



ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND ITS IMPACT ON RESOURCE

DISTRIBUTION:

***A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KENYA AND OTHER SELECT AFRICAN
COUNTRIES***

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Abstract

This thesis examines the impact of ethnic nationalism on resource distribution, focusing on Kenya and comparing it with other select countries in Africa. The countries in contemporary Africa are characteristically comprised of different ethnic groups, and loyalties to the respective ethnic group sometimes frustrate the country's cohesion and result in some outcomes such as skewed resource distribution. This study adopts a structured-focus approach to examine Nigeria, Ghana, and Cameroon and compares the impact of ethnic nationalism in these countries to Kenya. Study findings show resource distribution along ethnic lines in Nigeria, resulting in unequal resource distribution between the Northerners and Southerners. In Ghana, there is a practice of gift-giving to rally political support. The political party in power usually gets there through support from certain individuals and groups, and after they get to power, they pay back by awarding contracts to their favorites. This results in huge disparities, such as between the Eastern region and the Western region in Ghana. The latter has a poverty rate of 70.9% compared to the national rate of 23.4 percent. Cameroon has the greatest evidence of clientelistic relations. As shown by President Paul Biya, the president in power has formal and informal appointees that are tasked with reinforcing the political power of the president. They do so as puppets of the president and have the mandate to use state resources to benefit the political ambition of the president. Therefore, the citizens that put the president in power and those in support of the leadership get a share of the national resources. At the same time, the opposition group and their followers are left out. The same trend is evidenced in Kenya, where resource distribution depends on the tribe of the individual at the helm of government. Research conducted shows resource distribution in favor of the president's co-ethnics, which shifts with the president's ethnicity. The analysis shows that ethnic nationalism negatively affects equality regarding resource distribution, as evidenced in the four African countries analyzed.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	i
Table of Contents.....	ii
Lists of Tables and Figures	iii
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW	7
CHAPTER 3 – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (NIGERIA, GHANA & CAMEROON)	18
NIGERIA.....	21
GHANA	27
CAMEROON.....	32
CHAPTER 4 - ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN KENYA AND ITS EFFECT ON RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION IN KENYA	37
CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION	57
REFERENCES.....	65

Lists of Tables and Figures

List of Tables

Table 1: Education Department Expenditure by Race, 1930	45
Table 2: Percentage Primary School Enrolment by Province 1969	46
Table 3: Professionally Qualified Teachers in Primary Schools by Province, 1979	46

List of Figures

Figure 1: Map of Nigeria Showing the Broad Distribution of Major Ethnic Groups	23
Figure 2: Comparison of Poverty Incidence Rate between Two Regions in Ghana.....	30
Figure 3: Poverty Incidence in Cameroon per District	35

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

Ethnic nationalism is a form of affiliation where people identify themselves and categorize themselves into groups mainly based on ethnicity. It is an essential concept in the historical analysis of countries and even for a greater appreciation of the sociopolitical processes in a state. In most states, by virtue of being comprised of more than one ethnic group, the term “ethnicity” is frequently associated with negative outcomes and is even perceived as evil (Weber, 2010). While ethnic differences do not result in conflicts in every case, in the majority of cases, the existence of people with distinct ethnic roots, speaking different languages, and with different physical characteristics bound within one country results in ethnic tension and conflict. Civil wars along ethnic lines, such as the struggle in Kosovo, Sudan’s Darfur, Rwanda, and Somalia, appear to confirm this notion (Ibid).

Furthermore, the presence of various ethnic groups in a country has been used to explain civil wars and poor economic growth. According to Easterly and Levine (1997), ethnic diversity is one of the reasons underlying the poor developmental outcomes in Africa. A large number of ethnic groups are considered as impeding several areas of macroeconomic policymaking. People in ethnically diverse countries are perceived to be less inclined to cooperate effectively and more prone to defraud government resources. This is thought to result in more corruption, less macroeconomic stability, and lower economic growth (Ibid).

Furthermore, ethnic groups living in the same territory appear to be less likely to agree on major public-goods investments. Different ethnic groups have different preferences for different sorts of public goods. These preferences may be influenced by the ethnic group’s population makeup, housing location, or lingua franca (Ibid). Different ethnic groups, in particular, appear to have difficulty agreeing on investments in local public goods such as waste collection, roads,

sewers, and school maintenance (Ibid). This is the basis of the idea that ethnic nationalism could potentially impact resource distribution in a country is more detrimental than beneficial ways. The mechanism of resource allocation in countries is heavily dependent on the nature and characteristics of the government. Ethnic nationalism implies a significant affiliation to ethnic groups rather than the state as an amalgamation of the various ethnic groups within it. When this happens, it is the projected hypothesis that resource distribution will be skewed along with the ethnic affiliations.

Scholars generally agree that ethnic nationalism has a potentially negative effect on resource distribution in states (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Mauro, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997). However, the empirical evidence and specific data for various regions are still ambiguous and inconclusive. This thesis seeks to answer the following question: what are the mechanisms by which ethnic nationalism arises and how does it affect resource distribution? In particular, this thesis examines the impact of ethnic nationalism on resource distribution in select countries of Africa (chapter three) and Kenya (chapter four). Through the use of a structured-focus comparison, this paper evaluates the extent to which ethnic nationalism results in clientelistic resource distribution and how resource distribution is affected by the political prominence of ethnicity.

A starting point to this study is an appreciation of the origins of ethnic nationalism and its present characteristic in contemporary societies. Ethnic nationalism arises from the combination of ethnic identification and the state. For African countries, the clash between ethnic identification and the state can be thought to have its origins in the continent's history of colonization. Prior to European settlement and eventual partitioning of Africa, communities existed in tribal groups. European settlement in Africa led to the combination of multiple

ethnicities under the regions established as protectorates. In the fight for independence, these groups united to form self-rule governments. However, after independence, the ethnic identities have become somewhat problematic to the national unity and equitable distribution of power and resources.

Therefore, there appears to be incoherence in most contemporary societies' ethnic identities and nationalist movements. The ethnic group can be viewed as the traditional yet salient way by which people and groups identify themselves. At the same time, the state is the predominant mode of political organization and governance in contemporary societies (Nagi, 1992). As a result, these two are considered conflicting forces, which can have any range of effects. The pervasive effect that is both well researched and evidenced is secession movements and intrastate wars. However, there are other impacts, such as that of domestic economic disparities due to the conflicting nature of ethnic identity over the expectations of the state.

Ethnic nationalism can affect resource distribution in a number of ways. Ethnic nationalism frustrates efforts of a centralized "state" where different ethnicities are supposed to operate as one. As a result, people operate with interests other than the prioritization of statehood. In this setting, the actions of key political leaders first aim to appeal to the people of their ethnic group and put their interests before that of the state as a whole. With the control of resources centralized, there is the possibility of inequalities in their distribution. The expected consequence is that citizens who do not belong to the dominant ethnic group might not receive an allocation of resources compared to those from the dominant ethnic group. Therefore, with higher ethnic diversity, there could be the effect of a substantially lower influx of resources to ethnic groups that are not affiliated with the government or ruling power. This thesis will

examine the link between ethnic diversity and an uneven distribution of resources in various countries, which are ethnically heterogeneous.

In addition to this, ethnic nationalism can breed clientelistic distribution of resources. A clientelistic resource distribution system will typically have uneven economic development. There is anecdotal evidence from developing countries that seems to support the idea that government funding could be directed within the national leader's ethnic clientele. Clientelism is a practice that is associated with the under-supply of goods to all citizens while over-providing goods to specific groups, that is, their ethnic clientele (Ibid). The clientelism argument is a key aspect of this thesis, and the selected countries will be examined for the presence of such relationships. Under this argument, it is expected that ethnic parties distribute resources mainly to people of their ethnic groups, and hence foster better economic outcomes in their regions than other regions. This thesis provides an examination of the particular condition in these countries and aims to provide empirical evidence to show the existence of clientelistic relations.

Another critical mechanism analyzed as an effect of ethnic nationalism is the politicization of ethnic identities. The capacity of ethnicity to influence clientelistic resource distribution or uneven development outcomes is premised on whether ethnicity is a politically prominent factor in the first place (Ibid). Therefore, this thesis examines how ethnic affiliations affect political processes such as voting patterns in the select countries and the impact of these patterns on outcomes of resource distribution. For instance, whether ethnicity is a salient political factor influences how members from different ethnic groups will interact in the local setting. If ethnic identities are sharply divided in politics, inter-ethnic collaboration at the local level may suffer as a result. On the other hand, if ethnicity is not a politically important component, ethnic diversity at the local level will not be seen as a barrier to inter-ethnic cooperation.

However, the critical question remains as to why ethnic identity is politically important in one country but not in another. The evidence explaining ethnic politicization is limited, and it frequently focuses on a country's ethnic structure or the number and size of ethnic groups (Posner, 2005). Furthermore, considerable evidence exists on the usefulness of nation-building measures in reducing ethnicity's political importance (Miguel, 2004). However, there is room to discuss and analyze other key explanatory elements of ethnic politicization and the interrelationship between these aspects.

Therefore, in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, evidence from a comparative study in select African countries and Kenya is used to trace various explanatory factors that could contribute to the levels of politicization experienced in these countries. The structured-focus approach allows for the examination of these countries from the same perspective and assessing the underlying causal mechanisms through which the level of politicization of ethnicity is witnessed in this country. Specifically, chapter 4 traces the evolution of politicization in Kenya using detailed historical accounts with a case-specific causal point of view that helps improve a general understanding of the cause of politicization of ethnicity in the country compared to the other African states. The chapters describe the role of the structure of ethnicity, the colonial history, land distribution and various key policies post-independence for the level of the political salience of ethnicity in the country.

This thesis is organized in the following order. Chapter 2 consists of a literature review that delineates the concept of ethnic nationalism and the selection criteria of cases to be used in this thesis. Chapter 3 offers an analysis of three select African states to identify ethnic nationalism in these countries and their impact on clientelistic relations and resource distribution. Chapter 4 focuses on Kenya to show the causes of the political salience of ethnicity and how it

affects resource distribution and the development of clientelistic relationships. Chapter 5 provides a summary and conclusion of this thesis.

CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW

The formation of a state typically involves various processes that are unique to the particular country and take various forms. The analysis of the state is done in relation to what is expected of a state in terms of what it should be and what it should do (Pierson, 2012). A second perspective on analysis of the state is through an examination of states are actually like and this is the more preferred method of inquiry adopted by political scientists and sociologists (Ibid). In view of the modern state, these two forms of analysing the state focus on the means adopted by the state and the other is focused on its functions, respectively. Therefore, here there are two schools of thought on how to comprehend states, the first is in terms of its constitution and the second is based on its functions.

Scholars such as Max Weber, a German political sociologist and economic historian, support the first school of thought. He presented the argument that a state cannot be defined in terms of its ends but rather based on the specific means by which it is unique (Ibid). This understanding is important because it helps in the appreciation of the impact the state has on various concepts that are critical to the everyday life of its citizens. The mechanisms of the state influence monopoly, which is the means of controlling violence, territoriality, sovereignty, constitutionality, impersonal power, public bureaucracy, legitimacy/ authority and citizenship. Pierson, adds taxation as the ninth category of most significant characteristics in the mechanisms of a state. Therefore, the state can be defined in terms of the influence it exerts over these nine issues (Ibid).

The analysis of the state requires a comparison between the nature of the traditional state and the modern state. Fundamentally, the modern state is a novel social development which means, influenced by social issues. The modern state is introduced as a distinct and relatively

new entity, which can be traced back to no more than 300 years ago. Before the modern state, the traditional state took various forms such as the form of city-states and empires (Ibid). These traditional states were not bound by territorial borders that are clear but on more indeterminate frontiers (Ibid). The states in this pre-modern time are characterised by lack of conceptions such as those of sovereignty, monopolistic authority, constitutionality and nationalist as evidenced in the modern state (Ibid). This background is important to appreciate when discussing how states came to be and how they function to meet their objectives. For example, it calls upon the determination of the background issues that surround the formation of the state in modern times and how they influence the state's capacity to influence various social and economic issues.

The underlying influences in a state determine how the authority exercises power and how it achieves various objectives in the state. There are key concepts that need to be understood to appreciate the nature of states. First, despite the general use of the word "state" and "nation", they do not mean the same thing. The "state" refers to a physical and tangible thing which is a region defined within a certain territory (Connor, 1970). The state can be defined as having a certain territory, specific population or government. On the other hand, a nation is psychological rather than tangible and is a matter of attitude and not fact (Ibid). Despite the fact that any given nation may be characterized in terms of physical phenomena such as its population, linguistic, and religious composition, comparative studies show that no single tangible attribute or combination of traits is required for the formation of a nation. Therefore, tangible properties are a prerequisite for the creation of a state while on the other hand it is the feelings of the people, which are intangible, that determine the nation.

In cases where members of a certain group feel that they are culturally distinct from other people and places significance on the tangible and intangible characteristics of the group than

those shared with other people, the group can then be termed as a nation (Ibid). Therefore, the sentiment of the people constituting a nation is important in its formation and in its sustenance. On the other hand, the state can exist, even for some time, without the goodwill of all its populations and even amidst negative attitudes among a majority of its inhabitants (Ibid). This is not possible in a nation that has psychological endorsement at the basis of its formation and an integral part of its essence. The distinction between these two words is important in scholarly and state work that involves nationalism and its consequences (Ibid). These discourses require a clear distinction of the terms and their differences are not mere semantics. Rather, the feelings of individuals or groups to the nation and to the state are determined as being different and to some extent, in conflict. This further shows that while there is a definite number of states that are easily identifiable, there may be an indefinite number of nations, which are constantly varying depending on the feelings of the inhabitants of various regions. This understanding of the concept of the “nation” as distinct from “state” is a basis for a proper understanding of what nationalism is and its impact in understanding domestic and global politics.

Nationalism is a political principle, which postulates that the political and national unit need to be congruent. It is a sentiment or movement that can either be in the form of satisfaction if fulfilled or result in anger if it is violated. Ernest (1983) suggests ways in which the nationalist principle can be violated such as when the boundaries of a state fail to include members of a particular state or include some foreigners within it. It can also fail in both of these ways. From this understanding, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy in which it is necessary that the ethnic boundaries do not misalign with political ones (Ibid). This essentially means that the national principle comes alive where there is an ethical and universalistic spirit. The problem arises when there is a much higher number of potential nations compared to viable states, which

results in the social condition where it is not possible to satisfy all nationalisms at the same time. Therefore, in the political association of a state, there typically arises a nationalist sentiment that is angry because of the violations brought about by the amalgamation of various different nationalisms in one.

This violation of the nationalist principle is typical in various countries worldwide. For instance, African nations, as currently constituted, are the result of colonial powers' scramble and partition of the continent. The effect is that the state boundaries cut across different ethnicities, which according to Ernest becomes a potential source of anger rather than the satisfaction of a number of citizen groups. This is a recipe for negative sentiments within the nation and affects the various aspects of human conduct within the state. Therefore, in the analysis of the nature of states, it is important to consider whether the nationalistic principle is premised on civic values hence civic nationalism, or ethnic values hence ethnic nationalism (Ibid).

In the formation of states and political organizations – e.g., political parties – ethnicity is one of the underlying identities that patrons in various countries can choose from (Bachus, 2019). Ethnicity is a political force, which patrons in countries consider that serves their political ambitions. First, with ethnicity on their side, they are able to better foster trust (Ibid). Ethnicity also brings about greater exclusivity by which patrons can keep political office hence they make determinations aimed at including some ethnic groups and excluding others (Ibid). Thirdly, ethnicity is preferred because of its capacity to overcome the commitment problem associated with clientelism (Ibid). By having ethnicity on their side, the political actors can promise goods to clients in exchange for more votes by which they keep political power. Therefore, the political patrons choose to rely on ethnic identities to build their political power

because of the relatively low costs of maintaining these connections (Ibid). It is a relied-upon social construct also because it evolves slowly and can allow for permanence of the political power. Therefore, there is confidence of forging an enduring ethnic network and consequently political influence. Ethnic identity development and its preference in the political setting has economic implications because the political patrons rely on the ethnic identities for transactional reasons. Therefore, the increase in ethnic salience will ultimately lead to increase in privileged political access to economic rents (Ibid).

Therefore, countries around the world qualify as states because of territorial borders or one government that unites a certain group of people. However, for the state to be considered a nation, it is a requirement that the members have a feeling of connection to each member sufficient to see them as one of their own as opposed to others. These ideas have an effect on political control and the nature in which political power plays out in countries. From the concepts of the “state” and “nation” as defined in this chapter, it is possible to identify a country where ethnic nationalism is likely to have a significant impact on its internal affairs and provides a basis for analyzing political, economic, and social implications of these nationalistic feelings.

In the analysis of modern-day societies, it is important to analyze the contrasting nature of ethnic differentiation from the state with its central political organization and governance (Nagi, 1992). These two features found in various nations and the conflictual forces they engender underlie political instability in the various ways it is evidenced in these countries. It could manifest in secessionist movements and civil wars within these countries (Ibid). There typically is a clash between state movements and ethnic nationalist movements with significant human costs resulting from these movements. There are structural considerations by which an

assessment can be made to determine the extent to which ethnic affiliations influence feelings of nationalism as opposed to loyalty to the state.

Nagi uses six guiding questions to assess the nature of ethnic identification and nationalist movements. The aim is to assess the interaction between ethnic affiliations and the state. Therefore, Nagi presents a framework for the understanding of ethnic nationalism in terms of the factors that strengthen or diminish ethnic nationalism (Ibid). This can offer an understanding of the causes of strong ethnic feelings in some regions while other regions, such as the United States, do not experience strong ethnic feelings and are able to bring together diverse groups towards state goals. The first consideration in Nagi's model is the number of coterminous characteristics in which it is proposed that when most of these characteristics overlap the result is stronger ethnic identification. Simply put, having overlapping lines of ethnic identification has the effect of lowering tensions between groups. The second proposition in the model is that ethnic identification depends on the extent to which the differences are institutionalized in laws and rules, and the extent of social and residential mobility. In cases where the characteristics of a state promote residential segregation or ethnic differences in legal and normative rules, the result is greater stratification on the basis of ethnicity.

From this understanding, the next consideration is how ethnic identification to a level of "consciousness" that can be mobilized politically. This necessitates an understanding of the definition of nationalism. For this purpose, the most applicable definition is that of Anthony Smith which defines nationalism as an ideological movement that aims to attain and maintain autonomy, unity and individuality of a group whose members believe in their capacity for self-governance (1994). As per this definition, there are three basic goals of nationalist movements and they include self-governance, having a territorial home, and a unique ethnic history.

Therefore, a third proposition from Nagi's model of ethnic nationalism is that it is positively correlated with a real or perceived deprivation in the distribution of resources relative to a dominant group. The fourth proposition in the model is that a shift from ethnic-based to functionality-based ideals is associated with economic development. The fifth proposition asserts that there is a positive association between group competition over roles and resources to economic development. This model also theorizes that ethnic nationalism has positive correlation with uneven development, which causes inter-regional or inter-state dependency on economic aspects. This model is useful in understanding the evolution of ethnic identities into nationalism movements

Clientelism is an important concept to define and comprehend in this study. It is generally agreed that it is common practice for politicians to provide goods or commodities to citizens of their ethnic group (Wang and Kolev, 2019). Clientelism is the practice of politicians directly providing goods and services to individuals and other groups to rally them to support them through votes in elections. A clientelistic relationship has voters who expect certain goods that are provided to party supporters only while the voters who are engaged in a programmatic accountability system can only benefit from a broad policy package (Ibid). Similarly, both clientelism and programmatic competition are rational and deliberate efforts of the principal to agent relationship by which accountability can be fostered (Ibid). It is the assumption of an instrumentalist theory of ethnicity that ethnicity serves as a heuristic way by which parties can identify potential supporters (Ibid). In this setting, political actors aim to attract votes along ethnic lines while voters expect benefits that are targeted at ethnic groups. These theories can apply to the analysis of whether an ethnically heterogeneous society attracts clientelism more than ethnically homogenous ones.

Multinational states have the characteristic of being ethnically diverse. According to Weber (2010), ethnic diversity is widely considered to be an impeding factor in the modern state particularly because it arises multiple loyalties, which can derail the possibility of a unified nation. For instance, Ernest (1983) takes the position that achieving nationalism requires the political and national unit to be congruent. From this perspective, having people with different ethnic origins, who speak different languages, and affiliate with different religions living in one state that seeks to operate towards common interests is considered the cause of ethnic conflicts. A commonality of civil wars is in most cases rooted in ethnic diversity. History has shown this to be a fact for example in the wars of Kosovo, the Darfur conflict in Sudan and Rwandan genocide (Ibid). Therefore, the claim that ethnic diversity is a threat in developing societies implies the need for controlled systems to check the impact of ethnic nationalism.

Economic growth is a second consideration in the determination of the negative effects of ethnicity. According to Easterly and Levine (1997), ethnic diversity is a significant factor to consider in understanding the 'growth' tragedy in the African continent. An analysis of the various nations in the continent reveals that the high number of ethnic groups often impedes macroeconomic policy formulation and implementation. The outcome of assessments by these scholars demonstrates that countries, which have various ethnic groups, are less inclined to cooperate as one and there is a greater possibility of the fraudulent use of resources. In this context, there is a greater likelihood of corrupt practices, macroeconomic instability, and slow economic growth. This is a perspective shared by a number of scholars such as Alesina and Drazen and Mauro . These ideologies necessitate the study of the correlation between ethnic diversity and economic outcomes of a nation.

Furthermore, ethnic groups living in the same territory appear to be less likely to agree on major public-goods investments. Different ethnic groups have different preferences for different sorts of public goods. These preferences may be influenced by the ethnic group's population makeup, housing location, or lingua franca. Different ethnicities, in particular, appear to have difficulty agreeing on spending on local public utilities such as garbage collection, road and sewer maintenance, and education programs. For this perspective to become plausible there is, a need to identify a correlation between ethnic diversity and nationalism to the point of having political, social, and economic ramifications (Ibid).

The literature review reveals ethnic nationalism as a form of political expression among people who allude more significance to their ethnic groups than territorial characteristics by which they belong to a state. This phenomenon occurs in various places with various impacts such as complicating political processes usually with adverse outcomes. These outcomes are negative where there is a conflict of allegiance to the state and allegiance to the nation. The nature of ethnic nationalism is that the allegiance to the ethnic group conflicts with any possible loyalties to the state. The result is that a state, which is idealized to act as one, does not operate on a common front. Compounded by the realities of the state's political system that tries to impose a common government and jurisdiction, the result of ethnic nationalism is adverse outcomes. Works by different scholars as discussed in this paper have shown the political "ugliness" that arises from ethnic nationalism and the conflict that ensues out of it (Ibid). This current study is undertaken to look at how these political ramifications of ethnic nationalism project onto economic issues such as resource distribution.

It is the theoretical assumption in this study that in states that are ethnically diverse, political actors are more often than not likely to embrace ethnic identities to gain political capital.

Bachus (2019) adopts a simple constructivist model of ethnic identity development, which is applicable in this current study. This research project is intended at assessing the impact of ethnic nationalism on resource distribution in Kenya and compare it with select countries within Africa. The constructivist model of ethnic identity development can explain the linkage between political players' use of ethnic identities and the economic ramifications (Ibid). Therefore, ethnicity becomes a salient feature in these states and is exploited politically for transactional reasons. The constructivist model of ethnic identity development follows a three-step progression in which rents expand, the patrons target co-ethnic constituencies, and the prominence of ethnic networks increases (Ibid).

It is the basis of this model that ethnically diverse societies unlike ethnically homogenous ones will experience this ethnic progression. Therefore, in terms of scope, ethnic nationalism and its economic impact is to be expected in ethnically diverse societies. For example, in countries such as Madagascar where the Malagasy are the main ethnic group, there is no likely advantage of aligning with ethnic lines (Ibid). However, there are distinct accents and cultural habits by which the country can be divided along sub-cultural identities and hence construct different identities (Ibid). The use of ethnic identities by political patrons necessitates having rents by which they can buy loyalty from constituents. This means, the political elite have resources, which they can distribute at their discretion. Therefore, the progression follows that with the salience of ethnic nationalism in a country, the resource distribution follows a similar trend to buy loyalty from the constituents.

In this research paper, an analysis is made on ethnic nationalism in African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Cameroon, and compares these nations to the situation in Kenya. The paper takes the approach of a case study analysis with a particular focus on the African

continent. It is the basic assumption that the state boundaries in Africa depict an amalgamation of different ethnicities, which has potential for multiple nationalisms. Following the ethnic constructivist model adopted by Bachus (2019), an examination can be made on the linkage between the salience of ethnic identities as a critical feature exploited by the political elite to gain loyalty. These elite have at their discretion resources or the power to distribute resources that they can use to repay the loyalty. Therefore, the political elite and its impact on resource distribution aim the analysis of these countries at revealing the salience of ethnic identities, their exploitation.

CHAPTER 3 – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (NIGERIA, GHANA & CAMEROON)

For the analysis of ethnic nationalism and its impact on resource distribution and clientelism, the framework of analysis will be based on the structured-focus comparison. In a structured, focus comparison, the research inquires into certain questions to reflect the research objective, and the questions are asked of each case hence acting as a guide for data collection and standardizing the type of data collected (George and Bennett, 2005). Using this technique allows for systematic comparison and accumulation of findings from the wide range of cases identified. The technique of data collection is “focused” such that it only deals with certain aspects of the cases selected (Ibid). The requirement of structure and focus according to this analytical framework allows for the assessment to be applied equally to any range of different cases which can be enjoined for analysis.

The structured, focused comparison qualifies the case study approach by defining the metrics of every assessment hence ensuring standardization and utility of data collected. It is a useful design to appreciate occurrences in individual cases, which can be developed into a wider and more complex theory (Ibid). The structured, focus comparison improves on the conventional case study method, which does not provide a single standard for comparison. The structured, focus comparison eliminates this problem by setting a metric by which every case being used in the study is to be analyzed to appreciate certain findings which can fit into a certain theory that can be uniformly applied in other cases.

There are two characteristics of the structured, focus comparison by which it is a more advanced model than the case study approach and more suited for this analysis. First, the structured, focus comparison requires the use of standardized, general questions for every case (Ibid). The questions are carefully formulated to align with the research aims and theoretical

focus. With the set of general questions, it becomes possible to acquire data that is comparable to the comparative studies. The second characteristic is that the structured, focus comparison framework narrows down to a single objective and theoretical focus (Ibid). In this study, the research objective is to study ethnic nationalism and its impact on resource distribution through a comparison of Kenya and other select African countries. In terms of the structure of the analytical framework, the standard is to use African countries where there is a likelihood of ethnic nationalism.

The following questions will guide the analysis according to the structured focus comparison method:

- i. What is the level of diversity in the selected country - i.e., are there multiple ethnic groups that are likely to have ethnic loyalties and, frustrate the efforts of national cohesion?
- ii. What is the political organization adopted in the country and how does it magnify the impact of ethnic nationalism?
- iii. What are the effects of ethnic nationalism in these countries, in terms of resource distribution as evidenced by education, land ownership, and key infrastructure in the country?
- iv. How do clientelistic relationships emerge in these countries?

Therefore, the first step is the analysis of the origin of ethnic heterogeneity in these African countries. According to James Coleman (1994), nationalism in the African continent can be traced back to the fight for self-governance from colonial rule. Therefore, the concept of ethnic nationalism is likely to be found in the countries where there was an alliance of groups to fight for independence. The research focuses on the impact of the alliances on the political

processes of these countries post-independence and, ultimately, the effect they have on resource distribution. Therefore, the logic followed in the analysis is to first identify nations that underwent the partitioning process as European countries sought colonies in Africa. The process of the scramble and partition of Africa created countries, which from an ethnic perspective led to amalgamations of different groups. These groups formed alliances under one or more banners in the fight for independence. The study then analyzes how effective the alliances have been in creating political unity after independence. With the hypothesis that loyalties to the multiple identities exist in the political alliances, the study investigates the impact the loyalties have on the distribution of resources. Therefore, the study checks for the existence of clientelistic relations and distribution of resources to reflect the multiple identities amalgamated in the political alliances in all the countries identified. This can be used to meet the research objective of investigating the impact of ethnic nationalism on resource distribution and clientelism.

There is evidence of electoral clientelism in many African states such as Ghana, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Kenya; the former three being the focus of this section. They will later be compared to the status in Kenya. These are countries that are comprised of multiple ethnic groups and can help show the possibility of ethnic nationalism and how it affects the national spirit and potential impact on resource distribution. It is the basic assumption of this research that ethnic nationalism arises in close connection with a history of colonial rule. In addition, it is postulated that ethnic nationalism is an issue in ethnically heterogeneous countries where there is the likelihood of conflicting loyalties among the population. Therefore, Ghana, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Kenya are identical in these basic assumptions of having a past of colonial rule and being ethnically heterogeneous. The British colonized Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya while Cameroon was under German rule during the colonial period. The use of countries colonized by

the British and those colonized by the Germans allows the analysis to have a sense of uniformity on the effect of colonization on ethnic nationalism.

NIGERIA

The analysis of Nigeria as a multi-ethnic state lays the background to appreciate how multiple ethnicities come to exist in the African states. Ethnic nationalities within the state are deeply entrenched in the colonial history of the continent and persist in modern countries, as demonstrated by the nature of the political parties. With politics divided along ethnic lines, the administrations in these respective countries end up with biased policies and efforts with the result of the disproportionate distribution of resources. According to a study by Raphael Franck and Ilia Rainer (cited in Isaksson and Bigsten, 2017), sharing ethnicity with the national political leader has effects on educational outcomes and levels of infant mortality. Pre-natal care and education are among the most basic factors by which the standards of living of people can be assessed or influenced. Notably, education is a determinant of development as there is a strong correlation between education and economic development.

The Biafra war is an excellent example of the tensions that build up during colonialism. During British rule over Nigeria, the northern areas were secluded from the southern and eastern regions. The wealth distribution became skewed as a result. For instance, the Igbo people who hailed from the Southeast region experienced prosperity due to the presence of petroleum and palm oil resources (Uchendu, 2007). In contrast, the Hausa in the Northern region and Yoruba in the Southwest were economically deprived. Therefore, the decentralization of the Igbo due to location, religion, and wealth, resulted in their labeling as outsiders. The 1966 civil war in Nigeria was the result of this ethnic tension as a Hausa-controlled government taking drastic steps to eliminate the Igbo population after its attempts to secede and form the Biafra nation

(Ibid) characterized it. In the war period, over one million Igbo people were starved to death in a tactic known as Kwashiorkor (Ibid). Therefore, in the case of Nigeria, the history of ethnic disputes can be seen to evolve from colonialism and grow to become a significant issue after independence and have adverse outcomes in terms of the distribution of resources. The plight of the Igbo is the result of a different ethnic group being at the helm of government and using its power against people from different ethnic groups.

The ethnic nationalism issue in Africa seems to originate in the colonial period and plays out in contemporary societies. Nigeria is one African country in which the forces of ethnic nationalism play out to date and can be seen to influence almost all aspects of societal development. An evaluation of Nigeria's history reveals that the colonial rule resulted in divergent territories occupied by different ethnicities being brought under a unitary system (Bello, 2018). This becomes the origin of ethnic tensions that have had myriad implications in various aspects of the country until today. The British amalgamated the Northern, Southern, and Lagos protectorate into one in 1914 with the intention of serving their interests of easing administration by the British government (Ibid). The amalgamation did not involve any of the ethnic nationalities affected. Before the Europeans' influence, the country's nature was that the Fulani and Hausa tribes occupied the northern regions, the Yorubas occupied the Western region, and the Igbos dominated the Eastern part of the country (Ibid). There existed regional divisions, which, upon uniting them, resulted in ethnic tensions and rivalries. The British administrators were interested in transforming the country's outlook from ethnic identity to regional identity to gain political control. The aftermath for the country is that it became the origin of the struggle for power and resource control split along ethnic lines.

The difficulty with the federal structure was that it not only inequitably absorbed minorities into ethnically controlled regional bastions, but it also created a disproportionately large northern area that encompassed about three-quarters of Nigeria's territory and nearly half of its population (Solomon and Leith, 2000). The Christian south feared the more populous and Muslim north, while the economically poorer north feared the better-educated south, resulting in a more savage competition for political advantage among the regions (Ibid.). As a result, the three regions appear to be at odds with one another. All the enmity is heavily predicated on the ethnical nationalistic feelings and impacts resource distribution.

Figure removed due to copyright restriction.

Figure 1: Map of Nigeria Showing the Broad Distribution of Major Ethnic Groups

Source: Lodson et al., 2018

The outcome, which is evident in post-independence Nigeria, is a consistent struggle amid these major ethnic groups to take control of the political power. Political power determines the control of numerous resources. Hence, every ethnic group wants to capture political power (Bello, 2018). In Nigeria's first republic, the political parties were formed along ethnic lines in a

tripartite nature that spurred ethnic rivalry and political struggles that primarily showed ethno-regional interests rather than a common interest of the state. The second republic took the same ethnic-regional identity, albeit with different names, and sorted the interests of their respective tribes. The Northern region NPC party transformed to become the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) although it had a national stance. Its founders were the northerners, and it represented the interests of the Fulani/Hausa tribes. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) had the interests of the Western regions, and Nigeria People's Party (NPP) had the Southeastern political party outlook and represented the Igbos. Therefore, it becomes apparent that the political associations in the country were based and divided along ethnic affiliations.

The Third Republic in Nigeria held a promise of crushing the tripartite ethnic politics in the country by introducing a two-party political system. These two parties were the National Republican Convention (NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP). Both of these parties had a northerner as either presidential or vice-presidential candidate, and it can be argued that it had no ethnic underpinnings (Ibid). Therefore, in the Third Republic, the country held the promise of espousing a national rather than ethno-regional outlook. However, the election was annulled to protect the political hegemony of the North. The annulment led to the resuscitation of the ethnic suspicion and rivalry of the three ethnic groups. The South-West regions felt cheated.

It is postulated that stimulating ethnic awareness turns into conflict with the aim to gain maximally from the scarce societal resources. This is so because the more aware people are of their ethnic differences, the more divided the nation becomes. The magnification of ethnic differences increases the people's tendency to think along ethnic lines even in the electoral processes and instituting state leaders. In the case of Nigeria, the Northerners sought to prevent the slip of power to the West by which they could retain control of resources. This is the reason

underlying ethnic-based political associations and loyalties. Every ethnic group seeks to align with their ethnic leader or a particular leader that will rule in a manner that is favourable to this particular ethnic group. The leader of any country has political power, which can be used to influence the distribution of resources. With leaders having strong affiliation to certain ethnic groups rather than the state as a whole, there is the result of disproportionate economic outcomes.

The geographical distribution of ethnic groups in Nigeria culminates in disparities in economic outcomes. For instance, the people from the Niger-Delta region are characterized by deprivation compared to other ethnic groups in the country. The colonial administration favoured the three dominant groups, leaving out the minority groups that occupied the Niger-Delta region (Oluwaniyi, 2011). Therefore, during the colonial administration and its aftermath, these minority groups suffered injustices that form the bane of the Niger-Delta struggles. Notably, there is the issue of environmental degradation, such as oil spillage, which has severely affected the livelihood of the people in the region (Ibid). There has been suppression by the military regimes, which stems directly from ethnic disparities. In turn, there have been numerous agitations and incessant violence in the region.

The situation in Niger Delta results from decades of frustration and deprivation due to neglect that traces back to the political administration. According to research conducted on the status of the people in the Niger Delta, their struggles are the result of the need for equity and self-determination (Ibid). The condition of the Niger-Delta residents is a lack of political participation and democratic accountability, which is the basis for lack of development and widespread poverty (Ibid). The governing political parties in the region and hence the ruling class are mainly comprised of majority groups, leaving behind minorities (Ibid). The result is that

minorities such as the Niger-Delta people develop feelings of distrust and a general dearth of patriotism (Ibid). Therefore, the issues of ethnic nationalism and resource distribution correlate. Ethnic nationalism results in the deprivation of certain groups, and when these groups suffer injustice and inequalities, they revolt against the dominant groups, which frustrates statehood. There are implications of these ethnic feelings in the post-colonial state and contemporary Nigeria.

The influence of ethnic nationalities can explain the education and systemic group inequalities in the country. Nigeria is considered the country with the highest rates of educational inequalities in the continent. One critical aspect of the inequalities is that the Northerners are found to receive significantly less education than Southerners. According to Rustad and Ostby (2017), the regional inequalities culminating in differences in education completion rates can be traced back to the early 1900s. During the colonial period, the British exercised indirect rule, which means they ruled primarily through the agency of the existing rulers, thus subject to the constraints of the colonial government. The indirect rule policy in the north allowed for the continuation of the traditional Emirate system, i.e., a Caliphate with local emirates. In the South, however, there were few existing political entities, so locally warranted chiefs leaned further towards British educational and economic systems. These contrasting responses of Northern and Southern peoples to Western modernity, particularly education, are largely explained by these divergent paths to social mobility and nobility. In terms of educational outcomes, the same trend of poorer outcomes for Northerners compared to southerners persists. The wide educational gap between Northerners and Southerners in Nigeria can be attributed to the different responses of the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo to colonial rule and missionary activities. It is also attributable

to the differences in ethnic value systems, their motivations and different abilities to adapt to new circumstances brought about by Western education, philosophies and value systems.

GHANA

Most African countries are nominally democratic, with leaders elected through the popular vote but electoral clientelism as an expression of ethnic nationalism persists. Therefore, while public participation is valued in these countries, there are avenues by which democracy can be limited. Public participation through democracy allows for the efficient harnessing of the energy of all citizens in the making of the republic. However, this process of public participation can be corrupted, leaving room for ethnic-based participation and clientelism. It is a common characteristic in these states to provide material rewards as a way for the politicians to secure votes in patronage democracies. Gadjanova (2017) posits that the electoral politics in Africa are clientelist, and the politicians are expected to rely on patronage networks for political support. He uses Ghana as an example of clientelist relationships and examines the possible detriment to the provision of public goods and democratic stability as goods become concentrated in specific geographical regions while others are left lacking.

The selected example is of two districts in Ghana's Upper East region. In this region, there is pressure to appease the citizens using material inducements; hence, gift-giving shows status, authority, and political viability (Ibid). The voters select a candidate based on suitability, which they assess, the individual's past record on giving and attitudes towards the broader policies of other parties. Therefore, with an increase in voter sophistication, the parties move towards deliberation of policies and ideological differentiation, which co-exists with the practice of providing public goods as political leverage.

Evidence from Ghana shows that electoral clientelism persists for status affirmation in regions where gift-giving is normalized and anticipated, but the elections are still competitive. Gifts show the viability, leadership ability, popularity, and concern for the individual voters but are not on their own sufficient to guarantee victory (Ibid). This is attributed to the secrecy of the ballot and tactics from the opposition. This raises concern over the role of gifts, which appear to be one-sided and do not fit the definition of clientelism (Ibid). The condition in Ghana is perceived as status-affirmative electoral clientelism but still has implications on redistribution and accountability (Ibid). Since electoral handouts can co-exist with the deliberation of real issues within political parties, then it becomes possible that there are further consequences of the practice, even if it is not intended on a direct exchange of voter loyalty. For instance, there is the possible creation of an incentive to extract rents locally or from state coffers to recover expenses incurred during campaigns (Ibid). In the long term, the practice reinforces the need for accumulation and parading of personal wealth. Public institutions become an opportunity for enrichment, and over time, there develops a culture of a lack of ethics among civil servants.

In the case of Ghana, studies show that money plays a significant role during primaries. Therefore, the politics in the state are clientelistic, but the intent and role of material inducements vary during the entire electoral process (Ibid). Therefore, in countries where vote-buying is pervasive, but voting is secret, the aim is not only to win the support of the citizens, but also to undermine the effectiveness of the material rewards offered by the opponents. As material inducements become less effective, parties seek new linkage strategies to persuade voters (Ibid). Such policies are targeting constituencies with a preference for redistribution. For instance, in Northern Ghana, the policies are presented to farmers and youth and effectively capture the

loyalty of voters (Ibid). Politicians' strategies to gain voter loyalty are significant on the quality of democracy, the nature of political administration, and other outcomes.

In recent times, two main political groups – the NDC and NPP – dominate Ghana's political environment. While there is a vibrant democracy, the elections are “winner takes all” (Mills, 2018). The spoils include the right to appoint presidential staff, appoint ministers, board members, and the most important right is to award contracts. NDC's stronghold is the Volta and Northern Regions while NPP's stronghold is the Ashanti Region. The Accra Metropolis, Central, and Western Regions are swing regions (Ibid). While the leaders do not draw support from any specific socio-economic group, there is evidence of inefficiency and a system that impedes inclusive and broad-based development (Ibid). This is because, the political power in the parties, is centered on a fan base of most loyal supporters. As a result, contracts are awarded to individuals and groups that appear sympathetic to the political party in the administration. Contracts awarded under the previous administration are often forcibly renegotiated or canceled (Ibid). Therefore, the state of infrastructure projects suffers from the changes at every eight-year cycle of power alternation between the two main parties.

In Ghana, there is unbalanced development evidenced by huge disparities across the regions. For instance, the national poverty rate in 2016-2017 was 23.4 percent (Bathuure et al., 2020). The western region reflects this similarity being at 21.1 percent during the same period. However, the Upper West region, which is geographically and politically alienated, has an unconscionably disparate rate of 70.9 percent (Ibid). These two regions, within the same country, have a distinct difference that demonstrates the vast economic inequality in the country. The figure 2 below shows the poverty incidence in Ghana and how it appears in various regions in Ghana.




Figure 2: Comparison of Poverty Incidence Rate between Two Regions in Ghana

Source: Mills (2018)

The trend leading to the uneven development style depicted in Figure 2 fits in the concept of the Ghanaian paradox. The economy in Ghana appears to be vibrant and typically achieved respectable growth rates. There is an intensive investment in production, housing, and transport infrastructure yet the economy remains crushing with debt and unemployment (Mills, 2018). A key characteristic is the skewed nature of income distribution. The majority of the population remains impoverished. The state can be attributed to the challenge that exists within the form of political formation which while democratic has its inherent challenges. The main issues include: “pay to play”, cronyism, and influence peddling (Ibid). The political system is where contracts are exclusively awarded to party financiers, faithful fanbases, and to family members (Ibid). In

Ghana, ethnic affiliations have a much less role than other places in Africa but party affiliations remain strong and passionate and often result in clientelistic relations and hence inequality in income and resource distribution. However, ethnic-based rivalry is still existent and impacts resource distribution in the country.

Ethnic-inspired rivalry is evidenced through the Ashanti group that is the major producer of cocoa, the country's primary export and the Akan group known to be having most members from the educated elite including Kwame Nkrumah, the country's founding father. The Ashanti people are hence seen as the economic and industrial powerhouse while the Akan people hold political power (Ilorah, 2009). Nkrumah's Akan-led government taxed cocoa producers severely through a Cocoa Marketing Board from 1957 to 1966, effectively fixing the producer price of cocoa in the process (Easterly and Levine, 1997). The hefty tax burden on cocoa farmers was only eased when Ghana was ruled by an Ashanti-based government from 1969 to 1971, led by Kofi Busia. The government of Busia attempted to re-incentivize cocoa growers by raising producer prices and paying farmers close to market-determined rates for their harvests. The government also depreciated the country's overvalued currency, which helped boost cocoa exports (Ibid). When the military drove Busia from office in 1971, his efforts to expand cocoa production were overturned.

The military authority partially reversed the currency depreciation, favoring the political elite and their ethnic followers who were involved in foreign goods importation (Ibid). At the same time, cocoa production's contribution to farmer income and national income declined dramatically. For example, the producer price to world market price ratio of cocoa fell from 89 percent in 1949 to just 6% in 1983, while cocoa exports' contribution to GDP fell from 19 percent in 1955 to just 3% in 1983. (Ibid). Even the recent accession to power of President John

Kufour, an Ashanti, has not appreciably reduced ethnic enmity in Ghana, since many Ghanaians perceive it as heralding the Ashanti ethnic group's hegemony, which already outnumbers other ethnic groups in terms of economic and industrial strength. As a result, other ethnic groups are envious and hostile.

CAMEROON

In Cameroon, there is an exemplary indication of how clientelism plays out in the highest political ranks of the country. Cameroon is analyzed to depict the status of Central and Western Francophone Africa (Mişcoiu and Kakdeu, 2021). The analysis has an overtone of colonial rule because it addresses the situation in Cameroon as being similar to other countries that the French colonized. Mişcoiu and Kakdeu (2021) argue that despite repeated efforts to reinforce the local power structures, there is a continued practice of clientelism, which is centred on presidential 'creatures'. The country has 'creatures' who are President Paul Biya's formal and informal appointees (Ibid). The president has political and constitutional power to make appointments to various positions of power in the administration. Still, the analysis demonstrates a possible allegiance to the "creator," hence the possibility of failing to meet the needs of the citizens.

Mişcoiu and Kakdeu (2021) set forth focus groups on determining the role played by the 'creatures' of the president in Cameroon. The primary image of the 'creatures' is that they are distant masters of puppets that hold too high positions to be involved with essential political agents and voters¹. The 'creatures' carry the president's mandate and can effectively use his name to quell clashes and restore orders in regions with concerns over access to resources. They preserve the president's authority over various territories and populations by managing the

¹ "Creatures" – Mişcoiu and Kakdeu (2021) use the word 'creatures' to refer to Cameroon's President's formal and informal appointees. 'Creatures' means that the president makes these individuals and empowers them in the state to carry out his agenda.

reproduction system and classical exchange mechanisms, the latter being the exchange of votes for money. The ‘creatures’ also play the role of bargaining on what the government should spend and mobilizing voters in their favour (Ibid). Therefore, for a presidential candidate to select these ‘creatures’ to fill political positions of significance to the entire nation is solidifying political bases.

The ‘creatures’ in Cameroon work to ensure their creator maintains large political support that is well entrenched nationwide. There are records of secret meetings with local chieftains, religious leaders, councillors, mayors, and other prominent ‘creatures’ (Ibid). The ‘creatures’ are responsible for providing material incentives to the various groups or their representatives that are deemed strategic in the goal of achieving voter participation in the elections. Therefore, the promises from the political class are propagated through the president’s ‘creatures’. The ‘creatures’ are seen as direct negotiators who are at the centre of the clientelist structures in Cameroon.

Therefore, clientelism in Cameroon takes place through the president’s ‘creatures’, appointees that take various positions of power in the government. Therefore, when voting is done, special attention is given to the candidate who wins because this will effectively determine how the citizens will access various public goods. The creations of the president effectively ensure that the voters are directly leveraged to exchange their votes for economic benefits. There is a consensus that the ‘creatures’ have a special status of being the chosen ones; hence, the position is reserved for the key members that have excelled within the party of the winning presidential candidate (Ibid). As guardians of the president’s mandate and with powerful political positions, they determine how the resources will be distributed in the country. The resource distribution process thus becomes a transaction, and citizens receive resources depending on

their political inclination. This lays the ground for possible disparities because the typical nature of free and fair elections is that there will be losers and winners. In the clientelist relationship witnessed in Cameroon, the resource distribution is done politically and with political influence, hence economic disparities.

Taking the example of President Biya, it is possible to identify a correlation between political affiliation and resource distribution. President Biya is the longest-serving president in the country and is termed as the longest-ruling non-royal leader by global standards. President Biya, like his predecessor, hails from the country's south region. Economic analysis of the country per region indicates a poverty rate that can correlate with political leadership. The incidence of poverty in Cameroon is highest in the North and Extreme North provinces at 63.5 percent and 63.3 percent respectively (Kumase, 2018). The North-West Province is next at a poverty index of 62.3 percent (Ibid). In the South, where most political leaders hail from, the poverty rate is lowest at 27.5 percent (Ibid). In the East and Central Provinces, poverty is at 35.6 and 39.3 percent (Ibid). There is an evident trend of poverty levels depending on proximity to individuals and groups with political power.




Figure 3: Poverty Incidence in Cameroon per District

Source: Kumase (2018)

In the analyzed countries, Nigeria, Ghana, and Cameroon, different expressions of ethnic nationalism affect resource distribution. In the three countries, the basis of ethnic nationalism is in colonialism, which brought together multiple ethnicities to fight for independence. Soon after independence, without a common enemy, the ethnic, nationalistic feelings were a recipe for adversity. The African states are characterized by multiple ethnicities, depicted in the formation of political parties and various administrations. Hence, while intended to preserve the unity and

pursue common goals of the state, the political structure is often divided along with ethnic interests. The existence of ethnic nationalism, while not always a bad thing, leads to adverse outcomes in resource distribution, as demonstrated in these African countries. The political associations are formed for transactional reasons, and ultimately, resources flow toward the winning political side. In the subsequent chapter, this hypothesis is examined in the case of Kenya, an African country with the same history of colonization and in which there are multiple ethnic groups within the state.

CHAPTER 4 - ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN KENYA AND ITS EFFECT ON RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION IN KENYA

The focus of this analysis is on the salience of ethnic nationalism in Kenya and how it influences resource distribution. This chapter also investigates the existence of clientelistic relationships where resource distribution is done to benefit a president's co-ethnics. This perspective of evaluation will investigate the impact that ethnic nationalism has in a country such as Kenya with over forty tribes on resource distribution.

Appreciating the salience of ethnicity in political affairs first requires a historical evaluation of the presidency in the country. Like many African leaders, the first president, Jomo Kenyatta, came to power through a certain form of political consciousness. That is, the Africans had been fed up with being ruled by colonial powers and wanted to put in place one of their own. This can help explain the ethnic question in the country's politics (Muigai, 2004). Therefore, the nature in which the colonial authorities handed over power affected the development of ethnic nationalism. In addition, in his position as the president, Jomo Kenyatta made a personal reaction to the issue of ethnic nationalism, which has a role in the growth of ethnic nationalism in the country (Ibid). The nature in which the Jomo Kenyatta presidency handled the country's politics after independence also served to propel ethno-nationalism to the point of being a destructive force (Ibid). Therefore, the country's first president not only set the country on a path of ethno-nationalism, but also concealed the destructive nature of this force in the early years of the transition where redress would be most effective.

Therefore, in Kenya, critical issues from a historical account explain the emergence of ethno-nationalism and how it affects political power in the country until today. First, there is a legacy left behind by colonization that has an enduring effect on the ethnic consciousness of the people (Muigai, 2004). In addition, the contemporary forms of ethnicity are a response to the

powerful effects of social change (Ibid). The complexity of ethnicity in the country is also bred and promoted by key leaders such as Jomo Kenyatta (Ibid). At the time of independence, the state of Kenya could be created through a compromise of ethnic interests to political power and resources. During this period, the communities sought emancipation from the colonial ruler, which is evident in the certain extent of collaboration to fight for independence. However, the country lacked any coherent ideology; hence, the ethnic group persisted as a foundation and objective of political mobilization (Ibid). Therefore, the emergence of a leader such as Jomo Kenyatta implied that the Kikuyu people came off as ahead of the other ethnicities. With a vast range of resources at stake, the leader who took the top political seat in the country determined the flow of resources back to the community from the colonialists. This forms a basis for the direct impact of ethnic nationalism on resource distribution in the country.

As the first president of the country, Jomo Kenyatta has a major role in shaping ethnic loyalties in politics and its impact on resource distribution. When Jomo Kenyatta took over the president's office, there were no strong ties between the two communities despite being aligned with the Luo community. In fact, despite KADU being against the domination of the two large tribes, Kikuyu and Luo, they joined KANU. Instead, a faction of the Luo broke from KANU led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (Bennett, 1963). Therefore, after independence, a Kikuyu leader, and even the so-called smaller tribes, including the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu, rallied behind Jomo Kenyatta, assumed the presidency. However, the Luo community, representing a significant group of people in terms of number and political-strategic power, broke off to form the Kenya People's Union (KPU). Jaramogi Odinga, a former vice president and Luo elder, led KPU shaping the relationship between the Kikuyu and Luo as adversarial.

The Kikuyu-Luo adversary manifested in the 1960s in various ways. However, being in power, KANU managed to ban KPU and the leader was detained (Lamb, 1969). This followed political unrest when Jomo Kenyatta's visit to Kisumu turned chaotic and led to what became known as the Kisumu massacre. This adversary between the Kikuyu and Luo turned into an alliance of tribes behind each or with each other. Therefore, it resulted in political power shaping into an ethnic alliance where interests could be discussed with key importance being assigned to ethnicity. After the death of Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Arap Moi, the then Vice President, assumed office and was voted in as president, ruling the country for twenty-four years. The country has had four presidents, of whom three are from the Kikuyu tribe, and one is from the Kalenjin nation, each tribe taking up half of the entire period the country has been independent. Members from the Luo community and other tribes (Ibid) have always characterized the opposition. Therefore, the history of the presidency sustains the ethnic division that was born during the struggle for independence.

While belonging to a tribe is not a major issue, the significance of tribe in the country characterizes itself as ethnic nationalism because political ideologies are founded on ethnic feelings. In the 1960s, certain events depicted a blatant political fight between leaders based on ethnic feelings of hate. For instance, the assassination of Tom Mboya revealed the existence of fears and hostilities from the Kikuyu-dominated government (Ibid). While Jaramogi Oginga acted as the leader of the Luo, the community found a way to vent their rage and frustration in his death (Ibid). Since the independence period, the nation's politics became characterized by a rivalry between the major tribes and an alliance of the smaller tribes behind the ethnic group they believed best suited to protect and advance their interests.

In the time leading up to independence, the Kenyan people were organized around ethnic groups clamouring to get the power to run their affairs back from the white colonizers. The push for power meant the political authority and economic resources mainly held by the colonial masters could flow back to Kenyans that held it before colonization (Nasong'o, 2016). Therefore, at independence, Jomo Kenyatta sat as the leader not only of the country but as a representation of the Kikuyu people at the helm of the country's government. In this respect, one tribe had the keys to the political and economic power being handed over by the colonial masters. Tribalism was not a major issue until and after the struggle for independence from the colonial masters.

Therefore, the tribal nature of nationalism can be best examined during the colonial era that mainly lasted in the first half of the twentieth century. Between 1920 and 1963, Kenyans were put under the rule of the British, who utilized the divide and rule method to conquer (Weber, 2010). Over the years, the British gained the advantage by playing one community against the other (Ibid). The tribes of the Kikuyu and Luo, who threatened colonial rule the most, were particularly manipulated by the British to feud with each other constantly. This division persists and still represents one of the fiercest underlying tensions in the country to date. It is clear from the peaceful coexistence of the tribes before the independence struggle that tribe and belonging to certain tribes had no significant effect, especially in terms of hatred of other people from different tribes. However, in the independence struggle and the period after independence, the tribe became a significant issue affecting the country's political, social, and economic aspects.

The political parties formed around the independence period depicted these tribal alliances or movements. The main political parties included the Kenya African National Union

(KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU comprised and represented an alliance between the Kikuyu and the Luo. At the same time, KANU constituted the other minority tribes led by the Kalenjin people, the latter formed due to the fear that KANU would lead to the domination of the two tribes in political and economic aspects (Anyang'Nyong'o, 1989). Therefore, these two parties ignited the nature of politics in the country to be centered on tribal alliances and movements. Thus, since this time, when Kenyans cast their votes, particularly to select the president, they favored a candidate that aligned to their ethnicity or tribal inclinations. This formed the basis and has become a vital characteristic of every election since independence. It is conclusive to say that politics is split on an ethnic divide in Kenya. Therefore, when a candidate vies for the presidential seat, they appeal to the voters based on ethnic belonging or the need to include certain groups and communities that usually tend towards ethnic divide. Ethnicity and tribalism form the core of presidential campaigns and voting in the country.

The hypothesis that this research investigates is the expectation that there would be better economic outcomes among the Kikuyu ethnicity (because of a comparatively long reign of presidents from this community) compared to other ethnicities. The transition period between colonial rule and self-rule saw the movement of political authority from the colonial powers to African leaders. The fight for independence targeted political autonomy, but in addition to that, there was the expectation of a return of the resources that the white rulers had taken. Therefore, the first analysis point is in the transition period from colonial rule to self-rule.

At the time of the 1962 census, the indigenous African population in Kenya was distributed across forty tribes. The concept of division across ethnic groups existed even before the colonial period. However, the colonialists impacted the nature of the ethnic groups were divided. For instance, the Mbeere were classified under the Embu category as of the 1948 census

(Morgan, 2000). In some aspects, the colonial rulers divided the country to align with the tribal affiliations of the people. In addition, the African elite promoted the concept of the tribe, and hence it continued to be an essential aspect of the people's identities (Ibid). The 1962 census presents four main tribes constituting 57.8% of the population (Ibid). These tribes are Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo and Kamba. Over three-quarters of the country includes these four main tribes: the Kisii, Meru, Mijikenda, and Kipsigis (Ibid). Most of the settlements outside the White Highlands were occupied by tribal identities; that is, certain regions would be associated with certain tribes (Ibid). Therefore, it is possible to assess levels of development as per the geographies of the nation and the people that occupy certain regions.

After independence, one of the most divisive factors in the formation of government was centered on whether to adopt a centralized or decentralized government known as a *majimbo* state. The first and second presidents of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Arap Moi (1978-2002), adopted a design that would allow for greater distribution of central resources to members of their ethnic groups (Hassan, 2020). Under *Majimboism*, the role of the central government was limited, and resources could be distributed to the eight regions that had been established and were known as provinces. *Majimboism* had the potential of limiting possible favouritism of the president's co-ethnics (Ibid). According to the nature of the distribution of populations in Kenya, one tribe, for example, the Kikuyus, the co-ethnics of Kenya's first president, is found mainly in Central Province. Therefore, the only resources they could be guaranteed are those allocated to their province, which could be determined by factors outside the president's control (Ibid). Secondly, *Majimboism* had the potential to limit the resources that bureaucrats within the province could divert to the regions occupied by Kikuyu (Ibid). The decisions on resource allocation within each province were to be made by elected

representatives. Since these representatives were members of the ethnic groups in the respective regions, they could see that resources were not distributed disproportionately to the Kikuyu.

Therefore, it is no surprise that President Jomo Kenyatta dismantled the government structure of *Majimboism*. After independence, the president used the executive power bestowed upon him to create a unitary state with a centralized form of governance. The nature of this form of government is that there are national ministries that are tasked with the distribution of resources. The organizations are centrally managed which means that all allocation decisions are made at the country's headquarters. According to Burgess et al. (2015), the country's best-funded service ministries, education, roads, health and water, in combination, comprised 33 percent of the central government's budget between 1963 and 2011. The nature of the governance system is that decisions on budget allocations were made in the country's headquarters in Nairobi. The grassroots to which these resources were channeled were not consulted on these decisions. The executive state made the decisions, which can be termed as being bureaucratic. The president handpicked the Provincial and District Commissioners charged with implementing the budget. Therefore, President Kenyatta was guaranteed that the allocations in the country, right from the districts to the ministerial level, could be made in favour of political inclinations.

Therefore, unlike the devolved structure, the central government guaranteed the distribution of resources along ethnic lines and rewarded political loyalties as shown by the ethnic composition of the president's cabinet. The minimum spending quotas applicable in the *majimbo* state did not limit the central ministries (Hassan, 2020). Therefore, spending could be made disproportionately higher for the regions that are home to the president's co-ethnics. There is evidence of clientelism in the high number of Kikuyus in power positions during President

Kenyatta's reign (Hassan, 2020). By 1969, when President Kenyatta had begun consolidating power, 40 percent of the permanent secretaries, over half of the country's Provincial Commissioners and District Commissioners, were from his tribe (Ibid). At the time President Daniel Arap Moi came to power, the system put in place by the first president was still strongly in place to ensure the continued preferential treatment of the Kikuyu in resource distribution. The second president, being Kalenjin, followed the same trend and began replacing Kikuyus with his co-ethnics in top government positions (Ibid). By 1990, roughly two-thirds of the country's permanent secretaries were Kalenjin.

It is important to note that education played a major role in perpetuating favouritism between co-ethnics. At the time of independence, the vast majority of educated Kenyans were from the Kikuyu tribe. On its own, this factor depicts uneven development in the country. In addition, the higher literacy levels among this tribe made it possible for President Kenyatta to institute co-ethnics in top government positions. These individuals furthered the agenda of distributing resources to people of their tribes (Ibid). This factor also became known when Daniel Moi took over presidential duties after the demise of the first president. The transition from a country dominated by Kikuyus in senior government positions to Kalenjin was gradual due to the significant lack of educated individuals among pastoralist communities.

Education is one of the most important public goods whose distribution and accessibility can be evaluated to assess the influence of ethnic nationalism on resource distribution. At the time Kenya gained independence from the British administrators, the education path had already been set on disproportional terms. The inequalities began with the European settlers who invested more finances in European education than Asian or African (Alwy and Schech, 2004). This disproportionate spending is shown in the table below.

Table 1: Education Department Expenditure by Race, 1930

	Pupils (In State and State-aided schools only)	Total Expenditure (in US Dollars)	Expenditure per Pupil (in US Dollars)
African	6948	232,293	33.4
Asian	1900	70,329	37.0
European	776	140,041	180.5
Total	9624	442,663	46.0

Source: Kenya, Education Department Annual Report, 1930

Following Kenya's independence in 1963, the Kenyatta government made multiple attempts to remedy the problems that plagued the country's education system. The Kenya Education Commission was established in 1964 by Professor Ominde to promote social equity and national unity, and its initial report advised that educational facilities be provided in underserved areas and that all people's religious convictions be protected and respected (Ibid). Inequalities in educational provision and opportunities continued despite these suggestions, as evidenced by measurable indicators such as the distribution of government schools across the country, national examination performance, and university admittance records (Ibid). The quality of education depends on the quality of teachers hence the need to examine their distribution in the country. An analysis of the regions in Kenya reveals that by the end of the Kenyatta era, there was an overrepresentation of professionally qualified teachers in Central and Nairobi where the Kikuyu ethnic group dominate (Ibid). The percentage of primary school enrolment per province as of 1969 is shown below.

Table 2: Percentage Primary School Enrolment by Province 1969

Province	Enrolment % of 5 -14yr age group in primary schools
Central	64
Nairobi	61
Eastern	47
Western	40
Coast	32
Nyanza	31
Rift Valley	29
North Eastern	4
Kenya	38.5

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics: Kenya (1994)

Table 3: Professionally Qualified Teachers in Primary Schools by Province, 1979

Province	Nairobi	Central	Rift Valley	Eastern	Nyanza	North Eastern	Coast
Percentage	99.1	90.2	70.0	69.9	67.8	66.1	64.8

Source: Republic of Kenya, 1982,

An evaluation of the educational outcomes in the years soon after independence reveals proportionately higher enrolment and availability of qualified teachers in Nairobi and Central provinces. The accessibility of education, which is a major public good, appears to be influenced ethnically. As of 1979, the enrolment rates and the number of qualified teachers were higher among regions occupied by Kikuyus than Kalenjins. The analysis tabulated shows the ethnic-

regional disparities that began during colonial administration persisted to the post-colonial periods. These differences are still evident today with a majority of the educational institutions being located in Central and Rift Valley regions.

Oketch and Somerset (2010) conducted a case study analysis using select schools in Kenya to describe the impact of the Free Primary Education Program launched in 2003 on attendance in various parts of the country. The study identifies disparate outcomes despite a national policy that has been in existence for close to two decades aimed to ensure education provision equally to all regions in the country. An effective example is given between the status of schools in Nyeri and Kisii (both being rural and agricultural sub-counties in the country). Compared to Nyeri, which is in the former central province, Kisii in the Nyanza region has a less developed primary education system (Ibid). The assessment of Oketch and Somerset (2010) is that proximity to the city's capital both from a geopolitical perspective explains the uneven outcomes even despite the existence of a national free primary education program.

President Moi took over leadership intending to distribute resources to ethnic groups of political interest. The 1982 District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) is one mechanism that the president put to decentralize Nairobi resources. Under this initiative, the ministries had the task of listing and justifying projects, which made Kikuyu bureaucrats more accountable for their budgetary decisions (Hassan, 2020). The bureaucrats that were mainly Kikuyu found themselves answerable to superiors mainly of the Kalenjin ethnicity. While the initiative was meant to redistribute resources across all regions of the country, the districts were designed in a manner that largely benefitted the Kalenjins (Ibid). Out of the forty districts, the president's co-ethnics occupied a majority in six of them, even as they were only 14 percent of the country's population. The rest of his political base and the other pastoralists in Rift Valley region were a

majority in four districts despite only 3 percent of the country's population (Ibid). Therefore, in the context of ethnic comparison, the Kikuyus, who were 21 percent of the population, were a majority in seven districts and no other ethnic group were a majority in so many districts (Ibid). Therefore, the initiative to redistribute resources to other regions of the country while having the appearance of devolving resources still targeted the co-ethnics of the country's president.

Like his predecessor, President Moi made deliberate efforts to benefit his political base. The president's appointees facilitated the resource distribution to co-ethnics, such as the District Commissioner, who was charged with implementing center-led development at the district level (Ibid). The president maintained oversight through active management, and by the first five years of his reign, he had rotated out 75 percent of President Kenyatta's appointees, replacing them with new ones (Ibid). He cultivated neopatrimonialism with his appointees and allowed them to use the authority bestowed upon them for personal enrichment. This allowance was so that they could carry out his political orders when needed. The percentage of District Commissioners of Kalenjin ethnicity rose from 10 percent at the start of his presidency to 25 percent by 1992 (Ibid). The decentralization of resource distribution to individual districts guaranteed that the president's co-ethnics would receive a disproportionate share of the resources from the central government regardless of the bureaucratic inclinations of the individuals in offices at the headquarters in Nairobi.

After the return of multi-party elections in 1992, the rules of the political game shifted. A presidential candidate was expected to seek acceptability over a wider range than before. Under the one-party rule, every president sought support from co-ethnic bases. However, after 1992, it was necessary to win the support of multiple ethnicities due to the need for multi-ethnic coalitions (Hassan, 2020). Therefore, for a president to succeed in a multi-party contest, they

would seek votes from “unaligned” communities, that is, ethnic groups that lacked a viable presidential contestant. President Moi (Ibid), who won the 1992 and 1997 elections, shifted the resource distribution strategy to benefit the unaligned ethnic communities (Ibid). President Moi used his initial strategy of district creation and, this time, expanded them to benefit unaligned ethnic groups. Examples of minority ethnic groups that were recognized in the second creation of districts are the Tharaka and Nithi carved out of the Meru district in 1992 (Ibid). Archived documents indicate that these groups were fed up with being administered under the Meru district because they were minorities.

The third president of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki (2002 - 2013), followed his predecessor’s district creation patterns despite promises to desist. In his campaigns, Mwai Kibaki had vowed to end politicized district creation. However, he followed the same district creation patterns increasing the number of districts to 150 at the end of his first term and almost 300 by the end of his second (Ibid). The purpose of these districts remained to serve as a way to appease his electoral coalition. Out of the 80 districts created prior to 2007, only five were awarded to his co-ethnics, and only three went to those in areas dominated by his opponent’s co-ethnics – the Luo (Ibid). This shows the continuance of the trend of distributing resources along ethnic lines and political loyalties.

The first three presidents of the country, with a rule spanning between 1963 and 2013, evidence resource distribution along ethnic lines and for political interest. This can be found in the nature of resource distribution depending on the president in charge. After independence, the resources moved from the Whites to mainly the Kikuyu. After Moi took office, there was a large shift in expenditure for infrastructure projects such as roads and rural health towards the pastoralist areas and the Kalenjin community. According to Barkan and Chege (1989), the

districts with a shared ethnicity to the president received twice as much for road construction and had four times the length of paved roads compared to non-ethnic communities.

An examination of investment in education through literacy levels and completion rates shows a correlation with the president's ethnicity at certain periods. There is a "bump" in communities whose co-ethnic individuals took presidential office (Ibid). The research findings show an increase in years in primary schools from 4.6 to 6.1 under the reign of President Kenyatta and an increase from 4.2 to 6.7 under president Moi (Hassan, 2020). It is estimated that having a co-ethnic president during primary school years has an associated ten-percentage point increase in the probability of employment in the formal sector (Ibid). Therefore, there is a direct correlation between education completion rates and the presidency. Education is an essential indicator of economic outcomes because it influences employability.

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Therefore, there has always been a correlation between the ethnicity of the president and resource distribution in Kenya. This justifies the hypothesis that ethnic nationalism within a heterogeneous state, results in disproportionate outcomes in resource distribution. Even after the

transition to multi-party elections in 1992, empirical evidence from research shows that the resources under the central government's jurisdiction targeted the successful candidate's electoral coalition (Hassan, 2020). On the issue of land, one of the most sought-after resources, Morjaria (2011) finds that the conversion of forested land by the Ministry of Lands and Settlement to farming land is highest in politically royal areas. The trend of favouring co-ethnics and politically loyal communities continued after elections. Still, there is evidence of spreading infrastructure development projects to other groups in the times preceding an election (Hassan, 2020).

In Kenya, land is an essential resource in economic development. However, it is a scarce resource and kept out of reach for ordinary citizens. In the period of transferring power from the British rulers to Kenyans, the political class took advantage. Instead of allocating land for development purposes, it was allocated as a form of political reward and for purposes of speculation. The inaccessibility of land as a resource is a major determinant of poor economic outcomes since 85% of Kenyans live in rural regions and 80% of the population depend on agriculture as a source of livelihood. Land grabbing is a major issue that occurred in the post-independence years, mainly in the 1980s and onwards. During the single-party era under President Moi, there was one of the highest recorded rates of illegal allocation of land. The country's characteristic of political pluralism is believed to have generated two adverse outcomes; the intensification of politically motivated ethnic violence and the unlawful allocation of substantial public land and other resources (Rigon, 2013). The illegal allocations at the hands of the elite and along ethnic lines resulted in evictions, landlessness and poverty, which has the indirect effect of missing development opportunities and a lack of resources for the people to develop themselves economically.

The distribution of land, one of the most significant economic resources in the country has also been affected by the influence of ethnic nationalism. Illegal land allocation can be associated with political pluralism in the country. The result is that the elite acquired most of the land and the rest of the population suffered through evictions, landlessness and poverty. The result of this situation is further impoverishment due to lack of land and the associated natural resources.

One ethnic group may dominate specific occupations in an ethnic niche economy, shifting class resentments onto ethnicity (Mann, 2005). This has happened in the public sector, where individuals that dominate ethnically are at the top of the institution. Discrimination in the public sector can be rather severe; for example, the dominant group may be institutionally required to use their ethnic language as the ‘official’ one. As a result, code switching has occurred, in which a member of the group chooses to converse in their language while leaving out the others. Public-sector reforms and public-service commission guidelines for public employees have targeted tribalism in the public sector.

In the twenty-first century, infrastructure projects are being implemented in developing countries; yet, political and economic reasons may cause certain groups or members of the population to benefit from these initiatives more than others (Burgess et al., 2015). Infrastructure projects attract shady agreements, making them particularly vulnerable to corruption (Transparency International, 2008). Infrastructure project placement can be modified to favour certain regions disproportionately while disadvantageous to others (Cadot et al., 2006; Bates 2008). It is frequently said that African politicians use public funds to support people from their home countries or who share their ethnicity (Miguel, 2014). Ethnic favouritism can result in

large regional inequality and political instability in the end, with long-term effects as severe as ethnic riots or civil wars (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005).

In Kenya, the history of colonial policies can have led to the current ethnicity, which is the focal point of inequalities in ethno-regional development (Kanyinga, 2014). The colonial settlers preferred fertile central Kenya and the Rift Valley highlands, which increased agriculture in the region. Kanyinga (2014) goes on to say that because regional boundaries correspond to ethnic settlement patterns or regions, there have been regional differences in development that coincide with ethnic inequities. After each election, marginalized groups and underdeveloped regions criticize successive governments for failing to spend resources in their areas. This has exacerbated regional tensions. 'It is our turn to eat,' as Kanyinga (2014) puts it, becomes a slogan for uniting ethnic groups together to obtain access to and control of political power. As a result, leaders elected to office are perceived as people who will favour tribe members and distribute the national cake fairly to a select group who will grow wealthy. Ethnic blocks are sometimes formed based on power-sharing and socioeconomic progress.

Political exploitation can be apparent because the political elite owns and controls the common land resource, preventing members of other groups from acquiring and using it. Land, as previously stated, is a significant asset that the bulk of the poor do not appear to have obtained. When the political elite seeks to seize control, Caselli and Coleman (2012) argue that exploitation is costly because a fraction of the country's resources is lost. The argument continues that exploitation might take the form of excluding talented group members from administrative and management positions. This exclusion leads to the accumulation of resources by a select few, effectively excluding the others. As a result, people have lost faith in the governmental systems put in place to ensure their survival.

Kenya's constitution of 2010 established devolution, which resulted in the creation of county governments and organizations. By respecting variety, the devolved government hopes to foster national unity (Mitullah, 2012). The goal is to promote unity, which leads to national cohesion and appreciation of a shared culture. The bulk of county government leadership, on the other hand, may appear to come from the same tribe, clan, or neighbourhood. Service delivery at the local level is hampered by a lack of tribal diversity (Nyaura, 2018). This will have an impact on county service delivery in the long run. For example, certain county administrations have been known to hire persons from the region or the dominant ethnicity in the area where the county government is located (Ibid). This has been observed to be increasing. This negative aspect of ethnicity hampers the delivery of services and, as a result, development. The various county government leaderships have looted massively in these counties. When leaders provide economic possibilities to a select few (from their ethnic enclave), it becomes a problem and a source of contention for the rest of the community.

However, within the constitution of 2010 is an allowance to redress the adverse impact of ethnic nationalism in the country. One of the main purposes of Kenya's new constitution passed in 2010 is to advocate for devolution (Ibid). The 2010 constitution outlaws any form of discrimination based on ethnicity (Ibid). Specifically, the 2010 constitution identifies non-discrimination and the protection of the country's marginalized community as part of the national values and principles of governance (Ibid). The constitution also gives provisions for equality and freedom from discrimination (Ibid). It is not empathetic to the state or any person that can discriminate against another person based on ethnicity and any other grounds.

The 2010 Constitution of Kenya presents an opportunity for a new country. However, even with the new governance framework being well established, inequality and marginalization

will take a while before it disappears. The devolved government is established to control the counties' financial, political, and economic resources. Disparities are difficult to eliminate quickly, and they will continue to be a policy problem for both the government and non-state entities. However, the constitution has put in place policies intended to reverse the skewed resource distribution system. There is a formal system that determines how public finances should be allocated. There are local funds, which have been formalized, and by which there could be a greater equality in the distribution of significant resources such as land and infrastructure. The Constituencies Development Fund (CDF), the Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF), the Roads Maintenance Levy Fund (RMLF), the Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF), and the Women Development Fund are among these funds (WDF).

From the foregoing analysis, regional and county-based disparities can be seen to originate from the history of colonialism and unequal development, which is wired into the nation's character and can be deemed the structural origin of the regional disparities. The country is heavily laden by external debt that, as of June 2021, is approximately four trillion Kenyan shillings (US \$ 35.3 billion) (Oyugi, 2019). This amount is roughly 52 percent of the country's aggregate debt. The debt has increased significantly in the last year and with the current presidential regime than the predecessors with no significant growth in Gross Domestic Product and other revenues (Ibid). Therefore, the regions that are already disadvantaged in terms of resource distribution are likely to suffer more as political issues continue to take a regional and ethnic angle. This is to say that the 2010 constitution while being an instrument that promotes equity and inclusive growth, will require more support and time before the disparities that have lasted for almost half a century can be redressed. This can offer hope for the sustenance of a steady and inclusive development process and a robust national economy.

Although devolution has the potential to address marginalization issues, problems of marginalization have not always been lessened where devolution has occurred. First devolution can and does weaken the state, making it difficult to handle such issues. Second, devolution generates new minorities (at the devolved level) because counties do not always adhere to natural nationality groups, and even if they did, difficulties would still exist because certain parts of the newly created unit will be dominant, while others will be or feel dominated (Stiftung, 2012). As a result, decentralization is not a panacea for the problem of marginalization. Devolution must be complemented by effective institutional architecture to guarantee that the proper circumstances for cohabitation and participation for all are maintained if it is to tackle minority and marginalization problems (Ibid). To create these correct institutions, one must first comprehend and remember the issues that devolution was supposed to tackle.

Kenya's devolution system has been ethnically determined since independence. The majority of counties are populated by one ethnic group or by ethnic groupings that are dominant (Ibid). However, ethnic minorities have become a new challenge in numerous counties because of this partitioning. The Kuria of Migori County, the Sabaot of Bungoma County, the Sengwer of Elgeyo Marakwet County, the Cherangany of Trans Nzoia County, and the Pokot of Baringo County are among the most noteworthy (Ibid). Because counties and county boundaries cannot be restored, it is critical that wards within counties are constructed in such a way that minorities are not further marginalized or put together in a ward with another majority group where their voices are silenced.

CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION

As postulated in chapter one, ethnic nationalism is a characteristic existent in many states and is particularly strong in the African continent. Ethnic nationalism is not always associated with negative outcomes but can be an impediment to sociopolitical development in these countries. One negative aspect of ethnic nationalism is that it breeds unhealthy competition between ethnic groups that are supposed to co-exist as one within a single state. It is for this reason that scholars such as Easterly and Levine (1997) attribute poor developmental outcomes in Africa to ethnic diversity. In almost all states in Africa, there is more than one ethnic group brought together by state boundaries and expected to operate as one – politically and consequently economically. With ethnic loyalties greater than loyalty to the state, the result is higher levels of corruption, macroeconomic instability, and ultimately less economic development.

This study focused on the impact of ethnic nationalism on the distribution of major public goods and investments. It is the hypothesis developed from the works of various scholars that ethnic nationalism has a potentially negative effect on resource distribution in these states (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Mauro, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997). In this thesis, three African countries are compared to Kenya to assess the impact of ethnic nationalism on the distribution of major public goods and investments in the respective countries. While the focus is on Kenya, the other countries offer a better basis for a comparative evaluation to factor in other characteristics that help determine the correlation between ethnic nationalism and resource distribution outcomes. The assessment of the impact of ethnic nationalism focuses on how various key resources such as land and education are provided in the country and the existence of clientelistic relationships in these countries. Clientelistic relations are evidence of favoritism in

the allocation of major public goods hence an important determinant of the impact of ethnic nationalism. The underlying argument is that where the political class exercises favoritism along ethnic lines, members of similar groups will benefit from direct gifts and channeling of more resources while the rest of the country is deprived in comparison.

The countries analyzed in this research include: Ghana, Cameroon, and Nigeria, and these are compared to Kenya. These four are countries in the African continent that have a history of colonization. Colonization is an important consideration in this research because it is the single factor responsible for the amalgamation of different tribes into states. During the scramble and partition process, the colonial authorities split up ethnic groups and merged with others, creating political units that are comprised of different communities and societies. The co-existence of these groups, while not always adversarial, does not seem optimal either particularly in economic terms. Ethnic nationalism essentially means the existence of conflicting loyalties among the residents in these states.

In the case of Nigeria, which has over 150 ethnic groups, there have been numerous conflicts that are characterized by one tribe turning against the other. The conflict in the country has mainly been exemplified between the Northern region from Southern and Eastern regions following the colonial trend that had greater involvement with the South. As a result, the Southern region came about as more educated and hence politically advantaged after the departure of the British colonizers. In post-independence Nigeria, the conflict has been characterized mainly as between the Northern and Southern regions. The people in the Niger Delta are economically deprived compared to the other groups in the country. These communities were left out since the colonial period and are still overlooked by the post-independence administrations and the result is poorer political, economic, and social outcomes.

According to Oluwaniyi (2011), the problems experienced by the Niger-Delta residents stem from a lack of political participation and democratic accountability. The government in the country is comprised mainly of majority ethnic groups whose economic outcomes are better than the underrepresented groups. The influence of ethnic nationalities can explain the education and systemic group inequalities in the country. Nigeria is considered the country with the highest rates of educational inequalities in the continent. Education outcomes are also poorer among the Southerners compared to Northerners. Therefore, in the case of Nigeria, there is evidence of inequality in resource distribution on the basis of ethnicity.

Ghana is an excellent example of clientelism. In this country, it is common for politicians to provide material rewards as a means of securing votes hence the creation of a patronage democracy. According to Gadjanova (2017), the electoral politics in African countries such as Ghana are clientelistic where the citizens expect material rewards from the politicians in exchange for political support. Looking at Ghana's Upper East region, it is evident that gift-giving is a sign of status, authority and political viability (Ibid). Voters choose a candidate based on his or her appropriateness, which they judge, as well as the individual's previous record of giving and sentiments toward other parties' ideas. When a result, as voter sophistication rises, parties shift their focus to policy deliberation and ideological distinction, which coexists with the practice of using public goods as political leverage.

Ghana's situation is seen as status-affirming electoral clientelism, yet it nevertheless has ramifications for redistribution and accountability. Because electoral gifts can coexist with real-issue discourse within political parties, it is possible that the practice has unintended repercussions, even if it is not intended to be a direct exchange of voter loyalty. For example, there is the possibility of creating an incentive to extract rents locally or from governmental

coffers in order to recoup campaign expenses. In the long run, the behavior fosters the urge for personal wealth acquisition and display. Public institutions become a source of enrichment, and a culture of lack of ethics develops among civil workers over time.

In addition, there is evidence of inequality in resource distribution on the basis of ethnicity. For instance, the Ashanti group is the main producer of cocoa, the nation's primary export and the Akan group is considered the community with most elite individuals including the nation's founding father, Kwame Nkrumah. From 1957 until 1966, Nkrumah's Akan-led government imposed severe taxes on cocoa producers through the Cocoa Marketing Board, essentially setting the cocoa producer price (Easterly and Levine, 1997). Only when Ghana was ruled by an Ashanti-based government led by Kofi Busia from 1969 to 1971 was the heavy tax burden on cocoa producers reduced. This is evidence of different outcomes on different communities depending on the ethnicity of the president.

In Cameroon, there is a significant level of clientelism which is best exemplified by the nature of the relationship between the president and the citizens in the country. One of the main characteristics of Cameroon is the existence of favoritism in the appointment of individuals to fill various public offices. Therefore, the first aspect of clientelism in the country is through the process of allocating political seats which are done to reward the supporters of the candidates that win the election. According to Mişcoiu and Kakdeu (2021), this creates a group of individuals that do the president's bidding. These individuals determine the flow of resources and create a skewed system of distribution because they use public goods as a way to pay back loyal supporters.

It is plausible to find a link between political allegiance and resource distribution in the case of President Biya. President Biya is the country's longest-serving president and, by

international standards, the world's longest-ruling non-royal leader. President Biya is from the country's south, like his predecessor. Country-by-region economic research reveals a poverty rate that is linked to political leadership. The North and Extreme North provinces of Cameroon have the highest poverty rates, at 63.5 percent and 63.3 percent, respectively (Kumase, 2018). With a poverty rate of 62.3 percent, the North-West Province comes in second (Ibid). The poverty rate is lowest in the South, where most political leaders are from, at 27.5 percent (Ibid). Poverty levels are 35.6 and 39.3 percent in the East and Central Provinces, respectively (Ibid). There is a clear correlation between poverty levels and closeness to individuals and groups with political influence.

Kenya has over forty ethnic groups and like the other nations discussed, it is an amalgamation of different groups that owe their union to the history of colonization. An assessment of educational investment as measured by literacy and completion rates reveals an association with the president's ethnicity at different times. There is a "bump" in communities where co-ethnic individuals have been elected to the presidency (Barkan and Chege, 1989). According to the findings, years in elementary schools increased from 4.6 to 6.1 under President Kenyatta's rule, and from 4.2 to 6.7 under President Moi's administration (Hassan, 2020). It is projected that having a co-ethnic president throughout elementary school years increases the likelihood of employment in the formal sector by ten percentage points (Ibid). As a result, there is a clear link between educational completion rates and presidential office. Because education affects employability, it is an important measure of economic consequences.

The distribution of land in the country is an example of skewed distribution of resources that can be attributed to the influence of ethnicity. Because 85 percent of Kenyans live in rural areas and 80% of the population relies on agriculture for a living, the inaccessibility of land as a

resource is a major factor of poor economic outcomes. Land grabbing was a serious problem in the post-independence years, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. During President Moi's single-party rule, there was one of the highest rates of illicit land distribution ever documented. Evictions, landlessness, and poverty stemmed from illegal allocations by the elite and along ethnic lines, with the indirect effect of missed development chances and a lack of resources for people to develop themselves economically.

In Kenya, colonial policies may have contributed to the existing ethnicity, which is the focal point of ethno-regional development discrepancies (Kanyinga, 2014). The colonial settlers favored the fertile central Kenya and the Rift Valley highlands, which helped the region's agriculture. Kanyinga (2014) notes that there have been regional variations in development that overlap with ethnic inequities since regional boundaries correspond to ethnic settlement patterns or regions. Following each election, underprivileged groups and undeveloped regions blame successive governments for failing to invest in their communities. This has heightened tensions in the region. As Kanyinga (2014) puts it, 'It is our turn to eat' becomes a rallying cry for ethnic groups to unite in order to gain access to and control of political power. As a result, elected officials are seen as favoring tribe members and distributing the national cake equitably to a select group of wealthy individuals. Power-sharing and socioeconomic advancement are sometimes used to build ethnic blocs.

The inequality of distribution of resources is such a dire issue in the country and is considered one of the leading causes for the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution. The current constitution established a devolved way of governance. Discrimination based on ethnicity is prohibited under the 2010 constitution (Nyaura, 2018). Non-discrimination and the preservation of the country's marginalized community are specifically mentioned in the 2010 constitution as

national values and principles of governance (Ibid). Equal rights and freedom from discrimination are also guaranteed under the constitution (Ibid). It is not compassionate of the state or any individual to discriminate against another person on the basis of ethnicity or any other factor.

The constitution has policies in place to correct the system's unequal resource allocation. There is a formal mechanism in place that specifies how government funds should be distributed. There are institutionalized local funds that could help to achieve greater equality in the sharing of important resources like land and infrastructure. These funds include the Constituencies Development Fund (CDF), Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF), Roads Maintenance Levy Fund (RMLF), Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF), and Women Development Fund (WDF).

Since independence, Kenya's devolution system has been based on ethnicity. The majority of counties are predominantly populated by one ethnic group or ethnic groupings (Stiftung, 2012). However, as a result of this division, ethnic minorities have become a new challenge in a number of counties. Among the most notable tribes are the Kuria of Migori County, the Sabaot of Bungoma County, the Sengwer of Elgeyo Marakwet County, the Cherangany of Trans Nzoia County, and the Pokot of Baringo County (Ibid). Because counties and county borders cannot be restored, it is vital that wards within counties are built in such a way that minorities are not further disenfranchised or placed in a ward with another dominant group where their views are suppressed.

The challenge with ethnicity in Kenya and other countries discussed is that different groups that possess loyalties to themselves first before the country are merged in the state boundaries designed by colonial powers. The result is skewed distribution of resources. It is

evidenced that there is always a disproportionate representation in the political office, which results in individuals of certain groups being advantaged in terms of the distribution of economic resources. This study highlights the need to assess the ethnic nationalism feelings in countries and how they affect resource distribution. Improvement in this area can be achieved by identifying the different nationalities and through changes such as devolution providing for a decentralized mechanism of resource distribution.

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