

Measuring Minor Party Impact: The Australian Greens in a Changing Party System

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DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis:

1. Does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and
2. To the best of my knowledge and belief, does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

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ABSTRACT

In 2017, the Australian Greens celebrated its 25th anniversary as a national political organisation. Nine Greens senators and a single Greens member of the House of Representatives now sit within the federal parliament. But what impact does the party have on Australian politics? This thesis investigates the impact of the Greens in Australian politics by assessing the party's influence over the party system. The dominant perspective in the literature characterises the Australian party system as a relatively stable two- or two-and-a-half-party system. As such, either the common characterisations of the party system are inaccurate, or the Greens possess little capacity to shape the competitive environment in which they operate. Employing novel techniques and approaches seldom used in Australian political science, this thesis investigates party competition, ideological polarisation, electoral volatility, government formation, voting behaviour, and the contest for legislative outcomes. The evidence reveals general change in what is a multidimensional Australian party system. Two-partism is giving way to a contingent multipartism; while the contest for government remains marked by two-partism, multiparty dynamics are consolidating in the electoral arena and the Senate. In this process of change, however, the Greens are a party of meaningful but nonetheless minimal impact, more constrained and shaped by their competitive environment than they are capable of bringing about its transformation. This thesis therefore furthers our understanding of the Australian party system, party competition, minor parties and, especially, the role and development of the Australian Greens.

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Part I: Introduction

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE AUSTRALIAN GREENS

In the course of writing this thesis, the Australian Greens celebrated their 25th anniversary as a national political organisation. Having formed in 1992, the party has since contested each federal election from 1993 to 2016. The Greens' electoral and representative strength has grown steadily, albeit gradually, with only two elections, 1996 and 2013, seeing aggregate reductions in vote share across either the House of Representatives or the Senate. Nine Green senators and a single Green member of the House sit within the 45th Parliament, with the party also boasting considerable representation at the state and local council levels. The essential question this thesis seeks to answer, though, is: so what? It is one thing for a party to continue to exist; it is quite another for a party to have a meaningful, sustained impact on a nation's politics. Writing in *Green Magazine*, the Greens' members periodical, party leader Senator Richard di Natale (2017) marked the party's 25th anniversary by celebrating the "many campaigns that have enabled the Australian Greens to emerge on the national stage and fundamentally change this country from both inside and outside our parliaments." Di Natale pointed to policy wins, to agenda-setting, to obstruction of government-initiated legislation, and to power-sharing arrangements, as achievements for the party. These achievements, according to Di Natale, had been leveraged through electoral and legislative strength. But what changes in the Australian party system can we reasonably attribute to the influence of the Greens? How successful has the party been in altering the dynamics of party competition, in shaping the contest for government, for votes, and for legislative outcomes?

There are several avenues through which the impact of the Greens – or any individual party – might be investigated. In the international literature on green parties, scholars have examined, for instance, greens in government (e.g. Dumont & Bäck 2006), the influence of greens on issue competition (e.g. Abou-Chadi 2014), and the role of green parties in restructuring the electorate (e.g. Dolezal 2010). These studies focus on distinct, individual facets of party competition and have contributed significant insight into the nature of green parties and how they interact with their competitors. The key problem with much of the existing scholarship, however, is that components of party competition are considered in

isolation. What is lacking is a broader analytical framework through which to contextualise and interpret the way green parties have shaped, and have been shaped by, the competitive environments in which they operate.¹ The literature specific to the Australian Greens, too, has been focused on specific aspects of the party's development. Missing is a grander narrative connecting otherwise discrete findings into a synthesised analysis of party success and influence (or lack thereof). Through employing a party system framework, one which encompasses recurrent party interactions across legislative and electoral arenas, we can gain a richer, more complete picture of the Greens' impact. To do so is not only necessary for our understanding of the Greens, but also timely, given the recent analyses of populist and radical right parties through a party system lens (Lisi 2018; Wolinetz & Zaslove 2018a).

Evaluating the impact of the Greens on Australian politics by measuring the party's impact on the party system is inherently a comparative project; the Greens' impact is measured *relative* to its competitors. As such, this thesis involves classifying and tracking change in the Australian party system, whether resulting from the Greens, other parties, or other political phenomena.² In addition to party system classification, this project is concerned with *party* classification and, in particular, the question of whether the Greens are a minor party, a 'third party', or something else. Moreover, is there a need to distinguish between the role of the Greens in the Australian party system, and the role of other ostensibly 'minor' parties within the Australian Parliament? In answering these questions about party impact, party roles, and party system change, we require robust typologies to aid in understanding, to provide context, and to offer the very language with which to describe these phenomena. However, just as extant party system typologies have diminished in their discriminatory power (Mair 1997), so too has the conventional distinction between 'major' and 'minor' parties (and, more recently, 'micro' parties). As such, this thesis advances, in chapter twelve, two new typologies of parties and party systems. This thesis, therefore, makes original contributions to knowledge

¹ See Mair (2001), on West European green parties, for a partial exception.

² In some ways, this project is two theses – one on the Australian Greens, and another on the Australian party system. Given that party system analysis has been so rare in Australian political science, there is a need for a comprehensive re-evaluation of the Australian party system informed by recent developments in the party systems and party competition literature. Nevertheless, even where a wider lens is adopted in considering the Australian party system, each chapter attends to the question of the impact of the Greens.

of the Australian party system and the Greens. Further, this thesis enhances our understanding of party competition, party systems theory, and minor parties generally. This first chapter sets out the main research questions and the party system framework of the thesis through which I analyse the impact of the Greens in the contests for votes, government, and legislative outcomes.

The Role and Success of the Australian Greens

In many advanced democracies, populist radical right parties are now the most successful new party family to have emerged in the post-war era (Wolinetz & Zaslove, 2018b). Within the Australian context, however, it is arguably the Greens that hold this title. The Greens have responded to new issue demands regarding the environment, social justice and, increasingly, economic inequality. In so doing, they have attracted a distinct voter base. Relative to the party's electoral success, though, the Australian Greens have received little scholarly attention. Following the 2010 federal election, the Greens surpassed the peak of electoral support and parliamentary representation achieved by the previous significant minor party in the Australian party system, the Australian Democrats. Similarly, the Greens have maintained a larger, more stable voter base than many of the European green parties so often the subjects of academic inquiry. Nevertheless, there is much about the ostensible 'third party' of Australian politics that remains unknown or under-studied. There have been, of course, incisive contributions to understanding the Australian Greens. Much of what written, though, has adopted a relatively narrow scope, typically addressing one of three predominant themes: organisational structure, electoral support, and post-election analyses. In particular, the novel organisational arrangements and internal democracy of the Greens have been examined at length, often tracing change over time (Cunningham & Jackson 2014; Jackson 2012; Jackson 2016; Miragliotta 2012; Miragliotta 2015; Turnbull & Vromen 2006). Considerations of party structure have also occasionally overlapped with a detailing of party origins (Strauss 2011), the influence of institutions (Miragliotta 2010), and the profiling of party members and activists (Gauja & Jackson 2016; Vromen 2005).

Gaining less, but still considerable, scrutiny is the source of the Australian Greens' electoral support and the emergence of a green constituency. Such analysis is often coupled with commentary on the party's ideological positioning and forecasts of future prospects. Manning (2002) examined the demographics of the growing Green vote, finding early evidence to support the now commonplace profile of the party's voter base as relatively young, professional, tertiary educated, and middle class. Charnock (2009) demonstrated the interrelating left-wing and post-materialist tendencies of Greens voters, and consequently argued that any ideological or programmatic shift towards a more centrist position would likely undermine the party's existing support. A paper by Tranter (2011) confirmed prior findings of the demographic and ideological positioning of Greens voters, but also found that political knowledge played a significant role in encouraging split ticket voting between Labor and the Greens. Simms (2013) returned to the demographic data of the Green vote, arguing that the party's supporters represented Brett's (2003) 'moral middle class' of civic-minded voters. Lastly, Miragliotta (2013) employed logistic regression analysis to explore the characteristics of Greens partisans, finding that social class, ideological position, post-materialism, age and occupation predicted partisanship – though in differing levels of significance depending on survey year.

The ideological and strategic positioning of the party has been a focus of several post-election analyses of Greens performance. Cahill and Brown (2008) investigated the election of the first Greens member of the House of Representatives in the 2002 Cunningham by-election, and the subsequent failure of the party to maintain the seat. Hoffman and Costar (2010) also used a by-election – that of Higgins in 2009, in which the Greens arguably underperformed – to explore the relationship between, and the geographic concentration of, Greens and Labor supporters. Rootes (2011; 2014) also offers post-election profiles of the party, examining the campaigns, issue agendas, and performance of the Greens in the 2010 and 2013 federal elections. Manning and Rootes (2005) advanced a similar profile following the 2004 federal election, alongside a claim that the party was shifting leftwards at the expense of its original environmental agenda. Other studies have investigated the styles of representation adopted by Greens members of parliament (Vromen & Gauja 2009), analysed party strategy and internal tendencies (Miragliotta 2006), and discussed broader Green ideology and political

theory (Brown & Singer 1996). Such work is vital in progressing our understanding of the Greens, its development, and performance over time. What is lacking, however, is a comprehensive evaluation of the party's success and impact on Australian politics. Are the Greens just another minor party?

What Makes a Party 'Minor'?

Determining a satisfactory definition for the term 'minor party' is difficult, as there is no consensus position or dominant theoretical perspective. A range of nomenclature exists for this amorphous category of parties, including labels such as 'minor', 'small', 'third', 'micro', and 'fringe'. In this vein, Kefford (2017) highlights how party types are often conflated with party relevance. In response, Kefford sets out a classification of parties based on their role in the party system, separating major, minor and 'peripheral' parties. In most multiparty settings, though, Kefford's 'minor party' category becomes excessively crowded, reducing the discriminatory power of the taxonomy. The variety of descriptors used in the literature suggests that there is a gradation of minor parties and a need to effectively differentiate between them (Mair 1991). That is, any definition and subsequent typology must permit for the identification of disparities in the roles and influence of purportedly 'minor' parties; say, for example, between the Greens and the Nationals, or the Greens and One Nation. An initial step in constructing a definition of a minor party, then, is to identify which parties are to be included. In so doing, one must have some sense of the points at which a party becomes, and ceases to exist as, a minor party.

There is no wholly satisfactory solution to this problem. We could use any one of a variety of criteria, ranging from electoral support, to parliamentary presence, longevity, and organisational size. Smith (1991, p. 24) even suggests that it might be prudent to simply ignore the problem of strict definition and instead recognise some parties as "indubitably small." The simplicity of such a method is appealing and elevates subjective, 'expert' judgement. Yet it is also rather vague, with limited discriminatory power. Alternatively, we could introduce upper and lower thresholds – usually based on electoral performance, but potentially also organisational size – with parties between these cut-offs deemed minor. Lower thresholds

serve to differentiate minor parties from ephemeral and 'also-ran' parties, while the upper limit partitions minor parties from a category of 'larger' parties. As many scholars have noted (e.g. Gauja 2010; Miragliotta et al. 2013), setting such thresholds is an inherently arbitrary exercise. Mair (1991, p. 43) acknowledges this fact when detailing otherwise easily defensible criteria for recognition as a minor party: any party contesting three elections and receiving between 1 and 15 percent of the vote.

In contrast, we could combine qualitative and quantitative assessments, incorporating features of party competition. By this approach, thresholds of recognition are also used, but with the minimum cut-off point usually based on Sartori's (1976, pp. 22-23) notion of party 'relevance' – a concept explored in detail in chapter four. The upper limit in qualitative schema varies, however, and can be somewhat vague. For instance, Jaensch and Mathieson (1998) separate Australian political parties into majority, major and minor categories. While the minor party minimum is based upon an amended version of Sartori's relevance criteria, the upper limit is a quantitative distinction between minor and major party classifications. Jaensch and Mathieson's (1998, pp. 10-11) definition of a major party is exclusive, restricting the category to a party that "can expect to win sufficient seats to establish it as the Opposition, as the largest party out of government". They do, however, recognise the potential, but ultimate rarity, of an additional category of party – that of a 'third party'. Here, Jaensch and Mathieson rely on Fisher's (1974, p. 6) conception of a third party as one "that regularly breaks the two-party competitive pattern in a nation by winning or threatening to win enough offices to influence control of the government." The literature regularly labels the Greens as the new third party or force in Australian politics (Jackson 2016; McCann 2012; Miragliotta 2013), but often without adequate attention as to precisely what constitutes a third party, or whether it is an appropriate term.

Demarcating Parties by Relative Influence

In this vein, Gauja (2010) questions whether classification of the Democrats as a minor party accurately reflects the impact the party had on Australian politics. We might raise the same question in relation to the Greens. With current definitions, stringent thresholds, and

classificatory schema proving to be of little assistance in such an assessment, it may be wise to follow the advice of Smith (1991, p. 23) and depend on “intuition and knowledge of how the [party] system works”. What Smith suggests is that the characteristics of ‘small’ or ‘minor’ is a party systemic and relative concept, unique to an individual polity. As such, “the definition of a small party must not be divorced from considering the situation of one party in respect of all others in a particular party system.” (Smith 1991, p. 25) That is, what constitutes a minor party in a multiparty system may be quite distinct to a minor party in a two-party or two-and-a-half party system. Given the multifaceted nature of party systems, as well, it’s feasible that a party’s degree of minority status may fluctuate across different arenas of party interaction. In demystifying these questions, typologies remain useful, and we can certainly improve upon existing schema. Nonetheless, we must use any typology flexibly and informed by deep analysis of the case(s) under study.

A starting point is to recognise that a minor party, then, is one that maintains markedly less capacity, relative to dominant rival parties, to shape, and resist being shaped by, patterns of party interaction. Simultaneously, however, a minor party does hold *some* degree of party system influence, thus separating them from the larger cohort of largely ineffectual ‘peripheral’ parties (Kefford 2017). Even a cursory examination of the Australian party system reveals the Greens as a party of considerably less influence than the Labor and Liberal parties. Indeed, no party has ever threatened the displacement of either Labor or Liberal from their dominant roles. What is not clear without further study of the party system, though, is whether, and how, the Greens’ degree of influence and impact has varied across time. Likewise, there may be a need to categorically distinguish between the systemic impact of the Greens and those of other ostensibly ‘minor’ parties; for instance, One Nation, the Liberal Democrats, and the Nationals. It may also be necessary to repurpose and rename Fisher’s (1974) concept of ‘third party’, setting out less demanding and more flexible criteria to better capture developments in the Australian polity. Adequately defining party types and appropriately applying them to parties is, after all, inextricably linked with both party system analysis and any evaluation of the Greens’ impact.

A Party System Framework

A party system is a pattern of iterative party interactions, both competitive and cooperative, stemming from the contest for government, for votes, and for legislative outcomes. It is these contests that are the main lines of inquiry throughout this thesis. The term ‘party system’, though, is often employed in the broader political science literature without precise definition or outline of parameters, composition, and characteristics. Frequently, it is used as a collective noun to indicate the number of parties present. It is important to note such use does not always indicate an inadvertent oversight. Indeed, there has been a view since Duverger (1954) that party system evaluation is largely a matter of tallying parties – in other words, the parties *are* the system. Conversely, it is rare, as Bardi and Mair (2008, p. 151) contend, for ‘party system’ to be correctly connected with “the different elements that may structure the mutual relationships and interactions between the parties” and “those factors that may serve to constrain party behaviour”. What Bardi and Mair describe more adequately encompasses the attributes of a *system*. The most satisfactory definitions of a party system incorporate these attributes and party-derived phenomena. The majority of such definitions, including the definition used in this thesis, are founded upon the work of Sartori (1976, p. 44), whereby party systems are regarded as “the *system of interactions* resulting from inter-party competition.” Though brief, Sartori’s conceptualisation unambiguously emphasises the importance of patterns of competition between more than one party.

Building upon Sartori’s definition, it is important to specify that the party interactions that produce a party system can be competitive *and* cooperative. Party system change potentially results from alteration in the patterns of either type of interaction (Pennings & Lane 1998, p. 5; Webb 2000, p. 1; Wolinetz & Zaslove 2018b, p. 4). There are myriad factors that can shape and influence these party relationships. Smith (1989, p. 349) reminds us that parties, as strategic actors, not only respond to the observable behaviour of competitors, but also engage in prediction and pre-emptive action. When simply counting parties, or conducting other non-systemic analysis, party behaviour is implied to be constrained only by the boundaries of the broader polity. Conversely, a systemic approach incorporates not just the institutional, electoral, and structural constraints of a polity, but also the influence of the totality and

constituent dynamics of party interaction (Kitschelt 2009; Smith 1989). In so doing, a systemic approach recognises that the party system can itself operate as an independent variable, “propelled and maintained by its own laws of momentum.” (Sartori 1968, p. 21) Thus, while parties are strategic actors capable of influencing competitors and the environment in which they operate, parties too can be affected and limited by those very same factors. A party system, therefore, is not synonymous with a collection of parties; a system is far greater than the sum of its parts. Indeed, Sartori (1976, p. 43) argues that there is little reason to employ the term ‘system’ at all unless one defines it as involving “properties that do not belong to a separate consideration of its component elements.”

This thesis unites a party system framework with a thorough analysis of how one constituent party, the Australian Greens, navigates and adapts to its environment. The framework draws, in particular, on the work of Sartori (1976), but is overall an amalgam of party system theorising adapted for the Australian setting and for testing individual party impact. Despite frequent claims of the decline of parties in the academic literature³ and media commentary (e.g. Roggeveen 2018), parties remain central to liberal democracies. Parties are unparalleled as political actors; political competition is overwhelmingly *party* competition; democratic government is predominantly *party* government. Parties are the “intermediate structures lodged between citizens and governments” and are thus a primary means by which citizens can influence their governments (Wolinetz 1988a, p. 4). Parties, though, can themselves shape their electorates, as well as the competitive environments in which they function. Parties are strategic actors, constrained by the party systems they exist within, but capable, too, of exerting influence over that system (Sartori 1976). Party system research is vital to the study of liberal democratic politics because it incorporates analysis of relationships between citizens, parties, and government (Sharman 1990, p. 85). As such, the sum of variables and linkages that party system study may contain can, in the words of Pedersen (1983 p. 31), become “astronomical”. Centring this thesis on parties as strategic actors – and, specifically, the Australian Greens – necessarily focuses the scope of analysis.

³ See Daalder (1992; 2002) for a summary and critique of the ‘party decline thesis’ and its associated literature.

This thesis aims to identify and examine the impact of the Greens on the Australian party system. The conventional approach to party system change, including in the analysis of individual party impact (e.g. Mudde 2014), tends to follow a taxonomical method whereby party system change is said to occur when a party system has shifted from one 'type' (e.g. two-party) to another (e.g. multiparty). Generally, therefore, this approach employs typologies of party systems. Typologies are critical in the analysis of party systems, and Sartori's (1976) typology, in particular, is compelling. As explored in the literature review (chapter two) and research methodology (chapter three) chapters, however, extant typologies tend to have an overriding focus on government formation, set an unnecessarily high bar for party system change, and obscure the role of individual parties in any *ongoing* change. Following the conventional approach, for the Greens to have meaningful impact, the party would need to bring about a change in system 'type' by transforming the structure of competition for government. This is quite a feat for any party, regardless of size or success. We should not, though, discard typological assessments of party system change and party impact. Rather, these typologies should be refined (see chapter twelve) and supported by a richer investigation of party competition and cooperation.

Party system scholars tend to examine electoral volatility, voting behaviour and social cleavages, government formation, and the ideological dimensions of party competition (e.g. Broughton & Donovan 1998; Daalder & Mair 1983; Wolinetz and Zaslove 2018a). These are crucial components of party systems and are examined throughout this thesis. But what is absent in many party system analyses – and certainly in party system typologies – is the contest over legislative outcomes. The outcome of legislative competition, whether it be policy change or inertia, is the aspect of party interaction most directly felt by citizens. The successful passage of a legislative agenda, moreover, is directly linked with the *effectiveness* of governments. In this context, the effectiveness of government does not necessarily follow directly from the *viability* or formation of government, particularly in those systems where veto players (institutional or partisan) exist that can obstruct a legislative agenda. The presence of strong bicameralism means that, in the Australian system, the Senate and Senate parties are often such veto players. Thus, a principal contention in this thesis is that party interaction, party impact, and party system change must each be analysed across three broad

elements: the contest for votes, the contest for government, and the contest for legislative outcomes. This thesis is organised around these three elements.

The Australian Greens in a Changing Party System

Chapters four and five examine the Australian party system, and in so doing, serve three primary purposes. First, they establish the broad framework into which the following chapters are situated. Taken together, these chapters evaluate four principal components of the Australian party system: the number of parties, ideological polarisation, electoral volatility, and the structures of competition for government and in opposition. Each of these components connect directly to either the contest for votes, for government, or for legislative outcomes. Chapters four and five, therefore, assess the party system at the broad, macro level. Subsequent chapters deal with, in turn, each individual party system component in depth to provide a deeper understanding of the Greens' role and influence. Second, these chapters investigate the existence and degree of party system change in Australia between 1975 and 2016. If the Greens are to have had any substantive impact on party competition, it is necessary to demonstrate change in the principal components of the Australian party system. In recognition of the ongoing debates on how to best gauge variation in these components, multiple indicators are employed in each case. The number of parties, for example, is calculated using quantitative methods (the effective number of parties and the Golosov index) alongside qualitative counting (Sartori's test of party relevance). Third, the findings of chapter four and five inform, in chapter twelve, a typological reclassification of both the Australian party system and of the impact and role of the Greens.

Chapters four and five find that the conventional classifications of the Australian party system as a two- or two-and-a-half-party system are inaccurate. Only in one element of the party system – government formation – does the Australian party system exhibit the patterns of party interaction expected of such system types. Across all other elements, the findings reflect a far more complex, multifaceted, and changing party system. Party system fragmentation has increased in both the electoral and legislative arenas, and most significantly in the Senate. The ideological distance between relevant parties is widening. Aggregate electoral volatility is still

at relatively consistent, moderate levels. Nonetheless, in 2016 fewer people than at any other point in the last 30 years indicate having consistently voted for the same party over their lifetimes. Further, contrary to the structure of competition for government, the sites and cohesion of opposition have significantly altered, with a fragmenting Senate now the primary site of legislative opposition. While government formation is at the core of a party system, the structure of competition for government only provides partial insight into the dynamics of the *overall* system. What is most striking about the findings of these chapters is the clear demonstration of a party sub-system with a distinct pattern of party competition. This sub-system surrounds the electoral and legislative arenas of the Senate, and it is within this sub-system that the Greens have shown greater impact and influence over the dynamics of party interaction.

The Contest for Votes

Chapters six, seven and eight analyse the impact of the Greens on party interaction in the contest for votes in the Australian party system. Electoral change is not inherently synonymous with party system change (Mair 1997). Yet given the fundamental significance to democracies of voting, the way in which parties structure the contest for electoral support is central to any party system analysis. After all, a necessary precondition for a party having any influence over the contests for government and legislative outcomes is the attainment of at least some share of the vote. The contest for votes in any competitive party system manifests in a multitude of ways, of which this thesis covers just a few. Competition in this electoral arena encompasses party choices about: with which parties to compete or cooperate; the policy platforms furnished during election campaigns; the position taken on and salience afforded to particular issues; and the underlying social cleavages or political divides to be represented. The contest for votes is about how parties respond and adapt (or not) to the changing preferences and demands of the electorate and, simultaneously, structure the parameters and priorities of issue-based electoral competition. It is about to which segments of society particular parties appeal, and which voters parties are able to persuade to vote for them instead of their competitors. The contest for votes encapsulates what Schattschneider

(1960) termed the 'scope of conflict' and the constant struggle between parties to define what political competition is 'about'.

Chapters six and seven investigate the ideological dimensions of party competition and the extent and nature of ideological polarisation in the Australian party system. Both chapters focus on how parties use ideology and policy to compete. The two chapters are integrated, with chapter six providing the theoretical foundations for the empirical investigation of chapter seven. The central argument in chapter six is that ideological competition in the Australian party system predominantly takes place along two dimensions. The two dimensions encompass first, a left-right spectrum focused on equality and the market-state divide, and second, a progressive-conservative spectrum consisting of competing approaches to tolerance and hierarchy as they manifest in social, cultural, and moral issues. The two dimensions of ideological competition are conceptualised and operationalised following a deductive method; an analysis of party ideological traditions and policy platforms informs the parameters of, and variables used to construct, a two-dimensional space within which to locate parties. In the seventh chapter, party policy positions are calculated, mapped, and tracked over time using Manifesto Project data (Volkens et al. 2018b). The findings demonstrate an increase in ideological polarisation in the Australian party system, defined as the distance between the most ideologically-remote relevant parties. The Greens have significantly contributed toward this change, with the party having consolidated a position on the left-progressive fringe of the party system that has otherwise been unoccupied by other parties. In contrast, there is little evidence that the Greens have influenced the ideological profile or programmatic adaptations of other parties.

Chapter eight further investigates the Greens' impact on the contest for votes by focusing on the party-systemic drivers and individual-level determinants of Green electoral support. The chapter identifies, first, the ways in which the Greens have responded to the competitive environment into which they entered, and second, those voters on whom the party's electoral success rests. The results of chapter eight show that the Greens are electoral beneficiaries of growing ideological polarisation in the Australian party system – polarisation to which the Greens themselves contribute. The chapter also finds that, contrary to earlier studies on the

Greens (e.g. Vromen & Turnbull 2006), it is ideological *divergence* between the Labor and Liberal parties that is associated with a greater Greens' vote share, not *convergence*. There is also a significant, positive relationship between the conservative-nationalist positioning of the Liberal Party and the extent of Greens support. At the level of individual voters, chapter eight demonstrates that the Greens have steadily built an electoral base among the young, highly educated, non-religious, middle class, urban dwellers, and those in social-cultural and other professional occupations. That is, among the kind of voters who constituted a significant segment of Labor's electoral coalition under Whitlam, and later formed much of the voter base of the Australian Democrats. What is more significant, however, is the attitudinal basis of the Green vote, which locates the party's supporters as firmly on the left-progressive side of the political spectrum, also motivated by environmental and, to a degree, broadly 'postmaterial' concerns.

The Contest for Government

Chapter nine and ten discuss the Greens' minimal impact on the contest for government, despite the party's considerable electoral success. The contest for government comprises the influence of parties in narrowing or expanding the range and composition of governments formed in a party system (Wolinetz & Zaslove 2018b, p. 14). Patterns in the contest for, and types of, government formation have long been incorporated in classifications of party systems and measures of system change (e.g. Dahl 1966; Rokkan 1968; Sartori 1976; Mair 1997). As Mair (1997, pp. 199-211) explains, we can differentiate between party systems by the structure of competition for government. Systems exhibit either open and unpredictable structures of competition, or closed and predictable structures. The former involves partial alternation of governments, innovative governing formulae (the combinations of parties participating in government), and government formation as a process open to most, if not all, parties. In contrast, closed and predictable structures, are characterised by wholesale alternation, regular governing formulae, and government formation restricted to a small number of parties. The party system and the competition for government are interrelated; the format and mechanics of systems shape the nature of the contest for government, and vice versa (Budge & Herman 1978; Dodd 1976; Sartori 1976; Strøm 1990b). Nevertheless, if the

Greens have influenced this component of the party system, we must demonstrate that the party has disrupted the regular alternation between Labor and Liberal-National majority governments.

Notwithstanding the results of the 2010 federal election where the Greens played a significant role in underpinning the formation and ongoing viability of the Labor minority government, the party has not caused a *sustained* disruption to the structure of competition for government. Using rich qualitative data gained through face-to-face interviews with party elites, chapters nine and ten investigate the experience of the Greens as a support party to the Labor minority government of the 43rd Parliament. Chapter nine details the theoretical basis of the investigation, and discusses the methodology followed across both chapters. Additionally, chapter nine analyses the inter-relationship between party system mechanics, the Greens' role in the system, and inter-party bargaining immediately following the 2010 election. The Greens were unprepared for their sudden increase in influence over government formation resulting from what is still a peak in their electoral support. Internal organisational structures were lacking, with decision-making processes swiftly centralised to the Greens party room and, especially, the office of the party leader. Nevertheless, the Greens managed to leverage their contingent veto power in the newly-elected Senate to amplify the influence of the party's sole representative in the House, extracting significant policy concessions in a public agreement with Labor. This agreement became a template for negotiations between other cross-bench members and the Gillard minority government.

Chapter ten evaluates, from the perspective of the Greens as a support party, the Labor-Greens partnership in practice, its termination, and its (limited) impact on party competition and the Australian party system. By supporting and working cooperatively with a minority government, the Greens entangled themselves both with other parties and with a social and political system they had long criticised. The Greens, a party often previously dismissed as 'extreme', 'radical', and a 'wasted vote', intentionally acted to legitimise and institutionalise its place in the party system. Indeed, there appeared to be a preoccupation amongst the party's elites with appearing as responsible actors and constructive policymakers. Policy goals were consistently prioritised above electoral concerns, demonstrated not only in the substantial

number of reforms achieved throughout the parliamentary term, but also in the challenges faced by the party in maintaining an identity distinct to that of the minority government it supported. The Greens contributed to a temporary disruption in the standard formula for both the viability (formation) and effectiveness (passage of legislation) of government in the 43rd Parliament, but time spent as a support party had a lasting impact on the party. While decision-making processes within the Greens have been reformed to manage future power sharing arrangements, the 43rd Parliament intensified a yet-unresolved internal debate as to the *raison d'être* of the party and the desirability of government participation.

The Contest for Legislative Outcomes

Competition and cooperation in the contest for legislative outcomes is an element of party interaction consistently underplayed, or overlooked, in analyses of party systems and party impact. The legislative contest, however, is central to any complete picture of a party system. The contest for government is inherently concerned with the *product* of party competition; to characterise party systems by the structure of competition for government alone is to characterise party systems by the 'bookends' of party interaction. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of party interaction takes place between polling days (Laver 1989, p. 302). Assessments of the contest for votes can incorporate the dynamics of party interaction between elections, but are nonetheless limited to party interaction in the *electoral* arena. Between elections, the majority of meaningful party interactions – and, notably, instances of party cooperation – occur in the *legislative* arena. It is the legislative contest that tests the effectiveness of governments and, in turn, influences the ongoing viability of governments (Tsebelis 2002). The relationship between government and opposition, therefore, is of fundamental significance to the very core of the party system. Given this, it is not only the type and composition of governments that matter to party systems, but the site, cohesion and structure of parliamentary opposition, as well (Dahl 1966). Any evaluation of the Australian system, in particular – given the increased opportunities provided by strong bicameralism for oppositional legislative influence – that does not incorporate the legislative contest risks mischaracterising the nature and dynamics of the party system.

Chapter eleven outlines the theoretical case for the inclusion of the contest for legislative outcomes in the classification of the Australian party system. The chapter also provides the results of proposed indicators of party legislative influence, both of which can be easily integrated into party system analyses. The chapter argues that the importance of legislative competition in understanding party systems ultimately stems from the primary functions attributed to legislatures in democratic theory: linkage, representation, control, review, and policy-making (Bagehot 1872; Blondel 1973; Olson 1994). Given their direct association with government formation, linkage, representation, and control have long been incorporated into party system theory. With the notable exception of Dahl (1966), however, the review and policy-making roles are usually understated or overlooked. Applying a normalised Banzhaf index to the Australian Senate demonstrates a fragmentation of voting power and legislative influence. The purported 'third parties' of the Australian system – first the Democrats, and more recently the Greens – have consistently matched one, and sometimes both of the major parties in this regard. More recently, independents and other minor parties, too, have increased their capacity to shape legislative outcomes. In chapter eleven, the results of the Banzhaf measure of voting power are also used to weight quantitative counts of the effective number of parties. In both cases, the findings reveal a distinctly multiparty pattern of party interaction. However, as it relates to understandings of the Australian party system, the conclusion here is not necessarily one of change, but of persistent misclassification.

In sum, parties are not merely assimilators of the vagaries of public opinion. Rather, while often responsive to changing political demands, parties also maintain a capacity to act strategically in structuring the electorate and shaping the environment in which they compete. The party system, however, sets the parameters of party interaction, and constrains the responses and adaptations of parties. Thus, while parties, and specifically the Australian Greens, are the primary focus of this thesis, each chapter also investigates the reverse relationship, namely the extent to which the nature of the party system affects the development and impact of the Greens. The Australian party system appears to be changing, but the Greens' contribution to this change is modest. The Greens' impact predominantly derives from the party's role as a conduit for left-progressive and pro-environmental attitudes to enter party politics. This expands the ideological space of the Australian party system and

modifies the pattern of pattern of party interaction in the electoral and legislative arenas. The Greens have also brought about a partial restructuring of the electorate, attracting a support base with distinct political attitudes and some demographic commonality. Overall, however, the party was assimilated into pre-existing dynamics; across many of those indicators where change is occurring, this change was already under way as the Greens entered the party system. Nonetheless, the Greens have attempted to further cultivate this change in the face of two major parties determined to reassert twopartism, and stand apart from other ostensibly 'minor' parties in their success in so doing.

LITERATURE REVIEW: PARTY SYSTEMS, TYPOLOGIES, AND THE CASE OF AUSTRALIA

Adopting a party system approach to investigate the role and impact of a party entails a consideration of an expansive range of literature. Applying this theoretical basis to a specific party system, and concomitantly to a party that is philosophically, programmatically, and organisationally distinct from its competitors, only widens the scope of pertinent scholarship. Chapter one introduced a party system framework and surveyed scholarly work on minor parties and the Australian Greens. Amongst this literature, there is scant agreement on how to define and distinguish minor parties. Further, while there is valuable scholarship on the Australian Greens, there are nevertheless few examinations of the party's impact and influence. This chapter further builds the theoretical framework through which we will evaluate the impact of the Greens. It reviews and synthesises literature on party system theory, party system change and classification, and the Australian party system. I give particular attention here to Sartori's (1976) party system work, as it provides the basic foundation of my analytical framework and the basis of refined party and party system typologies in chapter twelve. The process of synthesis undertaken below identifies those variables significant to party system study, as well as the appropriate analytical techniques to be employed. Additionally, this chapter develops a "subject vocabulary" (Hart 1998, p. 27); party system analysis, due to its complexity and multitude of constituent variables, is reliant upon specialised terminology. Lastly, the review outlines the practical context of the research, and highlights a number of significant gaps in the literature, particularly as it pertains to the Australian setting.

Party Systems as Multidimensional: Arenas and Divides

A party system is a pattern of iterative party interactions, both competitive and cooperative, stemming from the contests for government, for votes, and for legislative outcomes. Any parsimonious definition of a party system, however, is bound to obscure the multifaceted

and complex nature of party systems, and therefore the complications inherent in their evaluation. Party systems are not monolithic; party competition and cooperation can occur across multiple distinct arenas and divides. As Webb (2000, p. 3) explains, parties interact in electoral, legislative and executive arenas, as well as in sub-national or supra-national political jurisdictions. These interactions can foster separate sub- and supra-party systems, each maintaining the potential to influence the national system (Pedersen 1983, p. 31; Smith, p. 350). As such, Bardi and Mair (2008) assert that party systems are best perceived as multidimensional, with three categories of division: vertical, horizontal, and functional. Vertical division refers to the segmentation of a system – often limited to the electoral arena – along ethnic, cultural, language, or religious lines, to the extent that such differences constitute an additional dimension of party competition. Horizontal divisions denote differing levels of government and political jurisdiction, and therefore of party competition. Lastly, functional divisions are those that result from the presence of multiple competitive arenas within a single level of government. Similar to Webb (2000), Bardi and Mair (2008, pp. 157-59) point to the potential for substantially different patterns of competition, issues of salience, and party strategy between the electoral and the parliamentary arenas.

The elements of Bardi and Mair's vertical division are of minimal significance in the Australian party system. There are no explicitly politicised ethnic or language divides, and religious sectarianism no longer represents a major electoral cleavage (Jaensch 1983, pp. 65-73; Warhurst 2006). While religious denomination was previously a notable determinant of voting choice, it nonetheless never simplistically translated into an electoral dimension, despite the common account of a 'Catholic Labor' against 'Protestant non-Labor' contest (Brett 2002; Maddox 2001). The notion of horizontal and functional divisions, though, are germane to the Australian context. Australia is a federation of states and territories, with national parties that, despite recent shifts toward centralisation, remain confederations of relatively autonomous state-based organisations (Jaensch 1983; Mills 2014). While not explicitly using the 'horizontal divide' terminology, both Sharman (1990) and Stewart (1994) note the influence of federalism on the Australian party system, and draw attention to the diverse state-based party systems. These sub-national systems can affect the national system (Smith

1989). For instance, Miragliotta (2010) argues that federalism is a significant explanatory factor in the formation and subsequent persistence of the Australian Greens.

Institutional arrangements have also fostered functional divisions in the Australian party system. A majoritarian electoral system – the ‘alternative vote’ – in the House of Representatives creates the potential for distinct patterns of competition between the legislative and electoral arenas, with the latter likely more fragmented than the former. The use of mandatory, full preferential voting, with parties often able to strategically direct large swathes of their voters’ preferences (Farrell & McAllister 2006, pp. 135-37; McAllister 2011, p. 9), can also strengthen this division. In contrast to the European party systems that Bardi and Mair’s (2008) article centres upon, it is rare in the Australian context for the requirements of coalition formation and maintenance to reinforce functional divisions. Though, as chapters four and five explore, such a possibility is feasible in the future should the Australian party system continue upon its current trajectory of change.

The Senate, in both its constitutional role and its proportional character, offers more immediate potential for peculiarities in the Australian party system. It is also a favourable site for a minor party to wield influence over the broader system. The Senate is a comparatively strong upper house, with powers similar to that of the House of Representatives, and thus can act as a significant restraint on the executive. The use of the proportional single transferrable vote electoral system, as well, arguably alleviates some of the divergence between electoral and legislative arenas. In turn, though, the functional divide in the party system can transform to include not just divergent electoral and legislative competition, but also distinct patterns of competition for, and within, separate houses of parliament. Consequently, it may be wrong to refer to a singular party system at all. Sharman (1999, p. 360), Weller and Young (2000, p. 171), and Singleton et al. (2009, pp. 326-27) each argue that there are dual party systems operating between the House and the Senate. Similarly, both Sugita (1995, p. 37) and Carty (1997, p. 99) assert that the Australian Democrats had fostered the emergence of different competition dynamics between the two houses. These scholars, however, did not prosecute such ideas in sufficient detail; indeed, often the notion of dual party systems was mentioned as an aside, in passing, or amongst broader conclusions.

Recognition of multiple interacting party systems, however, is becoming increasingly common in the study of other national cases. One example of particular interest, due to its shared political traditions with Australia, is the United Kingdom. Lynch (2007, p. 323), in his examination of the British system, calls for a “more nuanced approach” to party system inquiry, “one that recognises that the UK does not have a single party system but multiple party systems”. Wright (2013, p. 78) concurs, arguing that it is “no longer possible to describe something called ‘the party system’ in Britain, as there is a variety of party systems.” Both build upon the work of Webb (2000) in identifying multiple party systems functioning in Britain, delineated by levels of political jurisdiction and arenas of party interaction. Webb did recognise, however, an ongoing utility in referring to and discussing a national ‘party system’. Bardi and Mair (2008, pp. 159-60) also acknowledge that the existence of divisions in a polity may render erroneous references to a singular national party system. They also warn, however, that it is feasible that quasi-separate arenas, and associated systems, can persist subsumed under and “contributing to the constitution of a single, albeit complex and multidimensional, polity-level system.” The points of differentiation are: firstly, the degree of separation between, and nature of, such divisions; and secondly, the dynamics of party interaction across and within those divisions.

When scholars have questioned the precision of referring to a singular Australian party system, it has largely been in reference to the Senate. More specifically, the idea of a dual party system has involved the changing, and growing, role of minor parties that are almost exclusively located in the upper house. Those scholars (e.g. Maddox 2005; Ward & Stewart 2010) who uphold the view of a sole national party system, too, recognise the expanding electoral popularity and subsequent influence minor parties enjoy. While the vast majority of those parties formed during the influx of the past four decades have been short-lived and of scant significance, others have wielded substantial power in the Senate (Jaensch & Mathieson 1998). It is clear, then, that in furthering the study of the Australian party system, it is necessary to explore the purportedly changing dynamics between the parties of government, minor parties, and the system itself. In so doing, though, one cannot separate the Greens from their experience as a minor party in a system – or systems – dominated by two larger competitors. The manner in which minor parties interact with competitors and the party

system, across the various divisions and arenas, is likely different to that of major parties. There is a distinct lack of scholarship in these areas, and particularly of scholarship covering the developments in the Australian party system of the past three decades.

Competing Classifications of Party Systems

Party system study, particularly where it is concerned with classification, understandably tends to focus on dominant party actors (Herzog 1987, p. 317). Nevertheless, given that this thesis is concerned with the typological sorting of both parties and party systems, it is necessary to review the substantial literature on party system classification. Further, it is this literature that comprises much of the theoretical framework employed in the following chapters. What follows is a critical, chronological review of the party system literature with a focus on significant works on party system change and classification. The review begins with Duverger (1954), and then charts the early innovations of Dahl (1966), Blondel (1968), and Rokkan (1968). The review then focuses on the foundational work of Sartori (1976), outlining Sartori's system typology and criteria for party relevance. Recent developments in western democracies, however, have highlighted some critical limitations in Sartori's typology. Thus, I examine four more recent attempts, by von Beyme (1985), Ware (1996), Siaroff (2003; 2006), and Wolinetz (2004), to resolve such limitations. Lastly, this review surveys extant characterisations of the Australian party system, finding little agreement beyond assertions of relative system stability.

The simplest and most frequently employed typologies are those that merely tally the number of parties. Though flawed in the conceptualisation of a *system*, this form of classification does have the benefit of being rather undemanding both in usage and understanding. Indeed, a tallying of parties is common in the Australian literature. Deriving from Duverger (1954), this approach separates systems into one-party, two-party, and multiparty varieties. Sharman (1994, pp. 134-35) accurately notes that, despite the simplicity, numerical categorisation is by no means inconsequential. This categorisation attempts to encapsulate the separation between majoritarian and consensus models of democracy. Duverger's typology, however, is grounded upon quite explicit – and increasingly repudiated (e.g. Almond 1956; Lijphart 1984)

– normative judgements relating to how democracies ought to and best operate. It has also become evident that two-party systems, as per the ideal type, are a rarity at best and non-existent at worst (von Beyme 1985, pp. 260-62). Table 2.1 summarises Duverger’s taxonomy of party systems, as well as most of the alternative typologies surveyed below. The proposals of Ware (1996), Siaroff (2003; 2006) and Wolinetz (2004) are too complex to similarly tabulate. The table reveals not only the main points of contention in the understanding of party systems, but also illuminates the key concepts and language vital to party system analysis.

Table 2.1 – Approaches to party system classification

Classification	Primary Criteria	Typologies
<i>Duverger (1954)</i>	Number of parties	Two-party systems Multiparty systems
<i>Dahl (1966)</i>	Strategies of opposition	Strictly competitive systems Cooperative-competitive systems Coalescent-competitive systems Strictly coalescent systems
<i>Blondel (1968)</i>	Number of parties Vote share of parties	Two-party systems Two-and-a-half-party systems Multiparty systems with dominant party Multiparty systems without dominant party
<i>Rokkan (1968)</i>	Number of parties Seat share of parties Government formation	British-German systems (1 vs 1+1) Scandinavian systems (1 vs 3-4) Even multiparty systems (1 vs 1 vs 1 + 2-3)
<i>Sartori (1976)</i>	Number of parties Ideological polarisation	Two-party systems Moderate pluralism Polarised pluralism Predominant-party systems
<i>Von Beyme (1985)</i>	Number of parties Ideological polarisation Role of minor parties	Two-party systems Moderate pluralism with wing parties Moderate pluralism with centrifugalism Polarised pluralism

Source: Adapted from Mair (1997)

Beyond Tallying Parties: Dahl, Blondel and Rokkan

The counting of parties remains a central aspect of most party system typologies. However, to restrict categorisation to this singular dimension, as per Duverger, is an “extreme oversimplification” and reveals little insight into the nature of party competition and cooperation (Gross and Sigelman 1984, p. 463). The limitations of basic numerical classification prompted alternative approaches, notably from Dahl (1966), Blondel (1968) and Rokkan (1968). While these typologies are rarely employed in the literature today, subsequent classificatory schema have drawn considerable inspiration from these early innovations. Dahl (1966), for instance, shifted the focus of categorisation entirely away from the number of parties to instead focus on the behaviour and strategies of opposition parties. He identified competitive, cooperative and coalescent party behaviour, and further asserted that party interaction can occur across, and differ between, the electoral and parliamentary arenas. This latter observation remains a key development in party system study, being adopted in many later analyses (Laver 1989; Mair 1997). The product of Dahl’s examination of party strategy was a typology predominantly focused on the relationship between government and opposition parties, regardless of the number of parties. Dahl’s taxonomy consists of four classes of party system: strictly competitive, cooperative-competitive, coalescent-competitive, and strictly coalescent.

Rather than abandon the count of parties altogether, Blondel (1968) instead refined the method of counting by incorporating relative party size, measured by vote share. Blondel argued that not all parties were of equal significance to the party system, and therefore should not be given equal weight in classifying a system. Blondel’s categorisation of party systems rested upon two calculations of vote share. Blondel first considered the combined vote share of the two largest parties, which differentiated between two-party, two-and-a-half-party, and multiparty systems. Second, Blondel refined these categories by calculating the difference in support between the largest party and the second and third parties, which indicates the presence or absence of a dominant party. As Kline (2009, p. 262) asserts, however, the thresholds between Blondel’s different categories were “essentially arbitrary.” Nonetheless, Blondel advanced a typology of four classes: two-party, two-and-a-half-party, multiparty

with a dominant party, and multiparty without a dominant party. Though Blondel's typology justifiably highlights the capacity for competing parties to be of differing consequence within a system, any means of classifying party systems that maintains an overriding focus on the number of parties reveals little about the relationships and interactions between those parties. In effect, Blondel's taxonomy only served to split the Duverger multiparty grouping in three.

Rokkan's (1968) contribution has a similar focus on counting parties, but also includes the propensity for single-party majority governments, and the degree of fragmentation amongst minor parties. Rokkan emphasised seat rather than vote share, shifting the focus of classification from electoral to parliamentary strength, and thus government formation and coalition building. What results is a three-part typology delineating two-and-a-half-party 'British-German' systems, multiparty with a dominant party 'Scandinavian' systems, and 'even' multiparty systems in which no single party dominates. Rokkan's categorisation is useful in challenging popular contentions of two-partism – particularly in systems such as the United Kingdom and Australia.⁴ Nonetheless, Blondel's and Rokkan's typologies tend to group together party systems with quite dissimilar patterns of party interaction (Mair 2002). Even the two-and-a-half-party system class can conflate distinct patterns of party competition in such a way. As Ware (1996, pp. 163-64) and Wolinetz (2004, p. 4) explain, the category fails to distinguish between the fundamentally different functions the 'half' party may maintain depending on ideological position and coalition potential. Nonetheless, many subsequent studies of party systems, including the seminal work of Sartori (1976), mirror Rokkan's attention to the relationship between parties in the contest for government.

The Foundational Work of Sartori

No other work on party systems rivals the influence and widespread acceptance of Sartori's (1976) study. In some regards, Sartori adopted and reformulated the primary differentiating

⁴ The notion of two-and-a-half-party systems, whereby two major parties dominate but a minor party maintains an enduring presence, originated from Wildenmann's (1963) examination of the German system. While not incorporated into a broader typology, the 'half party' term derived from an analysis of the 'hinge' role that the small Free Democratic Party played in maintaining balance of power between the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and the Social Democratic Party.

criteria of previous classificatory schema. Sartori recognised, like Blondel (1968), that a Duvergerian counting of all parties in a system was insufficient. If party system categorisation is to convey any meaningful information, a more refined method by which to count parties, taking into consideration varying levels of systemic importance, is necessary. Additionally, as with Dahl (1966) and Rokkan (1968), Sartori was concerned with the competition between parties for government, and how particular forms of party competition and cooperation in pursuit of this goal could render a multiparty system remarkably similar in dynamics to that of a two-party system. Yet Sartori was also highly critical of some aspects of previous typologies, and in proposing a much more comprehensive taxonomy, proffered several innovations in the classification of party systems. First is Sartori's approach to counting parties, which abandoned both straightforward tallying and weighting based on seat or vote share. Instead, Sartori introduced the concept of 'relevance'. Second is Sartori's inclusion of ideological polarisation as a classificatory feature, as measured by the distance between the two most 'extreme' parties. Third, and relatedly, Sartori differentiated between the 'format' and the 'mechanics' of the party system.

Sartori's approach to counting parties centres on the concept of 'relevance'. A party is relevant if it can meaningfully alter the patterns of party competition, and thus the dynamics of the party system. Parties deemed irrelevant – generally smaller parties – are excluded from consideration in classifying a party system. Sartori set out explicit criteria to resolve whether a party is relevant or not. These rules of party relevance encompass what Sartori (1976, pp. 122-25) called coalition potential and blackmail potential. A party possesses coalition potential if it is in "a position to determine over time, and at some point in time, at least one of the possible governmental majorities." (Sartori 1976, p. 122) Blackmail potential, on the other hand, refers to a party's capacity to influence the direction of party competition leftward or rightward through 'veto potential' over legislation or governing coalition formation. Therefore, while Sartori's typology also involves counting parties, the means by which parties are counted relies on a more qualitative assessment of party competition, rather than on the kind of thresholds introduced by Blondel (1968).

Sartori (1976, pp. 185-92), moreover, was critical of the notion of 'half' and 'fractional' parties in classifications. He recognised that few examples existed of a two-party system when defined in a strict and literal sense. Yet Sartori asserted that the existence of a minor party, or parties, does not necessarily preclude a system from maintaining two-partism in relation to its fundamental mechanics. Regardless of format, the mechanics of two-partism survives, Sartori (1976, p. 186) explains, "whenever the existence of third parties does not prevent the two major parties from governing alone, i.e. whenever coalitions are unnecessary." What mattered to Sartori in identifying two-party systems was the nature of government formation. In response to the enduring Liberal-National Coalition in Australia, Sartori relaxed this criterion of governing alone to include occurrences of one party competing against two, where the two represented a lasting 'coalescence' rather than a transitory coalition. Sartori argues that a two-party system exists whenever a regular alternation of government occurs between two major parties, or a major party and two coalescent parties. These criteria could separate a two-party system from, for instance, party systems dominated by a single party or more fragmented multiparty systems.

The centrality of the number of parties in previous classification methods meant that resulting typologies largely reflected the format of the party system. The format, though, being the number of parties, "is interesting only to the extent that it affects the *mechanics* – how the system works." (Sartori 1976, p. 128) What is needed is a second factor in classification to capture these 'mechanics', the dynamics of party interaction. Sartori viewed the mechanics of party systems as inter-connected with the degree of ideological polarisation. Sartori's inclusion of ideological polarisation as a secondary factor in his typology produces a system of classification that first organises systems by the number of relevant parties, creating three forms: two-party systems, limited pluralist systems of three to five parties, and extreme pluralist systems of six or more parties. Sartori then refined these categories by assessing the distance between those two parties furthest away from one another on the ideological spectrum. Sartori considered such distance to be either 'moderate' or 'polarised'. Rather than contribute toward a matrix of typologies, Sartori instead insisted the two classificatory criteria are not independent phenomena, as they co-vary. Thus, small ideological distance is

connected with two-party and limited pluralist systems, whilst wide ideological polarisation is related to extreme pluralism.

The outcome is a typology comprising two-party systems, moderate pluralism, and polarised pluralism.⁵ Moreover, the internal dynamics of these party system types are connected with a particular direction of competition. Both two-party systems and moderate pluralism are characterised by centripetal competition, whereby parties – predominantly the major parties – gravitate toward the centre and compete for the median voter. Polarised pluralism, in contrast, entails centrifugal competition and extremist politics resulting from party fragmentation and the existence of anti-system parties. Contrary to some interpretations (e.g. Webb 2000, pp. 5-6), Sartori did not stipulate a particular direction of party competition as a prerequisite for classification. Rather, Sartori (1976, pp. 342-51) identified centripetal or centrifugal competition as what results from a particular party system configuration, unless it is undergoing transition. As Sartori (1976, p. 344) states, he was “not trying to explain... how and why a given system comes into being, but only how it operates once that it is given.” While the direction of party competition is not a set criterion in classification, each system type is nevertheless associated with an expected form and direction of such competition.

Sartori’s taxonomy built upon previous variants, but gave greater emphasis to party competition. While there is an argument that earlier typologies were, at their core, concentrated on party competition (Mair 1997, pp. 206-07), they did not address this fundamental aspect of party systems as precisely or thoroughly as did Sartori. Sartori’s typology not only disaggregates the multiparty category, but also provides an explanation for why some multiparty systems maintain centripetal and essentially bipolar competition

⁵ Sartori (1976) also included the category of predominant-party systems, marked by, as the name suggests, extended electoral and legislative dominance by a single party. A predominant-party system manifests when a party attains three consecutive absolute majorities in the legislature, the electorate is stable, and the difference between electoral support for the largest and second largest parties is wide (greater than 10 or so percentage points). While this is a valuable classification, it also sits uneasily in Sartori’s overall framework. As Mair (1997, p. 203) contends, the category is defined by “wholly different, ad hoc criteria, such that a predominant-party system can by definition coexist with every possible category of party numbers”. Additionally, Sartori noted the residual category of atomised party systems, but omitted them from the typology as such systems are deemed essentially non-functional.

similar to two-partism, while other multiparty systems do not. In turn, this provided insight into coalition and cabinet stability – that is, why two-partism and moderate pluralism both tends to provide stable government, and polarised pluralism fosters frequent government turnover and ever-changing coalitions. Moreover, it is through Sartori's (1968; 1969; 1976) work that the notion of the party system as an independent variable became a norm in party system inquiry. Prior to Sartori, party systems were widely considered the product of exogenous factors: electoral attitudes, social cleavages, and institutions. In contrast, Sartori's view was that the system was greater than the sum of its parts, and could itself shape party competition, electoral attitudes, and government formation. Sartori's framework remains the most widely adopted typology of party systems, and often informs national and comparative studies (e.g. Bartolini 1984; Evans 2002; Quinn 2013).

Dealing with the Weaknesses of Sartori's Schema: von Beyme, Ware, Siaroff and Wolinetz

Given several decades of change in many polities and associated party systems, Sartori's typology is not without criticism. What was once a strength of the moderate pluralism category – flexibility and permissiveness for systems that fluctuate between 3-5 relevant parties – has since developed into somewhat of a disadvantage. The category has lost discriminatory power as increasing numbers of polities maintain systems falling into this type (Mair 1996; Wolinetz 2004). On the other hand, despite the loosened criteria employed by Sartori, it is increasingly difficult to find genuine two-party systems. The emergence of significant minor parties, the increasing difficulties of referring to a singular national party system, and other considerable changes within the 'classic' examples of two-party systems have rendered the type quite unhelpful, except as an 'ideal type' (Mair 1997). Pennings (1998) also points to the inability of Sartori's typology to account for the multidimensional nature of contemporary party systems. Further, Maor (1997, p. 33) notes that party system change in Sartori's framework only occurs where a system has clearly shifted from one broad type to another. This line of criticism is of particular importance to this thesis, given that the emergence and persistence of a minor party may exert considerable influence over party competition and cooperation, yet not be of sufficient impact to cause system transformation.

There have been multiple attempts to overcome the limitations in Sartori's typology. Some of these efforts are reformulations, while others constitute complete departures (e.g. Siaroff 2003; von Beyme 1985; Ware 1996; Wolinetz 2004). In dealing with the crowding of the moderate pluralism category, von Beyme (1985) constructed a typology similar to that of Sartori's but which differentiates between moderate pluralism with wing parties, and moderate pluralism with centrifugal tendencies. This additional demarcation bestows greater attention to the role of minor parties, their ideological position, and their relationship with major parties. It distinguishes between those systems where the alternation of government tends to be bipolar between competing coalitions of major parties with minor parties, and systems where grand coalitions of major parties to the exclusion of minor players are frequent. Ware (1996), on the other hand, built upon Sartori, but with elements of Rokkan (1968) and Blondel (1968). First, Ware's approach modified the threshold of party relevance, counting only those parties with at least three percent of legislative seats. Like Sartori, Ware then distinguished between two-party, three-to-five-party systems, and more-than-five-party systems. The latter two categories are divided into three and two sub-types, respectively, to distinguish between different configurations of relative seat shares between parties. Ware's taxonomy provides an effective alternative to Sartori's moderate pluralism category. But, much like Blondel (1968), Ware is reliant upon a string of arguably arbitrary cut-off points in both the recognition of parties and the sorting of systems.

Siaroff (2003; 2006) instead departs somewhat from Sartori, instead reformulating the work of Blondel (1968) and Ware (1996). As with Ware, Siaroff adopts a threshold of party recognition of three percent of seats in the lower house of the legislature. There is also an initial categorisation, in Sartorian fashion, between two-party, moderate multiparty, and extreme multiparty systems. Siaroff (2006, p. 6) then introduces multiple measurements of relative party size and representative strength. What follows is a further disaggregation of all three classes in the initial classification, creating two types of two-party systems, four varieties of moderate multiparty systems, and three forms of extreme multiparty systems. While the moderate multiparty category is no longer crowded in Siaroff's taxonomy, the final framework comprises nine categories, with real world examples being in short supply for some. Fortunately, Siaroff (2006, pp. 15-17) also includes a method to simplify the typology,

merging two sub-types into others, for a final list of seven. Yet it is still a complex taxonomy to employ and calculate, and falls short of the desire for parsimony (Wolinetz 2006, p. 58).

In what is a self-declared work in progress, Wolinetz (2004) advanced a typology that more persuasively manages the limitations of earlier approaches. Wolinetz asserts that the number of relevant parties competing in a given party system remains the essential component of system classification. This is followed closely by the ways in which parties “habitually relate to each other.” (Wolinetz 2004, p. 11) Wolinetz’s approach borrows heavily from Sartori’s (1976) test for party relevance that incorporates coalition or blackmail potential. Wolinetz then conducts an initial Sartorian sorting of systems between two-party systems, limited multiparty systems of three to five parties, and extended multiparty systems of six or more parties (Wolinetz 2004, p. 12). To further differentiate these classifications, Wolinetz expands Sartori’s notion of ideological polarisation, adding a consideration of the extent and nature of party cooperation. In relation to ideological polarisation, Wolinetz offers a broader conceptualisation of polarisation taking in the ideological distance between parties, as well the number of poles or locations of party competition. Further, Wolinetz assesses party cooperation through the notion of ‘clustering’ – that is, the existence of semi-permanent or enduring alliances between particular parties. Such cooperation directly impacts the dynamics of party interaction, and can follow on to produce its own electoral and systemic consequences.

Wolinetz’s (2004) typology provides a conceptual framework, and associated language, that is valuable for the Australian context. For instance, the attention to different poles of competition, where a party competes more with one rival than others, is potentially useful in exploring the relationship between the Greens and the Australian Labor Party. Similarly, the concept of clustering captures the relationship underpinning the Liberal-National Coalition. These examples also reflect how Wolinetz’ typology might be better able to detect and describe party system change over time. Indeed, Wolinetz (2004, p. 5) insists that despite considerable doubts surrounding the capacity of measuring party system change through taxonomy (e.g. Smith 1989), it is still possible if the typology is carefully designed. Wolinetz’s typology, however, creates a high number of potential categories – twenty-four in total. In the

typology, systems are sorted first by number of parties as above, then by degree of polarisation (minimal, moderate, greater, or extreme), and finally by form and locations of competition (unimodal, bipolar, or multipolar). Though the categories themselves are straight-forward, the sorting of parties requires in-depth study. Moreover, as Wolinetz (2004, p. 19) himself notes, the determination of degree of polarisation, in particular, requires highly refined measurement of (often unavailable) data.

Classifying the Australian Party System

The Australian party system is rarely the subject of thorough examination. This has rendered the post-Sartori literature on party systems underutilised in assessing developments in Australian party politics. Admittedly, this is an observation frequently made by students of party systems. Johnston (2008, p. 816), for instance, in his presidential address to the *Canadian Political Science Association*, called for a revival of party system study – “a mode of analysis that was never very fashionable and for Canadians in the last 30 years, almost non-existent.” Similarly, Arter (1999a) argued that the Scandinavian political science literature’s preoccupation with party change overlooks systemic analysis. The dearth of party system investigation in the Australian setting, though, is even more pronounced.⁶ Writing in 1956, and again in 1969, Mayer derided the often-simplistic characterisation of party competition in Australia and argued that there had been few serious considerations of the party system thus far. The study of the Australian party system *as a system* remains underdeveloped, despite considerable advancements in our knowledge of party competition and party development (Head 1985). Three editions by Jaensch (1983; 1989a; 1994) are notable exceptions to the dearth of party system investigation, but they focus more so on the then-contemporary system rather than system change, and are now considerably dated. The remainder of this chapter reviews the literature on the Australian party system, finding clear gaps and inconsistencies in our current understanding.

⁶ For instance, see Einhorn and Logue (1988) on the Scandinavian party systems, and Bakvis (1988) on the Canadian system.

Discussion of the Australian party system is predominantly contained in introductory textbooks, mostly descriptive, and limited to outlines of system formation or broad categorisation (e.g. Maddox 2005; Miragliotta, Errington & Barry 2013; Singleton et al. 2009; Smith 1993; Ward & Stewart 2010). Beyond the textbooks, the Australian literature tends to fall into one of two categories. First, there is historical-systemic inquiry that remains within what Harmel (1985, p. 411) identifies as the early paradigm of party system analysis, focused on “‘original’ party systems and parties.” (e.g. Loveday, Martin & Parker 1977; Marsh & Miller 2012, ch. 5; Overacker 1952; Strangio & Dyrenfurth 2009) Second is the literature centred on components of party systems, with a particular focus on party organisation and development (e.g. Marsh 2006; Simms 1996), governance and representation (e.g. Marsh 1995) and, above all, quantitative investigation of shifting electoral patterns and voting behaviour (e.g. Aitkin 1982; Charnock & Ellis 2003; Jackman 2003; Jones & McAllister 1989; McAllister, Sheppard & Bean 2015).⁷

These are important contributions to Australian political science. Yet the factors that led to the formation and consolidation of the Australian party system are not necessarily useful in explaining the current state of the system, or system change. Similarly, while shifts in electoral patterns, internal party organisation, or other facets of party development are critical in the study of party systems, and significant in and of themselves, they are not synonymous with party *system* change (Smith 1989). Electoral and party change can each be the outcome, rather than the origin, of variations in the overall system (Mair 1996). Likewise, changes in governance and representation tend to follow from party system transformation, rather than other way around – precisely why some of the literature attending to this connection through a governance lens is often normative and conjectural (e.g. Marsh 1995).

Despite the sustained scholarly interest in aspects of the party system, a lack of systemic theorising and analysis has significant consequences. Bardi and Mair (2008, pp. 148-49) highlight three resultant weaknesses in the literature, each of which are present in the

⁷ Even a special issue of the *Australian Journal of Political Science* on party systems, representation, and policy making (Marsh and Uhr 1995) contained articles concerned predominantly with the ‘parts’ of the party system, rather than the system itself. The two exceptions being the contributions of Blondel (1995) and Scharpf (1995).

Australian setting. First, there has been an increase in the number and types of parties present in many party systems. There is mounting evidence to suggest that differing party types can bring about distinct forms of party cooperation and competition. While the relationship between the Australian Democrats and the Australian party system was Sugita's (1995) focus, more recent sources of potential system change are yet to be explored – notably, those resulting from the rise of the Greens. Secondly, echoing Eckstein (1968), Bardi and Mair contend that insufficient systemic inquiry is likely to preclude a comprehensive account of parties themselves. Third, oft-used schemas and typologies for party system classification – generating labels such as 'two-party system' or 'multiparty system' – are increasingly inadequate for explaining contemporary party system dynamics. It is precisely these labels, however, that are readily attached to the Australian party system, with insufficient attention given to their ongoing accuracy and applicability.

Classifications of the Australian party system have almost exclusively remained in Duvergerian and Sartorian terms, albeit with some slight modifications. The enduring debate has been whether Australia qualifies as a two-party or multiparty system, with the persistence and perceived significance of the Nationals and other minor parties as the obvious points of contention. Most classifications of the Australian system, whether two-party or multiparty, have been accompanied by explicit caveats (e.g. Blondel 1968; Lipson 1959; Sartori 1976). Some scholars have proffered the concept of a two-and-a-half-party system as a resolution to this fundamental disagreement (Ware 1996). However, the application of 'half party' status remains controversial, with competing views as to whether it is the Nationals or other minor parties acting as the half party. This has, in turn, spawned adjusted classifications, characterising the Australian system as a two-and-two-half-party system, or four-party system (Aitkin & Kahan 1974; Jupp 1968).

Contemporary assessments generally shift back toward the more conventional classifications, or to emphasising the difficulties involved in locating the Australian system in a taxonomy. Singleton et al. (2009), Ward and Stewart (2010), and Brenton (2013) each apply the label of two-party system, though all recognise the ongoing influence of minor parties. Stewart (1994) prefers the two-and-a-half-party system type, reflecting the positions of the two major parties,

and the presence of the Nationals as the significant minor. Stewart is supported by Siaroff (2006), who in applying his own taxonomy, describes Australia as a two-and-a-half-party system, though a relatively unique one due to the nature of the Coalition. Smith et al. (2012, pp. 134-35) argue that the system is “best seen as a three-party system, and a very durable one at that.” Smith et al. (2012, pp. 134-35) shortly after amend this classification, arguing that when the Senate and minor parties are considered, the Australian party system “becomes a multiparty system.” Jaensch (1994a), meanwhile, borrows from Lipson (1959) and Sartori (1976) in distinguishing between a party system that has become multiparty in form, but continues as two-party in function. This assertion of the existence of other relevant parties, but the persistence of essentially two-party and bipolar competition – particularly in relation to the executive – is now quite common (Maddox 2005; Miragliotta et al. 2013; Sugita 1995).

One shared element in the literature, therefore, is that some aspects of two-partism endure. The competition for government undoubtedly remains a contest dominated by the Labor and Liberal parties, with minor party influence largely contained to the Senate. The points of differentiation in classifications thus far, then, relate to the roles and influence of minor parties. Ghazarian (2015) is the most explicit in asserting the need to recognise the role of minor parties in advancing the understanding of the Australian party system. Ghazarian (2015, p. 9) highlights the impact of minor parties when claiming of the emergence of a multiparty system in the Senate. For Ghazarian (2015, p. 193) this is an impact so considerable that he names an ostensibly separate “Senate-based minor party system” that itself has “undergone some significant changes.” Ghazarian, however, does not give precise definition to the term ‘minor party system’. Nor does he explain how a ‘minor party system’ might differ *as a system* from a general Senate-based party system, or on what basis it is distinct from the overall party system. The source of Ghazarian’s claims is a tallying of parties, coupled with an otherwise valuable investigation of the changing ‘type’ of minor party elected to the Senate. However, alone, a demonstration of changing party types is insufficient evidence of a changing party system. It reveals little about the critical object of party system analysis: the relationships between parties, and between individual parties and the party system.

A related point of contention is found in assessments of the independence of the National Party. The work of Botterill (2009) and Botterill and Cockfield (2015) here is instrumental, providing two of the few examples of an Australian political party examined through the lens of contemporary party system scholarship. Botterill (2009), for instance, draws upon Siaroff (2003), as well as Bardi and Mair (2008), to claim that the Nationals are a distinct party, but nevertheless function as a 'wing party' to the Liberals and the 'rural faction' of the Coalition. Indeed, the Nationals' separate organisational structures, geographically-concentrated electoral base, and periodic renegotiation of the Liberal-National coalition agreement suggests a separate entity (Cockfield 2014; Sharman 1994; Ward & Stewart 2010). Moreover, the Liberal Party has required National Party support following all but three – 1975, 1977, and 1996 – federal elections.

Nonetheless, as Jaensch (1984, p. 20) explains, at each election, "[t]here was no doubt where the numbers would go" for the Nationals. A coalition with, or favourable electoral preferences toward, Labor has never been a realistic prospect at the federal level. The extent and permanence of cooperation between the Coalition parties led Sartori (1976, pp. 187-88) to characterise the relationship as "symbiotic" and subsequently dismiss the capacity of the Nationals to shift party system dynamics. Similarly, in the terminology of Wolinetz (2004), the Nationals engage in what is near-certain clustering with the Liberals, reducing the party's influence over the patterns of party interaction. On these bases, this thesis considers the Nationals as having coalesced with the Liberal Party, severely reducing both the Nationals' independence as a political actor and their potential party system influence.

There are several significant gaps and unresolved debates in Australian political science to which this thesis meaningfully contributes. First, analysis of the Greens tends to focus on the party's interaction with individual constituent elements of the party system. While useful, such approaches come at the expense of a more holistic evaluation of the party's role and impact. Second, there is ongoing disagreement as to the influence of minor parties generally on party competition in Australia, as well as to the differing degrees of impact on party competition between parties in this rather ambiguous 'minor' category. These two understudied facets of Australian party politics both contribute to, and are reinforced by, the

sidelining of party system analysis in the Australian political science literature. Assessments of the Australian party system are usually cursory and brief, lacking in detail and methodological rigour. Moreover, when the Australian party system is evaluated, the discussions are informed by only a limited survey of the relevant literature, overlooking considerable developments in the field. The literature on the Australian party system overlooks a variety of methodological approaches and analytical tools, outlined in the following chapter, for investigating party systems and measuring party system change. Exploring the systemic impact of the Greens – a process that is inherently concerned with impact relative to other parties over time – is thus a vital step in providing further insight into each of these areas.

RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

The study of party impact as defined by party system change raises two key methodological challenges. First, party systems are complex and multifaceted; one must account for the many elements of party competition, each often needing to be operationalised and investigated through different means. Following chapters four and five, which investigate party system change through broad indicators, this thesis proceeds thematically. Chapters six through eleven address a different component of the Australian party system. Each chapter has its own research questions connected to the central objective of determining the impact and role of the Australian Greens. Given that the methodological approach best suited to investigating one set of research questions is not necessarily the best for evaluating another set, diverse methods are employed across chapters. This thesis uses a variety of data, drawing upon individual-level surveys, coded party manifestos and parliamentary divisions, and face-to-face interviews. Nonetheless, we must connect this array of methodological approaches to some common ontological and epistemological foundation, namely, Sawyer's (2002; 2003) nonreductive individualism and List and Spiekkermann's (2013) 'reconciliation' of supervenience individualism and causal-explanatory holism. Further, we need an overarching framework for interpreting the results of each chapter and connecting them back to the central research question. Building upon Pennings and Lane (1998) and Smith (1989), this chapter proposes a hybrid framework that defines system change, identifies where meaningful change can occur, and highlights differing degrees of change.

Methodology

This thesis employs both quantitative and qualitative methods. A challenge of research design, then, is to logically integrate these approaches into the overall thesis structure. Filstead (1979, p. 45) argues that qualitative and quantitative methods are more than merely different procedures; rather, they often represent distinct epistemological and ontological frameworks for understanding complex phenomena. As such, the combination of quantitative and

qualitative approaches pursued in this thesis – commonly known as ‘mixed methods’ – is arguably inappropriate and theoretically weak. However, the dominant view amongst contemporary scholars in the social sciences, and particularly within political science, is that the advantages and benefits to mixed methods research far outweigh any theoretical weaknesses (Pierce 2008, pp. 51-52). Indeed, mixed methods research is the topic of a rich literature, exploring technique, theory, and application (Brewer & Hunter 1989; Small 2011; Tashakkori & Teddie 2010). Mixed methods “can improve the accordance of theories and empirical studies with the complexities of social reality” (Thaler 2015, p. 1) and offer greater opportunities for corroboration and data triangulation. For instance, chapters four and five apply quantitative and qualitative indicators of party system change to gauge the dynamics of party competition in Australia over time. Subsequent chapters further test these findings, employing different data or a divergent methodological approach.

Mixed methods research, though, must comprise more than an ad hoc combination of diverse data collection and analytical techniques. While the separation between quantitative and qualitative approaches is often exaggerated (Caporaso 2009, p. 67), the combination of methods must be performed carefully and systematically. An oft-used means of maximising the benefits of mixed methods while limiting theoretical weaknesses is to organise research, data collection, and analysis in a manner whereby one approach dominates another (Pierce 2008, pp. 51-52). Moreover, we should not mix methods just for the sake of it; there is value in single-method research. Given this, in some chapters of this thesis, I undertake exclusively qualitative or quantitative investigation. For instance, the analysis of the electoral support of the Greens in chapter eight focuses on statistical analysis of Australian Election Study (AES) surveys and quantified party system variables. On the other hand, through semi-structured elite interviews, chapters nine and ten explore the experience of the Greens as a support party to a minority Labor government in the 43rd federal parliament. Moreover, in the thesis conclusion, quantitative findings are used to inform what is conventionally considered a qualitative endeavour: classifying parties and party systems using typologies.

These approaches, as well as the associated types of data, methods of data collection, and techniques of data analysis, each entail their own limitations. Abstract questions relating to

ontology and epistemology, as well as more practical methodological concerns are just as relevant to the statistical analysis of survey data as they are to process tracing using elite interviews. For example, a central point of disputation in political science has been between methodological individualists and methodological holists or 'non-reductionists' (Hay 2006, pp. 88-89). Methodological individualism, List and Spiekermann (2013, p. 629) explain, is "the thesis that good social-scientific explanations should refer solely to facts about individuals and their interactions, not to any higher-level social entities, properties, or causes." Methodological individualism derives from a particular ontology and epistemology that can inform qualitative research just as easily as it shapes quantitative methods (Lamont & Swidler 2014, p. 163). Methodological holists, on the other hand, assert that higher-level entities and structural or social properties, such as institutions and party systems, can maintain causal capacity separate and distinct to that of their constituent individual-level elements. The divide between individualism and holism, though, is often exaggerated. Indeed, Hay (2006, p. 90) contends that a "commonsense ground" has recently developed in political science, which recognises that social forces can have independent and significant causal properties, but that these social forces ultimately comprise of individual elements. Such a position is inherent to the study of party systems as *systems* (Sartori 1976, p. 43).

In applying this 'commonsense ground', this thesis draws upon the work of Hay (2006) as well as Saywer's (2002; 2003) nonreductive individualism (NRI) and List and Spiekermann's reconciliation of supervenience individualism and causal-explanatory holism. Hay's (2006, p. 90) commonsense ground between individualism and holism comprises four primary assertions.

1. A higher-level entity or social force is greater than the sum of its parts.
2. Such higher-level entities and social forces maintain 'holistic properties'.
3. These holistic properties belong to the higher-level entity and not to any of the constituent elements.
4. The higher-level entity is still nevertheless the product of its component parts; if we dismantled the entity, only the parts would remain, not some "mysterious property which formerly held the whole thing together" (Ryan 1970, p. 181).

Hay's (2006) position is similar to NRI outlined by Sawyer (2002; 2003). In the first of two articles, Sawyer (2002) argues for a position that is ontologically individualist – only individuals exist – but that nevertheless rejects the methodologically individualist claim that the explanation for all phenomena derives from the interaction of individuals. In a subsequent article, Sawyer (2003, pp. 218-19) draws upon the philosophy of the mind and connects NRI with a 'supervenient causation' approach to social causation. This connection explains how, in Sawyer's NRI, social properties and higher-level entities, despite not being said to exist at the ontological level, can nonetheless exert causal influence over individuals.

In reconciling methodological individualism and holism, List and Spiekermann (2013) expand the work of Sawyer (2002; 2003). At the core of List and Spiekermann's work (2013, pp. 631-32) is the assertion that "one can consistently be an individualist in some respects while being a holist in others." Moreover, there are some political and social phenomena that are best explained by individualist methodology, while others require a more holistic approach. Further, the authors highlight how there are distinct variants of both individualism and holism, with some variants of the former compatible with the latter. In particular, 'supervenience individualism' is entirely compatible with 'causal-explanatory holism'. In other words, the view that "individual-level facts fully determine the social facts" is compatible with the notion that "some causal relations... are distinct from (and not re-describable as) any individual-level causal relations" (List & Spiekermann 2013, p. 632 and p. 634). A higher-level entity or system, however, only requires a holistic causal explanation if that system meets three criteria: multiple levels of description, multiple realisability of higher-level properties, and microrealisation-robust causal relations (List & Spiekermann 2013, p. 639).

Party systems satisfy each of the conditions for requiring a reconciliation of ontological individualism with causal-explanatory holism. Individual party system components, however, may not require such an approach. First, a party system is a higher-level property comprised of lower-level components: parties, and the individuals and internal groupings that constitute those parties. Second, while party systems are the product of the interaction of those parties, one cannot adequately explain the dynamics of party systems through an

examination of their constituent parties alone. Third, party systems are a “difference-making” causal force (List & Spiekermann 2013, pp. 635-36), capable of constraining and shaping party behaviour. Moreover, where effects of this causal force can continue even where parties adapt and change in response to their competitive environments. One might argue that mixing methods and combining ontologies and epistemologies in this fashion to study party systems is attempting to have the best of both worlds. In a sense, it is. But why not? The purported divide between individualism and holism is often as exaggerated as the supposed divide between quantitative and qualitative techniques. Sartori (1968; 1976) established that party systems can be both dependent *and* independent variables, just as the causal force of social structures, institutions, and higher-level entities is at the core of much of the comparative politics, international relations, and ‘new institutionalism’ scholarship. Thus, in investigating the inter-relationship between the Greens and the Australian party system, it is necessary and methodologically, epistemologically, and ontologically sound to combine a range of methods in answering a diverse set of research questions.

Party System Change: Meaning and Measurement

This section sets out a common framework to interpret the results of each chapter and relate these results to party impact as party system change. A vital part of this task is to outline a clear definition of what constitutes change. Party system change is not necessarily synonymous with electoral or party change. Nor do shifts in any other singular, or even multiple, component parts of a party system guarantee consequent transformation of the overall system. While the rise of new parties or realignments in electoral support may appear significant at first glance, such occurrences do not represent party system change unless there is attendant variation in the contests for votes, government, and legislative outcomes. Party system change, therefore, only occurs where a development, or set of developments, markedly modify the patterns of competitive and cooperative party interaction. As for what counts as a significant modification of party interaction, there are two primary competing approaches: a quantitative indicator approach, where party system change is defined as movement in measures of key system components; and a typological approach, where change occurs when a party system shifts from one system ‘type’ to another. The problem with these two

approaches, respectively, is that party system change is “seen as either happening all the time or as scarcely happening at all” (Mair 2006, p. 63).

Understanding party system change as a move from one party system type to another has thus engendered a perception of change as a dichotomy of two quite dramatic extremes. Party systems are either characterised as remarkably stable or especially volatile, with little ground in between. For change to occur in a typological framework, whether employing Sartori’s (1976) or any other surveyed in chapter two, a party system must meet stringent criteria, entailing extraordinary transformations. Indeed, as Mair (2006, p. 63) explains, to “see party systems in terms of discrete categories is therefore to bias one’s analysis in favour of the absence of change.” However, when investigating the dynamics of party competition within systems, few if any contemporary competitive party systems exhibit the inertia one would expect from a stable system. What is more common than immense or sudden party system change, Wolinetz (1988b, p. 313) explains, are “smaller changes – changes in coalition patterns, shifts in party strengths, or the growth or decline of individual parties.” These changes can take place in purportedly stable systems, while those systems categorised as ‘fluid’ and undergoing change can still demonstrate remarkable continuity in those same facets of party competition. The rarity of clearly-demarcated change versus stability in practice, though, is logical if we consider parties as strategic actors, adapting to and attempting to shape their competitive environment (Smith 1989).

The benefit of such a stringent taxonomical approach is that there are definitive criteria for system change. The disadvantage, however, is that the strict prerequisites for party system change create a method of analysis that is insensitive and inflexible. Significant alterations in the interactions between parties are unduly disregarded (Wolinetz 2018b, p. 312). This inflexibility reduces the discriminatory power of extant typologies. Few classic two-party systems exist, for instance, while Sartori’s (1976) ‘moderate pluralism’, and similar ‘multiparty’ categories in other typologies, have become excessively crowded (Mair 1996). As such, party system scholars have increasingly abandoned taxonomical assessment of change in favour of continuous variables measuring movements in essential party system components. Pennings and Lane (1998, p. 3), for example, outline a more flexible account of

party system change, whereby change occurs “when the competitive or cooperative relationships between parties in the electoral, parliamentary or governmental arena are altered.” The authors measure these relationships by examining the number, relative size, and ideological positions of parties. Further, party system stability is not merely the absence of change. Rather, stability involves the concerted effort of existing competitors, often exploiting institutional arrangements, to maintain existing boundaries and patterns of party competition.

The problem with employing (predominantly quantitative) indicators of party system change is that party systems then differ in degree, rather than in kind. Party system change is seen as constantly occurring, as such indicators detect even relatively minor shifts in electoral support or ideological positioning. However, it is not always obvious what has actually altered in the patterns of party interaction when the effective number of parties increases by, say, 0.13 points. Mair (2006, p. 64) argues that quantitative indicators make party system change “a confusing phenomenon” and “biases one’s analysis against the identification of stability.” Pennings and Lane (1998, pp. 5-6), though, contend that a clear-cut point of demarcation between party system change and stability is not always identifiable. Chapter twelve, though, posits a solution to this problem, designing a typology and informing system classification through the use of quantitative indicators.

The Parameters of Party System Change

If our analysis of the Australian party system is to capture political developments that, while not necessarily bringing about a new party system, are nonetheless significant, we need language and concepts designed for this purpose. This thesis employs a hybrid framework of party system change, the product of combining the work of Pennings and Lane (1998) and Smith (1989), as shown in Table 3.1. In building upon their conception of change, Pennings and Lane (1998, p. 6) outline three degrees of party system change. First, party system stability, which follows from the authors’ contention that systemic inertia is more than the absence of change, but the product of intentional party choices. Second, the authors identify gradual change. This category allows for the recognition of those variations in the core components of

party systems – for instance, electoral volatility, the number of parties, and so on – that, while not transforming the system as a whole, do effect noticeable and enduring change in the strategy and behaviour of parties over time. Third, there is radical change, which refers to an abrupt transformation of the party system – indeed, producing an entirely new system – resulting from dramatic shifts in party or institutional factors. This three-fold typology, though, is limited in that there is still a considerable gap between the ‘gradual change’ and ‘radical change’ categories. This could feasibly group together party system developments that are in fact quite dissimilar.

Table 3.1 – Frameworks of party system change

Smith (1989)	Pennings & Lane (1998)	Hybrid Framework
Temporary fluctuation	Stability	Stability
Restricted change	Gradual change	Temporary fluctuation
General change	Radical change	Restricted change
Transformation		General change
		Transformation

An earlier contribution by Smith (1989) is helpful in further disaggregating forms of party system change. Smith (1989, pp. 353-54) outlines four different types of party system change: temporary fluctuations, restricted change, general change, and transformation. Temporary fluctuation, as the name suggests, refers to ephemeral variations to components of the party system, such as brief periods of ideological polarisation or of electoral disruption. Determining what constitutes ‘temporary’ is often difficult, and necessitates both a retrospective and longitudinal consideration of the party system. Restricted change, on the other hand, involves permanent but contained modification in one or a small number of elements of the party system, such as an increase in electoral volatility, or the emergence of new parties. The third category, general change, has more onerous criteria, requiring alteration to several components of the party system to an extent that destabilises a previous ‘equilibrium’. General change, however, does not require the emergence of a completely different party system, as that represents what Smith refers to as transformation. In combination with the conception of party system stability offered by Pennings and Lane (1998, p. 6), Smith’s four-part outline offers a persuasive framework to assess party system change.

What remains is to identify the core components of party systems to serve as our indicators of party system change and as organising themes for the remainder of the thesis. As with much else in the study of party systems, there is some disagreement between scholars over which variables best allow for the detection of system change (Arter 1999b, pp. 143-44). Fortunately, however, there are common elements, and most approaches merely differ on the number of indicators used. Dalton et al. (1984, pp. 9-10), for instance, designate just two vital indicators of party system change: the number of parties and electoral volatility. Similarly, Bean (1996, p. 136) identifies two variables: the degrees of cleavage-based voting and party identification-based voting. This reflects an electoral bias common among discussions of party systems (e.g. Rose & Urwin 1970). To focus exclusively on electoral variation overlooks those instances of systemic change that occur without significant electoral variability. As such, it potentially misidentifies electoral adjustment alone as system change (Mair 1983). Others, such as Lane and Ersson (1987) draw from typologies, particularly those of Blondel (1968) and Sartori (1976), to establish four indicators of change: the number and relative size of parties, ideological distance between parties, aggregate electoral volatility, and the social cleavages or issue dimensions represented by parties. Though inspired by existing typologies, the indicators employed are measured using separate quantitative measures and indices.

Mair (1996; 1997; 2002) builds upon the typological work of Dahl (1966), Rokkan (1968) and Sartori (1976) to construct a principal gauge of party system change. He views the nature of party competition and cooperation in the contest for government as the primary differentiator between systems. Mair (1997, p. 206-07) identifies three measurable variables that aid in discerning “differential patterns in the competition for government”. These include the degree of alternation in government, the level of consistency in governing alternatives, and the variety of parties that are able to participate in government. This results in a spectrum of party interaction and competition for government, which ranges from a closed structure of competition to an open structure of competition. Party system change, then, occurs when a system moves along this spectrum. Though there is much merit in Mair’s proposal – and it is employed in chapter five – its overriding focus on the competition for government leaves many facets of party interaction outside the focus of analysis (Müller & Fallend 2004, p. 805). This is especially the case for the Australian case, given that there are strong grounds to

suspect that much of whatever party system change may be occurring is happening outside the scope of government formation.

Individually, such indicators give little insight into the nature of a party system. What is more, there are difficulties in measurement – some of which can vary from system to system – that must be resolved, such as how to count relevant parties most accurately. Yet when used collectively, with the measurements employed grounded in theory and tailored to the system in question, these indicators can be utilised in conjunction with a revised typology to provide a more accurate account of a party system. Only Jaensch (1983; 1989a; 1994a) has approached the study of the Australian party system in such a fashion. As outlined in chapter two, however, Jaensch was less concerned with party system change than is this thesis. Additionally, there have been considerable developments within Australian politics since Jaensch's final edition. Similarly, while there have been examinations of the core elements of the party system, such as aggregate volatility (e.g. Goot 1994), they have been self-contained analyses, disconnected from the broader system. What follows is a contribution to what remains an underdeveloped and often overlooked aspect of Australian political science. The following two chapters assess change in the Australian party system along four core components: the number and relative size of parties, ideological polarisation, electoral volatility, and the structure of party competition and cooperation in government and in opposition. The hybrid framework of change outlined in this chapter helps us interpret and contextualise such change. Moreover, these indicators represent the essential properties of party systems explored in the remainder of the thesis, encapsulating the contests for votes, government, and legislative outcomes.

Part II: Change in the Australian Party System

CHANGE IN THE AUSTRALIAN PARTY SYSTEM: FRAGMENTATION AND POLARISATION

Political parties are the very core of Australian politics, serving as linking intermediaries between citizens and government. Political competition is overwhelmingly *party* competition; democratic government is predominantly *party* government. A party system is a pattern of iterative party interactions, both competitive and cooperative, stemming from the contest for government, for votes, and for legislative outcomes (Webb 2000, p. 1; Wolinetz 2006, p. 52). These interactions are, in turn, shaped by the nature and parameters of the party system – as well as by other social, political and institutional factors. To study party systems, therefore, is to study one of the most fundamental properties of democracies. Party systems are complex, multifaceted structures. Their measurement and classification can illuminate not only the political dynamics of an individual polity, but also the way in which that individual polity differs from others. The Australian party system is generally associated with stability, widely considered as one of the few enduring two-party (or two-and-a-half-party) systems among advanced democracies. Alongside these claims of stability, though, has been considerable demographic and social change and, over the past three decades, a marked decline in the proportion of the vote obtained by major parties at federal elections. The Greens, and before them, the Australian Democrats, have been the prime beneficiaries of this gradual dealignment of voters from the Coalition and Labor parties.

Investigating the degree of party system change amid broader social change is especially worthwhile. Absence of corresponding system change would suggest a concerted effort by Labor and the Coalition to perpetuate their dominance, via adaptive policy and campaign strategies aimed at accommodating social, attitudinal and demographic changes (Wolinetz 1988b, pp. 298-300). Party system change, on the other hand, might be the more likely outcome in the face of social or attitudinal change, but how that change manifests is difficult to predict. The scope and nature of party system change is the product of party strategies and interactions, the contest between those players who seek to impose inertia and those seeking

to transform political competition. Together, this chapter and the following have five main aims:

1. Establish an overall analytical framework for the thesis.
2. Measure and analyse change, or inertia, in the Australian party system between 1975 and 2016.
3. Evaluate the degree to which the Greens have contributed to any change present in the party system and, in so doing, highlight those components of the party system that require further analysis in later chapters.
4. Assess the inter-relationship between the Greens and the party system, and ascertain how the party system shapes the Greens' success and influence.
5. Inform, in chapter twelve, a typological reclassification of the Australian party system.

Together, this chapter and chapter five measure the characteristics of, and change in, the Australian party system using four indicators. This chapter examines the number and relative size of parties and ideological polarisation, while the next evaluates electoral volatility and the structures of competition in government and opposition. These indicators each represent a distinct component of the party system, and are tested using approaches rarely employed in the Australian political science literature. The number of parties is determined using Sartori's (1976) criteria of party relevance, as well as through the quantitative methods advanced by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) and Golosov (2010). Ideological polarisation is calculated with Sartori's (1976) conception of distance, Sani and Sartori's (1983) measure of overlap, and Dalton's (2008) polarisation index. Electoral volatility is analysed at both the macro- and micro-level, employing Pedersen's (1979) index of net volatility, in addition to measures of electoral dealignment and party switching. Lastly, the competition for government and opposition is considered through Mair's (1996; 1997) framework of party competition.

Chapter two set up many of the foundational definitions, concepts, and subject vocabulary for this analysis of change in the Australian party system. Similarly, chapter three defined what is meant by party system change, and articulated a framework through which we can

interpret the following results. This hybrid framework identifies five degrees of party system change: inertia, temporary fluctuation, restricted change, general change, and transformation. Taken together, this chapter and chapter five find evidence for general change in the Australian party system. That is, there are indications of significant and continuing change, but change that has not prompted a transformation of the party system. Change, though, is concentrated in three components of the party system: the number and relative size of parties, ideological polarisation, and the cohesion and site of opposition. The Greens have demonstrably contributed to shifts in each. Importantly, this chapter also finds considerable discrepancy between the electoral and legislative arenas of the party system, as well as between the House of Representatives and the Senate. The findings demonstrate the existence of a distinct party sub-system surrounding the Senate, with party dynamics in this chamber increasingly separating from those of the House. These findings not only place into context many of the developments in Australian party politics over the past few decades, but also identify considerable implications for effective government and policymaking.

A Re-examination of the Modern Australian Party System

What is novel about studying party system change in the Australian context is that the dominant perspective is in fact of system stability, a finding at odds with the party systems literature focused on other advanced democracies (Drummond 2006; Lynch 2007; Mair & Smith 1990; Smith 1989). From Loveday et al. (1977), Aitkin (1982), and Jaensch (1983), to Smith (1993), Bean (1996), Singleton et al. (2009), and Miragliotta et al. (2013), scholars have emphasised the continuity and stability of the Australian party system. This is even the case where scholars recognise the gradually changing roles of minor parties and function of the Senate. The assumption of party system stability has featured in the methods, framing, and explanations of a wide variety of research (e.g. Mackerras & McAllister 1999; Mainwaring & Torcal 2006; Martin & Pietsch 2013; Siaroff 2003; Strangio 2009). More frequent are off-hand remarks as to the 'enduring stability' of the Australian party system. In each case, the party system is often characterised as static, remaining a two- or two-and-a-half-party type. The problem is that much of the literature obfuscates the extent of systemic change through fixating on aspects of electoral continuity, such as party identification (e.g. Bean & McAllister

2015; McAllister 2011), or on government formation (e.g. Brenton 2013), to the neglect of the other facets of the party system.

At the core of any assertion of party system stability or change is, firstly, the conceptualisation of the party system, and secondly, the definition and operationalisation of party system change. On these bases, especially, there is room to question the dominant characterisations of the Australian party system. Even the more rigorous works, such as by Jaensch (1983; 1989a; 1994a), need re-examination, particularly from a more contemporary perspective. Further, there is a tendency within the literature to evaluate the characteristics of, and classify, the Australian party system at singular points in time. Such evaluations, however, merely capture what later may prove to be ephemeral. A narrow window of analysis can promote further understanding of constituent elements of a system, but does little to advance our comprehension of that system in its totality or how it may be developing (Blau 2008). The primary aims of this chapter, and indeed this thesis, relate to research questions that inherently require a longitudinal scope. Questions of the impact of the Greens, of the characteristics of party interaction, of party system change, and even of party system classification, are best considered over time. Methods of measurement employed for analysing party system change, therefore, must meet each of these requirements.

There is little consensus among party system scholars on the best set of criteria against which to measure party system change (Arter 1999a, pp. 143-44). There are four variables, however, that both speak directly to the main components of party systems and are readily operationalised into indicators of system change. Table 4.1 outlines the measures of party system change applied across this chapter and the next. The number of parties reflects the format of the party system, while ideological polarisation identifies system mechanics. The primary dynamic factor shaping the system in an exogenous capacity, electoral attitudes, are gauged through aggregate and individual electoral volatility. Changes to the 'core' of the system are captured in the measures of the structure of competition for government and in opposition. Critically, this framework permits testing party system change within and across the divisions and arenas of the Australian party system. For instance, in counting parties, the tabulated methods each permit the separate calculation of parties in the electoral and

legislative arenas, as well as the House and the Senate. As a whole, this framework best captures not only the number of parties that compete in the Australian system, but also *how* and *where* that competition occurs. Employing multiple measures for each indicator also allows for some triangulation of results.

Table 4.1 - Indicators of party system change and methods of measurement

Chapter Four		Chapter Five	
Number of Parties	Ideological Polarisation	Electoral Volatility	Party Competition
Party relevance	Ideological distance	Index of Net Volatility	Structure of competition for government
Effective Number of Parties	Ideological overlap	Swinging and floating voters	Sites and strategies of opposition
Golosov Index	Polarisation Index	Timing of vote decision Consistency of voting	

The Number (and Relative Size) of Parties

A count of political parties is the most widely used criterion in classifying party systems. As such, this numerical measure also serves as the principal indicator of system change. As Sartori (1976, p. 120) explains, the number of parties “immediately indicates, albeit roughly... the extent to which power is fragmented or non-fragmented, dispersed or concentrated.” Moreover, the “tactics of party competition and opposition appear related to the number of parties; and this has, in turn, an important bearing on how governmental coalitions are formed and are able to perform.” The number of parties deals directly with the format of the party system, but also exerts influence on the mechanics of the system, i.e. how parties interact (Sartori 2001, p. 94). There is little disagreement among scholars regarding the centrality of the number of parties to the nature of a party system (Wolinetz 2006, p. 59). Where there is considerable debate, however, is in relation to which parties count, for how much those parties count, and the methods by which we perform the count. The differences can range from minor methodological points to fundamentally different understandings of the core components and dynamics of party systems (Blau 2008). Often, the approach employed is related to the type of research conducted, while other times the choice entwines with

normative judgements on democratic form and function. What follows is a counting of parties in the Australian party system from 1975 onwards, utilising three different methods advanced by Sartori (1976), Laakso and Taagepera (1979), and Golosov (2010).

Sartori and Qualitative Counting

There are two broad approaches to the counting of parties, usually categorised as qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative approach remains dominated by Sartori (1976), who sought to devise an 'intelligent' technique of counting parties in response to the relatively simplistic tallying practice of Duverger (1954). For Sartori, what matters is counting *relevant* parties; including parties with scant influence over the patterns of party interaction would only distort the classification of the system (Sani & Sartori 1983, p. 320). Sartori (1976, pp. 121-22) was also critical of numerical thresholds, whether based on electoral performance or legislative seats attained. Not only are thresholds rather arbitrary, they leave open the potential to omit parties that, despite their small size, wield influence over competition and government formation. Instead, Sartori (1976, pp. 122-25) set out two criteria for relevance: coalition potential, referring to capacity to serve in government, and blackmail potential, in terms of influencing the direction and tactics of party competition.

Sartori was concerned with both the legislative and electoral arenas, and encouraged comprehensive inquiry into the politics of the system one is attempting to assess. As Jaensch (1994a, pp. 10-14) shows, though, it is detailed analysis of a system that can reveal weaknesses in Sartori's criteria. Jaensch asserts that Australia's use of preferential voting, as well as the power and function of the Senate, require Sartori's list of criteria be expanded from two to four. According to Jaensch, a party is also relevant if it influences government formation through the direction of voter preferences, or if it holds balance of power in the Senate. The Jaensch additions strengthen the Sartori counting method in the Australian setting, but are employed at some cost. First, the Jaensch rule regarding the role of preferences in shaping the formation of government necessitates an even deeper analysis of electoral results. Second, without disaggregating the different arenas of the House of Representatives and Senate, the broadened criteria for party relevance leads to classifications and assertions of wholesale

system change that hinge on the relevance of parties derived solely from their presence in the Senate.

As Table 4.2 displays, application of the Sartori-Jaensch criteria for party relevance suggests remarkable stability in the number of parties in the Australian party system. From 1975 to 2016, across both the House and Senate, each election resulted in three relevant parties. These figures, however, obscure a great deal of complexity requiring further explanation. For the House of Representatives, the three relevant parties at each election are the Labor, Liberal and National parties. For each of these years, though, it is debatable whether the Nationals genuinely qualify as a ‘relevant’ party. A strict interpretation of Sartori’s rules as modified by Jaensch deems the party relevant on the basis of its coalition potential – except in 1975, 1977, and 1996, where the party was superfluous to the formation of a non-Labor government. As noted above, both Sartori and Jaensch include the Nationals only with significant caveats due to the permanence of the Liberal-National alliance. But even in those years where the Nationals are redundant in coalition terms, it is possible to mount an argument that the party instead qualifies in electoral terms. Through acting as a coalitional wing party representing sectional, geographically-concentrated interests, the Nationals allow the Liberal party to give negligible attention to rural matters (Botterill 2009; Costar 2011). This reduces the Liberal Party’s burden of broad interest aggregation, marginally altering the pattern and dimensions of party competition.

Table 4.2 – Number of relevant parties (modified Sartori), House and Senate

	House	Senate
<i>1975 – 1980</i>	3 (Labor, Liberal, Country)	3 (Labor, Liberal, Country)
<i>1980 – 2004</i>	3 (Labor, Liberal, National)	3 (Labor, Liberal, Democrats)
<i>2004 – 2007</i>	3 (Labor, Liberal, National)	3 (Labor, Liberal, National)
<i>2007 – 2016</i>	3 (Labor, Liberal, National)	3 (Labor, Liberal, Greens)

Source: Author’s own calculations.

We cannot make the same argument in favour of the Nationals in the Senate. The Liberal and National parties, in those states where the latter has some degree of electoral success, have run joint tickets in the upper house. Despite this, over the period studied, few Nationals

senators have won election, reducing the legislative influence and bargaining power of the party (Van Onselen 2015, p. 4). Only following those elections where Nationals senators were necessary for a Coalition majority in the Senate could we consider the party relevant by means of the second of Jaensch's additional criteria. The Nationals have inhabited this pivotal role in only two brief eras of the modern Australian party system, from 1975 to 1981, and 2005 to 2008.⁸ We could consider The Nationals a relevant party in the Senate from 2008 onwards, given instances where the Liberal Party might require National votes plus the support of a cross-bench party in order to pass or block legislation. For example, in the Senate of 2008-2011, the Coalition and the Greens combined could block Labor-initiated bills in the Senate, but only if the Nationals' five senators voted in accordance with their Liberal Party partners. We can dismiss this argument on two grounds, however: first, the coalescence of the Liberal and Nationals parties means that the two parties overwhelmingly vote together; and secondly, fragmentation of the Senate post-2008 has meant that other cross-bench Senators can be substituted for any defecting Nationals, reducing their bargaining power (see Chapter 11).

It is Jaensch's 'balance of power' rule of party relevance that counts the Australian Democrats and the Greens as relevant parties in the Australian party system. Contrary to the Nationals, both parties vote independently, absent a larger coalition partner, and have either held the sole balance of power, or shared this role while possessing the *most dominant* position on the cross-bench. For example, in the Senate of 2011-14, the Greens held sole balance of power, rendering the party a critical partner for both the Government and the Opposition should either wish to pass or block bills. In contrast, in the Senate of 2014-16, the Greens were unable to frustrate, with the Opposition alone, the Government's legislative agenda. The Greens could, however, use their numbers to negotiate deals and pass legislation in cooperation with the Government. Overall, what the application of the Sartori-Jaensch rules demonstrate is that, while there has been, by this measure, stability in the number of relevant parties over time, there is a marked difference in the parties that counted across chambers of parliament.

⁸ In noting these specific periods, it is important to highlight that, for the sake of simplicity, the table corresponds to election years. Due to constitutional stipulations on the length of Senate terms, the composition of the upper house does not alter until the 1st of July following the election, except in the case of double dissolution elections. There is therefore a small degree of discrepancy, as demonstrated by the aforementioned periods of Nationals 'relevance', between the tabulated results and the precise terms of the Senate.

Additionally, the relevant parties themselves in the Senate have altered periodically, each with divergent ideological profiles and approaches to the institutional power of the Senate.⁹ There is therefore a potential for distinct patterns of competition. Moreover, the variance in the number and nature of relevant parties indicates an instance of at least restricted change in the party system, and perhaps even general change should other indicators be found to have similarly shifted.

Laakso and Taagepera, Golosov, and Quantitative Counting

The Sartori method of counting parties maintains additional weaknesses to those noted by Jaensch. Several scholars, such as Lijphart (1984, pp. 117-18), have drawn attention to anomalies created by Sartori's criteria. More frequently, though, critics have emphasised the problem of dichotomous and uniform relevance (e.g. Blau 2008; Siaroff 2003). That is, by Sartori's method, parties are either considered relevant or irrelevant, and if deemed relevant, are then included with equal 'weight' or relevance. It was to avoid this lack of discriminatory power that scholars such as Blondel (1968) originally incorporated concepts like 'half party'. An alternative solution, though, is a quantitative approach to party counting. The quantitative approach arguably starts with Rae's (1971) fractionalisation index, which tallies parties by weighting them according to the proportion of seats won. Sartori (2001, p. 91) rejected this kind of quantification outright, arguing that "with Rae, the political science profession enters a path of measurement whose gains in precision are outweighed by major losses of understanding." Rae's index gained traction, but also received several persuasive critiques targeted at its methodology and the difficulty of interpreting its results (Kline 2009, p. 262; Stewart 1994, p. 198).

Notwithstanding Sartori's refutation of quantitative party counting, Laakso and Taagepera (1979) later developed the 'effective number of parties' (ENP) index in response to the methodological flaws of Rae's index. It has since become the most widely used quantitative technique for counting parties (Cox 1997; Grofman & Kline 2011; Lijphart 1994). Like Rae's

⁹ See the subsequent chapters of this thesis on ideological polarization and the Greens in parliament, as well as Ghazarian (2015), for a further examination of the changing 'type' of party elected to the Senate.

index, the ENP measurement presents results in a continuous scale – as opposed to only including parties as whole or half numbers – and can be applied across party systems without the need for exhaustive knowledge of the politics under study. The ENP calculation effectively weights each party's result against itself by a sum of squares. It can be weighted by either electoral results or seats, creating the 'effective number of electoral parties' (ENEP) and 'effective number of parliamentary parties' (ENPP) measures, respectively. Where the ENP measure offers improvement over Rae's index is in the figures produced, providing numbers that align with existing concepts and classifications of party systems. As Taagepera (1999, p. 498) affirms in a later paper, ENP tends to closely resemble both "average intuition" and Sartorian counts of relevant parties. The results below largely corroborate Taagepera's claim in the Australian context, but the figures also expose one of the enduring criticisms of quantitative measurements. That is, it is difficult to comprehend or convey what, if any, meaningful difference exists between, for instance, a party system with 2.4 effective parties and a system with 2.7 effective parties (Wolinetz 2004, pp. 10-11).

Notwithstanding the prevalence of ENP – or perhaps because of it – the measure has also been subject to criticism. Subsequently, a range of additions and alternatives to the ENP measure have been proposed (Dumont & Caulier 2005; Dunleavy & Boucek 2003; Kline 2009; Molinar 1991; Taagepera 1999). These updated indices attempt to overcome problems and anomalies that have arisen in the application of ENP. Of importance to the Australian context is the finding that ENP provides limited insight into relative power and influence of parties, and further, inadequately represents those instances where a party holds an electoral or legislative majority (Dumont & Caulier, pp. 6-7; Quinn 2013, p. 384; Sartori 2001, p. 93). An alternative index proposed by Golosov (2010) aims to overcome such flaws. Rather than amend the ENP measure, Golosov (2010, pp. 180-81) departs from the effective number 'family' of indices. Golosov claims these indices do not accurately account for single-party majorities. The Golosov index, too, involves calculations based on shares of electoral returns or legislative seats, meaning that it can be applied to both arenas. In place of weighting each party's success against itself, the Golosov (2010, pp. 181-83) measure instead weights individual party results against the largest party's share of votes or seats. Golosov argues that this provides more

intuitive results for a variety of party strength constellations, but also imparts a precise indication of what each political party contributes to the overall number of parties score.

Table 4.3 juxtaposes these competing calculations of the number of relevant or effective parties in the modern Australian party system. The quantitative measures in the table are rarely applied in the Australian case, and Sartori's qualitative counting has been under-utilised.¹⁰ Certainly, no other study has calculated the number of parties across party system divides and arenas, or compared separate counting techniques. In order to explore the potential for difference between distinct arenas and divisions in the party system, the results have also been separated along electoral-legislative lines and across the two parliamentary chambers.

Table 4.3 - The number (and relative size) of parties

<i>Year of Election</i>	House of Representatives					Senate				
	Sartori-Jaensch	ENEP	ENPP	Golosov Elec.	Golosov Legis.	Sartori-Jaensch	ENEP	ENPP	Golosov Elec.	Golosov Legis.
1975	3	2.7	2.5	2.6	2	3	2.3	2.6	2.1	2.5
1977	3	3.1	2.4	2.9	2	3	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.5
1980	3	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.4	3	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.7
1983	3	2.7	2.2	2.3	1.8	3	2.6	2.8	2.4	2.4
1984	3	2.8	2.4	2.4	1.9	3	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.6
1987	3	2.9	2.3	2.5	1.8	3	2.7	3.2	2.6	2.8
1990	3	3.3	2.4	3	2	3	2.9	3	2.7	2.7
1993	3	2.9	2.4	2.6	2	3	2.6	3.1	2.6	3
1996	3	3.2	2.6	3.1	2.1	3	2.9	3	2.6	2.9
1998	3	3.4	2.5	3.1	2.3	3	3.3	3	3.2	2.8
2001	3	3.4	2.5	3.3	2.3	3	3.3	3.2	2.9	2.9
2004	3	3.1	2.4	2.9	2.1	3	3	3	2.6	2.7
2007	3	3	2.2	2.7	1.9	3	3	2.8	2.9	2.7
2010	3	3.1	2.3	2.9	2.2	3	3.4	2.7	3.1	2.8
2013	3	3.4	2.3	2.9	2	3	3.9	3.5	3.4	3.2
2016	3	3.6	2.4	3.1	2.4	3	4.2	4.1	3.6	3.5

Source: Author's own calculations based on Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) results.

¹⁰ See Smith & O'Mahony (2006) and Best's (2013) for two rare instances of ENP figures calculated for the Australian case, albeit in less detail than presented here.

While the difference in the Sartori-Jaensch count reflects stability in overall number but difference in constituent parties between chambers, the quantitative measures allow greater specificity. Both the ENP and Golosov indices demonstrate a divergence between the two houses of parliament, particularly in the legislative arena. The results suggest an enduring two-party system is in operation in the House of Representatives, while limited multipartism is firmly entrenched in the Senate. Whether this multipartism became engrained in the 80s coinciding with the peak of the Democrats' success, or much more recently alongside the rise of the Greens, is a point of difference between the ENP and Golosov indices. The number of parties is just a single indicator, though, and an appropriate assessment of change requires more than a counting of parties alone.

The results also signal that the discrepancy in the effective numbers of parties between the two chambers has increased.¹¹ The same cannot be said when comparing the number of electoral parties across the two arenas. What these calculations conceal, though, is that the number of electoral parties in competition for the Senate are suppressed by the joint ticket adopted by the Coalition parties in several states. This leads to an unavoidable consideration of the Liberals and Nationals as a single party in this arena. What has increased over the time examined, albeit inconsistently, is the variance between the effective number of parties contesting for the House and the number gaining representation. The ENP results display, in 2016, a divide of 1.2 effective parties between what electors are voting for, and what is returned in terms of House seats. The electoral systems employed across the two chambers can explain a great deal of both the electoral-legislative variance in the number of parties in the House, as well as the disparity between parties in the House and the Senate. However, the electoral systems cannot explain much of the change over time. Apart from the introduction of above-the-line voting in the Senate in 1984, and the abolishing of group voting tickets in 2016 – which do not manifest as any noticeable turning point in the data – the electoral systems have been held constant.

¹¹ It should also be noted that the late 1960s and early 1970s did also witness a brief episode of fragmentation due to the Democratic Labor Party and independents, but not to the extent of several of the elections in the range considered above.

By any measure of the number of parties, it is evident that the oft-used two-party and two-and-a-half-party characterisations of the Australian party system are insufficient. Certainly, there are other key indicators of party system change to explore, but on this vital measure, the common classifications of the party system fall short in all contexts except that of the legislative arena of the House. Of course, it is in this arena that the formation of government occurs. But to limit any classificatory judgement or assessment of change to this facet of the party system is an unjustifiably narrow conceptualisation of the systemic milieu in which Australian political parties interact. The data above adds weight to the hypothesis that there are in fact distinct patterns of competition between the chambers of parliament. In turn, this supports the view that party systems are multidimensional, spanning multiple arenas and divisions. Further, there is evidence of change in the count of parties, warranting further exploration of the degree to which the Greens may have contributed to such change. It is noteworthy, for instance, that the 2010 and 2013 half-Senate (and 2016 double dissolution) elections resulted in the Greens attaining the highest individual Golosov scores of any non-major party in the date range investigated. What a counting of parties obscures, though, is the influence particular configurations of party strength, and the behaviour and interactions of specific parties, can exert on the broader party system (Blau 2008, p. 179; Quinn 2013, p. 380).

Ideological Polarisation

One useful contribution is Dalton's (2008, pp. 900-01) claim that the most important variable in differentiating party systems is not the quantity of parties, but rather the 'quality' of competition. Dalton grounds his argument on the spatial models of electoral behaviour articulated by Downs (1957), as well as Sartori's (1976) theories on the directions of competition (centripetal or centrifugal) and their consequences. According to Sartori, a centripetal pattern of competition involves an electoral contest where parties, particularly major parties, converge toward the middle of the ideological spectrum in competition for the 'median voter'. A centrifugal pattern of competition represents a more diffuse array of parties across the ideological dimension. Centrifugal competition generally entails greater ideological distance between parties, as well as the existence of 'anti-system' parties. The degree of ideological polarisation is intertwined with electoral choice, the existence and variety of

governing coalitions, alternation in government, and political stability (Dalton 2008; Sartori 1976; Wolinetz 2006). As Sartori explains (1976, p. 128), counting the number of parties indicates the format of a party system, but alone cannot reveal the mechanics of a system. A measure of ideological polarisation, then, is both a key factor in party system classification (e.g. Sartori 1976; Wolinetz 2004), as well as a useful indicator of party system change.

Methods of Measurement

The problem with employing ideological polarisation toward either of these uses is that it is difficult to operationalise. Despite its significance in the study of party systems, the measurement of ideological polarisation receives considerably less scholarly attention than the question of how to count parties. There is little agreement on the most accurate representation of party ideology, let alone methods of measurement (Jaensch 1994a, pp. 177-78). There can be, after all, a marked difference between a party's statements of its own ideology, its policy platform, its political rhetoric, and its actual legislative record (White 1978). Inquiry into these potential demonstrations of party ideology can produce a characterisation quite distinct from elite or mass public perceptions of the party. Jaensch (1994a), for instance, adopts a qualitative approach to estimating party ideology, scrutinizing each party's internal factions, statements, platforms and history for content and direction, intensity and salience, consistency, and congruence. This is a method capable of offering a nuanced understanding of the parties themselves, but one that is exceedingly difficult to employ as an intelligible indicator of party system change. Sartori (1976), too, initially preferred qualitative assessment of party ideology, but was not particularly forthcoming with his methodology beyond a basic left, right, centre, and anti-party classification.

In a later article, however, Sartori turned to quantifiable measurements of party ideological positions (Sani & Sartori 1983). Using survey data, Sani and Sartori (1983, pp. 320-21) employed voters' self-locations along a left-right ideological scale. They then sorted the data by voter party preference, constructing three measures of ideological polarisation: overlap, ordinal similarity, and distance. Overlap is a calculation of the degree of overlay of ideological self-locations, across the spectrum, between the voters of any two parties. Ordinal similarity

gauges the share, between any two parties, of partisans that are ideologically in the 'wrong order'. Lastly, distance measures the incongruities between the mean ideological self-locations of voters of any two parties. As Sani and Sartori (1983, p. 316) acknowledge, voter self-location is just one of several data options. Depending on the data available, one might instead analyse voter perceptions of party ideological positions, measure elite or legislator views of party ideology, or construct an ideological scale from textual analysis of policy platforms. Saalfeld (2002) and Quinn (2013), for instance, use Manifesto Project (MP) data – a dataset quantifying party positions through content analysis of policy statements – to track the ideological distance between German and British parties over time. Dalton (2008), on the other hand, devised a polarisation index that weights voter perceptions of parties' ideologies by the electoral performance of each party.

The rough approximations of party ideological distance provided by Sartori's (1976) approach, or from using 'party families' (e.g. Sigelman & Yough 1978), do not provide the necessary precision for measuring party system change. Yet the quantitative alternatives also maintain limitations, with potential for error present from the data source through to the means of measurement. Central to each of the quantitative approaches is the assumption that a unidimensional, left-right spectrum can adequately encapsulate the ideological dimension of party interaction. The existence of new dimensions of political conflict that may shape electoral choice in a manner distinct from that of the traditional left-right divide complicates the application of a unidimensional scale. Postmaterialism and related 'new politics' concepts, however, have been found to maintain some relationship to the left-right divide, rather than serving as wholly new and distinct political dimension (Charnock & Ellis 2003; Inglehart 1997). Certainly, the left-right political spectrum is a heuristic device and, as such, cannot be employed without some reduction in nuance. A mounting number of studies, however, have demonstrated that the left-right divide remains significant in electoral choice and party platforms (Budge & Robertson 1987; Knutsen 1998). Further, the concept has proven both malleable and flexible, absorbing some new facets of political conflict and remaining capable

of sufficiently condensing a broad range of political attitudes into a single measurement (Abedi 2002; Crepaz 1990; Mair 1997; von Beyme 1985).¹²

Nevertheless, in using survey data there is a further assumption that respondents not only comprehend the concept of left and right, but also perceive politics through such a lens. This is of particular concern for surveys answered by the mass public, such as the Australian Election Study (AES). Fortunately, there is evidence that most voters can locate themselves and parties on an ideological scale with some accuracy (Dalton 2006b; Inglehart 1990). Voters may not have deep understandings of 'left' and 'right', but nevertheless employ these concepts as useful informational short-cuts. The survey results of the Australian Candidate Study (ACS), on the other hand, are arguably less susceptible to such weaknesses, given that the respondents are actively engaged in the political process. Nevertheless, political activity is not necessarily a guarantee of a considered view of the ideological positioning of parties.

One might pose similar questions around interpretation in relation to the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2018b) data. Chapters six and seven undertake a more thorough evaluation of the MP dataset, but three main points are worth noting here. First, the dataset relies on manual coding, through content analysis, of party manifestos, policy statements, advertisements, and leader's speeches, and is thus susceptible to error (Hansen 2008). Second, the coding schema is grounded upon a conception of party competition that emphasises salience theory (Budge 2001a). This approach, and the salience theory of political competition more broadly, is contentious (Franzmann & Kaiser 2006; Gemenis 2013). Third, the calculation of a left-right party position in the MP dataset (called 'RILE'), through a subtraction of the total emphasis given to particular 'right' issues from that of 'left' issues, has been the subject of considerable criticism (Dinas & Gemenis 2010). Table 4.4 outlines the MP variables that constitute the 'right' and 'left' categories in the RILE measure. While the 'RILE' index is used here as one means of estimating ideological polarisation, chapters six and seven are dedicated to improving upon this measure. Despite its weaknesses, the Manifesto Project is employed in a broad range of

¹² Nevertheless, see chapters six and seven for improved measures of ideological polarisation and party positioning in Australia.

literature, remains the primary data source for estimating party positions, and offers a complementary dataset to those derived from surveys of voters and elites.

Table 4.4 – The component variables of the 'RILE' Index

Left-wing policy variables	Right-wing policy variables
Anti-imperialism	Military: positive
Military: negative	Freedom and human rights
Peace	Constitutionalism: positive
Internationalism: positive	Political authority
Market regulation	Free market economy
Economic planning	Incentives: positive
Protectionism: positive	Protectionism: negative
Controlled economy	Economic orthodoxy
Nationalisation	Welfare state limitation
Welfare state expansion	National way of life: positive
Education expansion	Traditional morality: positive
Labour groups: positive	Law and order: positive
Democracy	Civic mindedness: positive

Source: Volkens et al. (2018a)

Given the methodological limitations apparent in the approaches detailed above, and that “there is no single repository of a party’s ideology” (Aitkin & Jinks 1980, p. 163), I apply a combination of measures of ideological polarisation. The following analysis incorporates data from three sources: the Manifesto Project, the Australian Candidate Study, and the Australian Election Study. This allows for an examination of the degree of ideological polarisation present in the Australian party system from three perspectives: party policy, elites, and the public. The measurements applied to the datasets vary according to the nature, strengths, and deficiencies of the data. The deficiencies range from the methodological as outlined above (also see Goot 2013 on the AES), to the more obvious problem of germane questions having only been included in surveys inconsistently, or for short periods of time.¹³ Thus, while individually these techniques permit only an incomplete assessment of the ideological

¹³ At the time of writing, for instance, the Manifesto Project only contains data up to 2013 for Australian federal elections.

positions of parties, taken together it is possible to triangulate findings and draw conclusions with greater certainty.

Measuring Left-Right Party Positions using the Manifesto Project

We first examine polarisation by measuring party positions through quantifying the policy statements found in party election materials. The MP dataset, with its RILE index, permits comparison of parties over the greatest length of time. Though, there are data points missing, particularly for the Australia Democrats, and the parties considered in the analysis here are limited by those included in the MP dataset. In interpreting the results in Figure 4.1, the vertical axis refers to the 'left' or 'right' position of a party, as a net standing after having subtracted left-wing from right-wing policy emphases in party programs. The axis theoretically ranges from -100 to +100, yet it is unlikely any party would reach either endpoint, as it would require a party manifesto solely dedicated to policy appeals covered by one of the two poles of the index. The RILE index incorporates 26 of the total 56 variables in the MP dataset, meaning some of a party's policy platform can fall outside of this unidimensional operationalisation of ideological competition.

Figure 4.1 displays relative consistency in the positioning of the Liberal Party, but an almost cyclical narrowing and widening between the major parties due to modifications in Labor Party platforms. With that said, the Liberal Party has demonstrated a capacity for greater movement in the RILE index since the election of the Howard government in 1996. The federal elections of 2010 and 2013 are particularly notable, as the Labor Party registered two of its most 'left-wing' policy programs since 1975. Only in 2010, though, did this manifest in a degree of polarisation between the two major parties outside of the typical range; at the 2010 election, Labor's repositioning corresponds with one of the more right-wing policy programs for the Liberals.




Figure 4.1 – Manifesto Project right-left score, 1975 - 2013

The presence of the Greens and the Nationals, however, has in several cases contributed to a larger distance between any two parties in the overall party system. Indeed, by this measure, there is little doubt that the generally Greens persist as the most left-wing political party. What is questionable is whether the systemic significance of the party has been sufficient to noticeably alter the degree of ideological polarisation in the party system. The party system overall appears to have largely maintained its centripetal tendencies over time.

Polarisation from an Elite Viewpoint: The Australian Candidate Study

Turning now to the elite perspective of party positioning, we can unfortunately only use the Australian Candidate Study from 2007 onwards. The ACS has asked candidates to locate themselves on an ideological spectrum for much of the survey's existence, albeit inconsistently. But the ideological beliefs of individual candidates, particularly those failing to win election, are of little systemic value; they contribute little to our grasp of the direction of party competition and the mechanics of the party system. What is more useful is the estimation, by these candidates, of their own parties' locations on a left-right scale. While such data is only available for four elections, and the ACS as a whole suffers from low response

rates (particularly among major party candidates), it does offer some further insight into those recent elections where the MP data suggest that ideological polarisation has increased. Using the overlap and distance techniques of Sani and Sartori (1983), there is clear and consistent change evident from 2007 to 2016. As Table 4.5 displays, ideological polarisation has increased. We calculate ideological overlap as the degree of overlay, between a pair of parties, of candidate estimations of the ideological location of their own party. A higher score suggests greater overlap between parties, meaning less ideological distance and less polarisation in the system. Distance, meanwhile, is a more straight-forward calculation of the difference between the mean candidate estimations for the parties; greater distance represents greater polarisation.

Table 4.5 shows that, on the basis of candidate perceptions, the degree to which the two major parties overlap ideologically has reduced dramatically in the space of just four elections. In reading the overlap figures, a score of 0 indicates the absence of any overlap between the candidate-reported ideological locations of their own parties, while a score of 1 signifies complete overlap. While the two major parties have reduced their self-reported ideological overlap, the overlap between the Labor Party and the Greens has increased only marginally between 2007 and 2016. Despite minor movement in the overlap between the Greens and the Liberals, there is still little connection between the ideological positions of these two parties.

Table 4.5 – Ideological polarisation in the Australian Candidate Study, 2007 - 2016

	Overlap			Distance		
	<i>Liberal-Labor</i>	<i>Labor-Greens</i>	<i>Liberal-Greens</i>	<i>Liberal-Labor</i>	<i>Labor-Greens</i>	<i>Liberal-Greens</i>
<i>2007</i>	0.44	0.24	0.06	2.2	2.8	5
<i>2010</i>	0.32	0.29	0.04	2.7	2.4	5.1
<i>2013</i>	0.17	0.33	0.02	3.2	2.1	5.4
<i>2016</i>	0.19	0.27	0.05	3.4	2.1	5.5

Source: Author's own calculations using Australian Candidate Study data.

Note: The Nationals are excluded from the analysis due to very low candidate response rates,

As far as their own party candidates are concerned, the Greens and the Liberals represent the two polar ends of the ideological space in the Australian party system. The decrease in overlap

between the Labor and Liberal parties might initially suggest a corresponding increase in overlap between Labor and the Greens. This, however, has not occurred due to both the differing dispersal of responses between the Labor and Greens candidates – Labor respondents cluster in the ‘centre-left’ – alongside a further shift to the left by the Greens. Figures 4.2 and 4.3, illustrate these explanations. These figures depict the proportion of candidates locating their party’s own position at any one point along a unidimensional scale ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). In particular, the increased concentration of Labor candidate responses in the 3-4 (centre-left) range by 2016 is clear.




Figure 4.2 – Candidate-located party ideological position, 2007

The distance measurements in Table 4.5 reinforce the finding of reductions in party ideological overlap. The number in each cell of the ‘distance’ columns in Table 4.5 represents the difference, for any party pair, between the mean ideological placements of candidates of their own respective parties. The results can range from 0 to 10, with a higher score reflecting greater distance and, as mentioned above, greater distance indicates greater polarisation. If we follow Sartori’s (1976) definition of polarisation as the distance between the two parties furthest apart from one another on the ideological spectrum, then polarisation has steadily grown between 2007 and 2016. That is, the distance between the mean ideological placements between the Greens and the Liberals has expanded from 5 to 5.5.




Figure 4.3 – Candidate-located party ideological position, 2016

More significant, however, is the considerable shift in Table 4.5 between the Labor and Liberal parties, with mean distance increasing from 2.2 to 3.4. It is important, however, to be cautious in interpreting these ACS findings given the narrow window of data availability. The degree of polarisation present amongst candidate views may merely be returning to a level existent prior to the 2007 election. Moreover, unlike the MP and AES, the ACS has grouped together the Liberal and National parties as ‘the Coalition’ for this survey question.¹⁴

Perceived Party Polarisation in the Electorate

The Australian Election Study, on the other hand, allows for a consideration of party ideological positions from a voter perspective and over a longer time frame. From 1996 onwards, the study has asked respondents to locate a selection of political parties on a 0 to 10 left-right scale. Given the nature of both the question asked and the poll itself – a random sample of the voting population – it provides ideal data for calculating ideological polarisation weighted by the relevance of each party to the party system. We can achieve this weighting

¹⁴ With the exception of the 2016 Australian Candidate Study. To ensure consistency, the results for the Coalition parties were manually combined for 2016.

through a polarisation index, such as Dalton’s (2008). Dalton’s index, for each survey year, takes the square root of the sum of the difference between each party’s mean ideological score and the party system score, weighted by each party’s electoral strength. According to Dalton, weighting in such a manner indicates ideological polarisation more accurately; a major party at the ideological fringe would contribute more to party system polarisation than would a minor party at the fringe (Dalton 2008, p. 906). We can incorporate either electoral results or legislative seats into the index. Here, we employ House electoral results.




Figure 4.4 – Mean respondent-located ideological positions of parties, 1996 – 2016
 Source: Author’s own calculations using AES data.

Figure 4.4 displays the ideological score for each political party from 1996 to 2016, derived from the mean of respondent estimations. Also shown is the overall party system score, weighted by House electoral results for the parties included in the analysis. This forms the basis of the final ideological polarisation score below as calculated by the Dalton index. As with Table 4.6 below, the parties represented in the figure are those for which data is available in the AES. The exclusion of particular parties in any year is a constraint of all three data sources used in this chapter, but the AES performs well here – at least from 1996. Figure 4.4 demonstrates a high degree of continuity in voter assessments of each party between 1996 and 2016, though with some minor movement – particularly for the Greens and the Liberals. What

is significant is the relative proximity of the Labor Party to the weighted system mean score, which means Labor contributes less to the final polarisation number than the Liberals, and most markedly so since 2004.

Table 4.6, meanwhile, outlines the calculations for each party for the Dalton index, as per the formula explained above. The polarisation measurement within the index ranges from 0 to 10. A calculation of 0 indicates all parties occupying identical ideological space, whereas a score of 10 represents maximum and complete polarisation between all parties. Applying the Dalton polarisation index – a tool seldom employed in analyses of Australian party competition – reveals a general but inconsistent trend toward greater polarisation. While the polarisation score of 2.8 witnessed in 2004 was not matched until 2016, the intervening elections each recorded higher polarisation than elections of the late 1990s or 2001.

Table 4.6 – Dalton Index of ideological polarisation, 1996 - 2016

	Labor	Liberal	National	Democrats	Greens	Polarisation
1996	1.8	1.8	0.4	0.1	0.3	<u>2.1</u>
1998	1.3	1.7	0.2	0.1	0.2	<u>1.9</u>
2001	0.9	1.6	0.2	0.3	0.7	<u>1.9</u>
2004	2.4	3.5	0.2	0.1	1.6	<u>2.8</u>
2007	1.9	3.1	0.3		1	<u>2.5</u>
2010	1	2.4	0.2		1.5	<u>2.3</u>
2013	1.5	2.6	0.2		1.8	<u>2.5</u>
2016	1.9	3.4	0.4		1.9	<u>2.8</u>

Source: Author's own calculations using AES data.

Moreover, as Figure 4.4 suggests, the distance from the weighted system mean score resulted in the Liberal Party consistently contributing the highest value toward the final square root of the sum of party scores. That is, the Liberal Party, being a major party that positions itself at a considerable distance from the ideological 'centre' of the party system, adds significantly to ideological polarisation. Similarly, despite the weaker electoral strength of the Greens, the party's position as the left-most competitor in the Australian system produces a higher value in the polarisation index than even the Labor Party in 2010 and 2013, and equal to Labor in 2016. By this measure, the Greens are changing party competition in the Australian system.

In sum, the evidence for change in ideological polarisation in the Australian party system is slightly mixed, but broadly suggestive of greater polarisation over time. Data availability and the difficulties of constructing an accurate and parsimonious measure of ideological distance are limitations of the results. Additionally, none of the measures are suitable for detecting distinct patterns of ideological competition between or across system divisions. For example, the question remains whether ideological interactions between parties meaningfully differs across the electoral and legislative arenas. However, given the relationship between ideological polarisation and other indicators of system change, this is not overly problematic. It is the combined application of these indicators in a final schema that is of primary importance. What is clear from the results, though, is that the Greens have opened a left-wing 'fringe' in the ideological space of the Australian party system. The electoral strength of the party from the mid-2000s onwards has amplified the systemic value of this ideological placement, as well. There is also some indication that the Labor Party has moved leftwards in recent years, albeit moderately so.

Conclusion

This chapter, as part one of two investigating party system change, used multiple measures and data sources to gauge the (effective and relevant) number of parties and the degree of ideological polarisation, present in the Australian party system. The number of, and ideological distance between, parties are indicators of the format and mechanics of a party system, and are thus vital to the evaluation of change. They are also central to assessing the evaluation of impact of any individual party, such as the Greens. Each measure of the number of parties demonstrates that the two-party and two-and-a-half-party labels so often and readily attached to the Australian party system mischaracterise the system. In the electoral arena, as well as the legislative arena surrounding the Senate, there is evidence of multiparty dynamics. It is only in the House of Representatives where any claims of two-partism hold. Though limited by data availability, the calculations of ideological polarisation, taken together, generally suggest an increase in polarisation in the Australian party system over time. The Greens, in particular, have contributed to this change, opening a left-wing fringe in party competition. What requires examination, and is the subject of the next chapter, is any

electoral volatility that may be contributing to system change, and the extent to which shifting party dynamics have modified the contest for government and opposition.

CHANGE IN THE AUSTRALIAN PARTY SYSTEM: VOLATILITY AND THE FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT

This chapter, as part two of investigating change in the Australian party system, examines trends in electoral volatility and the structures of competition in government and opposition. It directly connects to the findings of the preceding chapter in which it was found that the number of parties and ideological polarisation present in the Australian party system has increased between 1975 and 2016. Here, we test for electoral volatility at the aggregate level using Pedersen's (1979) index, and at the individual level by measuring swing voting, vote switching, and the timing of voting decisions. The results show mixed evidence for increasing volatility. The chapter also assesses the structures of competition and cooperation in opposition and the contest for government using Mair's (1997) framework. While the contest for government remains largely unchanging, this chapter finds a significant shift in the site and cohesion of opposition. It is in the changing nature of the opposition that the Greens wield significant influence. The changing dynamics in the electoral and legislative arenas of the Senate now exhibit a multiparty pattern of party interaction. As this chapter is to be read in conjunction with the previous one, the theoretical framework and methodology for what follows can therefore be found in chapters three and four. Following the discussion of electoral volatility and party competition below, the two-part investigation of the Australian party system is drawn together, concluding that the Greens have contributed to modest but significant party system change.

Electoral Volatility

Electoral volatility is an oft-used indicator of party system change. Unlike the number of parties and ideological polarisation, though, party system typologies generally do not include electoral volatility as a sorting criterion. The concern with electoral volatility instead results from, as Pedersen (1983, p. 31) asserts, the "central role of elections in the process of party system change". This is, in some ways, an obvious statement in that we measure party system

change from election to election and use electoral results as variables in other party system measurements. Further, as Wolinetz (2006, p. 60) explains, electoral volatility “measures the ability of parties to build loyal followings and collectively structure the electorate.” However, a key difference remains between electoral volatility and the other indicators of party system change examined thus far. Electoral volatility does not directly illuminate the *mechanics* of the party system – that is, patterns of party interaction. It is also important to emphasise that party system change can occur with little to no electoral volatility and, conversely, system stability can endure despite considerable electoral change (Mair 1997, pp. 215-18). Electoral volatility is best considered as an indicator in the strict sense of the word, rather than a vital party system component. Nevertheless, while electoral volatility is not necessary for system change, it is a closely related concept and a useful tool when applied in conjunction with other indicators.

Electoral volatility refers to the rate at which individuals shift their votes from one party to another between elections. The total sum of these shifts refers to the gross volatility in an electorate. We can only accurately measure gross volatility through panel interviews, with a pool of respondents regularly surveyed over time (Goot 1994, pp. 175-76). Unfortunately, such panel data is rare; indeed, such panels have not been conducted in Australia except for isolated cases in the 1960s and 1980s. The substitute of ‘vote recall’, whereby voters are asked, at a later date, to indicate their votes for more than one prior election tend to be less reliable (Ersson & Lane 1998, p. 26). The inability to quantify gross volatility has fostered a reliance on alternatives. These proxies for gross volatility fall within two broad categories: macro-level and micro-level (Ersson & Lane 1998). At the macro-level, the focus is instead on volatility in aggregate or net terms, which circumvents the need for survey data by using electoral results. The micro-level, on the other hand, uses individual-level survey results, but tracks a separate set of questions from different respondents over time. Scholars applying these techniques elsewhere have revealed a recent trend toward greater electoral volatility in most advanced democracies (e.g. Drummond 2006; Franklin et al. 1991) – a marked change from the purported stability of the immediate few post-war decades (Lipset & Rokkan 1967; Rose & Urwin 1970). Previous analyses of the Australian case, however, have found enduring electoral stability (Bean 1996; McAllister 1991).

Macro-level Volatility

In re-testing the Australian case, we first investigate electoral volatility at the macro level. The dominant measurement for macro-level volatility is Pedersen's (1979) index. The calculation of this index is relatively simple, being the sum of all swings in party vote share between two contiguous elections, divided by two. Despite this simplicity, there are potential points of dispute in the implementation of the index, chiefly in relation to the inclusion and exclusion of parties. Pedersen (1983, pp. 33-34) acknowledged that party mergers and splinters, in particular, are problematic for the index. Similarly, there is the dilemma of whether to include the full gamut of parties, including micro-parties registering miniscule vote shares, or whether to amalgamate such parties with independents into a single 'other' category. Each option can lead to slightly different results. A grouped 'other' category is often adopted to manage the micro-party and independents quandary in measurements of electoral volatility in Australia (e.g. Goot 1994; Manning 2015). There is rarely acknowledgement, though, that such consolidation suppresses the volatility score. It is, nonetheless, a prudent decision, given that the inclusion of all party swings gives an exaggerated measure of volatility as it relates to party system relevance.

Figure 5.1 depicts net electoral volatility for the Australian party system, from 1975 to 2016, measured with the Pedersen index. This partly mirrors the work of Goot (1994) and Manning (2015), but with the precise figures slightly different from both. This difference is a consequence of my further disaggregation of the 'other' category. Here, we include parties as individual entities in the calculation where at any election, or an adjacent election, that party received two percent of the vote share. This is, admittedly, a somewhat arbitrary threshold, but is derived from one of the criteria of minor party 'success' put forward by Jaensch and Mathieson (1998). Moreover, unlike Goot or Manning, the figure includes net volatility for the Senate. Nevertheless, the graph illustrates what Manning (2015, p. 147) describes as "trendless fluctuation." It is noteworthy that there have been instances over the period studied where the Senate has deviated from the degree of volatility present in the House. Such deviations, however, have been transitory and, as the realignment of volatility in both houses in 2016

demonstrates, do not represent an indicator of separating dynamics between the electoral arenas of these chambers.




Figure 5.1 – Net Electoral Volatility, House and Senate, 1975 – 2016
 Source: Author's own calculations using election results.

There are, however, several developments that these aggregate volatility scores obscure. First, despite what a measure of volatility may indicate, there has been a near-linear, secular decline in the proportion of the vote share obtained by the two major parties. From an aggregated Labor and Coalition vote in 1975 of 95.9 and 92.6 percent in the House and Senate, respectively, these figures have fallen to 76.8 and 65 percent as of 2016. As this has been a gradual decline, not only does it go undetected in measurements of net volatility, but it is also more likely to represent a new standard rather than temporary fluctuation. Second, measurements of net volatility give greater weight to the presence of 'flash' parties and those with erratic levels of support. Third, volatility gauged at the national level can misrepresent that which is present at the state or regional level. While there has long existed claims of a 'nationalisation' of voting in Australia (e.g. Mackerras 1978), this view remains contested (Jaensch 1984, pp. 77-81). Lastly, as Pedersen (1983, p. 56) cautions, aggregate measurements can fall victim to the ecological fallacy of inferring individual behaviour from homogenised group behaviour. Still, measuring net volatility is a worthwhile endeavour; indeed, if electoral

or party system change has occurred despite unchanging degrees of stability in aggregate electoral patterns, that itself is a valuable finding.

Individual-level Volatility

To overcome some of the aforementioned shortcomings, we could instead measure volatility at the state level, or in terms of legislative seats churned between parties. But what seems more constructive is to instead measure individual-level volatility. Much has been made of the influence of party identification in perpetuating the relatively stable and dominant position of the major parties (Aitkin 1982; Jaensch 1994a; McAllister 2009). Indeed, Bean (1996, p. 138) views party identification as “one of the most important and fundamental indicators of potential change”. The power of party identification, though, is often exaggerated and misrepresented (see Goot 1972; 1994; 2013). Indeed, for these reasons (and more), I do not include party identification as a predictor in the regression models of chapter eight testing the social and attitudinal bases of the Australian Greens’ vote. Nevertheless, party identification remains central to one of the main available measures of individual-level volatility in the Australian context: estimating the number of swinging voters. It is thus worthwhile briefly investigating.

Given the lack of Australian panel data, there are a number of ways we can define and measure the proportion of swinging voters. First, there is the approach of Jaensch (1995), where swinging voters are those that either: maintain party identification but ‘defect’ and vote against this partisan affiliation; or, alternatively, report holding no party identification at all. More recently, Manning (2009; 2015) has adopted this conceptualisation of the swinging voter, as well. Relative to Manning’s work, however, Figure 5.2 updates the data to 2016 and expands it to cover the Senate. By the formulation outlined here, the proportion of swinging voters – and thus electoral volatility – has noticeably increased. Much of the variation, though, occurred in the mid-1990s and was followed by somewhat of a plateau before another pronounced increase in 2013 (and then a subsequent reduction in 2016). What has also changed over the period under study is the size of the difference in the swinging vote between the houses of parliament. Since 1996, more than a third of respondents qualify as swinging

voters in the Senate. The gradually greater volatility in the electoral arena of the Senate provides some evidence of a distinct pattern of party competition, as well as a greater willingness of partisans to ‘defect’ from their affiliated party – perhaps as a strategic ‘split-ticket’ vote (Bowler & Denmark 1993; Smith 2001, p. 68).




Figure 5.2 – The swinging vote, House and Senate, 1979 – 2016
 Source: Author’s own calculations using ANPAS (1979) and AES data.

A second measure of the propensity for voters to swing is the timing of the vote decision (Dalton et al. 2000; McAllister 2011). The reasoning behind this indicator is two-fold. If a voter is to delay their decision on which way to vote until the election campaign is underway, it suggests weak partisan attachment. Further, if a voter’s decision is delayed, parties are more likely to be able to encourage that voter to swing in their favour. Figure 5.3 identifies the proportion of voters determining their vote through the course of an election campaign or on election day, as opposed to well before the campaign. An increase in the share of voters deciding which way to vote during the election campaign could reflect higher electoral volatility. However, what once appeared to be an increase in delayed voting determination has, since 1998, shifted toward trendless fluctuation. Overall, the proportion of voters determining which party to vote for during the course of the campaign was in 2010-16 much the same as in the early 1990s. This indicator of volatility, however, is somewhat flawed. It

potentially conflates a possibility of swing voting with a voter simply paying little attention to political matters until the campaign proper. A delayed voting decision may also result from a voter intentionally waiting for the expiry of some, or all, of the election campaign in order to exercise a more informed vote.




Figure 5.3 – Alternative measures of individual-level volatility, 1987-2016
 Source: Author’s own calculations using AES data.

Figure 5.3, therefore, also displays two other possible measures of the proportion of voter volatility (McAllister & Cameron 2014). Both measures derive from AES questions relating to consistency in individual voting patterns in the House of Representatives and rely on respondent recall of past voting. Recall questions are sub-optimal measures of volatility relative to panel data given the potential for flaws in respondent memory or intentional misreporting of voting patterns. Indeed, they often underestimate actual levels of volatility (Waldahl & Aardal 2000). Nevertheless, Figure 5.3 demonstrates a marked decline in the proportion of voters consistently voting for the same party over time. As of 2016, barely 40 percent of the electorate are consistent partisans. There is also a slight increase, across the period examined, in the proportion of voters reporting that they have switched parties from one election to the next. This increase, however, has not been consistent, and more recent elections do not represent the peak (more than 30 percent switching between the 1996 and

1998 elections) in this measure of volatility. Taken together, though, these two measures reflect a more fluid Australian electorate, even if some individual elections do not exhibit significant electoral volatility.

Mixed Evidence

Overall, there is mixed evidence for change in electoral volatility over the period studied. It is important to reiterate, though, that each of the measures employed have limitations relative to panel data. Any inferences must therefore be made with caution. Nevertheless, the characterisation of Australian electoral politics and, in turn, the party system, as stable seems an oversimplification. Labor and the Coalition parties certainly still dominate the electoral arena. Yet there is evidence to suggest an increase in the proportion of swinging voters, and a related willingness of voters to countenance voting for alternative parties. Indeed, the proportion of swinging voters in the Senate significantly increased between 1979 and 2016. The simultaneous increase for the House, while smaller, is by no means insignificant. The major parties have undoubtedly experienced erosion of their vote shares, and those voters who do identify with the major parties are expressing such affiliation with reduced intensity. Similarly, there is a slight and gradual dealignment toward non-partisanship, though at a rate much slower than in other advanced democracies. The Greens, meanwhile, have registered a secular increase in the number of its partisans, even at those elections where the party received a negative swing in vote share – something not achieved by the Australian Democrats.

The data also suggest, though, that much of the electoral adjustment occurred in the 1990s, with only the recent elections of 2013 and 2016 significantly contributing to greater volatility. But such developments, when taken together with the findings in terms of the number of parties and ideological polarisation, add weight to the notion of a slowly altering party system – and one with functional divisions between the House and Senate. At the very least, it appears that there has been a shift in both the electoral environment faced by minor parties, and the broad perception of the appropriate function of minor parties in the overall polity. The Democrats first established and made electorally palatable the concept of a significant minor party using the Senate to hold government to account (Gauja 2010; Sugita 1995). It is

also evident that the Greens have successfully assumed this position, and in so doing perhaps more forcefully advocate an ideological position and associated platform than did the Democrats (Ghazarian 2012). The systemic influence exerted by this expanded minor party role, however, remains limited. For anything more than general system change to have occurred alongside the rise of the Greens – for transformative change – we must also find change in the structure of competition for government.

Competition for Government

In this section, we examine the structures of competition and cooperation among the opposition and in the contest for government. The competition for government, in particular, is a dominant variable in differentiating party systems. As chapter two details, Dahl (1966) and Rokkan (1968) both noted the importance of government formation, but it was Sartori (1976) that more directly highlighted the importance of focusing on this aspect of the party contest. Prior to Mair (1996; 1997; 2002), however, no typology or framework of change explicitly operationalised this key component of party. Examining competition for government targets attention on what Mair (1997, pp. 199-207) sees as the primary inter-relationships between parties, allows for the party system itself to serve as an independent variable, and further differentiates between electoral change and party system change. Mair's analytical framework is a powerful tool despite its relative simplicity. Mair (1997, pp. 199-200) distinguishes between those systems characterised by either closed and predictable, or open and unpredictable, structures of competition for government. This categorisation rests upon a three-fold evaluation of government formations: patterns of alternation in government, innovation or constancy in government formulae, and the variety of parties participating in governments (see Table 5.1).

According to Mair (1997, pp. 207-11), there are three gradations in the alternation of governments. First, there is wholesale alternation, whereby an opposition completely replaces a government, with no incumbent party remaining following the displacement. As Mair explains, such wholesale alternation occurs in two-party systems, where the executive switches between single-party governments. Additionally, however, wholesale alternation

can arise in multiparty systems with enduring coalitions and largely bipolar competition, or a single party against an assembly of smaller parties. Second, partial alternation refers to instances of government change that include a common element – a party that features in different, successive executives. An example here is the Free Democratic Party of Germany, which has regularly (albeit, not recently) featured as the minor partner in both Social Democratic and Christian Democratic/Christian Social governing coalitions. Lastly, Mair (1996, pp. 91-92) outlines non-alternation of government, which entails extended periods of executive dominance by the same party or parties displaced “neither wholly nor partially.”

Table 5.1 – Structures of competition for government

Open, unpredictable structure of competition	Closed, predictable structure of competition
Partial alternation	Wholesale alternation
Innovative governing formulae	Regular government formulae
Participation in government open to most, if not all, parties	Participation in government restricted to a small number of parties

Source: Mair (1997)

The second facet of Mair’s overall schema, innovation or constancy in government formulae, refers to the degree of familiarity present in the party elements of governments. That is, “whether or not the party or combination of parties has governed before in that particular format.” (Mair 1997, p. 209) This relates closely to Wolinetz’s (2004) concept of clustering outlined in chapter two. Australia provides a prime example of a party system where there has been zero innovation in governing formulae, with post-war governments consisting of either Labor or the Liberal-National coalition. Conversely, the Netherlands has experienced a remarkable range of coalition governments, often incorporating parties from across the political spectrum. Closely related is the third aspect of Mair’s framework, which examines the variety of political parties participating in government. Mair designed this measure to detect the existence of anti-system or fringe parties, around which ‘establishment’ parties had established a *cordon sanitaire*, excluding fringe parties from the executive. The far-right and right-wing populist parties of Europe offer a useful example of such practice; for instance, the adoption by other parties of explicit policies of non-cooperation with the Swedish Democrats and the National Front of France.

Structures of Competition in Australia

The three components of Mair's framework yield two categories: closed and open structures of competition. Closed structures of competition entail wholesale or non-alternation of governments, familiar governing formulae, and a highly limited number of parties participating in governments. Open structures encompass partial alternation, innovative governing formulae, and participation in government by a wide range of political parties. Mair's schema allows for a once-off classification of a party system, as well as for identifying change over time. Its application to the Australian case is an uncomplicated process; the Australian party system is a definitive example of a closed and predictable structure of competition for government, with wholesale alternation between Labor and Coalition governments to the exclusion of all other parties. The assertion of Jaensch (1983, p. 44) that "there has never been any doubt that either Labor or the Liberal-[National] coalition would win government" still holds true. The only exception to the otherwise resounding stability in the competition for government is the election of 2010, whereby a minority Labor government formed following negotiations with the Greens and a small cohort of independents. Labor still formed government alone, however, with neither the Greens nor the independents included in the executive. As of October 2018, as well, a Coalition minority government had emerged, though through the loss of the seat of Wentworth in a by-election, rather than through a general election.

The results of the 2010 federal election, and the negotiations that followed, did not modify the structures of competition for government. Nevertheless, the results do provide an opportunity, within Mair's framework, for some insight into potential future developments in the Australian party system – particularly in relation to the Greens.¹⁵ Even short-term disruptions to the usual process of government formation can promote future instability (Luther 1999, p. 134; Mair 1996, p. 104). The 2010 election is especially notable due to the absence of a governing majority of seats for either Labor or the Coalition. For the first time in

¹⁵ See chapters nine and ten for a detailed case study of the relationship between this minority government and the Australian party system. Moreover, potential future minority or coalition governments is not just conjecture; the frequency of such governments in the Australian states and territories demonstrate the consequences of further party system fragmentation.

the post-war era, protracted negotiations were held between the major parties and the cross-bench. These negotiations ultimately led to the formation of a Labor minority government supported by the Greens and several independents. Closed structures of competition are a result of not only institutional and cultural factors, but also the strategies and capacities to adapt of the entrenched establishment parties (Mair 1997). In 2010, for the first time, the balance between major and minor competitors in the house of government demonstrated the potential, should the Greens obtain additional seats in the House, for the minor party's systemic role to change from one of governing marginalisation to that of a potential coalitional wing party with Labor (Smith 1991).

The Australian Greens, though, like many of its European counterparts (Mair 2001), failed to penetrate the executive, despite attaining what is thus far a peak in the party's electoral support. It is contestable, though, whether the Greens assuming the role as a coalitional party, operating on the left-wing of the Labor party, would transform party competition. The overall pattern of party interaction could very well remain bipolar along a largely left-right divide, but with competition between two coalitions. Moreover, in supporting a minority government, the Greens struggled to maintain a separate identity to what became an increasingly unpopular Labor Party. What transpired during the agreement indicates both a minor party struggling to adapt to a moderately expanded role, as well as the capacity for the party system to reassert and preserve itself in the face of challenger parties. Indeed, given the reaction of voters and media to the very concept of minority and (non-Liberal-National) coalition government, there may exist a loyalty of individuals to prevailing patterns of competition and the current party system itself (Bakvis 1988, p. 263). After all, individuals often do not just vote for a party, but also register a preference for a particular government. An entrenched closed structure of competition narrows electoral choice by constraining the perceived feasibility of innovative government formula, contributing to party system self-preservation (Mair 1996, pp. 102-04).

The Structures of Opposition and Legislative Competition

Limiting our analysis to government, though, is insufficient in a political system where the upper house maintains considerable legislative power. The Australian Senate is one of the most powerful upper houses of any democracy, maintaining the capacity to amend and block a government's agenda (Kaiser 2008, pp. 35-36). The nature of the interaction between the House and Senate is dependent upon the precise configurations and relative influence of parties in the chambers (Heller & Branduse 2014). As Maor and Smith (1993) argue, the interaction between government and opposition is a relationship central to the party system, and thus a key systemic variable. Also instructive here is Dahl's (1966) concept of the patterns of opposition, specifically the site, setting, and goals of opposition. While the party occupying the role of formal Opposition is decided on the basis of seats in the House of Representatives, the high likelihood of governing majorities in this chamber severely reduces opportunities for meaningful legislative opposition. Conversely, the Senate, with its near-equal powers to the House and rarely containing a government majority, is frequently a check against government authority, and is the actual site of legislative opposition. It is the Senate where there is evidence for considerable change, both in terms of legislative outcomes and, concomitantly, the nature and array of the parties that reside within (Young 1997).

If we expand Mair's (1996; 1997; 2002) notion of structures of competition across the systemic functional divide to the Senate, we find an opposition structure as open as the governing structure is closed. In the Senate there is both partial and wholesale alternations of opposition, innovative opposition formulae, and a wide array of parties and independents able to exert influence over the passage and blockage of legislation. What is more, the configuration of the Senate-based opposition can change from one bill to the next, fostering an environment in which parties' capacity to adapt, negotiate, compete and cooperate are frequently tested. This is a point previously made by Uhr (1995, p. 128), who emphasised that the open structure of party competition in the Senate constituted a true system of multiple parties. However, what is needed for any claim of a multiparty system *separate* to that of the enduring twopartism of the House – as implied by Uhr's argument – is a demonstration of both distinct patterns of competition between the chambers, as well as a weakening of the linkages across them. While

the former condition is clearly evident in the Australian system, evidence for the latter is minimal. Those parties that are relevant and influential in the House also feature prominently amongst those that are relevant and influential in the Senate. There is also little sign that the strategies of these parties differ across chambers to the extent necessary to produce an entirely separate system of party interaction (Jaensch 1986, pp. 98-100; Smith 1994, p. 129).

Nevertheless, it is certain that surrounding the Senate, the modern Australian party system has witnessed considerable change. Not only are there now more parties in the Senate, but those parties and independents elected to the chamber are also now more likely to engage in ideological and programmatic advocacy (Ghazarian 2015). We can see evidence of this development when comparing the opposition strategy of the Australian Democrats (particularly in the party's earlier years) against that of the Greens. Moreover, the legislative jockeying for position in the Senate can be leveraged into subsequent electoral advantage. Just as the closed structure of competition for government has acted as a constraint on electoral choice, so too has the open structure of competition for opposition expanded electoral choice and contributed to the growth of minor and micro parties (see Mair 1996, pp. 102-02). It is in this capacity where the Greens have proven relatively astute, exploiting the cycles of party competition and cooperation to engrain themselves in the Australian party system. Thus, rather than two separate party systems based around the functional divide of the Senate from the House, it is more accurate to draw a conclusion of a distinct Senate sub-system that operates alongside what we might call the overall Australian party system. As Tsebelis (2002) argues, though, policy stability in a parliamentary system can produce cabinet instability; the Senate, through the legislative contest can therefore meaningfully shape the patterns of party interaction.¹⁶

Conclusion: General Change in the Australian Party System

We cannot adequately or accurately characterise the Australian party system as a two- or two-and-a-half-party system, despite the frequency of such claims. A comprehensive application

¹⁶ See chapter eleven for a more thorough development of this argument.

of measurements across four key indicators of party system change – the number of parties, ideological polarisation, electoral volatility, and the competition for government – reveals a more nuanced portrayal of what is a complex system. The findings do not support, though, the existence of two separate party systems in operation, divided by the House of Representatives and the Senate – at least not yet. The patterns of party interaction, while different, are currently not divergent enough to warrant such an assertion. The Australian party system is best thought of as a multidimensional system, in which there are multiple sites and arenas characterised by varied patterns of inter-party relationships. The party system exhibits, at least, a functional-institutional division between the House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as between the electoral and legislative arenas of party competition.¹⁷ Additionally, the findings indicate that this multidimensionality, as well as the extent and nature of the divides, has changed over the period studied, albeit not to the extent of complete systemic transformation.

Accordingly, using the hybrid framework of party system change outlined in the third chapter, the modern Australian party system has undergone general change. With that said, there are elements of the party system that are characterised by stability, demonstrating the resilience of the system and its established parties in the face of considerable social and economic transformation. By the quantitative ENP and Golosov indices, there has been an escalation in the number of parties in both the electoral and parliamentary arenas of the Senate, as well as the electoral arena of the House. Under a qualitative method of counting – an amalgamation of criteria put forward by Sartori (1976) and Jaensch (1994a) – the number of parties remained constant, but the specific individual parties within this count shifted. Data encompassing policy, elite, and voter perspectives on the ideological positioning of parties suggests an increase in overall polarisation. Much of this is a result of the Liberal party consolidating firmly on the right side of the political spectrum, while the Greens have opened a fringe to the left of all other relevant parties. There is some early indication, as well, that the Labor Party has responded to these programmatic movements from its competitors by

¹⁷ While not examined in these two chapters, there is also the possibility for a horizontal divide across political jurisdictions, resulting from federalism, which may further contribute to the complex nature of the overall polity-level system (see Sharman 1990).

gradually gravitating toward the left of the spectrum in recent elections, and particularly since 2016.

The investigation of electoral volatility reveals a complicated set of developments. The Australian electorate as a whole has not been volatile between 1975 and 2016, with significantly higher levels of aggregate volatility present in the first half of the twentieth century (Goot 1994, p. 177). Nor has any individual election demonstrated a high degree of macro-level instability. Notwithstanding the absence of dramatic electoral shifts in the modern Australian party system, there has nevertheless been an increase in the willingness of individual voters to defect and swing vote. Moreover, there has been a slight, gradual increase in the frequency of vote switching between elections, as well as a significant decrease in the proportion of voters consistently voting for the same party. The growing success of minor and peripheral parties, as well as independents, are in part a consequence of this greater readiness on behalf of voters to abandon, whether permanently or temporarily, the major parties. This trend is even more pronounced in the Senate, where electoral support for both the Labor and Liberal parties has eroded, and the size of the crossbench has expanded.

There has been remarkable stability, though, in the structure of competition for government. The modern Australian party system maintains a closed structure of competition, with wholesale alternation between Labor and the Coalition, complete familiarity in governing formulae, and a highly exclusive collection of parties entering government. Between 1975 and 2016, only the federal election of 2010 came close to disrupting this pattern, but still delivered a minority Labor government to the exclusion from the executive of all other parties and independents. In contrast, when considering the importance of the government-opposition relationship (Maor & Smith 1993), as well as different sites and cohesion of opposition, it is clear that assessment of government alone is insufficient – particularly in the Australian institutional context. As such, chapter eleven further explores the influence on the party system of legislative competition. From the results of this chapter, however, it is evident that the Senate has evolved. It is not merely a house of review, but also a site of more effectual opposition and programmatic advocacy than the House.

Applying Mair's (1996; 1997; 2002) three gauges of the structure of competition to the Senate exposes an open structure with remarkable capacity for malleability in regard to alternation, formula, and the range of parties incorporated into passing and blocking majorities. Without an associated alteration to the closed structure for government, it is not possible to argue that there has been anything more than general, gradual change to the party system. Nevertheless, as Mair (2006, p. 69) argues, the stronger a party system is, the more obviously it "revolves around a core opposition" – that it is 'about' something. While government formation remains dominated by Labor and the Liberal-National Coalition, a consideration of the full range of party competition suggests that the Australian party system is no longer a story about just the major parties; the party system is altering from the margins inward. The two-partism of the Australian party system has long been weakening, and with this weakening is coming a form of politics resembling that found in multiparty systems.

It is clear that change has occurred in the Australian party system. There exists, as well, favourable conditions for future party system change, particularly in relation to the structures of competition for government. In this regard, the crucial major-minor party balance in the Australian system reached somewhat of a precipice in 2010, from which it has not fully retreated. The electoral success of the Greens was instrumental in bringing about such an uncharacteristic result, and the party continues to uphold the subsystem of multipartism surrounding the Senate. The Greens have also widened the ideological space in the party system. But by the measures utilised in this and the previous chapter, we can only describe the influence that the Greens have exerted over the Australian party system as important but minimal. It was the Democrats that initially transformed the function of the Senate, and significantly altered popular perception of the accepted role of a minor party, and did so comparatively early in the party's lifespan. While the Greens have successfully occupied this role, and indeed even strengthened and expanded it, the party continues somewhat in the shadow of its minor party predecessor. What remains, then, is to explore how and why the Greens have had limited systemic impact. It is thus necessary to now consider, in greater detail, the inter-relationships between the party system and the Greens' ideology, policy platform, relationship to government and opposition, and voter base.

**Part III: The Greens and the
Contest for Votes**

IDEOLOGY AND PARTY COMPETITION IN AUSTRALIA

Party ideologies are significant determinants of the character of party competition and cooperation, and help to define the substantive qualities of a party system. Ideological polarisation is connected with electoral choice, legislative and executive coalitions, alternation in government, and political stability (Dalton 2008; Indridason 2011; Lachat 2008). Chapter four revealed that the Greens have contributed to an increase in ideological polarisation through occupying a 'left' fringe on the ideological spectrum. The three indicators of polarisation employed in chapter four are appropriate for detecting broad party system change, yet alone are insufficient for a comprehensive analysis of ideological competition in Australia. The overarching aim of this chapter, and the next, is to further investigate the extent and nature of the impact of the Greens on the parameters of ideological competition in the Australian party system. This chapter begins this project by examining the ideological traditions of relevant parties in the contemporary Australian party system. This allows us to identify the main dimensions of party competition and construct an ideological space in which to locate party positions over time. Building on the theoretical work of this chapter, chapter seven then measures and maps the ideological positions of Australian parties in a two-dimensional space to test the hypothesis of increasing ideological polarisation over time.

The central argument of this chapter is that a unidimensional left-right scale is insufficient for understanding party competition in Australia, or for accurately gauging ideological polarisation. What is more useful is a two-dimensional space, encompassing a left-right dimension centred on equality, and a progressive-conservative dimension incorporating social, cultural and moral divides. In prosecuting this argument, I first outline the structure of party interaction in Australia based on a synthesis of the literature on the ideological traditions of systemically-relevant parties. Next, I operationalise this two-dimensional space, following a deductive method, through Manifesto Project (Volkens 2018b) dataset variables. In chapter seven, party ideological positions are located within this space based upon the policy appeals recorded in party platforms. These chapters advance a novel way to conceive party competition in Australia, and apply methodological techniques not previously used in

the Australian setting. These techniques permit more precise measurements of party ideological positioning than do existing alternatives. The analyses of chapters six and seven reveal a marked increase in ideological polarisation in the Australian party system. The Greens have contributed this dynamic, expanding the parameters and nature of the ideological contest by occupying a left-progressive niche previously unoccupied by any other party. The Greens also demonstrate remarkable positional stability over time, which is expected for a niche party, but may constrain the party's future electoral gains.

Methods and Rationale: The Role of Ideology in Australian Party Competition

Any discussion of ideology in Australian politics must acknowledge that Australian parties have rarely, if ever, coalesced around a specific single political ideology. According to Loveday (1979, p. 2), political thought in Australia "has never been shaped into coherent and well-established bodies of doctrine which the parties guard, expound and apply." Indeed, it is a common assertion that ideological competition in Australia is shaped more by pragmatic utilitarianism than by strict ideological doctrine (Brugger & Jaensch 1985, Collins 1985; McAllister 2002). Yet, as Smith (2001, pp. 112-14) argues, Australian party competition and political culture rarely align with the rational, calculating nature one would expect if utilitarianism was dominant. Further, as Edwards (2013, pp. 1-2) points out, even if one accepts the role of utilitarianism, such claims understate the degree to which ideas and values inform perceptions of precisely what constitutes the 'greatest good for the greatest number'. Values also shape the policy solutions advanced in the pursuit of that goal of the 'greatest good'. Similarly, any conception of 'pragmatism' is itself deeply ideological in its implicit – sometimes explicit – defence of existing social, economic and political institutions (Johnson 1989, p. 3; Stokes 1994, p. 247).

Nevertheless, Jaensch (1989b, p. 81) contends that while political parties perceive themselves as champions for a particular conception of the 'good society', there are also "significant variations in the content, salience, and cohesion of the perceptions and prescriptions within any party over time, and often over short periods of time." This is quite understandable; after all, a party will possess a variety of objectives at any one time, some of which – electoral

appeal, for instance – may conflict with the goal of proffering a coherent ideology. Additionally, even minor parties, such as the Greens, tend to house multiple ideological strands or philosophical traditions; parties often house internal competition between competing ‘tendencies’ or ‘factions’ (Fenna 2014, p. 114; Jaensch 1986, p. 29). The recent emergence within the Greens of Left Renewal, a self-proclaimed ‘tendency’ resembling an ideologically-motivated but loosely organised faction, demonstrates that the party is no less prone to such intra-party conflict (Aston 2016). Indeed, the public formation and operation of this proto-faction, defended via the media by two sitting Greens members of parliament (Shoebridge and Rhiannon 2017), was later openly rebuked by the party’s National Council (Nicholls 2017).

When evaluating ideology in party politics, one must therefore adopt a broad definition of the term. Ideology is a contentious concept, but this chapter will follow Heywood (2000, p. 22), Scarbrough (1984, pp. 51-53), and Tiver (1978, pp. 5-6) in viewing ideology as a set of largely coherent and consistent ideas that provide a general plan for political action.¹⁸ Despite the disconnection between party politics and a more stringent definition of ideology, individual politicians readily associate themselves and their parties with particular ideological traditions (Head 1989, pp. 487-88). This is a means of differentiation from rivals, both within and external to the party. In turn, voters can utilise such characterisations as heuristics to simplify voting decisions and the comprehension of new political information (Bonica 2014, pp. 367-68; Scarbrough 1984, p. 3). These oft-used ideological labels, connecting parties with, for instance, ‘liberalism’ or ‘socialism’, or ‘left-wing’ versus ‘right-wing’, are in part the product of party traditions (and vice versa). In the contemporary context, though they give little more than a rough indication of the philosophical bases of parties. The intention of this chapter is not to engage in a philosophical evaluation of parties against their claimed ideologies. Rather, this chapter is concerned with surveying ideological reputations and appeals in the context of observable party competition – that is, through policy and programmatic adaptation.

¹⁸ Instructive, too, is Freeden’s (1996) ‘morphological analysis’ of ideology, which accounts for the malleability of political ideology and the frequent intersection between, and transformation of, ideological families.

There are limitations in using party policy platforms as indicators of ideological position; as Jaensch (1989, pp. 83) states, policies “do not, by themselves, constitute an ideology.” Moreover, parties can intentionally put forward individual policies at odds with their overriding ideological traditions. Additionally, there are myriad factors outside of ideology – for instance, internal party structures, or economic and social conditions – that shape how parties locate and realign themselves in the policy space (Adams et al. 2006, p. 514). In general, however, policies do tend to develop from an ideological foundation, and, when in an aggregated form such as a manifesto or program, constitute one of the clearest and most accessible public statements of a party’s ideological identity at that time (Harrison 2013, pp. 51-57). Lowe et al. (2011, p. 123) contend, “[a]lmost anyone interested in party competition, whether this takes place in legislatures, the electoral arena, or government, needs sooner or later to estimate the policy positions of key political actors”. The programs of parties represent political ideology for a competitive space.

The Assumptions Underpinning Spatial Assessment of Ideological Competition

The approach taken to analysing party competition in this section of the thesis – that is, of quantitative measurement and positional mapping within a deductively-formulated space – rests upon four main assumptions. First, the approach taken in this chapter (and the following chapter) rejects the often-overlapping claims that ideology and categories such as ‘left’ and ‘right’ no longer matter in party politics (e.g. Bell 1960; McKnight 2005) – even if the ‘left versus right’ divide, alone, is insufficient to fully comprehend party competition. Rather, I take the view that parties maintain ideologies, and that ideological appeals and party positioning are instrumental in shaping interaction between rival political parties (Laver & Hunt 1992, pp. 60-61). Moreover, while many voters may not hold coherent ideological views, they are hardly ‘innocent of ideology’ or immune to the ideas, reputations, images, and positions put forward and represented by parties (Lelkes & Sniderman 2014, p. 18).

Second, contrary to the classic Downsian (1957) view of politics, these chapters argue that the electorate is not autonomous in structuring the bounds and content of party competition. Parties do not solely engage in preference accommodation – that is, adapting to shifts in public

opinion. Rather, political parties themselves possess the capacity to influence voter preferences and political attitudes, shaping party competition and thus the wider party system (Hacker & Pierson 2014, pp. 645-47; Webb 2000, pp. 131-32). An important qualification to this, however, is that party type influences the degree to which parties will attempt to lead or to follow public opinion. For instance, niche parties – a category in which Green parties are often included – are less likely to accommodate broad public opinion in their ideological and policy appeals (Adams et al. 2006; Tromborg 2015; Zons 2016, pp. 1210-11). The focus for niche parties like the Greens is the persuasion of voters. However, the limited electoral and parliamentary success of many niche parties is both evidence of the inability, and a limit upon the capacity, of these parties to influence political attitudes to any significant extent.

The third and fourth assumptions of these two chapters are best discussed in unison. First, that we can understand interaction between parties through a spatial and issue competition frame, and second, that the distance between party positions is critical to the assessment of ideological competition. When party scholars discuss ‘space’ they are not referring to a directly observable object; it is a metaphor employed to organise and simplify the complexities of an essential component of party systems. With the use of a spatial metaphor, however, comes myriad additional assumptions about political behaviour (e.g. see Laver & Hunt 1992, pp. 7-28; Mölder 2014, pp. 4-8). Nonetheless, spatial analyses greatly contribute to the understanding of parties and political competition, and have fostered a rich literature. The basic assertions of the spatial view of party competition are: first, parties will position themselves along dimensions within an ideological space, from which voters will then support a party that is closest to their own position; and second, parties will adapt to the positions of competitors (Wolinetz 2006, p. 53). Important caveats, though, are that parties and individuals may each have quite different perceptions of the policy space, and that there are a multitude of factors exogenous to ideological and policy competition that inform both vote choice and party strategy (Abou-Chadi 2014, p. 419; Budge & Robertson 1987, p. 393).

Constructing a Policy Space and Locating Party Positions

The validity of a policy 'space' as an analytical tool rests upon the method by which it is constructed, and how party positions within it are determined. This chapter advances a two-dimensional policy space. The two dimensions represent, first, a right-left divide relating to state intervention in the economy, and second, a progressive-conservative divide incorporating social, moral, and cultural attitudes. The space is operationalised through 32 of the total 56 variables of the Manifesto Project dataset, with the selection of variables informed by the relevant scholarly literature and a review of work on ideological competition and party traditions in Australian politics. The centrality of environmentalism to the Greens' ideology, and to the very impetus behind the party, necessitates an examination of party stances on the environmental policy variables, as well. But, as is noted below, for theoretical coherence we must investigate environmentalism separately to the left-right and progressive-conservative spectrums. In each case, party positions are gauged using policy materials coded in line with the 'salience' theory of political competition adopted by the MP.

The Manifesto Project dataset is the foundation of this study into the role of the Greens in ideological competition in the Australian party system. The MP dataset of coded policy documents, however, represents just one of several data options available. Amongst the relevant literature, four main methods have been used to assess the positions of parties in a policy space:

1. Surveys of expert judgements,
2. Surveys of public or elite opinion,
3. Analyses of legislative proposals and expenditure of governments, and
4. Content analyses of party policy material.

Expert judgements generally entail surveying political scientists, asking scholars a range of questions relating to party policy and ideology. Slapin and Proksch (2008, p. 706) contend that, "in an ideal world, regularly conducted expert surveys may provide the best means for estimating party positions." Expert surveys, however, are rarely conducted, particularly in

Australia, and therefore are unsuitable for analysing competition over time.¹⁹ Surveys of public and elite opinion are subject to similar availability constraints, with the Australian Election and Candidate studies lacking the necessary data to construct a time series of party positions over the full period under study. On the other hand, a focus on legislation or public expenditure is primarily focused on governing parties, and is thus inappropriate for a whole party system analysis and, in particular, identifying the contributions of a minor party such as the Greens. The Manifesto Project, meanwhile, is a prime example of content analysis of party policy material, and provides an unparalleled wealth of data.

The next step in using the Manifest Project data is to identify a method of operationalising a policy space from the available variables. The MP dataset contains several political scales, of which the 'RILE' right-left index is most widely used; indeed, it was employed as a broad indicator of ideological polarisation in chapter four. However, there are many methods of formulating such scales and spaces. Chapter four details the component elements of the RILE index at greater length (see Table 4.4). In brief terms, it is an index constructed through a largely theoretical, deductive foundation, and has been subject to both trenchant criticism and vigorous defence (Benoit & Laver 2007; Budge 2001b; Budge et al. 2001; Lowe et al. 2011; Mölder 2016). Alternative inductive scaling procedures have also been developed that instead apply complex statistical analysis to the MP dataset itself to define the parameters of, and relevant measures within, a policy space (Franzmann & Kaiser 2006; Gabel & Huber 2000). Such inductive, statistical methods have themselves been criticised, due to their likelihood of producing spatial dimensions detached from both practical circumstance and theory (Jahn 2010, p. 750).

This chapter employs a deductive method to formulate a two-dimensional policy space, in which party positions are, in chapter seven, traced for each federal election from 1975 to 2013.²⁰ I adopt such an approach not only because of the persuasive critiques of inductive techniques made by those such as Jahn (2010), but also because, as Gemenis (2013, p. 18) contends, the

¹⁹ The Manifesto Project has been demonstrated to align closely with the party positions derived from expert surveys (Klingemann et al. 2006, ch. 5).

²⁰ Policy documents from the 2016 Australian federal election are yet to be coded and included in the Manifesto Project dataset.

search for the superior statistical scaling method of MP data has been elusive. For a study of the Australian party system, however, there are three additional, inter-related reasons why I aim to improve upon the RILE index here. First, the RILE index includes, for both 'left' and 'right' scores, some variables that hold little relevance to the dimensions and substantive qualities of policy competition in contemporary Australian politics. For example, it would be difficult to contend that anti-imperialism is a policy area that decisively splits left from right in Australia, or that freedom and human rights are inherently associated with the right, while democracy is naturally the ambit of the left. Second, as Keman (2007, p. 79) argues, it is "not only confusing, but also wrong" to conflate traditional ideological cleavages relating to socioeconomic positions with party differences on matters such as democracy, morality, or the military. Third, areas of party competition outside of questions of the role of the state in the economy should be assembled along a second, orthogonal dimension in the policy space. This enhances accuracy in estimation and coherence in concept (Cochrane 2011; Hellwig 2008; Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002). Next, we begin the process of deducing the two-dimensional party space.

Ideological Traditions in the Australian Party System

This section examines the ideological traditions of systemically-relevant parties in the Australian party system by reviewing the scholarly literature. In this context, relevant parties are those identified in chapter four: the Labor, Liberal, National, Democrats and Greens parties. As we are concerned with the modern Australian party system, the discussion is confined to party politics from 1975 to the present. This form of literature review has long been utilised by scholars of party competition to construct policy spaces and estimate party positions (e.g. De Swaan 1973; Dodd 1976; Taylor & Laver 1973). Surveying the ideological traditions of relevant parties in the Australian party system therefore serves three purposes:

1. It outlines the competitive environment into which the Greens have entered and now operate within,
2. It informs the operationalisation of the ideological and policy space developed later in the chapter, and

3. It begins the process of contextualising and explaining the quantitative results of the next chapter.

The Labor, Liberal and National parties each entered the period under study having recently undergone considerable programmatic change. The early- and mid-1970s, with Labor in government and the Coalition in opposition after a long period of the reverse, witnessed each party review its platform, significantly modify its policy program, and engage in broader ideological introspection. For Economou (2014, p. 167), this Whitlam era in Labor was “the most significant in altering the Labor Party’s policy agenda” in a “deliberate attempt to modernise” the party. This period of Labor history is certainly marked by significant change. It is far easier, however, to identify the Whitlam government with broad ‘social democratic’ belief and action – much like that of the Curtin and Chifley governments - than it is to do so for subsequent Labor governments (Jaensch 1989b, pp. 91-93; Johnson 1989, pp. 1-2). Rather, the contention that a more fundamental alteration occurred through the Hawke-Keating era is far more persuasive. Indeed, the debate surrounding whether or not the ‘economic rationalism’ of the Hawke-Keating governments was in line with ‘Labor tradition’ has dominated much of the academic literature on the ideology of the modern Labor party (e.g. Battin 1993; Jaensch 1989b; Johnson 1989; Maddox 1989; Manning 1992; Stretton 1987).

The idea of the ‘Labor tradition’ itself remains contested, and is inextricably intertwined with this split between the claims of ‘continuity’ versus those of ‘discontinuity’ of the tradition under Hawke and Keating. While contemplation of the Labor tradition is useful in constructing a broad historical narrative of the party, it lacks the precision we require for an analysis of ideological competition and programmatic adaptation. The concept of the ‘Labor tradition’ has become so malleable that it is claimed to accommodate governments as diverse as Curtin, Chifley, Whitlam, Hawke, Rudd, and Gillard (Johnson 1989; Johnson 2011; Manning 1996; Singleton 1990). As those evaluating Labor governments against Labor tradition acknowledge, the tradition is not “an essentialist list of Labor principles” but the product of “evolving ideology and policies of previous Labor governments and leaderships.” (Johnson 2011, p. 563) The related concept of ‘labourism’ is similarly flexible, with Manning (1996, pp. 43-44) noting, after stressing the importance of labourism as a philosophical

influence of Labor, that it “lacks ideological commitment to any particularly economic theory.” In applying either of these conceptual frameworks to the Labor party there is a real risk that they contort into ‘whatever Labor governments happen to do’ – a point made elsewhere, in relation to labourism, by Scalmer (1997, pp. 401-02). The quantitative measurement and spatial analysis that this chapter advances avoids such problems.

With that said, there remains much of value to extract from considerations of labourism and the Labor tradition for the purposes of this chapter. Primarily, it is the recognition, from within both the continuity and discontinuity theses, that Labor’s policy program undoubtedly shifted under Whitlam, again under Hawke and Keating, and has remained in flux since (Johnson 2011, p. 563). Regardless of whether it was in the pursuit of tradition – of humanising capitalism, of promoting the interests of wage earners, or similar – across the period studied, Labor has promoted and implemented a range of policies built upon theories once alien to the party and instead associated with its opponents on the ‘right’. Manning (1992, p. 22) stresses that the ‘economic rationalism’ of Labor “differs in form” from that advocated by the Liberal Party. Partial application of the economic rationalist agenda, however, in no way changes the ideational basis of those policies implemented, nor obscures the transformation in the party’s positioning in the policy space. Further, analysing the 2007-2013 Labor governments, Battin (2017, p. 148) argues that “even, or especially, when the ALP has attempted to devise some progressive policies... the party constrained itself to neoliberal thought.” Labor has mostly abandoned notions of a mixed economy, and instead elevate the role of the market and espouse policies of deregulation, privatisation, welfare targeting, smaller government, and reduction of economic protection (Battin 2000, pp. 46-48; Battin 2017; Head 1989, pp. 498-99; Manning 1996, p. 29; Simms 2009, p. 191).

These policies of ‘economic rationalism’ embraced by Labor derive from a modern reiteration of classical liberalism – often referred to as neoliberalism or market liberalism – that first gained influence within the Liberal Party. Economic downturn and ‘stagflation’ in the 1970s undermined the relative consensus on the interventionist role of the state, and politicised economic policy in a way that not only divided the two major parties, but prompted ideological division within the Liberal Party (Brett 2014, pp. 186-87). What emerged during

the leadership of Fraser was a proto-faction, later arguably a genuine faction, within the Liberals advocating for a form of liberalism associated with economists such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek (Head 1989, p. 490; Johnson 1989, p. 87; Jaensch 1994b, pp. 156-59). Over the course of the 1980s, this faction, known as the 'dries', gradually gained ascendancy – albeit with occasional setbacks – over the 'wets' who adhered to broadly social liberal positions. The dries, in contrast, advocated a radical restructuring of the Australian economy. That is, abandoning Keynesian intervention, tariffs, industrial arbitration, legal privileges for unions, and the mixed economy in favour of monetarist policy, free markets, privatisation, low public spending, low taxation, and deregulation (Brett 2014, p. 187; McKnight 2005, p. 50).

Notwithstanding the rhetoric of the era, the Fraser Coalition government did relatively little to advance the policy interests of the dries (Jaensch 1994b, pp. 159-61; Simms 1982, p. 159). Though Fraser significantly contributed to the legitimation and advancement of neoliberal ideas within the Liberals, his actions as Prime Minister belied his words, revealing enduring elements of his traditional conservatism (Shamsullah 1994, p. 27). I make this assertion cautiously, however, as Fraser's reluctance to embrace the policies of the dries was likely also influenced by electoral pragmatism. The 'traditional conservatism' – albeit of an Australian variety – once present in non-Labor politics had become increasingly difficult to find in the post-Menzies Liberals (Jaensch 1994b, pp. 167-68). It was in fact the subsequent period of opposition, and the unusual circumstances of competing against a Labor government implementing many of the economic reforms that the dries themselves had been advancing, that provoked a further restructuring of ideological power relations within the Liberal Party. In an example of the capacity for patterns of party competition, and relative party positioning, to influence power dynamics within a party, the Liberal Party further embraced neoliberal economics in order to differentiate themselves from Hawke Labor (Jaensch 1994b, p. 160; Johnson 1989, pp. 111-12). The 1987 federal election marked the new dominance of the dries within the Liberal Party, with opposition leader John Howard taking to the election a predominantly neoliberal policy program – that is, at least, in the area of economics.

The late 1980s also represented a paradigm shift for the Liberals in relation to social and moral policy, with a newly-cohesive and religiously-infused social conservative tendency asserting itself within the party (Brett 2004, pp. 74-76). This shift arguably reached a peak in the recent Abbott era, alongside a similarly strident nationalism (Austin & Fozdar 2017; Donovan 2014; Johnson 2015). The coupling of neoliberal economics with the social conservative belief in state support of the family, the church, the nation, and 'traditional' moral values, found its first articulation under Howard's opposition leadership of the 1980s. It was not until Howard's return, however, as party leader and then prime minister, that the partnership between these somewhat contradictory worldviews gained practical cohesion and philosophical hegemony within the Liberals (Brett 2004, p. 86; Johnson 2007, pp. 197-203). This social conservatism is also widely held in the Nationals, yet was less likely to be connected with economic liberalism until more recently (Cockfield 2009, pp. 131-32; 2014, pp. 198-200). Within both Coalition parties – though, following the Fraser era in the Liberal Party – this tendency also incorporated an assimilationist nationalism and promotion of Anglo-Celtic national identity. The Coalition parties have proffered this amalgamation of ideas in direct opposition to the more multicultural, cosmopolitan, 'progressive' set of positions advocated by Labor from Whitlam onwards, but particularly during the leadership of Keating (Brett 2003, pp. 144-46; Edwards 2013, pp. 172-74; Johnson 2007, pp. 197-200).

Earlier iterations of this approach to social and moral policy also provided part of the impetus for disaffected Liberals, and Liberal supporters, to shift to the Australian Democrats (Brett 2003, pp. 159-60). While the Democrats may have begun lacking a definitive ideology, over time a distinctive social liberalism emerged that also encompassed post-materialist concerns insufficiently attended to by either major party (Hagan & Maddox 1984, p. 35; Papadakis 1998, pp. 120-21). In the economic space, the Democrats' practice of centring themselves between Labor and Liberal proved more difficult as the space between the two major parties narrowed, as predicted by Brugger and Jaensch (1985, pp. 101-02). The Democrats' perceived move to the 'left' in the late 80s and early 90s is both an adaptation to changing policy competition, as well as a product of the relative rightward shifts of the two major parties. The Democrats' attempts to actively pursue more interventionist economic policy alongside environmental, civil liberty, and anti-arms race politics gave rise to criticism that the party was abandoning

its original purpose as a party of the ostensible centre (Castles 1990, p. 14). The attempts also represented a shift of the party toward an area in the policy space that a rising Australian Greens would soon occupy.

It was, after all, the “vacuum” in the politics of social and economic justice, coupled with an unfolding “global socio-ecological crisis”, that Brown and Singer (1996, p. 64) see as having provided the Greens with a distinct position in the party system. The rhetoric of the Greens has often claimed that the party is ‘neither left, nor right’ – and there are certainly aspects of the party’s underpinning philosophies and policy program that are difficult to locate within this traditional spectrum. What little scholarly attention has been given to the party’s ideological and policy tendencies, though, often identifies the Greens as ‘left-wing’, highlighting support for extensive state intervention in the economy (e.g. Cahill & Brown 2008, p. 263; Hutton & Connors 2004, p. 36; Manning 2002, p. 17). There is also consensus on the ‘libertarian’ nature of the party’s platform and policies in regard to social and moral questions (Charnock 2009, pp. 252-53; Jackson 2016, p. 166; Manning & Rootes 2005, p. 406). Moreover, the centrality of environmentalism and ecological politics in the philosophical foundations and policy positions of the party is an obvious but vital point to make – even if the party’s program has broadened over time (McCann 2012, pp. 4-6). Overall, there is little to contest about these general characterisations, but they are nonetheless broad labels that do not allow for precise measurement of party positioning, over time, in a competitive ideological and policy space.

Two Dimensions of Policy Competition in the Australian Party System

The preceding survey of the ideological development of Australian political parties provides insight into the nature of the ideological space into which the Greens entered. It also illuminates key areas of policy competition, which assists in operationalising a policy space against which to map parties. There are two clear limitations, though, in employing the aforementioned literature much further in the measurement of party positions and ideological competition. First, while many of the texts cited are rigorous in their application of theory or other methods of evaluation, there are others that are less than forthcoming about precisely

how the authors have assessed party ideology and policy programs. Second, scholars have often considered parties in isolation rather than as a component of a party system in which both opponents and the system itself can influence the manner in which any one party competes. To ascertain whether the Greens have intensified ideological polarisation, and how the party has employed ideology and policy to compete, there is a clear need for a different style of analysis. The preceding literature review, as well as scholarly work in comparative politics cited below, inform the parameters and operationalisation of the proposed two dimensions of party competition. This section of the chapter details these two dimensions, beginning with the left-right spectrum, followed by the progressive-cosmopolitan dimension. This two-dimensional space offers a new conceptualisation of the party contest at the ideological level, and provides a more precise means of tracking party policy evolution over time.

The First Dimension: Left and Right

The first dimension of ideological and policy competition in the Australian party system is the 'left' versus 'right' spectrum. Some, such as Giddens (1994) and McKnight (2005), have claimed that the left-right divide has lost its relevance in contemporary politics. These critics, however, often tend to mistakenly conflate the ideologies and philosophies *within* the left-right spectrum with the spatial categories of 'left' and 'right' themselves. Bobbio (1996, p. 56) explains that 'left' and 'right' "are not substantive or ontological concepts" but instead "represent a given political topology." A person or party, therefore, is not 'left-wing' or 'right-wing' in the same way that they are a 'liberal', 'socialist' or 'green'. The divide between left and right is malleable and spatial, with the potential to vary from one system to another, from one time to another. It is because of its enduring discriminatory and explanatory power, as well as its adaptive capacity, that the left-right metaphor is pervasive in party competition research, and is readily used by voters as a heuristic and inferential device (Butler & Stokes 1971, p. 248; Dahlberg & Harteveld 2016; Hellwig 2008, pp. 687-88; Keman 2007, pp. 78-80; Mölder 2016, p. 3). Indeed, the left-right divide remains an ideological cleavage in the majority of Western countries, including in Australia (Blais, Blake & Dion 1993; Knutsen 1988; Laver & Hunt 1992, pp. 49-55).

To recognise the malleability of the notions of left and right, though, is not to imply that the divide lacks meaning. Bobbio (1996, p. 60) argues that “the criterion most frequently used to distinguish between the left and the right is the attitude of real people in society to the ideal of equality.” According to Bobbio (1996, p. 80), an egalitarian policy is “typified by the tendency to remove the obstacles which make men and women less equal.” The left-right divide, though, is a spectrum. Thus, the further left a particular ideology, or party’s aggregated policy position, is located, the stronger the conception and commitment to equality between people. In contrast, the right will differ from a tolerance, to an indifference, to a welcoming legitimisation of inequality, depending on spatial location (Jahn 2010, pp. 751-52). It is from this theoretical foundation that the left-right divide is usually operationalised, in more practical terms, on the basis of socioeconomic policy (Budge & Robertson 1987, pp. 394-95; Franzmann & Kaiser 2006, p. 172; Laver & Hunt 1992, p. 12; McDonald & Mendes 2001, pp. 95-96). Left-right scales, Keman explains (2007, pp. 78-79), tend to incorporate variables “ranging from systemic categories like capitalism and socialism, free market incentives vis-à-vis state interference, taxation and expenditures, protectionism, nationalism, to labour relations, social policy and the provision of welfare.”

Table 6.1 outlines a new operationalisation of the left-right dimension using Manifesto Project variables, advanced here as an improvement upon the Manifesto Project’s own RILE index. This new operationalisation focuses primarily on the role of the state in the economy, but also includes social policy areas inherently related to the level of equality in a society. The majority of the tabulated variables are relatively uncontroversial and found in other left-right scales in the literature. Perhaps most open to dispute, though, would be the inclusion of the two opposing variables relating to education. Bobbio (1996, pp. 70-71), however, argues that ‘social rights’ – access to healthcare, to education, to work – are inherently connected to the promotion of equality. Moreover, the coding of the MP dataset is such that these variables primarily capture party positions on government funding of education. Given the traditional emphasis that education receives in both Labor (Johnson 2004, p.536; Johnson 2011, p. 579) and Greens (Jackson 2016, pp. 155-59) programs, and the shift through the Hawke-Keating and Howard eras toward user-pays funding arrangements (Head 1989, p. 498; Quiggin 2004, pp. 177-78), there is substantial grounds for its inclusion. It is also necessary to highlight the

omission of economic variables traditionally perceived as left-wing: those relating to nationalisation and Marxist analysis. In both cases, the MP data reveals that Australian party materials rarely, if ever, mention either of these issues.

Table 6.1 - The operationalisation of left-wing and right-wing

Left	Right
PER403: Market Regulation	PER303: Governmental and Administrative Efficiency
PER404: Economic Planning	PER401: Free Market Economy
PER406: Protectionism – Positive	PER402: Incentives – Positive
PER409: Keynesian Demand Management	PER407: Protectionism – Negative
PER412: Controlled Economy	PER414: Economic Orthodoxy
PER504: Welfare State Expansion	PER505: Welfare State Limitation
PER506: Education Expansion	PER507: Education Limitation
PER701: Labour Groups – Positive	PER702: Labour Groups – Negative

The Second Dimension: Progressive/Cosmopolitan and Communitarian/Nationalist

A left-right socioeconomic dimension is an essential but insufficient component of a space capturing the range of ideological competition in the Australian party system. There is little doubt that assembling *all* relevant policy issues and dimensions of ideological competition requires a multi-dimensional space (Charnock & Ellis 2003). But an overriding aim of spatial analyses is to construct parsimonious and easily intelligible explanations of party competition. It is crucial, therefore, to restrict the number of dimensions to just two. A two-dimensional space is thus not intended to encapsulate all aspects of party interaction or every line of party programs. Rather, the purpose of plotting parties across two dimensions is to estimate aggregate party positions in relation to those matters most central to party competition in the Australian system (within the constraints of the variables included in the MP dataset). A second dimension of competition allows for incorporation into the analysis of salient social, cultural, and moral policy issues without the theoretical obfuscation that can occur when conflating these issues with the left-right divide. In practical terms, this can ward against, for instance, two parties being similarly located on the ‘right’ of a unidimensional scale – one

party because of its immigration policies, while the other for its economic policies (Cochrane 2011, pp. 108-11).

The inclusion of a second dimension in spatial analyses of political competition is now commonplace within the literature (e.g. Cochrane 2011; Duch & Strøm 2004; Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002; Kitschelt 1995, pp. 13-19; Webb 2000, pp. 115-36). What has not emerged, however, is consensus on either the theoretical foundation or the practical operationalisation of this second dimension. Some of this variation is due to the development of country- or region-specific spaces. The most common conceptualisation of a second dimension posits 'liberty' or 'libertarianism' at one end of the scale, with 'authority' or 'authoritarianism' as its opposite. The liberty-authority dimension can range from the minimalist conception of Webb's (2000, p. 137) through to more expansive models, such as that of Flanagan & Lee's (2003, pp. 239-40). The essential components of the liberty-authority dimension, regardless of the operationalisation, relate to the degree of respect for democracy, level of state intervention in matters of social interaction and morality, and competing approaches to tolerance and hierarchy (Stubager 2010, pp. 508-09). Alternatively, secondary dimensions have also been formulated on the basis of divides between postmaterial and material values (Inglehart 1990), integration and demarcation (Kriesi et al. 2006, pp. 930-35), progressivism and conservatism (Keman 2007, p. 87), libertarianism and communitarianism (Duch & Strøm, pp. 235-36) and green-alternative-libertarianism versus traditional-authoritarian-nationalism (Hooghe et al. 2002, pp. 976-84).

Relatively little attention in the Australian political science literature is focused on the potential of a second dimension of ideological competition, or to spatial analyses more generally. Notable exceptions include Jackman's (1998) examination of racial politics, discussions of postmaterialism, and the study of postmodernism by Charnock and Ellis (2003). Consideration of this second dimension begs questions relating to the appropriate role of the state in structuring social relations, and promoting particular notions of morality, all of which are relevant to Australian party competition. As shown earlier, matters relating to society and morality have been present in ideological and policy competition throughout the period under study. Broadly speaking, a conservative defence of the status quo has contrasted with

demands for expanded civil liberties, individual autonomy, and self-actualisation free from the constraints of often state-supported social mores. Within the milieu of this contest are concerns regarding culture, social cohesion, national identity, and conceptions of citizenship. For example, since the late 1980s, conflicts between multiculturalism and assimilation, tolerance and intolerance of difference, and cosmopolitanism and nationalism, have shaped Australian political debates and party competition.

The operationalisation of the second dimension of party competition in Australia proffered here includes Manifesto Project variables that reflect this social, moral, and cultural divide. Table 6.2 details this second dimension, conceived as a spectrum bounded by the two poles of ‘progressive-cosmopolitanism’ (PC) and ‘conservative-nationalism’ (CN). The labels given to these poles do not, in themselves, embody any grand claims about the ideological mix and variety of non-economic policy positions adopted by parties in the Australian system. While the labels are not meaningless – they represent the most appropriate terminology – they are nonetheless of secondary concern. Much like the categories of ‘left’ and ‘right’, far more important in providing definition and substance to this spectrum of competition are the variables employed in the operationalisation. Some of the variables included match those of the second dimensions of party competition found in the work of Keman (2007) and Webb (2000). There are also similarities with spatial analyses not based upon MP data, such as the ‘GAL/TAN’ divide posited by Hooghe et al. (2002).

Table 6.2 - The operationalisation of a second dimension

Progressive-Cosmopolitanism	Conservative-Nationalism
PER105: Military – Negative	PER104: Military – Positive
PER107: Internationalism – Positive	PER109: Internationalism – Negative
PER201: Freedom & Human Rights	PER203: Constitutionalism – Positive
PER503: Equality – Positive	PER601: National Way of Life – Positive
PER604: Traditional Morality – Negative	PER603: Traditional Morality – Positive
PER607: Multiculturalism – Positive	PER605: Law and Order – Positive
PER705: Underprivileged Minority Groups	PER608: Multiculturalism – Negative
PER706: Non-economic Demographic Groups	PER703: Agriculture and Farmers

With that said, on theoretical and practical grounds I intentionally avoid the common nomenclature associated with a second dimension of political competition, that of libertarianism against authoritarianism. Much of the literature adopting the libertarian label, in particular, tends to follow Kitschelt's (1989; 1992; 1994) rather indiscriminate conception of libertarianism that encompasses 'positive' political, social, and cultural demands that do not necessarily expand individual liberty (Duch & Strøm 2004, pp. 235-38). One could restrict this aspect of the second dimension of ideological competition to merely moral libertarianism, but to do so would be omitting social and cultural conflicts that are critical to understanding party competition in the Australian system. Such conflicts are captured by the inclusion of variables covering human rights and social equality, multiculturalism, internationalism, and policy positions in support of underprivileged groups. A more accurate conception of the so-called 'libertarian' pole of the second dimension is therefore progressive-cosmopolitanism.

The second dimension outlined in the table also differs from much of the literature in the absence of measures of an authoritarian disregard for democracy. The prevalence of authoritarianism in other studies is in part a reflection of the European origin of such work; measures of authoritarianism are predominantly included to appropriately locate the radical and extreme right-wing parties present in some European party systems. There is little to suggest that democracy itself is a point of ideological contention in Australian politics. Indeed, the party with parliamentary presence that holds any resemblance to these 'radical right' parties, Pauline Hanson's One Nation, is sustained by voters that have previously been found as supportive of democracy and greater citizen influence over government decisions (Charnock & Ellis 2001, pp. 10-16; Western & Tranter 2001, pp. 453-54). Variables relating to the military, as well as law and order, are nevertheless present in my proposed dimension. These are included not to capture authoritarian or anti-democratic tendencies; rather, they are intended to encompass aspects of the 'culture wars' and competing conceptions of national identity discussed earlier (Flanagan & Lee 2003; Johnson 2007; Snow & Moffitt 2012). The exclusion of measures of democracy and authoritarianism, but inclusion of questions of broader culture, morality and society, thus make the label 'conservative-nationalism' more fitting than the typical 'authoritarianism'.

In addition, several other variables also warrant brief explanation as to the relevance to Australian party competition. The Manifesto Project codebook (Volkens et al. 2018a, p. 16) explains that variable 'per503: equality – positive' refers to “social justice” and non-economic aspects of party programs, hence its inclusion on this dimension rather than the left-right spectrum. The variables of 'per705' and 'per706' are similarly structured, with a focus on favourable statements in party programs toward particular groups of people or special interests. These variables represent viewpoints at the centre of social and moral policy divides, particularly from the Keating and Howard governments onwards. Indeed, the rejection of the categorisation of individuals into groups, and the related consideration of alleged special interests, has been a fundamental component of the rhetoric of the Liberal Party, and especially under Howard. The conservative-nationalist tendency in Australian politics, though, has also been prone to catering to sectional interests – those of farmers and rural workers – even promoting those interests as part of a broader national identity. The MP variable 'per703' covers these sectional interests.²¹

What is perhaps of most concern in relation to the Greens is my exclusion of the Manifesto Project variable reporting party statements on environmental protection. There are two reasons for this decision. First, it is difficult to contend that positive statements concerning conservation of the natural environment, mitigation of climate change, or animal rights, and the moral underpinnings of these positions, could be comfortably merged into any one of the four proposed poles of party competition. Indeed, Bobbio (1996, pp. 10-11) identifies Green parties – in terms of their ecological basis – as 'transversal' movements, capable of both subversion and synthesis of the traditional political spectrum. Further, Bobbio (1996, p. 10) points to the flexibility of environmentalism, with parties having “adopted the ecological theme without changing any of their traditional baggage.” Thus, while in contemporary Australian politics there is a tendency for 'left' or 'progressive' parties to give greater emphasis to environmental policy, this does not imply that the ideologies associated with the 'right' or conservative tendencies cannot defend environmentalist stances (see Gray 1993;

²¹ It is worthwhile noting that the inclusion of the variable 'per703', covering policies specifically favouring agriculture and farmers, surprisingly does not distort the position of the Nationals in the spatial maps. That is, the position of the Nationals at any one election is not excessively skewed toward the conservative pole by per703 scores.

Scruton 2012). Second, in contrast to per703 and the Nationals, inclusion of the environmental protection variable does significantly skew the locations of the Greens toward whatever pole it resides within (see also Franzmann & Kaiser 2006, p. 176). For these reasons, the positions of Australian parties on the environment are examined separately to the results of the two-dimensional mapping exercise.

Nevertheless, the two dimensions of ideological competition encompass the majority of policy statements contained within the average program of each party during the period under study. Table 6.3 shows the total salience of both dimensions for each party. The figure in each cell represents the percentage, for a given election, of a party's policy program dedicated to positions captured by that dimension of party competition. The figures are calculated by summing party scores for all variables constituting a particular dimension (see tables 6.1 and 6.2).

Table 6.3 - Total salience of ideological dimensions (%)

	Left + Right					Progressive/Cosmopolitan + Conservative/Nationalist				
	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Labor</u>	<u>Nats</u>	<u>Dems</u>	<u>Greens</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Labor</u>	<u>Nats</u>	<u>Dems</u>	<u>Greens</u>
1975	60.5	17.2	40.3			13.5	15.5	25		
1977	40.2	32.3	33.6			25	15.6	26.9		
1980	38.7	46.6	17			23.6	14.6	29.2		
1983	33.4	34.2	33.7			27.5	23.8	12.1		
1984	37.7	22.4	22.3			40.8	35.8	41.1		
1987	46.2	26.5	34.5			21.5	11	17.8		
1990	38.4	49	35.1	21.8		28.4	8.5	28.9	38.5	
1993	51.2	45.6	24.1			21.7	21.4	24.1		
1996	38.5	33.2	38.5	34		28.7	24	28.7	22.1	
1998	44.1	20.7	44.1	8.1		15	18.1	15	24.2	
2001	30.6	36	24.9	30		33	27.9	29.5	24	
2004	40.9	41.3	18.4		19.4	25.4	34.1	14.3		41.4
2007	37.3	39.4	35.4		26.6	29.6	14.5	12.1		34.3
2010	40.3	46.4	29		21.2	11.9	26.7	25.1		37.1
2013	42.6	34.4	30.9		33.2	22.2	25.7	36.1		23.9
<i>Average</i>	<i>41.4</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>30.8</i>	<i>23.5</i>	<i>25.1</i>	<i>24.3</i>	<i>20.8</i>	<i>24.4</i>	<i>26.3</i>	<i>32.4</i>

Empty cells reflect the exclusion of a party in the dataset at that election. Further, the proportions of party programs that sit outside of the combined total of these two dimensions do not necessarily represent actual policies. In fact, much of the party policy material are assertions of competence, commentary on rivals, general statements relating to government, and other non-policy matters. Still, Table 6.3 demonstrates, for instance, that while just 19.4 percent of the Greens' 2004 platform related to the left-right dimension, this figure had increased to 33.2 percent by 2013. This increase in emphasis on policies relating to the left-right divide often occurred at the expense of the Greens' focus on those policy areas subsumed under the second dimension of competition. In contrast, Table 6.3 reveals trendless fluctuation in the ideological emphases of the major parties, with the proportion of policy material dedicated to each dimension of competition shifting significantly from election to election.

Conclusion: Enhancing Precision in Measures of Ideological Positioning

The two-dimensional spatial metaphor developed here allows us to better understand the ideological components of party competition in the Australian party system. It also provides a more precise means of measuring the programmatic evolution of parties over time. The two dimensions encompass: first, a left-right spectrum focused on equality and state intervention in the economy; and second, a progressive-conservative spectrum consisting of competing approaches to social, cultural, and moral issues. This two-dimensional ideological matrix, derived from a deductive method, is an improvement upon extant conceptualisations of ideological spaces in the Australian setting. In particular, it is of greater theoretical coherence and empirical specificity relative to a unidimensional left-right scale that conflates a wide array of political divides into a singular spectrum. The appropriate role of the state in the economy remains the primary ideological partition between parties in the Australian party system. This stems from competing approaches to *equality*, as outlined by Bobbio (1996). However, the integration into party competition of issue demands associated with the 'new left', and later the 'new right', opened a second dimension of the ideological space encompassing divides on the values of *tolerance* and *hierarchy*. This new contest plots progressive-cosmopolitanism against conservative-nationalism along a spectrum, reminiscent of the similar libertarian versus authoritarian divide in West European

democracies. It is through this two-dimensional space that we can most accurately measure programmatic adaptation, ideological traditions, and overall systemic polarisation in the contemporary Australian party system.

Indeed, the main purpose of this chapter is to provide the theoretical and methodological basis for a spatial mapping of the ideological positions of relevant parties in the Australian party system. Party locations within the two-dimensional space formulated in this chapter are, in the next chapter, identified based upon policy positions put forward in election platforms and related policy documents. The issues upon which I measure party positions are those that structure the two-dimensional space, as tabulated above. For ideological polarisation to have increased in the Australian party system since 1975, the distance between relevant parties within this space needs to have increased. Likewise, for the Greens to have contributed to ideological polarisation, and thus to party system change, the data must identify the Greens as having either brought about centrifugal party movements, or as having carved an ideological niche outside of the space occupied by other parties. Notwithstanding the findings of the next chapter, this chapter itself contributes to knowledge of Australian party competition by advancing an alternative means to conceive the ideological contest beyond the conventional left-right divide. Through this proposed alternative, we can not only locate party positions more accurately, but also understand, with greater specificity than is capable through 'party tradition' frameworks, the adaptations and development of party ideological profiles over time.

THE GREENS AND IDEOLOGICAL POLARISATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN PARTY SYSTEM

This chapter tracks and maps, over time, party positions in the two-dimensional space formulated in chapter six. I conduct this quantitatively-based mapping using Manifesto Project (MP) data – a data source often overlooked in the Australian literature.²² In so doing, I test two hypotheses: first, that ideological polarisation in the Australian party system has increased; and second, that the Australian Greens are a cause of this increased polarisation. These hypotheses relate directly to the contest for votes that, along with contests for government and legislative outcomes, constitute a party system. Evidence derived from an ideological mapping of the policy appeals of Australian parties supports both hypotheses. This chapter demonstrates that the Greens have contributed to ideological polarisation in the Australian party system. The influence of the Greens over the party system, however, is relatively constrained. This constrained influence is the product of, inter alia, a comparatively narrow programmatic profile, niche party characteristics, limited electoral success, and an inability or unwillingness to respond to changing public attitudes. Nevertheless, since at least 2004, the Greens have consolidated a progressive-left niche in the Australian party system largely unoccupied by other parties. Similarly, the Greens afford the environmental dimension of party competition far greater salience than any other party. There is little indication, however, that the Greens have directly affected the issue positions of other competitors. Further, the stability of the Greens' ideological position over time indicates that the party is only minimally influenced by the strategic adaptations of other parties – each of which demonstrate considerable ideological flexibility.

The degree of ideological polarisation reflects the *mechanics* of the party system – how parties interact. Analysis of the ideological component of the party system, therefore, is not merely a matter of evaluating each party's ideological position in isolation. When the focus of research is party competition, it necessarily involves consideration of a party or parties *relative* to others

²² See Werner (2016) and Holloway et al. (2018) for two notable exceptions.

(Keman 2007, p. 78). Following Sartori (1976, pp. 135-36), this chapter is primarily concerned with ideological polarisation as defined by the ideological *distance* between the most ideologically-remote relevant parties. Thus, in exploring the impact of the Greens on the ideological component of the Australian party system, it is not necessarily a matter of demonstrating any causative effect the party may exert over the ideological positioning of its competitors. Rather, the key question is the location and distance, over time, between the Greens, other systemically-relevant parties, and the boundaries of the ideological space itself. However, this chapter is also concerned with the relationship between the ideological component of the party system and the qualitative characteristics of Greens policy programs. Measuring distance between party locations necessarily involves some form of aggregation of policy statements to determine a singular 'point' at a given time in a given space. But an exploration of the ideological contest between parties also requires a more disaggregated examination of policy programs. As such, this chapter will also explore the policy programs of the Greens through non-spatial means across key policy areas.

Mapping Australian Political Parties in a Two-Dimensional Space

Presentation of the spatial mapping of Australian political parties requires a brief explanation of the method behind calculating the data points in the following graphs. The Manifesto Project is founded upon the salience theory of politics and party competition. Put simply, the salience theory asserts that political parties avoid direct confrontation with competitors, but instead strategically select particular issues to emphasise. The preferred issues differ from party to party, and are often selected to coincide with those policy areas where voters perceive a party to maintain credibility and some form of 'ownership' (Budge 1987, pp. 24-27; Budge 2001b, pp. 212-22). The implication for party locations, then, is that each data point is determined by, in the first instance, the emphases given by parties to particular policy areas in their manifestos and programs. That is, we transform salience data into positional data. It is acknowledged here there is a debate in the literature as to whether calculations of salience can translate into 'positions' in a space – but it is a debate that remains unresolved (e.g. see Budge 2001b; Klemmensen, Hobolt & Hansen 2007, pp. 747-48; Laver & Garry 2000).

From the initial scores given to parties for each variable in the MP data set, the task is to then transform the scores into coordinates within the policy space constructed. There are several methods of achieving this, but this chapter employs two of the most common. First, mirroring the RILE index of the MP, we subtract the total scores for one pole of an axis from the other – for example, a subtraction of the total of ‘left’ variables from the sum of ‘right’ variables. This results in a score that represents each party’s estimated left-right position in the context of this dimension’s overall salience to the party. A potential weakness of this approach is that variables *exogenous* to the scale can influence the score *within* the scale. For instance, this method of calculation could reveal a party moderating its left-right position from a particular election manifesto dedicating more space to a temporarily salient issue outside of the scale, such as national security or immigration. The party’s economic policies may not have changed, yet the diminished emphasis given to such policies in party material translates into a shift toward the centre of the left-right index.

In response to this limitation, Kim and Fording (1998; 2003) propose a relative proportional, or ratio, scaling procedure that limits the calculation of a party’s position to exclusively those variables contained within the ideological dimension under study. A party’s left-right position, for instance, is measured solely on the basis of ‘left’ and ‘right’ statements; ‘left’ positions are subtracted from ‘right’ positions, and subsequently divided by the sum of total ‘left’ and ‘right’ statements. This procedure separates each score from the importance to which an individual party assigns the relevant policy areas. This decoupling is an improvement upon the original RILE approach, yet is not without its own flaws (e.g. see Lowe et al. 2011, pp. 129-30). Of primary concern is the tendency of the Kim and Fording technique to locate party positions further toward the poles of any dimension. Overall, the RILE approach to scaling provides dimensional positions on the basis of the salience of that dimension to a party’s full policy program. The Kim and Fording technique, on the other hand, produces party positions that indicate consistency in the promotion of policies in line with a particular pole of a dimension.

Results and Discussion: Ideological Polarisation in the Australian Party System

Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 graph estimations of party locations, using salience scaling, in the two-dimensional policy space. The graphs cover, respectively, all federal elections between 1975 and 1993, and 1996 and 2013.²³ What is evident from these graphs is that Australian political parties do indeed adapt their policy programs from election to election, while also generally remaining within a loosely defined ideological profile. Indeed, the general conclusion from the data is similar to that found by Dalton and McAllister (2015) in a comparative study – that of long-term party positional continuity. That is not to say, though, that parties do not substantially modify their policy programs, or temporarily diverge from party tradition.




Figure 7.1 – Two-dimensional policy space, salience scaling, 1975-1993

²³ The number of elections in the period studied necessitated the separation of the data into two separate figures for the sake of readability. It is also important to note that: first, missing from the MP dataset is much of the policy material of the Australian Democrats (policy documents are only available for four documents); and second, the Nationals have been excluded from the graphs from 1996 onward due to dubious positioning as a likely result of measurement error in the MP dataset itself.

The axes span values from -100 through to 100, and thus a movement such as Labor’s between 1990 and 1993, or 2010 and 2013, represent considerable shifts in positions and policy emphases. So too do the Liberals’ movements from 1998 to 2001 and 2007 to 2010. In approximate terms, however, the figures largely confirm the labels of Labor as moderately left-progressive, the Liberals as moderately right-conservative, the Democrats as relatively centrist, and the Nationals and Greens as respectively operating on the left-progressive and right-conservative peripheries. Beyond these summations, however, are several interesting findings regarding short- and long-term trends, significant position changes between elections, and particular policy programs that either breach (or come close to breaching) a separate quadrant in the two-dimensional space.




Figure 7.2 – Two-dimensional policy space, salience scaling, 1996-2013

The data clearly indicate the rightward shift of the two major parties in the 1980s as the Liberal Party, increasingly dominated by the ‘dries’, responded to the policy shifts of Labor under Hawke. The 1990s and early 2000s, however, following a sustained period of economic rationalism, witnessed a consistent leftward movement by both parties. Though, for the Liberal Party, this at most rendered them in the centre of the left-right spectrum. On the

second dimension of ideological competition, Labor has maintained a degree of consistency in overall position not shown by the Liberals. The latter have exhibited a wider range of locations, from the remarkably progressive-cosmopolitan 1993 policy program under Hewson to the predominantly nationalist and conservative stances of the 2001 Liberal campaign under Howard. Further, it is noteworthy that the 2010 election, which delivered a minority government, saw the highest degree of ideological polarisation between the major parties. This was the result of Labor's gradual leftward shift in policy coinciding with the Liberal Party under Abbott having transformed into a decidedly more right-wing and conservative-nationalist entity than during the late Howard era. The major party polarisation did ease at the following election, but this was largely due to Labor's 2013 campaign for re-election almost wholly reversing the party's leftward movements of the prior two decades.

From the data presented in these two graphs, it is difficult to contend that the Greens have exerted noticeable influence on this repositioning by its competitors. This conclusion is reinforced when one considers that parties are not only responding to the shifting ideological and policy profiles of competitors, but also to events, internal party dynamics, and the perceived shifts in public opinion. Indeed, the leftward shift of the Labor Party was already well under way prior to the election of a significant number of Greens. One could argue that Labor only moved so far to the left due to the growing programmatic and electoral threat of the Greens, especially in inner urban electorates Labor had previously held comfortably. Yet it is only in the 2013 election that the Greens put forward a policy program more appreciably emphasising left-wing positions relative to that of Labor's. An important caveat to this observation, though, is that it is largely a product of those policy areas captured by the left-right dimension being given comparatively less attention in Greens programs than the programs of other parties. But there is little here, or in the literature, to suggest that Labor's electoral strategy entailed an overriding concern with the economic positioning of the Greens rather than their primary competitors in the Liberal Party.

Conversely, there is some indication that the progressive and cosmopolitan character of the Greens is associated with a more progressive shift by Labor since 2007. Certainly, Labor under Keating in 1993 (though not in 1996) had proffered a more consistently cosmopolitan program

than Labor in either 2010 or 2013. The more progressive area of the two-dimensional space was hardly uncharted programmatic territory for the party. The key difference, though, is that the Liberal Party of 1993 had also advanced an uncharacteristically progressive program. It was therefore of less electoral risk for Keating to present a cosmopolitan Labor party than it was for Gillard or Rudd in 2010 and 2013. In these latter elections, as well, a (relatively) electorally successful Greens party limited the Labor Party's range of movement on this second ideological dimension. An attempt by Labor to converge with the Liberal Party on social and moral policy, as per 2007, would have likely incurred its own electoral costs as some Labor supporters defected to the Greens.

Party Positions using Ratio Scaling

Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4, using the Kim and Fording scaling method outlined above, display a similar set of trends for party movements. This method – a ratio scaling – identifies party locations without the calculation of those locations influenced by party policy appeals on issues exogenous to the index. It produces results more directly representative of party positions, rather than locations resulting from policy salience. The results therefore understandably differ from the previous figures. Nonetheless, the rightward shift of both major parties during the 1980s and early 1990s is again clearly evident. The ratio scaling technique, though, shows just how radical – and not attributable to changes in saliency – this repositioning was for the Labor Party. From an almost exclusively left-wing program in 1975, Labor advocated what was essentially a centrist economic platform just nine years later, mixing left- and right-wing policy appeals. In matters of society, culture, and national identity, a centrist course also marked the early Hawke years. This was particularly the case in the election of 1983, where the ultimately-defeated Fraser government had also strengthened its conservative policy emphases.

Quite surprisingly, it is this 1983 federal election that represents one of the high points of conservative-nationalism in the Liberal Party. The Liberals did not surpass this degree of conservatism and nationalism until 2001, in an election held amidst crises and controversies in immigration and national security. However, the party's election platform of 2010, under

Tony Abbott, took the party toward the extreme end of this second dimension of party competition. Indeed, the Liberal Party of 2010 advanced a wholly conservative-nationalist agenda. This was alongside a return to right-wing economic proposals, following an era under Howard in which the party's oft-claimed neoliberalism was often offset by an almost equal measure of left-wing promises. Simultaneously, figures 7.3 and 7.4 again demonstrate Labor's leftward movements following 1993, albeit with much of the shift occurring during the party's first period in opposition from 1996 to 1998.




Figure 7.3 - Two-dimensional policy space, ratio scaling, 1975-1993

What is an especially noteworthy distinction between the results of the two scaling procedures is the estimated positions of the Greens. Overall, the findings demonstrate that while the Greens may less frequently discuss issues germane to the left-right dimension, when that discussion does occur, it is remarkably consistent in its left-wing character. The results of the ratio scaling of figures 7.3 and 7.3, though, align more closely with the indicators of ideological polarisation presented in chapter four, which found the Liberal and Greens parties to be the most significant contributors toward ideological polarisation in the Australian party system.

As chapter four concluded, the Greens have emerged and remained as a systemically-relevant party that competes from a unique ideological and programmatic standing on the left. We must now expand this conclusion to recognise the Greens' distinct progressive-cosmopolitan position. Moreover, there has been no indication of a Greens retreat from this area of the two-dimensional policy space. Indeed, the Greens have demonstrated a consistency in principle and practice – or, alternatively, an unwillingness to adapt to public attitudes – not shown by other parties, regardless of size or systemic role. Just as the party has wielded little influence over the movements of its rivals, the ideological and policy shifts – which have been, at times, quite radical – of those rivals ostensibly matter little to the calculations of the Greens. Each of these findings offer significant insight into how the Greens compete in the Australian party system.




Figure 7.4 - Two-dimensional policy space, ratio scaling, 1996-2013

Discussion: Implications for Party Competition

The results from each of the figures reveal mixed evidence, at best, for several prominent theories within the literature on spatial theories of party competition. First, several data trends contradict the Downsian model of spatial voting, in which parties following a vote-seeking strategy converge toward the position of the median voter. The elections of 1980, 1987, 1998, 2004 and 2010 each witnessed an increase in ideological polarisation, with the two major political parties simultaneously diverging. In such instances, at least one – and likely both – of the parties have either misread the attitudes of the electorate, or have abandoned a strategy of preference accommodation. This not only highlights the contingent nature of the median voter theory in the Australian context, but also corresponds with the mixture of centripetal and centrifugal movements expected in a multidimensional, multiparty system (Abou-Chadi 2014, pp. 418-19; Cox 1990; Schofield & Sened 2006, pp. 3-5). That is not to say, of course, that the notion of the median voter holds no value in Australian party dynamics. The results also demonstrate that opposition parties have only successfully won government after following a centripetal course, converging toward their rival on one or both of the two dimensions of ideological competition. At times, though, such movements have been relatively minor and should thus only be taken as part of an explanation for any increase in vote shares.

Second, only from a broad and long-term perspective can one interpret the findings as consistent with ‘policy alteration’ or ‘homing tendency’ models of party behaviour. These models refer to observations that spatial movement for a party in one election is often negatively correlated with that party’s course from the previous election – the product of vote-seeking (Budge 1994, pp. 451-54; Laver & Sergenti 2012, ch. 8). There are certainly examples of this type of behaviour occurring, such as with the Liberal Party between 1984 and 1990, but they are few in number. Moreover, one must be cautious attributing party movement to a strategic search for votes when such movement might be better explained by changes in the internal dynamics of a party. Parties are not unitary actors – even if such an assumption is a convenient and often necessary heuristic – but coalitions of oft-competing individuals and groups with varying levels of control over policy programs (Kitschelt 1989, pp. 255-59; Maor 1997, pp. 133-35). This recognition of intra-party factors is useful not only in explaining

fluctuation in programmatic position, but also in stability. For example, any account of the Greens' consistent inhabitation of the left-progressive periphery in the Australian party system must acknowledge the relatively high degree of membership involvement in policy formulation, limiting the policy influence of party leaders (Schumacher et al. 2013, pp. 472-74).

Lastly, the left-progressive positioning of the Greens, particularly in Figure 7.4, contributes to an overall ideological configuration in the Australian party system that aligns with Kitschelt's (1993a) model of party competition. According to Kitschelt (1993a, pp. 304-05), while ideological competition in advanced industrial societies occurs in a multidimensional space, the primary axis of competition is diagonal through this space, spanning from what he refers to as left-libertarianism through to right-authoritarianism. These labels roughly correspond with the left-progressivism and right-conservatism posited here. However, just as Webb (2000, pp. 115-27) found for the British party system, it is only in the imprecise sense of long-term party traditions that Kitschelt's argument holds for the Australian party system. In short-term movements, all parties in the Australian setting have, at one time or another, moved contrary to Kitschelt's logic. Kitschelt's logic being that, if a party repositions leftward or rightward, the party will match this with a corresponding shift toward the progressive or conservative poles, respectively, on the second dimension. Moreover, there are individual cases – notably, the government-changing elections of 1996 and 2007 – where the Labor and Liberal parties have proffered programs arguably outside of party tradition, and in so doing, rotated the diagonal axis of major party competition to an almost horizontal orientation. Conversely, the Greens are yet to exhibit such programmatic flexibility. Collectively, what these findings mean is that the Greens are likely to continue to contribute to ideological polarisation in the Australian system, seemingly hoping to appeal to and structure the electorate with its stridently left-progressive package of policy appeals.

The Greens and the Environmental Dimension of Party Competition

The results thus far support both of our hypotheses; ideological polarisation is increasing in the Australian party system, and in recent elections, the Greens have contributed to this

ongoing change. The Greens, though, have had little detectable affect on the issue positions of other parties. Given the origins, ideological basis, and historical policy focus of the Greens, it is perhaps more likely to find such influence elsewhere, in the environmental dimension of party competition. There is polling evidence that the environment and climate change are the only two policy issues over which the public perceive the Greens to maintain any form of 'ownership' (Essential Research 2015, p. 8). This corresponds with findings for Green parties internationally (Bischof 2015, p. 11). However, I intentionally exclude this facet of party competition from the two-dimensional ideological space constructed earlier, as it does not coherently fit into either of the left-right or progressive-conservative divides. Here, Table 7.1 tabulates the saliency scores of each party's policy programs, across the two Manifesto Project variables relating to the environment. The results show, for example, that in the 2013 election, the Greens dedicated roughly 15 percent of the party's platform to environmental protection – a sharp contrast to the two percent in the Liberals' platform, and the complete absence of environmental appeals from Labor.²⁴ On the other hand, in 2013, Labor was just as likely as the Greens to take an 'anti-growth' stance in policy documents, supporting sustainable development and questioning unbridled economic expansion.

The findings demonstrate the centrality of the environmental dimension to the ideological character and programmatic offerings of the Greens. Indeed, environmental protection comprised one quarter of all policies statements found in the Greens' 2010 election platform. There is significant fluctuation in the degree of emphasis afforded by the Greens to environmental protection and anti-growth stances. Nonetheless, there is little sign that environmental dimension of party competition is receding in its importance to the party. There is little evidence that the Greens have caused the environmental dimension to become a significant site of competition in the Australian party system. The concern of the major parties with the environment varies, but usually only comprises one to five percent of all policy statements.

²⁴ The absence of a figure in any cell reflects the non-inclusion of a party at that election in the dataset, while a score of zero – a common score, particularly in regard to anti-growth sentiment – represents the absence of that policy viewpoint in a party's program.

Table 7.1 - Salience of Environmental Policies²⁵ (%)

	Anti-Growth Economy: Positive					Environmental Protection				
	Liberal	Labor	Nats	Dems	Greens	Liberal	Labor	Nats	Dems	Greens
1975	0	0	0			0.4	0	0		
1977	0	0	0			1.0	3.7	5.7		
1980	0	0	0			0.9	0.4	9.0		
1983	0	0	0			3.3	2.1	1.7		
1984	0	0	0			2.7	1.0	0.5		
1987	0	0	0			0	2.5	0		
1990	0	0	0	7.5		11.4	3.3	1.5	8.1	
1993	0	0	0			0.2	2.5	0.9		
1996	0	0	0	0		4.1	6.0	4.1	13.9	
1998	0	0	0	0		1.3	0	1.3	2.0	
2001	0	0	0	0		1.8	1.4	2.9	2.6	
2004	0.3	1.1	1.0		7.8	0	1.9	0		14.8
2007	1.2	1.8	0		8.8	0	2.5	2.0		17.5
2010	1.5	1.2	0.9		1.5	6.0	8.4	15.5		25.0
2013	0.7	4.5	0.6		4.3	2.0	0	10.3		14.5

Conversely, it is not until the Greens consolidated their position in the Australian Parliament following the 2004 election that we see these major parties give any attention at all to sustainable development and questioning (some forms of) economic growth. In sum, though, the party's impact may have been to limit the overall salience of the environmental dimension in the Australian party system. There is, after all, possible electoral advantage for other parties in adopting adversarial or even dismissive strategies toward the Greens' environmental focus (Meguid 2005). Indeed, the Liberals in particular appear to oscillate between these two stances, while Labor appears generally hesitant to allow the environment much attention in the overall issue agenda of Australian politics.

Niche parties are, in general, most at threat from ideologically-proximate parties. For the Greens, this is the Labor Party. When considering a policy issue that provides the primary

²⁵ The MP variables are: PER416 – Anti-Growth Economy: Positive; and PER501 – Environmental Protection. The former variable is in fact quite wide-ranging, encompassing calls for sustainable development, opposition to growth that causes societal or environmental harm, and rejection of the notion that all growth is good growth.

impetus for a niche party, however, the behaviour of mainstream parties across the political spectrum can shape niche party success. Through taking a hostile stance toward such 'owned' policy issues, a mainstream party can curtail the success of a niche party. But it can also leverage such a strategy into an attack on mainstream opponents proximate to that niche party, who are much likely to have adopted accommodating strategies (Meguid 2005, pp. 354-58). In other words, by taking a more adversarial stance toward environmental policy, the Liberals are able to both limit the influence of the Greens, and assail the positions of their primary opponent in Labor. This aspect of party competition is most evident since the lead-up to the 2010 federal election, when climate change and environmental policy more broadly became especially divisive issues. Thus, while the salience of environmental policy in 2010 increased considerably for all parties, neither are the Greens assuredly the catalyst for this shift, nor is the substantive quality of environmental policy necessarily the kind desired by the party. Further, though the perceived shortcomings of both Labor and Liberal parties may have served as a competitive advantage for the Greens in the 2010 election, the tangible policy advances in regard to the environment – notably, the price on carbon and related legislation – proved largely ephemeral (Crowley 2017).

Positional Stability Amid Shifting Salience in Platforms of the Greens

Now that we have established the broad dynamics of the ideological contest, this next section explores in greater depth the inter-relationships between the Greens and the party system. The observations of the Greens above accord with much of the international literature on the strategies of niche, policy-focused parties. Parties maintain a changing variety of sometimes contradictory goals (Harmel and Janda 1994; Strøm 1990a). Identifying these differing goals provides insight as to why parties behave and respond to identical events in different ways. While the 'catch-all' (Kirchheimer 1966) and 'electoral-professional' (Panebianco 1988) characteristics of the Labor and Liberal parties correspond with their demonstrated tendency to vacillate across substantial areas of the policy space, the Greens align more with the typical ideological and programmatic stability of niche parties (Adams et al. 2006, pp. 513-14). For any party, though, movement across the ideological and policy space entails a cost, whether in terms of electoral support or internal party cohesion (Robertson 1976, p. 40; Tavits 2007, pp.

152-53). For niche parties, the advocacy of a distinct ideology, or of particular policies, is of paramount importance. What is more, intra-party democracy and membership involvement in policy formulation often reinforces emphasis on policy advocacy, particularly among niche parties of the left (Fagerholm 2015, p. 4; Kitschelt 1989). Member involvement, however, tends to be dominated by small numbers of activists who maintain median ideological positions more extreme than both a party's wider support base and that of voters generally (Abou-Chadi & Orłowski, pp. 869-70; Kitschelt 1989, pp. 69-72).

The membership of the Australian Greens maintains significant input in the policy development process. With that said, as Jackson (2016) details, the Greens are experiencing creeping 'professionalisation' where some control of party processes is ceding to paid staff and parliamentarians. The party's activists are more ideologically extreme than both Greens voters and the wider Australian electorate (Jackson 2016, p. 78). This not only restricts the possible strategic adaptations of party elites, but also increases the potential internal costs of change (Adams et al. 2006, p. 514; Pedersen 2012, p. 898). Further, it raises the question as to whether the party's programmatic profile is more representative of the inclinations of party activists, or is more in line with the desires of current and likely Greens voters. Even for niche parties, there is an expectation that repositioning will occur in response to changing electoral tastes – though based on the attitudes of supporters, rather than the electorate in its totality (Ezrow et al. 2010, p. 288). Conversely, there is evidence suggesting that for niche parties generally, and the Greens specifically, ideological or policy moderation could in fact reduce electoral support (Charnock 2009, pp. 254-56). It is a difficult balance to strike; the conclusion of Adams et al. (2006, p. 526) that niche parties are "prisoners of their ideologies" may well also hold for the Australian Greens.

The Greens, though, have employed three separate but related strategies to alleviate such constraints on strategic adaptation, each of which find representations in the literature:

1. Changes in salience,
2. Emphasis on valence issues, and
3. Differing time horizons.

Exploring these strategies helps explain the Greens' overall positional stability, as well as the party's response to the constraints of inter- and intra-party dynamics. First, as Table 7.2 shows, there is considerable variation in the salience accorded by the Greens to the two dimensions of ideological competition, as well as to some of the individual policy areas that comprise the ideological space. The tables present, from 2004 to 2013, the percentage of each Greens policy program dedicated to the individual policy areas constituting the 'left', 'right', 'progressive-cosmopolitan', and 'conservative-nationalist' poles of the two-dimensional ideological space. The figure in each cell represents the salience, or degree of emphasis, the Greens attribute to that policy variable in their respective programs at a given election. Scores of zero reflect a policy stance not present in the party's program, while the 'total' rows represent the sum of policy emphases for that ideological dimension at each election. For instance, the figures show that the Greens have been consistent advocates for welfare state expansion (variable 'per504'), but with varying proportions of the party's platforms dedicated to this issue: from a low of 6.7 percent in 2004 to 16.8 percent in 2013. On the other hand, Table 7.2 reveals that the Greens have never, in any election platform, promoted a 'free market' economy (variable 'per401').

What is most striking is the reversal, over time, of the relative proportions of Greens policy programs afforded to the two dimensions. A comparison of the 'total' rows in Table 7.2 reveals that the Greens are becoming increasingly concerned with the questions of material equality. For any individual policy variable (e.g. education expansion, per506), though, there are few clear trends. This suggests that while the Greens may not be responding to shifts in public opinion with *positional* change, the party is adapting through moderate changes to the *salience* or emphasis given to particular issues. Political parties compete not only by adopting policy positions, but also by adjusting the degree to which a policy area is mentioned in party materials and campaigning (Meguid 2005, p. 349). Parties tend to emphasise those issues that they believe they 'own', but also often face incentives to contest the issue ownership of other parties, especially of ideologically-proximal rivals (Abou-Chadi 2014, pp. 419-20). The increasing emphasis given to the welfare state expansion by the Greens may be an example of the latter tactic, functioning as a broader strategy to compete in policy areas widely perceived to be part of the ideological tradition of the Labor Party.

Table 7.2 - Salience of policy issues of the left-right spectrum: Greens (%)

Left						Right					
Variable	Variable Name	2004	2007	2010	2013	Variable	Variable Name	2004	2007	2010	2013
PER403	Market regulation	0.7	0.4	1.4	4.8	PER303	Governmental efficiency	0.4	0.4	0.8	0
PER404	Economic planning	0	0.7	0.6	0.4	PER401	Free market economy	0	0	0	0
PER406	Protectionism: positive	0.4	0.7	0.1	0.6	PER402	Incentives: positive	0	0	0.4	0.2
PER409	Keynesian demand management	0	0	0.1	0	PER407	Protectionism: negative	0	0	0.1	0
PER412	Controlled economy	0	0.4	0.1	0	PER414	Economic orthodoxy	0	0	0.1	0
PER504	Welfare state expansion	6.7	13.1	9.9	16.8	PER505	Welfare state limitation	0.4	0	0	0
PER506	Education expansion	5.7	4.0	4.2	6.2	PER507	Education limitation	0.4	0.4	0.1	0
PER701	Labour groups: positive	5.0	6.6	3.4	4.3	PER702	Labour groups: negative	0	0	0	0
Total		18.4	25.9	19.7	33	Total		1.2	0.8	1.5	0.2
Progressive-Cosmopolitanism						Conservative-Nationalism					
Variable	Variable Name	2004	2007	2010	2013	Variable	Variable Name	2004	2007	2010	2013
PER105	Military: negative	5.7	4.0	1.4	0	PER104	Military: positive	0.4	0.4	0	0
PER107	Internationalism: positive	3.9	2.6	5.7	2.5	PER109	Internationalism: negative	0.7	1.1	0.6	0
PER201	Freedom and human rights	2.8	5.1	5.7	2.7	PER203	Constitutionalism: positive	0	0	0.1	0
PER503	Equality: positive	11.7	6.6	6.4	6.8	PER601	National way of life: positive	0	0.4	0.2	0
PER604	Traditional morality: negative	0.4	1.1	0.3	0	PER603	Traditional morality: positive	0	0	0.1	1.0
PER607	Multiculturalism: positive	2.1	1.8	3.1	0	PER605	Law and order: positive	0.7	0	0.8	0
PER705	Under-privileged minorities	7.1	7.3	3.9	5.2	PER608	Multiculturalism: negative	0	0	0	0
PER706	Non-economic demo. Groups	5.0	1.8	6.2	3.5	PER703	Agriculture and farmers	1.1	2.2	2.7	2.3
Total		38.5	30.3	32.6	20.7	Total		2.8	4.0	4.5	3.3

In addition to these variations in policy salience, a second means by which Greens elites have begun to circumvent some of the ideological trappings of the wider party is through leveraging the valence dimensions of party competition. The literature is replete with evidence regarding the significance of ‘valence’ issues in elections – that is, those issues where parties are understandably in agreement, such as the desire for low unemployment, and are thus judged by voters on the basis of unity, trust, and credibility.²⁶ In their study on party strategy, Adams et al. (2006, p. 526) concluded that there was “nothing in our findings to suggest that niche party elites cannot burnish their images with respect to these valence dimensions, thereby enhancing their party’s electoral appeal.” The perceptible effort from Greens parliamentarians, particularly from the leadership of Christine Milne onwards, to enhance the party’s perceived credibility in relation to economic management is an example of such an attempt to exploit valence evaluations (Bowman 2012; Hutchens 2015). Concerns with the valence dimensions of voting behaviour can also provide insight into the attempts by the party, under the leadership of Richard Di Natale, to ‘rebrand’ the party as that of the home of mainstream progressives, a party concerned more so with achieving practical policy solutions than with ideological purity (Lohrey 2015; Morris 2015; Taylor 2015).

Finally, the rhetoric of the Greens has consistently revealed electoral time horizons quite different to other parties in the Australian system. The party is not only quite confident that the times, eventually, will suit them, but also that their march toward a final goal of Greens government is inevitable – even if somewhat distant (Coorey 2015; Drummond 2016; Neighbour 2012; Tennant-Wood 2012). While we can interpret this as merely excusing relatively low levels of electoral support thus far, it does also align with findings from the international literature on niche party behaviour. Just as political parties can possess differing primary goals, so too can they maintain distinct ‘discount rates’ – that is, the degree to which they value short-term against long-term gains toward those goals (Laver & Hunt 1992, p. 74). Niche parties tend to prioritise long-term

²⁶ Much of this literature originates from outside of Australia, but see McAllister, Sheppard and Bean (2015) for one of the few, and most recent, studies on the influence of spatial and valence factors on the vote in Australian elections. Perhaps worryingly for the Greens, however, McAllister et al. found little evidence of valence factors influencing voting behaviour in Australia.

support in order to avoid ideological and programmatic compromise, whereas mainstream parties tend to emphasise more immediate objectives (Przeworski & Sprague 1986, pp. 119-120). Adams et al. (2006, p. 515) explain that this means that “to the extent that niche parties’ elites and activists have longer electoral time horizons than do mainstream party elites, we would expect niche parties to be less responsive to short-term trends in public opinion.” Thus, time horizons both provide further insight the positional stability of the Greens, as well as serve as a means by which party elites ostensibly believe that they can escape the trappings of that imposed stability – that is, with time, it will be irrelevant, or even perceived as a strength.

Conclusion: The Greens, Ideological Polarisation, and the Contest for Votes

This chapter had two main aims: to ascertain the extent of ideological polarisation in the Australian party system, and to determine the Greens’ role in any increase in polarisation or change in the mechanics of the party system. Ultimately, the primary contribution of the Greens is the mere act of existing. While the party’s impact on its rivals’ competitive adaptations appears minimal, the Greens occupy area in the ideological and policy space that would most likely remain otherwise uninhabited. Regardless of the scaling method employed, no other party has combined left-wing economic positions with a progressive cosmopolitanism to the degree advanced by the Greens. This contributes to the overall ideological polarisation present in the Australian party system, and reinforces the findings of chapter four. In particular, there is little doubt of the progressive nature of the Greens. The social, moral and cultural variables that constitute the second dimension of ideological competition account for, on average, a third of all Greens policy statements. The direction of these statements is not only overwhelmingly skewed toward the progressive-cosmopolitan pole, but also tends to be apportioned widely across the component policy variables. In other words, the Greens generally promote a comprehensively progressive platform, as shown in Table 7.2, rather than emphasising a small number of favoured issues.

In contrast, the matter of how far 'left' the ideological profile of the Greens is a great deal more complex. According to Manning and Rootes (2005, p. 406), writing in the aftermath of the 2004 election, socialists within the party "determinedly seek to spirit the party away from its original environmentalist focus." Putting aside the claim that the Australian Greens ever maintained an environmentalist *focus*, rather than an environmental or ecological *basis*, there is evidence of a general leftward direction in the party's programmatic profile since that 2004 election. Jackson (2016), meanwhile, permeates his study of party organisational development in the Greens with an implicit but clear belief that the party's natural ideological positioning is to the far left of the political spectrum. The theoretical underpinnings of the Green political movement have never been as narrow as Manning and Rootes might suggest, nor founded upon the *traditional* leftism through which Jackson apparently perceives the Australian Greens (e.g. see Barry 1999; Brown & Singer 1996; De Geus 1996; Doherty 2002; Eckersley 2004; Hutton 1987).

At first glance, though, the data presented in this chapter might appear to support a view of the Greens as a party of the traditional far left. Such a conclusion, however, would be a simplistic interpretation of the results. The left-right dimension of ideological competition in the Australian party system is fundamentally concerned with material equality and inequality. In practical policy terms, this manifests as differing views as to the appropriate level of state intervention in the economy. In this broad sense, this chapter's spatial mapping demonstrates that the Greens fall unequivocally on the side of interventionist economic policy in the pursuit of greater equality. Nonetheless, when one considers the salience of this economic dimension to the Greens, and the policies that contribute toward the Greens' aggregated position along this dimension, it becomes clear that any ideological categorisation of the Greens as a party of the left must come with caveats.

First, as shown in Table 7.2, the average salience of the left-right dimension for the Greens has been considerably lower than that recorded by the mainstream parties. If one examines the communist parties of European party systems, surely a benchmark for the contemporary far left, there is an emphasis among these parties on economic policy (Bischof 2015, pp. 3-4). This is a

degree of emphasis far beyond that found in the platforms of the Australian Greens. While the Greens are most certainly a party of the left in the sense of a relatively consistent programmatic commitment to enhancing material equality, the lack of weight afforded to this dimension of ideological competition weakens any conventional far left categorisation. Second, the Greens have consistently put forward a remarkably narrow range of economic policy. Table 7.2 reveals that policies relating to the expansion of the welfare state is in large part responsible for the left-wing positioning of the party. This is a far-reaching variable (per504), incorporating social services, healthcare, and pensions, but it accounts for roughly half of the party's 'left' score in any election. Moreover, there is little to no mention in Greens programs of economic planning, nationalisation, demand management, industry protection, or the controlled economy. Nor is there any reference to Marxist analysis, as is found in the programs of European parties of the far left. Certainly, much of this also applies to the Labor Party, but then, there are few sincere claims that Labor occupy the far left of the political spectrum.

The Greens are, therefore, a party of the left, but not of the left as it is traditionally understood. Thus, I make a distinction here that contrasts with much of the extant literature on the Greens and significantly improves our understanding of the ideological traditions of the party. The emphasis placed on expanding welfare, public services, and education provides for some programmatic affinity with more conventional left and far left parties. Such policy positions also align with social democratic and reformist welfare liberal traditions present since the earliest decades of the Australian party system. Moreover, green political theory has long incorporated a concern with socioeconomic justice grounded upon ecological principles of interdependence rather than class analysis or conceptions of positive liberty. Though, it is difficult to determine the extent to which Greens members and elites are motivated by green theory, despite the obvious similarities in name. Nevertheless, the commitment to a comprehensive welfare state, and the associated implications for the size of government, shifts the Greens to the left in both the ideological spectrum of this chapter and in the perceptions of voters (as shown in the fourth chapter). Despite such estimations, and while individual members and party elites may maintain their own philosophical worldviews, the policy material of the Greens appears to lack the type of

comprehensive and unified positions necessary to match the party's rhetoric of a meaningful transformation of existing political, economic, and social systems.²⁷

A key complication for the party going forward is the emergence of different patterns of party competition between the overall Australian party system and the sub-system that has developed centred on the Senate. Chapters four and five demonstrate that the Senate is increasingly exhibiting indicators of multiparty competition. Weakened centripetal directions of competition are often associated with multiparty competition; that is, there are fewer incentives for parties, especially small and niche parties, to converge toward the centre of the ideological matrix (Abou-Chadi & Orłowski 2016, pp. 868-69). This contrasts, however, with some of the enduring elements of two-partism in the Australian party system, notably the dynamics surrounding the competition for government and election to the House of Representatives, which do still reward centripetal competition toward the median voter. This difference between sites of competition is not only the result of the diverging number and nature of systemically-relevant parties, but is also driven by the fact that many Australian voters can and do differentiate between the House and the Senate, and subsequently engage in split-ticket voting (Bowler & Denmark 1993).

The question is, what does this entail for the Greens as the party seeks to forge optimal campaign strategies for the House of Representatives and the Senate? As Bolleyer (2007) argues, more centrist positions are advantageous for smaller parties in fulfilling office-seeking goals through inclusion in governing coalitions. Western European party systems, moreover, demonstrate that parties on the ideological periphery are far more likely to be subject to a *cordon sanitaire* and excluded entirely from coalition negotiations, except in rare circumstances. The manner in which the Greens 2016 election campaign was run, with a particular focus on lower house seats in inner-

²⁷ A key caveat to this statement is that it is founded upon the MP coding system, which by necessity allocates party statements into coding categories designed to capture the positions all parties, regardless of party type, party family, or guiding ideology. Given that part of the Green movement's distinctive claim has been that it is opposed to the 'industrialism' of other parties, and measurement of competition between such parties is grounded in that industrialism, there is an argument to be made that the coding system could well obfuscate what transformative statements the party does make.

city Melbourne and Sydney, moderate rhetoric eschewing ideology and advocating compromise, and active discussion of coalition partnerships, suggests an evolution in Greens strategy.²⁸ Such a change, though, not only risks internal disunity where we observe fundamental internal disagreement over whether the party should aspire to government, but may also be detrimental to wider electoral appeal. An overriding determination to win lower house seats and invite coalition negotiations does little to benefit the party in those states where even the election of Greens to the Senate is far from certain. Indeed, there is already indication of a regionalisation of the Greens' success, with a considerable disparity between the party's performance in states such as Victoria and Tasmania relative to South Australia and Queensland. In the next chapter, we examine the success and context of the Greens' appeals to the electorate, analysing the party system and individual-level drivers behind the party's support amongst voters.

²⁸ The conversation surrounding coalition government was rather one-way, however, as both the Labor and Liberal parties rejected participation in such an arrangement with the Greens (Massola & Kenny 2016).

THE PARTY SYSTEMIC AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DRIVERS OF THE GREEN VOTE

Party systems are the product of recurrent party interactions in the contests for votes, government, and legislative outcomes. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which the Greens have influenced the contest for votes. The Australian Greens, following their emergence as a national party in 1992, slowly developed an electoral niche, increasing their vote in the House of Representatives from 1.9 percent in 1993 to a peak of 11.8 percent at the 2010 federal election. While the 2013 federal election, following the Greens' single instance of partnership with a governing party, saw the party lose votes across both the House and Senate, the 2016 election brought a positive swing to the Greens in the House. This gradual expansion of electoral support, shown in Figure 8.1 below, is typical of green parties, and is markedly different to the sudden insurgency often displayed by parties of the far right (Wolinetz & Zaslove 2018a). The steadiness of the general trend of the Greens' vote suggests that there may be a consolidating sociodemographic or attitudinal basis to the party's support, allowing the party to resist, to a degree, the adversarial strategic responses of its mainstream competitors.

This chapter, therefore, analyses the party systemic and individual-level drivers of the Greens vote. At the party system level, the focus is on party competition in an ideological and policy context; it is this component of the party system that is most likely to constrain or facilitate the electoral rise of the Greens. Unlike in the Western European context, alternation or innovation in governing coalitions is not currently a relevant factor, given the continued dominance of the Labor and Liberal-National Coalition over government formation. To test the relationship between party competition and the Greens vote, I use party positions from chapter seven, which are based on calculations of Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2018) data. There are conceptual and methodological drawbacks to using the Manifesto Project data. Nevertheless, the MP dataset is the most complete and appropriate data available for testing the influence of party system

variables in the Australian context. On the other hand, to explore the potential sociodemographic and/or attitudinal basis of the Greens' vote, this chapter employs the 2016 edition of the Australian Election Study (AES). The AES also has its limitations, most notably in terms of the range of questions, its sampling, and the lack of a panel component (Goot 2013). Nevertheless, it is the best publicly available data source on Australian political attitudes and is widely used in the discipline.




Figure 8.1 - The Greens vote, House and Senate, 1993-2016
Source: Australian Electoral Commission (AEC).

The findings of this chapter suggest that, contrary to previous research on the Australian Greens (e.g. Vromen & Turnbull 2006), the Greens benefit from increased system polarisation and ideological divergence between the major parties, rather than convergence. Similarly, the movements of the Liberal Party toward more conservative and nationalist positions on social-cultural issues are also associated with an increase in the Greens vote in the House of Representatives. While not meeting the threshold of statistical significance, there is also a strong positive relationship between Labor taking more left-wing positions on economic issues and support for the Greens. At the level of individual voters, the results of cross-tabulations and three

models of multinomial logistic regression suggest that the party's electoral success derives mostly from a shared set of political attitudes and values amongst its voters. While in a generalised sense, a range of demographic groups typify the Greens vote – women, the young, highly educated, social-cultural specialists, non-religious, urban residents, and so on – few of these are statistically significant predictors of the vote when holding all other variables constant. On the other hand, the party's voters are more clearly defined by their left-wing, progressive-cosmopolitan positions in the ideological matrix, high salience attributed to the environment, and (to some degree) postmaterial values.

Literature Review: The Green Vote

A central contention of this thesis is that while the Greens, as a strategic actor, have influenced the party system, the system itself has also conditioned and constrained the trajectory of the party. This assertion draws upon Sartori's (1976) argument that a party system is more than the sum of its constituent elements. A party *system* can be a source of political change or even inertia, as the system becomes "propelled and maintained by its own laws of momentum." (Sartori 1968, p. 21) This is because the format and mechanics of party systems are inextricably intertwined with political stability (Sartori 1976, pp. 316-17). Two-party systems and moderate pluralism foster stability, while polarised pluralism is both marked by and foments political instability. At the mechanical level, this is the result of the direction of party competition, shaped by the number of relevant parties and the degree of ideological polarisation (Sartori 1976, pp. 126-28). The effects of these two interrelated variables have been demonstrated empirically. Pedersen (1979), for instance, demonstrated an association between the number of parties and aggregate electoral volatility, with ideological polarisation as a causal mechanism. Party system fragmentation (an increase in the number of parties) influences government formation, executive-legislative dynamics, government-opposition relations, and policy agendas (Brooks 2007; Golder 2006; Tsebelis 2002).²⁹ Ideological polarisation, on the other hand, has been shown to impact democratic

²⁹ Also see chapter eleven of this thesis.

stability, but also aspects of voter behaviour: turnout, party switching, ideological voting, and the influence of class (Crepaz 1990; Dejaeghere & Dassonneville 2017; Elff 2009; Lachat 2008; Sani & Sartori 1983).

Party system dynamics are also linked with the emergence and prospects of anti-political-establishment parties, including those of the green and radical right party families. As Abedi (2002, pp. 552-53) asserts, however, the literature long neglected the role that party system variables might play in the success of anti-political-establishment parties. Instead, institutional (especially electoral system) and sociodemographic explanations dominated scholarship (e.g. Harmel & Robertson 1985; Muller-Rommel 1989; Richardson & Rootes 1995). Nevertheless, there remains a strong theoretical case that party systems (alongside electoral systems) can facilitate, or hinder, the rise of green (and radical right) parties. While an increase in the number of parties may be associated with a rise in electoral volatility – an expanding range of parties enhances the likelihood of alternatives to previous vote choices (Blais & Gschwend 2010) – this can be as much a cost as it is a benefit for challenger parties. Rather, it is the degree of ideological polarisation that is more likely to shape the success of anti-political-establishment parties. Indeed, higher polarisation can offset electoral volatility; voter defection is less likely where there is greater space between parties' ideological positions (Hazan 1997). Explanations for this effect are both on the 'demand' side relating to Downsian proximity voting (e.g. Tavits 2005), as well as the 'supply' side where, in more polarised systems, parties are more likely to represent particular social cleavages (Mair 1995).

Two main facets of ideological polarisation affect the success of anti-political-establishment parties: first, the ideological space between the party system's two most distant parties; and second, the ideological space between the (often two) dominant mainstream parties. Relevant, too, is the ideological positioning of the mainstream party most proximate to the challenger party – for instance, the position of Labor relative to the Greens. Hainsworth (1992, p. 11) posits that ideological and policy convergence between establishment parties creates a favourable environment for the distinct appeals of anti-political-establishment parties. Similarly, Kitschelt

(1988, pp. 215-16) argues that the movement of socialist and social democratic parties toward the centre of the ideological spectrum facilitated the rise of green and left-libertarian parties. In contrast, however, Ignazi (1996; 1997) argues that it is ideological *divergence* – greater polarisation – between establishment parties that increases the electoral success of far right and green parties. According to Ignazi, these latter party families experienced electoral success in the 1980s and 1990s after establishment parties adopted aspects of the ‘new politics’ agenda. This not only legitimised these issue dimensions, but permanently expanded the ideological space, from which anti-political-establishment parties benefit even after establishment parties move back to the centre. Empirical tests of these competing hypotheses, however, have returned contradictory results and often focus solely on extreme right parties (Abedi 2002; Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Spies & Franzmann 2011).

The contradictory theoretical arguments put forward in the literature lead to three competing hypotheses to test for the Australian case:

***H1:** The greater the ideological polarisation present in the Australian party system, the higher the Greens’ vote share.*

***H2:** The smaller the ideological distance between the Labor and Liberal parties, the higher the Greens’ vote share.*

***H3:** The further the Labor Party, as the Greens’ most ideologically-proximate competitor, positions itself to the left and progressive ends of the ideological space, the higher the Greens’ vote share.*

With some notable exceptions, neither international nor Australian scholarship has given much attention to role of party system variables in explaining the green vote. To the extent that party competition is considered, it is predominantly limited to party positioning on ‘new politics’ issues, or as a minor facet in institutional or ‘political opportunity structures’ approaches (e.g.

Burchall 2002; Kitschelt 1988; Rohrschneider 1993). The literature is thus dominated by 'demand-side' explanations, primarily encompassing sociodemographic and attitudinal variables at the individual voter level. These are, nonetheless, vital contributions in the effort to understand the rise of the Australian Greens and the green party family generally. The leading approach has been sociological, identifying green parties as the political representation of value change or the emergence of new social cleavages in the electorate. The rise of the greens has therefore been ascribed to postmaterialism (Betz 1990; Inglehart 1977; 1990), new politics (O'Neill 1997; Poguntke 1987), and left-libertarianism (Kitschelt 1988; 1989). While each of these accounts incorporate environmental concern, they have nevertheless been criticised for underplaying the significance of the ecological dimension of green politics (Franklin and Rüdig 1995; Lowe & Rüdig 1986; Rüdig 1990). There is, according to this line of critique, a broadly similar ecological agenda at the core of green party identities, which also constitutes the primary basis upon which these parties compete for and attain votes.

While there are conflicting views in the literature as to the underlying stability of the green vote, there is nevertheless broad agreement on the primary sociodemographic variables driving this vote. Across (predominantly Western European) nations, green party voters are disproportionately young, female, highly educated, new middle class, working in the public sector, non-religious, and residing in urban areas (Birch 2009; Knutsen 2005; Müller-Rommel 1990; Poguntke 1987; Rüdig 2012). There is less agreement, however, on whether these demographic variables *determine* a vote for the green party; indeed, while acknowledging that supporters of the greens exhibited particular social characteristics, Müller-Rommel (2002, p. 124) found that belonging to such groups is "no strong predictor" of a green vote. Going further, Franklin and Rüdig (1995) claim that the social foundations of European Green voting are "far too heterogenous to suggest a stable social basis" and reject the idea that "Green parties represent a narrowly defined social group." In contrast, Veen (1989) argued that the Greens – at least in West Germany – represented a 'milieu party' with a distinct social structure reinforced by an alternative socio-cultural 'integration network'. More recently, Dolezal (2010, p. 547) asserts that the longevity of West European green parties derives from a "specific social and attitudinal

basis.” Certain social variables – age, education, occupation, geographic location, and religion – are predictors of a green vote and, further, link with environmental, libertarian and pro-immigration attitudes that simultaneously shape voting behaviour.

Scholarship specific to the Australian Greens tends to adopt the approaches of the literature on Western European green parties, with an emphasis on institutional, social structural, and attitudinal explanations. At the institutional level, federalism, bicameralism, and the permissiveness of the electoral system employed for the Senate features prominently in investigations of the Australian Greens and other minor parties (Donovan 2000; Ghazarian 2015; Miragliotta 2012). Moreover, the Australian literature is more willing to identify a sociodemographic foundation to the Greens’ vote. Cahill and Brown (2008) argue that the Greens are an exception to Bean’s and Papadakis’s (1995, p. 111) claim that support for minor parties in Australia is not underpinned by “systematic social structural factors.” Cahill and Brown (2008, p. 261) highlight, in particular, the significance of class, occupation, and education to the Green vote. Barry et al. (2016, p. 36) offer a narrower, and perhaps less accurate conclusion, claiming the Greens have “no clear cleavage constituency other than inner-city dwellers” and “culture-creatives”. Miragliotta (2013), meanwhile, found that age, occupation, and social class are significant predictors of partisan identification with the Greens. These social characteristics, Miragliotta (2013, p. 722) contends, are “fairly uniform and stable, providing the party with the basis for a potentially distinctive and reliable constituency.” Significant also are attitudinal variables, voters’ left-right position and degree of postmaterialism, which reflects earlier findings for the Greens’ vote (Charnock 2009; Miragliotta 2013; Western & Tranter 2001).

Given this chapter’s focus on exploring both the contextual party system *and* individual-level determinants of the vote for the Australian Greens, this review of the literature gives rise to two additional hypotheses:

***H4:** There exists a social-structural basis to the vote for the Australian Greens, with age, occupation, education, and (lack of) religious belief as significant predictors.*

H5: There exists an attitudinal basis to the Australian Greens vote, with voters' positions on left-right, material-postmaterial, and environmental indices as significant predictors.

Theory and Methods

Testing the above five hypotheses requires analysis of both aggregate electoral data, as well as individual-level voter data. The first three hypotheses seek to add a contextual explanation to variation in the Green vote, defined here as the nation-wide vote for the Australian Greens in the House of Representatives at federal elections from 1993 to 2013. These voting data are drawn from official Australian Electoral Commission results (AEC 2018). The final two hypotheses, tested using data on voter attitudes sourced through the 2016 Australian Election Study, likewise focus on finding voter-level determinants of a vote for the Greens in the House. This is contrary to most existing studies on the Greens' electorate, which instead examine the Senate (e.g. Tranter 2011). Voters for the Greens in the House, however, more directly influence the *core* of the party system: the structure of competition for government. Moreover, given that minor parties have historically received greater support in the Senate than in the House (Donovan 2000, p. 477) – often due to tactical 'split-ticket' voting as a 'check' on major party governments (Bowler & Denmark 1993) – it is plausible that House Greens voters are representative of a more 'committed' Green electorate. Further, contrary to Miragliotta (2013), House Greens voters are the focus, rather than voters that identify with the Greens, as there is little persuasive theoretical or empirical reason that party identifiers are a more meaningful source of party system change than the full cohort of party support (see more on the problematic use of party identification below).

Investigating the first three hypotheses also require data on ideological polarisation and positioning in the Australian party system. For the first hypothesis, we define ideological polarisation as the Euclidean distance between the positions of the two most ideologically remote

relevant parties in a two-dimensional space. This two-dimensional ideological space was developed, following a deductive method, in the sixth chapter of this thesis. It consists of: firstly, a left-right dimension founded on competing conceptions on the role of the state in the economy; and secondly, a progressive-conservative dimension encompassing social and cultural matters. This space comprises the Manifesto Project variables outlined in Table 8.1 and Table 8.2. Party positions, meanwhile, are determined by a ratio scaling of the Manifesto Project’s quantification of party policy positions, as outlined in chapters six and seven.

Table 8.1 - Operationalisation of the left-right dimension

Left	Right
PER403: Market Regulation	PER303: Govt and Admin. Efficiency
PER404: Economic Planning	PER401: Free Market Economy
PER406: Protectionism – Positive	PER402: Incentives – Positive
PER409: Keynesian Demand Management	PER407: Protectionism – Negative
PER412: Controlled Economy	PER414: Economic Orthodoxy
PER504: Welfare State Expansion	PER505: Welfare State Limitation
PER506: Education Expansion	PER507: Education Limitation
PER701: Labour Groups – Positive	PER702: Labour Groups – Negative

For the second hypothesis, mainstream or ‘establishment’ party divergence is operationalised as the Euclidean distance between the Labor and Liberal parties in this two-dimensional ideological space.³⁰ There can therefore be some overlap between these measures of polarisation and mainstream party divergence, but only in the handful of elections where the two major parties are the most remote relevant parties in the system. Lastly, for the third hypothesis, this chapter tests the Greens’ House vote against Labor’s position on the left-right and progressive-conservative dimensions separately. Each hypothesis is tested by way of a correlation between the relevant ideological variable and the Greens vote in the House.

³⁰ The Nationals have been excluded from the analysis due to flaws for this party in the Manifesto Project dataset, as outlined in chapter seven.

Table 8.2 - Operationalisation of the progressive-conservative dimension

Progressive-Cosmopolitan	Conservative-Nationalist
PER105: Military – Negative	PER104: Military – Positive
PER107: Internationalism – Positive	PER109: Internationalism – Negative
PER201: Freedom & Human Rights	PER203: Constitutionalism – Positive
PER503: Equality – Positive	PER601: National Way of Life – Positive
PER604: Traditional Morality – Negative	PER603: Traditional Morality – Positive
PER607: Multiculturalism – Positive	PER605: Law and Order – Positive
PER705: Underprivileged Minority Groups	PER608: Multiculturalism – Negative
PER706: Non-economic Demographic Groups	PER703: Agriculture and Farmers

This chapter explores hypotheses four and five through an interrogation of survey responses from the 2016 Australian Election Study. The existence of a social and/or attitudinal basis of the Green vote is investigated first through descriptive cross-tabulation, and subsequently through multinomial logistic regression. In the cross-tabulations, the demographic profile of Greens voters is compared against the profiles of those who voted for the Labor and Liberal parties in the House of Representatives. In the multinomial regression analyses, across three models, House of Representatives vote serves as the independent variable, with a vote for the Greens as the reference category. Setting the Greens vote as the reference category allows for the identification of those predictors, when controlling for all other variables in the model, that lead to a Greens vote rather than a Liberal vote, as well as a Greens vote rather than a Labor vote.³¹ Previous analyses of the Greens vote have either: constructed the dependent variable as a binary choice (i.e. Greens vs. all other parties; e.g. Tranter 2011) or set one of the major parties as the reference category (e.g. Miragliotta 2013). The former option “mis-specifies the actual choice process” by portraying all other parties as a “homogenous entity” (Franklin & Renko, p. 94), while the latter does not readily allow for comparison between the results of the choices we are interested in (i.e. the choice between Greens vs. Liberals, Greens vs. Labor). Table 8.3 lists the dependent variables for these analyses.

³¹ See Rüdig’s (2012) study on the German Greens’ support base for a similar approach.

Table 8.3 - Sociodemographic and attitudinal variables

Sociodemographic variables	
Gender	Social class (subjective)
Age	Housing
Education	Geographic location
Occupation	Religion
Sector of employment	Religious attendance
Union membership	
Attitudinal variables	
Post-materialism	Progressive-conservative index
Left-right position	Environment index

Many of the variables included in the cross-tabulations or employed as predictors in the regression models are relatively straightforward and uncontroversial. Indeed, in a broad sense, each of the variables listed feature amongst the literature on green parties or on political behaviour in Australia (Dolezal 2010; McAllister 1992; Miragliotta 2013). Some, however, need further justification for their inclusion or operationalisation, or explanation due to their theoretical importance to the green vote. Education, for instance, is expected to be a significant predictor of the Greens vote. As the descriptive statistics and earlier studies demonstrate, Greens voters are more likely than other voters to hold university degrees. Education has also been identified as the basis for a potential new social cleavage in post-industrial democracies (Stubager 2010; 2013). Geography, meanwhile, speaks to the traditional centre versus periphery cleavage (Lipset & Rokkan 1967), but is of added importance for green parties given that green and new social movements predominantly emerged from urban, highly populated environments (Close & Delwit 2016, p. 253; Kriesi 1993). A significant source of support for these movements have been workers in the public sector. As Webb (2000, pp. 56-59) explains, this is theorised to be the result of ideological predisposition (favouring state intervention), self-interest (for employment or support), and socialisation effects (in the workplace). Particular classes or occupations, then, may also be more likely to vote for the Greens.

The influence of class on voting has been at the centre of an especially vigorous debate in political science, both internationally and within Australian scholarship (e.g. Charnock 1997; Evans 1999; Franklin 1992; Goot 1994; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1999). A general conclusion, at least more recently, is that the importance of class voting has considerably reduced over the preceding decades. While green parties have been portrayed as existing outside of traditional cleavages (Dalton 2006a, pp. 167-68), there are nevertheless frequent claims as to the 'new middle class' origins of green electorates. Dolezal (2010, pp. 537-38), however, argues that it is necessary to further disaggregate the new middle class, citing different 'work logics' (Oesch 2006), noting the particular likelihood of 'social-cultural specialists' to vote green.³² As such, the operationalisation of (objective) class in this chapter is a simplified Goldthorpe schema (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992) with social-cultural specialists as a separate category. Conceptualising class as synonymous with occupational category is, admittedly, somewhat narrow, and a common problem in regression analyses of voting behaviour (Von Beyme 1985, p. 287). Occupational category does, however, encompass employment relations, work logics, and some shared life-chances (Chan & Goldthorpe 2007, p. 514), even if shared identity and group consciousness are left out (Aitkin 1976, p. 404).

In addition to these sociodemographic predictors, there are four attitudinal variables explored in testing this chapter's hypotheses. The attitudinal variables capture the two primary dimensions of political competition (left versus right, and progressive versus conservative), the 'value divide' between materialists and postmaterialists, and the salience of environmental issues. Many green parties, including the Australian Greens, have often tried to portray themselves as 'neither left nor right, but out in front' (Manning 2002, p. 17). There is a persuasive element to these claims, given the rejection of industrialism and unchecked economic growth at the core of green political thought (Richardson 1995, p. 11). Green parties, however, have regularly positioned themselves on the left of the political spectrum. The Australian Greens favour state intervention in the economy in the pursuit of greater equality – even if it is a qualitatively different, more expansive

³² See also the earlier work of Kriesi (1989; 1993) on social-cultural professionals and participation in 'new social movements' in the Netherlands.

conception of equality than traditional left-wing parties promote (Dolezal 2010, pp. 541-42; Holloway et al. 2018). Contrary to previous studies (e.g. Miragliotta 2013), this chapter does not employ respondents' self-location on a left-right scale to test the political attitudes of Greens voters. Such self-placement has a great deal of 'baggage', encompassing social identity, political values, and pre-existing partisan preferences (Evans 2010, p. 636; Freire 2006, p. 360). Following Dolezal (2010) and Close and Delwit (2016), this chapter gauges voters' left-right positions from a survey question directly relating to the size of government and its role in the economy.³³

In contrast, the extent to which Greens voters are motivated by attitudes toward the progressive-conservative ideological dimension is measured by an index. As outlined in chapters six and seven, there is strong theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence of a second primary dimension to political competition, including in Australia. As this dimension comprises social and cultural issues, and aspects of the 'culture wars' (Johnson 2007; Snow & Moffitt 2012), it is not possible to condense the variable to a single question from the AES. Instead, seven questions, detailed in Table 8.4, are combined into an additive index³⁴, with responses to each question given equal weighting. The index comprises competing approaches to hierarchy and tolerance and is therefore similar to the authoritarian-libertarian divide in Western European countries (Stubager 2010, pp. 508-09). The environmental index³⁵, on the other hand, consists of two questions inviting respondents to indicate the salience of global warming and the environment to their vote choice.³⁶ This additive index tests what may be intuitively obvious, but nonetheless vitally important in a model of Greens vote choice: the importance of the ecological dimension of politics. Lastly, the postmaterialist versus materialist variable is derived from Inglehart's four-item battery, with

³³ The question used, from the 2016 AES, is worded: "If the government had a choice between reducing taxes or spending more on social services, which do you think it should do?" Responses of 'strongly favour reducing taxes' and 'mildly favour reducing taxes' were combined to constitute a right-wing orientation, 'depends' is equivalent to a centrist disposition, and 'strongly' and 'mildly favour' spending more on social services are categorised as a left-wing preference.

³⁴ Cronbach's alpha = 0.753.

³⁵ Cronbach's alpha = 0.807.

³⁶ These two questions are part of an 'election issues' umbrella question: "When you were deciding about how to vote, how important was each of these issues to you personally?"

respondents categorised into one of four categories: postmaterialist, mostly postmaterialist, mostly materialist, materialist.

Table 8.4 - Variables of the progressive-conservative additive index

Issue	Question
Indigenous Australians	<i>“For each [change], please say whether you think the change has gone too far, not gone far enough, or is it about right?”</i> <i>“Government help for Aborigines”</i>
Law and order	<i>“The death penalty should be reintroduced for murder.”</i> <i>“The smoking of marijuana should NOT be a criminal offence.”</i>
Asylum seekers	<i>“All boats carrying asylum seekers should be turned back.”</i>
Immigration	<i>“Immigrants increase the crime rate.”</i>
LGBTI rights	<i>“Do you personally favour or oppose same sex couples being given the same rights to marry as couples consisting of a man and a woman?”</i>
Democracy	<i>“Do you think that Australia should become a republic with an Australian head of state, or should the Queen be retained as head of state?”</i>

Lastly, one omission from the regression models requires some explanation given its popularity as an explanation for voting behaviour in Australia: party identification (e.g. Aitkin 1982; Bean & McAllister 2015; McAllister 2011). Party identification is indeed prevalent and relatively stable in Australia compared to other similar democracies (see Webb et al. 2003), even if the strength of partisanship is declining (Smith 2001, p. 58). Nevertheless, there are several reasons to question the significance attributed to partisan identification in determining vote choice, especially as it relates to the Greens. As Webb (2000, p. 44) explains, party identification consists of two main concepts: “long-term affective attachment to a ‘group-object’ in the social environment” and political socialisation. First, at the conceptual level, the widespread existence of genuinely long-term, durable psychological attachments to parties has been questioned (see Fiorina 1981; Johnston & Pattie 1996). At the methodological level, Smith (2001, p. 49) highlights how traditional accounts of party identification “rely on what people say about parties” rather than on what voters actually do. Second, the socialisation component of party identification is said to begin within the family, even if it later might be reinforced by other groups and contexts, such as

the workplace. For the Greens, familial socialisation is not a persuasive explanation for vote choice, given Australian greens parties are relatively new (Goot 2013, p. 373).

Beyond the conceptual and methodological limitations of party identification, the traditionalist applications of party identification in explanations of Australian voting behaviour are also questionable. Goot (2013, pp. 373-74), for instance, points to three main deficiencies in explanations of vote choice that centre on party identification: an overestimation of political stability, an inability to account for surges in popularity of (in particular) new parties, and the fluidity of identification shown in panel studies of voters (e.g. Clarke et al. 2009, pp. 327-30). In what is the most persuasive 'revisionist view' of party identification in the Australian context, Smith (2001, p. 55) argues that traditionalists have "tended to play down the elements of change" in party identification and viewed "any electoral volatility... as a protest vote." Pointing to, in particular, the work of McAllister (and Ascuí 1988; and Bean 1997), Smith (2001, pp. 55-56) shows that traditionalists rely on votes for minor parties being characterised as short-term phenomena, leaving a great deal of political change in the last few decades of Australian politics unexplained. For Smith (2001, pp. 51-63), partisanship is more enduring than in some 'stronger' revisionist accounts of party identification, but open to gradual change over time. There remains, however the question of whether "party identification influences vote" or "vote influence party identification" (Curtice 2002, p. 162), especially in the Australian context where compulsory voting likely reinforces reported party identification (Mackerras & McAllister 1999, pp. 229-30).

Results: The Party System, Demographics, and Political Attitudes

Turning first to the party system context of the Greens vote, the results demonstrate a strong and statistically significant association between party positioning and electoral success. Table 8.5 outlines the ideological positions of the Liberal, Labor and Greens parties from 1993 to 2013, alongside measurements of major party divergence, party system polarisation, and the Green

vote.³⁷ For both the left-right and progressive-conservative dimensions of ‘ideological position’, a party can be positioned anywhere along the spectrums ranging from -100 to +100. Scores of -100 are the most left-wing and progressive positions, while +100 represents the most right-wing and conservative positions. Ideological divergence between the two major parties is measured as the Euclidean distance between the parties’ coordinates in the two-dimensional space; polarisation is similarly measured but between the two most distant relevant parties. At first glance, the findings suggest a potential relationship between – at least – the degree of systemic polarisation and the Greens vote. Generally, as ‘party system polarisation’ has increased, so too has the Green vote. The Greens vote and ‘Labor-Liberal divergence’ exhibits a similar relationship, but for fewer elections.

Table 8.5 - Ideological polarisation and party positioning - 1993-2013

Election Year	Ideological position (left-right, progressive-conservative)			Labor-Liberal divergence	Party system polarisation	Greens Vote (%)
	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Labor</i>	<i>Greens</i>			
1993	53.92, -65.22	-2.53, -75.38		57.4	57.4	1.86
1996	10.2, -15.07	-24.08, -17.85		34.4	80.6	2.92
1998	40, -11.76	-58.97, -29.41		100.5	100.5	2.14
2001	-29.41, 65.45	-58.82, -16.46		87	129.9	4.96
2004	3.08, 21.94	-64.23, -24.82	-89.19, -86.31	82	142.2	7.19
2007	-1.61, 15.99	-60.37, 2.48	-94.59, -76.66	60.3	131.3	7.79
2010	48.15, 100	-71.43, -47.45	-85.85, -75.74	189.8	221	11.76
2013	43.41, 8.96	-36.09, -60.32	-98.84, -72.58	105.5	164	8.65

Source: Author’s own calculations using Manifesto Project data.

Note: Labor-Liberal divergence and party system polarisation scores differ where there is another significant party closer to the poles of the two-dimensional space than either of the major parties.

To examine these relationships more closely, Table 8.6 presents a series of correlations between the aggregate national vote for the Greens in the House of Representatives and party positioning. Each row corresponds with one of the first three hypotheses set out for this chapter. First and foremost, the table demonstrates a remarkably strong ($r = 0.95$) and statistically significant ($p <$

³⁷ Data for the Greens prior to 2004 is unavailable, as the Manifesto Project only deemed the Greens a ‘relevant’ party from 2004. Likewise, the figures cease at 2013 as party programs from the most recent Australian federal election are yet to be included in the Project’s dataset.

0.01) relationship between the Greens vote and the level of party system polarisation. As party system polarisation increases, so too does the vote for the Greens. In some elections, but not all, the Greens have contributed to ideological polarisation, suggesting that the party has derived some success from establishing a left-progressive niche in the party system. This relationship between system polarisation and the Greens vote supports Hypothesis 1 – that is, the greater the ideological polarisation, the higher the Greens vote. Moreover, it accords with Ignazi’s (1996; 1997) contention that, contrary to Hainsworth (1992), it is overall ideological polarisation that benefits radical right and green parties – not a contraction of the ideological space.

Table 8.6 - Correlations between party ideological positioning and the Greens vote – 1993-2013

	Relationship with Greens vote in the House		
	r	r ²	p
Ideological polarisation (2D)	0.95	0.90	<0.01
Labor-Liberal ideological divergence	0.71	0.5	<0.05
Labor left-right position	0.6	0.36	0.12
Labor progressive-conservative position	0.02	0.00	0.96
Liberal left-right position	0.04	0.00	0.92
Liberal progressive-conservative position	0.77	0.59	<0.05

Source: Author’s own calculations using Manifesto Project data and election results.

In contrast, the results of the correlation between the extent of ideological divergence of the two major parties and the Greens vote do not support Hypothesis 2. It is not ideological *convergence* between the major parties that is associated with a higher vote for the Greens, but ideological *divergence* ($r = 0.71$, $p < 0.05$). In other words, the Greens are electoral beneficiaries from the Labor and Liberal parties moving toward opposite ends of the ideological space. This supports Ignazi’s (1996; 1997) argument that establishment parties can facilitate the rise of anti-political-establishment parties by moving away from the ideological centre, legitimising the issue positions of, for instance, green parties, and permanently enlarging the political space. As such, these findings also challenge those claims (e.g. Kitschelt & McGann 1995, pp. 20-23; Mair 1995, pp. 48-51) that anti-political-establishment parties flourish in systems where major parties adopt more centrist positions – at least in relation to the Australian Greens.

Lastly, the results show little support for the third hypothesis – that is, the further left-progressive the Labor Party positions itself, the higher the Greens vote. There is a moderately strong ($r = 0.6$) relationship between Labor's position on the left-right spectrum and the Greens' vote in House; the further Labor moves to the left, the greater the Greens' vote. This relationship, however, is not statistically significant ($p = 0.12$). Regardless, the direction of the relationship suggests that the Greens do not suffer from a 'crowding' of the left of the political spectrum in those elections where Labor have adopted more interventionist economic positions. Indeed, the Greens may even benefit from its more influential, most ideologically-proximate partner campaigning on similar issue positions. In contrast, however, there is almost zero association between Labor's positioning on the progressive-conservative spectrum and the Greens' electoral popularity.

Table 8.6 also includes results for correlations between the Liberals' ideological location and the Greens vote. Here, the results are near opposite those found for the movements of Labor. While there is almost no relationship between the Liberals' position along the left-right spectrum and Greens support, there is a strong ($r = 0.77$) and statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) association between the Liberals' location on the progressive-conservative dimension and the Greens vote. When the Liberal Party adopts more conservative-nationalist policy positions, the Greens vote tends to be higher. As the Greens are the most progressive party, it appears they benefit from a mainstream party taking more extreme positions on the opposite side of this second dimension of party competition. This accords with Meguid's (2005) finding that both ideologically-proximate *and* non-proximate mainstream parties can influence the electoral success of niche parties. Niche parties can benefit when mainstream parties adopt either an accommodative or adversarial strategy (as opposed to dismissive), as it prioritises and legitimises the issue dimensions upon which those niche parties compete. The results of Table 8.6, however, should be treated with caution, as they are bivariate correlations from a limited number of observations.

The Social and Attitudinal Bases of the Greens Vote

Examining the sociodemographic profile of Greens voters finds many of the ‘usual suspects’ (Tranter 2011, p. 8) as important characteristics, in line with previous research on the party and much of that on the green party family generally. Table 8.7 compares the profiles of Liberal, Labor and Greens voters in the House of Representatives at the 2016 federal election (columns total 100 percent for each category). Relative to the voters of both major parties, Greens voters are more likely to be female, young, university educated, social-cultural specialists, self-identifying as upper and middle class, renting, living in urban settings, and non-religious. The difference between Greens and major party supporters are especially stark in terms of gender, age, education, occupation, and religion. That almost two-thirds of Greens voters identify as female is striking. There are multiple explanations for this phenomenon: internal structures of green parties are less discriminatory toward women (Rüdig 2012, p. 115); women are more likely to report caring about and acting to protect the environment (Zelenzy et al. 2000); women are more likely to prioritise altruism (Dietz et al. 2002); and the generalised switch among, especially younger, women in advanced democracies from supporting right-wing to supporting left-wing parties as a result of socioeconomic and cultural changes (Inglehart & Norris 2000). However, both in the Australian context and elsewhere, the exact causal mechanisms for this gender voting gap remain unclear and contentious.

There is also a clear gap in age, with roughly 30 percent of Greens voters between 18 and 34 years of age. This compares to just 7.4 and 12 percent, respectively, among Liberal and Labor supporters. Likelihood to vote Greens tends to decline with age – except for those aged 55-64 – a finding that mirrors studies of other green parties (e.g. see Rüdig 2012). It’s unclear as to whether lifecycle or generational cohort effects might influence the Greens vote, though Martin and Pietsch (2013) did find each new cohort of younger voters more likely to vote for minor parties. Much like with the gender gap, the age gap in voting is likely associated with multiple factors, with younger voters. for instance, also more likely to be postmaterialist (Inglehart 1990; 1997), highly educated (Britton 2015), detached from traditional cleavages (Dalton 1996, p. 332; van der

Table 8.7 - Sociodemographic profile of Liberal, Labor and Greens voters – 2016 (%)

Characteristic	Liberal	Labor	Greens
Gender			
Male	54.6	44.4	38.5
Female	45.4	55.6	61.5
Age			
18-24	2.3	3.8	10.2
25-34	5.1	8.2	19.9
35-44	10.6	11.7	17.5
45-54	12.8	19	16.3
55-64	22.3	25.8	22
65+	46.9	31.5	14.2
Highest level of education			
School	25.5	27	15.7
Technical	37.3	34.6	21
Undergraduate	22.7	21.7	34.3
Postgraduate	14.6	16.7	29
Occupation			
Managers	27.8	16.8	16
Professionals	16.2	9.9	14.2
Social-cultural specialists	18	27.7	40.9
Routine non-manual	20.2	22	20.9
Skilled manual	13	15.2	5.3
Non-skilled manual	4.7	8.4	2.7
Sector of Employment			
Private	76.9	68.7	67.2
Public	23.1	31.3	32.8
Union membership			
Yes	9.8	30	23.6
No	90.2	70	76.4
Subjective social class			
Upper/middle	60.9	43	67.3
Working	33	46.5	22.2
None	6.1	10.5	10.5
Housing			
Own	83.6	75.5	60.5
Rent	11	18.8	28.2
Other	5.4	5.7	11.3
Location			
Rural	9.3	9.1	8.9
Town	31.1	34.8	21.4
Urban	59.6	56.1	69.8
Religion			
Religious	76.5	67.7	37.5
Non-religious	23.5	32.3	62.5
Religious attendance			
Regularly	18.1	14.3	6.9
Rarely	40.1	34.1	38.7
Never	41.8	51.6	54.4

Source: Author's own calculations using Australian Election Study (AES) 2016 data.

Brug 2010), and progressive on social-cultural issues (Kitschelt & Rehm 2004, p. 11). Age may also be the basis of a new cleavage in and of itself (Dalton et al. 1984, p. 21). So too may be education, with its effects on values and political attitudes (Stubager 2010; 2013). Indeed, almost two two-thirds of Greens voters hold a university degree, with 29 percent having attained postgraduate qualifications.

The occupational breakdown of parties in Table 8.7 reflects the disproportionately high levels of education amongst Greens supporters. The Greens draws more than 40 percent of its support from amongst social-cultural specialists, which are those professionals in education, health, social work and community work. Social-cultural specialists are client-oriented and interact with these clients in 'non-standardised' ways, and generally exhibit aversion to hierarchy while valuing tolerance, autonomy and self-actualisation (Dolezal 2010, p. 538; Kitschelt & Rehm 2004, p. 8). Social-cultural specialists also often work in the public sector or benefit from increased government spending on services. Put together, social-cultural specialists are likely to hold progressive-cosmopolitan and left-wing attitudes, increasing their likelihood of voting for green parties (Kitschelt & Rehm 2004, p. 10). The appeal of the Greens to non-religious voters may also intertwine with values and political attitudes, as well, given that the party's platforms tend to clash with traditional religious moral values (e.g. on abortion access, LGBTI rights, voluntary euthanasia, etc.). While religion and religious denomination may only matter "at the margin" in Australian elections, and more so for right-wing parties (Donovan 2014, pp. 641-42), *lack of religion* may well matter to the Greens vote.

The Political Attitudes of Party Supporters

Table 8.8 compares the attitudinal profiles of Liberal, Labor, and Greens voters at the 2016 federal election. There is a clear attitudinal basis to the Greens vote. The political attitudes of Greens voters are most distinct from those of the Liberal Party, but Greens voters also markedly differ from Labor voters on each measure. Matching the Greens' own position as the most left-wing competitor in the Australian party system, Greens voters are the most likely (64.8 percent) to

exhibit left-wing attitudes on the question of the size and role of government. Likewise, the mean score of Greens voters on the progressive-conservative index – ranging from 1 (consistently progressive) to 5 (consistently conservative) is the lowest, and thus most progressive, of any party’s voters. Further, there is a smaller gap on this index between Liberal and Labor voters than there is between Labor and Greens voters. The Greens are still the “real outsider in Australian politics” (Charnock and Ellis 2004, pp. 64-65) – both in their platforms and their support base. These attitudinal profiles of party voters closely align with the ideological positioning of parties detailed in chapter seven. The Liberal Party and its voters tend to situate themselves on the moderate right-conservative quadrant of the ideological space, the Labor Party and its voters on the moderate left-progressive quadrant, and the Greens occupy the left-progressive space.

Table 8.8 - Attitudinal profile of Liberal, Labor, and Greens voters - 2016 (%)

Attitude	Liberal	Labor	Greens
Left-right position			
Right (reduce taxes)	45.4	26.6	18.2
Centre (depends)	35.7	28.5	17
Left (increase services)	18.9	44.9	64.8
Progressive-conservative index (1-5)			
Mean score	3	2.6	2
Salience of the environment			
Extremely important	27.3	56.6	78.3
Quite important	55.1	36.1	17.7
Not very important	17.5	7.3	3.9
Salience of global warming			
Extremely important	18.5	47.1	72.7
Quite important	47.7	40.6	22.5
Not very important	33.9	12.3	4.7
Values			
Materialist	21.3	15.7	9.4
Materialist-leaning	43	34.6	23.4
Postmaterialist-leaning	25.9	30.1	34
Postmaterialist	9.8	19.7	33.2

Source: Author’s own calculations using Australian Election Study (AES) 2016 data.

Note: The ‘Progressive-Conservative index’ ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 representing purely progressive attitudes while 5 reflects purely conservative attitudes.

There is a substantial difference, as well, between Greens voters and major party supporters on the values divide and questions relating to the environment. Turning first to the environment, Greens voters are far more likely to rate the environment and climate change as important to their

vote than are Liberal and Labor voters. Reported high salience of climate change, in particular, divides the parties, with 72.7 percent of Greens voters viewing the issue as ‘extremely important’ to their vote, compared to 18.5 and 47.1 percent of Liberal and Labor voters, respectively. These attitudes toward the environment are tested separately from postmaterialism given the theoretical and empirical questions that remain over: first, precisely what Inglehart’s (1977; 1990) concept and operationalisation³⁸ of ‘postmaterialism’ is measuring; and second, whether environmental concern is genuinely captured or explained by Inglehart’s theory of value change. Theoretically, it is unpersuasive to conflate ‘postmaterialism’ with environmental concern – to do so, Lowe and Rüdiger (1986, pp. 517-18) argue, “effectively divorces environmental concern from ecological problems.” This dismisses the potential for ecological problems to be *material* matters, and inaccurately characterises environmentalism as a luxury that emerges alongside a range of other ‘non-material’ issue concerns. Indeed, in the traditional operationalisation of value change, the four-item battery does not mention the environment. The alternative 12-item battery includes a question on trying to ‘make our cities and countryside more beautiful’, yet this only indirectly relates to the environment and frames environmental concern in purely aesthetic terms.

The theoretical and empirical shortcomings of postmaterialism suggest that we should treat the concept cautiously, considered alongside other attitudinal variables – especially environmental concern – in explaining the Greens vote. After all, the values index, particularly when operationalised through the four-item battery, is likely detecting pro-democratic attitudes, rather than Inglehart’s postmaterialism (Duch & Taylor 1993; Warwick 1998a). Previous studies of the Greens have made much of the postmaterialist nature of the party and its support (Blount 1998; Charnock & Ellis 2004; Miragliotta 2013; Tranter 2011). As shown below, this chapter also finds postmaterialism as a statistically significant predictor of a Greens vote. Nevertheless, Table 8.8 gives us good reason not to overstate the importance of postmaterialism: only one-third of Greens voters can be categorised as postmaterialists. While there are more postmaterialists among

³⁸ In this chapter, the four-item battery test is used to assort respondents into materialist and postmaterialist categories. The alternative, 12-item battery test was not included in the 2016 AES. The 12-item battery, nevertheless, is still insufficient for testing environmental attitudes.

Greens voters than among supporters of the major parties, the bulk of the Green electorate maintain a mix of postmaterialist and materialist priorities. This is unsurprising given the positioning of the Greens and its voters firmly on the left of the ideological space. The figures also suggest that those concerned with the environment are not necessarily postmaterialists. Similarly, evidence suggests that the reverse claim – that postmaterialists necessarily hold pro-environmental attitudes – is also unlikely (Franklin & Rüdig 1995, pp. 429-30).

The multinomial logistic regression analyses presented in Table 8.9 allow us to identify those sociodemographic and attitudinal variables that best predict voting in the 2016 federal election when each variable is accounted for simultaneously. Three models are presented: model 1, including only sociodemographic predictors; model 2, limited to attitudinal predictors; and model 3, where all predictors enter the analysis. In each, a vote for the Greens is the reference category, meaning that we compare the vote choices between Greens versus Liberal, and Greens versus Labor. For each categorical predictor (e.g. gender, age, education) in the model, the last category within that predictor is the point of comparison and is thus represented by a blank row (e.g. 'female' in gender, '65+' in age, 'postgraduate' in education). Otherwise, each cell of the table contains a coefficient and, for the sake of easier comprehension, an odds ratio in parentheses. Some caution is required when reporting and interpreting odds ratios; odds ratios report odds, not probabilities (as is the case with relative risk ratios). The table also indicates standard thresholds of statistical significance for the findings, where appropriate. Lastly, a pseudo R-squared measure, Nagelkerke's R^2 , specifies the proportion of the variance (i.e. vote choice) explained by each model.

As it pertains to the *direction* of the effects of predictor variables, Table 8.9 confirms the broad conclusions from the cross-tabulations. Greens voters stand out as younger, highly educated, working in social-cultural and professional educations, non-religious, and so on. What is more surprising is the *strength* and statistical *significance* (or lack thereof) of certain independent variables that appear as prominent lines of demarcation in the descriptive statistics. Examining, firstly, the Greens versus Liberal vote choice in model 1, we can see strong and statistically

significant relationships between gender, age, education, union membership, subjective class, geography, and religious belief and the choice to vote Greens rather than Liberal. Of these, the effect size and significance of age, union membership and religious belief are especially noteworthy. Holding all other variables constant, the younger a voter is, the more likely they are to vote for the Greens rather than the Liberals. The difference is stark when comparing the youngest and oldest categories of voters; the odds of 18-24 year-olds compared to those 65 and above voting for the Liberal Party over the Greens are 0.11. In other words, the odds of voters aged 65+ supporting the Liberals are roughly 9 times greater than are the odds of 18-24 year-olds doing the same. Union membership is also an important predictor, with the odds of non-members voting for the Liberals 2.4 times greater than members. Likewise, the odds of religious voters supporting the Liberals, as opposed to the Greens, are 4.7 times higher than for non-religious voters.

Examining the Greens versus Labor vote choice in model 1, the results show fewer strong and statistically significant relationships than for the Greens-Liberal comparison. Age features yet again, but only for the three youngest categories. Much like with the Liberal Party, younger voters are far less likely than are the oldest category of voters to support Labor over the Greens. Also statistically significant are the social-cultural specialists category of occupation, self-identification with the working class, and religious belief. It is only in this first model, and for the Labor against Greens comparison, that any aspect of occupation (a proxy, in this chapter, for class) is a statistically significant predictor of voting behaviour. The odds of social-cultural specialists voting for Labor relative to the Greens are 3.1 times smaller than the odds of non-skilled manual voters supporting Labor. While the effect sizes for some other occupational categories (e.g. professionals) are similar, they lack statistical significance due to higher standard errors. In terms of subjective class, as well, the odds of those voters identifying with the working class (as opposed to no class) supporting Labor are almost three times greater. Finally, religious voters have 3.13 times greater odds of voting for Labor instead of the Greens in the House. As with youth, then, lack of religious belief is a strong, significant predictor of a person voting for the Greens instead of either of the major parties.

Table 8.9 - Social and attitudinal basis of Greens voting in the House of Representatives (results of multinomial logistic regressions with Greens vote as the reference category)

Characteristic	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Voting Liberal vs Greens	Voting Labor vs Greens	Voting Liberal vs Greens	Voting Labor vs Greens	Voting Liberal vs Greens	Voting Labor vs Greens
	B (exp(B))					
<i>Gender</i>						
Male	0.52 (1.684) **	0.01 (1.01)			0.21 (1.23)	-0.09 (0.92)
Female						
<i>Age</i>						
18-24	-2.18 (0.11) ***	-1.68 (0.19) **			-2.19 (0.11) ***	-1.8 (0.17) **
25-34	-1.76 (0.17) ***	-1.08 (0.34) **			-2.01 (0.14) ***	-1.23 (0.29) **
35-44	-1.26 (0.28) ***	-0.87 (0.42) **			-1.56 (0.21) ***	-0.98 (0.38) **
45-54	-1.02 (0.36) **	-0.38 (0.68)			-0.95 (0.39) **	-0.35 (0.70)
55-64	-0.94 (0.39) **	-0.53 (0.59)			-0.97 (0.38) **	-0.59 (0.55)
65+						
<i>Highest level of education</i>						
School	0.69 (1.99) *	0.41 (1.51)			0.48 (1.62)	0.39 (1.48)
Technical	0.75 (2.11) **	0.2 (1.22)			-0.66 (0.93)	-0.27 (0.77)
Undergraduate	0.46 (1.59) *	0.06 (1.06)			0.5 (1.64)	0.05 (1.05)
Postgraduate						
<i>Occupation</i>						
Managers	0.3 (1.35)	-0.59 (0.55)			0.81 (2.26)	-0.11 (0.9)
Professionals	0.72 (1.08)	-0.85 (0.43)			0.35 (1.42)	-0.62 (0.54)
Social-cultural specialists	-0.69 (0.5)	-1.15 (0.32) *			-0.24 (0.79)	-0.79 (0.45)
Routine non-manual	0.02 (1.02)	-0.61 (0.54)			0.43 (1.53)	-0.3 (0.74)
Skilled manual	0.56 (1.74)	0.12 (1.13)			0.76 (2.13)	0.37 (1.45)
Non-skilled manual						
<i>Sector of Employment</i>						
Private	0.2 (1.22)	0.05 (1.06)			0.12 (1.13)	0.1 (1.11)
Public						
<i>Union membership</i>						
Yes	-0.87 (0.42) ***	0.33 (1.4)			-0.79 (0.46) **	0.37 (1.45)
No						
<i>Subjective social class</i>						
Upper/middle	0.9 (2.47) **	0.35 (1.42)			1.12 (3.06) *	0.27 (1.31)
Working	0.92 (2.52) **	1.08 (2.93) **			0.32 (1.38)	0.59 (1.8)

None				
<i>Housing</i>				
Own	0.42 (1.52)	0.36 (1.44)	0.17 (1.18)	0.18 (1.2)
Rent	-0.46 (0.63)	-0.07 (0.94)	-0.46 (0.63)	-0.08 (0.92)
Other				
<i>Location</i>				
Rural	-0.16 (0.85)	-0.03 (0.97)	-0.38 (0.68)	-0.25 (0.78)
Town	0.52 (1.68) *	0.63 (1.89) **	0.36 (1.43)	0.62 (1.85) *
Urban				
<i>Religion</i>				
Religious	1.54 (4.68) ***	1.14 (3.13) ***	0.92 (2.51) ***	0.85 (2.34) ***
Non-religious				
<i>Religious attendance</i>				
Regularly	0.32 (1.37)	0.14 (1.12)	0.82 (1.09)	-0.02 (0.98)
Rarely	-0.14 (0.87)	-0.32 (0.73)	-0.25 (0.78)	-0.32 (0.72)
Never				
<i>Left-right position</i>				
Right (reduce taxes)			0.56 (1.76) *	-0.34 (0.71)
Centre (depends)			1.22 (3.38) ***	0.4 (1.5)
Left (increase services)				0.76 (2.13) **
Progressive-conservative index			1.78 (5.93) ***	1.19 (3.27) ***
Environment index			1.56 (4.75) ***	0.64 (1.89) ***
<i>Values</i>				
Materialist			0.81 (2.25) *	0.25 (1.28)
Materialist-leaning			0.97 (2.63) ***	0.41 (1.5)
Postmaterialist-leaning			0.53 (1.69) *	0.17 (1.18)
Postmaterialist				1.05 (2.86) **
				0.9 (2.45) **
				0.55 (1.72) *
				0.5 (1.66) *
Nagelkerke's R ²	0.33		0.35	0.53
<i>n</i> =	1963		2209	1804

Tests of statistical significance: * p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001.

Source: Author's own calculations using Australian Election Study (AES) 2016 data.

The second model of regression analyses tests the effects of attitudinal variables alone. Table 8.9 demonstrates that each of these attitudinal variables have large, statistically significant effects on vote choice in the House of Representatives – though mostly in the comparison between voting for the Liberal Party versus the Greens. Left-right attitudes, positions on the progressive-conservative and environmental indices, and degree of postmaterialism are each strong predictors of vote choice between the Liberals and the Greens. The left-wing orientations of the Greens are clear in the results, with those respondents with centrist and right-wing approaches to the size and role of government having 3.4 and 1.7 times greater odds, respectively, of voting for the Liberals. On the second dimension of party competition, for each unit increase towards conservative-nationalism (and away from progressive-cosmopolitanism) on the associated index, the change in odds for voting for the Liberals is 5.93. Likewise, for every unit increase in the environment index (toward viewing the environment as unimportant), there is a change of 4.75 in the odds of voting against the Greens. Finally, postmaterialism does hold as a predictor in the Liberals-Greens comparison, with mixed and materialist voters having greater odds of voting Liberal. On the other hand, only the progressive-conservative and environmental indices separate a Greens vote from a Labor vote in this model, and with smaller effect sizes and odds ratios: an increase in conservatism is associated with 3.3 times greater odds of voting Labor over the Greens, while viewing the environment as less important produces 1.9 times greater odds of a Labor vote.

Finally, model 3 tests, simultaneously, for a social and attitudinal basis to the Greens vote, entering all predictors in the regression analysis. The results in Table 8.9 demonstrate three main changes from the first and second models: substantial changes in effect sizes and odds ratios; the removal of gender, education, and occupation as statistically significant predictors of voting behaviour; and a substantial increase in the proportion of the variance explained by the model (Nagelkerke's $R^2 = 0.53$). What is clear from model 3 is that age, union membership, subjective class, geographic location, and religion are significant sociodemographic predictors of a Greens vote, even as all other variables are held constant. Similarly, there is a strong attitudinal basis to the Greens vote, with each of our attitudinal variables maintaining their high effect sizes and statistical significance while controlling for demographic (and all other attitudinal) predictors. Overall, voters who are: younger, belong to a union, do not identify

with a social class, are not religious, are left-wing, are progressive, consider the environment extremely important, and hold postmaterialist values have greater odds of voting for the Greens rather than the Liberals. On the other hand, voters who are: younger, live in metropolitan regions, are not religious, are progressive, consider the environment extremely important, and hold postmaterialist values have greater odds of supporting the Greens over Labor. That there are different predictors, and varying effect sizes, determining the vote choice between the Greens and each of the two major parties has important implications for how we understand the green vote and the party's position in the Australian party system.

Discussion and Conclusions

The failure or refusal of established parties to manage and assimilate new political demands is a primary cause of party system change across advanced industrial democracies. On the one hand, institutional, party system, and intra-party factors have certainly constrained the capacity of established parties to respond to changing electorates. On the other hand, the continued existence of these established parties as dominant players in their respective party systems is testament to *some* strategic adaptation. Nevertheless, across western party systems, including Australia's, there has been a marked reduction in the successful aggregation of preferences by major parties and a corresponding decline in their vote share (Dalton et al. 1984; Franklin et al. 1992; Powell 2009). Green parties also benefit from the reduced influence of traditional social cleavages over voting behaviour, and the associated defrosting of once 'frozen' party systems. In the Australian context, the Greens may not be responsible for establishing new issues or dimensions of party competition; even an ecological dimension of competition had long been effectively politicised by the Australian Democrats. The Greens have, however, consolidated their position in the party system by occupying a previously uninhabited space in the ideological matrix. The Greens, in advocating left-wing, progressive-cosmopolitan policy positions, have developed a clear support base. It would be difficult to contend, though, that traditional social cleavages underpin the Greens vote. The party predominantly attracts those social groups conventionally less integrated into traditional social cleavages: the young, the highly educated, the non-religious, and the 'new middle

class'. But while the Greens' support base may lack a common sociology, they nevertheless share political attitudes.

At the party system level, the Greens vote shows positive correlations with both general ideological polarisation and ideological divergence between the major parties. Contrary to comparative studies in the international literature (e.g. Hainsworth 1992; Kitschelt 1988), and single case studies amongst the Australian literature (e.g. Vromen & Turnbull 2006), centripetal movements along the ideological spectrum by the major parties has not fostered the rise of the Australian Greens. The 'convergence thesis' (and associated claims of the cartelisation of parties) in itself is dubious in the Australian context (Goot 2004). Indeed, chapter seven demonstrates that the ideological movements of the major parties tend to be cyclical, with the parties shifting from strategies of divergence to convergence and back again. As it pertains to the individual movements of the Greens' competitors, there is a moderately strong and positive relationship between Labor adopting more left-wing positions and the Greens' vote, though this did not meet the threshold of statistical significance. In contrast, there is a strong and statistically significant positive relationship between the Liberal Party advocating more conservative-nationalist policy positions and the level of Greens support. Given the absence of an effective, functioning populist right party in the Australian system, the Liberal Party is increasingly assimilating aspects of 'new right' politics – itself, in part, a reaction to the 'new left' – into its rhetoric and policies (see Ignazi 1996; 1997). This adversarial strategy appears to galvanise support for the Greens as the polar opposite party on this second dimension of party competition (see Meguid 2005; 2008).

The Greens are also contributing to some restructuring of the Australian electorate along sociodemographic lines. Younger voters are gravitating toward the Greens (and Labor), while the Liberal Party since the Howard prime ministership has dominated the 65+ vote (Goot & Watson 2007, p. 270). The levels of education among Greens voters is also notable, even if education lacks statistical significance in the final model of the regression analyses. While the educational breakdown of support for both the Liberal and Labor parties are remarkably similar – partly in response to the Liberal Party's more recent gains among low-skilled and low-educated voters (Goot & Watson 2007, p. 270) – the support for the Greens derives

disproportionately from those with postgraduate and undergraduate qualifications. Education may also be influencing the vote in a way not directly detected in the statistical models, as there is evidence that education is associated with more ideological voting and is a causal mechanism behind adopting more libertarian (or progressive) positions on social and cultural issues (Stubager 2013; Zagorski 1988). Social-cultural specialists and professionals – occupational groups tending to require higher levels of education – stand out as key components of the Greens’ constituency, but show little significance as predictors in the statistical models. These findings couple with doubts as to whether either of these occupational categories genuinely constitute a social class (Dolezeal 2010, p. 548; Evans 2010, p. 639) to suggest that class explanations for the Greens vote are unpersuasive.

It is the Greens’ ability to foment a genuine values-based cleavage in the Australian party system that will determine the party’s long-term electoral stability. As the results for this chapter indicate (see also Charnock 2009; Charnock & Ellis 2003; Miragliotta 2013), there are early signs of such a cleavage forming, with clear attitudinal divides already present. Greens voters position themselves firmly on the left of the ideological space (see also Edwards 2017), differentiating themselves most markedly from the Liberal Party and its supporters. The Labor and Greens electorates maintain a common predilection for greater state intervention in the economy, though it is more pronounced amongst Greens voters. Far from a party of postmaterialism, the Greens, through their platform and their voters’ attitudes, exhibit the material concerns reminiscent of social democratic parties – even if the conception of equality pursued differs and is less grounded in class struggle (Holloway et al. 2018; Talshir 2002). The Greens’ support base, though, is more distinguished from Labor’s (and the Liberal Party’s, again) through their more progressive social-cultural attitudes and the importance attributed to the environment and climate change. Many Greens voters are classic cosmopolitans, “oriented to global culture and society” with the “social skills and attitudes that enable them to move among people of different cultures with confidence and purpose” (Brett 2003, p. 210). The moral community of Greens voters tends toward the global and the universal, while the Liberal Party increasingly represents the local, and the Labor Party attempts to strike a balance in aggregating the diverse preferences of its electorate.

Ultimately the Greens' electoral prospects will be as much a product of the party system, and the movements of its competitors, as it will be the strategies of the party itself. In discussing the future of the Greens, Miragliotta (2013, pp. 720-22) identified three constraints: the (small) number of postmaterialists in the Australian electorate; that any search for new constituencies would involve "a search for neutral ideological ground" and risk alienating existing supporters; and finally, that the major parties would become "more aggressive" in reasserting two-party system dynamics. The first of these constraints appears dubious, given the shortcomings of postmaterialism identified in this chapter, as well as the relatively minor role postmaterialism plays in explaining the extant Greens vote. Second, the Greens' search for voters does not necessarily need to come from drastic ideological manoeuvring – many of the Greens' policy positions are, at least individually, electorally popular – but from building credibility in additional policy areas and challenging major party issue ownership.³⁹ Rather, it is the final constraint identified by Miragliotta (2013, pp. 721-22), coupled with an unfavourable electoral system for the lower house, that is likely to be most challenging for the Greens. Recent elections have seen the Greens' strategy falter in the face of major party responses and the inertia imposed by the party system itself (Sartori 2001). The party is instead plateaued on national support levels of barely 10 percent and, in some states, struggling to return Senators to the upper house from which the party gains much of its party system influence.

³⁹ Demographic change may also benefit the Greens in the future (see Martin & Pietsch 2013).

Part IV: The Greens and the Contest for Government

THE LABOR-GREENS SUPPORT AGREEMENT: INTER-PARTY BARGAINING AS A MINOR PARTY

The Labor-Greens support agreement of the 43rd Parliament represents a significant, albeit temporary, disruption to the usual patterns of party interaction in the executive and legislative arenas. For the Greens, it reflects the party's peak electoral and parliamentary strength, and given the hung parliament, the party's influence over the party system. Following the election, a 17-day period of negotiations took place between the Labor and Coalition parties with members of the cross-bench. The Greens were the first party to declare their support for a particular government, reaching an accord with Labor less than two weeks after polling day. The accord entailed a commitment to stable and effective government alongside several pages of policy and parliamentary concessions from Labor to the Greens.⁴⁰ In contrast to earlier agreements between state-based Greens parties and minority governments, the policy concessions were quite broad, extending well beyond the party's early environmental focus (see Bove 2010, pp. 147-48). The Greens thus traded their single vote in the House on supply and motions of confidence for a significant expansion of influence over the minority Labor government's legislative agenda. At the insistence of the Greens, the agreement was publicly available, and set the standard for subsequent pacts Labor struck with other cross-bench independents. Overall, the Labor-Greens pact closely mirrors the 'contract parliamentarism' response to hung parliaments evident internationally.

There are a variety of ways, though, a prospective government might manage a 'hung parliament'. From single party minority governments to multiparty majority coalitions, a House cross-bench of one Greens and four independent members meant that the 43rd Parliament could have led to a variety of cabinet types. Likewise, the direction and nature of the Greens' support was not a given, particularly so in light of the fact that written support agreements are still relatively uncommon. Paun (2011) emphasises historical particularities, political culture, and expectations of a return to majority government as explanatory factors

⁴⁰ See here for a copy of the agreement in full: <https://goo.gl/TBuanl>

for the formation of the Labor minority government. However, this is only part of the picture. Paun (2011, pp. 449-50) only indirectly addresses party systems, relative bargaining power, or particular personalities, and their implications for negotiation and government formation. The nature of inter-party bargaining impacts not only which parties govern, but also how those parties govern (Bergman et al. 2013; Nyblade 2013). It additionally has implications for the duration and success of a government, and relatedly, the popularity of a government with voters (Powell 2013; Saalfeld 2013). This first of two chapters focusing on the Labor-Greens support agreement, applies a party system framework, with an overriding concern with party competition, to the negotiation of the Labor-Greens agreement. This chapter provides answers to four key questions:

1. What explains the emergence of a single-party Labor minority government, rather than a multiparty cabinet featuring the Greens?
2. Why did the Greens choose to support Labor, rather than the Coalition, and insist on a comprehensive written, public agreement?
3. How were the policy concessions and parliamentary reforms in the agreement determined?
4. How did the Greens leverage their parliamentary strength into bargaining power amid indications the party was 'captive' to Labor?

From the perspective of the Greens, this chapter traces the processes leading to the signing of the Labor-Greens support agreement, from inter-party bargaining through to the establishment of terms and the final signing. The following chapter examines the operation of the agreement, identifies the causal mechanisms leading to its termination, and analyses the impact of the agreement on the Greens and the wider party system. This process tracing is conducted on the basis of face-to-face interviews with Greens parliamentarians. I argue that the Greens were able to exploit Australia's strong bicameralism and multifaceted party system to extract considerable legislative and some executive influence in the 43rd Parliament. Moreover, contrary to the party's commitments to participatory democracy and decentralised organisational structure, decision-making processes were highly centralised to the party room and, in particular, to the office of the party leader, Bob Brown. This centralisation caused

considerable disquiet in the party, prompting minor organisational reform while furthering other pre-existing debates.

Literature Review and Theoretical Background

Tracing the full course of a support agreement from the perspective of the junior partner draws upon a diverse literature. Evaluating the effects of the agreement – on the smaller partner and on the party system – expands the scope further still. The initial task is to situate government formation within party system theory in order to connect the findings of these two chapters to the analytic framework of the thesis. This is followed by a discussion of ‘contract parliamentarism’ - a specific form of minority government closely mirrored in this case. Finally, this section surveys the international literature on how parties of the green ‘party family’ manage the challenges of participating in or cooperating with government.

Party Systems and the Formation of Government

Classifications of party systems have long incorporated patterns in the contest for, and types of, government formation (e.g. Dahl 1966; Rokkan 1968; Sartori 1976). As outlined in chapter five, however, it is in the work of Mair (1996; 1997; 2002) that the structures of competition for government are *explicitly* operationalised and elevated as both the primary criterion in classifying party systems, as well as the central indicator of system change. Mair argues that the party system and the competition for government are interrelated; the format and mechanics of the former shape the nature of the latter, and vice versa. One of the primary arguments of this thesis is that an overriding focus on government formation, in both the international and the Australian literature, has resulted in misclassifications of the Australian party system and an inappropriately high threshold for what constitutes system change. This focus also reduces our capacity to gauge the impact of, and relations between, individual parties in the system – most notably smaller parties such as the Greens. With that said, the translation of electoral and representative strength into executive power remains central to any understanding of party system dynamics – it just needs to be understood in the appropriate context.

The structural components of the party system regularly feature as part of the explanation for the emergence of particular forms of government (e.g. Budge & Herman 1978; Dodd 1976; Sartori 1976; Strøm 1990b). Chief among these components are the number of parties and the degree of ideological polarisation. Sartori (1976, p. 178), for instance, associates minority governments with his 'moderate pluralism' party system type, in which there are three to five 'relevant' parties separated by moderate ideological distance. The "extremely strong relationship" between the number of parties and government type has been demonstrated empirically, most notably by Lijphart (2012, pp. 101-02). Laver (1989, p. 307) points out that not only does the number of parties influence the basic mathematical complexity of the bargaining environment, but also the number will exert "a very significant *qualitative* impact on the nature of coalition bargaining." As such, bargaining norms tend to arise as a means to simplify especially complex bargaining environments; extremist parties, for instance, are often excluded from negotiations.

The degree of ideological polarisation further influences the bargaining environment created by the number of parties. As chapter four argues, ideological polarisation is a key variable in both party system classification and in measuring change. But also, in its measurement, ideological polarisation provides insight into the degree of commonality between the philosophical viewpoints and policy platforms of individual parties. In general, ideological polarisation is inversely correlated with the number of feasible and durable party groupings; the greater the distance between parties, the less likely they are to cooperate in forming government (Döring & Hellström 2016, pp. 394-95; Powell 1982, p. 142). Yet, as Indridason (2011, pp. 689-91) argues, not only does the ideological distance between any two parties matter, so too does the polarisation of the system as a whole. A given coalition or multiparty arrangement may be more or less attractive to a party given the alternative configurations. A clear example of this in practice is in 'bipolar' party systems, where parties cluster toward both the poles of the ideological space, and government merely alternates between relatively enduring blocs. Polarisation, though, can also increase the likelihood of minority governments if a governing party can exploit a 'captive party' on its ideological fringe; a party of the far left, for instance, has little ability to make credible threats of supporting a government of the right (Strøm 1990b, pp. 14-15).

The converse, of the competition for government influencing the party system, is a less intuitive but nonetheless common occurrence. Indeed, it is one of the better demonstrations of parties as strategic actors, capable of shaping the competitive environment in which they operate. The example of Ireland is often given in the literature (e.g. Laver 1989, pp. 309-10; Mair 1997, pp. 72-74), whereby the party system was transformed by the choice of two parties, Fine Gael and Labour, to form a pre-electoral pact after decades of refusing to cooperate against the larger party, Fianna Fail. In the Australian context, a weakening of the Liberal-National Coalition to the extent that the Nationals would consider entering or supporting a Labor government, while unlikely⁴¹, would achieve a similar result. Inclusion of the Greens in governments, as well, would weaken the persisting two-party mechanics in the executive arena of the party system. On the other hand, more regular single-party minority governments do not necessarily undermine such mechanics, and may in fact reinforce two-partism where it is already present (Sartori 1976, pp. 188-89). Indeed, as Strøm (1990b, p. 90) explains, minority governments in Westminster-influenced democracies have tended to function as “imperfect majority governments” expecting a return to majority government in the following election.

At first glance, many of the aforementioned relationships between components of the party system and the competition for government are reflected in the 43rd Parliament. For instance, both media commentators and Labor members of parliament, including Gillard (2014, p. 58), argued that the Greens are a captive party, isolated on the peripheral left of the ideological spectrum. Likewise, there was considerable practical fragmentation in the House of Representatives due to the mix on the cross-bench of independents and a single Greens member. These factors, combined with a political culture strongly favouring single-party cabinets at the federal level (Powell 1982, p. 143; Smith 2001, p. 71), offer some basic explanation for why Labor formed a minority government. But, for an allegedly captive party, the Greens were able to secure a written agreement with considerable policy and parliamentary procedural concessions. The agreement, however, was terminated merely 18 months after its signing, despite the greatest degree of ideological and policy commonality between the two parties of any parliamentary period (see chapter seven; Holloway et al. 2018).

⁴¹ It has, however, happened at the state level – for example, during the Rann period in South Australia.

Support Agreements and Contract Parliamentarism

Studies of support agreements are uncommon amongst the government formation literature (Bale & Bergman 2006a, pp. 189-90; Bale & Dann 2002, pp. 349-50). Minority governments supported by parties external to cabinet are not an uncommon occurrence in parliamentary democracies (Strøm 1990b, pp. 61-62). What is novel, however, are minority governments sustained by written, public agreements that commit the parties to longer-term and more extensive cooperation beyond merely 'confidence and supply'. Such arrangements inform the concept of 'contract parliamentarism' (Aylott and Bergman 2004). Contract parliamentarism, Bale and Bergman (2006b, p. 430) explain, describes the "increasing formalisation, indeed institutionalisation" of support arrangements in some parliamentary democracies – notably Sweden and New Zealand. To qualify as contract parliamentarism, five criteria must be met (Aylott & Bergman 2004, p. 3):

1. One or more parties outside of cabinet must support the executive through an agreement,
2. The agreement must be long-term,
3. The agreement must be written,
4. The agreement must be public, and
5. Support parties must have appointed representatives outside of cabinet, but within the executive branch.

With the exception of the final point, the Labor-Greens pact corresponds with these criteria of contract parliamentarism. The agreement does, however, meet the broader benchmark of contract parliamentarism of occupying that space between a legislative and an executive coalition (Aylott & Bergman 2004, p. 3; Laver & Schofield 1990, p. 67). The agreement also sits imperfectly within the specific criteria of Strøm's (1990b, pp. 94-97) 'formal minority government', whereby the 'contract' must be formalised, comprehensive, long-term, and lead to consistent legislative coalitions between the parties involved. Again, it is the latter point which does not match the Labor-Greens arrangement. While there was frequent legislative cooperation between the two parties, there was no expectation of Greens support beyond the

policy outlined in the agreement; indeed, the expectation was of building ad hoc legislative coalitions from issue to issue. The ‘contracts’ that form the basis of support arrangements tend to represent a transactional relationship.

While there is a substantive difference between support arrangements and coalition partnerships, there are some findings in the literature pertaining to written coalition agreements that offer useful context. A key question is why an agreement is written at all, given that the agreements are neither legally binding, nor able to cover all issues that may arise during a given parliament. One answer from the literature is that it is a means to reduce the potential policy drift of governments or individual ministers; another is that it signals to the public the legislative agenda of the governing (and support) parties, which voters can then use to hold these parties to account (Indridason & Kristinsson 2013, p. 825). The negotiating phases of agreements can also function as an important policy-making arena as parties attempt to reconcile their respective policy positions (Peterson & De Ridder 1986). In addition to policy content, written agreements often include clauses detailing procedure and mechanisms for conflict resolution (De Winter & Dumont 2006, p. 183). Lastly, outlining specific policy commitments provides a basis for parties to later claim a justification for terminating the agreement (Eichorst 2014, p. 98), something the Greens used to extricate themselves from their relationship with an increasingly unpopular Labor government.

Greens and the Challenges of (Supporting or Participating in) Government

Broadly speaking, participation in the executive has been an uncommon experience for green parties. In a comparative analysis, Dumont and Bäck (2006, p. 39) argue that European green parties “seem to cumulate disadvantages with regard to coalition membership determinants.” Moreover, for green parties, participation in government, when it does occur, poses significant challenges – electorally, ideologically, and internally. A common experience for Green parties, predominantly in Western Europe, is a loss of electoral support following time in government (Rüdiger 2006, pp. 146-48). No successful model has emerged for Green parties, individually or collectively, to follow in terms of successfully navigating the costs and benefits of office. Fundamental aspects of Green party identity and organisation often make it difficult to

engage in the negotiation and compromise inherent to multiparty government. However, as green parties' electoral support grows, they inevitably face "the difficult task of balancing the maintenance of fundamental principles... with the development of alliances and coalitions" (Burchell 2001, p. 242). A Green party joining a coalition is often seen as a culmination of organisational reform (away from decentralised structures), strategic change (toward pragmatism), and accession to conventional party politics (Kitschelt 1993b; Poguntke 1993; Rihoux 1998). Overall, the question remains as to whether aspiring to and sharing government is a prudent course at all for Green parties.

Externally supporting a government, rather than directly participating in it, is a potential means to circumvent the costs of office while maintaining some of the benefits. Minority governments do occur from support parties being excluded from cabinet, but it can also be a rational choice for smaller parties to refuse joining coalitions. A comparative study by Rüdig (2006) suggests that there have been instances where green parties benefited from agreements where distance was maintained from government. Thicker analyses of individual or smaller numbers of cases, however, provide more nuanced conclusions, highlighting some success but a range of challenges – many of them not successfully met by Green parties (Bale & Bergman 2006a; Bale & Bergman 2006b; Bale & Dann 2002; Burchell 2001). Unsurprisingly, no model has emerged for green party strategy on this matter, with neither a cooperative stance toward government (as in Sweden), nor a more principled approach against government (as in New Zealand), proving electorally popular (Bale & Bergman 2006a, p. 204).

Previous analyses of Green party involvement in government in Australia have predominantly addressed state and territory parties (Bowe 2010; Crowley 2003; Moon 1995) and, as such, offer limited insight into how an agreement at the federal level might be forged and maintained. Moon (1995), for instance, examines the long history of minority governments at the state level in Australian politics and proffers a typology of such cabinets. Moon argues that the type of minority arrangements has changed over time, from 'ersatz majoritarianism' to 'minoritarianism'. The rarity of minority governance at the federal level means that the application of this typology is of little value. Both Crowley (2003) and Bowe (2010) apply Moon's typology to contextualise several state-level cases, but it is in their

historical narratives of their selected cases that we can find points of comparison, albeit few, to the Greens' actions in the 43rd Parliament. The Labor-Greens support agreement offers a unique case through which to explore the challenges and opportunities faced by the Greens at the national level.

Aims and Methods

While the overall party system effect of the Labor-Greens agreement by itself is likely to prove small, there is nevertheless considerable value in analysing this rare case. Chapters four and five demonstrate general change in the Australian party system, as well as the bases for further change in the future. Moreover, in the Australian system, minor parties, and the Greens especially, now appear entrenched in the sub-system surrounding the Senate. The Greens' consolidated position in the Senate and the breakthrough result in the House of Representatives electorate of Melbourne were the reasons for the signing of the Labor-Greens agreement. Since 2010, the Greens have also come close to winning a small handful of other lower house seats, such as Batman and Melbourne Ports. Independents, as well, are making increasing gains in the House. As a result, the prospect of future minority governments seems likely. Accordingly, it is worthwhile to trace the experiences of the Greens in the 43rd Parliament through the reflections of party elites, sourced through semi-structured interviews.

Case Studies and Process Tracing

Case studies lend themselves to 'thick', careful description and explanation that is sensitive to context and the idiosyncratic features of individual cases (Bäck & Dumont 2007; Nyblade 2013, p. 24). Curtin and Miller (2011, p. 7) argue that 'thick' description is vital if we are to understand the differing goals and behaviours of parties in the bargaining, formation, and operation phases of governments. It is also of particular value in this case, given the potential for more general models of government formation to both overlook important variables in explaining minority government support agreements, as well as the understandable exclusion of Australia in the development of such models (Aylott & Bergman 2004, p. 4; Costar 2011,

pp. 30-31). As Peters (2013, p. 146) contends, a sole case “can be used to expand the analytic knowledge of political science and to illuminate, and even test directly, theories commonly used in the discipline.” The chapter is therefore not merely descriptive, though description is of value in and of itself (Dowding 2016, p. 36 and pp. 55-60). The approach of this chapter (and the following) is also analytical and explanatory, aiming to identify, within the constraints of interview-based research, the causal mechanisms that led to certain events and phenomena occurring.

In qualitative and case study research, causation is often thought of in line with the ‘mechanisms and capacities’ approach (Brady 2003). This approach conceives causation as “a process involving the mechanisms and capacities that lead from a cause to an effect” (Bennett & Elman 2006, p. 457). Case studies, particularly those following a ‘process tracing’ method, are well-suited to identifying causal mechanisms. Process tracing involves detailed description of cases and decision-making in order to uncover a ‘smoking gun’ in the form of a causal mechanism (Mahoney 2012). Causal mechanisms are the processes and chains linking independent variables and outcomes (George & Bennett 2005, p. 206). Identifying these mechanisms contributes to explanations of particular phenomena. The specification problem, though, arises in single case studies, meaning that such research plausibly suggests causal mechanisms, rather than definitively establishing them (Dowding 2016, p. 156). Moreover, given that these chapters approach the Labor-Greens support agreement from the perspective of the Greens, the identification of causal mechanisms will be most plausible where they relate directly to Greens decision-making and perceptions. For other questions, it will still be possible to identify patterns of relationships and sequences of events to aid subsequent research.

Like much case study research, this section of the thesis focuses on what is an unusual or aberrant case. What sets this research apart, however, is its scope *within* the case. Rather than focusing merely on government formation or termination, this chapter also encompasses the operation and effects of the inter-party relationship that maintained the Labor minority government. As Peters (2013, p. 241) notes, this is rare in the study of governments, despite the events between the formation and dissolution of governments arguably being the most

significant to the lives of voters. The time frame of the study thus takes in the 2010 federal election campaign, through to the termination of the Labor-Greens agreement and the later 2013 election. The study proceeds chronologically, aiming to offer a “continuous and theoretically based historical explanation of a case, in which each significant step toward the outcome” is identified and explained (George & Bennett 2005, p. 30). Recollections of this period, from current and former Greens parliamentarians, form the core of this research, but also included are post-hoc reflections and forecasts for the future. This allows for a rich understanding of the experience of the Labor-Greens agreement from the junior party perspective, as well as insight as to the longer-term impact the agreement has had on the Greens – something no study thus far has adequately examined.

Process Tracing and Interviews

A potential weakness of process tracing, though, is its reliance upon interview evidence sourced from the actors involved. The individual perceptions and post hoc rationalisations of those actors can distort results (Beck 2006; Kingdon 1981, p. 12). It is for this reason, Mosley explains (2013, pp. 22-23), that findings of semi-structured interviews must be critically evaluated in the context of existing theory and findings from similar studies in the international literature (e.g. Bale & Bergman 2006b; Bale and Dann 2002). The interviewees – Greens federal parliamentarians – were selected on the basis of their proximity and significance to the events under study, as is typical for process tracing (Aberbach & Rockman 2002, p. 673; Martin 2013, p. 113). The formation, ongoing viability (survival), and effectiveness (passing of legislation) of a minority government are processes predominantly contingent upon the relationships between such party elites (Strøm 1990b, pp. 27-29). This chapter, and the following, demonstrate that this tends to hold even for parties with more participatory organisational structures, such as the Greens.

Interviewing Greens elites with the closest involvement in inter-party bargaining provides the most direct and valuable insight into the attitudes, goals, and expectations underpinning the decisions made. While interview data has limitations, interviews are nevertheless the most suitable means to identify causal mechanisms and develop explanations for this case. As

Mosley (2013, p. 2) states, interviews “directly and deeply assess the roots of individual actions and attitudes” with scholars interacting “directly with the individuals... who populate our theoretical models.” Well-executed interviews can also generate information unavailable on the public record and provide insight as to the micro-foundations of political phenomena (Lynch 2013, p. 37; Vromen 2010, p. 258). Tansey (2007, p. 767) argues that elite interviews hold particular utility in process-tracing research, given that such research “requires data collection on key political decision-making and activity, often at the highest political level.” What is important is that limitations are acknowledged, interviews are well-designed, and results are reported transparently and accurately (Bleich & Pekkanen 2013).

Interview Method

Semi-structured interviews were held with current and former Greens parliamentarians. The interviews took place between the 20th May and 10th July 2017, conducted face-to-face in electorate offices (with one exception), and the recordings are an average of 54 minutes in duration. Table 9.1 outlines additional details. Interviewees were asked a set of foundational questions, as well as questions tailored to their individual roles in the party. Each interview also included follow-up questions, in line with the semi-structured interviewing technique (Bailer 2014, p. 174). A combination of open and closed questions was used to elicit individual explanations and allow for a reconstruction of events.

Table 9.1 - Interviews with Greens Members of Parliament

Interviewee	Position in party	Date of interview	Duration of interview	Mode of interview
<i>Bob Brown</i>	Party leader	20/5/17	51m	In person
<i>Christine Milne</i>	Deputy leader	29/7/17	1h 34m	In person
<i>Sarah Hanson-Young</i>	Senator	5/7/17	1h 4m	In person
<i>Adam Bandt</i>	Member of the House	30/6/17	44m	In person
<i>Penny Wright</i>	Incoming Senator	29/5/17	58m	In person
<i>Lee Rhiannon</i>	Incoming Senator	9/6/17	55m	In person
<i>Larissa Waters</i>	Incoming Senator	26/6/17	33m	In person
<i>Richard Di Natale</i>	Incoming Senator	10/7/17	35m	By phone

In accord with the recommendations of Beckmann and Hall (2013, pp. 197-98), interviewees were not asked to make “empirical generalisations or epous[e] theoretical explanations.” With the consent of participants, each interview was audio recorded and later transcribed for analysis. I incorporate substantial quotes from the transcriptions into these two chapters to construct a narrative through the process tracing method. Quotes replicate precisely statements made by interviewees, including fillers and vocal pauses (e.g. ‘um’, ‘uh’, etc.) to convey the data in full. Generous quotation exhibits the personal ‘voice’ of the interviewees, and allows for greater transparency in the interpretation and analysis of the data (Mosley 2013, pp. 20-22).

Election 2010 and the Hung Parliament

The Greens met the results of the election lacking dedicated internal procedures for navigating a hung parliament and any ensuing multiparty arrangements. The Greens experienced a positive swing of roughly 4% in both the House and Senate, taking their nation-wide first preference votes to 11.8 and 13.1 percent, respectively. This placed the party in a balance-of-power position in both parliamentary chambers, albeit a shared role in the House. When asked of what internal party decision-making processes were initiated in response to these results, Milne remarked, after a pause: “[t]hat’s a good question, because I don’t really remember any processes.” What filled this vacuum was the parliamentary party room, headed by party leader Bob Brown. The party room collectively maintained regular and substantial involvement, but it was Brown that exerted the greatest influence, and often represented the Greens in inter-party negotiations alone. The intra-party decision-making on which major party to support for government, and in what manner, began the day after the election, as Brown (2017) recalls:

“I spoke with Julia Gillard at the Melbourne CPO – the parliamentary offices in Melbourne – on the Sunday. And then we had various phone calls and link-ups. We had a press conference there. Now, as I recollect, that was just one-on-one, to get the ball rolling. But I always went back and spoke to the rest of them, and reported back and got opinion and kept everybody involved.”

Bandt (2017) similarly emphasised the collective approach taken by the party room, noting it “wasn’t any one person just deciding on behalf of everyone else, or one small group of people, [it] was done as a party room.” The collective approach, however, was limited to those Senators holding their seats prior to the 2010 election, plus newly-elected Bandt. Largely excluded from discussions were the new Senators-elect Richard Di Natale, Lee Rhiannon, Larissa Waters, and Penny Wright. Rhiannon (2017) expressed being omitted from any dialogue or decisions:

“I actually know nothing more than what I see on television, and what I see on television is – you assume it’s the party room, but maybe it’s Bob and Adam. I guess Christine. But it’s really just the impressions of what you see in the news.”

Rhiannon also observed that the party more widely – notably, local branches and individual members – was entirely excluded from internal discussions on how to proceed following the election of a hung parliament. The party room, nevertheless, considered themselves acting as trustees, closely representing what they perceived to be the wishes of Greens membership:

“... it was pretty clear that we weren’t going to be able to back an Abbott government.... I think it’s fair to say that our members wouldn’t accept that. That didn’t mean it was a fait accompli to do what we did with Gillard though...” (Hanson-Young 2017)

While the decision to support Labor in forming government appears to have been a relatively straightforward reflection of the expectations of Greens members, the precise form that support would take was a more complicated matter. As Hanson-Young noted, “what the deal would look like, what the arrangement would look like with Gillard was very much party room.” This was in part due to the absence of appropriate internal structures and procedures. Additionally, though, there were concerns around speed. Milne explains:

“Gillard obviously needed something locked in early, to put pressure on, uh, Wilkie, Oakeshott, and Windsor. And Bob and I had had enough experience in balance of power politics, you know, that you need to grab the opportunity when it comes. And so,

essentially, Bob's strategy was to try and get Gillard to sign something early, as fast as possible."

Thus, leaning toward supporting a Labor government, the Greens party room needed to move swiftly to settle the positions the party would take to the negotiations. It was this concern for momentum and leverage that gave impetus to Brown's strong influence over the earliest intra-party deliberations over how to approach negotiations with Labor. Brown (2017) was clear in articulating his view that the exigencies of inter-party negotiations made consultation with the broader party a risky prospect. While acknowledging a persistent decision-making tension between the party elite and the membership, Penny Wright (2017) expressed a similar concern about the party appearing indecisive to the public:

"Number one: you have to act fast. You don't have time to faff around and prevaricate. You actually need to act fast and get that agreement signed up. Because the public and everyone is waiting to see where you're going to go, and the last thing you want to look is indecisive."

Amongst the party room, there was remarkably little disagreement on whether to consult the party organisation, on how to approach the negotiations with Labor or, later, over what concessions to request in return for support. When asked of the existence of dissent, Hanson-Young (2017) said:

"To be absolutely honest, no. We thrashed it out and we talked about pros and cons, and the impact of taking some things off the agenda, not having something on refugees, not having gay marriage... there were definitely robust conversations but there was never a division."

What is novel about the Greens in this scenario is that while the party remains a relatively decentralised organisation, decision-making in the immediate post-election stage was highly centralised with little divergence of opinion. There is one notable exception, however, to this finding of the party as a relatively unified actor. During the campaign for the seat of

Melbourne, amidst media speculation over the possibility of a hung parliament, Bandt ruled out supporting a Liberal minority government. This was a decision ultimately made by the candidate himself, in a campaign overseen directly by the state branch, rather than the confederated Australian Greens. For Bandt, the commitment was about removing uncertainty and indicating to local voters what kind of government they could expect should his seat prove pivotal:

“I think it’s what most people in Melbourne would have expected – it’s, um, legitimate for voters to want to know where you stand... the consequences of them voting for you... And I think people would have been, uh, concerned at the thought that voting for me could have in any way assisted the forming of a Liberal government, so I wanted to give people the assurance they were asking.”

Given that Bandt’s seat would likely be critical not only to the formation of an eventual government, but also contribute to any leverage the Greens may acquire, this decision significantly altered the eventual bargaining environment into which the Greens entered. This kind of ‘anti-pact’ not to cooperate has been shown in international cases to influence negotiations in a similar fashion to pre-electoral commitments to cooperate, setting parties on a path that is difficult to alter (De Winter & Dumont 2006, p. 179; Debus 2009) When questioned whether his rejection of cooperating with the Liberals weakened the Greens’ bargaining power by relegating the latter to a captive party of Labor’s, Bandt dismissed the idea: “no... to think that we’d, um... simply saying that we weren’t going with the Liberals didn’t automatically put us in the Labor column.” After all, despite Bandt’s stated position, Brown as party leader still spoke, and eventually met, with Tony Abbott – albeit several days after Brown’s first contacts with Gillard.

Brown saw meeting with Abbott and the Liberals as an obligation to the electorate, and to Greens voters in particular:

“I had, as party leader, always believed in negotiating with both major parties not just one... And I think the electorate is owed it. If you look at the Greens’ voter base, 70/30 or

80/20 is the split between who used to vote Labor in the main and who used to vote Coalition in the main. It's a mistake to think it's 100% Labor – it isn't – and that part of the constituency has to be honoured. And you only do that by negotiating."

It is here where Abbott could have fostered some discord within the Greens. Brown highlighted that Bandt had only committed to personally not backing the Coalition – he did not speak for the party as a whole. While Brown met with Abbott in good faith, it was nonetheless highly unlikely – a “flight of fancy” – that any deal could have been struck between the Greens and the Coalition (Brown 2017). As it was, the meeting with Abbott was short and futile, with the Liberal leader rude and indifferent. This left Gillard, who had first called Brown on the night of the election, to continue negotiations with the Greens, which by that point were almost reaching fruition. Though Greens support for a Labor government was probable from the outset, the nature of that support was to be the result of further bargaining.

Greens, Labor and Inter-Party Bargaining

The Greens' ideological distance from the Liberals, Bandt's anti-pact, and the swift breakdown of the Greens-Liberal dialogue, combine to suggest that the minor party had little option but to support Labor. Indeed, there has been a view within Labor that the Greens were a captive party (Kelly 2014, p. 549). Gillard (2014, p. 58), for example, believed that “raw politics would dictate that they could not enter an alliance with Tony Abbott and the Liberals.” The Greens, though, maintained a diminished but formidable bargaining position throughout the negotiations. The strength of the Greens' position resulted from four factors.

1. The willingness of the Greens to abandon any guarantees of support and force another election.
2. The resolve of the Greens – or at least, the party elite – to maintain a perception of being independent from *both* major parties.
3. Labor's need to secure an early agreement with the Greens to gain leverage over the remaining independent MPs, and
4. The legislative influence of the Greens, particularly as a veto player in the Senate.

When asked about the view of some Labor parliamentarians of the Greens as a captive party, Brown's response was resolute:

"They're totally wrong, you see, and that is an example of the naivety of people in the Labor Party, who feel that the Greens are a captive of theirs. There are very big options, and one of those is to say: 'you go in there as a minority government, we owe you nothing. First time you do something wrong, we'll bring you down. There'll be another election.' ... [It] was a very real option. And it was exercising my mind all the time, and certainly Christine's."

Thus, while any Greens warning that they may back a Coalition over a Labor cabinet would be implausible, the minor party nonetheless maintained a credible 'walk away' threat of another kind. For a small party, maintaining the impression that it could undermine the viability or effectiveness of a cabinet can significantly enhance bargaining power (Bale & Bergman 2006b, p. 440; Bergman 1995, p. 168). For the Greens, the idea of entering the 43rd Parliament without an agreement was not merely about ideology or policy, but tied up with party strategy and identity. The perception, or reality, that the Greens exist only as a left flank to Labor is one the party elite wished to avoid:

"It's not a position that I like... I think that if we're serious about wanting to be a party in our own right, and a growing party in our own right, and therefore a party of either opposition or government, we can't be captive to either side... Our members and our grassroots expect better than that; they don't want us to be a captive to just the Labor Party." (Hanson-Young 2017)

Moreover, Brown had accurately judged that Gillard and Labor needed to secure the vote of the Greens in the House as quickly as possible. Labor was set on reaching the first signed deal, adding to the House seats they could corral to provide supply and confidence. Gillard (2014, pp. 64-65) identified the Greens as the most likely party to provide that seat and needed momentum. This resulted in a series of meetings throughout the bargaining phase, mostly conducted between Brown and Gillard alone. Occasionally, Milne as deputy leader and Bandt

as the Greens member of the House were also involved. This supports Strøm's (1990b, p. 27) assertion that cabinet formation is "a game played by a very small and select set of party leaders." What the literature often overlooks, however, is the critical role of staff-to-staff interaction. Brown's chief of staff, Ben Oquist, was in regular contact with the chiefs-of-staff of Gillard and the independents. These advisers were vital in devising both the broad strategy and finer details of the eventual support agreements (Brown 2017).

It was the Greens' prospective balance of power position in the Senate, though, that bolstered the party's bargaining position above all else. When the newly-elected Senators would take their seats in July 2011, the Greens alone would determine whether government legislation should pass or fail, if (as it indeed turned out) the Opposition was to adopt an obstructionist strategy. If Labor wished for stable government, and potentially an easier passage of their legislative agenda, they needed to accommodate the Greens. Gillard (2014, p. 65) recognised the importance of bringing the Greens on side in order to manage the Senate.⁴² Brown was unequivocal in his assessment of the importance of the Greens' contingent veto power in the Senate:

"[It] was critical to this agreement being as strong as it was... It was there at the outset that this was a crucial part of the arrangement, that the Greens would have that balance of power and would be able to make things happen when the time came."

Milne went further, asserting that while Bandt's lower house seat may have been what opened a dialogue between Labor and the Greens, it was the minor party's considerable Senate influence that was responsible for the favourable terms of the final agreement:

"It was not just Melbourne. It was the fact that we had balance of power in both houses. Otherwise, it would have just been, it wouldn't have been anything, because if they didn't have the confidence that they'd get it through the upper house, then why would have they bothered with anything? ... If it had just been the lower house, there might have been a

⁴² See also Brown (2014, p. 150).

few concessions to Melbourne, but there would not have been a comprehensive agreement with the Greens.”

There are two important conclusions to draw from the influence of the Greens’ position in the Senate on Labor-Greens bargaining. First, the relative bargaining positions of parties are determined not only by what potential contributions each party could make to the formation of a cabinet, but also by the legislative influence each party may hold in the upcoming parliamentary term. In bicameral settings, these can be separate matters. Considerations of competition in the legislative arena can therefore shape party interaction in the executive arena, and thus influence the broader party system. Second, and relatedly, the negotiation of the Labor-Greens support agreement demonstrates the capacity of bicameralism to affect government formation. Both party leaderships acknowledge that it was the Greens’ power in the Senate that allowed the minor party to extract such significant concessions in the agreement. These conclusions are somewhat straightforward points to make, but have been underplayed in theorising on government formation. Only recently, for instance, have studies emerged detailing the effects of bicameralism on the formation and longevity of governments (Druckman et al. 2005; Eppner & Ganghof 2017). Governing coalitions in control of institutional veto players like the Senate are more likely to form, as well as to endure. If a Labor government was to be both viable and effective, they needed to accommodate the demands of the Greens.

The Support Agreement: Writing it Down and Making it Public

There were a variety of ways in which the accord between Labor and the Greens could have been finalised, but it was the Greens that insisted the agreement be written down and made public. This was a demand that Brown had made of Gillard early in the process, and was the result of Brown and Milne’s experience in Tasmanian state politics. When reaching an agreement with another party to form government, Brown was adamant:

“... you have to have the agreement written down, and signed off on... [and] you have to make it public. That created quite a deal of tension as we insisted on that, and finally that we had a joint press conference. Labor didn't want to do that.”

Brown and Milne identified two main reasons for these demands of Labor. First, a minor partner can only expect its larger partner to deliver what is written down and formalised; verbal agreements are unlikely to be honoured. Second, releasing the agreed terms to the public aids in holding the government to account. As Milne explained:

“Bob and I are very strongly of the view that, that once the government is sworn in, what you've negotiated is all that you're going to get, and you're likely to regress from there. If it's written down, then the community can at least hold the government to account for failing to deliver on what they promised in order to get government, or alternatively, you can bring them down.”

The degree to which even a written and public agreement can be used in this manner, however, is debateable. As we discuss later, several key policy terms of the pact were unrealised. Labor, as the major partner in the pact, maintained far greater power to determine the extent to which the agreement was fulfilled. This was a reality that the Greens were aware of from the outset:

“Once the government has gotten onto the green leather benches, the only way you can enforce an agreement – verbal, written, or anything else – is by trying to talk to them about their obligations to deliver. Well they just say they won't and they can't, full stop. You can then threaten them by saying that either they deliver on x, y and z, or you won't pass other legislation, or something else. Or you can bring them down. You don't have many options.” (Milne 2017)

The perspectives of both Brown and Milne were clearly shaped by their experiences of the short-lived Tasmanian Labor-Greens Accord. Each referenced Tasmanian politics in explaining their decisions in the 43rd federal parliament. Brown and Milne were amongst the

five Green Independents that negotiated an agreement to support a minority state Labor government following the election of 1989. Despite having first-hand experience of a support agreement with limited success, the Australian Greens leadership nevertheless pressed forward with a written, public agreement with federal Labor. Written and public agreements are, after all, somewhat unusual for support relationships internationally (Bale & Dann 2002, p. 355). More common are the kind of unwritten, more ad hoc relationships that the Greens entered into with the Rundle Liberal minority government in Tasmania in 1996, which also delivered mixed results for the minor party.

While the Greens leadership had relied upon insights from their experiences in Tasmanian state politics, it is predominantly in post-hoc discussion that they considered international cases of support relationships. Whether it was in pursuing a 'contract' agreement, negotiating particular concessions or, later, in navigating and later terminating the pact, references were minimal to the (often negative) experiences of green and other minor parties in support arrangements internationally. When asked why this was the case, Milne responded:

"Because we don't really know enough about it.... I think there's a lot we can learn, but we don't know. So, for example, the Greens are currently in some form of power relationship in 11 of the 16 states in Germany. Now who would know?... [T]he fact is, we don't reference that or even talk about it in the Australian Greens party room because, essentially, we haven't got the detail. We haven't. And we desperately need it because those dynamics don't change the world over."

Unique to the Greens, however, is the international network of greens parties, the Global Greens, with each of its 90 member parties sharing a common charter. One of the purposes of the Global Greens is inter- and trans-national learning between parties, and many green parties – in Europe, especially – have experience supporting or participating in executives. Nonetheless, the Global Greens is a fledgling organisation, with its limited funding largely originating from the Australian and New Zealand Greens. Milne (2017), now a Global Greens ambassador, spoke enthusiastically about the potential of this global network for information sharing between parties – a potential thus far unrealised. With little examination of

international examples, but considerable learning from Australian state politics, the Greens saw a 'contract' with Labor as the best chance of securing parliamentary reform and policy concessions.

The Terms of the Agreement

The terms of the Labor-Greens agreement were a product of internal debates within the respective parties, the ensuing bilateral negotiations, and the complex multiparty bargaining environment within which those negotiations took place. The Greens' approach to determining which terms to include in the pact was centralised to the party room. The question of which policy concessions to ask of Labor often dominated these party room deliberations (Bandt 2017). Hanson-Young (2017) outlined the initial thinking, focused on key Greens policies:

"I remember distinctly, um, debating the list of issues we wanted to put to Gillard, and it was: climate, a price on carbon, something on refugees, and gay marriage. And it was made pretty clear that we weren't going to get all three of those. And that she wasn't going to shift on refugees, and she wasn't going to shift on marriage. So, they came off the list."

Thus, internal processes, rather than bilateral bargaining, eliminated two of the Greens' most totemic issues as potential concessions. This is noteworthy, as it tends to be a party's core issues – those that unite the membership and supporters – that a party elite will take to and press, as far as possible, in negotiations (Laver & Schofield 1990, p. 29). For some issues, though, a pragmatic assessment of political reality overruled what had otherwise long been Greens priorities. As Milne explained:

"So that is why some things that we would have liked in there don't go into those agreements, because you know the other side is never going to sign it. So, that's why you get basically a scan, a quick scan of the horizon, the policy horizon, put in there as much as you can of the policy horizon that you think you might be able to deliver, and that you will get them to agree to."

In line with much of the literature adopting a spatial approach to party competition, and indeed Warwick's (1998b; 2000; 2005) work on 'policy horizons', the policy terms of the agreement appear to be those within the intersecting 'horizons' of the two parties. That is, within the limits of the common ideological-policy space that Labor and the Greens inhabited in 2010. As chapter seven demonstrates, the two parties were ideologically closer at this election than those previous or since. Milne explained how this functioned in practice:

"A lot of it goes down to, um, obviously climate was core. The rest is about what there was... so, any policies on which Labor had already said it would move or had a progressive point of view. So, if Labor said we will support so much renewable energy, or we'll support high-speed rail, or they've got a policy to support a treaty, or whatever. So, we basically looked at, um, what can we put in here that Labor not necessarily has a policy on but have already spoken about or been committed to, or have had a Minister say that they would do."

The willingness of the Greens to find some common ground with Labor, to compromise, provides another facet of the explanation of why certain core issues were left out of the agreement. The Greens party room recognised that any policy demand put to Labor was likely to be diluted or weakened, either in the negotiation of the pact or in the design (and passage) of later legislation. Certain issues, such as same sex marriage or reform to asylum seeker policies, were either impractical or unacceptable to compromise on (Hanson-Young 2017). Climate change, while also a central Greens concern, nevertheless has a range of potential policy responses. Dropping certain issues prior to bargaining with Labor, therefore, was a result of both pragmatic politics as well as a refusal to compromise certain principles and ideological commitments.

What further complicated the bilateral negotiations between Labor and the Greens was the complex multiparty bargaining environment. That Labor would have to secure the support of at least three independents, in addition to Bandt's seat in the House, directly influenced the bargaining strategy adopted by the Greens. The likelihood that a push for same sex marriage would alienate the rural independents, in what was already a "quagmire of unknowns", also

informed the Greens' decision to avoid such a demand (Brown 2017). Similarly, the agreement, specifically demanded by Milne, that a date be set by which climate change legislation would be passed in Parliament was kept private, known only to Labor and the Greens. The fear was that Oakeshott and Windsor might not back a Labor government if they knew carbon pricing – the real intention behind the proposed multiparty climate change committee – was essentially a *fait accompli* (Milne 2017).

Once set on supporting a Labor government, the Greens went about aiding Labor in persuading the independent cross-benchers to similarly commit. While there was little direct communication between the Greens and the independents in this bargaining stage, the Greens, and primarily Brown, worked through Gillard to facilitate a Labor minority government. Significant components of the final agreements Labor made with Windsor and Oakeshott, especially, were concessions and parliamentary reform ideas Brown (2017) “offered to Gillard to give to them... to make them feel like they’re getting a better bargain, something to go back to their constituency with.” For instance, reform to Question Time and private members’ business in parliament were concessions first put to Labor by the Greens for this purpose. Brown handing the independents these ‘wins’ was not entirely altruistic; after all, the Greens would also benefit from parliamentary reform. Certainly, such improvements were about principle, but also about increasing the party’s influence in the 43rd and future parliaments. Regardless, Brown’s concessions to the cross-bench through Labor bought significant leverage with the independents throughout the 43rd Parliament (Hanson-Young 2017).

While Labor was the first to reach out and lobby for Greens support, each of terms in the final agreement were Greens requests. For Labor’s part, Gillard (2014, p. 65) claims that she “fielded a number of ambitious asks and said no” to Brown. When asked, however, neither Brown nor Milne recalled any specific requests made to Labor that were outright rejected. Gillard (2014, p. 65) was also determined to avoid a coalition government with the Greens – the minor party was not to hold a ministry. The aversion of the major parties to coalition government with the Greens has precedent in state-level politics, as well (Bowe 2010, p. 144). Some media commentary at the time claimed that the Greens, and Bandt specifically, were seeking a

ministerial position – a contention since repeated in scholarly work (Paun 2011, p. 450; Tennant-Wood 2014, p. 36). However, neither Brown or Milne as party leaders, or Bandt as a pivotal member of the House, sought a ministry for themselves or the party. When questioned, Brown (2017) specifically drew a line between a support arrangement and a coalition government, and cited the difficulties Greens ministers had experienced in coalition governments at the state and territory level.

A Labor-Greens coalition was simply not a desirable option for either party. Negotiation over portfolio distributions were thus avoided, with the focus of the agreement being the policy and parliamentary reform demands put forward by the Greens. For the Greens, both the determination of the party's asks and negotiation positions, as well as the actual bargaining with Labor, were both highly centralised processes. For a party whose core tenets espouse participatory, grassroots democracy, the decision to support a Labor minority government in exchange for policy concessions involved little of the party outside of its parliamentarians. Even newly-elected Senators were largely excluded from decision-making. The party elite, however, do put forward cogent reasoning for employing such an approach, largely in line with the 'trustee' model of representation. The Greens backed Labor predominantly because that is what the membership would have expected. The Greens' subsequent policy demands were selected through a prism of principle, pragmatism, campaign priorities, and securing long-term influence. As Wright (2017) emphasised, each policy clause of the final agreement was consistent with the Greens' platform, and it is into this platform that the Greens membership has direct and significant input. Thus, on the 1st of September 2010, Brown and Milne stood with Gillard and Swan to sign, publicly, the agreement that brought Labor one seat closer to forming a minority cabinet.

Conclusion

Following the election of a hung parliament in 2010, a minority Labor government may have been the most likely and easily explicable result, but it was by no means guaranteed. Such an outcome relied upon securing the support of the Greens and at least three other cross-bench independents while excluding each from cabinet. For the Greens' part, backing a Labor over

a Coalition government was always likely, but as this chapter demonstrates, far from assured. While the Greens maintained a dominant focus on appearing as responsible policymakers committed to stable government, the party nonetheless regularly considered the option of removing its support. Similarly, it was far from inevitable that the agreement was written, public, and included a commitment by the two parties to cooperate on legislation. These outcomes continued the closed structure of competition for government in the Australian party system, with the executive still open only to Labor and the Coalition. However, these developments disrupted the usual process of government formation, weakened predictability in the governing formula, and may facilitate greater change in the core of the Australian party system in the future.

The vote in 2010 remains the zenith in the Greens' electoral support. This translated into a bargaining position entailing a potential degree of influence over government and legislation for which the Greens' organisational structure was not adequately prepared. This allowed, in a party generally committed to intra-party participatory democracy, for decision-making process to quickly centralise to the party room, and further to the offices of the party leaders, Bob Brown and Christine Milne. Within the party room at the time, there was little divergence in opinion over the course the party should take, namely to back a Labor government in exchange for declared policy concessions. More serious party room debate, however, was had in regard to which policy demands would be put to Labor. Nevertheless, the approach of the Greens supports the idea that inter-party bargaining over government formation is a game played by small groups of party elites, overriding even otherwise decentralised party structures and commitments to membership participation. Further, it was the prior political experiences of these elites that significantly shaped the approach taken by the party to negotiations and the form of inter-party arrangement reached with Labor.

Several key variables shaped the bargaining environment. Foremost was relative party strength, with Labor commanding a near-majority, and the Greens with only a sole representative, in the House. Second was the ideological proximity of the Greens to Labor, and distance from the Coalition parties, meaning that Greens support of the latter was untenable. This was reinforced by Bandt's 'anti-pact' from the campaign period, which ruled

out his support of a Coalition government. The Greens leadership nevertheless maintained a credible 'walk away' threat; while the party was unlikely to back the Coalition, they could have also rejected an accord with Labor. This threat strengthened the minor party's bargaining position, as did Labor's need to secure an early agreement with the Greens to gain momentum and greater leverage with the cross-bench. Contributing most to the Greens' negotiating strength, however, was the party's contingent veto power in the Senate; the party controlled the fate of any legislation the Opposition voted against. The party adroitly exploited Australia's strong bicameralism and multifaceted party system to amplify its individual seat in the House, extracting far greater policy concessions than other cross-bench actors. The terms of the final agreement were predominantly Greens demands, with those demands the product of a clear set of criteria, albeit criteria established by the party's parliamentarians to the exclusion of the wider party. Overall, however, the Labor-Greens agreement marks a significant milestone for the Greens, solidifying their position in the parliament and party system.

THE LABOR-GREENS SUPPORT AGREEMENT: THE LASTING COSTS AND EPHEMERAL BENEFITS OF SUPPORT PARTY STATUS

The Labor-Greens agreement of the 43rd Parliament included terms pertaining to the ‘working relationship’ between the two parties. These terms encompassed access to information, to ministers, and to consultation over proposed legislation. Nonetheless, merely writing down the goal of a fruitful, cooperative relationship is insufficient. Myriad factors determine inter-party relations, from broader variables like electoral competition and ideological commonality, through to narrower and intangible influences like individual relationships between parliamentarians. Important, too, are the intra-party dynamics of the two parties. Indeed, within both Labor and the Greens there were gradations of opinions on how to manage interactions with their respective partner – or whether to maintain that partnership at all. Ultimately, the Greens terminated the accord 18 months after its signing. Party leader Christine Milne announced the cancellation at a National Press Club address, citing an increasing range of policy disputes with the Labor minority government, most of which fell outside of the scope of the agreement.

The 43rd Parliament, the Gillard government and, to an extent, the support agreement, have received notable journalistic and scholarly attention. Lacking is an account of the Greens’ role in supporting the Labor minority government, and the implications of this support for the junior partner and the party system more generally. This chapter has four main aims:

1. To analyse how intra-party dynamics within the Greens were affected by regular cooperation with Labor, necessitating considerable compromise and a centralisation of power toward the party’s parliamentarians.
2. To examine how the Labor-Greens agreement operated in practice, and how the bilateral relationship evolved over time.
3. To identify the causal mechanisms that led to the termination of the support agreement.

4. To trace the impacts of the breakdown of the Labor-Greens relationship.

These four research aims connect to the central question of this thesis – the Greens’ impact on the Australian party system – in two ways. First, this chapter builds upon the findings of chapter nine in investigating the Greens’ limited influence over the contest for government constituting the ‘core’ of the Australian party system. Second, this chapter analyses the relationship between the Greens and their most ideologically-proximal competitor, the Labor Party. The nature of this relationship contributes to the overall structure of party interaction present in the party system. This chapter traces the processes underpinning intra-Greens conflict, the operation and termination of the agreement, and the enduring impacts of the breakdown in the Labor-Greens relationship. This chapter argues that while the choices of the Greens in the 43rd Parliament legitimised the party’s position in the Australian party system, they nonetheless placed the Greens somewhere between a mainstream and radical party – two poles between which the party continues to oscillate, to the detriment of its party system influence.

Inside the Greens: Conflict, Compromise, Consensus

For the Greens, the process or even prospect of compromise, particularly on policy, can create significant internal conflict. This conflict stems from the policy-seeking goals of the party, as well as the Greens’ consensus-based internal decision-making, which is intertwined with the founding principle of participatory democracy. Operating under an inter-party agreement and legislative bargaining are both centralising processes; they almost inevitably transfer power to a party’s parliamentarians. Each interviewee was asked whether they believed compromise in parliament was at odds with participatory democracy and consensus decision-making. Responses varied from rejecting any contradiction, to acknowledging a (positive) tension or contradiction, through to outlining examples where such a contradiction created conflict during the 43rd Parliament. The views of Greens MPs appear informed by differing conceptions of representation and internal democracy. Responses were also shaped, though, by long-existing factional divides, mainly operating along state- and branch-based lines.

Milne, for instance, rejected the notion that compromise and negotiation are incompatible with participatory democracy. Milne readily connects the tension between compromise and internal democracy to an amalgam of state-based differences and competing approaches to representation:

“All of the parties in the Australian Greens, with the exception of New South Wales, regard their members of parliament as trustees of the party’s philosophy. That is, the principles of ecology, social justice, peace and non-violence, and participatory democracy. So, when you’re elected, you are the trustee of that.”

On the other hand, Rhiannon (2017), the sole Greens parliamentarian from New South Wales, highlighted an unavoidable conflict between parliamentary compromise and a member-driven party organisation. For Rhiannon, this is primarily the result of operating a party based on participatory democracy within a system of representative democracy. Thus, friction between the party room and the membership is, at times, to be expected, but can be resolved through empowering the membership and, as a parliamentarian, acting more in line with a delegate model of representation. In Rhiannon’s view, this is vital to party cohesion, to member ownership over what the party does, and delivering better campaigning and policy outcomes. Rhiannon views the internal processes leading to the Labor-Greens pact as having contravened party principles, resulting in an inferior agreement relative to what could have been achieved through a more inclusive, consultative process.

Bandt, meanwhile, represents a middle ground in the party room. Bandt (2017) questioned the point of having parliamentarians if the party is not able to entrust those representatives with some power and a degree of autonomy. To offset this, however, Bandt sees a need to strengthen and better resource the national party organisation with a goal of having the broader party “more integrally involved in the decisions” that the party room makes. Indeed, one of the consequences of the way the Labor-Greens agreement was determined is reform to the Greens internal decision-making structures. A NSW Greens push to codify the party’s constitution with a requirement to consult the membership prior to entering into a coalition or support agreement failed. Nevertheless, a similar requirement that the party room must

consult with the National Council⁴³ should the party find itself in a potential power-sharing position as in the 43rd Parliament was accepted.

Brown was the least sympathetic to Rhiannon's approach and the notion that compromise and negotiation is at odds with participatory democracy. For Brown, compromise and negotiation merely reflects the reality of parliamentary politics, and it is through parliamentary politics, in conjunction with social and political movements, that the Greens could bring about meaningful change.

"New South Wales – and Lee [Rhiannon] was in there – never opposed the agreement but you knew that they were ready to pounce on anything that they didn't agree with, because they have this fundamentalist viewpoint that we mustn't get involved with the big parties because they're corrupt, they're right-wing, they're owned by the corporates, and so on."

"Well, ladies and gentlemen, if that's the case, give up on it, and go man the barricades and get the revolution going. Because we either have a democracy in which we try to win over the public and grow our position in parliament and influence, and that means working with the other people who are elected by the people of Australia. Or you go to a revolution, get your guns out – take your pick."

Party politics, according to Brown, is about "seeing what's possible and going for it" – and striking a contract with Labor was the best means to secure lasting policy impact and parliamentary reform. Brown demonstrated throughout his leadership of the party both strong principles and a high capacity for pragmatism. This pragmatic political nous and willingness to compromise influenced both the negotiation and the operation of the support agreement. But, as we discuss below, compromise and practicality come at a cost for a small party founded as a challenge to existing parties and, for many members, 'politics as usual'.

⁴³ The National Council, which first met in early 2015 and generally meeting each month since, consists of: the national convenor(s), secretary and treasurer; one to two representatives from each state branch, depending on the proportion that branch contributes to national party members; two members from the federal party room; and up to two general members (holding no voting rights) appointed by a consensus of National Conference.

The Agreement in Practice

In this section, we examine the Labor-Greens agreement in practice. This not only allows us to better understand the relationship dynamic between the two parties, but also reveals how the Greens manage relationships with rivals where both competition (to maintain a distinct identity) and cooperation (to achieve legislative goals) is necessary. The literature tends to categorise minority governments based on how cabinets obtain majority support in parliament for legislative agendas. Generally, this categorisation is dichotomous, differentiating between those minority governments that can rely on regular backing through comprehensive support agreements with non-cabinet parties, and those minority governments needing to assemble ad hoc coalitions for each bill. Herman and Pope (1973), for instance, distinguish between supported and unsupported minority governments, while Strøm (1990b) similarly separates formal (supported) from substantive (unsupported) minority cabinets. The reasoning behind this categorisation is that the means of majority-building will influence government effectiveness, and thus, over time, viability (Daalder 1971, p. 288; Damgaard 1994, p. 90). Additionally, the degree of formalised cooperation will shape the patterns of party competition in the legislature. Supported minority governments tend to maintain regular and stable legislative coalitions, whereas unsupported minority governments engage in iterative coalition-building with ever-shifting legislative partners (Godbout & Høyland 2011).

These distinctions, however, are somewhat complicated both by the nature of the Labor-Greens support agreement, as well as by Australia's strong bicameralism. First, as noted by Field (2016, pp. 92-93), support agreements can permit degrees of legislative support (or opposition). The Labor-Greens agreement facilitated strong cooperation in some policy areas. Labor bills pertaining to issues external to the agreement, though, generally required considerable compromise and negotiation, or were opposed outright by the Greens. Second, the presence of an institutional veto player, the Senate, meant that the minority Labor government needed to secure legislative coalitions across two houses of parliament. What is novel about the Australian setting, and the case of the 43rd Parliament specifically, is that the Greens' balance of power position in the Senate meant that Labor had greater incentive to put

forward bills in the House likely to secure Greens backing. Building a legislative majority in the House that excluded the Greens in favour of other cross-bench members meant a bill had little chance of passing the Senate, given the frequent obstructionism of the Abbott Opposition. Gillard (2014, p. 71) reports that this shifted much of the inter-party bargaining to the House, and “with those negotiations concluded, passage through the Senate on Labor and Greens votes was automatic.” The Greens had been able to use their bargaining power in the Senate to gain considerable leverage across both chambers of parliament.

However, the durability, effectiveness, and legislative output of the Labor-Greens agreement were primarily results of cross-party, interpersonal relationships. For some in the Greens party room, the ‘working relationship’ terms in the pact facilitated a far greater degree of cooperation between the two parties; for others, these terms were largely irrelevant. Regardless of the origin or motivation, these basic relationships are a determinant of inter-party agreement and legislative success often overlooked in the literature. Most notably, in their memoirs both Brown (2014, pp. 149-52) and Gillard (2014, p. 72) speak of mutual respect, bond-building, and a degree of friendship to the extent that it directly influenced inter-party relations. Brown (2017), in the interviews, identified this rapport with Gillard as instrumental in making the agreement work, and directly contrasted this relationship with the actions of other Labor ministers who actively worked to undermine the Labor-Greens partnership and stymie legislative initiatives deriving from the agreement.

The agreement itself contained terms that fostered a more successful working relationship between Labor and the Greens, as well as further increased the Greens’ legislative influence. An entire section of the pact was dedicated to ‘working relationships’, with terms including: weekly meetings between Brown (later Milne), Bandt and Gillard to discuss the legislative agenda; advanced notice of planned legislation (introduced by either party); meetings with ministers and senior public servants; access to public service resources, such as for the costing of policies proposed by the Greens; and staff-to-staff interaction across parties. The extent to which individual Greens MPs found these terms to be beneficial tended to vary depending upon seniority; party leadership and longer-term Senators found them far more

advantageous. Milne again built upon prior experience in state politics, saying the working relationship terms were essential for securing Greens' policy demands:

"... and that's something we learnt from the Tasmanian experience. Once you've got your agreements, how they are going to be developed, what is the process whereby you're actually going to get this to legislation. It requires meetings, it requires access to ministers, it requires access to information, it requires a working relationship."

Hanson-Young instead saw the primary benefit of the terms on working relationships as having influence over agenda-setting, a power usually dominated by the government of the day. This spanned both day-to-day politics and the longer-term legislative agenda. It also allowed the Greens greater time to prepare a response, both inside and outside of parliament. Central to these advantages were meetings with relevant ministers:

"People kind of have this view that there's a process that ministers go through that is regimented and all you need to do is sort of follow the formula. It's just like raw politics; politics doesn't work like that. Being able to have, being in that meeting, in that moment when they are vulnerable, gives you an edge that you wouldn't otherwise have."

In contrast, those Greens senators taking their seats in mid-2011 found the terms promoting a working inter-party relationship to be largely inconsequential. This is likely a result of two factors. First, despite holding some important portfolio responsibilities, these were nevertheless junior senators; meetings between these senators and relevant Labor ministers were often also attended by Brown or Milne as party leaders (Waters 2017). Second, the junior senators entered Parliament after the support agreement had been in operation for several months. The foundational dynamics of the Labor-Greens relationship had already taken shape. Regardless, functional relationships were not present across all portfolio areas, and adherence to the agreement was not consistent. Further, neither the agreement nor interpersonal connections prevented, from the Greens' perspective, some significant failures in consultation, cooperation, and Labor's overall legislative strategy.

The Unity-Distinctiveness Dilemma

One of the foremost strategic challenges in maintaining a functional inter-party agreement, though, is balancing the competing needs of cohesion and cooperation on the one hand, and party integrity and identity on the other. This is often referred to as the ‘unity-distinctiveness dilemma’ in the international literature on governing coalitions (e.g. Boston & Bullock 2012; McEnhill 2015; Sagarzazu & Klüver 2015). Nonetheless, parties in support agreements also face this dilemma. Indeed, the challenges faced by the Greens in this regard significantly reduced party elites’ enthusiasm for pursuing future support arrangements. While support arrangements typically do not involve parties governing together, there is nonetheless a common interest in maintaining unity to promote government stability and legislative effectiveness. Additionally, just as for coalition partners, there is a risk that parties signed to support agreements can have their party identities blurred, or their integrity diminished, as compromise and cooperation becomes more frequent. While Labor and the Greens committed to legislate together across a range of policy areas, both parties nevertheless compete alone for votes across electoral demographics, as noted in chapter five, with considerable overlap (see also Miragliotta 2013, pp. 719-22).

The Greens experienced this unity-distinctiveness dilemma acutely. First, as the junior partner to the support agreement, the party lacked the personnel, resources, agenda-setting power, and long-established position in the party system enjoyed by Labor. Second, as is common for support parties generally, the Greens existed in a “grey area between government and opposition” (Bale & Bergman 2006a, p. 199). Though the party was not in cabinet, as Milne explains, there remained a limit to which the Greens could criticise or campaign against Labor:

“At what point does distinctiveness play into the hands of the opposition, and bring the government down? Which is also what you don’t want to happen. So, we couldn’t afford to be too vociferous in our criticism of the government because the government was hanging by a thread, and it was not in our interest, or the nation’s interest, in our view, to put Abbott in, to go to the polls.”

Nevertheless, the tension between remaining a distinctive party and the need to maintain a degree of cohesion with Labor consistently exercised the minds of Greens parliamentarians. Yet contemplating the dilemma is quite distinct from managing it, and managing it well. The interviewees were divided on this question of management, which connects with overall campaign, parliamentary, and communication strategies. For Rhiannon, it raised questions as to the purpose and goals of the party:

“How did we manage that? I don’t think we did manage that, actually. And I think this is one of the big issues for the Greens is: do you go into those agreements? Are there other ways to do it? Do you form coalitions? We really don’t have much experience with this in Australia just yet. And the little experience we’ve had, being frank about it, we haven’t discussed... Managing it both while it was happening, and post – in terms of how it’s perceived – didn’t really happen.”

As with the experience of support party status of the Swedish Greens (Bale & Bergman 2006a, p. 199), there was only limited capacity for the Australian Greens to educate the public about the support arrangement and its limitations. The readiness with which the Greens celebrated policy wins, as well, may very well have amplified public misperceptions. Bandt (2017), though, contends that emphasising the advantages of the support agreement was key not only to preserving party identity, but also to increasing the party’s chances at the following election. Asked on his view of the party’s handling of the unity-distinctiveness dilemma, Bandt, after a considerable pause to think, stated:

“The election after the agreement is in some ways your judgement on that, or voters’ judgement on that. And, um, in some respects ... you look around the country and it’s a tale of two elections. Elsewhere, our vote went down; in Melbourne, our vote went up, and it spilled over into surrounding areas. I think a key reason that our vote went up is that – one of the key reasons – is that we were proud of what we achieved in the agreement.”

In contrast, Brown (2017) was entirely untroubled by a supposed choice between unity and distinctiveness, expressing that perceptions of being in an alliance with government is simply an inevitable consequence of effecting change through parliament:

“Well, you know, if you’re going to work with government, you do have to work in alliance... People elect you to utilise maximum power; they don’t want you to go in and be weak. They won’t vote for you. They want you to go in and take the maximum opportunity you have to wield power to bring in the policies you’ve put to them. And if you don’t do that, you’ll go out backwards.”

There is a clear pragmatism and policy orientation to both Bandt’s and Brown’s approaches to the questions of unity versus distinctiveness, to compromise and negotiation, and to parliamentary ‘alliances’ more generally. This contrasts quite starkly with the more sceptical standpoint of Rhiannon. Sitting between the poles of Brown and Rhiannon, however, are the remaining Greens representatives interviewed. Other Greens MPs recognised the fine line between frequent or comprehensive inter-party cooperation and the blurring of party identity, yet nevertheless viewed the party as having handled this problem relatively well. The Greens were able to exploit the support agreement’s lack of coverage of several policy areas core to the party’s identity. Waters saw the environment as key to this strategy of managing the unity-distinctiveness dilemma:

“I think we managed it well... I never personally felt muddled by the agreement. And I don’t imagine anybody else did, either. It didn’t stop us from speaking out, calling them out for their very weak environmental policies they had at the time, and sadly still have.”

Hanson-Young is of a similar view. She emphasised the significance of her portfolio areas of LGBTIQ rights (including marriage equality) and asylum seekers, and pointed to their strategic use in maintaining party identity:

“I think I had the two distinct portfolios that matter to Greens voters, so in a way I was always kind of seen as the one to kind of prove that we weren’t totally Labor [laughs]...”

You know, Bob and Christine would do something on climate and I'd go and do something the next day on refugees to kind of keep the distinction going."

Both Waters and Di Natale, however, acknowledged that there may have been shortcomings in the strategy the party employed to remain considered separate to the Labor minority government. That is, to the extent that the Greens, come the next election, were associated in the minds of voters with a dysfunctional Labor government. The Greens, rather than benefiting from protest votes against established parties, instead became a target of "people's general sense of discontent" (Waters 2017). According to Di Natale (2017), though, this may be unavoidable when supporting a minority government, particularly following an election where that government has lost a prior majority. The electoral costs of remaining linked with what appeared to be a terminal Labor government was an issue that became increasingly pressing for the Greens over the course of the agreement, leading to the pact's cancellation in February 2013.

The End of the Agreement

The termination of the Labor-Greens agreement, announced by then-Greens leader Christine Milne, was claimed publicly to be the result of Labor failing to abide by the agreed terms. While Labor's failure to deliver on several policy promises is certainly one contributing factor, the pact's cancellation was also fuelled by a breakdown of inter-party relationships, Labor's leadership instability, and electoral strategy in the lead-up to the 2013 election. From the perspective of Greens MPs, Labor had already abandoned the agreement in practice, with Gillard beginning to distance her party from the Greens and re-orient Labor toward the centre of the ideological spectrum. Gillard had an eye toward the election, and on consistently poor public opinion poll results (see Holmes 2013). But she was also competing, within Labor, with an amalgam of conservative elements and a rival leadership aspirant (and his supporters), Kevin Rudd. In this context, the Greens saw the agreement as exhausted; they believed Labor would deliver few, if any, further legislative reforms stipulated in the pact. Though ending the support agreement did somewhat damage the relationship with Labor, most Greens MPs

nonetheless saw the termination as inevitable. For the Greens, the termination offered the opportunity to regain party distinctiveness and greater capacity to criticise the government.

After having assumed leadership of the Greens in April 2012, Milne also took Brown's place in the regular leaders' meetings held with Gillard. By late 2012, though, Milne sensed from these interactions that Gillard was merely "going through the motions" and "had no intention whatsoever of delivering on any of those remaining, outstanding issues." Milne surmised that this was a product of Labor's electoral concerns, as well as the Gillard-Rudd leadership turmoil within the party; working with the Greens further would expend political capital that Gillard barely held. In addition, though, Gillard likely recognised that the Greens possessed little capacity for retribution late in the parliamentary term:

"And she knew at that point – what choice, what were we going to do about it? Are we going to bring her down because she hadn't delivered that? Were we going to block a budget? She knew. And so, it just became perfunctory." (Milne 2017)

Outside of these leaders' meetings, what informed the Greens' belief that Labor was altering their strategic direction were two perceived changes: one in Gillard's rhetoric, and one in Labor's policy positions. Beginning with speeches at the Don Dunstan Foundation and the Whitlam Institute in 2011, Gillard began to articulate a more conservative social policy focused on traditional family values, coupled with a return to traditional labourist emphasis on 'hard work'. In both speeches, Gillard specifically criticised the Greens. It was the Whitlam oration, however, in which Gillard (2011) declared that the Greens "will never embrace Labor's delight at sharing the values of every day Australians". These kinds of comments tested the inter-party relationship, particularly as the critiques intensified through 2012 and early 2013. Gillard coupled her rhetoric with tangible policy changes related to core Greens positions on environmental preservation, climate change mitigation, and social and economic equality. Milne (2017) saw Labor, "with an eye to the election", as intentionally adopting anti-Greens policy positions. For instance, Labor's failure to protect the Tarkine wilderness area in Tasmania from mining, or New South Wales farmland from coal seam gas extraction, were

leading reasons listed in Milne's public address announcing the end of the agreement (Milne 2013).

However, few of the Labor policy decisions cited in Milne's address cancelling the Labor-Greens agreement were actually covered by that document. A favourable interpretation of this observation is that the change in Labor's policy trajectory infringed upon the vaguer terms and overall spirit of the agreement, and thus tarnished the broader relationship with the Greens. A more sceptical reading of this would suggest that, rather than being primarily motivated by principle, Milne became increasingly aware of the electoral costs of remaining in the agreement. Bandt (2017), seemingly still unconvinced by the decision to distance the Greens from the support agreement and its achievements, nevertheless offered the case for the former, favourable interpretation:

"Well the position put forward was that Labor, um, was no longer complying with the terms of working in the public interest. The abandonment of the mining tax, and their attacks on single parents were, um, used as examples of that. So, the, um, foundation of the agreement, it was said, was not being complied with."

Policy decisions and the degeneration of the inter-party and interpersonal relationships previously upholding the agreement were indeed prime factors behind the Greens ending the agreement. It is also clear, though, that the Greens needed to regain a perception of independence. According to Milne (2017), the party needed a "clear break from the Rudd-Gillard-Rudd stuff" and "chance to come out and be openly critical of the government, as critical as we'd like to be". The majority of interviewees share Milne's view. Rhiannon (2017), for instance, saw the Greens as "falling into this black hole" of being inextricably linked with Labor in the eyes of voters. Similarly, Waters (2017) acknowledged that the cancellation was partly political. The Greens needed to "remind people that we were a separate party – that just because they were pissed off at Labor didn't mean they had to be pissed off at the Greens." The termination of the agreement restored flexibility to the parliamentary and campaigning strategies of the party, with Gillard's (and later Rudd's) Labor Party the subject of increasing criticism from the Greens from early 2013 onwards, mirroring the Greens' experience

following the breakdown of the Labor-Greens accord in Tasmania in 1990 (Crowley 2003; Moon 1995, p. 157).

Dissolving the Labor-Greens support agreement had a small but significant impact on the overall bilateral relationship. Former Senator Wright (2017) observed that the termination did “sour things a bit” and removed the “sense of being able rely on each other.” Nonetheless, Wright added, in some regards Labor would have welcomed the end of the relationship, and would have likely acted first if they could have predicted what it would mean for the stability of their government. Di Natale (2017) expressed similar sentiments, pointing to the number of Labor parliamentarians that had long, or always, been against cooperating with the Greens. Milne’s decision, at first glance, came with little cost for the Greens. Nevertheless, the choice to end the relationship, and how it shaped parliamentary and campaigning strategy heading into the 2013 federal election, remains a point of contention within the party. Milne, speaking of this internal disagreement, acknowledged:

“Adam [Bandt] didn’t ever agree with it, he always wanted to maintain the relationship with Labor right up until the 2013 election. But that is, that is a Melbourne perspective. And Melbourne is an inner-city, Labor-Greens seat, so his perspective in my view is purely electorally based.”

Despite the end of the support relationship, Bandt and his office continued to advocate the benefits of the agreement throughout the parliamentary term. It is a choice that Bandt stands by:

“I would say that in, uh, in Melbourne, we continued to prosecute the strengths of the agreement, even – and what it had delivered – even, um, even though the agreement had been terminated. And I think history shows that that was in part, that that was a better approach.”

Choosing how, and when, to leave an agreement is a persistent dilemma for smaller parties. In a study of radical left parties participating in governing coalitions, Dunphy and Bale (2011,

p. 493) linked this dilemma to the very survival of these parties. Support agreements are arguably lower stakes, but can nonetheless entail similar risks, especially for a party, such as the Greens, that still sometimes seeks to position itself as an anti-establishment force. A further risk is that the support agreement may now be seen as a 'failed experiment' by Labor (and some within the Greens), limiting the Greens' options for future involvement in governing arrangements. Tavits (2008), for instance, found that multiparty coalitions that end in animosity are less likely to form again following future elections. Throughout the 43rd Parliament, resistance to the very notion of working with the Greens intensified within Labor, overlapping with leadership infighting, and demonstrating the significance of intra-party politics to inter-party relations. Public comments from Labor leaders and MPs since seem to suggest that such resistance has strengthened (e.g. see Mitchell 2016).

Overall, however, the Greens managed to operate within, and extricate from, the Labor-Greens agreement experiencing only some of the frustrations and costs experienced by support parties elsewhere (Bale & Bergman 2006a, pp. 444-45; Paun 2011, pp. 450-53). The Greens were not exploited or strongarmed into policy positions contrary to their platform, many of the agreed terms were fulfilled (e.g. a price on carbon, public dental services, a parliamentary budget office), and the party faced only moderate electoral backlash. Nevertheless, the disagreement over party strategy pertaining to the relationship with Labor continued on to the 2013 federal election campaign. It is important not to overstate any acrimony between Bandt and Milne – indeed, very little surfaced in the interviews. Nevertheless, the competing approaches to managing the relationship with Labor, to campaigning, and to navigating inter-party cooperation generally, spilled over into the rest of the party. Impressions and narratives within the media, and within the party itself, regarding Milne's leadership and the Greens' future success, were rooted in this divide and have persisted well beyond the pact's termination and the subsequent 2013 election.

Looking Back: The Greens' Reflections on the Support Agreement

While most Greens parliamentarians consider the Labor-Greens support agreement broadly successful given the circumstances, there nevertheless remains a widely-held hesitancy

toward participating in another such pact. Broadly speaking, those Greens MPs sitting in the party room at the time of the signing of the agreement look more favourably upon the agreement than those senators who took their seats part way through the 43rd Parliament. This suggests a degree of self-interested concern with defending decisions made by the party room in 2010. Brown and Bandt, party leader and the pivotal House member at the beginning of the pact, respectively, were most effusive in their approval. Both, however, readily acknowledged there were things that could have been done better. Brown accepted that the Greens made errors, but nevertheless emphasised that:

“But by and large, I think it is quite remarkable what we got out of a situation in which we weren’t in the balance of power in the House, we were sharing it.”

Similarly, though Bandt (2017) recognized there were problems with the Labor-Greens arrangement, he pointed to the numerous policy achievements in making the case for the worth of the agreement. For Bandt, leveraging the balance-of-power positions in the House and Senate to secure considerable legislative reform meant the party was able to “knock over in one fell swoop” the notion that a vote for the Greens was a wasted vote. This notion, according to Bandt, had been a leading hindrance to growing the Greens’ voter base. To be able to trace specific funding or initiatives back to the Greens is something he sees as “incredibly powerful.”

Like Bandt, Hanson-Young (2017) highlighted the need for the Greens, in the party’s first opportunity to shape the formation of government, to be perceived as acting responsibly. Signing a written agreement, committing to stable and effective government, helped realise this goal and combat some of the stereotypes of the party. Hanson-Young, however, is not “wedded to the idea” that a written agreement with a government is inherently valuable; the Labor-Greens agreement was a product of context and circumstance:

“The independents that we had to negotiate with – it wasn’t just about us. And the other thing is a prime minister, Gillard, who didn’t have the backing of her own party, or even the backing of the voters because of how she got there... We didn’t know what we’d get out

of her, we didn't know what she was going to be like... You know, she was an untested leader with a crazy madman as opposition leader. Locking down some of that stuff was crucial."

From Wright's perspective, having a written agreement was crucial for holding Labor accountable, but also to remain transparent and accountable to Greens supporters. Wright noted that Greens supporters had voted for the Greens, not for Labor; a written agreement made it clear under which conditions the Greens were supporting the formation of a Labor government. This was even more important given the negotiation of the pact involved scant member or supporter consultation. The need for transparency, for Wright, meant that she would have been uncomfortable with a more ad hoc, unwritten agreement to support Labor. What might be possible in the future, Wright thought, was a form of hybrid agreement that differentiated between non-negotiable and negotiable policy demands in exchange for confidence and supply. Nevertheless, Wright was concerned about whether and how an agreement might include guarantees of policy delivery. Indeed, this was a concern shared by all interviewees – that as a smaller partner, there is little recourse but to remove support for a government failing to implement promised reform.

In this vein, Milne detailed a specific addition she now wishes the agreement included. Asked if there was anything that should have been done differently, Milne replied, following a long pause:

"I mean, obviously there were, but nothing is ever perfect, but obviously there were. In terms of what, um, [long pause]... I guess in terms of the agreement, the dates issue. And that would be my overall learning in all of this: we should have had dates on things like political donations reform. The big things that were going to be contentious, we should have had dates on them."

Di Natale (2017), Greens party leader at the time of writing, also reflected on the lack of membership consultation in the determination to support a Labor minority government, and the form in which that support would take. Indeed, when asked for his view on whether he

would like to see the Greens, under his leadership, enter into written inter-party agreements, he initially deflected; it was not a decision for him or the party room to make unilaterally. When asked whether this meant he would like to see a different decision-making process than was used during the 43rd Parliament, Di Natale was cautious, stating: “I don’t want to reflect on what’s gone on before me, but yes, I would... I would see that there’d need to be an active involvement from, uh, the party.” Nevertheless, Di Natale did add his personal view that, depending on circumstances, the party should not rule out reaching agreements with governments in the future. Those agreements, however, should “outline very specifically some outcomes that are consistent with our policy agenda.” For Di Natale, then, the problems were more about process and less about the product of the 2010 pact itself.

On the other hand, Senator Rhiannon expressed strong aversion – albeit, with a caveat – to the Greens involving themselves in future formal agreements with other parties. When asked whether she would support signing another support agreement like that of the 43rd Parliament, Rhiannon responded:

“If I was sitting in the party room right now, where I would land – and I would obviously listen to my colleagues, and I could be persuaded – but how I would be approaching it, and this is having looked at what’s happened in Tassie, in the ACT, and federally, is that I don’t think we should enter into a formal agreement.”

Holding up a copy of the Labor-Greens pact, though, Rhiannon then added that she would not necessarily be against a more flexible confidence and supply agreement. Such an agreement would guarantee the viability of a government, and list priorities for legislative and regulatory reform, but would involve no clear policy commitments from either party. Each proposed bill would be judged on its merits, as is the case for the Greens in all other parliamentary terms. Rhiannon was not the only Green interviewed hesitant to sign up to another formal agreement. Milne, too, contemplated a range of options the party might be better off pursuing in any forthcoming hung parliaments, including avoiding pacts altogether. Like Rhiannon, Milne could envisage such an arrangement giving the Greens the flexibility to criticise both sides – minority government and opposition – with the aim of making further

gains in the subsequent election. For Milne, though, the policy-seeking goals of the Greens has always meant that such a vote-seeking strategy would unlikely to be pursued:

“The thing is, we don’t want to test that in the sense that when you’ve got the opportunity to deliver on the policies that you’ve worked so hard for and actually matter to the country, why would you not take it? You don’t know what’s going to happen at the next election.”

Overall, Greens parliamentarians tend to be relatively pleased with the policy achievements stemming from the deal struck with Labor in the 43rd Parliament. There was a universal recognition, however, that the agreement came with significant disadvantages for the Greens, both during and following the operation of the pact. A loss of party identity, electoral backlash, internal division, and a membership accustomed to participation excluded from decision-making, were amongst the most commonly cited costs. Chief among the difficulties of the relationship with Labor, however, was the inability for the party to compel Labor to bring about each of the agreed upon legislative changes. That is, without threatening to bring down the government by supporting or initiating motions of no confidence (or blocking supply). Both were options the Greens, already feeling beset by stereotypes of being ‘irresponsible’ and ‘extreme’, were unwilling to pursue. While the party room may have been relatively united in securing the agreement with Labor, there is a considerable array of opinion on how the party should approach future opportunities for legislative or executive power sharing. There are some lessons learnt from the experience of acting as a support party, but the knowledge gained from these lessons appear held by individuals, with the party having spent little time evaluating the experience.⁴⁴ Power sharing may allow the party to wield significant influence, but there are few clear solutions proposed for the associated challenges.

The Greens, Inter-Party Cooperation, and the Australian Party System

This chapter now turns to an assessment of the effects of the Labor-Greens agreement on the patterns of party interaction in the Australian setting. This section also evaluates the impact

⁴⁴ It should be noted, however, that the Greens, in 2018, began holding member workshops discussing options for future ‘balance of power’ roles.

of the agreement on the Greens party itself. To summarise, the support agreement contributed to substantial but temporary change in the party system. It disrupted the usual process of government formation, further blurred government and opposition, and changed inter-party relations. Many in the Greens (and, it appears, in Labor) now seriously question future agreements with Labor, which has direct implications for how future hung parliaments might be managed. The pact also shifted intra-party dynamics within the Greens. The Australian party system, and Senate sub-system, acted to set the parameters and constrain the strategic choices available to the Greens through each stage of the support agreement. With the 2010 election bringing about the peaks of both the Greens' electoral support and parliamentary representation, the party had to reconcile oft-competing goals, and reckon with its current and desired position in the party system.

The Greens benefited from the multifaceted nature of the Australian party system, leveraging bargaining power in the Senate to amplify the influence of a single representative in the House. Nevertheless, the Greens faced a system in which two-party dynamics still dominate the formation of government. Indeed, it is a twopartism reinforced by an electoral system and a majoritarian political culture unaccustomed – despite the frequent negotiation between government and opposition parties in the Senate – to minority government and its implications for executive-legislature relations (Smith 2001, p. 71). By supporting and working cooperatively with a minority government, the Greens entangled themselves both with other parties and with a kind of policy compromise and incrementalism they had long criticised (Stammen 1979, p. 47). The party, previously dismissed as 'extreme' or 'radical', may have helped legitimise their place in the party system, but becoming part of the establishment risks the very identity of the Greens.

The most direct, though perhaps also most ephemeral, impact the Labor-Greens agreement had on the Australian party system was a disruption of the standard governing formula. That is, after decades of alternation between majority Labor and Coalition governments, the Labor-Greens agreement was the first such pact of several in backing the formation of a minority government. The Greens' insistence that confidence and supply be traded for policy concessions in a public document established a standard followed by the cross-bench

independents. The Greens' pact, though, alongside its sole balance of power position in the Senate, put the party in a 'halfway house' between government and opposition (Dunphy & Bale 2011, p. 500). Inter-party relations, from government formation to legislative competition, by necessity reflected a form of consensus rather than adversarial, majoritarian democracy. Australian federal governments often need to negotiate to pass legislation, but this negotiation is usually limited to the Senate. To rely on inter-party bargaining, across both chambers of parliament, for both the viability and effectiveness of the government, alters the nature of government and thus the core of the party system. This change, however, has thus far proven temporary, with a return to majority governments since.⁴⁵ What initially appear as temporary fluctuations, however, can promote future instability and change (Luther 1999, p. 134; Mair 1996, p. 104). Certainly, the shifting patterns of electoral competition that facilitated an instance of minority government have persisted.

If the current trajectory of electoral support for small parties and independents continues, the frequency of hung parliaments will likely increase. A key question is whether these hung parliaments will produce coalition or minority governments. From this question immediately stems another: whether comprehensive written agreements and contract parliamentarism will be the basis of these cabinets. Part of the answer will be relative party bargaining power following a given election. Another key determining factor, however, will be the nature of inter-party relations (Bolleyer 2007). As it pertains to Labor and the Greens, sustained and meaningful cooperation, through either governing coalitions or pacts in opposition, is possible but highly unlikely in the short- to medium-term. Not only are there some institutional barriers that mitigate against such cooperation (Barry et al. 2016), but the necessary relationship to underpin such accords is also simply not present. In fact, the experience of the 43rd Parliament appears to have discouraged Labor and some within the Greens party room from pursuing written support agreements, meaning contract parliamentarism may not inform any future negotiations arising from a hung federal parliament.

⁴⁵ The loss of a by-election in Wentworth in October 2018, however, removed the Coalition's majority in the House of Representatives. At the time of writing, the Government continues as a minority cabinet.

For the Greens, Labor's failure to comply with the full terms of the agreement signed in 2010 has had a lasting impact on the party's view on working with Labor in the future. What has wielded greater influence over the Greens' view of working with Labor, though, has been experiencing the effect of Labor's mixed ideological profile and factional infighting. Associated with this, too, is the split within Labor on whether the Greens should be treated as a long-term existential threat or a progressive partner:

"There's a large number of people in Labor who don't want to have anything to do with the Greens. And that's because, ultimately, they sit closer to the Liberal Party than the Greens. And, um, we saw in the 2010 parliament those people fight tooth and nail to bring down Julia Gillard, and tear up the agreement... This is the right-wing of the Labor Party; they were actively out to tear that agreement down and distance Labor from the Greens as much as possible." (Bandt 2017)

Di Natale echoed Bandt's views, underscoring that the ideological and policy profiles of Labor and the Liberals tend to have greater similarity than do those between Labor and the Greens. This meant that the durability of the Labor-Greens pact was consistently put under strain as Labor reluctantly moved to implement the policy demands included in the agreement. There are, according to Di Natale, Labor parliamentarians who possess similar policy outlooks to the Greens. Yet it is often these parliamentarians, generally belonging to Labor's left faction, who maintain "a sense of entitlement" and feel the Greens have "got no right to challenge" Labor on progressive issues. On those issues, Rhiannon (2017) observed that Labor "walk both sides of the road" and are far more progressive while in opposition than they are in government. Brown (2017), on the other hand, points to the fact that inter-party negotiations decrease the influence of backbench Labor MPs and factional heavies; in cases like the 43rd Parliament, they see their influence replaced by that of the Greens in a zero-sum game.

Underlying each of these factors, as well, is the considerable extent to which Labor-Greens competition in the electoral arena contributes to a more adversarial relationship in the legislative and executive arenas. According to the interviewees, the fact that much of the gains in Greens' electoral and representative strength has come from Labor's losses shapes the

relationship between the two parties. Di Natale (2017) believes “there are some members of the Labor Party who see the Greens, I think, as a bigger enemy than the Coalition.” It is difficult for Labor parliamentarians, whose seats are at threat from an increasing Greens vote, to view working with the minor party as a desirable means or end. Asked whether, to facilitate a more cordial relationship, the Greens and Labor could replicate the Coalition and strike non-compete agreements in certain seats, or cooperate in opposition like the Greens and Labour in New Zealand, Greens MPs held a common view: it should not be ruled out, but it is highly unlikely. The Greens, according to Bandt (2017) need to be in ‘growth mode’, and that means fierce competition in all target seats, whether they are held by Labor or the Liberal Party. Besides, Rhiannon (2017) stated, Labor’s left faction would never agree to cede key seats, such as Grayndler or Fremantle, where the Greens’ prospects are strong.

The Support Agreement and the Greens’ Internal Politics

What further complicates future Labor-Greens cooperation, and will influence the nature of the Greens’ impact on the party system going forward, is the shift in the intra-party dynamics in the Greens since signing the support agreement. The Greens party room agreeing to partner with a Labor government furthered an internal debate, still unresolved, over the goals and ‘project’ of the party. This debate has only intensified under the leadership of Di Natale, who has promoted the idea of power-sharing with Labor. However, a significant minority within the party, including in the party room, view an aspiration to government as counter-productive, contrary to the ethos of the party, and a risk to the Greens’ connection to social movements. Even those supportive of seeking a role in government acknowledge the costs of this aspiration and the change that it could exert on the party. Senator Rhiannon’s (2017) views, in particular, are reflective of a tendency within the party that is sceptical of government participation. This has roots in a competing account of how social and political change is brought about; that is, not by political parties, but by social movements. Rhiannon explains:

“You think of saving the Franklin River, women winning the right to vote, occupational health and safety, saving the rainforests in NSW, and many, many others, that was driven

in the first instance – and right up to the end, in fact – by strong social movements that start off small and get bigger, and bigger, and bigger. We must never lose sight of that as a party... The danger of being focused on government and getting into government is that you can then get removed from those social movements to a degree that you may not be helping build them up and achieve, and being the drivers of change that they are.”

Former Senator Wright (2017) also cited the Greens’ origins in social and protest movements. Any parliamentary power, and especially any executive power, must be exercised with caution and in consultation with communities, social groups, and relevant movements. Nonetheless, Wright rejected the notion that the Greens should not aspire to government:

“I don’t understand that way of thinking if you are a political party. I’ve been an activist in environmental and many different kinds of activist groups, and that’s your role: to be an activist. I think the Greens are a hybrid. We absolutely take our credibility and our strength from the community and our activism. But we are a parliamentary party. We are saying to people: ‘vote for us’. You know, we want to be in the Parliament... I think the idea that you wouldn’t use the potential to make change when you can would be ludicrous.”

On the other hand, Senator Waters (2017) acknowledged that both the ambition and eventual act of serving in government changes the party. In particular, it puts under strain connections to communities and social movements. Nevertheless, the Greens had “for a little while now” aspired to government – an aspiration that, Waters believes, most party members support. Waters added, though, that the Greens’ goal of executive power did not necessarily mean supporting a government or entering into a coalition. Indeed, Waters could not “ever imagine [the Greens] being in a coalition-style arrangement.” Asked what, therefore, the party’s path to government might be, Waters considered international cases:

“I guess there’s many pathways, isn’t there? ... Look at Macron, you know, he hasn’t started off small, gone into coalition, and slowly grown and now become the government operative, he’s gone from nothing to all of a sudden taking over the whole parliament...”

Clearly in order to win government, you need to win seats. It's not rocket science. I think we do that by winning the hearts and minds of the public, and we don't necessarily need to be riding on the coattails of another party."

The trajectory of the Greens vote, however, suggests that Macron's rise is unlikely to be a path to government that the Greens could realistically imitate. In contrast, Hanson-Young articulated a more conventional course toward government for a minor party of gradually building support over time. Hanson-Young, however, also expressed the need to work with parties from across the political spectrum:

"I think the Greens should aspire to government. So that's my gut response to you. However, and, I think we have to be realistic about how, you know, how that happens and how we get there. And, um... being in balance of power, um, being able to negotiate, being able to work with both sides of government whoever they are, is essential. No one is going to elect you to government if all you have ever done is, um, only negotiated with that side, one particular side."

Hanson-Young, like Waters, wishes to avoid 'riding on the coattails' of, or being captive to, any one party. But it is unclear whether regularly working with Coalition governments is a feasible means of expanding the Greens' electoral support, given that the parties regularly position themselves on opposite ends of the ideological spectrum (see chapter seven). Further, it is unlikely that Greens supporters would look favourably upon assisting in passing significant aspects of a Coalition government's legislative agenda. Indeed, any movement – perceived or otherwise – toward the ideological centre, or shedding of radicalism, is something Bandt specifically rejects in the pursuit of government:

"There's been a, uh, a view from some that to get to that position of being in government or in shared government, we need to move to the centre to win those additional seats. I don't subscribe to that view. I don't think the pathway to government for the Greens is through the centre... It's a potential worry if you, if you say that we need to shed anything that's potentially perceived as being radical."

Hanson-Young may not have been advocating a move rightwards in policy or ideological outlook. Working with 'both sides of government', however, would almost necessarily involve compromise and a further weakening of the Greens' radical credentials. Writing much earlier in the party's history, Miragliotta (2006, p. 585) argued the Greens "use radicalism in a highly pragmatic way to achieve their political objectives." However, as the party has gained a more prominent position in Parliament and the party system, there has been greater priority given to appearing as responsible policymakers interested in the overall stability of government. A pragmatic exploitation of radicalism is far more difficult when legislation can be passed or blocked, or governments formed or dissolved, based solely (or near enough) on Greens party votes. To use such party system power is to entangle and institutionalise the Greens in that system, becoming part of the establishment that the party often rails against.

Further, serving in, or supporting, governments can prompt a shift in the internal dynamics of a party. To the extent that this alters or constrains the party's approach to the exercise of legislative or executive influence, these intra-party changes can produce, or preclude, party system change (Laver 1989, pp. 304-05; Laver & Schofield 1990, p. 16). The Greens' experience of support party status and, in particular, the party room-dominated negotiation of the agreement, has had a lasting impact on the party. Decision-making structures in the party have been amended. More fundamentally, the party is split firstly on the desirability of office-seeking goals, and secondly, on the means to achieve such goals. There is little sign that the party elite share a common view to how the Greens might become a party of government. The party has established itself as a relevant actor in the Australian party system, but this has come at the cost of deepening division over the identity and *raison d'être* of the party. Much like the party's role in the 43rd Parliament, the Greens remain, indecisive and with plateaued national support, in a 'halfway house' between an establishment and a protest party.

Conclusion: The Greens and the Contest for Government

The Labor-Greens support agreement and ensuing minority government offers a novel case for examination, aiding in the understanding of both the changing Australian party system, as well as the two parties involved. As Laver and Schofield (1990, p. 89) assert,

“[u]nderstanding how a given election result leads to a given government is, when all is said and done, simply one of the most important substantive projects in political science.” The Labor-Greens arrangement proved the crucial first step in the formation of the Gillard minority government, as well as to many of the legislative reforms of the 43rd Parliament. Further, the last two chapters provide crucial insight into the link between the internal dynamics within the Greens and the party’s actions in competitive environments. Approaching the Labor minority government from the perspective of the minor supporting party reflects a recurrent theme in this thesis of joining the study of component ‘parts’ of the party system with study of the system itself. It also allowed for this innovative case of government formation to be considered not as an isolated event, but instead in connection with previous and subsequent structures of competition for government (Muller 2009, p. 240). Tracing the full lifecycle of the support agreement demonstrated resistance to change in the executive arena of the party system, as well as a degree of confusion on the part of the Greens as to their place within that system.

Throughout the agreement, the Greens regularly elevated policy objectives above concerns for future electoral performance or attainment of office. The commitment to policy is in line with expectations for a party of the Greens’ type and party family. Yet party elites were too reliant upon the assumptions that: firstly, the policy achievements would be lasting; and secondly, that the public are engaged, rational in their evaluations, and reward constructive policymaking. Evidence is slim in both cases. Moreover, fulfilling policy goals in the 43rd Parliament required compromise and extensive cooperation with the Labor minority government. The exigencies of inter-party legislative bargaining continued a centralisation of decision-making power within the Greens that began, in this case, with the decision to back Labor with a contract-style agreement, but which also reflects a long-term, party-wide trend (Jackson 2016). On the other hand, empowering the party’s parliamentarians facilitated critical interpersonal relationships between, especially, Greens and Labor leadership, which served as the foundation for a legislatively-effective partnership for some 18 months. To the extent that Labor abided by the terms of the agreement, though, most interviewees exaggerated the likely influence of the pact itself. The agreement was, after all, unenforceable, and was forged

more within the context of the raw numbers on the floor of the parliament and the Greens' contingent veto power in the Senate.

Ultimately, it was in part a resurgence of vote-seeking goals ahead of the 2013 election that led to Milne cancelling the support pact with Labor. The party's strategic use of core policy concerns – the environment, asylum seekers, and LGBTQI rights – to maintain a perception of independence from Labor met with only moderate success. There remains a range of opinion within the party as to whether abandoning the agreement was appropriately timed, and whether the partnership should have ended at all. Indeed, the management of the relationship with Labor was a key point of disagreement amongst the party room, with implications for the 2013 election campaign and later assessments of Milne's leadership. There were many mitigating and external circumstances that impacted upon the Greens' performance in that election. Nonetheless, the party did experience its first loss in its support at the national level since the late 1990s. The Australian Greens, like other support and green parties internationally, lacked a cogent plan for managing the costs of partnership with a governing party, or for extricating themselves from the support agreement. Indeed, it appears that such a strategy is still lacking. The 43rd Parliament may reflect a highpoint in the party's influence over the Australian party system, but it has come at a cost of clarity over the party's identity and path forward. Nonetheless, the contest for government is not the only means by which the party can wield some influence over the patterns of party interaction; important, too, is the contest for legislative outcomes. It is this legislative contest to which we now turn.

**Part V: The Greens and the Contest for
Legislative Outcomes**

STRONG BICAMERALISM AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LEGISLATIVE CONTEST IN THE AUSTRALIAN PARTY SYSTEM

The theory and classification of party systems have been historically focused, whether implicitly or explicitly, on the formation and configuration of governments. But if a party system is a “a particular pattern of competitive and cooperative interactions” (Webb 2000, p. 1), then we can better understand that pattern through a framework encompassing a broad range of party interactions. To limit system analysis to the establishment of executives is to examine only the *product* of a complex process of recurrent party interactions. The overwhelming majority of party interactions take place between polling days, and mostly in the legislature (Laver 1989, p. 302). It is vital, therefore, that the contest for legislative outcomes is operationalised and included in both the measure of party system change, as well as the classification of systems. This is especially necessary in strong bicameral settings, such as Australia. Such an institutional arrangement elevates further the role and consequence of the legislature as a site of party competition and cooperation. In the Australian context, a government without ‘double majorities’ in the House of Representatives and Senate must engage in a process of iterative coalition building to pass its policy agenda, creating a ‘divided party government’ dynamic (Uhr 1999). Divided party government entails non-government parties occupying a far more influential role in determining legislative outcomes, enlivening the review and policy-making functions of legislatures.

Bicameralism is fundamentally about the distribution of power: between chambers, between government and opposition, and between (and occasionally within) parties.⁴⁶ Strong bicameral legislatures are distinctive in their capacity to review, veto, and propose legislation, even under majority governments. Strong bicameralism, Lijphart (2012, pp. 192-94) explains, is marked by symmetry and incongruence: where upper and lower houses maintain equal or near-equal powers, but members are elected via different means. The presence of the Senate

⁴⁶ In the Australian case, one might have originally added ‘between states *in* the federation’ and ‘between states *and* the federation’, but the Senate long ago ceased operating, in practice, as a states’ house.

as a legislative veto player – given certain configurations of parties – changes the nature of government and structures the very process of governing (see Mulgan 1996; Uhr 1999; Young 2000). A government unable to navigate its legislative agenda through a parliamentary chamber outside of its control risks both legislative ineffectiveness and, ultimately, its own survival. Further, the “quality of democracy” as experienced by citizens is “tied intimately” to the ability of governments to implement policy (Martin & Vanberg 2011, p. 2). If the study of party systems is to be truly relevant to citizens as they experience politics, party system analysis should be explicitly concerned with the legislative process. Strong bicameralism in the Australian case has fostered a multifaceted party system, in which a distinct sub-system has consolidated around the Australian Senate. Contrary to the two-party contest for government, this Senate-based sub-system has become dominated by multipartism.

The notion that the contest for the executive adequately reflects the dynamics of a party system only holds so far as legislatures can be shown to be ineffectual. If legislatures are weak, then there is little reason to afford them much attention in classifying party systems or evaluating system change. This is clearly not the case in Australia. The recognition of strong bicameralism and the legislative process in our party system framework produces a more accurate classification of the Australian party system, and more precisely detects system change. This chapter adopts a wider lens to the study of the Australian party system than previous chapters, but nevertheless continues to consider closely the role the Greens play in shaping the system. This chapter, therefore, has four primary aims.

1. Establish the significance of the legislature, and legislative competition, to understanding party systems, and especially the Australian party system.
2. Highlight and test two measures through which to integrate legislative party interaction into analysis of the Australian party system: the normalised Banzhaf index, and the effective number of relevant parties (ENRP).
3. Identify the impact of the Greens on the contest for legislative outcomes.
4. Analyse the implications of the findings of these measures for our understandings of party competition, government-opposition relations, and the dynamics of the Australian party system.

The findings of this chapter demonstrate that understanding party systems through government formation produces an incomplete interpretation of inter-party relationships and a deficient classification of the Australian party system in particular. What labels of ‘two-party’ or ‘two-and-a-half-party’ system imply is that, simply put, we can adequately understand the patterns of party interaction that constitute the Australian party system solely through examining the contest between the Labor and Coalition parties. These labels ignore the function and differing degrees of legislative effectiveness of governments, and, relatedly, the abilities of opposition parties to constrain and counter the executive. Governments must not only be viable, but also legislatively effective in order to maintain legitimacy, meet public expectations, and fulfil normative functions (Strøm 1990b, pp. 5-7; Zittoun 2014, pp. 1-6). Moreover, legislative ineffectiveness – the inability to enact a policy agenda – can itself undermine the ongoing viability of an executive (Tsebelis 2002). The results of the Banzhaf index reveal a fragmented Senate, with voting power distributed between multiple parties. This complicates the legislative bargaining environment, and modifies the structures of opposition. Likewise, the findings from the ENRP measure demonstrate a long-term misclassification of the Australian system, with the Senate long having held between, roughly, 3 and 4 ‘effective relevant’ parties.

The Functions of Legislatures and their Party System Implications

This section attends to the first aim of the chapter, establishing the significance of the legislative arena to our understanding of party systems. The need to recognise the legislative contest in party system analysis ultimately stems from the functions of legislatures in democratic polities. Though legislatures perform a variety of tasks, five principal, overlapping roles can be identified: linkage, representation, control, review, and policy-making (Bagehot 1872; Blondel 1973; Loewenberg 2011; Olson 1994). Legislatures vary in the degree to which these functions are achieved, and it is through this variation that legislatures can shape, and be shaped by, the party system. *Linkage* represents the capacity of legislatures to act as an intermediary between citizens and the executive. As Kreppel explains (2014, p. 85), legislatures “act as a conduit of information... allowing local level demands to be heard by the central government and the policies and actions of the central government to be

explained.” Connected with linkage is the notion of *representation*, whereby legislators represent, and incorporate into legislative activity, the views and values of their constituents (Pitkin 1967). *Control*, meanwhile, refers to the capacity to remove a government, and thus in parliamentary systems, encompasses both the power of voters through elections, as well as the parliament via motions of no confidence. The emphasis given to the formation of government, the number of parties, and ideological polarisation means that system taxonomies and analyses of change have long incorporated these three functions of legislatures. The remaining two functions, however, are those that are often minimised or entirely excluded.

While linkage, representation, and control are associated with the viability of government, the review and policy-making functions of legislatures relate directly to the legislative effectiveness of government. More than that, these latter two functions encompass the power of opposition and the degree to which the legislative process is dominated by the executive or is subject to a broader dispersal of influence and power. Precisely what constitutes the *review* function, however, varies between legislatures, and is a contested topic even within the Australian system. Indeed, review can encompass both retrospective and prospective elements (Bach 2003, pp. 149-50). The former involves the oversight of government action and of the executive agencies tasked with implementing government policy. Prospective review, on the other hand, entails the scrutiny, amendment, or even the restraint of the actions and legislative agenda of government. On this latter point, there has been significant debate as to the role of the Australian Senate as a ‘house of review’, precisely what constitutes ‘review’, and at what point that review becomes lawmaking (Bach 2003, pp. 139-56; Fusaro 1966; Goot 1999; Mulgan 1996).

Where one draws the line between review and lawmaking will affect the level of influence the review function of a legislature exerts over the legislative process, government stability, and the broader party system. Nevertheless, a final primary role of legislatures relates specifically to the function of *policy-making* – that is, the extent to which the legislature, separate from the executive, can meaningfully participate in the formation and passage of legislation. The relative policy-making power of legislatures is recognised as a key differentiating variable in

most classificatory schema of legislatures (Blondel 1970; Kreppel 2014; Olson 1980; Polsby 1975). This power varies significantly across legislatures, ranging from the ability to advise on or delay legislation, through to the authority to amend or block the proposals of government, or even initiate and progress non-government legislation. The House of Representatives' capacity to meaningfully influence the legislative agenda of governments, and its own legislative power separate from the executive, is diminished. The rarity of either a Labor or Coalition majority in the Senate, however, renders the Senate more likely to exercise its constitutional capacities for both review and policy-making.

The review and policy-making functions of legislatures are critical in understanding institutional settings, regime types, government formation and survival, and as this chapter argues, interpreting party systems. Indeed, the extent to which a chamber can involve itself in the legislative process – whether to delay, amend, block, or propose legislation – is a common core variable in otherwise distinct, albeit overlapping, work in political science. It unites, for example, Lijphart's (1984; 1999; 2012) analyses of forms of democracy, Döring's (1995a; 1995b; 2001) work on agenda-setting, and Tsebelis's (1995; 1999; 2000; 2002) veto players approach to evaluating institutions. Tsebelis is arguably the most forthright in asserting that, in understanding and distinguishing political systems, what matters most is the ease (or difficulty) of moving from the policy status quo. Yet, more than a variable for the comparative analysis of political systems, policy change – and its inverse, policy stability – also matters *within* a political system. Tsebelis (2002, p. 14) observes that “the difficulty a government encounters in its attempt to change the status quo may lead to its resignation and replacement in a parliamentary system... policy stability will lead to government instability.” In this process, the party system occupies a decisive role, particularly as it is played out in the Senate. It is this connection between the Senate, the legislative contest, and the Australian party system, to which we now turn.

Strong Bicameralism, the Senate and the Australian Party System

The relevance of the Senate to the party system derives predominantly from its potential to engage in the review and policy-making functions attributed to legislatures, and through

these functions, meaningfully alter party system dynamics. The Senate contributes to Lijphart (2012, pp. 198-201) identifying the Australian Parliament as one of just five existing examples of strong bicameralism. In a separate measure, Heller and Branduse (2014) rated Australia at the maximum score in their index of bicameralism, indicating an institutional setting in which the two chambers of parliament share roughly equal powers. The minutiae of the powers of the Senate are covered in detail elsewhere (e.g. Bach 2003; Odgers et al. 2016). Of particular importance, however, is the capacity of the Senate to veto government proposals; it is through this mechanism that the upper house can exert its greatest impact upon party competition. This veto power is at its greatest effect where the Senate obstructs supply, forcing the government, and the House of Representatives, to an election. This is a rare occurrence, however, being constrained by parliamentary convention.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the potential for a Senate to amend, or even reject, government proposals restructures the legislative process and, with it, the patterns of party competition and cooperation.

The fundamental points, therefore, are that bicameralism makes it more difficult for a government to effect policy change, and that non-government parties can significantly influence any such change. Strong bicameralism, particularly where the government does not possess a majority in both houses, tends to amplify these consequences. A government's lack of double majorities in the House and Senate creates a form of 'divided government' (Elgie 2001; Fisk 2011). This refers to "the division of control over the core institutions of government when opposed political parties dominate the executive and legislative branches" (Uhr 1999, p. 99). In the Australian setting, party organisational strength and discipline transforms this into what Uhr (1999, p. 94) refers to as 'divided party government'.⁴⁸ Many factors shape inter-cameral bargaining amid divided party government, but particularly notable are party discipline, party identity and ideology, and party goals. Heller (2001, p. 34) explains that, as

⁴⁷ The interference of the Senate – notably, minor parties – in the broader budget process, and measures within budgets, has nonetheless become commonplace since at least the 1993 budget (see Uhr 1999; Young 1997).

⁴⁸ A minority government, such as that of the Gillard Labor government in the 43rd Parliament, further complicates the legislative process for the executive. The Gillard government, lacking a majority in either chamber, relied upon confidence and supply agreements with external partners for its viability, but needed ever-changing coalitions across both House and Senate to pass legislation. This is a particularly strong case of divided party government, or perhaps 'divided party minority government.'

“cooperation dilutes party labels, parties have an interest in passing and claiming credit for policy, but also in preventing their counterparts from doing the same.” Further, the greater difference there is between the ideological and programmatic positions of opposition parties and the government, the greater the need for government compromise (Larkin & Uhr 2009).

The impact of an evolving Senate on legislative outcomes and the nature of parliamentary opposition have received considerable scholarly attention (e.g. Kaiser 2008; Russell & Benton 2010; Stone 2014; Young 1999). Absent is a persuasive effort to connect these developments to consideration of how the Parliament shapes the contemporary Australian party system. Ghazarian’s (2015) work only indirectly examined the pattern of party interactions that constitute a system. He argued that the type of parties in the Senate had changed, thereby altering activity in the Senate, but his analysis was largely disconnected from the party system literature. The outcome was some muddled terminology and unconvincing conclusions, such as the claim that a “Senate minor party system had evolved” (Ghazarian 2015, p. 193). Ghazarian never makes clear precisely how minor parties in the Senate constitute their own system. Carty (1997) and Sharman (1999), in a study of the Australian Democrats and of minor parties in the Senate, respectively, also advanced the idea of a separate party system associated with the Senate. But both offered this notion in passing in concluding remarks. Uhr (1995; 1999; 2009a; 2009b) made progress by connecting the dynamics of the electoral system, legislative process, government-opposition relations, and the Senate with the party system, but consideration of the party system itself was limited.

Veto Players, the Legislative Contest, and the Australian Party System

The central argument of this chapter is that we must integrate the capacity for Australia’s strong bicameralism, through the legislative contest, to alter the party system. Strong bicameralism shapes the nature of government, of opposition, and the relationships between these two forces. This section argues that a ‘veto players’ framework provides the best means through which to conceive the legislative contest in strong bicameral systems. As such, this section provides the theoretical underpinning for our operationalisation and measurement of legislative competition. A veto players framework incorporates the full range of legislative

functions into party system analysis. Crucially, however, it allows us to identify instances where particular party system dynamics restrain or facilitate legislative functions, namely the 'veto power' functions of review and policy-making. The relationship between government and opposition, between the legislature and the executive, and between the two parliamentary chambers, are markedly different depending upon the number and nature of parties inhabiting each. As chapters four and five demonstrate, the primary source of change in these relationships in the Australian party system is the Senate. This is the result of changing partisan competition, as well as expanded parliamentary and public respect for upper houses and a new Senate self-assertiveness (Mughan & Patterson 1999, pp. 343-44; Uhr 1999, p. 114).

The chief problem that comes with recognising the systemic importance of the legislative party contest is how to include these complex processes in system classification and measurements of change. There are hundreds of points of interaction between parties in any parliamentary term, and the influence of the legislature does not only manifest as open and measurable conflict across chambers or between parties. Blondel (1970, pp. 78-82) identifies 'reactive' and 'preventive' influence in legislatures. Reactive influence encompasses the ability to scrutinise and make amendments to bills – to which we could add blocking of legislation, at least where opposition party cooperation is sufficient. On the other hand, preventive influence is far subtler and more difficult to measure; it refers to the anticipation, by government, of the ideological positions of competitors and the bargaining environment into which legislation is proposed. Given the interest of government to avoid successive legislative defeats, preventive influence can shape the nature of government proposals, or prevent them entirely in the first instance (Fisk 2011; Tsebelis & Money 1997, pp. 211-212). Detecting preventive influence is difficult, manifesting as it does 'behind closed doors'. It is therefore necessary to limit the focus of any operationalisation of legislative competition primarily to reactive influence of opposition.

The reactive influence of opposition parties in the legislature is the direct counterpart of a government's ability to pass legislation – to shift from a policy status quo. It is here, therefore, that veto player theory – particularly the work of Tsebelis (1995; 1999; 2000; 2002) – provides

a useful framework through which to assess party competition. The central argument in Tsebelis's work is that policy stability – or, conversely, policy change – is the product of veto players within a political system. Tsebelis (2002, p. 121) explains that veto players are established by either the constitution (institutional veto players) or by the party system (partisan veto players). Partisan veto players are those parties, or independent members, occupying those institutions and, through particular constellations of party strengths and strategies, give practical effect to these institutional powers. In order to shift from a policy status quo, a government must navigate its legislative agenda through these institutional veto players. In bicameral systems where differing majorities exist between chambers, Tsebelis (2010, p. 7) asserts that partisan veto players include the “required parties” for concurrent legislative majorities.

The passage of legislation is more difficult as the number of veto players increases, the ideological distance between players widens, and the internal cohesiveness of players strengthens (Tsebelis 2002, p. 13). We can assess these three variables at both the collective-institutional level, as well as the individual-partisan level. In the Australian context, the two institutional veto players of the House and Senate each maintain collective ideal policy points deriving from the seat strength, strategies, and ideologies of the constituent partisan players. These collectively preferred policy positions are likely to differ, and perhaps differ significantly, across chambers where divergent majorities exist. Further, varying configurations of party seat shares influences institutional cohesion; the House, commonly dominated by a majority government, is more cohesive than the more fragmented Senate. For partisan veto players, cohesiveness refers to party discipline; the more disciplined parties are, the less likely individual legislators are to defect, and the more difficult it is for the government to secure a legislative majority (Tsebelis 2002, p. 128).⁴⁹ Given that the exercise of institutional veto power is dependent upon partisan veto players, it is the latter group that is the primary focus of veto player analysis. In the Australian context that means including in

⁴⁹ On the other hand, the nature of discipline within some Australian parties, whereby parliamentarians are *de jure* or *de facto* bound to a final party position, may in some cases facilitate legislative coalition-building; parties serve as voting blocs. Either way, the important point, for the purposes of this chapter, is that it is a fairly safe assumption to treat Australian political parties as unitary actors in legislative voting.

party system evaluation the varying capacities of partisan veto players, individually and collectively, to obstruct or modify policy change.

The regularity with which a government controls the House but not the Senate means that, in regard to the passage of legislation, it is the Senate that is of most interest. Divergent party majorities between these two chambers with near-equal powers has fostered divided party government and a potentially empowered opposition. This can have profound effects on the party system. As Heller (2007, p. 254) argues, the “ability to hinder policy making might imply influence, but it also implies the ability to undermine government policy making and, potentially, to bring down governments.” Indeed, the Australian Senate is “powerful in its own right” (Thompson 1980, p. 37), a “full-fledged veto player” (Eppner & Ganghof 2017, p. 169), and the “single most important institutional resource of the parliamentary opposition” (Helms 2008, p. 12). Parliamentary convention and the self-restraint of Senate parties has tended to preclude the full exercise of the Senate’s constitutional powers (Brenton 2013, p. 291; Ward 2013, p. 218). However, the election of new minor parties less willing to recognise a broad legislative ‘mandate’ for the executive has fostered a reassertion of Senate authority, including over core budgetary matters (Ghazarian 2015; Jaensch 1986, pp. 98-100; Young 1997). It is these minor parties that are best positioned to leverage, and benefit from, the legislative functions of a strong second chamber (Kaiser 2008, pp. 35-36).

Minor parties, and particularly the Greens, have disrupted patterns of legislative competition and cooperation through their roles in the Senate. The rise of minor parties has sometimes served as an advantage to government. Where formal Oppositions tend to be office-seeking and obstructionist in the pursuit of self-interest, policy-seeking parties on the cross-bench can offer bargaining alternatives (Ganghof 2003, pp. 19-20). Conversely, that same policy-seeking behaviour of many minor parties – the Greens serve as a prime example – can reinforce the policy status quo, with these parties refusing to compromise (Norton 2008, pp. 244-45). Veto player theory is often aimed at ‘predicting’ these outcomes in terms of policy output (e.g. König et al. 2010). For the sake of party system analysis, though, we are not concerned with forecasting the likelihood of policy inertia or change. Rather, we are interested in measuring the cohesiveness of institutional veto players by measuring the number of, and degree to

which, individual parties operate as partisan veto players. Put simply, what matters for a more nuanced evaluation of party competition is the site and cohesion of opposition, as well as the differing *potential capacity* for individual parties to influence the legislative process.⁵⁰ This avoids the inaccuracies and assumptions inherent to predictive modelling, and instead speaks directly to party relevance to the wider system.

Legislative Coalitions, Voting Power, and the Number of Relevant Parties

We can measure the differing capacities for individual parties to act as partisan veto players and influence the legislative contest through an a priori voting power index. There are several such indices available, of which the Shapley-Shubik (1954) and Banzhaf (1965) indices are most commonly used. Here, we employ the normalised Banzhaf index, as it better reflects how voting occurs in the House and Senate.⁵¹ Voting power indices have previously been utilised as measures of ‘coalitionability’ (Bartolini 1998) and as alternative weights in calculating the effective number of parliamentary parties (Dumont & Caulier 2003; Grofman 2006; Kline 2009). Nevertheless, in each case, voting power has been either explicitly or implicitly concerned with the contest for government.⁵² The Banzhaf index is calculated on the basis of the format of the party system – the number and relative strengths of parties – but gives insight into the mechanics of the system. It reflects the relevance of individual parties and the degree to which these parties can leverage their position in the party system to influence legislative outputs and, in turn, the system itself.

⁵⁰ See Bartolini (1998) for a similar critique of coalition theory and predictive modelling in relation to party systems. Rather than predict the formation of governments, Bartolini instead focuses on the potential ‘coalitionability’ of parties.

⁵¹ The Shapley-Shubik index is concerned with sequential coalitions (permutations) – the order in which parties join the coalition matters. Moreover, parties are assumed not to be free to leave the coalition once in it. A ‘pivotal’ party – and only one per hypothetical coalition – is that which shifts the coalition from a ‘losing’ one to a ‘winning’ one. The Banzhaf index, on the other hand, sees parties as free to enter and leave coalitions, and determines ‘critical’ parties as those whose departure from the coalition would take the coalition from ‘winning’ to ‘losing’. The Banzhaf index also allows for there to be more than one critical party per coalition.

⁵² Robson (2007), in a working paper, applied three voting power indices to the Australian Senate; however, this was a descriptive exercise that remained disconnected from consideration of either the legislative process or the party system.

The normalised Banzhaf index here is used to identify the voting, or bargaining, power of parties in the Senate. The voting power of a party is proportional to the frequency, relative to other parties, with which that party serves as a 'critical player' in forming winning legislative coalitions. A party is a critical player in a legislative coalition when its departure from that coalition would transform the coalition from 'winning' to 'losing' – from successfully passing legislation, to failing to pass legislation.⁵³ Such a party has a 'swing vote'. Parliamentary voting power in the Banzhaf index is determined by finding all possible winning legislative coalitions, identifying the critical players for each winning coalition, and then counting the number of times each party has maintained a swing vote. The index is then normalised, allowing results to be presented as a percentage, by dividing the number of swing votes of each party by the total number of swing votes across all parties. As Dumont and Caulier (2003, p. 13) explain, the results for the normalised index represent a party's "probability to influence the outcome, relative to the other parties present in a given assembly." Therein, too, lies the advantage of the index compared to merely counting the seat share of parties in a chamber; voting power captures the reality that party legislative influence is determined by *relative*, rather than *absolute*, representational strength in a chamber. Indeed, as the results show, a party's voting power can significantly differ from its number of seats.

As Figure 11.1 demonstrates, the fluctuating voting power of parties since 1975 onwards suggests that the notion of a two-party system should be dismissed – at least in relation to the Senate. Not shown are the results for the House, as they are considerably less eventful; apart from the minority government of the 43rd Parliament, Labor and Coalition majority governments have monopolised House bargaining power. In the 43rd Parliament, the bargaining power ceded by the major parties was distributed evenly amongst four independents and a Greens MP.

⁵³ A legislative coalition here "carries no connotation of permanence, of institutional status, or any executive role whatsoever" and is merely a group of parties, or independents, voting together on a bill, motion, or other issue (Laver & Schofield 1990, p. 129).




Figure 11.1 - Senate voting power by party, 1975 – 2019
 Source: Author's own calculations based on AEC election results.
 Note: 'Other' category is the sum of separately-calculated voting powers..

In the sub-system of the Senate, though, there have been *at least* three (four, if we count the Coalition parties separately) parties with significant legislative influence over much of the period under examination. This is most stark from 1983 to 1993, and again between 2011 and 2014, where Labor and the Coalition maintained equal voting power with a 'third party': the Democrats, then the Greens, respectively. A similar configuration of voting powers is evident prior to the period under study, with the Democratic Labor Party in a similar balance of power position in the Senate from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s. Thus, the finding here may not necessarily be about change, but a long-term misclassification of the Australian system resulting from a downplaying of the presence and effects of divided government.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ An argument for change could be made on the basis of how these parties have used their bargaining power in the Senate (e.g. Ghazarian 2015). The adversarial relationship between the DLP and Labor often, in effect, rendered the former an extension of the Coalition, reducing the DLP's impact on party competition (Uhr 1997, pp. 78-79; Uhr 1999, pp. 108-09; but see Young 1997, pp. 26-30).

Configurations of relative party strength has meant that the bargaining power of the ‘third party’ in every Senate since 1983 has mirrored exactly that of Labor.⁵⁵ This has held whether Labor has been in government or in opposition. In the case of the 1996 to 1999 Senate, both the Democrats *and* the Greens possessed equivalent bargaining power with Labor. While the Coalition regularly holds greater bargaining power than Labor, Figure 11.2 shows that the Coalition too have regularly needed to negotiate with the cross-bench to pass legislation.




Figure 11.2 - Senate voting power of governments, 1975 – 2019

Source: Author’s own calculations based on AEC election results.

Note: Blue bars correspond to Coalition governments, while red bars are Labor governments.

Of course, the Coalition and Labor have maintained the capacity to vote together and pass legislation. But what the voting strength of third and fourth parties has meant in practice is that governments have almost consistently had open to them the option of negotiating with a singular alternative to the formal Opposition. This has shown some early signs of change, albeit in just three instances thus far, during the senates of: 1993-96, 2008-11, and 2016-19.⁵⁶ In

⁵⁵ And, for this reason, Labor’s line is difficult to see on the graph. Exact figures can instead be seen in Tables 11.1 and 11.2.

⁵⁶ Prior to the defection of Senator Cory Bernardi from the Liberal Party, the Coalition could pass legislation with the sole support of the Greens in the 2016-19 Senate.

each case, shifting from the policy status quo has forced governments facing an obstructionist Opposition to negotiate the support of multiple cross-bench players.⁵⁷

The reduction in the collective bargaining power of the major parties and the 'third party' in the Senate is the product of fragmentation. This is especially so in recent Senate terms, where the number of parties and independents has reached as high as nine (or eleven, in 2014-16, following defections from the Palmer United Party). Figure 11.1 charts the rise in influence of 'other' parties and independents. While the graph has grouped these players together for readability, they are not a single unitary actor. As such, Tables 11.1 and 11.2 outline the Senate bargaining power of each party from 1975 to 2016. The results are based upon party seat shares at the beginning of Senate terms; mid-term party defections are not reflected. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of the Senate sub-system and the associated dispersal of legislative influence and opposition is clearly on display. So too is the key strength of the Banzhaf index. The table highlights how bargaining power is not necessarily proportional to seat numbers. The Greens are a good example of the importance of *relative* rather than *absolute* seat share; between the senates of 2011-14 and 2014-16, the party increased its number of senators but faced a reduction in voting power due to the emergence of an array of smaller parties.

It is too early to make any inferences as to a change in the patterns of party competition and cooperation in the Senate resulting from this more recent fragmentation. The election producing the Senate of 2014-16 was the peak of 'preference harvesting': the act of smaller parties, regardless of ideological or policy affinity, exploiting above-the-line and group ticket voting, and preferencing one another in the hope of being elected in a "lottery of chance" (Green 2014, p. 10). The following Senate, elected after reform to the Senate electoral system, was nonetheless the result of a double dissolution election, whereby the quota for winning seats is approximately halved. As such, the significant increase in Senate fragmentation could be temporary, with subsequent half-Senate elections under new electoral laws hindering further fracture of the party system.

⁵⁷ In effect, other Senate terms have imposed similar constraints; for instance, while the Coalition could pass legislation with the support of the Greens alone from 2014 to 2016, and certainly did, ideological differences meant that this occurred infrequently.

Table 11.1 - Senate seats (n) and voting power (%), 1975 - 1996

	1975-78		1978-81		1981-83		1983-85		1985-87		1987-90		1990-93		1993-96	
	Seats	Power	Seats	Power	Seats	Power	Seats	Power	Seats	Power	Seats	Power	Seats	Power	Seats	Power
Labor	27	0	27	0	27	25	30	33.3	34	33.3	32	33.3	32	33.3	30	20
Coalition	35	100	34	100	31	41.7	28	33.3	33	33.3	34	33.3	34	33.3	36	44
Lib. Mov.	1	0														
Democrats			2	0	5	25	5	33.3	7	33.3	7	33.3	8	33.3	7	20
NDP									1	0	1	0				
Vallentine											1	0				
Harradine	1	0	1	0	1	8.33	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	4
Greens													1	0	2	12

Note: 'Lib. Mov.' refers to the short-lived 'Liberal Movement'.

Source: Author's own calculations based on AEC election results.

Table 11.2 - Senate seats (n) and vote power (%), 1996 - 2016

	1996-99		1999-2002		2002-05		2005-08		2008-11		2011-14		2014-16		2016-19	
	Seats	Power	Seats	Power	Seats	Power	Seats	Power	Seats	Power	Seats	Power	Seats	Power	Seats	Power
Labor	29	13	29	30	28	18.9	28	0	32	16.7	31	33.3	25	19.5	26	23.5
Coalition	37	56.5	35	34	35	41.5	39	100	37	50	34	33.3	33	39.1	30	36.1
Democrats	7	13	9	30	8	18.9	4	0								
Harradine	1	4.4	1	2	1	3.7										
Greens	2	13	1	2	2	9.4	4	0	5	16.7	9	33.3	10	19.5	9	23.5
One Nat.			1	2	1	3.7									4	6.3
Murphy					1	3.7										
Fam. First							1	0	1	8.3			1	2.5	1	1.2
Xenophon									1	8.3	1	0	1	2.5	3	5.8
DLP											1	0	1	2.5		
PUP													3	9.4		
LDP													1	2.5	1	1.2
AMEP													1	2.5		
JLN															1	1.2
Hinch															1	1.2

Source: Author's own calculations based on AEC election results.

This fragmentation, however, has currently made for a considerably more complex bargaining environment. In the process, it has also reduced the influence of the 'third party' in the Senate. In the senates of 2014-16 and 2016-19, the Greens have held less bargaining power than either the Democrats or the DLP at their respective peaks, despite the Greens having a greater number of senators. While the 'balance of power' position in the Senate is always predicated on conflict between the Government and the Opposition, the rise in small parties has transformed this position from being individually-held to shared.

Figure 11.3 depicts the multifarious bargaining environment of the most recent senates. The graph demonstrates the effect of a moderate increase in the number of small parties and independents in the Senate. The number of potential winning coalitions – that is, configurations of parties able to pass legislation – has drastically increased. What is perhaps most vital to the patterns of party competition and cooperation, however, is the rise in the number of minimal winning coalitions. Minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) are winning coalitions where at least one of the member parties possess a 'swing' vote, thus making the coalition vulnerable to failure through defection. These MWCs, however, are arguably far easier to negotiate than majorities with surplus favourable votes. A party holds a 'swing' vote where their entry into a legislative proto-coalition can transform it into a winning coalition, or where their exit from a proto-coalition will render it losing. The number of different MWCs reached 22 at the outset of the 2014-16 Senate, while the 2016-2019 Senate began with 14 such potential coalitions. The departure of senators from established parties to instead sit as independents, and subsequently form their own parties, expanded this number further in both senates: to 100 MWCs in 2014-16, and 29 in 2016-19. While this offers governments with a wider range of bargaining alternatives, it also significantly increases the uncertainty and difficulty of negotiations; there are many more interests that a government must reconcile for legislation to be passed.




Figure 11.3 - Winning Senate coalitions, 1975 – 2019
 Source: Author's own calculations.

Examining the Banzhaf index results, it would be difficult to contend that the Greens (and the Democrats before them) have not occupied a unique and significant role in the party system. These two parties have often wielded, in the Senate, the same or similar bargaining power as the Coalition and Labor. While there are disparities between the major parties and these ‘third parties’ in terms of personnel, resources, and agenda-setting power as they regard to the legislative process, the sheer bargaining strength of the Greens and, previously, the Democrats, cannot be ignored. Party typologies grounded in party relevance, such as Kefford’s (2017), which have equated the role and significance of the Greens and the Democrats with other smaller parties in parliament are therefore dubious. There are substantial differences in bargaining power, and thus party relevance, between the Greens and other smaller parties currently in Parliament. Some smaller parties are more important than others, more pivotal to the legislative process and to the wider party system. This is a matter we return to in chapter twelve, which advances a party typology that sorts parties by party system impact. This chapter, however, now turns to a brief discussion of the limitations of using a ‘veto players’ framework and the Banzhaf index to measure legislative competition,

before investigating an additional party system measurement: the effective number of relevant parties (ENRP).

Limitations of the Banzhaf Index

Measuring voting power using the normalised Banzhaf index has one main limitation: it treats all legislative coalitions as equally likely to form. This is quite obviously not the case in reality. Among other factors, party goals, strategies, ideology, and electoral concerns intervene to shape the likelihood of parties voting for or against a particular motion or bill. The index is blind to such variables, and thus considers a legislative coalition involving, say, the Greens and the Coalition just as likely as one between the Greens and Labor. As an example, Table 11.3 demonstrates the difference in the rates of formation of legislative coalitions in the Senate between the Greens and the two major parties by examining more than 3000 Senate divisions across five parliamentary terms.

Table 11.3 - Greens voting record in Senate divisions, 2004 - 2017

Parliamentary term	Greens vote type (% of total divisions)				Number of divisions (n)
	Against Labor & Coalition	With Labor, against Coalition	With Coalition, against Labor	With Labor & Coalition	
2004-2007	34.2	65.4	0.5	0	650
2007-2010	53.6	35.1	10.4	0.9	444
2010-2013	41.9	55.9	1.4	0.8	852
2013-2016	36.7	50.3	11	2	788
2016- ⁵⁸	29.1	60.1	6	4.9	268

Source: Author's own calculations based on recorded Senate divisions in Hansard.

A division is a request from two or more senators that a formal vote be recorded. Division voting records were sourced from parliamentary records and Hansard, sorted with computer assistance, and hand-coded. The main weakness in using divisions as an indicator of party interaction is that not all votes within the Senate occur through divisions. Many are simply

⁵⁸ Figures are based on the beginning of the parliamentary term in 2016 until the 31st March 2017.

determined 'on the voices' of senators, and thus the positions of individual senators on the matter at hand are not recorded. Nevertheless, divisions *are* regularly called – particularly on divisive issues – and, as Bach points out (2003, pp. 159-61), they are a rich data source with no practical alternative.

From the table, it is clear that, in the Senate, the Greens and Labor vote in accordance far more regularly than do the Greens and the Coalition. The alignment between the Greens and the Labor Party reached its peak in the 2004 to 2007 parliamentary term, and its nadir in the subsequent 2007 to 2010 term. These terms correspond, respectively, with a Coalition government – holding, for much of the term, a parallel Senate majority – and with the first term of a Labor government. The advent of a Labor minority government in 2010, supported by the Greens in return for policy concessions, saw the rate of Greens-Labor alignment in divisions rise considerably. On the other hand, there are also parliamentary terms – one where the Coalition is in opposition (2007-10), the other where the Coalition is in government (2013-16) – in which there are notable levels of alignment between the Greens and the Coalition. However, between roughly a third and a half of Senate divisions in any parliamentary term will see the Greens vote against both Labor and the Coalition. This reflects both the affinities between the two major parties, as well as a tendency of the Greens to stake out their own ideological-programmatic 'territory' in Australian party system.

The data in Table 11.3 represent important findings in regard to party competition and inter-party relationships. Some legislative coalitions are indeed more likely than others to form. But neither the neutrality of the Banzhaf index, nor the retrospective calculation of legislative coalitions, undermine the use of voting power for party system evaluation. First, as Bartolini (1998, p. 47) asserts, voting power indices reflect the "pure and absolute coalitionability of all partners" – the *potential* bargaining of a player. This accords with other indicators used to classify party systems and gauge change. The a priori nature of the calculations also capture the fact that the influence of the Senate primarily derives from the *threat* of its veto power (Russell & Benton 2010, p. 172). That is, the results reveal potential reactive influence. Additionally, however, the figures can serve as a proxy for more nebulous preventive influence, as such 'backroom' influence arguably stems from relative parliamentary strength.

Voting power thus speaks directly to party relevance in the Sartorian (1976) sense⁵⁹, as well as more contemporary conceptions of party ‘importance’ based upon differing party roles in shifting from the policy status quo (e.g. Abou-Chadi & Orłowski 2016, p. 4; Bolleyer 2007; Gauja 2013, p. 31). It can therefore better inform assessments of individual party impact within party systems, as well as the classification of party systems themselves.

Voting Power and the Effective Number of Relevant Parties (ENRP)

In this section, we explore a further means of including the legislative contest into classifications of party systems and assessment of system change. As noted above, we can employ the Banzhaf index as a standalone measurement of party systems to capture legislative bargaining power. However, we can make further use of the voting power results to weight the ‘effective number of parties’ (ENP) index used in chapter four, creating an additional indicator of party system change. This potential usage of bargaining power has been highlighted previously (Dumont & Caulier 2003; Grofman 2006; Kline 2009), but is not widely employed; indeed, it has seldom been applied to the Australian case. Weighting the ENP index with the voting power figures of the Banzhaf index creates what Dumont and Caulier (2003) have referred to the ‘effective number of relevant parties’ (ENRP), a complement to the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) and parliamentary parties (ENPP) indices. The ENRP measure is especially suited to the Australian setting, as it directly reflects the patterns of party interaction in the legislative contest, and can be applied across functional divides (i.e. the House and Senate) in the party system. While the ENEP and ENPP indices provide considerable insight into party system format, ENRP better demonstrates party system mechanics.

The results in Table 11.4 show the potential for significant disparity between the effective numbers of electoral, parliamentary, and relevant parliamentary parties. Table 11.4

⁵⁹ Contrary to Sartori (1976), however, it is argued here that some parties are more ‘relevant’ than others. As explained earlier in this thesis, one of the main criticisms of Sartori’s approach to determining party relevance is that all parties, once meeting Sartori’s criteria, are deemed equally relevant to the party system.

reproduces, for the Senate, the ENEP and ENPP results from chapter four, but also offers an additional calculation of ENPP, ENPP-2. The difference between the two ENPP calculations, explained further in respective footnotes, is in whether the Liberal and National parties are treated as a single party or two distinct entities. On the other hand, the ENEP and ENRP measures both consider the Coalition as a single entity, given the tendency for Coalition parties to run joint tickets in Senate electoral contests and vote in accordance in Senate divisions. Depending on the particular configuration of relative party strengths, the ENPP measure can misrepresent the 'effective number' of parties as it pertains to passing legislation and exerting the veto power of the Senate. For instance, ENRP better reflects competitive dynamics within the Senate in those periods where the Coalition held majorities; in those instances, there is only one party relevant to the passage of legislation, the Coalition. Indeed, it is for this reason that ENRP findings for the House are not shown; with the exception of the 43rd Parliament, single parties have monopolised the House's legislative power. Other parties during single-party majorities are not *entirely* without influence, but the fact remains that, for example, the Coalition maintained a monopoly on the institutional veto power of the Senate from 1975 to 1981, and again from 2005 to 2008.

Outside of those infrequent periods of single-party dominance, the ENRP findings support the results of the Banzhaf index, demonstrating a fragmenting Senate. The institutional veto power of the Senate has, over time, become predicated on a gradually increasing effective number of partisan veto players. Once again, the supposed two-partism of the Australian party system does not adequately characterise the nature of party competition and cooperation in the Senate. The pattern of party interaction here is overwhelmingly one of multipartism, not one of competition between just two dominant parties. Further, while the figures have fluctuated, there has been a general trend toward this multipartism consisting of four effectively relevant parties, rather than the previously common three.

Table 11.4 - The effective number of electoral, parliamentary, and relevant parties (Senate)

Year of Election ⁶⁰	ENEP ⁶¹	ENPP ⁶²	ENPP-2 ⁶³	ENRP ⁶⁴
1975	2.3	2.1	2.6	1
1977	2.8	2.2	2.6	1
1980	2.6	2.4	2.7	3.2
1983	2.6	2.4	2.8	3
1984	2.9	2.5	2.9	3
1987	2.7	2.6	3.2	3
1990	2.9	2.6	3	3
1993	2.6	2.6	3.1	3.5
1996	2.9	2.5	3	2.7
1998	3.3	2.7	3	3.4
2001	3.3	2.8	3.2	3.9
2004	3	2.5	3	1
2007	3	2.4	2.8	3.1
2010	3.4	2.5	2.7	3
2013	3.9	3	3.5	4.2
2016	4.2	3.4	4.1	4

Source: Author's own calculations.

This trend toward greater fragmentation and more complex multipartism began with the coexistence of the Democrats and the Greens in the 1990s, and has continued as the Greens have consolidated their place in the Senate alongside the proliferation of smaller parties more recently elected. Of course, the 'tripartite' effective number of relevant parties tendency could reassert itself, even if just as a result of reform to the Senate electoral system in 2016.

⁶⁰ For ENEP, rows correspond to election years. For ENPP, ENPP-2, and ENRP, the rows relate to the Senate term following the election stated. This is due to the delay, except following double dissolutions, between Senate elections and senators taking their seats in the chamber.

⁶¹ The ENEP column calculates the effective number of electoral parties contesting for the Senate, with Coalition parties counted as a single entity, given their tendency to run joint-tickets in Senate elections.

⁶² This first ENPP column represents the effective number of parliamentary parties in the Senate, with Coalition parties counted as a single entity.

⁶³ The second ENPP column (ENPP-2) represents the effective number of parliamentary parties in the Senate, but with the Coalition treated as two separate entities. Liberal National senators from Queensland are allocated to either the Liberal or the National parties depending on which party room these senators sit, while the Country Liberal Senator is included under the National Party given his/her tradition of inclusion in the Nationals' party room.

⁶⁴ The ENRP column measures the effective number of relevant parties in the Senate, with the Coalition parties again considered as a single entity, given the high likelihood of these parties voting together.

Nevertheless, the table demonstrates the value in integrating voting power in calculations of the effective number of parties if one is concerned with representing the complexities of legislative party competition – something that has been consistently downplayed in characterisations of the Australian party system.

Divided Party Government, the Structure of Opposition and the Party System

A central proposition of this chapter is that strong bicameralism provides an institutional opportunity structure through which divided party government can emerge. Divided party government entails greater influence over the legislative process for non-government parties, enlivening the review and policy-making functions of the legislature. The fundamental linkage of the legislative process, and of the functions of legislatures, to the normative expectations and effectiveness of government mean that divided party government transforms the nature of government and governing. Through creating an environment conducive to a higher number of legislative partisan veto players, the institutional characteristics of the Australian political system generates atypical government-opposition, and executive-legislative, relationships. The nature of these relationships has party system implications. In turn, however, the party system itself shapes these relationships and provides the competitive environment in which they take practical effect. However, party system classification, and measurements of system change, are predominantly concerned with the formation of government. As a consequence, it is necessary to briefly contextualise and interpret changes occurring to political opposition and what this means for classifications of the Australian party system.

Oppositions differ, according to Dahl (1966), in at least six ways: cohesion, competitiveness, site, distinctiveness, goals, and strategies. The central thesis of this chapter pertains most directly to the cohesiveness and site of opposition. Cohesion refers to both the fragmentation of opposition in terms of the number of non-governing parties with parliamentary representation, as well as to internal discipline of those parties. The site of opposition is concerned with the primary site or location in which governing and opposition parties compete. The cohesion or, inversely, the fragmentation, of the opposition is firstly a product

of the format of the party system; it represents the degree to which parliamentary strength is dispersed or concentrated. The data presented in this and preceding chapters have demonstrated gradually increasing fragmentation in the Australian party system. Importantly, however, this fragmentation is primarily focused in the Senate – in both electoral and legislative arenas – and the electoral arena of the House of Representatives. The consequence of this uneven splintering is that governments in the Australian system remain relatively cohesive (or non-fragmented), while the number of non-governing parties in the Senate have proliferated, diffusing the role of opposition. As with many parliamentary democracies, Australia appears to be moving away from the conventional Westminster model of opposition (Best 2013, pp. 337-38).

The Senate has emerged as the genuine site of parliamentary opposition following change in the Australian party system. Divergence in government and opposition cohesion between the House and the Senate produces parliaments with “two different patterns of parliamentary opposition.” (Kaiser 2008, p. 23) The control of the House by a single party (or coalesced parties, such as with the Coalition) renders opposition in this chamber largely ineffectual. In contrast, the Senate has progressively evolved as a site for the legislative functions of review and policymaking; it has recalibrated the balance between government and opposition, executive and legislature. Sharman (1999) correctly identifies this as largely the result of the growing representation of minor parties. This has consequences for the passage of legislation, and thus means substantive opposition now occurs not only in the electoral arena, but also in the legislature. It also transforms the nature of government-opposition relations. The opportunities afforded to minor parties to play a decisive role in passing legislation in the Senate means the upper house no longer fully reflects the ‘Government versus Opposition’ adversarialism of the House. This is characteristic of divided party government, but we can also view it as a partial move from majoritarian toward consensus democracy (Lijphart 2012).

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that existing approaches to analysing the Australian party system underplay, or overlook, two functions of legislatures that are central to understanding party

interaction: review and policymaking. These two functions are especially critical to understanding the Australian case given the presence of strong bicameralism, an institutional setting that regularly generates divided party government. The institutional arrangements in Australia have intersected with a gradually changing party system to produce a policy process in which the legislature is highly influential. At the centre of this development is the Senate and its constitutional, though party system contingent, veto power. This development results in more balanced executive-legislative and government-opposition power dynamics, in which the legislative agenda of governments can be frustrated, and even minor players can leverage disproportionately large bargaining power to modify policy. As such, any evaluation of the Australian party system focused on government formation is insufficient. The link between legislative effectiveness and government survival requires we look beyond government formation to government function. The institutional opportunity structure available to opposition parties to intervene in government function similarly necessitates incorporating legislative dynamics into our analytic framework. The vast majority of party interactions, after all, occur between the 'bookends' of elections, much of which as competition and cooperation in the legislature.

Measuring voting power and the effective number of relevant parties (ENRP) are two techniques especially suited to incorporating legislative party interaction into party system analysis. Prior to this thesis, neither measure had ever been applied to examine the Australian party system. The results of this chapter therefore significantly contribute to our understanding of party competition and cooperation in the Australian setting. While the Banzhaf index and ENRP are quantitative indicators, we can also use the findings to inform the classification of the Australian party system (see chapter 12). This derives from the connection between voting power and party relevance. This chapter's findings demonstrate the inadequacy of prevailing characterisations of the Australian party system. The use and threat of the institutional veto power of the Senate, critical to understanding the wider party system, is conditional upon a complex partisan bargaining environment that shows signs of even further fragmentation. This points to a distinct sub-system, based around the Senate, with distinct multiparty dynamics. This sub-system has been the site of much of the party system change witnessed thus far, and could well extend to influencing the very 'core' of the

party system in the future. Indeed, as chapters nine and ten demonstrate, the Greens leveraged their contingent veto power in the Senate to amplify their influence over the Labor minority government in the 43rd Parliament. However, the Greens, like the Labor and Coalition parties, have seen their voting power in the Senate – and thus their party system influence – decline alongside further electoral and parliamentary fragmentation.

Part VI: Conclusion

THE AUSTRALIAN GREENS AS A MINOR PARTY IN A CONTINGENT MULTIPARTY SYSTEM

The Australian party system is changing. Two-partism is giving way to a contingent multipartism, in which multipart dynamics are consolidating in the electoral and legislative arenas. The Australian party system is a multilayered party system, where the contest for government maintains a distinct pattern of party interaction to the contests for votes and legislative outcomes. These patterns differ to the extent that we must recognise a distinct party sub-system operating surrounding the Senate. The entrenched multipartism in the Senate holds consequences not only for the legislative process, but also for the effectiveness (and, in turn, viability) of governments, and for Australian democracy more broadly. Clearly, the party system core still resists transformation; government formation remains a process limited to the Labor and Coalition parties. The question is, for how much longer? The alternative vote electoral system of the House of Representatives suppresses many of the consequences of societal and electoral change. Nonetheless, the 43rd Parliament demonstrates that the fragmentation of the electoral arena can break through into the House, as well. What is more, Labor and Coalition majority governments are already needing to reconcile the adversarial majoritarianism of government formation with, in the legislature, the kind of bargaining and compromise more typical of consensus democracies (Lijphart 1984). Power, in the Australian party system, is diffusing.

The process of change in the Australian party system, however, is one of modification rather than transformation. The Greens have undoubtedly contributed to the process of power diffusion, but are neither the only nor the most significant factor in an overall explanation of shifting party system dynamics. The longevity and gradual growth of the Greens, in electoral strength and parliamentary representation, is an achievement in itself in a polity where minor parties tend to have short lifespans. Moreover, the Greens are one of just four parties in the postwar era – alongside the Nationals, the Democratic Labor Party, and the Australian Democrats – to be a ‘pivotal’ party in the formation of government or passage of legislation.

Relative to each of these parties, though, the impact of the Greens is more limited. The Greens have plateaued in electoral support, only disrupted the usual process of government formation once, and have lost the sole balance of power position in the Senate. While the Greens are furthering change in the Australian party system, the trends underpinning this change were already underway prior to the party's election to the federal parliament. Indeed, further party system fragmentation following recent elections has blunted the Greens' prospects. On the other hand, the Greens have established a left-progressive niche in the ideological space, broadening the parameters of party competition to a degree not achieved by any other non-major party. The Greens appealing to a significant segment of the electorate from this position makes a qualitative difference to party competition, representation, and legislative outcomes.

The primary aim of this thesis was to identify and analyse the extent of the Australian Greens' impact on the Australian party system. To date, the Greens may claim minimal, but meaningful, impact over the patterns of party interaction. The introduction of this thesis, however, posed two additional research questions closely associated with this analysis of party impact. Are the Greens just another minor party? And how can we best describe the Australian party system? The primary objectives of this chapter, therefore, are:

1. Synthesise the findings of the preceding chapters in line with this thesis's organising framework, namely the contests for votes, legislative outcomes, and government formation.
2. Articulate a new typology for the classification of parties based upon their relative impact on and roles in the party system. This typology distinguishes between 'major', 'pivotal', 'minor', and 'peripheral' parties.
3. Propose a new party system typology, including the concept of 'transitional' party system types, following and refining Sartori's (1976) classic system typology. This typology separates two-party systems from four types of multiparty systems: contingent, limited, extended, and atomised.

Applying these new typologies, this chapter argues that the Greens have fluctuated between a 'minor' and a 'pivotal' party as the party's influence first increased, then plateaued, and slightly declined. The Australian party system, meanwhile, is no longer a two-party or even two-and-a-half-party system. Rather, it is a contingent multiparty system with multiparty dynamics firmly entrenched in the electoral and legislative contests, particularly in the party sub-system surrounding the Senate.

The Contest for Votes

The Greens have made their most significant impact upon the Australian party system through the contest for votes. Chapters six and seven demonstrate that the Greens have consolidated a niche on the fringe of the ideological space, packaging together a set of left-wing and progressive-cosmopolitan policy appeals. The Greens have stretched the boundaries of party competition in Australia and increased ideological polarisation. They are not, however, a party of the traditional left. Certainly, the party advocates expansion of the welfare state, increased spending on public education, and the rights of workers to unionise. What Greens' policy platforms do not contain, though, are the type of class-based appeals one would expect from parties of the traditional left. The conception of equality underpinning the Greens' economic positions is qualitatively different, even if that conception leads to some policy affinities with other parties of the left. Nonetheless, the Greens appeal to a considerable segment of the Australian electorate. Chapter eight shows that the Greens are contributing toward a minor restructuring of the Australian electorate, drawing in disproportionate levels of support from young, highly educated, non-religious, urban-dwelling voters working in social-cultural fields. It is doubtful, though, that the Greens alone could credibly lay claim to driving value and attitudinal change amongst the Australian electorate. Some of the Greens' electoral success is the product of established parties failing to manage political demands that first emerged well before the Greens' emergence in 1992.

A key challenge for the party in expanding its electoral appeal will be developing ideological clarity and programmatic breadth in a competitive environment in which the party faces considerable constraints. Chapter seven shows that, in a typical election, half of the Greens'

policy program comprises statements regarding welfare expansion, education spending, industrial relations, and environmental policies. To be sure, this accords with what we expect from a policy-oriented, niche party. However, in looking at the relationship between programmatic profiles and electoral success, Zons (2016) found that there is somewhat of a time limit on the electoral feasibility of 'niche-ness' and narrow policy emphases. Centring a party upon one or a small number of policy areas is of electoral benefit to new parties, but this benefit incrementally recedes over time – to a point where, eventually, it is likely to detract from party support (Zons 2016, pp. 15-18). There is some indication, particularly from the Greens' 2016 campaign, that the party is attempting to expand its policy appeal and focus. The problem for the Greens, however, is that any attempt to broaden programmatic scope or moderate existing stances carries a significant risk of movement within the ideological space. This raises the question of whether there is any ideological space inhabitable by the party that would enhance the prospects of increasing the party's vote without risking internal cohesion.

The Contest for Legislative Outcomes

The Greens' electoral success has translated into substantial influence over the legislative contest. This influence is a product both of the favourable electoral system of the Senate, as well as the role of the Senate as an institutional veto player. Since 1993, the Greens have frequently held, whether alone or alongside other cross-benchers, a balance of power position in the powerful upper house, both complicating the inter-party bargaining environment and allowing the party to shape the nature of legislative outcomes. As shown in chapter eleven, the Greens since 2008 have matched the voting power of the Labor Party (as measured by the Banzhaf index). This means that the Greens and Labor wield similar potential influence over the passing and blocking of bills and, in turn, over the effectiveness and ongoing viability of governments. Since the 2013 federal election, though, the relative influence of the Greens – in terms of raw numbers on the parliamentary floor – has declined. While earlier in the party's history the Greens' vote and legislative influence increased with party system fragmentation, the recent further splintering of the legislative and electoral contests have rendered the Greens as just one more minor, rather than a pivotal, player in the Australian Parliament.

Competing tendencies also exist within the Greens, divided over both the practical and the more philosophical concerns raised by inter-party negotiation and compromise. The interview data in chapters nine and ten highlight these divisions; regular policy compromise potentially risks future electoral performance, but also fosters conflict over the *raison d'être* of the Greens. This is not simply a rift between office-seeking pragmatists and policy-seeking ideologues; indeed, the Greens, as a whole, is a policy-seeking party. Rather, the schism in the Greens is over the desirability and value of incremental policy reform – on the use of negotiation in parliament to bring about moderate change that, while not delivering the full extent of Greens' demands, nonetheless gets part way there. This rift stems from fundamentally different theories of social and political change. Legislative cooperation between Labor and the Greens has been frequent and relatively fruitful, securing significant reform (e.g. a price on carbon, see Crowley 2013) as well as often frustrating the legislative agendas of Coalition governments (e.g. bills relating to the 2014 federal budget, see Chan 2015). The Greens also traverse the ideological spectrum to vote with the Coalition, though such instances are rare and foster particularly intense internal conflict.⁶⁵ Intra-party conflict over policy platforms and positions taken in votes in the legislature are common to all parties. What is notable about the Greens, however, is a particular lack of clarity over the very purpose of the party and how it should engage with its competitors.

The Contest for Government

It is in the contest for government that the Greens have exerted the least amount of influence. The alternative vote electoral system employed for the House of Representatives undoubtedly constrains the Greens' impact. Minor parties (and independents) are certainly capable of gaining representation in the House, but to do so requires a geographic concentration of the vote that minor parties, besides the rurally-based Nationals, tend to lack. In more than 25 years, the Greens have only elected two members to the House: one resulting from a relatively inconsequential by-election (Cahill & Brown 2008), and the other in successive elections,

⁶⁵ See, for instance, the consequences of the Greens considering working with the Coalition government on education funding, which culminated with Senator Lee Rhiannon being (temporarily) expelled from the Greens' parliamentary party room (Doran 2017).

beginning in 2010, from the seat of Melbourne. The Greens' first win in Melbourne also presented the party with its only instance of direct influence over the formation of a federal government. As chapters nine and ten demonstrate, the party was quick to support a potential Labor government, and exploited the opportunity for considerable policy gain. The gains, however, have since proven largely ephemeral, while many of the costs of supporting a minority government have remained.

The immediate problems for the Greens in this site of competition are straightforward to diagnose, but difficult for the party to resolve. The Greens simply lack the numbers in the House to disrupt the pattern of government formation and, regardless, are internally divided over how (and whether) to use such numbers in the future. What is more, future 'hung parliaments' may well be the product of a proliferation of independents and other minor parties, rather than the result of the Greens gaining further representation in the House. Such dispersion of power in the House reduces the relative bargaining power of the Greens, limiting the party's sway over which of the major parties might form government and on what basis. Indeed, at the time of writing, a by-election in the seat of Wentworth has seen the election of an independent, resulting in the loss of the Coalition's governing majority in the House. Another instance of minority government is monumental; it is an occurrence, however, that the Greens have no claim of causing and over which the party has minimal influence going forward. What remains to be seen, as well, is whether the electorate, so accustomed to an adversarial contest between alternative majority governments, are genuinely ready to accept and support the fundamental transformation of the party system, and the operation of Australian democracy, that frequent instances of minority or coalition governments would entail.

The Australian Greens: From Minor to Pivotal Party and Back Again

The Greens, in spite of limited impact on government formation, have nonetheless contributed to some change in the Australian party system. This section outlines a new party typology to contextualise the party system role of the Greens. The findings of the preceding chapters demonstrate that the party has disrupted patterns of party interaction, appealing to

a small but relatively stable segment of the electorate. The party has leveraged this electoral success to gain significant influence over the contest for legislative outcomes, having frequently occupied a shared or sole balance-of-power position in the Senate. From this position, the party has further ingrained the practice of an assertive, policy-initiating Senate, and challenged the notion of a general government mandate (see Sharman 1998). Nevertheless, the Greens are just one of several forces contributing to change in the Australian party system. Indeed, the Greens have been more so assimilated into an ongoing process of change, rather than having caused that change. This thesis's findings show that the party system began fragmenting, with attendant shifts in party interaction, prior to the Greens gaining significant electoral success or parliamentary representation. This does not mean the Greens have been ineffectual. Beyond Labor and the Liberal-National coalition, no party currently matches the impact of the Greens. There is an important distinction, though, between instigating change and influencing change that is already underway.

The central aim of this thesis is to ascertain the extent of the Greens' impact on the Australian party system. Such a project necessarily tackles the question of whether the Greens are just another minor party – and determining what we even mean by 'minor party'. The evidence in this thesis makes clear the need distinguish the influence of the Greens from other competitors – both from the major parties, as well as from those other small parties occupying the cross-benches. The Greens lack the parliamentary size to form or even participate in government, but nonetheless possess greater capacity than other small parties to shape legislative outcomes and the effectiveness of government (see chapter eleven). One way to resolve the problem of distinguishing and categorising the differing 'relevance' of parties is to revisit the usual distinction between 'major' and 'minor' parties and develop a party typology founded upon party system influence. Kefford (2017) outlines such a party typology, containing the classes of 'major', 'minor', and 'peripheral' parties. In so doing, Kefford (2017, p. 102) defines a major party as one that "can be expected to form government in their own right or which can regularly be expected to become the biggest party out of government." Such a definition – perhaps inadvertently – renders large parties that form government through coalition as non-major parties, unless they are captured by the secondary 'biggest party out of government' criterion.

The peripheral party type is Kefford's (2017) most valuable and persuasive contribution. A peripheral party is one which has "no effect on the party system" with no "blackmail or coalition potential" (Kefford 2017, p. 102). It is Kefford's 'minor party' type, though, that is problematic. According to Kefford's (2017, p. 102) definition, minor parties "could hold balance of power or veto positions, have coalition potential, or dependent on the electoral system, could shape party competition." This definition encompasses several distinct roles in the party system and subsequently results in a crowding of the minor party type in any moderately (or greatly) fragmented party system. Kefford's minor party type puts together parties that serve in government (e.g. the Nationals) and hold legislative veto power (e.g. the Greens) with parties that hold small numbers of parliamentary seats (e.g. the Derryn Hinch's Justice Party), so long as the latter might occasionally cast a vote or two toward the passage of legislation. If we believe there is little meaningful difference between such parties, then classifying each as a 'minor party' is sufficient. Certainly, in specific configurations of party cooperation in the legislature, the latter group of small parties can wield a crucial vote in the passage of legislation. Yet, clearly, some smaller parties are more important than others – more pivotal to the legislative process, to the viability and effectiveness of government, and to the wider party system.

A new party typology grounded in party relevance to the party system must meet four main criteria:

1. Conceptual clarity and coherence.
2. Collective exhaustion; all parties competing putting forward candidates for election should be sorted into a party type.
3. Mutual exclusivity; each party should only 'fit' one party type.
4. Discriminatory power sufficient to differentiate between parties with distinct roles in the party system and avoid unnecessary crowding of any one type.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ See Collier et al. (2008) for more on the requirements of mutual exclusivity and collective exhaustion in typologies.

I propose a party typology consisting of four types – major, pivotal, minor, and peripheral – as detailed in Table 12.1. The major type follows a fairly conventional definition, covering the main parties of government and opposition, while I adopt the peripheral type from Kefford (2017). The primary innovation in the typology is the separation of the traditional ‘minor party’ category into ‘pivotal’ parties and ‘minor’ parties, distinguishing between the separate roles these two party types play in a party system. The pivotal party type builds upon Fisher’s (1974, p. 6) notion of a ‘third party’, expanding it to encompass those parties that, while not regularly participating in government, nevertheless significantly impact the party system through their legislative influence. In comparisons between systems, it may also be beneficial to distinguish between ‘majority’ parties (those capable of forming government alone) and other major parties (Jaensch & Mathieson 1998). Within a system, however, there tends to be so few cases of ‘major’ parties that this differentiation is unnecessary.

Table 12.1 – A party typology grounded in party system roles

Party type	Criteria
Major	Any party that regularly forms government, whether alone or as the largest party in a coalition, or any party that holds the greatest number of parliamentary seats amongst non-governing parties.
Pivotal	Any non-major party that regularly participates in government as a junior coalition party, or whose parliamentary numbers are required for the ongoing viability of a government. Additionally, any non-major party that regularly holds sole ‘balance of power’ (contingent veto power) in the blocking and passing of bills in the legislature.
Minor	Any party that, while neither regularly participating in or supporting government, nor holding sole ‘balance of power’ in legislative votes, nevertheless maintains coalition <i>potential</i> , a shared ‘balance of power’ role in legislative votes, or significantly influences the tactics of electoral competition.
Peripheral	Any party, regardless of parliamentary representation, that regularly fields candidates for election yet fails to attain any meaningful influence over the result or pattern of electoral competition, legislative votes, or formation of government.

By this typology, the Greens, for much of their existence, have been a minor party. It is only between 2010 and 2014 that the party clearly qualifies as a pivotal party. From 2010 to 2013, the Greens, with three cross-bench independents, provided confidence and supply for the Labor minority government, as explored in chapters nine and ten. Moreover, in the Senate of

2011 to 2014, the Greens held sole balance of power in the Senate, determining the fate of proposed bills in instances where Labor and the Coalition were at odds. We might, however, extend the pivotal party classification of the Greens out to 2016. The Greens maintained a *partial* balance of power position in the Senate of 2014 to 2016. That is, the Coalition government could secure the passage of bills through the Senate with the support of the Greens alone, yet the Greens and Labor opposition together had insufficient numbers to block legislation without further cross-bench support. Nonetheless, cooperation between the Greens and the Coalition is relatively rare, as shown in Table 11.3. Interestingly, one product of Coalition-Greens cooperation was electoral reform, amending the electoral system of the Senate. The Greens' parliamentary strength has suffered from further system fragmentation following the 2013 and 2016 elections. Changes to the Senate electoral system, though, may decrease this fragmentation, delivering the Greens the kind of sustained legislative veto power the Australian Democrats enjoyed through the 1980s and early 1990s.

Classifying the Australian Party System

We now turn to the third aim of this chapter in advancing a new party system typology. A party system is a pattern of party interactions stemming from the contests for government, for votes, and for legislative outcomes. Party systems can differ on the basis of distinct configurations of party competition or cooperation within any or all of these contests. In this thesis, and particularly in chapters four and five examining change in the Australian party system, specific indicators were employed to identify and measure these competitive and cooperative dynamics. Each of the other chapters study specific facets of party competition in greater depth, providing more nuanced assessment of the dynamics of party interaction and the parameters and nature of the party system. Using the hybrid framework of change outlined in chapter three, this thesis finds general change in the Australian party system. While the hybrid framework sets out parameters for party system *change*, there is still a need to provide meaning and additional context for understanding the characteristics of the Australian party system at any one point in time. What, for instance, does it mean that, following the 2016 election, the Australian party system had 3.6 and 4.2 'effective parties' in the electoral arenas of the House and Senate, respectively (chapter four)? Likewise, what

difference does greater ideological polarisation (chapter seven), or multiparty patterns of competition in the passage of legislation (chapter 11), make to our understanding of Australia’s party system?

It is here that returning to typologies is especially valuable, using the results of the preceding analyses to better inform party system classification. As outlined in chapters two and three, however, many traditional party system typologies (e.g. Sartori 1976) have declined in discriminatory power, while more recent proposals either omit key dimensions of party competition (e.g. Mair 1997) or lack parsimony (e.g. Siaroff 2006; Wolinetz 2004). The particular institutional characteristics of the Australian party system – chiefly, strong bicameralism alongside two quite distinct electoral systems – further complicates the application of extant typologies. Scholars have long recognised the multidimensionality of party systems – that is, the existence of distinct arenas (i.e. electoral and legislative) and divides (i.e. horizontal, vertical, and functional) (Bardi & Mair 2008; Laver 1989). Australian institutions amplify this multidimensionality, and have fostered the emergence of a distinct party sub-system surrounding the Senate. This sub-system, while still maintaining linkages to the overall federal party system, nevertheless exhibits markedly different patterns of party competition and cooperation. Following an application of Sartori’s (1976) typology (see Table 12.2) to the Australian case, this section of the chapter presents a new typology that refines Sartori’s to disaggregate sites of competition and include ‘transitional’ system types.

Table 12.2 – Sartori’s typology of competitive party systems⁶⁷

	Two-party	Moderate Pluralism	Polarised Pluralism
Number of <i>relevant</i> parties	2	3-5	6+
Ideological polarisation	Low	Low	High

A strict application of Sartori’s (1976) original typology – still the most widely used and influential – results in a consistent and unqualified categorisation of two-partism in Australia throughout the period under study (see Table 12.3). Employing Sartori’s typology, as outlined in chapter two, competition between the only two relevant parties – Labor and a Liberal-

⁶⁷ Sartori (1976, pp. 192-201) also included a ‘predominant party’ type in his typology of competitive party systems, but it sits uneasily in the typology overall, using different sorting criteria.

National ‘coalescence’ – for control of government makes for a supposedly stable two-party system. If we believe that the characteristics of party interaction in the Australian party system are best understood by considering just the behaviours of the Labor and Liberal parties alone, then the two-party label is satisfactory. But much in this thesis suggests that there is far more to party competition in Australia than just the interaction between the Labor and Coalition parties. If we amend Sartori’s rules for counting ‘relevant’ parties to fit the Australian context, as per Jaensch (1994a, pp. 10-14), the number of parties counted more accurately reflects Australian circumstances. As Table 4.2 demonstrates, this increases the number of relevant parties, and complicates any two-party classification. The additional relevant parties, however, are included on the basis of their existence and role in the Senate, rather than their role in the competition for government that was at the core of Sartori’s framework. This also complicates system classification. As Table 12.3 shows, Jaensch’s amendments to Sartori’s typology produces a ‘moderate pluralism’ classification for Australia, despite the Australian system not exhibiting the frequency of minority and, especially, coalition governments expected in a conventional multiparty system (Sartori 1976, p. 178).

Table 12.3 – Classifying the Australian party system using modified Sartori typologies

	Sartori (1976)	Sartori + Jaensch (1994a)	Multidimensional Sartori
1975 – 1980	Two-party system	Two-party system	Two-party system
1980 – 2004	Two-party system	Moderate pluralism	Two-partism with moderate pluralist subsystem
2004 – 2007	Two-party system	Two-party system	Two-party system
2007 - 2016	Two-party system	Moderate pluralism	Two-partism with moderate pluralist subsystem

At first glance, Jaensch’s amendments to Sartori’s criteria for party relevance make sense in the Australian setting, but nevertheless prevent accurate classification. That is, unless one integrates into the typology an allowance for the multidimensionality of party systems. The final column of Table 12.3 outlines such a classification, modifying Sartori’s original typology to include Jaensch’s expanded rules for party relevance *and* an allowance for party relevance to differ from one party system divide or arena to another. Using the results of this thesis to inform classification, this amended Sartori typology shows a bifurcated Australian party

system. Two-partism remains at the core – that is, surrounding government formation – but Sartori’s ‘moderate pluralism’ and its associated multiparty dynamics exists in a linked party subsystem. This subsystem derives from the presence of additional relevant parties – the Democrats, then the Greens – that feature prominently in the Senate. The presence of this subsystem, however, is not constant throughout the period studied. The coalescence of the Liberal and National parties – to the extent of running joint tickets in the Senate – renders inaccurate an assertion of a multiparty subsystem in those periods where neither the Democrats nor the Greens qualify as relevant parties. As with the polity-level party system, while one can make the case for frequently counting the Nationals as a relevant party, the nature of the Coalition subsequently eliminates the party’s capacity to meaningfully influence the mechanics of the system.

Tacking on multidimensionality as a qualifier to individual cases within Sartori’s typology may be a convenient way to classify the Australian party system more accurately, but it sits uneasily in the schema overall. It also does not aid in resolving a key flaw in party system typologies: the detection of party system change outside of quite dramatic transformations. Unfortunately, no typology, either pre- or post-Sartori, offers much in the way of resolving the problem of classification of a party system with distinct patterns of party interaction across system divides or between the contests for votes, government, and legislative outcomes. Siaroff (2006), for instance, in applying his own typology, considers Australia to be a two-and-a-half-party system. This is determined, primarily, by the relative electoral and parliamentary strength of parties, but only in the House of Representatives. This omits from the classification process a significant proportion of party interaction – namely, that which occurs within the Senate and between the two chambers. Further, Wolinetz’s (2004) typology, while – as argued in chapter two – the most persuasive attempt at constructing a taxonomy of contemporary party systems, nonetheless maintains similar limitations to Sartori’s framework. Wolinetz employs Sartori’s method of counting ‘relevant’ parties, and likewise provides no means by which to account for differing patterns of party interaction across party system divides (e.g. between the House and Senate). While Wolinetz’s integration of party cooperation – so-called ‘clustering’ – is a useful addition, the typology still considers the Australian party system as broadly two-party.

Again, these characterisations of the party system are fine if we believe that they sufficiently summarize the parameters and dynamics of party interaction in Australia – that what the Australian party system is ‘about’ is still the contest for government between Labor and the Liberal-National coalition. Such an assertion, however, is increasingly difficult to sustain. Each of typologies above, and others explored in chapter two, obscure the multidimensionality of party systems. A case study of the Australian setting alone does not allow us to generate a new typology that we can claim accurately categorises all competitive party systems. Single case studies can nevertheless contribute to theory development and generate hypotheses for further testing (Levy 2008; Lijphart 1971). Thus, in creating a schema for classifying, and tracking change in, the Australian party system, we might identify trends and dynamics common to contemporary democratic systems, and provide a foundation for a future typology of competitive party systems derived from wider study. A typology suited to the Australian system must meet those aforementioned criteria of coherence, collective exhaustion, mutual exclusion, and high discriminatory power. Additionally, it must incorporate the contests for government, for votes, and for legislative outcomes – across the House-Senate functional divide – as well as sufficiently track and contextualise change over time.

A New Party System Typology

This section outlines an alternative typology appropriate for, at least, the Australian context. This typology draws upon Sartori (1976) in its basic structure, and Wolinetz (2004) in nomenclature, but introduces two new system types. The original distinction in almost all party system typologies is between systems with two parties, and systems with more than two parties. This is an important first sorting, as it broadly demarcates systems with divergent qualities in party competition. Nevertheless, a key problem each scholar advancing a typology then must tackle is how to disaggregate this latter ‘multiparty’ category, lest considerably different systems be grouped together. The typology proposed below splits the ‘multiparty’ category into four party system types. Like Sartori’s schema, this new typology differentiates between system types on the basis of the number of parties and degree of ideological polarisation. As with Sartori’s typology, the number of parties and ideological polarisation

are not independent; these two variables, along with expected forms of government, co-vary. Contrary to Sartori, however, our application of this new typology involves a count of parties conducted across the three primary sites of party contest: government formation, the electoral arena, and the legislature. These separate counts acknowledge the multidimensionality of party systems, allowing us to identify where patterns of party interaction meaningfully differ across sites of party contest and potentially create distinct 'sub-systems'. In addition to two-party systems, the final typology therefore differentiates between four multiparty system types: contingent, limited, extended, and atomised.

The Where and How of Counting Parties

The new typology advanced here gives primacy to the number of parties as a classificatory criterion. A count of parties, as Sartori (1976, p. 120) explains, indicates "the extent to which power is fragmented or non-fragmented, dispersed or concentrated." The degree of fragmentation, Sartori adds, influences the "tactics of party competition and opposition" which "has, in turn, an important bearing on how governmental coalitions are formed and are able to perform." While existing typologies differ on the precise method used to count parties, most party system typologies nevertheless share two common characteristics: parties are counted on the basis of electoral competition and/or government formation alone;⁶⁸ and the product of the count is a singular figure, despite the potential for differing numbers of parties in different sites or arenas of competition.⁶⁹ The new typology diverges on both points. The number of parties is calculated across all three sites of party competition – the contests for government, for votes, and legislative outcomes – and is left disaggregated, allowing for the identification of party systems that exhibit differing distributions of power across these sites. The method of calculating parties, as well, is tailored to each of these sites of party

⁶⁸ Sartori's (1976, p. 123) second criterion for party relevance is centred on 'blackmail potential' – that is, a party is deemed relevant if it alters the direction of party competition. For Sartori (1976, p. 123) blackmail potential tended to be found in the electoral arena and "something which generally coincides with an anti-system party." Nevertheless, Sartori did later qualify (1976, pp. 123-24) that blackmail potential can also be found in the "veto power" of parties "with respect to the enactment of legislation." Relative to Sartori, the typology introduced here both elevates and distinguishes this legislative aspect of party competition in the design of types and sorting of cases.

⁶⁹ See Siaroff (2006) for an exception.

interaction, employing Sartori's (1976) first rule of party relevance and separate weightings to the 'effective number of parties' measure (Laakso & Taagepera 1979).

The new typology seeks to integrate quantitative measurements into what scholars often consider a qualitative exercise: identifying types and classifying party systems. The counting techniques used, and where to apply them, are summarised in Table 12.4. The count of parties in the *contest for government* is conducted in line with Sartori's (1976, p. 122) first rule of party relevance. That is, a party is included in the count of parties in this contest "if it finds itself in a position to determine over time, and at some point in time, at least one of the possible governmental majorities." The number of parties in the *contest for votes*, meanwhile, is calculated using the 'effective number of electoral parties' (ENEP), averaged across the arenas of electoral competition. Thus, the ENEP scores for the House and Senate electoral arenas are averaged in the Australian case (see Table 4.3). Lastly, the party count in the *contest for legislative outcomes* – frequently downplayed in party system classification – is performed using the 'effective number of relevant parties' (ENRP) measure introduced in chapter eleven. For this count, we take the highest number from calculations of parties in across all chambers of parliament that are institutional veto players (e.g. the House and the Senate). We take the highest number, rather than an average (as with ENEP), as what matters most in the contest for legislative outcomes is how easily a government can pass its agenda; it matters little if a government controls one institutional veto but cannot navigate its proposed bills past another.

Table 12.4 – Counting parties across different contests

<i>Contest for</i>	Measure	Application
<i>Government</i>	Coalition potential	Count of parties based on participation in government formation
<i>Votes</i>	Effective number of electoral parties (ENEP)	Average count of parties across all electoral arenas
<i>Legislative outcomes</i>	Effective number of relevant parties (ENRP)	The highest count of parties within any institutional veto player

The Degrees and Measurement of Ideological Polarisation

The second criterion in the typology advanced here is ideological polarisation. Measuring ideological polarisation is somewhat contextual and dependent upon the nature of party competition in the system(s) under study. The ideological space of one party system, after all, is unlikely to precisely match that of another. For the Australian system, the two-dimensional space designed and operationalised in chapters six and seven is apt, with the degree of ideological polarisation being the distance between the two most ideologically-remote parliamentary parties. The challenge is in taking the quantified measurements of chapter seven and setting thresholds for differing degrees of ideological polarisation. Setting such thresholds relies on subjective judgement, with points of demarcation admittedly somewhat arbitrary. In our two-dimensional space from chapter six, for instance, the maximum Euclidean distance ranges from 0 (parties occupying the same position) to approximately 282 (parties occupying opposite ends of the space). As ideological polarisation covaries with the number of parties, and is further shaped by divergence in the number of parties across sites of competition, we need several grades of polarisation among this 0-282 range that align with the expected patterns of competition exhibited by specific configurations of parties.

In the Australian party system, we can identify four degrees or categories of ideological polarisation: minimal, moderate, greater, and severe. Transforming the quantified distance between parties into these qualitative categories, we can set thresholds of ideological distance at 0-100 for minimal, 101-150 for moderate, 151-200 for greater, and 201-282 for severe levels of ideological polarisation. These cut-off points are summarised in Table 12.5. The uneven ranges are intentional. Even in two-party systems where we expect minimal ideological distance, parties nevertheless adapt their policy and ideological profiles; there needs to be sufficient 'slack' in the ranges to allow for party movements without declaring a system as more polarised. Similarly, given how unlikely it is for two parties to occupy the very outer limits of an ideological space in a system (and thus reach a theoretical maximum score of 282), the 'severe' range must be extended lest there be very few systems meeting the score criteria for severe polarisation. A key limitation of these categories is that change can be quite abrupt; a shift from a polarisation score of 69 to 72 will modify the party system's classification from

‘minimal’ to ‘moderate’, but how much has party competition really changed? This is a generalised problem of typological sorting, and points to the caution required in their use and any subsequent analysis.

Table 12.5 – Degrees of ideological polarisation in the Australian 2D space

Euclidean Distance	Degree of Ideological Polarisation
0 – 100	Minimal
101 – 150	Moderate
151 – 200	Greater
201 – 282	Severe

Understanding the Types and Using the Typology

The results of these two criteria inform the categorisation of party systems into one of the five system types tabulated in Table 12.6. Party systems consist of three main sites of party interaction: the contests for government, votes, and legislative outcomes. Examining these contests separately is a worthwhile endeavour when assessing any party system, but is especially necessary in those settings where particular institutional characteristics or electoral systems can foster divergent patterns of interaction across sites of competition. The contest for government remains the ‘core’ of a party system, as it is the most influential force in shaping what a system is ‘about’. However, all party systems have, in effect, party ‘sub-systems’ surrounding the legislative and electoral arenas. Where these sub-systems matter most to our understanding of an ‘overall’ party system is in those instances where electoral and legislative interaction differs markedly from that of party competition in the formation of governments. Where party systems exhibit the same number of parties, and thus a similar pattern of party interaction, across all three party contests, the system can be categorised into one of three ‘conventional’ party system types: two-party, limited multiparty, and atomised multiparty. These types correspond closely to Sartori’s types outlined in Table 12.2. Conversely, where party systems display a pattern of party interactions in the electoral and legislative arenas distinct to that in the contest for government, we sort party systems into one of two ‘transitional’ types: contingent multiparty and extended multiparty.

Table 12.6 – A multidimensional party system typology

<i>Contest for...</i>	Party system type				
	<i>Two-party</i>	<i>Contingent multiparty</i>	<i>Limited multiparty</i>	<i>Extended multiparty</i>	<i>Atomised multiparty</i>
<i>Government</i>	Two parties	Two parties	3-5 parties	3-5 parties	6-8 parties
<i>Votes</i>	Two parties	3-5 parties	3-5 parties	6-8 parties	6-8 parties
<i>Legislation</i>	Two parties	3-5 parties	3-5 parties	6-8 parties	6-8 parties
Expected ideological polarisation	Minimal	Greater	Moderate	Greater	Severe
Expected form of government	Single-party majority	Single-party minority and majority	Majority coalition	Majority and minority coalition	Minority coalition

For a party system to move from a ‘conventional’ system type (two-party, limited multiparty, atomised multiparty) where the number of parties roughly aligns across each site of party contest, one of two things must occur. Either there is a transformation at the party system core, shifting the party system from one conventional type to another; or, there is general change in the legislative and electoral contests, shifting the party system from a conventional type to a transitional type. The contingent and extended multiparty system types capture those party systems in which general system change, but not transformation, has occurred (see chapter three). In these transitional system types, voters have turned away from the parties of government in significant enough numbers to fragment the electoral contest and distribute legislative power, but parties of government nevertheless maintain control over executive formation. Change in the electoral contest (or legislative contest) alone does not warrant a party system reclassification, as variation in just one of these party contests is not so significant to meaningfully alter the overall pattern of party interaction.

Each party system type maintains an expected degree of ideological polarisation and likely form(s) of government. This is due to the fundamental link, as asserted by Sartori (1976), between the format of the party system (the number of parties) and the mechanics of that system (how those parties compete and cooperate). Party systems can deviate from the expected mechanics of their type; for instance, there are two-party systems that demonstrate

considerable ideological polarisation (Wolinetz 2006, p. 53).⁷⁰ Due to the link between format and mechanics, though, it is anticipated that these deviations, unless the system is undergoing long-term change, will be relatively short-lived, with the system having strong 'homing tendencies' back to expected mechanics. The expected degree of ideological polarisation in a two-party system, for example, is minimal. This draws upon the Downsian (1957) model of political competition, in which there are strong incentives for centripetal competition in two-party systems. In such systems, parties generally gain little by moving toward the ideological fringe. In particular, the 'swinging voters' over which the two parties compete purportedly cluster in and around the centre of the ideological spectrum; if a party is to win over these crucial voters and form government, the party must moderate its ideological appeals. Indeed, government formation is a contest between these two competitors alone, (usually) alternating between them relatively frequently.

Contingent multiparty systems exhibit a similar pattern of competition for government as in two-party systems. Indeed, it is the mismatch of two-partism in government formation alongside multipartism in other sites of the party contest that produces the 'contingent' nature of the multipartism of this type. However, the incidence of single party minority governments, such as in the 43rd Australian Parliament, increases as the traditional parties of government struggle to consistently obtain parliamentary majorities. When these parties do fail to secure a majority, single party minority governments are likely, rather than multiparty coalitions, due to the greater ideological distance between parties. This increase in the ideological distance between parties is a product of electoral and legislative fragmentation. The emergence of new parties and the policy responses of established parties politicises new political issues and extends the parameters of party competition. Simultaneously, given the preponderance of single party governments, there is little incentive for moderation and programmatic rapprochement between parties to cooperate and form coalition governments. As discussed below, it is this system type, contingent multiparty, which best describes the Australian party system in recent years. Further, it is the trajectory from two-party to contingent multiparty system that best describes change in the Australian case.

⁷⁰ In such cases, it would be worth adding a qualifier to the type ascribed to a system - for example, a 'polarised two-party system' - to note the system's unusualness.

For the Australian party system to transform from the contingent multiparty type to a limited multiparty system, though, the three to five parties present in the electoral and legislative contests would need to be matched in government formation. As shown in Table 12.6, a limited multiparty system maintains three to five parties across all three sites of party interaction. The primary trait of limited multiparty systems is coalition government. With the fragmenting of the competition for government, no party can form majority cabinet alone. What further distinguishes the limited multiparty type from the two adjacent types, contingent multiparty and extended multiparty, is that there is less ideological polarisation. Limited multipartism, like Sartori's (1976, p. 179) moderate pluralism, is "conducive to moderate politics" as "all the parties are governing oriented, that is, available for cabinet coalitions." Parties signal this availability through a degree of policy reconciliation with their most ideologically-proximal competitors and, in so doing, tend to cluster in blocs, which exhibit broadly bipolar competition. What this would look like in the Australian context, for instance, would be a concerted effort toward greater policy alignment between Labor and the Greens as an alternative governing coalition to the Liberal and National parties.

It is at this point where the proposed typology ceases being derived from the Australian experience and instead moves to logical inference from the types already outlined. The 'extended multiparty' type introduced in Table 12.6 is a transitional type similar to that of contingent multiparty systems. Extended multiparty systems retain the three to five parties in the contest for government that characterises limited multiparty systems, but exhibit a further fracturing of the electoral and legislative contests. As with the other transitional party system type, contingent multiparty, this discrepancy in the distribution of power between a more consolidated system core and a more dispersed electoral and legislative contest captures instances of 'insider' and 'outsider' parties. Prime examples of outsider parties, in recent decades, have been the radical right parties of Western Europe. Indeed, an existing example of the proposed extended multiparty system type might be Germany, whereby the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party has disrupted the pattern of party interaction but has thus far been excluded from executives. With this fragmentation in the electoral and legislative arenas, though, greater ideological polarisation is expected between parliamentary parties, and instances of minority coalitions in government are likely to occur. Indeed, minority coalition

government is one of two main distinguishing traits, alongside severe ideological polarisation, of the final party system type: atomised multiparty. Atomised multiparty systems, like Sartori's (1976) polarised pluralism, represent the most fragmented systems, with wide ideological parameters to party competition and considerable distance between party positions.

The new typology in Table 12.6 is a more accurate means to classify, and track change over time in, the Australian party system. It does, however, maintain several limitations. The first is that this typology may have limited capacity to travel outside the Australian context, given its development from a single case study. Nevertheless, the typology is strongly grounded in theories of party competition, builds upon existing typologies, and is worth testing more widely as a means to contextualise recent developments in western party systems (e.g. Wolinetz & Zaslove 2018a). Second, there are other components upon which party systems differ that might fruitfully be incorporated into a new typology; for example, the dimensions of issue competition, or the social cleavages structuring electoral competition. Each of these, however, are difficult to operationalise and include in a sufficiently parsimonious taxonomy. Third, the typology advanced here omits the direct impact of horizontal divides in party systems. In the Australian context, this might examine the influence of federalism and state-based arenas of party interaction (Sharman 1990). Lastly, there is little room within typologies generally to account for the fact that parties are not unitary actors, but rather collections of individuals, groups and, in the Australian context, state-based organisations (Daalder 1983; Kitschelt 1989). Nonetheless, the proposed typology successfully integrates the multidimensionality of party systems, incorporates multiple sites of party interaction, and recognises the importance of the structures of competition and cooperation both in government formation and amongst the opposition.

Applying the Typology to the Australian Case

Table 12.7 displays the new typology applied to the Australian case from 1975 to 2016. The key finding is that the Australian party system has fluctuated between a two-party and contingent multiparty system, with the four most recent elections appearing to entrench this

multiparty type. Indeed, if not for the Coalition holding majorities in both houses of parliament from 2005 to 2007, the Australian party system would be a contingent multiparty system from 1998 onwards. There are periods of classification, marked in the table with an asterisk, in which some election years witnessed more or less ideological polarisation than expected for the assigned type. For example, while the elections of 1975, 1977 and 1980 demonstrate most of the characteristics of a conventional, two-party system, these election years also record higher than expected levels of ideological polarisation.

Table 12.7 – A new typological classification of the Australian party system

	Number of Parties			Polarisation	Government	System Type
	<i>Government</i>	<i>Electoral</i>	<i>Legislative</i>			
1975	2	2.5	1	138	SP Majority	
1977	2	3	1	130	SP Majority	
1980	2	2.7	3.2	148	SP Majority	Two-party*
1983	2	2.7	3	87	SP Majority	
1984	2	2.9	3	86	SP Majority	
1987	2	2.8	3	127	SP Majority	
1990	2	3.1	3	150	SP Majority	Cont. multiparty
1993	2	2.8	3.5	57	SP Majority	
1996	2	3.1	2.7	80	SP Majority	Two-party
1998	2	3.4	3.4	100	SP Majority	Contingent
2001	2	3.4	3.9	130	SP Majority	multiparty*
2004	2	3	1	142	SP Majority	Two-party*
2007	2	3	3.1	131	SP Majority	
2010	2	3.3	3	221	SP Minority	Contingent
2013	2	3.7	4.2	164	SP Majority	multiparty
2016	2	3.9	4	-	SP Majority	

Likewise, the contingent multiparty classification for 1998 and 2001 must come with the qualification of only moderate, rather than greater, polarisation. Forms of government, though, are as expected for each type; the only deviation from single-party majority government, following the 2010 election, aligns with the predicted dynamics of contingent

multipartism.⁷¹ Lastly, the flux in system types between 1990 and 2004, especially, is not inherently a problem for classification, but it demonstrates how classification can be subject to electoral volatility. One means to ‘smooth’ this is to require a new pattern of party interaction exist across two to three elections before reclassifying the party system. Nonetheless, change has clearly occurred in the Australian case.

Conclusion: The Greens as a Party of Minor Impact in a Contingent Multiparty System

This chapter advances two new typologies, one for the classification of parties, the other for the sorting of party systems. Both typologies are founded upon party competition and party relevance – the roles of parties and how they interact. These typologies derive from a single case study; further research is required to test their capacity to distinguish between parties and party systems accurately and sufficiently outside of the Australian setting. The proposals in this chapter serve as strong hypotheses for later study; in particular, the concept of transitional party system types may be valuable in evaluating the shifting party dynamics in other western democracies. Further, these typologies effectively resolve many of the problems the Australian case has perennially posed for classification schema found in the international literature, and is thus a worthwhile endeavour in itself. Typologies, as Collier et al. (2012, p. 217) explain, “make crucial contributions to diverse analytic tasks: forming and refining concepts, drawing out underlying dimensions, creating categories for classification and measurement, and sorting cases.” Further, Ganghof (2014, p. 656) adds that typologies “help to organise our thinking and formulate testable hypotheses”. Lastly, and particularly helpful in the case of party systems, typologies provide us with language with which to easily describe and compare party systems; typologies can “create a common medium of discourse” and “permit economical discussion” (Wesley 2007, p. 31). The party system types introduced in this chapter are a means by which we might finally gain some consistency or consensus on how to talk about the Australian party system.

⁷¹ As per Sartori (1976, pp. 187-188), the Liberal and National parties are considered “symbiotic” and a “coalescence” in the contest for government. Thus, the Coalition here is considered to be a single entity.

This thesis furthers our understanding not only of the Australian party system, but of party competition, minor parties and, especially, the role and development of the Australian Greens. It examines the Greens using an approach never before applied to the minor party, addressing questions of the Greens' development inadequately attended to in the extant literature. What is more, this thesis employs novel techniques rarely, or seldom, used in the Australian setting. It has generated new data, calculating the effective and relevant number of parties, measuring ideological polarisation, gauging electoral volatility, and evaluating the structures of competition and cooperation in government and opposition. Further, this thesis develops our comprehension of the ideological space in the Australian party system, and how parties position themselves in this space through policy appeals. This thesis investigated the party-systemic and individual-level drivers of the Green vote, providing an assessment of the party's electoral support that differs from existing accounts. Through face-to-face interviews with Greens parliamentarians, this thesis traced the processes behind the formation, operation, and termination of the Labor-Greens agreement of 2010, highlighting the unique challenges faced by parties choosing to support minority governments from outside cabinet. Lastly, this thesis makes a strong contribution to party system theory and analysis, arguing for the explicit integration of legislative competition in the classification of party systems and evaluation of change. My original contributions to knowledge culminate, in this conclusion, with new typologies of party systems and party types.

This thesis also contains the foundation for fruitful further research. Notably, taking aspects of this research from a single case out to comparative studies would be especially rewarding. Further, there are limitations in the preceding chapters, especially regarding data availability but also in the assumptions and choices made in research design. For instance, this thesis often assumes parties to be unitary actors. This is a reasonable and even necessary assumption in party system analysis. A fascinating avenue for future research, however, would be to explore the extent to which intra-party politics shape inter-party dynamics and, in turn, the Australian party system. Chapters nine and ten do consider this aspect in regard to the Labor-Greens support agreement, but there is potential for further study (see Maor 1997). There are also, unavoidably, omissions in this thesis. Future research should attend to questions of the Greens' influence on agenda-setting, issue appeals, and the dimensions of party competition.

The interaction of state-based politics and party systems with the federal party system is also worthy of scrutiny and rethinking in line with recent developments in Australian politics and the party systems literature (see Sharman & Moon 2003). Nonetheless, the findings of this thesis reveal that the Greens are a party of meaningful but limited impact, more constrained and shaped by their competitive environment than they are capable of bringing about its transformation.

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Bandt, A., Greens member for Melbourne in the House of Representatives, interviewed on the 30th of June 2017.

Brown, B., former Senator for Tasmania and parliamentary leader of the Australian Greens, interviewed on the 20th of May 2017.

Di Natale, R., Greens Senator for Victoria and parliamentary leader of the Australian Greens, interviewed on the 10th of July 2017.

Hanson-Young, S., Greens Senator for South Australia, interviewed on the 5th of July 2017.

Milne, C., former Senator for Tasmania and parliamentary leader of the Australian Greens, interviewed on the 29th July 2017.

Rhiannon, L., former Greens Senator for New South Wales, interviewed on the 9th of June 2017.

Waters, L., Greens Senator for Queensland, interviewed on the 26th June 2017.

Wright, P., former Greens Senator for South Australia, interviewed on the 29th of May 2017.

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