action carrying disapproval, so that a Muslim who does not perform acts considered makruh it will be rewarded, but if they do perform such actions, they are not considered a sin, and do not attract punishment; lastly, *mubah* is an act that is neither recommended nor prohibited, and there is no reward or punishment for those who do it.
[651] Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, 2014, *Ibid*., pp. 51-55
[652] Interview with Dirwan on 25 July 2016

that segregation is intended to minimise interaction between women and men.[653] Another corollary of segregation is the division of women's and men's seating at an event. When I attended a public Islamic discussion in which HTI women and men participated, I observed that women's chairs were separated from men's, so that women did not sit with their husbands. However, the position of the chairs was parallel, different to their position at prayers, where women sit behind men, and there was no curtain between them to screen women from men. Women were free to directly ask questions and their faces appeared on the televised screen, so that all female and male participants were able to see them.

In this regard, the practice of segregation is different to that practised by the Women's Division of WI (MWI). As shown in the Chapter Five, MWI uses partitions or screens as room dividers, or women are located in a different locale from men at events. Likewise, MWI does not allow women to appear on a screen that can be seen by men. This difference exists because of different views between MWI and MHTI with respect to the limitation of women's *aurat*. Unlike WMI, which obligates women to cover all parts of body, MHTI views that women's *aurat* includes all parts of the body except faces and hands, so the hijab is not compulsory. As a result, women's faces can be seen by men.

Lastly, women face restrictions at the level of leadership. Both MHTI and MWI argue that although women are entitled to take part in public activities, particularly in public *da'wa*, they are unable to be elected to leadership roles such as president, vice president, or governor. They base these views on the *Qur'an* and *hadith*.[654]

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[653] Interview with Andi (name changed to protect identity) on 29 July 2016

[654] One *hadith* that HTI refers to is "a community will never prosper if they leave their affairs to a woman'. For further discussion of this matter, see Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, *Sistem Pergaulan dalam Islam*, *Op. Cit.*, pp.137-153

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter I have examined the motives, benefits, and restrictions of women's involvement in *da'wa* by HTI, and the similarities and differences between WI/MWI and HTI/MHTI. Although both organisations recognise the obligation for members to engage in individual and public *da'wa,* MHTI is more focused on bringing about change to the political system to create an Islamic state, rather than calling upon other people to purify their spirits through religious rituals, as MWI does. This is because Hizbut Tahrir understands Islam as an ideology that should be implemented as a basis for the governmental system. In addition, MHTI justifies the use of mass demonstrations as a medium to criticise social-politico conditions such as the policies of the Indonesian government it perceives to be un-Islamic, or contradictory to sharia regulations, whereas MWI does not accept this.

Women are encouraged to take an active part in achieving HTI's political and religious goals. Their participation is motivated by a range of factors, and they gain diverse advantages. These benefits have brought significant changes in women's condition, including in the spiritual, psychological, and social aspects of women's lives. However, both organisations recognise restrictions applying to women, which women fulfilling their obligations to Islamist thought through their involvement in *da'wa* must be aware of. They share the view that women should be segregated from men, comply with *aurat*, have permission from their spouses, be accompanied by *muhrim*, and not aspire to be leaders. However, both organisations have different notions with respect to the extent of women's *aurat* and the use of screens to maintain this segregation.

Regarding these constraints on women, it may be argued that women in both organisations experience gender discrimination or injustice. On the other hand, by considering Islamist women's public roles, it may be said that women are empowered politically and spiritually, even if they have different spheres of operation from men in achieving religious obligations and the political

goals of the organisations of which they are members. Segregation can be understood as delineating a distinct sphere of 'women's business', rather than to exclude, or discriminate against, women. The next chapter, therefore, addresses the key question of whether, and how, women's involvement in the Islamist movement contributes to women's empowerment.

CHAPTER SEVEN
WOMEN' EMPOWERMENT IN ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS: IS IT POSSIBLE?

Introduction

Previous chapters reveal that, in general, women's involvement in WI and HTI centres primarily on the engagement in *da'wa* which constitutes structured, planned, and sustainable activity. The research findings revealed that *da'wa* has two forms: personal and public. In the light of a piety politics framework, personal *da'wa* refers to self-improvement which orientates the pious-self, while public *da'wa* is to invite others to be pious-individuals which aims to transform current social order into Islamic social structure marked by the implementation of sharia in daily lives or the establishment of an Islamic state.

This chapter, thus, examines the key question of whether women's participation in *da'wa* activities, such as that of HTI and WI, can empower women. This issue is complicated by apparently contradictory facts. On the one hand, women's involvement in HTI and WI can bring positive changes to women's lives, by raising women's intellectual capacity or knowledge through education, as well as their political awareness, economic activities, and engagement in the social-religious fields. There are also some factors, on the other hand, that are more likely to disempower women. For example, both organisations acknowledge that they are not women's movements per se, advocating agendas that seek to liberate women from gender inequalities and patriarchal domination. They disagree with and criticise gender theory and feminism, arguing that both are incompatible with Islamic principles, and that they operate intentionally as a construction of Western (non-Muslim) ideology, or even a conspiracy aiming to humiliate Islamic civilisation. In their view, such ideas can destroy the Islamic family, as women are encouraged to enter the public sphere to seek paid work, which may result in women's main responsibilities at home being

disrupted. This results in women's household tasks becoming less manageable. Another reason for the rejection of gender and feminism movements is the suggestion that women should demand equal treatment, like their male counterparts. This is neither realistic nor logical, according to these groups, as it contradicts the fact that women and men are biologically and psychologically different. These inherent differences also lead to different treatment. In this regard, Ummu Khalid, leader of the Women's Division of WI (MWI), confirms that women's involvement in the project of *da'wa* is not because women experience discrimination or oppression from patriarchal structure. Like men, the key problem women face is that they only embrace Islam formally or are registered administratively as a Muslim without a deep and comprehensive understanding and implementation of Islam. Khalid argues that negative impacts of a limited Islamic understanding result in many women not knowing their domestic and public responsibilities, and they apply less Islamic knowledge in educating their children and in social interaction.[655] Khalid's view is not in accordance with insights advocated by other religion-based women's movements. For example, the young women's division in Nahdathul Ulama (NU), which is known as Fatayat NU, argue that women experience oppression and violence partly because of 'gender-biased interpretation of Islamic sources'.[656] Furthermore, Fatayat NU argues that one of ways to resolve this gender-biased understanding is to re-interpret the Islamic sources through a gender-sensitive lens.[657]

Further, HTI and WI are typically male-dominated organisations. Both were established by men, and they share the belief that women are not allowed to act in leadership roles in a religious organisation. Their position is that if women become leaders, they will face many difficulties due to instabilities in women's emotions or feelings, especially when women are menstruating, or their concentration may be lacking when they are pregnant or having babies. But, I think this position

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[655] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016

[656] Monika Arnez,'Empowering Women Through Islam: Fatayat NU Between Tradition and Change', in *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 21:1, 2010, p. 74

[657] *Ibid*., p. 79

is problematic, as it based on supposition and not based on scientific argument or fact. In addition, books and literature used to reference and frame the organization's knowledge and the movement are mostly authored by men. In the case of HTI for example, every member must read books written by Taqiyuddin An Nabhani (founder of central Hizbut Tahrir), and other male Islamic scholars in Hizbut Tahrir. Likewise, the transmission of Islamic knowledge was initially delivered by male members to other male and female members. These facts suggest that Islamic thought and ideology disseminated among members of HTI and WI and their Women's Divisions, are more likely to be influenced by male subjectivity in interpreting Islamic tenets.[658] Male domination within WI is demonstrated by the fact that the organisation has a sharia department whose members consist entirely of men. The section's main function is to determine whether something can be done or not, according to sharia considerations. When I asked my male informants about the reason why it is only men who can be members of the sharia department, they were reluctant to answer. One possible reason is that Islamic teaching, as understood by WI, does not support the fraternisation of men and women. However, in the future should WI women achieve full autonomy organisationally, it is entirely possible that women will have their own sharia department. Female participants recognise the existence of the department and know about its functions. This leads to the question of whether women's empowerment is possible within organisations that place men in a dominant position and restrict women through regulation, or is it possible to talk about women's empowerment outside a gender specific or feminist framework?.

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[658] Islamist women tend to accept voluntarily Islamic interpretations produced and spread by men. This is different to women in NU, who actively propose the use of gender equality perspectives in understanding and interpreting Islamic resources. NU women see the existing interpretations of Islam produced by men as a conservative understanding, if not a misinterpretation of Islamic tenets. This conservatism reproduces gender discrimination in Islamic discourse and practice. That is why, according to NU Women, women need to deconstruct male-biased interpretations and then reconstruct new ways of reading Islamic texts involving women's perspectives. Furthermore, Islam can empower women only when non-patriarchal methods and androcentric paradigms used in interpreting Islamic texts are deconstructed. See Nisa, 'Embodied Faith: Agency and Obedience among Face-veiled University Students in Indonesia', T*he Asia Pacific of Journal of Anthropology*, 27 July 2012, p. 375. Also see Sara Ababneh, 'The Palestinian Women's Movement versus Hamas: Attempting to Understand Women's Empowerment outside a Feminist Framework', *Journal of International Women's Studies*, Volume 15(1), 2014, p. 40, and Van Doorn-Harder, *Women Shaping Islam*.

Answering these questions partly depends on how the concept of women's empowerment is defined, and how to measure it.

Thinking about Women's Empowerment

The term empowerment is complex, it has multiple meanings and interpretations. Haleh Afshar, in her edited book on the topic, recounts varied meanings of and emphases the idea of empowerment offered by her contributors. Thus, the definition of women's empowerment is contextual and historical, dependent on time and place.[659] For instance, Stephanie Barrientos draws on the disadvantages and advantages of women workers as seasonal labourers in Chilean agribusiness. These Chilean women made a significant contribution to the field and got involved in the labour movement. However, they also experienced the double burden of work and family and earned less money for their work in work environments that offered few conditions. Another contributor to Afshar's edited volume, Purna Sen, found that many married women in India experienced violent treatment by their husbands, but the women still held to their family relationships and tried to seek a resolution to family tensions. They were reluctant to use divorce as a way out. Furthermore, the cases of Iran and Syria, show that women in these countries have been oppressed by the intertwined factors of state, culture, and religion, but these women regarded themselves as empowered, as they have had both public and private opportunities in the establishment of these countries' reform.[660] These contradictions suggest that attempts to define and to assess women's empowerment should be careful to take specific and varied contexts into account. These efforts to consider specific and local contexts are also inspired by the spirit of the third-wave feminism,

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[659] Haleh Afshar, Introduction: 'Women and Empowerment – Some Illustrative Studies', in *Women and Empowerment: Illustrations from the Third World*, (ed.) by Haleh Afshar, Macmillan Press, Great Britain, 1998, p. 2

[660] Frances Cleaver, book review of Women and Empowerment: Illustrations from the Third World, in *Journal of International Development*, July 2000,12, p. 1

which has argued that there is no universal or essential way to read or understand women' lives throughout the world.[661]

Rowlands argues that the meanings of women's empowerment are more closely related to how power is defined. She identifies different ways of defining power in the social sciences. In the 1960-1970s, power was designed as 'power over', which means that individual or collective group of people can direct or dictate other's behaviours and choices through a variety of forms. Power, in this form, may be delegated by someone to another. It also prescribes a set of results and typically limits resources so that 'if some people have more, others have less'.[662] Women's empowerment, thus, can be measured by an examination of to what extent women participate in development, economics, and politics. In such readings, women should be given equal opportunities to hold power in these areas and to be involved in decision-making. The empowerment of women aims to overthrow unequal social systems and patriarchal society, as well as women taking control of their own lives. This meaning of empowerment has been advocated in Women in Development (WID).

In the late 1970s and 1980s, the definition of power was extended to not only mean "power over", but also known to encompass notions of 'power to', 'power with', and 'power within'. Quoting Hartsock (1985:223), Rowlands contends that Hartsock recognises '*power over*' as an obedience designation, whereas the other three classifications of power operate as 'energy' forms of power. According to Rowlands, these forms of power exclude the control associated with '*power over*'. This power is 'generative, for example the power some people have of stimulating

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661 For further reading, for example, see Chandra Talpade Mohanty, 'Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses', in Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, & Lourdes Torres, eds., *Third World Women and The Politics of Feminism,* Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1991, pp. 51-80

662 Jo Rowlands, 'A Word of the Times, but What Does It Mean?: Empowerment in the Discourse and Practice of Development,' in *Women and Empowerment: Illustrations from the Third World*, (ed.) by Haleh Afshar, Macmillan Press, Great Britain, 1998, p. 15

activity in others and raising their morale'.[663] The nature of 'power to', therefore, is that intervention or advocacy only functions to facilitate an individual or community to exercise their own power to achieve their aims. The intervention does not necessarily cause a conflict of interest between the facilitator and the individual or group. Meanwhile, Rowlands argues, following the definition provided by Williams et al. (1995: 234), '*power with*' refers to 'a sense of the whole being greater than the sum of the individuals, especially when a group tackles problem together'.[664] In other words, the possibility to achieve a planned goal or intended social change is more powerful, if it is initiated by a collective group rather than only by an individual. Still citing Williams, Rowlands defines '*power within*' as 'the spiritual strength and uniqueness that resides in each one of us and makes us truly human. Its basis is self-acceptance and self-respect which extend, in turn, to respect for and acceptance of others as equals'.[665] This form of power enables an individual to determine a truly perceived choice even if they deal with challenges and menaces. Different to '*power over*', '*power to*', '*power with*', and '*power within*', are both unlimited and a type of process. In this sense, power owned by someone does not always diminish others' power: 'The more people are exercised the more power can grow'.[666]

Kabeer defines empowerment as a process of change from a disempowered condition, comprising ignorance by an individual of available choices, to an empowered situation marked by the acquisition of ability to make choices. According to Kabeer, '[i]nasmuch as empowerment is a change, it refers to the expansion in people's ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to them'. [667] Following this definition, it may be argued

[663] Jo Rowlands, *Ibid*., p. 13
[664] Jo Rowlands, *Ibid.,* p. 14
[665] Jo Rowlands, *Ibid*, p. 14
[666] Jo Rowlands, *Ibid.*, p, 15
[667] Naila Kabeer, Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women's Empowerment, in Development and Change, Vol. 30, 1999, p. 437

that women's empowerment may be assessed by considering to what extent women are able to exercise their capability to determine what choices they can make in their lives.

Furthermore, Kabeer argues that this ability is related to three other factors: resources, agent, and achievement. Resources refers to material, human, and social resources, from a variety of social relationships taking place in social institutions such as the family, the market, and wider society. Agency refers to 'the ability to define one's goals and act upon them',[668] and includes both practical and abstract activities including the significance, impetus, and reasons behind women's activism. Agency not only takes the form of decision-making, but also comprises 'bargaining and negotiation, deception and manipulation, subversion and resistance as well as more intangible, cognitive processes of reflection and analysis. It can be exercised by individuals as well as by collectivises.'[669] Lastly, exercising agency in the utilisation of available resources will then create capabilities. Quoting Sen (1985), Kabeer defines these capabilities as:

> The potential that people have for living the lives they want, of achieving valued ways of `being and doing'. He uses the idea of `functionings' to refer to all possible ways of `being and doing' which are valued by people in a given context and of `functioning achievements' to refer to the particular ways of being and doing which are realised by different individuals'.[670]

According to Batliwala, the concept of women's empowerment is based on recognising corrupt social structures marked by women's subordination and inequality, which are effects of the domination of patriarchal ideology. The term empowerment is structured by the word 'power', generally referring to control over 'material assets, intellectual resources, and ideology'.[671] In this context, power means an ability owned by person or group of people in controlling the supply of

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[668] Naila Kabeer, *Ibid.*, p. 438
[669] Naila Kabeer, *Ibid.*, p. 438
[670] Naila Kabeer, *Ibid.*, p. 438
[671] 'Material assets include physical, human, or financial, such as land, water, forest, people's bodies, labour, money, and access to money. Intellectual resources include knowledge, information, and ideas. Control over ideology signifies the ability to generate, propagate, sustain, and institutionalize specific sets of beliefs, values, attitudes, and behavior'. See Srilatha Batliwala, 'The Meaning of Women's Empowerment: New Concepts from Action', in *Population Policies Reconsidered: Health, Empowerment, and Rights*, (ed.) Gita Sen, Adrienne Germain, & Lincoln C. Chen, Harvard University Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 1994, pp. 128-129

resources that can create personal and public social relationships. The magnitude of control is determined by the amount of resource ownership as well as by the aptitude in the production of ideology. Such control, according to Batliwala, will in turn generate the power of decision-making. Inasmuch as the social system has been shaped by means of patriarchal arrangements, control over the distribution of material assets, intellectual resources, and ideology have been dominantly exercised by men. However, this does not necessarily mean that women have been completely incapable, or indeed, incapacitated, just as it does not mean that all men are powerful, nor that men are all-powerful.[672]

Women's empowerment can, therefore, be defined as both a process and the result of challenging a patriarchal structure, and of gaining control over sources of power. Not only can this liberate women, empowerment can also refer to the liberation of men from material and psychological burdens. In this sense, men can be liberated from 'the roles of oppressor and exploiter, and from gender stereotyping, which limits the potential for self-expression and personal development in men as much as in women'.[673] A society which is changed by a women's empowerment process will be marked by the absence of, or at least reduction in, men's control over women's bodies, sexuality, and activities. Household tasks and children's education would no longer be the responsibility of women, but there would no longer be domestic violence. However, similar to Rowlands' elucidation regarding the extent of power's scope, Batliwala also recognised that women's empowerment is not merely about the overthrow of dominant power, but that women use different methods to achieve their goals. Moreover, Batliwala explains:

> Women's empowerment process must evolve a new understanding of power, and experiment with ways of democratizing and sharing power – building new mechanism for collective responsibility, decision-making, and accountability. Similarly, once women have gained control over resources, they should not use them in the same short-sighted and ecologically destructive manner as male-dominated capitalist societies. Women's empowerment will have to lead women – and the "new men" – to address global concerns and issues, including the environment: war, violence, and

[672] Srilatha Batliwala, *Ibid*., p. 131
[673] Srilatha Batliwala, *Ibid.*, p. 131

> militarism: ethic, linguistic, religious or racial fanaticism; and population.'[674]

Meantime, my informants also have their own perceptions about the meanings of women's empowerment. Three informants from Women's Division of WIa (MWI) and one from Women's Division of HTI (MHTI), describe their understanding of this concept:

> Women's empowerment refers to the maximum use of women's potential. We want to channel every recruit's capacities. From the skill side, for example, Muslim women are able to be speakers in seminars or workshops. The more they actualise their expertise, the more their skills will be sharpened. Despite having wider knowledge, if we never give them the opportunity to empower themselves, they are unable to do so. (…). So, there is a process of regeneration.[675] Ummu Saniwati (MWI)

> When we articulate ourselves, it does not mean that we intend to put men behind. Exploration of women's selves must take place. Women do not only know about domestic affairs. Many aspects of their selves need to be explored so they become independent. Women's empowerment does not mean pointing out against our husbands. (…). Women should be empowered in order to be smart. When they are intelligent, they are capable of generating clever children as well. Likewise, what we can share with other people depends on what we have. We can never give or contribute to society if we have nothing.[676] Rini (MWI)

> Women's empowerment is about how women can work and be productive. (…). Evidently women's talents and passions can be trained so they are more beneficial for religion, their selves, and for Muslims in general.[677] Samhariyani (MWI)

> Empowerment tends currently to be recognised as gender terminology referring to women's economic empowerment. When people hear the word, therefore, they directly associate it with women's empowerment in the economic sector. But we do not understand like that. It has certainly been an obligation that men and women must contribute equally to da'wa so that the education pattern carried by HTI is to make us capable of taking part in society. We enhance domestic and social roles, in which previously a housewife did not know her task, but after undertaking HTI's training, she knows more about her domestic responsibilities. Furthermore, because we definitely also have social roles, she also understands more about her social tasks. As a result, women's empowerment points to exercising the roles that God has regulated in terms of domestic and public responsibilities.[678] Mutia (MHTI)

Based on these narratives, I underline that for MWI, a woman can be deemed empowered, if she is able to actualise her self-potential into a set of capacities which can be used to support the success of *da'wa*. These capacities should bring about benefits for herself, her family, and wider society. In this context, the practice of "power to", "power with", and "power within" might be

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[674] Srilatha Batliwala, *Ibid*., pp. 134-135
[675] Interview with Ummu Saniwati on 9 August 2016
[676] Interview with Rini on 17 June 2016
[677] Interview with Samhariyani on 19 June 2017
[678] Interview with Mutia on 29 June 2016

found. “Power to” refers to mentors’ (senior recruits) efforts to empower their junior recruits through training and education. What makes those mentors enthusiastic in helping their junior recruits is encouraging them to realise their self-potential and to be able to use their skills and capacities. Senior members do not intend to exert control over junior recruits, but how to create regeneration or how to develop together as members of the organisation. “Power with” can be seen from the involvement of many individuals in the creation of empowered women, who are able in turn to achieve the goal of these organisations. “Power within” emerges from the spiritual strength owned by Islamist women. This power is based on the belief that women’s involvement in Islamic movement is a manifestation of devotion to God and on the desire to share with others about various advantages they gained from their involvement in these organisations. In addition, for MHTI, the measurement of women’s empowerment is in the virtue of women’s capability to exercise roles which have been determined by sharia. This understanding cannot be isolated from religious notions.

These meanings of empowerment revealed by Islamist women, however, do not address issues of women’s subjugation, oppression, and discrimination that are partly produced by the domination of the patriarchal system. For this reason, Islamist women do not seek to act against an unequal social structure. To some extent, they even support male domination within their daily lives such as, positioning men as leaders in all aspects of life, because this is enshrined in the Qur’an, and operates as a tenet of religious observance.

Forms of Women’s Empowerment in MHTI and MWI

Education in the Islamist movement refers to both semi-formal and formal education which is said to underpin women’s empowerment. The former includes *halaqah* (religious study clubs which are institutionally compulsory and hold regularly) for MHTI, and *tarbiyah* for MWI, whilst the formal education refers to conventional education. Both *halaqah* and *tarbiyah* are somewhat

similar to formal education, in that they consist of particular curriculum, of stages of attainment, as well as examinations at every level. As discussed in previous chapters, in MHTI's case, a potential member who wants to join needs one to two years' learning of HTI's basic texts and will be tested with respect to her knowledge and loyalty to the organisation. This recruitment process also happens in MWI even more complex and discipline. After joining, a cadre still should attend weekly *halaqah* and *tarbiyah* functioning to update her secular and religious acquaintance and to re-charge her spirit and loyalty.

In addition, both organisations encourage their members to pursue higher education. This can be seen from the fact that most members of the groups are educated women, who have at least a senior high school qualification. Some members, who have only finished senior high school, feel empowered after undertaking semi-formal Islamist education, such as the leader of MWI, Ummu Khalid. My informants, particularly from MWI, said that they stay in Women's Division of WI (MWI), as they are encouraged to pursue postgraduate study including Master and Doctorate level degrees. WI has its own educational institutions, starting from kindergarten through to college level. Likewise, although HTI does not have educational institutions as WI's, it does not forbid its recruits to pursue higher education, and the initial spread of HTI was at campuses. This is evidence to suggest that both organisations pay attention to the advancement of their members' intellectual resources. This has brought significant changes to Islamist women's lives, either as individuals or as part of the group.

At the level of deciding to join an Islamist movement, and particularly in choosing to be active in the *da'wa* project, WI and HTI women's decision to become involved is mainly rooted in the knowledge and awareness they receive through Islamist education. The skills including the capability of reasoning or critical thinking women have attained through their participation they are given to understand that they have a public duty to create an Islamic social order by means of sharing with other 'un-Islamic' women. Women's choice to become involved is, therefore, not an

instant or spontaneous decision, and women do not feel forced to participate, even if the process of women's involvement is varied, and not all women have the same experience.

The decision to join Islamist organisations also leads to challenges which women need to face. Women who join in WI and HTI, bring different insights and practical concerns (*amaliyat*) about Islam received from their parents and from the Muslim mainstream. What they know of and apply to Islam is not solely inherited from their parents. But rather, the ways they understand and apply Islam are based on their own spiritual journey. They even criticise the religiosity of their parents and general society, and struggle to reform it through the *da'wa* movement. They perceive the current implementation of Islam as contaminated by both local and other cultures so that it needs purification and reformation. Further, the Islam which ordinary people understand is particular and secular, rather than encompassing all aspects of life, so it separates Islam from worldly life. Moreover, women's ways of comprehending and practising Islam enable them to understand religious reasons (*dalil*) behind every single deed they perform. This, in turn, makes them feel confident and pious, in that what they do truly complies with what the Qur'an and the hadith direct.

Owing to these differences in the practice of religion, Islamist women also have to negotiate several forms of challenge, including stereotyping or mocking. For example, Ummu Khalid describes how the first generation of WI women strived to maintaining the use of *cadar*[679] (face-veil) in the 1980s, when donning it was still an alien performance of Islamic adherence in society at that time. They were often ridiculed or subject to negative images such as being called "ninja troops". As is well known, ninja dress covers all the body except for the eyes. Similarly, those women have been negatively represented as "*kura-kura ninja* (ninja turtles)", drawn from

[679] *Cadar* is a term which is commonly used by Indonesian people, including Islamist women themselves, to point out a face-veiled woman.

the movie for children of the same name. The most derogatory term is "*parakang*". *Parakang* in Bugis-Makassar culture is the belief that humans, particularly women, are able to be transformed into a very dreaded demon,[680] however, this local belief is gradually disappearing.

Some of the interlocutors I worked with, experience challenges from their close families, which these women also need to navigate:

> My relationship with my mum is conflictual, as we are different. In the early times after joining WI, if I visited my mum wearing *cadar,* when lunch time came, we ate together. My mum asked me to open up the *cadar* and told me that I would be hot if donning it. Next time I visited my mum wearing black *cadar,* and spontaneously my mum mocked me as looking like a crow. I did not confront my mum's treatment. I just let time run hoping that eventually my mum could understand.[681] Ummu Hana (MWI)

> I am married and have three children. My mum is still asking me when I want to work. My parents are still complaining about my involvement in the organisation, though their rejection has been slightly changed through negotiation. I tried to make them understand. They want to act as my protector.[682] Faridah; (MWI)

> In my big family, I am the only one who joined the Islamist movement and the only one wearing *cadar* in my village. My parent's opposition to me is very hard. This condition made me delay my study at University for a while. (…). My parents were against me at first, but eventually could welcome me. They were forced to accept me, as there was no choice available except accepting me. It was because I was also very strong at defending what I believe is right. Although my parents are not able to follow my ways of thinking, at least they are no longer against me, especially now that I can prove to my parents that I am able to be financially independent. The material orientation in my family is still heavily rooted. That is why I want to show them that performing religious affairs for the hereafter can make my worldly affairs accomplished as well. In short, in my family, I have been regarded as the most peculiar person and have been isolated.[683] Samhariyani (MWI)

From the excerpts above, several points can be noted. Firstly, Islamist women use various means to convince their parents to accept them. At least three means are visible: silence (letting time pass), negotiation without confrontation, and resistance in a confronting way. Secondly, although there are different levels of parent affirmation, Islamist women try to convince their families, to lessen tensions, and in turn, to make changes in their relationships with parents. It does not

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680 Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016
681 Interview with Ummu Hana on 18 September 2016
682 Interview with Faridah on 19 July 2016
683 Interview with Samhariyani on 19 July 2016

necessarily mean, however, that all members are able to persuade their families. Some younger Islamist women are less able to convince their parents, as Ummu Khalid's (MWI) statement shows that she often faces complaints from parents of young recruits:

> Other challenges from young members, are that the mode of communication remains immature. How to deliver their hopes, ideas, and feelings to their family is still inappropriate, which is more likely to spark frictions. Some parents visit us, wanting to put forward their complaints. (…). We frequently encourage our young members to bring their families to be introduced to us and ask them to build close bonds with their families.[684]

Nisa, in her work regarding Islamist women in the purist movement in Yogyakarta, also found similarities for young women dealing with their parents' objections. Various sorts of rejection are influenced by how these women communicate with their parents. According to Nisa's informants, if they adopt a respectful approach (*santun*) in explaining the change to their parents, it is more likely to reduce levels of opposition.[685]

Thirdly, Islamist women's ability to defend their decision to involved in Islamist activism in both the domestic and public arenas shows that they are able to meet challenges, which require qualities such as knowledge, skills, and strength. In their use of *cadar,* for example, despite these Islamist women facing negative stereotyping, they were capable of figuring it out. Being labelled as devils and isolated by society and even by their families, are extraordinary challenges that Islamist women face. They have proven that they are strong enough to withstand hostile and horrible treatment, although the practice of *cadar* is relatively accepted by wider society, there are, of course, still some obstacles. Meanwhile, in the context of confrontations with family, Islamist women have exercised agency by choosing self-determination with regard to religious activity. They are able to determine and to choose ways of acknowledging and implementing Islam. Their practice of Islam is not something taken for granted and inherited from their parents, but a result of their own quest. Their Islam is discontinuous from the religiosity of their parents', and contains

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[684] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016

[685] Eva Nisa F, 'Embodied Faith: Agency and Obedience among Face-veiled University Students in Indonesia', in *the Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology*, 13:4, 2012, p. 372

a transformative mission, as they have strong ambitions to reform society into an Islamic structure according to the beliefs they hold. Furthermore, women's defence of Islamist ideology in front of their parents through providing robust arguments is a manifestation of a woman's self-confidence and capacity for thoughtful debate. This is because they can construct a rationale for their attitude, delivering reasons convincingly rooted in Islamic texts and history. They are very confident with their knowledge, even when their parents were first to embrace Islam.

The impact of education can be also seen in women's presence in public d*a'wa* as female preachers. Women's existence in this field has led to change, as previously, this arena was dominated by male preachers. Women's public attendance of *da'wa* has decreased male preachers' domain, as female preachers replace men in female audiences. Their presence also reflects that women's religious authority has been recognised. This, thus, requires women to be informed in terms of religious cognizance as well as politics, social, and economic insights, and to be skillful in communication. It also may mean that Islamist women have had access to education, learning Islamic literature directly without reliance on male mediation to understand them, although sometimes this is still needed.

Women's public roles as preacher in MWI and MHTI are only directed at female audiences and need solid preparation. For instance, as described before WI categorized preacher into *murabiyya*t (female religious teacher), *mubaliqqat* (female preacher for less than a hundred audiences), and *daiyat* (female preacher for more than audiences in big events such as seminars and workshops), women were required to undertake semi-formal and formal education or training to hold these three positions. After the Jakarta conference in 2016, WI added three levels of training. There were previously only three stages of training, so that, currently there are six levels of training women need to pass. One reason for the additional training is to equip both women and men members with greater capabilities in terms of religious knowledge, personality and skills. Ummu Saniwati (MWI) explains:

> We have certain curriculum and stages of training as formal education. We call this *ta'rif*, *takwin* and *tanfidz*. (…). The result of the last *muktamar* (the conference) has changed to six levels. This is because the training has more objectives and gives cadres more time to explore their capabilities, so they are ready to be leaders. If they are only in the instant forms of education or have not been equipped properly, they will be vulnerable to be split, not strong and solid enough when they are acting as caretakers or leaders. That is why, cadres who are capable of completing of all these levels are those who have really understood religious cognisance as well as reciting the Qur'an and their personalities are good.[686]

To pass each level, women must pass certain examinations. Ummu Saniwati (MWI) explained that women must undertake two kinds of examination: oral and written tests. However, their male counterparts do not have the same assessment. According to Saniwati, this is because the men are not able to take the test. Men tend to see it as something very complicated or too difficult. [687] There is, therefore, a management discrepancy in the organisation's handling of men and women. The existence of the test is an initiative of women themselves, and exam materials are formatted by them as well. Likewise, in Women's Division of HTI (MHTI), as explored before, although MHTI does not have levels of training, being activists require women to undertake certain training including to understand HTI's books clearly as well as to implement it consistently in the daily lives. This training may take several years. But, unlike WI, there is no distinction between women and men in the training process in HTI. Both must undertake the same process before joining.

In addition to the religious knowledge that WI women must master, they are also equipped with skills in how to deliver religious messages to public audiences. From their proficiency education, women have realised that to call people to true faith is not solely about Islamic knowledge transfer, but about how to communicate and how to package Islam in a fashionable form, which is important. Even women's tasks as religious preachers change into roles as trainers.

[686] Interview with Ummu Saniwati on 9 August 2016
[687] Interview with Ummu Saniwati on 9 August 2016

This shift for me reflects that the Islamist women I interviewed are up to date with modern techniques such as public speaking. In this regard, Ummu Saniwati (MWI) explains:

> Since 2007, we have been trained in a program of Train the Trainer (TtT). From this, we understood that it is not enough to only learn religious matters. Islam should be attractively packaged. Although the content of Islamic teachings delivered is correct, the way of presenting it, if it is not interesting or boring, will bore our audiences who will regard Islam as uninteresting. The program also taught us that there is distinction nature between a trainer and a preacher: the former is an ice-breaker, or an interlude within a presentation. We formed groups for women who have been trained in TtT to coach other *mubaliqqat* and *daiyat*. Its materials are varied, from how to deliver a speech in an Islamic study group (*majelis taklim),* to a seminar on how to walk to the podium where the woman will speak, and how to greet an audience of 2000, 5000, or 9000 people. Ways of welcoming different amount of people are different.[688]

The picture below shows a TtT event held by MWI. This event aimed to create professional and militant female trainers. The occasion lasted for three days in a hotel and was attended by thirty female members of MWI. During the program, participants completed thirteen subjects, and on the last day, they engaged in microteaching practices. The women's faces in the picture have been deliberately blurred, as they did not wear *cadar* during the activity.

Picture from MWI's official website[689]

[688] Interview with Ummu Saniwati on 9 August 2016

[689] WI, Muslimah WI Sul-Sel Siapkan 30 Trainer, (Muslimah WI Sul-Sel Prepares Thirty Trainers), available in http://Wahdah.or.id/muslimah-Wahdah-islamiyah-sulsel-siapkan-30-trainer/, accessed on 3 April 2018

Women's empowerment can also be measured in the domestic field. If we use Kabeer's measurement of women's empowerment, educated Islamist women involved in *da'wa* are less empowered. This is because one of the goals of MWI and MHTI education programs is to equip women to be better housewives. It is important to note that WI and HTI also offer advice to men with respect to being 'better husbands'. This is because both organisations have a marital preparation program for brides and grooms preparing to marry which is based on and in accord with sharia. Moreover, WI has a specific department which offers a family counselling service. Kabeer notes that this form of education has not been recognised as a medium to empower women. However, for Islamist women, being educated wives and mothers is essential, as it is through their socialization of children that the quality of the family or future generation will be achieved.

That said, women's involvement in *da'wa* may, to some extent, contribute to women's empowerment in some domestic settings. As explained above, both MWI and MHTI consider the main role of women to be in the home, so domestic tasks are both essential and fundamental to establish a quality Islamic community. For these organisations, the institution of the family is a fundamental element of social order, so that the creation of an Islamic social structure is influenced by the extent to which the family can be managed. The more qualified a family is in Islamic faith, the more likely it is to generate a society based in religion, economics, health, politics, and education. According to the leader of WI, Zaitun, the ideal family has become WI's aim and goal. This has three features: firstly, the institution of the family should be a peaceful place, to which its members desire to return; secondly, it should be a site for training and education for all family members; lastly, the family is the locus of the Islamic struggle. Marriage is not entered into solely to find a suitable partner, but rather, aims to build a family that can underpin the Islamic fight. In

other words, the family is the key foundation to spread Islamic values. This, of course, requires struggle and sacrifice.[690]

Furthermore, Zaitun emphasises that to achieve an ideal family, wives and husbands should work hand-in-hand and be mutually supportive. The establishment of the family becomes their shared responsibility. One form of this cooperation is that a wife must not prevent her husband conducting *da'wa*, by putting him in a difficult situation so that he is unable to perform these duties, and the reverse is also true. Zaitun states that encouragement not only comprises a series of words, but, most importantly, real action. A man needs to help his wife perform domestic tasks so that she is not overloaded with household tasks, which can prevent her conducting public *da'wa*. Moreover, Zaitun explains that if public *da'wa* obligations lead to shortcomings in carrying out domestic tasks, both parties should communicate with each other to resolve it.[691]

Zaitun's view shows that, for WI, the existence of a quality family is important. Family arrangements and organisation are crucial concerns within WI, and also in HTI. Some participants from both organisations argue that an ideal woman is capable of perfectly balancing both domestic and public duties. Household roles, therefore, are not an 'ordinary' responsibility. Women need particular knowledge and skills to arrange them. It is certainly not enough if women are relying only on understandings inherited culturally from the past generation. Women need up-to-date capabilities, as times are changing, so the challenges of the household are also changing. Islamist women's domestic and public responsibilities are both religious obligations. How to balance these dual roles is something not easy in practice. In addition, WI and HTI do not forbid their female members from undertaking paid work.

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[690] WI, Keluarga adalah Miniatur Perjuangan Islam (Family is a Miniature of Islamic Struggle), available in http://Wahdah.or.id/keluarga-adalah-miniatur-perjuangan-islam/, accessed on 3 April 2018

[691] WI, Keluarga adalah Miniatur Perjuangan Islam (Family is a Miniature of Islamic Struggle), available in http://Wahdah.or.id/keluarga-adalah-miniatur-perjuangan-islam/, accessed on 3 April 2018

In the context of children's education, for example, evidence of seriousness in looking after and educating children can be seen from a variety of activities advocated by both Women's Division of HTI (MHTI) and Women's Division of WI (MWI). One of the important areas of activism in children's education is the idea shared by both groups that followers introduce ideas of Islamic parenting to their members. MHTI, within its public *da'wa* activities, for instance, often addresses issues that concern women, the family, and the creation of the future generation. MHTI's spokeswomen, Mutia, argues that talking about problems the Muslim community faces today cannot be separated from issues with respect to women, the family, and the future generation.[692] Similarly, MWI regularly holds serious discussions, seminars and training regarding Islamic parenting, where questions about how to nurture children properly and correctly according to Islamic teaching and the guidance of the Prophet Muhammad, and how to communicate with children are discussed. Ummu Khalid (MWI) argues that the parenting culture of Makassar people tends culturally to be rather unrefined, as they educate their children using both physical and emotional forms of discipline. This, in turn, can lead to a culture of violence within the family. According to Khalid, one way to tackle this problem is for women to update their knowledge of modern parenting, in line with Islamic values. MWI has been developing the concept of modern Islamic parenting since the late 1980s.[693] The pictures below show a parenting seminar held by MWI in Makassar on 11 March 2018.

[692] Interview with Mutia on 29 July 2016
[693] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016

Pictures taken from the official website of WI[694]

The seminar entitled "Creating Generations Who Yearn for Heaven in the Midst of Modernity and Technology Flows" was attended by around 560 participants from MWI and from outside the organisation. It aimed to enhance mothers and prospective mothers' knowledge with respect to children's education in the family.[695] Such events and other similar activities reflect how seriously Islamist women take the need to equip themselves as knowledgeable mothers who act as first educators for their children. Being a mother is not easy. It needs a considerable amount of expertise that must be deliberately achieved. Such seminars are not exclusively limited to MWI members but invite other women from outside the organizations to attend. To some extent, such

[694] Lazis Wahdah, MWI DPD WI Makassar – LAZIS Wahdah Gelar Seminar Parenting, Dihadiri 562 Peserta, available in https://lazisWahdah.com/blog/MWI-dpd-wi-makassar-lazis-Wahdah-gelar-seminar-parenting-dihadiri-562-peserta/, accessed on 10 April, 2018

[695] Lazis Wahdah**,** MWI DPD WI Makassar – LAZIS Wahdah Gelar Seminar Parenting, Dihadiri 562 Peserta, available in https://lazisWahdah.com/blog/MWI-dpd-wi-makassar-lazis-Wahdah-gelar-seminar-parenting-dihadiri-562-peserta/, accessed on 10 April 2018

activities suggest that Islamist women practise agency and are empowered as individuals, because they are capable of comprehending and determining what they need and how to establish their interests. It is women themselves who initiate and conduct these activities, requiring various competencies to do so.

However, there is a gap in knowledge and awareness about parenting between male and female members of WI. As pioneers of the importance of parenting within WI, Women's Division of WI (MWI) has been knowledgeable about this, whereas their male counterparts are left behind, as Ummul Khalid explains:

> One obstacle we face is that we have been trained in parenting, whilst our husbands are still less knowledgeable so there is an imbalance between us. We have tried to communicate quietly, but our husbands are still unresponsive. (…). We have learned how to bring up our children in relaxed condition, so they are able to wake up and to go school without any distractions. We have sought to let our children hear calm Qur'anic recitation and to listen to cheerful songs so as to create a positive atmosphere. But due to poor insight about parenting, our partners are inclined to be angry. Consequently, we eventually initiated to set up training especially for men, not only our husbands, but also other men from outside WI in a venue that can accommodate 3000 participants. We were acting as event organisers and our husbands only need to sit nicely, without doing anything. Even some wives paid for their husbands' seminar tickets. for their spouse. What we did was merely to facilitate our partners gaining parenting knowledge, so that we may create equilibrium at home.[696]

Ummu Khalid said that during the seminar[697], they attempted to avoid the use of lecturing methods in case their husbands felt patronized. As she points out:

> We did this as men are still the leaders of the family. We worried about not getting to heaven. Our husbands might misunderstand. If we failed to communicate properly with our partners, we would gain nothing. Many valuable messages would be meaningless if we improperly communicated them. Sometime wives' intentions are good but the means they use to communicate to their spouses are inappropriate, so their partners feel patronised and dictated to. They feel their authority as a leader in the family undermined. I acknowledge that such a strong sense of men's authority is part of our cultural influence.[698]

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[696] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016

[697] Although there is no specific data informing that the parenting seminar for men has directly benefited them, it might be said that the seminar has partly contributed to men's readiness to take part in domestic affairs and in looking after their children as explored in the chapter four. Based on my observation, when I was at the WI's office, it was common to see some male cadres bringing their children while were working at the office. Likewise, when attending the *Muktamar* in Jakarta, I saw married cadres who brought their children and they took turns to care for them

[698] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016

Wahdah Women's efforts to empower their spouses is an example of what Minganti calls "tactical orthodoxy". This concept refers to: 'temporary allusions to one's own perceived higher degree of piety in order to realise personal preferences (within, of course, the frame of what the individual in question understands as true Islam).'[699] Minganti also defines "tactic" by referring to the ideas of Michel de Certeau[700], that tactics comprise of:

> …. fragmentary and fragile victories of the weak within the framework of a power order that they cannot (or do not want to) escape. With the religious scripture in their hands, the women claim their rights by emphasizing all Muslims' duty to realise Islam- men included.[701]

Following this framework, I argue that Wahdah Women's initiation of parenting seminars for their male counterparts demonstrate that if Islamist men want their wives to be pious, educated, and capable of educating children in accordance with Islamic values, then men also need to become pious and educated fathers who understand how to properly nurture children. By employing religious arguments, Wahdah Women seem to want to say to their spouses that the creation ofthe Islamic generation through the institution of the family will never occur if their husbands are not actively involved. Islam prescribes that education of children in the family must be performed by both parties, so women are able to use these teachings to shift men's behaviour.

Women's complaints are not channelled by confrontational means that directly point out men's shortcomings. Rather, they choose subtler ways to address their partners' weakness, in consideration of religious and cultural factors. Complying with Islamic prescriptions is also one form of obedience to God, rather than disapproving of the leader of the family. Culturally, particularly in Makassar culture, men are more likely to feel annoyed or undermined if their authority or superiority as the head of the family is questioned. Wahdah women fully recognise

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[699] Pia Karlsson Minganti, 'Challenging from Within: Youth Associations and Female Leadership in Swedish Mosques', in *Women, Leadership, and Mosque: Changes in Contemporary Islamic Authority*, edited by Masooda Bano and Hilary kalmbach, Brill, Leiden, 2012, p. 384

[700] Michel De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1984, pp. xviii–xx.

[701] Pia Karlsson Minganti, '*Op. Cit*., p. 384

these cultural barriers, so they prefer to advocate a lenient and moderate approach by setting up parenting seminars led by a professional trainer rather than criticising their husbands for their shortcomings. This recalls Mahmood's argument that agency is not solely exercised through resistance against the values and system subjugating women but can be expressed by various means including through negotiation.[702] Wahdah Women have taught their male counterparts without overlooking or interfering in men's superiority and authority as leader. These women focus on the need to reform men's poor understanding of parenting and use strategies and tactics to negotiate the obstacle of men's higher positioning.

In terms of the division of labour, both Islamist organisations recognise the concept of respectful gender complementarity in line with divinely- prescribed divisions of labour between women and men, as well as of the sharia-based leadership position of men over women. However, in practice, the notion is not necessarily understood so rigidly and strictly but is quite flexible. It still leaves space to negotiate and modify the division of labour. It also may denote that men's position of leadership within the family should not be regarded as assigning them superiority over their wives or become a justification for men's unlimited control or enforcement of women. Rather, flexibility and the limited nature of men's domestic leadership is partly influenced by another religious obligation, that is, the responsibility of conducting the public *da'wa* for men and women alike. Public *da'wa* demands for women are sometimes prioritized above household tasks, if *da'wa* has more social-religious benefits and women's attendance in the community cannot be substituted by others.

This modification of domestic affairs may be seen from some forms of cooperation by men and women in the family. Some informants from the both organisations admit that they have

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[702] Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and The Feminist Subject*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2005, p. 15

successfully made agreements about sharing household tasks with their husbands. Thus women are able to negotiate with their husbands so that they can help each other. However, it cannot be denied that some couples are less successful in agreeing to work hand-in-hand. Some the Islamist women acknowledged that they experienced a double burden of work, tasked with domestic affairs such as cooking, washing, and cleaning at home, and performing public *da'wa* simultaneously. It is not uncommon for them to wake up in the early morning (around 3am) to complete their domestic duties. Although there may be some assistance from their husbands, this is still very little and is not regular.[703]

Moreover, wives are also able to relieve the burden on their husbands as breadwinners such as Mutia (MHTI)[704] and her husband who run their own business at the home and this is the only source of the family's revenue, and Ros (not real name) from MHTI, becomes a teacher of a kindergarten to help her husband's income. Some Wahdah women are employed in business institutions owned by WI such as at the WI's hospital. Others are self-employed individuals, offering services to the wider society, as trainers or teachers who teach how to recite the Qur'an correctly. The income they earn from working certainly belongs to them, and according to them, it is not religiously compulsory for these women to share it with their partners or to contribute financially to meet the needs of the home. However, these women contribute their money for family affairs. As Ummu Saniwati notes:

> …. our family finances are regulated so that my husband's income is under his control, and also mine. Although Islam rules that the wife's salary is her own, it does not mean that a wife does not

[703] Interview with Ummu Hana on 08 September 2016

[704] My observation was that there is little difference in the socio-economic standing between HTI's cadres and WI. The economic level of HTI's cadres tends to be lower than WI's cadres. It is partly because HTI does not have business institutions such as minimarket and educational institutions from which its cadres can work. Whereas WI runs various economic activities such as pharmacy shops, minimarkets, restaurants, and educational institutions from elementary school to college so cadres can work therein and earn a salary. Moreover, almost all MHTI's informants are income earners, three informants are teachers, two run their own small business, and one is a housewife. Meantime, MWI's most informants are incomes earners, as teachers, entrepreneurs, pharmacists, and lecturers

> contribute at all financially to the family's needs. So sometimes I pay for our children's school fees and sometimes my husband does'.[705]

These various modifications of a religiously-prescribed gender division of labour, therefore, demonstrate that WI and HTI spouses are able to mutually receive the incompleteness in conducting their respective duties. In this sense, men need to accept conditions in which their wives do not have enough time to handle all domestic tasks, whilst women need to accept that their husband's low income, is the result of their time being reserved for the accomplishment of public *da'wa* responsibilities. To tackle these imperfections, they should work hand-in-hand. These extra duties show that women's involvement in Islamist movement has instigated changes in women's lives at the level of the domestic sphere. Women have been equipped new capabilities, such as the ability to negotiate, to communicate, to get support,[706] and to empower their partners in promoting Islamic teachings and family values.

Before examining the impact of women's involvement in the Islamist movement on women's economic lives, I note that there are considerable differences between HTI and WI pertaining to economic activities. Based on its Constitution, HTI/MHTI does not have business institutions and not allow adherents to run the particular businesses under the banner of the organisation, but personal endorsement of HTI is welcome. The group is purely a political movement marketing the ideas and ideology of Islam, and removed away from economic activities.[707] Conversely, WI/MWI promotes business activities. It has a variety of commercial undertakings such as franchise pharmacy, restaurants and cafes, hospitals for mothers and children, mini-markets, schools, bread factories, and others. I asked how to become a partner in the pharmacy, Ummu Seniawati its manager, told me that I would have to provide approximately $

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[705] Interview with Ummu Saniawaty on 17 July 2016
[706] Jo Rowlands, *Op. Cit*., p. 24
[707] Interview with Mutia on 29 July 2016

AUD 25000 and a site for the shop. They will supply medicines and professional employees, including a pharmacist.

Ummu Khalid (MWI) explained that WI conducts a variety of enterprises in order to have dignity and to avoid asking for help from others. They seek to prove to wider society that they are very financially independent. Key resources in WI's funding derive from these commercial enterprises, but there are also donations from outside the group, such as from Islamic countries or WI sympathisers. This is different from the HTI/MHTI's situation. Some informants stated that the organisation operates on funding support from members' donations.

At the individual level, women's engagement with Islamist organisations has changed their economic lives. HTI's opposition to the Indonesian government, which is perceived as corrupt and un-Islamic, and its unwillingness to be part of the structure, reflected in its members being banned from taking up employment in government institutions, have indirectly caused its members, including female members, to think creatively and to find alternative ways to find work or even create their own job opportunities. One male informant of HTI told me that he was a temporary employee of the Fisheries Department in the province of South Sulawesi. He decided to leave his job, as he found bribery was a common practice to get high-level position in the Department.[708] My observations show that some male members of HTI have become real estate agents for sharia property, marketing houses or land to people offering either a cash or instalment payment without interest or penalty if a customer is late with a payment. They reject all cooperation with the banks. Female members of HTI tend to operate their businesses from home, for example selling dresses and other goods as in Mutia's case.

Meantime, Wahdah Women have diverse occupations, ranging from working as employees in the state institutions, working as lecturers, to running their own businesses. There is also a

[708] Interview with Iwan (not real name) on 29 July 2016

Muslimah (female Muslim) entrepreneur community that consists of female members who run their own enterprises, such as catering or boutiques. If entrepreneurship is designed as the capacity to organise and manage a business enterprise, Muslimah entrepreneurs can be regarded as 'women who initiate, organise, or run business'.[709] As Ummu Khalid explains:

> *Da'wa* cannot be separated from economic affairs. Members are even encouraged to be entrepreneurs who own a business, even if it is small. We have a Muslimah entrepreneur community. So, although they still run the little business, they are able to finance themselves. They are very independent financially.[710]

According to Shamshad, being independent economically by running a business is more powerful than being an employee. The reason for this is that female entrepreneurs can control their own enterprise, ands are free to decide what they want to do in terms of organising and developing their commercial undertakings. Not only can they earn revenue but also provide job opportunities for other women. In the wider context, being a successful entrepreneur is more likely to help alleviate poverty.[711]

To develop the entrepreneurial potential of Wahdah Women, the community often arranges entrepreneurship training. For example, the Women's Division of WI (MWI) in collaboration with the Centre of Small Business Incubation, South Sulawesi province, held entrepreneurship training from 20-21 October 2017 in the MWI Center of *Da'wa*. The training was attended by 20 women members of MWI and structured along three key themes. The first concerned the significance of the concept of economic empowerment, based on sharia cooperative models, aiming to enlighten participants about the importance of Islamic community having independent finances under their own control. The second theme was training in the Simple Bookkeeping App (*Aplikasi Pembukuan*

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[709] Ahmad Shamshad, 'Women's Empowerment in India; Rhetoric and Reality, in From Patriarchy to Empowerment: Women's Participation, Movements, and Rights in the Middle East, Nort Africa, and South Asia, edited by Valentine M. Moghadam, Syracuse University Press, New York, 2007, p.151

[710] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016

[711] Ahmad Shamshad, *Op. Cit*., p. 151

Sederhana, SIAPIK), intended to introduce the significance and reliability of financial reporting through simple software. Lastly, participants learned how to comprehensively analyse the chances of success in business. This theme was presented as it is common for business to fail due to the lack of an overarching evaluation before it starts operating.[712] According to Ummu Saniawaty, MWI seeks to combine pure knowledge with skills, as these are two sides of the same coin.[713]

Aside from being a pharmacist and a manager of Wahdah's pharmacies, Ummu Saniawaty is a trainer and counsellor. She is often invited to speak at seminars, and sometimes she is on panels with other speakers about health, which she delivers from a sharia perspective. She can combine two forms of knowledge, Islam and health, into one perspective in addressing health issues. According to her Islam is interlinked with health. Leading seminars has given Ummu Saniawaty self-confidence in interacting, and meeting people. She holds the belief that the more networks she has, the more benefits she will earn. These social interactions, in fact, have given her many advantages, including as an *umrah*[714] advisor, in which she supervises a hundred participants going to Mecca every year. She states that she finds it easy to collect prospective *umrah* pilgrims, as she has channels and networks as a result of speaking at seminars and training events, so people automatically trust her. Not only is she successful in her role of as *umrah* advisor, through her social linkages, she also achieves non-cash benefits. For example, if she is sick and goes to see a doctor whom she knows well, it will be free of charge. Examples such as these demonstrate that she is financially independent.[715]

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[712] Muslimah Wahdah Islamiyah (MWI), *Pelatihan Kewirausahaan Muslimah Wahdah Islamiyah (MWI)* (Entrepreneurship Training by Wahdah Muslimah), available in https://muslimahWahdah.or.id/pelatihan-kewirausahaan-muslimah-Wahdah/, accessed on 18 April 2018

[713] Interview with Ummu Saniawati on 17 July 2016

[714] Umrah is non-mandatory lesser pilgrimage made by Muslims to Mecca, which may be performed at any time of the year, available in https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/umrah, accessed on 17 April 2018

[715] Interview with Ummu Saniawati on 17 July 2016

Some Wahdah women offer their services as teachers of the Qur'an for wider society. They are able to teach how to read the Qur'an correctly, according to the method of Qur'anic recitation. Women have gained this skill through their intensive learning of how to recite al Qur'an provided by MWI. The skill has enabled them to create job opportunities as paid teachers of the Qur'an through which they can earn revenue, though this is not main goal of learning the Qur'an. One example of this is that I myself have used the service by engaging a female teacher from Wahdah to teach my children at home. This work is becoming a recognised occupation, as the demand to learn the Qur'an in Indonesia, particularly in Makassar, has significantly increased. The local government of Makassar enacted local law, no 1, 2012 to foster Qur'anic education, and to eradicate Qur'anic illiteracy.[716]

In the context of Islamist women's roles as part of the community, Wahdah women work together to manage several business entities owned by WI. They are very loyal to these businesses, and are able to contribute to WI's financial support, which has survived on member support until now. WI very much relies on women's financial contributions, and most commercial institutions under the umbrella of WI are arranged by Women's Division of WI (MWI). As Ummu Saniawaty explains:

> Although I got many job offers from outside and also I can personally create my own business since I have experience, I did not take these offers and establish a personal business. I prefer to take part in developing the group businesses, as the religious power to develop Islam is very strong. For example, this pharmacy has become a financial supporter of the organisation. We denote $ AUD1500 to WI for water and electricity every month. This pharmacy is under Wahdah management. Its capital and location have been provided entirely by Wahdah. The third and fourth pharmacies are semi-franchised which means that their venture capital comes from a third party, but they are still under Wahdah's brand, so they should donate to the organisation, though not too much, if we have our own capital. I plan to establish pharmacies in several spots in Makassar and outside Makassar. These types of business never fail as long as they are well-organised. Since there is *da'wa* value therein, I ask cadres with money to support Wahdah pharmacies. (…). I think that it is also necessary to build a distributor of medicines as we have many pharmacies.[717]

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[716] Kementerian Agama Indonesia, *Sosialisasi Perda No. 1/2012 tentang Baca Tulis Al-Qur'an* (The Socialization of the Perda no. 1/2012 on Reading and Writing al Qur'an) , available in https://sulsel2.kemenag.go.id/berita/111210/ccc, accessed on 18 April 2018

[717] Interview with Ummu Seniawaty on 9 August 2016

Ummu Khalid also considers Wahdah's significant role:

> Although our hospital is still under the control of the Central Board of WI, its management is organised by the Women's Division of WI (MWI). All staff of the hospital are from MWI, including its doctors, but not its security personnel. In future, there is consideration from WI to hand over the administration of the hospital to WMI. At this time, we are still not ready to handle it. We need more time to enhance our resources.[718]

The accounts above reflect that there is a sense of collective empowerment[719] for these women, who employ tactics and strategies to manage and arrange these businesses. They also demonstrate women's abilities to work in the form of a team, and to create relationships with wider society, other groups, and even with local government. These businesses can be grown and become fundamental financial sponsors for Islamist organisations, as women comprise a form of human capital that contribute to their management and development.

Men and Women's Involvement

Both HTI and WI recognise that women's participation in the project of *da'wa* is an embodiment of religious doctrine and a fulfilment of the Indonesian societal situation, as in the following excerpts from research participants;

> Women involved in da'wa are driven by hereafter motives, not to express self-existence. We teach, therefore, that religious beliefs and practice (ibadah) consist of two forms: specific (mahdah) and general (amma). One kind of ibadah amma is da'wa and care of others. So, we cannot obstruct Muslimah to take a role in that field. Also, we believe that Islam recognises that men and women are equal even if they are different. Many verses in the Qur'an declare this such as anyone who does good deeds will be equally rewarded by God. So, we view that there is no dichotomy within the righteous deeds, including in da'wa and educating the Islamic community (ummah). The further problem is how arrange the different gender roles correctly. There is a distinct segmentation. (…). This is because men and women have diverse natures so the division of labour should comply with the natural stream.[720]

> Women's main role is as ummu rabbul bait. They are in charge of household tasks and act as the husband's representative in the family. But the ideal situation is when they are able to add roles as daiyyah (female preachers) or murabiyyah (Islamic teachers). This we regard is as something ideal.

[718] Interview with Ummu Khalid on 30 August 2016
[719] Jo Rowlands, *Op. Cit*., p. 22
[720] Interview with Ikhwan Jalil on 10 June 2016

> Nor do all women have to spend all their time at home, such as women whose children have grown up, who certainly have different responsibilities to women whose children are still little. It means the former have plenty of free time at home, and they should take part in the public da'wa.[721]

> In WI, we target both the male and female segments. We cannot overlook one of them. So, institutionally speaking, the women's wing in WI has existed since the early period of this organisation. When WI transformed into a mass-based religious organisation in 2002, we formed a department especially concerned with women's affairs, which we called Lembaga Muslimah WI (LMWI, Muslimah body of WI). (…). These women play two main roles, that is, in the domestic domain as housewives whose key responsibilities are for their husband, children, and the family's education (…), and in public da'wa and the social sphere. (…). Women should take up public responsibility, since we are fully aware that the most appropriate way to deal with women is women themselves who really understand female psychology and so on.[722]

> The case of Indonesia (and Malaysia as well) are specific, as the majority of the population are women and have a degree of security that is different to other countries in Middle East. Actually, in the Middle East, there is also Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir activism, but it is not mass-based like in Indonesia, as their culture is different to Indonesian culture. (…). In the Indonesian context, the number of women is many, so they are encouraged to get involved in da'wa. Da'wa for us is not only for men, but also for women. (…). HTI and MHTI have different arrangements. MHTI have their own activities and we do not intervene. They have programs and we have ours.[723]

> Both men and women are religiously obligated to perform da'wa as stated in the Qur'an. Conducting da'wa is an individually religious compulsory. Apart from the Qur'an, the hadith encourage every Muslim, regardless of different gender, to disseminate religiously valuable messages, even if one verse from the Qur'an.[724]

The above quotations capture at least four factors, according to men's reasoning, which encourage women to get involved in public *da'wa*. Religious impetus is commonly cited as the main element in why women aspire to participate. Islam, according to the men in this study, stipulates that both men and women are commanded to perform the call for others to have true faith, although women's "headquarters" is in the home. Secondly, the large number of women in the Indonesian population explains women's presence in the public sphere in conducting *da'wa*. Psychological matters are also considered to explain why women take part in the divine project. These Islamist men seem to acknowledge that there is a women's 'side', which they find difficult to understand, as only women can clearly and exhaustively know their own affairs. In addition, women feel more comfortable if they are sharing their experiences with other women. The last

[721] Interview with Qasim on 1 June 2016
[722] Interview with Rahmat on 25 June 2016
[723] Interview with Dirwan on 29 July 2016
[724] Interview with Andi (name changed to protect identity) on 29 July 2016

consideration that these male Islamists recognise is that the Indonesian context is politically and socially both more secure and freer for women to perform roles in public compared to other Islamic countries in the Middle East. This situation provides women with great opportunities to take up public roles.

The male Islamists interviewed also recognise that women's involvement in *da'wa* has positively contributed to the development of the organisations. Likewise, women's activism is more active, more progressive, and better-organised than their male counterparts', particularly in the case of WI. Qasim (male member of WI) acknowledges that 'the number of female members is three times more than that of men. The addition of members is very fast, and they are more progressive'.[725] Even in particular areas of South Sulawesi, women's activism emerged before men's, as confirmed by Hamid (male member of WI):

> Muslimah's roles are outstanding. The numbers of members through MWI are bigger. Their figures are enormous, and they have an aggressive and structured movement. Hence, they are very visible, not only among youth but also among mothers. They have a lot of varied and creative programs. The ways of recruitment they employ are multiple. They are different from male members. Women are more creative, aggressive, and more quickly touched with *da'wa* than men. They are able to mobilise masses in an event such as religious study group and to raise a lot of funds.[726]

When I asked Qasim (male member of WI) why women were more active, creative, and progressive than men, he told me that he thought women were psychologically more responsible when charged with specific duties. According to Qasim, in fact, women can be trusted by the leaders to follow prescribed instructions, as they have more focus than men. Women also are very detailed in their tasks. For example, he explained that men spend two hours to conduct a meeting, but for women, two hours is not enough, and they often devote three or four hours. This is because, according to Qasim, women address not only general or global issues, but more detailed aspects. This is very different to men, who tend to think globally. Issue that men might not consider are

[725] Interview with Qasim on 1 June 2016
[726] Interview with Hamid on 15 June 2016

often identified by women. Qasim also suggests that the ways women advocate for the movement underpin the development of the organisation.[727]

However, male Islamists' appreciation of women's activism does not necessarily mean that they fully support or encourage women to take up public roles. Some of the narratives suggest that male Islamists experience a dilemma between supporting women's public activism entirely, and/or hoping women will stay at home:

> Although HTI women can take up public roles, the main role of women is in the home as housewives. When women are in workplaces, they must obey sharia laws. For example, woman is not allowed to mix with man in an isolated place and she must leave her public job, when there are urgent family concerns which need her attendance. This can put women in a difficult situation.[728]

> But, I personally keep directing them (women) to be able to comply with the meaning of the verse in the Qur'an (*wakarna fi buyutikumna),* which in general means that women's attention should be in the home. In this sense, home is women's base and concern, why do they need to go out to do something, if they can do so at home?. They only may go out when they are in an emergency situation, or no one can replace them, but again, their attention should be focused at home. Staying at home for women can eschew them from *fitnah* (the possibility of doing bad deeds), and their domestic responsibilities will be kept up. Especially when we can use information technology. I sometimes suggest they meet through WhatsApp (WA). A problem may be resolved through the app without necessarily meaning the women must go out. If you (women) go out, you will be in traffic jams, how much time will you lose, especially if you have little children who still need your care, supervision, and affection.
> Because of that women's minds are very detailed, they are awfully responsible when carrying out a mandate, and they occasionally neglect their families. They frequently have meetings since they have a lot of agendas, but we always advise them. (…). We continually caution and direct them (women) that your attendance (such as in a meeting) here means you left your children and husband. (…). According to the hadith, women were created from Adam's rib. If it is left unchecked, it will be forever bent but if it is enforced, it will be damaged or broken. So, to straighten it needs a particular way. Sometimes we want to be tough on them, so they will leave their activism, becoming powerless. But on the other hand, if we let them be more active in public, the impact is not good for their families.[729]

This dilemma may also be seen in the refusal by WI's male elites to the female members' proposal to make the women's wing autonomous. The rationale for this rejection is partly based on men's fear that when women become institutionally full autonomous, they will be more likely

[727] Interview with Qasim on 1 June 2016
[728] Interview with Andi (not real name and member of HTI), on 29 July 2019
[729] Interview with Qasim on 1 June 2016

to disregard their roles as mothers, wives, and, housewives. Also, men fear that will be difficult to control and to advise women if they are too independent. Rahmat (WI) elucidates that the discourse of autonomy for the women's wing in WI still exists, but it cannot be approved, because although women are entitled to get involved in public activism, their key duties must be at home. These tasks must be women's highest priority. They are not allowed to leave their homes for *da'wa* reasons[730]

Conclusion

I argue that women's involvement in *da'wa* which is a process of piety politics as a means of personal development and a pathway to social reform, has contributed to significant changes in women's lives, at both the individual and the community level. These changes have occurred through training and educating women, so that their potential is realized as a set of capacities. Women are able to exercise these capabilities not only in performing public *da'wa*, by being skilful and thoughtful preachers or trainers, but in all aspects of their lives, whether they are housewives or entrepreneurs. In taking up these roles, and applying their capacities, women in Islamist organisations operate as agents of social change, particularly by taking an active part to establish an Islamic society or Islamic state.

[730] Interview with Rahmat on 25 June 2016

CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION

This study has examined women's involvement in two Islamist organisations in Makassar, namely: HTI/MHTI and WI/MWI. Their emergence in the Indonesian public sphere was under Indonesian Government's official licence, but on 17 July 2017, the Indonesian ruler liquidated HTI's licence, as it was accused of being a separatist movement wanting to establish an Islamic state which is certainly not in line with Indonesian ideology, *Pancasila* (the Five Pillars). When I conducted research in 2016, however, both organisations were freely operating, without legal obstacles in doing *da'wa.*

Regardless of HTI's legal issues, the public presence of both organisations has coloured Indonesian Muslim women's movements. It is partly because these groups are typically patriarchal movements, in which men take the dominant positions and their women appear to perpetuate male domination. Yet these women are publicly active in performing *da'wa*. Even, to some extent, women's way of carrying out public *da'wa* has contributed to their empowerment. Such phenomenon becomes interesting, raising questions of why women might want to join movements which seem less than friendly for them.

Key issues which are addressed in this study, therefore, are around what women do, why and how they get involved in Islamist movement, and whether their ~~e~~ngagement can empower them. This research relies on qualitative fieldwork research through the use of three methods to collect data: in-depth one to one interviews, observation, and an analysis of the literature. The collected information is arranged in the light of thematic analysis, and then is analysed based on the perspective of piety politics and a women's empowerment framework. By doing so, I argue that women's involvement in the Islamist movement is underpinned by piety politics, in which women aim to create pious selves as well as a transformation of the wider social order. The

activities carried out by women in HTI and WI to reform themselves and society determine the process of women's empowerment, as women are actively engaged in these twin projects.

The research findings show that there are a variety of incentives, benefits, and challenges which Islamist women obtain and confront. Islamist women in WI and HTI believe that what they do is a form of embodiment of religious observance or worship to God. This is partly because that they conduct *da'wa* which is believed to be God's project. *Da'wa* that literally refers to an invitation to true faith, is one of religious commands which constitute and obligation for both men and women. *Da'wa* based on collected information, can be divided into two categories: personal and public *da'wa.* In the light of piety politics, the former is to transform oneself into a pious individual, while the latter denotes an act of proselytising to invite other people to the true faith. When the people have become pious, the Islamic social order marked by implementation of sharia in daily lives will be created. To achieve both personal and public reform, it needs systematic, sustainable, and structured planning.

For WI, personal *da'wa* aiming to transform the self into a pious individual undertaken through a process of self-discipline in following *Tarbiyah Islamiyah* (Islamic education). *Tarbiyah* is a gradual and continuing process in the form of weekly Islamic study circles (*halaqah*), through which recruits learn Islamic knowledge as well as non-Islamic subjects and are highly encouraged to become accustomed to live their lives according to sharia. In general, the process aims to create militant, firm, creative and pious cadres who have a sense of leadership, can resolve emerging problems appearing in their families, society, nation, or state. In particular, this training has as an objective to generate ideal Muslims (*al-Syakhsiyyah al-Muslim al-Mutamayyiz*) who are marked by five qualities (*muwashafat*): *Mukmin, Muslih, Mujahid, Muta'awin*, and *Mutqin*[731]. For HTI,

[731] Other than these designated traits of the ideal Muslim, WI like HTI defines that the ideal female Muslim, for example, should take up public roles without neglecting her main roles in domestic sphere. She has to

the process of self-reform operates through *halaqah* (Islamic study circles). The study circle involves four or five recruits and one supervisor (*mushrifah* for female and *mushrif* for male) and meets about once a week. Recruits study certain books adopted by Hizbut Tahrir (HT), particularly books authored by founder of Hizbut Tahrir, Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani. Through *halaqa,* recruits are expected to understand the ideological, political, and religious beliefs of HT, and simultaneously to implement that knowledge they have gained in their daily lives. The collected information from this research shows that the learning process can take more than one year of study to finish a book. In addition, both *tarbiyah* and *halaqah* are prerequisites that recruits must fulfil before joining the organisation when they are expected to maintain, refresh, and update their knowledge, belief, and ideology.

The obligation to conduct public *da'wa* is based on the *Qur'an* and *hadiths.* In the *Qur'an* and *hadiths,* according to HTI and WI, there are at least three reasons why all Muslims must perform public *da'wa*: all Muslims are expected to embrace goodness and reject badness; all Muslim are *khalifah* (God's representation on Earth) who are responsible for the earth; and all Muslims must contribute to the betterment of others. Alongside these normative reasons, public *da'wa* has the pragmatic goal to recruit new members. In this regard, HTI and WI place a different emphasis on public *da'wa*, in which WI pays more attention to purifying religious rituals such as prayer and fasting from local traditions which are perceived as un-Islamic practices. By contrast, HTI pays more attention to promoting Islam as an ideology and political system, to orientate Indonesians to the need to change the socio-political system to an Islamic state. Thus, HTI believes that to be a truly pious Muslim, it is necessary to create an Islamic state. This is because some religious obligations or regulations cannot be implemented in daily lives without the existence of

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be able to balance household and social responsibilities as well as comply with a set of restrictions when in the public sphere such as not mixing with men without expressed permission from her husband

an Islamic state. However, both HTI and WI share the view that women can only conduct public *da'wa* to other women, not for male audiences.

WI and HTI have relatively similar ways in delivering public *da'wa* such as the weekly study circle, monthly religious meeting, book discussions and teaching sessions (*Tabligh Akbar*), routine religious lectures in schools, on campuses, and in government as well as private institutions, workshops, and seminars. But HTI justifies mass demonstrations as *da'wa* to criticise government policy, to address national and global issues, and to attract public attention, whereas WI rejects the use of mass demonstrations as part of the *da'wa* method. In addition, in WI's case, its women are more creative in performing public *da'wa*, their position as religious preachers is also combined with being religious trainers who are able to communicate profound religious knowledge as well as possess the skill of public speaking. WI women realise that public *da'wa* is not solely about the call for others to true faith and Islamic knowledge transfer, but also about how to communicate and to package Islam in a more contemporary form.

Da'wa activities carried out by women in HTI and WI have contributed to women's empowerment. In general, this is clearly seen from the positive development of women's lives in many aspects, ranging from religious spirituality, religious and general knowledge, to financial independence. For WI women, their involvement in *da'wa* enables them to actualise their self-potential into a set of capacities which can be used to support the success of *da'wa*. These capacities bring about benefits for themselves, their family, and wider society. While for HTI women, the measurement of women's empowerment is in the virtue of women's capability to exercise roles which have been determined by sharia. Understanding women's roles according to Islamic prescription, acknowledging Islam as an ideology and worldview, and having an ideal to establish Islamic state, are signs that women are empowered. Both women in WI and HTI are agent of social change.

Although Islamist women can take up public roles, particularly taking part in public *da'wa*, however, there are a set of restrictions women should be aware of. Both organisations share the view that women's public *da'wa* is only for women, as women should be segregated from men. But if Islamist women have big events such as *tabliq akbar* which also involve men, then women's chairs must be separate from that of men. While WI also requires the use of a curtain to separate men and women HTI does not. Covering *aurat* and having permission from women's spouses are also constraints which women must take into account. Another restriction is that women who perform public *da'wa* over a long distance, must be accompanied by their *muhrim* (chaperones) Lastly, women are not permitted to be leaders over men. Likewise, in practice, the implementation of these constraints is not inflexible. For example, to get a husbands' permission, women do not have to be face to face with their spouse. When their husbands are outside the home, they can use a mobile phone or other devices to advise them or ask permission. Moreover, in WI women are no longer expected to have a chaperone when they engage in public *da'wa* outside Makassar city, currently, there are two districts bordering Makassar city: Gowa and Maros which are excluded. This means that women can perform public *da'wa* in the two districts without *muhrim*.

These above research findings indicates several things. Firstly, although WI and HTI women criticise and reject feminism and gender agendas, as explored in the chapter one and seven, these women acknowledge that women have public roles and responsibilities. Different to feminism, the important and main public role for Islamist women is to perform *da'wa* voluntarily without abandoning their principal domestic roles as wives, mothers, and household manager, as well as women's restrictions enacted by sharia. Paid work for women and their involvement in political participation which are indicators used by United Nation Development Program (UNDP) to measure women's empowerment, are only additional or optional roles for Islamist women. In the sense, WI and HTI women may take up professional work such as being doctor, as long as their attendance at these jobs is really needed. However, while Islamist women can take up public

roles, they still maintain the belief that gender relations should be complementary and the gender division of labour is demarcated such as in the domestic sphere, women's main role as housewives and men's as breadwinners and leaders. This is similar to the traditional gender division which is culturally embedded and practiced in Bugis-Makassar society. The difference between Islamist and culturally specific gender division of labour is that the latter does not recognise women's obligation to conduct public *da'wa* and it is acceptable for women to work outside the home to contribute to the family income.

Secondly, forms of women's empowerment advocated by WI and HTI women cannot be separated from religious orientation. Women's empowerment, thus, cannot be always achieved through economic or political factors. But women's engagement in voluntarily religious activities such as *da'wa* and to conduct their lives according to religious rules and values, can be also deemed as forms of women's empowerment. This is in line with what it was discussed in the chapter seven, that the idea of empowerment has multiple meanings and interpretations, depending on the particular context, time, and place. To measure women's empowerment, there is a need to consider diverse factors including religion. This reminds us of Jawad Syed's critique of the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) used by UNDP, that GEM is Eurocentric and underpinned by capitalist and secular bias with little relevance to non-secular or religion-based society. He suggests that religion and women's unpaid work in household should be taken into account in measuring women's empowerment so that it may be defined as a dynamic social practice that is sensitive to culturally specific context.[732] Thirdly, although WI and HTI women get involved in

[732] He suggests that: 'empowerment may be treated as a dynamic process that involves developing the capacity of women to participate in economic as well as non-economic activities of life, within private and public domains. The dynamic approach is more likely to produce an effectual empowerment strategy and is premised on recognition that the concerned women (must) have the final agency to determine the kind and extent of empowerment they would like to pursue'. Jawad Syed, 'Reconstructing Gender Empowerment', in *Women's Studies International Forum* 33, 2010, p. 292.

male-based Islamist movements, these research findings demonstrate that women are both active and progressive, making fundamentally important contributions to the development of their organisation and as such should not be overlooked. The male members of WI and HTI interviewed in this study, without exception, recognised that women's *da'wa* activities were more creative and progressive than that of men.

Contribution and Limitation

My examination of women's involvement in WI and HTI in Makassar city offers an important contribution to the literature on Islamist social movements, particularly women's participation in these movements, providing an account that delves into women's incentives, benefits, challenges, and women's empowerment. Although there has been scholarly work regarding Islamist movements in Indonesia, women's roles in Islamist movements has received little attention. In fact, women's presence in Islamist organisations is very significant and important. Furthermore, this study contributes to ideas of women's empowerment, by proposing that religious factors and domestic roles can become additional variables in measuring women's empowerment.

There are, at least, two limitations of this research. First is that my fieldwork research was only conducted in Makassar city, and did not include other districts around South Sulawesi province. Further research that might cover other areas of South Sulawesi province as well as other provinces in Indonesia would investigate women's involvement in Islamist movements in different and complex contexts. Secondly, particularly in WI's case, my research has not explored further the implications of the structural change of women's department of WI. In *Muktamar* III (the third Islamic Conference), lasting from 17 to 20 July 2016 in Jakarta, WI Women's proposal to change their name from *Muslimah* Institution (*Lembaga Muslimah*, LM) to Women's WI (Muslimah Wahdah Islamiyah (MWI) Islmiyah, MWI) was approved. This shift was also followed by a change in the women's organisational structure as well as the inclusion of special articles with

respect to women in WI's Constitution. In the future I hope, along with other researchers, to engage in further research that will examine the outcomes of this change with respect to women's participation in WI and how other women or women organisations perceive them. In the HTI case, there is also a need for further research to scrutinise the condition of the HTI's women's movement in the Indonesian public sphere following a ban by the Indonesian Government. In truth, this is merely the beginning, not the end whereby our understanding of women's involvement in Islamist movement is relevant not only to Indonesia but across the Islamic and non-Islamic world.

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