

**Re-speaking the Hub? Contextualising the
Australia-Japan-United States Security
Community, 2001 – 2017**

by

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Synopsis

This thesis examines the painful development and successful emergence of a mature Australia-Japan-United States security community. This project examines the gradual evolution and final transformation of this unique trilateral security relationship, showing how it grew from three distinct bilateral relationships based in war and cultural difference to an integrated trilateral community. The thesis explains the events and processes that sustained and promoted the growth of the trilateral Australia-Japan-United States security community which is now of fundamental importance in securing the stability of the Asia Pacific region.

The thesis emphasizes the importance of state-craft in maintaining the momentum and maturation of this security alliance built on trust and tested, so far, in peace. There was little that was inevitable in this. The US and Australia fought WWII without quarter. Without the leadership of John Howard, Koizumi Junichiro, and George W. Bush, those past scars, suspicions, and memories would have dominated the relationships of the three nations. In the case of Australia, Japan, and the United States, the key characteristics identified in this thesis that led to contemporary security community were communication, security cooperation, and commitment. This broad framework is refined through an analysis of three tiers of sensitivity within each that marked progress towards a mature security community.

While many scholars have covered the theory and growth of multilateral regional security partnerships, and the development of security communities, this thesis combines those approaches

and that scholarship to trace the development of a security relationship within a community framework. The result is an assessment that highlights the constructivist nature of the Australia-Japan-United States security community, indicating that realist assessments alone are insufficient to explain the complex behaviour exhibited by the three states over the quarter of a century considered here.

The growing intensity and depth of security cooperation across the spectrum of inter-state relations highlights the premium states place on the securitisation of their relations. The Asia Pacific is not naturally the locus of complex and effective security groupings, particularly among these three nations. Their legacy, their very different threat perceptions, and the highly diverse capabilities were central challenges to the security unification of the trilateral states. This thesis demonstrates that this successful security community was the result of specific actions, contexts, and normative structures, making its successful replication both hopeful but also difficult and uncertain. The Australia-Japan-United States security community, however, is a fundamental achievement in the development of structures built on trust that have moved the entire region away from the sapping hostilities of the past to a far more peaceful region than would otherwise have prevailed. To this story and the leaders who wrote it we all owe an enormous debt of gratitude. It is an achievement worth celebrating, particularly in this contemporary moment when US concerns are so differentially focussed.

Acronyms

ACMC Australian Civil-Military Centre

ACSA Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement

ADF Australian Defence Force

ADMM ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting

AMARSECTIVE Asia Maritime Security Initiative

AMSA Australian Maritime Safety Authority

ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States

APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

ARF ASEAN Regional Forum

ARF-DiREX ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise

ASDF Air Self-Defense Forces

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ATDET Agreement on the Transfer for Defence Equipment and Technology

ATLA Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency

AUSMIN Australia-United States Ministerial Consultation

CENTCOM United States Central Command

CHINCOM China Committee

CLB Cabinet Legislation Bureau

COCOM Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls

DPJ Democratic Party of Japan

DSG Defense Strategic Guidance

EAS East Asia Summit

ECSC European Coal and Steel Community

GATT Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GSDF Ground Self-Defense Forces

HA/DR Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

INTERFET International Force East Timor
ISA Information Sharing Agreement
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JDSC Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation
JSDF Japanese Self-Defense Forces
JSF Joint Strike Fighter
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War
MSDF Maritime Self-Defense Forces
NAFTA North America Free Trade Agreement
NALSAS National Asian Languages and Studies in Australian Schools
NALSSP National Asian Languages and Studies in Schools Program
NDPG National Defense Program Guidelines
NSS National Security Strategy
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OTS Off the Shelf
PACOM United States Pacific Command
PPBES Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Execution System
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force
RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RAN Royal Australian Navy
ReCAPP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
RIMPAC Rim of the Pacific
S/CRS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SAR Search and Rescue
SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

SEATO Southeast Asia treaty Organisation

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SLOC Sea lanes of communication

TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

TISA Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement

TPP TransPacific Partnership

TPSEP Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership

TSD Trilateral Security Dialogue

TTIP TransAtlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor

UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan

USN United States Navy

UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

ZOPFAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

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Declaration

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Signed: Jesse Barker Gale

December 16, 2018

Introduction

The Second World War changed the fundamental characteristics of alliance relations. In the aftermath of another devastating global conflict, international society grappled anew with the fierce urgency of protecting succeeding generations from the spectre of apocalyptic war. The founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), reflected this desire.

The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty declared that the signatories were “determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisations of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”¹ Unusually for the time, this pledge to *values* committed the signatories to a Treaty designed to do far more than the traditional considerations that aimed to regulate a balance of power among nations. The reference to individual values as the basis of the treaty symbolised a pledge among the signatories that these states had adopted these values, had assimilated them into their societal identities, and would propagate them. They created a community based on safeguarding and securing these values. This departure from traditional alliance goals created the conditions for alliance partners to be drawn together even in the absence of a common threat to their security. These uncommon characteristics were highlighted in Karl Deutsch’s seminal work, *Political Community and the North Atlantic*

¹ The United States of America et al., “The North Atlantic Treaty” (1949), https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience as evidence that the North Atlantic region resembled a security community.²

Deutsch theorised that whenever separate sovereign states become integrated to the point that they create a sense of a community of values they have also created an assurance that they will settle their differences short of war and will maintain “dependable expectations of peaceful change.”³ In doing so, states not only create the conditions for a stable order, but crucially create the conditions for a stable and enduring peace between participating states.

Deutsch observed that security communities would be reinforced by the growing cohesion and strength of the community, which would in turn drive participating states, with this far wider perspective of purpose, to coordinate their security relations as threats to the individual state became threats to the shared values of the community. Writing in 1957, Deutsch argued that the structure of the North Atlantic area was already a political community, and that the creation of institutions similar to those underpinning NATO would deepen integrative processes and create conditions conducive to trust that would see the emergence of a pluralistic security community.⁴ In this thesis, ‘security community’ refers only to pluralistic security communities.

² Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

³ Ibid, pp. 5-6.

⁴ In his original thesis, Deutsch proposed two different types of security community, amalgamated and pluralistic. Amalgamated security communities exist whenever there is “a formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation.” Amalgamated security communities are seen most frequently in the formation of states. Ibid, p. 6, 118.

A pluralistic security community sees participants “[retain] the legal independence of separate governments,” but are so closely affiliated that the real or perceived threat of intra-community violence is implausible.⁵ Deutsch identified three fundamental prerequisites that indicated the success of a security community: 1) the compatibility of major values and norms among the allies; 2) the capacity of the political units of the participating states to send, receive, and understand messages from participating states and giving those messages weight in decision-making; and 3) the mutual predictability of behaviour based on cumulative experience and thus a trust-based relationship.⁶

The broad contours of Deutsch’s model for security community development remain valuable defining characteristics of contemporary assessments of security communities. Despite the increasing complexity of international society and advances in technology, common values and norms are still considered to underpin the notion of a Western code of values, reflected in globalisation and trade integration. These advances increase the capacity of political states to respond to one another and increase the intimacy of inter-state relations. The result is that a state’s behaviour in relation to others becomes predictable.

The post-World War II era has witnessed a fundamental expansion of alliance relations between states in ways that Deutsch did not elaborate. This is hardly surprising given the immaturity of the North Atlantic security community when Deutsch first developed the concept. From the base he

⁵ Ibid, p. 6.

⁶ Ibid, pp. 66-67.

established we have an opportunity to more fully explore the consideration of security cooperation as a necessary function of a contemporary security community development and the nebulous sense of ‘commitment’ which binds mature security communities.

Deutsch developed his theory of security communities with the North Atlantic and Western Europe regions as models. Integration theorists subsequently deemed this European-centric approach to community formation inapplicable to the Asia Pacific, due to the historic absence of both of liberal politics and market economies.⁷ This broad critique of applying European-derived integration theories to the Asia Pacific may be correct at a region-wide level in the sense that a supranational institution similar to the European Union (or even the European Coal and Steel Community) would be unworkable in the contemporary geopolitical environment.

Nevertheless, the growth and strength of minilateral institutions within the Asia Pacific indicates a wellspring of integrationist sentiment and practice on the margins of the region. Some of the most compelling evidence comes from the well-developed, and developing, trilateral relationship linking Australia, the United States, and Japan. Although the region itself may not be a locus of integrationist sentiment like the European Union (and there are increasing doubts even there in terms of shared values and common purpose), the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty) which was directly influenced by the North Atlantic Treaty mantra,

⁷ See Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968); Leon Lindberg and Thomas Scheingold, *Regional Integration: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Mark A. Pollack, “International Relations Theory and European Integration,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39, no. 2 (June 2001): 221–44; Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams, *Integration Theory and the Politics of European Integration* (London: Routledge, 2000).

indicates the strong presence of similar integrationist sentiments. And it is notable that the ANZUS treaty served as a model for the three subsequent security treaties the United States would sign: with South Korea, the Philippines, and, crucially for this thesis, Japan.⁸

Despite the myriad regional divergences between Europe and the Asia Pacific, the bilateral alliances the United States forged with both Australia and Japan in the early Cold War era were heavily influenced by the existing NATO value and trust-based framework.⁹ Contemporary political leaders and diplomats slowly and steadily guided the three separate and distinct bilateral relationships into the trilateral arrangement in place today.

The development of an emergent security community in the Asia Pacific has not been an easy project and it has not enjoyed the analysis it deserves. The Asia Pacific region is filled with vibrant actors confronting dynamic changes and emerging challenges. Cooperative security models in the Asia Pacific must find a common strategic purpose. The continued strength of the Chinese economy and the growing bellicosity of the Chinese maritime forces of course is the central disrupter to regional stability. For the trilateral community, the central issue has been changing US aspirations for China. Initially that vision was to help shape China as a responsible stakeholder in Asia Pacific order-building, while still leaving Washington space to move if Beijing vied for

⁸ Dean Acheson, "Background Papers for the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Council Preparations," State Department Bulletin (Washington, DC: Department of State, July 24, 1952), https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/achesonmemos/view.php?documentVersion=both&documentYear=1952&documentid=70-6_26.

⁹ Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, "Inquiry into Australia's Defence Relations with the United States" (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, May 22, 2006), chap. 2, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfad/usrelations/report.

primacy with the United States or other regional powers. The balance between these two positions has fluctuated, and dramatically so in recent years, a point discussed in the Coda of this thesis.

Cooperation in the Asia Pacific has always been characterised by caution, with a good deal of dialogue between leaders and senior officials promoted as a central component of community building. Much of this dialogue has avoided both binding resolutions and supranational institutions. These are measures of the distance of other relationships from the pathway toward international communities, security or otherwise, all of which require visibility and tangibility.

The mature security community of Australia, Japan and the US is at least for a time likely to remain a regional outlier. However, the growing concentricity of regional relations and aspirations, particularly as transregional security threats multiply, highlight the importance of new types of security relations with a focus on flexible and dynamic institutions such as a security community.

The first chapter of this thesis addresses the primary frameworks for the development of a security community as originally postulated by Deutsch, and latterly developed by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett in their edited volume, *Security Communities*.¹⁰ As the thesis reviews this conceptual evolution, it also addresses the state-specific frameworks established in the contributions to *Security Communities* by Ole Wæver, Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephan Haggard, and Amitav Acharya. These authors discuss security community formation amongst the Nordic

¹⁰ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

states, between the United States and Mexico, and within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.¹¹

The chapter identifies and analyses the concepts of security, sovereignty, trust, and cooperation as foundational to the emergence of even an immature security community. Further, the chapter will also incorporate a discussion of the distinction between alliances and security communities. However, the chief challenge for students of security community theory is that Deutsch's innovative inquiry failed to generate a robust developmental research agenda to test and measure the evolution of additional security communities beyond the North Atlantic area. Few scholars have directly committed to the theoretical and methodological questions highlighted by Deutsch.

By drawing on the related frameworks established by Wæver, Gonzalez and Haggard, and Acharya, the first chapter of the thesis contrasts these competing frameworks in order to distil the common elements of security community development within and across societies. Influenced by Adler and Barnett's defining reassessment of security community development, the chapter then identifies five essential conditions which are theoretically appropriate to chart the emergence and progression of a security community from the non-existent to immature phases. These include persistent, existential, exogenous threats; non-complex security environments; sufficient non-

¹¹ Ole Wæver, "Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephen Haggard, "The USA and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Amitav Acharya, "Collective Security and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

existential threats so as to warrant diverse foreign policies; a pattern of functional relationships across other units in the system; and finally, a long-term peace between the participating states.

This chapter then establishes the contemporary key to creating and sustaining a mature and successful security community. The focus shifts from attributes and measures of an immature security community to those of a sustaining security community. That pathway is defined by a legacy of communication, security cooperation, and commitment.

In these two ways, the first chapter contributes to the development of the theoretical questions and concepts raised originally by Deutsch, Adler, and Barnett, and constructs a fresh theoretical framework through which we can analyse empirical evidence from the emergence of a nascent security community embracing Australia, Japan, and the United States. This chapter demonstrates a successful security community is not a product of chance, but of active creation by diplomats and leaders, many of whom take great political risks to achieve the outcome they regard as fundamental to their nation's security. The chapter concludes on cautionary note: the conditions and actions that prompted and created a security community do not ensure the survival of that creation.

Chapter 2, *The Audacious Experiment*, is structured around addressing the five essential conditions for the creation of an immature security community, using both theories of regionalism and geographies and informed by the post-World War II history and interactions of the three states. This chapter traces the bilateral relationships the United States established with both Australia and

Japan in the early Cold War era. This discussion of diplomatic history will highlight that understanding the beginnings of relationships in security community terms, allows us to understand the success, or failure, of the community.

As Deutsch, Adler, and Barnett all note, the literature on the formation of communities is clear in that successful communities (both security and non-security) cannot be blindly utopian for they often face continual internal debate and challenges from their participants. These challenges, and their peaceful resolution, are in fact critical to emergent security communities as they institutionalise the norm that problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'. As we shall see in this chapter, the United States in the Cold War period offered both Australia and Japan their greatest security guarantees, but also exposed them to a much broader range of threats.

What becomes clear in this analysis is that the three states, particularly Australia and Japan, sought a more comprehensive sense of security beyond the traditional base of hard security. This chapter identifies the underlying rationale driving each state's deepening involvement in the emerging security community. In tracing the developmental steps of this security community, we discover the dynamic nature of security communities. They are the result of sustained development and interest and commitment: this chapter provides the important foundational analysis that supports the succeeding chapters focused on Australia, Japan and the United States.

Chapter 3, *Talk Isn't Cheap: Communication in the Trilateral Community*, is the first of the three central elements that guide the body of this thesis. Appreciating the flow and content of communication helps answer the question of how an immature security community, once created, is sustained. At the heart of Deutsch's approach to security community development is the notion that communication is the critical sustaining element:

a matter of sympathy and loyalties; of 'we feeling', trust, and mutual consideration; or partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviour...in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision making.¹²

The chapter affirms Deutsch's contention that communication is central to security community sustention. What is clear is that to maintain 'dependable expectations of peaceful change', states seeking to sustain their immature security community need to communicate with one another in a language that is common and comprehensible to all participants, though, as Oscar Wilde noted in *The Canterville Ghost*, it is entirely possible for two states to be separated by the same language.¹³ The nuance of international diplomacy is such that it is critical for states not only to understand intent, perception, trends, and limitations, but to be *seen* to understand such indicators for future community development.

¹² Ibid, p. 36.

¹³ This is in reference to a quip generally, though incorrectly, attributed to George Bernard Shaw that often appears as (or a variant thereof), "The English and Americans are two peoples divided by a common language." It first appears in Oscar Wilde's short story, *The Canterville Ghost*, as "Indeed, in many respects, she was quite English, and was an excellent example of the fact that we have really everything in common with America nowadays, except, of course, language." Oscar Wilde, *Lord Arthur Savile's Crime & Other Stories* (London: J.R. Osgood, McIlvaine and Company, 1891), p. 94.

This chapter is the first of three to utilise the developmental framework for assessing contemporary security community development as established in the opening chapter of this thesis. It assesses the development of the security community from immature to mature, using the markers of minor, medium, and major sensitivity to indicate the level of sensitivity at which the community currently operates. Inspired by Adler and Barnett's three tier framework (nascent, ascendant, and mature), the chapter begins the identification of a quantifiable set of standards by which security community development can be assessed.

Although a security community should be properly understood as a dynamic process, one that is much more about the journey than the destination: charting the development of the community is essential to determine its cohesiveness and durability. In this context, Chapter 3 argues that a mature security community is emergent when the participating states commit to joint statements that specifically and directly highlight areas of shared threat perception and aspirations for future cooperation. They thus commit to the collaboration and collation of strategic assessments, with the goal of the successful resolution of issues that threaten the cohesion of their shared community.

Chapter Four, *Constructing Security Cooperation: Lessons from the Trilateral Community*, examines the operationalisation of military coordination and cooperation between the trilateral community as the participants face extant and emerging traditional and non-traditional security threats. Here we explore the increasing securitisation and complexity of transregional challenges that range from humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations and transnational crime, to

peacekeeping and military operations short of war. The end result is a mutually supportive defence industry and the demonstration of interoperability in a combat setting.

The covetous nature with which states guard their military assets and capabilities makes this process and this result useful in measuring the emergence of a mature security community. Continuous and deep cooperation in the military space is a powerful indicator of the strength of the trust that exists between Australia, Japan, and the United States.

Following the convention established in Chapter 3, this chapter tracks the evolution of security cooperation through the minor, medium, and major tiers to indicate the depth of the community's cooperative activities. This achievement is in contrast to the experience of the broader Asia Pacific where the divergent physical size of militaries and military resources undercuts the coordination of operational capacity and effectiveness which further reduces operational experience. In contrast, Australia, Japan, and the United States have undertaken a series of cooperative operations to ground, expand, and hone their military interoperability, as a prelude to deeper forms of cooperation.

Chapter Five, *Constructing Credible Commitment in the Trilateral Security Community*, addresses the asymmetric perception of commitment between the United States on one hand, and Australia and Japan on the other. The demonstration of credible commitment is the chief challenge to the development of a mature security community. In cases where there is a profound power imbalance among community members, such as is the case with the states assessed in this thesis, there is a

resultant perception of asymmetry in levels of commitment. As this chapter will demonstrate, the prism through which Australia and Japan view the United States' commitment to the spirit of the community is indelibly coloured by the persistent fear of an impending US withdrawal from the region. Equally, the United States' position as the hegemonic power affords it any number of options for the conduct and direction of its foreign policy. This positioning brings with it a resultant mutual desire to maintain a foreign policy that both maximises benefit and minimises risk.

This chapter argues that a mature security community exists when participating states commit to a course of action that is not simply defined as within the self-interest of the state; when domestic audience sentiment enforces commitment in the absence of a formal agreement; and is consummated in the successful defusing of a challenge to the mutual commitments of the community to one another. Successful security communities are structured around the 'mutual compatibility of main values', which are intended to promote, and do promote, long term perspectives. This mutual compatibility functions as a key norm undergirding the perception of mutual commitment within the community.

The penultimate piece of this thesis is a Coda, written after the election of Donald. J. Trump to the presidency of the United States. The time period analysed in this thesis was deliberately drawn to end with the 2016 United States presidential election. However, the unexpected victory by Donald Trump over his Democratic opponent, Hillary Clinton, his strong and public views on Japan, in particular, and his campaign slogan of 'America First', necessitated an effort to assess the level of threat a Trump presidency seems to pose to the mature trilateral security community. The Coda

argues that the surface-level tension and disturbances caused by Trump's election and post-election comments have not had displaced the deeper, stronger currents of the trilateral community's relationship.

The thesis concludes by noting that alliances are not exercises in altruism. They exist to define inter-state relationships, certify levels of formal commitment, and provide a foundation for the future direction of a bilateral or multilateral security relationship. Throughout the pre-World War II era, alliances had moderate goals and finite lifespans, sustained primarily by the intensity and existential nature of the threat. The United States' initial perception of enduring commitments with other states was grounded in the closing statement of George Washington's presidency that, "[i]t is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world..." and the opening statement of Thomas Jefferson's arguing for, "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none..." For 165 years this advice prevailed.

Thus by 2016, the United States maintained 66 alliance commitments, the majority of which had been concluded in the opening decade of the Cold War, and none of which were in danger of being unilaterally broken. Since colonisation, Australian defence policy has assumed that a 'great and powerful friend' would play an outsize role in the defence and protection of the nation. This national neurosis influenced Australia's foundational relationship with the United Kingdom from colonisation to the early stages of the Second World War and from then its relationship with the United States. Japan's path was divergent of course: forming an early alliance with the United

Kingdom from a position of strength as a major power in East Asia before signing a unidirectional security treaty with the United States after its defeat in the Pacific Theatre.

A mature security community offers all members the most viable opportunity to transcend the strictures of the traditional alliance structures and create a structure that is adaptable to the contemporary environment. The increasing connectedness of international society and the accelerating complexity of interstate relations forces all states to consider new approaches to enduring and emerging challenges. As we will see, the mature security community of the Australia-Japan-United States reflects a deliberate series of manoeuvres designed to integrate the separate bilateral relationships into a robust and enduring trilateral community.

As this thesis will show, security communities are quantifiable, assessable, and above all represent a viable model for the future of inter-state interaction, coalition building, and regional stabilisation. They are tall, but stable structures, standing on ground that can and has produced convulsions: for that reason, they are built with care and careful design to ensue flexibility, durability, and, above all, an abiding power to enhance security.

Chapter 1

An Organised Common Peace

On January 22, weeks after his victory in the 1916 presidential election, President Woodrow Wilson stood before the United States Senate and delivered his ‘Peace without Victory’ speech. Speaking two months prior to the United States’ entry into the First World War, Wilson argued that it was possible to bring the warring opponents together in a truce, so that the United States would be able to abstain from the European war.

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.¹

Wilson’s language of a ‘secure peace’, a ‘community of power’, and an ‘organised common peace’ seemed to invoke the spectre of the Concert of Europe, the first significant modern attempt to establish and protect peace amongst states.² The Concert was heavily influenced by the writings of Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant, who advocated for a ‘league of nations’, that Kant argued would mitigate conflict and promote and perpetuate a stable peace.³ Although the Concert was, in the aftermath of the devastating Napoleonic Wars, able to stabilise the fragile peace on the

¹ Woodrow Wilson, “Peace without Victory” (Speech, January 22, 1917).

² Though the question of whether it was the peace which maintained the Concert or the Concert which maintained the peace remains to be answered. See W.N. Medlicott, *Bismark, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe* (London: Athlone Press, 1956), p. 18; Richard B. Elrod, ‘The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System’, *World Politics* 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 159–74.

³ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*, trans. M Campbell Smith (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1917).

European continent, the great power upheavals and rivalries of the mid-nineteenth century began to undermine the European interstate relations.⁴ Wilson's idealistic beliefs bedevilled his contemporaries, their experience shaped by the great power and empire politics on immediate, enduring, and violent display in Europe. Chastened by his very public failure surrounding the United States' role in establishing the League of Nations, and in worsening health, Wilson's liberal internationalism fell out of vogue and the promising concept of an 'organised common peace' seemed further away than ever.

This chapter will analyse the major contributions to the literature of security communities in two distinct periods: their original conceptualisation in the early Cold War, and their reimagining in the post-Cold War era. The purpose of this analysis is to construct a framework for the conceptualisation of the Australia-Japan-United States security community. This chapter will make a study of the foundational elements that, when reconsidered, constitute an immature security community: security, sovereignty, trust, and cooperation, before examining three security communities in various stages of maturity. This chapter will also include an important discussion on the distinction between alliances and security communities. Finally, this chapter will identify the two frameworks used to both identify the existence of an Australia-Japan-United States security community, and to determine its development. This chapter will argue that although every security community is created in a specific context and from a specific set of circumstances, there are normative structures broadly common to the early development of all such communities.

⁴ In particular, the revolutionary wave which swept Europe in 1848, resulting in political instability in France, the independent states of contemporary Germany and Italy, Denmark, the Hapsburg Empire, and Switzerland, as well as the Crimean War that began in 1853 and involved the Russian Empire against the French and British Empires.

Therefore, the duplication of mature security communities based simply on common normative structures seen in early development is unlikely to be successful.

Forty years after President Wilson's speech, in 1957, Harvard political scientist Karl Deutsch first proposed the term and concept of a 'security community'. In the pioneering study, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Deutsch, argued for the existence of such a community in the North Atlantic region following evidence that the members had a sense of community, of 'we-ness', that allows common social problems to be resolved through processes of 'peaceful change'.⁵ As defined by Deutsch, a security community is, "[a] group of people that had become integrated to the point that there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will resolve their disputes in some other way."⁶ To attain and maintain a norm such as the non-violent resolution of disputes requires a high level of integration between community members.⁷

This resolution of problems via expectations of 'peaceful change' is in line with constructivist theories that place a greater importance on processes of identities and interests shaped by the external environment.⁸ Furthermore, the notion that security communities are socially constructed and do not require a strong territorial element, means that the community must develop an identity based beyond territorial boundaries. Consequently, a security community represents the highest

⁵ Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5.

⁶ Ibid, p. 21.

⁷ Ibid, p. 5.

⁸ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 34.

attainable level of integration between politically separate states, mirroring functionalist David Mitrany's statement that, "The task of our times is not to keep nations peacefully apart but to bring them actively together."⁹

Deutsch's concept of a security community was an important early contribution to the nascent and decidedly minor constructivist discipline of international relations. Indeed, it was such an enduring concept that security communities and their development were analysed as the focus of Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett's 1998 edited volume that examined Deutsch's claims in the post-Cold War environment across multiple regions.¹⁰ The authors in Adler and Barnett's volume considered security community development through the key structural lenses of security, sovereignty, trust, and cooperation. To guide this assessment, we will assess the conceptions of security community development presented by Ole Wæver, Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephen Haggard, and Amitav Acharya. Wæver's analysis focuses on the development of a security community in the 'Norden' (Scandinavian) region of Europe.¹¹ Gonzalez and Haggard examine the United States – Mexico relationship (which Deutsch had considered to have security community potential).¹² Finally, Acharya assesses the rhetoric and reality of a security community among the foundational members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹³

⁹ David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London: Martin Robertson, 1957), p. 228.

¹⁰ Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*.

¹¹ Wæver, "Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community" in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

¹² Gonzalez and Haggard, "The USA and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community" in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

¹³ Acharya, "Collective Security and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia" in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

From this assessment, the central concepts of what constitutes and sustains a security community will be deduced and then applied to the succeeding chapters of this thesis. This chapter will conclude with a preliminary analysis on the focus of this thesis, the developing pluralistic security community between the United States, Australia, and Japan. In understanding the ‘constructed’ nature of security communities, we must also grasp that security communities are not naturally occurring structures. They are the result of specific actions and contexts, and specific normative structures which undergird their development, meaning that their replication is a highly difficult and uncertain task.

Understanding Deutschian Communities: Amalgamated and Pluralistic

Deutsch considers a political community to be an organised social union that has “machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance.”¹⁴ This is in line with the territorial and relational dimensions of community as defined by sociologist Joseph Gusfield.¹⁵ Territorial communities, he argues, are organised along physical or regional boundaries and form the basis for the majority of political communities across the world.¹⁶ Relational communities, by contrast, find their basis in the “quality of character of human relationship, without reference to location.”¹⁷ David McMillan and David Chavis’ psychological theory of community posits that a “[s]ense of community is a feeling that members have of belonging, a feeling that members matter to one another and to the group, and a shared faith that members’ needs will be met through their commitment to be together.”¹⁸ There is significant overlap between the community constructive elements Deutsch’s original theory, and those proposed by Gusfield, McMillan and Chavis, and the ‘imagined communities’¹⁹ and ‘imagined geographies’²⁰ of Benedict Anderson and Edward Said.

¹⁴ Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, p. 5.

¹⁵ Joseph R. Gusfield, *The Community: A Critical Response* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1975), pp. xv-xvi.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 32-33.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 45-47.

¹⁸ David W. McMillan and David M. Chavis, ‘Sense of Community: A Definition and Theory’, *Journal of Community Psychology* 14 (January 1986), p. 9.

¹⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 2nd Edition (London: Verso, 2006).

²⁰ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, 1st Edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

Deutsch divided security communities into two groups: amalgamated and pluralistic. An amalgamated security community occurs when two or more politically separate states, often in the face of an internal or external crisis, combine to form a common government.²¹ The concept of an amalgamated community is most widely seen in an analysis of modern state development.²² However, it is important to note that Deutsch believed that amalgamation did not necessarily overlap with integration, and as a result, one can occur without the presence of the other. This thought was later conceptualised in horizontal and vertical integration theory.²³ Deutsch illustrated this distinction in Figure 1.1 by noting that an amalgamation without integration results in entities such as the Hapsburg Empire, and that amalgamation with integration results in communities such as Canada since 1867, Germany since 1871, and the United States since 1877.²⁴

²¹ Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, p. 6.

²² Charles S. Maier, *Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014).

²³ See: R. Duane Ireland and Robert Hoskisson, *Understanding Business Strategy: Concepts and Cases* (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2008), p. 173; Yves L. Doz and Gary Hamel, *Alliance Advantage: The Art of Creating Value Through Partnering* (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 1998), p. 4; J.S. Raue and A Wieland, 'The Interplay of Different Types of Governance in Horizontal Cooperation', *The International Journal of Logistics Management* 26, no. 2 (2015), p. 401.

²⁴ Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, p. 7; See also: Andrew S. Harvey, 'Amalgamated Security Communities' (Doctorate, University of Kansas, 2011),

https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/8128/Harvey_ku_0099D_11680_DATA_1.pdf;jsessionid=D5C642D05826611F647C03471ABAF7B7?sequence=1.

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Figure 1.1: Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, p. 7.

By contrast, Deutsch noted that pluralistic security communities are much less ambitious, and therefore much more common, as they “retain the legal independence of separate governments.”²⁵ In this type of community, sovereign states in a transnational region, through increased communication, the sharing of values, and a desire for a common future, have become so closely affiliated that the very idea that physical violence could occur between them is highly implausible. Deutsch noted that three conditions were necessary for a pluralistic security community: the compatibility of major values, the increase in the response capabilities of the participating political units, and the mutual predictability of behaviour.²⁶ The compatibility of major values is a recognisable and core facet for the successful integration of every type of community, no matter

²⁵ Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, p. 6.

²⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 66-67.

the level of maturity or complexity.²⁷ To remain effective, the participating units of the community need to be assured that messages that pass from one unit to another will not “[m]erely be received, but would be understood, and they would be given real weight in the process of decision making.”²⁸ The third condition, the mutual predictability of behaviour, is closely related to the former two conditions, and, read broadly, covers aspects of the community relating to cooperation and trust.

A pluralistic security community does not require the same ceding of sovereignty as required in amalgamated communities and resultantly is less concerned with self-transformation, as the participating units, attracted to one another by their mutually held values already agree on their core enduring interests. Similarly, there are fewer conditions necessary for a successful pluralistic community as the main goal of this type of community is the “[k]eeping of the peace among the participating units...”²⁹ However, Deutsch notes that simply keeping the peace, or avoiding war, is not enough, with the citizens of the community wanting a more powerful (and therefore a more complex) community in order to provide other public goods.³⁰ In line with the expectation of further public goods provisions is the understanding that although some units in the community may have experienced previous military conflict, there is, at the point of the community forming and for the estimable future, no expectation of future military confrontation.³¹ A further key point to this is that pluralistic communities are not blindly utopian, devoid of political conflicts or sharp

²⁷ Gusfield, *The Community: A Critical Response*; McMillan and Chavis, “Sense of Community: A Definition and Theory”; Stephen Castles, “Migration and Community Formation under Conditions of Globalization,” *International Migration Review* 36, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 1143–68.

²⁸ Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

social disagreements; rather the peaceful resolution of these conflicts is what characterises such a community.

For Deutsch, the development of the ‘community’ aspect of a pluralistic security community occurs when its members acquire compatible fundamental values as well as a sense of mutual responsiveness.³² These compatible values engender a sense of ‘we-ness’ – a collective identity that serves the community. When states assume particular social identities – democratic, law-abiding, economically liberal – their inhabitants also assume these identities.³³ As a result, when people define their state as belonging to a grouping of states (either geographically or relationally bound), the ‘West’ or the European Union for example, they internalise the norms that go with this definition. Behaviours such as the respect and concern for values like the democratic process are ‘correct’, whereas others like the corruption or subjugation of the democratic process are unacceptable. Edmund Burke, in opposing British overtures to revolutionary France, contended,

Men are not tied to one another by papers and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies. It is with nations as it is with individuals. Nothing is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspondence in laws customs, manners, and habits of life.³⁴

This collective identity is largely post-sovereign, as it is comprised of values transnational in origin. However, this spate of collective and shared identities and the language of communities does not mean that self-interest based behaviour by individual states will end and that material and

³² Ibid.

³³ See: Andrew Linklater, ‘The Problem of Community in International Relations’, *Alternatives* 15, no. 2 (1990): 135–53, p. 149; Heather Rae, *State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

³⁴ Edmund Burke, ‘First Letter on a Regicide Peace’, in *The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke*, vol. 5, 12 vols (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1866), p. 317.

security dilemmas will cease to shape interstate behaviour. This sociological perspective of national and international security was at immediate odds with the prevailing realist approach to international relations popularised by the zero-sum environment wrought by the Cold War. Despite the relational differences characterised by ideology between the Soviet Union and the United States, the debate was grounded in the constructed idea of the ‘West’ v. ‘East’. As much as foreign policy, particularly for non-great power states, is largely reactionary, policy makers must construct a world in which the wider relational community sees their actions as ‘correct’.³⁵

Deconstructing a Security Community: Security and Sovereignty

Understanding how contemporary ideational power dynamics unfold in times of peace is a key challenge to students of constructivism. Changes in the distribution of power matter, as they result in the reassessment of hegemonic and great power’s attitudes towards ‘new’ normative structures.³⁶ Reflecting fluctuations in the distribution of power, developments within the Australia-Japan-United States trilateral relationship indicate a cooperative power dynamic, rather than one based in zero-sum competition. This community reflects elements of a Deutschian security community, which we can see in the in the increased political, economic, and military c between the trilateral participants. This thesis does not intend to develop a definitive concept of community nor or security. Additionally, as noted, it will not pursue a theoretical model applicable

³⁵ Alexander Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’, *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 71–81, p. 73; Ian Hurd, ‘Constructivism’, in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 298-99.

³⁶ See Alasdair Young, ‘Perspectives on the Changing Global Distribution of Power: Concepts and Context’, *Politics* 30, no. 1 (2010): 2–14.

to all regions of the world as the contextual and normative structures of a security community are specific to the one community. Rather, it is interested in identifying benchmarks relevant to the development of a security community between Australia, Japan, and the United States.³⁷

‘Security’ is an ambiguous term with near universal application. Deutsch does not provide a definition of security in a strict sense, though his characterisation of ‘peaceful change’ as “the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.”³⁸ does bear reference to the following definitions of security. As Emma Rothschild observes in her insightful article ‘What is Security?’, “The idea of security has been at the heart of European political thought since the crises of the seventeenth century.”³⁹ She goes on to note that the “Latin noun ‘securitas’ referred, in its primary classical use, to a condition of individuals...it denoted composure, tranquillity of spirit, freedom from care, the condition that Cicero called the “object of supreme desire,” or “the absence of anxiety upon which the happy life depends.””⁴⁰ It is the latter conception that journalist Walter Lippman used to formulate his conception of security, commenting that the true goal of foreign policy is to secure the nation in both peace and war.⁴¹ Further, he noted that, “A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war.”⁴² Similarly, political scientist Arnold Wolfers expanded on the role that perception plays in

³⁷ Following the convention in Adler and Barnett’s seminal work, throughout this paper, the use of the term ‘security community’ will refer only to pluralistic security communities.

³⁸ Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, p. 4.

³⁹ Emma Rothschild, ‘What Is Security?’ *Daedalus* 124, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 53–98, p. 60.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁴¹ Walter Lippman, *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1943), p. 51.

⁴² *Ibid.*

determining the meaning of security, noting, “[S]ecurity, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”⁴³ From a strict realist perspective, Hans Brauch indicates that regional, state and sub-state apparatus mitigate *objective* threats to security, whereas the *subjective* threats to security, from a constructivist perspective, are overcome by shifts in perception.⁴⁴

For the West, ‘security’ was traditionally associated with the nation state-based Peace of Westphalia, wherein states had sovereignty and mastery of their internal affairs and activities guaranteed under international norms. This statist of security propounded the view that security could not exist without the state. Indeed, Ken Booth defines statism as “the concentration of all loyalty and decision making at the level of the sovereign state.”⁴⁵ Thus, the perception of what precisely needs securing depends on the perspective of the chief policy makers of the state. Analogous to security analyses of his contemporaries,⁴⁶ Deutsch’s version of a security community maintains that the centrality of the state is consistent with understanding security.⁴⁷ However, the

⁴³ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 150.

⁴⁴ Hans Günter Brauch, ‘Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks’, in *Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security: Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks*, ed. Hans Günter Brauch et al. (Berlin: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011), p. 61.

⁴⁵ Ken Booth, ‘Cold Wars of the Mind’, in *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond*, ed. Ken Booth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 52.

⁴⁶ John H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (January 1950): 157–80; Bernard Brodie, *National Security Policy and Economic Stability* (New Haven: Yale Institute of International Studies, 1950); Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol”, *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (December 1952): 481–502; James R Schlesinger, *The Political Economy of National Security: A Study of the Economic Aspects of the Contemporary Power Struggle* (New York: Praeger, 1960).

⁴⁷ Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, p. 7-8.

end of the Cold War gave rise to serious analysis of the varied categories of security and the insecurity that came with these new categories.⁴⁸

On Sovereignty

In *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Stephen D. Krasner nominates four categories of sovereignty: International legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty.⁴⁹ International legal sovereignty as recognition within the international state environment, Westphalian sovereignty as the principle of non-interference in the territorial and domestic affairs of a state, domestic sovereignty as the legitimacy of the state government and its ability to maintain the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of force’,⁵⁰ and interdependence sovereignty as the ability of a state government to control any kind of intra-territorial movement.⁵¹

These various states of sovereignty do not necessarily correlate, and states may hold one or several categories without holding them all, or one type of sovereignty may undermine the totality of another.⁵² Clear examples of this disparity exist in the cases of Taiwan, Somalia, and the European Union, though even these are imperfect examples as the states or entities in question are atypical.

⁴⁸ Jessica Tuchman Matthews, ‘Redefining Security’, *Foreign Affairs*, 1989.

⁴⁹ Stephen D Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 3.

⁵⁰ Jean Bodin, *Les Six Livres de La République*, vol. 1, 6 vols (Paris: Fayard, 1986), p. 179; Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London: Orion Publishing Group, 1994); Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in *Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society*, ed. and trans. Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), p. 129–98.

⁵¹ Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy*, p. 4.

⁵² *Ibid.*

In the case of Taiwan, due to its irregular political and international status, it lacks international legal sovereignty but in practice retains Westphalian, domestic, and interdependence sovereignty.⁵³ Somalia has international legal and Westphalian sovereignty, but highly limited domestic sovereignty and no interdependence sovereignty, which obfuscate its claim to statehood. In the case of the supranational entity, the European Union, the international legal sovereignty afforded to the collective, ironically undermines the Westphalian and interdependence sovereignty of the individual European states.⁵⁴

Using Krasner's categorisation of sovereignties, a mature security community would challenge the concepts of international legal sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty. Given there is no international institution for recognising alliances or groupings of likeminded individual states, a security community would not generate additional sovereignty unless the participants opted to create a supranational institution, but the individual states would not be compromised by their grouping. From an interdependence sovereignty standpoint, as the development of a shared common identity requires the transfer and free movement of citizens and flows of information, requiring a sovereignty-lessening agreement similar to the European Union's Schengen Agreement.⁵⁵

⁵³ Harry S. Truman, 'United States Policy Toward Formosa' (Washington, DC: Department of State, 16 January 1950), <https://archive.org/stream/departmentofstat2250unit#page/78/mode/2up>; United Nations General Assembly, 'Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations', Pub. L. No. Resolution 2758 (1971), [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2758\(XXVI\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2758(XXVI)).

⁵⁴ Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy*.

⁵⁵ European Economic Community, 'The Schengen Acquis - Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders', Pub. L. No. 42000A0922(01) (1985), [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922\(01\)](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(01)).

How, When, and Why States Trust

In order to conceptualise these communities, we first need to understand their component parts. Forty years after Deutsch's original publication, a profound change in the international environment stimulated the further work into the original question: how and why do states form trusting relationships? Such questions were addressed in the work of emerging critical social theory scholars such as Alexander Wendt, whose seminal work *Social Theory of International Politics*, emphasised the importance of norms and shared values, as opposed to the material values underpinning the liberal and realist interpretations of the world.⁵⁶ However, as Aaron Hoffman notes, the original divisions within the literature regarding trust centred on the question of causality.⁵⁷ Hoffman convincingly argues that much of what we knew about trust formation “derived from either laboratory conducted studies or game-theoretic models...”⁵⁸

Trust is integral to the development of advanced relations between states. Trust within the state system exists in conditions wherein the “[m]embers of that system act according to and are secure in the expected futures constituted by the presence of each other or their symbolic

⁵⁶ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁵⁷ Aaron Hoffman, *Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), p. 5; Annette Baier, ‘Trust and Antitrust’, *Ethics* 96 (January 1986): 231–60; Russell Hardin, ‘Conceptions and Explanations of Trust’, in *Trust in Society*, ed. Karen S. Cook (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001); Aaron Hoffman, ‘A Conceptualisation of Trust in International Relations’, *European Journal of International Relations* 8 (September 2002): 375–401; Aaron Hoffman, ‘The Structural Causes of Trusting Relationships: Why Rivals Do Not Overcome Suspicion Step by Step’, *Political Science Quarterly* 122, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 287–312; Andrew H Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

⁵⁸ Hoffman, *Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict*, p. 6.

representations.”⁵⁹ Simply, trust exists when all participating parties act as if it exists. That the existence of security communities is so dependent on mutual trust is unsurprising, as trust is the only functional alternative to the Hobbesian “war of all against all.”⁶⁰ Trust also has the added advantage of reducing a relationship’s complexity. This occurs by changing the environment in which the trust is administered. A large environment with a high number of multi-level actors indicates that trusting relationships will be harder to sustain and deepen due to the number of actors. Smaller environments foster a less diverse and less complex system. States can restrict their environment through several factors, with the most common restrictions arranged around a state’s perceived identity. In support, Hoffman notes Hans Morgenthau’s work on relations between European leaders in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, relations, Morgenthau notes, that were based on common social identities.⁶¹ An environment based on exclusivity, whether territorially or relationally, is the standard within the international system. Exclusivity is necessary as the international environment is always more complex than the state system itself. Therefore, by restricting the environment in which they operate, states can reduce complexity in inter-state relations.

Surprisingly, Deutsch’s conception of a security community does not explicitly utilise the concept of trust. It surfaces at points during his analysis, most notably the phrase ‘dependable expectations of peaceable change’, which presupposes that each state depends on the other in order to maintain peace. Unlike Lewis and Weigert, Deutsch seems to consider trust mostly as a precondition to the

⁵⁹ J. David Lewis and Andrew Weigert, ‘Trust as a Social Reality’, *Social Forces* 63, no. 4 (June 1985), p. 968.

⁶⁰ Hobbes, *Leviathan*.

⁶¹ Hoffman, *Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict*, p. 5; Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1967), p. 235.

predictability of the actor's behaviour, indicating that trust functions as an aspect of expectation rather than as a dimension of security.

Prior to the work of Wendt, Adler and Barnett, and Hoffman, Vivien Hart convincingly argued that distrust is just as important as trust to the functioning of a social relationship, particularly in international and domestic politics.⁶² Distrust dictates the course of action of a relationship based on suspicion, monitoring, and the establishment and activation of institutional safeguards. Indeed, there is a tantalising argument in the concept that distrust amongst wartime allies motivated many of the post-Second World War defence treaties. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties defines a treaty as,

“Treaty” means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation;⁶³

Yet, as Charles W. Kegley and Gregory Raymond insightfully note, committing alliance agreements to writing, as required by the Vienna Convention, indicates that there *is* an element of apprehension within the cooperating parties and ultimately they do not trust each other.⁶⁴ The contractual nature of the treaty arrangements suggests that states can never be too sure as to whether their friends (or interests), whether special, great and powerful, or merely necessary, will reliably fulfil their end of the agreement.⁶⁵ Given no fool proof safeguards exist, suspicion must

⁶² Vivian Hart, *Distrust and Democracy: Political Distrust in Britain and America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

⁶³ United Nations, ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’, Treaty Series (Vienna: United Nations, 27 January 1969), <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf>, p. 333.

⁶⁴ Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), p. 47.

⁶⁵ Hoffman, *Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict*, p. 32.

constantly face examination, until it gives way to understanding and ultimately realignment, so that the actors fall back on some conceptualisation of trust.⁶⁶

Andrew H. Kydd, in *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* notes four implications of the theory of trust, and is worth quoting at length here:

First, cooperation requires a certain degree of trust between states. The threshold of trust required for cooperation depends on a set of variables including a state's relative power and costs of conflict. Second, though conflict between trustworthy states is possible, when we see conflict it is a sign that one or both of the states are likely to be untrustworthy. Thus, we, as external observers, should become less trusting of the parties involved in a conflict, just as they themselves do. Third, in multilateral settings, hegemony—the presence of a very powerful state—can promote cooperation, but only if the hegemon is relatively trustworthy. Untrustworthy hegemons will actually make cooperation less likely. Fourth, if two parties are genuinely trustworthy, they will usually be able to reassure each other of this fact and eventually cooperate with each other. The key mechanism that makes reassurance possible is “costly signaling,” that is, making small but significant gestures that serve to prove that one is trustworthy.⁶⁷

Kydd sees trust and cooperation as linked, in that a state (or party) trusts when they understand that their opponent will not exploit their cooperation.⁶⁸ This scenario is dominant in game theory models, with the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ model the most relatable. A common version of this game sees two members of a criminal gang imprisoned in solitary confinement with no opportunity to contact or communicate with each other. The prosecutors lack the evidence to have the gang members charged on the principle charge, and thus devise a bargain for each prisoner. The

⁶⁶ Lewis and Weigert, ‘Trust as a Social Reality’, p. 969.

⁶⁷ Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*, p. 5.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 6.

prisoners are given the opportunity to either betray the other by accusing them of committing the crime or cooperate with the other by remaining silent.⁶⁹

- If X and Y both attempt to betray one another, then they are both sentenced to 2 years.
- If X betrays Y, but Y does not betray X, X is set free whereas Y is sentenced to 3 years (and vice-versa).
- If neither X nor Y betrays the other, then both X and Y are convicted on a lesser charge and are sentenced to 1 year.

If narrow self-interest holds, then both X and Y will attempt to betray the other and will each be sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment. The way for X and Y to minimise their liability – that is, access to their freedom – is to collaborate and not betray the other. In doing so, they minimise their risks by not cooperating with the prosecutors, share the burden of a 1-year prison sentence, and maximise their opportunity (within the rules of the game) to serve the shortest sentence possible.

In contrast to Kydd, Hoffman argues that cooperation is not necessary for trust.⁷⁰ In line with rationalist theories of state behaviour, basic cooperation offers states more flexibility with regard to determining outcomes and benefits.⁷¹ This mode of thinking is largely supported by the logics of consequence and appropriateness outlined by James G. March and Johan P. Olson. They posit that all behaviours are controlled by these two logics. The logic of consequences involves self-interested actors that match their behaviour to their expected returns, analogous to the realist school

⁶⁹ Anatol Rapoport and Albert M. Chammah, *Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965).

⁷⁰ Hoffman, *Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict*, p. 6.

⁷¹ See Karen S. Cook, Russell Hardin, and Margaret Levi, *Cooperation without Trust?* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005); Brian Rathbun, *Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics and American Multilateralism*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 121 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

of international relations.⁷² Its opposite, the logic of appropriateness, considers the roles that identity plays in the course of an action. The laws of identity institutionalise social practices, granting an institution stability, but also predictability.⁷³ These laws retain their legitimacy as actors seek to fulfil the obligations assigned to their identity, and in doing so, reinforce the expectations originally attached to their role. Rather than following rules on the basis of interests or power, as would be expected using the logic of consequences, the logic of appropriateness stresses the importance of the traditions of a democratic polity, with the concept of citizenship conferring a preparedness to act as a member of the community.⁷⁴

In their influential paper, ‘Trust as a Social Reality’, Lewis and Weigert posit that three dimensions of trust – cognitive, emotional, and behavioural – make it possible to distinguish trust from other psychological states such as faith or prediction.⁷⁵ At a base level, trust is a cognitive process discriminating amongst those whom are trustworthy, distrusted, or unknown. Familiarity with the institution is key to determining whether trust is extended or withheld. If an institution is unknown, there can be no logical reason to trust or distrust, as familiarity cannot be present. By itself however, familiarity with an institution is not enough to engender trust. As Lewis and Weigert note, trust at a cognitive level is reached when the relevant actors “[n]o longer need or want any

⁷² James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘Elaborating the “New Institutionalism”’, in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ed. R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Chapter 1.

⁷³ See Aristotle on the law of identity - Aristotle, ‘Book IV’, in *The Metaphysics*, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Classics, 1999), Part 4.

⁷⁴ James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The Logic of Appropriateness’, Working Paper (University of Oslo: Centre for European Studies, January 2004), pp. 5-6.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p. 970.

further evidence or rational reasons for their confidence in the objects of trust.”⁷⁶ Further to this, trust is a social, *collective* reality. All trust, therefore, rests on the assumption that others trust.

Trust also has an emotional dimension, complementary to its cognitive base. Though domestic politicians have long utilised emotive language to agitate their supporter bases, international diplomats have carefully tendered to their domain of tempered activity. Emotional trust is present in states that share a relational identity. This is largely demonstrated with feelings of ‘goodwill’ between the inhabitants of the states, or in the outpouring of grief when catastrophe strikes. As with cognitive trust, emotional trust is based in reciprocity.⁷⁷ Further, Russell Hardin notes that this emotional trust, ‘encapsulated interest trust’ in his parlance, may not be as altruistic as it first seems.⁷⁸ Hardin goes on to define encapsulated interest trust as,

being grounded in the assumption that the potentially trusted person has an interest in maintaining a relationship with the trustor, an interest that gives the potentially trusted person an incentive to be trustworthy.⁷⁹

Finally, behavioural dimension of trust is present when actors act as if trust exists. That is, acting as if “[t]he uncertain future actions of others were indeed certain in circumstances wherein the violation of these expectations results in negative consequences for those involved.”⁸⁰ Analogous to the cognitive and emotional dimensions of trust, behavioural trust is openly reciprocal – if other institutions act in ways that imply that they hold trust in ‘us’, we are predisposed to return that

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 971.

⁷⁸ Russell Hardin, *Trust* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p. 17.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Lewis and Weigert, ‘Trust as a Social Reality’, p. 971.

trust. Equally, if institutions behave in a manner that violates our trust we react by reassessing our level of trust in them.

Although the behavioural dimension of trust exists when we act as if a set of future actions were certain, trust is more than mere prediction. As a social construct, it can only ever function within the limits set by the situational conditions. As Hart notes, democracy trusts that people are capable of governing themselves while simultaneously depending on the right amount of suspicion of those in power (and those seeking it) if it is to function properly.⁸¹ In all, “[t]rust which undergirds our everyday lives is a pure social construction which answers to our need for security by seeming to be a fact when it is always a projected assumption.”⁸²

So far, we have examined the question of causality, the role of trust in reducing complexity in interstate relations, and trust as a function of self-interest. Next, Alexander Wendt explores the contention that anarchy is unrelated to self-interested behaviour on behalf of states. Wendt’s original paper, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’ appeared in 1992, and formed the basis for his later book, a *Social Theory of International Politics*.⁸³ In his article, Wendt punctures the equilibrium surrounding theories of state actions and argues, in line with contemporary theories of trust and identity, that the identities that states form are “inherently relational”.⁸⁴ Wendt advances a constructivist, rather than neorealist global system

⁸¹ Hart, *Distrust and Democracy: Political Distrust in Britain and America*, p. xi.

⁸² Lewis and Weigert, ‘Trust as a Social Reality’, p. 982.

⁸³ Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, *International Organisation* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992).

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p. 397.

that broadly classifies security systems as competitive, individualistic, or cooperative.⁸⁵ The competitive system, mirroring the Hobbesian conception of a “war of all against all”,⁸⁶ constitutes the ‘realist’, zero-sum power stance of this system. Collective action is constrained by the irreducible security complex, trust as a social reality is non-existent.⁸⁷ Trust or even alignment are not possible, as each state acts selfishly, concerned primarily with exogenous threats to its security.⁸⁸ This type of security system allows situations like a security dilemma and the Thucydides Trap to exist.⁸⁹

Similar to the competitive system, an individualistic security system sees states “indifferent” with regard to linking the security of others to the security of self.⁹⁰ However, as Wendt notes, the neorealism encouraged by the competitive system still exists as states attempt to achieve absolute gains in security.⁹¹ States assist each other to achieve these absolute gains, as they are less concerned that their existence is under immediate threat.⁹² Finally, Wendt identifies the cooperative security system, wherein ‘security’ is linked to community. States seek security within a group, one with which they positively identify. This minimises the concern posed by ‘active threats’, as states do not seek collective security *from* their rivals, they are much less inclined to view the relative power disparities negatively.⁹³ Wendt’s concept of a cooperative state security

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 400.

⁸⁶ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 71.

⁸⁷ Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, p. 400.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954), Chapter 1, Section 23; Graham Allison, ‘The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China Headed for War?’, *The Atlantic*, 24 September 2015; Graham Allison, ‘Thucydides Trap Project’ (Harvard University, 22 September 2015).

⁹⁰ Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, p. 400.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid, p. 101.

system is broadly in line with Adler and Barnett's definition of the nascent phase of a security community.⁹⁴

Like Adler and Barnett, Wendt's model of a cooperative security system presupposes that the actors do not view each other negatively. Negative association leads states to become more concerned with relative gains in security as opposed to absolute gains in security. Wendt argues that this negative association is evident in competitive systems⁹⁵; wherein states focus on gains at the expense of the 'other' leading to divergence and distrust. Much of the rationale for the competitive state system is based in the assumption that identities are fixed. This system is sustained, as Wendt notes, because actors become socialised into their identities, to the point that, short of a fundamental re-ordering of the dominant power structure, it becomes impossible for states to consider changing their identity because their identity is owed to the competitive system.

Alliances and Security Communities

Here, it is important to discuss the difference between an alliance and a security community. Alliances are indelibly linked with the balance of power theory, as in an anarchic system, the overwhelming concern of states is their sovereignty. As both Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer note, threat is derived from power alone. Waltz states, "Secondary states, if they are

⁹⁴ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 'Security Communities in a Theoretical Perspective', in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 50.

⁹⁵ Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', p. 418.

free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them.”⁹⁶ Mearsheimer concurs, noting, “the more power a state possess, the more fear it generates amongst its rivals.”⁹⁷ Waltz further argues that the distribution of material capabilities is the critical deciding factor in determining state behaviour under an anarchic system.⁹⁸ Accordingly, balance of power theory holds that states will either balance against threatening powers by allying with other states, or bandwagon by aligning themselves with the threatening state.

To be clear, the trilateral Australia-Japan-United States relationship is not an alliance due to the lack of either *de jure* and *de facto* defence commitment in the Australia-Japan dyad. The three dyadic relationships, Australia-United States, United States-Japan, and Australia-Japan, certainly assist in guiding greater integration at the trilateral level, however as we shall see, it is not in the interest of these states to formalise this relationship as an alliance. The asymmetry inherent in these relationships also acts as a limiting factor towards greater formalisation. For example, the US-Japan dyad is the only one that features a ‘complete’ alliance, in the sense it compels the United States to come to the aid of Japan in the event of armed attack.⁹⁹ The Australia-US dyad calls on its participants to “consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened in the Pacific.”¹⁰⁰ The

⁹⁶ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 127.

⁹⁷ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), p. 43

⁹⁸ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 127.

⁹⁹ Japan’s constitutional prohibition on maintaining armed forces also means that Japan is not compelled to go to the aid of the United States if the situation were reversed.

¹⁰⁰ Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, Government of New Zealand, and Government of the United States of America, “Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America,” § 3 & 8 (1952), <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1952/2.html>.

Australia-Japan dyad is the least developed with no bilateral defence treaty or pact, and limited, albeit expanding, security-related bilateral agreements.¹⁰¹

Alliances as traditionally considered are narrow and specific arrangements, formed with one particular contingency in mind.¹⁰² They aimed to deter and defend against a particular war that could be anticipated, rather than guaranteeing another state's territorial integrity and sovereignty indefinitely. As we shall see throughout this thesis, security communities encompass a much broader conceptualisation beyond the military dimensions of international relations. Glenn Snyder considers alliances to be a subset of alignment, with the former existing to strengthen the former.¹⁰³ As Michael Ward notes, "Degrees of alignments in political, economic, military, and cultural spheres present a multifaceted sculpture of national and supranational postures."¹⁰⁴ Importantly for this thesis, the lack of an alliance between Australia and Japan is not a barrier to the development of increasingly aligned postures, as we shall see.

Celeste Wallander, in an insightful article, assesses the sustainment of NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union. She notes alliances can be more than "simply pieces of paper or aggregation of military power in an explicit, persistent, and connected set of rules that prescribe behavioural roles and constrain activity, sometimes alliances are institutions."¹⁰⁵ Here, we can establish the that

¹⁰¹ The three dyads will be discussed extensively in the following chapters.

¹⁰² Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, "Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44, No. 5, (2000), p. 692-693; Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 211.

¹⁰³ Glenn Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," *International Organization* 45, no. 1 (1991): 1221-142.

¹⁰⁴ Michael D. Ward, *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics* (Denver, CO, University of Denver, 1982), p.7

¹⁰⁵ Celeste A Wallander, 'Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War, *International Organization*, 54 no 4 (Autumn 2000), 705-735, p. 706.

institutions guiding the relationships enable the repurposing of the broader institutional framework towards meeting new threats. We shall examine the repurposing of institutional frameworks in this next section.

Re-evaluating Contemporary Security Community Development

An effort to address the growth in insecurity caused by the end of the Cold War security apparatus prompted a security community renaissance led by political scientists Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, in their edited book, *Security Communities*.¹⁰⁶ Adler and Barnett noted that, in the post-Cold War era there was a distinct lack of interest in the theoretical elements of security communities exhibited by international relations scholars. They felt that this was in part due to hostility to the theses of constructivism meted out during the Cold War. Adler and Barnett argue that an underlying reason Cold War realists were so hostile to constructivism was due to the idea

[t]hat actors can share values, norms, and symbols that provide a social identity, and engage in various interactions in myriad spheres that reflect long-term interests, diffuse reciprocity and trust, strikes fear and incredulity into their hearts.¹⁰⁷

Adler and Barnett's edited book remains the most substantive recommitment to Deutsch's work in the immediate post-Cold War environment. They define a pluralistic security community as, "[a] transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change."¹⁰⁸ However, rather than becoming caught up in the debate as to *whether* an

¹⁰⁶ Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*.

¹⁰⁷ Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities in a Theoretical Perspective', p. 3.

¹⁰⁸ Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', p. 30.

international community exists, Adler and Barnett question when, where, and how the existence of an international community matters.¹⁰⁹ As Tod Lindberg notes, debates and dissent over the existence of an international community are largely shaped by the perspective of those in the international arena, particularly by those whom have the power and the position of others in relation to the powerful.¹¹⁰ The dominance of the United States in the Cold War and post-Cold War era led to the realist advancement of the concept an international community with aims indistinguishable from America's own. This conceptualisation of the international community as a pro-US vehicle sharply diverges from the constructivist understanding of the international community as voluntary and associational.¹¹¹

The existence of an international community matters to states in times when their identity, either individual or collective, faces challenge from an external other. As the legitimacy and authority of a state's government is largely dependent on the identity of its citizens, during times of crisis, (real or imagined) governments take steps to ensure that the identity of its citizenry stays in line with the government by oftentimes employing nationalistic rhetoric. However, for Adler and Barnett, identity causes *and* constitutes community.¹¹²

In a later, separate work exploring the sociological elements of the 'community' aspect of a security community, Adler theorises that 'liberal community regions' have a higher rates of turning

¹⁰⁹ Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities in a Theoretical Perspective', p. 5.

¹¹⁰ Tod Lindberg, 'Making Sense of the "International Community"', Working Paper (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, January 2014), p. 11

https://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/IIGG_WorkingPaper14_Lindberg.pdf.

¹¹¹ Ibid, p. 9.

¹¹² Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', p. 31.

into security communities due to the, “shared practical knowledge of peaceful conflict resolution and a propensity to develop strong civil societies and a transnational civic culture.”¹¹³ As political authority in the realms of security, economic welfare, and particularly human rights has become diffused, international society and security becomes fixed in the non-territorial space.

This diffusion, or demarcation,¹¹⁴ of authority indicates an evolution toward the construction of a pluralistic security community. While security communities clearly possess a strong territorial element, they are much more than strictly physical constructions. Without a community dimension to transcend the territorial base of the nation-state, a security community is little more than an on paper alliance.¹¹⁵ Adler further acknowledges that although liberal community regions, such as North America or Europe, are very likely to develop security communities, the socially constructed nature of a security community means that historically non-liberal regions, like the Asia Pacific, Africa, or the Middle East, may also develop security communities.¹¹⁶ In non-liberal regions, a liberal international institution is often required to ‘socialise’ the non-liberal states into adopting and institutionalising selected liberal practices. This is seen in Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War in the construction of institutions such as the United Nations and NATO but also the multilateral denazification, democratisation, and reconstruction of Germany. Consequently, the United States’ unilateral occupation and democratisation of Japan as well as the

¹¹³ Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 186.

¹¹⁴ Rajagopalan, ‘Demarcating Units, Re-Distributing Authority: Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka’.

¹¹⁵ Kegley and Raymond, *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics*, p. 47.

¹¹⁶ Emanuel Adler, ‘Imagined (Security) Communities’, *Journal of International Studies* 26, no. 2 (1997), p. 258.

lack of sustained interest in the establishment of analogous international bodies in the Asia Pacific region slowed the socialisation of these liberal practices.¹¹⁷

In their work, Adler and Barnett retain the broad structure of Deutsch's design while offering a new categorisation of pluralistic security community development. They identify three stages of security community development: nascent, ascendant, and mature. The nascent phase describes how governments rarely, if ever, demonstrate deliberate intent to create a security community. "Instead, they begin to consider how they might coordinate their relations in order to: increase their mutual security; lower the transaction costs associated with their exchanges; and/or encourage further exchanges and interactions."¹¹⁸ In other words, security communities develop because the policy makers seek the security in a society of 'us', as well as the security of an oftentimes-existent military partnership. The ascendant phase occurs when military forces functionally integrate, and there are intelligence exchanges:

[i]ncreasingly dense networks; new institutions and organisations that reflect either tighter military coordination and cooperation and/or decreased fear that the other represents a threat; cognitive structures that promote 'seeing' and acting together and therefore, the deepening of the level of mutual trust, and the emergence of collective identities that begin to encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change.¹¹⁹

Finally, a mature community exists when the actors promote and practice cooperative and collective security, there is a high level of military integration and interoperability, actors coordinate their internal policies against internal threats, citizens of participating states have

¹¹⁷ Christopher Hemming and Peter Katzenstein, 'Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism', *International Organisation* 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 575–607.

¹¹⁸ Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', p. 50.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 53.

freedom of movement, the internationalisation or supra-nationalisation of authority, and a multiperspectival polity.¹²⁰ The actors express their common identity through these cooperative efforts and “therefore, entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change and a security community now comes into existence.”¹²¹ Whilst acknowledging, but not engaging with the validity of Deutsch’s theories of amalgamated security communities, Adler and Barnett’s work primarily focused on the two variants of ‘mature’ pluralistic security communities, tightly coupled and loosely coupled. Again, expanding on Deutsch’s theory, Adler and Barnett offer an assessment of mature security community cohesion, defining it as being either ‘loose’ or ‘tight’. A loose pluralistic community is one that is multilateralist; has unfortified borders; common definitions of threats; and at least the language of community. A tight pluralistic community is minilateral; has cooperative and collective security; high levels of military integration; policy coordination against external and internal threats and the internationalisation of authority.¹²²

Adler and Barnett primarily see the development of security communities in terms of path dependence.¹²³ In line with the Deutschian model, Adler and Barnett are clear on the need for ‘triggering factors’, either endogenous or exogenous, which result in a punctuated equilibrium wherein states seek to increase their security collectively. These factors could be “technological, an external threat [...], the desire to reduce mutual fear through security coordination, new interpretations of social reality, transformations in economic or demographic or migratory

¹²⁰ Ibid, pp. 56-57.

¹²¹ Ibid, p. 55.

¹²² Ibid, pp. 55-57.

¹²³ Charles Tilly, ‘International Communities, Secure or Otherwise’, in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 406.

patterns.”¹²⁴ The basic notion underlying the mechanism of security community development is the re-orientation of interstate relations into coordinated relations as opposed to competing interactions.

Deutsch does not explicitly analyse the role and the importance of trust in security community development. However, he observes that (in 1957) the North Atlantic area could not yet be considered to be a security community as, “[i]t (the North Atlantic area) also contains at least one country that is not entirely trusted by some of the others – Germany.”¹²⁵ He does identify several security communities in the form of the security dyads: United States-Canada, United States-United Kingdom, United States-Mexico, and the Scandinavian region.¹²⁶ Deutsch’s intention here is to indicate that while a larger community was not yet a functional option for the North Atlantic area, smaller outbreaks of peace and stability did indicate a trend away from the ruinous power politics of the recent past. However, not all of these communities remained stable or viable. The US-Mexico security dyad, believed by Deutsch to have formed in anticipation of the Second World War, could not be said to exist in today’s international environment. Here, we can see the clear utility and supremacy of the reconceptualisation of Deutschian theory by Adler and Barnett. By using their approach, we have stronger criteria for understanding security communities, their development and challenges to their cohesion.

¹²⁴ Adler and Barnett, ‘A Framework for the Study of Security Communities’, p. 38.

¹²⁵ Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, p. 118.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

‘So Far from God’: The US-Mexico Community

As Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephen Haggard note, repeated US interventions in Mexico from its independence through the early twentieth century, in seeming violation of the Monroe Doctrine, challenged the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention on which Latin American countries have built their foreign policy.¹²⁷ Furthermore, they remark that a Deutschian security community has its basis in the economic transactions and interdependence that promote political cooperation and the subsequent construction of the community.¹²⁸ However, the tensions over trade, conflict over the protection of the property rights of foreign investors, and the ‘lost decade’ caused by the Latin American Debt Crisis in the late 1970s, indicate that Deutsch’s hypothesis regarding economic transactions and the occupation of the same geographic region are not enough on their own to guarantee a stable peace.¹²⁹ The vast disparity in economic and military power between the United States and Mexico, the American tendency for unilateralism and interventionism, and a defensive foreign policy on both sides of the Rio Grande have engendered significant barriers to the creation and sustention of a US-Mexico security community.

In tracing the limits of this community, Gonzalez and Haggard note three factors that have acted to substantially weaken ‘institutionalised cooperation’ while promoting American interventionism. The first factor relates to trade, a common area of dispute between states,

¹²⁷ Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephen Haggard, ‘The USA and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community’, in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 296.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 298.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

particularly those with asymmetric economies.¹³⁰ With regard to the dyadic relationship, steady tensions developed throughout the Cold War as a result of Mexico's propensity in favour of protectionist trade policies firmly against the United States' promotion of liberalised economies.¹³¹ Mexico's unwavering protectionism signalled that they had no intention of joining or promoting the economic interests of the United States at the cost of their own. Mexico's stance was largely ignored by its larger neighbour until the succession of economic crises which struck the United States in the 1970s. America's economic stagflation occurred at much the same time as Mexico underwent an (ultimately short lived) economic boom resulting from their discovery of petroleum reserves, creating an unwelcome comparison between the two states. The Administrations of George HW Bush (1989-1993) and Bill Clinton (1993-2001) and Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) and Ernesto Zedilla (1994-2000) were turning points in the economic relationship, as the United States began to focus on their domestic economy and the emergence of new market places after the close of the Cold War¹³², and Mexico embarked on its policy of 'modernization'.¹³³ The resultant signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a step towards wider cooperation. However, tensions, particularly related to trade, remain.¹³⁴

¹³⁰ World Trade Organisation, 'World Trade Organisation Dispute Settlement', accessed 5 June 2016, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.

¹³¹ Jorge I Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict*, Second (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 11; Sidney Weintraub, *A Marriage of Convenience* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

¹³² Michael Kelly, 'The 1992 Campaign: The Democrats -- Clinton and Bush Compete to Be Champion of Change; Democrat Fights Perceptions of Bush Gain', *The New York Times*, 31 October 1992.

¹³³ Carlos Salinas de Gortari, 'Primer Informe de Gobierno', 1 November 1989, <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/sia/re/RE-ISS-09-06-17.pdf>; Emilio Zebadúa, 'The Heralded Revolution: The Project of Modernization in Mexico', *International Journal of Political Economy* 24, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 71–85; Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict*, p. 14.

¹³⁴ Sidney Weintraub, *Unequal Partners: The United States and Mexico* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), p. 132; Julián Aguilar, 'Twenty Years Later, Nafta Remains a Source of Tension', *The New York Times*, 7 December 2012.

The second area of conflict is in what Gonzalez and Haggard term ‘Cross-border externalities’.¹³⁵ Although largely unintended, these are the negative consequences facilitated by geographical proximity. Historically, this geographic propinquity has been more troubling to Mexico, than it has been to the United States. Indeed, we only need to note the wry comment of long serving Mexican President and military dictator Porfirio Díaz, “Poor Mexico! So far from God, and so close to the United States.”¹³⁶ However, it was not until the second half of the twentieth century in the United States when proximity to Mexico acquired a political flavour as the flow of undocumented immigrants and the persistence and impact of high levels of drug trafficking increasingly lead the United States to militarise much of the southwestern border with Mexico.¹³⁷ Although there has been sustained political interest in the United States in taking aggressive steps to curb these issues, the Mexican government has been slow to demonstrate their ability to curtail these externalities. Deutsch considers demilitarised borders to be a critical step on the path to a security community and clearly, the recurrent cross-border externalities will prevent the demilitarisation of the border so long as Mexico is unable to demonstrate a serious commitment to these issues.

The previous two factors, trade and cross border externalities are broadly subject to the third factor – the perceptions held by the larger actor about the smaller one. In international society, states do not solely look at the policy pronouncements of other states or international organisations. Instead, as Peter Cowhey argues, the credibility of the institution making those pronouncements is of

¹³⁵ Gonzalez and Haggard, ‘The USA and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community’, p. 299.

¹³⁶ Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict*, p. 11.

¹³⁷ Gonzalez and Haggard, ‘The USA and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community’, p. 299; Jason Ackleson, ‘Constructing Security on the US-Mexico Border’, *Political Geography* 24 (2005): 165–84.

significant importance.¹³⁸ Historically, Mexican domestic politics has rarely been more than a passing interest of the United States government. However, increased instability within the Mexican government has flow-on effects in increases in the forms of both the cross-border externalities and the security of investment and trade in the region. The less stable Mexico appears, the higher the likelihood of US intervention, and thus trust and the opportunity for cooperative relations decreases.

Largely, the development of a security community has been stymied by the stark asymmetry of the relationship and the distrust this asymmetry has engendered. Although cooperative relationships need not be institutionalised, persistent trade concerns, Mexico's withdrawal from the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in 2002, divisive identity politics disputes on both sides of the border, and the seeming inability of Mexico to restrict the cross-border externalities coupled with the United States' resultant militarisation of the border, all act as countervailing forces to the development of mutual trust. These features are all exacerbated by the asymmetry of the two states as well as the negative perceptions each holds of the other. The US-Mexico relationship, whilst fulfilling a basic requirement of a Deutschian security community – a rejection of force to settle disputes – is still a long way from exhibiting features of a Deutschian security community or even the most basic features of a nascent security community as defined by Adler and Barnett.¹³⁹

¹³⁸ Peter F. Cowhey, 'Domestic Politics and International Commitments: The Cases of Japan and the United States', *International Organization* 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 299–326.

¹³⁹ Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', p. 50.

The Nordic Model

In his case study, Ole Wæver assesses the applicability of the term ‘security community’ to the Scandinavian region of Europe.¹⁴⁰ He, too, takes issue with the vagueness of Deutsch’s language and qualifying features, and notes that if an absence of war is the definition of a Deutschian security community, then it is a non-war community as opposed to one that can account for all manner of security.¹⁴¹ Although Wæver states that Western Europe is (now) a security community, tracing the causation of this community is perilous, as the secure peace could comfortably be carried by competing theories ranging from democratic peace, to offshore hegemony.¹⁴² As Western Europe is commonly observed to be the most likely candidate for a security community, Wæver notes that questions as to *whether* a Western European security community exists is incorrect. Rather, he asserts the three questions that need to be asked about the emergence of the Western European security community:

1. How do we prove it?
2. What decides its stability and will it last?
3. What can we possibly learn from this region, from the experience of this security community?¹⁴³

These questions highlight the question of agency identified in the opening sections of this chapter. There is nothing inevitable about the development of a security community, they are context bounded constructs and their replication is a highly uncertain endeavour.

¹⁴⁰ Wæver, ‘Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community’.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, pp. 69-70.

¹⁴² Ibid, p. 70.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

If we use Adler and Barnett's conceptualisation of a mature security community as the basis for assessing the Western European security community, then there can be little doubt that a security community does exist in Western Europe. Under the guidance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and with the external threat of the Soviet Union, states in Western Europe entered into collective, cooperative, and integrative military arrangements. Initial efforts were fragmented; policy coordination against 'internal threats' began in earnest with the 'Inner Six'¹⁴⁴ signing of the Treaty of Paris (1951) and creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. Proposed by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in 1950, and supported by the Truman Administration, the ECSC was created with the explicit purpose of pooling the national heavy industries (coal and steel) in order to make it materially impossible for historical rivals France and Germany, to wage war against one another in the future.¹⁴⁵ Securing French-German rapprochement was crucial to the early success of the West European security community. Schuman's proposal also called for the founding of a 'High Authority', an independent supranational executive to assist in administering the ECSC. Schuman noted that:

The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible...By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Belgium, France, the Netherlands, West Germany, Luxembourg, and Italy.

¹⁴⁵ Robert Schuman, 'The Schuman Declaration', 9 May 1950, <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/declaration-of-9-may-1950>; See Bruce Carolan, 'The Birth of the European Union: US and UK Roles in the Creation of a Unified European Community', *Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law* 16, no. 1 (2008): 51–64, p. 55.

¹⁴⁶ Schuman, 'The Schuman Declaration'.

This material restriction of France and Germany's ability to prepare for war against each other was an important moment in the development of the Western European security community. Although contentious at the time, the radical proposal was instrumental to the desecuritisation of Western Europe.¹⁴⁷ Although desecuritisation can be understood as the conceptual twin of securitisation – the subjective escalation and presentation of a subject non-essential to security so that it presents an overwhelming and immediate existential threat¹⁴⁸ – they were not assumed by Wæver to be as such.¹⁴⁹ Wæver outlines two means through which a subject can be desecuritized: the effacement of acts by the non-securitizers, and the failure of speech by the securitizers.¹⁵⁰ The desecuritisation of Europe, to Wæver, relates to the former, the effacement of acts. The re-distribution of any type of power depends on the effacement of the existing units to eliminate them from the arena of previously existing authority.¹⁵¹ Therefore, the creation of the *European Coal and Steel Community* removed and re-distributed the authority surrounding the individual states' control of their heavy industry materials by removing the existing authority, desecuriting inner continental Europe.¹⁵² This desecuritisation plays into the second of Wæver's questions - What decides its stability and will it last?

¹⁴⁷ Schuman wrote a personal letter to West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer highlighting that though both French and German citizens feared an attack from the other, placing the 'war' materials under the administration of a supranational authority would do much to reduce this fear, and, over time, would promote trust between these two great adversaries.

¹⁴⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 25.

¹⁴⁹ Ole Wæver, 'Securitisation and Desecuritisation', in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-61.

¹⁵¹ Swarna Rajagopalan, 'Demarcating Units, Re-Distributing Authority: Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka', in *Re-Distribution of Authority: A Cross-Regional Perspective*, ed. Jeanie J. Bukowski and Swarna Rajagopalan (Westport: Praeger, 2000), p. 32.

¹⁵² See Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy*, Chapt. 1.

Wæver's contention is that the stability of the Western European security community is attributable to the process of desecuritisation initiated by the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community.¹⁵³ Wæver notes that the ongoing stability of the community should be studied as being distinct from its causal origins, a proposal adopted by this thesis.¹⁵⁴ While security concerns were likely to play a key role in the creation of such a community, if states feel that security dilemmas are not resolved, then they are highly likely to cause the dissolution of the security community. Adler and Barnett do not directly address steps to maintaining the stability of a security community. They comment on the causes that can lead to the disintegration of the community – chief among them, the breakdown in mutual trust – and conclude by noting that war amongst community members is an overwhelming indicator that the security community has failed.¹⁵⁵

It is interesting to note that, as the individual European states began the process of reducing their antagonism with respect to each other, the intergovernmental organisation of NATO became responsible for redirecting that antagonism towards the hostile 'other' of the Soviet Union. This raises interesting possibilities about the role of third-party actors, in this case the United States, in such a transition. Whilst it is comforting, though not particularly correct, for states to believe that the impetus for developing peace may be the result of internal machinations, the ability of third-party actors in acting as a monitor or a guarantor in the interactions between states is worthy of consideration. As previously noted, being able to restrict the immediate environment in which the trust is actioned, increases the chance that it will be stable. Rather than immediately trusting each

¹⁵³ Wæver, 'Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community', p. 76.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', p. 58.

other, the mutually distrustful states placed their trust in the United States as it enacted its comprehensive economic and strategic support programs across Europe, creating stronger environmental conditions for trust.¹⁵⁶ As even a casual reading of the history of the European continent indicates, trust, particularly that between enemies of the historical magnitude of France and Germany,¹⁵⁷ does not develop simply through longstanding economic, social, and strategic interactions. So what then accounts for the stability?

Stability, in the Western European context, is also carried by the ‘mutual compatibility of main values’ underpinned by the common identity as European. Despite frequent periods of enmity, these relations are longstanding and varied.¹⁵⁸ In line with the security community’s relational understanding of identity, what distinguishes a common transnational identity is not best measured in terms of “similarity or actual connectedness, but the self-conscious idea of community.”¹⁵⁹ That is, a communal identity requires both a conceptualisation of the oft reviled ‘other’, but also an

¹⁵⁶ United States Senate, ‘European Recovery Program: Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations’ (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 26 February 1948), http://marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/04/Report_of_the_Committee_on_Foreign_Relations.pdf; 80th Congress, ‘Foreign Assistance Act of 1948’, Pub. L. No. 472 (1948), http://marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/06/Foreign_Assistance_Act_of_1948.pdf; Harry S. Truman, ‘Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey’ (United States Government Printing Office, 12 March 1947), http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/pdfs/5-9.pdf.

¹⁵⁷ See Henri Burgelin, ‘Le Mythe de l’Ennemi Héritaire Dans Les Relations Franco-Allemandes’, *Documents: Revue Des Questions Allemandes* 34, no. 4 (December 1979): 76–88; Michael Jeismann, *La Patrie de l’Ennemi: La Notion d’Ennemi National et La Représentation de La Allemagne et En France de 1792 À 1918*, De l’Allemagne (Paris: CNRS Editions, 1997); Michael E. Nolan, *The Inverted Mirror: Mythologizing the Enemy in France and Germany, 1898-1914* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005); Ulrich Krotz, ‘Three Eras and Possible Futures: A Long-Term View on the Franco-German Relationship A Century After the First World War’, *International Affairs* 90, no. 2 (2014): 337–50.

¹⁵⁸ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 235.

¹⁵⁹ Wæver, ‘Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community’.

understanding of who ‘we’ are. The community (and its associated identity) exist when the relevant actors operate as if there is a community.

A valid criticism levelled at the development of the Western European security community is that it is too linear, too perfect. The synchronised symphony of historical European adversaries limiting their capacity for inter-state violence, while (re-)establishing a unified non-exclusive transnational territorial identity and establishing a set of non-aligned supranational institutions to guarantee the equity of the new system, run largely counter to all conventional expectations. Perhaps this is why there are so many competing theories about the stability of the European project. However, one part of the Western European experience that is noteworthy and may provide firmer answers as to the sustention of a security community, was the surprising lack of political insecurity amongst members of NATO in the absence of a clear Soviet threat throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.

The ASEAN Way

Security communities are a largely untested concept in the broader Asia Pacific. At a sub-regional level, if we are to take the post-war Western European model as a developmental guide, a high level of trust and interdependence are considered critical factors, though these features are, at best, sporadically exhibited in the region.¹⁶⁰ Perhaps the best examples of institutions exhibiting those features commonly identified with security communities are the dyadic relationships in the United

¹⁶⁰ Chapter 2, ‘The Audacious Experiment’, will discuss on the application of regionalism to the success of a security community.

States' hub-and-spokes model of alliances. Arguably, the proliferation of advanced multilateral fora, and the absence of armed conflict amongst the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 1967 is the strongest claim that the Southeast Asian region has to classifying as a security community.¹⁶¹ Amitav Acharya notes in his analysis of a potential ASEAN security community that the most remarkable aspect of this purported community is that its members do not (yet) share the "liberal-democratic principles or a substantial degree of intra-regional economic interdependence"¹⁶² identified by Adler and Barnett as critical to a successful community.¹⁶³ As a successful mature security community fundamentally implies a convergence of security issues across the spectrum, does the fact that the members of ASEAN have not been involved in inter-state conflict in since 1967 indicate that they have achieved a security community or, more simply, a non-war community?

Acharya tackles the question of collective identity, perhaps the key issue that has limited the proliferation of security communities to regions that do not have a strong history of liberal-democratic traditions. He observes that ASEAN's collective identity developed from four distinct factors: multilateralism, member norms, symbolism, and regional sovereignty. The first is the sustained practice of multilateralism observed by the member countries.¹⁶⁴ The founding of ASEAN allowed for the creation of a framework in which issues could be addressed multilaterally. This framework acts as a check, as does the organisation of every governmental body, on the more extreme behaviours present in inter-state relations. Acharya also comments that multilateralism is

¹⁶¹ Acharya, 'Collective Security and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia'.

¹⁶² Ibid, p. 200.

¹⁶³ Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities'.

¹⁶⁴ Acharya, 'Collective Security and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia', p. 208.

critical to community building, as it provides a platform for elites to socialise, encouraging enhanced communication and transaction flows.¹⁶⁵ This indicates that the importance of regional or supranational institutions is key to the initial and further development of the ASEAN security community, as they were to the Western European security community.

Second are the norms that govern inter-state relations between member states. Whilst routinely enraging human rights activists and environmentalists with their obstinacy¹⁶⁶, ASEAN members strictly observe the norms of non-interference in the internal affairs of members, respect for territorial integrity and political independence, and settling disputes via non-military solutions. Acharya notes that the aggression that Vietnam displayed towards Cambodia during 1978-89 resulted in the ASEAN states organising the international isolation of Vietnam for its violations of the norms of non-interference, territorial integrity, and settling of disputes through non-military means.¹⁶⁷ ASEAN's desire to protect the regional status quo, achieved through non-military means, as opposed to Vietnam's destabilising manoeuvres, gave legitimacy at both a regional and international level to ASEAN's norms of non-interference. Furthermore, the socialisation of Vietnam under the 'ASEAN Way' resulted in Vietnam joining the ASEAN community in 1995, six years after its international isolation ended.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ United States Department of State, 'ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights', (Press Statement, 20 November 2012), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200915.htm>; Phil Robertson, 'ASEAN's Road to Nowhere? Subverting Standards within the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration', *Human Rights Watch*, 26 April 2012; International Commission of Jurists, 'ICJ Condemns Fatally Flawed ASEAN Human Rights Declaration', 19 November 2012, <http://www.icj.org/icj-condemns-fatally-flawed-asean-human-rights-declaration/>; Mong Palatino, 'Human Rights Declaration Falls Short', *The Diplomat*, 28 November 2012, <http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/human-rights-declaration-falls-short/>.

¹⁶⁷ Acharya, 'Collective Security and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia', p. 209.

This is notable for two reasons. First, the two ‘recognised’ hot wars of the Cold War, Korea and Vietnam occurred in Asia. America’s humiliation in Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet split served as limits on the engagement of the superpowers in Southeast Asia. As a result, the regional community that grew out of this non-engagement, as well as the shared experience of colonialism, reflected these beliefs, but also moderated the dominant zero-sum nature of Cold War state interactions in the region. Although members of ASEAN practiced ‘good-neighbourliness’, and publicly stated their commitment to the settling of disputes via non-military means, the primary threat their safety was intra-regional.

Second, the military modernisation undertaken by ASEAN states during the Cold War period reflects a broader long-term adjustment to the regional security environment made in the aftermath of the Nixon Doctrine. This abrupt policy shift by President Richard Nixon, prefaced in press conference in Guam in July 1969,¹⁶⁸ and institutionalised in his so-called Address to the ‘Silent Majority’ of the nation in November 1969,¹⁶⁹ substantially changed the tone of American foreign policy. The Nixon Doctrine stated that the United States would no longer “[u]ndertake all the defence of the free nations of the world.”¹⁷⁰ In effect, this meant that although the security of the American ‘nuclear umbrella’ still existed in the extreme cases, generally speaking, ‘free’ nations were expected to provide for their own national security. Although such a policy engendered

¹⁶⁸ Nixon, Richard M., Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen, 25 July 1969, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140>.

¹⁶⁹ Nixon, Richard M., ‘Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam’, Address to the Nation, (3 November 1969), https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forkids/speechesforkids/silentmajority/silentmajority_transcript.pdf.

¹⁷⁰ Nixon, Richard M., Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen; Nixon, Richard M., ‘Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam’.

support from an American public weary of the state of political circumstances¹⁷¹ and wary of further entanglements with an ever more distant foreign enemy, the ability of the United States to simply withdraw from their forward defence institutions is contestable.¹⁷² Considering the context of the international environment, it is unsurprising that the ASEAN states sought security introspectively in a regional community context rather than pursuing competing foreign policies.

The third factor is the creation and manipulation of symbols.¹⁷³ When considered against the realist and liberal themes prevalent in the international community, the idea of the ‘ASEAN Way’ and the ‘ASEAN Spirit’ seem at best idealistic and at worst, immature. Yet, these symbols have endured, and they have power both within the community and within the wider region. As Acharya notes, these symbols have helped to reduce multi-layered tensions between Malaysia and Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, and Singapore and the Philippines.¹⁷⁴ Acharya defines the ‘ASEAN Way’ as a process of regional interactions and cooperation based on “discreteness, informality, consensus building and non-confrontational bargaining styles.”¹⁷⁵ The desire for consensus and non-confrontation, unusual in the broader Asia Pacific region, functions as a symbol of ASEAN’s collective uniqueness.

¹⁷¹ The Presidential election campaign on 1968 involved the shock assassinations of Civil Rights leader the Reverend Dr Martin Luther King, and Senator Robert Kennedy (D – New York). In addition, the Democratic National Convention was marred by riots, and other violent disturbances, feeding into the campaign themes of Republican nominee Richard M. Nixon, who promised law and order. Richard M. Nixon, ‘Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention’ (Miami Beach, Florida, 8 August 1968).

¹⁷² Richard M. Nixon, ‘US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace’, Report by President Nixon to Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 18 February 1970); Earl G Ravenal, ‘The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments’, *Foreign Affairs*, January 1971.

¹⁷³ Acharya, ‘Collective Security and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia’, p. 210.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2014).

Finally, the fourth element relates to the principle of regional autonomy. Simply put, regional problems are of primary concern to those within the region and those within the region should take the lead in organizing their resolution. This principle grew out of an initial concern that regional issues not solved regionally only functioned to attract the interests of outside powers, thus increasing the intra-regional tensions.¹⁷⁶ The signing of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 by the Foreign Ministers from Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines and the Special Envoy of Thailand provided specific institutional objectives on regional cooperation to address this concern. The relevant part of the text reads,

[t]hat the countries of South East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples.¹⁷⁷

This declaration, particularly its use of the term ‘external influence’, indicates ASEAN had begun to create a restricted environment that would allow trust to develop between its members.¹⁷⁸ This feeds back into the third factor, the importance of symbols, as arguably, ZOPFAN is more powerful than the nebulous influence of the ASEAN Spirit or ASEAN Way. The declaration unambiguously

¹⁷⁶ Acharya, ‘Collective Security and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia’, p. 213.

¹⁷⁷ Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and the Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand, ‘1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration’ (1971), <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/zone.pdf>.

¹⁷⁸ See Kei Koga, ‘Institutional Transformation of ASEAN: ZOPFAN, TAC, and the Bali Concord I in 1968–1976’, *The Pacific Review* 27, no. 5 (2014): 729–53.

decries the danger and influence of external powers as well as underscoring the need for self-reliance in a regional context, a key indicator of a ‘tightly coupled’ security community.¹⁷⁹

These four factors together: the practice of multilateralism; the respect for norms; the creation of symbols; and the powerful principle of regional autonomy, constitute the basis of ASEAN’s collective identity. However, that existence of collective identity amongst the ASEAN community is not enough to classify it as a security community in either a Deutschian sense or in an analysis utilizing Adler and Barnett’s framework. Additionally, the lack of trust amongst the members of the ASEAN community prevents the development of a more stable normative foundation upon which a security community could be constructed. The member states of ASEAN sought to reduce the complexity of their relations by changing the environment. However, the inflexibility of the ASEAN community has clashed with the transregional nature characterising the proliferation of security challenges, highlighting that the community could not be said to have progressed far past the immature stage. Indeed, Acharya notes, that the best characterization of ASEAN may be one that embodying several characteristics of a nascent security community.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and the Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand, 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration.

¹⁸⁰ Acharya, ‘Collective Security and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia’, p. 219.

Developing a New Framework for Security Community Development

This section of the chapter has assessed three security case studies, the United States-Mexico, Western Europe, and ASEAN. The importance of these studies is in the conditions under which the community was successful, and peace sustained. From this assessment, and the earlier discussions of security, sovereignty, trust, and cooperation, we can develop a framework to indicate the necessary conditions and context that create, sustain, and enhance a mature security community and apply it to the Australia-Japan-United States trilateral relationship. Beyond the minimal requirements for cooperative security, the development of the Western European security community highlights the critical importance of the development of trust, particularly between historical rivals, as well as the members of this community behaving as if a community does exist. The developing security community amongst members of ASEAN challenges the conventional notions of community development in regions fraught with competing interests, but also provokes debate on the notions of trust within authoritarian societies. The failure of the United States-Mexico security community provides commentary on the dangers of asymmetrical relationships if there is a breakdown in mutual trust, but also the constructive role that symbolism plays in enhancing interstate relationships. Positively for this thesis, it illustrates that, contrary to the Western European experience, occupation of the same geographical region and a high level of economic interdependence is not enough to create trust or to sustain a security community.

The analysis of security, community, and security community literature offers a framework for the two distinct aspects of security community development. The first is a set of 5 essential conditions

which chart the ‘non-existent to immature’ phase of the community. This early framework provides traceable progress of community development. These 5 essential conditions are: a persistent, existential, exogenous threat; a non-complex security environment¹⁸¹; sufficient non-existential threats so as to warrant a diverse foreign policy; a common relationship to other units in the system; and long-term peace between the participating states. Fulfilling these conditions indicates the existence of an immature security community, one where there are detectable levels of trust, and the participating states are beginning to see an alignment of their future interests and coordinate their threat perceptions and security relations. These conditions are as close to a duplicable model as possible for early security community development.

¹⁸¹ As highlighted in Chapter 1, smaller groupings of states are able foster a less complex environment for the provision of trust. Similarly, a non-complex security environment is one where a limited number of actors work closely together to align their foreign policy strategies. This will be explored further in Chapter 2.




Figure 1.2 - Factors indicating the existence of an immature security community

Once the participating states have adhered to the essential conditions they are classified as having the potential to become a mature security community. For the purposes of this thesis and its analysis of the Australia-Japan-United States security community, the three key contributory factors to a contemporary security community are: communication, security cooperation, and commitment. Determining a framework for the development of a security community in the style of Adler and Barnett's three tier process is critical to understand the contemporary development of the Australia-Japan-United States security community. The broad framework based on communication, security cooperation, and commitment, is further refined through an analysis of three tiers of sensitivity that indicate progress towards a mature security community.

Drawing inspiration from Adler and Barnett's three tier system for security community development, this thesis will provide a demonstrable model of the contemporary development of the Australia-Japan-United States relationship. Areas of minor sensitivity include cooperation on humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations, authoring joint ministerial statements on regional security, and building the credibility of regional institutions. Medium sensitivity areas include collaboration on military capabilities, the creation of legal and technical frameworks to protect sensitive information sharing, and commitment to solving the collective action problem. Areas of major sensitivity, those indicating a mature and trusting relationship, involve collation and collaboration on strategic assessments, a clear commitment to interoperability, and commitments to courses of action not in the narrow self interest in the individual state.

The mature security community that presently exists between Australia, Japan, and the United States is comprised of several elements drawn from the literature. As Deutsch determined, the foundations of a security community are the compatibility of major values, an increase in the responsive capabilities of the participating political units, and the mutual predictability of behaviour.¹⁸² Adler and Barnett further clarify that a mature community requires that the actors promote and practice cooperative and collective security, there is a high level of military integration and interoperability, actors coordinate their internal policies against internal threats, citizens of participating states have freedom of movement, the internationalisation or supra-nationalisation of authority, and a multiperspectival polity.¹⁸³ Additionally, Acharya's important work on the symbols that undergird intra-regional communities lends itself well to understanding

¹⁸² Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, pp. 66-67.

¹⁸³ Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', pp. 56-57.

how historically recent rivals can affect a shift in their perceptions of one another. To these foundations, we must also consider the geo-strategic considerations that underpin the Australia-Japan-United States relationship.

Communication can be either via government or private industry that utilises the language of the community. At a government-level, public forums between high-level representatives from participating states and updating alliance infrastructure and scope. In the private sphere, foreign investment, transnational corporations, and educational exchange programmes are important aspects that serve broader communication efforts between states that are not necessarily represented at a governmental level. Cooperation involves both traditional and non-traditional security, represented by military cooperation, the introduction of ideologically similar legislation across the political systems, and ideological alignment on trade and support for regional and international institutions. The final piece is the states' commitment to the community. How states manage endogenous tensions whilst simultaneously engaging in long-term planning and independent actions to strengthen communication and cooperation between the less developed sides is critical to the survival of an advanced community. The confluence of these factors, lead states to entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change, the key characteristic of a security community.




Figure 1.3 – The Foundations of a Mature Security Community

A security community requires states to be interested in cooperation across a range of issues, in the hope of generating prosperity and sustaining peace. By imagining a new relational space in which cooperation is possible, policy makers can encourage new forms of interaction grounded in material interests, but will also change interaction patterns, which leads to shifts in identity and conceptions of location. Anarchy by itself says very little about which types of threats states are likely to perceive, and which ones they are likely to act upon.¹⁸⁴ Having established the incorporative theoretical elements of what constitutes a mature security community, this thesis will

¹⁸⁴ Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, p. 396.

now analyse the development of the Australia-Japan-United States trilateral relationship, tracing its genesis and development through the established framework.

Chapter 2

The Audacious Experiment: Embracing the Immature Security Community

In a successful effort to dispense with sustained criticism regarding the continued involvement of the United States in post-war European affairs, newly confirmed Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, took to a time-honoured public medium. In a radio address to the nation, in a manner similar to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 'fireside chats', Secretary Acheson laid out his reasoning for the United States' participation in a *European* defence organisation:

It [the North Atlantic Pact] is based on the affinity and natural identity of interests of the North Atlantic powers. The North Atlantic Treaty which will formally unite them is the product of at least three hundred and fifty years of history, perhaps more. There developed on our Atlantic coast a community, which has spread across the continent, connected with Western Europe by common institutions and moral and ethical beliefs. Similarities of this kind are not superficial, but fundamental. They are the strongest kind of ties, because they are based on moral conviction, on *acceptance of the same values in life*.¹

The United States was developing diverging systems for post-war engagement in Europe and Asia. There was broad support for multilateral security engagement in Europe amongst the Democratic Party and interventionist wing of the Republican Party. However, to create the necessary public and bipartisan support for this security agreement pushed the United States to a concept alien to their public identity, that they belonged to the same region as Western Europe, the North Atlantic region. During hearings on the proposed North Atlantic Pact before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in May 1948, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr (R-Massachusetts) struggled with

¹ Dean Acheson, 'Statement on the North Atlantic Treaty', 18 March 1949, www.trumanlibrary.org/nato/doc5.htm.

the conceptualisation that the United States and Western Europe inhabited the same region.² Committee Chairman, Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-Michigan) quickly replied, “Certainly [they] could, because this is the North Atlantic region.”³ In the same hearings, Senator Walter George (D-Georgia) expressed his belief that theories of regionalism were stretched too far if North America and Northern and Western Europe, several distinct cultures, could inhabit the same region. Furthermore, he noted, “There may be a community of interest all right, but it seems to me that your word ‘regional’ as used in the charter was not intended to be stretched out of proportion and embrace the whole world. *You can embrace anything in it.*”⁴ The Undersecretary of State, Robert Lovett, answered Senator George’s concerns by explaining that the United States’ existence in a region, in this case the North Atlantic region, was tied directly to the national security of the United States.⁵

Secretary Lovett’s explanation reflects both the importance of Europe to the United States, and to the creation of a North Atlantic region. Furthermore, it speaks to the social and cognitive construction elements of regions in the creation of diplomatic security communities.⁶ That the United States in the post-war context so closely identified Western Europe as critical to its national security is not surprising.

² United States Senate, ‘Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings Held in Executive Session before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’, § United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1973), p. 14.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid, p. 15 (*emphasis added*).

⁵ Ibid, pp. 15-16.

⁶ Christopher Hemming and Peter Katzenstein, ‘Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism’, *International Organisation* 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): p. 578.

Nor is it surprising that Asia, Africa, and the Middle East did not fit the criteria as being critical (then) to the national security of the United States. What is surprising is that the conceptualisation of a common region was necessary in order to legitimise American engagement with a bound geographic region that, historically, had been fraught with the threat of over-engagement. The creation of a North Atlantic region was critical to the conception of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), as it placed the United States into a grouping of states that together were roughly equal in economic and military power to the United States.

Secretary Acheson's description of the Pact as the formalisation of a pre-existing community based on common institutions and shared beliefs was, in large part, reflective of the beliefs held by a number of Americans whom retained the significant cultural ties with their European lineage and maintained familial ties in Europe.⁷ Indeed, Senator George's concern over the flexibility of a region designation was manifest in the inclusion of Italy in NATO. Italy's strategic position on the Mediterranean Sea rather than the Atlantic Ocean fit closely with Secretary Lovett's explanation that, as the North Atlantic region existed to the benefit of the United States, its membership could conceivably consist of those states that the United States felt were critical to its national security. Additionally, this went some ways towards the legitimisation of the United States' successful attempt to 'remake' the Italian, German, and Japanese societies by eradicating their fascist tendencies and implanting democratic structures and institutions modelled on the United States.

⁷ Pew Research Center, 'Modern Immigration Wave Bring 59 Million to US, Driving Population Growth and Change Through 2065: Views of Immigration's Impact on US Society Mixed' (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015).

Shared experiences in the European and African theatres of war during the Second World War had linked the national security of the United States to that of those ‘across the pond’. The conceptualisation and operationalisation of the North Atlantic region was influenced largely by exogenous factors, the tensions between the United States and United Kingdom,⁸ the deteriorating relationship between the Soviet Union and the Allies, and an economically struggling Europe. These factors threatened to destabilise the continent and shatter the fragile and hard won peace. Despite the centrality and overwhelming criticality of the United States’ involvement in the Pacific Theatre – the theatre of war that arguably posed the largest threat to the United States – and their unilateral role in the reconstruction of Japan, there was seemingly no *natural* structure to link the security of the United States to that of the Asia Pacific. It is to the construction of this unnatural structure with which this chapter will concern itself.

This chapter will utilise the 5 essential conditions which indicate the development of the immature security community between Australia, Japan, and the United States. In order to operationalise the immature security community, this chapter will apply theories of regionalism and geographies to the play of forces in national and security community development and regional stability. The chapter will assess the post-war relationship between these three states using the 5 essential conditions established in Chapter 1. These 5 essential conditions are: a persistent, existential, exogenous threat; a non-complex security environment; sufficient non-existential threats so as to

⁸ A serious rift between the United States and United Kingdom developed over the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act). This legislation, which placed all nuclear technology that the United States had jointly developed with wartime allies Canada and the United Kingdom under American control, angered the British scientific and political communities that had contributed to the success of the Manhattan Project. For further reading on this topic see Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, *The New World, 1939-1946: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, vol. Volume 1 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962).

warrant a diverse foreign policy; a common relationship to other units in the system and; long-term peace between the participating states. This framework will highlight the events which prompted the consideration of an emergent trilateral relationship, one which indicated the key elements of security communities as indicated by both Karl Deutsch, and Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett.⁹ As highlighted in Chapter 1, a successful security community is not a product of chance, nor can their ongoing stability be assumed from the conditions that prompted their creation.

Despite the manifest need for coordination in Northeast Asia, the region lacks effective regional institutions. This has been little studied in the Asian context, whereas it is a central theme in the understanding of the successful establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The diverging systems of engagement pursued by the United States were evident in the post-war reconstruction plans of the United States. Some \$13 billion was given to Europe under the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), whereas the aid to Asia amounted to \$5.9 billion over the same period. It is clear that the Truman Administration did not view Asia as a collective in the same way as it viewed Europe. Further, outside of the reconstruction, democratisation, and socialisation of Japan, there was no clear plan for a broader community in Asia.¹⁰ Although the

⁹ Deutsch believed a security community was demonstrated by “the compatibility of major values, the increase in the response capabilities of the participating political units, and the mutual predictability of behaviour.” Adler and Barnett, owing to their reassessment of Deutsch’s theory, argued that a nascent security community existed when the states began to coordinate their relations “in order to: increase their mutual security; lower the transaction costs associated with their exchanges; and/or encourage further exchanges and interactions.” Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 66-67; Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ‘A Framework for the Study of Security Communities’, in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 50.

¹⁰ James P. Warburg, ‘United States Post-war Policy in Asia’, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 318, no. 1 (July 1958): 72–82; Victor Cha, ‘Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia’, *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009): 158–96.

United States did develop a series of bilateral alliances with Japan, the Philippines and South Korea, and a multilateral alliance with Australia and New Zealand and the ill-fated South East Asian Treaty Organisation there is little research that suggests that the United States sought anything other than a hard-military relationship.¹¹

Post-war dynamics placed a heavy role in the United States' actions in Asia. This chapter aims to balance the earlier analysis of the United States' actions in Europe and the theories behind the establishment of this North Atlantic community with a demonstration of the divergent actions taken by the United States in Asia within the theoretical matrix of immature security community development. As security communities are founded in the conceptualisation of a community linked by a shared 'we-ness', it is important that this chapter begins with a conceptualisation of the conditions that led to the creation of this shared feeling within the context of theories of regionalism.

¹¹ See Hemming and Katzenstein, 'Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism'; Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003); G. John Ikenberry, 'American Hegemony and East Asian Order', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 58, no. 3 (September 2004): 353–67; Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Cha, 'Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia'; Robert J. McMahon, 'Fragile Alliances: America's Security Relationships in Cold War Asia', in *The Legacy of the Cold War: Perspectives on Security, Cooperation, and Conflict*, ed. Vojtech Mastny and Zhu Liqun (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2014).

Community in the ‘Frightful Sphere’

The Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges’ famous essay, *Pascal’s Sphere*, traces the historiography of God as a perfect sphere.¹² Luis Borges notes that the first recorded depiction of the spherical nature of God was Xenophanes of Colophon, who argued against a pantheon of gods in favour of a single god.¹³ Xenophanes criticised the anthropomorphic traits given to the classical Greek gods and proposed that a god represented as an ‘eternal sphere’ was the true depiction of divinity.¹⁴ The sphere was the perfect representation of divinity due to its uniform nature and the equidistance of all points on its circumference to its centre.¹⁵ Following on from Xenophanes, Luis Borges notes that the twelfth-century French theologian Alain de Lille reasoned that “God is an intelligible sphere, whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere.”¹⁶

Blaise Pascal, the noted French mathematician, appeared to follow in the lead of the earlier intellectuals describing the universe in much the same way as his compatriot de Lille, as “an infinite sphere, the center of which is everywhere, the circumference nowhere.”¹⁷ However, as Luis Borges notes, the Pascal’s conceptualisation of finite but absolute space terrified him, and led

¹² Jorge Luis Borges, ‘Pascal’s Sphere’, in *Other Inquisitions, 1937-1952*, by Jorge Luis Borges, trans. Ruth L.C. Simms (Austin: University of Texas, 1964).

¹³ Diogenes Laërtius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, trans. Robert D Hicks, vol. 1, 2 vols (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).

¹⁴ Luis Borges, ‘Pascal’s Sphere’; Laërtius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*.

¹⁵ Peter Kalkavage, *Plato’s Timaeus* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001).

¹⁶ Luis Borges, ‘Pascal’s Sphere’; G.R. Evans, *Alain de Lille: The Frontiers of Theology in the Later Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

¹⁷ Luis Borges, ‘Pascal’s Sphere’.; Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, trans. Leon Brunschvicg and Emile Faguet (Paris: Nelson, 1949).

him to hate the universe.¹⁸ Additionally, according to Luis Borges, Pascal's manuscript originally used the word 'frightful' (*effroyable*) in place of 'infinite'.¹⁹ The phrases were exchanged pre-publication.

The geographic bounds of the Asia Pacific are largely akin to Pascal's 'frightful' sphere, wherein the centre and the periphery are largely left to the vagaries of perspective. As noted in Chapter 1, the essence of the security community thesis rests on the existence of a shared feeling of community, a 'we-ness'. Simply put in this conceptualisation is the insistence that a community without a shared identity cannot be considered a community. Typically, communities in the international order are organised around easily identifiable traits such as ethnicity, language, or religion, typically bound by a common geographic area. As we have seen, the conceptualisation of a North Atlantic identity based in a common constructed geography was crucial in creating NATO. If these are the key requirements for the development of a community, then it is unsurprising that the history of community building in Asia has not been one of sustained success for the Asia Pacific ranks as the most geographically, ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse 'region' in the world.²⁰

The 'unity' explicitly and implicitly referred to in the term 'community' does not form overnight, and, outside of the above endogenous features, the identity of the Asia Pacific as a 'region' is the

¹⁸ Luis Borges, 'Pascal's Sphere'.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Pew Research Center, 'Global Religious Diversity: Half of the Most Religiously Diverse Countries Are in the Asia-Pacific Region' (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2014); Paul M. Lewis, Gary F. Simons, and Charles D. Fennig, eds., *Ethnologue: Languages of the World*, Eighteenth Edition (Dallas: SIL International, 2015), <http://www.ethnologue.com>.

result not only of the paternalistic and exploitative experiences of colonisation, but also an attempt of regional nations to ‘reclaim’ their previous identities, real or imagined.²¹ Arguably, the chief determinant in the commonality of state identity in the broader Asiatic region has been the imposed imperial boundaries, rather than boundaries shaped by human movement.²² Indeed, part of the very purpose of all colonisation is to deny and obfuscate any attempt at a ‘natural’ identity.²³

Shared geographic space is the broadest identifier of the basic first steps of community building. In the case of the Asia Pacific, the lack of uniformity across ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines is only compounded by the unsettled geography left by imperialism. The terms used to describe the region and the specific areas covered are, perhaps intentionally, ambiguous: Asia Pacific, Pacific Rim, Western Pacific, Asia and the Pacific, and the Indo Pacific. Today’s confusion echoes Senator George’s wry observation that a constructed geography is capable of embracing anything.

The most commonly used term to describe the region inhabited by Australia, the United States and Japan is the ‘Asia Pacific’. This term broadly describes those countries on either the Oceanic or Asiatic continents tangent to the Pacific Ocean. The Asia Pacific centres on East and Southeast Asia, extends as far southward, westward, and eastward as to incorporate Australia, Russia, and the United States. The ‘Pacific Rim’ is spatially similar to, but not entirely congruent with, the

²¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 2nd Edition (London: Verso, 2006); Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

²² See A.B. Shamsul, ‘Nations-of-Intent in Malaysia’, in *Asian Forms of the Nation* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1996); Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb, ‘Introduction: Japan and the Transformation of National Identities in Asia in the Imperial Era’, in *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945*, ed. Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Ashok Kapur, *Regional Security Structures in Asia* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

²³ Lewis and Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography*.

‘Asia Pacific’ region, encompassing all lands tangent to the Pacific Ocean, including those in South America, largely analogous to the Pacific Ring of Fire.²⁴ As Lewis and Wigen note, the Asia Pacific and Pacific Rim are regional constructs conceived of in economic terms.²⁵ The economic nexus that unites Beijing, Washington, Seoul, Tokyo, Jakarta, Singapore, and Canberra is empowered by the rich flows of capital, human labour, and energy resources, and demonstrate the extent to which “spatial categories are embedded in a discourse of power.”²⁶ This convergence elegantly illustrates the material considerations around which social constructions develop.

In terms of discourses of power, global superpower, the United States, has introduced ‘Western Pacific’²⁷ and ‘Asia and the Pacific’ into the spatial lexicon. Both are American-centric terms, with Western Pacific being the region from the West and Northwest coasts of the United States to the East coasts of Australia and Japan. Similarly, the delineation of Asia *and* the Pacific grants the United States the freedom and flexibility to proclaim itself as both an ‘Asian Power’²⁸ *and* a

²⁴ The Ring of Fire is an area on the Earth’s surface where the majority of the Earth’s volcanic activity and earthquakes occur. It stretches from the southern tip of South America, northwards to the Aleutian Islands in the Northern Pacific Ocean, downwards through Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia, and is completed in the South Pacific by New Zealand and Antarctica.

²⁵ Lewis and Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography*, p. 204.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 205.

²⁷ Mitchell B. Reiss, ‘Remarks to the Japan Institute of International Affairs’ (Tokyo, 30 November 2004), <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/39180.htm>.

²⁸ William J. Perry, ‘The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region’ (Virginia: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1995), <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19950227.O1E.html>; William S. Cohen, ‘The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region’ (Virginia: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998), <http://www.dod.gov/pubs/easr98/easr98.pdf>.

‘Pacific Power’,²⁹ although since the early 2000s the ‘Asian Power’ title has changed to ‘security guarantor’.³⁰

The spatial descriptor ‘Indo Pacific’ has gained currency in the geostrategic circles in the post-Cold War environment.³¹ The phrase is a reference to the ‘super’ maritime space, stretching from the littorals of East Africa to the littorals of the Western Pacific.³² The largest promoters of this phrase are India, the United States, and Australia. In the same way that other regional descriptors exist in the power discourse, ‘Indo Pacific’ is used by India, which views itself a superpower, to not only establish its legitimacy as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean, but also to proclaim that the Pacific Ocean exists as an area of its secondary interest.³³ Conversely, for the United States,

²⁹ Katharine Murphy, ‘US Defence Secretary: “We Are a Pacific Power, We Aren’t Going Anywhere”’, *The Guardian*, 11 August 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/11/us-defence-secretary-we-are-a-pacific-power-we-arent-going-anywhere>; Barack H. Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament’ (Canberra, 17 November 2011),

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>.

³⁰ Colin L Powell, ‘Remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner’, 10 June 2002, [http://www.ait.org.tw/en/officialtext-bg0206.html](http://www.ait.org.tw/en/officialtext/bg0206.html); Reiss, ‘Remarks to the Japan Institute of International Affairs’; Condoleezza Rice, ‘Rice’s Trip to Asia-Pacific to Focus on Global Security Relations’, Office of the Secretary of State Spokesperson, 18 March 2005, <http://wfile.ait.org.tw/wf-archive/2005/050318/epf503.htm>.

³¹ Gurpreet S Khurana, ‘Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation’, *Strategic Analysis* 31, no. 1 (2007): 139–53; Shinzo Abe, ‘Confluence of Two Seas’ (New Delhi, 22 August 2007), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html>; Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Defending Australia and Its National Interests’, Defence White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defence, 13 May 2013), http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf; Bruce Vaughn and Thomas Lum, ‘Australia: Background and US Relations’ (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 14 December 2015), <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33010.pdf>.

³² Khurana, ‘Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation’; Michael McDevitt et al., ‘The Long Littoral Project’ (Virginia: CNA, June 2013), <https://www.cna.org/research/long-littoral>.

³³ Robert M Gates, ‘America’s Security Role in the Asia-Pacific’ (Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 30 May 2009), <http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2009-99ea/first-plenary-session-5080/dr-robert-gates-6609>; Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review Report’ (Virginia: Department of Defense, February 2010),

<https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/341273/file/48799/Quadrennial%20Defense%20Review%20-%20February%202010.pdf>; Gurpreet S Khurana, “‘Net Security Provider’ Defined: An Analysis of India’s New Maritime Strategy 2015’,”

Center for International Maritime Security (blog), 4 December 2015, <http://cimsec.org/net-security-provider-defined-analysis-indias-new-maritime-strategy-2015/20203>.

the phrase exists to legitimise its presence in a ‘super-region’, which allows it to remain and engage with the endogenous regional institutions.³⁴

The phrase entered the Australian strategic and political lexicon at approximately the same time as West Australian Labor MP Stephen Smith’s ascension to position of Minister for Foreign Affairs.³⁵ Smith’s first speech as Foreign Minister concluded with an assertion that it was essential that Australia looked to India for development and partnership.³⁶ Speaking as a “proud Western Australian”, Smith noted the growing importance of the Indian Ocean, rather than just the traditional ‘look east’ across the Pacific Ocean, for the economic and social prosperity of Australia.³⁷ For Smith, the geography that had so disobligingly placed Australia outside the British cultural ‘homeland’, had placed Australia at the nexus of future economic and social prosperity. Accordingly, sitting astride the great trade lanes of the Indian and Pacific Oceans spoke more conveniently to Australia’s uncertainty of its ‘frightful’ geographic (and cultural) identity, than to

³⁴ Chengxin Pan, ‘China Anxieties in the Geopolitical Cartographies of the Indo-Pacific’, in *New Regional Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific: Drivers, Dynamics and Consequences* (New York: Routledge, 2016); Sanjay Chaturvedi, Timothy Doyle, and Dennis Rumley, ‘Securing the Indian Ocean? Competing Regional Security Constructions’, *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 8, no. 1 (2012): 1–20; Kamal Davar, ‘Let’s Not Miss the Big Picture’, *The Hindu*, 5 September 2013; Sureesh Mehta, ‘Inaugural Address’, 13 February 2014, <http://maritimeindia.org/Chairman,%20NMF%20Inaugural%20Address.pdf>; G.V.C. Naidu, ‘Perspectives on Economic and Security Ties between India and Southeast Asia’, in *Asia’s Arc of Advantage* (New Delhi: Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, 2013); Nirupama Rao, ‘America’s “Asian Pivot”: The View from India’ (Brown University, 4 February 2013), <http://www.indianembassy.org/prdetail2097>; Shaunik Nayantara, ‘Developing Geostrategic Linkages in the Indo-Pacific’, *Defence and Security Alert*, April 2013; David Scott, ‘India and the Allure of the “Indo-Pacific”’, *International Studies* 49, no. 3&4 (2012): 1–24.

³⁵ Rory Medcalf, ‘Australia’s Relations with India’, *The Interpreter* (blog), 21 December 2007, <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2007/12/21/Australias-relations-with-India.aspx>.

³⁶ Stephen Smith, ‘Speech Notes for the Annual Diplomatic Corps Christmas Party’ (Canberra, 3 December 2007), <http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2007/071203.html>.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

its belated attempt to identify with, and cause others to accept, the notion Australia is an Asian nation.³⁸

This motivational variety certainly played into the creation of region that Senators George, Cabot Lodge, Jr. and Vandenberg debated in 1948. The broader issue here is the difference, as Richard Higgott puts it, in the discourse between *de facto* and *de jure* regionalism.³⁹ None of the above spatial descriptors constitute a ‘natural’ region in a geographic sense. The plethora of the above descriptors to conceptualise the regions problematises the legitimisation of states that identity with one region, to the exclusion of the other. As Higgott notes,

The specific selection of the East Asian states (deliberately no Australians, no Indians) that attended the inaugural ASEM and the decision to go for deepening the APEC free trade process rather than admitting the Indians and the Russians at this point in time, are clear examples of states making identity forming choices.⁴⁰

This discussion reveals the fundamental issue that there is no objective, given, Asia Pacific region, but rather a kaleidoscope of competing ‘ideational constructs’ that owe little to geographic physicality and much to national self-interest. Here we can see the link to the creation of security community in the competing identities of the Asia Pacific region, that they are context and circumstance specific, and not naturally occurring institutions. In keeping with this theme identified in Chapter 1 which established the constructed, and unduplicatable nature of security

³⁸ Department of Defence, “Australia in the Asian Century,” White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defence, October 2012); “What’s Strine for ‘Asian Century’?,” *The Economist*, November 3, 2012.

³⁹ Richard Higgott, ‘De Facto and De Jure Regionalism: The Double Discourse of Regionalism in the Asia Pacific’, *Global Society* 11, no. 2 (1997): 165–83.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

communities, it is important to note there is similarly nothing inevitable regarding alliances and their formation.⁴¹

⁴¹ Stephen M. Walt, 'Why Alliances Endure or Collapse', *Survival* 39, no. 1 (1 March 1997): 156–79.

Existential Threats in Comparative Perspective: Common Threats and Uncommon Partners

At the end of the Pacific War, Australia's overriding concern was the arraying of allied power in such a manner as to prevent the emergence of Japan as a threat to Australia, a fear Australia had maintained since Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War some forty years previously.⁴² This concern coloured all interactions Australia had with the United Kingdom and the United States in the six years between the end of the war and the concluding of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. The perfunctory manner in which Australian concerns and requests were dismissed by the wartime governments of Winston Churchill and Clement Attlee moved the Curtin, Chifley, and Menzies' Governments to seek alternate security guarantees. In 1944, the Curtin Government organised the ANZAC conference with New Zealand, wherein the two Dominions demanded representation "at the highest level on all armistice planning..." and called for a "regional zone of defence..." to be established in the Southwest and South Pacific.⁴³ As described by Neville Meaney, this pact was a rebuke to both the Americans and the British, and was intended to highlight the maturity of the Dominions, while simultaneously reinforcing the centrality of the South and Southwest Pacific.⁴⁴ Australia, dismayed by repeated dismissals by both great powers in their quest for status as a full partner at any stage of the war effort were further humbled when they learnt of the Potsdam Declaration, outlining the terms of surrender for Japan, through the press.⁴⁵

⁴² See Neville Meaney, 'Look Back in Fear: Percy Spender, the Japanese Peace Treaty and the ANZUS Pact', *Japan Forum* 15, no. 3 (1 June 2003): 399–410.

⁴³ Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and Government of New Zealand, 'Australia-New Zealand Agreement 1944', Pub. L. No. 1944 No.2 (1944).

⁴⁴ Neville Meaney, 'Primary Risks and Primary Responsibilities in the Pacific: The Problem of Japan and the Changing Role of Australia in the British Commonwealth, 1945-1952', Discussion Paper (London: Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, March 2000).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

The post-bellum Pacific saw the United States studiously avoid the suggestion of any sort of “artificial...regional arrangements for security purposes.”⁴⁶ Repeated Australian entreaties to the Truman Administration were firmly rebuffed, as there was no clear strategic advantage for the United States to remain in the region, unlike as had been established in Europe. Indeed, the preliminary interest of the United States in the Asia Pacific was solely in the acquisition of bases, predominantly held by the British and Commonwealth States, in the Southwest Pacific area.⁴⁷ The Americans favoured direct deals with the British, reasoning that the Commonwealth States would follow British direction. This situation highly distressed Australian strategic planners, as the Pacific conflict had confirmed that the British were unable to protect Australia in the advent of a conflict in Asia, a consequence of their Europe-focused foreign policy since 1905. Despite vigorous claims to the contrary, the fall of Singapore highlighted the inability of the British to provide a credible commitment to Australia’s defence. Additionally, the challenges inherent in constructing Australia’s defence strategy were too great for Australia to counter alone in the absence of a reliable security guarantee.

Australian strategists were briefly given hope when President Harry Truman announced that,

[T]hough the United States wants no territory or profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of world peace. Bases which our military experts deem to be essential for our protection, and which

⁴⁶ Dean Acheson to W. Averell Harriman, ‘The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom’, Memorandum, 27 April 1946.

⁴⁷ See Foreign Relations of the United States, ‘United States Interest in the Acquisition of Base Rights in British Commonwealth Areas and in Arrangements for Defense of Such Areas in the Southwest Pacific’, The British Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1946), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v05/ch1subch1>.

are not now in our possession, we will acquire. We will acquire them by arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter.⁴⁸

As the United States armed services had been the only military capable of thwarting the Japanese thrust southwards, the belief that they would form a barrier against a resurgent Japan sat well with regional zone of defence Australia had established with New Zealand under the ANZAC Pact. As the Americans began to agitate for permanent rights to the bases they had constructed on islands administered by the British Commonwealth, Australian Minister for External Affairs H.V. Evatt took the opportunity to attempt to leverage a binding security guarantee from the United States government in exchange for permanent rights to the American base on Manus Island. Coral Bell wittingly recalls,

[T]he time when the Australian Minister...tried to parlay a base that the Americans themselves had built, on an island that did not belong to Australia anyway, into a binding security treaty and access to other US bases, lives only in the memories of those who cherish instances of diplomatic *chutzpah*.⁴⁹

The Americans, unwilling to bargain and unimpressed by Australia's penchant for self-aggrandisement, simply moved west and established their southern defence hub in the Philippines.⁵⁰ Meaney notes that Evatt pursued a binding security agreement with the United States as a bulwark against the perceived threats of isolationism and unilateralism.⁵¹ Indeed, confirming

⁴⁸ Harry S. Truman, 'Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference' (Washington, DC, 9 August 1945), <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12165>.

⁴⁹ Coral Bell, *Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 33-34.

⁵⁰ Andrew Baker, *Constructing a Post-War Order: The Rise of US Hegemony and the Origins of the Cold War* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2011).

⁵¹ Meaney, 'Primary Risks and Primary Responsibilities in the Pacific', pp. 25-26.

the United States' commitment to the defence of Australia has been a key role of each incoming government.

The failure to secure a binding security agreement was compounded by President Truman's 1947 budget, wherein he directed the Secretaries of War and the Navy to reduce military expenditures as the United States began to revert to a peacetime military.⁵² The legislative follow-up to Truman's directive was the National Security Act of 1947, which served to consolidate the Army and Naval forces.⁵³ The National Security Act fulfilled one of Truman's long held beliefs – that the existing structure of the United States military was strategically inefficient and fiscally irresponsible.⁵⁴ With the military departments consolidated and the United States at peace, the 1947 military budget decreased by two thirds from its 1946 allocation.⁵⁵ These decisions by the Truman Administration coincided with Australia's gradual realisation that the United Kingdom, militarily drained and economically devastated, would not improve upon its pre-war status in Southeast Asia.⁵⁶ The United States seemed content to maintain the bulk of its diminished forces in Japan, and were of the opinion that there was no immediate threat to the peace in the South

⁵² Harry S. Truman, 'Statement by the President on the Review of the 1947 Budget', 3 August 1946, <http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1729&st=&st1=>.

⁵³ The 80th United States Congress, 'An Act to Promote the National Security by Providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, a Department of the Air Force; and for the Coordination of the Activities of the National Military Establishment with Other Departments and Agencies of the Government Concerned with the National Security.', Pub. L. No. 80-253 (1947).

⁵⁴ Harry S. Truman, 'Our Armed Forces Must Be Unified', *Collier's Weekly*, 26 August 1944.

⁵⁵ M. Slade Kendrick, *A Century and a Half of Federal Expenditures* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1955); Paulo E. Coletta, *The United States Navy and Defense Unification, 1947-1953* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1981); Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

⁵⁶ Roger J Bell, *Unequal Allies: Australian-American Relations and the Pacific War* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1977).

Pacific.⁵⁷ The United States' diminished posture left Australia in a similar predicament to the early war years: alone, looking northward with immense trepidation, and facing the round eternal of the vulnerability of the Australian continent.

The Peripheral Threat

Serious discussion of nation-based collective security pacts was stymied by the creation of the Security Council as one of the six major organs of the United Nations. Joseph G. Starke notes that despite the great hopes for this organisation, "The quasi-paralysis of the UN Security Council from 1946 onwards, as a result of the exercise of the veto by its permanent members...led to suggestions...for recourse to regional agreements of self-defence, within the ambit of article 51 of the Charter, in order to fill the gap."⁵⁸

The 'suggestions' manifested themselves in June 1948 as Senate Resolution 239, debated in committee principally by Senators Vandenberg, Cabot Lodge Jr., and George, and assisted by Undersecretary of State Lovett, the 'Vandenberg Resolution', as it came to be known, was a precursor to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. This Resolution approved in principle the "[d]evelopment of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defence",⁵⁹ insofar as these collective agreements were in accordance with the United Nations

⁵⁷ Wayne Reynolds, 'Imperial Defence after 1945', in *Australia and the End of Empires: The Impact of Decolonisation in Australia's Near North*, ed. David Lowe (Geelong: Deakin University Press, 1996).

⁵⁸ Joseph G. Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965).

⁵⁹ United States Senate, 'Senate Resolution 239' (1948).

Charter. Importantly, the Resolution made it a matter of policy for the United States to associate with any regional and collective arrangements that affected its national security.⁶⁰

Despite the clear intentions of this Resolution to pave the way for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the wording of the Resolution could conceivably have been applied to the Pacific as well as to the Atlantic. However, Secretary of State Dean Acheson again dispelled any notions of a Pacific equivalent of NATO. At a press conference on May 18, 1949, Acheson brusquely rebuffed those who sought a Pacific Pact declaring,

While the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty does not mean any lessening of our interest in the security of other areas, as I have taken the pains to make clear on several occasions, the United States is not currently considering participation in any further special collective security arrangements other than the North Atlantic Treaty.⁶¹

Furthermore, Acheson stated

Recently there have been a number of public suggestions about a Pacific pact [modelled] after the North Atlantic Treaty. It seems to me that some of those who make such suggestions may not have given study to the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty, which was largely the product of a specific set of circumstances peculiar to Europe and the North Atlantic community – the logical culmination of a long series of developments.⁶²

Acheson's response offered little support to Australian defence and foreign policy planners, though critically, he did confirm that the North Atlantic community was an artificial construct, and that there was a 'logic' to its creation. The withdrawal of the British Empire to its 'critical' colonies of Hong Kong and Malaya again confirmed to Australian planners that nostalgia was no substitute

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, "The Far East and Australasia," Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1949), p. 1143.

⁶² Ibid.

for a security guarantee. The United States' continued refusals to entertain discussion of a collective security pact in the region was a decisive blow for Australian security aspirations.

Here, we can see the dire situation in which Australia found itself. The United States had assumed the role of principal democratic superpower and faced the challenge of the innumerable demands for its attention. The drawdown in US military expenditure, the prioritisation of the reconstruction of Europe and Japan, and US concern over Soviet influence in Northeast Asia left little bandwidth for areas of the globe not currently the focus of great power competition. It is Australia's perspective here that is particularly critical as we construct the foundations of the community. The United States was restricted by its superpower status, its actions increasingly choreographed by its competition with the Soviet Union, Japan was diminished by its defeat and eager to re-emerge as a compliant ally to the United States. In contrast, Australia was restless, believing little should be owed to an historic protector whose protection had been shown as inadequate, and concerned as to the longer-term commitment of the United States. The resolution of this period of uncertainty lay in external events.

While the United States was dismissive of Australian entreaties, they held an immediate and abiding interest in securing Japan. A declassified report from the Central Intelligence Agency reveals the reasons for the United States' unilateralist actions in Japan. Preventing the Soviet Union from gaining a further foothold in Northeast Asia was at the forefront of American strategical thought, particularly as the Communists gained ground in Chinese Civil War. The damage that further Soviet success would have to American prestige if it were able to expand its influence in a

region so obviously prized by the United States would be immense.⁶³ This report also paid close attention to the importance of undergirding Japanese economic prosperity as a bulwark against Soviet entreaties.⁶⁴ Presciently, the report states,

Over the long term, exclusion of Japan from Northeast Asian trade would so dramatically distort Japan's natural trade pattern that economic stability could be maintained only if the United States were prepared to underwrite substantial trade deficits on a continuing basis.⁶⁵

The increasing importance of Japan and Asia to the United States was influenced by the proximity of the Soviet Union. Like the British preoccupation with maintaining their colony of Singapore, which sits astride the critical sea lines allowing access to Southeast Asia, the US came to recognise that Japan sits close to the sea routes that allow access to Beijing and South Korea. Soviet Union involvement in the direction of Japanese military policy would severely curtail American attempts to maintain their influence in the critical region of Northeast Asia, as had happened in Eastern Europe. As the importance of Japan remained undiminished to the United States, Australia was forced to re-evaluate the threat it perceived from Japan and a Japanese society remade by the United States. This re-evaluation highlights the early trust-building, or at least suspicion-dispelling, effort Australia undertook to align themselves with the United States in the post-war era. As noted in Chapter 1, nascent trust amongst states within a small, non-diverse, restricted environment is much easier to develop and sustain than in open, multilateral environments.

⁶³ Central Intelligence Agency, 'Strategic Importance of Japan (Declassified)' (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 24 May 1948).

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

An important shift in this perception occurred with the Australian federal election in December 1949 saw the election of the Liberal Party with its coalition partner, the Country Party. During the election campaign, Liberal Party leader Robert Menzies, drew a clear link between anti-communism and national security, a move which realigned Australia's national security priorities towards those of the United States and the United Kingdom.⁶⁶ Menzies echoed Churchill in his famous "Iron Curtain" Speech and the Truman Administration in their pursuit of the doctrine of containment. However, Menzies' foreign policy reorientation towards the spectre of Soviet aggression in Europe seemed at odds with the vision Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender, announced shortly after the election:

Geographically, Australia is next door to Asia and our destiny as a nation is irrevocably conditioned by what takes place in Asia. This means that our future depends to an ever increasing degree upon the political stability of our Asian neighbours, upon the economic well-being of Asian peoples, and upon the development of understanding and friendly relations between Australia and Asia... It is therefore in Asia and the Pacific that Australia should make its primary effort in the field of foreign relations.⁶⁷

Attending the 1950 Colombo Conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers, Spender remarked that every Commonwealth state in attendance had "vital territorial and strategic interests in either the Pacific or Indian Ocean."⁶⁸ Though, as Minister for the Army in 1941, Spender had seen the plain limits of British military capabilities. He went on to note:

And in our deliberations we should not forget - Australia is certainly not likely to do so - how much our security has depended in the past on the friendly and generous assistance of the United States

⁶⁶ Menzies' linking of anti-communism and national security was an indirect political attack on his Labor Party opponents. Although there is little to suggest that the Federal Labor Party Executive were Communists, the labour unions from which they drew much support had significant Communist sympathies. Robert Menzies, 'Election Policy Speech' (Melbourne, 10 November 1949), <http://electionspeeches.moadoph.gov.au/speeches/1949-robert-menzies>; A W. Martin, *Robert Menzies: A Life*, vol. 2, 1944–1978 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1999).

⁶⁷ Department of External Affairs to All Posts, 'Australian Relations with Asia', Cablegram, 9 January 1950, <http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-21/6-cablegram-from-department-of-external-affairs-to-all-posts.aspx>.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

of America. The events of the last war are too close for that. The United States is the greatest Pacific power. Her policy towards Asia is accordingly of supreme importance to Australia's future.⁶⁹

Menzies was emotionally and intellectually remote from the American strategy in Northeast Asia. To Menzies, concerned by the perennial problem of anchoring Australia's vulnerable northern approaches, the preservation of British rule in the 'near north' states of Singapore and Malaya was key. Additionally, friendly relations needed to be maintained with the emergent states of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea in order to preserve the stability of this inner island 'shield'.⁷⁰ The problem for Australia was that neither the United Kingdom nor the United States were particularly committed to maintaining this island shield. Shocked by the Communist victory in China and the Communist insurrections in Malaya, the priority of the Truman Administration was to keep Indonesia out of a potential Communist bloc by supporting its fledgling nationalist government.⁷¹ This action by the United States undermined the British attempts to diminish the regional nationalist factions in order to retain its former colonies and prevent rebellion from spreading across Southeast Asia.⁷² Rather than an inner island shield, Australia confronted a troublesome arc of instability.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Reynolds, "Imperial Defence after 1945", p. 131.

⁷¹ Charles J. Shohan to Willis C. Armstrong, 'Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, to the Associate Chief, Economic Resources and Security Staff', Memorandum, 14 August 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/d64>; Gene Z. Hanrahan, *The Communist Struggle in Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1971); Anthony Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, First (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1975).

⁷² See Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, *Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950-1966*, vol. Vol. 5, Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1975 (Sydney: Allen and Unwin and the Australian War Memorial, 1996); Peter Dennis et al., *The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995).

In this context, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 represented a tremendous blow to Australian aspirations of creating a state of comprehensive security. This was reinforced by a controversial address delivered by Secretary Acheson in January 1950 at the National Press Club wherein he delineated the United States' outer western boundary as one that extended from the Aleutian Islands through Japan to the Philippines.⁷³ This clear excising of Australia, but also of South Korea and Taiwan, from the United States' defensive perimeter in Asia indicated to an Australian audience that the Truman Administration had publicised their intentions towards a region that remained hostile to Australia.⁷⁴

Despite the multiple signals from the Truman Administration highlighting their reluctance to maintaining Australia's sovereignty, the outbreak of the Korean War did not provoke an outpouring of alarm from Menzies. Not only was this attack considered little more than a 'probe' by Stalin-backed forces, but its resolution would not require ground troops. In these beliefs, he was influenced by his understanding of the British not to send troops to assist South Korea. British forces were engaged in fighting the Communist insurgents in Malaya, and Menzies' understanding was that the British were reluctant to jeopardise their chance of success by also engaging with Communist insurgencies in Northeast Asia.⁷⁵ Furthermore, if British troops were drawn from the forces supporting Hong Kong there was a fear amongst the British defence establishment that Korea might prove only a diversion and that a more serious incursion might occur into Hong Kong,

⁷³ Dean Acheson, 'Speech on the Far East' (National Press Club, Washington, DC, 12 January 1950).

⁷⁴ Richard Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The General and the President and the Future of Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1951), 101; Trumbull Higgins, *Truman and the Fall of MacArthur: A Precipitous Limited War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 13.

⁷⁵ Karl Hack, *Defence and Decolonisation in South-East Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore 1941-1967* (Surrey: Curzon Press, 2013).

which would disrupt British commercial interests.⁷⁶ This fear also motivated the British government to swiftly recognise the People's Republic of China.⁷⁷ Despite his beliefs, Menzies' Cabinet approved a proposal to place two Australian warships under the control of the United Nations and redeployed a squadron of Mustang P-51 fighter planes from Japan to Korea. However, this was as far as Menzies was prepared to go regarding troop deployments.

Menzies departed for Britain and the United States on July 9, 1950, two weeks after North Korea had invaded the South. Whilst in Britain, Menzies resisted pressure in communications from his Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender, to increase Australia's commitment to the Korean conflict, believing that his talks with British officials had confirmed that there would not be a commitment of troops from the Attlee Government. Unbeknownst to Menzies, the British Ambassador to the United States, Oliver Franks, had written to Prime Minister Attlee advising that if Britain were to consider increasing its commitment to Korea, particularly a troop deployment, then Britain would likely be viewed as a power in Europe along with Russia.⁷⁸

Franks' argument eventually bore fruit as the British Cabinet approved the sending of a brigade of troops to support the American forces in Korea. This *volte-face* occurred whilst Menzies was crossing the Atlantic on his way to Washington. Given Menzies' refusal to deploy troops to Korea had rested largely on the British occupying a similar position, the abrupt change in British position

⁷⁶ Tom Buchanan, *East Wind: China and the British Left, 1925-1976* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁷⁷ See David C. Wolf, "'To Secure a Convenience': Britain Recognizes China — 1950", *Journal of Contemporary History* 18, no. 2 (1 April 1983): 299–326.

⁷⁸ M. Hopkins, 'The Price of Cold War Partnership: Sir Oliver Franks and the British Military Commitment in the Korean War', *Cold War History* 1, no. 2 (2001): 28–46.

suddenly made a similar shift much more palatable to Australia. Alan Watt, the Australian Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, received word that the British Government would be formally changing their position on troop deployment in a statement in the House of Commons on July 26.⁷⁹ Communication and discussion of Australia's position with Menzies was close to impossible as he was still completing the Atlantic crossing. Watt contacted Spender and the Acting Prime Minister Arthur Fadden in order to chart a path forward. Spender, noting the particularly transitory nature of the opportunity, drafted a statement and convinced Fadden to support a statement announcing that Australia would provide ground troops for the Korean conflict to be aired on the evening news an hour *before* the British announcement.⁸⁰

The simple statement read,

In response to the appeal of the United Nations, the Australian Government has decided to provide ground forces for use in Korea. The nature and extent of such forces will be determined after the conclusion of discussions which the Prime Minister will have in the United States.⁸¹

Spender then contacted Menzies via trans-ocean telephone to inform him of the change in circumstances and to tell him not to speak to any American media until he had read the cables that would be provided upon his arrival by the Australian Embassy.⁸² No doubt, Spender and Watt feared a blowback from three sides. Menzies, they feared, would charge that they had effectively enacted a *coup d'état* against his leadership. Additionally, United Kingdom was under the impression that Menzies would not move until they did, much less that he would undercut their

⁷⁹ Alan Watt, *Australian Diplomat: Memoirs of Sir Alan Watt* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972).

⁸⁰ Percy Spender, *Politics and a Man* (Sydney: Collins, 1972), p. 65

⁸¹ Percy Spender, "Cablegram to Menzies," Cablegram, (July 26, 1950).

⁸² Spender, *Politics and a Man*, p. 285.

announcement. Finally, the United States had previously expressed their disapproval of Australia's penchant for self-aggrandising speech with regard to foreign affairs. Despite these fears, none of the parties gave any public indication of rancour. Menzies embarked on a highly successful tour of the United States and good relations with the Attlee Government were maintained.

Based on this narrative, it is remarkable just how close Australia came to not securing the coveted position of the 'first responder' to the United States-directed UN appeal. Arguably, this clever politicking by Percy Spender was the first in a fortuitous set of circumstances that ultimately led to the signing of the security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The two other major factors that coalesced to bring about this agreement were the February 14 signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, an act that hastened China's entry into the Korean War, and the increasing anxiety of the Americans and British for a peace treaty with Japan.

A sudden opening to Australia's, or at least Spender's, goal was taking shape. With regard to the formation of the ANZUS Treaty, Alan Watt recounted a discussion he had with James Marjoribanks, the Official Secretary to the British High Commission in Australia. Marjoribanks inferred that, while the British were opposed to the entry of Australia (and New Zealand) into a mutually obligatory military pact with the United States, the British Government was not opposed to a unilateral declaration from President Truman that expressed the willingness of the United States to "assist the two dominions in the case of aggression against them."⁸³ Despite the near

⁸³ Watt, *Australian Diplomat*, p. 178.

decade of *de facto* and *de jure* separation in foreign affairs, the United Kingdom's belief that it could absolve itself of any defence obligations to its remaining colonial possessions in the Asia Pacific whilst using the formal language of 'dominions' is striking.

Part of the British reluctance to give their support to an Australian-United States military pact can be traced to the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. This legislation abruptly banned the exchange of atomic information between the United States and its allies (principally Britain and Canada) and was passed in spite of the fact that British and Canadian scientists had contributed significantly to the success of the Manhattan Project and the resulting military predominance of the United States. This legislation seriously strained relations between the United States and Britain, and as a result, in September 1950 British Prime Minister Attlee secretly approached Menzies about the testing of the first British atomic bomb in Australia.⁸⁴ Menzies' acceptance of Attlee's request further illustrates that Curtin's attempts to curtail the influence of the British Empire in Australia's foreign policy remained notional at best.

⁸⁴ R McClelland, J Fitch, and WJA Jonas, "Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia," Royal Commission (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985), pp. 10-11; JL Symonds, "A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia" (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985); Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952*, vol. 2 (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1974), pp. 476-79.

A Non-Complex Security Environment

Complex Beginnings

Australia's identity rests culturally on a lingering bastion of British sensibility, and politically on an audacious fusion of British and American political structures. The shift away from the British 'model' nascent identity change was made clear in Australian Prime Minister John Curtin's 1941 New Year's message,

The Australian Government...regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies' fighting plan. Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.⁸⁵

Unsurprisingly, Curtin's laudable sentiment received a poor reception from Prime Minister Churchill. Churchill's curt reply was that this might be expected from Australians who as a people had suffered far less than suffering and hardship "under which the people of Great Britain have long been proud to live."⁸⁶ Further, Churchill also noted that he was quite ready to directly address the Australian people if "hostile speeches...against the mother country" continued to be made by members of the Government.⁸⁷ Churchill also noted in a memo to the Lord Privy Seal, Clement Attlee and the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Viscount Cranborne that Curtin's article had made a "very bad impression in high American circles."⁸⁸

⁸⁵ John Curtin, 'The Task Ahead', *The Melbourne Herald*, 27 December 1941.

⁸⁶ Winston Churchill to John Curtin, 29 December 1941, <http://john.curtin.edu.au/artofthepossible/documents1.pdf>.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Winston Churchill to Clement Attlee and Viscount Cranborne, 'Memorandum to Lord Privy Seal and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs', Memorandum, December 1941, <http://john.curtin.edu.au/artofthepossible/documents1.pdf>.

While providing no evidence of this claim, Churchill was at the time of Curtin's article in Washington, DC conferring with President Roosevelt. He was aware that the President had summoned inaugural Australian Ambassador to Washington Richard (later Lord) Casey and made it clear in no uncertain terms that if the Australian Government had thought that the statement would further Australia's favour with the United States then it would have precisely the opposite effect. The article, Roosevelt felt, "tasted of panic and disloyalty."⁸⁹ Roosevelt cautioned that his comments on the article were to be considered personal and not official but set the tone for sustained American unease with continuous self-aggrandising pronouncements by the Australian government.⁹⁰

There can be little doubt that Curtin's article was written for primarily political purposes. The Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor and its simultaneous, unprovoked attacks on Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaya and Thailand ferociously elevated the intensity and scale of the war in Southeast Asia. Australia quickly dropped the British regional identifiers. As noted by Prime Minister Menzies in 1939, the area that "Great Britain calls the Far East is to us the near north."⁹¹ Although Menzies was quick to add that he was not agitating for independence, he did note that a disproportionate amount of risk was borne by Australia and New Zealand given their isolation from the United Kingdom.⁹² It is in this same vein that Curtin followed with his article, 'The Task

⁸⁹ Lady Maie Casey, *Tides and Eddies* (London: Michael Joseph Publishers, 1966), p. 83; Lloyd Ross, *John Curtin: A Biography* (Melbourne: MacMillan Company, 1977), p. 247; David Black, ed., *In His Own Words: John Curtin's Speeches and Writings* (Perth: Paradigm Books, 1995), p. 197.

⁹⁰ Casey, *Tides and Eddies*, p. 197.

⁹¹ Robert Menzies, 'Broadcast Speech 73', 26 April 1939, <http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/%28LookupVolNoNumber%29/2~73>.

⁹² *Ibid.*

Ahead', arguing that the Pacific War was not a side issue.⁹³ As befitting a Dominion of the British Empire, Australia's initial military strategy closely mirrored that of the United Kingdom. Consequently, the majority of Australian forces deployed overseas in 1940-41 served with the Commonwealth campaigns in North Africa and the Mediterranean. In the face of the rapid Japanese advance, however, Curtin stated that the immediate return of these troops to Australian territory was imperative.⁹⁴ Australia's self-protection and fundamental security would be jeopardised by continued acceptance of British regional perspectives.

Efforts to coordinate military strategy in the Southwest Pacific after the attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in the formation of the American-British-Dutch-Australia Command.⁹⁵ The region covered by this command stretched from Myanmar, across Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the north and northwest coasts of Australia. Continued Japanese attacks and advancement through Southeast Asia effectively divided the region, splitting the command, crushing the regional naval capabilities, and heightening the vulnerability felt by Australia.

However, on December 17, 10 days after the attack on Pearl Harbor and 10 days before Curtin's article appeared in *The Melbourne Herald*, General George C. Marshall approved a plan by Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower that Australia should be the major base for American operations in the Southwest Pacific and immediate support for the beleaguered garrison station in

⁹³ Curtin, 'The Task Ahead'.

⁹⁴ John Curtin to Clement Attlee, Cablegram, 22 February 1942, <http://web.archive.org/web/20130405123752/http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/historical/volume-05/historical-document-05-357.html>.

⁹⁵ James R. Masterson, 'US Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-1947', Monograph (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, October 1949), <http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll11/id/903>.

the Philippines.⁹⁶ This indicates that the United States military command was unwilling to commit substantial effort to the success of the ABDA Command. Additionally, it highlights that the United States had a firm belief that American assets in Asia should be protected above all else and that Australia could serve as a means to this end. Eisenhower was also aware that the Philippines base was likely to fall, though he viewed abandonment as worse than military defeat.⁹⁷

Unknown to Eisenhower, but certainly known to Curtin and General Marshall, President Roosevelt and the Joint Board (a precursor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff) had already approved a plan to divert troops and other defence materiel to Australia in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack. The *Pensacola* Convoy, as it was known, had been dispatched from Pearl Harbor on November 27 in order to reinforce General Douglas MacArthur's garrison in the Philippines.⁹⁸ The attack on Pearl Harbor necessitated a change in strategy, and the President recommended that, rather than return to the United States, the convoy should continue. The Joint Board nominated Brisbane as its destination, from where the Philippines garrison could be resupplied and supported.⁹⁹ As the Japanese had conquered United States territory of Guam, it was inferred by the United States Naval Command that much of the North Pacific Ocean had become an area of significant danger for US and allied vessels.¹⁰⁰ As it were, none of the defence materiel from the *Pensacola* Convoy ever

⁹⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Melbourne: William Heinemann, 1948), p. 25; Louis Morton, *The War in the Pacific: The Fall of the Philippines*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 152.

⁹⁷ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, p. 25.

⁹⁸ Morton, *The War in the Pacific: The Fall of the Philippines*, p. 145.

⁹⁹ Chester Nimitz, *Nimitz Gray Book: War Plans and Files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet*, vol. 1, 8 vols (New York: American Naval Records Society, 1972); Morton, *The War in the Pacific: The Fall of the Philippines*, p. 145; Gill Hermon, *Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1942*, 1st ed., vol. Volume 1, Second World War Official Histories 2 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957).

¹⁰⁰ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*.

reached the Philippines garrison before it surrendered to the Japanese.¹⁰¹ On December 22, still five days before Curtin's article, the first contingent of 4,500 American troops and materiel landed Brisbane.¹⁰²

Curtin's politicking seems curiously awkward, especially given his awareness of the American military manoeuvres. However, given Curtin's consistent and long-held views on the need for an autonomous Australian foreign policy it is unsurprising that he sought to promote Australia as a country that should be seen as independent from its historical reliance upon the United Kingdom.¹⁰³ Australia's defence was best entrusted to those whose regional understanding was not limited to the exercise of colonialism. Whether or not Curtin anticipated Roosevelt's private response, the lack of a public response from Roosevelt did assist in the shift of Australia's foreign policy future, at least in Britain and the United Kingdom, if not the United States. Curtin's public institutionalisation of Australia's need to 'look east' was the first in a series of wartime manoeuvres that began the coordination of relations and spatial redefinition so critical to the future relationship between Australia and the United States.

¹⁰¹ Morton, *The War in the Pacific: The Fall of the Philippines*, p. 147.

¹⁰² Dudley McCarthy, 'Volume 5 - The South-West Pacific Area - First Year: Kokoda to Wau', in *Australia in the War of 1939-1945*, ed. Gavin Long (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1959).

¹⁰³ Curtin's foreign policy preferences had been known for close to two decades before his 'Task Ahead' article. See John Curtin, 'More Conferences of Empire: Has Australia a Foreign Policy?', *Westralian Worker*, 2 March 1923; John Curtin, 'Speech to the House of Representatives' (Canberra, 25 August 1937), http://espace.library.curtin.edu.au/view/action/singleViewer.do?dvs=1471544609127~357&locale=en_US&VIEWER_URL=/view/action/singleViewer.do?&DELIVERY_RULE_ID=10&adjacency=N&application=DIGITool-3&frameId=1&usePid1=true&usePid2=true.

The Roosevelt Administration's official response to the Australian Government, delivered by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific, was stern and set out to correct Curtin's suggestions regarding the United States, noting:

Australia was part of the British Empire and it was related to Britain and the other Dominions by ties of blood, sentiment and allegiance to the Crown. The United States was an ally whose aim was to win the war, and it had no sovereign interest in the integrity of Australia. Its interest in Australia was from the strategical aspect of the utility of Australia as a base from which to attack and defeat the Japanese.¹⁰⁴

Furthermore, MacArthur reiterated that despite the 'warm' feelings that the American people had for Australia, the express purpose of the American troop deployment was "not so much from an interest in Australia but rather from its utility as a base from which to hit Japan."¹⁰⁵ MacArthur's language echoed the language of the 1926 Imperial Conference of British Empire leaders (Balfour Declaration), which declared the British Dominions to be relationally bound to the United Kingdom through "[c]ommon allegiance to the crown..."¹⁰⁶

Stimulated by MacArthur's remarks as to Australia's Imperial relations and witnessing the capitulation of the 'impregnable' British fortress at Singapore and the rapid Japanese advance, Curtin revived the stalled 1931 *Statute of Westminster*.¹⁰⁷ Following on from the *de facto* independence granted by the Balfour Declaration, this Imperial Act provided for the *de jure* independence of the British Dominions upon the assent of their Parliament. Despite the Act passing

¹⁰⁴ Prime Minister's War Conference, 'Strategical Policy in the Southwest Pacific Area' (Melbourne, 1942), <http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=239150&I=1&SE=1>.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Inter-Imperial Relations Committee, 'Balfour Declaration' (London: Imperial Conference, November 1926).

¹⁰⁷ Parliament of the United Kingdom, 'An Act to Give Effect to Certain Resolutions Passed A.D. 1931. by Imperial Conferences Held in the Years 1926 and 1930 (Statute of Westminster)', Pub. L. No. 22 George V, Chapter 4 (1931), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1931/4/pdfs/ukpga_19310004_en.pdf.

the British Parliament and receiving Royal Assent in December 1931, successive Australian Parliaments, then controlled by the conservative United Australia Party, made no effort to adopt the Statute. Eager to diminish the perception of United Kingdom control over Australian policy, especially during wartime, Curtin pushed the *Statute of Westminster Adoption Act* through Parliament, receiving Royal Assent on October 9, 1942.¹⁰⁸

These divorcing acts by Curtin further accelerated the breakdown in commonality of interests and identity between the governing elites in the United Kingdom and Australia. The fundamental conflict in the foreign policy interests of both states was revealed by the tempestuous relationship between Curtin and Churchill during the war. As noted, Curtin well aware of the crises of Australian-British relations during the First World War, had been a long-time opponent of Imperial control of Australia's armed services and stridently disagreed with Churchill's attempts to use Australian forces to protect other parts of the British Empire. By the early 1940s, post-*Statute of Westminster Adoption Act*, the changing international order, stress of war losses, and economic weariness acted to accelerate the *de facto* shift in allegiance.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Parliament of Australia, *Statute of Westminster Adoption Act*, 1942, <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2004C00661>.

¹⁰⁹ Christopher Waters, 'Conflict with Britain in the 1940s', in *Australia and the End of Empires: The Impact of Decolonisation in Australia's Near North*, ed. David Lowe (Geelong: Deakin University Press, 1996).

A Farewell to Normalcy

The 'Australia as a utility' reasoning freed the United States from any obligation to assume the mantle of Australia's new 'Great and Powerful Friend' while yet sending precisely this invitation. The swift and unsettling victories of Japanese forces across Southeast Asia even prior to the fall of Singapore in early February 1942, were of immediate concern to Australian officials. These concerns became even more manifest with the Arcadia Conference, held in Washington from December 22, 1941 to January 14, 1942.¹¹⁰ This conference, the first military strategy meeting between the United States and the United Kingdom, was perhaps the most important conference conducted during the war, as it established the European Theatre of Operations. The conference combined and centralised military resources in Europe, drafted a 'Declaration by the United Nations' which bound the Allied nations to an agreement of the conduct on the war with the Axis Powers.¹¹¹ Finally, and critically for Australian interests, it reaffirmed the basic decision to pursue a 'Europe first' strategy, while checking the Japanese advance in the Pacific.¹¹²

The 'Europe first' plan was first proposed in 1940 in a memorandum written by Admiral Harold Rainsford Stark, Chief of Naval Operations. In this memo, Stark established five strategic alternatives should the United States enter the war. (A) Defend the Western Hemisphere without

¹¹⁰ This conference is also known as the 'First Washington Conference'.

¹¹¹ This Declaration held its signatories to a pledge that they would devote themselves to 'total war' with the Axis nations and would not seek a separate peace with their Axis enemies. Foreign Relations of the United States, 'The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942 and Casablanca', Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Department of State, 1968).

¹¹² Louis Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, the United States Army in World War II* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 80.

allies. (B) Take the offensive in the Pacific and act defensively in the Atlantic. (C) Fight equally in the Pacific and Atlantic theatres of war. (D) Take the offensive in the Atlantic and fight defensively in the Pacific. (E) Focus on the defence of the American continent, peaceful preservation of assets in the Far East and the continuation of material assistance to Britain.¹¹³ Stark recommended that the United States pursue option D, which due to the naval phonetic alphabet became known as Plan Dog. Stark noted that,

[G]reat Britain requires from us very great help in the Atlantic, and possibly even on the continents of Europe or Africa, if she is to be enabled to survive. In my opinion Alternatives (A), (B), and (C) will most probably not provide the necessary degree of assistance, and, therefore, if we undertake war, that Alternative (D) is likely to be the most fruitful for the United States...¹¹⁴

Stark also noted that the odds were against the United States' ability to retain its political and military influence in the Far East and check the influence of Japan if the United States did not first win the war in Europe.¹¹⁵ Despite this strategy calling for the United States to act primarily defensively in the Pacific, the United States' strategy did not conform perfectly to this model. The course of war proved that to act defensively in the Pacific, the United States Navy first had to engage aggressively against the Japanese Navy, winning the two decisive naval battles against the Japanese: the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway. Together these triumphs against high odds diminished Japan's ability to wage an aggressive war that had allowed it to dominate large swathes of Southeast and East Asia. For the Axis powers in Europe, the pernicious combinations of a war of attrition in the East, the victory of Allied forces in Northern Africa (and

¹¹³ Harold Rainsford Stark, 'Plan Dog Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy', 12 November 1940, <http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box4/a48b01.html>.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

the subsequent Italian Armistice with the Allied forces), and the ‘Black May’¹¹⁶ period of the Battle of the Atlantic, sharply diminished their possibility of victory.

The tides of war in the Pacific introduced the first common theme to bind Australia, the United States, and indeed Japan: the exploitation of a common physical vulnerability. The central theme of Australian foreign policy throughout history has been to secure the bold claim to a huge tract of land, maintained by a relatively small population, in an over populated region far from the societies and markets desired.¹¹⁷ The Japanese bombing of Darwin and the naval expeditionary forces sweeping through Southeast Asia brought war to Australia. Although Australian troops had served in theatres of limited war previously, primarily as a part of the British Imperial Army, the appearance of an asymmetric total war in their region brought to life the imagined and previously unsubstantiated fears of an invasion from the north had for so long so coloured Australian interactions with its Asian neighbours.¹¹⁸ In a similar way, the United States, so used to the advantages conferred by geography,¹¹⁹ was “suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air

¹¹⁶ May 1943 saw U-boat numbers reach their peak in the Atlantic Ocean; however, there was no corresponding increase in the numbers of Allied ships that were sunk in May. Moreover, of the 118 operational U-boats, 41 were sunk during that month. From May 1943 onwards, operational U-boats were destroyed faster than they could be produced.

¹¹⁷ Allan Gyngell, ‘Emerging Challenges for Australian Foreign Policy’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 68, no. 4 (2014): 381–85.

¹¹⁸ See Thomas D Chataway, ‘The Australia Sugar Industry: Economic Expansion and White Australia’, *International Sugar Journal* 1 (1921): 140–46; Andrew Markus, ‘Of Continuities and Discontinuities: Reflections on a Century of Australian Immigration Control’, in *The Legacies of White Australia: Race, Culture and Nation*, ed. Laksiri Jayasuriya, David Walker, and Jan Gothard (Crawley: University of Western Australia Press, 2003), 175–90; Stefanie Affeldt, “‘White Sugar’ Against ‘Yellow Peril’: Consuming for National Identity and Racial Purity’ (Images of Whiteness: Exploring Critical Issues, University of Oxford, 2011).

¹¹⁹ In the immortal words of French Ambassador to the United States, Jules Jusserand, listing American assets, “On the north, she had a weak neighbour; on the south, another weak neighbour; on the east, fish; on the west, fish.” Quoted in George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations since 1776* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Philip Resnick, *The Labyrinth of North American Identities* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012); Earl H Fry, *Lament for America: Decline of the Superpower, Plans for Renewal* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010); S. M. Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974).

forces of the Empire of Japan.”¹²⁰ This sense of vulnerability had been prefaced by Roosevelt in an Address to Congress in May, 1940, wherein he noted that, “The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were reasonably adequate defensive barriers when fleets under sail could move at an average speed of five miles an hour.” But advances in air navigation had now rendered such barriers moot.¹²¹ Similarly, Japanese vulnerability to new forms of force was revealed by the extensive aerial bombings of Japanese cities and industrial areas. The Allied Occupation of Japan was first since the Mongol invasions of the mid-*Kamakura* era (1185–1333 CE). Additionally, President Roosevelt’s Executive Order No. 8832, freezing Japanese assets in the United States, developed into a full embargo, preventing the export of oil and gasoline to Japan.¹²² The embargo highlighted the calamitous vulnerability of the island nation in its dependence on external resources.

For Australia, satisfaction over the close of the Pacific theatre of war was swiftly undercut by pervasive fears of abandonment.¹²³ The Japanese had been soundly defeated and Australia’s continued existence as a white dominion in Asia was no longer under threat. The long shadows of the Pacific war and the distinct character of Australia’s perennial abandonment neurosis

¹²⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt, ‘Address to Congress’ (United States Congress, 8 December 1941).

¹²¹ Roosevelt, Franklin D., ‘Message to Congress on Appropriations for National Defense’ (United States Congress, 16 May 1940); Michael Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

¹²² Franklin D. Roosevelt, ‘Freezing Japanese and Chinese Assets in the United States’, Pub. L. No. Executive Order 8832 (1941), <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16148>; Herbert Feis, *Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 142–144, 205–208, 227–250; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941: The World Crisis and American Foreign Policy*, 1st ed. (New York: Harper, 1953), 645–654; Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 215–219, 225–232.

¹²³ See Geoffrey Blainey, *The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia’s History* (Melbourne: MacMillan Company, 1966); David McCraw, ‘Change and Continuity in Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and New Zealand’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 65, no. 2 (2011): 167–84; Shannon Tow, ‘Diplomacy in an Asymmetric Alliance: Reconciling Sino-Australian Relations with ANZUS, 1971-2007’, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 12, no. 1 (2012): 71–100.

guaranteed that the key post-war strategy of successive Australian governments was to double-down on the words of wartime Prime Minister John Curtin:

The Australian Government, therefore, regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies' fighting plan.¹²⁴

Thus, the immediate and long term strategic concern of the Chifley Government was how to maintain the presence of the United States in the Western Pacific. A junior acquaintance during the war and decidedly more so in peacetime, Australia was in no position to dictate terms of engagement to the world's pre-eminent military and economic superpower.

The Restoration of Japan

The arrival of *HMS Phaeton* to the harbour of Nagasaki in October 1808 forced the *Tokugawa* Shogunate to accept the military superiority of the European powers.¹²⁵ The post-Napoleonic peace in Europe saw an aggressive expansion of European trade to China, culminating in the First Opium War. The frenzy of foreign incursions on the Asian mainland occurred made it clear to Japan that it lacked the military power to resist these modern powers. Thus, the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry and his naval squadron into Edo (now Tokyo) Bay in July 1853 was greeted with

¹²⁴ Curtin, 'The Task Ahead'.

¹²⁵ During the Napoleonic Wars, the British Navy began to attack Dutch ships. The *HMS Phaeton* arrived at Nagasaki Harbour, disguised as a Dutch trading vessel, in search of Dutch trading ships suspected to be nearby. Captain of the *Phaeton*, Fleetwood Pellew, threatened the execution of the Dutch representatives as well as the destruction of the Japanese and Chinese vessels in the harbour unless supplies were brought to the *Phaeton*. Unable to raise a defence, the Japanese capitulated. See Noell Wilson, 'Tokugawa Defense Redux: Organizational Failure in the Phaeton Incident of 1808', *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 36, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 1–32.

trepidation and political turmoil.¹²⁶ Displaying tactics not dissimilar to European actions on mainland Asia, Commodore Perry rejected the Japanese refusal to negotiate, and threatened to open fire on the Uraga Harbour if the Japanese hesitated in agreeing to American trade terms.¹²⁷ Additionally, the fleet, despite its small size, performed the first coordinated modern military tactics the Japanese had seen, demonstrating the power of unified command and steam-powered vessels. Perry's arrival produced the same uncomfortable challenge the Japanese had confronted with the Mongol invasion some 600 years earlier: solitude had not produced the required innovation in military or economic affairs in the Empire of the Rising Sun.¹²⁸

Commodore Perry's arrival in Edo Bay and the resultant trade agreement greatly undermined the power of the ruling *Tokugawa* Shogunate. In the pre-Meiji era, the position of the Emperor was ceremonial, power over the foreign, military, and economic direction of the state resided with the Shogun. However, the letter Commodore Perry carried from United States President Millard Fillmore was addressed to the ruling Emperor Kōmei, rather than the current Shogun Tokugawa Ieyoshi.¹²⁹ Although, this was a revealing misunderstanding about Japanese power dynamics by the American emissaries, it served to humiliate the Shogun as it seemed clear that a modern military state did not see the Shogun as a legitimate representative. In addition, economic troubles caused by a shift in agricultural output from subsistence to commercial agriculture, moved wealth from the establishment Samurai class to the new merchant class.

¹²⁶ Yosaburo Takekoshi, *The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan*, vol. 3 (London: Routledge, 2004).

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Stephen R. Turnbull, *Genghis Khan and the Mongol Conquests, 1190-1400* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2003).

¹²⁹ In Japanese culture, the surname precedes the given name, this thesis follows this convention. Millard Fillmore to Emperor of Japan, 'Letter to the Emperor of Japan', 14 July 1853.

The deep economic and political turmoil brought about by the ‘opening of Japan’ established the conditions for the thorough re-ordering of the Japanese political and economic system, with Emperor Meiji ‘restored’ and the state committing to industrialisation. The commitment to industrialisation additionally saw an expansion and modernisation of the military under the national slogan *Fukoku kyōhei* (Enrich the state, strengthen the military).¹³⁰ The slogan and accompanying mindset guided Japanese political, economic, and military strategy to the mid-twentieth century, seen as they signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) with the United Kingdom, defeated a Eurasian power (Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05), and participated in the Washington Naval Conference (1921-22) as an equal.

As a result of increasing imperial ambitions and a growing propensity toward militarism, Japan’s dependence on American strategic exports created a constrained economic dynamic. As Walter LaFeber notes, the more Japan attempted to diversify its trade relationships and consolidate its regional financial relationships, particularly with China an historical trading partner, the more the United States worked to keep the Japanese dependent on American exports.¹³¹ LaFeber goes on to describe this dynamic as akin to a ‘slipknot’, the more Japan struggled against the United States, the more control the United States exerted, a tactic that would become a trend in the post-war environment.¹³² Japan’s trade relationship with China was constrained by America’s Open Door

¹³⁰ Junji Banno and Kenichi Ohno, ‘The Flexible Structure of Politics in Meiji Japan’, Research Paper (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, April 2010); Richard J. Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

¹³¹ Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: US-Japan Relations Throughout History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997).

¹³² *Ibid.*

Policy, and the global economic depression of the late 1920s and 1930s.¹³³ Despite Japan's remarkable economic and technological advancement since the Meiji era, it remained constrained by the foreign power that had forced its modern global engagement.

The end of the Pacific War saw the fading European imperial powers return to Asia in an attempt to reassert their rights to their colonial possessions. Predictably, the guerrilla nationalist movements that had formed in the years that these colonies had been occupied by Japanese forces were unwilling to undergo further subjugation. The stark uncertainty of the regional post war stability in Australia's 'near north' amplified Australia's neuroses regarding abandonment and isolation.

As both a beneficiary of colonialism and supporter of self-determination, Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley was forced to walk an exceedingly difficult line between supporting the emerging nationalist movements – where his sympathies of the United States lay – and reconnecting with Australia's pre-war sources of security and trade.¹³⁴ The position of the United States had shifted after the cessation of hostilities. The European states argued that without possession of their former colonies, and the raw materials and protected markets therein, their

¹³³ United States Government, 'Commercial Rights in China ("Open Door" Policy)' (1899), <http://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000001-0278.pdf>.

¹³⁴ The third point of the Atlantic Charter, signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941, called for the right of all people to choose their government. Churchill was concerned that this clause would give legitimacy to the agitators in the colonial societies, but nonetheless advised his Cabinet to approve the Charter. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/atlantic-conf> Full text: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp>. See David Fetting, 'JB Chifley and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-1949', *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 59, no. 4 (December 2013): 517–31.

chances of post-war recovery were at serious risk.¹³⁵ Concerned over the need to strengthen Europe as tensions within the Grand Alliance rose, the Truman Administration was hesitant to alienate the remaining imperial powers in Europe.¹³⁶ Furthermore, the Departments of Navy and War had intentions to retain a number of islands in the Pacific to use as military bases, a contentious position, given the United States' anti-colonist history.¹³⁷

Similarly, the re-making of the Japanese identity post-war, turned Japan from “semi-feudal despotism into a model twentieth-century democracy rooted in Western precepts of freedom.”¹³⁸ Democracy was not so much adopted by Japan as it was imposed by Supreme Allied Commander General Douglas MacArthur as part of a complete reordering of Japanese society. The key part of MacArthur's task was the spiritual demotion of Emperor Hirohito, returning the role of Emperor to its pre-Meiji position. This lowering was accomplished through the Emperor's *Ningen Sengen* (Denial of Divinity/Declaration of Humanity).¹³⁹ Despite this act, the British, Australians, Koreans, Russians, and Chinese all pressed President Truman to start the formal proceedings to charge Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal.¹⁴⁰ The pressure was not only external in mid-September 1945, a month after Japan's unconditional surrender, well prior to the Emperor's declaration, Senator

¹³⁵ See Tony Smith, ‘A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20, no. 1 (January 1978): 70–102; Ronald Hyam, ‘The Primacy of Geo-Politics: The Dynamics of British Imperial Policy, 1763-1963’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 27, no. 2 (1999): 27–52; John Darwin, ‘Was There a Fourth British Empire?’, in *The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival?*, ed. Martin Lynn (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006); Office of the Historian, ‘Decolonization of Asia and Africa, 1945-1960’ (Washington, DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, n.d.), <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/asia-and-africa>.

¹³⁶ Cordell Hull, *Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. 2 (London: MacMillan Company, 1948).

¹³⁷ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1992).

¹³⁸ Victor Sebestyen, *1946: The Making of the Modern World* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2014).

¹³⁹ Emperor Hirohito, ‘Kanpo Gogai Showa Niju-Inchi Nen Gatsu Tsuitachi Shosho (Ningen Sengen)’ (Printing Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, 1 January 1946), National Diet Library.

¹⁴⁰ ‘War Criminal Charge and Hirohito’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 January 1946; ‘Australia Claims Hirohito Criminal: Jolt to US Crime List’, *The Courier-Mail*, 18 January 1946.

Richard B. Russell (D-Georgia) introduced legislation to declare Emperor Hirohito a war criminal.¹⁴¹

Although this legislation went no further than the Committee on Military Affairs, it indicates the widespread understanding that Emperor Hirohito would face a criminal trial in the same way that the remaining leaders of Nazi Germany were prosecuted in the Nuremberg Trials. The precedent set by the Nuremberg trials, and President Truman's strong support for legal trials for the deposed Nazi leadership, seemed to suggest that a similar course of action would be taken with regard to Japan.¹⁴² Indeed the establishment of the International Military Tribunal was a positive indication that the United States was committed to pursuing the Japanese leaders responsible for the war.

Despite increasing pressure from all sides, General MacArthur argued for the protection of the Emperor, aided by the memorandums of his Military Secretary Brigadier General Bonner Fellers. Fellers argued that placing the Emperor on trial would destabilise the entirety of Japan, necessitating a large expeditionary force to forcibly occupy Japan.¹⁴³ Fellers also notes that the devotion to the Emperor is so profound that it was his Imperial command that caused the remaining soldiers to lay down their arms, undoubtedly saving the life of thousands of Allied service

¹⁴¹ Richard B. Russell, 'Declaring It Is the Policy of the United States That Emperor Hirohito of Japan Be Tried as War Criminal', Pub. L. No. S.J. Res 94 (n.d.); 'Senate Resolution Asks Hirohito Trial', *The Deseret News*, 18 September 1945.

¹⁴² Samuel I. Rosenman, 'Draft Agreement on the Punishment of War Criminals', 3 April 1945, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?documentid=11-2&pagenumber=7; Harry S. Truman, 'The War Crimes Trials: The Appointment of Justice Robert H. Jackson' (The White House, 2 May 1945), http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?documentdate=1945-05-00&documentid=13-3&pagenumber=1.

¹⁴³ Bonner Fellers to Douglas MacArthur, 'Memorandum to the Commander-in-Chief', 2 October 1945.

members.¹⁴⁴ Lacking support from key members of the Allied Occupation and concurring with Fellers and MacArthur's assessments of the status of the Emperor in Japanese society, Truman did not resist the impetus of the trials shifted from an indictment of the Emperor to his exoneration.¹⁴⁵

Australia persisted with arrangements to have the Emperor's name formally added to the list of criminals of the Pacific War. However, in mid-January 1946, the British made it clear that they had not included the Emperor's name on their list.¹⁴⁶ Lacking support from senior allies, old and new, the Australian government quietly dropped its effort.¹⁴⁷

The Pariah: Post-war Japan

The long and total occupation of Japan by Allied forces under the military governorship of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), was designed to convert Japan into an American ally while eliminating Japan's potential for future independent hostilities. Japan would become part of the Western 'camp' with a heavy pro-American orientation. Such directives are explicitly stated in the 'United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy for

¹⁴⁴ Emperor Hirohito, 'Imperial Rescript of the Termination of the War (Shusen no Shosho)' (Tokyo Imperial Palace, 14 August 1945), http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/017/017_0011.html; Fellers to MacArthur, 'Memorandum to the Commander-in-Chief'.

¹⁴⁵ See B.V.A. Röling and C.F. Rüter, eds., *The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 29 April 1946-12 November 1948* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1977); John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, First Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 323–25, 562; Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 583–85.

¹⁴⁶ 'Australia Claims Hirohito Criminal: Jolt to US Crime List'.

¹⁴⁷ It is clear, however, that the Australian Government's perception of the Emperor remained murky until his death. Susan Chira, 'Tokyo Funeral Forces Choice by Old Foes', *The New York Times*, 13 January 1989.

Japan', developed by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), and signed by President Truman on September 6, 1945. This document sets out two ultimate objectives:

- (a) To ensure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.
- (b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.¹⁴⁸

These objectives were to be achieved through the pursuit of four main policies:¹⁴⁹

- 1) The limiting of Japan's sovereignty to its 'home islands' of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku.
- 2) The complete demilitarisation and elimination of the authority of the Japanese military.
- 3) Encouraging the Japanese people to pursue individual liberties, respect fundamental human rights, and establish representative organisations.
- 4) The Japanese economy would be developed for peaceful purposes.

Although part (b) of the ultimate objectives noted that, "it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people",¹⁵⁰ there was never any question that the military occupation would end before Japan had adopted the democratic model favoured by the West. Furthermore, although it was formally known as the 'Allied' Occupation, the United States alone exercised definitive control over all aspects of the Occupation. There was the token inclusion of non-American (predominantly British and Australian) forces garrisoned at Hiroshima, and the President of the International Military

¹⁴⁸ State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 'Politico-Military Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan' (Washington, DC: State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 6 September 1945).

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

Tribunal for the Far East was Australian High Court Justice Sir William Webb; however, the Tribunal, modelled after the Nuremburg Trials, was still very much an American dominated forum, as the decision to not prosecute Emperor as a war criminal illustrated.¹⁵¹

Typically, the surrender of Japan and the subsequent Occupation that followed are seen as the turning points of Japanese society, the transformation of a highly militaristic society into one reflecting the democratic norms of the Allied nations, albeit a constitutional monarchy rather than a republic. However, General MacArthur governed as a neo-colonial king, dubbed the *Gaijin Shogun*, in a political system that had been under military rule since 1930.

Nascent Economic Cooperation

Australia's economic position at the end of the Pacific Theatre was precarious. The European economies that Australia had relied upon for over 50 percent of its trade pre-war faced a lengthy recovery from the devastation wrought by war.¹⁵² The situation across Asia could hardly be considered better, Allied forces had fought at great cost to remove Japanese forces from islands across Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

¹⁵¹ For a comprehensive analysis of the Allied Occupation, see Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*; Eiji Takemae, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, trans. Roberts Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002).

¹⁵² Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Year Book Australia: Trade Since 1900' (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 25 January 2001), <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article532001>.

Again, actions by the United States were the critical factor for modern Australia-Japan economic relations. Until early 1950, it was assumed that the resumption of Sino-Japanese trade was both inevitable and desirable.¹⁵³ American strategic planners presumed that resumption of trade would not only help stabilise the Japanese economy, but could also open an early rift in the Sino-Soviet relationship, potentially avoiding arc of communism stretching across a quarter of the globe.¹⁵⁴ However, the participation of Soviet-backed Chinese forces in the Korean War forced American officials to readjust their assessment of Sino-Soviet political relations and the immediate future of Sino-Japanese economic relations. It was the view of top administration officials, in particular John Leighton Stuart, the United States Ambassador to China, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson, that the Soviet Union planned to build a presence in the 'Far East', and would use Chinese resources to do so.¹⁵⁵ Stuart predicted that the north China province of Manchuria would receive heavy Soviet investment and that the returns from this investment would "finance Soviet imports from China, thus materially reducing Soviet exports China with consequently deleterious effect Manchurian economy."¹⁵⁶

The Administration's response was the US-led trade embargo on China and the creation of CHINCOM (China Committee) and COCOM (Coordinating Committee) whereby the United States monitored the measures by which Allied trade with China was embargoed. By placing a trade embargo on China, the United States hoped to make the Chinese more dependent on the

¹⁵³ John Dower, 'Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia', in *Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays*, by John Dower (New York: The New Press, 1993).

¹⁵⁴ National Security Council, 'The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia'.

¹⁵⁵ John Leighton Stuart, 'The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State', Telegram (Nanking: United States Department of State, 9 June 1949), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v08/d445>.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

Soviet Union. They expected the Soviet Union to respond to this reliance with “their characteristic greed”, trapping the Chinese in a dependent economic relationship.¹⁵⁷ Apparently fearful of such an occurrence, moderate elements of the Chinese Communist Party approached the United States Embassy in June 1949, desirous of American aid.¹⁵⁸

However, with the official engagement of China in the Korean War in November 1950, President Truman placed China in Group Z of the Commodity Control List. This meant that any direct or indirect exports to China required written authorisation from the Department of Commerce.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, on February 1 and May 18 1951, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a US-sponsored resolution calling upon “[A]ll States and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea.”¹⁶⁰ Despite the long and profitable history of trade relations between China and Japan, the continuing military Occupation of Japan by the United States, left it no other option than to accept the embargo on Chinese trade. It seemed clear that the United States envisaged a similar role toward Japan that the US saw as the Soviet relationship with China. Southeast Asia, still recovering from the long shadows of Japanese occupation and abandoned by their European colonisers, offered little in the way of the economic stability and opportunity that Japan would have needed to ‘wean’ itself from the United States.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ John Leighton Stuart, ‘The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State’, Telegram (Nanking: United States Department of State, 9 June 1949), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v08/d447>.

¹⁵⁹ Department of Commerce, ‘The Code of Federal Regulations of the United States of America: Commerce and Foreign Trade’ (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986).

¹⁶⁰ United Nations General Assembly, ‘Intervention of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in Korea’, General Assembly Resolution (New York: United Nations, 1 February 1951), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/744/45/IMG/NR074445.pdf?OpenElement>; United Nations General Assembly, ‘Additional Measures to Be Employed to Meet the Aggression in Korea’, General Assembly Resolution (New York: United Nations, 18 May 1951), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/744/47/IMG/NR074447.pdf?OpenElement>.

Like post-war Europe, Japan struggled on the brink of economic collapse. At surrender, the wartime devastation saw a quarter of its buildings destroyed, the ruination of its industrial machinery and 17 percent of the civilian population without work.¹⁶¹ Although massive financial aid and economic liberalisation were given by the occupying forces, this in fact weakened the economy, igniting inflation which pushed producer and consumer prices higher.¹⁶² Shinji Takagi notes that in the three year period between September 1946 and August 1949 “monthly inflation in official consumption goods never fell below 80 percent per annum...”¹⁶³ In addition to the economic stimulus from the United States, inflationary pressures were also exacerbated by the high post-war expenses brought on by payments to veterans and wartime contractors.¹⁶⁴ Meanwhile US led reforms (see fn. 162) had the unintended effect of strengthening the Communist movements inside Japan.¹⁶⁵

Alarming, the continuing victories of the Communists in the Chinese Civil War strengthened the Japanese Communist movements. These led key American officials to view increased Communist activity within Japan with more suspicion than the ultranationalist elements of post-war Japanese

¹⁶¹ James D. Savage, ‘The Origins of Budgetary Preferences: The Dodge Lines and the Balanced Budget Norm in Japan’, *Administration & Society* 34, no. 3 (July 2004): 261–84.

¹⁶² The four key liberalisation measures included: the dissolution of the *Zaibatsu* conglomerates that concentrated economic power, agrarian reforms that increased the numbers of independent farmers, labour market reform that allowed for the establishing of labour unions, and finally the introduction of fair market rules such as Anti-trust Law and Security Exchange Law. Koichi Hamada and Munehisa Kasuya, ‘The Reconstruction and Stabilization of the Post-war Japanese Economy: Possible Lessons for Eastern Europe?’, in *Post-war Economic Reconstruction and Lessons for the East Today*, ed. Rudiger Dornbusch, Wilhelm Nölling, and P. Richard G. Layard (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993).

¹⁶³ Shinji Takagi, *Conquering the Fear of Freedom: Japanese Exchange Rate Policy Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

¹⁶⁴ Savage, ‘The Origins of Budgetary Preferences: The Dodge Lines and the Balanced Budget Norm in Japan’. p. 266

¹⁶⁵ See ‘A Note on the Communist Party’, in Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949).

society.¹⁶⁶ These suspicions manifested themselves as the so-called ‘Reverse Course’, wherein the Occupation abruptly shifted from large stimulus packages from the United States to austerity measures designed to return the Japanese government to functionality as soon as possible.

The ‘loss’ of China reinforced Japan’s importance as a bulwark against Communist influence in Asia. The Communist surge in mainland Asia came on the heels of the Japanese elections in January 1949, where the Communist Party achieved considerable success, gaining 35 seats of 466 and nearly 10 percent of the popular vote. Although the US Reverse Course is considered to have begun with General MacArthur’s prohibition of a general strike planned for February 1, 1947, it took a full two years for the nascent shift to mature.¹⁶⁷ Key aspects of this change were achieved through the suspension of the war crimes trials – thus allowing former military officers to be returned to public office, a diluting of labour laws that had weakened the business conglomerates, as well as reform of the Japanese heavy and military industries.¹⁶⁸

The growing strength of the Communist Party in Japan prompted President Truman to appoint Joseph Dodge to stabilise the economic recovery of Japan in March 1949. Dodge, a Detroit banker, whose previous appointment was as head of the fiscal department of the US military government

¹⁶⁶ George Atcheson and George Marshall, ‘The Political Adviser in Japan to the Secretary of State’, Telegram, 15 June 1947, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d219>.

¹⁶⁷ George Atcheson, ‘Substance of Remarks to Allied Council of Ambassador George Atcheson, Junior, Chairman and United States Member, in Regard to American Attitudes toward the Occupation as Observed on His Visit to the United States’ (Tokyo, 14 March 1947),

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d189#fn:1.3.2.8.4.26.7.4.9.3>;

George Atcheson and George Marshall, ‘The Political Adviser in Japan to the Secretary of State’, Telegram, 15 June 1947,

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d219>.

¹⁶⁸ Takemae, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*.

in occupied Germany, issued a nine-point directive to stabilise Japan's economy.¹⁶⁹ As to be expected, in the early stages of the Occupation, Japan placed a higher significance on maximising their exports within the dollar market, rather than through the competing Sterling Bloc.¹⁷⁰ However, this changed course in late 1949 as the SCAP *de-emphasised* trade within the dollar market and emphasised an increase in their trade with non-dollar currencies in order to increase Japan's self-reliance, and to reduce the amount of economic aid they required from the United States.¹⁷¹ This was actioned as part of a multifactor counter to the rising inflation in part caused by the pre-Dodge economic stimulus program. In addition to the economic controls imposed by the Dodge Plan, it also relaxed the controls placed on the recovery of Japan's heavy industries. Although this element of the Dodge Plan was in line with the Reverse Course, allowing Japan to rehabilitate its shuttered heavy industries provoked immediate alarm across mainland Asia and Pacific states. It is clear that the United States thought that the threat posed by a recovered Japan to the security of the Pacific and the Allied nations therein was not as large as the threat as the one posed by a vulnerable Japan. Additionally, the recovery of Japan's economy would have the added benefit of minimising the influence of communism in Japan, particularly as the communist forces in China strengthened their position.

¹⁶⁹ Of the nine points, the first four are known as the crux of the so-called Dodge Plan: balancing the general budget, tightening tax collection, restricting credit, and stabilising wages. United States Government, 'Economic Stabilisation in Japan' (Washington, DC: Department of State, 10 December 1948); Douglas MacArthur to Shigeru Yoshida, 'SCAP Letter to Prime Minister on Stabilisation', Letter, 19 December 1948; Hamada and Kasuya, 'The Reconstruction and Stabilization of the Post-war Japanese Economy: Possible Lessons for Eastern Europe?', p. 174.

¹⁷⁰ Ryutaro Takahashi, 'Trade Policies of the New Japan', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1952.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

Australia's Trade with the 'Enemy'

On April 30, 1952, the day after the ANZUS Treaty came into force, a *Note Verbale* from the Japanese Foreign Ministry was delivered to the Australian Embassy in Tokyo. It sought advice as to the “trading, maritime and other commercial relations to be maintained between Japan and Australia as from the first coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951.”¹⁷² As identified in a memorandum by the Department of Commerce and Agriculture,

The [Japanese] Ministry wishes to be informed regarding the extent to which Australia intends to accord Japan national or m.f.n. (Most Favoured Nation) treatment as provided for in Article 12 of the Peace Treaty, pending the conclusion of an agreement. The note indicates Japan desires this advice as a prerequisite to fulfilment of its obligations under Article 12(c), and that the Japanese Government thinks commercial relations can be promoted if mutual m.f.n. treatment is accorded.¹⁷³

The timing of the request is striking and indicates that this request from the Japanese Government was conducted with the tacit agreement of the US officials. As noted, US officials saw the diversification of the Japanese economy as paramount in avoiding deeper communist support within Japan. Therefore, deeper economic cooperation with anti-communist allies was critically important. Europe, devastated, heavily in debt to the United States, and undergoing decolonisation, was unable to keep up with production output of the American industries. However, it is important to note that the agreement establishing Japan's most favoured nation status was only necessary because the United Kingdom and Australia did not abide by the provisions of the Global

¹⁷² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'Note Verbale to the Australian Embassy in Tokyo', Note Verbale, 30 April 1952.

¹⁷³ Department of Commerce and Agriculture, 'Japanese-Australian Commercial Relations', Memorandum (Canberra: Department of Commerce and Agriculture, 3 July 1952).

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Members of GATT were required to grant most favoured nation status to all other member states. However, Japan's upgrade from observer status to a full member of the organisation only proceeded over the ferocious opposition of the United Kingdom and other British Commonwealth states, including Australia.¹⁷⁴ In what would become the enduring theme of US engagement in the Asia Pacific, Administration officials, eager to diversify Japan's trading relationships, pushed for full Japanese inclusion, seeking new markets to lessen the burden on the United States. As perhaps the only alternate supplier to the United States in the region, and an increasingly active member of the Sterling Bloc as well, Australia soon took the initiative, pressing forward, though not without reluctance, to establish a normalised bilateral trading relationship with Japan.

These reconstruction efforts culminated with the 1957 *Agreement on Commerce Between the Commonwealth of Australia and Japan* (Commerce Agreement).¹⁷⁵ This Agreement established the institutional framework for the development of trade which promoted Japan's ascension to Australia's largest (and perhaps most important) export market from the mid-1960s. Much like the contention that written security alliances alleviate issues of distrust; the bilateral economic agreement had a similar psychological effect on the Australia-Japan relationship.¹⁷⁶ The five-year

¹⁷⁴ Janet Hunter and Shinya Sugiyama, 'Anglo-Japanese Economic Relations in Historical Perspective, 1600-2000: Trade and Industry, Finance, Technology and the Industrial Challenge', in *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations: Economic and Business Relations*, ed. Janet Hunter and Shinya Sugiyama, vol. 4 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 77; Aaron Forsberg, *America and the Japanese Miracle: The Cold War Context of Japan's Post-war Economic Revival, 1950-1960* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

¹⁷⁵ Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Japan, 'Agreement on Commerce Between the Commonwealth of Australia and Japan' (1957), <http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-19/221-agreement-on-commerce-between-the-commonwealth-of-australia-and-japan.aspx>.

¹⁷⁶ On distrust and alliances see Vivian Hart, *Distrust and Democracy: Political Distrust in Britain and America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990).

negotiation process, from the delivery of the *Note Verbale* to the signing of the Commerce Agreement allowed for both actors to face and test their suspicions of the other. This nascent trust development involves elements of both Kydd and Hoffman's conceptions of trust maturation, as well as March and Olsen's logics of consequences and appropriateness.¹⁷⁷ Somewhat ironically, the United States' desire to make Japan less of an economic burden, but still deny access to its traditional markets soon resulted in Japan's strong competition *against* the United States.

To this end, a strong economic link between Australia and Japan, coupled by the bilateral security relationships each had concluded with the United States brought a measure of political stability to each state as the 1950s progressed. Japan, foreswearing its sovereign right to make war, and its eagerness to resume trade and share prosperity with states across the Asia Pacific region, showed its commitment to becoming a 'good neighbour'.¹⁷⁸ Politically, the Commerce Agreement indicated to the Japanese, that the Australian Government was willing to endure bitter domestic opposition to conclude this agreement, promoting closer relations between the two states.

Common Relationship to Other Units in the System

The Ties that Bind

¹⁷⁷ Aaron Hoffman, *Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006); Andrew H Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Logic of Appropriateness', Working Paper (University of Oslo: Centre for European Studies, January 2004); James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'Elaborating the "New Institutionalism"', in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ed. R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

¹⁷⁸ The National Diet of Japan, 'The Constitution of Japan', § Article 9 (1947), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

Empirical evidence about the role that written alliances play in global politics is inconclusive. Promoted for deterrence, solidarity, and behaviour management, it is unclear whether alliances exacerbate or alleviate inter-state tension.¹⁷⁹ Certainly, there is a wealth of evidence for either side of this debate, and as John Vasquez notes, the facts of the matter probably lie somewhere in the centre:

First, alliances do not prevent war or promote peace; instead they are associated with war, although they are probably not a cause of war. Second, the major consequence of alliances is to expand war once it has started; in the war alliances are important in accounting for the magnitude and severity of war.¹⁸⁰

Whether either the *Security Treaty between the United States and Japan* or the *ANZUS Security Treaty* qualify as alliance treaties in an offensive deterrence manner is unclear. Despite the name,

¹⁷⁹ For arguments that indicate a positive correlation between an alliance and the exacerbation of interstate conflict see: M. F. Altfeld and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, 'Choosing Sides in Wars', *International Studies Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (1979): 87–112; Alan N. Sabrosky, 'Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War', in *The Correlates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models*, ed. J. David Singer (New York: The Free Press, 1980); Randolph Siverson and Joel King, 'Attributes of National Alliance Membership and War Participation', *American Journal of Political Science* 24, no. 1 (1980): 1–15; Randolph Siverson and Michael Tennefloss, 'Power, Alliances and the Escalation of Interstate Conflict, 1815-1965', *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 4 (1984): 1057–70; Gary King, *Unifying Political Methodology: The Likelihood of Statistical Inference* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Ido Oren, 'The War Prone of Alliances', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 2 (1990): 208–33; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity', *International Organization* 44, no. 2 (1990): 137–68; Chae-Han Kim, 'Third Party Participation in Wars', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 4 (1991): 659–77; Randolph Siverson and Harvey Starr, *The Diffusion of War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991);

For arguments that posit that alliances alleviate interstate conflict see: Brett A. Leeds, 'Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarised Interstate Disputes', *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 3 (2003): 427–39; J. C. Johnson and Brett A. Leeds, 'Defense Pacts: A Prescription for Peace?', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7, no. 1 (2011): 45–65; Brett V. Benson, 'Unpacking Alliances: Deterrent and Compellent Alliances and the Relationship with Conflict', *The Journal of Politics* 73, no. 4 (2011): 1111–27; Brett V. Benson, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsey, 'Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 2 (2014): 307–35; M. Fuhrmann and T. S. Sechser, 'Signalling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence', *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 4 (2014): 919–35; T. M. Wright and T. J. Rider, 'Disputed Territory, Defensive Alliances and Conflict Initiation', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31, no. 2 (2014): 119–44.

¹⁸⁰ John Vasquez, 'The Steps to War: Towards a Scientific Explanation of Correlates of War Findings', *World Politics* 40 (1987): 108–45.

the US-Japan security treaty does not oblige Japan to defend the United States in the case of an attack on that partner. Similarly, the ANZUS Treaty does not require the parties to do anything more than ‘consult’ on issues that relate to the mutual security of the signatory parties.

These non-traditional alliances, among the longest serving of any alliance the United States is a party to, do indicate the objectives of each party. For Japan, it allowed the country to create the foundations for an economic empire while their physical security, their chief vulnerability, was guaranteed by a partner determined to underwrite their success in the international economy. For Australia, while the ANZUS Treaty was not as comprehensive as originally desired, it did include important language that could be used to maintain the attention of the United States in the Asia Pacific.¹⁸¹ Additionally, the treaty acted as a potential source of external support in the event of a newly aggressive post war Japan.

For the United States, these hub-and-spokes alliances spoke to the *de facto* influence that Washington wielded over the host states. Much like Pascal’s ‘frightful sphere’, Washington’s hub-and-spokes model has a centre and a periphery, but lacks a rim.¹⁸² Daniel Nexon and Thomas

¹⁸¹ The particular language is contained in Articles III and VIII. Article III notes that, “The Parties will consult together whenever in *the opinion of any of them...*” This vague language indicates that there does not need to be a consensus of a crisis for consultation to occur. Additionally, Article VIII states, “Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security...” Within this language is the understanding, at least from the Australian side, that the United States would be involved in a broader and more comprehensive United Nations-backed effort in the region. Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, Government of New Zealand, and Government of the United States of America, ‘Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America’, § 3 & 8 (1952), <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1952/2.html>.

¹⁸² Alexander J. Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

Wright refer to this ‘rimless’ model as typical of an imperial relational structure as it combines the two features of ‘rule through intermediaries’ and ‘heterogeneous contracting’.¹⁸³ The latter feature refers to the peripheral states in the network that are disconnected from each other.¹⁸⁴

The disconnection of the peripheries served to consolidate the United States’ position as a ‘core of strength’, a key facet of an emergent security community.¹⁸⁵ By establishing non-traditional alliances in the region, the United States was able to coordinate relations with its peripheral allies, Australia and Japan, and, importantly operationalise the developing community. As noted by Adler and Barnett, a nascent security community can be created when states begin to coordinate their relations so that they may increase their mutual security, lower the transaction costs associated with increasing their security, and encourage further exchanges and interactions.¹⁸⁶ The operationalisation can be seen in the security treaties signed by each of the states that acted to increase their mutual security. Next, the non-traditional imperial alliance structure acted to lower the transaction costs for the participating states, promoting the growth of supranational institutions. Finally, the alliance structure itself, through its vague and non-traditional expression acted to encourage the further interactions between the signatory parties.

¹⁸³ Daniel H. Nexon and Thomas Wright, “What’s at Stake in the American Empire Debate,” *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 2 (May 2007): 253–71, p. 253.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, p. 38; Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities.”, p. 39

¹⁸⁶ Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, p. 50

The framework established in Chapter 1 and analysed in this chapter similarly indicates that the trilateral states had undertaken the requisite steps to create an immature security community. As we have established, there are five essential conditions: a persistent, existential, exogenous threat; a non-complex security environment; sufficient non-existential threats so as to warrant a diverse foreign policy; a common relationship to other units in the system and; long-term peace between the participating states. The operationalisation of this security community can be seen in the recognition by Australia and Japan of the sincere threat posed by Soviet Union, and more broadly, communism, to the continued hegemony of the United States and the security of their societies. Further, a non-complex security environment is constructed by the early rejection of and eventual rapprochement with Asia, as practised by both Japan and Australia as they broadly accepted the US conduct of the Cold War. Additionally, a diverse foreign policy is demonstrated in the post war policies of Australia and Japan which were forged away from historical trade and alliance partners towards policies promoting a mercantilist and global outlook. Further, the centrality of the alliance both states maintained with the United States promoted their growing concentricity and their criticality to the United States role in the Asia Pacific. Finally, the long-term peace was codified by the signing of the 1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Australia and Japan. This treaty, signed 30 years after the close of the Pacific War, institutionalised the normative correctives of regulated political competition, a stable political environment, and commitment to democratic governance.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁷ Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, 'Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986', *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 624-38.

New Directions

Relational communities, whether formal or informal, are only as strong as their participants. An unfamiliar arrangement, involving untested partners in a newly realigned and volatile global order would require serious attention in order for it to endure. Perhaps surprisingly, the immediate post-peace treaty relationship between the United States and Japan indicated more stability than the relationship between the United States and Australia. This instability arose from Australia's desire to offset the weaknesses in its traditional relationship with the United Kingdom with the security offered by an alliance with the United States. Under occupation, Japan's relationships were managed by the United States, which brooked no challenge to its strategy. The beginning of the Korean War had caught the United States dangerously understrength as a result of Truman's 1947 military budget which cut spending by two-thirds and the resulting restructure of the armed services.

To restore American military hegemony, the Eisenhower Administration ushered in the 'New Look' military offset strategy to ensure that there would be no return to the *status quo*.¹⁸⁸ As the strength of the United States increased, so too did its ability and its interest in furthering interactions between its peripheries. We can see this interest and ability in the Australia-Japan Commerce Agreement, as well as Prime Minister Menzies' inaugural visit to Japan in April 1957.

¹⁸⁸ United States National Security Council, 'A Report to the National Security Council' (Washington, DC: National Security Council, 30 October 1953), <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-162-2.pdf>.

Menzies' visit sealed the normalisation strategies that the 'near north neighbours' had pursued since the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.¹⁸⁹

Additionally, Menzies' visit spoke to the break with the United Kingdom in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis. It was the United Kingdom that had expressed the greatest resistance to normalising Japan within the international community. The United States' clear anti-colonialism stance during the Suez Crisis indicated to the international community that, in conjunction with the 'New Look' strategy and the aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Hungary, the United States refused to entertain a return to the colonial *status quo*.¹⁹⁰ Therefore, Australia's outreach to Japan was entirely consistent with the development of an emergent security community in that it increased their mutual security, lowered transaction costs, and provided a clear path to future interactions. The public normalisation of the Australia-Japan relationship (and the subsequent diminishing of the Australia-United Kingdom relationship) proved critical to the success of the emergent community. It allowed the United States to revise their peace settlement with Japan in 1960 without the strong international opposition that had coloured the original 1951 treaty. However, the success of the emergent economic community laid the foundations for bitter considerations regarding trading practices.

¹⁸⁹ 'Menzies' Visit Makes for Closer Links', *The Canberra Times*, 18 April 1957.

¹⁹⁰ Louise Richardson, "Avoiding and Incurring Losses: Decision-Making in the Suez Crisis," *International Journal* 47, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 370–401, p. 377.

In large part due to the economic structures imposed during the Occupation and its acceptance into the international monetary order, the Japanese economy underwent a sustained period of economic growth. This trend of strong Japanese economic growth initially correlated with the phenomenal post-war economic growth experienced by the United States. However, the slowing of the United States economy in the late 1960s and early 1970s prompted unwelcome attention by American officials expressing the perennial concern that Japan (and other states) were profiting at the expense of the United States. This habit of attributing trade deficits to the fiscal policies of major trade partners soon ingrained itself in the American political psyche. Campaigning in 1968, Richard Nixon promised to address the concerns of the struggling domestic manufacturing industries that were unable to compete with foreign made products.¹⁹¹ Nixon's campaign promise came as the trade surpluses the United States had enjoyed with Japan had decreased and slipped into deficits.

To arrest the disturbances to the American economy allegedly caused by unfair trading practices, President Nixon claimed a popular mandate to act unilaterally to resolve the growing trade imbalances. Exercising the President's prerogative in foreign affairs, Nixon attempted to assuage domestic economic discontent by reforming the basis of American economic hegemony.¹⁹² These jolts, dubbed the *Nixon Shokku*, by the Japanese, seemed unerringly aimed at capping Japanese

¹⁹¹ Howard Criswell Jr, 'Nixon Promises Aid to Textile Industry', *The Sumpter Daily Item*, 4 October 1968.

¹⁹² Barbara Hinckley, *Less than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 6; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy," in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Jeffrey E. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 27; William Howell, *Thinking about the Presidency: The Primacy of Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 135.

economic success, a strange occurrence given America's established reputation as the champion of economic free market capitalist democracy.

The three shocks, Sino-American rapprochement, suspending the US dollar's convertibility to gold and imposing a 10 percent surcharge on dutiable goods, and the textile quota dispute, severely undermined confidence in the Japanese political and economic system, and their relationship with the United States. Prime Minister Satō Eisaku noted this dilemma in a speech in the Japanese Diet:

The drastic change in world conditions in 1971 put Japan in a difficult situation. Under these new conditions, it is reasonable to say that uneasiness and irritation have been pervasive among the Japanese people.¹⁹³

These shocks came after Nixon's enunciation of the Guam Doctrine, which generated decidedly cool responses from Asian allies whose security had been predicated on an enduring US military commitment to the region, as envisaged by the 'New Look' strategy from the Eisenhower Administration.

The three US actions were 'shocks' to the Japanese precisely because Nixon was determined to neither do anything to alleviate their impact nor provide any advance warning of their occurrence. The first 'shock' was President Nixon's July 1971 announcement that he would visit mainland

¹⁹³ Prime Minister Satō Eisaku quoted in Atsushi Kusano, *Two Nixon Shocks and Japan-US Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

China in early 1972.¹⁹⁴ Nixon's time as a member of the House Un-American Activities Committee – particularly his pursuit of the Alger Hiss spy case – as well as the 1960 campaign publication, 'The Meaning of Communism to Americans,' had established his reputation as an anti-Communist.¹⁹⁵ This sudden reversal astonished Australian Prime Minister William McMahon, who non-committedly remarked that it was "an act of great imaginativeness and political courage".¹⁹⁶ Nixon's move sparked alarm in Japan, with Prime Minister Satō only informed of the policy change three minutes before Nixon's announcement. This action was doubly disquieting as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had assured Satō a week earlier that the Nixon Administration was not considering a change to its China policy.¹⁹⁷ Nixon's unilateral manoeuvre and his refusal to share relevant major foreign policy changes with Japan called into question the United States' commitment to the region. Japan's fear at the concept of an absent United States was fuelled by the knowledge of the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement, signed a month prior to the Sino-American rapprochement. In light of the announcement, it now seemed as if the United States had acted deliberately in order to loosen their ties and commitments to the region.

The second shock was Nixon's issuance of Executive Order 11615, the freezing of wages and prices, as well as an imposition of a temporary 10 percent surcharge on imports, and the floating

¹⁹⁴ Carol Kilpatrick, 'President Agrees to Visit China: Groundwork Laid by Kissinger', *The Washington Post*, 17 July 1971.

¹⁹⁵ Richard M. Nixon, 'The Meaning of Communism to Americans' (Washington, DC: Office of the Vice President, August 1960), <https://archive.org/details/TheMeaningOfCommunismToAmericans>.

¹⁹⁶ William McMahon quoted in Andrew Scott, *Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), p. 52.

¹⁹⁷ Michael Schaller, 'The Nixon Shocks and US-Japan Strategic Relations, 1969-74' (The National Security Archive US-Japan Special Documentation Project, 1996), <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/japan/schaller.htm>.

of the dollar.¹⁹⁸ To be sure, Nixon's abandonment of the Bretton Woods international economic system disrupted the global economy, with most major trading partners voicing outrage over the 10 percent surcharge tax.¹⁹⁹ In addition, the two principal architects of Nixon's economic policy, Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans and Secretary of Treasury John Connally both repeatedly singled out Japan and Japanese behaviour as justification for the new economic program. Stans remarkably declared, "[T]he Japanese are still fighting the war. Their immediate intention is to try to dominate the Pacific and then perhaps the world."²⁰⁰ Connally was no less bombastic, arguing that economic competition from Japan was the most important non-military threat to the national security of the United States.²⁰¹ To the Japanese, the floating of the dollar was purely a punitive measure designed to force a readjustment of the yen, for the dubious benefit of the United States dollar.²⁰²

The final shock was the conclusion of the extended trade dispute over Japanese textile exports. In the 1968 Presidential campaign, candidate Nixon promised the American textile industry that he "would do all possible to aid them in their fight against their No. 1 problem, stifling competition from cheaply produced imports."²⁰³ By March 1970, eighteen months after Nixon's pledge each

¹⁹⁸ Richard M. Nixon, 'Providing for Stabilization of Prices, Rents, Wages, and Salaries', Pub. L. No. Executive Order 11615 (1971), <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/1971.html>; Richard M. Nixon, 'The Challenge of Peace' (Washington, DC, 15 August 1971), <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3115#axzz1UZnES7PMon>.

¹⁹⁹ Bruce Muirhead, "From Special Relationship to Third Option: Canada, the US, and the Nixon Shock," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 34, no. 3 (2004): 439–62, pp. 441-42.

²⁰⁰ Schaller, 'The Nixon Shocks and US-Japan Strategic Relations, 1969-74'.

²⁰¹ Muirhead, "From Special Relationship to Third Option: Canada, the US, and the Nixon Shock", p. 439.

²⁰² T. Yoshino, "Policy of the Central Bank Under Floating Exchange Rate System in Japan," in *Floating Exchange Rates: The Lessons of Recent Experience*, by H. Fournier and J.E Wadsworth (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1976, pp. 153-4); I.M. Destler et al., *Managing an Alliance: The Politics of US-Japanese Relations* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 44.

²⁰³ Criswell Jr, 'Nixon Promises Aid to Textile Industry'.

side was irreconcilably opposed to the other's proposal.²⁰⁴ The situation worsened when Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills (D-AR) visited Japan and successfully negotiated a compromise quota. Nixon saw this as not only an attempt to undercut the President's constitutional authority to negotiate international trade agreements, but also the collusion between the Japanese government and a powerful political rival of Nixon, and harshly denounced its substance.²⁰⁵

In a heavy-handed ultimatum to the Japanese negotiators, the Nixon Administration announced that unless an agreement (with official US negotiators) was reached by October 15, the President would impose textile quotas by Executive Order.²⁰⁶ The questionable authority for this action is embedded in the *Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917* (HR 4960), which gives the President the power to limit trade with any nation considered 'hostile' to the United States.²⁰⁷ The Japanese, unaccustomed to the concept that a senior, powerful member of the legislature would conclude a negotiation without support from the executive, were confounded by the power plays between the Legislative and Executive Branches of the United States government.

The confluence of these events convinced the Japanese Government that the benign paternalism of the San Francisco *Pax Americana* system had ended. The shattering of the established economic model forced Japan toward a diversification of its economic model. Stung by the United States'

²⁰⁴ Destler et al., *Managing an Alliance: The Politics of US-Japanese Relations*.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ 'Trading with the Enemy Act', Pub. L. No. H.R. 4960 (1917), <http://legisworks.org/sal/40/stats/STATUTE-40-Pg411.pdf>.

sudden reversal of economic and foreign policy, Japan's insecurity was again revealed in their dependency on the United States economic model. Concerned about their obvious reliance on an increasingly capricious ally, Japanese businesses had begun to accede to China's requests to cease trade with the Republic of China. Accepting Zhou Enlai's 'Four Conditions' for trade,²⁰⁸ Japan circumvented the attempts of the Nixon Administration to restrict its economy, finding the long-sought economic prosperity in the forced diversification of its trading relations. The structure of Japanese political and economic society, the all-powerful triumvirate of the Liberal Democratic Party, big business, and the bureaucracy, acted in sharp contrast to the United States' *laissez faire* system.

For Australia, the alignment brought about by the shared experience in the Vietnam War strengthened the extant military and political relationship. Australia's strong commitment to United States strategy in Vietnam won it praise from American sources, given the highly contentious nature of conflict and the political risk that the Australian government accepted. The early stages of the Vietnam War brought Australia a level of access and intimacy that it had long desired from the United States, as Lyndon Johnson in 1966 became the first sitting American President to visit Australia, before returning a year later to attend the memorial service of Prime Minister Harold Holt (1966-67). As an example of the role of individuals in strengthening alliance relations, as well as Australia's relative importance to the United States Cold War strategy, the next Presidential visit would not come until the post-Cold War era. During the 1970s, the alliance and relations weakened, prompted by Australia's decision to withdraw troops from Vietnam, and

²⁰⁸ Sadako Ogata, "The Business Community and Japanese Foreign Policy: Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China," ed. Robert A. Scalapino (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 185.

an acrimonious relationship between Prime Minister Gough Whitlam (1972-1975) and President Richard Nixon (1969-1974).²⁰⁹ In addition, the foreign policy goals pursued by President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) during his administration caused the government of Malcolm Fraser (1975-1983) serious angst. This is particularly evident when Carter, at a March 1977 press conference, announced that he had proposed, without consultation with regional partners, to the Soviet Union that the Indian Ocean be demilitarised.²¹⁰

On the other hand, at the period when relations with the United States seemed adrift, Australia and Japan deepened their bilateral relationship with the signing of the 1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. It is significant that this Treaty was the first comprehensive treaty that Australia had signed with another country. Although Japan had signed similar accords in the past, this agreement was more comprehensive than any to date.²¹¹ It had become clear to both states that, as a matter of course, their relationship had evolved beyond its hesitant economic beginnings. Indeed, the preamble to the treaty states, “wishing to place their relations on an even closer and more concrete basis”, and Japanese officials spoke of wishing to “complete the chain of friendly agreements.”²¹²

²⁰⁹ E. Gough Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government* (Ringwood: Viking, 1985).

²¹⁰ Jimmy Carter, ‘Remarks at President Carter’s Press Conference’ (Washington, DC, 9 March 1977), <http://millercenter.org/president/carter/speeches/speech-3397>.

²¹¹ Gary Woodard, Moreen Dee, and Max Suich, “Negotiating the Australia-Japan Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Reflections and Afterthoughts,” *Asia Pacific Economic Papers* (Canberra: Australian National University, 2007), p. 10.

²¹² Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Japan, *Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-Operation between Australia and Japan*, 1977; Woodard, Dee, and Suich, “Negotiating the Australia-Japan Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Reflections and Afterthoughts”, p. 11.

Two years after the Australia-Japan Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Japan and the United States signed the 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. This agreement sought to clarify the roles of the Self Defense Forces and the US military in the event of a Soviet attack.²¹³ The guidelines focused on three major areas: “Posture for Deterring Aggression; Actions in Response to an Armed Attack Against Japan; and Japan-U.S. cooperation in the case of situations in the Far East outside of Japan which will have an important influence on the security of Japan.” However, as Tomohiko Satake notes, the guidelines were motivated by Japanese policymakers concerns that the US was disengaging with the region at the same time that the Soviets represented an increased threat.²¹⁴ On the US side, fear was prevalent that Japan would seek to become an ‘independent military power’ if the US did not maintain a military presence in Japan.²¹⁵ The 1978 Guidelines gave the first public authorisation for US and Japanese forces to train together, substantially boosting the effectiveness of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Crucially, as Senator Sam Nunn noted, “It [the Guidelines] opens the door for joint planning and greater cooperation in many key defense areas, and provides an excellent opportunity to develop highly interoperable forces.”²¹⁶ Further, Japan began providing host nation support for US bases in 1978, which assisted the perception that Japan was taking on a greater burden sharing role, an impression that maintained a strong US-Japan alliance through to the end of the Cold War.

²¹³ Ministry of Defense of Japan, “The Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation,” Government, November 27, 1978, https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/ampo/19781127.html.

²¹⁴ Tomohiko Satake, “The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and an Expanding Japanese Security Role,” *Asian Politics & Policy* 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 27–38.

²¹⁵ Michael J. Green and Koji Murata, “The 1978 Guidelines for the US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Process and the Historical Impact,” Working Paper, US-Japan Project (Washington, DC: The George Washington University, 1998), <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//japan/GreenMurataWP.htm#5>.

²¹⁶ United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, “United States-Japan Security Relationship: The Key to East Asian Security and Stability,” Report of the Pacific Study Group (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 22, 1979).

As noted in Chapter 1, written treaties are an important precondition of trust in the post-Second World War environment.²¹⁷ Although, the concern with which the conservative governments in Australia and Japan viewed the recently recognised People's Republic of China indicates that there was an element of balancing involved. In addition, given that it was the initial policy of the Carter Administration to withdraw US troops from the Korean Peninsula, withdraw from the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, and normalise relations with mainland China, it is unsurprising that Australia and Japan felt compelled to strengthen their security options.²¹⁸ This agreement established the institutional framework critical for further negotiations and affirmed their mutual interest in being stable and reliable market suppliers.²¹⁹ Relations between Australia and Japan continued to improve under the Hawke Government, with calls for Japan to join the ANZUS alliance (as John Foster Dulles had originally intended) increasing.²²⁰

The key event for 1980s alliance relations was the dispute between the United States and New Zealand over nuclear policy. Australia, caught between one of its oldest and most culturally important relationships, and its most materially important relationship, sided with the United States. Due to host the next annual meeting of the ANZUS foreign ministers, Australia indefinitely

²¹⁷ Kegley and Raymond, *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics*, p. 47; J. David Lewis and Andrew Weigert, "Trust as a Social Reality," *Social Forces* 63, no. 4 (June 1985), p. 969.

²¹⁸ Joe Wood, 'Persuading a President: Jimmy Carter and American Troops in Korea' (Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 1 January 1996), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB431/docs/intell_ebb_002.PDF.

²¹⁹ Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Japan, Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Australia and Japan.

²²⁰ United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, vol. 6, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951); Alan Rix, *The Australia-Japan Political Alignment: 1952 to the Present* (London: Routledge, 1999).

postponed the meeting due to the tensions between two of the signatory partners. Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke noted that it was not incorrect to call ANZUS “[a] treaty in name only.”²²¹ However, it is equally correct to note that New Zealand’s suspension and departure from the tripartite severed a lingering connection to its Australia’s imperial past. Australia’s clear reluctance to defend New Zealand’s actions on the grounds of state sovereignty, occurred as the members of the United States Congress threatened to introduce economic sanctions targeting New Zealand.²²² Australia’s choice to passively side with the United States in the ‘ANZUS crisis’, thus averting a national security catastrophe, is analogous to Japan’s decision to bear the repeated trade allegations of the United States without compromising their long-term relationship. Here, both Japan and Australia were forced to confront an extremely powerful and angry United States, one that refused to accept any compromise or domestic challenge to its position.

As the US presence in Asia ebbed and flowed, it had become clear to both Australia and Japan that an absent United States was no longer a trigger for closer relations between them. Indeed, the evidence of these closer relations while the United States remained engaged in the region may have even been a catalyst for fresh American interest in the region. The perennial American concerns about over commitment, divisions of labour, and financial and political costs could be assuaged by evidentiary proof of an Australia-Japan relationship that acted to institutionalise some of its factors.

²²¹ Bernard Gwertzman, ‘Meeting of ANZUS Alliance Is Postponed’, *The New York Times*, 5 March 1985.

²²² Steve Lohr, ‘New Zealand Premier Warns US on Imposing Economic Sanctions’, *The New York Times*, 12 February 1985.

In these efforts, we can see the further emergence of an immature security community as it stabilises and begins to evolve into its mature iteration. The trust invested in the early phases of development is positively returned, as there are now institutionalised relationships between the social, political, and economic spheres of the states with less developed relationships. A palpable sense of community also exists, with the sense that each state 'belongs' to the same social grouping as the other. For Australia and Japan, their community existed in their shared commitment to Southeast Asian development, as well as in their longstanding relationships with the United States.

Despite the bilateral tensions present in each alliance at various points in the Cold War era, it remains clear that neither Japan nor Australia imagined a shift away from the United States. Hindered by its global commitments, the United States fell back on a basic alliance management concept of 'benign neglect' rather than active engagement. Rather than exploring new relationship options, Australia and Japan reasoned that there was latitude to develop their own bilateral relationship within the broad arc of the United States' umbrella. Just as cautious distrust is integral to deepening trust, benign neglect, in this case, acted to further enmesh the previously tangential relationship between Australia and Japan.

Long-term Peace Between the States

Confronting the Frightful Frontier

The end of the Cold War sparked a renewed identity and security crisis for Australia Japan, and the United States. The United States, unexpectedly the only superpower, faced a crisis of confidence, regarding both uncertainty as to for which interests and values the United States should defend, and how international institutions and allies should offset the United States' global military burdens.²²³ For Australia and Japan the key questions were, could the relationship's longevity be only attributed to the urgency and immediacy of bloc tensions? Or had new elements emerged that would contribute to the stability of the alliance?

For Australia, the latter answer was yes. The ANZUS alliance had quietly evolved beyond the regional confines of mutually held threat perceptions in the Pacific in the mid-1970s, as Australian had assisted in peacetime ocean surveillance and reconnaissance in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, regions outside the narrow scope of the ANZUS agreement.²²⁴ Additionally, US President George HW Bush had reacted positively to Prime Minister Paul Keating's call to expand the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.²²⁵ In a discussion between Keating and US Defence Secretary, Dick Cheney, Keating also offered the US access to a bombing range in development

²²³ Stanley R. Sloan, 'The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Toward Self-Deterrence' (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 20 July 1994).

²²⁴ 'The Scope of ANZUS', *The Canberra Times*, 6 August 1976.

²²⁵ Chris Uhlmann, 'Left to Check Keating's US Military Offer', *The Canberra Times*, 5 May 1992.

at the Tindal Royal Australian Airforce Base in the Northern Territory, to replace the loss of the United States' bases in the Philippines.²²⁶

The Japan-US alliance development was less obvious. Constrained by the limitations of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, Japan could still not militarily commit to the vision of a 'new Pacific community' promoted by incoming Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord.²²⁷ Lord noted that Japan should begin to "make contributions worthy of a major political and economic power", but did not call upon Japan to engage more fully with regional security.²²⁸ Japan's ascension to major power status ran uneasily alongside its renunciation of force, particularly as Japan began to pursue more collective security policies, working with the United Nations to stabilise new, quasi, and failed states.²²⁹ Though, Japan's shift from passive ally to semi-active partner, particularly in the then-emerging area of human security, indicated that their interests were evolving past the parameters of their region. This shift will be explored in Chapter 4.

For Japan, the initial crisis of the post-Cold War era came in the form of the First Gulf War. Under the parameters of their 1947 constitution – and the political culture encouraged by the United States – the Japanese (and the Germans)²³⁰ were unable to contribute ground or support troops to the

²²⁶ Ibid.; David E. Sanger, 'Philippines Orders US to Leave Strategic Navy Base at Subic Bay', *The New York Times*, 28 December 1991.

²²⁷ Winston Lord, 'A New Pacific Community: Ten Goals for American Foreign Policy' (Washington, DC, 31 March 1993).

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Desmond Ball, 'Whither the Japan-Australia Security Relationship?' (Berkeley: Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 21 September 2006).

²³⁰ Stephen Kinzer, 'Gulf War Sets Off Crisis For Germans', *The New York Times*, 17 February 1991.

military operations in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. Instead, the Japanese elected to contribute \$10 billion USD to the war effort, a little under 20 percent of the overall cost of operations.²³¹ The Japanese were unprepared for the storm of criticism from the United States that greeted their offer.²³² Belatedly, the Japanese Diet passed legislation to allow Japan to take part in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.²³³ This peacekeeping participation by Japan represented a significant step forward in terms of their global engagement and allowed Japanese peacekeepers to participate in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The Australian and Japanese representatives worked closely together to create a genuinely diplomatic solution to the Cambodian questions and each provided communications and engineers to the UN Authority in Cambodia.

Following on from their success in Cambodia, during the 1990s Japan was involved in six separate peacekeeping missions, ranging from El Salvador to Mozambique to Timor Leste.²³⁴ These missions acted to establish Japan's regional bona fides as a neighbour uninterested in the great

²³¹ Department of Defense, 'Conduct of the Persian Gulf War', Final Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 1992), <http://www.ssi.army.mil/!Library/Desert%20Shield-Desert%20Storm%20Battle%20Analysis/Conduct%20of%20the%20Persian%20Gulf%20War%20-%20Final%20Rpt%20to%20Congress.pdf>.

²³² Ronald E. Yates, "Japan Parliament Approves Gulf Aid," *The Chicago Tribune*, March 7, 1991; Robert J. Samuelson, "The Japan Problem," *The Washington Post*, April 10, 1991; Richard Cohen, "No Time for Hubris," *The Washington Post*, February 28, 1991; Tim Kelly and Nobuhiro Kubo, "Gulf War Trauma Began Japan's Retreat from Pacifism," *Reuters*, December 19, 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 1991: Japan's Diplomatic Activities* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1991); Kenneth B. Pyle, "The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era" (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1992), p. 127.

²³³ The National Diet of Japan, 'Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations', Pub. L. No. No. 79 (1992).

²³⁴ Aurelia George Mulgan, 'International Peacekeeping and Japan's Role: Catalyst or Cautionary Tale', *Asian Survey* 35, no. 12 (December 1995): 1102–17; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'Japan's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations' (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 14 May 2015), http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/ipc/page22e_000684.html.

power plays so characteristic of the Cold War era. However, as we will see in the succeeding chapters, with the support and pressure of both the United States and Australia, Japan's security interests soon evolved to those consistent with a mature, normalised state within international society.

An Immature Community

The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a historical background to the emergence of an immature security community between Australia, Japan, and the United States. The original construction of the United States alliance system in the Asia Pacific deliberately maximised the level of control that the United States maintained over their allied partners. This control allowed the United States to engineer linkages between Australia and Japan that were unlikely to have developed independently. As established in Chapter 1, security communities are not naturally occurring institutions, therefore, their success or failure rests heavily on the leadership and domestic and international trends influencing the partnered states. Tensions within the separate bilateral relationships, most prominently the United States' extended trade dispute with Japan in 1970 and the breaking of the ANZUS alliance in 1985, threatened the viability of deeper engagement beyond the end of the Cold War. Importantly, however within this historical context, all three states understood that their national security encompasses more than the traditional realist agenda of alliances, balance of power and arms control, and must incorporate reduction of vulnerability to the disruption of essential imports. Despite sharp divergence in opinions and actions on economics, civil society, and military endeavours, the tests of the community were overcome by the commitment to the "shared practical knowledge of peaceful conflict resolution..."²³⁵ As we shall see in the succeeding chapters, this commitment promoted a more far-reaching and flexible security arrangement that sustained the institutional arrangements of the alliances beyond the end of the Cold War.

²³⁵ Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

Our three states sought security beyond the basic comfort of hard power. By institutionalising the economic facets of their relationships, they founded a solid base for their joint participation in the military endeavours that marked the end of the decade. The development phase of the community occurred progressively from the signing of the Australia-Japan Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation through to the early post-Cold War era. This is evidenced through the creation of multifaceted regional institutions and agreements, an increasingly cooperative military environment, particularly in supporting the other parties' involvement in international military operations.

In addition, the growing confidence Australia and Japan placed in their relationship minimised tensions between them. Each's confidence in the strength of the other encouraged the maturity of cognitive structures associated with trust and collective identities. These factors form an environment conducive to trust and further encourage the 'dependable expectations of peaceful change', critical to a successful security community.

It is important to recognise the developmental stages of a security community as it reminds us of the dynamism of community development. As noted, successful security communities do not arise by chance, they are the product of sustained development and interest. The commitment to this security community represents a critical break with tradition for all three states. For Japan, it is the effective normalisation of their security policies after a long self-imposed cycle of pacifism. For the United States, it represents the normalisation of institutionalised partnership, as opposed to the

unidirectional coalitions that have been the hallmark of their initial alliance policy in the Asia Pacific. For Australia, it symbolises an understanding of how to move beyond the trite reliance of the ‘great and powerful friend’, and successfully manage high level involvement with two powerful allies simultaneously.

Our understanding of theory is largely bound by what we expect theory to be able to accomplish. To suit this end, theories are minimalist, more horoscope than predeterminism. They exist to assist and structure, but not dictate, our analysis. As noted in Chapter 1, the defining features of a mature security community are clear-cut, even if analysing their operationalisation is less so. Peace between the participants is predictable and well-established; the threat and use of force becomes delegitimised, and no military plans are made to exploit the vulnerabilities of the other participants; a high degree of integration is achieved; and, finally, as a result of this integration, transparency between participants is extensive and multifaceted.

Operationalising the trilateral relationship through the theoretical matrix of a security community provides a strong framework to chart the development of this relationship. As noted in Chapter 1, the key facets of contemporary security development are communication, cooperation, and commitment. The lines of communication need to be well-established, well used, and present across multiple levels of society. These communication ‘tracks’ act together to promote conflict resolution. Cooperation between the participating states deepens transparency and trust, reducing points of tension in the relationship. Public commitment to the relationship and to the shared future is essential for developing a mature relationship. Additionally, commitment acts to neutralise

endogenous tensions so that the participants can action long term planning that increases strands of communication and areas of cooperation. It is to the problems associated with the operationalisation of these facets that we now turn.

Chapter 3

Talk isn't Cheap: Communication in the Trilateral Community

The People's Republic of China made its displeasure clear in no uncertain terms. In a strongly worded rebuke, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, attending the 6th East Asia Summit (EAS) Foreign Minister's Meeting in July 2016, called the statement issued by the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) “[i]nconsistent with the aspiration of regional people to lower the temperature surrounding the South China Sea situation...”¹ Wang also questioned the commitment of the TSD members to regional stability, calling on them to determine whether they are “[p]eacekeepers or troublemakers.”² The TSD, the regional ‘minilateral’ comprised of Australia, the United States and Japan, meeting for only the sixth time on the sidelines of the 2016 EAS Foreign Minister's Meeting, had provoked this stern reaction by releasing a joint statement condemning coercive actions that threaten stability, supporting the rule of law, and, most significantly, explicitly calling for China to abide by the legally binding settlement handed down by the Permanent Court of Arbitration regarding the arbitration between the Philippines and China regarding maritime issues in the South China Sea and the legality of the Chinese ‘nine-dotted line’ claim.³

¹ Yi Wang, ‘Wang Yi Refuting the Joint Statement by US, Japan and Australia: Peacekeeper or Troublemaker’ (East Asia Summit Foreign Minister's Meeting, Laos, 27 July 2016), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1384823.shtml.

² Ibid.

³ Julie Bishop, John Kerry, and Fumio Kishida, ‘Japan-United States-Australia Trilateral Dialogue’ (East Asia Summit Foreign Minister's Meeting, Laos, 25 July 2016), http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2016/jb_mr_160725.aspx?w=tb1CaGpkPX%2FIS0K%2Bg9ZKEg%3D%3D; Permanent Court of Arbitration, In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China, No. 2013–19 (Permanent Court of Arbitration 12 July 2016).

The trilateral statement, as delivered, is a remarkable *tour de force*. The driving message of the statement is that the governments of the United States, Australia, and Japan, those states with the most advanced and sophisticated maritime capabilities in the region, are pushing back against Chinese coercion in the South China Sea. The TSD statement drew further notice when the Chairman's statement from the EAS Foreign Minister's Meeting, issued on the same day, did not mention the outcome of the arbitration.⁴ This contrast in statements can be attributed to both the influence the Chinese have in stymieing independent regional institutions and multilateral fora, and the strength of the community that exists between the United States, Australia, and Japan. Additionally, the statement issued by the TSD indicated that these states had achieved unity in their regional threat perceptions.

The opening chapter of this thesis addressed the literature surrounding security community development and maintenance, and the associated issues such as trust, sovereignty, and interdependence. In addition, following the examples of Deutsch, Adler and Barnett, Wæver, Gonzalez and Haggard, and Acharya, a key part of the methodology of this thesis has been an analysis of pre-existing examples in order to isolate the characteristics of successful security communities.⁵ The first chapter established the foundational pillars of contemporary security

⁴ Saleumxay Kommasith, 'Turning Vision into Reality for a Dynamic ASEAN Community: Chairman's Statement of the 6th East Asia Summit Foreign Minister's Meeting' (East Asia Summit Foreign Minister's Meeting, Vientiane, 26 July 2016),

http://asean.org/storage/2016/07/CHAIRMAN_STATEMENT_OF_THE_6TH_EAST_ASIA_SUMMIT_EAS_FOREIGN_MINISTERS_MEETING.-FINAL.pdf.

⁵ Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Ole Wæver, 'Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community', in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephen Haggard, 'The USA and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community', in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge

communities, determining that quantifiable levels of communication, cooperation, and commitment act to stabilise political communities and produce ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change.’

The second chapter addressed the context of each state’s foreign policy development in the Asia Pacific region. This was critical to contextualise the divergent foreign policy strategies each state intended to pursue at the end of the Pacific theatre of operations and the paths ultimately taken. This contextualisation is key to understanding the developmental stages of the Australia, Japan, and United States security community. In determining the environments that led to the states considering a security community, this thesis established five essential conditions: a persistent, existential, exogenous threat; a non-complex security environment; sufficient non-existential threats so as to warrant a diverse foreign policy; a common relationship to other units in the system and; long-term peace between the participating states. In tracing the arc of this community from the immature stage, where states begin to consider how they might coordinate their security, to the mature stage, where tighter security cooperation is reflected in institutional networks, deepened trust, and the emergence of collective identities, we can determine the deeper forces reflecting the changes in the international environment.⁶

University Press, 1998); Amitav Acharya, ‘Collective Security and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia’, in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2014).

⁶ Adler and Barnett, ‘A Framework for the Study of Security Communities’.

This three-step evaluation of contemporary security community development, the historical analysis, followed by an assessment of the contemporary environment, is critical to establish whether a security community has cause to exist amongst the three states. Having established the sound foundational elements of a contemporary security community and the historical paths of security community development, maintenance, and existence, this thesis turns now to the key task of assessing the viability of a mature security community existing between Australia, the United States, and Japan. This chapter, and the two to follow, will lay out the case for the existence of a mature security community between these states. However, once realised, how is the health of the community sustained? Adler and Barnett do not speak directly to maintaining the health of the community, commenting logically that a breakdown in mutual trust is likely to result in the dissolution of the community.⁷ The health of a security community is determined by assessing the states' engagement on issues of minor, medium, and major sensitivity. As mentioned in Chapter 1, areas of minor sensitivity include cooperation on humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations, participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, and regional anti-piracy campaigns. Medium sensitivity areas include collaboration on military capabilities, participation in military exercises, and access to territorial claims. Areas of major sensitivity, those indicating a mature and high confidence relationship, involve collation and collaboration on strategic assessments, a clear commitment to interoperability, and deepened efforts to overcome the challenges inherent in an asymmetric relationship. Each chapter will address one of the specific elements of a mature security community, communication, cooperation, and commitment that, once collated, will strongly indicate the existence of a mature security community.

⁷ Ibid.

A security community offers a tangible path towards a whole-of-government approach to interstate interoperability. As we shall see in this chapter, communication, as a foundational element of a security community, is critically important as states and governments must learn how to communicate with one another in a language that is both common and understood by all parties. The subtleties and nuance of international relations are such that even states which share a common native language are not immune to serious and disruptive bouts of miscommunication. Therefore – as a prelude to deeper forms of interoperability such as military cooperation and the largely unrelenting challenge of demonstrating credible commitment – intent, perception, and limitations must not only be understood but must be *seen* to be understood for the community to maintain its coherence and develop towards maturity. For our trilateral community, the formidable barriers of language and physical distance have historically acted as ‘dampeners’ to community cohesion, particularly in terms of attaining a sense of mutual threat perception, a key indicator of the maturity of a security community. As we shall see in this chapter, the chief task facing early iterations of the trilateral community was the standardization of the methods through which the community members communicated.

The focus of this chapter is on the role that communication has played in creating an environment for the enhancement and maturation of the security community. Security community development is a dynamic process, and a mature community can be considered to exist when the state-to-state interactions regularly manage issues of major sensitivity. The communication issues of major sensitivity that indicate that the community has successfully transitioned from immature to mature security community are: a progressive rhetorical shift away from the *status quo* in a way that

deepens the relationship with other members of the community, the collaboration and collation of strategic assessments, and the successful resolution of issues that threaten the cohesion of the community.




Figure 3.1: A Framework for Analysing Communication in Security Community Development

In assessing this visual structure, the same basic framework which is replicated across all three body chapters, we can highlight the points at which communication between the trilateral community ascends through the tiers of sensitivity, from the minor to the medium tier, and the medium to the major tier. Once interactions occur frequently at the level of major sensitivity we can consider a mature security community to exist. At the level of minor sensitivity, interstate interactions are assessed by the content and theme of joint statements, broad agreements on common areas of threat perception, and basic steps to improve interstate cooperation. The intersection of these indicators is seen first in the practice of issuing joint statements which contain highly important indicators of community concern and direction, as we shall see as the tenor of each state's relations with the chief regional competitor, China, begin to show strain. Next, states publicly signify the areas in which they perceive a common threat, communicating to the other members of the community future areas of cooperation. Additionally, to complete this horizontalisation, states identify the areas of concern likely to cause a breakdown in their communications and damage the fledgling community.

At the medium sensitivity tier, the community members issue joint statements that identify specific areas of concern and opportunities for improvement relating to the community, straying from the vague platitudes that characterise statements issued at the lesser tier. The standardisation of language in national security documents highlights to the deepening of shared threat perception and an agreement on steps to address behaviour that undercuts the mutually held goals of the community. Further, as areas of future cooperation and threat perception have been established in the first tier, the community turns to collaborating on strategic assessments. Establishing this process indicates that the community members are eager to develop formal elements to their

relationship that assist in contouring the future development of the community. Through these binding elements, the community is able to create a normative framework that acts to diminish the likelihood of contentious issues fracturing the emerging community.

Finally, at the major sensitivity tier, community members clearly and jointly state their shared threat perceptions and aspirations for the future direction of the community. These shifts are not only visible in the joint statements issued after meetings of community representatives, but also the in the official documents produced by their governments that shape their interactions with the rest of international society. By this stage, the community has established practices for the collation of strategic assessments and develops the legal framework for the sharing of highly sensitive materials, strengthening their abilities to communicate effectively with each other. Finally, the normative framework established in the preceding tier functions to insulate the community from dissolution.

Issues of Minor Sensitivity

Communicating the Convergence of National Interests

At the Australia-US Ministerial Consultation (AUSMIN) press conference in July 2001, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and United States Secretary of State Colin Powell jointly responded to one final question from the journalists present. The questioner asked:

From the American side, there has been reference to the three main bilateral alliances, with Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Is there any advantage at all in seeking to achieve greater coordination and greater oomph between these separate alliances and...what would be the strategic purpose of that?¹

Secretary Powell's response invoked the benefits of increased communication, noting that such an increase would not lead to a new formal arrangement, but rather that, "since we have common interests", there may be a "need for us to seek opportunities to come together and talk more often."²

Downer's response was more direct, and is worth quoting at length:

As Colin says, this is something that we have discussed, we've also informally discussed with the Japanese as well...we obviously...wouldn't want sort of new architecture in East Asia which would be an attempt to kind of replicate NATO or something like that. We are talking here just about an informal dialogue and the question of whether we could do it at a more numerous level than two, that is, we obviously have a dialogue with the Japanese, the Japanese with the United States, the United States with us.³

¹ Colin L Powell, 'Remarks to the Press' (Canberra, 30 July 2001), <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/4350.htm>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

Whereas Powell offered a studied non-committal response to the question, Downer clearly did not. It is interesting to examine the disparity in the two responses, particularly as the language in the Joint Communique tended toward Powell's answer than the one given by Downer.⁴ What is clear, however, is that this answer is one that the Australian Government had considered as they looked to make gains with the new presidential Administration.

The expansion of Australia-Japan relationship, as indicated by Downer, was prefaced and underwritten by the 2001 'Sydney Declaration' which promoted a 'creative partnership' between Australia and Japan.⁵ This effort provided a critical early underpinning for the relationship, particularly as it was championed by the respective Prime Ministers of both states, John Howard and Koizumi Junichirō.⁶ This 'creative partnership' placed a large emphasis on the non-traditional partnership areas of 'cultural, social, science, and technological relations'.⁷ This non-traditional partnership indicates the sustained interest that Australia and Japan had in developing their relationship beyond being individual spokes in the wheel of the United States' alliance relations in the Asia Pacific. This initial attempt at laying the foundations for a comprehensive relationship was not without a basis in the original mainstays of the relationship, trade and strategic relations.⁸ Noting that Australia and Japan had a "shared sense of concern, responsibility and opportunity about our neighbourhood", the declaration called for sub-regional, regional, and transnational

⁴ United States Department of State and Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations Joint Communique 2001', Joint Communique, Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (Canberra, 30 July 2001).

⁵ Co-Chairs' Statement, 'Sydney Declaration for Australia-Japan Creative Partnership' (Australia-Japan Conference for the 21st Century, Sydney, 29 April 2001), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/conf0104/joint.html>.

⁶ Junichirō Koizumi, 'Japan and Australia: Toward a Creative Partnership' (Asia Society, Sydney, 1 May 2002), <http://asiasociety.org/australia/japan-and-australia-toward-creative-partnership>.

⁷ Co-Chairs' Statement, 'Sydney Declaration for Australia-Japan Creative Partnership'.

⁸ Ibid.

dialogue on traditional issues ranging from regional instability to newer security concerns such as food security and international crime.⁹ In contemporary joint statements, this language is routine, banal even, however in April 2001 the public declaration that Australia and Japan shared a sense of responsibility for ‘our neighbourhood’ signalled a surprising advancement for a bilateral relationship that was yet to engage on deeper military measures.¹⁰ The joint declaration by Australia and Japan that they share a sense of ‘concern, responsibility, and opportunity’ is far more than a bland diplomatic exercise as it is presented by ‘private’ actors emphasising public goods. The language of closer military and political relations is presented positively alongside deeper ‘people-to-people links’, more ‘educational exchanges’ – including a deeper commitment to language study, and dialogue on common social issues such as “ageing population, health and quality of life issues; steps to revitalise regional and rural areas; youth issues...”¹¹

The declaration also references the Australia-Japan Cable, a fibre optic cable network laid in December 2001 running from Australia to Japan via Guam, to “maximise communication and mutual understanding between our peoples.”¹² The mention of the cable is important, not only as contemporary submarine cables carry 95 percent of global data traffic (down from 99 percent in 2006), but the potential of the cable to become a factor in any future information sharing operation was high.¹³ The security of interstate communication has long been a factor in determining the

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ As we shall see in Chapter 4, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw the Japanese Government carefully couch their growing interest in expanding their security experience in the language of ‘human security’.

¹¹ Co-Chairs’ Statement, ‘Sydney Declaration for Australia-Japan Creative Partnership’.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Barney Warf, ‘International Competition Between Satellite and Fiber Optic Carriers: A Geographic Perspective’, *The Professional Geographer* 58, no. 1 (2006): 1–11; Valerie C. Coffey, ‘Sea Change: The Challenges Facing Submarine Optical Communications’, *Optics & Photonics News*, March 2014.

stability of alliances. Intelligence transmissions delivered via fibre optic submarine cables are far less likely to be intercepted than those delivered via satellite, as they require a physical wiretap to be compromised. A key factor that highlights the critical vulnerability of submarine cables is that the maps of cable routes are often publicly available, and this transparency presents a critical vulnerability to the security of these commons.¹⁴

Linguistic Concentricity

An additional aspect of the relationship involves language. As native English-speaking states, Australia and the United States are beneficiaries of the linguistic legacy of the international system largely shaped by the United Kingdom and the United States. Proficiency, if not mastery, is necessary for non-native English-speaking states to comprehend the substance and nuance of international relations and global economic policy often conducted in the English language. Japan, as a critical hub of international business, prioritised the teaching and learning of ‘practical English’, additionally, entrance examinations for secondary school are conducted in English, despite English not being a mandatory subject. English acquired legitimacy both as the *de facto* language of Japan’s growing global engagement, but also as an important indicator of social status and mobility. For Australia and the United States, study of the Japanese language became economic imperative during and immediately after the Pacific War.

¹⁴ Philip Dorling, ‘Australian Spies in Global Deal to Tap Undersea Cables’, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 29 August 2013; Robert Martinage, ‘Under the Sea: The Vulnerability of the Commons’, *Foreign Affairs*, February 2015; David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, ‘Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close for US Comfort’, *The New York Times*, 25 October 2015.

In both states, the numbers of students studying Japanese were promoted and sustained by the closer post-war economic links. In the United States, there was a strong strategic element based on the continued occupation of Japan, but additionally a concern that the United States was being out-influenced by the Soviet Union. This concern, and the recent successful launch of the Sputnik satellite, prompted the 1958 *National Defense Education Act*, which directed funding to all levels of the United States' education system, including language and area centres.¹⁵ As we can see in Table 3.1, growth in Japanese language study experienced a steady uptick post-passage of the legislation and even made steady gains during the economic doldrums of the 1970s. However, the 1980s recorded a tremendous uptick in students enrolling in Japanese, indicating that the booming Japanese economy spurred interest in the Japanese language.

¹⁵ 85th Congress of the United States, 'National Defense Education Act', Pub. L. No. 85-864 (1958).




Table 3.1, Enrolment in Collegiate Japanese Language Courses, 1958-2016¹⁶

Additionally, the United States military has long included Japanese in the ‘enduring’ language grouping in its list of ‘strategic languages’.¹⁷ The ‘enduring’ language category, as distinct from the ‘immediate’ and ‘emerging’ categories, are those languages considered to “[r]epresent the long-term needs” of the US military.¹⁸ However, Japanese is not included on the list of ‘dominant’ languages, the languages where the military has ‘sufficient’ capability.¹⁹

¹⁶ Data compiled from Dennis Looney and Natalia Lusin, ‘Enrollments in Languages Other Than English in United States Institutions of Higher Education, Summer 2016 and Fall 2016: Preliminary Report’ (New York: Modern Language Association, February 2018), <https://www.mla.org/content/download/83540/2197676/2016-Enrollments-Short-Report.pdf>.

¹⁷ Mary A. Legere to James McConville, ‘Department of the Army Strategic Language List’, Memorandum, 1 June 2015.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

Similarly, the teaching of Japanese in Australian universities began in earnest in the 1960s, facilitated by the progressive outreach of the Menzies Government to the Kishi and Ikeda Governments of the late 1950s to early 1960s. As Anne de Kretser and Robyn Spence-Brown note, Japanese language education was also sustained in Australia due to a genuine fascination with Japanese culture and growing interpersonal links.²⁰ It was not until the 1980s however, that Japanese language was identified and targeted to receive additional funding under the newly devised ‘National Policy on Languages’.²¹ Like the business considerations that drove the Japanese language enrolment in the United States, the Japanese tourism boom drove the Hawke Government to promote Japanese language study at both secondary and tertiary levels in Australia. With this new focus, in 1990 Japanese overtook French as the most taught language in Australian secondary schools.²²

Like the United States Armed Services, the Australian Defence Force has designated Japanese a ‘Group 3’ language, along with Arabic, Chinese and Korean.²³ This designation reflects the contemporary strategic engagements, but additionally nominates the status Australian strategic planners consider of high traditional security importance. However, there is no indication as to whether the Australian Defence Force considers its Japanese language capacity ‘sufficient’.

²⁰ Anne de Kretser and Robyn Spence-Brown, ‘The Current State of Japanese Language Education in Australian Schools’ (Carlton South: Melbourne Centre for Japanese Language Education, 2010).

²¹ Joseph Lo Bianco, ‘National Policy on Languages’ (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987).

²² Joseph Lo Bianco, ‘Second Languages and Australian Schooling’, Australian Education Review (Camberwell: Australian Council for Educational Research, 2009).

²³ Australian Department of Defence, ‘Australian Defence Force Pay and Conditions’, Australian Government, 2017, <http://www.defence.gov.au/payandconditions/adf/Chapter-4/Part-3/Div-1.asp>.

The Hawke Government introduced the 1991 White Paper, *Australia's Language: The Australian Language and Literacy Policy*, which continued the focus on Asian languages. In 1994, the Keating Government introduced the *National Asian Languages and Studies in Australian Schools* (NALSAS) which had a broader focus than a specific focus on Asian languages, promoting regional studies of Asia too. The funding for this programme was not renewed under the incoming Howard Government. It was not until 2008 that the next language initiative emerged to combat Australia's lacklustre attitude to foreign language education, the *National Asian Languages and Studies in Schools Program* (NALSSP). A deliberate homage to the earlier NALSAS, the NALSSP aimed to raise 12 percent of the Australian population to 'fluent' speaker status.²⁴

As we can see in Table 3.2, enrolment in Japanese Language courses advanced rapidly in the early 1990s, driven by government and business interests. The peak and stabilisation of these courses appears to have occurred at the end of the 1990s, leading into the new millennium. This stabilisation appears to coincide with the removal of funding for the NALSAS, though the introduction of the NALSSP does not seem to have had a demonstrable effect on student numbers. Although the study of languages, particularly Asian languages has declined in Australia over the

²⁴ Australian Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, 'The Current State of Chinese, Indonesian, Japanese and Korean Language Education in Australian Schools: Four Languages, Four Stories' (Carlton South: Education Services Australia, 2010), https://docs.education.gov.au/system/files/doc/other/the_current_state_of_chinese_indonesian_japanese_and_korean_language_education_in_australian_schools.pdf.

past decade, Japanese remains the most widely studied language in Australian secondary and tertiary institutions.²⁵

By the end of 2016, Japanese remained the most taught language across Australian schools, with French, German, Mandarin, and Indonesian following as the next most taught.²⁶ Interestingly, the fact that Japanese remains so widely taught is not reflective of the number of speakers within Australian society. 2016 Census data indicates that French, German, Mandarin, Indonesian all are more widely spoken in Australian society than Japanese, but have not received similar levels of funding or strategy.²⁷

Although numbers of tertiary Japanese Studies students have not been recently published, the strategic importance of the Japanese language was reaffirmed with its 2014 addition to the list of ‘strategic languages’, that “[r]equire commonwealth approval before a course closure...”.²⁸ However, this decision was not paired with an additional governmental program to sustain or expand these languages. As with its predecessors, it became clear that the program had not reversed the trend of declining interest in language education.

²⁵ Joseph Lo Bianco, ‘Second Languages and Australian Schooling’, Australian Education Review (Camberwell: Australian Council for Educational Research, 2009); See also: Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Australia in the Asian Century’, White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defence, October 2012), p. 16.

²⁶ Warren Midgley, “What Languages Should Children Be Learning to Get Ahead?,” *The Conversation*, March 24, 2017.

²⁷ Australian Bureau of Statistics, “The Census of Population and Housing,” Census (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, April 11, 2017), <https://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/2016>.

²⁸ Chinese, Hindi and Korean were also designated as ‘strategic languages’. Bernard Lane, ‘Funding Tied to Four New Languages’, *The Australian*, 5 February 2014.




Table 3.2: Enrolment in Tertiary Japanese Language Courses, 1990 – 2012 (Australia)²⁹

Altruism does not guide strategy. The designation of Japanese as a strategic language by both the Australia and the United States military communicates the strategic element that undergirds national policy. What is more revealing for our purposes, is the sustained strength of the teaching of Japanese in Australian tertiary institutions. Despite the disconnect that characterised Australia’s national language strategies, there was clearly a specific strategy that centralised and protected Japanese, rather than other examples such as Indonesian.

²⁹ Data compiled from The Japan Foundation, ‘Present Condition of Overseas Japanese-Language Education: Survey Report on Japanese-Language Education Abroad 2012’ (Tokyo: Fujitsu Research Institute, December 2013).

Common Areas of Threat Perception

For Australia, the 1999 East Timor Crisis highlighted the type of regional incidents that were to be expected in the post-Cold War period. These low intensity conflicts necessitated that the Australian armed services limit their fields of expected conflict to the Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific. In line with President George W. Bush's stated desire for a "humble" foreign policy, Secretary of State Colin Powell's remark during his confirmation hearings that the United States was 'pleased' to see Australia take a lead in dealing with the troubles in Indonesia, indicated that the United States felt comfortable charging Australia with the responsibility to ensure stability long the southern rim of the Asia Pacific.³⁰ In praising Australia, Secretary Powell also rhetorically framed Australia's active field of operations, highlighting Australia's immediate geographic environment as the one in which the United States thought Australia should concentrate its attention. In this respect, the United States echoed the sentiments of former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Gareth Evans, who noted in 1989 that the regional perception of Australia's 'otherness' limited the effectiveness of Australia's regional outreach.³¹

Senator Evans outlined the strategy of 'comprehensive engagement' that lay at the heart of Australia's long-term relations with Southeast Asia and 'constructive commitment' which drove

³⁰ Commission on Presidential Debates, 'The Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate', *PBS News Hour* (Winston-Salem: PBS, 11 October 2000); Colin L Powell, 'Confirmation Hearing by Secretary of State-Designate Colin L. Powell' (Washington, DC, 17 January 2001), <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/443.htm>.

³¹ Gareth Evans, 'Australia's Regional Security' (Senate of Australia, 6 December 1989).

relations with the South Pacific.³² These strategies called for the development of a “substantial and mutually beneficial range of linkages with our regional neighbours”, so as to delegitimise the threat of an armed movement against Australia.³³ Interestingly, Evans’ proposal also contained a reference to the development of a “regional security community, based on a sense of shared security interests.” Evans’ statement aimed to broaden the scope of security for Australia by advocating a ‘multidimensional’ approach to regional security. Herein, Evans notes that the entirety of Australia’s networks must be operationalised to mould a favourable security environment. Evans makes specific reference to “non-military threats; and the exchange of people and ideas...”³⁴ Both points are revelatory, as they indicate the interest the Australian government had in exploring, rhetorically at least, an evolved approach to security in the Asia Pacific.

This rhetorical exploration was in line with the United States’ foreign policy objectives during the George HW Bush and Bill Clinton Administrations. Although lacking the unifying themes of Cold War foreign policy, these policies promoted US military presence as necessary to ensuring access to markets, enhancing regional economic architecture and promoting peaceful, sustained economic growth.³⁵ This rhetorical alignment, as Peter Chalk named it, was the central theme of the United States Southeast Asia policy in the immediate post-Cold War era.³⁶ Though the immediate goals of the change in foreign policy were unclear, the rhetoric indicates a clear shift away from the

³² Ibid.; Peter Van Ness, ‘The Impasse in US Policy Toward China’, *The China Journal* 38 (July 1997): 139–50, p. 147.

³³ Evans, ‘Australia’s Regional Security’.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Diane K Mauzy and Brian L Job, ‘US Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-Engagement after Years of Benign Neglect’, *Asian Survey* 47, no. 4 (August 2007): 622–41.

³⁶ Peter Chalk, ‘Australian Foreign and Defense Policy in the Wake of the 1999/2000 East Timor Intervention’ (Arlington: RAND, 2001).

stance that had driven the strategic policy of both states. This strategic vagueness calls to mind President Dwight D. Eisenhower's observation that "Plans are worthless, but planning is everything."³⁷

Eisenhower's statement finds further purchase in the campaign statements of President George W. Bush and the confirmation notes of Secretary Powell, which indicate that the Bush Administration was not preparing to abandon the decade-old Southeast Asia policy. Rather, Bush's defence and foreign policy teams were quietly preparing to double down on the existing commitments, institutionalising a continuing US presence across the region. It is clear from the 2001 Joint Communique that the United States was interested in Australia not only amplifying its burden-sharing capacity for further regional cooperation but also accepting a greater responsibility for the immediate neighbourhood. The regional role that the United States seemingly envisioned for Australia had previously been boosted by the comments of Prime Minister John Howard who, in a 1999 interview with *The Bulletin*, stated that he saw "Australia acting in a sort of 'deputy' peacekeeping capacity in our region to the global policeman role of the US."³⁸ Howard's interview, given eight days after the United Nations-backed INTERFET peacekeeping force entered Timor Leste, was poorly received in the immediate region but his comments were clearly heard and received well the United States.³⁹ The reception in Washington to Howard's statements is a

³⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower, 'Remarks at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference', 14 November 1957, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10951>.

³⁸ Fred Brenchley, 'The Howard Defence Doctrine', *The Bulletin*, 28 September 1999.

³⁹ 'Howard Denies Plans for Regional Peacekeeping Role', *Kyodo News International*, 28 September 1999; United States Department of State and Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations 1999 Joint Communiqué', Joint Communiqué (Washington, DC, 3 November 1999), <http://dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations-1999-joint-communicu.aspx>.

remarkable change from their long held unease with Australia's penchant for self-aggrandisement in foreign policy, and indicated a maturation of the relationship and a further institutionalisation of the rhetorical alignment.

In characterising Australia as the 'deputy' to the United States' global law enforcer, Howard sought to frame Australia's role, that of the submissive junior partner, rather than one that saw Australia strengthen its claim to middle powerdom. However, Australia was not the only state in the region that saw an opportunity to change their relationship with the new Administration. Koizumi Junichirō, new Prime Minister of Japan, also looked to affect a permanent change in their relationship. The chief threat to Japanese security in the immediate post-Cold War era was an unstable North Korea. Abandoned by the Soviet Union upon its dissolution, the Hermit Kingdom had started along the path to non-proliferation and normalisation with the West, signing the Agreed Framework with the Clinton Administration. However, the ascension of Kim Jong-Il, the son of the founding leader Kim il-Sung, along with the devastating famine that roiled the authoritarian state from 1994-98, stalled the non-proliferation and normalisation, threatening the balance of Northeast Asia. Additionally, the Framework, neither treaty nor legally binding executive agreement, ran into domestic political headwinds in the United States, as it was signed days before the Republican Party took control of the House of Representatives in the 1994 midterm elections, many of whom viewed it as appeasement and consistently refused to fully fund the agreement.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Larry A. Niksch, 'North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program', Issues Brief for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 17 March 2003).

The Agreed Framework was never able to affect a significant change to the long-strained relationship between North Korea and the West. The enduring concern for Japan, like Australia, was that the United States would look to invest their resources elsewhere without delineating their expected future role in the region. This furthered and compounded Japan's problem of how its security might be guaranteed in the era of a 'humble' foreign policy. Initially, the Bush Administration's position on North Korea seemed unclear. In early March 2001, at a press conference with the Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, Secretary Powell said "We do plan to engage with North Korea to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off... Some promising elements were left on the table, and we'll be examining those elements."⁴¹ However, the next day President Bush, having just met with South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung, seemingly contradicted Powell when he stated that he "look[s] forward to, at some point in the future, having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but that any negotiation would require complete verification of the terms of a potential agreement."⁴² Powell later amended his statement to match that of the President. Bush's imposition of conditions before any further engagement with North Korea was welcome news to Japan, who had long feared that the normalisation of relations between North Korea and the West would increase Japan's insecurity.⁴³

⁴¹ Eli J Lake, 'Bush Committed to N Korean Engagement', *United Press International*, 6 March 2001.

⁴² George W. Bush and Dae-Jung Kim, 'Remarks by President Bush and President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea' (Washington, DC, 7 March 2001), <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010307-6.html>.

⁴³ James R. Kendall, 'Japan and Korean Unification: Ambivalence and Pragmatism - Finding the Least Bad Option', *International Journal of Korean Studies* 19, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 126–55; Rob York, 'No Optimism for Inter-Korean Unification in Japan', *NK News*, 12 December 2015.

In addition to fiercely denouncing Washington's change of tone and threatening a military strike against them, North Korea cancelled planned dialogues with the South, stalling further talks.⁴⁴ Although it appeared that the latest round of sabre-rattling had been fatal to the pursuit of stability on the Korean Peninsula, only three months later in June, the Bush Administration announced that it would now pursue further discussions with North Korea.⁴⁵ Interestingly, two weeks after the Administration's change of course on supporting revived dialogue with the North, President Bush hosted new Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi at Camp David. The Joint Statement released by the two leaders after this meeting did not specifically mention North Korea except to repeat the desire to work with "the Republic of Korea to achieve peace on the Korean peninsula..."⁴⁶ This joint statement suggests that despite the previous public statements of Bush and Powell, the United States was not preparing to take the lead on any plan to pacify the region. This was confirmed six months later, when, during his State of the Union address, President Bush designated North Korea a member of the so-called 'Axis of Evil', placing it in the category of states that threaten the world, thus removing any impetus for normalisation.⁴⁷ These collective actions by President Bush against the North Korean threat further institutionalised and communicated the United States' recognition of Japan's insecurity.

⁴⁴ 'US Hostile Policy Toward DPRK Under Fire', *The People's Daily*, 16 March 2001.

⁴⁵ George W. Bush, 'Statement by the President' (Washington, DC, 13 June 2001), <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/text/20010611-4.html>.

⁴⁶ George W. Bush and Junichirō Koizumi, 'Joint Statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi' (Press Statement, Camp David, 30 June 2001), <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010630.html>.

⁴⁷ George W. Bush, 'President Delivers State of the Union Address' (Washington, DC, 29 January 2002), <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

The September 11 attacks radically changed the calculus for all parties. Again, a ‘sudden and deliberate’ attack on the United States’ homeland, underscored the physical vulnerability of the United States, and introduced the threat of similar attacks to other allied states. Australian Prime Minister John Howard, in Washington, DC to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty signing, was a direct witness to the attack. Having met President Bush for the first time the previous day, Howard immediately returned to Australia and his Cabinet invoked the ANZUS Treaty for the first time. This action, though largely symbolic as the ANZUS Treaty calls on its signatories to do nothing more than ‘consult’, did institutionalise enduring Australian support for the United States’ response to the initial attack. The importance of this action lies in the fact that the measures employed to counter the threat are only terminated when, “[t]he Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”⁴⁸ It was not immediately clear when such a directive from the Security Council would be forthcoming. Hence, Australia, in a clear expression of interstate trust signed on to an open ended international engagement.

Similarly, the institutionalisation of US opposition to the North Korea regime communicated to the Koizumi Government that the Bush Administration now considered Japan’s largest threat, previously a regional issue, to be a threat on a global scale. The swiftness of the Koizumi Government’s response to the terror attacks – the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law⁴⁹ – was no doubt in reaction to the fierce criticism Japan endured after their ‘chequebook’

⁴⁸ Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, Government of New Zealand, and Government of the United States of America, ‘Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America’, § 3 & 8 (1952), <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1952/2.html>.

⁴⁹ The National Diet of Japan, ‘The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law’ (2001), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html.

contribution to the first Gulf War. Additionally, the instability of the international environment allowed the Koizumi Government to action the first step in Japan's path to becoming a 'mature' state, the re-establishment of the armed services. The passage of this legislation allowed the Japanese Self-Defence Forces to protect themselves as well as others on the scene, a crucial broadening of their mandate.⁵⁰ Additionally, Koizumi's post-passage statement noted that this legislation allowed "Japan to be even more proactive in advancing its efforts."⁵¹ Koizumi's language here indicates his desire to move Japan from a 'reactive' state, one where the Self-Defence Forces are limited to their traditional post-war role, to a 'proactive' stance, one that frees Japan to "contribute actively and on its own initiatives to the efforts of the international community for the prevention and eradication of international terrorism."⁵²

Again, Koizumi's statement makes clear that Japan's imposed exile from affecting the international environment will not persist. Like Australia's pledge, Japan did not indicate a firm end to this new commitment, highlighting both the desire for the Koizumi Government to support the United States indefinitely, and for Japan to undertake the redevelopment of their armed forces under the auspices of international cooperation for the 'prevention and eradication of international terrorism.' Additionally, this redevelopment also allowed Japan to offer more burden-sharing support for United States' actions concerning the Korean peninsula, and tensions in the region. Despite the regional concerns that Japan's reengagement stoked, their actions were consistent with international expectations, and so criticism was muted. What is clear, is that Japan's new

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Junichirō Koizumi, 'Statement by Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi on the Passing of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law by the Diet of Japan' (Tokyo, 29 October 2001), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/terro0109/speech/pm1029.html>.

⁵² The National Diet of Japan, The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.

legislative action was not considered in conflict with Article 9, the Constitutional clause outlawing war to settle interstate disputes.

Identifying Areas of Future Stress

A key obstacle to the deepening of the trilateral community has been Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Article 9 sits in the uneasily space between what the clause says, how it is publicly discussed, and its actual progressive reinterpretation over the years. The clause reads:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.⁵³

Paragraph 1 of Article 9 rather clearly renounces war. However, paragraph 2 prohibits the maintenance of the potential for war, additionally noting that the state has no right to belligerency. This second paragraph is the one most subject to interpretation. The plain text reading of the second paragraph lasted until the close of the Korean War, when the Yoshida Government created the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, rationalising that Article 9 of the Constitution did not forbid the sovereign right to self-defence. There was additional pressure from the United States for Japan to upgrade their defence capacities and capabilities following the signing of the 1954 *Mutual Defense*

⁵³ The National Diet of Japan, 'The Constitution of Japan', § Article 9 (1947), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States.⁵⁴ Holding that the term “war potential” did not prohibit the creation of the Self-Defense Forces, the government outlined three requirements that must be met in order to meet the right of self-defence: (1) when there is an armed attack against Japan, or against a foreign state, which in turn threatens Japan’s survival; (2) Japan’s survival and the protection of its people is dependent on the use of force; and (3) force is used only to the minimum extent necessary.⁵⁵ Interestingly, this determination was given by Satō Tatsuo, the then-Director General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), rather than an elected official. Of the administrative agencies in the Japanese government, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau is the most important and powerful. Although formally an organ of the Prime Minister’s secretariat and lacking a vote in Cabinet meetings, the CLB derives its power from its jurisdiction over the legality and constitutionality of all draft pieces of legislation, regulations, Cabinet orders, and treaties.⁵⁶ Without the formal approval of the CLB these legislative acts stall, resulting in the consolidation of the power of the Bureau.

The role of the CLB is highly important to consider in the debates regarding the constitutionality of legislation that affects Article 9 and the expanding role of the Self-Defense Force. Like Australia and the United States, Japan does have a Supreme Court, whose role it is to determine the constitutionality of government actions. However, unique to Japan, the Supreme Court tends to

⁵⁴ Government of Japan and Government of the United States of America, ‘Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America’ (1954). This agreement permitted the United States to station its troops on Japanese soil for the purposes of protecting regional security. In addition, Japan agreed to assume responsibility for its own defence.

⁵⁵ Answer given by Cabinet Legislation Bureau Director-General Tatsuo Satō, ‘Cabinet Committee Minutes’, § Cabinet Committee of the Japanese House of Representatives (1954).

⁵⁶ Richard J. Samuels, ‘Politics, Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau: Who Elected These Guys, Anyway?’, Working Paper (Oakland: Japan Policy Research Institute, March 2004).

decline the opportunity to issue rulings on legislative acts, arguing that their “power of constitutional review of the courts extends only to cases where there is ‘clearly obvious unconstitutionality or invalidity.’”⁵⁷ Famously, in the *Sunakawa* decision, the court stated that it was ineligible to rule on the constitutionality of the US-Japan Security Treaty arguing:

Acts of state having a highly political nature relating to the foundation of direct state sovereignty are beyond the power of court review even though judgment as to their validity or invalidity is legally possible. Judgment in these instances should be entrusted to the political branches, as the government and the Diet, which bear political responsibility to the sovereign people, and ultimately to the political judgment of the people themselves.⁵⁸

This recusal of both themselves and the lower courts from ruling on acts of the state allowed the CLB to amass almost complete *de facto* power regarding constitutional interpretation. Resultantly, as Richard J. Samuels notes, “Effectively final constitutional judgments are not made by courts in response to suits by plaintiffs, but by bureaucrats in the normal course of governance.”⁵⁹ The key point here is that the Japanese political system carefully pared back any attempt to devolve the Diet’s control over the content or conduct of Japanese foreign and domestic policy. Additionally, five former Directors-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau have been appointed to the Supreme Court after their tenure on the Bureau expired, highlighting the influence of the CLB at the judicial level. The convention of appointing former Directors-General to the Supreme Court additionally signals to allies that Japan brooks no domestic challenge to the foreign policy conventions. Even the defeat of the long dominant conservative Liberal Democratic Party and the

⁵⁷ John M Maki, trans., *Japan’s Commission on the Constitution: The Final Report* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1980).

⁵⁸ Kotaro Tanaka et al., Violation of the Special Criminal Law enacted in consequence of the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, No. 1959 (A) 710 (Supreme Court of Japan 16 December 1959).

⁵⁹ Samuels, ‘Politics, Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau: Who Elected These Guys, Anyway?’

ascension of the Democratic Party of Japan (as of March 27, the Democratic Party) was not enough to provoke any significant shift in the bedrock of Japanese foreign policy conventions.

Less constrained by their constitutions, Australia and the United States have only rarely seen the involvement of their ultimate courts in the conduct of their foreign policy. In Australia's case, the most contested debates (outside the parliament) involve the unilateral actions taken by individual states. This was seen in 1982 where the Cain Government in Victoria attempted to ban visits by nuclear ships to Victorian ports. Concerned over the damage that this action would do to the ANZUS alliance, though curiously silent regarding previous similar actions taken by the Wran and Dunstan Governments in New South Wales and South Australia respectively, the Fraser Government used Section 109 of the Constitution to force Victoria to back down.⁶⁰ In the United States, the conflict is overwhelmingly concentrated between the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government. Articles I and II of the United States Constitution grant explicit power to the President and the Congress, though, as Edward Corwin notes,

[a]ctual *practice* under the Constitution has shown that, while the President is usually in a position to *propose*, the Senate and the Congress are often in a technical position at least to *dispose*. The verdict of history, in short, is that the power to determine the substantive content of American foreign policy is a *divided* power, with the lion's share falling usually, though by no means always, to the President.⁶¹

However, during as noted in Chapter 2, during the extended dispute between the United States and Japan regarding textile products, Representative Wilbur Mills, the Chairman of the House Ways

⁶⁰ Malcolm Fraser, 'Victorian Government Threat to Ban Nuclear Ships' (Canberra, 7 June 1982).

⁶¹ Edward S. Corwin, *The President: The Office and the Powers, 1787 - 1957*, 4th ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1957).

and Means Committee, provoked a challenge to this convention, when he negotiated directly with the Japanese to end the dispute. The next major challenge to the President's authority over foreign policy was the passing of the War Powers Resolution of 1973.⁶² Prompted by Congressional concern regarding President Nixon's undeclared bombing of Cambodia, the legislation was swiftly vetoed by Nixon who declared it "unconstitutional and dangerous..."⁶³, the Congress overrode Nixon's veto. Nixon, and his successors have largely ignored the restrictions of this Resolution, believing it an attack on the position of the President as the Commander-in-Chief. The one true power that the House of Representatives has to affect foreign policy is the so-called 'power of the purse' that they can wield to stymie an incumbent President's foreign policy.⁶⁴ Such direct power plays between the Executive and Legislative branches of government are not uncommon in the United States political system, though traditionally, foreign policy proposals from both branches have been grounded within the pillars of United States grand strategy.⁶⁵

⁶² The 93rd United States Congress, 'War Powers Resolution', Pub. L. No. 93-148 (1973).

⁶³ William B Sprong, Jr, 'The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or Surrender', *William & Mary Law Review* 16, no. 4 (1975): 823-82; Richard M. Nixon, '311 - Veto of the War Powers Resolution' (Washington, DC, 24 October 1973).

⁶⁴ The relevant clauses relating to fiscal policy are Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 and Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7. Philadelphia Convention, 'The Constitution of the United States of America' (1788).

⁶⁵ Paul D. Miller, 'Five Pillars of American Grand Strategy', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 54, no. 5 (November 2012): 7-44; R. D. Hooker, Jr, 'The Grand Strategy of the United States' (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, October 2014); Francis J. Gavin, 'Strategies of Inhibition: US Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation', *International Security* 40, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 9-46; Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, 'Revising US Grand Strategy Toward China', Special Report (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, March 2015).

Issues of Medium Sensitivity

The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue: Elevating the Conversation

Power in a security community is reified through the establishment of multilateral institutions. As Adler notes in his assessment of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), institutions “mobilize material and normative resources for the development of a transnational liberal collective identity.”⁶⁶ Thus, the significance of institutions for security community development is clear, the strength of the institution is correlated with the strength of the bilateral or multilateral relationship. Of the three case studies in Chapter 1, Gonzalez and Haggard’s assessment of the US-Mexico relationship was the one that lacked the features of even an immature community.⁶⁷ To be clear, there are numerous factors which can affect a bilateral relationship, however in this case, the lack of a strong, respected independent institution exacerbates underlying issues. Although the assessments by Acharya and Wæver were inconclusive regarding the *cause* of the developing security communities in their studies, they were unambiguous regarding the importance of regional institutions in facilitating the advancement of relations between states.⁶⁸ The core institution of the Australia-Japan-United States trilateral relationship is the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD). This institution was established as a sub-cabinet level meeting in 2002 and upgraded to the full ministerial level in 2006. As this chapter focuses on the communication

⁶⁶ Emanuel Adler, ‘Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE’s Security Community-Building Model’, in *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁶⁷ Gonzalez and Haggard, ‘The USA and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community’.

⁶⁸ Wæver, ‘Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community’; Acharya, ‘Collective Security and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia’.

cornerstone of security community development, this section of the chapter is only interested in the establishment of the TSD as an act of political communication.

As Foreign Minister Downer articulated after the 2001 AUSMIN, the Australian Government had clear designs on incorporating Japan into a future dialogue on the strategic importance of the region. Despite the hedging of Secretary Powell, the rapid environmental change brought about by the September 11 attacks changed the regional approach of the United States. Buoyed by a groundswell of sustained international support, the initial multilateralist inclinations of the Bush Administration promoted minilateralist institutions like the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue.⁶⁹ For Japan, participation in such a dialogue furthered both their relationship with Australia, an increasingly key relationship as the United States reoriented the thrust of their foreign policy away from Asia, towards the Middle East. Additionally, considering this reorientation, participation in this dialogue furthered Japan's movement towards normalcy within the regional and global environment. Australia's primary benefit was realised in the continuing institutionalisation of the United States' participation in the region. A second benefit for Australia involved the opportunity to increase Australia's relative regional significance. For both Australia and Japan, these sought-after changes to their statuses were underwritten by an empowered United States.

As previously noted in the discussion on the conceptualisation and development of trust in Chapter 1, and noted in the associated literature, trust does not develop overnight. Although these three

⁶⁹ 'Assessing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue', NBR Special Report (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008), 23–31; Stewart Patrick, 'The Unruled World: The Case for Good Global Governance', *Foreign Affairs*, February 2014.

states had enjoyed a largely cordial, non-complex relationship within the broader arc of the post-Cold War era, this new institution did propose a new method through which relations could be advanced. The meetings continued at a sub-cabinet level until the meeting was upgraded by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to the full ministerial level in 2005 after meetings with her Japanese and Australian counterparts.⁷⁰ The inaugural meeting in Sydney on March 18, 2006 involved Secretary Rice, Japanese Foreign Minister Asō Tarō, and Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer. The subsequent joint statement cautiously noted that “[The dialogue’s] elevation to the level of Foreign Minister reflects our determination to work together to protect our shared strategic interests in promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.”⁷¹ Additionally, the TSD provided a structure through which the ‘weak leg’ of the Australia-Japan security relationship could be strengthened.⁷²

The TSD should be understood to be a continuation of United States engagement with key Asia Pacific allies, but not necessarily a mechanism to replace the bilateral hub-and-spokes alliance system. Rather, the goal of the dialogue can be seen in the consistent and high-level meetings arranged on an annual basis. A broader question to consider is, how does the trilateral dialogue fit within the existing bilateral relationships? The question is particularly important for Japan, hamstrung by convention and geographically isolated. As the trilateral relationship deepens, the chief concern for Japan is that its key issues become subordinated to the ‘needs’ of the collective, something less likely to occur in a bilateral relationship. We see this concern manifest itself in the

⁷⁰ Condoleezza Rice and Alexander Downer, ‘Remarks with Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer After Their Meeting’ (Washington, DC, 4 May 2005).

⁷¹ Tarō Asō, Alexander Downer, and Condoleezza Rice, ‘Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement’ (Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Sydney, 18 March 2006).

⁷² ‘Assessing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue’.

concept of the globalisation of the once bilateral relationship. Japan's key regional issues, instability on the Korean peninsula and an increasingly assertive China, are not assuaged by participation in globalised partnerships. Australia's key regional issue, the instability of its near northern neighbours, temporarily abated in the spread of democracy in the immediate post-Cold War era. Australia's other key desire, keeping the United States in Asia, is strengthened by participation in a globalised relationship. However, the subordination of the individual interest to the group interest indicates that the states party to the relationship have achieved maturity in their conception of the purpose of the institution and their role within it.

A key moment for Australia's participation in the ongoing dialogue was the six-month period between March and September 2007. China's position as a potential strategic competitor to the United States had become a clear theme of United States' foreign policy in Asia. During the tenure of George W. Bush, China had evolved from a 'strategic competitor' in 2001, to a 'responsible stakeholder' in 2005. Despite the peaceful development of this relationship by the Bush Administration, the China hawks in Congress complicated matters, pushing the Administration to adopt a tougher line due to domestic concerns over the growing trade deficit with China.⁷³ At the same time the Howard Government deepening its relationship with China, beginning talks on a Free Trade Agreement, and capitalising on high Chinese demand for steel.⁷⁴ Howard's actions here are well within the scope of his vision of Australian foreign policy. As Opposition Leader, Howard argued that Australia did not have to make "[a] choice between our history and our geography."⁷⁵

⁷³ Bonnie Glaser and Jane Skanderup, 'US-China Relations: Disharmony Signals End to Post-September 11 Honeymoon', *Comparative Connections* 7, no. 2 (July 2005).

⁷⁴ Hugo Gerard and Jonathan Kearns, 'Introduction', in *The Australian Economy in the 2000s*, ed. Hugo Gerard and Jonathan Kearns (Sydney: Reserve Bank of Australia, 2011).

⁷⁵ John W. Howard, 'A Reflection on the National Identity Debate', 13 December 1995,

In practice, this meant that neither Howard (nor any future Australian Prime Ministers) saw a contradiction in pursuing a profitable economic relationship with China whilst deepening Australia's military relationship with the United States and, resultantly, Japan. This fortuitous and unprecedented combination of economic prosperity and military security for Australia boosted its image as a flexible middle power.

We can see this dual hedge in the signing of the Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) in March 2007 and the hosting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in September of the same year. The signing of the Joint Declaration came five years after the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in May 2002. Despite resigning as Prime Minister prior to the signing of the Joint Declaration, Koizumi's visit played a key role in determining the scope in of the Declaration. The joint press statement released by Koizumi and Howard during the visit in 2002 made explicit reference to the ties that bound Australia and Japan, "shared values of democracy, freedom, the rule of law and market-based economies..."⁷⁶ As public diplomatic documents, joint statements are far more than a bland diplomatic exercise and provide an important source of information for tracking the progress of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Though this bilateral relationship has developed in association with the United States, the statements resulting from the bilateral ministerial meetings indicate the degree to which integration is realised. Howard and Koizumi's 2002 statement contains the rhetoric of 'values', a peculiar addition to a relationship that had previously existed only in the spheres of mutual economic engagement and limited United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Howard had

<http://australianpolitics.com/1995/12/13/national-identity-howard-headland-speech.html>.

⁷⁶ Koizumi, 'Japan and Australia: Toward a Creative Partnership'.

frequently employed the language of ‘values’ in describing the Australian relationship with the United States since the attacks on September 11 and subsequent beginning of the ‘War on Terror’.⁷⁷ In doing so, Howard framed the alliance as being above the security interests upon which the bilateral relationship had historically been based. As Jack Holland notes, Howard additionally went on to frame the September 11 attack as an “attack on all of *us*”.⁷⁸ In doing so, Howard accepted Bush’s Manichean rhetoric of ‘freedom’, ‘evil’, and ‘democracy’, which created the linguistic legitimacy of community values. Such rhetoric had already been employed in the service of the United States-Japan relationship during the first meeting of President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi.⁷⁹ Arguably, its use between the longstanding bilateral alliance fits with convention, but its use in the early stages of the securitisation of the Australia and Japan relationship speaks to desire to include Japan in the community of ‘us’. By signalling that Japan ‘belonged’ to the same cultural grouping as Australia and the United States, the cooperative nature of a shared identity was extended to the trilateral community.

Incidentally, the first sentence of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation “[affirms] that the strategic partnership between Japan and Australia is based on democratic values, a commitment to human rights, freedom and the rule of law, as well as shared security interests, mutual respect, trust and deep friendship.”⁸⁰ The JDSC was the first bilateral security agreement that Japan had signed with a state other than the United States. As noted by *The Economist*, the Bush

⁷⁷ Jack Holland, ‘Howard’s War on Terror: A Conceivable, Communicable and Coercive Foreign Policy Discourse’, *Australian Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 4 (2010): 643–61.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 651 (emphasis added).

⁷⁹ Bush and Koizumi, ‘Joint Statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi’.

⁸⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation’ (Tokyo, 13 March 2007), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html>.

Administration's concerns over the conflict in Iraq, and their appreciation of the political sensitivities of the military presence of the United States in Asia led them to encourage their close allies to tighten their security cooperation with each other, as a prelude to a "network of alliances to supplement...[the]...traditional hub-and-spokes architecture..."⁸¹ This indicates that the trust between Australia and Japan was not mere verbal theatrics, but grounded in a comprehensive blueprint for future cooperation on security issues. The Joint Declaration had the additional benefit of upgrading the Australia-Japan relationship into one with a quantifiable and trackable goals. For the Japanese, it furthered the normalisation of their defence programmes, coming two months after the upgrading of the sub-Cabinet Defence *Agency* to a full Cabinet-level Defence *Ministry*. The upgrading to a full ministry was a critical step in communicating the scope of Japan's future military contributions to the international community. Although there was no clear immediate change to the scope and role of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces, it was still an important step in the normalisation process of the Japanese security outlook.

Australia's hosting of the APEC forum in early September 2007 showcased the success of this dual hedge. APEC, the forum designed for peaceful regional engagement and the pursuit of community-building opportunities, has a mixed achievement record. Although APEC is among the more flexible and innovative regional institutions, this success is somewhat overshadowed by its broad issue area, the opacity of its many goals, and the complexity and diversity of the region it serves. The flexibility of APEC is important as we witness the erasure of the traditional distinction between economic and security issues. The forum is promoted as an institution whose

⁸¹ 'Reaching out over the Pacific', *The Economist*, 16 March 2007.

primary goal is to support “sustainable economic growth and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region.”⁸² However, as John McKay suggests, security issues have always had an embedded role in the APEC fora as the leader’s meetings, particularly bilateral or small group meetings, give leaders the space to address emerging or pressing regional problems.⁸³ Given economic prosperity for states is, and has always been, based on access to technologies and industries, it is clear that the challenge of access to shipping lanes and the unequal distribution of advanced technologies acts as flashpoints that are likely provoke further security dilemmas. Institutions such as APEC, which are not as susceptible to being stymied by regional actors as other regional multilateral institutions, are more likely to facilitate successful discussions on a range of security related issues.

APEC’s ability to facilitate the discussion security-related issues was on display at the Australian-hosted 2007 APEC summit. The second meeting of the TSD, and the first involving the leaders of all three states, John Howard, Abe Shinzo, and George W. Bush, was scheduled during the 2007 APEC forum.⁸⁴ Additionally, Howard and Abe met separately to discuss implementation of the recently signed Joint Declaration.⁸⁵ Howard also made time to meet with Chinese President Hu Jintao and discuss the establishment of a Sino-Australian strategic dialogue.⁸⁶ This dual hedging

⁸² Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, ‘Mission Statement’, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, January 2017, <http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Mission-Statement.aspx>.

⁸³ John McKay, ‘APEC: Successes, Weaknesses, and Future Prospects’, *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2002, 42–53.

⁸⁴ Dennis Wilder and Dan Price, ‘Press Briefing on the President’s Trip to Australia and the APEC Summit’ (James S. Brady Briefing Room, 30 August 2007), <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/08/20070830-2.html>.

⁸⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Major Elements of the Action Plan to Implement the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation’, 9 September 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/action0709.html>; ‘Pact with Japan Strengthens Links’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 September 2007; Chris Uhlmann, ‘A Look Back at APEC’, *The Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 9 September 2007.

⁸⁶ Qin Jize, ‘Beijing, Canberra Agree on Strategic Dialogue’, *China Daily*, 7 September 2007; ‘Assessing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue’.

by Howard was undercut by two sudden and major changes: the shock resignation of Abe the week after the APEC forum, and Howard's own departure from Parliament in the aftermath of the 2007 Federal election.

Aligning Strategic Assessments

Post-Cold War, the United States' strategy towards the East Asia Pacific was codified in the 1995 'East Asia Strategy Report' and updated in 1998 report of the same name.⁸⁷ There are strong indications that the new Bush Administration intended to follow on with these East Asia Strategy Reports, perhaps even in the same model as the future Obama Administration's 'Rebalance to Asia', however as meticulously noted by Nina Silove, the September 11 attacks deferred the pursuit of this strategy.⁸⁸ In spite of, or perhaps because of, the Bush Administration's pursuit of a far-reaching Middle East policy as a result of the September 11 attacks, both Australia and Japan reached the same conclusion. They could ensure the United States remained engaged in Asia and achieve a renaissance in alliance relations (particularly the military sphere) were they willing to participate in the United States' engagement in the Middle East. In announcing his foreign policy team, President-elect Obama called for a new strategy to utilise all aspects of United States'

⁸⁷ William J. Perry, 'The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region' (Virginia: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1995), <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19950227.O1E.html>; William S. Cohen, 'The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region' (Virginia: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998), <http://www.dod.gov/pubs/easr98/easr98.pdf>.

⁸⁸ See Nina Silove, 'The Pivot before the Pivot', *International Security* 40, no. 4 (Spring 2016): 45–88.

power.⁸⁹ However, as we shall see, on entering the White House, Obama's rhetoric tended along the same lines as his predecessor.

During the second term of President Bush and first term of President Obama, national strategic guidance documents began to utilise the language of 'partnership'. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was the first to conceptualise the concept of partnership as a national security imperative.⁹⁰ The 2006 QDR contained some 140 references to 'partner' or 'partnership', a stark shift from the 2001 QDR, which contained just 14 references to these terms.⁹¹ Despite the softening of language, the 2006 QDR largely retained the unilateralist style of the post-September 11 Bush Administration's foreign policy, defining the relationship the United States would have with its partners as one where the partners would follow the intent of the United States.⁹² This can be seen in the TSD, which in its infancy aimed to integrate Australia and Japan into the United States' global perspective. Similarly, the 2010 QDR, despite containing 225 references to 'partner' or 'partnership', echoed its 2006 counterpart, espousing that global counter-terrorism operations were the rationale for states to partner with the United States.⁹³ However, a significant change was prefaced in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS). This document is the most significant as it guides the "department level program-development efforts — the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review and State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review —

⁸⁹ Barack H. Obama, 'Obama's National Security Team Announcement', *The New York Times*, 1 December 2008.

⁹⁰ Department of Defense, 'Quadrennial Defense Review Report' (Virginia: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), <http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf>.

⁹¹ Department of Defense, 'Quadrennial Defense Review Report' (Virginia: Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), <http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>; Department of Defense, 'Quadrennial Defense Review Report', 6 February 2006.

⁹² Department of Defense, 'Quadrennial Defense Review Report', 6 February 2006, especially pp. 87-91.

⁹³ Department of Defense, 'Quadrennial Defense Review Report' (Virginia: Department of Defense, February 2010), <https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/341273/file/48799/Quadrennial%20Defense%20Review%20-%20February%202010.pdf>.

that more directly shape budgeting and force-structure decisions.”⁹⁴ Deriving from the Office of the President, the NSS has the responsibility for “set[ting]...the national security strategy of the United States” and is the most important strategic report submitted to the Congress.⁹⁵ This contrasts with the QDR, which is a document prepared by the Department of Defense detailing the military doctrine of the United States and has less scope than the NSS.⁹⁶

The 2010 NSS, the first prepared by the Obama Administration, noted the complexity of the international environment and global challenges are beyond the power of any one state.⁹⁷ Additionally, the first section of the report listed the attributes that support US global leadership and placed “sturdy alliances...” at the top of the list, ahead of the US military, economy, and citizenry.⁹⁸ Adopting an institutionalist outlook, the 2010 NSS highlights the power of normative institutionalism, arguing that the international order is sustained “because it is based on broadly shared norms and fosters collective action to address common challenges.”⁹⁹ As the United States sought to deepen its partnerships with allied and friendly states, it reinforced the importance of these shared norms, in turn shaping the actions of other international actors. The 2012 Defense

⁹⁴ Peter Feaver, ‘How to Read the New National Military Strategy’, *Foreign Policy*, 6 July 2015.

⁹⁵ ‘Title 50’, US Code §3043 (b) § (1999); Catherine Dale, ‘National Security Strategy: Mandates, Execution to Date, and Issues for Congress’ (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 6 August 2013).

⁹⁶ The NSS requires the President to comprehensively describe and discuss the following: (1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States. (2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States. (3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1). (4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy. (5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States. Title 50.

⁹⁷ Barack H. Obama, ‘National Security Strategy’ (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, May 2010), <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf>.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 1.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 12.

Strategic Guidance (DSG) document, a precursor to the 2014 QDR, furthered endorsed the views of the 2010 NSS, institutionalising the concept of partnership in the United States national security strategy.¹⁰⁰ The title of the DSG, ‘Priorities for 21st Century Defense’, reflected the intent of the document, and provided a list of 10 missions specified as the contemporary priorities for the US Armed Services.¹⁰¹ As prefaced in 2012 DSG, the 2014 QDR embraced the twenty-first century priorities, including a deeper emphasis on partnership and building partner capacity.¹⁰² However, lacking from these documents were a clear understanding of what exactly building partner capacity would look like, how it might be assessed, how long it might take, and the costs for participation. While this was a concern for states that had neither a longstanding nor close relationship for the United States, similar concern was not exhibited by Australia or Japan, the two states that stood to gain tremendously from enhanced and sustained partnership with the United States in the Asia Pacific.

The grand test of Obama’s strategy can be seen in his ‘Rebalance to Asia’. First conceptualised as a ‘pivot’, then as a ‘rebalance’ in the 2012 DSG to avoid the charge that the United States was deserting its European and Middle Eastern commitments, this strategy formalised the United

¹⁰⁰ Department of Defense, ‘Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense’, Defense Strategic Guidance (Virginia: Department of Defense, January 2012), http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.

¹⁰¹ The 10 unordered priorities are: counter terrorism and irregular warfare; deter and defeat aggression; project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges; counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD); operate effectively in cyberspace and space; maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities; provide a stabilizing presence; conduct stability and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations; and conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations. Ibid, pp. 4-5.

¹⁰² Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review Report’ (Virginia: Department of Defense, March 2014), http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.

States' strategic position towards the Asia Pacific.¹⁰³ Again recalling McLuhan's maxim, the President of the United States announcing a major force posture change directed towards the Asia Pacific region before the legislature of a key regional partner sent a strong message that the key goal of the United States was to preserve their superior status in the region. Here, we can see a clear contrast with Nixon's Guam Doctrine in that the concept of United States' withdrawal from the region was considered antithetical to the goal of ensuring United States' security. Rather, the Obama Administration's strategy of high-level regional engagement with a key focus on building partner capacity centralised the importance of both Australia and Japan. The setting of the announcement was key. Australia, the United States' key partner in the Asia Pacific, enjoying historically strong relations with its near northern neighbours, and a strong trading and diplomatic relationship with the Chinese government. Announcing such a far reaching foreign policy alteration in Japan would have acted as a destabilising factor in the Northeast Asian region. Additionally, President Obama's announcement of an initial deployment of a company of United States Marines (250) to Darwin – a deployment that was eventually set to grow to a full Marine Air Ground Task Force (2500) – incurred criticism from China.¹⁰⁴

In his speech, Obama noted that “[a]s a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future...” These words appear carefully chosen, to not only reinforce the United States' history in the region – a counterpoint to China's continued claims of 'historic rights'¹⁰⁵ – but also to pushback against the lingering concerns that the United States

¹⁰³ Barack H. Obama, 'Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament' (Canberra, 17 November 2011), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>; Hillary Clinton, 'America's Pacific Century', *Foreign Policy*, 11 October 2011.

¹⁰⁴ Jackie Calmes, 'A US Marine Base for Australia Irritates China', *The New York Times*, 16 November 2011.

¹⁰⁵ Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to United Nations Secretary-General, 7 May 2009.

would look to reduce their regional commitments. The pervasive fear of abandonment that provides much rationale for Australian and Japanese foreign policy development was a clear motivating factor in the redefinition of both state's security outlooks to support this change. Japan had already introduced the new concept of 'dynamic deterrence' into the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG).¹⁰⁶ This concept was aimed at deterring 'grey zone' conflicts, that is conflicts that occur during wartime and peacetime, and not as a strategy to deter a full-scale military attack.¹⁰⁷ Japan's introduction of this deterrence strategy could be understood in the context of the increase in both number and intensity of maritime incidents in the waters around the Senkaku Island chain. However, Japan's strategy was quietly promoted by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her article 'America's Pacific Century' wherein she articulated three 'core principles' of the Obama Administration with respect to alliance policy. The three principles are:

[M]aintain[ing] political consensus on the core objectives of our alliances. Second...ensur[ing] that our alliances are *nimble and adaptive* so that they can successfully address new challenges and seize new opportunities. Third...guarantee[ing] that the defence capabilities and communications infrastructure of our alliances are operation and materially capable of deterring provocation from the full spectrum of state and nonstate actors.¹⁰⁸

Clinton's language here, the reference to alliances that are "nimble and adaptive" that can successfully adapt to "new challenges", is illustrative and supportive of Japan's 'dynamic deterrence' as a concept that aims to address the challenges created by the creeping opportunism of regional power politics. In addition, the 2010 NDPG shifted the focus of Japan's security from the outlook of the 2004 NDPG. The 2004 NDPG promoted a globalist approach to securing Japan,

¹⁰⁶ Ministry of Defense of Japan, 'National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond' (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense of Japan, 17 December 2010), http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Hillary Clinton, 'America's Pacific Century', *Foreign Policy*, 11 October 2011 (*emphasis added*).

linking the stability of the international environment to the security of Japan.¹⁰⁹ In contrast, the 2010 guidelines endorsed cooperation with Japan's regional neighbours, shifting the strategy back to the Asia Pacific. Japan's strategy was rewarded by an agreement between the Obama Administration and the Noda Government that would transfer 9,000 US Marines from Okinawa, an arrangement long sought by successive Japanese Governments.¹¹⁰ This transfer is linked to the Australia-United States relationship as the Marines departing Okinawa would also be part of the contingent that would rotate through the Darwin base.

As indicated by the third principle, communication infrastructure was critical for the success of the reinvigoration of the regional role of the United States. As we shall see in the final section of this chapter, the conclusion of the Australia-Japan Information Sharing Agreement was a critical step towards building this infrastructure, reducing the trilateral relationship's asymmetry *vis à vis* the bilateral relationships. Additionally, the 2012 AUSMIN Joint Communiqué fully supported the rebalancing strategy, tying it directly to Australia's security.¹¹¹ In the Communiqué, under the first subheading 'Protect and Promote Asia Pacific Security', Australia and the United States affirmed their intent to work with "Japan to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in East Asia...[and] conduct trilateral defence exercises with Japan to enhance security through air, land and maritime cooperation."¹¹² The AUSMIN Joint Communiqués in 2013 and 2014 followed this trend, welcoming the announcements of the Abe Government that it would undertake efforts

¹⁰⁹ Defense Agency of Japan, 'National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005' (Tokyo: Defense Agency of Japan, 10 December 2004), http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/national_guidelines.pdf.

¹¹⁰ Patrick Cronin, 'Transfer of US Okinawa Troops a Doubly Good Move', *CNN*, 1 May 2012; Justin McCurry, 'US to Move Marines out of Japan', *The Guardian*, 27 April 2012.

¹¹¹ Bob Carr and Hillary Clinton, 'AUSMIN 2012 Joint Communiqué', 14 November 2012, http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2012/bc_mr_121114.html.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

to redefine its approach to self-defence and collective security.¹¹³ The strengthening of the trilateral relationship was clearly a key part of the rebalance, allowing both Australia and Japan to leverage the United States' strategy to deepen cooperation with each other.

Similarly, Australia's national security documents began to incorporate changes to language, highlighting their acceptance of the US vision. The 2009 Defence White Paper, 'Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030' was the first to utilise the, now ubiquitous, phrase 'rules-based order', linking it directly to Australia's regional security.¹¹⁴ Altogether, the 2009 White Paper employed the phrase 'rules-based order' 11 times.¹¹⁵ Despite an increase in regional tensions between the 2009 and 2013 White Papers, the 2013 White Paper still only contained 11 references to the 'rules-based order'. By contrast, the 2016 White Paper contained 40 references to the 'rules-based order', highlighting both the growing Australian comfort with the language, and the increasing complementarity of the US-Australia relationship. Interestingly, over the same period that Australia began to employ 'rules-based order' in their defence documents, references to the US-Australia alliance decreased. The 2009 White Paper contained 39 references to the alliance, the 2013 White Paper contained 25 references, and the 2016 White Paper contained 19 references. This is indicative less of Australia's decoupling from the United States and more

¹¹³ Julie Bishop and John Kerry, 'AUSMIN 2013 Joint Communiqué', 20 November 2013, http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2013/jb_mr_131120.aspx?ministerid=4; Julie Bishop and John Kerry, 'AUSMIN 2014 Joint Communiqué', 12 August 2014, <http://dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/ausmin-joint-communication-2014.aspx>.

¹¹⁴ See Commonwealth of Australia, 'Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030', Defence White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009), http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

reflective of the desire to link their defence actions and policies into a broader international framework underwritten by the United States.

The triumphant return of Abe Shinzo as Japanese Prime Minister in 2012 also ushered in a change to Japan's defence documents. Although Japan had been slower to adopt analogous language in their annual defence 'Defense of Japan' White Papers, from 2012 onwards, these papers began to include references to the 'rules' of the international system. Additionally, the 2014 Defense of Japan White Paper was the first to include a subsection of Chapter 2 titled: 'Initiatives to Strengthen the Japan-US Alliance'. It is in this section that subtle references to the rules-based order appear, though the phrase used is 'rule of law' in the context of 'common interests' and 'norms'.¹¹⁶ Additionally, the 2015 Defense of Japan White Paper saw Australia ascend two positions in the subsection of Chapter 1 titled: 'Defense Policies of Countries'.¹¹⁷ In previous White Papers, Australia had been placed at position seven, above Europe, but below (in top-down descending order): the United States, the Korean Peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. The new placement saw Australia at position five, with Southeast Asia and South Asia both shifting one position down the list and Europe remaining at position eight. As an annual publication, the Defense of Japan White Paper is designed to be routine, non-reactionary, and inoffensive, and therefore, changes to content speak volumes. As Japan's ally, the United States assumes the primary position, followed by Japan's immediate strategic challenge, the Korean Peninsula, and the two long-term strategic challenges of China and Russia. Both Australia's re-

¹¹⁶ Ministry of Defense of Japan, 'Defense of Japan 2014', White Paper, Defense of Japan (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2014), http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2014.html.

¹¹⁷ Ministry of Defense of Japan, 'Defense of Japan 2015', White Paper, Defense of Japan (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2015), http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2015.html.

positioning and the inclusion of new subsections are important signifiers of community cohesion that indicate that the Japanese Government were eager to highlight the appearance of their relationship with both the United States and Australia.

Testing the Ties that Bind: New Leadership, New Priorities

A key goal of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue has been to involve Japan, and to a lesser extent, Australia, in accepting the United States' perception of and vision for the world.¹¹⁸ However, the future of the dialogue was heavily dependent on the individual leadership of the three states. The original leadership trifecta of Bush, Koizumi and Howard was instrumental in the conceptualisation and advancement of the dialogue. The task of pushing the dialogue fell to their successors, all of whom were elected on a platform of opposition to the incumbents' policies, foreign and domestic. This leadership change in all three states threatened the existing commitment to the community. A shared characterisation binding all three new leaders was their 'ambitious' foreign and domestic policy agendas.¹¹⁹ The key challenge was their inexperience in maintaining alliance relationships.

¹¹⁸ Michael Auslin, 'Shaping a Pacific Future: Washington's Goals for the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue', in *Assessing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue*, ed. William Tow et al. (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008), p. 12.

¹¹⁹ Katharine Murphy and David Rood, 'Rudd's Bid for Peace with States', *The Age*, 11 December 2007; Tony Eastly, 'Health Tops COAG Agenda', *ABC Local Radio AM* (Melbourne: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 20 December 2007); Jim Acosta, 'Democrats Eye an Ambitious Agenda', *CNN Politics*, 10 November 2008; Yoichi Funabashi, 'Tokyo's Trials: Can the DPJ Change Japan', *Foreign Affairs*, December 2009.

The ascension of the Kevin Rudd and the Australian Labor Party came after 11 years in opposition. For Hatoyama Yukio and the Democratic Party of Japan it was the first time in over half a century that the DPJ would govern without coalition partners. The victory of Barack Obama and the Democratic Party marked the first time in 14 years that the Democrats had control of both chambers of Congress and the White House. All three incoming governments had comprehensively defeated their opponents, and after extended periods in opposition, were eager to flex their mandates to fit their vision. The key risk at this point was the collapse of the nascent Australia-Japan dyad. The energy brought by Howard and Koizumi and Abe in establishing the dialogue was one thing, but sustaining it and moving it forward became the challenge.

Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, a proficient Mandarin speaker and former diplomat at the Australian Embassy in Beijing, pushed back against the United States' attempts to turn the trilateral strategic dialogue into a quadrilateral dialogue with the addition of India. As John Lee notes, one of Rudd's first acts as Prime Minister was to direct the Australian Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, to unilaterally withdraw from the nascent quadrilateral dialogue without prior consultation with the United States.¹²⁰ Smith dutifully did so during a joint media appearance with the Chinese Foreign Minister Jiechi Yang in Australia for the inaugural Sino-Australian strategic dialogue, saying:

One of the things which caused China concern last year was a meeting of that strategic dialogue plus India, which China expressed some concern with. And I indicated when I was in Japan, that Australia would not be proposing to have a dialogue of that nature.¹²¹

¹²⁰ John Lee, 'PM May Trump Rudd in Managing China', *The Australian*, 21 April 2011; Brendan Nicholson, 'Japan Jittery Over Closer Ties Between Australia and China', *The Age*, 6 February 2008; Rowan Callick, 'Rudd Revelations Are Old News', *The Australian*, 9 December 2010.

¹²¹ Stephen Smith and Jiechi Yang, 'Joint Press Conference with Chinese Foreign Minister' (Canberra, 5 February 2008), https://foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2008/080205_jpc.html.

This event recalls Marshall McLuhan's famous axiom, "the medium is the message".¹²² McLuhan's argument is that the medium through which we communicate holds as much importance, if not more, than the actual message itself. In this sense, the public statement that Australia was not interested in participating in a dialogue that China had already publicly labelled as an attempt at 'encirclement', without informing Australia's key regional and global ally, whilst standing next to the Foreign Minister of China seemed to indicate that the Australian Government sought a change to the existing arrangements.¹²³ Earlier in the press conference, Smith had praised the trilateral dialogue and pledged to continue the meetings.¹²⁴ However, even the viability of the trilateral dialogue seemed under pressure when Rudd visited China, but not Japan, on his first major international trip as Prime Minister.¹²⁵ Additionally, Rudd, as Opposition Leader, had criticised the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation as threatening to 'shut in' China, and had indicated that there were no plans to follow the JDSC with a formal defence alliance.¹²⁶ Rudd's seeming synchronicity with Chinese concerns and inconsistent approach to relations with Australia's largest emerging regional partner highlights the stark uncertainty which characterised the critical early period for the trilateral community.

¹²² Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), p. 1.

¹²³ 'PM: India Not Part of "Contain China" Effort', *The Hindu*, 11 January 2008; Editorial, 'China Left Out in India-Japan Pact', *The Business Times Singapore*, 28 October 2008; John Lee, 'Bush Legacy: Better US-India Relations', *The Straits Times*, 8 October 2009.

¹²⁴ Smith and Yang, 'Joint Press Conference with Chinese Foreign Minister'.

¹²⁵ China was the final stop on Rudd's trip which also saw him visit the United States, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. Based on Rudd's itinerary, Japan was a glaring absence.

¹²⁶ Christopher W. Hughes, 'Japan's Response to China's Rise: Regional Engagement, Global Containment, Dangers of Collision', *International Affairs* 85, no. 4 (2009): 837–56, p. 851; William Tow, 'The Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and Asia-Pacific Strategic Geometries' (Berkeley: Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 6 September 2007), <https://nautilus.org/apsnet/the-japan-australia-joint-declaration-on-security-cooperation-and-asia-pacific-strategic-geometries/>.

Adding to the strained relations, Australia and Japan swiftly became embroiled in an unusually fierce dispute over Japan's whaling activity in the Southern Pacific Ocean. The Rudd Government, in the two weeks after its election, announced its plan to monitor Japan's whaling ships during their annual expedition, enlisting both the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal Australian Navy.¹²⁷ Additionally, in mid-January 2008, the Australian Federal Court ruled that the Japanese whalers were in violation of the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999*, and their hunt was therefore illegal under Australian law.¹²⁸ Rudd had promised to take the issue of Japan's whaling to the International Court of Justice during the 2007 election campaign and in light of the successful domestic legal victory lodged formal proceedings which commenced in The Hague on May 31, 2010.¹²⁹ The escalation of this issue is significant, as it progressed from a public denunciation and monitoring in 2007 (in itself, no small matter), to an argument before the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It is unclear exactly what the Australian Government was attempting to achieve with this action, which threatened relations with one of Australia's key trade partners. The most obvious domestic result for the Rudd Government was the large public support for such a move, thus providing a good environmental news outcome in the aftermath of the disappointing outcome of the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen and the resulting failure of the Emissions Trading Scheme.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ Malcolm Farr and Lauren Williams, 'Navy, RAAF to Shadow Whalers', *The Daily Telegraph*, 13 December 2007; 'Customs Ship to Shadow Japanese Whalers', *The Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 18 December 2007.

¹²⁸ Andrew Darby, 'Japanese Whaling Fleet Loses in Court, at Sea', *The Age*, 16 January 2008; James Allsop (J), *Humane Society International Inc v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd* [2008], No. FCA 3 (The Federal Court of Australia 15 January 2008).

¹²⁹ Neil Mitchell, Transcript of Interview Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, Radio, 11 December 2009, <http://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-16973>; Commonwealth of Australia, 'Application Instituting Proceedings' (International Court of Justice, 31 May 2010), <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/15951.pdf>.

¹³⁰ Philip Dorling, "'Doomed" Whaling Fight Aimed at Saving Labor Vote', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 January 2011.

These two actions by Rudd, early in his tenure, indicate that he was eager to shatter the perception of Australia as the ‘deputy sheriff’ to the United States and to promote a more independent foreign policy engaging Asia as befitting a middle power. These two principles had been strong in the Australian Labor Party since the modernisation of the Party during the Hawke-Keating years. However, as Rudd discovered, the learning curve from the sound bites of opposition politics to the chequered realities of governing was steep. Despite his strong background in international relations, perhaps the strongest of any Prime Minister since the end of the British Empire, Rudd’s centralisation of the office of the Prime Minister across all portfolios diminished his ability to enforce long term policy initiatives.¹³¹ In doing so, the ‘top down’ approach of Rudd undermined Australia’s dedicated foreign policy agencies, and resulted in uncertainty as to Australia’s desire to embrace its middle power status.

This uncertainty is clearly represented by Rudd’s call for an ‘Asia Pacific Community’ a scant four months after Australia’s withdrawal from the quadrilateral strategic dialogue.¹³² Rudd’s proposal, a loose model on the European Union, envisaged a community incorporating the key states in the region, the United States, Japan, Australia, China, India, Indonesia and others. This community would allow these states to “engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, co-operation and action on economic and political matters and future challenges related to security.”¹³³ Rudd’s

¹³¹ Andrew Carr and Chris Roberts, ‘Foreign Policy’, in *The Rudd Government: Australian Commonwealth Administration 2007-2010*, ed. Chris Aulich and Mark Evans, vol. 10, Volumes 2007-2010 of Australian Commonwealth Administration (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010).

¹³² Philip Dorling, ‘Rudd’s Man Criticised Hasty Asia Pacific Community Plan’, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 December 2010.

¹³³ Kevin Rudd, ‘Toward an Asia Pacific Union’ (Asia Society AustralAsia Centre 11th Annual Dinner, Sydney, 4 June 2008), <http://asiasociety.org/kevin-rudd-toward-asia-pacific-union>; Tim Colebatch, ‘Rudd’s Grand Plan for Asia Pacific’, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 June 2008.

proposal, hastily conceived and uncomfortably vague, was received poorly by states across the region, leading Robert McCallum, the United States Ambassador to Australia, to list it under the subheading ‘Rudd’s Foreign Policy Mistakes’, in his report on the first year of the Rudd Government.¹³⁴ Additionally, Rudd presented his concept of an Asia Pacific Community to key officials in the Obama Administration, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, promising to send her a draft copy of his upcoming essay, ‘Managing Global and Regional Interdependence: the Future of the G20 and an Asian Pacific Community’, outlining his initiative in more detail.¹³⁵ Though, in a clear sign of how far out of step Rudd was with the establishment sentiment in Washington, the highly influential foreign policy magazine *Foreign Affairs*, refused to publish the essay, an highly unusual snub for the leader of a close ally.¹³⁶

In a similar sense, the ascension of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to power in the 2009 election, ending the near half century-long rule of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), brought the prospect of a rebalance to Japan’s US-centric foreign policy. The DPJ had entered the election promising to improve ties with their Asian neighbours (a New Asianism), to push for a more equal alliance with the United States, and participate in further UN-backed peacekeeping missions.¹³⁷ A key promise of incoming Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio was the

¹³⁴ Robert McCallum, ‘Rudd Government - One Year Report’, Diplomatic Cable, 28 November 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08CANBERRA1196_a.html.

¹³⁵ Aleisha Woodward, ‘Secretary Clinton’s March 24, 2009 Conversation with Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’, Diplomatic Cable, 24 March 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE30049_a.html.

¹³⁶ The official response from *Foreign Affairs* editor, James Hoge Jr., was that Prime Minister Rudd’s essay was too similar to a number of essays recently published by *Foreign Affairs*. Leo Shanahan, ‘Foreign Affairs Magazine Rejects Kevin Rudd’s Essay’, *The Australian*, 3 June 2009.

¹³⁷ Yukio Hatoyama, ‘A New Path for Japan’, *The New York Times*, 26 August 2009; Daniel Sneider and Richard Katz, ‘The New Asianism’, *Foreign Policy*, 13 October 2009; see also Democratic Party of Japan, ‘The Democratic Party of Japan’s Platform for Government: 2009 Change of Government’, Policy Manifesto, (18 August 2009), <https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2009.pdf>; Democratic Party of Japan, ‘Manifesto: The Democratic Party of Japan’s Platform for Government: Putting People’s Lives First’, Policy Manifesto, (July 2007),

complete closure of the United States' base on Okinawa, a position that required the United States to indicate they would not publicly force the issue.¹³⁸ Hatoyama's vow proved to be politically impossible and was unpopular with the voting public at-large, as other areas in Japan were unwilling to accept a US military installation in their backyard. Hatoyama's resignation only eight months after his landslide election clouded the impetus for a renegotiation of the factors placing stress on the alliance. Additionally, intra-party struggles, a struggling economy, and changes in the regional security environment – including an extended and acrimonious dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands – resulted in a continuation of the *status quo*. The DPJ backed away from attempts to creating new regional institutions, preferring instead to deepen commitments with the existing trilateral groups (Australia-Japan-United States, United States-Japan-ROK, United States-Japan-India) and with the existing regional architecture.¹³⁹ However, as we have seen in the analysis of Rudd's early interactions with Australia's policy towards Japan, it was not immediately clear that Australia wished to retain the existing Australia-Japan-United States trilateral architecture.

<https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2007.pdf>; Democratic Party of Japan, 'DPJ Manifesto for the 2005 House of Representatives Election: Nippon Sasshin: Toward a Change of Government', Policy Manifesto, (30 August 2005), https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto5/pdf/manifesto_05.pdf; Democratic Party of Japan, 'Manifesto 2004: Directly and Single-Mindedly', Policy Manifesto, (24 June 2004), http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto4/pdf/manifesto_2004_a4.pdf; Democratic Party of Japan, 'Creating a Dynamic Japan: Towards a Secure Society', Policy Manifesto, (October 2003), http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto_eng/images/fullmanifesto.pdf; Democratic Party of Japan, 'Policies for the 19th House of Councillors Elections: A Fair Deal for All', Policy Manifesto, (17 April 2001), https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/19hc-elec.html#a_01.

¹³⁸ Yuriko Nakao, 'US Says Won't Dictate to Japan on Military Bases', *Reuters*, 21 September 2009.

¹³⁹ Weston S. Konishi, 'From Rhetoric to Reality: Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan' (Cambridge: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, April 2012), <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/fromRhetoricToReality.pdf>.

The DPJ under Prime Ministers Hatoyama, Kan Naoto, and Noda Yoshihiko were unable to deliver on their foreign policy election commitments. Their central foreign policy commitment vaguely promised to equalise the relationship with the United States.¹⁴⁰ How this was to be achieved was never fully expressed, however much centred on the ability of the DPJ to re-negotiate the terms of the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. The long period in opposition did nothing to assuage the ideological divisions between the competing factions in the party.¹⁴¹ These rifts were papered over to present a unified opposition to a weakened LDP, but the post-election division of offices fractured the party. Hence, contentious policy positions, particularly those regarding the role of the United States, were deliberately ambiguous to not further inflame the factional splits. The ambiguity was such that the promise to ‘equalise’ the relationship between Japan and the United States could have meant anything from changing Tokyo’s deference towards Washington, to a complete strategic shift away from the longstanding relationship.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Martin Fackler, ‘Japan’s New Leader Reassures U.S. on Alliance’, *The New York Times*, 3 September 2009, sec. Asia Pacific; William L. Brooks, ‘Stress Test for the U.S.-Japan Alliance under the Democratic Party of Japan’, *The SAIS Review of International Affairs* 32, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 121–35, p. 121.

¹⁴¹ At the time of the August 2009 election, the DPJ had eight distinct factional groups and one group of independents. As noted, the DPJ is an amalgam of left, centrist, and right-leaning politicians. In opposition, the faction sizes ranged from 42 members to 7, no faction comprised more than 19 percent of the party as a whole, which led to intra-party factional alliances to determine policy. After the election, however, the largest faction, headed by DPJ founder Ozawa Ichirō, increased its proportion of the party room from 19 percent to 33 percent. Two of the smaller factions, headed by Maehara Seiji and Edano Yukio, and (future Prime Minister) Noda Yoshihiko, respectively, were strongly critical of Ozawa, and although they were not large enough to block initiatives supported by Ozawa’s faction, their continued intraparty opposition dogged and weakened each DPJ Prime Minister. In Carmen Schmidt’s research, she identified, based on shared policy positions, five factions (Ozawa, Hata, Hatoyama, Kawabata and Yokomichi) as being ‘pro-Ozawa’, and the remaining four factions (Maehara, Noda, Kan, and the independents) as ‘contra-Ozawa’. See: Carmen Schmidt, ‘The DPJ and Its Factions: Benefit or Threat?’, *Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies* 43, no. 1 (July 2011): 1–21.

¹⁴² Hatoyama, ‘A New Path for Japan’; Jim Hoagland, ‘Shockwaves from Japan’s Election’, *The Washington Post*, 6 September 2009; Mark Landler and Martin Fackler, ‘US Is Seeing Policy Thorns in Japan Shift’, *The New York Times*, 1 September 2009; Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, and Aki Mori, ‘Electing a New Japanese Security Policy? Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan’, *Asia Policy* 9 (January 2010): 45–66.

The party itself was an uneasy amalgam of views on the US-Japan security relationship, ranging from the establishment view not dissimilar to those of the Liberal Democratic Party on the right to those of the Japanese Socialist Party on the left. Kan Naoto, the inaugural President of the DPJ, noted that he saw the party as being both “the party of Thatcher and Blair.”¹⁴³ The leader of the largest faction and most powerful politician in the party, Ozawa Ichirō, a persistent critic of Japan’s participation in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, called for Japan to increase its contributions to international security through missions authorised by the United Nations.¹⁴⁴ This statement by Ozawa echoed Rudd’s pre-election policy of assigning greater priority to the United Nations, and both statements were likely driven by considerations of China, though from differing perspectives.¹⁴⁵ Ozawa’s statement was influenced by his belief that Japan needed to firm its standing within Northeast Asia, particularly against nascent China maritime assertiveness, rather than participating in global military operations, which he felt caused Japan to be militarily overstretched.¹⁴⁶ Rudd, by contrast, was more sensitive to Chinese criticism regarding the emerging tripartite community with the United States and Japan, and saw the United Nations as the preferred avenue through which to exercise Australia’s middle power diplomacy.

¹⁴³ Gerald L. Curtis, *The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

¹⁴⁴ Daniel Sneider, Ichirō Ozawa: Ozawa in His Own Words, *Oriental Economist*, June 2009; ‘Ichiro Ozawa: The Shadow Shogun’, *The Economist*, 10 September 2009; Tobias Harris, ‘Japan’s New Shadow Shogun’, *Foreign Policy*, 27 August 2009, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/08/27/japans-new-shadow-shogun/>.

¹⁴⁵ Tow, ‘The Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and Asia-Pacific Strategic Geometries’.

¹⁴⁶ In May 2009, the People’s Republic of China submitted two Notes Verbales to the United Nations Secretary General containing China’s objections to the joint submissions of Malaysia and Vietnam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. These Notes, and the attached map – depicting nine dashes – stated: “China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof...” Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to United Nations Secretary-General, Note Verbale, 7 May 2009, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf. Harris, ‘Japan’s New Shadow Shogun’.

There is an interesting symmetry in the policies of Rudd and Hatoyama regarding their vision of a ‘community’ in Asia. The Japanese policy on an East Asian Community, originally planned by Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi, was revitalised by Hatoyama in his first policy speech before the Japanese Diet in October 2009.¹⁴⁷ The key difference between Rudd and Hatoyama’s concepts was that the ‘East Asian Community’ concept had been discussed as the natural facilitator of community building to the Asia Pacific, a successor of sorts to the ASEAN Plus Three forum.¹⁴⁸ By contrast, Rudd’s showed little desire to fit his concept of an Asia Pacific Community within the established fora, and his lack of consultation certainly did him no favours.

Both Australia and Japan made serious missteps in their relationships with each other, the United States, and the broader region during their first term in office. Despite these faults, which threatened to, and on occasion did exacerbate tensions between parties, the communication between the partners remained strong and civil. Indeed, in June and December 2008, Australia and Japan signed both a Comprehensive Strategic, Security and Economic Partnership and a Memorandum on Defence Cooperation.¹⁴⁹ The combination of these initiatives indicate that both states were committed to expanding on the conception of security by broadening future avenues of security cooperation. These two initiatives were a critical part of the ongoing, early development

¹⁴⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress’ (East Asia Vision Group Report, 2001), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/report2001.pdf>; Yukio Hatoyama, ‘Policy Speech’ (173rd Session of the Diet, Tokyo, 26 October 2009), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/200910/26syosin_e.html.

¹⁴⁸ Seri Syed Hamid Albar, ‘Chairman’s Press Statement’ (ASEAN Plus Three Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 26 July 2006), http://asean.org/?static_post=chairman-s-press-statement-for-the-seventh-asean-plus-three-foreign-ministers-meeting-kuala-lumpur-26-july-2006-2.

¹⁴⁹ Ministry of Defense of Japan and Department of Defence of Australia, ‘Memorandum on Defence Cooperation between Ministry of Defense, Japan and Department of Defence, Australia’ (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense of Japan, 18 December 2008); Yasuo Fukuda and Kevin Rudd, ‘Joint Statement by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda of Japan and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia on “Comprehensive Strategic, Security and Economic Partnership”’ (Tokyo, 12 June 2008), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0806.html>.

of the framework for continued cooperation. As we shall see in the next section, this cooperation began to bear fruit regarding China's increasing regional assertiveness.

Issues of Mature Sensitivity

Shared Threat Perceptions and Communal Aspirations

The joint statement released after the 2013 Trilateral Strategic Dialogue meeting on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Bali was a stark departure from the soporific language previously the hallmark of the TSD meetings. In noting that the “Ministers opposed any coercive or unilateral actions that could change the status quo in the East China Sea”¹⁵⁰ it was clear there had been a significant linguistic evolution since the previous meeting in 2009. The 2009 meeting lasted a brisk 40 minutes and is a model of inoffensive diplomacy. Utilising devastatingly diplomatic turns of phrase as, “The three ministers shared the view that trilateral cooperation is meaningful in responding to regional and global issues...”¹⁵¹ it was unclear at that stage whether the trilateral community could maintain its original premise and bearing, rather than succumbing to internal apathy. By clear contrast, the 2013 statement marked a rapid coalescence in the threat perceived *within* the community regarding increased Chinese aggression in the South and East China Seas.

As prefaced in the opening to this chapter, the mature communication between the trilateral community was taken seriously by China. The swift and unusually fierce Chinese response to the statement released by the 2015 Trilateral Strategic Dialogue indicated clearly that China saw this

¹⁵⁰ Julie Bishop, ‘Trilateral Strategic Dialogue’ (Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Bali, 4 October 2013), http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2013/jb_mr_131004.aspx?ministerid=4.

¹⁵¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘The Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue’ (Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, New York, 21 September 2009), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0909.html>.

grouping as a threat to its growing regional clout. As we have seen, the intervening years between the 2009 and 2013 Dialogues saw progress on the bilateral relationships, particularly between Australia and Japan, but little headway at the trilateral level. This change was driven by external factors as much it was by the growing connectivity between the states. The growing institutionalisation of the Australia-Japan relationship at a time when Japanese defence policy was driven by a belated realisation of the vulnerabilities in their defence posture exposed by China's 'grey zone' activities was no coincidence. The Chinese reaction to the 2015 statement both solidified and highlighted the trilateral community's perception of China's long-term strategy as being to challenge the United States' regional hegemony and undercut the network of alliances and security partnerships that institutionalise the international order.

A Legal Framework for Strategic Communication

Building from the two previously agreed upon agreements promoting security cooperation¹⁵², the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was signed in May 2010 and the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement (ISA) was signed two years later in May 2012.¹⁵³ The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement allows the armed forces of both states to provide reciprocal supplies and services (food and fuel, though not weapons or ammunition)

¹⁵² The Australia-Japan Comprehensive Strategic, Security and Economic Partnership and a Memorandum on Defence Cooperation.

¹⁵³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Department of Defence of Australia, 'Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force' (Tokyo, 19 May 2010), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/pdfs/agree1005.pdf>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, 'Signing of the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement' (Tokyo, 17 May 2012), www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/0517_01.html.

during training exercises, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, disaster relief operations, and other 'routine activities'.¹⁵⁴ The signing of ACSA was again the first major security-related agreement that Japan had signed with a state other than the United States, and was a major practical step toward closer security relations between Australia and Japan.

Here, we can begin to see the trend that influences the trilateral relationship, The Information Security Agreement was tied to the theme of practical security cooperation as it established the legal procedures necessary for the protection and mutual exchange of classified information between Australia and Japan. The ACSA was a clear step toward testing the strength of the relationship and establishing the institutions that would guide Australia and Japan's future security cooperation. It also indicates the states were not simply seeking a traditional bilateral security arrangement, but rather one that would provide a broad and stable framework for deepening confidence and ensuring ongoing cooperation. The exclusion of weapons and ammunition from the original agreement reflected Japan's domestic constraints on the international use of force. However, on January 14, 2017, Australia and Japan signed an updated version of the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement, one that did include provisions for the transfer of weapons and ammunition.¹⁵⁵ This agreement brought the Australia-Japan relationship to the same level as the United States-Japan relationship, and opened the way for a future trilateral agreement, to further strengthen the trilateral security community.

¹⁵⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Department of Defence of Australia, 'Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force'.

¹⁵⁵ Marise Payne, "Signing of the Australia-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement" (Sydney, January 14, 2017), <https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-releases/signing-australia-japan-acquisition-and-cross-servicing>.

The Information Security Agreement is both a model example of the development of trust in a controlled environment and a clear indication that Australia and Japan wished to participate in trilateral information sharing processes with the United States. However, in contrast to the JDSC and ACSA, Australia was not the first state outside the United States to sign an information security agreement with Japan, with both NATO and France signing similar agreements in the two years prior to the Australia-Japan Agreement. Japan signed an ISA with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 2010 to enhance and smooth cooperation in Afghanistan for Japanese aid workers and additional multilateral operations.¹⁵⁶ The next ISA was signed with France in 2011, which aimed to enhance the yearly bilateral defence consultations held by the two states since 1994.¹⁵⁷ The agreement with France indicates that Japan was seeking diversity in its security options, opting to pursue deeper relations and closer threat perceptions with Europe on the development of security issues in the Asia Pacific.¹⁵⁸

Japan signed an information sharing agreement with the United Kingdom in 2013, which meant that three members of the five-member United Nations Security Council had signed such an agreement with Japan, indicating that the political influence of Europe matters to Japan on issues of a non-military nature. Additionally, this also brought Japan closer to participating in supra-

¹⁵⁶ Randall Schriver and Tiffany Ma, 'The Next Steps in Japan - NATO Cooperation' (Arlington: Project2049 Institute, 23 November 2010).

¹⁵⁷ Here it is worth noting that although the French signed an Information Security Agreement with the Japanese in October 2011, it was not until June 2013 that President Francois Hollande made an official visit to Japan, the first time a French President had visited Japan in 17 years. The long gap between signing of the agreement and any moves to increase the momentum of the France-Japan defence relationship indicates that the ISA was aspirational, rather than reflective of a highly developed Franco-Japanese relationship.

¹⁵⁸ Céline Pajon, 'Japan and France: Slowly but Surely Moving Forward on Security Cooperation', *The Diplomat*, 6 February 2017.

regional intelligence community, though not of the reach of the so-called ‘Five Eyes’ global intelligence network. The agreement between Australia and Japan provided the legal framework for the exchange of classified information, bringing the Australia-Japan bilateral relationship to the same standard as that of the Australia-United States relationship and the Japan-United States relationship. Together, the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and the Information Security Agreement provided a legal framework through which cooperation and interoperability could be actioned and enhanced.¹⁵⁹ This legal framework heightened the capacity of the community to collaborate and coordinate on issues of strategic assessment, an area of major sensitivity.

This framework was further strengthened by the 2014 signing of the Agreement on the Transfer for Defence Equipment and Technology (ATDET).¹⁶⁰ Like the ACSA and ISA, the ATDET established a legal framework for both states to deepen security and defence cooperation in the bilateral relationship. This framework elevates the Australia-Japan bilateral relationship to the standard of each state’s relationship with the United States. In the Agreement preamble, the parties note that it has “[b]ecome common among developed countries to improve the performance of defence equipment and technology and to cope with their rising costs by participating in international joint research, development and production...”¹⁶¹ This language seems intended to

¹⁵⁹ Julia Gillard, ‘Keynote Address to the Japan National Press Club’ (Tokyo, Japan National Press Club, 22 April 2011), pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-17801.

¹⁶⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Signing of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology’ (Tokyo, 8 July 2014), http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000349.html.

¹⁶¹ Government of Japan and Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology’ (2014), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000044447.pdf>.

convey both Japan's position as a 'normal' state and the intention of Australia and Japan to burden-share to lower the 'cost' of joint participation. The timing of this Agreement is important, as it occurred three months after the re-elected Abe Government adopted new arms export principles that eased the heavy restrictions established by the 1967 'Three Principles on Arms Export' and its 1976 revision.¹⁶²

Successive Japanese Governments had considered changing the policy, but the shifting balance of power in the Asia Pacific from 2010, and concerns that Japan was unable to take advantage of future-generation weapons system development or commit to further interoperability with security partners brought about the policy reversal.¹⁶³ Again, the swift passage of an Agreement establishing a framework for defence and security cooperation emphasises the increasing cohesiveness and strength of the community.

The ATDET Agreement offered a streamlining of defence cooperation and was signed in Canberra during Prime Minister Abe's first official visit to Australia. During Prime Minister Abe's address to the Australian Parliament, he explicitly called for Australia and Japan to "[f]inally use our relationship of trust, which has stood through the trials of history, in our cooperation in the area of security."¹⁶⁴ He went on to note that Australia and Japan had "freed" themselves from the old order

¹⁶² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'The Three Principles on Arms Export and Their Related Policy Guidelines' (1967), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/>.

¹⁶³ 'Japan, US Mull Joint Upgrade of Aegis System in 2010', *The Japan Times*, 9 March 2014; Martin Fackler, 'Japan Ends Decades-Long Ban on Export of Weapons', *The New York Times*, 1 April 2014.

¹⁶⁴ Shinzo Abe, 'Remarks by Prime Minister Abe to the Australian Parliament' (Canberra, 8 July 2014), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201407/0708article1.html.

of things and were “moving towards a new ‘special relationship.’”¹⁶⁵ This language and its employment on the eve of the signing of the ATDET strongly indicates that Australia and Japan were ready to commit to a deeper level of trust. In October 2016, due to Australia and Japan’s now-established frameworks on the sharing and protection of sensitive security and defence information, representatives from the trilateral community signed a ‘Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement’ (TISA).¹⁶⁶ This Agreement looked to enhance the strategic aspect of the relationship by “[e]xpediting information sharing to enable higher capability defense exercises and operations among the three states taking into account situational awareness in the region.”¹⁶⁷ A key part of this Agreement promoted the horizontalisation of information sharing, allowing the integration of ISR capabilities within the trilateral community.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ United States Department of Defense, ‘Australia, Japan, US Sign Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement’, 27 October 2016.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

Issues Threatening Community Cohesiveness

As this chapter has explored, the cohesion of the trilateral community cannot be taken for granted. The resolution of issues that threaten the cohesion of the community is the final indicator that the trilateral security community has attained a quantifiable measure of maturity. The architecture of security communities is such that it requires continuing communication to maintain its direction and fluency. As noted by Adler and Barnett, breakdowns in mutual trust trigger the dissolution of the community.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, attention must always be given to fractures in the relationships to minimise their potential to undermine the broader structure. As we saw, both Australia and Japan undertook actions that could have seriously damaged their relationship with other members of the community. The Rudd Government's court challenge over Japan's whaling and Rudd's ill-fated attempt to lead an 'Asia Pacific Community', though provoking concern at the time, were largely lost in the maelstrom of global events surrounding the Global Financial Crisis. Similarly, Japan's own domestic upheavals, Rudd's departure as Prime Minister, and an introspective Obama Administration facing significant domestic challenges all threatened to splinter the emerging community. Similarly, the uncertainty surrounding the direction of the Democratic Party of Japan's foreign policy provoked consternation in the United States, as domestic calls mounted for the DPJ to thoroughly renegotiate their security arrangements with the United States. However, continued domestic instability removed the impetus for these changes and a hard shift in Japan's external security environment quietened calls for the change. What is clear is that despite these challenges, the community continued to advance, strengthen, and seek out new areas for cooperation. This progression highlights the cohesiveness of the mature trilateral community.

¹⁶⁸ Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities'.

Mature Communication in the Trilateral Community

This chapter has analysed the critical role of communication in the development and maturation of the Australia-Japan-United States security community. As we have seen, 2001 was the point at which the Australian government verbalised their desire for an enhanced relationship with their Japanese counterparts as a natural expansion of the existing hub-and-spokes model of engagement with the United States. This expansion was actioned the next year as the nascent Trilateral Security Dialogue, the institution through which the trilateral community could harmonise and, if necessary, deconflict, their agendas, visions and capability development. This chapter outlaid the conditions demonstrate the existence of a mature community within the sphere of political communication. The conditions: the shared perception of threats, a legal framework for the sharing of documents of a highly sensitive nature, and the resolution of issues that threaten the cohesion of the community.

The shared perception of threats is evident in the joint statements, political documents and communications between the trilateral partners that aimed to explore new avenues for partnership and cooperation. In this we can see Australia and Japan's early discussions that invoked the language of 'shared values', the verbalised concern for 'our neighbourhood', and the elevation to a 'special relationship'. This practice in the art of communication led to the creation of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, the vehicle for much of the community's progress. The institutionalisation of three key bilateral Agreements between Australia and Japan, the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, the Information Security Agreement, and the Agreement on the

Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology brought the Australia-Japan bilateral relationship to the same level as the United States-Japan relationship, opening the door for trilateral cooperation in the area. Indeed, this framework led to a Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement, highlighting both the latent capacity of the trilateral community, but also the development in two of the three key areas of security community maturation. With the signing of the TISA, the community had progressively shifted away from the previous hub-and-spokes model of bilateral relationship management towards a trilateral community

Finally, the community worked through a number of issues that threatened to derail community formation and blunt growth. This chapter identified that the architecture of the security community favours the resolution of issues posing a threat to community cohesion. The strong intra-community communication networks outlined in this chapter speak to the success the trilateral community has had in communicating differences across a range of issue areas.

Having established the maturity of the communication aspect of security community development, Chapter 4 – *Constructing Security Cooperation: Lessons from the Trilateral Community* – will analyse the cooperation aspect of security community development

Chapter Four

Constructing Security Cooperation: Lessons from the Trilateral Community

During *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, the 21-day multilateral invasion of Iraq and deposition of the government of Saddam Hussein, 14 Australian pilots from the No. 75 Squadron flying F/A 18 Hornet fighter jets defied orders from their American commanding officers, aborting 40 bombing missions.¹⁶⁹ These missions were independently terminated when the pilots discovered at the point of delivery that the intended targets were inconsistent with the intelligence given prior to departure.¹⁷⁰ The pilots relied on the Australian Rules of Engagement, shaped by Australia's ratification of international statutes such as the Ottawa Landmines Treaty and the Protocols of the Geneva Conventions, statutes which the United States has not ratified. The question we must consider, is how can deep and continuing cooperation be achieved when parties are forced to act on different terms in the most intimate of state interactions?

Sustained cooperation in the international security environment requires the confluence of four common objectives, threat perception, capacity, political will, and support. First, the perception of a common threat is a critical motivator in stimulating states to consider coordinating their responses to this threat. The second is an understanding of the limitations of each participating state which necessitates a more complete conceptualisation of the vulnerabilities of each party. Third, the compatibility of each state's objectives in relation to their partners. Finally, the

¹⁶⁹ Frank Walker, "Our Pilots Refused to Bomb 40 Times," *Sydney Morning Herald*, March 14, 2004.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

broadening of the original basis for cooperation presents participating states with a deeper rationale for maintaining cooperation in the absence of a formal alliance or declared threat.

This chapter examines the operationalisation of cooperation between Australia, Japan, and the United States in the context of both traditional and non-traditional security threats. The operationalisation of this trilateral relationship is critical to the sustention of the mature security community. Chapter Three addressed the construction of the rationale for enduring cooperation, laying the foundation and context for the issues addressed in this chapter. By maintaining the same framework, a vertical and horizontal assessment of community development, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, we can see the development of security cooperation between the trilateral community. At the minor sensitivity level, cooperation and coordination in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), the procurement of complementary defence equipment and technology, and participation in large-scale multilateral military exercises such as the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) indicate that an immature security community exists between the participating states. At the medium level, participating states engage in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in post-conflict societies, have furthered their capacity for operational interoperability through high-level, small-scale military exercises, and have acquired defence equipment and technology that enhances operational interoperability. Finally, a mature community exists when we can see operational interoperability in HA/DR operations, when a mutually supportive defence export industry cycle has been established, and the display of interoperability in a combat setting.

Levels of Security Cooperation in a Mature Security Community




Figure 4.2

In assessing this structure (as shown in Fig. 4.1), we can visualise the vertical and horizontal points that indicate evolution in the cooperative aspects of the trilateral community. These indicators, ranked from issues of minor sensitivity to those of major sensitivity, identify those areas in advanced state-to-state relations relating to the provision of trust and formation of a practical security community.

At the minor sensitivity level, state interactions are assessed by participation in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations relating to natural and ecological disasters, similar trends in defence acquisition, and participation in large-scale multilateral military exercises. The connection between these three indicators is seen first in HA/DR operations, which act to institutionalise cooperation within a regional framework of non-traditional security. Given the constraints on Japan's atypical military arrangement (including their longstanding and large donations of Official Development Assistance), and Australia's national security concern for the stability of the Asia Pacific region, it is likely that both states would see the benefit in developing their cooperative abilities when responding to regional HA/DR crises.

Japan's modernisation of their Self-Defense Forces under the auspices of international peacekeeping was influenced by their interactions with Australia and the United States, mature states with a history of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.¹ Additionally, Japan's strict defence export industry suffered from the so-called 'Galapagos Syndrome', a term capturing the high cost,

¹ Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan–China Arms Race and Global Power Projection," *Asia-Pacific Review* 16, no. 1 (May 1, 2009): 84–99; "Japan, Australia Aim to Expand Military Logistical Support," *The Japan Times*, November 20, 2016; See also: Andrew L. Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), especially Chapters 1, 4, and 5.

indigenous state-specific, and long-production time of defence materiel, that traditionally characterised Japanese defence development.² From this participation in HA/DR operations and military modernisation, we can see increasing confidence in their participation in multilateral military exercises.

Indicating a medium level of sensitivity, we see an expansion of HA/DR operations to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in post-conflict societies, the acquisition of defence equipment and technology that promotes and enhances flexibility and interoperability with close allies and partners, and the practice of interoperability through high-level small-scale exercises and building partner capacity. These indicators of medium sensitivity act to accommodate and institutionalise cooperation between partners. The evolution of HA/DR operations to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in post-conflict societies indicates the growing confidence that the states have in each other's abilities. This confidence is further enhanced by the acquisition of defence equipment and technology guided by the policy of enhancing interoperability, a clear indication that states see the viability of a sustained military partnership. Further, these experiences lead to communities increasing their level of interoperability to create an environment in which partner states can utilise their interoperable capabilities in the context of military exercises and building partner capacity.

² Rod Lyon, "Japan's Strategic Outlook," Special Report (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2011), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/161639/SR44_Japan_strategic_outlook.pdf.

Finally, the indicators that presage that the community operates with a major level of sensitivity are the ability to act in an interoperable manner in all HA/DR operations, the development of a mutually supportive defence export industry, and testing interoperability in a combat setting. These indicators demonstrate the high level of confidence exhibited by the community partners. The concept of ‘core partners’ is a recent evolution within the global national security lexicon and indicates that states consider themselves part of a community. This is a particularly important concept in the field of HA/DR which relies on cooperation and consensus within a responsible international community. A critical component of a community indicating both the closeness of the respective partners and the clarity and strength of the common future they observe is the development of a mutually supportive defence export industry. Finally, interoperability in a combat setting completes this horizontalisation, indicating that members of the community are confident and comfortable in acting together in all range of military operations. So far, we have covered the theory, now we turn to the operationalisation of cooperation within the community.

Minor Security Cooperation

This first section of this chapter addresses the early stages of security cooperation, focusing on the foundational elements of the state-to-state relationships critical for demonstrating the future development of the trilateral community. In this section we will analyse the early efforts to identify areas of future security cooperation, instances of early cooperation in the security space, and efforts to acquire and standardise the use of advanced combat systems. Identifying areas of future cooperation allows states to direct their resources towards specific opportunities with the aim of increasing the operating ability of the mature security community. Highlighting instances of early cooperation allows for the effective engagement with and provision of public goods, a critical and non-complex strategy that promotes inter-community familiarity. Efforts to standardise the defence acquisition process across the trilateral community were critical to facilitate security connections between the three states at a deeper level to facilitate complementarity in each states' approach to defence acquisitions. This section will demonstrate the sustained interest the trilateral community exhibited in deepening the coordination of their relations, indicating that they have surpassed the first tier of security community development.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: A Catalyst for Cooperation

The increasing securitisation of transregional challenges like HA/DR requires and facilitates the type of coordination necessary for cooperation on issues of major sensitivity. Additionally, although HA/DR is considered an area of non-traditional security, the ramifications of HA/DR events and operations do have traditional military implications. Events even of a localised nature can provoke severe political and military reactions in the form of domestic political and economic instability, or even a military revolt or *coup d'état*. The emerging market democracies in the Asia Pacific, particularly those with a large but inexperienced military, are those most at risk of an escalation of a natural disaster to a full blown security dilemma.

The catalyst for change in this area was the devastating 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami which ranks as the deadliest natural disaster of its kind in history. Outside of the damage and loss of human life in Indonesia, in particular the island of Sumatra which bore the brunt of both the earthquake and the tsunami, reporting over 200,000 deaths, 17 other states, stretching from Southeast Asia to Southern Africa, reported severe humanitarian, economic, or environmental destruction.³ The geography of the Asia Pacific region does not favour rapid or easy access in the event of an ecological or constructed disaster. The widespread nature of the devastation and minimal prior experience in dealing with a region-wide disaster added an additional level of complexity in providing humanitarian and disaster relief. Indonesia bore the brunt of the disaster,

³ "Indonesia Quake Toll Jumps Again," *BBC News*, January 25, 2005.

with the coastal tourist regions particularly affected. As Australia's most vital neighbour, and one with jurisdiction over the deepwater Lombok and Makassar Straits, swift and profound assistance was provided. Additionally, a generous response by Australia was perhaps seen as assuaging the rupture in the relationship caused by Australia's support for Timor-Leste's independence.

The Bush Administration, while recognising the strategic importance of Indonesia, also looked to build capital with states in the Asia Pacific region as domestic concerns that the United States was ceding strategic ground to China began to mount.⁴ Japan's contribution to the disaster came in the form of USD500 million, the third-highest contribution behind Australia and Germany as well as the dispatch of approximately 1,000 Self-Defense Force troops, representing both the largest overseas relief operation undertaken ever and critically, the first overseas joint operation between the three branches of the Self-Defense Forces. In addition, Australia and Japan pledged to assist with the creation of a tsunami warning system, similar to the network of sensors that determine the severity of seismic activity around Japan.⁵

The two key regional institutions, ASEAN and ARF, were ill-equipped to address such a spontaneous and region-wide disaster. Indeed, the ASEAN principle of non-interference and the prioritisation of the sovereignty of the state proved to be thoroughly incompatible with an effective

⁴ Jane Perlez, "Letter from Asia; China Is Romping with the Neighbors (US Is Distracted)," *The New York Times*, December 3, 2003; Kurt Campbell, "Asia's Anxieties Are a Warning to America," *The Financial Times*, October 28, 2004; Glenn Kessler, "US, China Agree to Regular Talks: Senior-Level Meetings to Focus on Politics, Security, Possibly Economics," *The Washington Post*, April 8, 2005; Rhoda Margesson, "Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami: Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Operations" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 10, 2005), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32715.pdf>.

⁵ "Officials in Asia Concede That They Failed to Issue Warnings," *Associated Press*, December 27, 2004.

regional response to this or any other disaster.⁶ In the immediate 48 hours post-tsunami, an ad-hoc coalition of four states established the ‘Tsunami Core Group’, to construct the appropriate infrastructure and coordinate the huge amount of resources necessary in the short term. These four states, India, United States, Australia, and Japan, “contributed more than 40,000 troops and humanitarian responders...dozens of helicopters, cargo ships, and transport planes.”⁷

Nine days after the tsunami, this Core Group was disbanded, and control was returned to the United Nations. However, its short life span is not indicative of its success. Indeed, as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman noted, “The Tsunami Core Group was an organisation that never met in one of diplomacy’s storied cities, never issued a communiqué, never created a secretariat, and took as one of its successes its own demise.”⁸ The effectiveness of the Core Group was in its lack of resemblance to the extant regional institutions. No high-visibility meetings occurred and consultation existed at a Deputy Foreign Minister-level.⁹ The Core Group’s short life indicated that effective, non-traditional regional institutions that addressed transregional challenges were possible in the Asia Pacific region, and that Japan’s modernisation of their Self-Defense Forces had not gone unnoticed by the other partner states.¹⁰

⁶ Erin Zimmerman, “Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Non-Traditional Security as a Catalyst,” *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 10, no. 2 (2014): 150–65, p. 153.

⁷ Marc Grossman, “The Tsunami Core Group: A Step toward a Transformed Diplomacy in Asia and Beyond,” *Security Challenges* 1, no. 1 (2005): 11–14, p. 11.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Victor Cha, “The Security Dilemma in Asian Architecture: United States, Japan, and China,” in *The US-Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism*, ed. Takashi Inoguchi, G. John Ikenberry, and Yoichiro Sato (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), p. 163.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 165.

It is this latter point that was of interest to both Australia and the United States and provided a basis for a re-characterisation of Japan's approach to HA/DR operations throughout the region. There are three features which indicate this re-characterisation – first, helicopters belonging to the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF), deployed for the first time in an international disaster relief operation, were carried by the Marine Self-Defense Forces (MSDF). Second, the MSDF acted as the logistics centre for the GSDF during their deployment, an event that precipitated the JSDF's transition to early internal interoperability. Third, the large-scale deployment of troops and humanitarian responders was the first time that all three branches of the Self-Defense Forces had been deployed together for the same disaster relief operation.¹¹ This demonstration of military modernisation, efficacy, and effectiveness indicated that Japan was both psychologically and physically prepared to play a larger role in the regional provision of public goods.

One other key public goods initiative Japan had been highly involved in since early 2000 was the 'Asia Maritime Security Initiative' (AMARSECTIVE). This initiative brought together the Heads of Coast Guard Authorities from some sixteen Asian states including South Korea and China for capacity building measures to combat terrorism and piracy.¹² In addition, Japan was foundational in establishing the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).¹³ Although beset by the restraints suffered by the other regional

¹¹ Ministry of Defense of Japan, "Defense of Japan" (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2005), p. 64.

¹² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "The Progress Report of the Trilateral Cooperation Among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea" (Tripartite Cooperation among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, Tokyo, November 27, 2004), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/conference/asean3/report0411.html>.

¹³ The Japan Forum on International Relations, "Challenges and Prospects of Japan-US Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security: Focusing on Anti-Piracy Cooperation," The Global Maritime Security and the Japan-US Alliance (Tokyo: The Japanese Forum on International Relations, May 2010), p. 32, http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/special_study/counter_piracy.pdf.

forums, such as issues relating to sovereignty and territoriality, the strength of the ReCAAP undoubtedly lies in its noting and reporting of incidents, thus providing a searchable database which states can use to allocate their maritime security resources. As Sam Bateman notes, piracy has been an area of major strategic challenge and engagement by Japan since 2000, prior to their nascent engagement with the United States and Australia.¹⁴ Japan's primary engagement in areas of non-traditional security indicates the political neutrality associated with these areas, particularly those approaches that provide incontestable public goods.¹⁵ As an accepted extra regional actor in Southeast Asia, Japan's support for endogenous regional security issues bestowed an element of legitimacy upon Japan denied to the United States, and to a lesser extent, Australia. Importantly for the security community thesis, Japan's engagement in and acceptance by Southeast Asia states assisted in the development of Japan's threat perception to one closer to that shared by Australia and the United States.

Recent Trends in Defence Procurement in the Trilateral Community

The ability to perceive an emerging or extant threat is very different from the ability to respond to said threat. Building capacity for multi-domain operations is a resource-debilitating activity.

¹⁴ See Sam Bateman, "Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation: What Are We Talking About?," in *Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: A Selection of Papers Presented at the CSCAP Study Group Meeting on Security Circulation, December 2004, Kunming, China, and April, 2005, New Delhi, India*, ed. Peter Cozens and Joanna Mossop (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 2005); Sam Bateman, "Piracy and Maritime Security: Japan's Strategic Challenges," in *Japan's Strategic Challenges in a Changing Regional Environment*, ed. Purnendra Jain and Peng Er Lam (Singapore: World Scientific, 2013).

¹⁵ See, in particular, Dr. Emily Bienvenue's work on Japan's efforts to rehabilitate its post-war image and acceptance as an extra regional actor in the Straits of Malacca. Emily Bienvenue, "Japan and China's Strategies for Maritime Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, 1945-2014: Identifying Prospects for Cooperation" (Flinders University, 2015) Chapter 4, <https://flex.flinders.edu.au/file/c3a0cf03-ce21-4ffc-9508-44165ef8fb3d/1/Whole%20Thesis%20September%201.pdf>.

Maintaining operationally ready equipment is paramount in furthering contemporary military cooperation amongst states. Trends in military expenditure indicates to allies and partners a state's scope to increase their capacity and capabilities for future operations. By highlighting the complementary growth patterns in the military expenditure of the United States, Australia, and Japan, we can see the point(s) at which these states substantially deepened their ability to enhance their existing capabilities and develop new ones. For the purposes of this thesis, the harmonisation of military expenditure trends between the members of the community is indicative of an immature security community.

Globally, military expenditure grew explosively in the period 2000 – 2016, increasing from \$1.06 trillion¹⁶ in 2000 to \$1.68 trillion in 2016.¹⁷ This 58 percent increase was driven by several factors, military modernisation, increased costs from ongoing overseas deployments, and increasing regional tension and instability, and the largest increases in this expenditure occurred in the Americas and Asia & Oceania. Together, these two regions contributed \$477 billion to the overall increase of \$618 billion, 77 percent of the total.¹⁸ On an analysis of data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) from 1997-2006, it is clear that the recovery from the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis was not responsible for the sharp increase in defence expenditure. As we can see below in Table 4.1, comparing defence expenditure in constant US

¹⁶ All monetary amounts are in USD unless otherwise stated.

¹⁷ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

¹⁸ Although the America's expenditure increase was huge in absolute terms, the clear majority of it driven by increases in the United States defence spending, the relative increase over the studied period is 44 percent.¹⁸ Comparatively, the increase in defence spending in the Asia & Oceania region over the same period was \$269 billion, or 144 percent. While the United States has historically accounted for the largest percentage of global defence expenditure, their share of the global total, while increasing in actual monetary terms, has declined in relative terms from 44.6 percent in 2000, to 40.6 percent in 2016. Over the same period, defence spending in Asia & Oceania jumped from 17.5 percent to 27.1 percent of the global total.

dollars across a seven-year period highlights that it was not until 2002 that expenditure returned to near its 1997 peak, with some states not having returned to their 1997 levels by 2006.¹⁹ Further, as we can see, even by 2006 the expenditure of some states had not yet recovered to the spending levels of 1997.

	<i>1997</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2006</i>
<i>Brunei</i>	334	301	269	254	234	249	260	268
<i>Indonesia</i>	2653	2079	1710	2242	2367	2486	3319	3695
<i>Malaysia</i>	1858	1365	1847	1677	2087	2370	3020	2996
<i>Cambodia</i>	147	138	131	127	117	110	110	114
<i>Laos</i>	44	29	43	43	46	n/a	n/a	n/a
<i>The Philippines</i>	828	818	807	853	794	833	920	901
<i>Singapore</i>	4153	4703	4791	4634	4745	5002	5051	5868
<i>Thailand</i>	3006	2440	2113	1982	2063	2087	2077	2045

Table 4.1 Defence Expenditure (2005 millions USD) in Southeast Asian States, 1997-2006²⁰

Australia and Japan are starkly different examples of the trend towards greater defence expenditure. As we see in Figure 4.2, Australia's defence expenditure (in 2015 USD) grew from \$14.2 billion in 2000 to \$24.4 billion in 2016, an increase of 71.6 percent. Over the same period, Japan's defence expenditure recorded only a 1.67 percent increase, moving from \$40.9 billion to \$41.5 billion.

¹⁹ Singapore is an interesting case, as defence expenditure rose consistently over the studied period, an indication that the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis had a minimal effect on the Singaporean economy.

²⁰ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).




Figure 4.2 - Australian and Japanese Defence Spending 2000 - 2016²¹

As we can see in Figure 4.2, Japan’s defence expenditure remained consistent over the studied period. This consistency is markedly different from the Australian experience, where an observable increase occurs in-line with Australian military engagements in the Middle East. Australian defence expenditure slowed markedly in between the 2008-09 budgets, plateaued in 2010, and began to decrease, as the Global Financial Crisis impacted government expenditure. One key point that is not evident in Figure 4.2, is that Australia’s defence spending has consistently declined as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product since 1995, reaching a nadir of 1.56 percent

²¹ Ibid.

in 2010-11.²² The last time in history that Australia's defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP was so low was 1938, a comparison that provoked significant consternation amongst Australian defence strategists.²³ Frustratingly, Australian defence expenditure is often determined by funding models provided in the semi-regular Defence White Papers. The 2009 White Paper, the first since 2003, declared that there would be 3 percent real growth in the Australian Defence budget over the coming decade.²⁴ However, this growth did not materialise, and the 2013 White Paper made no mention of a percentage growth figure, vaguely stating only that,

the Government is committed to increasing Defence funding towards a target of 2 percent of GDP. This is a long-term objective that will be implemented in an economically responsible manner as and when fiscal circumstances allow.²⁵

Japanese defence expenditure had been formally capped at one percent of their GDP until 1987, when Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro passed a military budget amounting to 1.004 percent of GDP.²⁶ Despite the removal of the formal cap, defence spending only exceeded the now *de facto* cap in 1988 and 1989, when the budget recorded spending of 1.013 percent and 1.006 percent respectively.²⁷ This *de facto* limit, when combined with the restriction on arms exports and

²² David Watt and Alan Payne, "Trends in Defence Expenditure Since 1901," Budget Review 2013-14 (Canberra: Department of Parliamentary Services, May 2013), p. 55,

http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/2891592/upload_binary/2891592.pdf.

²³ Ross Babbage, "Little Security in Defence Budget," *The Australian*, July 17, 2012; Mark Thomson, "The Cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2012-13" (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2012).

²⁴ Commonwealth of Australia, "Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030," Defence White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009), p. 137,

http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf.

²⁵ Australian Government, "Defending Australia and Its National Interests," Defence White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defence, May 13, 2013), p. 72, http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf.

²⁶ Clyde Haberman, "Japan Formally Drops Military Spending Cap," *The New York Times*, January 25, 1987;. Interestingly, when he was head of the Japanese Defense Agency, prior to becoming Prime Minister, Nakasone had argued for an increase in defence expenditure from 1 percent to 3 percent. See, Robert Harvey, *The Undeclared: The Rise, Fall and Rise of Greater Japan* (London: MacMillan Company, 1994), p. 363.

²⁷ John C. Wright, "The Persistent Power of 1 Percent," Forum Issue No. 4 (Washington, DC: Sasakawa Peace Foundation, September 2016), p. 4.

constitutional limits on military activity led to a critical underfunding of Japanese defence architecture and its ability to build influence in the Asia Pacific. As the relative stability of first decade of the post-Cold War era gave way to the limitless ‘War on Terror’, an isolated and threatening North Korea, and an increasingly assertive China, the vulnerability felt by Japan meant in effect, that it was both unable to cover the cost of its own deterrence and unable to stabilise its immediate neighbourhood through cooperative defence-related activities and exchanges. In addition, as we can see from Figure 4.2, the marginal increases in Japanese defence expenditure would not have kept up with the cost of military modernisation and capability levels. The one percent cap both provided domestic political cover for the government from seeking to increase defence spending and thus continue to have their security and regional stability underwritten by the United States and prevented any internal discussion regarding defence objectives or a vision for a regional security role. However, the unceasing vulnerability prompted consideration of the existing Japanese defence and acquisition structure, seeking to coordinate with the institutions utilised by the United States and Australia.

Defining Limits in Defence Procurement

Having perceived an emerging or extant threat to the community, the next steps are to determine the compatibility of each state’s objectives in relation to their partners and assess the limitations of each state. Although defence expenditure had begun to increase, the size of a state’s defence budget does not correlate with a judicious doctrine, effective training, grounded leadership, or organisational coherence. Therefore by, adopting, or at least pursuing complementary defence

acquisition strategies, the trilateral community could deconflict and strengthen their internal coordination regarding the capability acquisition process. The defence acquisition frameworks for all three states differ substantially. Although the United States and Australia both have long-established agencies and processes that engage with all facets of defence procurement, the United States' primacy as a defence manufacturer, has meant that its procurement process are largely developed from within the domestic market. By contrast, Australia, historically dependent on the power projection capabilities of the 'great and powerful friend', has frequently purchased equipment from the international defence markets. As noted in Chapter 2, part of the transition from dependence on the United Kingdom to the United States involved a switch in the sourcing of the majority of defence materiel from the former to the latter.

Despite the differences between the Australian and United States' defence procurement markets, both states have established agencies to guide purchases for the provision of national security. In the United States, within the Department of Defence, the Office of Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics oversees a three-step system for defence acquisitions – first, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) identifies a requirement for mission completion. Second, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) prepares a budget for the acquisition and distributes resources accordingly. Finally, the Defence Acquisition System determines whether the program meets the requirement as identified in JCIDS and manages the program through each 'Milestone Review' through to completion.²⁸

²⁸ The three milestones pertain to the 'Pre-Systems Acquisitions, Systems Acquisition, and Sustainment' phases of program acquisition. For specific detail of the United States defence acquisition process, see Moshe Schwartz, "Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapons Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 23, 2014), pp. 6-13.

The size and strength of the defence contracting business in the United States is supported by labyrinthine series of regulations and norms designed to promote and protect their domestic industry. These regulations range from the over 1,800 pages of regulations governing the defence acquisitions, the independence of each branch of the armed services in the acquisition process, the Buy American Act, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, the Berry Amendment, and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.²⁹

In contrast, Australia's defence acquisitions, historically 'off-the-shelf' (OTS) programs researched and developed overseas rather than domestically produced, were managed through the former-Defence Materiel Organisation, now the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group within the Department of Defence. Given Australia's lack of a domestic defence development industry, purchasing OTS military equipment has been endorsed by successive Australian governments, whilst maintaining various domestic industries to tailor the products to Australian Defence Force requirements. However, the tension that exists within the broader Australian defence community is whether the Australian defence budget is intended or indeed able to serve the dual role of both satisfying defence requirements and supporting and stimulating Australia's domestic defence industry.³⁰ As noted, Australia's history of defence procurement clearly trends towards the purchase of overseas equipment, a trend that leaves it vulnerable to changes in supply

²⁹ General Services Administration, *Federal Acquisition Regulation* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005). Jeffrey Drezner et al., "Measuring the Statutory and Regulatory Constraints on DoD Acquisition," Technical Report (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2006), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR347.pdf; John Ronald Fox, *Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960-2009: An Elusive Goal* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012).

³⁰ Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, "Principles and Practice: Australian Defence Industry and Exports," Inquiry of the Defence Sub-Committee (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, November 2015), p. 1, http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Defence_Industry_Exports/Report.

and frustrates domestic industry development. However, these policies make defence integration a desirable strategy for Australia.

In April 1995, Australia and the United States signed a Memorandum of Agreement on Reciprocal Defence Procurement, the first agreement of its kind that the United States had signed with a non-NATO partner.³¹ The preamble to the Memorandum noted the expectation that the United States and Australia would “promote interoperability of their military equipment...”³² This Memorandum was followed in 2007 by the US-Australia Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, which would ease the export controls enacted by both states and provided streamlined access to defence trade. The significance of this Treaty can be found in the fact that it was the second such treaty, behind the United Kingdom, that the United States had signed with another state. The Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty similarly noted in the preamble the mutual desire for Australia and the United States to “achieve and sustain fully interoperable forces...”³³ These two mentions of interoperability, particularly in the Memorandum indicate the long-term strategy that both states had towards serious reform of their armed services. The mention of interoperability in the 2007 Defence Trade Cooperation is less unusual as it had come after Australia had been military engaged with the United States for six years in Iraq and Afghanistan. By contrast in 1995, outside of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Australia and the United States had not been involved

³¹ Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and Government of the United States of America, “Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States Concerning Reciprocal Defence Procurement” (1995).

³² Ibid.

³³ Government of the United States of America and Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, “Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Australia Concerning Defence Trade Cooperation” (2013).

together in a military engagement since the Gulf War, and there no imminent conflicts that would have justified the attempts towards interoperability.

Regarding defence procurement, Japan, again due to domestic constraints, has only recently begun to seriously engage with the international defence procurement industry. As noted, Japan's one percent cap on military expenditure did not allow the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to maintain their capability or modernise their defence programs or the delivery of defence-related services. It was only in 2015 that the Japanese Government established the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) to centralise and reform defence procurement, using the United States defence acquisition process as a model. The previous model for defence procurement had been reformed after a series of corruption scandals in the late-1990s that involved the inflation of contract prices. The reform of the Japanese defence procurement system took some 12 years to complete, hindered by further corruption allegations and the 2009 election that ushered in a change of government.³⁴ Despite modelling their defence procurement system on the one used by the United States, the Japanese defence procurement process bears similarity to Australia's in the sense that Japan elects to purchase off-the-shelf equipment, a decision that has contributed to the hollowing out of Japan's indigenous defence industry. The reform of the Japanese acquisition process was rewarded by the United States with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement.³⁵ Similar to the Memorandum and Defense

³⁴ "Japan's Defense Agency Head Quits after Corruption Probe Finds Coverup," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 20, 1998; "Investigators Search Defense Ministry in Japanese Bribery Scandal," *The New York Times*, November 29, 2007.

³⁵ Department of Defense of the United States and Ministry of Defense of Japan, "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of the Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Japan Concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement" (2016).

Cooperation Treaty the United States had signed with Australia, this Memorandum expressed the desire to “promote the objectives of rationalisation, standardisation, interoperability, and mutual logistics support...”³⁶

Comparing the three states and their defence equipment acquisition, allows us to identify the factors that have guided their development and undergird their confidence regarding the future interoperability of their equipment and forces. The structure of the United States defence industry and procurement system highlights the fundamental economic fact that US contractors retain huge, if not insurmountable, advantages over their international competitors, the fundamental political fact is that these companies employ a coterie of advisors who have both deep contacts within the defence industry, but also highly specialised knowledge of the incredibly complex US defence acquisition industry. In the era of increased budgetary pressure and stronger international competition, US defence contractors have an interest in increasing their market. This benefits partners like Australia and Japan, both of whom have a national interest in closer and deeper ties with the United States but pay the price for hollowing out their own tech defence industries and becoming technologically dependent on the United States.

On the other hand, as longstanding purchasers of ‘off-the-shelf’ defence equipment, this pattern of ever deeper engagement with US defence contractors may ensure that the armed services of Australia and Japan maintain their modernisation and combat effectiveness, while offering offer critical chances to the respective domestic industries to be involved in research and development

³⁶ Ibid.

of advanced defence programs, while providing some degree of leverage to keep the attention of the United States firmly focused on Asia Pacific.

Multilateral Military Exercises: Fostering Trilateral Cooperation

As we saw in Chapter 1, the number of actors in an environment is directly linked to the provision of trust and cooperation. Environments with a low number of actors are less complex and therefore more conducive to higher levels of trust and more effective cooperation. By contrast, environments with a large number of actors tend towards higher levels of complexity which acts to reduce the level of trust and the effectiveness of large-scale cooperation. We can see an example of this model in the Core Group established after the 2004 tsunami; the small number of participants were able to act swiftly to send relief for the initial HA/DR effort, a feat that would have been more difficult had there been a larger group.

States in environments with a dearth of trust guard their military strategies and capabilities carefully. This section of Chapter 4 assesses the trust and confidence building characteristics of multilateral military exercises as an indication of each member of the security community's capacity to engage cooperatively with other regional actors. Participation in military exercises promotes the maturity and efficacy of a state's armed services in relation to those of other regional actors. Multilateral military exercises serve a similar function to regional multilateral fora and HA/DR operations in that they create an environment conducive to cooperation and negotiation.

The rationale of our three states for participating in multilateral military exercises is close to the strategic interests rationale for their creation of the security community. For the United States, these exercises acted as an opportunity to maintain their hegemony and visibility in the post-Cold War era. For Australia, they acted as a crucial opportunity to engage with a wide variety of regional states. Additionally, the Australian armed forces have long been engaged in providing training for the armed services of regional and non-regional states at the Defence International Training Centre and the Australian Defence College, and therefore these multilateral engagements represented an opportunity to both reaffirm the cross-cultural connections and provide an example of the strength of Australia's defence training facilities. As a state with a highly modernised and efficient military, the Australian defence training facilities are a critical component of its soft power operation. Finally, for Japan, these exercises serve a dual purpose both as a quantifier of their military normalisation and modernisation by virtue of their inclusion, and as a demonstration of their capabilities in a controlled environment. This is particularly prescient given the complexity of exercises such as Talisman Sabre and Southern Jackaroo. Participation in these exercises needs to be understood within the context of the drive to institutionalise interoperability between the trilateral community.

Of the multilateral military exercises conducted in the Asia Pacific region, the Pacific Partnership, the Proliferation Security Initiative, Cobra Gold, the ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREx), the various ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM)-Plus

exercises,³⁷ and the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise are the most important for the purposes of this section. These exercises are an important representation of the cross-section of regional military exercises, ranging from ones administered by states, to those administered by the regional institutions. There is a distinct difference between the exercises administered by the regional institutions, and those administered by states. The exercises administered by the Asia Pacific regional institutions have so far tended towards increasing capabilities in the realm of HA/DR operations. The reasons for this are two-fold, first, there is a genuine need for states in the Asia Pacific region to comfortably operate around and with each other with respect to minor sensitivity HA/DR operations. Second, HA/DR operations remain a largely incontestable area of public good provision, and so are acceptable operations around which multilateral cooperation should be based.

In contrast, military exercises led by the United States or other regional states place a premium on the compatibility or interoperability between forces. The Cobra Gold and RIMPAC exercises are critical opportunities to showcase the dynamism and modernisation of regional armed services, and they play an important role in portraying the United States as engaged in the region, buttressing its role as the stability guarantor and demonstrating engagement in the Asia Pacific, an increasing necessity considering the increased role that China has come to play in the region.³⁸ This is seen clearly in the decision by the United States to scale-down, but not cancel their participation in the Cobra Gold exercises after the ousting of the Yingluck Shinawatra government in 2014.³⁹ Although

³⁷ For the full list of exercises, see ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting, "ADMM-Plus Achievements," February 16, 2017, <https://admm.asean.org/index.php/about-admm/about-admm-plus/2013-01-22-11-00-45.html>.

³⁸ Amy Sawitta Lefevre, "Thailand 'Supports' China's Efforts to Maintain Maritime Peace," *Reuters*, September 7, 2016.

³⁹ Gregory B Poling, "The Case for Holding Cobra Gold 2015 in Thailand," *Southeast Asia from Scott Circle* (blog), October 30, 2014, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/southeast-asia-scott-circle-case-holding-cobra-gold-2015-thailand>.

there was criticism over the decision to continue these exercises, in effect legitimising the Thai military *coup d'état*, the strategic importance of the exercises outweighed the desire for democratic governance, as indeed it did in the case of the 2006 *coup d'état*.⁴⁰ The Cobra Gold exercise is the largest of its kind in the region, with some 35 nations included in 2016, either as participants or as observers. Japan began to send observer forces in 2001 and has been an active participant in these exercises since 2005.⁴¹ Australia has also sent participant and observer forces and considers the Cobra Gold exercises to be a critical component of their growing amphibious warfare capabilities.⁴²

The Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), hosted and administered by the United States Navy and conducted biannually off the coast of Honolulu, Hawaii, is the largest multilateral military exercise in the world. The first exercise took place in 1971 and was attended by the members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Since then, Australia, Canada, and the United States have attended every RIMPAC exercise. Japan too, was an early participant in the exercises, sending their first contingent of Maritime Self-Defense Forces to RIMPAC in 1980.⁴³ As noted by Euan Graham, the MSDF had sought to participate in RIMPAC since its inception in 1971, but were prevented by furious internal

⁴⁰ Adam R. Cole, "CTF 76 Begins Cobra Gold 2006 in Thailand," May 18, 2006, www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=23706; "Exercise Cobra Gold: Defence Strategist Says US Likely to Keep Annual Thai War Games out of NT," *The Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, June 27, 2014; David Brunnstrom, "US Says That Military Rule Likely to Last Longer than Expected," *Reuters*, June 25, 2014.

⁴¹ Eric Slavin, "Japan Is New Player at Cobra Gold: Training with Foreign Militaries a Big Step for Self-Defense Force," *Stars and Stripes*, May 9, 2005.

⁴² Ken Gleiman and Peter J Dean, "Beyond 2017: The Australian Defence Force and Amphibious Warfare" (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 2015), p. 19, https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/beyond-2017-the-australian-defence-force-and-amphibious-warfare/Beyond_2017_amphibious_capability.pdf.

⁴³ Euan Graham, *Japan's Sea Lane Security, 1940-2004: A Matter of Life or Death?* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 134.

opposition from the Japanese Defence Agency (the precursor to the Ministry of Defence).⁴⁴ This demonstrates again, as noted in Chapter 3 with regard to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, the strength of the Japanese government bureaucracies vis-à-vis other elements of the Japanese state. As RIMPAC is designed to test the tactical capabilities of its participants' armed services, the benefits of training and interoperability are offered alongside the growing importance of the neutrality of the sea lines of communication.

Through both the Cobra Gold and RIMPAC exercises we can see growing cooperation and familiarity between the armed forces of the trilateral states in the different settings administered by both exercises. The Cobra Gold exercises place a heavy emphasis on the likely features of a regional conflict, amphibious-based capabilities and operations associated with jungle and urban combat. In contrast, RIMPAC has a far heavier deepwater maritime focus, with training including “[R]eplenishments-at-sea, submarine search and rescue, aircraft refuelling, and multiday diving operations.”⁴⁵ However, in an indication that the parameters of the RIMPAC exercises are changing, the 2016 exercise included for the first time an amphibious operations training scenario off the coast of southern California.⁴⁶ The inclusion of the amphibious exercise in the 2016 RIMPAC indicates that the United States has an interest in aligning the objectives of both exercises, to build the capacity of regional states given the inability of the ASEAN processes to conciliate the claims and counterclaims of the regional maritime domains. The addition of the amphibious exercise to the most recent RIMPAC exercise is an indication that the United States

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Miranda Williams, “Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2016 Concludes,” August 5, 2016, <http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/lcs4/Pages/Exercise-Rim-of-the-Pacific-2016-Concludes-.aspx>.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

looked to demonstrate the interoperability it has with other regional partners, particularly considering the importance of freedom of navigation operations to the trilateral community.⁴⁷

In RIMPAC we can most obviously see the growing closeness of the trilateral community. The long-term participation of both Australia and Japan is a key indicator of their commitment and their growing compatibility with the United States and importantly with each other. The joint participation of both the Japanese MSDF and GSDF is a concrete conceptualisation of the outline given in the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond, which identified areas of joint operations to be furthered both within the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and with the United States military.⁴⁸ In recognition of Japan's contribution, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Rear Admiral Koji Manabe acted as Vice Commander of the Combined Task Force at RIMPAC 2016. Similarly, Australia's long association and familiarity with the United States resulted in Royal Australian Navy Commodore Malcolm Wise having command of the maritime component of RIMPAC.

⁴⁷ See Ronald O'Rourke, "Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 6, 2017), pp. 44-50, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf>.

⁴⁸ See Ministry of Defense of Japan, "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond" (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense of Japan, December 17, 2013), http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf.

Medium Security Cooperation

This section considers security cooperation at the middle tier of sensitivity. At this level, the participating states have indicated that they have the ability to participate in more complex humanitarian assistance operations, branching out into peacekeeping and peacebuilding exercises. As we will see in this section, the trilateral community also has furthered their desire to integrate the capabilities of their armed services, transitioning towards an arrangement that would induce further complementarity in the community's defence materiel, to heighten and encourage interoperability. This section will also highlight the large number of bilateral and trilateral military exercises conducted between the three states. In contrast to the earlier discussion of multilateral exercises, these minilateral exercises are intimate, technically specific, and greatly increase the fluency of the trilateral community's interoperable capabilities.

Military Operations Other than War: Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The increasing subtlety of conflict among states seen in trade, ambiguous borders, and above all in cyber-attacks has encouraged a concurrent evolution in the role of the armed services in peacetime. As noted, the Asia Pacific region bears the brunt of more natural disasters than any other region on the globe. In addition to the devastation wrought by local or regional disasters, the key component of the disaster management is maintaining the stability of a foreign state, a unfamiliar role for the military. The logic of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), developed by the United States during the 1990s, promoted the understanding of the critical changes to the international environment, particularly the trans-national nature of traditional and non-traditional

security challenges.⁴⁹ This concept covered joint operations, logistics, search and rescue, the keeping and enforcement of peace, and the protection of lines of communication.⁵⁰

Translating this concept to the Asia Pacific, however, is not a straightforward endeavour. Maintaining stability in the Asia Pacific region is a key goal for each state in the trilateral community as maintaining a modern military, that is one that is efficient, effective, and capable across a variety of domains, requires a clear doctrine and experienced leadership. Despite the size or budget of many state militaries in the Asia Pacific, their operational capacity is undercut by their inexperience. This inexperience lends itself to rigidity and inflexibility and furthers the risk of miscalculation and distrust.⁵¹ As we shall see, Australia, Japan and the United States have undertaken a series of operations to ground, expand, and hone their cultural and political familiarity with one another. After coordinating and cooperating in the lowest tier of humanitarian assistance and disaster relations, the trilateral community engaged with the more complex tasks of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in post-conflict societies.

Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Compared to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in the aftermath of natural and ecological catastrophes, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are far more complex and fragile

⁴⁹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War," Joint Publication (Virginia: The Pentagon, June 16, 1995), pp. vii-x, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_07.pdf.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Michael Wines, "US Alarmed by Harsh Tone of China's Military," *The New York Times*, October 11, 2010.

endeavours. The designation of peacekeeping and peacebuilding as issues of medium sensitivity acknowledges the high-stakes nature of their undertaking.⁵² The destabilising impact that that weak and failing states have on regional stability is a large factor in determining the role that operations to keep and build peace have on the global stage. Although, peacekeeping and peacebuilding seem intrinsically linked and the latter is often seen to flow from the former, it is important to establish the key conceptual difference between these two types of peace operations.

Peacekeeping, as defined by the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation is “guided by three basic principles: consent of the parties, impartiality, [and] non-use of force except in self-defense and defence of the mandate.”⁵³ By contrast, peacebuilding, designed to establish a durable peace, is not an impartial process, and may not occur with the consent of the warring parties. In resolving to create a durable peace by addressing the ‘underlying causes’ of conflict within a state, successful peacebuilding seeks to reconstruct the societal institutions and norms that underpin a liberal democratic state. In peacebuilding, the actors often must choose to endorse a side, adding the unstable element of domestic politics to both their actions and themselves.

Complicating this role determination is the debate over Westphalian and post-Westphalian understandings of peace operations. Broadly, the Westphalian perspective of peace operations argues that events relating to human suffering within a state’s internationally recognised borders, are not the concern of other states unless either interstate peace and security or international order

⁵² See Paul Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2003), chap. 3.

⁵³ United Nations Peacekeeping, “Peacekeeping Operations,” United Nations Peacekeeping, June 14, 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml>.

are breached.⁵⁴ In contrast, post-Westphalian perspectives argue that liberal democratic states are more conducive to long-term interstate peace and that the foreign policy of a state is reflective of its internal domestic politics.⁵⁵ Further, states adopting a post-Westphalian perspective consider that peace should be promoted and enforced within states with a history of violence and that states can be held responsible for their treatment of their citizens, a direct contravention of Westphalian norms of sovereignty.⁵⁶ This debate matters for our purposes as the key regional institutions in the Asia Pacific region are more grounded in the Westphalian perspective, than is our trilateral community.

The tension between acting as a ‘good neighbour’ and adhering to regional norms of non-intervention and promoting liberal democratic norms adds an additional level of complexity to effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. As states deeply engaged with, but peripheral to, ‘Asia’, the trilateral community faces the twin challenges of history and authenticity, when acting to stabilise states and promote liberal democratic standards. It is the latter part that often provokes consternation, as promoting liberal democratic standards often requires institutional, economic, and societal reconstruction within states.

⁵⁴ Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. 4.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Richard Falk, “Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia,” *The Journal of Ethics* 6 (2002): 311–52, p. 313.

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding represent what might be termed the minimalist and maximalist standards of peace operations.⁵⁷ Peacekeeping, as it aims for the affected state to resolve its internal conflict mediated by a multilateral force with international oversight, though the purpose of the mission is to attain and maintain the cessation of hostilities, rather than to reconcile the warring parties. Peacebuilding is a multidimensional and long-term effort to assist a populace to rebuild a functional and resilient society. Successful peacebuilding requires resources, doctrine and leadership to move through the post-conflict stages of societal reconstruction, from the prevention of immediate conflict, to conflict management, to the rehabilitation of institutions and regions necessary to ensuring a stable peace.

Of the two peace operations, peacekeeping is far more widely accepted in the Asia Pacific region, as it ties neatly in with the prevailing Westphalian norms of consent and impartiality. Peacebuilding, as it requires a far greater commitment with no certainty of success, is still an underdeveloped concept in the international, and certainly regional, arena.⁵⁸

Trilateral Conceptions of Peacebuilding

How do each of the trilateral states conceptualise and operationalise the notion of peacebuilding?

All three states have adopted differing, but not conflicting, strategies to the approach of this peace

⁵⁷ See Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, "Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies," *International Studies Perspectives* 9 (2008): 1–21.

⁵⁸ See W. A. Knight, "Evaluating Recent Trends in Peacebuilding Research," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 3, no. 2 (2003): 241–64, pp. 242–50.

operation. Japan, as we have established, has consistently pursued a ‘comprehensive’ approach to foreign policy and national security.⁵⁹ Constrained by their constitution and political convention, a dedication to the concept of human security has emerged from within this comprehensive approach. As noted by Prime Minister Obuchi Keziō (1998-2000) in a December 1998 speech,

While the phrase ‘human security’ is a relatively new one, I understand that it is the key which comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and strengthens the efforts to confront those threats. Since many of the problems affecting human security cross national borders, no country can solve such problems alone. The co-ordinated action of the international community is necessary. Moreover, since these problems directly affect the lives of human beings, and since it is this area where the activities of citizens through NGOs and others are most effective, it is important for governments and international organizations to strengthen the linkages and cooperation with citizen's activities to cope with such problems.⁶⁰

Following Obuchi’s statement, the Japanese government donated US\$4.2 million to establish the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security.⁶¹ This speech, donation, and commitment came amidst the Asian Financial Crisis and the deteriorating situation in Timor-Leste. Obuchi’s mention of transnational problems as well as a call for the coordinated effort of the international community indicate that Japan saw a regional role in the offering. Obuchi’s statement was an announcement that Japan would seek to practice peacebuilding, in addition to only funding it and leaving the difficult work of implementation to other parties. A successor to Obuchi, Koizumi Junichirō, furthered pushed for normalisation, remarking in 2002 in Sydney that, “[t]he Government of Japan will consider how to increase our international role by providing an added pillar for the

⁵⁹ See Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Japan’s Dual Hedge,” *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 5 (October 2002): 110–21.

⁶⁰ Keizō Obuchi, “The Asian Crisis: Meeting the Challenges to Human Security” (An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, Tokyo, December 2, 1998), <http://www.jcie.or.jp/thinknet/tomorrow/lobuchi.html>.

⁶¹ Fatoumata Ndiaye, “Management of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security,” Audit Report (New York: Internal Audit Division, Office of Internal Oversight Services, January 29, 2010), sec. Introduction, https://usun.state.gov/sites/default/files/organization_pdf/144941.pdf.

consolidation of peace and nation building. We hope to cooperate with Australia, which has expertise and experience in this area.”⁶²

Australia’s approach to peacebuilding has closely mirrored and supported the evolution of the concept through the United Nations framework. Understanding that peacebuilding must address the root causes of intrastate conflict, Australia has deployed over 65,000 personnel to peace and security operations in the period 1947-2012.⁶³ Japan has deployed 9,500 personnel in the period 1992-2012.⁶⁴ For the United States, the data is less clear, as US troops have only been deployed on missions identified as ‘peacekeeping’ since the end of the Cold War.⁶⁵ Approximately 71,500 troops were deployed in four peacekeeping operations from 1992 – 2004 in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.⁶⁶ In a comprehensive report on Australia’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in the Australasian region, 11 lessons were identified for success in peace operations.

The lessons related to:

- National ownership and local leadership.
- Long-term commitment to capacity building
- Regional cooperation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
- An understanding of the non-linear relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

⁶² Junichirō Koizumi, “Japan and Australia: Toward a Creative Partnership” (Asia Society, Sydney, May 1, 2002), <http://asiasociety.org/australia/japan-and-australia-toward-creative-partnership>.

⁶³ Australian Civil-Military Centre, “Partnering for Peace: Australia’s Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Experience in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, and in Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste” (Queanbeyan: Australian Civil-Military Centre, 2012), p. 5, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ACMC-PFP-REPORT.pdf>.

⁶⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Efforts for Peace and Stability of Japan and the International Community,” in *Diplomatic Bluebook 2013* (Tokyo: Government Printing Office, 2013).

⁶⁵ Nina M. Serafino, “Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of US Military Involvement” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 13, 2006), pp. 6-7, <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/p/peacekeeping-and-related-stability-operations.html>.

⁶⁶ Nina M. Serafino, “Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of US Military Involvement” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 13, 2006), <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/p/peacekeeping-and-related-stability-operations.html>.

- Comprehensive civilian-military integrated missions.
- Strengthening of the judicial and correctional systems
- High visibility of civilian experts.
- Engaging women in the decision-making process.
- The adoption of context-specific mandates.
- Mission length to be determined by on the ground requirements rather than by budgets.
- The use of data collection and analytical evaluation from all missions to improve overall operational quality.⁶⁷

The institution which produced this report, the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC), demonstrates the whole-of-government approach Australia takes to peace operations. Established by Prime Minister Rudd in 2008, ACMC is staffed by civil servants from the Federal Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Australian Agency for International Development, and Australian Federal Police, and the Attorney-General's Department. This capacity for an integrated, singular process through which peace operations could be assessed and improved came after the Australian-led peacekeeping, and later peacebuilding, force was engaged in Timor-Leste.

Prior to the establishment of ACMC, an interdepartmental committee, comprised of members of the Australian Federal Police, the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), acted to consider regional peace operations.⁶⁸ The successful 2003 Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was organised under this semi-permanent structure and the further creation of the ACMC is a key indication of Australia's long-term strategy to institutionalise peace operation capacity.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Ibid, pp. 6-7.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 47.

⁶⁹ The success of RAMSI lay in the conceptualisation of the operation as a program to stabilise the state and rebuild the financial, judicial, and security apparatus, as well as health, education, and other civic institutions.

If Japan is considered to reside at one conceptual end of the peacebuilding process with its focus on civilian-led multinational approaches, Australia is in the conceptual ‘middle’ with an historic focus on an integrated approach while the United States would represent the opposite conceptual end, with a military-oriented approach to peacebuilding operations. This military approach is in line with the contemporary US view that weak and failed states represented a threat to US hegemony and national security, a point first made after the first battle of Mogadishu and consolidated after the September 11 attacks. Therefore, we must consider US peace operations in the context of the global war on terror.

This counterterrorism setting is seen in the 2002 National Security Strategy (2002 NSS), which outlined the need to form “cooperative security arrangements...[against] these emerging transnational threats.”⁷⁰ Additionally, the NSS noted that “[w]hen violence erupts and states falter, the United States will work with friends and partners to alleviate suffering and restore stability.”⁷¹ This emphasis on military cooperation to stabilise warring regions is a measure of the fact that the United States did not utilise a ‘whole of government’ approach to peace operations, allowing instead the military to largely monopolise the provision of resources to be used for post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation, to the detriment of civilian diplomats and aid agencies.⁷² As Secretary John Kerry noted in the introduction to the 2016 State Department budget request,

⁷⁰ George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, September 17, 2002), p. 11, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, p. 9.

⁷² Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs” (Washington, DC: Department of State, February 2, 2015), p. 1, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236395.pdf>; Lorelei Kelly and Erik Leaver, “Unbalanced Security: The Divide between State and Defense,” *Foreign Policy in Focus* (blog), March 28, 2007, http://fpif.org/unbalanced_security_the_divide_between_state_and_defense/; Bryan Bender, “Pentagon Muscles out State Dept on Foreign Aid,” *Politico*, March 23, 2016.

“[T]here are few more reliable – or damaging – applause lines than to promise to slash the budgets of the State Department and USAID.”⁷³

A promising corrective to the disconnection between the relevant US agencies associated with peace operations was the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilisation and Reconstruction (S/CRS) within the State Department in 2004. The *raison d’etre* of the S/CRS was to:

[L]ead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.⁷⁴

In this development, we can see an effort, in the end unsuccessful, to replicate the role of the semi-permanent interagency taskforce Australia had successfully established to conduct peace operations. Critically for peace operations, the S/CRS had the ability to coordinate strategy and the authority to implement that strategy across agencies in a manner consistent with its serious and bipartisan mandate. However, despite the promise of the S/CRS, it lacked a domestic constituency and failed to receive full funding from Congress, was unable to secure the support of the Secretary, often incurred the wrath of the State Department Regional Bureaus which saw it as a challenge to their mandate, clashed with USAID, which outmanoeuvred the S/CRS in budget negotiations with Congress, restricting their resources, and suffered from the waning public interest in nation-

⁷³ Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs,” p. 7.

⁷⁴ Department of State, “Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation,” Federal Government, Department of State, June 17, 2017, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/crs/>.

building.⁷⁵ With the inability of the S/CRS to affect or institutionalise any stabilisation to contemporary peace operations, the trend of a reduction in State Department power over civilian-led peace operations in favour of an expansion of the power and roles of the Defense Department has been maintained.

The active role that the US military takes in the initial stages of a peace operation to stabilise the affected area is evidence of their position as the ‘leader’ of post-conflict development. The under resourcing of civilian-led operations and the increasing complexity of post-conflict peace operations indicates the difficulty that the United States has maintaining its commitment to post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation operations.

Despite the difference in each state’s conceptual approach to post-conflict peace operations, the common key to the effectiveness to a state’s approach to post-conflict peace operations is the degree of legitimacy granted to its intervention. For the states of the trilateral community, the conceptual legitimacy of their peacebuilding operations differed. The United States sees its legitimacy as being granted by its military, economic, and diplomatic primacy, rather than solely by the recognition of the international community. Indeed, given the defence-based relationships the United States maintains with many global states, an argument could be mounted that the legitimacy of the United States’ hegemony is based on coercion. As the only superpower, its ‘constituency’ is expected to cover its global engagement, and pursuit of its interests. Australia’s

⁷⁵ Noam Unger, Margaret L. Taylor, and Frederick Barton, “Capacity for Change: Reforming US Assistance Efforts in Poor and Fragile Countries” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, April 2010), p. 7; 28-9
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04_aid_unger.pdf.

peacebuilding legitimacy has been slowly constructed through small-scale peace operations with regional states in the Pacific, with a focus on stabilising fragile or transitioning democracies, strengthening judicial institutions, and rehabilitating or constructing economic institutions. Unlike its other partners, Japan faced a far steeper road to legitimacy. Still carrying the legacy of their actions during the Pacific War, the human security focus established by Prime Minister Obuchi, indicated that protecting the citizens of other states would be the prime aim of Japan's new security agenda. To that end, the Self-Defense Forces' strongest skills have been developed in engineering, particularly in logistical reconstruction, roads and water purification.⁷⁶

Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Operations

The United States undoubtedly has the greatest material and geographic capability in conducting peace operations, Australia, a moderate ability, and Japan, the least ability. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has participated in six peacebuilding missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Australia has participated in five such missions, in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (Bougainville), Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Japan has participated in seven peace operations after its non-participation in the first Gulf War: Cambodia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia, South Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan. However, Japan is yet to deploy as 'first wave' peacekeepers.

⁷⁶ David Hunter-Chester, *Creating Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force, 1945-2015: A Sword Well Made* (London: Lexington Books, 2016), pp. 208-9.

All these missions can be separated into two tiers of operations. The first tier involves deploying forces in a manner consistent with protecting or reinforcing the state apparatuses related to the rule of law and governance. The second tier requires the rehabilitation of the institutions that form the foundation of a liberal democratic state and indicates that the society would require a long-term commitment to attain stability. Missions in the first tier would include Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Bougainville, Solomon Islands, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Second tier missions include those in Timor-Leste, South Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

INTERFET: Practical Peace Enforcement

Increased comfort and familiarity between military forces is a key signifier of deeper confidence and trust between armed services. The joint peacebuilding operations that have a clear military-centric element are those second-tier missions in Timor-Leste, South Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This is owing to both the role that combat forces were required to undertake in the initial days of the peace operation, and the large amount of military resources provided due to the presence of the combat forces. Although these four missions are grouped together as second-tier operations, the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq resulted from the multilateral military interventions against an internationally recognised state, rather than internal conflict that required an international intervention to ensure the stability of a new state as was the case for both Timor-Leste and South Sudan. In these four examples, all three trilateral states were involved in post-conflict peace stabilisation operations, providing multiple opportunities for ongoing close-knit military operations.

The International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) represented a critical moment for the regional security stabilisation efforts of all three states and provided important momentum for the emerging Australia-Japan security relationship. Constrained by their constitution, despite the passage of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, Japan donated US\$100 million to the international, non-United Nations peacekeeping taskforce lead by Australia, which was followed by the deployment of peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET).⁷⁷

Despite Australia's official response to Japan's donation, some Australian planners misunderstood the conditions under which the Japanese Government would be able to deploy the Japanese Self Defence Forces.⁷⁸ Under their peacekeeping law, Japan was prohibited from contributing to personnel to non-UN peacekeeping operations or deploying them in active conflict zones and was unable to contribute. The passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272 established a transitional administration in Timor-Leste freed Japan to participate in the peacekeeping operation.⁷⁹ The financial contribution made by Tokyo was made at the request of developing states in Southeast Asia, still suffering the effects of the economic turndown, in order to support their participation in the multinational coalition, a fact not fully appreciated by Australian planners

⁷⁷ Alexander Downer, "East Timor - Japanese Contribution to Interfet Trust Fund," *Minister for Foreign Affairs* (blog), October 6, 1999, http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/1999/fa108_99.html; United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1246," Pub. L. No. S/RES/1246 (1999).

⁷⁸ Yoichi Funabashi, "Uncertainty and Irritation Taint Australia-Japan Relationship," *Asahi Shimbun*, November 18, 1999; Peter McCutcheon, "Japan Critical of Howard over East Timor," *AM* (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, November 19, 1999).

⁷⁹ The National Diet of Japan, "Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations," Pub. L. No. No. 79 (1992).

at the time.⁸⁰ The largest contingent of Japanese forces came in the form of 680 JSDF engineering personnel whom arrived in Timor-Leste in March 2002. Altogether, some 1600 JSDF personnel would rotate through Timor-Leste over the course of the UN Transitional Administration mission.⁸¹ The importance of the Timor-Leste peace operation for Japan is that it began the process of institutionalising collaboration between peacekeeping operations and Japan's Official Development Assistance. This is important as it elevated the role of Japanese peacekeepers to peacebuilders over a period of three years, providing critical legitimacy for Japan's emerging human security-focused operations.

The misunderstanding of Japan's ability to deploy its armed forces came about largely due to the differences in threat perception. For the Japanese, the prime motivating factors were the maintenance of the key sea lines of communication (SLOCs), the political stability of the Indonesian archipelago, and the protection of sizable investments made in Indonesia.⁸² For Australia, the marauding pro-Indonesian militia presented a genuine threat to the stability of relations between Australia and Indonesia. If Jakarta was unable to curb the excesses of military leaders, then it escalated the possibility that Australia may be caught in an unintended conflict with a much more populous neighbour. Additionally, the growing humanitarian crisis in Timor-Leste documented by the Australian media placed immense pressure on the Australian Government to

⁸⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japanese Contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund for the Multinational Force in East Timor" (Tokyo, October 4, 1999), <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1999/10/1004.html>>; John Moore, MP, "Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force" (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2000); Peng Er Lam, *Japan's Peace-Building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a More Active Political Role*, Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 48.

⁸¹ Lam, *Japan's Peace-Building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a More Active Political Role*, p. 50.

⁸² As a new and fragile democracy with a history of military coups the deleterious effects of a disintegration of the Indonesian state would have severely disrupted the relative functionality of the Southeast Asian region.

act. The Australian actions were not driven by economic or national interests, and the decision to intervene, in the words of Coral Bell,

more or less demolished in three months a security and diplomatic relationship (with Indonesia) that Canberra policy-makers had been working on for more than fifty years.⁸³

Despite the misunderstandings regarding each side's contribution to the peacekeeping operation, the fact remains that both sides were late converts to the cause of self-determination in Timor-Leste. In 1996, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate José Ramos-Horta was ignored by the Japanese Government on his visit to the country, with both the Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro and Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiko both claiming that they were too busy to meet with Ramos-Horta.⁸⁴ Similarly, successive Australian Governments had not prioritised self-determination for the peoples of Timor-Leste.⁸⁵ It was the relationship that both countries had fostered with Indonesia which prevented them from joining the self-determination cause vigorously promoted by Portugal, and several non-government organisations. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis caused widespread economic instability to many of the 'Asian economic miracles', a carry on effect was the severe destabilisation of the domestic political scene.⁸⁶ The precipitous decline in the Indonesian economy (an 80 percent fall in the Indonesian Rupiah against the US Dollar) forced the resignation of the authoritarian Suharto and the collapse of his regime, providing an opening for both Australia and

⁸³ Coral Bell, "Changing the Rules of International Politics," *AUS-CSCAP Newsletter*, February 2000.

⁸⁴ Lam, *Japan's Peace-Building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a More Active Political Role*, p. 46.

⁸⁵ Fiona Reynolds, "Howard Hits Back at Keating Over Criticism," *The World Today* (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, October 5, 1999); Lam, *Japan's Peace-Building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a More Active Political Role*.

⁸⁶ See C. Johnstone, "Strained Alliance: US-Japan Diplomacy in the Asian Financial Crisis," *Survival* 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 121–38; Saori N. Katada, *Banking on Stability: Japan and the Cross-Pacific Dynamics of International Financial Crisis Management* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), chap. 8; Edward J. Lincoln, "The Asian Development Bank: Time to Wind It Up?," in *Reconfiguring East Asia: Regional Institutions and Organisations After the Crisis*, ed. Mark Beeson, 1st ed. (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 218–19.

Japan to alter their relations with Indonesia.⁸⁷ The fact that other countries in the Southeast Asian region provided support for the intervention in Timor-Leste legitimised the participation of regional (and cultural) outliers, Australia and Japan.

The security cooperation between Australia and Japan in Timor-Leste has continued and expanded to include the United States. Since 2014, personnel from the Australian Army, the US Army, Navy, and Marines, the Japanese GDSF, and the Timor-Leste Defence Force have participated in Exercise *Hari'i Hamutuk* (Build Together), an exercise designed to increase the interoperability of the participating engineering corps in responding to HA/DR operations.⁸⁸ Additionally, the trilateral exercise is a critical example of strengthening Timor-Leste's civil society, in format of support pioneered by Australia's approach to regional leadership, by providing the defence forces with the ability to respond to in-country natural disasters, lessening their reliance on external forces. Additionally, promoting interoperability between Timor-Leste and the trilateral community indicates that the community, less free with funds than other militarily powerful regional states, sees capacity building and military interoperability as an effective substitute for ongoing support.

⁸⁷ David Richardson, "Asian Financial Crisis," Current Issues Brief (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, June 29, 1998), http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/CIB9798/98cib23.

⁸⁸ Australian Embassy Timor-Leste, "Exercise Hari'i Hamutuk 2015" (Dili, September 1, 2015), <http://timorleste.embassy.gov.au/dili/3011.html>.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan highlighted the weaknesses of the individual approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding within the trilateral community. The speed with which the conflict emerged, the large scale, and the lack of a viable state institution coupled with the inexperience of the trilateral community at formal, long-term coordination highlighted the areas in which the emerging trilateral community were deficient. Although Afghanistan is less an example of positive trilateral cooperation, especially in the early stages of the conflict, it offers a transparent view of the style and structures of each state's armed forces, providing illumination for points where cooperation and complementary strategy were to be achieved in future engagements.

As this section will show, the individual strengths of the community members were overshadowed by the broader issues around the stability of the new Afghan state. Japan, self-limited in terms of their military contribution, provided fuel for coalition ships and funded critical infrastructure and other long-term stabilisation projects. Australia's integrated civil-military approach worked well in a small-scale regional setting like Timor-Leste, particularly when they exercised command, but in a large coalition without a unified command, the results of Australia's integrated peace strategy did not yield returns consistent with expectations. The two chief deficits of the United States' approach to peacebuilding in Afghanistan were the speed with which the onus of security and reconstruction were placed on the new Afghan government, and the comparatively low resources available for post-conflict reconstruction, especially after the beginning of the 2003 intervention into Iraq.

Owing to political constraints on the deployment of their military to active combat zones, the Japanese Self-Defense Force were prevented from engaging directly in either the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, or the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). However, Japan was able to contribute in an innovative fashion by providing logistical support to the United States and its allies during the combat phase of the intervention.⁸⁹ This refuelling mission lasted from November 2001 to January 2010. Another important aspect of Japan's early engagement with coalition operations in Afghanistan was the stationing of JSDF officers at US Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida from late 2001.⁹⁰ These officials, stationed at the result of a request from deputy commander of CENTCOM, Lieutenant General Michael DeLong, offered the Japanese military critical insight into the Bush Administration's conduct of the early stages of the Afghanistan conflict.

In assessing Japan's contributions to the operations in Afghanistan we can see that the focus on infrastructure that began in Timor-Leste, continued and deepened in Afghanistan with Japan disbursing USD520 million towards infrastructure projects out of a total USD1.7 billion in reconstruction assistance between 2001 and 2012.⁹¹ After the ascension of the Democratic Party

⁸⁹ This logistical contribution was enabled by the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, which permitted the Maritime Self-Defense Forces to refuel coalition vessels engaged in the US and NATO-led operations. Kuniko Ashizawa, "Japan's Approach to Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Money, Diplomacy and the Challenges of Effective Assistance," *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 9, no. 3 (December 2014): 1–16; The National Diet of Japan, "The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law" (2001), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html.

⁹⁰ Andrew L. Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), p. 4; "SDF to Station Officials at U.S. Central Command," *The Japan Times Online*, July 25, 2002.

⁹¹ Ashizawa, "Japan's Approach to Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Money, Diplomacy and the Challenges of Effective Assistance."

of Japan (DPJ) in the 2009 elections, Japan announced that they would stop their almost 10-year mission refuelling coalition ships in the Indian Ocean. To maintain their commitment to the ongoing peacebuilding process, the DPJ replaced the refuelling mission with US\$5 billion in economic development aid to Afghanistan over a five-year period.⁹² Additionally, in 2012 Japan announced a further \$3 billion over five years for economic development and security enhancement.⁹³ Japan also provided financial assistance to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the states sharing Afghanistan's north-eastern border, complementing the United States' efforts to deepen relations with states in Central Asia.⁹⁴

The Australian mission to Afghanistan is perhaps the most challenging of the peacebuilding operations involving the Australian Defence Force (ADF).⁹⁵ The ADF were deployed in response to the invocation of the ANZUS Treaty in November 2001. However, it was not until April 2009 that Australia employed the whole-of-government approach, as seen in its other peace operations.⁹⁶ Despite the ongoing nature of the deployment, four lessons are evident from the past 16 years of operation in Afghanistan that are not a typical feature of Australia-led peace building operations. First, Australia exercised only minor influence in determining the course of the operation, which

⁹² Mark McDonald, "Japan Pledges \$5 Billion in New Afghan Aid," *The New York Times*, November 10, 2009; Victoria Tuke, "Japan's Crucial Role in Afghanistan," *Asia Pacific Bulletin* (Washington, DC: East-West Centre, April 10, 2013), http://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb206_0.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=34003.

⁹³ Tuke, "Japan's Crucial Role in Afghanistan."

⁹⁴ See Elizabeth Wishnick, "Growing US Security Interests in Central Asia" (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2002), <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB110.pdf>.

⁹⁵ This is not said to denigrate the abilities or consummate professionalism of the Australian Defence Forces in peace operations, but rather indicates the chaotic nature of the military-led operation and the competing agendas during post-conflict reconstruction.

⁹⁶ From 2001-2006, the Australian presence in Afghanistan was completely comprised of the Australian Defence Force. An early Embassy was established in 2006, and AusAID and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade joined in 2008 and 2009, respectively. Australian Civil-Military Centre, "Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia's Whole-of-Government Mission" (Canberra: Australian Civil-Military Centre, November 2016), p. 7.

limited the efficacy of the post-conflict reconstruction. Second, the initial military-led operation lacked a strong civil strategy, a problem compounded when the United States intervened in Iraq 17 months after the intervention in Afghanistan, stretching Australia's available forces, and further delaying the implementation of a strong civilian aspect to the peace operation. Third, the ISAF operation was originally focused on establishing and training an Afghan security force, rather than rehabilitating the institutions to promote and safeguard the rule of law and democratic governance. Finally, the ISAF were slow to recognise the importance of civilian-led reconstruction projects in areas outside Kabul, allowing the powerful Taliban regional commanders to control supply, slowing the rehabilitation of judicial institutions outside the capital.⁹⁷

Like Australia's peace operations in Afghanistan, the United States' suffered from the disjointed arrangement and disparity between the combat and the reconstruction aspects of the operation. Despite a coalition force assisting with the intervention, the United States exercised supreme command in the combat aspect of the operation. This is a stark difference to the reconstruction period, where the United Nations is responsible for political rehabilitation, and individual donors assist with economic reconstruction. Interagency and inter-donor disunity, particularly between international NGOs and the UN-backed Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority, contributed to delays in funding for reconstruction projects.⁹⁸ Relative to other peace operations the United States undertook in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, James Dobbins notes, "The

⁹⁷ Michael G. Smith, "Australian Civil-Military Lessons from Afghanistan," in *Australia and Canada in Afghanistan: Perspectives on a Mission*, ed. Jack Cunningham and William Maley (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2015).

⁹⁸ Ray Jennings, "The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Post-war Iraq," *Peaceworks* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, April 2003), <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/pwks49.pdf>.

arrangement is a marginal improvement over Somalia...but it [the reconstruction] represents a clear regression from what was achieved in Haiti, Bosnia or, in particular, Kosovo.”⁹⁹

Iraq

The Iraq War posed a different set of conditions for interstate cooperation to those in Afghanistan. Despite consistent domestic opposition to their participation, both Australia and Japan joined the United States ‘coalition of the willing’. In practical terms, the ‘War on Terror’ was an open-ended conflict. The inability of the United Nations Security Council to agree to a post-conflict peacekeeping operation particularly troubled the Koizumi Government, as the Japanese had only ever dispatched troops in UN-mandated missions. However, the common threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was used by both Prime Ministers Howard and Koizumi to highlight the clear and present these weapons posed to both the Australian and Japanese societies. Howard explicitly linked Iraq, international terrorism, and the national security of Australia, stating “[I]f terrorists ever get their hands on weapons of mass destruction that will...constitute a direct, undeniable and lethal threat to Australia and its people...”¹⁰⁰ For Japan, the threat was less that Iraq might have access to weapons of mass destruction, but more the existential threat that a North Korea possessing weapons of mass destruction posed to Japan. Then-Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo stated that “Japan’s attitude toward the Iraq issue will naturally affect the situation over North Korea... We must make the Japan-U.S. alliance a firm one

⁹⁹ James F. Dobbins, “America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq,” *Survival* 45, no. 4 (August 2006): 87–110.

¹⁰⁰ John W. Howard, “Address on Iraq to the National Press Club” (The National Press Club, Canberra, March 13, 2003), <http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/2003/speech2185.htm>.

so that it will act as a deterrent toward the North.”¹⁰¹ Prime Minister Koizumi followed suit, stating in a March 18 press conference that,

[W]eapons of mass destruction; toxic gas and other chemical weapons, or anthrax and other biological weapons, if they fall in the hands of dictators and terrorists, it would not be the matter of tens or hundreds of lives but would be of thousands and tens of thousands of lives being threatened. This is not other people's affairs... It is extremely dangerous now that we came to the conclusion that there is no willingness to disarm on the part of the Hussein regime. I deem it appropriate to support the use of force by the United States.¹⁰²

The publics of both Australia and Japan were vociferously against the war, exacerbating the domestic risks faced by the leaders of both states.¹⁰³ The lack of a mandate from the United Nations contributed to the questions surrounding the legitimacy of the war, as did the weakness of the demonstrated connection between Iraq and international terrorism. In contrast to Afghanistan, the United States, rather than the United Nations, took charge of the post-conflict environment, with the occupation administered by the Department of Defense. Declaring major combat operations in Iraq to be finished on May 1, Bush indicated that the stabilisation and reconstruction processes would now begin. This announcement by Bush cleared the way for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to deploy to Iraq. However, despite the declared end of major combat operations, widespread violence continued across Iraq, complicating the ability of officials in determining whether any non-combat areas existed that could be used to base the JSDF. Despite their professional appearance, the JSDF had never been deployed to an active combat zone, their

¹⁰¹ Kanako Takahara, “Japan Backs Revised UN Resolution Against Iraq,” *The Japan Times*, March 9, 2003.

¹⁰² Junichirō Koizumi, “Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi’s Interview on the Issue of Iraq,” March 18, 2003, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iraq/pm_int0303.html.

¹⁰³ Annabel Crabb, “‘No’ to Going It Alone,” *The Age*, January 18, 2003; “Howard Commits Troops to War,” *The Sydney Morning Herald*, March 18, 2003; “Opinion Polls Against Iraq Conflict without UN,” *The World Today* (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, January 24, 2003); Eric Schmitt, “Japan Authorises Troops for Iraq: First Forces in War Zone Since ’45,” *The New York Times*, July 27, 2003; Jonathan Watts, “End an Era as Japan Enters Iraq,” *The Guardian*, July 25, 2003.

deployment to Iraq was a major challenge to the Japanese commitment to their security relationship with the United States.

Despite these concerns and the results of the 2003 general election, which returned Koizumi's government, albeit with a reduced majority, Koizumi claimed a 'mandate' to send the JSDF to Iraq.¹⁰⁴ The southern part of Iraq was deemed the 'safest' and thus most conducive to receiving JSDF troops for reconstruction efforts. However, at the end of November, prior to the deployment of any troops, two Japanese diplomats, Oku Katsuhiko and Inoue Masamori, were ambushed and killed while travelling from Baghdad to Tikrit to attend a conference on reconstruction.¹⁰⁵ This attack provoked furious discussion regarding the role of Japan in Iraq, and the status of the non-combat zone where the JSDF troops would operate. However, the capture of Saddam Hussein two weeks later on December 13, seemed to indicate that the remaining insurgency would diminish, and on December 26, the JSDF were deployed to the city of Samawa in the southern province of al-Muthanna.

Originally, the Japanese troops were 'protected' by Dutch forces, as they fulfilled their reconstruction mission. The planned withdrawal of Dutch forces in March 2005 threatened to prematurely end the Japanese presence. As the Japanese forces were limited to using their weapons only in self-defence, they required non-Japanese troops to provide security. After a request from the United Kingdom and a phone call from Prime Minister Koizumi, Prime Minister Howard

¹⁰⁴ Junko Takahashi, "Vote Validates JSDF's Iraq Dispatch: Koizumi," *The Japan Times*, November 11, 2003.

¹⁰⁵ Norimitsu Onishi, "Despite Danger, Japan Says Its Troops Will Still Go to Iraq," *The New York Times*, December 1, 2003; Michael Penn, *Japan and the War on Terror: Military Force and Political Pressure in the US-Japanese Alliance* (London: IB Tauris & Co, 2014), p. 90.

agreed to increase Australia's troop levels in Iraq, breaking one of his key election promises from the 2004 Australian Federal Election.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, Howard's compromise came after having previously rejecting requests from the United States, United Kingdom, and United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to increase troop levels.¹⁰⁷

This strained context makes it all the more clear that it was the request from Koizumi and the opportunity to deepen political and strategic familiarity with Japan that influenced Howard towards increasing Australia's commitment to the Iraq War, a measure of Australia's commitment to the emerging trilateral security community. Shortly after the Australian troops commenced their mission in al-Muthanna, Koizumi agreed to establish a feasibility study for a free trade agreement between Japan and Australia, a proposal long sought by Australia.¹⁰⁸ This agreement reflected Japan's parallel desire to expand the parameters of their relationship with Australia, even though Australia's strong agricultural sector would pose political problems for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

The legitimacy of the peacemaking commitment of all three states was challenged by the ambiguity of the intervention in Iraq. The post-conflict peace process, though authorised by the UN Security Council Resolution 1483, did not have the same multinational aspect as the post-

¹⁰⁶ Grant Holloway, "Australia Sending More Iraq Troops," *CNN*, February 21, 2005.

¹⁰⁷ Takashi Terada, "Evolution of the Australia-Japan Security Partnership: Toward a Softer Triangle Alliance with the United States?," in *The US-Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism*, ed. Takashi Inoguchi, G. John Ikenberry, and Yoichiro Sato (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011).

¹⁰⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Joint Study for Enhancing Economic Relations between Japan and Australia, Including the Feasibility or Pros and Cons of a Free Trade Agreement" (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 2006) p. 5, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0612.pdf>.

conflict peace operation in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁹ The original lack of UN involvement in authorising the intervention diminished the legitimacy of the operation within the international community. Although the United States' saw the legitimacy of the Iraq intervention in the 2002 National Security Strategy, which spoke of 'preventive' warfare as well as downplaying the need for international support, the challenge of sustaining legitimacy was hampered by a Bush Administration openly hostile to the United Nations, the international institution that could grant the intervention legitimacy.¹¹⁰ Further, the under-resourcing the Iraq conflict, particularly in the numbers of troops required to pacify and stabilise the state, indicated that the United States did not have a comprehensive plan to rehabilitate Iraq.¹¹¹

The questions over the United States' legitimacy in the original intervention were also borne by Australia and Japan in their continued support for the intervention and occupation. Facing increasing domestic opposition to the Iraq mission, Australia and Japan risked their legitimacy, carefully constructed through regional assistance missions, in order to create a lasting relationship with the United States.

¹⁰⁹ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1483," Pub. L. No. S/RES/1483 (2003).

¹¹⁰ Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America."

¹¹¹ James Quinlivan's seminal research indicated that in states with an active insurgency, a ratio of at 10-20 troops per 1000 would be required to maintain stability. A larger study of stability operations by R Royce Kneece et al, indicated that a ratio of 40-50 troops per 1000 would be required for a high confidence of success in stability operations. The ratio of 20/1000 was not achieved until the 2007 'surge', four years after the initial deployment. James T. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," *Parameter: US Army War College Quarterly* XXV, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 59-69; R Royce Kneece et al., "Force Sizing for Stability Operations" (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses, March 2010), <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA520942>.

South Sudan

The United Nations' Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has existed since July 2011, and Australian and Japanese troops have participated in the humanitarian mission in a cooperative capacity since August 31, 2012.¹¹² In this mission, we can see the deepened commitment Japan has undertaken towards a more vigorous approach to peace operations in contrast to their earlier efforts in Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In deploying approximately 4000 JSDF personnel over the course of the mission to the newly-created South Sudan where they supported construction efforts with funds provided by Japan's Official Development Assistance, Japan was committing to peacekeeping as a critical aspect of its contemporary foreign policy.¹¹³ For these reasons, South Sudan is a pivotal important example in assessing Japan's military normalisation.

Japan's commitment was strained in December 2013, two-and-a-half years into the peacebuilding mission as civil war broke out after an alleged *coup d'état* attempt. The immediate destabilisation of the region prompted UNMISS to scale back their mandate from construction of the new state to the protection of civilians. The mission status change placed Japanese peacekeepers in an active conflict zone, something both prohibited under the existing deployment law and completely new to the Japanese forces. As we have seen in other case studies, the JSDF had only ever been

¹¹² "Japan-Australia Cooperation in South Sudan," *Japan Defense Focus*, April 2015; Department of Defence of Australia, "Operation Aslan," Australian Federal Government, n.d., www.defence.gov.au/operations/southsudan/.

¹¹³ See: Kyoko Hatakeyama, "Japan's Peacekeeping Policy: Strategic Calculation or Internalization of an International Norm?," *The Pacific Review* 27, no. 5 (October 20, 2014): 629–50; "Japan as a Peace Enabler: Voices from the Next Generation," n.d.; Kazuto Suzuki, "Twenty-Five Years of Japanese Peacekeeping Operations and the Self-Defense Forces' Mission in South Sudan," *Asia-Pacific Review* 24, no. 2 (July 3, 2017): 44–63.

deployed to either states which were not in active conflict, as in Cambodia and Sri Lanka, or the safest areas of states which were in active conflict, as in Timor-Leste and Iraq.

In late January 2015, three and a half years into Japan's South Sudan deployment, two Japanese hostages held by Islamic State militants were executed, prompting Prime Minister Abe to publicly vow "revenge" for their killing.¹¹⁴ Japan's pacifist stance and financial support for many international organisations meant that many Japanese nationals were employed by international development agencies and could therefore be targeted by resurgent 'terrorist' groups. Again, the debate coalesced around the crucial conceptualisation of 'self-defence' in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and how that might evolve in the contemporary era. As noted in Chapter 3, in 2010 the revised National Defense Program Guidelines introduced the concept of 'dynamic deterrence', aimed at deterring 'grey zone' conflicts.¹¹⁵ This additional expansion of what had been strict conditions under which the JSDF could be deployed can be seen in the desire of the Abe Government to expand the mandate of the JSDF in South Sudan. Another consideration that may have fed this move was the widespread influence China had accumulated on the African continent – particularly with energy supplying nations – which fed Japan's concerns related to the insecurity of trade routes and the 'creeping opportunism' of Chinese investment in Africa.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Martin Fackler, "Departing From Japan's Pacifism, Shinzo Abe Vows Revenge for Killings," *The New York Times*, February 1, 2015; Mizuho Aoki, "Abe Wants to Enable JSDF to Rescue Citizens Overseas," *The Japan Times*, February 2, 2015; Jonathan Soble, "Japan Moves to Allow Military Combat for First Time in 70 Years," *The New York Times*, July 16, 2015.

¹¹⁵ Ministry of Defense of Japan, "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond" (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense of Japan, December 17, 2010), p. 7, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf.

¹¹⁶ See Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin, "China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States," Background Paper (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, February 22, 2006), <http://www.heritage.org/asia/report/chinas-influence-africa-implications-the-united-states>; Evan S. Medeiros, "China's International Behaviour: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification" (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2009), pp. 147-160, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf;

The Peace and Security Legislation, pushed for by Abe, passed by the Japanese Diet on September 19, 2015, was packaged as a part of Japan's 'Proactive Contribution to Peace'.¹¹⁷ With respect to overseas peace operations, the new legislation permitted the JSDF engaged in peace operations to use their weapons in a *proactive* capacity to protect UN-associated forces in areas outside of JSDF control. Under this interpretation, Japanese peacekeeping forces were able to not only rescue Japanese nationals, but non-Japanese nationals too. This legislative change came after the revision of the 2015 Japan-US Defense Guidelines which expanded the geographic scope of the alliance, replacing the limiting language of "situations in areas surrounding Japan" with "situations that will have important influence on Japan's peace and security."¹¹⁸ The revised Guidelines stressed that these situations "cannot be defined geographically", paving the way for deeper Japanese cooperation within the increasingly globalised trilateral security community.

Minding the Capabilities Gap: Interoperability through Defence Equipment and Technology Acquisition

Military interoperability is the centrepiece of a modern security community. Military strategy and capabilities are jealously guarded and are the key inhibitors of cooperation between states. Given

Lloyd Thrall, "China's Expanding African Relations: Implications for US National Security" (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015),

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR905/RAND_RR905.pdf.

¹¹⁷ Government of Japan, "Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security: Seamless Responses for Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community" (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 2016), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000143304.pdf>.

¹¹⁸ Ministry of Defense of Japan, "The Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation," Government, April 27, 2015, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/shishin_20150427e.html.

the obvious asymmetries in the defence institutions and force posture capabilities of the states in the trilateral community, interoperability in this context means less a push towards identical defence systems and more an ability to offset and complement the insecurities and strengths of one's security partners. As former Australian Defence Minister Brendan Nelson noted,

Interoperability refers to the structured effort by two or more countries in an alliance to ensure that their forces can operate together seamlessly. In practical terms this means things such as operating procedures, common communications links, common doctrine and standards, and compatible equipment.¹¹⁹

For the United States, the physical and economic costs attached to the interregional power projection have increased as security threats have diversified. In accepting that there were problems beyond the capability of the United States to solve by itself, so too the burdens of global security were beyond the responsibility of the United States to carry alone. The geographical isolation of both Australia and Japan plays a key role in their determination to keep the United States engaged in the Asia Pacific. Additionally, driven by their continued insecurity regarding the United States' visible commitment to the Asia Pacific, these states have sought complementary defence equipment and technology to burden share the public goods provided by the United States.

After experiences through both security operations of a traditional and non-traditional nature, and highly intimate and intensity military exercises, the trilateral community has had plenty of cause to develop their capacity for interoperability between their armed forces. As we saw in the discussion on defence procurement in the minor sensitivity section of this chapter, the development of military interoperability between the United States and its allies Australia and Japan has long

¹¹⁹ Brendan Nelson, "The ANZUS Alliance," September 8, 2006, <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2006/ANZUS-Speech.doc>.

been understood as desirous by all three nations. The lack of a strong domestic defence industry in Australia and Japan and their historic preference for off-the-shelf defence acquisitions complemented the US defence industries' push for new markets. Although discussions regarding Australian-United States interoperability had been in the public sphere since the 1995 memorandum, debates continued over access to and dependence on the United States technology that would make possible the shift to technical interoperability. The key impediment was trust, specifically the concern that advanced technology from the United States would not pass through Australia to third parties. Although at the time of the 1995 memorandum the United States had three separate agreements pertaining to information security with Australia, none were legally binding. The Agreement between Australia and the US concerning Security Measures for the Reciprocal Protection of Classified Information, a legally binding treaty, was signed in June 2002. This legal basis for confidence was furthered by Australia signing of similarly binding Information Security Agreements with NATO, South Korea and Japan, deepening their commitment to the United States' key regional allies.

The United States identifies three dimensions of interoperability with its allies. The US perspective here is critical, as they are the main supplier of the materiel used by both the Australian and Japanese armed services and possess the most advanced global defence industry. The three dimensions – technical, procedural, and human – act to indicate the depth and cohesion of the interoperable forces. Technical interoperability concerns itself with logistics systems and

management and operations at the mission command level. Additionally, technical interoperability is demonstrated though “[e]xchanges and use of equipment between...partners.”¹²⁰

The deepening of the 2017 Australia-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement is a prominent demonstration of both the logistics management and mission command aspects of technical interoperability.¹²¹ The provision of materiel under an ACSA clearly fulfils the logistics facet of the technical interoperability, however the materiel included in the ACSA would have been determined by discussions by mission commanders in order to maximise the efficacy of the Agreement. Although a trilateral ACSA would indicate a more perfect demonstration of technical interoperability, the landmark national security reforms passed by the Japanese Diet in 2015 permitted Japan to include the provision of ammunition in any revised and future Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements. This move allowed for the revision of both the United States-Japan ACSA and the Australia-Japan ACSA, paving the way for a future trilateral agreement.

The procedural dimension of interoperability is demonstrated by the standardisation of capabilities and unit formations. Additionally, it incorporates national security doctrines and strategies with the intention of minimising differences in doctrinal and strategic interpretation. In this context, we can see the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue as a key promoter of the procedural aspect of interoperability. As noted in Chapter 3, The TSD functions to standardise modes of communication

¹²⁰ Duane A. Gamble and Michelle M. T. Letcher, “The Three Dimensions of Interoperability for Multinational Training at the JMRC,” *Army Sustainment*, September 2016.

¹²¹ Marise Payne, “Signing of the Australia-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement” (Sydney, January 14, 2017), <https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-releases/signing-australia-japan-acquisition-and-cross-servicing>.

and terminology, particularly when deliberating over extant and emergent threats. Australia and Japan both have standardisation agreements with the United States. The US-Japan effort is incorporated within the Guidelines for Defence Cooperation and comes from the late 1970s.¹²² The Australia-United States agreement exists in a multilateral setting known as the ABCA (American, British, Canadian, Australia and New Zealand) Armies Program.¹²³ As noted by Thomas Little,

The ABCA Armies Program is a product-focused organization. This means that it conducts deliberate analyses of interoperability gaps and then develops the products required by its member armies to close or mitigate those gaps in accordance with top-down direction.¹²⁴

Australia's longstanding involvement in this forum, along with its participation in other fora dedicated to improving interoperability between the Five-Eyes – AUSCANNZUKUS Naval C4, the Air and Space Interoperability Council, and the Technical Cooperation Program – highlights its close interoperability with the United States at a procedural level.

Finally, human interoperability exists within the social interactions, relationships, and education that “maximise national contributions.”¹²⁵ The 2013 secondment of Australian Major General Richard Burr to the position of Deputy Commander, United States Army Pacific, was an unprecedented command choice.¹²⁶ It marked the first time a non-American general had been given a service command in the United States Army, and is a key indicator of the procedural interoperability and deep trust between the United States and Australia. Major General Burr was

¹²² Mark Lorell, *Troubled Partnership: A History of US-Japan Collaboration on the FS-X Fighter* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996), p. 12.

¹²³ The program grew out of cooperation between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada during the Second World War. Australia joined in 1963, and New Zealand was granted full membership status in 2006.

¹²⁴ Thomas D Little, “ABCA: A Coalition That Works,” *Army Sustainment*, September 2011.

¹²⁵ Gamble and Letcher, “The Three Dimensions of Interoperability for Multinational Training at the JMRC.”

¹²⁶ James Guzior, “Australian General Joins US Army Pacific” (United States Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, August 20, 2012), <http://www.usarpac.army.mil/pdfs2/Press%20Release-MG%20BURR.pdf>.

succeeded by Major General Gregory Bilton in November 2015, and Lieutenant General Angus Campbell, the Australian Chief of Army, has confirmed a third senior officer, Major General Roger Noble, will succeed Bilton at the conclusion of his term.¹²⁷ Although there has been no formal appointment of Japanese commanders to comparable positions within the United States Army, the presence of the subordinate unified command United States Forces Japan provides numerous opportunities for human interoperability between the Japanese and American forces. As Gamble and Letcher note, the human facet of interoperability is the most important dimension as it is the one most connected to the effectiveness of interoperable capabilities.¹²⁸

As noted, offsetting the insecurity of partners is a key aspect of interoperability. It is important to note, however, the regional environment in which Australia and Japan are situated and which comprises their largest security threats, places a higher premium on advanced maritime and air force capabilities, rather than ground force as in other regions. Accordingly, interoperability between naval and air forces is considered key for the endurance of the trilateral community. One material measure of this can be seen in the fact that since the early 1960s, when Australia began to procure its military technology from the United States, all but one combat aircraft series used by the Royal Australian Air Force has been purchased from the United States. The one exception, as noted by Adam Lockyer, is the French Dassault Mirage IIIE, procured due to a delayed service entry by the F-4 Phantom II.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Rowan Callick, “Greg Bilton Is Our Military Man in the US Army Pacific,” *The Australian*, December 1, 2015.

¹²⁸ Gamble and Letcher, “The Three Dimensions of Interoperability for Multinational Training at the JMRC.”

¹²⁹ Adam Lockyer, “The Logic of Interoperability: Australia’s Acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter,” *International Journal* 68, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 71–91, fn. 1.

To replace the aging F-4 Phantoms, in 2002, Prime Minister Howard bought into the development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project, shortly after the contract had been awarded to Lockheed Martin. In 2014, Prime Minister Tony Abbott formally completed the deal to purchase 58 Joint Strike Fighters (in addition to the 14 already purchased) in Australia's largest defence procurement.¹³⁰

Similarly, Japan's dependence on the United States for defence-related purchases saw a similar merging, of sorts, in the types of defence programs in which Australia invested. Here, Japan engaged in a version of virtue signalling, highlighting their interest in being seen as a responsible stakeholder, even though they were unable to exercise that option. Japan formally announced its intent to purchase 42 Joint Strike Fighters on December 20, 2011, three days after the death of Kim Jong-Il, a reflection of increased regional instability. Like Australia, the purchase of JSF was intended to replace Japan's aging fleet of F-4 Phantom II's and provides the trilateral community with a fifth-generation air force.

Australia has continued to deepen its commitment and is the only state other than the United States to operate the Boeing F/A 18A variant, the EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft.¹³¹ The original F/A 18A aircraft were purchased to act as an interim replacement for the F-111C, the tactical strike aircraft long considered the "preeminent weapons system in the Asia Pacific region."¹³² The purchase of an interim aircraft was immensely contentious manoeuvre and was

¹³⁰ "Joint Strike Fighters: Government to Spend \$12 Billion on 58 More Next-Generation F-35s," *The Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, April 23, 2014.

¹³¹ James Grubel, "Australia Fighter Jets First to Get Hi-Tech US Jammers," *Reuters*, August 23, 2012.

¹³² Alan Stephens, *The Royal Australian Air Force: A History* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 290.

opposed by senior Australian air officials on the basis of its inferiority *vis-à-vis* the Mikoyan MiG-29 and Sukhoi Su-30.¹³³ Owing to both the continued production delays of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and sustained criticism, the new Labor Government opted to continue the purchase with the addition of the technology that would convert 12 of the F/A 18A to EA-18G aircraft. The series of delays on the JSF were costly for the Defence Department, pushing the absorption capacity of the Department to its limits.¹³⁴

Nevertheless, the conversion promised to minimise the capability gap between Australia and the United States and presented an actualised upgrade for the Australian air capabilities. The significance for the trilateral community in Australia's purchase of the EA-18G aircraft lay in the Growler's ability to disrupt the radar installations on China's contentious military installations in the South and East China Seas. In June 2016, US Navy dispatched four EA-18Gs to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines to "[s]upport routine operations that enhance regional maritime domain awareness and assure access to the air and maritime domains in accordance with international law."¹³⁵ The EA-18G aircraft provided the Royal Australian Air Force with a large force multiplication capacity, one that remains tremendously important given the defence spending increases in the Asia Pacific and the relative smallness of Australia's armed forces.

¹³³ Peter Criss, "There Is Nothing Super about This Hornet," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, March 15, 2007; Kerry O'Brien, "Nelson Stands by Fighter Jet Decision," *The 7:30 Report* (The Australian Broadcasting Corporation, March 15, 2007), <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007/s1873007.htm>.

¹³⁴ Australian National Audit Office, "Management of Australia's Air Combat Capability: F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet Fleet Upgrades and Sustainment." (Canberra: Australian National Audit Office, September 27, 2012), chaps. 2–4, <https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net3176/f/201213%20Audit%20Report%20No%205.pdf>; Australian National Audit Office, "Management of Australia's Air Combat Capability: F-35A Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition" (Canberra: Australian National Audit Office, September 27, 2012), p. 22 <https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net3176/f/201213%20Audit%20Report%20No%206.pdf>.

¹³⁵ Commander, US 7th Fleet, "VAQ-138 Detachment Arrives at Clark Air Base," June 15, 2016, <http://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/800731/vaq-138-detachment-arrives-at-clark-air-base/>.

On the maritime front, both Australia and Japan have the most advanced forces in the broader Asia Pacific. As noted by Brendan Nelson, the maintenance of compatible equipment is a key component of interoperability.¹³⁶ Despite occasionally operating different platforms, such as the P-8 Poseidon, aircraft used by the United States and Australia, and the Kawasaki P-1 operated by Japan, these diversions serve the same tactical purpose. Perhaps the largest demonstration of the growing interoperable elements of the trilateral community is the commitment to the Aegis Combat System installed on US and Japanese cruisers and destroyers and which are to be installed on the Australian Air Warfare Destroyers currently under construction.

Japan was one of the first states to acquire the Aegis system in the 1990s, by contrast, the Australian Defence Department recommended that the *Hobart*-class air warfare destroyer, expected in late 2017 to begin to replace the *Perth* and *Adelaide*-class air warfare destroyers, be constructed around the Aegis system.¹³⁷ Acting on the recommendation, the Australian Government chose Gibbs & Cox, a US maritime engineering and design firm which was the lead

¹³⁶ Nelson, "The ANZUS Alliance."

¹³⁷ In contrast to Japan, Australia's acquisition of the Aegis Combat System has been slow. In 2004, the Australian Department of Defence identified that the Future Air Warfare Destroyers should be built around the Aegis system and formal permission was received in April 2005 to acquire the Aegis system. However, cost overruns and construction delays pushed their dates of operationality back by three years to 2017-2020, some 24 years after the launch of the *Kongō*-class destroyers. Japan's acquisition of the Aegis system in the early 1980s was driven by US pressure to increase their defence expenditure. In addition, the threat posed by North Korean missiles aimed at Japan, a threat that Australia did not become prescient of until the early 2000s, influenced Japan's strategic acquisition. Frank Carlucci and George Shultz, "The Japanese and the Aegis Sale," *The Washington Post*, August 1, 1988; "Ballistic Missile System 'Moving Closer,'" *Sydney Morning Herald*, November 22, 2006; Nick Brown, "Spanish Designs Are Australia's Choice for Warship Programmes," *International Defence Review*, June 28, 2007; Cameron Stewart, "\$8bn Navy Flagship Founders after Construction Bungle," *The Australian*, October 26, 2010; Cameron Stewart, "Overdue and Over Budget: \$8bn Destroyer Plan in Crisis," *The Australian*, May 31, 2011; Rupert Pengelley, "Aussie Rules: Air Warfare Destroyers Push Boundaries," *Jane's Navy International*, September 26, 2011.

designer on the *Arleigh Burke*-class of destroyers, the first ever outfitted with the Aegis system.¹³⁸ Australia's prioritisation of a destroyer-class built around the Aegis system indicates the importance Australia places on minimising the operational capability gap between the trilateral states. Additionally, all three states are participating in advanced research undertaken in Australia on cavitation in naval vessels. This research is critical for increasing fuel efficiency, improving manoeuvrability, and reducing detection through obfuscating sonar operations.¹³⁹

The critical moment for the trajectory of naval acquisition with the context of the trilateral relationship was undoubtedly Australia's Future Submarine Program, designed to replace the *Collins*-class submarines which are scheduled for decommission in 2025. The 2009 Defence White Paper, 'Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030', confirmed that the *Collins*-class would be replaced and specified that they would be replaced with 12 new vessels.¹⁴⁰ The original proposal called for the 'winning' design to be selected by 2013, allowing the first submarine to be constructed before the scheduled 2025 decommission of the *Collins*-class. However, the initial meetings regarding necessary capabilities and operational concepts did not occur until March 2012, setting back the replacement project by at least three years. The change of government in early September 2013 also presented a new challenge to the replacement project. Incoming Prime Minister Tony Abbott, upon assuming office pursued far closer relations with the Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, back in power after a period of five years, than his immediate

¹³⁸ Robert Hill, "Preferred Designer Chosen for AWD Contract" (Canberra, August 16, 2005), <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=5048>.

¹³⁹ Australian Maritime College, "Reducing Noise Key to Ensuring Stealthy Ships," Australian Maritime College, December 10, 2015, <http://www.amc.edu.au/about-amc/news-and-events/news-items/reducing-noise-key-to-ensuring-stealthy-ships>.

¹⁴⁰ Commonwealth of Australia, "Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030," 70–71.

predecessors declaring Japan Australia's "closest friend in Asia."¹⁴¹ In April 2014 the Abe Government ended the ban on the export of weapons in another indication of their path towards normalisation.¹⁴² July 2014 saw the signing of an agreement on the transfer of defence equipment and technology, an indication that the Abbott Government looked favourably upon the Japanese capabilities.¹⁴³

However, there remained sustained expert and political concern over the capability of the Japanese defence export industry to share intellectual property, engage in knowledge transfer, and critically, provide Australian employment in a defence industry project of this size.¹⁴⁴ Despite the established concern, time pressures, prompted by yet more delays in the meetings to even establish the capabilities and concepts of the Future Submarine Program loomed as a larger factor, and on December 2, 2014, Treasurer Joe Hockey publicly ruled out an 'unrealistic' tender process.¹⁴⁵ The abolition of the tender process was widely seen to benefit Japanese chances, as it would not force them into a competitive process which would highlight their inexperience in non-indigenous defence construction.¹⁴⁶ However, the February 9, 2015 motion to bring about a leadership spill in the Federal Liberal Party, threatened Abbott's leadership sufficiently that he agreed to a

¹⁴¹ Mark Kenny, "Tony Abbott Says Japan Is Australia's 'Closest Friend in Asia,'" *The Sydney Morning Herald*, October 9, 2013.

¹⁴² Martin Fackler, "Japan Ends Decades-Long Ban on Export of Weapons," *The New York Times*, April 1, 2014.

¹⁴³ Government of Japan and Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, "Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology" (2014), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000044447.pdf>.

¹⁴⁴ John Kerin, "Inquiry Rejects 'Inadequate' Japanese Sub Option," *The Australian Financial Review*, November 26, 2014.

¹⁴⁵ Jared Owens, "Joe Hockey Rules Out Open Tender for New Submarines," *The Australian*, December 2, 2014.

¹⁴⁶ "Japan Gains Traction as Builder of New Australia Subs," *The Japan Times*, December 2, 2014; Jamie Smyth and Ben McLannahan, "Australia Rules out Open Tender for A\$20bn Submarine Fleet," *Financial Times*, December 2, 2014.

competitive tender process, a reversal of his Government's earlier position.¹⁴⁷ The abrupt change in the Australian Government's plans against an open tender did not publicly dissuade the Abe Government, which in May 2015 assented to an entry into the tender process against competitive French and German bids.¹⁴⁸

As in the specifications around the air warfare destroyer project, the new submarines were to utilise US combat systems, raising the level of complexity of the build and therefore the experience required by the successful team. Although the Obama Administration was careful to not publicly take a stance on the Future Submarines Program, there is little doubt that their preferred option was the Japanese bid.¹⁴⁹ The opportunity to operationalise the defence export partnership between the states was highly attractive.

Here was a key chance to 're-spoke' the existing alliance structure, integrating the previously 'decoupled' military export relationship between Australia and Japan. Handled appropriately, the undersea capabilities of Australia and Japan coupled with their geographic positions just outside the archipelagic states sitting astride the major sea lines of communication could burden share the US domination of the maritime choke points – from the Kuril Islands off northeast Hokkaido, to the Philippines and the deepwater straits off Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. The large number of states investing in submarine capabilities makes it clear that anti-submarine warfare and area

¹⁴⁷ Daniel Hurst, "Tony Abbott Pledges Open Tender for Submarines to Win over SA Liberals," *The Guardian*, February 8, 2015.

¹⁴⁸ Justin McCurry, "Japan Security Council Approves Bid to Build Australian Submarines," *The Guardian*, May 19, 2015.

¹⁴⁹ Cameron Stewart, "Turnbull Government Rejected US Advice to Prefer Japanese Subs," *The Australian*, June 5, 2017.

denial are two capabilities that will support the maintenance of the *status quo*, a key goal of the trilateral community.

Despite the promising signs of an operationalised Australia – Japan defence export relationship, the September 2015 motion to bring about a spill in the Federal Liberal Party resulted in Malcolm Turnbull ousting Tony Abbott as Leader of the Liberal Party and therefore as Prime Minister. Turnbull’s ascension immediately reset the parameters of the tender process, with the experienced French and German teams increasing their lobbying for the project, building crucial links with local industrial partners and the key defence companies Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, who were competing to build the submarine’s combat system.

In this immediacy, the strategic considerations that had largely driven the Japanese bid were uncompetitive compared to the capabilities of the French and German bids.¹⁵⁰ The result was the failure of Japan’s submarine bid and an undeniable blow to the defence export aspirations of the Abe Government, as well as a setback for the cohesiveness of the trilateral community. Nevertheless, the strategic logic of a relationship based on capability was undiminished, with Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide noting that although the Japanese Government were

¹⁵⁰ Chris Uhlmann, “Submarine Deal: Successful Bid for New Royal Australian Navy Boats to Be Announced Next Week,” *The Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, April 19, 2016; Andrew Greene, “Germany Argues Political Incentives in Bid for Submarine Contract,” *The Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, March 17, 2016; Latika Bourke, “Malcolm Turnbull Expected to Make Submarines Announcement on Tuesday,” *The Sydney Morning Herald*, April 26, 2016; Euan Graham, “Myths Surface over Australia’s Submarines Deal with France,” *The Sydney Morning Herald*, May 3, 2016; “Hesitancy on Local Production Sank Japan Sub Deal,” *Nikkei Asian Review*, April 27, 2016.

disappointed and would be seeking further answers from Australia, he did not see the decision affecting “the security and defence co-operation between Japan, the US, and Australia.”¹⁵¹

The logic of closer relations with the Japanese and Americans, was not enough to forestall the French bid, which received unanimous support from the experts in the Australian Government’s competitive evaluation process. Here we can see the tension between the strategic advantages offered by the French bid and the abstractness of the strategic community. The experts highlighted the French design’s superior range, critical for the defence of the Australian coastline, and the submarines’ compatibility with nuclear technology, a useful feature as Australia seeks to increase its interoperability with the United States Navy.¹⁵²

Despite the clear disappointment from the Abe Government, and the alleged resistance from the Turnbull Government to advice from the Obama Administration on the submarines decision, the outcome is not outside the bounds of the economic and strategic decisions that occur in alliance politics due to domestic political pressures.¹⁵³ Future trilateral cooperation, much like historical cooperation does not rest on a successful outcome in one area, but rather on a broad array of sources. It is the pattern that counts. There is nothing in the failure of the Japanese bid to suggest that interoperability between the forces will be compromised. As we have determined, mature

¹⁵¹ Donna Weeks, “How Has Japan Reacted to Its Failed Bid to Build Australia’s New Submarines?,” *The Conversation*, April 28, 2016.

¹⁵² Commonwealth of Australia, “2016 Defence White Paper,” White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2016), pp. 64; 121, <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/2016-defence-white-paper.pdf>; Tim Kelly, Cyril Altmeyer, and Colin Packham, “How France Sank Japan’s \$40 Billion Australian Submarine Dream,” *Reuters*, April 29, 2016.

¹⁵³ Cameron Stewart, “Turnbull Government Rejected US Advice to Prefer Japanese Subs,” *The Australian*, June 5, 2017.

security communities are not fragile entities. Rather vigorous internal debate and fierce challenges are crucial to their continued strength. The continued testing of the boundaries of acceptability is a critical component to the maturation of security communities. As we have seen, the Australian decision to choose the French design over the Japanese design was intensely political. Our understanding of security communities does not assist in determining *why* the Japanese design was not chosen, that answer lies in the political realm, but it does establish the strength of the community in that this setback did not derail the progression of military capability building between Australia and Japan. As we have seen, less than a year after the Turnbull Government's decision, in January 2017, Japan and Australia signed an updated Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement which included provisions on the transfer of weapons and ammunition.¹⁵⁴

Minilateral Military Exercises: Reshaping Defence Diplomacy

Our trilateral states have demonstrated a clear command of the sophistication required when engaging in post-conflict peace operations and defence acquisitions that offset partner's insecurities. Indeed, it is through the mutual confidence developed from successful peace operations and interoperability through defence acquisitions that has created the sharp increase in the number of military exercises involving the trilateral states. As noted in the section on large-scale multilateral military exercises, the rationale for each of our trilateral state's participation in these exercises is directly tied to their rationale for participating in a security community. At this

¹⁵⁴ Marise Payne, "Signing of the Australia-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement" (Press Statement, January 14, 2017), <https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-releases/signing-australia-japan-acquisition-and-cross-servicing>.

deeper level of confidence with fewer participants we have a clearer view of the potential of the maturing security community. As we have seen, in the large-scale multilateral exercises undertaken by states in the Asia Pacific have tended towards humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises, reflecting both the importance of interstate cooperation in natural disaster relief, and the sensitivity of military strategy in amongst states in the Asia Pacific. By contrast, the military exercises undertaken by the United States have had a firm basis in combat exercises, highlighting the United States' interest in building partner capacity.

For the trilateral community, the intra-community military exercises have traditionally focused on 'high end' capabilities, highlighting the interoperable elements of each state's forces. The high intensity exercises involve anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, tactical manoeuvres, exercises in communication and networking, maritime interdiction, and amphibious warfare. The trilateral exercises and one bilateral that incorporate these offensive capabilities are Exercises Talisman Sabre, Cope North, Red Flag, Southern Jackaroo, Nichi Gou Trident, and Yama Sakura. Nichi Gou Trident is a naval exercise, Red Flag is an air force exercise, Southern Jackaroo is an army exercise, Cope North combines both naval and air units, and Talisman Sabre involves members of all branches of the armed forces. The sole bilateral exercise included in this grouping is Nichi Gou Trident, an exercise between the Royal Australian Naval and the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Forces.

Nichi Gou Trident began in 2006, prior to the signing of the 2007 Security Declaration, and was originally an exchange between Japanese and Australian P-3 Orion maritime surveillance crews.¹⁵⁵ The exchange expanded in 2009 when it was raised to the level of a combined exercise.¹⁵⁶ Its importance here is that it indicates the progression of the Australia-Japan security relationship after their experience in peace operations in Iraq. Additionally, the persistence of the exercise allows Australia and Japan to develop their maritime capabilities independently, without the appearance of playing a minor role to that of the United States.

Exercise	Original Partners	Year of Trilateralisation
Talisman Sabre	US-Australia	2015
Nichi Gou Trident	Japan-Australia	TBD
Cope North	US-Japan	2012
Red Flag	US-Australia	2013
Southern Jackaroo	US-Australia	2013
Yama Sakura	US-Japan	2012

Table 4.2: Date of Military Exercise Trilateralisation

These exercises existed at the bilateral level exercises between the United States and Australia or the United States and Japan. As we can see in Table 4.2, the trilateralisation of these exercises

¹⁵⁵ The P-3 Orion was replaced in Australia by the P-8 Poseidon and in Japan by the Kawasaki P-1.

¹⁵⁶ Jaimie Abbott, “‘Nichi Gou’ Goodwill: Japanese Crews Visit Edinburgh to Say ‘Konichiwa’ to 10SQN Counterparts,” *Air Force*, October 16, 2008.

occurred remarkably swiftly, with Australia joining the US-Japan Cope North and Yama Sakura exercises in 2012, and Japan joining the US-Australia Red Flag and Southern Jackaroo exercises in 2013. It was not until 2015 that Japan joined the Talisman Sabre exercise, in part due to the focus on amphibious assaults, as territorial disputes with China and Russia, and threats from North Korea maintained their intensity.¹⁵⁷ Additionally, as Talisman Sabre involves all branches of the armed services, it is a far larger undertaking than those exercises which involve only one or two branches of the armed services. These trilateral exercises, dedicated to building combat readiness, analysing trilateral planning capabilities, and normalising fraternisation between the services, offer the most realistic combat experiences short of war. Minilateral military exercises are important vehicles for shoring up regional norms and stability, undergirding developing relationships, and expanding defence cooperation.

The large number of military exercises engaged in by the trilateral community, covering every aspect of modern warfare, has the key effect of diminishing the insecurities of the partner states. As we have seen, power projection remains the largest challenge to the United States' defence of its regional interests. Additionally, the rapid increase in defence spending across the region has introduced new actors whom may in time become valuable partners in status quo maintenance. Additionally, the fear of isolation that undergirds Australian and Japanese national security policy has resulted in their mutual move towards expanding their defence fraternisation and cooperation. The trilateralisation of their military exercises with the United States offers both states the opportunity to upgrade their capabilities by engaging in exercises outside of their zone of standard

¹⁵⁷ Rick Wallace, "Japan Military Drill with US, Australia Likely to Upset China," *The Australian*, November 25, 2014.

activity. Indeed, Japan's invitation to participate in the Australia-US Exercises Talisman Sabre and Southern Jackaroo offered the critical opportunity to develop their amphibious capabilities in a forum beyond the scope of their previous experiences. It is clear that the trilateral partners are committed to those activities that expand their military capabilities, highlighting the central dimension of the maturation of their security community.

Major Security Cooperation

This final section of Chapter 4 analyses the evidentiary data that indicates that the trilateral community has attained the mature level of security cooperation and preparedness expected of a mature security community. Consistent with the sections of this chapter that assessed the minor and medium levels of security cooperation, this section analyses cooperation across three areas: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, the organisation of the trilateral defence industry, and a demonstration of interoperability in a security operation. These three areas together provide compelling evidence for the existence of a mature security community.

As noted, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations are increasingly conducted in highly securitised environments across the Asia Pacific and represent the most likely scenario, short of a region-wide conflict, under which the trilateral community would deploy their armed forces. As established in the preceding sections, as Japan and Australia commit more resources to their defence budgets and increase their acquisition of complex US equipment and combat systems, the sustainment of these systems becomes a priority. Community cohesion is furthered by the fact that both Australia and Japan can maintain and modernise their US defence acquisitions and provide support to US forces in the region. Finally, the demonstration of interoperability in a security operation highlights the fluency of the trilateral community and their high level of trust in one another. As we shall see in this section, the trilateral community demonstrates the high level of functionality and deep level of confidence needed to maintain the cohesiveness of a mature security community.

Mature HA/DR Cooperation: The Triple Disaster, Typhoon Haiyan, and MH 370

As we have seen, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations involve an important security element. In this section of the chapter, we will examine the evolution of HA/DR operations in light of the deepened defence cooperation between the trilateral partners. The three operations that we will consider in this section are the March 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown, the November 2013 Typhoon Haiyan – one of the strongest typhoons on record, and the March 2014 disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. Each of these disasters involved the trilateral community acting in an interoperable manner as ‘preferred partners’ as they coordinated the relief effort and search and rescue (SAR) operations.

The ‘triple disaster’ of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown in Japan occurred before the trilateralisation of the military exercises. The cooperation of the Japanese, Australian, and United States’ forces in this disaster relief operation assisted in deepening the restructuring of their bilateral military exercises. In the case of Typhoon Haiyan, which presented a far more traditional HA/DR operation, the security considerations arose from the geostrategic location of the Philippines and their ongoing territorial dispute with China. Finally, the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 further developed the capabilities of the trilateral states in the original search and rescue operation. In each of these three situations we can see the increasing ease with which the trilateral states were able to act based on their experience with each other through the trilateral community.

Triple Disaster

The 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown provoked an immediate security challenge to the region. In addition to the devastation wrought by the 9.1 magnitude earthquake and the resulting tsunami, the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant complex suffered three level 7 meltdowns, the highest on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale.¹⁵⁸ According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 163 states offered support in the aftermath of the triple disaster.¹⁵⁹ However, Japan specifically requested support from only four states, New Zealand, South Korea, Australia, and the United States.¹⁶⁰ Australia's HA/DR contribution as part of Operation *Pacific Assist* was the frigate *HMAS Sydney* and the Heavy Landing Ship *HMAS Tobruk*, along with an Urban Search and Rescue team with experience from the Christchurch earthquake which had occurred three weeks previously, and three RAAF C-17A Globemaster III transport aircraft. The United States' contribution under Operation *Tomodachi* (Friend) was swift, given the 40,000 in-country American troops and well-resourced military bases in Japan. Some 20,000 American service members participated in the relief operations, representing the largest joint operation in the history of the bilateral relationship. Additionally, US forces participated in joint coastal search and rescue operations with the Japanese Coast Guard. Altogether, the United States and Japan provided the two largest contributions to the disaster. Australia's provision of

¹⁵⁸ Richard Black, "Japan: Nuclear Crisis Raised to Chernobyl Level," *BBC News*, April 12, 2011.

¹⁵⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Offer of Assistance from Foreign Countries, Regions and International Organizations (as of September 15)" (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 15, 2011), http://www.mofa.go.jp/j_info/visit/incidents/pdfs/offer_assistance.pdf.

¹⁶⁰ Stephanie Nebehay, "Japan Requests Foreign Rescue Teams, UN Says," *Reuters*, March 11, 2011.

three C-17A aircraft was immensely significant as this represented the entire operational fleet at that point, meaning that there were now none left in Australia to respond to a domestic emergency scenario.¹⁶¹

Although all three states had prior experience in coordinating in disaster relief operations, most notably in the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami, the experiences from developing states could not be applied here. Japan, as an advanced state, was unfamiliar with approaching the international community for assistance, and the restrictions placed on the operation of domestic and foreign armed forces meant that the traditional cooperation between states was not applicable here. As a result, foreign search and rescue teams faced delays in being cleared for entry into Japan, which prevented them from assisting in the critical immediate aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami.¹⁶²

The RAAF avoided this impediment by requesting to be integrated directly into the United States airlift operation. This action is indicative of the innovative nature of the Australia-United States relationship, but also of the United States-Japan relationship. The recently completed Australia-Japan Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement included a provision on “operations to cope with large scale disasters in the territory of either Party or a third country.”¹⁶³ Although the ACSA

¹⁶¹ “Final RAAF C-17 Returns Home after Op PACIFIC ASSIST | Australian Aviation,” March 29, 2011, <http://australianaviation.com.au/2011/03/final-raft-c-17-returns-home-after-op-pacific-assist/>.

¹⁶² Russell Goldman, “Foreign Rescue Team Delayed by Japanese Bureaucracy,” *ABC News*, March 13, 2011.

¹⁶³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Department of Defence of Australia, “Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force” (Tokyo, May 19, 2010), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/pdfs/agree1005.pdf>.

had not yet been passed by the Japanese Diet (and would not be until January 2013), the framework for cooperation still existed to guide assistance during the operation. To assist the relief effort, the United States Government requested remote control pumping equipment from the US-based Bechtel Corporation, which was assembled in Australia and delivered by RAAF, to cool the Fukushima nuclear reactors.¹⁶⁴ In an example of the highly interoperable capabilities of the trilateral forces, the pumping equipment arrived at Yokota Air Base, before being transported to Fukushima by the Ground Self-Defense Forces and towed to the damaged reactors on US Navy barges by the Maritime Self-Defense Forces.

The elements of the ‘triple disaster’ that elevate it to an operation of major sensitivity are the sheer scale of the disaster, the regional security and health threat from the nuclear reactors in meltdown, and the importance *vis à vis* the development of the military aspect of the trilateral relationship.¹⁶⁵ The humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities undertaken by Australian, Japanese, and United States’ forces occurred in light of the serious damage dealt to the nuclear reactors. The fact that they were in active meltdown during the deployment of the Australian and United States forces indicates the commitment to the trilateral community. Each states’ experience in this operation highlighted the flaws in the existing framework, largely caused by unfamiliarity of post-disaster operations in Japan. However, as we saw with rapid expansion in trilateral military exercises

¹⁶⁴ “Bechtel Innovation and Global Resources Used in Japanese Crisis Response,” Bechtel Corporate, March 16, 2011, <http://bechtel.com/newsroom/releases/2011/03/innovation-resources-japanese-crisis-response/>.

¹⁶⁵ See Toby Dalton, “Nuclear Security After Fukushima,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 13, 2011, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/13/nuclear-security-after-fukushima-pub-43591>; Masatsugu Hayashi and Larry Hughes, “The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Its Effect on Global Energy Security,” *Energy Policy* 59 (2013): 102–11.

beginning in 2012, the experience made the trilateral partners more determined to deepen their investment in the community.

Typhoon Haiyan

Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in the Eastern Visayas region of the Philippines on November 7, 2013, causing catastrophic damage, killing an estimated 6,300 people and displacing a further 6 million.¹⁶⁶ Haiyan ranks as the deadliest typhoon on record in the Philippines and the humanitarian crisis that emerged in the aftermath required a large international response. The trilateral community contributed large aid packages, Japan deployed over 1000 Self-Defense Force personnel in the largest deployment since the Pacific War as well as \$30 million in aid. Australia deployed forces from the Royal Australian Air Force and Royal Australian Navy and \$28 million in aid. The United States contributed \$40 million and 13,400 military personnel to assist in search and rescue and reconstruction operations. The trilateral states supplied essential relief supplies and equipment to the Philippines and expanded their own relationship in the process.

A key moment for the trilateral relationship was a Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey landing on the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces Hyūga-class helicopter destroyer *Ise*, a first during an

¹⁶⁶ National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, “Final Report: Effects of Typhoon ‘Yolanda’ (Haiyan)” (Quezon City: National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, December 11, 2015), http://ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/1329/FINAL_REPORT_re_Effects_of_Typhoon_YOLANDA_%28HAIYAN%29_06-09NOV2013.pdf.

operation.¹⁶⁷ Additionally, the now in-force Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement between Australia and Japan facilitated operational level cooperation between their responses to the disaster.

In considering the relief operation and the support given by the trilateral community, it is critical to consider the broader context of their support. The fifth meeting of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue had occurred one month prior to Typhoon Haiyan, and in the post-Dialogue statement, the members had reaffirmed their commitment to collaborating and contributing to regional stability.¹⁶⁸ In September 2013, shortly before the TSD met, Australia confirmed Simon Merrifield as the first resident Ambassador to ASEAN, highlighting Australia's increased investment in the ASEAN community.¹⁶⁹ Similarly, Japanese Prime Minister Abe had recently completed trips to Cambodia and Laos, two key ASEAN member states. Abe's trip publicly promoted infrastructure and democratic institutions, however, a side effect of trip was an attempt to loosen China's influence over these two states.¹⁷⁰ Additionally, in 2012, the United States had begun the process of liberalising their relationship with Myanmar, re-engaging with Southeast Asia to limit Chinese influence. These points serve to illustrate the merging of the trilateral strategy centred around committed engagement to the maintenance of the *status quo*. In this context, the magnitude of the

¹⁶⁷ Matt Myers, "Osprey Lands on JMSDF Ship for First Time in Asia-Pacific," November 14, 2013, <http://www.okinawa.marines.mil/News/News-Article-Display/Article/504456/osprey-lands-on-jmsdf-ship-for-first-time-in-asia-pacific/>; Eric Talmadge, "Ospreys Show Value in Flying Typhoon Aid," *The Japan Times*, November 22, 2013.

¹⁶⁸ Julie Bishop, "Trilateral Strategic Dialogue" (Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Bali, October 4, 2013), http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2013/jb_mr_131004.aspx?ministerid=4.

¹⁶⁹ Julie Bishop, "First Resident ASEAN Ambassador," Federal Government, September 18, 2013, http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2013/jb_mr_130918a.aspx.

¹⁷⁰ Shinzo Abe, "Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following His Visit to Cambodia and Lao PDR" (Tokyo, November 17, 2013), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201311/17naigai_e.html; Catharin Dalpino, "Abe Opens New Fronts," *Comparative Connections* 17, no. 1 (May 2015).

trilateral community's response to Typhoon Haiyan leaves no ambiguity regarding the Philippines significance to the community or the community's desire for a common future.

Malaysia Airlines Flight 370

The disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 remains one of the strangest incidents in aviation history. The scheduled international flight from Kuala Lumpur International Airport to Beijing Capital International Airport on March 8, 2014 ceased contact with air traffic control less than an hour after take-off, and disappeared from radar screens shortly thereafter.¹⁷¹ Based on its presumed heading, the initial search was concentrated in the South China Sea, however further information from military radars resulted in the search area being widened to include the Andaman Sea and Southern Indian Ocean, west of Australia.¹⁷² As the search area had widened to include areas within Australia's Search and Rescue regions, Australia assumed the responsibility for coordinating the search on March 17, nine days after contact was lost.¹⁷³ Covering close to 53 million square kilometres, or 12 percent of the Earth's surface, Australia's Search and Rescue region is the largest of any state.¹⁷⁴ Australia's SAR capabilities are second only to those of the United States, and much of the equipment used by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority

¹⁷¹ Malaysian ICAO Annex 13 Safety Investigation Team, "Safety Investigation for MH370" (Putrajaya: Ministry of Transport of Malaysia, April 15, 2015), <http://mh370.mot.gov.my/download/FactualInformation.pdf>.

¹⁷² Biman Mukherji and Joanna Sugden, "India Continues Search for MH370 as Malaysia Ends Hunt in South China Sea," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 15, 2014.

¹⁷³ Australian Maritime Safety Authority, "Search Operation for Malaysian Airlines Aircraft" (Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Canberra, March 17, 2014), <http://www.amsa.gov.au/media/documents/17032014MH370SearchAustraliaUpdate1.pdf>.

¹⁷⁴ Australian Maritime Safety Authority, "Australia's Search and Rescue Region," Federal Government, April 16, 2017, <https://www.amsa.gov.au/search-and-rescue/australias-search-and-rescue-system/australia-srr/index.asp>.

(AMSA) is interoperable with that used by the United States. While the search for MH370 produced largely unprecedented cooperation between states in Southeast Asia, trust remained in short supply. Malaysia received heavy criticism for releasing incomplete and inaccurate information, clouding the efficacy of the SAR operation.¹⁷⁵ In particular, the distrust between regional states resulted in the withholding of critical information gained from their military radars, for fear of revealing their surveillance capabilities.¹⁷⁶

Disasters such as MH370 offer participating states the opportunity to “substitute latent armed competition with a strategic competition through acts of compassion and retrieval.”¹⁷⁷ As the search shifted from Southeast Asia to the Southern Indian Ocean, coming under Australia’s direction, the trilateral states deployed technologically advanced equipment to continue the search. Australia and Japan both contributed P-3 Orion maritime surveillance planes equipped with radar, infrared sensors, and cameras on the landing gear for speciality search and rescue operations. The United States contributed a P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance craft, the same craft as the one Australia had recently agreed to procure.¹⁷⁸ The deployment of military capable equipment in the SAR is indicative of the ‘securitisation’ of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in the Asia Pacific.

¹⁷⁵ Tania Branigan, “Malaysia Flight MH370 Hunt Sees Suspicion and Cooperation,” *The Guardian*, March 14, 2014.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.; Vikram Nehru, “Flight MH370 Shows Southeast Asia in Unflattering Light,” *Nikkei Asian Review*, March 28, 2014.

¹⁷⁷ Alan Chong and Jun Yan Chang, “Security Competition by Proxy: Asia Pacific Interstate Rivalry in the Aftermath of the MH370 Incident,” *Global Change, Peace & Security* 28, no. 1 (2016): 75–98.

¹⁷⁸ “Abbott Government to Spend \$4b on New Patrol Aircraft,” *The Canberra Times*, February 21, 2014.

The confidence displayed by the trilateral states in deploying and operating military aircraft with potential anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, and maritime interdiction capabilities \ was surely not lost on China, a major contributor to the SAR operation on account of the 152 Chinese citizens aboard MH370. Additionally, China’s SAR equipment was surprisingly criticised by the state-run *China Daily*, which highlighted the superiority of the equipment and air sea platform capabilities of the trilateral states.¹⁷⁹

What we have seen in this section is the clear increase in capabilities between the trilateral partners, highlighting their preferred partner status and increasing fluency in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Each of the scenarios examined in this section has illustrated the capabilities, civilian and military, of the trilateral relationship. In the response to the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, tsunami and nuclear meltdown, the trilateral community was confronted with an unprecedented situation, both in its location and the risks posed to the forces participating in the operation. The presence of United States forces in Japan and the links between the Australian and United States forces were critical in the provision of supplies and the diminishing of the nuclear threat. As noted, this situation catalysed deeper cooperation between the Australian, Japanese, and United States armed services, expanding their capabilities and familiarity to match the situations in which they would likely be deployed. The response to Typhoon Haiyan is a clearer example of the ‘boost’ the states had received from their enhanced cooperation. It was clear that their support was coordinated and effective.¹⁸⁰ Finally, the disappearance of MH370 provided an additional opportunity for the trilateral states to deploy their most capable equipment in the search and rescue

¹⁷⁹ Zhao Lei, “Tech Gap Exposed in Search Mission,” *China Daily*, April 8, 2014; James T. Areddy, Richard C. Paddock, and Daniel Stacey, “Jet Search Tests Beijing’s Crisis Playbook,” *The Wall Street Journal*, April 15, 2014.

¹⁸⁰ “Typhoon Haiyan: China Gives Less Aid to Philippines than Ikea,” *The Guardian*, November 14, 2013.

operation. This operation confirmed the foundational strength of the trilateral community in all areas of HA/DR operations and demonstrated the large capability gap that existed between themselves and their nearest competitors.

Trilateral Defence Industry Organisation

Mature security communities depend on the participating states sharing a sense of foresight with regard to regional requirements. As noted, the vast majority of defence acquisitions by Australia and Japan come from the United States, and those that are either indigenous or through a third party are constructed to be compatible with US combat systems. The greatest challenge for the United States' operations in the Asia Pacific is the physical distance over which it must project power. This classic impediment affects the strategic aims of the United States, increasing participation costs, and if their advanced equipment malfunctions or needs expert repair, it must be returned to the United States, adding to the overall resource cost. To minimise this disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the United States' regional competitors, in 2014 Pentagon selected Australia and Japan as the regional hubs to maintain and repair the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters.¹⁸¹ The choice of Australia and Japan to be the regional hubs for the most expensive defence program in contemporary history is indicative of three key factors. First, the notoriously complex US defence industry is confident in the demonstrated and emerging capabilities of the Australian and Japanese industries and their ability to service and maintain the craft. Second, the US defence community was confident that the sensitive information contained within Joint Strike Fighters outfitted for US purposes would

¹⁸¹ Brendan Nicholson, "Our Bases Win Joint Strike Fighter Repair Role," *The Australian*, December 19, 2014.

not be passed to third parties. Finally, the selection of Australia and Japan indicated to other regional states that had purchased the F-35, chiefly Singapore and South Korea, with other US-platform aircraft operated by Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and India, that their forces would be able to maintain their capabilities over the expected life of the equipment.

In institutionalising Australia and Japan as the anchors of US network of suppliers, the United States is able to reduce the participation costs of its power projection and engagement in the Asia Pacific. This institutionalisation also sustains high level of cooperation and interoperability by reducing the risks to Australia and Japan that are associated with purchasing highly technical combat systems and advanced equipment. The value to this community was that of a sustained US presence in the region, the realisation of a long-held desire for Japan and Australia.

Beyond Exercises: Interoperability in Combat

Interoperability is a concept that clearly means something to everyone, but not the same to anyone. As James Goldrick reliably notes, “Interoperability by its nature is much more a journey than a goal.”¹⁸² The problem, as ever, is in the operationalisation of this concept. Is interoperability indicated by the seamless operation of the armed services of two or more states? Is it only ever quantifiable in a combat setting? If so, is that a plausible achievement for our trilateral community, given the current absence of major conflict? For our purposes, interoperability is about

¹⁸² James Goldrick, “Interoperability,” in *Australia’s American Alliance*, ed. Peter J Dean, Stephan Frühling, and Brendan Taylor (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2016).

compatibility and connections, in reference to both the need for the trilateral community to operate equipment that matches or reinforces equipment used by the other partner states, and the familiarity between service members to the point that they can operate within each other's forces using complementary, if not identical, equipment. The long goal of the trilateral military exercises has been to develop and maintain compatibility and connections to an interoperable standard for use in combat scenarios. As noted, the trilateral community has participated in a series of high-intensity military exercises that cover every aspect of contemporary combat, with much scope for future cooperation. However, the community has only ever been able to demonstrate the interoperable elements of their equipment and strategy through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. These operations take place within a framework and in response to an immediate need, with requirements and capabilities known, and with operational oversight generally assumed by an independent regional or international institution. The same cannot be said of interoperability within an active combat zone which has the wherewithal to shift rapidly. Quantifying the true level of interoperability requires the operationalisation of the services in a combat setting.

Within the trilateral community, interoperability is most advanced within the maritime forces. This reflects both the key role that the Australian and Japanese maritime services play within their national security portfolio and the relative simplicity of dealing with the United States Navy, the Marine Corps Forces, or Coast Guard. Given the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) is both traditionally commanded by an Admiral and is dominated by US maritime forces, it is important to understand the trilateral community as one that is fundamentally maritime. Further, the procurement of the EA-18G Growler aircraft by the Royal Australian Air Force increased the

RAAF's interoperability with the US Navy, which operates these craft, rather than the United States Air Force, which does not use the same navigation system. This applies so to the operation of the P-3 Orion and P-8 Poseidon, which are operated by the RAAF and USN. Japan's Kawasaki P-1, operated by the Air Self-Defense Force, is a Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft compatible with the maritime aircraft operated by the United States and Australia. The amphibious capabilities of the Australian Army places them closer to the Marine Corps, than to the United States Army. This is demonstrated too by the rapid development of the amphibious capabilities of the GSDF, with the explicit intention of the Western Army Infantry Regiment training and serving alongside US Marines.¹⁸³ Finally, the embedding of the HMAS *Sydney* with the USS *George Washington* Carrier Strike Group based at Yokosuka, Japan signifies the interoperable characteristics of the USN and RAN. This reflects the strong maritime element that guides cooperation in the trilateral community.

The trilateral community has demonstrated their highly capable and compatible forces in numerous military exercises and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief scenarios. The presence of an Australian Army Major General as the Deputy Commander, United States Army Pacific highlights the integration of the Australian Army into the strategic calculi of the United States Army. Similarly, the RAAF's successful request to be integrated into the US airlift operation during the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake indicates the familiarity between Australian and United States forces.

¹⁸³ Takateru Doi, "GSDF 'Marines' Planned to Defend Isles," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 1, 2010; Fumiaki Sonoyama, "GSDF Wants Amphibious Capabilities of US Marines," *Asahi Shimbun*, October 28, 2012; Justin Goldman, "An Amphibious Capability in Japan's Self-Defense Force: Operationalizing Dynamic Defence," *Naval War College Review* 66, no. 4 (Autumn 2013): 117–34.

Finally, the embedding of HMAS *Sydney* with the USS *George Washington* Carrier Strike Group is a strong signifier of interoperable capabilities of naval forces.

Mature Defence Cooperation in the Trilateral Community

This chapter has addressed the emergence and maturation of defence cooperation between the Australia-Japan-United States security community. As we have seen, the peace operation in Timor Leste in 1999 was critical for the normalisation of the Japanese military modernisation. The further peace operations involving the trilateral community have been vital for familiarising each with the other's capabilities and strategy and, particularly in the case of Australia and Japan in Iraq, have resulted in a comprehensive relationship. The commitment by both Australia and Japan to force modernisation and integrated capabilities have been driving factors in the acquisition of defence equipment and technology that enhances their interoperability with the United States. The United States' desire to reduce their operating costs and build the capabilities of their regional allies and partners has provided additional opportunities for Australia and Japan to enhance the capabilities of their indigenous defence industry. The commitment to capability enhancement has also been boosted through the rigorous participation in trilateral military exercises, encompassing all elements of contemporary warfare.

As noted, the immediate operating environment of Australia, Japan, and PACOM is maritime, and the integration of maritime force capabilities and inter-service familiarity is a key aspect of the contemporary security community. To that end, we have seen the largest growth in the area of maritime capabilities, underscoring their importance as determined by the trilateral community. Despite Japan's deep disappointment over Australia's future submarine project, the maintenance and evolution of the relationship past this point indicates that there has been no foundational

damage to the relationship. The lack in applied interoperability in a sustained combat mission also presents a challenge to actualised depth of the trilateral community. The continued development of capabilities certifies James Goldrick's truism that "Interoperability by its nature is much more a journey than a goal."¹⁸⁴ Nevertheless, what this chapter demonstrates is that the depth of security cooperation and preparedness is indicative that the trilateral community is representative of a mature security community.

¹⁸⁴ Goldrick, "Interoperability.", p. 173

Chapter Five

Constructing Credible Commitment in the Trilateral Security Community

United States Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel was frustrated. Taking questions after his presentation at the First Plenary Session of the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2014 he showed his exasperation with repeated questions on the United States' commitment to the 'rebalance to Asia'.

“[L]et me remind you of a little recent history”, he began,

The President laid out a couple of years ago a very thoughtful, very clear Defense Strategic Guidance...and it is a centrepiece of his foreign policy...it was articulated very clearly by General Dempsey and me and all of our Chiefs of Staff and all our Secretaries and the legions of people that troop up to Capitol Hill and testify before the House and the Senate on our budgets...¹

Further, Secretary Hagel continued,

I have been here now five times in 13 months saying the same thing, articulating the same thing. Secretary Kerry has been here a number of times. Admiral Locklear (Commander, United States Pacific Command) and his team are all over the Asia-Pacific focusing on the rebalance...So I am not sure what further we can do to indicate that this...is not a promise or it is not a vision, but it is a reality. This rebalance is happening, it has been happening, will continue to happen.²

Secretary Hagel's contemporary frustrations have been echoed by his predecessors since the construction of the post-war alliance system and the development and implementation of the doctrine of extended deterrence. The United States' commitment to global security has consistently been viewed asymmetrically by its allies and partners, and its opponents. Former British Defence Minister Denis Healey once observed “[I]t takes only five percent credibility of American

¹ Chuck Hagel, 'The United States' Contribution to Regional Security' (Q&A, The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 31 May 2014), <https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-1-d1ba/qa-eee0>.

² Ibid, (author's clarification).

retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”³ This disparity was clearly articulated at the beginning of the Berlin Crisis when French President Charles de Gaulle bluntly asked President Kennedy whether the United States would “be ready to trade New York for Paris.”⁴

Therefore, perhaps *the* enduring theoretical challenge within debates surrounding the existence of an international society is the demonstration of enduring commitment. In sum, how do states credibly demonstrate commitment to ideologies, agreements, and norms to other states and international institutions within the international system? The fundamental dilemma of the politics of commitment within security communities, indeed within any community, is that states strong enough to protect themselves and maintain the democratic contract with their citizens, ally or align with other states powerful enough to render that protection and contract moot. As both Deutsch and Adler and Barnett have noted, successful security communities are structured around the ‘mutual compatibility of main values’ which promote long-term perspectives.⁵ For our trilateral community, commitment to the cause has always left an outsize impression on the norms that shape and guide the community. The challenge for each state is the same, how to prove long-term commitment to the community.

³ Denis Healey, *The Time of My Life* (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), p. 243.

⁴ Edmund Glenn, ‘Wednesday Morning Talks: Memorandum of Conversation’, Memorandum, (31 May 1961), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v14/d30>.

⁵ Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ‘Security Communities in a Theoretical Perspective’, in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

However, the asymmetries present within each party to the community engender asymmetric levels of commitment. The challenge for the United States, as indeed it is for any hegemonic power, is the numerous options it has for the conduct of its foreign policy. How does the United States convince its Asian allies, Australia and Japan, of its commitment to their territorial integrity? How do Australia and Japan convince the United States that their longstanding alliances have not created a moral hazard, and that any future deepening of their relations with each other will not create further risk for the United States?⁶

Australia and Japan are both committed to preventing the United States from slipping into nonchalance regarding the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Asia Pacific. As with all developed states, Australia and Japan's strategic policies rest uneasily on the balance of probability. Although a complete withdrawal of United States' support to the region is unlikely, the seeming strategic incoherence of the Clinton Administration, the early and strong Middle East focus of the Bush Administration, and an Obama Administration grappling with the effects of the Global Financial Crisis and the rapid, destabilising effects of transregional threats, have engendered a sense of wariness in the development of allied foreign policy. The furious populism which characterised the 2016 Presidential election did little to assuage this wariness, with once-fringe isolationist sentiments entering the mainstream of American politics.

⁶ For analyses of moral risk in alliance politics see: Glenn Snyder, 'The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics', *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461–95; Robert Jervis, 'What Do We Want to Deter and How Do We Deter It?', in *Turning Point: The Gulf War and US Military Strategy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 122–24; Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, 'Alignment Patterns, Crisis Bargaining, and Extended Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Analysis', *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 4 (2003): 587–615; Amy Yuen, 'Target Concessions in the Shadow of Intervention', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 5 (2009): 745–73.

Level of Commitment in a Security Community




Figure 5.3

In the above structure, we can see the vertical and horizontal evolution of commitment within a contemporary security community. At the base level of minor sensitivity, commitment is assessed by the evidence that the partners have a) the ability and incentive to act as promised, b) those activities undertaken by a state to the public benefit of another state which have little to no costs domestic audience, and c) the building of the credibility of external institutions. At this level, domestic support is critical for the establishing of even a basic level of commitment. Partners indicating their ability and incentive to act as promised promotes a ‘whole of government’ approach to the establishment of credible commitment.

The verbal contracts entered into by states grant a measure of flexibility in determining the final arrangement and become a critical element of subsequent bargaining. Additionally, low cost ventures like sister-city networks act to establish critical bonds at the community level, promoting positive and enduring associations between communities. Finally, building the credibility of regional institutions establishes the commitment the community states have to the region.

At the medium sensitivity level, a deeper level of commitment is expressed by a) investment in relationship-specific capabilities, b) actions within the community which bear an immediate audience cost, and c) the mutual acceptance of external institutional oversight to minimise or solve the rational impulse to ‘free ride’. States ‘invest’ in relationship specific capabilities to fortify the view of all parties that investment in the community is a basis for creating a competitive advantage. This competitive advantage creates a positive relationship between community investment and the growing capabilities of the community. Further, states committing to cost-bearing actions highlight

the critical role and restraining influence that the domestic audience exercises on foreign policy. In particular, domestic audience influence is disproportionately felt in trade and related agreements, as well as increases in military expenditure, two of the key contemporary signifiers of commitment. The acceptance of regional institutional oversight goes a long way to resolving the ‘collective action problem’ which presents a major problem to effective regional governance.

Finally, the indicators that presage the existence of commitment at the major sensitivity level are: a) strong positive domestic audience sentiment that enforces commitment without the need for a formal agreement/alliance, b) commitment to a course of action not within the narrow self-interest of the state, and c) a challenge to the enforcement of standards within the community which is resolved by peaceful means. As we shall see, the commitment at the level of major sensitivity is that which highlights the strength of the community in expansive and non-formal methods.

Strong domestic audience sentiment in favour of state interactions enforces compliance in the absence of a formal alliance or agreement. This sentiment we can measure through an analysis of the public polling of approval in the relationship. The strong public support for the trilateral community undoubtedly provides a buffer for leaders to incur not insignificant audience costs, and also acts as a key limiter of instability caused by leadership changes. Additionally, commitments to courses of action not in the narrow self-interest of the state are an example of Thomas Schelling’s ‘rationality of irrationality’¹ and an example of commitment at this level is the globalisation of the Australia-United States and Japan-United States alliances beyond their original

¹ Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

focus. Finally, the commitment of the community is tested by a challenge to its enforcement from within. We have seen this challenge in the fierce surge of populism in the 2016 US presidential election from both presidential candidates rejecting established views regarding the United States' global posture and purpose.

Indications of Minor Commitment

Constructing Credible Commitment

Commitments are the primary means through which an actor (either an individual or a coalition) can influence the expectations of their opponents through either threats or promises. Commitments can only be effective if they are considered credible, in that the opposite actor understands the substance and context of the commitment. An example of a credible commitment is a state's declaration of its inherent right to self-defence in the event of an imminent or armed attack.² A commitment considered non-credible if it has no effect on the opposite actor because of their perception that there is no substance behind the commitment. As Brett Leeds notes, "A state makes a credible commitment when it convinces its counterpart that it will have both the ability and the incentive to act as promised."³ However, commitment, like trust and cooperation, functions with practice, and accumulates over a lengthy period of time.

In a pioneering article, Franklin Weinstein moved beyond the base concepts of credible and non-credible commitment and articulated the 'situational' and 'non-situational' forms of credible commitment in interstate interactions.⁴ Situational commitment, as its name suggests, characterises commitment as a variable concept, whose fulfilment is dependent on whether national interests are

² United Nations, 'Charter of the United Nations', § Chapter 7 (1945), sec. 51; Daniel Webster, 'Letter to Henry Stephen Fox', in *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, 1841-1843*, ed. K. E. Shewmaker, vol. 1 (Lebanon: Dartmouth College Press, 1983).

³ Brett A. Leeds, 'Credible Commitments and International Cooperation: Guaranteeing Contracts without External Enforcement', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 18, no. 1 (2000): 49–71.

⁴ See Franklin B Weinstein, 'The Concept of Commitment in International Relations', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13, no. 1 (March 1969): 39–56.

still being served at the time the commitment is required. By contrast, non-situational commitments exist as symbolic demonstrations to the importance of keeping all commitments and are most prominent in alliance or collective security commitments, where the original impetus for the alliance may have diminished, but the commitment is maintained nonetheless.

Non-situational commitments are best understood through the lens of Thomas Schelling's work concerning the rationality of irrationality.⁵ Schelling's phrasing here indicates the duelling nature of non-situational commitments, in that states make rational commitments to ally with another state or to join a collective security arrangement, even though a future carrying out the full nature of this commitment would not serve the strict national interest. Schelling notes, that in a show of commitment during the Cold War, the United States went to great lengths to convince the Soviet Union that it had destroyed or eschewed options that it may have found 'attractive' during an emergency.⁶ For example, the United States stationed troops in Berlin during the Cold War, not so much as to defend Berlin against a numerically superior Soviet Army, but rather to leave the Soviet Union with no doubt that the United States would automatically be engaged in any attack on Europe. This demonstration of intentions meant that the United States' commitments to its extritorial allies acted as an indicator of America's honour and prestige, with each agreement creating a method through which states could identify themselves with the United States. Schelling highlights the conundrum,

'To identify' is a complex process. It means getting the Soviets or the Communist Chinese to identify us with, say, Pakistan in such a way that *they* would lose respect for our commitments

⁵ Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, chapter 1.

⁶ Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Hartford: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 44.

elsewhere if we failed to support Pakistan and *we* know they would lose that respect, so that we would have to support Pakistan and *they* know we would.⁷

Constructing an identity which allows the United States to maintain credible commitments to far-flung regional allies like Australia and Japan, is a clear example of the rationale for the centrality of commitment in creating and assessing a contemporary security community.

Credibility within the trilateral community is generated by a combination of transparency, accountability, and flexibility. Transparency in this regard refers to the domestic political process, i.e. the openness of the electoral process and the legitimacy of the election of the national government with stated objectives to enhance the community. The similarities in the composition of the national governments in all three participating states – bicameral, popularly elected – promotes a common political identity. Additionally, the intention of the Koizumi Government to restructure the 47 prefectures into 12 ‘states’, a plan continued under every government since Koizumi, would further this common political identity.⁸

This sharing of political familiarity and identity is important because it assists with the mutual predictability of behaviour. As the trilateral community shares commonly transparent processes, the borders of behaviour within the community are shaped by these practices. Similarly, each executive in our three states is accountable to their constituency, albeit in different manners. All

⁷ Ibid, p. 56 (*emphasis* in original).

⁸ Anthony Rausch, ‘Post Heisei Merger Japan: A New Realignment in the Dōshū System’, *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration* 32, no. 1 (2010): 17–33, pp. 18-19.

three executives are indirectly elected, Japan and Australia are both constitutional monarchies with parliamentary representative governments operating with a fusion of powers, whereas the United States is a federal republic with a strict separation of powers. For Australia and Japan, the fusion of powers furthers the ability of the governing executive to commit to courses of action, and also empowers a new government to reverse previous commitments. In the case of the United States, the separation of the executive and legislative branches increases the chances that one party will control the Presidency, and the other the Congress which has been the case half the time since the Second World War but was much less common before the Second World War. This trend seems to be accelerating: since 1969, there have only been a little more than 12 years (or a quarter of the time) where both branches were controlled by the same political party.⁹ The reality of divided government diminishes the commitment capabilities of the United States, as contentious international issues, such as trade agreements, treaties, or denuclearisation arrangements, can be blocked by either branch of government.

However, all three states face the same constraint, the tenure of their governments. Understanding that any commitment entered into by one government or administration can be reversed by the next forces promises and agreements to be negotiated with that awareness in mind. The reality of regular leadership change is not in and of itself a negative measure of national commitment, as the position of the parties and their elected officials towards international agreements is usually transparent prior to leadership transitions.¹⁰ Indeed, the likelihood of future leadership change,

⁹ These years were 1977 – 1981, 1993 – 1995, several months in 2001 before Senator Jim Jeffords (VT) left the Republican Party and began to caucus with the Democrats, 2003 – 2007, and 2009 – 2011.

¹⁰ Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, 'Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations', *International Organization* 50, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 109–39, p. 116.

particularly as recently demonstrated in Australia and Japan, coupled with the biennial elections in the United States' Congress, mandates that leaders will seek broad agreements that will satisfy all relevant parties. This increases the credibility of all trilateral partners as it lessens the likelihood that the one partner will defect from the commitment due to a change of leadership.

Additionally, each government is structured so that key elements of the civil service bureaucracy remain in place through each transition and into the life of the new government, maintaining commitment. This is clearly demonstrated in the 2007 – 2012 period between the trilateral states, as a succession of political leaders in both Australia and Japan did not interrupt the quickening evolution of the bilateral relationship. Similarly, the rotation of leaders did not affect either state's relationship with the United States, nor did the shift to divided government after the 2010 midterm elections significantly change the relationship between the United States and its allies. This stability of processes is a key element of commitment at a minor level which undergirds the ability of states to maintain their obligations.

Familial Ties: Friendship and Sister Cities

In her remarks at the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the 1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Japan, Australian Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop noted, "At the time [of the Agreement] our two governments shared a remarkably optimistic vision for the future of the relationship. It has grown to exceed all expectations, resulting in the special friendship...that our

countries enjoy today.”¹¹ Bishop’s claim to a ‘special friendship’ is not an uncommon expression in inter-state relations. Indeed, as both Evgeny Roshchin and Felix Berenskoetter note, terms such as ‘friend’ and ‘special friend’ have a long history within the Westphalian tradition.¹² The concept of friendship also finds support in the foundational writings of Deutsch, Wendt, and Derrida and the reconceptualisation of security communities by Adler and Barnett.¹³ Conceptualising the relationship between Australia and Japan as one with an early basis in friendship is critical in highlighting the established and continuing influences on the trilateral community.

In an insightful article, Andrea Oelsner and Antoine Vion identify four escalating and interlinked notions of friendship in international relations. The first is friendship as the basis for bilateral cooperation, strengthened by cooperative initiatives and damaged by disputes.¹⁴ The second is the interpersonal friendship that develops between leaders of countries as seen in the friendship of French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in the creation of the European political community.¹⁵ The third conceptualisation is of friendship that promotes solidarity in the global order when applied by the civic leadership developed in the

¹¹ Julie Bishop, ‘Remarks at 40th Anniversary of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between Australia and Japan’ (Speech, Tokyo, 16 February 2016), http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2016/jb_sp_160216.aspx?w=tb1CaGpkPX%2FIS0K%2Bg9ZKEg%3D%3D.

¹² Evgeny Roshchin, ‘The Concept of Friendship: From Princes to States’, *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (December 2006): 599–624, p. 600; Felix Berenskoetter, ‘Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International’, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 35, no. 3 (2007): 647–76, p. 648.

¹³ Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship* (London: Verso, 2005); Adler and Barnett, ‘Security Communities in a Theoretical Perspective’.

¹⁴ Andrea Oelsner and Antoine Vion, ‘Friendship in International Relations’, *International Politics* 48, no. 1 (2011): 1–9, pp. 4–5.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

second stage.¹⁶ Finally, the fourth conceptualisation, and the one of most use for our purposes “exemplifies the promotion of common ideals and higher values”, in turn recognising and guaranteeing the parties’ participation in the same international system.¹⁷ Basing the 1976 Treaty explicitly in the concept of ‘friendship’ established the intuitive association between friendship and stable peace. Friendship implies commitment and authenticity and can be understood as a progressive alternative to the Hobbesian dynamic of untempered anarchism.

The institutionalisation of the concept of ‘friendship’ within the relationship came after a concerted effort to promote localised or community relations. We can see this with the growth in ‘sister city’ relations between Australia and Japan.

Sister cities were conceived by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1956 at the time US was eloping its own corps of international relations as a part of a Cold War strategy to “involve individuals and organised groups at all levels of society in citizen diplomacy with the hope that personal relationships, fostered through sister city, county and state affiliations, [and] lessen the chance of future world conflicts.”¹⁸ As noted by Kevin O’Toole, Eisenhower saw sister cities as a key aspect of the United States foreign relations, particularly with Japan.¹⁹ Sister cities offered an attractive and low-cost method of integrating American values into foreign societies. Further, as Christine Klein notes, “In publicising the idea that all humanity belonged to the same family, the show

¹⁶ Oelsner and Vion.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 4.

¹⁸ Rolf Cremer, Anne de Bruin, and Ann Dupuis, ‘International Sister Cities: Bridging the Global-Local Divide’, *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 60, no. 1 (January 2001): 377–401, p. 380.

¹⁹ Kevin O’Toole, ‘Kokusaika and Internationalisation: Australian and Japanese Sister City Type Relationships’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 55, no. 3 (November 2001): 403–19, p. 403.

reinforced the terms through which the U.S. explained and justified its reshaping of the international order. America's claims of global 'responsibilities,' 'obligations,' and 'commitments' became more acceptable when they were embedded in a logic of family."²⁰

Australia's initial approach to 'sister cities' was far less strategic with its early forays into these international community relationships almost exclusively with British municipalities and functioned largely as an exercise in sentimentality.²¹ The first relationship established that reflected the aspirations of Eisenhower was formed in 1963 between the Australian city of Lismore in New South Wales, and the Japanese city of Yamatotakada in the Nara Prefecture. In the 20 years after the conclusion of the 1976 Treaty, more sister city relationships were formed between Australia and Japan than with any other state, highlighting both the success of this peacebuilding initiative and the steady and growing desire for each state to deepen their interactions and values integration.

In total 67 sister city relationships were formed between Australian and Japanese municipalities.²² Currently, there are 108 sister city relationships between local governments in Japan and Australia, representing the largest proportion of Australia's relationships at this level.²³ The United States,

²⁰ Christine Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 188.

²¹ Barbara T. Lloyd, 'Safe Sisters: Limitations of Sister City Relationships for International Peace Building' (PhD, University of Tasmania, 2010), p. 40.

²² Melissa Gibbs et al., 'Sister Cities and International Alliances: Can and Should Australian Local Government Play an Expanded Role?' (Sydney: Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government, 2015), p. 38.

²³ Australian Embassy Tokyo, 'A Selection of Australia and Japan's 108 Sister-City/Sister-State Relationships', Government, 14 June 2016, <http://japan.embassy.gov.au/tkyo/sistercities.html>; Julie Bishop, 'Remarks at 40th Anniversary of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between Australia and Japan' (Speech, 16 February 2016), http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2016/jb_sp_160216.aspx?w=tb1CaGpkPX%2FIS0K%2Bg9ZKEg%3D%3D.

owing no doubt to their greater resources and larger number of municipalities, has 414 sister city relationships with Japan.²⁴ As with to Australia, this represents the largest proportion of the United States' sister city relations. There are 64 sister city relationships between Australia and the United States, promoting the same cross-cultural institutionalism as they promote in Japan. The importance of sister cities in the post-Cold War era and for the development of security communities lies in their ability to construct public networks that enable all members to cooperate on the provision of public goods. By creating an international public network at a community level, commitment becomes anchored at that level, and is present at multiple levels of society. As Akira Iriye notes, sister cities “[h]ave proved quite successful in reconciling differences because their own weapons are ideas, a sense of commitment, and voluntary service.”²⁵ Sister cities, established to promote an early Cold War vision of a cohesive Western order, have maintained their utility and have provided critical to the development of commitment within the Australia-Japan-United States security community.

Building the Credibility of Regional Institutions

Security communities share an open-ended commitment to the peaceful change generated through regional institutions. Such relations are critical, as Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee noted in remarks at the Lahore Declaration, “We can change history but not geography. We can

²⁴ East West Center, ‘US-Japan Sister Cities by Prefecture’, 8 August 2016, <http://www.asiamattersforamerica.org/japan/data/sister-cities-prefecture>.

²⁵ Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organisations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 192-193.

change our friends but not our neighbours.”²⁶ This echoes President Kennedy’s assertion before the Canadian Parliament that, “Geography has made us neighbours. History has made us friends.”

The United States’ hegemony in the post-Cold War era has played a large role in determining the credibility of international institutions. As such, a reversal of engagement, a new policy of American non-involvement in or objection to regional dialogues or cooperative efforts has the potential to inflict serious damage on the credibility of US commitment and the effectiveness of the associated institutions. The principal institution in the Asia Pacific is the Association of South East Asian Nations, which supports several critical regional bodies, chief among them, the East Asia Summit²⁷. The United States needed to meet three conditions to join the EAS: 1) dialogue partnership with ASEAN; 2) a significant economic relationship with ASEAN; and 3) accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The United States had achieved the first two conditions but balked at signing the Treaty. At first, The United States’ reluctance to sign the treaty during the Bush Administration was reflected by similar reticence by both Prime Ministers Koizumi and Howard.²⁸ In 2003 at the ASEAN+3 Summit in Bali, Prime Minister Koizumi stated his belief that it was possible for Japan to engage and strengthen ties with Southeast Asia without signing the TAC, saying “[o]f course it is good for other countries to sign such a treaty, but Japan over the years has already built up a very strong and firm relationship of cooperation with the

²⁶ Barry Bearak, ‘India Promises, With Pakistan, To Seek Peace’, *The New York Times*, 22 February 1999.

²⁷ The East Asia Summit is a regional dialogue with a focus on strategic dialogue and cooperation on regional challenges. It comprises the founding ASEAN members, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

²⁸ Mark E. Manyin, Michael John Garcia, and Wayne M. Morrison, ‘US Accession to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)’ (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 13 July 2009), p. 2, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40583.pdf>.

ASEAN members.”²⁹ With this statement, Koizumi articulated his understanding of Japan’s positive relationship with the ASEAN community, while simultaneously drawing attention to ‘other countries’, whose relations with Southeast Asia required the constraints of a formal agreement.

The consistent non-commitment by Japan was rattled when China both signed the TAC at the 2003 ASEAN+3 Bali Summit and issued a joint declaration with ASEAN on a ‘strategic partnership for peace and prosperity’.³⁰ As noted by Shoji Tomotaka, China’s signing of both the TAC and a strategic partnership “suggested that China had a clear, or clearer than Japan, strategy to form a comprehensive partnership with ASEAN including political and security cooperation.”³¹

To counter this perception, Japan swiftly organised a Japan-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in December 2003, at which Prime Minister Koizumi and Indonesian President Megawati Soekarnputri announced Japan’s support for the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as well as negotiations on an economic partnership agreement.³² As noted by Takashi Terada, Australia’s

²⁹ Junichirō Koizumi, ‘Press Conference by the Prime Minister of Japan at the ASEAN+3 Summit’ (Press Conference, 8 October 2003), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv0310/press.html#5>.

³⁰ ASEAN Heads of State/Government and People’s Republic of China, ‘2003 Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’ (Joint Declaration, 8 October 2003), <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2003%20Joint%20Declaration%20of%20the%20Heads%20of%20State%20of%20ASEAN%20and%20China%20on%20Strategic%20Partnership-Peace+Prosperity-pdf.pdf>.

³¹ Tomotaka Shoji, ‘China’s Rise and Japan’s Changing Approach toward Southeast Asia: Constraints and Possibilities’, in *Southeast Asia between China and Japan*, ed. Peng Er Lam and Victor Teo (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), p. 70.

³² Junichirō Koizumi and Megawati Soekarnputri, ‘Joint Press Conference 12 December 2003’ (Press Conference, The ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit Meeting, Tokyo, 12 December 2003), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/year2003/summit/press1212.html#8>.

membership in the fledgling East Asia Summit was contingent too on signing the TAC.³³ The hesitancy of the Howard Government was seen by members of the ASEAN community as a sign of Australia's less-than-firm commitment to cooperation in East Asia. The chief sticking point emanated from ASEAN's principles of non-interference and a concern (similar to that of the Koizumi Government and the Bush Administration), that the TAC would reduce Australia's growing cooperative abilities with the United States. Additionally, Howard's 2002 statement that Australia would be prepared to launch a pre-emptive strike against terrorists in another country if there was a credible threat of an attack, received a vitriolic response from regional states like Malaysia and the Philippines.³⁴ Therefore, regional pressure for Australia to sign the TAC, committing to the norm of non-intervention, came from states concerned about the lingering possibility of a pre-emptive strike. However, it was 2 key actions by Japan that were integral to Australia signing the TAC. First, a report by the Koizumi Government was delivered to the Australian Embassy in Tokyo, drawing the conclusion that signing the TAC would not constrain Japan's security relationship with the United States.³⁵ Second, this report was followed by a March 2005 meeting in Tokyo between Foreign Minister Downer and his Japanese counterpart Machimura Nobutaka, wherein Machimura asserted that similar to Japan, signing the TAC would not constrain Australia's foreign policy.³⁶ Interestingly for our purposes, the 2005 meeting between Downer and Machimura came before the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue had officially been raised

³³ Takashi Terada, 'The Japan-Australia Partnership in the Era of the East Asian Community: Can They Advance Together?', Pacific Economic Paper (Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre, 2005), p. 15, <https://crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/pep/pep-352.pdf>.

³⁴ 'Malaysia, Philippines Slam Howard's Preemptive Strike Talk', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 2 December 2002.

³⁵ Terada, 'The Japan-Australia Partnership in the Era of the East Asian Community: Can They Advance Together?', p. 16

³⁶ Hatsuhsu Takashima, 'Press Conference 22 March 2005' (Press Conference, 22 March 2005), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2005/3/0322.html#5>; Terada, 'The Japan-Australia Partnership in the Era of the East Asian Community: Can They Advance Together?', p. 16

to the Ministerial-level, highlighting the comfort high-ranking Australian and Japan officials had in coordinating their relations.

In a break with the Bush Administration's stance, the Obama Administration advanced two actions to strengthen relations with Southeast Asia, and especially to demonstrate commitment to the region. The first was the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton which was the remaining precondition for the United States to join the East Asia Summit.³⁷ The second was the engagement with the East Asia Summit, which began when Clinton attended in 2010 as a guest of the Vietnamese government and culminated in 2011 with the participation of President Obama as part of the long-term strategy to shift resources to the Asia Pacific, later formalised as the 'Rebalance to Asia'.

In assenting to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the United States signalled to regional states, that it would not only be bound by the principles of territorial integrity and a renunciation of a threat or the use of force, but that they would make sure that these principles were respected. As we have seen, the evolution of each state's stance towards the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was influenced by regional suggestions that their level of commitment was insufficient for their desire for a deeper economic relationship. Ultimately, the success of the trilateral security community required committed engagement with the region and its institutions.

³⁷ Dean Yates and Arshad Mohammed, 'U.S. Signs ASEAN Treaty, Boosts Engagement', *Reuters*, 22 July 2009.

Security and trade have long been linked in the regional institutions, and therefore, commitment to those institutions is critical to promoting the legitimacy of the trilateral community. The key is demonstrating that the trilateral states are actively promoting and acting through the regional institutions, rather than undercutting their utility. An added pressure were the growing questions, predominantly from the United States, regarding the relevance of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. Although Japan and Australia were integral to its inception, by the mid-2000s, APEC seemed to have strayed from its original vision as a vehicle for region-wide multilateral trade and investment agreements.

The proliferation of bilateral and sub-regional trade and investment agreements, as well as China's accession to the World Trade Organisation, greatly diminished the impetus and effectiveness of APEC as a preferred negotiation platform.³⁸ However, international institutions retain strong self-preservation instincts, and the trilateral community opted to not draw down their commitment in light of the discussion over relevance, continuing to appoint ambassadors and other diplomatic officials. There also remained the expectation that APEC could serve the development of the fledgling Trans-Pacific Partnership. Although the members of the trilateral community were not foundational members of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPSEP), the TPSEP was conceived on the sidelines of the 2002 APEC meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico. In fact, it was the non-binding and consultative nature of APEC that ultimately strengthened early negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Given the overlap in states participating in both the

³⁸ Choe Sang-Hun, 'APEC's Relevance Is under Scrutiny', *The New York Times*, 14 November 2005; Richard Weixing Hu, 'APEC: The Challenge of Remaining Relevant', *Brookings*, 14 November 2008, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/apec-the-challenge-of-remaining-relevant/>.

APEC forum and the TPP, APEC became a natural partner to the TPP.³⁹ Much like the security discussions that had long been held on the sidelines of the regional economic dialogues, APEC acted as a forum through which lingering issues could be discussed and resolved before the formal and binding negotiations.

At the minor sensitivity level, we have seen that the trilateral community undertook a series of activities and actions to highlight the existence and development of the commitment. The existence and growth of the sister city network within the trilateral community, particularly the fact that Japan was the recipient of most of the networks established by Australia and the United States, created a base level of commitment at the local level. This positive socialisation embedded a measure of support for and familiarity between the societies. Further, the familiar structure of each state's political institutions promotes a shared political identity, further socialising the trilateral community. This shared identity and the transparency of their political institutions incentivises commitment. Finally, the trilateral states demonstrated commitment through their engagement with and promotion of regional institutions. This is particularly evident with the relations each state was careful to maintain with APEC, and the interlinked decisions with regard to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. In assenting to the TAC and its limitations as a precondition to entry into the East Asia Summit, the trilateral community demonstrated their commitment to each other.

³⁹ See Carlos Kuriyama, 'The Mutual Usefulness between APEC and TPP' (Singapore: APEC Policy Support Unit, October 2011), http://publications.apec.org/publication-detail.php?pub_id=1194.

Indications of Medium Commitment

Competitive Advantage and the Trilateral Community

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Australia and Japan base their strategic policy on the balance of probabilities.⁴⁰ Forecasting strategic futures is by no means a new trend and states have consistently categorised the future under four categories – possible, plausible, probable, and preferred.⁴¹ Possible futures are vast *status quo* altering events, often described as ‘black swan’ events.⁴² Plausible futures are those, which based on current strategic trends remain credible. Probable futures are those resulting from an analysis of causal factors and contemporary trends which have a high(er) likelihood of occurring. Finally, preferred futures involve an element of shaping based on the understanding of the strategic trends guiding a nation’s classification of the possible, plausible, and probable futures.

Within our trilateral community, we can see each state react to the confluence of trends and events in the Asia Pacific. In a zero-sum system, states would seek an individualised competitive advantage over their neighbours in order to maximise their power dividend. However, given the commitment to the security community demonstrated by Australia, Japan, and the United States, the system is no longer zero sum, as the trilateral states cooperate and consult to determine the

⁴⁰ As the superpower, the United States does not face such a challenge and instead must confront the fact that the nation has a diverse range of options through which to pursue its strategic dominance.

⁴¹ See Peter Bishop and Andy Hines, *Thinking About the Future: Guidelines for Strategic Foresight* (Washington, DC: Social Technologies, 2006); Beat Habegger, ‘Strategic Foresight in Public Policy: Reviewing the Experiences of the UK, Singapore, and the Netherlands’, *Futures* 42, no. 1 (1 February 2010): 49–58.

⁴² See Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2010).

preferred future. A *possible* future for the Asia Pacific region is that of global United States withdrawal in the face of a major attack on the American homeland. Such a withdrawal, and the global repercussions thereof, would provoke immediate security crises across the region which may evolve into a region wide conflagration. The vacuum caused by a sudden and immediate departure of the United States would embolden the militarily powerful regional states to circumscribe access to trade lanes, energy deposits, and deepwater straits. US withdrawal represents the worst-case scenario for Australia and Japan, and the commitment undertaken by these two members of the trilateral community, both individually and as part of the collective, to diminish the likelihood of its occurrence has been significant. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, Australia and Japan have used their competitive advantage in industry and access to begin the process of offsetting the ‘operating costs’ for the United States in the Asia Pacific. This ‘offset strategy’ has been key to avoiding the possible futures which may include a severe form of strategic incoherence or complete withdrawal on the part of the United States.⁴³

A *plausible* future for the region is one where key regional institutions such as ASEAN and ARF dissolve in the face of a split in the southeast Asian community, particularly between the ‘maritime’ and the ‘territorial’ states of the ASEAN community.⁴⁴ The loss of these normalising and legitimising institutions would strengthen dominant regional actors like China. Additionally,

⁴³ The phrase ‘offset strategy’, used here is related to the strategy first employed by President Eisenhower during the early 1950s. When NATO was outmatched in conventional terms by the Warsaw Pact states, President Eisenhower responded with the New Look strategy, which bolstered US nuclear capabilities, offsetting the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact. This first offset strategy has been followed by two more, with the third announced by the Department of Defense in November 2014. The principle of all three offset strategies has remained the same, leverage US technology superior to offset the current disadvantage. In this way, Australia and Japan’s use of their technology to offset the operating costs for US power projection fits within the broader usage of this concept.

⁴⁴ Jeremy Grant, Ben Bland, and Gwen Robinson, ‘South China Sea Issue Divides ASEAN’, *Financial Times*, 16 July 2012.

the sudden instability of southeast Asia as states jockeyed for influence and security would have far reaching repercussions affecting critical factors such as trade. Additionally, the capabilities of the community would be stifled, as their attention would be fragmented, and the responses disjointed. This future is plausible when one considers the success China has had in neutralising ASEAN, particularly regarding territorial claims in the South China Sea.⁴⁵ As noted in the previous chapters, the trilateral community is hedging against this future by committing to deepening their relationships with individual states and providing crucial support to regional institutions, highlighting their shared commitment to regional stability.

The *probable* future is one where states in the Asia Pacific continue to improve their military capabilities, and the trilateral community, having demonstrated its depth of trust and cooperation, maintains its cohesiveness and regional engagement. The rapid increase in military capabilities among regional states and trends in military expenditure as we saw in Chapter 4 indicates an increasing and unceasing effort towards minimising their vulnerability *vis-à-vis* rivals they perceive as belligerent. The chief challenge for the states likely to be involved in this transition is on developing a normative framework which prevents highly militarised, dominant states from becoming belligerent and overbearing in regional politics. As China's land reclamation in the South China Sea has expanded, and territorial disputes and maritime incidents have multiplied, states in south and southeast Asia have returned to seeking a deeper security relationship with the United States.⁴⁶ China's largely effective neutralisation of ASEAN has blunted the ability of the

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⁴⁶ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 'Land Reclamation', 10 October 2016, <https://amti.csis.org/category/land-reclamation/>; Pew Research Center, 'Global Opposition to US Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America's Image: Many in Asia Worry About Conflict with China' (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, July 2014), p. 10, <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2014/07/2014-07-14-Balance-of-Power.pdf>.

regional states to respond as one. This pivot back to the United States is clearly evidenced through the increase in states participating in regional military exercises.

As the two closest allies of the United States in the Asia Pacific, Australia and Japan benefit from the closer relations between the US and regional states. They have capitalised on these relations in recent years by developing deeper diplomatic and economic relations with individual states. Given the strong likelihood that Asian states will take control of their security in coming years, the commitment the trilateral community has demonstrated to the likely leaders of this transition will indicate that the trilateral community will retain its competitive advantage in the defence space.

The preferred future before us is the continuation of the *status quo* with the minor changes. In this future, we see the United States maintaining its relative regional forward posture and Australia and Japan maintaining their trajectory towards greater defence cooperation across the board. Additionally, the chief challenges to the commitment demonstrated by the community will remain Chinese aggression in territorial disputes and the influence they exercise in the domestic politics in several regional capitals. However, developments in the capabilities of regional states which lead the regional institutions will promote a ‘push back’ against belligerent states. The trilateral states will continue to maintain and develop their relationships with these regional states, particularly in developing and normalising their military capabilities. These developments would ease the burden of regional security and protect the competitive advantage of the trilateral community in the development of norms of security provision and the training of future military leaders.

Domestic Audience Costs and Interests

The middle tier of our analysis examines the audience costs imposed on the domestic societies as a result of actions taken by the trilateral states on behalf of other members of the community or the community as a whole. The strength of a security community depends as much on the material capacities and capabilities of the members as it does on the provision of social capacities such as trust. Commitment is illustrated by the individual states accepting the raised costs for their participation, and the transfer of these costs to the domestic component of their societies. The two key areas where we see this costs transfer are in defence and economic agreements. Domestic audience costs are an important indicator of a credibility of a commitment. In his seminal analysis on the escalation of international disputes, James Fearon examines the methods through which democratic states demonstrate their commitment and international reputation.⁴⁷ In his discussion on the likelihood of states escalating disputes Fearon argues,

First, the signalling and commitment value of a stronger domestic audience helps a state on average, by making potential opponents more likely to shy away from contests and more likely to back down once in them...Second, if democratic leaders tend to face more powerful domestic audiences, they will be significantly more reluctant than authoritarians to initiate 'limited probes' in foreign policy.⁴⁸

Fearon notes that democratic leaders are more likely escalate disputes against non-democratic leaders than they are against democratic leaders.⁴⁹ Perceiving that the democratic audiences of both societies will impose costs on the escalatory impulses of each leader, the threat of intensifying

⁴⁷ See James D. Fearon, 'Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes', *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577–92.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 585.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 586.

disputes between democratic societies decreases even as those with non-democratic societies increases.

A key issue with commitments is that they often appear to be zero-sum interactions. By developing new relationships and diversifying their interest base, states indicate credible commitment to other states. However, this new indication of commitment may be interpreted by longer term allies and partners as a lessening of a previously existing level of commitment. An example of the zero-sum nature of commitment is the concern generated by the announcement from President Obama of a desire to “see the future”, achieved by a strategic shift to the Asia Pacific.⁵⁰ While this announcement was greeted with enthusiasm in Canberra and Tokyo, there was a decidedly cooler reaction in the capitals of Europe.⁵¹ Similarly, the full measure of the United States’ ‘rebalance’ to the Asia Pacific indicated that the US would seek to “forg[e] new partnerships with India, Indonesia, and Vietnam.”⁵² A key element of the ‘rebalance to Asia’, was to assuage critic’s concerns over the United States demonstrated inability to make a long term commitment to the region. The Bush Administration during its second term had improved its relations with southeast Asia in particular, including appointing the first US Ambassador to ASEAN, completing a free trade agreement with Singapore, and beginning free trade agreement negotiations with Thailand and Malaysia. However, these successes were undercut by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s

⁵⁰ Barack H. Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament’ (17 November 2011), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>.

⁵¹ Tomas Valasek, ‘Europe and the “Asia Pivot”’, *The New York Times*, 25 October 2012; Jonas Parello-Plesner, ‘Grading Europe in the Asia-Pacific: European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013’, Asia Pacific Bulletin (Washington, DC: East-West Centre, February 2013), <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/grading-europe-in-the-asia-pacific-european-foreign-policy-scorecard-2013>.

⁵² Mark E. Manyin et al., ‘Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia’ (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 28 March 2012), p. 2, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf>.

attendance at two of the four ASEAN meetings during her tenure and President Bush cancelling the 2007 US-ASEAN leaders summit due to the deteriorating security situation in Iraq.⁵³

The strategic shift in American military, economic, and diplomatic power to the Asia Pacific is a clear, comprehensive example of a commitment bearing immediate domestic audience costs. Part of the impetus for the rebalance to Asia was a desire to increase the functionality of multilateral security cooperation among regional states. A greater United States military presence in the region would give Australia and Japan greater access to military materiel and influence in US Asia Pacific strategy. However, to achieve this access and influence, both states faced a significant amount of pressure from the United States to demonstrate their commitment to the United States' shift in posture. Peter Hartcher, in the lead up to the 2012 AUSMIN meeting, described the strong criticism directed at Australia's defence spending by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell and former Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage.⁵⁴ Armitage stated, "Australia's defence budget is inadequate...It's about Australia's ability to work as an ally of the US."⁵⁵

Even more disheartening, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2014 rebuked Australia's drive for a deeper economic relationship with China whilst still expecting the United States to act

⁵³ CSIS Southeast Asia Initiative, 'US Alliances and Emerging Partnerships in Southeast Asia: Out of the Shadows' (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2009), p. 36, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/090710_southeast_asia_alliances_partnerships.pdf.

⁵⁴ Peter Hartcher, 'US to Take Up Defence "Freeloading" with Cabinet', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 November 2012.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

as the primary maintainer of the *status quo* in the region.⁵⁶ Responding to information about a recent trade delegation Trade Minister Andrew Robb had led to China, Clinton stated, “Well that is a mistake. It’s a mistake whether you’re a country, or a company or an individual to put, as we say in the vernacular, all your eggs in the one basket.”⁵⁷ As noted in Chapter 4, over the 2010-11 budget period, Australia’s defence expenditure reached a nadir of 1.56 percent, calling into question Australia’s ability to be an effective ally to the United States.⁵⁸ Japan faced a similar scenario, with the historic 1 percent cap on defence spending the subject of sustained criticism from US lawmakers and officials over a number of years. The re-election of the Liberal Democratic Party and Abe Shinzō in December 2016 promoted an expansion in Japanese defence expenditure to match the expectations of the Obama Administration. In Australia, Prime Minister Tony Abbott first introduced the 2 percent target, and his immediate successor Malcolm Turnbull locked in the 2 percent target in the 2016 Defence White Paper.⁵⁹

Both Australia and Japan are committed to increasing their defence budgets in line with United States’ expectations. For Australia, this has meant a commitment to achieving an overall expenditure of 2 percent of GDP by fiscal year 2020-21. Importantly as a measure of commitment to maintaining a capable defence force, the 2016 Defence White Paper asserted that the 2 percent expenditure target should be considered a singular occurrence and that expenditure was being decoupled from GDP estimates. This meant that once the 2 percent target had been achieved,

⁵⁶ Paul McGeough, ‘Hillary Clinton Criticises Australia for Two-Timing America with China’, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 June 2014.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Christopher Joye, ‘Richard Armitage: Why the Free Ride on the US Must Stop’, *The Australian Financial Review*, 18 August 2013.

⁵⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, ‘2016 Defence White Paper’, White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2016), p. 24, <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/2016-defence-white-paper.pdf>.

defence expenditure would continue to grow over the ten-year target period irrespective of changes to Australia's GDP. This commitment to growth of defence expenditure is a key indicator of the credibility of the Australian government to contribute to the 'operation costs' of the United States in the Asia Pacific. In decoupling defence expenditure from GDP estimates, Australia incurred ongoing domestic costs given future governments would be unable to reduce defence expenditure through a re-estimation of a GDP estimates. Here, defence expenditure functioned as a 'commitment device' – that is, a behaviour aimed at institutionalising increased spending.

Commitment devices are typically seen as so-called bridge burning gestures. The term emerges from the game theoretic model wherein Army B occupies an island with two bridges on opposite sides. Army A arrives at one bridge with the intention of taking the island and threatens Army B. Here, Army B has three options, (1) they can stay and fight; (2) they can retreat across the unoccupied bridge, thereby surrendering the island; or (3) they can elect to fight while reserving the ability to retreat if their will, their commitment, weakens, thereby surrendering the island. However, if, upon Army A's arrival, Army B destroys the second bridge, they remove the option of retreat and by doing so make themselves far more formidable as they now have no choice but to fight. This public show of commitment to defending the island by Army B, forces Army A to recalculate how much they are willing to commit to taking the island, now that the option to not fight is no longer available.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 43.

By publicly announcing a change to Australia's defence expenditure calculations, and making expenditure regression close to impossible without incurring higher costs, the Australian government removed an 'escape' clause of which they might have availed themselves in the future had Australia's GDP growth declined.⁶¹ Additionally, the bipartisan nature of the new defence expenditure policy diminished the likelihood that the policy would be reversed under Australia's parliamentary system of government.⁶² Thus, with this policy change, Australia credibly committed to long term funding of defence expenditure under either major political party.

These were not changes easily achieved in domestic politics. The two percent gap was highly contentious. So was the crucial matter of who was to pay for the rotating of United States Marines in Darwin taking five years and four Australian governments to resolve. First announced during President Obama's inaugural visit to Australia in November 2011, the question of which state would cover the necessary infrastructure and additional costs remained open. Indeed, it was not until 2014 that the Abbott government and Obama Administration signed a Force Posture Agreement, and finally in October 2016 the Turnbull government and Obama Administration reached a cost-sharing deal.⁶³ Again, in this deal we can see the use of commitment devices, namely the impending 'hard deadline' of the November 2016 United States presidential election.⁶⁴ Australia was eager to resolve the financial terms of the agreement before either Hillary Clinton

⁶¹ However, in the advent of a major economic crisis, it is probable that Australia would revise its defence expenditure to avoid a complete economic collapse.

⁶² David Crowe, 'Federal Election 2016: Labor Pledges More Defence Spending', *The Australian*, 3 June 2016.

⁶³ Phillip Coorey, 'Australia, US Strike Cost-Sharing Deal on Marines', *The Australian Financial Review*, 6 October 2016; Tom Westbrook, 'U.S. and Australia to Share Cost of Marines Deployed in Darwin', *Reuters*, 6 October 2016; 'US Agrees to Share Cost of American Military Presence in Australia's Northern Territory', *The Guardian*, 7 October 2016.

⁶⁴ Coorey, 'Australia, US Strike Cost-Sharing Deal on Marines'.

or Donald Trump succeeded President Obama, both of whom had questioned the level of support provided by US allies.

As noted, Japan's expenditure on defence has historically and normatively been capped at 1 percent of GDP. However, defence expenditure increases in real terms began in 2013. Like Australia's, the parliamentary nature of the Japanese political system does leave such policy changes, particularly contentious ones such as defence expenditure and expanded military operations, vulnerable to reversal.

The particular problem in Japan in expanding its defence spending was the notorious malapportionment of Japanese electoral districts, particularly the 'vote value disparity' between rural and urban districts, has historically benefitted the Liberal Democratic Party.⁶⁵ Even though the Japanese Supreme Court has ruled three times that the electoral system was in a "state of unconstitutionality", precedent indicates that the disparity *is* constitutional so long as the disparities in the vote do not exceed more than 3:1 in House of Representatives' elections, and 6:1 in the House of Councillors' elections.⁶⁶ Absent bipartisan cooperation, a stable feature given the discomfort the leading opposition parties have historically expressed with expansions to Japanese

⁶⁵ See Pradyumna Prasad Karan, *Japan in the 21st Century: Environment, Economy, and Society* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2005), p. 292; Tokuji Izumi, 'Concerning the Japanese Public's Evaluation of Supreme Court Justices', *Washington University Law Review* 88, no. 6 (2011): 1769–80; 'Editorial: LDP's Makeshift Plan to Reduce Vote-Value Disparity Is Unacceptable', *Mainichi Daily News*, 8 April 2016; Mizushima Asaho, 'The Value of a Vote: Addressing the Disparities in Japan's Electoral System', *Nippon.com*, 6 November 2013, <http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00078/>.

⁶⁶ Izumi, 'Concerning the Japanese Public's Evaluation of Supreme Court Justices', pp. 1770–71.

military capabilities, the Liberal Democratic Party's electoral advantage is likely to sustain this change into the medium term.

Additionally, the longer these defence expenditure agreements are in place, the higher the cost is for reneging upon them. A clear example is the election promise of the Hatoyama Government to relocate the US bases on Okinawa. Despite being elected with an overwhelming majority in the 2009 election, the Hatoyama government failed to make any headway on negotiations with the United States, a failure that led to a reversal of fortunes and swift departure of Prime Minister Hatoyama.⁶⁷ In both cases of defence-related expenditure, the governments of Australia and Japan chose to increase their 'capability commitment' to the United States, and additionally, the trilateral community. An increase in military spending by both governments came after stern criticism from the United States, weary of having to bear the brunt of increased military outlay.

Here, we can see the 'cost' associated with broken commitments. In the case of Prime Minister Hatoyama and the Okinawa military bases there was a 'cost' imposed by both audiences to which Hatoyama attempted to appease, the United States and his own domestic base. The cost imposed by the United States was the refusal to renegotiate the 2006 agreement to move the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station to the southern, less congested region of Okinawa, and redeploy 8,000 marines to Guam.⁶⁸ Hatoyama had enthusiastically campaigned for the complete removal of the

⁶⁷ See Chapter 3, Yuka Hayashi, 'Jostling Begins Among Hopefuls to Lead Japan', *Wall Street Journal*, 2 June 2010; 'Hatoyama, Obama to Talk on Futenma Air Base: Report', *Reuters*, 25 May 2010; John Pomfret, 'Japan Moves to Settle Dispute with U.S. over Okinawa Base Relocation', 24 April 2010.

⁶⁸ Martin Fackler, 'Japan Suspends Talks About U.S. Air Base on Okinawa', *The New York Times*, 8 December 2009; Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian Rinehart, 'The US Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy' (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 20 January 2016), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf>.

Futenma Base from Okinawan territory. But to achieve the reduction in US forces, he was forced to accept the 2006 agreement.⁶⁹ Hatoyama's seeming acquiescence to the United States prompted the resignation of a key coalition partner, fracturing his fragile coalition.⁷⁰ This public split, and Hatoyama's breaking of the key election commitment to move the bases, led to a dramatic loss in support within his Okinawan domestic audience which led to Hatoyama's resignation.⁷¹

Bad Economics as Good Politics

Alongside deeper military commitments, bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements are indices of a state's commitment to the furtherance and deepening of relationships. Like all states in the globalised society, the trilateral community is highly dependent on their bilateral and multilateral trading relationships. Although the United States, Australia, and Japan have long standing bilateral trading relationships, it has only been in the contemporary era that comprehensive trade agreements have been negotiated and concluded.

Despite the trilateral community's deep, indeed, foundational engagement with regional and global economic institutions which aim to establish region-wide, liberal trade agreements, the contemporary era witnessed the rise of trading agreements which were largely preferential and illiberal. An additional factor effecting Australia and Japan is their geographic condition as islands,

⁶⁹ Jonathan Soble and Mure Dickie, 'Japanese Premier Concedes Defeat over US Base', *Financial Times*, 5 May 2010.

⁷⁰ Mure Dickie, 'Japan Coalition Partner Fired over US Base Move', *Financial Times*, 28 May 2010.

⁷¹ Justin McCurry, 'Japan's Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama Resigns', *The Guardian*, 2 June 2010.

which prevents trade across land borders, necessitating increasing costs to construct posts to handle increasing maritime trade.

The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, spurred by sharp currency depreciations, and the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis revealed the underlying vulnerability Asian markets had to fluctuations in the business cycles of United States and Europe. Additionally, as noted Michael Wesley, there was a sense in the Asia Pacific that the Clinton Administration had fundamentally misinterpreted the Asian Financial Crisis.⁷² Wesley argues, that “[W]hat looked to Washington as a necessary economic correction with few political-security implications was seen in the region as an existential calamity – a gut-wrenching challenge to the hard-won economic viability, resilience, and political legitimacy of Asian states.”⁷³ Washington’s response to the crisis was viewed by Asian leaders as largely unsympathetic, and the bailout conditions offered by International Monetary Fund were seen as very strict and in lockstep with statements and policies issued by the Clinton Administration.⁷⁴ The Japanese government proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund, to secure the financial future of the region.⁷⁵ This proposal angered the Clinton Administration who perceived the attempted establishment of another economic institution as an attempt to undercut the authority of the IMF and the United States.⁷⁶

⁷² Michael Wesley, ‘Trade Agreements and Strategic Rivalry in Asia’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 69, no. 5 (2015): 479–95, p. 482.

⁷³ Wesley, ‘Trade Agreements and Strategic Rivalry in Asia’, p. 482.

⁷⁴ Gerald P. O’Driscoll, ‘IMF Policies in Asia: A Critical Assessment’ (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 30 March 1999), <http://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/report/imf-policies-asia-critical-assessment>.

⁷⁵ Phillip Y. Lipsy, ‘Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal’, *Standord Journal of East Asian Affairs* 3, no. 1 (2003): 93–104.

⁷⁶ Lipsy, ‘Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal’.

Within the trilateral community, despite the common nexus of economics and security, there are fundamentally different approaches to negotiating bilateral trade agreements. The United States' approach has been to use trade agreements to reinforce strategic goals and relationships.⁷⁷ This strategy began during the Reagan Administration and accelerated under the George W. Bush Administration. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick announced that free trade agreements with the United States were to be considered a privilege earned through "cooperation – or better – on foreign policy and security issues."⁷⁸ For Japan however, international economic policy is divided between the six powerful ministries of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Economy, Trade and Industry; Foreign Affairs; and Finance. This division effectively prevents any attempt at a comprehensive trade agreement, as each ministry has the power to block the compromises that are included in any effective and successful trade negotiation. As a result, Japan has generally concluded very narrow trade agreements. Like Japan, and indeed the United States, Australian trade negotiations are often heavily influenced by domestic politics.

⁷⁷ See Joanne Gowa and Edward Mansfield, 'Power Politics and International Trade', *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 2 (1993): 408–20; Diane B. Kunz, *Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy* (Darby: Diane Publishing Company, 1997); Robert Zoellick, 'Speech to the Institute for International Economics' (Washington, DC, 16 May 2003); Richard Higgott, 'After Neoliberal Globalisation: The "Securitisation" of US Foreign Economic Policy in East Asia', *Critical Asian Studies* 36, no. 3 (2004): 425–44; Gregory White, 'Free Trade as a Strategic Instrument in the War on Terror', *The Middle East Journal* 59, no. 4 (2005): 597–617; Maryanne Kelton, 'US Political Economy in East Asia' (Second Oceanic Conference on International Studies, University of Melbourne, 2006); Maryanne Kelton, 'US Economic Statecraft in East Asia', *International Relations of Asia and the Pacific* 8, no. 2 (2008): 149–74; Vinod K. Aggarwal, 'Linking Traditional and Non-Traditional Security in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements: The US Approach', in *Linking Trade and Security: Evolving Institutions and Strategies in Asia, Europe, and the United States*, ed. Vinod K. Aggarwal and Kristi Govella (New York: Springer, 2013).

⁷⁸ Zoellick, 'Speech to the Institute for International Economics'.

Complicating any region wide trade agreements in the region are the protectionist policies of the Asia Pacific markets.⁷⁹ The 1980s and 1990s were characterised by wide-ranging policies liberalising trade and reducing tariff barriers. However, by the early 2000s, more narrow preferential trading agreements were re-embraced, with Australia signing the first preferential trade deal in 2003 with Singapore. As Shiro Armstrong notes, this was the first preferential deal Australia had been a party to since the end of British Imperial Preference.⁸⁰

In 1992, Prime Minister Keating rejected the offer of a free trade pact from President Bush.⁸¹ By 2000 however, the Howard Government had decided to pursue a free trade agreement with the United States.⁸² When the Bush Administration was approached in April 2001 by Prime Minister Howard with the proposal, the Administration did not consider it a high priority.⁸³ However, by November 2002, and the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US, Congress gave President Bush fast track authority to negotiate trade agreements and Trade Representative Zoellick notified Congressional leaders that trade negotiations would shortly begin.⁸⁴ Although negotiations had begun before Zoellick outlined the conditions for a free trade agreement with the United States in his May 2003 speech, we can see the July 2002 decision by Howard to support

⁷⁹ See Simon J. Evenett, 'Mapping Crisis-Era Protectionism in the Asia and Pacific Region', Working Paper (Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, November 2013).

⁸⁰ Shiro Armstrong, 'The Economic Impact of the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 69, no. 5 (2015): 513–37, p. 514.

⁸¹ James Brooke, 'Free Trade Debate in Australia', *The New York Times*, 5 August 2004.

⁸² Philippa Dee, 'The Australia-US Free Trade Agreement: An Assessment', Pacific Economic Papers (Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre, 2005), p. 1, <https://crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/pep/pep-345.pdf>.

⁸³ William H. Cooper, 'The US-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Provisions and Implications' (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 12 January 2005), p. 5, <http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL32375.pdf>.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*; Dee, 'The Australia-US Free Trade Agreement: An Assessment', p. 1.

any future American military action in Iraq as fitting Zoellick's "cooperation – or better..." framework.⁸⁵

Similar difficulties emerged when the Howard government sought a more comprehensive trade relationship with Japan in 2003. These overtures were rebuffed on account of the sensitivity of the Japan agricultural sector. It was not surprising that the Australia-Japan Trade and Economic Framework, signed in 2003, made no reference to a future free trade agreement. However, by 2005 a changed political reality in Japan allowed the Koizumi government to make a complete political *volte-face* with the announcement that they now supported a feasibility study into an Australia-Japan FTA.⁸⁶ The reasons for this change, noted in Chapter Four, included Australia's protection of Japanese troops on their successful peacebuilding mission in Iraq's al-Muthanna province.⁸⁷ That both the United States and Japan changed their positions on free trade agreements with Australia after Australia's high-level military engagement with both states indicates the nexus of economics and security.

However, despite the political achievement of securing deeper trade agreements with both the United States and Japan, the overall economic benefits of these agreement for Australia were not

⁸⁵ John W. Howard, 'Why We Took on Saddam's Iraq', *The Australian*, 25 October 2010.

⁸⁶ John W. Howard, 'Feasibility Study into Australia-Japan Free Trade Agreement', (Press Release, 20 April 2005), <http://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-21707>.

⁸⁷ Takashi Terada, 'The Japan-Australia Partnership in the Era of the East Asian Community: Can They Advance Together?', *Pacific Economic Paper* (Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre, 2005), <https://crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/pep/pep-352.pdf>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'Joint Study for Enhancing Economic Relations between Japan and Australia, Including the Feasibility or Pros and Cons of a Free Trade Agreement' (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 2006), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0612.pdf>.

considered economically positive. Although the two free trade agreements with the United States and Japan were heralded as comprehensive achievements by the incumbent governments, the Australian Productivity Commission's 2010 review of Australia's bilateral and regional trade agreements concluded that the economic benefits of these agreements were often overstated, and their importance lies as much, if not more, in their political nature.⁸⁸

Additionally, the Australian government has been criticised for their over eagerness to conclude FTA-type agreements, particularly with the United States and Japan, which undercuts the effectiveness of their negotiation, diminishing the opportunity for larger economic gain in favour of a political announceable.⁸⁹ This reduced economic gain confers an immediate 'cost' upon the domestic audience as the access negotiated to the markets, though improved, is lopsided.⁹⁰ Domestic objections aside, it is clear that the political achievement of the enhanced trade agreements furthered the development of the trilateral community by offering additional layers of interaction in the economic sphere. Particularly in Australia's case, the willingness to accept an (estimated) lower economic benefit for a deeper political benefit highlights the multifaceted nature of the trilateral security community.

⁸⁸ Australian Productivity Commission, 'Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements', Research Report (Melbourne: Australian Productivity Commission, 2010), pp. xxi - xxv, <http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/trade-agreements/report>.

⁸⁹ Ann Capling and John Ravenhill, 'Australia's Flawed Approach to Trade Negotiations: And Where Do We Sign?', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 69, no. 5 (2015): 496–512, pp. 499-500.

⁹⁰ Here we can see the difference in negotiating strategies by the Howard and Abbott Coalition governments, and the Rudd and Gillard Labor Governments. Howard famously rejected the advice of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to walk away from the AUSFTA on the basis of American demands for access to Australia's agricultural access while limiting reciprocal access to their market. After Howard's defeat in the 2007 federal election, the progress of the Australia – Japan FTA slowed to a crawl, with successive Labor governments unwilling to agree to what they saw as a distorted trade arrangement with Japan. However, the 2013 election of the Abbott government changed the calculus, with the political elements of a deeper relationship with Japan outweighing the trade distortions that had previously limited progress.

The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue: Escaping the Collective Action Problem

The collective action problem that bedevils large multilateral alliance structures is close to non-existent in minilateral institutions such as the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue. The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue is unique amongst Asia Pacific institutions in that it has immense capability – particularly demonstrated in the realm of HA/DR activities – but lacks regional legitimacy because the Asia Pacific’s regional institutions are largely governed by smaller states. They possess significant reserves of legitimacy but face an almost insurmountable challenge in marshalling their capabilities.⁹¹ This capability deficit has been particularly evident, as noted, in the disappearance of MH370 when the original leading states seriously confused early investigations with incorrect information based on outdated equipment, and a distrust of their regional neighbours.

The TSD has circumvented the collective action problem by limiting membership only to those parties with shared values and interests. As the size of the institution is small, the opportunities for the normalisation of consultation and trust exercises is immensely increased, strengthening the commitment of members towards each other and the whole. The previous 10 years have seen a deepening in both Australia and Japan’s commitment to the United States’ position in the Asia Pacific beyond an increase in defence expenditure. This commitment is seen in both states in accepting increased US basing, criticising the Chinese Air Defence Identification Zone, agreeing

⁹¹ Amitav Acharya, ‘Foundations of Collective Action in Asia: Theory and Practice of Regional Cooperation’, in *The Political Economy of Asian Regionalism*, ed. Giovanni Capannelli and Masahiro Kawai (Tokyo: Springer Tokyo, 2014), p. 22.

to complex negotiations in respect to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and hesitating – or, in Japan’s case, outright refusal – to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.⁹²

⁹² Julia Gillard and Barack H. Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Gillard of Australia in Joint Press Conference’ (Joint Press Conference, Canberra, 16 November 2011), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/16/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-gillard-australia-joint-press>; Catherine McGrath, ‘China, Australia Spat Over Air Defence Identification Zone Highlights “Troubled Relations” in Region’, *The Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 27 November 2013; Karen Barlow, ‘Australia Expresses Concern Over China Air Defence Zone’, *The Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 26 November 2013; Martin Fackler, ‘Japan, Sticking With U.S., Says It Won’t Join China-Led Bank’, *The New York Times*, 31 March 2015; Cormac Power, ‘Conflicting Perceptions of the AIIB’, *Australian Institute of International Affairs*, 16 October 2016, <http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/conflicting-perceptions-of-the-aiib/>.

Indications of Mature Commitment

Evidence of Domestic Audience Sentiment Which Reinforces Commitment

We have seen the efforts made by the political leaders of each state to commit to each other, while noting that domestic audiences play a large role in determining the scope of the commitment and ensuring that commitments are kept. One only needs to examine the furious protests that have characterised Japan's various attempts to normalise their security arrangements from their World War constitutional limitations or the strategically disastrous defeat Trans-Pacific Partnership in the United States to understand the power of domestic audiences in foreign policy development. When we look at the domestic audience sentiment towards each of the other states in the community we can see the depth and fragility of their commitment, despite all the gains in recent years. The sentiment is a cautionary note about the level of commitment underpinning the trilateral community.

The annual Lowy Institute Poll tracks the reaction the Australian public has to domestic, regional, and global events. In a compilation of their results from 2005 – 2016, we can see the ebbs and flows of the Australian perception of the importance of the United States alliance. From the first poll in 2005 indicating that 72 percent of Australians have a positive perception of the alliance, we can see this number decline by almost 10 percent to a nadir of 63 percent in 2007. The perception then records a swift rebound, jumping 22 percentage points to 85 percent in the two years to 2009. Over the next three years we largely see stability in the perception before it begins to gently decline to a position approximate to where it began in 2005.




Figure 5.2 – Australian perception of the importance of the United States alliance⁹³

As we can see in a comparison between Figures 5.2 and 5.3, there is a slight difference in how the Australian voting public *perceives* the importance of the United States’ security guarantee and how they *feel* towards the United States. The sharp downturn in the perceived importance of the alliance seems more closely related to the Australian public’s perception of the current president of the United States and the degree to which they align with that president. However, the general positive public feeling toward the United States remained steady over the same period, with increases and decreases confined to one or two percentage points. Similarly, in the case of Japan, the public feeling has exhibited a positive, but overall steady trend despite the growing intimacy between the two states. However, it is interesting to see how the two states’ numbers on ‘feeling’ track together, despite the lack of a comparable military relationship between Australia and Japan. This strong

⁹³ Alex Oliver, ‘The Lowy Institute Poll 2016: Understanding Australian Attitudes to the World’ (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 2016), <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lowy-institute-poll-2016>.

and sustained positive sentiment between Australia and Japan is indicative of a shared identity, as the states sharing a similarly high and consistent level of public support are the United States, Canada, and New Zealand.⁹⁴





Figure 5.4 - Australian Public's Feelings Towards the United States and Japan⁹⁵

Irregularly since 1998, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan has conducted polling in Australia. Below, in Figure 5.5, we can see the shifts in Australia's view of Japan measured as a percentage. Figure 5.4, based on a very different source and methodology, reinforces the results from Figure 5.3 and shows that Australia's view of Japan is consistently positive. However, in the years between the 2006 and 2010 polls we can see a sharp increase in the number of respondents who characterised the Australia-Japan relationship as 'Excellent'. This trend, not reflected in the Lowy Institute polling, indicates that although the yearly increases in favourability are small, they are

⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 30.

⁹⁵ Oliver.

comprised of a deeper number of respondents indicating a very favourable view. This strength further reinforces the view that Australia and Japan share a strategic affinity.



*Figure 5.5 - View of Present Relations Between Australia and Japan*⁹⁶

Although the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs polling focused on the Australian public’s view of relations between Australia and Japan, for the United States they took a different track. In these surveys, conducted by in the US by Gallup, the question was the American perception of Japan as a dependable ally. The results indicate an upward trending perception of Japan’s dependability throughout the 2000s and early 2010s before a decline of approximately 10 points between 2012 and 2014. We can see at the beginning of Figure 4 the plateau before a rapid uptick of 6 points in

⁹⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Australian Image of Japan’, Opinion Poll (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 2006), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/survey/summary0606.html>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Australian Image of Japan’, Opinion Poll (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 27 May 2010), http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/5/0527_02.html; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Australian Image of Japan’, Opinion Poll (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 2015), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000209504.pdf>.

2002 as Japan increased their visibility and support for the United States in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.⁹⁷ As the defence relationship deepened, we can see the stabilisation of these perceptions before a decline beginning in 2013. Nevertheless, the perception of Japan as a dependable ally remained high.




Figure 5.6 – US Public Perception of Japan as a Dependable Ally⁹⁸

As demonstrated in Table 5.1, the 2015 Pew Report into United States-Japan relations on the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War revealed that although both states have a high level of trust in each other, moreover, they both trust Australia slightly more than they trust each

⁹⁷ It is not clear what caused the decline in 2008, however the significant bounce in 2009 is surprising, given the strong stand the incoming Hatoyama government had made against the Japanese defence relationship with the United States.

⁹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'US Poll on Opinions Toward Japan', Opinion Poll (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 2014), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000061649.pdf>.

other.⁹⁹ The report contrasted American and Japanese levels of trust with the key regional actors of China, South Korea, and Australia. The report revealed unsurprisingly that both American and Japan have very low levels of trust in China (30 percent and 7 percent respectively). However, in terms of trusting South Korea, almost half of Americans responded favourably (49 percent), whereas less than a quarter of Japanese expressed the same sentiment (21 percent). 68 percent of Japanese trusted America, and 75 percent of Americans trusted the Japanese, which holds with the polling data collected by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs as seen in Figure 5.5.

Table 1 – US and Japanese levels of trust in regional states, 2015¹⁰⁰

	US	Japan
US	-	75
Japan	68	-
Australia	80	78
China	30	7
South Korea	49	21

This data indicates that the publics of all three states perceive each other as dependable and trustworthy. This data affirms the normative binding power of domestic audiences, particularly as we have seen the trilateral community strengthen their cooperative activities over the same period. In maintaining unequivocally positive opinions of each other during the growing military and

⁹⁹ Pew Research Center.

¹⁰⁰ Pew Research Center, ‘Americans, Japanese: Mutual Respect 70 Years After the End of WWII’ (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 7 April 2015), p. 11.

diplomatic relationships each state developed and furthered with the others we can see further evidence that the trilateral community has come to exhibit a deep level of endogenous commitment.

Rational Irrationality: Moving Beyond the ‘Rational Actor Model’ of Foreign Policy

A mature security community presents a challenge to the rational actor model of foreign policy. In that model the rational policymaker determines the goals of the state and prioritises them accordingly. Then, considering the options associated with each goal, the rational calculator conducts a cost-benefit analysis to determine the likely consequences of each option. The options are then ordered from least to most preferred based on this analysis. The options that are costly and will likely not produce beneficial outcomes are the least preferred options, while options deemed inexpensive with likely beneficial outcomes are highly preferred. In the optimal system, the policymaker then chooses the highest ordered option, which then becomes the new policy of the state.¹⁰¹ In a non-optimal system, policymakers and other influential actors may have access to the full range of options but due to the environment and amount of information possessed by the policymakers what may appear the best option in the vacuum of the optimal system may be simply unworkable in the non-optimal system.

¹⁰¹ See Graham Allison, ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, *The American Political Science Review* 63, no. 3 (September 1969): 689–718.

A useful example of the disparity between these systems emerges from their approach to the role of alliances in interstate relations. In the optimal model, we have two states of equal size and capabilities, State A and State B. State A is attacked, unprovoked, by elements of State B. State A issues a formal declaration to State B to turn over the attackers or face a full attack from State A. Not wishing to be drawn into a war that would tax their abilities to the limit and one which they might not win, State B opts to turn over the rogue actors and repairs their relations with State A. In the non-optimal model, State B actively denies the involvement of rogue actors and warns State A that any attempt at an attack will be met with force. In addition, State B has secured the support of other states, who commit to defend State B in the event of an attack by State A.

We can see the actual cases of the disparities in the rational actor model in both the bilateral alliances the United States has with Australia and Japan. Both alliances were crafted at a specific point in time to deal with a specific threat. The ANZUS Treaty was designed to protect Australia against a revanchist Japan, and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was designed to protect Japan from external states.

Nevertheless, uncertainty as to commitments owed remained. Australia invoked the ANZUS treaty after the September 11 attacks, a clear-cut case of an unprovoked attack on the United States. Yet, in 2004 trip in China, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer described the treaty as ‘symbolic’ and argued that the treaty would not necessarily be invoked if the United States became involved in a conflict that was not prefaced with an attack on Australian or United States soil.¹⁰²

¹⁰² Hamish McDonald and Mark Forbes, ‘Downer Flags China Shift’, *The Age*, 17 August 2004.

Downer was swiftly corrected by his United States counterparts, and Prime Minister Howard stepped in to make it clear to the United States that Downer was incorrect in his interpretation, confirming the globalisation of the ANZUS treaty.¹⁰³

A globalised ANZUS alliance is, from a purely rational, balance of power standpoint, irrational. States are self-interested, pursuing agreements that reduce their insecurity. However, the Australian government sought deeper security from their relationship with the United States in the insecurity of the globalised alliance. In other words, the behaviour of the Australian government was rational, as it resulted in a deeper and more comprehensive security guarantee, even though irrationally expanding the geographic parameters of the alliance added an undercurrent of insecurity to Australia's security environment.

Similarly, the formal extension of the United States security guarantee to the Senkaku Islands by President Obama during the escalating territorial tensions between China and Japan in late 2012 is an example of rational irrationality. The United States had historically considered the island chain to be administered by Japan and therefore covered under the 1960 treaty and had, as far back as 1996, publicly articulated this understanding.¹⁰⁴ Further statements by State Department officials in 2004 and 2010 doubled down on that understanding, although until 2012 the United States had never taken a firm position on the actual ownership as opposed to the administration of

¹⁰³ Louise Yaxley, 'US Spells out ANZUS Conditions', *PM* (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 20 August 2004), <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/s1181620.htm>; Richard Baker, 'US Sent "Please Explain" to Downer over China Comments', *The Age*, 17 May 2006.

¹⁰⁴ Michael J. Green, *By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), p. 477.

the disputed islands.¹⁰⁵ In publicly affirming that the treaty did cover the islands administered by Japan, a seemingly irrational move which quantified the nature of the United States' alliance, the Obama Administration raised the stakes for China's continued provocation. Indeed, in the months after President Obama's declaration, the rate of Chinese activities in the contested waters sharply decreased.¹⁰⁶

Japan's move to explicitly deepen their security relationship with Australia in the 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation is a further example of rational irrationality. This early move by Japan was unexpected by observers of the bilateral relationship. While there was little doubt that Australia and Japan were well positioned to seek new security arrangements, given their extensive economic and diplomatic engagement, the move did open Japan to criticism regarding their previous militarism.¹⁰⁷

Here, the rationality of Japan's desire for new security arrangements to minimise their vulnerability to Chinese military assertiveness was juxtaposed against the irrationality of a greatly expanded geographic area of security interest. In indicating that Japan wanted to strengthen their security cooperation with Australia in areas ranging from humanitarian relief operations to

¹⁰⁵ 'U.S. Fudges Senkaku Security Pact Status', *The Japan Times*, 17 August 2010; Hillary Clinton, 'Remarks with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem' (Remarks, Hanoi, 30 October 2010), www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/150189.htm; Paul Eckert, 'Treaty with Japan Covers Islets in China Spat: U.S. Official', *Reuters*, 20 September 2012.

¹⁰⁶ M. Taylor Fravel and Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Chinese Signaling in the East China Sea?', *Washington Post*, 12 April 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan's Response', Government, (4 September 2016), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html.

¹⁰⁷ Qin Gang, 'Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang's Regular Press Conference on March 13, 2007', (Press Conference, 13 March 2007).

combatting transregional crime to counter-terrorism exercises, it was clear that Japan was undertaking a fundamental reorganisation of their security strategy. This reorganisation indicated Japan's early commitment to a mature relationship with Australia, and one that sought to bring the Australia-Japan bilateral relationship to the same standard as the relationship both states enjoyed with the United States.

Challenging the Commitment of the Community

Like interoperability, the strength of state's commitment to the community can only be fully quantified in an active setting. As noted earlier in this chapter, the United States' options for its foreign policy are far more varied than the options available for either Australia or Japan. Simply, maintaining their strong military relationships with the United States is a foundational aspect of the governing parties of each state. Even the election of opposition parties which have prominently argued for a less-US centric foreign policy have thus far invariably bend to the iron law of precedent. Therefore, the challenge to the community can only come from the United States itself when deciding on a policy or set of policies which threaten to diminish the United States presence in the Asia Pacific. We can see a similar response from the United States' European allies, when President Obama and Secretary Clinton announced the 'Pivot to Asia', where the overplayed implication was that the United States would suddenly shift its interests and resources to the Asia Pacific, abandoning Europe.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ See Linda Basile and Pierangelo Isernia, 'The US Rebalancing to Asia and Transatlantic Public Opinion', *The International Spectator* 50, no. 3 (September 2015): 103–21; Bjørnar Sverdrup-Thygeson, Marc Lanteigne, and Ulf

The relevant incident, or rather series of incidents, for the purposes of this section is the influence of populism on the 2016 US Presidential primaries and election. As has been noted throughout this thesis, the timeframe in which many, but certainly not all, acts strengthening and advancing the community occurred during the Obama Administration. Early in the primary season, the campaign was upset by the entry of Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT), into the Democratic primaries, and of businessman Donald Trump into the Republican primaries. Although both candidates ran without the assistance or support of the political establishments, historically a death knell for non-compliant candidates, the primary process had evolved sufficiently to allow these two candidates to mount successful insurgent campaigns against their establishment counterparts. Both insurgencies were largely concentrated in arguments of economic populism, which claimed American prosperity was harmed by involvement in the global economy. Both the conservative nationalism advocated by candidate Trump and the utopian idealism which propelled candidate Sanders challenged the international role that the United States had fashioned for itself since the Second World War.¹⁰⁹ In challenging the relevance of longstanding international institutions and the merits of international trade agreements, Sanders and Trump – both popular candidates – challenged the commitment of the United States to the maintenance of the international system and its allies.

Sverdrup, “‘For Every Action...’ The American Pivot to Asia and Fragmented European Responses’ (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, January 2016).

¹⁰⁹ Robert Kagan, ‘This Is How Fascism Comes to America’, *Washington Post*, 18 May 2016.

Determined to upset the *status quo*, candidate Trump spelt revived 1980s-style economic attacks on Japan, using them to question the efficacy of the United States' commitment to the region. During the campaign, Trump repeatedly referred to Japan as another currency manipulator and one of the states that had unfair trade arrangements with the United States.¹¹⁰ His most severe criticism of Japan came during a campaign rally in Iowa, wherein he stated that, "You know we have a treaty with Japan, where if Japan is attacked, we have to use the full force and might of the United States. If we're attacked, Japan doesn't have to do anything. They can sit home and watch Sony television, OK?"¹¹¹ The jingoistic nature of the Trump's statement, caused ripples of alarm in Japan, especially as Trump had already attacked Japan's level defence spending and support for the stationing of US troops in Japan, arguing that Japan needed to pay more.¹¹² On the Democratic side, Sanders used similar rhetoric to challenge the rationality of the region-wide trade agreements the United States had negotiated, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the TransAtlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.¹¹³ In addition, both Sanders and Trump questioned the utility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, with Sanders calling it a "waste of money" and Trump deeming it "obsolete".¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Jonathan Soble and Keith Bradsher, 'Donald Trump Laces Into Japan With a Trade Tirade From the '80s', *The New York Times*, 7 March 2016.

¹¹¹ Jesse Johnson, 'Trump Rips U.S. Defense of Japan as One-Sided, Too Expensive', *The Japan Times*, 6 August 2016.

¹¹² Reiji Yoshida, 'Trump Remarks Prompt Debate over Cost of Japan-U.S. Defense Ties', *The Japan Times*, 16 May 2016; Johnson, 'Trump Rips U.S. Defense of Japan as One-Sided, Too Expensive'.

¹¹³ Guian McKee, 'This Is What Trump and Sanders Get Wrong about Free Trade', *Washington Post*, 17 May 2016; Bernie Sanders, *Press Conference on Job-Killing Trade Deals in Michigan*, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7zt3irWIqck>.

¹¹⁴ Kurtis Lee, 'Democratic Debate: Clinton and Sanders Spar in an Increasingly Bitter Primary Fight', *The Los Angeles Times*, 14 April 2016, <http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-live-updates-democr-1460688145-htlstory.html>.

As well as these attacks played to the respective candidates' bases, they deeply unnerved United States' allies. Although Sanders was not considered to have a strong chance at winning the Democratic Primary, his popularity led frontrunner Hillary Clinton to mirror some of the populist rhetoric used by her opponents to decry 'unfair' regional trade agreements, most critically the TPP, which in fact she had largely negotiated as Secretary of State in the Obama Administration.¹¹⁵ Despite the strength of the Republican field arrayed against him, Trump coasted to victory in the Republican primaries.

The deep pessimism of the United States' global role evinced by the populist rhetoric from Clinton and Trump provoked great concern amongst the members of the community.¹¹⁶ The challenge prompted by the populist surge in the United States forced Australia and Japan to address the structural integrity of the community. Australia pushed back upon the narrative that the alliance was personality-driven, and therefore tied to a traditional type of American president, while also highlighting the cooperative nature of Australia's alliance relationship with the United States.¹¹⁷ Japan defended itself against the charge that it was not contributing adequately to the alliance by announcing their largest defence budget in its post-war history.¹¹⁸ In February 2016, Australia

¹¹⁵ Hillary Clinton, 'If Elected President, I'll Level the Playing Field on Global Trade', *The Press Herald*, 23 February 2016.

¹¹⁶ Stephanie Anderson, 'Donald Trump Would "Cause Mayhem" for Australia's Security Alliance with US: Kim Beazley', *The Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 10 August 2016; Gareth Hutchens, 'Julie Bishop Raises Concerns Over US Foreign Policy Under Donald Trump', *The Guardian*, 30 October 2016; Paul Dibb, 'US Election: Donald Trump Presidency Is Cause for Real Security Concern', *The Australian*, 8 November 2016; David B. Larter, 'Japan Defends US Alliance Amid Worries Stoked by Trump, Sanders', *Navy Times*, 6 May 2016; Gavin Blair, 'How Trump's White House Bid Has Put Japan on the Defensive', *South China Morning Post*, 8 October 2016.

¹¹⁷ Malcolm Turnbull, 'American Australian Association & US Studies Centre 10th Anniversary Dinner' (Sydney, 9 June 2016), <https://www.liberal.org.au/latest-news/2016/06/09/american-australian-association-us-studies-centre-10th-anniversary-dinner>.

¹¹⁸ 'Japan Defense Budget to Exceed 5 Trillion Yen in 2016/17', *Reuters*, 24 December 2015; Ministry of Defense of Japan, 'Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of FY2016 Budget Request' (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2016).

released the Defence White Paper to highlight its commitment to raising and maintaining defence expenditure. These actions indicated that Australia and Japan recognised that the perception that they were taking the United States for granted was not only unfounded but debilitating to the cohesion of the community.

The Actualisation of Commitment

As we have seen over the course of this chapter, the commitment expressed by the states in the trilateral community has resulted in realisation of credible commitment. The difficulties inherent in demonstrating credible commitment are significant in asymmetric relationships and this is an accomplishment of some note, a considerable triumph for vision and the efficacy of sustained diplomacy. The resources and capabilities of the trilateral community to commit to each other and importantly the willingness of Australia, Japan, and the United States to bear the costs on their respective societies are important indicators of the maturity of the commitment.

As we have seen, Australia and Japan's defence expenditure increases occurred steadily, as each state utilised commitment 'devices' to ensure that future governments would not be tempted to renege on the agreements. Additionally, the nature of the preferential trade agreements signed by both Australia and the United States and Australia and Japan had obvious political connotations which acted to layer the commitment. In that process, the states maximised their competitive advantages to guide the region toward their preferred future. Furthermore, we have seen the consistent efforts to diminish the legitimacy-capability gap regarding the effectiveness of the trilateral community. In examining this disparity, the superiority of multilateral groupings was shown in moderating the collective action problem that can undercut the commitment of individual states to the community. Both Australia and Japan have taken firm steps to maintain their contributions to the trilateral community.

Finally, in considering Schelling's "rationality of irrationality", we see actions undertaken by the trilateral community that are well beyond the narrow self-interest of the state. The maintenance and globalisation of the bilateral alliances both Australia and Japan share with the United States, particularly regarding each other's security, highlight the depth of the community. The highly positive association the societies of all three states share with each other acts as a highly cohesive bind to ensure commitment in the absence of a formal trilateral alliance. Finally, the challenge to the cohesiveness of the community emerged from the 2016 US Presidential election. The populist campaigns of Senator Bernie Sanders and businessman Donald Trump challenged the United States' commitment to the international order. Longstanding allies and alliances were not spared, as their utility to the United States was challenged, prompting a critical test of the strength of the community to defuse the tension and reaffirm the foundational commitment of the community.

Conclusion

Security Communities: The Alliance after Next?

Paul Bracken, in his 1993 article, 'The Military After Next', identified the difference between the 'next military' and the 'military after next'.¹ He noted that the former will be produced by the current doctrine, trends, and recent experience, and the latter would "aris[e] from trends and decisions that reflect the technology and international security environment of the next century."²

In the same way, an immature security community represents the 'next' conceptual stage for enhanced state-to-state relationships. This reflects Adler and Barnett's contention that nascent security communities are often unintended, with states instead "begin[ning] to consider how they might coordinate their relations in order to: increase their mutual security; lower the transaction costs associated with their exchanges; and/or encourage further exchanges and interactions"³

There are abundant examples of such relationships emerging, nor does this constructivist approach seem out of place within the contemporary context. This thesis argues that security communities are representative of future inter-state relationships as seen in the Australia-Japan-United States security community. As a flexible, dynamic institution, the security community model will define

¹ Paul Bracken, "The Military after Next," *The Washington Quarterly* 16, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 157–69.

² *Ibid.*, p. 159.

³ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 50.

the future of regional groupings. The security community of Australia-Japan-United States is distinctive in having emerged, but also in having achieved maturity.

Chapter 1 of this thesis identified the theoretical pillars of security community development: security, sovereignty, cooperation, and trust. The chapter established the ‘security’ aspect of a security community as centred around the protection of the state; that a security community retains the “legal independence of separate governments”⁴, which limits the loss of sovereignty; and identifies trust as a projected assumption that allows states to consider cooperation which then acts to quantify and reinforce the assumed trust.

The chapter identified a two-tiered model to identify the distinction between an immature and mature security community. The increasing securitisation of areas of non-traditional security have prompted states to demonstrate their interest in cooperation across a range of emerging and extant issues. A security community is interested in influencing the interaction patterns of the participating states to strengthen the formation of a shared identity that extends beyond material interests.

An immature security community exists when participating states begin to coordinate their relations and envision new forms of cooperation. To further specify the circumstances that give rise to an immature security community, this chapter identified five conditions: 1) These include

⁴ Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 6.

persistent, existential, exogenous threats; 2) non-complex security environments; 3) sufficient non-existential threats so as to warrant diverse foreign policies; 4) a pattern of functional relationships across other units in the system; and 5) a long-term peace between the participating states.

The chapter established a three-tier framework to assess the development of the security community from the immature to mature level. This framework is built around 1) communication, 2) cooperation, and 3) commitment, in line with the theoretical considerations of Deutsch, and Adler and Barnett. After the first contextual chapter, the thesis devoted a chapter to development in each of these three areas.

Chapter 2, *The Audacious Experiment*, provided historical context to the emergence of the Australia-Japan-United States security community. The chapter shows the absence of an initial design to establish a security community among these three central players. The original architecture of the post-war bilateral alliances the United States forged Australia and Japan was deliberately engineered to provide the United States with a high level of control. Australia, by contrast was preoccupied by precisely the opposite fear – that Japan would again seek military hegemony in the Asia Pacific. Convergence of perspectives emerged as each nation developed new relationships with one another during the Cold War, without any coherent plan. Indeed, their Cold War perspectives were remarkably unaligned: the United States was preoccupied with anti-communism to a degree not emulated in either Australia or Japan. This chapter identified in the

narrative of these trilateral foreign policy developments evidence of the five conditions that identify an immature security community.⁵

The vulnerability of both Australia and Japan in the immediate aftermath of the Pacific Theatre left them immensely exposed to further disruptions within the Asia Pacific region. The regional instability provoked by decolonisation and the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula, coupled with the unremitting menace of the Soviet Union provided the 1) persistent, existential, exogenous threat. 2) The non-complex security environment was assured by each state's rapprochement with other neighbouring and regional states under the umbrella of the United States leadership in the Cold War. We can see the 3) diverse foreign policies of Australia and Japan in the forging of mercantile and global partnerships with regional states. Further, their equal status as treaty allies of the United States gave them a 4) commonality in which to base their emerging relationship, further promoting their concentricity. Finally, the 5) signing of the 1976 Australia-Japan Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation institutionalised the emergent trust driven by the long-term peace between the two states.

Ties among members of an immature security community are only as strong as their participants' trust and commitment to the community as a whole. The chapter highlighted the two historical incidents that very nearly shattered the bilateral relationships between both states and the United States. The first of these was the Japanese-US trade dispute(s) of the 1970s which severely shook

⁵ Persistent, existential, exogenous threats; non-complex security environments; sufficient non-existential threats so as to warrant diverse foreign policies; a pattern of functional relationships across other units in the system; and a long-term peace between the participating states.

the foundations of the prosperous Japanese society and highlighted power imbalance in the United-States security relationship. The second was the breaking of the ANZUS Treaty in the late 1980s, which saw Australia sacrifice an historic relationship with New Zealand for their security guarantee from the United States.

Identifying contrary trends toward greater trust, the chapter also demonstrated how tension in the United States-Japan and United States-Australia alliances drove Australia and Japan to strengthen their bilateral relationship in an effort to offset the tension. The chapter makes clear the impact of exogenous factors in providing the steps, largely unplanned, toward a more mature security community.

Chapter 3, *Talk isn't Cheap: Communication in the Trilateral Community*, identified the importance of trilateral communication, the first of the three trust-enhancing dimensions, in intensifying and focusing the three nations' mutual commitment to enhancing their relations to the standard of a security community. Communication is a vital developmental element as states must learn how to communicate with one another in a language that is common and understood by all participants. This reminds us of a central point: security communities are not naturally occurring arrangements and require an inciting event that pushes the participating states to consider how and why they might begin to better coordinate their relations.

A key event in that development was, as noted in Chapter 3, the Howard Government's publicly stated intent to 're-spoking' the bilateral hub-and-spokes alliances model to increase the interaction

between Australia, Japan, and the United States. The result was increasing communications patterns in joint statements that articulated, specifically and directly, areas of threat perception and areas for future cooperation, collaboration and collation on strategic assessments; and the emergence of an institutional framework for resolving contentious issues that otherwise would have diminished the cohesiveness of the community.

This communication evolution can be seen in the 2013 Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, which publicly broke with previous model of studied neutrality and non-offensiveness that had characterised prior joint communiqués, setting the standard for the joint communiqués to follow. The signing of the Australia-Japan Information Sharing Agreement, the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement, and the Agreement on the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, all followed this pattern and elevated the Australia-Japan bilateral communication relationship to the same level as the Australia-US and US-Japan alliance.

Chapter 4, *Constructing Security Cooperation: Lessons from the Trilateral Community*, focussed on cooperation, particularly in the security arena, to demonstrate the development of the second test for transiting to a mature sc. Once community members communicate with each other in a manner that is common and understood, their trust in each other is enhanced and can be demonstrated through various forms of security cooperation.

To provide a measure of this test, the chapter expands the concept of ‘security’ to securitisation as manifest in security cooperation exercises. The three measurable characteristics of mature security

cooperation identified in the Chapter were: 1) interoperability in all HA/DR operations; 2) the development of a mutually supportive defence export industry; and 3) the demonstration of interoperability in a combat setting.

Demonstrative cooperation in interoperability came in an HA/DR operation in the coordinated responses of all three nations to the 3/11 ‘Triple Disaster’ in Japan, Typhoon Hainan in November 2013, and the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370.

Cooperation in support of a mutually supportive defence industry was identified in the designation of Australia and Japan as regional hubs for the repair and upkeep of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters by the United States Department of Defense. This development made it clear that Australia and Japan not only possess the advanced facilities for such upkeep, but that joint hosting lowered the cost for the United States’ projection of power into the Asia Pacific.

Finally, this chapter noted that interoperability is most advanced among the maritime forces of each state’s defence services, highlighting the fundamental maritime foundations of the security community. Though interoperability in a combat setting has to date not been displayed, the three states have all indicated a willingness to confront Chinese territorial claims and military zones in the South and East China Seas.

Chapter 5, *Constructing Credible Commitment in the Trilateral Security Community*, demonstrated the development of credible commitment among the three partner states, the final test in this thesis of the emergence of a mature security community. The willingness of the individual participants of the trilateral community to impose costs on their domestic constituencies to the benefit of the community as a whole is a strong indicator of the maturity of the commitment. Commitment is seen too in the decision to maximise and sustain the community's competitive advantage *vis-à-vis* regional challengers.

Defence expenditure has historically been a locus of tension within the trilateral community, Australia and Japan highlighted their commitment to reducing this tension by committing to increased defense expenditure and limiting the ability of future governments to reduce defence spending. These actions reflect more than considerations of state self-interest; instead they highlight the depth of maturity within the security community.

This thesis has provided a theoretical framework and empirical tests to demonstrate that the contemporary Australia-Japan-United States trilateral relationship is a mature security community. Karl Deutsch posited that a security community existed when the participating states demonstrated the three following characteristics: a compatibility of major values and norms, the capacity of the political units of the participating states to respond to each other, and the mutual predictability of behaviour. As we have seen, the trilateral community also demonstrates these three characteristics. In addition to Deutsch's understanding of security community creation, this thesis developed and

employed an innovative framework to assess the development of a contemporary mature security community.

Security community formation is a dynamic process, with opportunities for linkages and challenges arising from the continued close engagement across multiple domains. By developing a multi-tiered approach to security community development, this thesis has demonstrated the progress to a mature Australia-Japan-United States security community. What began in a war without mercy that Australia, Japan and the United States waged at any and all costs is now an alliance of these same three nations dedicated to their mutual security and regional stability.

Coda

Beyond Rhetoric: Donald Trump and the Future of the Trilateral Security Community

There can be no doubt that the question at hand is how serious a threat the Trump presidency is to the mature Australia-Japan-United States security community. Yet, despite the destabilising influence President Trump's rhetoric has had on the stability of the international order, the cohesiveness of the Australia-Japan-United States security community has neither unravelled nor stopped. As noted throughout this thesis, security communities are not naturally occurring phenomena, they are carefully crafted and layered to maximise flexibility and growth. As we have seen, the building of normative and institutional linkages between the three states has continued regardless of partisan considerations.

While President Trump has not fulfilled every campaign promise with regard to renegotiating the United States' alliance network, it is fair to say that his presidency has not unduly damaged the trilateral security community. As evidenced by the recent announcement that the trilateral community have agreed to mobilise infrastructure investment in projects to stimulate economic growth in the Indo Pacific, to counter the influence of Chinese infrastructure investment in the Pacific.⁶ Similarly, the increasing use of the descriptor 'Indo Pacific', particularly in the 'Free and Open Indo Pacific Strategy' advanced by the Japanese government and then adopted by the Trump

⁶ Julie Bishop, 'Australia, US and Japan Announce Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo Pacific' (Washington, DC, 31 July 2018), https://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2018/jb_mr_180731.aspx.

Administration, and the renaming of Pacific Command to the Indo Pacific Command, highlights the continuing confluence of the United States' interests in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

This thesis was conceived before the election of Donald J. Trump to the U.S. presidency. It is important to note that the theories of community building that undergird contemporary security development are hostile to the aggressive nationalist themes which characterised Mr. Trump's primary and general election campaigns. As a candidate, Trump attacked Japan (along with China and Mexico) as a modern state whose economic strength was largely attributable to the over generous military and economic support of the United States. In one attack, Trump drew attention to the imbalance constructed by the United States in the US-Japan security treaty noting that in the event of an attack on the United States, "Japan doesn't have to do anything. They can sit home and watch Sony television, OK?"⁷ Australia, by contrast, received relatively little attention from candidate Trump during the electoral campaigns. However, after Trump's electoral victory and inauguration, the tenor of President Trump's tone towards Australia and Japan abruptly switched.

Prime Minister Abe, eager to repair an unusually fraught relationship with an incoming President, was the first foreign leader to be received by President-elect Trump a week after his electoral victory.⁸ Similar to Percy Spender's understanding of the pivotal and transitory opportunity provided by abrupt United States policy shift brought on by the advent of the Korean War, Abe took the opportunity to emphasize to Trump the utility of the bilateral security relationship, seeking

⁷ Jesse Johnson, 'Trump Rips U.S. Defense of Japan as One-Sided, Too Expensive', *The Japan Times*, 6 August 2016.

⁸ Justin McCurry, 'Japanese PM Abe to Meet Trump against Backdrop of Security Fears', *The Guardian*, 16 November 2016.

early public assurances to check Chinese and North Korean aggression and maintain the uneasy balance of power in Northeast Asia. Abe's early visit to Trump paved the way for Abe's official visit in February 2017, at which Trump stated, "This administration is committed...to the security of Japan and all areas under its administrative control and to further strengthening our very crucial alliance."⁹

However, the Trump Administration's unconventional and untested approach to trade and military alliances have not brought any additional measures of security to Japan, frustrating Abe who had put great political stock in the expectation that Trump would be able to bring about a resolution on the Korean Peninsula and check Chinese military aggression in the South and East China Seas. Most concerning, Abe was not included in the negotiations with the North Korean regime, an area of acute sensitivity for Japan. Although these negotiations are still ongoing, they have not yielded the benefits sought by the Trump Administration.

In sharp contrast to the early positive dynamic exhibited between Trump and Abe, Prime Minister Turnbull's first official leader-to-leader communication with President Trump was a startling departure from the tone of previous encounters between incoming Australian Prime Ministers and United States' presidents. In the highly testy phone call with Trump, Turnbull struggled to confirm the Trump Administration's commitment to a refugee swap agreement committed to by the Obama Administration.¹⁰ The agreement, that the United States would agree to vet 1,250 refugees held

⁹ 'President Trump Meets with Prime Minister Abe in Washington', *U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Japan* (blog), 11 February 2017, <https://jp.usembassy.gov/president-trump-meets-prime-minister-abe/>.

¹⁰ Greg Miller, Julie Vitkovskaya, and Reuben Fischer-Baum, "'This Deal Will Make Me Look Terrible': Full Transcripts of Trump's Calls with Mexico and Australia", *Washington Post*, 3 August 2017.

offshore on Nauru and Manus Island and resettle an unspecified number while Australia would accept a number of refugees from Central American countries in return, was negotiated and agreed to by the Obama Administration and Turnbull Government. Although Trump agreed to honour the deal, he made it clear to Turnbull that he felt that he was being forced into the arrangement.

Additionally, Trump made his displeasure clear both privately to his allies, and publicly through the social media application, Twitter. In an incendiary tweet that came *after* Trump had agreed to honour the arrangement in the phone call with Turnbull, Trump posted, “Do you believe it? The Obama Administration agreed to take thousands of illegal immigrants from Australia. Why? I will study this dumb deal!” Trump’s language called into question his commitment to honouring all arrangements that had been signed by the previous Administration but were yet to be actioned.

Such was the perceived seriousness of Trump’s anger, that the Chairs of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Bob Corker (R-TN) rang the Australian Ambassador to the United States, Joe Hockey, to express their complete and ongoing support for the United States-Australia relationship.¹¹ Additionally, a bipartisan grouping of Senators – Lamar Alexander (R-TN), Ben Cardin (D-MD), Marco Rubio (R-FL), and Ed Markey (D-MA) – introduced Senate Resolution 50, which reaffirmed their strong commitment to the United States-Australia relationship. An identical resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives by Democratic Representatives Eliot Engel (D-NY) and Jackie

¹¹ Ultimately, more than 50 members of the United States Congress called Ambassador Hockey to express their solidarity, support, and goodwill towards Australia.

Speirs (D-CA). Further, Senators Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Dick Durbin (D-IL) revived the Friends of Australia Congressional Caucus, which (at January 2018) boasts 70 members. It was not until May 2017, some three months after their acrimonious phone call, that Trump and Turnbull met officially, in New York at an event commemorating the 75th anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea, a decisive naval battle in the Pacific Theatre of the Second World War.

Despite the discomfiting public re-evaluations of the bilateral alliances in the aftermath of the 2016 Presidential election, the trilateral relationship has maintained its steady course towards deeper integration, particularly regarding the underdeveloped Australia-Japan leg of the relationship. We can see an early indication of this course maintenance in Abe's January 2017 tour of Southeast Asia. In addition to visits to the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, key members of the ASEAN community, Abe also paid an official visit to Australia. In a joint statement, Turnbull and Abe remarked upon tensions in the South China Sea as well as North Korea's continued missile launches, indicating that there had been no lessening of the shared threat perception.¹² Additionally, Abe and Turnbull signed an updated version of the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) first analysed in Chapter 3. The updated ACSA included the sharing of ammunition during exercises, relief operations, and peacekeeping operations, rather than just food, fuel and other supplies, coming into force in September 2017.¹³ The important

¹² Malcolm Turnbull and Shinzo Abe, 'Joint Meeting Outcomes - Visit to Australia by Japanese Prime Minister Abe', 14 January 2017, <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2017-01-14/visit-australia-japanese-prime-minister-abe>.

¹³ Marise Payne, 'Signing of the Australia-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement' (Sydney, 14 January 2017), <https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-releases/signing-australia-japan-acquisition-and-cross-servicing>.

inclusion of ammunition highlighted the ongoing maturation of the Australia-Japan relationship to the level of the United States-Japan and United States-Australia relationship.

Tellingly, the first visit to the region by an Administration official was by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. Secretary Mattis, widely seen as a steady and experienced foreign policy professional in contrast to the undisciplined and inexperienced transition team, represents a clear and longstanding supporter of the trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic alliance networks.¹⁴ Announcing his trip less than a week after his swearing-in as Secretary of Defence, Secretary Mattis' visit to South Korea and Japan aimed to dispel lingering security concerns generated by Trump's consistent calls for allies to pay more and for Japan to develop a nuclear deterrent.¹⁵ Further, Vice President Mike Pence made an early visit to both Japan and Australia in April 2017, in part to reassure these key Asia Pacific allies. President Trump had held a successful summit with the President Xi Jinping of China in February 2017, a week before Prime Minister Abe had his first official meeting with President Trump.

Despite the tension and uncertainty that characterized the early relationship between the three leaders, there is little to indicate that the mechanisms of alliance relations undergirding the security community were affected. As we have seen, the trilateral Defence Ministers' Meeting proceeded as planned on June 3, 2017 on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. The joint statement maintained the theme of previous communiqués, expressing strong opposition to the use of force

¹⁴ Justin McCurry, 'US Defence Chief Heads to Japan and South Korea to Strengthen Ties', *The Guardian*, 26 January 2017.

¹⁵ Ibid.

by the Chinese to alter the status quo in the South and East China Seas as well as attempts to militarise the ‘disputed features’ of these regions.¹⁶ Further, the 7th Trilateral Strategic Dialogue was held on the margins of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in August 2017 and was attended by Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and Japanese Foreign Minister Konō Tarō. The joint statement issued after the meeting continued the themes of the Defence Ministers’ communique, noting:

The ministers expressed serious concerns over maritime disputes in the South China Sea (SCS). The ministers voiced their strong opposition to coercive unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions. In this regard, the ministers urged SCS claimants to refrain from land reclamation, construction of outposts, militarization of disputed features, and undertaking unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment in areas pending delimitation.¹⁷

Similarly, the evolution of the trilateral community’s interests into the realm of infrastructure investment indicates the cohesion and vision of the community remain strong, and importantly, that there is space for the security community to expand and deepen its interactions.

There is an element of historical symmetry here: the community has weathered such uncertainty before. As noted in Chapter 3, 2007 was a similarly disruptive year for the fledgling trilateral community. On the positive side there was the signing of the Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in March 2007 and the second meeting of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (but the first involving the three leaders) on the sidelines of the 2007 APEC conference in Sydney. However, 2007 also saw the abrupt departure of both Shinzo Abe and John Howard, and the

¹⁶ ‘Australia-Japan-US Defence Ministers’ Meeting’ (Defence Ministers’ Meeting, Singapore, 3 June 2017), http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2017/06/03_js_j-us-aus_e.pdf.

¹⁷ ‘Australia-Japan-United States Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Ministerial Joint Statement’, 6 August 2017, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273216.htm>.

Democrats take control of both chambers of the United States Congress, largely as a rejection of the Bush Administration's handling of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Hurricane Katrina, and the economic slowdown. Despite the departure or the diminished power of all three leaders, the mechanics of the deepening relationship weathered the disruption and community cohesion was maintained. As noted in Chapter 3, the slow progress on the trilateral relationship from 2009 to 2013 was not replicated at the bilateral level, particularly in the relationship between Australia and Japan. Then, as now, the uneven policies emanating from Washington underscore the importance both Australia and Japan place on their bilateral security relationship.

The long term strategic aims of the Trump Administration in Asia remain unclear, a fact not lost on the strategic competitors and partners of the United States. This sense of strategic instability is coupled with the lack of political appointments to critical bureaus within the Departments of State and Defense in the Trump Administration, highlight the unwelcome narrative that the United States is not interested in retaining their hegemonic position in the Asia Pacific.

There is a vast gulf between the rhetoric that has consumed popular imagination over the last 2 years and the reality of the stability of the trilateral community. In adopting Japan's 'Free and Open Indo Pacific Strategy', Trump has made it clear that the United States will remain militarily engaged in the Asia Pacific. Despite seeming early accommodations with Chinese President Xi Jinping and the North Korea regime, President Trump has doubled down on the United States' existing relationships with allied partners in the region, sharply pushing back against the spread of Chinese coercion and intimidation. The development of the trilateral infrastructure investment

forum has been another additional element of the mature security community, aimed at blunting Chinese ‘debt trap diplomacy’ in the Pacific Islands. There has been no attempt by the Trump Administration to ‘walk back’ security commitments to either Australia or Japan, indeed there has been an increase in US military sales to both countries.

As with much of the popular commentary surrounding President Trump’s foreign policy strategy, the effect of the president’s rhetoric is overstated. In contrast to popular narratives about the retreat of allies from the United States, Australia and Japan have maintained their commitment to the trilateral relationship and have sought to deepen and expand their relationship with the Trump Administration. The central characteristic of a security community is the peaceful resolution of inter-community disagreements. As evidenced by the history of post-war relationships between these three states, every step towards a deeper level of community cohesiveness has been the product of oft-furious debate and challenge. Mature security communities are neither static nor fragile institutions, they are built to withstanding the *sturm und drang* of domestic and international politics and evolve to meet the needs of a changing regional environment. Honesty requires strategists to confess that the region of tomorrow will be little like the region of today. Accordingly, the mature Australia-Japan-United States security community offers the greatest capability for the participating states to meet critical threats, foreign and domestic.

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