Towards greater social and ethical response-ability?

Practising contemplative higher education in times of uncertainty and change

by

Loretta Geuenich

Thesis
Submitted to Flinders University
for the degree of

Doctor of Education (Research)

College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences

May 2019

CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

SUMMARY

Higher education is in flux and for many, crisis. How then are we to prepare learners for this increasingly tumultuous 21st century? Within the global north (predominantly the USA & Canada) Contemplative Higher Education (CHE) is being offered as a potential vehicle for personal enrichment and ethical social change. However, little is known about educators' personal training, or how they understand the nature of their work as a social practice. This study focusses on key scholar-practitioners of CHE and explores what motivates, constrains, and enables their practice. To explore the persistent problematic of agency-structure I employ UK Philosopher Roy Bhaskar's meta-philosophy of critical realism (CR) and its operationalisation through Sociologist Margaret Archer's morphogenetic theory. Ensuing from this is an ontologically and ethically bold realist approach to answering the question: *In times of great uncertainty and change in Higher Education, what potential exists for CHE to be a practice of ethical and social capacity building – for students and educators?*

The project's methodology is framed by commitments to ontological realism and epistemological relativism. Where the former understands the nature of reality to be stratified, emergent and constellated, the latter takes human knowledge of that reality to be fallible and partial. This ontological realism and epistemological relativism coheres with the Buddhist philosophy underpinning most CHE practice. Data was collected over a 9-month period employing multiple in-depth interviews with North American CHE practitioners. The research design drew upon Archer's three-stage morphogenetic sequence with additional resources for data and standpoint offered by Pamphilon's (1991) 'Zoom Method'. As a result, this project offers insight into how educators make sense of their own contemplative practice, their active agency and dispositional stances in the face of complex social structures.

This research finds that as a pedagogical movement rooted in deep meditative practice CHE cultivates capacities for social response-ability and contributes to self-enrichment. CHE relies on ontology of higher education grounded in inherent human capacity and sufficiency, rather than lack and deficit. This ontology allows for the possibility for active human agency and ethical dispositions

of care. A key finding of this project is that the deep meditative training of educators supports non-instrumentalist learning environments where genuine learning occurs across all domains of being human – the cognitive, affective, embodied, dispositional, and inter-subjective. Contemplative practices grounded in the sitting practice of meditation, rather than producing calm acquiescence, disrupt both identarian thinking and dispositional habitus. While further research is needed findings, indicate the potential of CHE learning environments to support meta-reflexive thinking, underpinned by an ethic of care – towards self, and other.

DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Loretta Geuenich

28 May 2019

ACRONYMS USED

ACC	Atlantic Contemplative Centre
ACHME	Association of Contemplative Mind in Higher Education
BCR	Basic Critical Realism
CACE	Centre for the Advancement of Contemplative Education
CE	Contemplative Education
CHE	Contemplative Higher Education
CMind	The Centre for Contemplative Mind in Society
CR	Critical Realism
DREI (C)	Description, Retroduction, Exploration, Identification, and Correction
EO	Equal Opportunity
HE	Higher Education
HEI	Higher Education Institution
HOD	Head of Department
IC	Inner Conversation
MGA	Morphogenetic Approach
PEP	Personal Emergent Property
S-A	Structure – Agency
SEP	Structural Emergent Property
TMSA	Transformational Model of Social Activity

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to so many people for their support, encouragement and generosity. Not least, the seven key participants of this research project for their immense generosity, openness and candour. It was an honour to sit at your feet. The learnings from this precious opportunity will continue to ripple throughout my life, practice and work for (*inshallah*) many years to come.

A deep bow of appreciation goes to my two supervisors, Dr. Grant Banfield and Associate Professor Ben Wadham. Your fine minds, provocative scholarship, and good hearts have pushed me to 'not be satisfied with easy answers' in order to be of benefit – to colleagues, the academy and our broader community. Grant, your generosity and patience was unsurpassable and inspires me, as an educator, to now pay this forward.

I have also been indebted to the Flinders University School of Education. So many of you modelled to me a commitment to deepen human knowledge and insight, nurture collegiality and community, and always work for more inclusive and creative human societies. Special thanks to Associate Professor Susan Krieg, Dr.Yarrow Andrew, Professor John Halsey, Dr. Sam Schultz, Dr. Bev Rogers, and Professor Jan Orrell. Dr. Leigh Burrows provided invaluable encouragement and support in the early stages of this project and thereon through the Mindfulness Special Interest Group.

If it takes a village to raise a child, it requires a community to produce a doctorate. I am fortunate to have had the love, care and enduring patience of good community. In particular, my parents, Carlien Bannister, John and Loretta-Kay Geuenich, and John O'Keefe; the Adelaide Shambhala Meditation community; my Brownhill Creek extended family; and friends Abbie Patterson, Jo Baulderstone, Cathy Cornell, and Margaret Hughes. This village has included my fellow travellers on the doctoral journey: Celina Valente, Mei Wang, Hadeel Alatallah, Rebecca Napier, Divvya Dawadi, Vanessa Alexander, Nicci Parkin, Shani Sneidze-Gregory, Selim Reza, Cece Djulete, Aby Diplock, Pang Lo and Koulika Bo – you have all been an invaluable source of sanity, study-tips and encouragement. Your friendship and humour has been one of the great delights of this journey.

Profound thanks to Dr Priyambudi Sulistiyanto for unsurpassable support in so many ways; to Dale Asrael for so generously and wisely guiding my meditation practice for the past 17 years; and to Sakyong Mipham for the example of his unflinching bravery, kindness and social action, as well as for providing a path upon which to travel.

Additional support for this thesis was generously provided through an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship, Flinders University Faculty of Education, Humanities and Law Research Higher Degree Project Funding, and a Flinders University Overseas Field Trip Grant.

THESIS PROLOGUE

As an adult-educator with over 25 years of community and tertiary-based work, I am particularly interested in the transformative potential – individual and societal – of education. As a student of Buddhist[1] meditation for the past 16 years, I am curious about those scholars who, unlike me, have found ways of offering the practices of wisdom traditions within mainstream secular institutions.

In the Northern Summer of 2011, I attended a retreat in the mountains of Colorado, and afterwards spent a few days in the small city of Boulder. While there, I had the opportunity to sit in on a third-year BA social-psychology class as students were being oriented to, and undertaking, their final exam (oral). While I had elected for an oral exam assessment mode in the final year of my own undergraduate studies[2], the approach was a little different for these students. They were at Naropa University, established 45 years ago upon principles and approaches to higher education that have come to be known as Contemplative Education. As I witnessed the orientation to their contemplative-based oral exam, I found myself moved and astounded by the sanity of the 'life-wisdom' being offered. I conjectured to myself that if in the future, when faced with inevitable life challenges, these students could remember the sage content being offered by their professor, they might then be spared a significant degree of future human suffering and anxiety. Having invested a significant amount of personal time and money pursuing such sane human wisdom via other means, it seemed incredible that this might be offered as part of a university education alongside rigorous theoretical inquiry. I began perturbations about the possibilities for academic study that not only prepares one for a life of deep critical-intellectual engagement, but one that does not shun the philosophies, suffering and relational realities of everyday life; an education that acknowledges and further cultivates our many human capacities, and agency.

Some years later, I found myself sharing a journey with the same lecturer who had taught that class. By then I had become interested in rising interest in 'mindfulness in education', particularly at

[1] In the Indo-Tibetan tradition.

[2] This was is 1995 and offered for a topic called History of 20th Century Thought, taught by Assoc. Prof. Jack Cross. My studies were a Bachelor of Visual Arts (Printmaking major), South Australian School of Art, UniSA.

Flinders University, and the founding work there by Dr. Leigh Burrows. As a regular meditator, and part-time student, I had begun reading in this emerging field. At our re-encounter, I remarked to the lecturer that while publications about contemplative (higher) education were beginning to appear, they mostly addressed the range of practices and techniques being used in the classroom. Conspicuous in its absence was discussion of the paths of deep meditative training of scholar-practitioners – sometimes enduring many decades[3]. Naropa lecturer's response was: '*Well you know why you don't you?*' to which I replied with a baffled '*No*'. They resumed: '*Well, because we would never have been allowed to do the things we have done*.' On return to Australia, curiosity ablaze, I applied for a research-based Doctor of Education programme.

The research project that follows is my personal and intellectual journey into if, where and how contemplative higher education (CHE) might have something to offer 21st century higher education. If, as I witnessed on that day in 2011, CHE does appear to have some sort of contemporary relevance, what potential is there for its expression? This question seemed vital given the degenerate fog of neoliberal instrumentalism hovering low and wide across the terrain of higher education. What enables and what constrains CHE's manifestation? What possibilities are there for its personal and social potency to extend unencumbered?

[3] I had stumbled upon this information through a feature article in the Teachers College Record (USA) by James Rhem in 2012 where he 'outed' key scholars in the field as "long-term meditators".

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

> The meaning of being human is to care for one another and to have the ability to pass on knowledge. (Keelan DeVogt, Waterville High, Maine)[4]
>
> My implicit prejudice or assumption is that human beings are not inherently wicked. Human beings in the right circumstances – and they are not in the right circumstances – are capable of behaving cooperatively and on the basis of trust if they are allowed to. … If you believe in some idea of human defectiveness, then you are going to be led towards some form of authoritarianism as a way of rectifying that defectiveness. (Critchley 2012, p 66)
>
> Ultimately human beings are fine, they are absolutely fine, there is nothing wrong with them, they are beautiful. (Bhaskar, 2002, p. 304)

This research project is about the emerging field of contemplative higher education (CHE) and its (im)possibility as a 21st century pedagogical movement. Can it cultivate human capacities for ethical response-ability to these complex times? Critical to the project and its realist methodological framing is the notion of ontology – specifically, what it means to be human. This chapter introduces the reader to this critical realist study of the emerging field of CHE. It provides a brief background to the topic, referring to the current need to specify what a 21st century education should offer and the emergence of CHE in response. Context and justification for the project is offered through highlighting current gaps and tension within CHE scholarship. These led to the primary research question: *'What potential exists for CHE to develop the agential capacities of social and ethical response-ability of educators and, by implication, students?'* The reader is introduced to the realist methodological framing of the project and its relevance to the field of higher education. The chapter ends with an orientation to the remainder of the thesis.

This study is primarily located within the discipline of the sociology of education. It relies on a stratified and emergent ontology common to both the 'deep realist' tradition (Blaikie 2007, 2010) within the social sciences, and to Indo-Tibetan Buddhism (Karr, 2007). The latter has significance

[4] Online comment included as part of the Smithsonian Museum's "What does it mean to be Human?" project. See Smithsonian project http://humanorigins.si.edu/about/become-involved/submit-your-response-what-does-it-mean-be-human

given that much CHE is rooted in and draws from this tradition. The study pulls in literature from the fields and disciplines of sociology (Adorno, 1973, 2010; Archer, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2007; Rose, 1999a, 1999b; Smith, 2011); sociology of education (Ball, 2015; Banfield, 2010, 2015a; Hattam, 2004a); higher education research (Barnett, 2009, 2012; Clegg, 2005, 2010, 2013; Shahjahan, 2012, 2014; Wagner & Shahjahan, 2015); Western Marxism (Banfield, 2010, 2015a; Ollman, 2003); and philosophical thought spanning 'East-West' (Bai, 2012; Bhaskar, 2002, 2016; Eppert, 2011; Loy, 2003; Loy, 2002, 2014).

This research project examines the inner conversations of established scholar-practitioners of CHE. It explores their motivations, meditative training, and pedagogical practice. It seeks to understand their differing reflexive styles and dispositions in the face of structural constraints and enablements. The project was supported by 11 weeks of Fieldwork in North America (Canada and the USA), which included a seven-week Visiting Scholar residency at the Centre of the Advancement of Contemplative Education, Naropa University, Colorado. While there is some overlap between the field of CHE and mindfulness in education, this thesis does not consider the broader Mindfulness (MF) movement in any depth. However, this predominantly North American movement is referred to in places within this thesis in order to provide broader contextualisation, and as a counterpoint to CHE.

Background to the Study

We are living in times of increasingly rapid change. Modernity's promise for certainty, order and mastery is betrayed by the apparent uncertainty, disorder, and uncontrollable nature of, what many call, these 'post-' or 'late' modern times (Bauman, 1999; Giddens, 1991; Paolini, Moran, & Elliott, 1999, p. 16). For some '=the 'liquid' nature of uncertainty avails new secular spaces (Ergas, 2015) and increased agential possibility (Giddens, 1989). For others, an emphasis on opportunity obfuscates pervasive inattention to the origins of problems (Bauman, 1999), and the conditions and supports needed for meaningful social action (Archer, 1995, 2000; Bhaskar, 1986). These bring significant risks alongside of promises of 'dramatic technological revolution' (Bauman, 2007;

Kellner, 2003, p. 53) and blurring of traditional binaries[5]. Within the field of higher education the new 'drivers of change' such as globalism, mass (online) education, and neo-liberal 'common sense' ideologies – bring increasing complexities, and render social problems irrelevant or invisible (Gidley, 2012, p. 1019; Giroux, 2010, p. 155). There is a sense of deep unsettlement by both academics and students. Many identify that higher education is in a crisis, characterised by an increasing 'precariat' oriented to the market and shaped by 'liberalised' regulatory practices at all institutional levels (Standing, 2011). The pursuit of ever-increasing fiscal efficiency privileges instrumental approaches emphasising competencies and outputs. This threatens the traditional broad-based 'liberal' (i.e. pluralistic) education that cultivates human capacities for deep inquiry and critically reflexive thinking in service of the public good.

Within these turbulent times are calls for a renewal of higher education (Fitzgerald, 2014; Giroux, 2010, 2014). What is needed are not only new ways of knowing (epistemologies), but also new ways of being in the world; a call for 'an ontological turn' (Dall'Alba & Barnacle, 2007; Eppert, Vokey, Nguyen, & Bai, 2015). It is the concern of the researcher that higher education is not cultivating the ability to be responsive in academics or students – either to their own needs, or to pressing social and global issues – in any sustainable way. Lobel aptly summarises that 'It seems as if conditions of modern life demand modes of inner training that have not been a part of how we educate people in the contemporary world' (2014, p. 4). Amplifying Lobel's point, Holba (2014) demands an education for being human:

> We are charged with teaching our students disciplinary concepts, structures, and applications. We focus on teaching our students how to think critically and we help them cultivate skills that they can use in the marketplace. However, this is only part of the picture; shouldn't we be teaching our students more about life—about the other side of being a working agent—about what it means to be human? If so, how do we teach students to experience their own humanity, and in doing so, how do we help them learn how to make decisions when confronted by moments of human exigence. (2014, p. 9)

Like Holba (2014), Lobel (2014) and Kahane (2009) among others, this thesis takes the view that

[5] Particularly pertinent to CHE is that of the secular-religious (Ergas 2013, 2015) and self-other (Hattam and Baker 2015). Please see Chapters 5 and 6 for further discussion. For many these bring an experience of increased risk, and uncertainty, and fear (Critchley 2012).

21st century education must provide students with the skills to meet the demands of a world in flux. Underlying the intent of this thesis is revealing that the solutions needed are near at hand. To this end, Chapters 2, 5 and 6 explore Archer's proposition that we develop distinct and important 'knowledges' (Archer, 2000, 2003) through necessary engagement with the different realms of existence (embodied, practical, and discursive). These become essential to developing skilful and compassionate responses to the plethora of current challenges. This thesis argues that higher education rarely cultivates the embodied, relational and inter-subjective aspects of being human – i.e. capacities beyond the rational intellect alone (see Chapter 5). Increasingly higher education appears impotent in the face of collective anxiety, depression and a three-fold alienation from self, others and this living world (Bai, Cohen, & Scott, 2013).

Emerging from within this scene[6] is the field of Contemplative Higher Education (CHE). It presents as a potential vehicle for the renewal of higher education through personal enrichment, academic enhancement, and social transformation. Central to CHE is the development of deep inquiry, compassion, and pro-social[7] attitudes. It does this in the service of disrupting binaries of self-other and individual-social (Hattam & Baker, 2015; Lobel, 2014), and invites an ethical intersubjectivity[8] (Bai, Scott, & Donald, 2009). As such, CHE appears to hold potential as a challenge or provocation for prevailing individualism. However, as I indicate below, our understanding of this is hampered by significant gaps in the literature. Most saliently there is a lack of attention to the following:

- broader forces enabling and or constraining CHE (Baugher, 2014; Purser & Milillo, 2015);
- intention, ethical integrity and training of the contemplative educator (Brown, 2011; Simmer-

[6] Predominantly in the global North (USA and Canada) and over the past 40 years.

[7] 'These include the emotional, social, moral, and civic capacities that express character and develop increasing autonomy, responsibility, sense of connectedness, sense of self, and sense of purpose.' (Brown et al 2012 p.4)

[8] Paolini et al, (1999) define intersubjectivity as 'the capacity of individuals and societies to live with, work through, and manage the anxieties, uncertainties and contingencies of modern living, without some overarching universal code'. This definition is helpful as it provides specific reference to social context. It also indicates the embodied nature of inter-subjectivity – given that it is the human body, in which the 'felt-sense' of anxiety and uncertainty are held. Please see Chapter 5 for further discussion of the embodied and relational nature of being human.

Brown, 2009);

- sociological analyses (Baugher, 2014; Lee, 2015; Loy, 2003); and
- qualitative ethnographic research (Walsh, 2016).[9]

Two key aspects are critical in considering CHE as beneficial to a 21st century education. First, context matters. There is a broad general consensus that the now 'neoliberal university' is significantly limited in its ability to function for the public good and realise its 'critical and emancipatory potential' (Saunders, 2010, p. 66). Second is the necessity to 'locate subjectivity as central to socio-political power' (Lobel, 2014, p. 2)[10]. Implicit in the latter is an examination of human agency. For CHE to be a socially transformative and globally relevant pedagogy, it is important that we understand how scholar-practitioners negotiate agential power in the face of significant structural (im)possibility and what supports them to do this.

Current literature provides little insight into how (1) scholar-practitioners of CHE understand the nature and social context of their practice, and (2) how significant structural mechanisms are enabling or constraining the enactment of CHE as a practice of ethical and social capacity building. This is partly because CHE is a 'relatively new educational focus in the Western world' (Mackler, Aguilar, & Serena, 2008, p. 263)[11]. It can also be attributed to what Banfield (2004, 2010, 2015a) describes as the 'ontological shyness' pervading the social sciences. Thus, this thesis takes as its primary research question: *'What potential exists for CHE to develop the agential capacities of social and ethical, response-ability of educators and, by implication, students?'*

The next section provides further context to the emerging field of CHE. It identifies and expands

[9] A further omission identified in the literature refers to the lack of critical engagement with the domination of the USA in the field (Bazzano, 2014; Roth, 2006). While not the object of this research, it is addressed via critical engagement with current literature, as well as the examination of current structural conditions and ensuing powers of enablement and constraint. Agential reflexivity and intervention vis-à-vis such powers and the ensuing re-shaping of society are revealed.

[10] This has been the project of critical theory since Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School (late 1930s). However, critique, as a method for inquiry into the enslavement of the human being in relation to broader social forces and conditions is a lineage whose founding is generally attributed to Marx.

[11] Most relevant scholarship regarding CHE has occurred during the past six years (2011-2017).

upon the gaps in the literature mentioned above, and highlights key critical questions, which supported the justification for this study.

Context and justification for the study

Contemplative Education (CE) has attracted increasing attention in recent years (Beer, 2010; Kahane, 2009). Within North America more than 80 institutions of higher education (Grace, 2011; Website, 2015) currently offer contemplative study options across various faculties and departments[12] (Grace, 2009; Kahane, 2009; Rhem, 2012; Website, 2015; Zajonc, 2013). While contemplative pedagogies intersect with existing 'reflective', 'critical', and 'conscientizing' approaches popularised within the humanistic education tradition favoured by Dirkx, Mezirow, and Cranton (2006), Kolb (1984), Schon (1983), Brookfield (1996), and Cranton (2006), they differ in that the 'orienting practice and experience is that of meditation' (Kahane, 2009, p. 41). In this thesis, the term 'meditation' refers to a 'sitting practice' that cultivates mindfulness-awareness[13]. Meditation trains the mind to place attention on everyday human experience – including the experience of being human – in a steady, unbiased[14] way and with an attitude of kindly curiosity. The practitioner simultaneously cultivates and maintains awareness of the broader context and moment within which their reality occurs.[15]

While there is no single theory or praxis of contemplative pedagogy (Coburn et al., 2011; Glanville, Iwashima, & Becker, 2014; Johnson, 2016), there is a common focus on 'first-person methodologies' using subjectivities as part of the critical learning process (Ergas, 2013b; Hart, 2004; Simmer-Brown, 2016; Varela & Shear, 1999). Learners are invited to develop the ability to:

---

[12] Including Engineering, Literature, Fine Arts, Religious Studies, Medicine, Architecture, Music, Maths, Environmental Studies, Psychology, Social Work, Philosophy, IT, History and others (Website, 2015)

[13] Mindfulness-awareness meditation is commonly known by Sanskrit term *shamatha-vipashyana* in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist lineages (Karr, 2007; Trungpa, 2005b, 2010). The inclusion of awareness or *vipashyana* in the definition is critical; Meditation is not a project to cultivate personal concentration as an end in itself. Its rich, and ancient history reveals *shamatha-vipashyana* as social practice oriented towards understanding and then removing the causes and conditions of human suffering (Lobel, 2014; Trungpa, 2010).

[14] This term is used ubiquitously throughout Buddhist and secular mindfulness texts. It refers to a stance free of preconceptions.

[15] Personal definition used as those found in the research are overly instrumental or 'goal' oriented.

intimately observe phenomena[16] (Kaszniak, 2014); hold multiple perspectives simultaneously (Hart, 2004); reflectively and purposively interact with their environment (Langer, 1989, 2000; O'Reilly, 1998); and learn to see old things in new ways, combining reflective action with creativity and insight (Kyle, 2010). The suite of contemplative practices used in higher education includes mindfulness meditations and contemplations, as well as other first-person approaches[17]. The booming field of mindfulness is not the focus of this project. However, some awareness of the mindfulness trajectory is important to this study; it provides a reference-point and a caveat for the emerging field of CHE (Lipari, 2014; Vokey, 2014). Recent critique of mindfulness emphasises the 'stripped-back' nature of practices which are de-contextualised from their ethical, communal and cultural origins (Purser & Loy, 2013) – practices that are being 'repurposed' to suit the needs of the market (Purser & Milillo, 2015). This corporatised instrumentalist appropriation of traditional Buddhist (*shamatha*) practices is henceforth referred to as Mindfulness (MF).

CHE currently differentiates itself through an explicit commitment to relationality, intersubjectivity (Bai et al., 2013; Bai et al., 2009), and different ways of being with self, and others (Eppert et al., 2015; Hattam & Baker, 2015). Challenging historical disdain for contemplation as a 'merely detached stance' towards the other (Honneth, 2008)[18], meditation is presented as 'a social practice' aimed at personal and social transformation (Lobel, 2014, p. 2). Long-term practitioners (Coburn et al., 2011; Eaton, Davies, Williams, & MacGregor, 2011; Simmer-Brown, 1999, 2011)[19] point to its value and controversy and raise key critical questions. These include:

1. What motivates key scholar-practitioners of CHE? (Coburn et al., 2011; Komjathy, 2011)
2. Are educators 'deeply steeped' in the practices they teach? What bearing does meditative training have on CHE in practice? (Bache, 2011; Simmer-Brown, 2011, p. 108)

[16] This is to develop knowledge and understanding of, for example, natural processes, cultural productions, and habitual judgements, as well as mental and emotional states.

[17] See Appendix B for a 'tree' of the full range of contemplative practices used in higher education contexts.

[18] This was historically contrasted – by Marxist philosopher Lúkacs – with the more relationally engaged notion of 'genuine human praxis' (see Honneth, 2008, pp. 98-129).

[19] These authors introduced contemplative practices into their pedagogical practice after having experienced its transformative power, over many years, in their personal lives.

3. What connection is there between scholar-practitioner's own contemplative practice and the 'transformative power' of CHE? (Beer et al., 2015, p. 162)
4. How are the neoliberal practices of increased regulation and economic rationality impacting CHE? (Eaton et al., 2011, pp. 29-30; Gunnlaugson, Sarath, Scott, & Bai, 2014; Lipari, 2014)
5. How does CHE consider and challenge student acculturation (or habitus)?[20] ((Berila, 2014a; Eaton et al., 2011; Ergas, 2014, 2015; Magee, 2015)

CHE views itself as critical to the renewal of higher education and to ensuring human flourishing in general.[21] However, as these questions reveal, relatively little is known about CHE in practice. To gain insight in to the (im)possibility of its potential for HE renewal in specific contexts, we need to examine two things: what capacities for reflexivity and agency (Archer, 2003; Vandenberghe, 2005) CHE cultivates; and whether and how these capacities translate into increased capacity for social and ethical response-ability.

There is a scarcity of qualitative research (Baugher, 2014; Baugher & Bach, 2015) in the field. the research that does exist, only uses a narrow[22] lens of inquiry (Bazzano, 2014). This study responds to both of these gaps through its intensive research design aimed at examining and explaining the broad range of personal, social and structural powers and mechanisms at play in CHE. The following section discusses my encounter with basic critical realism (BCR), and the subsequent realist methodological framing of this thesis.

Encountering Critical Realism

My initial encounter with Critical Realism (CR) followed a period of perturbation about how to locate and reconcile idealist ontology alongside the realist ontological commitments implicit within

[20] This is particularly the case in relation to dominant mainstream culture and in the face of increasingly diverse communities and societies.

[21] Some advocate that CHE must challenge prevailing views by encouraging people to become 'activists against materialism' (Simmer-Brown 2002), to work for 'ecological sustainability (Eaton et al 2011), and develop a practices of (global) 'obligation, compassion and justice' (Kahane 2009, p.49).

[22] i.e. examining practice that is non-sociological and primarily instruction-focussed.

Buddhist philosophy and practice. Sixteen years of training within a societal-change-oriented lineage of Buddhism[23] provided significant experiential learning of an ontology of human capacity and sufficiency – a radically different ontology to the one that pervades late-capitalist society. Additionally, having previously researched women's agency[24], aspects of the poststructuralist and feminist thought I was familiar with were becoming unwieldy in the face of life experiences[25]. I had questions about how to allow for examination and explanation of the 'real' conditions and causes – both apparent and underlying – in people's lives (Connell, 1995, pp. 24-45). Much theoretical work appeared distant from real-world experiences of both suffering[26] and social transformation and did not allow for a transformative human agency. Well into my first year of research, critical realism was suggested. While infinitely complex, it appeared to address the above concerns and cohered well with the object of research (CHE), and personal ontological commitments.

In this project, basic critical realism (BCR) is deployed in two ways: as methodological framing, and as underlabourer to existing social science theory. As such it becomes a tool for undertaking social science research that 'we can act on' (Bhaskar, 2016, p. 2). This is achieved through a series of commitments, which constellate around the key leitmotifs of ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgemental rationality. In this thesis, CR provides a set of principles and processes (outlined in Chapters Two and Four) to bring to each aspect of the research process. These ensure continual engagement with different moves of abstraction – depth, breadth and perspective – throughout the research process, which is iterative and generative in nature. As an exploratory approach, it allows for examination of both parts and wholes and their dialectical relations. Archer's morphogenetic theory supports this telling of 'two stories' (Archer, 2000): that of society: the socio-

[23] Within the Indo-Tibetan tradition of Dzögchen/Shambhala Buddhism.

[24] My MA research project had investigated local women's agency vis-à-vis political quotas at the micro-level in rural El Salvador and its impact on the use of small arms and light weapons.

[25] The range of tensions that presented included: the all-but 'disappearance' of the subject (Butler, 2005; Sawicki, 1991); moves towards a non-agentic 'post-humanism' (Ferrando, 2013); a pervasive privileging of the discursive over the material[25] (Putnam, 2015) – which frequently explained the body and nature 'not as real entities but as products or effects of discourse' (Gillman, 2016, p. 458); and difficulty defining active agency vis-à-vis post-structuralist emphases on the 'the contingent, fractured, and fluid nature of identities' (Connell, 2004, p. 24).

[26] That is the result of privation, alienation and a vast array of structural injustices.

cultural and institutional context; and that of the human agents: the scholar-practitioners. Lamentably, it is the latter that is left out of much sociological research (Smith, 2011, p. 309; 2015a), precluding understanding of what it means to be human and how we shape our environments.

Bourdieu (1990) teaches us that 'environment' – our culture – can also be understood as 'fields' . Not only are we born into socio-cultural contexts not of our own making, we continue to be located, embedded within cultural 'fields'. While Bourdieu is light on discussion of agency within those 'fields', Archer's work on the inner conversation helps provide insight into different reflexive modes, and stances towards society with all of its limitation and opportunities. Critical realists have varying degrees of affinity and inhospitality towards Bourdieu, with Archer being at the extreme of the latter. I lean towards the positions of Elder-Vass (2010, 2012) and Porpora (Porpora, 2013; Porpora & Rutzou, 2015) which acknowledge the indisputable nature of human agency alongside the seductive pull of habitus with its 'feel for the game' which perpetuates habituated (identarian[27]) ways of being. Via the internal conversation, their apparent entwined and dialectical[28] nature is revealed.

In this thesis, I do not distinguish between structure and culture (S-C). While Archer used culture as a lens of analysis[29], she provided few tools for doing so beyond her 1995 differentiation of the

[27] This term is ascribed to Adorno, who used it in complement with 'identity thinking' (Adorno, 1973, p. 149). A variation on this spelling is 'identitarian' thinking. In this thesis I use the former used by Adorno in the above translation, and by O'Connor (2013), among others.

[28] Dialectical because it is the (increasingly) mundane and stifling nature of the self's cocooning behaviour that provides stark contrast to glimpses of being others, and the underlying yearning for freedom. I am aware that this view echoes or appropriates a Mahayana Buddhist approach to how the 'self' overcomes the confines of ego (i.e. one's cocoon). An in-depth exploration of this is beyond the scope of this project. However, in exploring the stories of both the scholar-practitioner and their social contexts it has been interesting to note their non-hostile stances towards constraints (outer and inner). Within sociology Maxwell and Aggleton (Maxwell and Aggleton (2014, p. 801) discuss the how tensions and disjuncture produced by the experience of the habitus, and their affective reception contribute to the provocation or 'generation' of agency within the habitus. They quote McNay (2000, p. 72), who argues that 'the logic of the field may reinforce or displace tendencies of the habitus . . . it is this tension that is generative of agency.'

[29] For example, in her 2012 publication: *The Reflexive Imperative in Late Modernity*, Cambridge University Press

two, summarised here by Case (2015)

> Structure has to do with material goods (unequally distributed across society) and is also the domain of social positions and roles. Culture is the world of ideas and beliefs, and includes both the worlds of propositional knowledge (in which two ideas can be put in a logical relation with each other), including science and engineering science, and the world of myths, opinions and beliefs.(2015, p. 843)

Archer subsequently (2005) points to the difficulty of separating S-C due to a lack of conceptualisations beyond the descriptive[30]. Henceforth the use of the term 'structure' (-S-) implies a dialectical inseparability with culture.

In this thesis, CR ensures a well-considered methodological framing of the research and brings clarification to existing social theory and persistent conundrums. It is also coherent with personal ontological commitments. In this way, it has been well positioned to explore and explain the structures, contexts and relations which enable and constrain the practices and agency of contemplative educators.

Critical realism and personal commitments

This following section offers a short discussion of how CR intersects and coheres with two important personal commitments: the feminist political project, and the Buddhist ontology of being human. I include this section in anticipation of readers not yet familiar with critical realism, and in response to valuable external critique offered during the research process.

Bhaskar's critical realism brings to this research project a meta-philosophical framing for critical social scientific inquiry. Others have expounded upon this in various ways that are relevant to this project, specifically: Archer's (1995, 2000, 2003) operationalisation of Bhaskar's thought through her morphogenetic approach and sociological theories of human agency and reflexivity; Norrie's reading of Adorno (2004); Sayer (1992, 2000) and Danermark et al's (2002) contribution to CR 'method in social science'; the earlier feminist work of Clegg (Clegg, 2005, 2006, 2016; 2005) and

[30] For further reading, see Zeuner (1999) who, in her review essay, presents Archer's historical trajectory articulating the relationship between structure and culture, and her own discontents regarding Archer's approach.

New (in New & Carter, 2005)[31]; and Smith's (2011, 2015a) sociological studies exploring what it means to be human. CR is sometimes viewed as another research paradigm or epistemology (Barnett, 2017). This erroneous view only serves to mislead the researcher. Critical realism is a meta-philosophy of science. It is neither a research methodology, nor a concrete political theory[32]. That it competes with other theories is a misconception.

As will be discussed in Chapter 2, Bhaskar's hope was to bring ontology back into science. Historically, this challenge has been taken on by a variety of different fields, including Marxism, feminism, new materialisms, and more recently indigenous 'cosmovision'[33]. While engagement with all of these is beyond the scope of this research project, it is important to briefly mention feminism given its huge influence on advancing critical social science research. Feminism has experienced a recent dynamic and fruitful engagement with critical realism and researchers are finding CR beneficial to the 'critical-emancipatory' nature of their projects.

> The principle argument being that in gaining knowledge of [CR's stratified ontology], it becomes possible to change the social structure in a manner conducive to women's empowerment. (Gillman 2016, p.464)

At key points in this thesis, I refer to junctures between feminism and CR given that both theorise concepts of structure, agency and liberating practice. While there was a dearth of engagement with feminism by earlier proponents of critical realism,[34] the past decade has seen the emergence of a number of CR feminists whose scholarship is included in this thesis[35]. Because CR is not a concrete political theory in itself, it needs other concrete theories such as in feminism to do its

[31] Further below I refer to a very recent wave of dialectical engagement between CR and feminist methodologies.

[32] Here I acknowledge that because CR is concerned with the realisation of innate human capacities for human flourishing in the service of a good society, there is an aspect of it which can be considered a political project.

[33] Obviously, there is overlap among and between these. For further reading on new materialism, see the work of Karen Barad (2003, 2007) and Rosi Braidotti (2006). Indigenous cosmovision has emerged from meso-American indigenous tradition and is new in terms of mainstream scholarly articulation. See Astor-Aguilera (2016).

[34] This includes Roy Bhaskar, Margaret Archer, Mervyn Hartwig and Andrew Collier.

[35] This includes Caroline New, Sue Clegg and Lena Gunnarsson.

work. In particular, it has brought precision and clarity to feminist standpoint epistemology., (Sprague, 2016)[36]

Neither feminism nor BCR appears to have the resources for cultivating human capacities of recognition, care and compassion. Here, Buddhism may have something to offer. Similar to CR, Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy makes explicit stratified realities or 'realms'[37] and views human beings as possessing inherent capacities that are good in themselves[38]. This latter view accords with what Bhaskar calls the 'ground state' (2002, p. 311). Inherent human nature, the ground state easily becomes clouded by 'ignorance'. Such ignorance is not a lack of knowledge, wilful or otherwise, but an inability or unwillingness to experience everyday reality as it is. In the practice lineages of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism[39] knowledge of the nature of reality (ontology) and ways of knowing (epistemology) are grounded in direct experience. A graduated path of deepening meditative practices is accompanied by study of the human 'mind'[40]. Both, Indo-Tibetan Buddhist meditation practices and critical realist inquiry, provide opportunities for recognising what clouds

[36] While Archer mentions neither feminism nor researcher positionality (England, 1994; Harding, 1991; Rose, 1997; Sprague, 2016), it could be considered implicit in her work. The retroductive research strategy at the heart of critical realist research draws on the Hegelian-Marxist abstraction of 'immanent critique' which Hartsock (1983, p. 231) (1983, p.231) coined as 'standpoint'. Fundamental to the Marxian dialectics underpinning CR (Banfield, 2015a; Banfield, 2015b; Ollman, 2003) is the abstraction of 'perspective' – involving abductive reasoning. The researcher gains perspective through honing in and standing back, then repeating this from within different positions. While Archer barely mentions feminism, she may not elide a commitment to 'positionality' (Harding, 1991) or critical standpoint. Certainly aspects of the feminist project appear in Archer's method, and in those moments where she brings the lens of gender to her analyses (Archer, 2007).

[37] Called 'kaya's' (Karr, 2007).

[38] Buddhism refers to this as 'Buddha nature' or 'enlightened genes' (Karr, 2007; Trungpa, 2013). It is a fundamental 'basic goodness'; fundamental in the sense of existing prior to any thought, action, language or behaviour. It refers to an inherent human workability that is self-existing (Eppert et al., 2015; Trungpa, 2013). An example is that we do not need to continuously meddle and fiddle to keep our breathing, digestion, heartbeat, and synapses going, or to be able to use our senses. Their self-existing nature is fundamentally 'good'. Where one of these capacities is lacking or absent, others are strengthened. This 'fundamental goodness' – existing prior to 'good' or 'bad' – is expressed as capacity and adaptability.

[39] The two 'practice' linages of Tibetan Buddhism, Kagyu ("oral lineage") and Nyingma ("ancient lineage"), and dating back to the 9th and 8th Centuries respectively.

[40] In Sanskrit, the common term for 'mind' is synonymous with 'heart'.

our understanding of the nature of reality and inhibits the expression of inherent human capacities. Specifically:

- the illusion of an unchanging and permanent 'self'[41] (ego);
- the contingency of thoughts and dispositions relative to specific cultural and structural contexts;
- that products of the mind have causal powers (karma); and
- that most thinking and its ensuing actions fuels further suffering through reinforcing habitus, or 'cocoon' or 'ego' as different Buddhist traditions call it (Bourdieu, 1990; Karr, 2007; Lobel, 2014).

How the sitting practice of meditation is significant in the practice of CHE is examined in Chapter Five. Together CR and Indo-Tibetan Buddhism share an axiological commitment to Marx's notion of the 'free flourishing of each as a condition for the free flourishing of all' (Bhaskar, 2016, p. 164) . Souza (2014) proposes that CR holds significant possibility for opening up two-way conversations between 'Western' and 'Asian' epistemologies. This thesis establishes preliminary linkages between CR and Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, and thus begins a conversation that the author hopes will deepen in future research.

Relevance of the study for the field of higher education

This thesis contributes to the field of higher education research in three distinct ways: extending research into the emerging field of CHE[42]; undertaking intensive research that addresses identified gaps in CHE scholarship; and finally, contributing to the very small (global) body of work, which applies Archer's morphogenetic theory, and the internal conversation to higher education research.

In the discussion above, I have provided a brief overview of the research topic, its context,

[41] This is akin to what Deleuze and Guattari (1988, p. 44) call 'assemblages'. The Sanskrit term is 'skandhas', meaning 'aggregates' or 'heaps' (Karr, 2007, pp. 46-49).

[42] Research from outside of North America is scarce; particularly from Australia, where the only other scholar researching CHE (Patricia Morgan previously from UNSW) has now retired from her university post and is working privately.

background, research question, and aims. I have also offered a preliminary introduction to BCR, which, along with Archer's theoretical contributions, provides the methodological framing for this research. The next section provides an outline of the thesis, describing the overall layout of the thesis and what is covered in each chapter.

Outline of the thesis

Chapter Two provides the reader with an understanding of Bhaskar's basic critical realism (BCR) by outlining its key commitments of ontological realism, epistemological relativism, and judgemental rationality. An outline of BCR's relevance to the social sciences and Archer's operationalisation for applied social research is provided. This discussion offers insight into the value of her morphogenetic approach in understanding the emergence of different forms of human agency. The latter is discussed within the context of the internal conversation through which exploration and explanation of human agency become possible.

Chapter Three establishes the ground for this research project by setting up the argument that guides the subsequent discussion chapters. It examines the field of higher education – emphasising North America where fieldwork for this research was conducted – and considers the implications of the political project of neoliberalism on HE. This is followed by a discussion of the (im)possibilities for 'being otherwise' in these times. The emerging field of CHE is differentiated from the Mindfulness movement and considered as a pedagogical response to the current crisis besetting higher education. The chapter concludes with an overview of CHE and the need for deeper inquiry into its potential.

Chapter Four presents the critical realist methodological architecture, which supports the entire research process underpinning this thesis. It outlines the three phases of research implementation: preparation; data gathering; and data analysis and presentation. A discussion of the primary research method of in-depth interviews follows and considers the contribution of recent feminist and CR scholarship[43]. The chapter highlights additional methodological resources provided by

[43] The work of Clegg (2005); Clegg and Stevenson (2013); Smith and Elger (2012); and Sprague (2016) are particularly notable.

Banfield's (2010) tri-partite model of abstraction, which helped keep the research process focussed; and Pamphilon's (1999) Zoom method which honed researcher reflexivity. Discussion of the interview process, use of the internal conversation, and finding my way through critical realist data analysis with no established guide concludes the chapter.

Preceding the two 'discussion' chapters (Five and Six) is a short prologue, which guides the reader through the application of Archer's morphogenetic approach in these chapters

Chapter Five focusses on the research participants and examines the potential of CHE in practice. It highlights what scholar-practitioners do, and their underlying motivation and concerns. The discussion then moves to participants' understanding of the nature of their social contexts (or 'fields'), and how they locate their own practice as socially relevant and or ethically driven. A critical thread running through this chapter is exploration of the role of long-term meditation practice for educators and students.

Chapter Six examines the wide-ranging context of structure – in particular current inhospitable forces in HE. It unpacks scholar-practitioners' experience of their own social contexts and how complex enabling and constraining mechanisms impact on their personal projects[44]. In attempting to understand different stances towards structure, Archer's work on different reflexive modes and their ensuing dispositional stances is applied. The chapter seeks to examine the possibility of CHE given constraining political and social arrangements.

Chapter Seven presents the key findings of the research project and discusses their critical relevance to a 21st century higher education. Future beneficial research trajectories are suggested. This chapter concludes with a short autobiographical reflection on the research process.

[44] Following Archer 'personal' does not mean 'individualist' as these projects may be communal, or community oriented, in nature.

CHAPTER 2
'THINKING BEING'[45]: BASIC CRITICAL REALISM AND ITS OPERATIONALISATION

> Science is a wondrous thing. We are moving from a level of reality that we do understand to the level that explains that reality. It tells us something new. It expands the frontiers of what we know. (Bhaskar, 2014)

What does it mean to be human in our world? How do we become human? These are ontological questions – questions of being. They differ from questions about what we know about us as human beings and the world we are a part of. Ontology is at the fore of Bhaskar's critical realism, which provides the philosophical underpinnings and methodological framing for this research journey. The purpose of this chapter is to orient the reader to basic critical realism (BCR)[46] and its application to the social sciences. While Bhaskar's BCR is concerned with both natural and social ontology (that is, the natural and social sciences[47]), it is the latter which is pertinent to this research project. This chapter relies upon four logical moves preceded by a short introduction (which locates CR in relation to positivism and hermeneutics). The first move introduces the key commitments of BCR: ontological realism, epistemological relativism, and judgemental rationality. Next, I discuss the relevance of BCR to the social sciences. Particular attention is given to the vexed problematic of structure and agency (S-A), and considers the work of UK sociologist Margaret Archer and her operationalisation of BCR for social science practice. Her contribution towards understanding S-A, the stratified nature of human agency, and use of the internal conversation provides insight into the reflexive deliberations of agents. In the final section of the Chapter, I offer a critical realist perspective of the formation and location of the subject.

Basic Critical Realism

First, it is important to clarify that the term 'critical realism' here refers to the philosophical work and

[45] See Bhaskar (2002, pp. 249, 311).

[46] Throughout this thesis, I use BCR to refer to the fundamental principles and commitments of basic critical realism underpinning this research project, and CR to refer to critical realism in general.

[47] A critical aspect of this is the importance of clarifying between the natural and social sciences and their differing ontological status.

subsequent movement initiated by British philosopher Roy Bhaskar (1994 -2014)[48].Bhaskar's work is generally understood to comprise three related phases[49]. However not all are embraced by subsequent 'critical realist' scholars (Gunnarsson, 2011). In his early work, Bhaskar's meta-philosophy meticulously engaged the depths of the Western philosophical tradition. In later years, he pivoted towards 'Eastern' ontologies and epistemologies particularly in relation to education (Bhaskar, 2002)[50]. This period is sometimes referred to as his 'spiritual turn' (Zembylas, 2006). While Bhaskar is one of numerous philosophers exploring the interstices between East and West in relation to education and social change, it is his meta-philosophy of science that is most relevant to this research project. His 'middle way' philosophy (Blaikie, 2007; Zembylas, 2006) accords well with the object of this research project (CHE) with its bold emphasis on human capacities and *being* human.

> I can tell you that when I was an undergraduate you could not say anything about the world as such in Western philosophy; it was a prohibited, taboo subject. That was the first step in critical realism which was just thinking being. (Bhaskar, 2002, p. 311)

For us 'Western' educators, this notion of 'taboo' manifests in the contemporary philosophy of science as 'ontological shyness' (Banfield, 2015a), even though the very purpose and practice of science is to engage with and understand nature of things. Bhaskar refers to the confusion about ontology in contemporary science and proposes that for the world to be as it is, it must rely upon an ontology that is both stratified and emergent (Bhaskar, 2016; Collier, 1994). This allows for re-acknowledgment of the complex and layered nature of both natural and human worlds. For Bhaskar, the purpose of science is to delve beneath the surface layer of appearances and reveal the underlying constellational mechanisms which exert influence and display tendencies not

[48] Early in this research journey, I was surprised to hear the affirmative response of a dear friend, Paul Knitter (Emeritus Professor at Union Theological College), regarding my choice of critical realism for the methodological framing of this project. A statement that he had been trained in critical realism under Theologian Bernard Lonergan accompanied this. For a very recent discussion comparing Longeran and Bhaskar's critical realism, see Walker (2017).

[49] These three phases are generally recognised as basic Critical Realism, Dialectical Critical Realism, and the philosophy of metareality. See Bhaskar (2016).

[50] In particular, see pages 299-330 of Bhaskar (2002).

necessarily felt or seen by human beings[51]. It is through 'good science' (a commitment to 'seriousness' in research methodology) that we can gain insight into these. Critical realism's emphasis on a deep ontology that extends beyond – but simultaneously encompasses – surface appearances and actual experience extends to the understanding of human beings and the social worlds they make. Human beings have fundamental capacities with real generative power. Depending on various factors (social conditioning, inherited goods, and personal identity), these may become activated or lay dormant. Close examination of the interplay between structure[52] and agency[53] becomes the focal point of critical realist social science practice. Embodied in this is a commitment to the philosophy and method of (social) science as an emancipatory practice (Sayer, 2000; Zembylas, 2006).

Bhaskar's critical realism is viewed as a 'middle-way' philosophy seeking a path through the poles of positivism and hermeneutics (Blaikie, 2007, p. 144; Zembylas, 2006). Other scholars have navigated this crevasse, including Foucault Bourdieu, Adorno and Frankfurt School contemporaries. However, what CR offers in variance is clarification of differentiated, emergent, and dialectical (relational) ontological realities without the reticence and conflation common to the others (Gunnarsson, 2017; Putnam, 2015). Bhaskar's social ontology gleans 'the insights of both positivism and social constructionism' (Mussell, 2016, p. 538). From these two antithetical paradigms, critical realism draws on the desire and need for causal explanations, and the possibility of (an anti-positivist) naturalism in the social sciences (Bhaskar, 1998; Blaikie, 2007, p. 146). CR's accommodation of the naturalistic is not to establish some sort of deterministic base, but to acknowledge it as a crucial conditioning factor in social reality (Mussell, 2016, p. 538).

Ontological Realism: stratified and emergent

If there is a single big idea in critical realism, it is ontology (Bahsakr in Norrie, 2017).

[51] This is the beginning of Bhaskar's critique of empiricism and its attendant philosophy, positivism. For Bhaskar, empiricism was not a serious practice of science because of its inability to dig beneath surface appearances and reveal underlying causal powers, constellations and tendencies.

[52] That is": institutions, and factors which exercise influence on individual/communal opportunity.

[53] The capacity of individuals to reproduce, challenge, or change existing arrangements/structures/practices.

What is the nature of our world (natural or social) and how do we come to know about it through scientific inquiry? Bhaskar's starting answer was retroductive[54] and led him to assert that much of the history of Western science has been plagued by what he called 'the epistemic fallacy', i.e. confounding statements about 'what is' with 'what we know'. Most Western philosophy and science has demonstrated the pervasive ontological shyness mentioned in Chapter 1 (Banfield, 2015a). When science reduces the world to human knowledge of it (i.e. empiricism), a narrow and flattened reality ensues. A flat ontology cannot capture the complexity, depth, paradox and relationality of reality and existence, nor can it contribute to explanation[55]. In the natural sciences, causation has traditionally been linked to successive repetition of events in (artificially) closed systems[56]. Explanation is reduced to the 'god trick' (Haraway, 1988) performed by the all-seeing position-free enlightenment 'man'. Fallout from the collapse of this all-knowing, objective, rational-thinking subject led to understanding how time-space-history play their role in constructing the objects, subjects and methods of scientific research. Feminist scholars played a pivotal role (Connell, 1995; Fonow & Cook, 2005; Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1991; Hekman, 1990; Hekman, 2007) and their tradition of feisty, dynamic debate continues (See Gillman, 2016; Gunnarsson, 2017; Hekman, 1990; Mussell, 2016). Yet, positivism's rule over the social sciences remains pervasive. While many feminist theorists have placed materiality, structure and agency at the fore, an 'ontological shyness' or 'reticence' (Gunnarsson, 2013) has persisted. This has manifested through privileging the discursive over the material, and the epistemological at the expense of the ontological (Hekman, 2007). For example, according to Gorski (2013), North American social scientists pursue 'idiographic knowledge'[57] by hermeneutic means. They do not attempt to explain what happens in the social world, only to render it comprehensible by reconstructing meaning and intention (2013 p.

[54] Bhaskar asked the retroductive question of "what must be the case for science to be possible?" (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 47).

[55] In making such claims, critical realist writers are, in the main, referring to positivist empiricist science; stronger forms of social constructionism, (i.e. we are solely textually constructed); and either a lack of clarity and precision, or a confused conceptualisation of ontology.

[56] Philosophically known as Humean 'constant conjunctions' (Bhaskar, 2016, pp. 23-24).

[57] A Kantian term referring to knowledge of the everyday at the level of the individual, groups of people, communities.

661).

Even critical research practice aimed at making visible oppressive structures, lines of power, and discursive regimes, frequently ignores identifying 'deep-real' causal mechanisms and their powers (Banfield, 2015a, p. 87)[58] [59]. For Bhaskar, possibilities for explanation are continuously erased through this flat ontology and the reality of socio-linguistic contingency (Bhaskar, 2016, p. 11). Gorski (2013) contends that strong 'versions of constructivism have pushed the argument further' presenting both social life and natural science as linguistically and semiotically constituted (2013, p. 661)[60]. Archer echoes this in her critique of post-modern/structuralist thinkers[61]. Donati and Archer (2015) insist that the 'de-centring of the Enlightenment concept of the human being' has directly lead to the 'dissolution of the subject and inflation of the social' (2015, pp. 89-90). Human beings were stripped of all personal powers and properties which they use to make a difference to themselves and their social environment. Archer soberly posits 'What then becomes of human dignity or human rights?' (Donati & Archer, 2015)

Bhaskar's critical realism boldly re-presents ontology as stratified and differentiated. Its three domains of reality the 'empirical', 'actual' and 'real' (Bhaskar, 2008, p. xi) offer a kind of 'ontological map' (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 18) These three strata are depicted as emergent with neither being lesser than or reducible to the other (Bhaskar, 2008)'[62] (see Figure 2.1 below). The domain of the *empirical* includes what 'we experience either directly or indirectly'; the domain of the *actual* is where 'events happen whether we experience them or not'; and the domain of the *real* is the realm where 'generative mechanisms' and 'powers', which produce events, whether observed or

[58] Banfield uses the term 'deep-real' to distinguish Bhaskar's domain of the 'real' (see Figure 2.1 below) from those of the 'actual' and 'empirical' while giving all their due as being 'real'.

[59] Where the 'deep real' may have been made visible (for example, the construct of gender and its powers) a lack of clarity has prevailed in relation to the ontology of human persons, and explanation (Archer, 2000; Clegg, 2016; Gunnarsson, Martinez Dy, & van Ingen, 2016; Mussell, 2016).

[60] An example of this is the work of Berger and Luckman (1991).

[61] Archer cites Rorty, Lyotard, Derrida, Hall and Foucault, among others. See Archer (2007, pp. 18-25).

[62] A common allegory for this is water and its different emergent forms and their distinct properties, each irreducible to the other. Ice (comprised of the molecules H_2O) which when heated forms the liquid water, which when heated forms the gas, steam.

not (i.e. in the *empirical* and *actual*), occur (Danermark et al., 2002, pp. 20-21). Bhaskar presents three features of ontological strata as emergent, irreducible and efficacious (Hawke, 2017). Borrowing from Collier, he uses the term 'laminated' to express this irreducible emergence (2016, p. 11), noting that this deep dimension of reality distinguishes critical realism from other forms of realism.[63] In later work (Dialectical Critical Realism), he uses the term 'constellationality'[64] to 'describe the necessary connectedness of things' (Bhaskar, 1993, p. 86; Bhaskar & Norrie, 1998), i.e. that reality itself is 'dialectically structured' and constellated in different ways (Gunnarsson, 2017, pp. 115-116). For Bhaskar, critical realism argues not only for the primacy of ontology, but a 'new ontology' (Bhaskar, 2016, p. 17).



Figure 2.1 Bhaskar's stratified ontology

However, it is important to mention here that many scholars (especially feminist-critical realist; post

[63] Blaikie (2007, pp. 13-18) discusses other forms of realism: naïve, subtle, cautious, and shallow. He considers Bhaskar a deep realist. See also Groff (2008) for a discussion of 'dispositional' critical realists.
[64] In rejecting Hegel's notion of constellationality, Bhaskar acknowledges and draws from Adorno's (Bhaskar, 1993, pp. 86, 106).

positivist-realist-feminist; and new materialist) are currently revisiting much contemporary theory[65] through the lens of CR[66]. What this reveals is that, rather than offering a completely 'new ontology', Bhaskar's CR is bringing an elegant precision and re-articulation of existing differentiated, emergent and relational ontologies and theories (Gunnarsson et al., 2016; Mussell, 2016).[67]

In taking seriously, a stratified and emergent ontology, this project sets the ground for inquiry into where phenomena exist in relation to different strata. For example, educational policies, and personal experiences and responses to certain policies all reside in different ontological strata. Policies and people are dissimilar kinds of things. Different ontological strata proffer distinct enablements and constraints, both upon the objects of research, as well as epistemology and method. The concept of an emergent phenomena is also important because these are always dependent upon, but not reducible to, the 'lower or more basic strata' (Banfield, 2015a, p. 89). As suggested in Chapter 1, both mindfulness and contemplative higher education ostensibly emerged as post-millennial responses to an overly technocratic and regulated sector. Yet deeper exploration reveals that these two have very different historical origins and are founded on different (ontological and epistemological) foundations. Therefore, a 'laminated' system enables and entails a commitment to deeper inquiry for both exploratory and explanatory purposes.

A key concept in understanding ontological realism in relation to research practice is Bhaskar's distinction between the transitive ('the production of knowledge') and intransitive levels ('existing independently of humans') of reality (Fletcher, 2017, p. 3; Mingers, 2006, p. 22).

Epistemological Relativism

Bhaskar 'reworked the traditional distinction between epistemology and ontology into two dimensions necessary for understanding the practice of science' (2016, p. 24). He distinguishes

[65] In particular, this has been in relation to feminist standpoint, social constructionism, and Adorno's dialectics.

[66] Please see Alcoff and Shomali (2010); Gillman (2016); Gunnarsson (2013, 2017); Gunnarsson et al. (2016); Mussell (2016); Norrie (2004); Poutanen and Kovalainen (2005); Putnam (2015); Satsangi (2013). Earlier debates relating to feminist economics between Tony Lawson (1999, 2003) and Sandra Harding (1999, 2003), can also be included here.

[67] For example, the work of Yuval-Davis (2006;2011)

between what he called the ‘enduring mechanisms’ of the natural/physical world and the existing bodies of theory that researchers develop, revise and transform (Bhaskar, 2008; Groff, 2008). The former he called the intransitive dimension and the latter as the transitive dimension.

Both are seen to exist in an irreducible dialectical relationship that expresses ‘science as a process’ (Bhaskar 2016, pp. 24, 36). As Mingers (2006, p. 26) explains: ‘once an event has occurred, or some theory has been produced, it becomes transitive relative to possible explanations of it’. Thus, it is ‘real’ in the sense of possessing causal powers (which may or may not be exerted or observed). In the domain of the real, ‘science as process’ means that our theories, offer ‘partial perspectives’ – to use Haraway’s 1998 term – and thus:

> Can only be regarded as the best truth about reality we have for the moment. It is no ultimate knowledge. New scientific studies may show that the knowledge was false. Theories can always be surpassed by new theories. (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 23)

For Bhaskar, there is socially produced knowledge and knowledge of things, which are not produced by humans at all. Nor are they dependent on human activity – such as the ‘gravity of mercury’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 11).

Distinguishing between the transitive and intransitive dimensions of knowledge enables us to ground ourselves in a practice of science that is socially constructed (i.e. ‘epistemically relative’) yet retains appreciation for the ‘ontological dimension’ (Mingers, 2006, p. 22; Sayer, 2000). There can be no effective bracketing-out of the researcher, because knowledge is always produced within particular socially and linguistically mediated descriptions (Bhaskar, 2016, p. 25). What we know is always, inescapably, a function of our geo-socio-historical ‘situatedness’ (Haraway, 1988; Scambler, 2012, p. 145). While all science is a product of time, place, language and culture, Bhaskar makes an important distinction between the natural and social sciences. He shows that the latter is non-neutral in a double sense: it is both the process *and* the object of social science research that are socio-culturally mediated (Blaikie, 2007, p. 148).

Judgemental rationality

Bhaskar’s foregrounding of ontology arose as ‘an argument against the epistemic fallacy’ (Hawke,

2017, p. 19) that science and its philosophies had not clearly articulated (Bhaskar, 2008; Cruickshank, 2000). Furthermore, while Bhaskar (2016, p. 25) emphasises that human knowledge is fallible, he stresses that there are rational grounds for giving preference to certain beliefs or theories over others (Bhaskar, 2016). As human beings, we have the capacity for judgemental rationality, i.e. irrespective of the social construction of knowledge it remains 'possible to decide between alternative theories on rationally compelling grounds' (Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson, & Norrie, 1998, p. 2; Sayer, 2000). Elaborating further, Rutzou (2016)[68] offers that just because all knowledge is fallible:

> This does not imply that all knowledge is equally fallible; because knowledge is socially constructed or produced, this does not mean that it is nothing but social constructions (Rutzou, 2016)

Here CR as an underlabourer for the practice of science enables the researcher to evaluate, discriminate and discern between different theories which may be competing, overlapping, or complementary. Sometimes differing theories map the 'same place in different ways to highlight different features' (Rutzou, 2016). Chapter 4 takes this discussion further by outlining Bhaskar's recommended steps for the practice of (social) science as applied to this research project. Through these we are able to see how, with significant work, the researcher can arrive at a fuller picture of their research object in all its complexity (Fletcher, 2017; Horrocks, 2009).

Bhaskar dubs his foundational commitments of ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgemental rationality as 'the holy trinity of critical realism' (2016, pp. 6, 26). They are underpinned by an emancipatory impulse. His ontological realism differs to naïve realism, which purports that we can have knowledge of reality through careful construction of experiments, which replicate reality and seek constant conjunctions of events. Bhaskar's realism promotes a precise demarcation of ontology from epistemology and clear delineation of the different strata of reality – which researchers may or may not access. The *real*, that 'deep dimension of reality', can never be completely known – it is unobservable (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 22). While its effects can be experienced (via the *empirical* domain) and investigated (within the *actual* domain), our knowledge

[68] Rutzou (2016) is an audio-visual (webinar) reference.

of their underlying generating mechanisms and powers (the *real* domain) is always fallible, partial and subject to future correction. Implicit in the latter is the history and sanity of science – grounded in the courage and methodological discipline of many researchers. Over time and from within the collegiate academy they have contributed to what we now take for granted in our 'knowledge economy'.

Critical realism proposes that emancipatory change can only take place if the structures responsible for the discourses and events are known and influenced. Bhaskar affirms:

> These structures are not spontaneously apparent in the observable patterns of events. They can only be identified through the practical and theoretical work of the social sciences (1989, p. 2).

Critical realism and the social sciences

Once we acknowledge the socially constructed/located nature of science itself, the objects of study in the natural sciences is relatively straightforward – what Giddens coined in 1976[69] as the 'single hermeneutic'. Bhaskar distinguishes the natural from the social sciences and reveals that the latter differs in two[70] important ways: First, it entails a 'double-hermeneutic' (Bhaskar, 2016, p. 58), in which the objects of its research are both 'socially defined *and* socially produced' as different to 'socially defined and naturally produced' (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 31). Sayer (2000) describes this as 'a hermeneutic cycle'[71] which results in a 'two-way movement – a fusing of the horizons – of listener and speaker, researcher and researched' (2000, p. 18). Both are equally real (Sayer, 1992, p. 26fn). This is because social practices are informed by ideas, which may or may not be 'true' – regardless of whether they have some bearing on what happens (Sayer, 2000, p. 18). Critical realism declares (similar to Adorno, 1973) that truths and untruth, presences and absences all

[69] See page 8 in Giddens, A. (1976) "The New Rules of Sociological Method", Taylor and Francis Group.

[70] An additional differentiating factor is that a range of 'dichotomies and dualisms' also troubles social science and are macro and micro in nature (Bhaskar, 2008, pp. 48-49; 2016). Critical realism proposes to resolve these dualisms through lengthy meta-philosophical argument, which is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss.

[71] Of course, Sayer is referring here to an original hermeneutic concept, which has its roots in the writings of Aristotle.

have causal powers or tendencies.

A second difference pertains to the fact that social structures act in unpredictable ways and are highly context dependent (Bhaskar, 2016). For example, in the natural world we can assume that the sun will rise each morning (whether experienced or not) and that in Adelaide there is a cycle of seasons (albeit a little different each time). With social mechanisms, such assumption of regularity is foolhardy. This is because human beings are involved. Familiar to us all is the unpredictability and uncertainty integral to our everyday actions and interaction. As Archer observes, human beings similarly placed act in divergent ways. The irregularity and complexity of human thought and action has provided an enduring and vexed problematic for the social sciences, particularly sociologists. This is what is referred to as the macro-dualism of structure and agency (S-A). Critical realism's proposed resolution of this problematic is discussed in the following section.

Beyond the structure-agency problematic

The two interrelated phenomena of structure and agency have been a core problematic in social science research (Elder-Vass, 2010). Archer (2005) summarises this as 'how to capture someone who is partly formed by their sociality, but also has the capacity to transform their society in some part?' (2005, p. 261). Sociologists are accustomed to conceptualising S-A as a continuum and positioning different social theories accordingly. However, this has led to either over or under-socialised accounts of human beings. Both are inadequate foundations for social theory (Archer, 2005, p. 261)[72]. Bhaskar (1975) claims to have resolved the persistent S-A conundrum via his Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA [73]) (see Figure 2.2 further below). In this, he allowed for the acknowledgment that:

[72] Please be aware that I am drawing quite significantly on Archer's language, which may be overly technical. While Archer rarely uses the language of political movements and projects, her meticulous research engages with key sociological, historical and psychological thinkers who do (for example, Bourdieu, Giddens, Said, Frankfurt, Lacan Derrida, Foucault, Mouzelis, Mouffe, Emirbayer, Bauman, Ulrich and Beck). It is beyond the bounds of this thesis to provide specific examples of this. However, for interest, the early chapters of *Making our Way through the World* (2007) and *The Reflexive Imperative in Late Modernity* (2012) offer a taste of the breadth of her engagement.

[73] See also Bhaskar (2016, pp.51-55) and also Bhaskar (1986).

- social structures always precede human action;
- S-A are radically different kinds of things – ontologically – with different emergent properties[74];
- human beings either 'remake' or transform their socially enabled and or constrained contexts; and finally
- while human beings and structures are ontologically different, they are 'activity-dependent' and thus inseparable (Bhaskar, 2016, pp. 51-53).

Bhaskar originally likened the TMSA to Giddens' structuration theory (1971). However, Archer (1995) distinguished and elaborated upon it for social science research.[75] Her contribution was proposing the necessity of 'analytical dualism' in examining S-A followed by the 'morphogenetic' sequence which allowed for time-space considerations (1995, pp. 6,15). Through these two moves Archer avoids the epistemic fallacy (Archer, 1995, p. 201) and preserves ontological difference in the activity-dependent relations between S-A. See below for further discussion of Archer's morphogenetic approach in relation to this research project.



Figure 2.2 Bhaskar's Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA)[76]

Implications for practice

[74] For example, human beings are reflexive, whereas an institution is not. This is why it is 'important not to conflate structure and agency' (Bhaskar 2016, p.53).

[75] Archer's critique of Gidden's structuration is that it expresses what she calls central conflationism. See discussion later in this chapter.

[76] See Bhaskar, 1993, p. 155.

Bhaskar clarifies that BCR is not a new meta-theory or methodology. Rather, he suggests that it exists to act as an 'underlabourer' for doing good (social) science research (2016, pp. 1-2). Current debates between critical realism and feminist standpoint (see above) indicate that CR is playing this role of clarifying, and making more productive, existing theories and methodologies (Clegg, 2016; Gunnarsson, 2017; Gunnarsson et al., 2016; Satsangi, 2013)[77]. Paraphrasing Einstein, Bhaskar repeats that 'the world we have created today as a result of our thinking thus far has problems which cannot be solved by thinking the way we thought when we created them' (2016, p. 2). In the context of this project, CR offers a rationale for thorough 'critical social science' research through: detailed and precise exploration; a commitment to producing useable knowledge; including and valuing everyday accounts of reality; and pursuing explanation, as well as exploratory inquiry. It purportedly allows for the full complexity of our experience of the reality of self and other, to be acknowledged. This is of particular importance to this project, which seeks to explore the pro-social orientation of contemplative practices and pedagogies. Within BCR, (social) science research is viewed as an emancipatory project. Its critical aspect is contained within its 'rationale' to be simultaneously critical of the 'social practices it studies as well as of those of the theories' it seeks to clarify (Sayer, 2000, p. 18).

For Bhaskar, research is practical work. It involves iterative and generative processes aimed at deepening knowledge and understanding of the intransitive object/s of research. The value of the products of social scientific work that include theories, concepts and explanations can be gauged by 'how well they function in practice' (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 25). Sayer instructively calls this the test of 'practical adequacy' (2010, p. 18) where theory and practice are united. Bhaskar refers to this as 'seriousness' (2016, p. 2). It has an ethical commitment to produce knowledge that is 'useable' and relevant to current exigencies and 'at least ideally can illuminate a way forward (telling us something new)' (Bhaskar, 2016, p. 2)

Given the fallibility of human knowledge, scientific knowledge, as well as everyday notions and conceptions, may be correct or false. While delusions or misconceptions are frequently

[77] Others currently writing in this sphere include Gillman (2016); Putnam (2015); and Mussell (2016).

contradictory, 'they are important' (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 36). This is because they have causal power; i.e. they inform and motivate people's actions, and the ensuing effects. As an illustration, we can take the recent comment of the US President who stated, 'The leaks are absolutely real but the news is fake'[78]. Yet such news has real causal powers, resulting in both observable and non-observable effects, which further shape reality[79]. Thus, to be serious about exploring the mechanisms underlying social phenomena requires giving importance to both the real and the fake.

The ethical and emancipatory impulse of critical realism requires scientific concepts to go further than merely summing up 'essential and incisive aspects of the phenomena explored'. Hermeneutics is 'not enough' (Horrocks, 2009, p. 36). Both exploration *and* explanation are required (Gorski, 2013; Horrocks, 2009). It is the existence of the deep real – that which we cannot directly observe at the level of 'generative mechanisms' – which justifies the existence of science. Science must 'dig deeper than the immediate experience of events in the world is able to do' (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 36). This 'digging' pushes explanation – i.e. the identification of laws and powers producing a certain phenomenon or event. Understanding science as an end in itself is not enough. If science is for explanation, then it has a purpose. That purpose is for human freedom. For Bhaskar, the purpose of science was to contribute to a eudemonistic[80] society. This commitment remains consistent across his vast body of works.

Summary

Above, I have presented the key tenets of critical realism underpinning the overall methodological framing of this project. Yet Bhaskar's work remains a meta-philosophy and as such a critique of the process of doing science. For Gorski it is a starting point because 'certain aspects' of BCR 'remain inadequately elaborated' (2013, p. 668) – not least key theoretical questions relating to S-A. The

[78] See *The Independent (online*) Thursday 16 February 2017 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-russia-leaks-fake-news-claims-quote-a7584516.html.

[79] This means that even though such news is erroneous, it generates real world causes and effects. People assume attitudes and stances that shape dispositions and affect actions, of others and their own.

[80] This is a Greek word referring to a human state of interdependent well-being and flourishing.

following section discusses Margaret Archer's social ontology, which affords valuable theoretical insight and the operationalisation of BCR for social research.

Operationalising critical realism: Morphogenesis, reflexivity and the subject

Archer's morphogenetic theory and work on the internal conversation (IC), provides an approach to understanding human subjectivity, agentic powers, and reflexivity. Her starting point was the persisting conundrum of the relationship between structure and agency. Bhaskar's TMSA presented the ontological differentiation and irreducibility of S-A (1989, p. 94). Yet, within the social sciences, the only area of slim agreement regarding this S-A relationship is that 'in some sense, structure is objective, and in some sense agency is subjective' (Archer, 2003, p. 2). Understanding objectivity and subjectivity as ontologically distinct and 'irreducibly different in kind' opens up possibilities for understanding the different 'contributions to social outcomes' that each makes (Archer, 2003, pp. 2-3). Working closely with Bhaskar at the time, Archer argued that the history of sociology (and social theory more broadly) had tended towards three main forms of structure-agency conflationism: determinism, voluntarism and structuration. Determinism relies on a downwards conflation – as in Durkheim where structures shape and consume agents; Voluntarism (as per Weber) is where agential power takes precedence – a form of upwards conflation; and finally structuration (as in Giddens), where S-A are seen as co-constituted and thus indistinguishable (Archer, 2000, 2003). Archer's clarity allowed Bhaskar first to distinguish his analysis of the interaction between S-A from any of these three prevailing sociological views; and second to understand the need to analytically 'decouple' S-A (Archer, 1995; Scambler, 2012, p. 146). For Archer, the relationship between structure, culture[81] and agency:

> ….. remains hopelessly indefinite unless the interplay between them is unravelled over time to specify the where, when, who and how – otherwise we are left with the vagaries of mutual constitution. (1995, p. 274)

Recognising structures and human beings as ontologically distinct entails deep exploration and

[81] See statement in Chapter 1 about the distinction between structure and culture within the context of this thesis.

understanding of what it means to be human – and how our agency manifests.

The stratification of agency

Archer recognised the significance of Bhaskar's meta-theoretical work[82]. However, as a sociologist she needed to flesh out the abstractedness of Bhaskar's TMSA and 'supply a social theory which is pre-eminently usable' (Archer, 1995, p. 61). Working with the philosophical tools provided by Bhaskar, Archer demonstrated how social change is not the result of social ''hydraulics' but rather is the outcome of enacted reasons by differently positioned and conditioned human 'agents' in various combinations (Archer, 1995, p. 62). Essential to this was Archer's depiction of the ontological stratification of agency. She identified three 'kinds' of human agency, each playing differing roles in socio-cultural maintenance (morphostasis) or transformation (morphogenesis)[83] (Archer, 2000, 2003). The three types of agency – primary, corporate and actor – are emergentist. First, all human beings are 'persons' (i.e. biologically, embodied, and involuntarily placed[84]) or 'primary agents'. Second, most of are 'agents' ('individual persons filling their social roles' (Zeuner, 1999, p. 81) and sharing the same life circumstances such as place of birth, religion or parents with other human beings. This is what Archer refers to as our 'corporate agency' (Archer, 2003). The third type of agency is that of 'actors'; social actors who share with other human beings their personhood and collective agential being (both involuntarily positioned). Actors, however, tend to make choices which distinguish them from other persons and collectives (Archer, 2003; Vandenberghe, 2005). Archer allows for a conceptualisation of human persons as both active and reflexive. Brock et al (2016) summarise this as:

> Someone who has the properties and powers to monitor his or her own life, to mediate structural and cultural properties of society and thus to contribute to societal reproduction or transformation. (2016, p. 32)

It is important to mention here that amidst the current flurry of new-materialisms, post-positivism

[82] She described this as the 'generous under-labouring of a philosopher who has actually dug beyond disciplinary bounds' (Archer, 1995, p. 61).

[83] As human beings, we are also involved in cultural reproduction (morphostasis). But Archer posits that because of the reflexive imperative of these times, the possibilities for morphostasis are ever diminishing.

[84] That is, as human beings and not something else e.g. donkeys.

and other realisms[85] Archer's caution regarding ontological conflation remains relevant (Mussell, 2016; Mutch, 2013). For these authors, along with Clegg (2006, 2016) who engages with feminist intersectional theory, Archer's work (particularly in relation to the morphogenetic approach) helps bring greater clarity to understanding human reflexivity and associated methodological implications.

The morphogenetic approach: structure and agency as an analytic dualism

The morphogenetic approach – Archers 'own version of realist social theory' (Archer, 2012, p. 50) – is an explanatory framework. It applies Bhaskar's stratified and emergent ontology to structures, cultures and agents through recognising that each 'has its emergent and irreducible properties and powers' (Archer, 2012, p. 50). In this thesis, I do not distinguish between structure and culture (S-C). While Archer used culture as lens of analysis[86], she provided few tools for doing so beyond her 1995 differentiation of the two, as summarised by Case (2015), and included above (see p.19). Archer subsequently (2005) points to the difficulty of separating S-C due to a lack of conceptualisations beyond the descriptive[87]. Henceforth the use of the term 'structure' implies a dialectical inseparability with culture.

Archer's morphogenetic cycle is underpinned by two fundamental premises. The first recognises structure and agency consisting of 'different kinds of emergent properties'' (Archer, 2012, p. 51). To illustrate the point, Archer notes that as an institution a university 'can be "centralized" whereas a person cannot' – humans are emotional and embodied, 'which cannot be the case for structures' (Archer, 2012, pp. 50-51). The second premise takes S-A as happening over time – or diachronically. Most important is that they precede human engagement. For example, the social institution of marriage and gendered division of labour precede my engagement with them.

---

[85] In regard to new realisms, the work of Karen Barad (2003, 2007) and her 'agential realism' is currently salient. For discussion regarding the location of her work and that of other new-materialists and post-positivists see (Beer et al., 2015; Gillman, 2016; Gunnarsson, 2017; Gunnarsson et al., 2016; Hekman, 2007, 2014).

[86] For example, in her 2012 publication: *The Reflexive Imperative in Late Modernity*, Cambridge University Press

[87] See *fn*.30 (p.20) for further reading.

Archer's contribution is in producing a useable BCR social science theory resting on the two primary methodological conceptualisations of (i) the 'analytical dualism' between S-A, and (ii) the notion of social morphogenesis. Analytical dualism allows us to make distinctions between structure, and agency in thought, but not reality. While apparently co-constitutive of everyday life, recognising S-A as differing in kind enables and compels examination of their various generative powers that enable and constrain contexts and events. Social morphogenesis recognises that structures pre-exist and condition human beings. The basic morphogenetic approach (Archer 1995, p.157) or sequence (MGA), depicted in Figure 2.3 is an approach to social research that enables the possibility of empirical accounts of the interaction between human action and structural conditioning as they interweave over time.



Figure 2.3 Archer's Basic morphogenetic sequence

Considering structures and agents analytically and temporally separable allows the researcher to examine their causal powers as if they were isolated capacities for the purpose of bringing them back together to consider their dynamic interplay as whole. Human reflexivity meditates structure and agency. Yet the only way a researcher can know about individuals' reflexive deliberation is

through their internal conversations. One example provided in this project regards discussion of the properties and relations between the Mindfulness movement, and scholar-practitioners of CHE (see Chapter 6).

Human reflexivity and the internal conversation

Bhaskar highlighted that the power of structural forms is 'mediated through intentional human agency' (Bhaskar, 1998, p. 88). Archer takes the idea of mediation seriously, but points out that Bhaskar tells us 'nothing about the mediatory process involved' (2003, pp. 2-3). As a critical realist sociologist, she is interested in concrete realist questions such as: what are the mechanisms of mediation? Her response is human reflexivity that can be accessed via a person's internal conversation.

Archer presents the development and exercise of human reflexivity as a 'lifelong' three-phase process which makes explicit the everyday reflexive processing that all human beings undertake (1995, 2003; 2007, pp. 16-17). As we cannot but engage with the different aspects of our world, we must filter and evaluate large amounts of information ('Discern'), process and prioritise concerns ('Deliberate'), and dedicate ourselves to projects that we believe are of meaning and value to us personally ('Dedicate')[88] (Archer, 2007, pp. 20-21). Through this model (see Figure 2.4 below) Archer allows for the 'contextualisation of agency' and 'prepares the ground for her defence of the notion of the internal conversation' (Scambler, 2012, p. 147)[89]. Only by inquiring into people's internal conversations is their rich and varied reflexive life made visible. The IC helps to account for how and why people act so and not otherwise (Archer, 2007).

[88] Of course, these may be self-serving or altruistic ('we first') in nature (Chapman, 2012).

[89] Further discussion of this three-phase model in relation to this research project can be found at the beginning of Chapter 5.



Figure 2.4 Archer's tripartite model of reflexive personhood[90]

Archer contends that the 'internal conversation' is the most neglected aspect of social science history (2002, p. 17). Following USA pragmatist Peirce's work, she emphasises that all 'normal persons'[91] have a 'domain of mental privacy' (2002, p. 34) where we reflect upon what we encounter in our everyday lives, and 'monitor the status of our ongoing concerns' (Mingers, Mutch, & Willcocks, 2013, p. 4). What Archer shows is that ICs have causal efficacy. Through them, we make plans and dedicate actions that inevitably and consciously either replicate or transform the social and cultural conditions around us (Archer, 2002, pp. 11,17,34). The IC is important to researchers because it enables us to 'ascertain the extent and degree of influence of social structures' on our research participants[92] as human agents (Archer, 2003, p. 15). Through the IC, we come to understand that as human persons we are 'capable of authentic creativity which can transform society's conversation in a radical way' (Archer, 2003, p. 19).

Three core features of the IC are important to note. First, Archer stresses that inner dialogue is a 'genuinely interior phenomenon'. It is something we do by ourselves, for ourselves. As Archer has put it, the internal conversation has a 'first-person ontology' such that when a person experiences

[90] See Archer 2003, pp. 135, 135-141

[91] That is neither physically or neurologically impaired (Archer, 2014a).

[92] Examination of my own internal conversation throughout this research project has also been important in maintaining high degrees of reflexive awareness during data collection and analysis. See Chapter 4.

and how they experience it is unique to them. Second, our internal conversations are real: that is they possess causal efficacy. Through our ICs, we 'modify ourselves'; we ascertain our social roles and responsibilities, and we dedicate action to specific causes or projects (Archer, 2000, pp. 10-12; 2003, pp. 41,34-44; 2007, pp. 65-66) . Third and finally, Archer asserts that we conduct our ICs in different ways. We have differing reflexive styles.[93]

All human beings are reflexive, yet we deploy this differently. Archer offers three dominant styles or modes of reflexivity (2003)[94], that are supplemented by a fourth 'non-reflexive' mode (2007, 2012). Archer came to these four styles (or 'modes') of being reflexive through twenty in-depth interviews undertaken as part of a pilot investigation exploring the nature and extent of participants' reflexive process via their internal conversations. For an in-depth discussion of Archer's method in her pilot investigation see Archer (2003, pp153-157).

Defining reflexivity as '*how* the causal powers of social forms are mediated *through* human agency' (2007, p. 15) Archer's empirical research (2003; 2007, pp. 98-99) revealed the following four distinctive styles of that *"through".* First*,* **communicative reflexives** are those who require others to complete their internal conversations, before taking courses of action. Communicative reflexives are deeply rooted in and connected to their 'natal contexts', and seek to preserve these rather than seek social mobility. Second, **Autonomous reflexives** are those who sustain their own internal conversations which lead directly to action. They tend to be confidently self-motivated and rely on their own inner resources. **Meta-reflexives** differ somewhat in that they are both critically reflective about their own inner conversations, and their effective action in society. They tend to be unsettled within their familiar contexts, self-effacing, and concerned about our world. Finally, the fourth group is the **fractured non-reflexives**, who do not hold adequate internal conversations. For these people the experience of reflexivity leads to distress rather than purposeful action.

[93] Archer wistfully observes that many social theories have and continue to be presented 'without any reference to human reflexivity' (2003, p. 19). This key human capacity is taken for granted.

[94] Archer's four modes of reflexivity elucidated in her work SAIC (2003) emerged from a pilot study of the 'inner dialogues' of 20 participants in the UK. Enquiring about whether and how people talked to themselves through a lens of ten basic mental activities (2003, p.167)

While all people possess and utilise each of the four modes, Archer stresses that one tends to be dominant[95]. Importantly, the reflexive modes are to be understood in connection with 'particular combinations of structural and cultural moments, both in time and space' (Mingers et al., 2013, p. 4). These shape the conditions under which a particular dominant mode flourishes. According to Archer, in our current historical moment we rest on the cusp between the 'logic of competition' (where dominant autonomous reflexives prevail) and 'the logic of opportunity' (where meta-reflexivity is becoming increasingly prevalent) (2012, p. 248). The conditions of these two logics and their implications for this project are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

Archer's attention to the different types of agency and modes of reflexivity enable a nuanced understanding of human agency and how these play out across time and space. However, how does the self that we recognise ourselves as arise? Moreover, how do we locate that subject? In the following section, I engage Archer's theory in responding to each of these questions.

Locating the subject: identity, agency and change

To meaningfully address issues of identity and positionality in social research we need a proper theory of persons. Archer offers this. The following section presents an overview of subjectivity from an Archerian critical realist perspective. This provides the ground for understanding that the enablement of a strong (collective) social agency responsive to current realities and challenges is possible.

This study puts forward a notion of the subject as agentic. Drawing on Archer's stratified notion of agency[96] (Archer, 2000, 2003; Vandenberghe, 2005), my use of the term 'agentic' acknowledges the *active* agency of all participants in this study. Post-modern and post-structuralist notions of the subject frequently elide this active agency as evident through in the work of scholars such as Bourdieu (1990), Derrida (Mutch, 2004), Baudrillard, Lacan, and the (early) Foucault (Archer, 2000, pp. 19, 24; Sawicki, 1991). Where agency is acknowledged, it tends to be under-defined (Smart, 1982) or overly contingent, suggesting inherent instability and passivity (Vandenberghe, 2005).

[95] This was true for at least 93% of Archer's subjects (2007, p. 93).

[96] See Archer 2000, (p. 117) and 2003, (pp. 119-121).

Critical realism promotes a strong sense of agency reflected through Archer's 'we are all most of the time *active* agents' (2007, p. 265). An ontology of basic or inherent human capacity underpins this. Archer calls our inherent, fundamental human capacities 'personally emergent powers' (PEP's) (2002, p. 18); Nussbaum, 'capabilities' (2003; 2000)[97] and Buddhism, 'Buddha nature' or *tathagatagarbha*[98] (Rosch, 2013, p. 237) or 'basic goodness' (Eppert et al., 2015, p. 275). Trungpa favoured the term 'enlightened genes' (1991, p. 213). Within Buddhism, the notion of capacities as 'basic goodness' refers to an inherent and innate 'workability' (Trungpa, 2010) indicating that humans have all they need to be responsive in the face of current exigencies.

Within the social sciences (particularly sociology and cultural studies), the liberal humanist subject has been the object of much post-structuralist and feminist critique. For example, Adorno and Horkheimer (1979) posit that we need to deconstruct the (white) liberal human subject (Wadham, 2002, p. 155). This is because of its formation by, and allegiance to, an enlightenment rationality that favours 'positivity'[99] thereby propagating hegemonic relations detrimental to those expressing marginality of any kind. What hope might there be for the (white) liberal-humanist-subject who is unable to disrupt or dislodge their own habituations or be sufficiently critically self-reflexive? (Wadham, 2002) Are we to take the subject who cannot, to use Bhaskar's terminology 'absent absences' (2016, p. 117) as lacking an intentional agency? Where to go with this subject in these times where we need both hope and ground for a positive politics of social response-ability? Who will disrupt the compulsion and practices, which cover others, the Other in our concepts? (Adorno, 2010) In this thesis I argue that without recourse to an ontology of human sufficiency we cannot adequately grasp the possibility of conscious human disruption of negatively 'structuring structures' (Swartz, 1997, p. 103) and hegemonic practices.

The human capacity to affect change

[97] Philosopher Martha Nussbaum's work on human capabilities – which she applies to the justice sphere – is a further development of the pioneering work of economist-philosopher Amartya Sen. For those unfamiliar with Sen's capability framework, sound and accessible overviews are provided by Alkire (2005), as well as the online Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/capability-approach/

[98] A basic state of wakefulness that is inherent in all of us and all sentient beings.

[99] By positivity, I mean the project of sameness, unity and always reconciling 'Other' to itself.

Critical realism takes a different approach to the disruption of hegemonic ideologies and practice. Rather than focus solely on the individual[100], it places attention on the environment or context: what Bhaskar calls the 'master-slave' relations within that environment, the forces and flows of enablement and constraint of those relations, and their underlying generative powers (Bhaskar, 2016, p. 55; Brown, 2009). It is an approach that allows for a radical critique and dismantling of epistemic certainty while presenting the subject as more complex than being in possession of a 'totalising self-reflexivity' (Wadham, 2002, pp. 154-155). Unlike the 'anti-humanism' redolent in much post-structuralist theory (Archer, 2000; Clegg, 2006; Donati & Archer, 2015), critical realism retains the powers of the individual, and their possibility for affecting change[101]. While agency is directed towards projects that (we feel) can be realised, the outcomes are not necessarily in our interests, or those of the wider community. This is because humans' projects are frequently fallible.

Identity formations

Much sociological work is concerned with 'how the subject acquires identity and how it emerges from the ongoing dialectic of self and other' (Hall & Du Gay, 1996, p. 5; Wadham, 2002, p. 156). Both Bhaskar and Archer view identity as forming through our necessary engagement with our world and all it contains. Fervidly arguing against any sort of 'neural reductionism' (Archer, 2003, pp. 10-11) follows Bhaskar and Marx in espousing the 'primacy of practice'. Our ability to engage with our world arises precisely through our need to engage with our world. As human beings, we necessarily confront three realms of worldly engagement: the natural, practical and social orders (Archer, 2000, pp. 312-313). These three include our environment and the other beings we share it with; the world of arts, performance, achievement, language acquisition and utilisation; and the complex socio-cultural realm. As we engage, across the 'duration of our lives' (Archer 2000, p. 161), we develop into mature human beings. What human beings share is the reality that identity

[100] That is their occupation of social spaces as either primary or corporate agents, or social actors.

[101] Bhaskar (in his later Dialectical Critical Realism) distinguishes between two types of power which he describes as $power_2$ ('the kind of power exercised by masters over slaves in master-slave societies') and $power_1$ ('or transformative capacity') (Bhaskar, 2016, p. 131). Within the field of development, even broader conceptions of power have been at play; for example, the work of Gaventa and Cornwall (2008, p. 73) who refer to 'power over' 'power to' 'power with' and 'power within'.

hinges upon resolving concerns intrinsic to engagement, i.e. those of self-worth (social order), performance (practical order), and wellbeing (natural order).

Through subsequent processes of deliberation, determination and dedication (DDD) our 'unique' human personhood emerges[102]. Archer and Donati (2015) eschew the term individual and, along with Smith (2011) opt for 'personhood', precisely because it emphasises our undeniable relationality (or interbeing) and covers the 'full gamut of concepts regularly used in social theory: 'selves', 'agents/agency' and 'actors'' (Donati & Archer, 2015, p. 85). Agency emerges from the objects it takes: for primary agents, the 'me'; for corporate agents, the 'we'; and for social actors, the 'you'[103] (Donati & Archer, 2015, p. 103). The process of 'becoming a full person' depends on continued and deepening relational circling through the domains of the personal, private, collective and individual (2015, pp. 103-104) continually engaged in the DDD process.

While Archer does not deny that our knowing of the world under our own particular description is derived from language, she prevents the subject from disappearing into discursive constitution – through disavowal of the three kinds of conflation (see above), and emphasising the primacy of practice. She rejects sole discursive construction of the human persons inherent in strong social constructionism by emphasising pre-cognitive development. Fairclough, Jessop, and Sayer (2004) remark on her contribution, which demonstrates

> … the importance of the embodied, practical and non-semiotic, indeed non-social (in the sense of intersubjective) dimensions of human practice, and their status as preconditions of language-learning and use. (2004, p. 7)

The view of human subjectivity that Archer presents is both relational and irreducible to our (individual) psychology (2007, p. 2). She observes that while our 'reflection is *about* the world it cannot therefore be independent from the way the world is' and that

[102] Differing prioritisation of concerns leads to differing manifestations of agency.

[103] Of course, depending on our dominant reflexive style (communicative, autonomous, meta-reflexive, or the fractured reflexive), we may remain predominantly 'me' or 'us' focussed and never engage the 'you' which for me refers to the other.

> We are not free to construe [the world] as we please, as the epistemic[104] and linguistic fallacies would have it, because the world's powers in relation to our own prevent us, for example, from taking threats to the body as unthreatening (rather than their being of less concern than other commitments). Therefore, part of our human subjective human story is itself shaped and constrained by the causal powers of objective reality (2000, p. 313)

Thus, for Archer our subjectivity and objectivity, agency and structure are inextricably intertwined (2000, p. 313). The complex interweaving and iterative nature of our action in the world (arrived at through reflexive deliberation) is presented in Figure 2.4 above. The power of this model is that it protects against researchers 'imputing' intentions, motivations and findings on to participants rather than 'examining' their 'own reflexively defined reasons, aims and concerns' (Archer, 2007, pp. 13-15)[105].

Within social contexts, structures enable and constrain through their emergent oppressive and repressive powers. It is through tapping into ICs that researchers can gain insight to how people understand enabling and constraining powers and what kinds of concerns, projects and practices emerge. Sometimes we encounter activated social agency (Clegg, 2016) where people have made purposeful transformative shifts to social contexts and the relations within them. Archer is adamant that we must honour and trust the IC in order to enable insight into if, where, and how social agency is activated. This is because the IC has real causal powers in our social worlds.

Honouring the internal conversation

Perhaps we have noticed that our internal conversation rarely pauses or sleeps (Archer, 2002, p. 19). A common Buddhist metaphor for the discursive aspect of mind is 'monkey mind' (drunken monkeys!). It would be easy to conflate the 'never suspended' IC with 'monkey mind' and view Archer's honouring of the IC as questionable. We could return to our familiar (Western) philosophical, Abrahamic inspired and culturally inscribed stance towards the human being as

[104] See Collier (1994, pp. 76-85) regarding the epistemic fallacy as equating what we know for what is and not accounting for the possibility that we may or may not know how things are.

[105] Resulting in the 'Two-Stage Model' (common to much social science research) where the 'first-person subjective ontology of the agent's internal conversation' is turned 'into a third person "objectivist" account proffered by the investigator' (Archer 2007, pp. 13-14).

basically untrustworthy and their subjective accounts inherently suspect. Following positivist social sciences traditions, we would not afford human beings the dignity of 'having the last word about themselves' (Archer, 2003, p. 11).

Archer (2003) insists that social science researchers must give participants the opportunity to not only express, but also take seriously, what participants think and their underlying motivations. She outlines three key elements in support of viewing personal 'outlooks' and subsequent stances towards the world as valid and necessary to social science research (Archer, 2003, p. 14). First: people are right in recognising that humans live 'in a social world that has different properties and powers from [their] own', which also acts to enable and or constrain their efforts (Archer, 2000, p. 21). As mentioned above, in their causal efficacy, enablements and constraints are relatively autonomous and pre-exist human action. Second, subjectivity is 'our own internal property' – it is real because it is influential, i.e. has powers that can affect change personally and in our society (2000, p. 22). This is Bhaskar's point: that reasons are causes (Bhaskar, 1998). Agents are different kinds of things to structures because we have reasons and can act on them. Benton asserts that this is because our IC must:

> … reconcile the demands arising from practical interaction with natural, practical and social orders, it follows that it must, as a source of personal identity, be wider in scope than social identity. (Benton, 2001, p. 37)

Not only is the human capacity for reflexive self-evaluation and the practice of the IC it entails central to the development of personal identity, but also distinguishes human agents from social structures and culture (Archer, 2000). For Archer, structures and agents are ontologically distinct, but dialectically entwined as an 'analytical dualism' (Archer, 1995, p. 76).

Through Archer's sociological operationalisation of CR, we experience an ontology, which affords human beings knowledge, agency and a kind of 'expertise' (discriminating awareness), about our own lives. As we necessarily engage with (and within) the three aspects of reality (natural, social and practical), we gain different kinds of emergent and interactive knowledge (embodied, affective, practical and discursive). It is through this developmental process that our social agency emerges. Thus, for Archer, social agency is viewed developmentally. This suggests that we can educate for

social agency and for increased reflexivity. However, this requires attention to the conditions freedom requires for genuine learning to occur.

Critical realism: a cautionary note

For the novice critical realist, nuanced engagement with varieties of social constructionism, post-structuralism and feminist theory in general is not available within the work of Bhaskar or his earlier proponents (e.g. Archer, Outhwaite or Hartwig[106]). Thus, CR is easily viewed as a radically singular meta-philosophy. From outside of the field there has been criticism (for example Manzi, 2002) that CR tends to create a 'straw person' particularly, from 'strong constructionism' by not engaging with versions of 'weak constructionism' and where it overlaps significantly with CR (Fopp, 2008). Both Elder-Vass (2010) and Farrugia and Woodman (2015) have sought to remedy this. Refuting Archer's negation of Bourdieu's work[107] (particularly on *habitus*), Elder-Vass (2010) proposes that a dialectical engagement with both theorists enhances the productivity of their respective bodies of work. This is something that is congruent with current feminist scholarship. For these writers, CR's radical nature lies not in its singularity, but in its lucid, precise and perspicacious insights, commitments and method. They propose that CR is most transformative where it enacts its underlabourer role thereby enhancing, and making more effective and productive existing ontologies and epistemologies (see Elder-Vass, 2010; Gillman, 2016; Gunnarsson, 2017; Gunnarsson et al., 2016; Mussell, 2016; Satsangi, 2013). For both Gunnarsson (2017) and Mussell (2016) this increased 'productivity' means sharper identification of oppressive structures and the political conditions and relations that enable them. Norrie (2004) also illuminates that rather than eschew influential 20th century theoretical movements of feminist and poststructuralist theory, CR can enable new 'critical standpoints':

> Bhaskar's starting point is the social and historical (constructed) character of forms of knowledge, but he holds on to the idea that social and historical processes are real and emergent. Human beings live in society and history, by and through norms, forms and relations that are structured and shaped … Recognising that we are part of an emergent social and historical world, we can hold on to the insights of

[106] Obvious (later) exceptions are Lawson (followed recently by Gunnarsson) regarding feminist standpoint theory; Norrie regarding post structuralism and ethics, and Adorno (Norrie in Archer 1998, pp 702-722; Norrie 2004); and Elder-Vass regarding social constructionism (2012).

[107] See Archer (2007, pp. 38-49; 2012, pp. 47-48, 68-82).

> poststructuralism concerning difference and exclusion without positing an abstract ethical 'beyond.' There is no metaphysical 'other,' but there is real emergent history and developing social structure, and these generate actual difference, conflict, change, sometimes crisis. Difference, 'something new,' emerges in real time, space and history. New perspectives and critical standpoints, new ways of looking at old phenomena … are produced in this process of emerging change and difference. (Norrie, 1998, p. 704)

Where CR has been undeniably persuasive is in deepening understanding of the micro-macro 'dualism' of S-A within a broader social ontology, and which provides part of the key philosophical furnishing for this project.

The second half of this chapter presented Archer's operationalisation of Bhaskar's resolution of the S-A problematic. Her contribution allows for a non-reductive or conflationary exploration and explanation of human agency. The IC reveals the human processes of deliberation upon specific situations and then reflexively committing to particular projects, positions and identities (Clegg, 2016, p. 506). Critical realism does not resolve structural problems – such as violence of all kinds, and personal inaction. Instead, it provides a range of methodological tools[108] – highlighted in this chapter – for examining the underlying causal powers and mechanisms at play. The hope for human beings as social actors resides in three realisations:

- recognition of our ground state of capacity and potential;
- the irreducibility of our ontology to our social contexts; and
- understanding that we are all inherently evaluative and reflexive beings. We cannot but engage with all aspects of our world.

This ontology of human adequacy and theory of active reflexive agents disrupts the dominant Western cultural view rooted in human lack and deficit (Critchley, 2012; Loy, 2002, 2014). It is a central lens of inquiry for this project. In the following chapter, I outline the realist methodological architecture and method for the project

[108] Including vantage point, immanent critique, 'ontological depth', and morphogenetic theory, the internal conversation, understanding different dominant reflexive modes and how human development and learning occurs through interaction with the different realities of our world.

CHAPTER 3
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Introduction

In this chapter, a case is made for investigating active human agency as the ground for other ways of being and doing vis-à-vis increasing regulation of higher education, and the excavation of its purpose as an ethical and social good. The chapter is organised into four moves: the first speaks to the notion of educating in the 21st century given the seemingly omnipresent neoliberal project. An examination of its implications for higher education focusses on North America, where the fieldwork for this project took place. The second move considers Butler (2005) and Ball's (2015) solicitation of how to be 'otherwise' (vis-à-vis neoliberalism). Recent scholarship on neoliberal subjectivities in higher education is explored in order to identify the kinds of agency in which neoliberal subjectivity consists. The third move highlights calls from within higher education for a renewed focus on ontology and the human person. Both Mindfulness and contemplative education are educational approaches, which have emerged within the complexity of these times. While ostensibly overlapping, this thesis proposes that they rely upon different underlying generative mechanisms, shaping distinctive ontologies: of education, and of being human. The fourth move focusses entirely on CHE. Mapping this field reveals its current emergent nature, and that two key defining narratives underpin it. The chapter ends with a discussion of current tensions in the field and gaps in scholarship.

Educating in the 21st century

Over the past fifteen years, a growing amount of literature emphasises that higher education is experiencing deep crisis and a state of heightened urgency (Asher, 2015; Gill & Donaghue, 2016; Giroux, 2010; Sidhu, 2015). These are times of significant transition and change – phenomenal technological advances, a globalised market, and the free flow of labour and capital (Archer, 2007, 2012; Asher, 2015). Juxtaposing this is a persistent ineptitude to feed and care for inhabitants of this planet. These are particularly challenging times for young people with diminishing employment

opportunities, the increasing variety of everything[109] and the unfamiliarity of older generations with current circumstances (Archer 2012). All face a challenging and unpredictable world. How to educate for this 21st century? Why educate?

Many educators, philosophers and social theorists concur that education is a project for both personal development and social change. For example, those working within the philosophical interstices between East and West[110] propose that education (including HE) is a project for 'drawing out individual capacities in the support of new perspectives' (Bhaskar 2002); as well as 'creating further dignity in our own living situation', and helping society by 'not allowing it to fall asleep' (Trungpa, 1978, pp. 3-4). Furthermore, Adorno framed this educational demand of creating further dignity as 'striving against barbarism' and making sure that 'Auschwitz not happen again' (Adorno, 2010, p. 191). The 'single genuine power standing against the principle of [barbarism][111] is autonomy'. Adorno defines 'autonomy'[112] as 'the power of reflection, of self-determination, of not cooperating' (Adorno, 2010, pp. 1,4). While it is 'personal', it is 'always a socially connected situation' that consistently has to be 'established and developed' (Spatscheck, 2010, p. 7). These three philosophers (Bhaskar, Trungpa and Adorno) all engage East-West in dialogue. They offer a view of education as both process and praxis, underpinned by an ontology of human capability. Education, as such, is oriented towards 'unfolding the enfolded' (Bhaskar, 2016, p. 165), and gaining access to our neuroses and not participating in their perpetuation. Its purpose is to 'further human dignity and societal wakefulness' (Trungpa, 1978, p. 5), thereby creating more response-able human beings.

The neoliberal project

Many express concerns about the future of higher education in relation to the pervasive influence of neoliberalism[113]. Described as series of politico-economic principles (or structures) neoliberalism

[109] That is: media, social media, technology, information, ideas, modes of surveillance, and types of employment etcetera.

[110] See Bhaskar (2002), Adorno (1959), Trungpa (1978), hooks (1984), and Todd and Ergas(2016)

[111] In this instance, Adorno uses the term 'Auschwitz' (1998, p.4).

[112] Adorno clarifies that he draws on the 'Kantian expression' of 'autonomy',

[113] See discussion further below.

promotes the free flow of capital within and across traditional geo-political borders, seeking the least hindrance possible (in the form of restriction, regulation, protection) (Adorno, 2010; Connors, 2015, p.3). The neoliberal 'project' promotes individual 'entrepreneurial freedoms and skills' (made possible by this reduced regulation and protection). As a system of ideas and supporting ideals (Connell & Dados, 2014), neoliberalism garners consent through a somewhat seductive and viral discourse of common sense. Appealing to the human yearning for freedom, it repackages this into increased (individual) freedom of choice leading to manifold wellbeing (Amsler, 2008; Harvey, 2007). Key features of neoliberalism and its market-oriented logic include: privatisation and commodification; ('the fine art of') 'crisis creation, management and manipulation'; and various redistributive policies Harvey (Harvey, 2007, pp. 160-64). Rather than 're-generating' wealth and income, neoliberalism's 'main substantive achievement' has been the funnelling upwards of vast amounts of wealth (Harvey, 2007, p.159). As such, it has been discursively reframed from a late-modern economic project, into a 'political' and 'class project' (Amsler, 2008, p.9; Amsler & Canaan, 2008; Robertson, 2008). In in relation to education, Connell (2014) remarks that 'the worldwide extension of market logic continues with education at the cutting edge' (p.132).

Within higher education, the neoliberal turn (Connell, 2013b) has meant a general reorientation of policy and practice towards the service of the market. Universities are forced to serve economic ends and perform with certain market-like behaviours. Contemporary scholars, indicating ever-diminishing structures, spaces, and capacities for change, observe a swathe of effects. First, there is strong emphasis on measurability, accountability, and performance. These mechanisms exert their powers in the form of increased control over academic performance and curriculum design, reduced liberal arts programmes, and contribution to a compressed notion of time for deep scholarly thinking and practice (Biesta, 2015a; Harvey, 2007; Morley, Marginson, & Blackmore, 2014; Shahjahan, 2014). Second, there is a sense of the university, once a public good, now refashioning itself as the 'corporate university' (Adsit, Doe, Allison, Maggio, & Maisto, 2016; Giroux, 2014). The corporate university concerns itself first and foremost with buildings, branding, global rankings and reputation in order to get ahead within what a broader societal logic of competition (Archer, 2014a; Aronowitz & Giroux, 2003; Hazelkorn, 2015; Scott, Brown, & Lunt, 2004). Third, as

managerialist policies and practices dominate, there has been a demise of the educational leader who is now replaced by managers who have cut their teeth in the corporate sector (Dennis, 2016; Lorenz, 2012; Smith, 2015b). This has hit faculties of Education in a particularly forceful way. In these units, it combines with historical neglect (by both sociology and philosophy) to the intersection of 'ethics-education-leadership' (Barnett, 2017; Dennis, 2016) leaving the field, and faculties, bereft of a language for debating ethical responsibility (Beaton, 2010) and support in counterpoising the constraints of a corporate managerial ethos and its ensuing practices (Dennis, 2016, p. 117). From within the sociology of education, Amsler (2008) observes that the effects of all of these mechanisms is resulting in the 'decline of professional confidence in the sociological "normality" of the possibility of radical social change' (2008, p.3). What human resourcefulness is there to draw upon? Will we see current and future generations too diminished in their capacity to imagine real possible alternatives or 'concrete utopias'? (Bhaskar, Esbjörn-Hargens, Hedlund, & Hartwig, 2015, p. 235) What happens within this increasingly corporatised sphere where 'education has become a commodity and not a right'? (Connell, 2013a, p. 136)

A rise in the cult of the (education) professional appears to be replacing that of the expert. Evetts (2003) proposes that the term 'professional' now involves critically orienting others to 21st century pressures and socialisation – a role ostensibly resonant with that of the educator. However, as neoliberal logics increasingly shape teacher subjectivities (Connell, 2013b), the educators themselves are in turmoil (Bexley, James, & Arkoudis, 2011; Lorenz, 2012). A constellation of nuisances is observed. Academics are under siege by increasing workloads, job insecurity, diversification of tasks, corporatist management, and the accompanying audit culture (Dennis, 2016; Lorenz, 2012). Amidst the squeeze on time and job security, is increasing emphasis on teaching quality, oriented to maximising student employability (Billot, 2010; Boyd & Smith, 2016; Shahjahan, 2015). Ironically, the new 'knowledge economy' is not to be facilitated through broadened or deepened knowledge and understanding but rather through preparation for the workforce (Canaan, Amsler, Cowden, Motta, & Singh, 2010, p. 210). Stronach et al articulate these tensions as the 'economy of performance' in conflict with 'ecologies of practice' (2002, p. 109). That universities have become a 'financial sector infused by the logic of profit' (Ball, 2012, p. 27) is

now a central pivot point for most critical (scholarly) engagement with higher education. Yet Connell (2007) cautions against generalisations: place must be considered as the take-up of neoliberalism has been differentiated across regions.[114] What does the scholarship reveal about neoliberalisation of HE in North America?

Higher education in the USA

While Harvey offers that neoliberalism's full investiture happened circa 1979 (UK and the USA), it came to the fore differently within the USA where the neoliberal project melded with existing cultural sensitivities and structural mechanisms. Two are distinct: first, a 'long embedded' notion of individual freedom/s and not discreet from 'an equally long embedded' accommodation of dispossession and deprivation of that freedom (Harvey, 2007, p. 5). Under neoliberal policies, individual freedoms became seen as partially 'guaranteed by the freedom of the market and of trade' (Harvey, 2007, p.7). Second, a tradition of partnership between corporate culture and higher education for over a century (Brint & Clotfelter, 2016). Higher education in North America is decentralised, powerful, and a much more 'highly tiered[115] and multiply segmented sector' (Brint & Clotfelter, 2016, p.6) than countries like Australia, for example. Employing immanent critique through a lens of effectiveness and efficiency to the US HE sector, Brint and Clotfelter (2016) draw on qualitative (including sociological) and demographic data to bring to the fore the intersection of higher education with neoliberal practices. Unlike antipodean HEIs, universities and colleges in the USA have been drawing on corporate sector practices for over 100 years (Brint & Clotfelter, 2016, p.23-24). However, neoliberalism has taken this to a new level. As Wagner and Shajahan observe 'neoliberal logic has increasingly come to influence the ways in which institutions are run' (2015,

[114] Harvey (2007) also refers to this.

[115] This tiering includes a broader range of higher education institutions including 2-year colleges; baccalaureate-granting universities; master's and Doctoral granting universities; a small selection of very wealthy liberal arts colleges; research focussed universities; for-profit universities; and a range of specialised institutions. For example, religious seminaries, business or management universities, etcetera (Brint, 2009; Brint & Clotfelter, 2016; Saunders, 2010; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). The universities included in this research project were all three-year Bachelors and masters granting institutions, with a few also offering doctoral degrees. None was religious or only offering Bachelor level programmes.

p.244).

Specific to the USA are a range of mechanisms, which both enable and constrain the processes of educating. Those most pertinent to this project and discussed by all research participants include important structural divisions along the lines of selectivity, wealth, and prestige, and significant investment by large corporations and their foundations. Concerning the latter, there has been huge recent investment in to MOOCs (Massive Open Online Learning Communities). For an excellent presentation of the journey to the current precarity of liberal education in the USA *vis-à-vis* corporate culture, Andrew Rossi's (2014) film *Ivory Tower* presents a sobering chronicle. Other mechanisms include increasing interdisciplinary initiatives and doctoral degrees, a well-established philanthropic sector, and furtherance of a customary four-fold mapping of academic disciplines along the lines of hard/soft sciences, qualitative/quantitative, and knowledge for 'knowledge's' sake vs. for application (vocation) (Brint, 2015; Bring & Clotfelter 2016). In spite of large investment into 'financial aid', there are weighty issues of access and completion for students from low-socio-economic contexts (Brint & Clotfelter, 2016), with high and rising tuition fees. Again, these affect most severely, the least wealthy of students. Finally, there is a bandwagon effect regarding the adoption of corporate management 'fads' (Brint, 2015; Brint & Clotfelter, 2016; Rossi, 2014; Saunders, 2010).

While neoliberalism has become a 'dominant hegemony' within the USA over last three decades (Saunders, 2010, p.45), there has also been a backlash. A growing scepticism of corporate-style HEIs is evident in the increased volume of studies and critiques that observe the rise of, for example, 'academic capitalism' (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997), 'the corporatization of academic life' (Schrecker, 2013) and 'everything up for sale' in the neoliberal university (Bok, 2009)[116]. Yet, it would seem that any project aimed at countering the neoliberalisation of the university (Anderson, 2016b)[117] must also consider broader and deeper cultural and structural mechanisms. This is

[116] Key additional backlash publications include Washburn (2008); Kirp (2003); Selingo (2013); and Kamenetz (2010).

[117] While this is a well-used phrase, Anderson is of interest because of his PhD research being an indicator of the emerging scholarly critique of the Mindfulness movement (see discussion further below).

because neoliberal policies and projects were introduced into an already accommodating structural context. Mechanisms of dispossession through increased privatisation, commodification, and an individualist approach to wellbeing, were familiar tropes within the prevailing ideology of liberalism. Disregarding humans as inherently social and communal beings, liberal individualism (Kymlicka, 1989) supported a 'pull yourself up by the bootstraps' approach to everyday health, wealth and success. It is a small move from here to understand how, decades later, 'mindfulness' North American-style arose as an individualist practice of psychological wellbeing and repair. As well as why it gained such cultural traction within US society and why both mindfulness and CHE have until recently been overwhelmingly white, middle-class phenomena (Forbes, 2016; Ng & Purser, 2015).

Key tensions: neoliberalism and higher education in the USA

The above discussion points to a selection of some of the many mechanisms shaping higher education in the USA today. Across the globe, neoliberalisms manifest in different ways (Connell, 2013b; Harvey, 2007). While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an in-depth account of the precise mechanisms and processes involved in to the inquiry in the neoliberalisation of HE, it is nevertheless important to note in summary their capacities to not only constrain but also reframe learning environments, teaching, and pedagogical possibilities. As a result, current approaches to education tend to 'defy the very values of ethics and quality they profess to uphold' (Dennis, 2016; Stromquist, 2017, p. 132). Tensions common across Australia, UK, NZ and North America include: a focus, not on the co-learning venture of education (i.e. educator and educatee), but on student learning (Biesta, 2015b calls this 'learnification'); and an emphasis on individual teachers and students, rather than enabling learning environments (Brown, 2009; Williams, 2012). Canaan and Shumar (2008) refer to this as the 'commodification' of knowledge. Another mechanism is the increasingly casualised workforce (Brint & Clotfelter, 2016; Stromquist, 2017), leaving fewer educators with depth of experience and practice and finally, a pervasive regulatory culture characterised by what Shore and Wright (2015) call 'governing by numbers'.

Within North America, scholars observe specific additional tensions. These include: the rise of 'bare pedagogies' oriented to 'market considerations' rather than human needs and relationality

(Giroux, 2010, p. 85), along with funding cut-backs so severe that public universities are having to raise revenue and increase online learning to support themselves (Shahjahan, 2014; Stromquist, 2017). Both Douglas (2014); (Giroux, 2010) observe and lament the militarisation of campuses, alongside of cultivating individual achievement and prestige to enhance the institution (Stromquist, 2017, p. 141). Additional tensions include: a most spectacular 'hidden curriculum' (Douglas, 2014); and a rise in 'adjunct' and 'contingent' faculty for 'efficiency' in spite of research showing that these educators produce lower levels of student learning (Stromquist, 2017). There is also a drive for increasing competition to augment efficiency, alongside of diminished pay and working conditions, and fewer avenues of power within institutions to address such needs. This leads to a protetarianization where university teaching becomes just another low-paying service job (Anderson, 2016b). The role of the educator is reduced to 'academic worker' (Waring, 2013). While all of this is creating new forms of power, modes of governance, and thus subjectivities (Shore & Wright, 2015, p.22) there appears to be a tendency towards losing sight of spaces and opportunity.

The possibility of 'being otherwise'?

Since entering the university working environment over ten years ago, I have witnessed a shift in the culture and ethos of the university. It is repositioning itself from a vibrant public space representing a battleground of competing ideas and policies (Ball, 2012) to one fashioned by a logic of profit, metrics, audit and survival[118]. The culture of survival triggers certain reflexivities and perhaps discourages others. Ball's (2015, p. 5) question 'who have we become and who might we be otherwise?' offers pause for reflection that could evoke alternatives to the 'hell in a handcart' narrative and its accompanying despair (Connell et al., 2009). The tendency to see neoliberalism as a behemoth to be overthrown (Connell & Dados, 2014; Rose, 1999a, 1999b) is readily presented (Gill & Donaghue, 2016; Kumar, 2012; Lorenz, 2012). This leaves little space for human agency (refer back to Chapter 2). It continually reorients towards the prevailing ontology of deficit and impoverishment, and encourages the dovetailing of inner conversations towards totalising (neoliberal) discourses of 'crisis' and 'moral panic' (Archer, 2003; Dennis, 2016). Taking a critical

[118] The fight for survival of the latter is particularly pronounced within North America and increasingly more so within Australia and NZ (Davies, 2005; Thornton, 2015).

realist lens and viewing neoliberalism as emerging from varied causal mechanisms (Connell & Dados, 2014; 2015) allows us to see that while neoliberal logics are pervasive, they are not totalising; in HE actors have enacted diverse 'tactics to contest neoliberal conceptions of diversity' (Shahjahan, 2014, p.225). Yet, precisely because of the complexity of context and wickedness of the situation, 'we need multiple tools and lenses' (Andreotti, 2010, p. 244; Cuthill, 2012).

A number of social and educational theorists are opening up spaces through which we might respond to Ball's (2015) entreaty. Many draw on Foucault[119], particularly his later work where he makes a conscious shift from emphasising technologies of domination to technologies of 'care of the self' (Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Foucault, 1986; Hattam & Baker, 2015) while others use a Freirean, activist, critical pedagogy lens[120]. Reading across this diverse group there are common themes relating to a politics of refusal, resistance, renunciation, destabilisation and avoidance. What then becomes possible under neoliberalism is understanding that relations are more contingent, fractured and unstable than we fear them to be, or even want them to be (Rose, 1999a, 1999b). Neoliberalism is not 'all encompassing' – there is space and latitude for resistance and more relational ways of being (Torres, 2012, p. 29). In this vein, Connell (2013a, 2013b; 2014) highlights the importance of 'building alternative spaces' to counter the 'shrinking of the public arena of reflection and debate' (Connell, 2013a, pp. 284-285).

What we designate as 'neoliberalism' is a constellation of mechanisms and emergent properties which exist within what Archer calls a socio-historical 'logic of competition' (2007, 2012). The accompanying 'logics' that then assume and justify these structures (Shahjahan, 2014, p. 222) are presented as discursive formations which frequently appear to us as 'truths' (Prado 2006 in Ball, 2015, p. 5; Rainbow & Rose, 2003). The neoliberal logic we are most familiar with is grounded in a view of the human being as committedly self-serving and active in pursuing the enhancement of the self and its 'capital' (Rose, 1990; Shahjahan, 2014). Under this strange (non-relational) logic of

[119] For examples see Rose (1989,1999); Hattam and Baker (2015); Ng (2015); Brady (2014); Dennis (2016); Ball (2012, 2015); and Ball and Olmedo (2013).

[120] See Martin and Brown (2013); Torres (2008); Shahjahan, Wagner & Wane (2009); Canaan et al (2010); and Giroux (2003, 2010. 2012).

economic rationality, the 'individual' human person is the 'object of intervention in neoliberal efforts (Ong, 2006; Rose, 1990; Shahjahan, 2014, p. 221). Butler (2001) proposes that it is through coming up against these 'regimes of truth' that the terms of self-recognition become possible. For example in being 'governed by numbers' (Shore & Wright, 2015) we become aware of our humanity as more than numbers, evidence and instrumentality; in the dialectic of struggle we (potentially) locate ourselves. Butler proposes that when we question regimes of truth we also question our own ontological status (Ball, 2015; Butler, 2005). Returning to Ball's aforementioned enquiry we observe no lack of scholarly discussion of 'who we have become' under these 'regimes' of neoliberal (un)truth. But who are we? What is the human 'ontological status' that Butler has us greeting? What kinds of agency for being otherwise might it avail? (Ball, 2015; Ball & Olmedo, 2013) From the perspective of CR, it is the particular subjective (agential) capacities of human persons that make alternatives possible.

Subjectivity, self-work and embodied dispositions

Scholars view human 'subjectivity as a site of struggle and resistance' via which possibilities for thinking differently and being differently may be glimpsed (Ball, 2012, 2015; Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Brady, 2014; Rose, 1990, 1999b; Shahjahan, 2014, 2015). Drawing on Foucault, Ball (2015) iterates that the process is two-fold, involving 'self-examination' and 'self-work'. The first involves critically reflecting so as to destabilise, disengage from and renounce what we have become. The second points to finding spaces to recognise one's self according to one's own principles: the development of an 'aesthetics of the self'' (Ball & Olmedo, 2013, pp. 84, 92-94). In counterpoising neoliberalism in the academy, cultivating 'negative ethics' and 'negative ontology' points to ways of envisioning a new politics of individual and 'collective refusal' (Ball, 2015; Dennis, 2016). However, as (Sayer, 1992) might ask, how could such a theory offer 'practical adequacy'? It does not tell us about the everyday reality of either collectivist, or embodied practices. We are material beings. What to do with our human bodies, which are also bearing, and being recruited into neoliberal ways of being, and performing? An excellent illustration is the reality of speed-up in daily neoliberal life that continually pushes efficiency and productivity (Berg & Seeber, 2013). Shahjahan (2015) identifies human 'contemplative' bodies as real sites of resistance against the 'temporal

colonisation of our bodies' and the 'mind-centred epistemologies' of the neoliberal academy (Shahjahan, 2015, pp. 5-6). Yet, as Archer asserts, it is precisely through our materiality, and engaging with the three orders (the practical, social and natural realms of existence) that we gain knowledge of the world and ourselves as agential beings.

Both Ball (2013; 2015) and Shajahan (2014, 2015) recognise that critical reflection alone will not suffice in an activist resistance. For Ball, this is because it does not offer a way of working with how we conduct ourselves in specific situations, and for Shahjahan because we need to use our bodies (as well as our thoughts) as modes of non-conformity and resistance. Recognising and resisting less than fully human ways of being is important and skilful, particularly given the neoliberal penchant for crisis creation and manipulation. However, such politics of refusal, resistance and non-participation requires courage, relying on a strong sense of trust in and care for self (Connell, 2013a). What is unclear in all of the above is with what ontology of being such skills and stances emerge from. When we are burdened by disappointment and disheartenment, from where is an active agency obtained? From what ground do we 're-envision and undiscipline economic subjectivities' (Saltmarsh, 2011, p. 134) and will this suffice? Even Shahjahan focussing on deeply contemplative and embodied ways of being discloses that dislodging our neoliberal personhood and invoking a 'new vision of ourselves and HE' is difficult to imagine when we are constrained by 'scarcity thinking' (Shahjahan, 2012, p. 11; 2014, p. 11). Similarly, Connell and Giroux both highlight the importance of building productive spaces to counter the 'shrinking of the public arena of reflection and debate'' (Connell, 2013b, pp. 284-285) and allow the emergence of what Giroux (in Harper, 2014, p. 1084) refers to as a 'new agency':

> Opposing the forces of domination is important, but it does not go far enough. We must move beyond a language of pointless denunciations and offer instead a language that moves forward with the knowledge, skills and social relations necessary for the creation of new modes of agency, social movements and democratic economic and social policies. We need to open up the realm of human possibility, recognize that history is open, that justice is never complete, and that democracy can never be fully settled. (Harper, 2014, p. 1084)

There are appeals to agency in the literature, but what exactly is agency? How are we to conceive

it? From Archer we have the helpful distinction between primary and corporate agents,[121] and social actors. The latter are those who have brought to bear upon a particular (social) concern[122] their inherent human capacities of reflexivity and creativity. Archer acknowledges the role that being born into privilege[123] plays in shaping the 'initial interests' which we, as agents, are 'endowed'. These provide:

> …. the leverage upon which reasons (otherwise known as constraints and enablements) for different courses of action operate. They do not determine the particular Social Actor an individual chooses to become, but they strongly condition what type of Social Actor the vast majority can and do become. (Archer 2000: 285)'

So what does determine who and what we become? The relational goods inherited from our 'natal contexts' are pivotal to which reflexive mode dominates. Remembering that it is the meta-reflexive who is most likely to be an agent of social 're-orientation' which is an the outcome of bringing together 'their life courses' and their 'value commitments' (Archer, 2007, p. 322). Yet what Archer omits is the existence and (real) power of human yearning in agency. Bhaskar, however did recognise this, observing that 'there is a real striving and yearning for freedom deep down in all humans'[124] (Hartwig, 2015, p. 232).

We yearn for bigger worlds and have an inherent antipathy towards determinism. Buddhist psychology expresses this as a yearning to step beyond the stifling, imprisoning familiarity of the 'ego' or 'cocoon'. This human capacity to long for something forgotten, or not yet realised, is implicit in scholarship theorising the possibility of 'being otherwise' *vis-á-vis* persistent neoliberal impingements (Bazzul, 2012). What is being sought but not always clearly articulated, is a persistent, reflexive, and 'active agency'; an agency that allows us to both envision and resource concrete utopias (Bhaskar, 2016), as well as 'resisting notions of action that are productive' and refusing what we have become (Shahjahan, 2014, p. 12). It is important to stress that Bhaskar's view of concrete utopianism does not simply entail cognitive performance. Rather, it is grounded in

[121] For example, all those human beings like me studying at Flinders University.

[122] That is of personal significance and concern.

[123] In terms of material needs being met, the possibility for self-determination, and access to education, nurturance and freedom from violence against our person.

[124] He referred to this as 'the pulse of freedom' (Bhaskar, 1993).

‘dispositional realism’ where’ the idea that possibilities as well as their actualisations are real’ (2016, p. 93). It is a key tool for thinking about how to affect a transition to the good society – for all. We know that similarly placed individuals act differently and sometimes in the face of all odds. This ontological view of the human being and their agency allows for more than mere human existence (‘primary agency’) or collective identity (‘corporate agency’) (Archer, 2000, 2003). It makes possible in every moment the resourcing of ‘ways of being otherwise’.This research project seeks to examine and explain the role of CHE in cultivating a socially-oriented active agency.

Both critical realism and Mahayana Buddhism offer support to this project by proposing that as human beings we always have access to a (transcendentally) real ‘ground state’ (Bhaskar, 2016, p. 162). While it can never be fully understood, or pinned down, it is from this space of vast plurality and possibility that both human yearning, and agency emerge. Theories of critical self-reflection, contemplative embodiment, active refusal and resistance are immensely helpful (even inspiring). However, they are inadequate in resourcing agency amidst deep disheartenment and pervasive scarcity thinking about what it means to be human, and how to educate for the 21st century.

Will shifts in understanding suffice?

Drawing back out to the broader literature on higher education, there are additional calls for ‘shifts in our understanding’ (Williams, 2008, p. 534); ‘new epistemologies’ (Elliot 2015 in Dennis, 2016, p. 124); seeking new ‘identity’ opportunities (Harris, 2005); building alliances (Giroux, 2011); and activist stances (Stetsenko, 2014). Activist oriented scholarship makes appeals to bring to visibility and name (collectivist, communal and feminist) activities from the centre and margins of universities (Adsit et al., 2016; Brady, 2014; Gill & Donaghue, 2016). Lacking again, is a strong and clear sense of human agency. It is here that critical realism acts as an underlabourer for thinking about a ‘deep ontology’ of being human. An ontology that permits understanding of the differentiated agential and reflexive positions that may (or may not) be emergent vis-á-vis neoliberalism in the academy.

Much literature on the current crisis and challenges in higher education has a focus on human agency that is either weak, related only to negative capabilities, or on ontologically thin ground –

for example, Ball (2015); Dennis (2016); Gill and Donaghue (2016). What kind of education and pedagogies does this allow for? What kinds of students does it seek to cultivate or produce? Education from the Latin root verb '*educare*' (to lead out, educe)[125] is an ethical activity (Dennis, 2016). Nurturing human capacities into their full flourishing for the benefit and enjoyment of all sentient beings is the ethical impulse of education. It requires space and freedom (Heidegger in Dall'Alba & Barnacle, 2007). Therefore, the challenge presented to all educators is how we respond to the considerable global challenges before us. How can HE cultivate awareness of and confidence in a rich set of human capacities and potentialities that can resource both active agency and an alternative art of being human? (Menihan, 2012) If *educare* is taken seriously then it cannot be reduced simply to teaching and learning. The work that is most noteworthy in this regard is from the margins of HE literature. It places our shared humanity front and centre, calling for relational approaches that are ontological in nature (Barnett, 2009; Clegg, 2005, 2008; Dall'Alba & Barnacle, 2007; Eppert et al., 2015; Palmer, Zajonc, & Scribner, 2010). There are others; for example from psychology (Stetsenko, 2012, 2014) and sociology (Smith, 2011). Their message is clear: more attention needs to be given to the human and their agency (Clegg, 2005). This is more than student-centeredness alone. Rather, is about the human capacity for active agency and relations with contemporary societal structures. Here, Mindfulness and CHE have radically different conceptions of the human and human-society relations.

The Mindfulness movement

Strikingly absent in almost all HE literature mentioned above are the students – or 'educatees' – of HE (exceptions include Amsler & Canaan, 2008; Canaan et al., 2010). Instead, the focus remains firmly upon being an academic in the neoliberal university. This differs in the fields of psychology and psychology of education. There, a proliferation of research and debate relates to student performance, outcomes, anxiety, mental-health and wellbeing. The focus on the individual self and its anxieties suggests support for Rose's (1990) prescient observation of the rise of the 'psy'

[125]Definition from the OED Online accessed 29/08/2016 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/educe.

sciences extending into all domains of existence. Again, the question of individualism as an ideology of liberalism in all its forms (including neoliberalism) is important here. While some call for the reinvigoration of existing pedagogies (for example: critical-Freirean; transformative; and holistic), two new approaches to education in the 21st century are noted: Mindfulness in education, and contemplative education. Both focus on the educator and learner in very different ways. The latter pertains predominantly to HE and the former is now readily found across both K-12, and higher education. Ostensibly, these two 'new' pedagogical approaches have arisen in response or parallel to this turbulent epoch. Rife with anxiety, precarity and flux, these times mean that socialisation for young people is a complex and often-confusing experience. The support and 'advice' they receive from older or extended family members is either unhelpful or insignificant. This is because the degree of variety present in the world they encounter and need to begin to make a life for themselves in, has not been known before. It is also rapidly changing (Archer, 2007, 2012). This state of affairs provides an interesting lens of inquiry into emerging new approaches such as mindfulness and contemplative education and will be discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6. The apparent companion pedagogies of Mindfulness and Contemplative Education do have similarities (as discussed below), however, there are significant differences not least socio-ethical commitments.

Both mindfulness and contemplative education arose as almost exclusively North American phenomena (predominantly the USA). Their origins precede neoliberalism. However as discussed below, in reality they make an entrance generations apart (mid-seventies, as opposed to the early 'noughties') and thus parallel to, or from within the neoliberal creep into HE. This distinction is important in terms of the different generative mechanisms and cultures of those respective times; that is, 'hippy' post-68, and the corporate pull. Underpinning these are different aspirations and yearnings.

A brief history of mindfulness

The prevailing narrative regarding the 'turning point' for mindfulness' entry into mainstream discourse occurred circa 2003 when Jon Kabat-Zinn (MIT) published research demonstrating 'the 'clinical efficacy' of mindfulness practice (Ergas, 2013b; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Fondly seen as the

‘forefather’ of secular mindfulness practice, Kabat-Zinn ‘pioneered’ his Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) course in 1990 as a support for people with chronic pain. Through packaging MBSR as a form of ‘secularised and re-configured’ Buddhist meditation he managed to avoid the ‘risk’ of it being seen as new-agey Buddhist, Eastern mysticism, or ‘just plain flaky’ (Grossman & Van Dam, 2011, p. 289) . It is important to note that in the early 1990s when Kabbat-Zinn was working and researching his MBSR approach, the USA socio-cultural context was at its peak of ‘new-age religiosities’ where individuals and movements were seeking the ‘articulation of spiritual significance’ in everyday life in order to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing world reality (Szerszynski, 1992, p. 20). Making individual ‘stress’, ‘pain’ and ‘anxiety’ the focus of MBSR Kabat-Zinn constructed the problem as ‘medical’ and ‘non-spiritual’ (i.e. non-existential), thereby paving the way for scientific acceptance of his research findings (Ergas, 2014) and subsequent uptake by the fields of psychology and neuroscience (Davidson & Kaszniak, 2015).

Hot on the heels of MBSR, a range other mindfulness-based therapeutic approaches arose including Dialectical Behavioural Therapy (DBT) (Dimidjian & Linehan, 2003), Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) (Teasdale et al., 2002), and Acceptance Commitment Therapy (ACT) (Bach & Hayes, 2002). Subsequent research into ‘mindfulness’ ventured beyond stress-reduction to a host of other human phenomena, including concentration, attention span, self-regulation, memory, executive function, etc., all of which are readily transferable to education. This has been particularly evident in research relating to HE and the role of mindfulness in supporting the development of academic skills (Ergas, 2014; Shapiro, Brown, & Astin, 2011) across a diverse range of disciplines (mentioned in Chapter 1). Following education there has been a strong uptake of ‘mindfulness interventions’ by government, corporate and military institutions seeking to increase ‘productivity’ and teamwork, and reduce the effects of personal stresses and anxiety (See Bjurström, 2012; Hyland, 2016; Purser, 2014; Trisoglio, 2012). Critical for Ergas (2014) is that the sanctioning of mindfulness as an ‘object of research’ by science (i.e. the ‘ruler of contemporary society’) changed what counted as valid knowledge; ‘change science and you change education’ (2014, p. 40; Todd & Ergas, 2015).

Mindfulness’ secular accessibility and econometric amenability along with its salutary claims has

found broad appeal across academic and professional domains and disciplines, and into corporate and military institutions. Farb (2014) discusses this in terms of two main appropriations of mindfulness: the first from 'religion' (i.e. Buddhism) into science, followed by science into the realm of popular culture.[126] Until recently, criticism and critique of the field have been hard to find (Turnbull & Dawson, 2006 excepted), however this is changing and an increasingly strident 'mindfulness' critique is emerging – particularly in relation to the second appropriation into popular culture. Healy (2013) notes that with the proliferation of training courses espousing the benefits of yoga and meditation, critics have coined the term 'McMindfulness' in order to

> … describe a cottage industry whose profit motives appear to contradict the ethical foundations of the practices it appropriates. From a Buddhist standpoint, mindfulness is not a mere stress-reduction technique: it is a 'distinct quality of attention' with transformative social potential. (Healey, 2013)

Critics remark on this absence of the 'social' in current mindfulness literature and highlight the need for better theoretical framing and engagement with broader sociological debate (Baugher, 2014; Purser, 2014; Purser & Loy, 2013).

Rose's (1999a) particularly influential work has provided helpful conceptual architecture for engaging with the Mindfulness phenomenon over the past three years. Particularly in relation to the ready adoption of Mindfulness by the fields of psychology, psychology of education, and allied health disciplines[127]. Rose (1999a) destabilises 'conspiracy theories' about structural behemoths such as 'neoliberalism' by showing that relations are more constellational and unstable than we fear (or want) them to be. Similarly to Buddhism, Rose advances the idea that it is our struggle with our own 'assembled nature'[128] and the groundlessness of our existence that causes us to seek a 'big nasty evil' to blame and target. We thereby ease ourselves (albeit illusorily) from the free-floating anxiety which is just part of being human. The notion of human beings as having no solid, enduring, unchanging essence, also finds home in all Buddhism through the philosophy of the five

[126] I observe that Farb omits the meso level of relations.

[127] These include, for example, mental health and wellbeing, psychiatry, counselling, therapeutic approaches and interventions.

[128] Here, Rose draws on the work of Canadian Philosopher Iain Hacking. See Hacking (1986); (1992, 1998).

skandhas. This philosophy teaches that as human beings we are made up of five *skandhas* ('heaps' or 'aggregates')[129] which are emergent and are the vehicle through which our ego develops. We become imprisoned by an illusory 'myth of freedom' and 'autonomy' (Trungpa 2010); stating that we exist as solid, unchanging, individuals. Subsequently, we invest significant time, effort and money in maintaining this myth. It is in this light that the socially conditioned emergence of mindfulness can be grasped.

Rose highlights how we are shaped, enabled and constrained by increasingly dominant 'psy discourses'. He then points us towards what has fallen away, what we no longer value, speak about or aspire to[130]. Relevant to this project is his observation that what unites all of the different therapeutic 'psy' systems and discourses is a ;calculated attempt to bring the subject from one way of acting and being to another' (1999a, p. 250). Mindfulness, as a 'psy' therapy (or intervention) promotes a 'fix yourself' or 'get a better version of yourself' narrative. Yet, Rose's foremost concern is not that the psy sciences, their accompanying technologies of subjectification and their articulation with other cultural and structural institutions are extending their way into our lives in ever increasingly dominant ways. It is that as human beings we do not have the freedom to not be obliged to freedom, to not work on ourselves, to not improve ourselves, cultivate, shape, inculcate, strive for, and fix a better version of ourselves. This development of the psy sciences, unmasked by Rose, connects with Bhaskar's view of 'scientism' (i.e. the ideology of positivism), in which the practice of science is abstracted, form its historicity. This leaves a huge gape in the practice of science and thus understanding of its objects. Bhaskar, Rose and Adorno all direct to the necessity of acknowledging the causal power of absences. For Bhaskar, agency is about addressing social 'voids' and as such is a process of 'absenting'[131](Bhaskar, 1993, p. 240). While the Mindfulness

[129] These five are comprise of form, feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness. See Karr (2007, p. 158) and Trungpa (2005a).

[130] Rose makes salient the invention of 'psy' sciences (psychology, psychiatry, therapeutic interventions of all kinds) and their historical search for legitimacy vis-á-vis the 'hard sciences'. He then observes the integration of 'psy' discourses into every arena of our lives (political, social, medical, economic, ethical) and their centrality in the creation, expression and identity of human persons (1989; 1990a).

[131] The notion of absence is developed by Bhaskar in his Dialectical Critical Realism (Bhaskar, 1993).

movement seeks to abjure the messiness of our uncertain human selves, literature on CHE suggests that which may be an education in the service of 'absenting absences' (Bhaskar, 1993, p. 240). That is, bringing back what it means to be human and possess the capacity for responsiveness to an uncertain world.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, I entered the emerging field of CHE via the portal of mindfulness in education. Where and how then, is Mindfulness (and CHE) intersecting with neoliberalism?

Mindfulness and CHE: intersections with neoliberalism

Reviewing the less nuanced literature on Mindfulness first, I was struck by a paucity of critique from within the field. A handful of exceptions were mentioned above and mostly found within the blogosphere[132]. Some mention of reflexivity and problematising was observed from within the very small number of publications specifically mentioning CHE and could be found and dating back to 2002 (Coburn et al., 2011; Miller, 2000; Simmer-Brown, 2002; Solloway, 2000). However, there are glaring omissions. These include:

- how Mindfulness as a 'commodified phenomenon' (Anderson, 2016b), transects the broader political and economic phenomena of neoliberalism;
- sociological analyses speaking to diversity,[133] subjectivities, governmentality, and critical pedagogies; and
- feminist[134] and post-colonial thought.

In the 18 months since undertaking this review, critique of Mindfulness has burgeoned to the point of almost becoming a sub-field in its own right. As Cannon (2016) notes, critiques of Mindfulness now come close to overshadowing empirical research or practitioner-led publications.

As discussed above, much of the literature relating to neoliberalism, and higher education leaves little room for an active human agency (Gill & Donaghue, 2016; Hyatt, Shear, & Wright, 2015). Where space is made for the possibility of agentic intervention, it frequently leaves humans on

[132] See for example (Ng & Purser, 2015; Purser, 2014; Purser & Loy, 2013; Purser & Milillo, 2015)

[133] Later arrivals on the scene beginning to address this gap include Magee (2015, 2017) and Berila (2015).

[134] Again, Berila's recent (2015) work is a recent exception.

unexamined or thin (Actualist) ontological ground (Barnett, 2009; Dennis, 2016). Bhaskar employs the term 'actualism' to refer to the particular ontological conflation of the domain of the *real* with the domain of the *actual* (Bhaskar, 2016, p. 24). An *Actualist ontology* is 'one-dimensional', taking our current social conditions as given (Bhaskar, 2016, p. 73). This sorry state of affairs combines a theoretical falsity with a 'practice in accordance with axiological necessity' and leads to what Bhaskar calls the TINA compromise (there is no alternative). We have Margaret Thatcher's neoliberal dictum echoing down through history. Neoliberalism's 'common sense logic' rest upon this TINA compromise. Within it, there is no need for agency beyond serving the need of the market that we have placed at the centre of our society. An Actualist ontology can be found in much of the mindfulness in education literature where overwhelmingly 'mindfulness interventions' are aimed at uncritically shaping the individual (learner) towards acquiescent stances in the face of structural and cultural constraints (Anderson, 2016b). Here, human persons are left without recourse to an autonomous 'reflexive determination' through which we define our own concerns, and action to situations not of our own making (Archer, 2007, p. 17). A small amount of very recent literature is the exception[135]. Delving into who the authors are, I found that they are mostly deep practitioners from within the field of CHE who use the term 'mindfulness' to express one aspect (and outcome) of deep meditative inquiry[136] and\or convey the secular orientation of their practice. There is also a possibility that they may be camouflaging more provocative contemplative approaches as socially sanctioned Mindfulness. I take up this notion of camouflage in Chapter 6.

Mindfulness interventions appear to shape uncritical subjectivities which either indulge or anxiously disappear into the rabbit hole of the 'me project'. How then might contemplative practices help us open up spaces to be 'otherwise'? But where too does this depend on 1) understanding how we view ourselves (ontologically), and 2) available alternative ontologies of being and manifesting as a human, i.e. that are not grounded in deficit or passivity? The work of the following section is to unpack these questions and see what indications emerge from within scholarly work on CHE.

[135] See Cannon (2016); Magee (2013, 2015) (Berila, 2014a, 2014b, 2015).

[136] That is the development of the placement of attention upon an object – *shamatha* (in Sanskrit) or mindfulness (English translation).

Contemplative higher education

Some (Ergas, 2014; Repetti, 2010) locate the rise in contemplative philosophies and pedagogies to the acceptance of 'healing' by science via the measurable mindfulness trajectory discussed above. Others trace Contemplative (university) Education back 1,000 years in SE Asian contexts, and 40 years within North American institutions (McWilliams, 1996; Morgan, 2014; Simmer-Brown, 2002; Zajonc, 2006a). Repetti (2010) views contemplative practices in HE as the 'natural outgrowth' of earlier pedagogies inspired by Freire's 'anti-banking education' and which focussed on the 'processual' and what the learner brings to the learning environment. Given these different views, it was important for this project to glean participant accounts of the emergence of CHE. Second, regardless of this, what has become evident these past years is that CHE is a field of increasing interest (Ozawa-de Silva, 2016) and thus worthy of deeper examination.

I initially approached Contemplative Education via a 'mindfulness research' portal. There, I was confronted with a plethora of studies mostly documenting practices, approaches, measures and 'interventions'. This literature pertained to schools, university programs, and teaching and learning centres (Barbezat & Bush, 2013; Brady, 2007; Bush, Markus, & Fountain, 2012; Davidson et al., 2012; Komanee, Hoxsuwan, & Phusee-on, 2013; Kyle, 2010; Meiklejohn et al., 2012; Walsh, 2012). Curious as to whether the field of CHE had followed the psychological-intervention, 'technology-of-the-self' trajectory of Mindfulness discussed above, it was important to distinguish the pedagogical, with its philosophical and theoretical underpinnings, from the psychological (i.e. interventions, their models and metrics). I chose to leave aside the research dealing with mindfulness based initiatives (MBIs) in education and focus on scholarship relating specifically to contemplative pedagogies using meditation as their basis. This is because most of these are psychologically based and therapeutic or remedial in purpose[137]. The following section discusses what I found, and highlights contemplative scholars' ontology of higher education, what CHE has to offer, and the agency of the 'educatee' (Freire, 2000). It also emphasises key contemporary issues

[137] See for example Schonert-Reichl and Lawlor (2010); Broderick and Metz (2009); Haynes, Perry, Stupnisky, and Daniels (2009); Danitz and Orsillo (2014); Bamber and Schneider (2016); and Regehr, Glancy, and Pitts (2013) among others.

to which contemplative scholars are speaking, the specific issues they raise and how [they] are problematized. I conclude the section with a discussion of some apparent gaps and identify areas that are under-theorised, thereby validating this research project.

Above, I alluded to Archer's (2012) assertion that this is a time where orientation to processes of socialisation by preceding generations is no longer usable or supportive. This is precisely because of the ever-increasing 'variety' that young people encounter in their everyday lives (particularly at the level of the material and social levels). How do students acquire the tools, dispositions and literacies they need to not only negotiate their liquid lives and communities, but also create and thrive in them? Key philosophers comment that as human beings we have a plethora of capacities that could serve us well in these times, however, they need to be acknowledged, nurtured and 'drawn out' (Bhaskar, 2002) through education. They also note that three capacities in particular are imperative. For Nussbaum (2006), these three particular capacities are imperative and include the capacities for: critical self-examination; the capacity to see oneself as human being bound to all other human beings with similar ties and concerns; and, the capacity for emotional understanding and being able to empathise with others, to stand in their shoes. Yet key contemplative scholars' (Broom & Bai, 2011; Coburn et al., 2011; Repetti, 2010) emphasise that they are still doing what Freire (1972) called 'banking education'; focussing on content, testing, and recall, rather than fostering critical thinking, and dialogical problematising, along with development of multi-literacies for navigating (current and future) complex realms (Hytten, 2013; Kellner, 2003; Magee, 2015). Identifying and drawing out deeper human capacities is needed in the face of increased pressures and instrumentalist models of higher education, given the stealthy 'creep' of neo-liberal agendas of economic rationalisation shaping the academy (see Eaton et al., 2011; Giroux, 2010; Kellner, 2003; Vokey, 2014). Perhaps there needs to be a fourth capacity added to Nussbaum's list: the capacity for an ontological understanding and appreciation of ourselves (and others) as a species. Chapter 5 discusses participant views of the purpose of HE and how an ontological befriending is part of their work.

The following section maps the emerging scholarly field of CH: a field that is not immediately apparent to those considering broader HE research. Key apparent sub-fields of CHE are identified,

followed by exploration of how the field views the purpose of HE, and what degree of critical reflexivity is indicated. The purpose of the section is to gain insight into what CHE might contribute to HE more broadly.

CHE: an emerging field

Scholarship on contemplative higher education has increased notably over the course of this research project. While not clearly delineated into 'sub-fields', I contend that it is possible to identify four general sub-fields of scholarship within which scholar-practitioners locate themselves and which reveal particular worldviews and philosophies of education. These include: liberal, and progressive education (including Deweyan and Freirean dialogical, and anti-banking education) (Brown, 2011, 2014); Feminist, social- and or eco-justice education (Berila, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Eaton et al., 2011; Magee, 2013, 2015); those who seek to enhance existing pedagogies, for example, Transformative, Holistic or Experiential education (Beer, 2010; Beer et al., 2015; Miller, 2015; Miller & Nozawa, 2002); and finally, decentred non-ethnocentric 'third-space'[138] approaches underpinned by an intercultural philosophy of education (Bai et al., 2013; Bai, Eppert, Scott, Tait, & Nguyen, 2015; Eppert et al., 2015; Eppert & Wang, 2008; Kahane, 2009; Vokey, 2008). The following section highlights key points from each of these.

How does CHE view the purpose of HE? Scholars offering a view of higher education that resonates with the progressive, critical, and liberal approaches of Dewey (1915), Nussbaum (2010; 1997) and Freire (1972, 2000) speak about its purpose as an approach that: creates good citizens (Broom & Bai, 2011); supports a 'sustaining and flourishing of humanity in relationship with their world' (Bai et al., 2013, p. 19; Bai et al., 2015) cultivating exemplary, ethical and responsible human beings who live ethically (Bai et al., 2009), not lives of selfish monadism (Zajonc, 2006a); and trains and nurtures the 'growth of the human mind, especially in the pursuit of 'critical reason' (Rockefeller, 1994). These scholars propose that education should be humanising, develop relationality (i.e. overcome alienation), and affirm human dignity and community (Simmer-Brown & Grace, 2011). This implicates shaping thriving democracies (Bai et al., 2009; Broom & Bai, 2011)

[138] By 'third space', I am referring to the term initiated by Bhabha. See Bhabha and Rutherford (1990).

and humane societies (Thurman, 2006). This view of HE pays homage to the lineage of Deweyan progressive education with its emphasis on human flourishing, and democratisation, through a participation in social life and problem solving through communicative inquiry, and courageous experimentation (Kahane, 2009; Kellner, 2003; Nussbaum, 2010; Scott, 2010; Talisse, 2011). Increasingly, contemplative scholar-practitioners (Barbezat & Bush, 2013; Eaton et al., 2011; Kahane, 2009; Rockefeller, 1994, 2006) offer a more critical ontology of HE which could be described as Freirean – in the sense of existential exploration and questioning of our lives that not only 'opens possibilities, particularly toward the ends of greater social justice' (Hytten, 2006, p. 444; Kellner, 2003, p. 6) but also has a participatory and emancipatory agenda (Gill & Niens, 2014). Established scholars, like Simmer-Brown, could also be included here when reading across her diverse publications, e.g. from considerations for teacher training of contemplative educators (2011), to the 'crisis of relentless consumerism' and the need for activism (2002) and 'listening dangerously' to cultivate radical 'peacemaking skills' (2013, p. 39).

What degree of critical reflexivity is indicated thought CHE scholarship? Feminist, post-structuralist and post-colonialist scholars have made a significant contribution in highlighting the implication of ourselves as educators in the structures we are trying to change, and how in replicating the ideologies of these structures we can 'impede', rather than further efforts towards democratisation, pluralism, and social justice (Coburn et al., 2011; Hytten, 2006, p. 444). A group of scholar-practitioners (Eaton et al., 2011; Kahane, 2009; Magee, 2013, 2015; Polinska, 2011; Vokey, 2014) bring this critically-reflexive stance to problematising their own contemplative epistemologies and pedagogies. More recently, Magee (2015) and Berila (2015) use a feminist lens to provoke awareness of issues of voice and call for the placement of marginalising and silencing practices and their underpinning ideologies at the centre of inquiry and dialogue. Hytten argues that one of the most important roles for education today 'is to teach the habits, dispositions, attitudes, and behaviours necessary for democratic citizenship' (Hytten, 2006, p. 441). In later work she highlights the variety of ideological approaches to social and eco-justice in HE and suggests using dialogue to better facilitate understanding across these traditions (hooks, 1994; Hytten & Bettez, 2011). However, Eaton et al. (2011) assert that we also need to understand our global, political,

social and ecological challenges, and that this requires both personal and collective action. For this third group of contemplative scholars, CE reframes a critically reflexive practice (praxis) of education through orienting learners and educators alike to deeper personal work that will facilitate more inclusive social change. A critical aspect of this is relating to our human embodiment and its bearing vis-à-vis flux and uncertainty. In such challenging (self) work that is required of us all, contemplative practices can support students and educators alike to 'face our own fear, anxiety, uncertainty, grief, and even mortality' while recognising our collective complicity in creating the situation in which we find ourselves (Eaton et al., 2011, p. 6). Yet for many, the enormity of such a task results in a (potentially) immobilising 'overwhelm' which threatens to render them inactive; too afraid to turn towards complexity and suffering in order to understand it better. It is here that contemplative education feels it has something to offer epistemologically and ontologically (Eaton et al., 2011; Kahane, 2009; Magee, 2015).

What then might CHE contribute?

Contemplative philosophies and pedagogies are being put forward as hopeful vehicles for seeing, understanding and relating differently to pressing global and social issues – including the current crisis in higher education (Giroux, 2010; Thornton, 2014). Key scholars view CHE as critical to the renewal and repair of HE and to ensure human flourishing (Barbezat & Bush, 2013; Baugher & Bach, 2015, p. 105; Rosch, 2013). This renewal must extend 'beyond the psychological realm' (Simmer-Brown & Grace, 2011, p. xv) and consider humans as embodied relational beings. The fourth group view CHE as occupying a more radical position: one that challenges the prevailing understanding of education today (Broom & Bai, 2011), disrupting ethnocentrism (Berila, 2015; Magee, 2015) and shaking the foundations of democratic approaches (Eaton et al., 2011). This means becoming 'activists' against consumerism and materialism (Simmer-Brown, 2002, p. 33). In order for this to be possible, educators need to reconceptualise and re-prioritise both pedagogical intent and content (Bai et al., 2009, p. 18). This notion of educators as activists was implicit within the work of many. Key areas of activism included ecological justice and sustainability (Eaton et al., 2011); developing intercultural approaches (Bai et al., 2015; Eppert et al., 2015); and orienting students towards practice of global 'obligation, compassion, justice' and 'life service' (Kahane,

2009, p. 49; Simmer-Brown & Grace, 2011). Complementing socially oriented activism is a focus on self-work. Pivotal in this is coming to understand that relating to discomfort (both cultural and personal in nature) is an important first step in widening circles of compassion (Asrael & Bialek, 2016). Learning to relate to the discomfort, disappointment or delight of things as they are is a critical aspect of contemplative practice. For Lobel (2014), it is here that a persistent dualism of benefitting self or benefitting others is dissolved. Deep contemplative practice where we become familiar with the full catastrophe of how things really are, and cease to evade, deny or manipulate reality becomes a social practice.

As mentioned above, mindfulness research is prolific and until recently (Gunnlaugson et al., 2014) has appeared to obfuscate other debates by contemplative pedagogues. In a review of the literature on mindfulness-meditation in HE, Shapiro et al (2011, p. 8) highlighted major findings in three key areas: cognitive and academic performance; mental health and psychological well-being; and development of the whole person. This focus on individual student-outcomes is resonant with the broader Mindfulness movement, emphasising the psychological along with short-term interventional approaches (Grossman, 2008, pp. 224-225) aimed at rapid alleviation of symptoms (Farb, 2014)[139].

With specific reference to CHE scholarship, I encountered more nuanced debate and critique. Two salient publications – Barbezat & Bush's (2013) and Gunnlaughson, Sarath Scott, & Bai (2014) – offered significant overviews of the CHE landscape. While usefully highlighting differing terrains of CHE research, both point to the rapidly emergent nature of the field. The former offers a guide to contemplative practices in use, along with some practical and theoretical background, In contrast, the latter publication[140] offers nuanced theoretical and philosophical discussions pointing to future trajectories. These two have been followed by further recent releases (Ergas & Todd, 2016; Walsh, Bickel, & Leggo, 2014). In Gunnlaughson et al (2014), twenty-eight established and emerging

[139] Here there is a focus on outcomes for both for the individual and the institution – one example is reduced levels of student stress and anxiety, bolstering retention rates.

[140] Gunnlaugson, O., Sarath, E. W., Scott, C., & Bai, H. (2014). *Contemplative Learning and Inquiry Across Disciplines*: SUNY Press. Available as of March 2015.

scholars draw on one or both of two key contemplative traditions: meditation for developing concentration and insight; and reflective-inquiry. The latter is also aimed at deeper insight – into thinking processes, course content, and problematising (Baugher & Bach, 2015; Gunnlaugson et al., 2014; Zajonc, 2006b). Eaton et al (2011) discuss the interchangeable use of the terms 'reflective' and 'contemplative' in some current literature. While not advocating for precise definitions, they offer the simple, agreed-upon distinction that 'reflection generally connotes acts of cognition' and whereas 'contemplative' 'connotes perceptual rather that conceptual activity'. The latter refers to identifying understanding and knowledge as distinct to 'thinking about it' (Eaton et al., 2011, pp. 11-12). For the remainder of this chapter and thereon, I will be drawing on those scholar-practitioners[141] who include theoretical framing, philosophical discussion and or critical analyses in their work, and speak to the primacy of meditative practice. This group[142] draw on traditions of deep meditative inquiry in order to present the potential of CHE in affecting individual and social change in a range of key areas that will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. These include:

- The disruption of habituated dispositions, reductive epistemologies, ontologies of scarcity and lack. This includes fixed or identarian thinking (Bai et al., 2015; Brown, 2011; Brown, Simone, & Worley, 2016; Eppert et al., 2015; Kaszniak, 2014; Palmer et al., 2010)[143].
- The 'unclouding', building and strengthening of capacities which underpin the agency which brings about both personal and social change (Eaton et al., 2011, p. 5; Magee, 2013, 2015; Polinska, 2011; Zajonc, 2006a).
- The relational pedagogies that help shift 'instrumentalist mindsets that perpetuate the epistemological, axiological and ontological disconnect' (Bai et al., 2009, p. 332). Mindsets, which are increasingly characterising much higher education and are reflected in our broader social structures.

[141] Many of whom are included in Gunnlaughson et al (2014).

[142] Including but not exclusively Bai (2009, 2011, 2013) Simmer-Brown (1999, 2002, 2009, 2011), Kahane (2009), Coburn et al (2011), Zajonc (2006, 2013), Ergas (2013, 2014), Roth (2014), Grace (2011) et al (2012).

[143] Including increasing our capacity to understand issues of 'race' and white-privilege' (Magee 2015 p.4).

- Practice that supports educators and students alike to become familiar with and develop steadfastness amidst constant discomfort and flux.
- The promotion of education as an inherently ethical, creative, transformative and relational endeavour of liberation from ignorance (Bhaskar, 2002; Kaszniak, 2014; Repetti, 2010; Thurman, 2006); so that we may become familiar and steadfast amidst in the face of discomfort and flux.
- The cultivation of ethical and embodied beings with a sense of active agency, intercultural knowledge, and practical know-how (Eppert et al., 2015; Pulkki, Saari, & Dahlin, 2015)

Two sub-narratives embedded in CHE literature emphasise 'expansive thinking' (Cho, 2009, p. 79)[144] and ethical action. The first highlights the importance of higher education in strengthening inherent human capacities for multiple ways of knowing and thinking (see above). The second relates to the role of contemplative education in challenging and transforming higher education. CHE aspires to produce graduates who relate to themselves, and their world in more compassionate, embodied, creative, sustainable, ethical and response-able (read: active) ways. The latter includes realising our interbeing with other/s[145] and our natural world; the mandate of higher education being the betterment of society as a whole (Eppert et al., 2015; Simmer-Brown & Grace, 2011). Interestingly, and as counterpoint to Loy's (2002) assertions above, both narratives are underpinned by human decency and capacity rather than deficit. While this resonates with Nussbaum's (2006) work (also mentioned above), it nonetheless implies a radical divergence from the ontology of 'human fuckupedness' (Trungpa, 2005b) our Western societies have inherited via our shared Abrahamic-traditions (Loy, 2002). Important within the context of this study is that an ontology of human sufficiency and potential, enables a ground for more meta-reflexive stances and 'active agency' (Archer, 2000, 2003). It is confidence in these inherent human capacities that creatively resources the ability to be otherwise in the face of limiting dispositions and structures. How is this manifesting in CHE scholarship?

[144] Here Cho is referring to Adorno's use of the term education or *Bildung*, which he and others consider difficult to translate.

[145] This includes other non-human beings (Blasdel, 2017; Morton, 2014).

Almost all CHE scholars[146] emphasise the basic inherent 'goodness', intelligence, 'brilliance' and creativity of learners as different to the more common ontology of deficit, or basic psychological 'wickedness' (Critchley, 2012, p. 66). Many propose that we have lost the larger vision of education as enhancing and developing confidence in our (inherent) human capacities and relationality (Bai et al., 2013; Donati & Archer, 2015; Eaton et al., 2011; Nussbaum, 2011). Instead, universities are churning out people with high levels of domain-specific knowledge and 'technical competence yet who are 'perpetually anxious and prone to dis-ease or discontent' (Bai et al., 2009, p. 323).[147] As humans, we possess a 'gold-mine of opportunities' for exploration, understanding and problem-solving. Too frequently passed over in favour of curriculum and content, this wealth can be 'drawn out' through respect and training (Bai et al., 2009, p. 323; Coburn et al., 2011, p. 169). CHE scholarship offers that through contemplative pedagogies, latent human capacities are nurtured and enabled. These include: engaging in multiple perspectives and holding the creative tension associated with that; developing relational sensitivity (self, others, environment); embracing intersubjectivity; building a capacity for discernment; 'staying with' a specific question, or theme in order to be able to explore it deeply and critically; and cultivating 'direct experience' so as to interrogate 'belief' (Bai et al., 2013, p. 14; Eaton et al., 2011; Gunnlaugson et al., 2014; Simmer-Brown, 2011; Zajonc, 2006a, 2013).

The second narrative of CHE as a provocation to HE focusses on bringing the view, and rigors (i.e. discipline and precision) of contemplative practices (originally from wisdom traditions) into the

[146] Including but not exclusively Bai et al., (2009); R. Brown, (2011); Eppert et al., (2015); Kahane, (2009); Simmer-Brown, (2009, 2011, 2016); Simmer-Brown & Grace, (2011); Asrael and Bialek (2016); Vokey (2008) and others.

[147] While there is not space for adequate discussion in this thesis, individualisation theorists (such as Giddens 1991, Bauman 1998, 1999, 2001, and Beck 1992) would ascribe such discontent to the 'agony of choice' characteristic of late-modernity and commensurate to the declining influence and legitimacy of socially regulating institutions of the state and church. This brings an increasing sense of personal risk (and thus anxiety) as we bear the full responsibility for our own choices in an environment of hyper-choice as increasing products, and identities, are offered by the commodification and marketisation of almost all aspects of social life. However, recent theory grounded in applied research paints a more nuanced and paradoxical view of such individualisation as scholars encounter strong and pervasive social embeddedness within and across cultures/sub-cultures (Houtman, Aupers, & De Koster, 2011).

academy so as to broaden academic praxis and thought across disciplines (Asrael & Bialek, 2016; Simmer-Brown, 2016). In part, this includes validating the place of first-person epistemologies in both pedagogical practice and academic research – and as part of research methodology (Ergas, 2013a, 2014; Giorgino, 2015; Stanley, 2012; Varela & Shear, 1999). Underpinning this narrative is an emphasis on HE's responsibility in helping students and educators alike to more adeptly 'read the world' so as to engage in socially (and globally) meaningful ways (Coburn et al., 2011; Ergas, 2013b; Gunnlaugson et al., 2014; Kahane, 2009, 2011). Again, this includes cultivating the ability to sit with and hold feelings of discomfort, overwhelm, non-knowing and disheartenment; feelings that may be related to small provocations or all-out cognitive dissonance[148]. It is a path of deep self-work and ultimately personal transformation so as to be of greater benefit through engagement in all levels of our world – micro, meso, macro (Donati & Archer, 2015). It is a path of deep self-work and ultimately personal transformation (Asrael & Bialek, 2016) so as to be of greater benefit through engagement in all levels of our world – micro, meso, macro (Donati & Archer, 2015). Asrael and Bialek (2016) insist that discomfort is itself a necessary component of the manifestation of relational compassion.

Gaps and omissions

The promise of CHE as a pedagogical movement is constrained by critical gaps in the literature. Four are salient: first, inquiry into the role of deep (meditative) practices in shaping the reflexive capacities and dispositions[149] of educators. Second is the absence of sociological inquiry into how scholar-practitioners of CHE work with existing structural mechanisms – specifically within a neoliberal HE policies and Mindfulness. Many indicate CHE's potential in expanding worldviews and cultivating less-reactive and more pliable minds. However, there is no overt inquiry into whether either our ontological views or reflexive styles might be shifted; for example from an ontology of human psychological wickedness (Critchley, 2012) to one of basic human goodness or decency (Bhaskar, 2016; Brown et al., 2016; Eppert et al., 2015; Vokey, 2014). It is here that

[148] I draw on Fanon's usage of the term to indicate the feeling that people experience when a strongly held belief is challenged by evidence suggesting otherwise. See Fanon (1967).

[149] This includes the pedagogical, relational and socio-political.

traditional and contemporary Buddhist meditative practices and discipline are of benefit. They slowly and steadfastly orient towards a radically different ontology of both being human and being in the world. They are helpful in overcoming a range of pervasive dualisms[150] and moving towards an emergent, stratified ontology of 'interbeing' (Nhất Hạnh, 1998). Finally, if the potentially disruptive and proposedly revolutionary effects of contemplative pedagogies (Coburn et al., 2011; Kahane, 2009; Mahani, 2012; Simmer-Brown, 1999, 2002, 2013) are to be realised, then the field needs a more *active* 'global' level engagement. Again, this means disrupting student acculturation and encouraging greater awareness of self, others and the world (Bai et al., 2013)– including the world beyond North America. Can CHE prise open spaces for exploring and embracing alternative epistemologies in the pursuit of more ethical and social capacity building? Or will it remain a predominantly middle-class North American phenomena? (Bazzano, 2014; Drougge, 2016)

Educating the whole human being

Both CHE and Mindfulness (in education) are contemporary expressions reflecting calls to place the human persons back at the centre of higher education (Barnett, 2009; Dall'Alba & Barnacle, 2007). As we will see in Chapter 6, participants' reasons to why they educate, reflect reasons expounded in the literature[151]. Key critical themes that emerged regarding the purpose of higher education included: developing all aspects of what it means to be human, and recognising the self as inherently relational. There was emphasis on cultivating more socially response-able subjects. A critical aspect of this was disrupting self-absorption and *habitus* to provoke more critically reflexive worldviews. Finally, HE must instil a lifelong love of learning for learning's sake. Together, these themes indicate a fuller purpose of HE, i.e. beyond cultivation of the individual intellect, and employability.

For participants, a critical aspect of educating the whole human being in the service of greater social and societal wellbeing is cultivating the skills and dispositions that enable us to regard others

[150] This includes: self -other, mind-body, individual-collective, and active-contemplative.

[151] See Eppert et al. (2015); Vokey (2008); (Kahane, 2011); Brown (2011).

– the Other – with empathy, curiosity, and respect for their autonomy[152] (Adorno, 2010). Yet, there was clarity that this same affection and inquisitiveness must also be shown towards the self, and its habituations and *habitus*; that which serves to occlude or inhibit our respect and regard for others. To regard the self with care or tenderness (Adorno, 1973; Honneth, 2008; Seel, 2004; Trungpa, 1978, 2005a) ensures non-violence. For Trungpa (and implied within Adorno) is that violence arises in the refusal to relate to the fullness of our everyday reality through deploying aggression, or seduction, or just 'numbing out'. At first glance, this fuller education of CHE appears to align with a radical humanistic education; a non-anthropocentric humanism that settles more comfortably with the emergent realism of Bhaskar, than for example, the surface Actualism of Rogers'[153] person-centred education.

Summary

From the above, there is a strong suggestion that CHE, rather than being a 'technology of domination of the self' for governing positive behaviour or to 'manipulate the self away from the self' (Rose, 1999a, p. 249)[154] is instead a potentially transformative relational practice. Its purpose is to disrupt habituated or 'identarian' ways of being (Adorno, 1973; Norrie, 2004). I argue that this includes our ways of being with being; that is our indifference or shyness regarding our human ontology. CHE also appears to support prising open spaces for transformative 'self-work', leading to self-enrichment and increased confidence. Both are necessary resources for individuals and collectives seeking to enliven social response-ability and act skilfully in the face of immense current challenges; social, and environmental. Differing from Mindfulness, the practice of CHE appears to turn the human heart-mind towards the reality of life as it is. The pivot point of this reality is our

[152] Please refer to the previous discussion in this chapter where I discuss Adorno's understanding of autonomy. That is, as the freedom to be reflective (exercise our reflexivity), to self-determine, possessing the freedom to not cooperate. Notwithstanding, this autonomy occurs within the context of our inherent inter-relationality.

[153] I am assuming reader familiarity with Rogerian 'person-centred' education, and of course, counselling and therapy. Regarding education please see Rogers (1969).

[154] For a translation of Foucault's original essays titled 'Technologies of the Self' please see Martin, Gutman, and Hutton (1988).

inter-relationality or what Vietnamese Buddhist master Thích Nhất Hạnh calls ‘interbeing’ (1998).

However, there are tensions and cautions regarding CHE. Not least of these is furthering more devastating aspects of the Enlightenment project under neoliberal narrowing. What possibilities for an education of ‘unclouding’ and response-ability might CHE offer? Will it drive ways of genuinely being otherwise? Alternatively, will it follow suit with the Mindfulness movement, reinforcing ideologies and psychologies of social control and passivity via the wasted passions of laxity and elation?

Critical realism places ontology squarely in the centre of all deep inquiry and acknowledges the stratified nature of human persons, and our social life and action. Because of this and its commitment to serious, critical and transformative research provides the best methodological framing for exploring the questions raised and omissions noted above.

CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

This chapter guides the reader through the critical realism methodological framing of the research process underpinning the thesis. It first introduces the two supplementary methodological resources provided by Banfield and Pamphilon which were highlighted in Chapter One. The reader is then guided through the research methodology, its intensive design and the methodological commitments underpinning it. The research architecture and its operationalisation allow for understanding the process of research for this thesis. The chapter concludes with critical reflection on the primary method of in-depth interviews; and the implication of this and the CR framing for data collection, transcription and analysis.

Research Methodology

Critical realism claims to take on the role of philosophical underlabourer in the service the ethico-practical work of doing 'good science' (Bhaskar, 2016). It does not seek to replace existing research paradigms. Rather, as Bhaskar insists, critical realism is a 'permissive' meta-theory open to a range of research methods (Banfield, 2010, p. 3) that invites a multifaceted and transdisciplinary approaches to inquiry (Smith & Pangsapa, 2007). It was CR's promise of a permissive underlabouring that was initially attractive. I was well aware that the prime research object (i.e. the contextualised agential practice of CHE) was a 'many-sided' one (Sayer, 2000, p. 19). Before outlining the specifics of the project's methodological framing, it will be prudent to note two further tools that were important in the design and execution of the project: Banfield's tri-partite model of abstraction and Pamphilon's Zoom method. Both are discussed below. Enabling me to hold complexity of CR research within simplicity (i.e. without convolution) has been Banfield's 'vantage point' tool (2009, 2015a) which supported the entirety of my research journey.

In approaching education research Banfield (2009, p. 144) draws on the elegantly systematic,

deliberate and socially contextualised method of Marx. To obtain additional purchase Banfield brings into dialogue Bhaskar's ontological commitments, and Ollman's (2003) elaboration of Marxian dialectics. He depicts this in his 'Tripartite Model of Abstraction' (see Figure 4.1).



Figure 4.1 Banfield's (2010) Tri-partite Model of Abstraction

Deceivingly simple, it presents the three dialectical moves of abstraction that Marx employed, and which Bhaskar avows is necessary for emancipatory social science practice. Banfield is quick to clarify that these are not 'abstract imaginings' (2009, p. 145) but rather drawn from deep empirical and theoretical inquiry. He emphasises the necessity of depth (ontological and theoretical), stretch (geo-temporal time-space) and consideration of the multiplicity of 'ontological and epistemological standpoints' (Banfield, 2009, p. 5; 2015a, pp. 122-123; 2016). The latter Banfield calls 'perspectivism'. Banfield's emphasis of theoretical depth on the vertical axis refers to both 'ontological theorising', and 'digging deep' into theory (or theory-driven research). However, what the above representation does not clarify is that really 'all three abstractions are theoretical moves of different kinds'; the remaining two being theorising the world in terms of 'actual geo-historical events'; and 'theorising the world from certain vantage points' (personal email communication 30

October 2017). Banfield calls ontological and epistemological standpoints ‘perspectivism’. This ‘perspectivism’ is not dissimilar to what is proposed by Hikins and Cherwitz (2011) who arrive at a kind of ontological realism and epistemological relativism through their sensitive and considered argument for an understanding of ‘expertise’ as an ability to respond to the critical issues of our world. This, they argue, requires ‘intellectual entrepreneurs’ who can ‘apply expert knowledge as citizen-scholars engaged in critical, holistic, perspectival problem-solving’ (2011, p. 305). What Bhaskar, Archer, Banfield and others have been stressing is that

> Only the three moves considered together in their dialectical relation can develop (scientific) understandings of the world with sufficient explanatory power to enable radical, conscious and reflexive action. (Banfield, 2017)

This means that the critical realist researcher must explore and seek to explain each of Bhaskar’s three domains/worlds. First, the world of the actual by considering phenomena across time-space. Second, the world of the real, by developing and testing theoretical assumptions. Finally, the empirical domain, which the researcher explores from the perspective of different subject positions. This tool has served me well in focussing the complexities of doing critical realist research and providing an accessible heuristic for understanding the tri-partite dialectic indicative in my methodology. This was particularly important in moments that are more mundane where I risked losing overemphasising one axis (mode of abstraction) at the expense of others. The addition of Pamphilon’s’ Zoom method (see further discussion below) acted as a reminder to retain as a further lens of analyses the macro, micro, meso and interactional levels of S-A.

Intensive design

Critical realism’s claim is that it dissolves the quantitative-qualitative binary by conceptualising research designs as encompassing intensive and extensive kinds (Sayer, 1992, 2000). Its particular objects of inquiry drive the kind of research design appropriate to a specific project. For example, extensive research designs are required when the research object is large population groups. The methods employed might include surveys and statistical analysis. In contrast, intensive approaches are appropriate where a relatively small population group is the research focus. The methods employed might include in-depth interviews and observation. While a single research design can encompass extensive and intensive kinds, it is important to stress that the

latter should not be seen as necessarily failing the test of generalisability. Abstraction plays a key role in generalising from the particular. In this project, additional support was provided through Banfield's tripartite model, Pamphilon's Zoom model and Danermark et al's (2002) 6 phases (please see further below). Together these enabled me to seek out 'substantial relations of connection and situated practice within wider contexts so as to illuminate part-whole relationships' (Sayer, 2000, p. 20). As such, the project has an intensive research design employing qualitative data gathering methods (techniques) within a realist methodology demanding the illumination of whole-part relations. It relies on a small sample size, and is concerned with mining for 'depth' (Banfield, 2009). It is both exploratory and explanatory. Explanatory research seeks to understand the underlying generative mechanisms at work in a specific context and better understand the 'complex issues involved' (Clegg & Stevenson, 2013, p. 19). It is supported by the more traditional exploratory research, which must be expansive, probing and perspectival.

Four key methodological commitments

Critical realism's 'holy trinity' of ontological depth, epistemological relativism and judgemental rationality entails a range of commitments for the methodological framing of an empirical social science research project. First, the notion that the world and objects within it are stratified and emergent implies that 'causal mechanisms are not immediately empirically evident and so further work is needed to access them' (Connors, 2015, p. 98). Causal tendencies and powers[155] exist at the level of the real. Thus, changes observed or revealed at one level may be due to processes at another level. They may also be in response to structural enablements/constraints at the micro, meso or macro levels. Thus, the research design must be robust enough to enable inquiry into all of these. Second, because critical realism views science as an emancipatory project the researcher is committed to explanation as well exploration. Again, explanation requires probing into possible generative mechanisms and their causal tendencies. What allows the researcher to dig deep is the intensive research design discussed above (Sayer, 2010) which permits the illumination of whole-part relations. The in-depth interview technique (method) is used as a

[155] Bhaskar calls these 'generative mechanisms'. See Bhaskar (2016, pp. 28-31).

support. This is discussed further below. Third, the socially and linguistically defined transitive dimension of science (i.e. the theories we draw on and generate to understand the 'intransitive' objects of research) compels us to consider time-space. As seen in Bhaskar's TMSA (1993), and Archer's morphogenetic approach (1995) structures precede agents, but are also modified and changed by them. Events and their mechanisms happen and change over time. Critical realist research design[156] could be described as 'dance of the dialectic'.[157] The articulation of this dialectic (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2) is gestured through iterative elaboration, and retroductive strategy. Finally, critical realist research design must be prepared to deploy judgmental rationalism. This is because

> The relation between theories/theoretical concepts and the properties or objects the concepts are referring to is not unambiguous and simple; nor is it arbitrary. All theoretical descriptions are fallible, but not equally fallible. (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 116)

Thus, CR researchers must determine the best approximations available to them in explaining underlying tendencies and causal powers.

Research strategies

'Why things are as they are' (Olsen, 2009, p. 13) is a key feature of a critical realist approach (Bhaskar, 2016; Fletcher, 2017). Retroductive logic underpinned my initial starting point, i.e. what must the case be for this reality of CHE to exist in over 80 institutions of higher education in North America? Retroductive logic became a touchstone that I returned to with each iterative cycle of inquiry in seeking to explain both context and underlying generative mechanisms. I also relied on the other three models of inference or abstraction: the abductive, deductive, and inductive; each of which provided different 'ways of relating the specific to the universal and general' (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 113).

---

[156] Which here includes Banfield's abstractions over time and space as well as to the 'deep real' mechanisms (Banfield, 2015a).

[157] See Ollman's eponymously titled book (2003) where he uses this term in reference to Marx's dialectical method (which is essentially the same as Bhaskar's) and which Banfield draws upon in elaborating his discussion of vantage point (Banfield, 2015a).

- The **abductive** move corresponds to Banfield's 'perspective' and facilitated interrogation of phenomena from the differing practitioner perspectives. The abductive strategy helped with understanding CHE in practice and everyday life from the perspective of the scholar-practitioners. Examples of questions asked included: 'What images and metaphors are Julia (Gen Y) and Emily (Baby Boomer) using in speaking about both mindfulness and contemplative education?' and 'What does their teaching practice of CHE look like?'
- **Deduction** within the context of critical realist research in practice refers to the move from theoretical assumptions and hypotheses at the level of the real (i.e. seeking generative mechanisms) back to the empirical. What do I expect to see? The deductive strategy was used for answering 'why' questions, particularly where some social regularity had been observed but not understood. For example, 'I have a theory that CHE practitioners have a practice of "camouflaging" traditional Buddhist practices as secular MBI's'. Why might they be doing this?' What becomes visible (or not) when I take this lens to my interview questioning and to examination of the data?
- The **inductive** move refers to asking the question 'this happened before therefore I induce that it will happen again'. Inductive logic was useful working with data once gathered and providing description of the 'what' of the research context, particular situations, and events and relating to 'social characteristics and the nature of regularities in social life' (Blaikie, 2007; 2010, pp. 18-19, 104-105). For example, two scholar practitioners talk about their classrooms as 'learning environments'. I subsequently mapped these and using inductive logic as the basis for mining interview data from other research participants. As a result, I was able create visuals which then helped me understand the play of enabling and constraining factors at play in individual participants contemplative pedagogy in practice.

Methodological innovation

Examples of applied critical realist research (particularly using Archer's morphogenetic approach, and internal conversation), are still few in number as noted by Fletcher (2017) and Brown

(2009)[158]. The same can be said of Pamphilon's (1999) Zoom method[159], which I used as an additional tool for data analysis. Essentially, the Zoom method provides a schematic, underpinned by a series of questions to jog researcher reflexivity and commitment, particularly in the domain of the empirical. It also compels consideration of semiotic mechanisms, sometimes overlooked in some critical realist research (Fairclough et al., 2004). To date, there has been no combining of these ostensibly complementary approaches. Therefore, in addition to much needed intensive research into scholar-practitioners and their agency in the emerging field of CHE, this project makes a two-fold methodological contribution: first, by adding to the small body of work drawing on Archer, and second, in bringing Pamphilon's Zoom method to bear upon analysis of the internal conversation. While further exploration and application of the latter is required, there is a suggestion that bringing Pamphilon's additional perspectival lenses helps to bridge gaps in (Archerian) CR research as identified by Fairclough et al. (2004), and Clegg (2016) and including semiosis, intersectional analysis and the affective.

Researcher positioning

In Chapter 2, I discussed the issue of the research subjects' identity and agency from a critical realist perspective. Embedded throughout Chapter 1 is the researcher's positioning[160]. It is important to note here that my own positioning in this research project is one of insider-outsider. Not only am I a researcher – or outsider to the world of the research participants – I am also an insider by virtue of the fact that of being both a practicing meditator and higher education worker. The work of Clegg and Stevenson (2013), Smith (2012), and more recently, Sprague (2016) have all been helpful in addressing this issue. Importantly, Sprague (2016) directs attention to the epistemic privileges and disadvantages that come with both either or positions. Clegg and Stevenson (2013) stress that this alerts the researcher to the responsibility they have to continually critique their taken-for-granted assumptions of position. In particular, Pamphilon's Zoom method proved to be a touchstone for a self-reflexive disposition I was keen to maintain throughout the

[158] One significant exception is Scambler (2012, 2013).

[159] Recent exceptions arising during the process of this research include Waters (2017) and Drew (2014).

[160] That is my commitment to a Buddhist ontology of reality and being human, and to feminist political projects. I also reveal my own experience with contemplative practice over the past 16 years.

project. Specifically her advice for the researcher to deploy a high-level of continual critical reflexivity through zooming in and out at four empirical levels (macro, micro, meso and interactional – diagram 4.5 below), while recognising their dialectical nature (Pamphilon, 1999). Her approach not only assisted in connecting the process of doing research with the organic, spiral, nature of the research architecture[161]. It also provided a continual reminder to attune to the semiotic aspects of the texts and to dialectal self-reflexivity (Fairclough et al., 2004; Pamphilon, 1999).

Research architecture and process

Figure 5.2 below illustrates the original architecture of the research process. Its spiral nature is consistent with that of critical realist research (Blaikie, 2010). Both Danermark et al (2002) and Olsen (2009) assert that in exploratory (CR) research 'steps are not meant to be carried out in a pre-specified sequence. Instead, the research must expect to 'revisit earlier steps and re-work the earlier conceptual or data-collection framework' (Olsen, 2009, p. 12). Similar to Grounded Theory, the research architecture for this project involves continual reflexive and iterative movement (observing, reflecting, and engaging). However, where it differs is that CR's key strategic move is the retroductive one (whereas Grounded Theory relies more heavily on abductive reasoning). For further discussion on this topic see Smith and Pangsapa (2007) and Danermark et al (2002).

[161] Banfield's aforementioned 'tri-partitive model' also supported this.



Figure 4.2 Research model architecture

How useable was this?

Reflecting on the usefulness of this research architecture, I realised that, as a community development worker and adult educator, this iterative cycle of inquiry was already well internalised. Banfield's (2009, 2015a) elaboration of Ollman's (2003) conception of materialist dialectics was my first point of visual recall when caught in theoretical and philosophical perplexity. However, the key spiral architecture allowed me to keep sight of the broader shape of things, i.e. where I felt uneasy about having to, needing to, frequently return to theory, and literature. The project remained faithful to this initial architecture suggesting adequate consideration of research design. What this original diagram failed to represent (visually) was the

retroductive move that occurs contiguously and congruently with the basic action research cycle of observe, reflect, engage.

Thus, the research architecture diagram (above) provided a visual touchstone throughout the empirical research component of this project (i.e. development of in-depth interviews, ongoing contextual analysis, and the coding and analysis of data). Bringing into dialogue Banfield's (2009, 2015a) dialectical abstractions with Archer's morphogenetic sequence provided ways for maintaining (macro) overview while honing in on micro and meso. I refer the reader to the discussion above which describes this process as illuminating part-whole relations. Where Pamphilon's (1999) Zoom model was most valuable was during data analysis. Her attention to the macro, meso, micro and interactional dimensions of life-history narrative complements Archer's differentiated agency and reflexive modes. Both enable nuanced exploration of everyday life experiences, and events (Bhaskar's 'empirical', 'actual' and 'real'), as well as seeking insight into underlying causal tendencies. Pamphilon brings additional attention to mapping the 'patterns, sequences, and tendencies evidenced in human speech, texts and discourses' (Olsen, 2009, p. 13). How then does the researcher undertake applied critical realist research?

Unpacking the research question/s

In seeking to answer the primary research question 'what potential exists for CHE to develop the agential capacities of social and ethical, response-ability of educators and, by implication, students?', two inter-related sub questions and their aims were made explicit. The first was: 'how do CHE practitioners understand the nature and social contexts of their practice?' The aim of this question was to identify and explore what CHE practitioners *do* and the extent to which they understand their work as an ethical and social practice. Thus, inquiry needed to include their own accounts of both their pedagogical practice, *and* their social contexts. Beyond this, a deeper understanding of their view of their practice was necessary and was subsequently unpacked through seeking response to the questions: what is higher education for?; why educate?; what were participants' (life) concerns?; what was their view of social change?; and what was the underpinning inspiration, aspiration and/or motivation towards an (ethically) active agency? While the term 'activism' was not included in the initial research proposal, some participants did refer

either directly or tacitly to social activism.

The second sub-question was 'What are the significant structural mechanisms that enable and/or constrain the enactment of CHE as a practice of ethical and social capacity building?' This indicates educators' (scholar-practitioners of CHE) interactions with the structures that have preceded them and are currently being encountered. Critical realism's non-conflationary theory of structure and agency acknowledges the (potentially) active agency of educators in their world. This entails their individual and or collective replication, modification, or transformation of the structures they encounter. Here, the notion of geo-historical (stretch) is significant. For example, those entering the (newly unfolding, fringe-dominated) field of CHE in the mid-70's to late '80's encountered very different mechanisms at play and or with varying degrees of command than those entering the field parallel to the intensifying Mindfulness phenomenon. Thus, a different ontology of CHE was available to participants at their point of entry. I also propose that CHE and mindfulness themselves have a different ontology[162]. The aim of this sub-question was to identify and explore those enabling and/or constraining structural mechanisms significant in the shaping of CHE practice, and to explain their role in framing the possibility of ethical and social response-abilities. Again, inquiry required self-reported and intimate accounts of the identification of, and direct experience with, enablements and constraints. Given the socially oriented focus of this project, the dialectical moves of stretch, depth and perspective, needed to include experiences, events, and causal mechanisms at the micro, macro, and meso levels.

Modifying Bhaskar's interpretive and explanatory model

Drawing on Marx's method, Bhaskar (2016, pp. 7, 30-31) proposed two five-stage models of theoretical explanation: DREI(C), and DRRREI(C)[163] for realist research, and for theoretical and 'applied' research respectively (2016, pp. 79-80). These can be described as methodological framings. The letters refer to description, 'resolution' (unpacking), retroduction, elimination (of

[162] I acknowledge that for some, such a proposal will be somewhat controversial, and that where terms are used interchangeably it will only be of use to those audiences curious about Buddhist or other wisdom lineages.

[163] For an in-depth discussion of their distinction, please see Bhaskar (2016 pp. 78-82).

alternatives), interpretation, (further) retroduction, and contextualisation. Bhaskar stresses that the purpose of his schema is to facilitate the process by which the curious investigator seeks to open up and understand 'deeper and more recondite levels of reality' (2016, p. 7). Danermark et al (2002) found Bhaskar's models complex and their distinctions unwieldy for applied social science research. Instead, they propose a six-stage model, which takes the researcher through a progression of logic from description (of the research object) to presentation of findings (interpretative and explanatory). Importantly, they emphasise that their model 'should be seen as a guideline and not as a template to be followed to the letter' (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 102). The six key phases are: *describing* precisely the object of research; *unpacking* key components and establishing delimits; *interpreting* data through processes of abstraction (especially. retroduction and abduction)[164]; *re-describing* components/aspects in the light of different theoretical and explanatory frameworks; *identifying* explanatory mechanisms, and theories and causal frameworks with the greatest explanatory power; and finally, *contextualising*, and *re-contextualising* i.e. returning to the 'concrete', along with initial research questions and 'objects'.

Danermark et al's (2002) Six-Phase Process

The six-phase process guided me through this research and was adapted as follows:

Stage One: Describing

This stage involved describing the current phenomena of contemplative higher education (CHE) (the object of this study), acknowledging its complex and composite nature, and differentiating it from Mindfulness. Key aspects of this stage included:

- exploring theoretical and philosophical literature as well as applied research – intensive, extensive,[165] and mixed methods;
- considering how scholar-practitioners of CHE described their everyday lived-reality of the

[164] See Blaikie (2010) who provides an excellent presentation of these.

[165] This included exploring the number of universities and colleges offering CHE programs, scholar-practitioners (and their location, discipline region etcetera), key publications and journals, overlapping fields, incidence of keywords, and historical trajectories.

practice of CHE (the important 'lay accounts'); and

- undertaking a stratified contextual analysis using interview data.

The result of the latter is the morphogenesis of CHE presented in Figure 5.1 (Chapter 5) below.

Stage Two: Unpacking the components

Danermark et al (2002) call this stage 'analytical resolution'. In this project, it involved unpacking the various components, aspects and dimensions of CHE: For example, establishing the analytical distinction of the different strata, i.e. structural (cultural[166]) and agential as well as macro, micro, meso. Examples of the latter include:

- for *macro*: neoliberalism; increasing globalisation; 'Occupy' and other social movements including mindfulness; rise of the 'psy-sciences'; fiscally conservative policies; increasing regulation; and technology;
- for *meso*: state and institutional policies; HR and marketing; accreditation and regulatory bodies; resource constraints and financial processes; academic disciplines; state and private HE institutions; religious churches/institutions; the CHE movement; associational communities like ACHME, and Mind and Life; and
- the *micro*: local level individual and collective action; individual institutional events; agentive action and the inner conversations through which concerns are discerned, deliberated, and dedicated; human inter-relationality with the three orders (natural, practical and social (Archer, 2000, 2003). Figures 5.1 and 6.2 elaborate upon this initial exploration.

This stage also involves the stage-setting for the limits and delimits for the study including the 6-7 research participants (only North American based), use of the Internal Conversation (via in-depth interviews), and prioritising CHE[167].

Stage Three: Data Interpretation and Redescription

[166] See Chapter Two for a discussion of Archer's distinguishing of Structure and Culture through and in relation to this thesis. Most important at this point is to understand that latter is ideational.

[167] That is, not including and/or making a comparison with the field of Mindfulness in education.

Here, data is analysed and interpreted as per structure and stratified agency, dominant reflexive modes, participant motivation (inspiration), affect, emotions and concerns. Examination occurs at the macro, meso, and micro levels. The different components and aspects from hypothetical conceptual frameworks and theories are then redescribed. Re-description occurs through placing the original objects (described and unpacked in stages one and two) into a new context (enriched by interview data). The field is redescribed, and the researcher looks for possible causal powers through comparison and integration (where possible) with different theoretical interpretations and explanation. A proposed (and revitalised) contextual analysis is re-drawn. Abductive reasoning is a key feature of this process.[168]

Stage Four: The Retroductive move

While Danermark et al (2002) identify this as a separate stage in CR methodology, they note that it is closely interwoven with the previous stage of redescription. Here, different components or aspects are revisited and interrogated through a process of retroductive abstraction, i.e. bring to bear the key to what must the case be for this particular aspect/component to be manifesting in the way it does and what properties does it rely upon. One example that emerged from the research project was the paradoxical relationship between CHE and the Mindfulness movement – participants experienced the latter as simultaneously constraining and enabling. Deeper inquiry into how Mindfulness was received by participants revealed differing mechanisms (within Mindfulness) and highlighted the need to not conflate them. The retroductive move assisted in the identification of a range of possible causal powers.

Stage Five: Comparison between version/accounts

Having sought out possible explanatory mechanisms (tendencies), the researcher compares and 'weights them against each other' (Bhaskar, 2016, pp. 79-80). Theories with the greatest explanatory power are separated from those that are 'complementary' i.e. they 'focus on different

[168] Blaikie (2007, p.3) articulates this as 'creative process in which social scientific concepts and theories of social life are drawn from social actors' everyday conceptualizations and understandings.' Figure 5.1, The Morphogenesis of CHE, is an example of this.

specific but the same necessary conditions'. Bhaskar highlights the use of imagination (abduction) here too (Hawke, 2017). As Bhaskar (2016, p. 79) then explains, theories whose explanatory powers are false, are then eliminated.

Stage Six: Contextualisation

In this final stage, there is a return to the concrete (i.e. the actual practice of CHE). Structural conditions determined to be merely accidental or contingent are identified and discarded. This final stage has dual purpose: to offer both interpretative and explanatory knowledge, and to contribute to deeper understanding of the conditions, process and powers necessary for social change. This adaption of Bhaskar's research logic by Danermark et al (2002) guided the development of the full research process, which was then implemented through the three phases and various stages of the research process.

Three-phase research implementation process

The three-phase research process operationalisation and timeline is presented below in Figure 4.3.



Figure 4.3 Three-phase research processes (original dates)

Research projects involving human subjects frequently encounter a range of problems. This project was no exception. All significant changes to the above three-phase implementation are included in Figure 4.4 below.

Research Phase	Changes to initial plan
Phase 1	Final ethics approval - Phase 1 March 30th 2016. Project no.7132.
Phase 2	Only one Canadian (Atlantic Coast) fieldwork site (due to cost of air travel). Zoom not Skype online platform - better reliability, higher definition and with sophisticated audio-visual recoding options. Relied solely on the in-depth interview method. Final interviews completed (via Zoom) January 2017 (Phase 2) Academics unavailable (August-December) due to very high workloads. Six full in-depth interview sets comprising of two recorded interviews each. In some cases, pre-interview discussions (also recorded) were completed. Seventh participant unable to complete the second interview, however, a pre-interview discussion and the first interview were available and therefore included in analysis. Two 'non-participants' who consented to a one-off (recoded) discussion/meeting.
Phase 3	Thesis submission date extended by five months due to a delay in data collection delay relating to ankle surgery and ensuing confinement (during Phase 1).

Figure 4.4 Research process modifications[169]

Methods of data collection and analysis

In-depth interview method

In-depth interviews were the primary research method used to explore the current constraints and opportunities for CHE practice in cultivating a critical social response-ability. Participant observation[170], and document analysis, initially included as methods in my Research Proposal were not used. This is because fieldwork occurred during the (Northern) summer break, i.e. prior to the new academic year and no academic classes of any note were in process.

[169] My original research proposal included the additional methods of document analysis and participant observation. Due to fieldwork falling within the (Northern) summer break, as well as the small number of documents offered, these two methods became irrelevant.

[170] While not a primary research method, participant observation had been included to accommodate for contingent circumstances for example, in case I was invited to observe a research participant's classroom.

From a critical realist perspective, the in-depth interview method is discussed from a broader methodological perspective, i.e. as more than just 'recording views' (Clegg & Stevenson, 2013; Smith & Elger, 2012, p. 14). Deep realists like Marx, Bhaskar, and Archer all highlight the layered or laminated nature of social reality (Bhaskar, 2013; Blaikie, 2010). Interviews are attractive to the social researcher because they provide direct access to the thoughts, experiences, and meanings of the individual participant (Elder-Vass, 2010). However, from a CR perspective they are considered 'inadequate' when used alone for analysing the plethora of 'causal factors' at play in the relations between agency and structure (Clegg & Stevenson, 2013; Elder-Vass, 2010; Smith & Elger, 2012, p. 18). Archer's (1995, 2000) morphogenetic sequence helps us to understand this (see Figure 3.2) as we see that structural forces precede an individual life or given time within that life (e.g. within which an interview takes place). As humans we are always the experts of our own 'reasons for conduct' (Archer 2003) and considered deeply intimate with the specifics of our own socio-cultural placement. However, our awareness regarding the 'full-set of structural conditions or consquences' at play is always incomplete (Smith & Elger, 2012, p. 12). Critical realists thus deem that the research interview needs to be 'theory-driven' (Pawson & Tilley, 1997) . This means that the researcher needs to bring their existing hypotheses and theory-informed hunches to the interview process and offer the participant a conceptual framework from within which these can be explored (Pawson & Tilley, 1997; Smith & Elger, 2012). As illustration of this, my semi-structured interview prompts are included at Appendix 1.

My critical realist approach to interviewing drew upon the work of both Archer (2003), and Pamphilon (1999). The latter's Zoom model was developed to support the examination of the life-histories of older Australian women in 1990s – in particular, the narration of lived experience from a range of different perspectives[171]. Her method supports the researcher to 'account for the multiple and contradictory dimensions within personal life accounts' (1999, p. 395). It provided an additional and nuanced lens of analysis to the 'interview sets' as the researcher is encouraged to 'zoom' in and out at different points across the narrative. Archer's morphogenetic approach (1995, 2000)

[171] That is at the micro, meso, macro and interactional levels – previously mentioned above.

provided the conceptual tools (analytical dualism, and time-space consideration) for both exploring the mediation of structure and agency through the internal conversation. Using Archer's notion of stratified agency and four 'modes of reflexivity' (Mutch, 2004, p. 431) supported exploration of structural enablements and constraints and seeking out underlying generative tendencies.



Figure 4.5 Pamphilon's Zoom model (1999) – key elements used in this project

Critical realist and feminist researchers all acknowledge that researcher and co-researcher co-construct the narrative account produced within an in-depth interview (Archer, 2000, 2003; Clegg & Stevenson, 2013; Pamphilon, 1999). There is 'need to theorise the nature of the interview' (Clegg & Stevenson, 2013, p. 8) and here Pamphilon's model was important in this instance. I refer the reader to the discussion above regarding its support in honing my own dialectical reflexivity. Additionally, I become acutely aware of the skills required for kind of deep listening that in-depth interviews require. A commitment to the 'micro' dimension of the Zoom model means that I made space for all aspects of communication: silences, emotion, gestures, pauses, and filler words[172]. Pamphilon argues that our own reactions within interviews and in working with text indicate 'the

[172] Most common were 'uhmm' 'uhh' 'errh' and the ubiquitous 'y'know'.

historical subjectivities of the self as we have constructed them' (1999, p. 406). By relating to my own discomfort, non-comprehension, and reactions or over-enthusiasm allowed 'competing discourses to be more visible' (Pamphilon, 1999, p. 406). Interviews are inherently challenging for the researcher (in process and or afterwards when transcribing), yet this discomfort is valuable. It offered a disjuncture in which to experience, identify and then disrupt habituated modes of communication, unexamined assumptions, and pre-conceived 'truths'. My attention was drawn to what remained marginal and contradictory as well as compatible (Pamphilon 19991, Opie 1990). Through Archer's (2000, 2003) Internal Conversation (IC), I was able to make more transparent my own reflexive style and stance towards constraints and enablements, as well as those of the participants. In researching HE, I was compelled to examine this 'insider status' and attempt to disrupt any habitus or 'feel for the game' associated with this uncanny, yet common, position Clegg and Stevenson (Clegg & Stevenson, 2013, p. 7). This was helped by undertaking research in other countries (USA and Canada) with very different HE systems and cultures. Finally, in understanding that 'power and positionality shape all stages of the research process', I attempt to make transparent in this thesis, not only 'rich descriptive accounts', but also my processes of interviewing, and where particular choices have been made (Clegg & Stevenson, 2013, pp. 7,14), particularly in relation to findings presented.

Common criticisms of in-depth interviews include: ambiguity about what can and can't be told in a text; doing justice to multiple and shifting identities; and not considering power relations (Shacklock & Thorp, 2005, pp. 157-158). These concerns were countered through Pamphilon's Zoom model (informed by her feminist commitments), which, as I allude to above, helped me look out for where there might be multiple, contradictory or shifting identities as well as 'giving voice to any versions of reality that have been neglected or suppressed' (Pamphilon, 1999, p. 407). A CR methodological framing acknowledges from the outset that in-depth interviews will not be exhaustive in the quality and quantity of data provided. Employing Archer's morphogenetic approach (MGA), and using Danermark et al's (2002) phases of critical realist research I have used interview data as an immensely valuable – although not exclusive – source of knowledge.

Selecting participants

The project relied on both purposive and snowball sampling (Seale, 2011) to select a final sample of seven full participants, and two non-participants[173]. Suggestions for participants/co-researchers were offered through a network of critical friends that included a few well-established scholar-practitioners working across different universities in North America (Colorado, California, and Wisconsin). In total seventeen people were approached and, while all were highly supportive, time commitments made it impossible for some to participate. Lamentably, three of these were key scholar-practitioners researching the intersection of CHE and socio-politico-ethico issues. While the intent was to have as much diversity as snowball sampling and participant availability would enable[174], the final sample cannot be considered representative. Participant demographic details can be found at Appendix C. All engaged in regular (daily) meditation practice. A number of the scholar-practitioners generously offered additional contextual information[175]. This provided evidence regarding personal motivations, and further understanding of the critical and disruptive nature of deep meditative practice from different perspectives.

Fieldwork

This research project comprised 11 weeks of fieldwork to North America (the United States and Canada). This was undertaken between mid-May and the beginning of August 2016[176]. Fieldwork was conducted in two sites: Boulder, Colorado, and Halifax, Nova Scotia. In-person and online interviews were conducted using these two sites as bases.

---

[173] Full interview sets were completed for six participants. For the seventh, a long, recorded initial meeting and completion of the first interview enabled their inclusion. Two additional educators were unable to commit to full participation in interviews due to travel commitments; however, they participated in a recorded 'meeting' for which they provided consent. I refer to these two as 'non-participants'.

[174] That is, in relation to age, gender, cultural background, faith path, Canadians as well as 'Americans'[174], length of long-term meditation practice (15-40 years), disciplinary area.

[175] These scholars represented various faith paths (Buddhist, Catholic, Islamic and Protestant); disciplinary backgrounds (religious studies, sociology, social work, theology, education, administration, music and fine arts); and ages, from approximately 25-70 years. Among this group were two people of colour (African-American), and one with SE Asian parentage.

[176] Fieldwork was made possible through a Faculty of Education Project Grant and a Flinders University Overseas Fieldwork grant.

A key aspect of fieldwork was securing a Visiting Scholar residency at the Centre for the Advancement of Contemplative Education (CACE) at Naropa University in Boulder, Colorado for seven weeks (from May to July 2016). Naropa University was established upon a contemplative pedagogical principles/model in 1974 and coined the term 'contemplative education'[177]. This university provided a good base from which to reconnect with existing USA contacts; draw on the valuable resources at Centre for the Advancement of Contemplative Education (CACE) resources based at Naropa University; conduct face-to-face interviews (in person and via Zoom); and meet with key people in the field. I knew via existing contacts and the literature (Brown, 2011; Rhem, 2012; Simmer-Brown & Grace, 2011) that Naropa had a significant concentration of scholar-practitioners with a consistent long-term meditation practice (predominantly but not exclusively Buddhist).

Nova Scotia was chosen as the Canadian site (planned additional travel to the West Coast was unviable financially). Halifax was chosen for its significant concentration of people working within CHE and what is being called Open Mindfulness (via the Atlantic Contemplative Centre[178]). Halifax has five universities and many scholar-practitioners of CHE are involved in the ACC, which enjoys a faculty of seventy-four trained educators. While there, I undertook in-depth interviews, met practitioner-scholars, and attended a twelve-day contemplative intensive retreat. While the latter was not officially part of my research, I was fortunate in spending that time with four others researching CHE from within the disciplines of sociology, social psychology, religious studies, and social anthropology. Rich and beneficial conversations ensued and have since continued.[179]

Fieldwork was a critical aspect of this research methodology. While challenging, (particularly in the USA), it offered a range of advantages for the project. First, given the significant cultural histories and differences (primarily the USA), I gained firsthand experience of how some structural and

[177] See further discussion in Chapter Six as well as Gunnlaughson et al (2014), and Schonert-Reichel & Roeser (2016).

[178] See http://www.contemplativecentre.ca/ .

[179] Deep retreat also provided a reminder of the willingness and discomfort in challenging our habituated views and behaviour, and insight into the capacities of the heart-mind that are available to us as human beings.

institutional enablements and constraints played out in everyday life. Second, as an outsider on a low budget I gained insight (via public transport, speaking with dozens of locals, and walking the hot streets daily for 2 months) into life for those on the margins of a society, which is overwhelmingly white, wealthy and 'wholesome'[180]. My own discomfort (cultural, political confrontation, altitude, prolonged heat, and the regular ups and downs of doing research work with other humans) was (yet another) positive disruption to my notions of self, perception of skilfulness, and plethora of habitual ways. Finally, sitting down face-to-face with individuals was not only deeply delightful, it enabled a sense of the presence of the contemplative educator – a theme participants spoke about in relation to classroom practice.

The research participants

The age of research participants spanned approximately 35 to 70 years[181]. Their years of a daily/regular sitting practice of meditation ranged from about 12 to 46 years with the majority (five) of participants having more than 30 years of deep meditative practice experience. They work in both public and private universities/colleges in Canada and the United States[182]. One of the two Canadian scholar-practitioners had also worked in the USA. Two of the seven were in high-level academic administration positions that involved teaching; three were heads of departments and/or Professors (one on the verge or retirement); and the remaining were either course-coordinators and or senior lecturers[183]. Their disciplinary areas included teacher education, psychology, counselling, psychotherapy, social work, neuroscience, religious studies, creative writing, and cultural studies. Due to the still intimate nature of this emerging field, I have chosen to use pseudonyms, and not discuss each participant in detail to guard against any possible breaches of privacy. A summary of participants' details is included at Appendix 3. Their generosity in sharing their inner-conversations and thus deep motivations and concerns revealed a significant amount of

[180] Boulder has a significant homeless population, most of whom appeared to be experiencing serious mental health issues, compounded by varying physical ability, and extreme poverty.

[181] I did not inquire as to participants' exact ages.

[182] One of which includes Naropa University in Colorado.

[183] The two additional 'non-participants' were both in combined administrative and teaching roles.

personal and, in a few instances, sensitive data.

Participants loosely fell into two generational cohorts: roughly late Gen X-ers (born 1965-1980) and Baby Boomers (born 1946-1964[184]). Not surprisingly, different structural conditions supported their paths of encountering and committing to a path of personal contemplative practice. For all, this is now central to their work and lives. All but one[185] have published within the emerging field of CHE. Three in particular have been at the public forefront of this field since the early 1990s; involved with research and dialogues leading to the birth of organisations such as the Mind and Life Institute (MLI), the Centre for Contemplative Mind in Society (CMind), and the Association for Contemplative Mind in Higher Education (ACHME).

Like others (Clegg, 2013; Scambler, 2012), I also assumed that these scholar-practitioners would all have metareflexivity as a dominant mode of engaging with their worlds. While this was shown to be so, further nuance could be brought to bear upon Archer's reflexive modes. For example, differentiating between the capacities for meta-reflexivity, and making one's way through the world, meta-reflexively. That said, most offered a trajectory of life contexts, events and choices that, for the most part, were strongly indicative of Archer's metareflexivity (see below for further discussion).

Conducting the Interviews

The interviews themselves took the shape of two one-two hour interviews. Two were conducted completely online using the Zoom platform, which allows for audio-visual and MP3 recording formats. With four participants, the second interview was conducted online. An initial meeting of up to an hour occurred for three participants. Consent was provided to include the rich data from these meetings. All interviews, online and in-person were recorded with an Olympus recorder. In case of audio failure, I also took detailed notes during the in-person interview (online interviews had audio-back up). Multiple interviews enabled rich data as I was able to follow up on key themes, address any gaps or where aspects of the narrative had been overlooked or under-responded to

[184] See Seniors Australia https://nationalseniors.com.au/be-informed/research/publications/ageing-baby-boomers-australia

[185] An early career academic.

because of any personal agendas at the time[186], and undertake reading that participants were suggesting for me and or which informed their own writing and teaching. Given the dearth of research using Archer's IC, I followed the approach she used in her initial pilot study (in 2003). Thus I introduced the notion of the inner conversation, and her list of 'ten mental activities' (2003, p. 161)[187] suggesting that participants might identify additional mental activities[188]. While Archer discovered that 'no-one disavowed the activity' (2003, p. 161), all my participants took it as a given, and were even slightly dismissive of me mentioning this. After all, the sitting practice of meditation provides one with a near-uninterrupted opportunity to witness the IC *ad infinitum* (and *absurdum*) in one's life. While Archer enquired about 'themes on which their internal conversations dwelt' (2003, p. 162), I tended to ask at certain points in the interviews 'How do you [did you/are you] talking to yourself about this?' While I had a series of prompts related to my primary research question and two sub-questions (see Appendix 1), I also frequently asked about deeper motivations, intentions and processing, aiming toward those 'conversations' which may never be made external. An open dialogical approach meant that interviews tended to hover between unstructured and semi-structured. Academic participants, who have further cultivated their inherent curiosity through years of contemplative discipline, certainly have many questions and much to say!

Unlike Archer, I was not researching the IC and reflexive styles *per se* but using both as a vehicle for understanding the practice of CHE and participants as corporate and active agents in their engagement with structural/cultural enablements and constraints. An ongoing challenge with using the IC was for me as the researcher to remain open and receptive and 'never intentionally evaluative' (Archer, 2003, p. 162) . Each interview set concluded with a request regarding the possibility of clarifying via email any sticky points I might encounter during analysis. All participants agreed to this and it was helpful in three cases. Interview transcripts were sent to all participants on

[186] For example momentary tiredness or distraction, keen interest in one aspect of a story over another, some sort of emotional or cognitive reaction or blindness, etc.

[187] Archer (2003, p.61) identifies these ten 'mental activities' as to plan, rehearse, mull over, decide, re-live, prioritise, imagine, clarify, imagine conversations, and budget.

[188] As long-term meditation practitioners I was aware that participants may have a higher degree of familiarity with their internal conversations.

completion. Due to their great generosity with time, as well as the IC approach, transcripts provided richly layered and thus valuable data that may assist them in future publication or research.

Transcription and coding

An early commitment to the possibility of using Pamphilon's Zoom method had significant implications for transcription. Being open to exploring the micro aspects of participant narrative (see Figure 5.2 below) meant that I needed to include all 'uhm's, 'ah's, 'y'know's, pauses, silences (and their duration), overt gestures and significant emotions. Transcription required about 11 weeks and delivered a document of approximately 168,000 words. The highly meta-reflexive nature of most participant narratives (i.e. narrative that bends back upon itself and critiques its key points as they are being spoken) intensified the transcription time commitment.

A lack of literature on applied critical realist research provides significant challenges for coding of interview data (Fletcher, 2017, p. 5). Archer's only advice is to get a feel for the data and not be too rigid with coding. I undertook two phases of coding. For the first, I used NVivo and created nodes and node clusters under specific headings[189]. This provided a rich sense of the depth and breadth of key themes as well as enabled the emergence of unforeseen participant concerns[190]. Heeding Archer's advice to get a feel for the data, the second phase of coding involved printing out and binding all interviews. I subsequently immersed myself in each set, reading slowly and making notes in the margins. This process enabled a deep intimacy, and 'feel for', individual narrative style and expression, dominant discourses and cohort similarities (Pamphilon, 1999) as well as the profundity of concerns of each participant. All of this was communicated through both verbal and non-verbal communication. Pamphilon's interactional zoom helped ascertain where I might have over-anticipated, shut down or projected in the interview process. While multiple interviews

[189] These included headings such as structure, agency, culture, neoliberalism, ontology, being human, enablements, constraints, internal conversation, practice of contemplative education, mindfulness among others.

[190] Examples of these included 'interbeing' and 'interdependence', 'scientism', 'Anthropocene' and 'transmission'.

mitigated against this, sticking points were clarified via further email communication with some participants.

Tools for analysis

Archer asserts, 'Data never speak for themselves and their patterning is not self-revelatory. Even an exploratory study is guided by questions' (2003, p. 162). Key analytical tools were provided via Pamphilon's Zoom method and Archer's analytical cycles highlighting the interplay between local/global context (structures) and CHE scholar-practitioner action (agency). Additional sources that assisted with bringing a CR lens to data analysis included Fletcher (2017), Collier (1994), Danermark et al (2002) and Sayer (1992, 2000).

One key influence was Archer's work on reflexive types which she argues are not reducible to an individual's psychology, their socio-economic background, or education level, but do show a strong correlation with 'the receipt of relational goods, or harm' from subjects' family backgrounds (2007, p. 22). Identifying participants' family backgrounds and locating these within their socio-cultural context allows insight into experiences of contextual continuity, discontinuity, or incongruity impinging upon or enabling participants' early lives (2012, pp. 18-21). Sayer observes that

> Contexts or groups are rarely just background; exploration of how the context is structured and how the key agents in the study fit into it – interact with it and constitute it – is vital for explanation. (Sayer, 1992, p. 248)

While the first phase of coding facilitated valuable thematic analysis, the second phase revealed participants' particular constellation of concerns, and their dominant reflexive style and its ensuing dispositional stance towards structural constraints. Critical realism appreciates that narratives are not merely textual, but have real causal power in replicating or challenging underlying social relations (Olsen 2009). Pamphilon's Zoom method definitely contributed to my feeling that each interview set was more than just text on a page. Each arose through acknowledging all dimensions of the (two) human beings involved its creation. Thus, the texts themselves have a strong sense of embodiment, with the power to communicate the dreams, concerns, interpersonal intimacy, communicative skills, meditative potency and sharp minds of participants.

Reflection

Critical realist methodology requires considerable work and seriousness. There are few guides to assist the researcher, particularly those of us venturing into using the internal conversation. I consistently encountered my own shortcomings in the face of the seriousness required and was ever challenged to work harder. In some cases, this required some kind of additional effort. One example is when, early into data collection, I commented (via Zoom) to my supervisor on the difficulty of evoking greater sociological analysis in interviews. I was then reminded of the need to put in extra work into reading in and through interview narratives; research fruition would not be delivered on a plate. At other times, the effort required was to back off and allow more space for deeper critical reflection and analysis. Recognising and challenging my own shortcomings and not making deficit-based assumptions about these (or my participants) became a practice. Bringing contemplative processes and critical realism together animated me towards ever deeper respect and curiosity about self, others and the research process.

The following section orients the reader to Chapters 5 and 6, which specifically respond to each of the two research questions and pull in Archer's theoretical work to do that. The morphogenetic approach (MGA) is not the focus of these chapters. Rather, it occurs across the whole thesis.

First, to remind the reader, the two sub-research questions are:

1. How do CHE practitioners understand the nature and social contexts of their practice?
2. What are the significant structural mechanisms that enable and/or constrain the enactment of CHE as a practice of ethical and social capacity building?

To explore and explain research findings in the light of these research questions, I draw on two analytical tools provided by Archer (as part of her MGA). First are her three stages of reflexive personhood, which show the process of the reflexive mediation of structure by agency (see Figure 2.4). Second is a presentation of the three conditions necessary for understanding how social conditioning (enablements and constraints) impact on individuals and communities (Archer, 2012,

p. 56)[191]. I outline this below.

Chapter 5 focusses on the participants. It begins with their account of the morphogenetic emergence of CHE. This provides a present moment slice of the reflexive meditation of structure and agency, as well as their reflections back on the geo-historical conditions at play. This is followed by an exploration of what they do[192] and their underlying motivation and concerns. Using the notion of a sociological imagination as a lens, I open up a conversation about how participants understand and locate their work as a social and ethical practice. The chapter concludes with a preliminary assessment of the potential of CHE as a movement for personal and social change. Running through this chapter is a plied[193] thread of inquiry interweaving scholar-practitioners' view of what it means to be human, and the role that deep meditative training plays in cultivating relationality and care.

Chapter 6 zooms out to the broader societal context. Here the focus is on the broader location of CHE and examines how structural conditioning impacts upon participants' projects. Archer's three conditions needed for social conditioning frame the discussion. First, I revisit participants' concerns (first highlighted in Chapter 5) vis-à-vis social structures. Second, I investigate where and how social powers are experienced as congruent and or incongruent to the project of CHE. Finally, I examine how participants respond in the light of (potentially) differing dominant reflexive modes and their attendant dispositional stances. The purpose of this chapter was to examine the possibility of CHE given significant structural constraints within these less hospitable times.

It is important to mention that within this thesis, Archer's morphogenetic approach is realised through the provision of accounts of CHE beyond that of participants. Through situating CHE within

[191] I use the term 'individual' more as an analytical term. It allows for the reality of the sometimes radically differing responses of similarly placed people, as well as the similar responses of those from vastly differing structural and cultural contexts.

[192] That is their classroom practice, and personal meditation practice.

[193] Plying is a process where two threads (lengths of yarn/fibre), each with a twist in them are put together in the opposite direction to which they were spun. The result is a stronger (and sometimes variegated) thread, or rope.

the broader problematic of neoliberalism[194] and higher education in North America, all three stages of the morphogenetic approach are covered. I also make reference to macro-level morphogenesis away from a structural logic of competition, to one of opportunity. What emerges from the following chapters is congruity between participant, and my own theory-informed accounts. This says something significant about participants' reflexivity and the role of deep meditative training in deepening a holistic experience of reality. This and other findings are presented in Chapter Seven.

[194] Moreover, neoliberalism's 'hijacking' of (most) of the Mindfulness movement as implied in Chapter 3 and discussed in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 5
CHE IN PRACTICE: ITS HISTORY, NATURE AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

The emergence of CHE is frequently linked to that of mindfulness in education[195] (see discussion in Chapter 3). In this chapter, participant trajectories reveal long-term training within meditative traditions; ethical practice and action; and rigorous intellectual paths. This alternative history has powerfully shaped the lives of participants, and they in return are continually re-shaping it. This notion of responding to and re-shaping rather than seeking replication or stasis is a critical aspect underpinning participant stances towards their current contexts of uncertainty and constraints. This point is further discussed in Chapter 6. As a precursor to these discussions and the content of Chapters 5 and 6, Figure 5.1 is offered as a morphogenetic representation of the participants' accounts of the rise and development of CHE.

The architecture of Figure 5.1 below provides detailed insight into the historical emergence of CHE and its morphogenesis – as distinct from morphostasis. Key general points that will be picked up later in this and the following chapter include: an alternative narrative and thus ontology of CHE; participant identification of particular enablements and constraints; and the types of agency demonstrated by participants. Additionally, Figure 5.1 makes explicit that CHE has a more deeply rooted history than suggested by popular assumptions that it emerged from the Mindfulness movement early in the new millennium.

[195] Recent literature frequently advises that the emergence of CHE parallel that of mindfulness in education. There are assumptions that both rode in on the slipstream provided by mainstream science's enthusiasm for Kabat-Zinn's (2003) seminal publication which included measures of patient benefit from mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs).



Figure 5.1 the Morphogenesis of CHE (participants' account)

Two cohorts, different social contexts

In contrast to much literature, scholar-practitioners' motivation for introducing CHE was not for instrumental reasons. According to recent scholarship these non-instrumental motivations include better learning, teaching and general well-being as a new 'technology' either for management of the self[196], or for enhancement of traditional educational outcomes (Glanville et al., 2014; Meiklejohn et al., 2012; Oberski, Murray, Goldblatt, & DePlacido, 2015; Shapiro et al., 2011). Rather, participants were motivated by having experienced potent benefits of self-enrichment and deep reflexive inquiry in their own lives. This also included disrupting habituations, fostering more fulfilling educational experiences, and increased meaningful engagement with others and their communities (this is discussed later in the chapter). Yet it is a focus on the non-instrumental benefit of CHE for students that underpins why these lecturers and professors choose to educate.

Participants' reported that their approach to pedagogy was an extension of life concerns. For all, these were shaped through a combination of incongruities in their childhood and adolescent years, and inspiration gained by meeting and studying with and about meditation masters. Those mentioned included Thich Nat Hanh, Suzuki Roshi, Chogyam Trungpa, Pema Chödrön, among others[197]); along with experiences from their own lengthy paths of contemplative practice. While Archer (2007, p. 155) employed the term 'incongruity', Wadham (2002, p. 164) offers (strong) 'difference' or 'alterity', indicating a shift in what one participant referred to as 'lifeworld'[198], which is then accompanied by a shift in key primary concern.

Chapter Four showed that participants roughly grouped into two generational cohorts, whose initial encounters with meditative traditions were shaped by their respective socio-historical contexts. These two cohorts are:

1. The post-1968 social revolution 'Summer of Love', Euro-American world – otherwise known

[196] An example of this self-management could be the amelioration of stress and anxiety for either the educator and\or the student.

[197] Others mentioned by participants were Lama Tsultrim Allioni, Dzongsar Khytense Rinpoche, Joan Halifax Roshi, and Dzögchen Pönlop Rinpoche.

[198] Here the participant (Julia) was drawing on the work of Habermas (Habermas, 2002).

as the 'hippy era' (particularly within North America). This period saw the influx of meditation 'masters' from Northern and SE Asia who not only came to live but teach and establish communities (Morgan, 2014).[199]

2. The turn of the new millennium and the rise of interest in Western secular-mindfulness practices. These arose commensurate to the work of Kabat-Zinn (2003) and that of Joseph Goldstein, founder of the Insight Meditation Society[200] (Barbezat & Bush, 2013).

These categories show that opportunities for encountering a genuine meditation master or contemplative community were structurally different for the two cohorts. The 1970s and 1980s allowed for more flexible work arrangements and participants had the benefit of a less-constrained university education. There were more opportunities for retreat-practice, sometimes lasting up to 3 months. Five participants mentioned being able to leave academia for frequent retreat practice (Zen and Tibetan Buddhist). One, who was in a senior position, remarked that after some years, their Executive Dean asked where they were going.

> When I told him y'know, we would sit silently for 12-14 hours a day that seemed just an impossible notion for him. But then the next month at the Department Heads meeting before we got started and I think he was anticipating another very contentious meeting and he said 'do you think there is some way you could take the other Department Heads along with you when you go to this retreat?' [laughs ha ha ha]. (Bernie)

Yet meditation and (the not yet in common parlance term of) 'mindfulness' were viewed as fringe activities. By the turn of the millennium, this had shifted considerably. More openness and curiosity towards mindfulness-meditation was observed in relation to the conceptualisation of wellbeing, and resilience; particularly in relation to students. This has had a significant impact on current practice of CHE and will be discussed further in the following chapter.

Early life concerns motivate historical choices

Archer observes that primary life concerns, rather than parents' or society's expectations, trigger our agency and shapes how we make our way through the world Archer (2000, 2007). This is not a

[199] See Morgan (2014), whose paper proposes three historical waves through which contemplative education arrived in North America.

[200] Within which Kabat-Zinn practiced within at that time.

clear path of intention and action. There are significant trade-offs and sublimation of certain wants and desires to others, which more adeptly enable a coherent trajectory for ourselves[201]. In the very personal reflections revealed by participants we are provided with glimpses into the principles and concerns that later underpinned their views of higher education. Some examples of these life questions and formative events included:

> [My successful sibling] said to me recently … *'it's been interesting. You know, in my life'* [they said] *'I've helped a lot of people, but I never wanted to help people'*. For me it was like, I was driven to help people from my earliest memory. (Emily)
>
> [In high school] we had to do service work and I chose to go to a refugee camp, I mean it was transformative like the sun. When I got there for the first time it was like immediate that, this is where I belong, this is the kind of work I need to be doing – even though I'm not doing that kind of work ... just the whole social justice … connection. (Julia)

These life-concerns underpin the morphogenetic emergence of CHE presented in Figure 5.1. It is not difficult to see how the adolescent anxieties expressed above led to, and were supported through, encounters with contemplative lineages and traditions[202]. Participants indicated that deeper adolescent concerns (i.e. beyond managing the everyday ups and down of human life and work) were drivers of experiences that ultimately led them to CHE. For Stephen, this included an acculturated inability to harness the affective embodied self and see this as a vehicle for – rather than an obstacle to – transformative pedagogical practice.

> Well I think back to my own experience of being a public school teacher … I knew how to get around the classroom and do all the things that teachers are supposed to do but there was some disconnect between, I guess you'd say my emotional life, and my teaching ... at the time it felt like a failure to me that I wasn't able to adapt to that particular situation and be effective. And, I realised that … was partly because of the way I was raised not being in touch with the emotional side of yourself and not being able to bring that liveliness into whatever I was doing. (Stephen)

---

[201] The exception here is the experience of the fractured reflexives for which this process is elusive. Escaping the harm experienced from within the family context as children is a motif they replicate in adult years. Archer's work is not (yet) able to provide an adequate account of the more mature years of these people and the possible conditions under which fractured reflexivity might ease, shift, or become less dominant.

[202] These were lineages of Zen, and Tibetan Buddhism now practiced in the West, but which have existed in Northern Asia for over 1400 years (Harvey, 2013).

This sense of disjuncture (or alienation) in relation to self, others or the broader community expressed by Stephen was a key factor reported by other participants. It also played a role in their practice of CHE.

Reasons for engaging 'the contemplative' higher education

Personal reasons for participants' involvement with CHE run counter to dominant discourse regarding the seminal role of the Mindfulness movement. Instead, they wanted to enable a convergence between research and or teaching, and meditation-practice lives, and in some cases, use the latter as the basis for research[203]. The edginess provoked through personal encounters with deep practice and living meditation masters[204], along with study of key texts[205], facilitated shifts in their experiences of self, perceptions of reality, and the possibilities for learning. Emily recounts that this is where she:

> … realised that learning, real learning takes place; learning that *actually transforms* a person and their world – which is what I think learning is. (Emily)

For some, acknowledging and trying to 'resolve' the incongruity of academic and social contexts provided impetus for contemplative pedagogies. Examples given included: the discipline of Religious Studies, which delves into texts, yet disdains the practices contained within them; the inadequacy of clinical approaches towards clients, which denied the embodied existential and emotional support they sought; or the contradictions inherent in modern science, which provided a dualism of great hopefulness and the possibility of destruction[206]. As a result, Bernie expressed that he:

> …felt increasingly drawn towards questions about well 'how do you actually approach that?' If science is not an unvarnished social good then what else is needed? What has to occur along with that? I saw possibilities for something that might provide that counter valence, both in my own life as a scientist but also,

[203] This was in the areas of neuroscience (laboratory based) and social science (mixed-methods research).

[204] As previously mentioned, these were mostly Buddhist and of both genders.

[205] Predominantly but not exclusively – two participants mentioned (in addition to Buddhist) study of Hindu Vedic, Daoist, and Ignatian (Christian/Catholic) texts and practices.

[206] Paraphrasing Bernie.

> generally, in the culture. (Bernie)

His key concern – shared by all participants – was that universities were 'straying from the origins of higher education in terms of addressing the whole person'. Bernie observed far too many instances of treating students as empty vessels into which one poured information and that the university had:

> … become a remarkably uncompassionate environment, and students were suffering greatly because of feeling alienated; y'know all the kind of indicators that are talked about – high suicide rates on campuses and high rates of depression and diagnosable anxiety disorders … I saw contemplative practices as a way to counter that. (Bernie)

Yet, the rise in CHE as pedagogical approach was slow — even at Naropa according to one participant where there was initially a separation between personal practice and traditional academic methods. The morphogenesis of CHE is the result of the agency of scholar-practitioners like those included here. What then, does the practice of CHE look like within the university? At which levels and disciplines do participants teach?

CHE in practice

CHE in the university classroom varies from semester-long introductory programmes, to core units, low-residency[207] summer intensives, and 2-3 year Masters programmes[208]. The scholar-practitioners interviewed all taught a mix of undergraduate and post-graduate students, and around half supervised PhDs[209]. Programmes taught by participants fell into two general groupings: those investigating texts and practice from key wisdom traditions with the purpose of personal enrichment and (more relational) professional practice[210], and those engaging traditional

[207] Low residency programmes included a more significant online content.

[208] Masters programmes in contemplative studies are taught in a number of universities, including Simon Fraser University (CA), Brown University (USA), University of Michigan, Naropa University (USA) and Antioch University, New England (USA), Rice University (USA) has a PhD programme in Religious Studies with a contemplative studies concentration. For a full list see ACHME link http://www.contemplativemind.org/resources/study

[209] Unlike Australia, not all universities in the USA offer Doctoral programmes.

[210] For example, in the areas of social work and teaching practice, curriculum design and in therapeutic work.

disciplinary content[211] through contemplative pedagogy using first-person (meditative) practices. Many participants worked across both groupings. Those emphasising wisdom texts[212] as the main object of study iterated the emphasis they placed on bringing these into critical dialogue with each other utilising respective modes of contemplative and scholarly inquiry. Fulfilling Hattam's (2004) anticipation, Bernie, Julia, Eugene and Karen included Buddhist and Western philosophy along with social (cultural) theory into this East-West dialogical exploration. A key purpose of this was to draw out and resource capacities for critical thinking that could stretch perspectives and trouble prevailing dominant worldviews. Reflecting on her own education, Julia laments its limited depth and therefore seeks not to replicate that for her own students:

> And I also thought: 'what a shame', as I started reading all of this literature and being influenced by it and realising that my entire educational background all those years, I was never exposed to this. Even when I was living abroad[213] I wasn't exposed to, to these ideas. My ideas were still largely Western and I thought that, y'know, 'how terrible'. I started to realise a responsibility to broaden the horizons of the kind of scholarship that my students are introduced to. (Julia)

Pivotal to challenging the cognitive and broader lifeworld of students were pedagogies to foil alienation of the student from herself in the process[214].

Participants were from a wide range of academic disciplinary traditions, and what and how they taught was equally diverse. Content aside, there were two key aspects of CHE in practice emerging from this research. The first was the emphasis participants placed on the learning environment as an enabling environment. Second was the presence and maturity of the educator (Brown, 2009; Brown, 2011, 2014; Jennings & Greenberg, 2009). Furthermore, as scholars, all had an unflinching commitment to what is commonly referred to as 'academic rigour', which includes cultivating trust in the subjective as a mode of complementary inquiry (Bach & Alexander, 2015, p.

---

[211] In the areas of creative writing, critical theory, psychology, neuroscience, religious studies, research methodology teaching, counselling and social work practice.

[212] That is, from the world's wisdom traditions and as identified by participants as Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Contemplative Christianity and Indigenous 'spirituality'.

[213] Julia lived in SE Asia for some time.

[214] Eaton et al (2011) emphasise that a key barrier to critically reflexive thinking in relation to pressing social issues is student overwhelm, along with an inability to 'care for self' in a way that enables deep curiosity and relationality with the other (see Lobel 2014).

106; Simmer-Brown, 2016). The purpose of this is to develop fresh personal insight into learning and its application and not just rehashing existing narratives and approaches. Importantly, it included the whole human being – their brilliance, confusion, and obstacles – as part of the learning journey. Such a commitment to reflective inquiry finds support from Adorno, who remarks that:

> From what, if not sharable and communicable subjective experience, should the normative sources that are an unavoidable footing for the knowledge of reality of life come? And how if not through an 'experimental' reflection on what and how things are done to humans, should the conditions of a comparatively un-pressured life come to be known? (Adorno in Seel, 2004, p. 261)

Here we see similarities with Bhaskar's (2016) notion of the importance of concrete utopias: supporting learners to envision real alternative futures. This theme was recently echoed by Zipin et al (2015) who highlight the necessity of learning environments 'capacitating'[215] learner aspirations for better futures amidst these 'dark times'. From what ground might this proceed? Participants reveal that CHE in practice necessarily includes reflection on the matter of our everyday lives[216]. It brings to bear upon these multi-faceted experiences, continual probing, inquiry, deconstruction and reconstruction. What undergirds this approach is a valuing of human persons and their capacities.

Grounding practice in an ontology of human capacity

All participants articulated an ontology of being human grounded in wealth and possibility. They shared the view that both educator and educatee contributed to the learning environment through their own particular skills, styles, wisdom, life experience and knowledge. Julia, and Bernie explicitly referred to the 'deficit view of humanity' (Loy, 2002, 2014) as inherited from Abrahamic traditions through which students then see themselves as 'born into original sin' (i.e. fundamentally flawed or lacking). For Bernie this was the ground from which inherent human capacities (such as a 'biological need and orientation towards connection and compassion') have been mistrusted in science (Davidson & Harrington, 2002). Julia invites students to explore non-deficit views of

[215] Here they draw upon the work of social-cultural anthropologist Arjun Appadurai and direct their inquiry towards low SES students. See Zipin, Sellar, Brennan, and Gale (2015, p. 240).

[216] Including: our suffering, delights, and oppression; habituated repression and delusion; and stances of disaffection and hardening.

humanity as a key aspect of CE curricula. This becomes fertile ground for bringing awareness to the necessity of not creating harm, as well as understanding its current enactment in our world. Vince (working in a professions-based discipline) explained that as students came to understand the effect they have on others within group-work sessions[217], they became aware of their agency and thus future potency in influencing others and their world. All participants made explicit their acknowledgement of the 'whole person' - affective, embodied, cognitive, sense-based, and socio-culturally located – and how CHE draws on this as a resource. As such, CHE appears to be an educational praxis which acknowledges Bhaskar's claim that we are relational beings existing on all planes of social existence (material, intersubjective, structural and stratified-self) simultaneously (Bhaskar (1993, 2016))

Including first-person inquiry

Archer (2003) opens her book on structure, agency and the Internal Conversation by highlighting two critical human capacities:

> Any form of social interaction, from the dyad to the global system, requires that subjects know themselves to be themselves. … a reflexive being who is also an intelligent being, has the capacity to ask herself, how do other things, including people, affect me? The combination of reflexivity and intelligence has produced someone who can reflect upon the world. (Archer 2003, pp.19-20)

In spite of calls for re-humanising HE, Freire's notion of an instrumentalist banking education (1985; 2000) still flourishes today (see Bernie's comment below). Recent scholarship (Bach & Alexander, 2015; Sable, 2014; Simmer-Brown, 2016) suggests that CHE acknowledges well the reflexivity and intelligence of the learner[218]. It draws upon and strengthens student capacities, personal styles and insight (or wisdom). Together with the inevitable personal struggles and neuroses, this richness becomes the basis for 'digging deep' (Emily). Here, 'digging deep' means provoking more critically reflexive engagement with course content, the learning environment, and

[217] He provided examples of prejudice and entitlement related to gender, privilege, and colour.

[218] This is something that Julia referred to as their *Bildung*. This German term for a fully rounded and whole education is found extensively in Adorno's work where he refers it in the negative *Halb-bilding,* and in relation to 'current' ways of education, which only offer this 'half-education'. Unfortunately, deeper discussion of this complex and virtually 'untranslatable term', and Adorno's use of it is beyond the scope of this thesis (Adorno, 2010; Varkøy, 2015).

the nature of students' lives as contemporary social beings. One participant articulated this as 'your life as a laboratory'. Harnessing, rather than discarding of personal obstacles may also be critical to revoking Giroux's bare pedagogies and the re-vitalisation of academic writing (Simmer-Brown, 2016). Emily utilises obstacles as stepping-stones to a relational grounding in the present:

> What I do as a teacher, which is to say let's talk about what's going on in our classroom right now, what's going on here? What are you experiencing? What am I experiencing?' What is it that makes it possible for us to meet each other at the moment? (Emily)

All programmes taught by participants used contemplative practices as a vehicle for experiential first-person inquiry and in complement with dialogical and more traditional (third-person) approaches (Roth, 2006; Simmer-Brown, 2016; Varela & Shear, 1999). Yet as Emily indicated above, these are also vehicles for intimate encounter – with self, and other. A critical foundation is the sitting practice of meditation[219]. As the basis for further processual and inter-subjective[220] pedagogy, it includes reflective critical inquiry, experiential learning and sense-based and dialogical inquiry. Courses relied upon self-selected enrolment. Exceptions occurred where the entire study concentration relied upon contemplative inquiry and pedagogy, along with ongoing personal practice – as a prerequisite for entry into the programme, and its duration. Yet, voluntary participation and 'opt-out' possibilities[221] were no 'green pass' out of demanding academic reading and inquiry. To the contrary, not being satisfied with easy answers was a consistent theme. Learning-lite did not appear to be an option and agentic capacities to critically reflect on self, ideas and one's world appeared to be well exercised in participants' classes.

Key features of the contemplative 'classroom'

> Contemplative higher education… It's about the development of other domains of what it is to be human (Stephen)

An essential aspect of the contemplative classroom is the acknowledgment, and inclusion of emotions as part of being human. Viewing these as intrinsically related to our embodiment, and

[219] Some participants used the term 'mindfulness'.

[220] Within CHE, also referred to as 'second person' approaches.

[221] Bernie explained these as 'choosing to not participate' in a particular aspect of contemplative inquiry.

thus worthy of attention in the production of knowledge. Archer acknowledges emotions as rich elements of our 'inscapes' (Hopkins in Archer, 2004, p. 24). Moreover, while HE has long endured the separation of logos from pathos, Archer (2002, 2004) views discursive knowledge as necessarily entwined with the embodied *and* practical. For Honneth (2008) and others[222], development of our cognitive discursive capacities depends upon an affective and embodied acknowledgment of Other. Thus, rather than viewing emotions as intrusive or corruptive powers, participants viewed them as 'emergent properties', valuable for incorporation into academic learning journeys and vital aspects of relational being. Likewise for Archer, emotions play a central and vivid role in the development of who we are as persons – directly related to our cares and concerns in three relational domains. Interestingly, these cohere with those of Bai et al. (2013) i.e. the self-self, self-other and self-environment[223] (Archer, 2000, p. 199). Yet, our 'vivid' emotions can easily throw us out of the saddle. Mahayana Buddhism proposes that we learn to harness and ride their energies, rather than vice versa. It is in this vein that Emily shares her work with emotions in the classroom.

> The Buddha taught that the experiences of positive, negative, and neutral are experienced in the body and you can use those as objects of attention, but I also teach within that … how to work with the emotions. So that when people have all kinds of emotions they are not just in their thoughts about the emotions, but they are experiencing the emotion and the physical issues that are part of the emotion. (Emily)

Harnessing the power of emotions

Within the fields of mindfulness and psychology, significant attention is paid to emotional regulation.[224] Instead, participants focussed on deepening scholarly exploration, and personal understanding. This had a two-fold purpose: to befriend and better understand our humanity; and to use increased emotional literacy as the basis for deeper inquiry into social suffering and

[222] In Honneth's 2008 publication ('Reification') he draws upon the work of Habermas, Dewey and Cavell in finding support for his claim that recognition of *other* is grounded in an embodied disposition of care, which in turn is essential for cognitive development.

[223] Archer uses the term 'body-environment' (2000, p. 199).

[224] Some recent examples of this regarding higher education include (Bamber & Schneider, 2016; Bettis et al., 2017; Canby, Cameron, Calhoun, & Buchanan, 2015); Meiklejohn et al. (2012) .

structural injustice. The latter includes more skilful interrogation of personal beliefs and assumptions. I return to a discussion of this further in this chapter.

Julia draws on Ahmed's (2014) work, as well as others from within the field of affect studies to engage students in 'the social and emotional' and bring:

> East-West into dialogue with each other [to encourage] … 'Eastern' understandings of the emotions, 'Western' understandings of the emotions, *and* history of the emotions. (Julia)

One of the non-participants observed that as part of relating to emotions 'it all comes up, the painfulness of our being'. She also observed that 'students were unbelievable in their willingness to investigate questions such as what is it the nature of my suffering? Where have I created storyline out of my suffering that has not allowed me to free myself from suffering or come out of it? And where have I lost agency in myself right now?*'* Emily employs (traditional Buddhist[225]) methods of inquiry, which focus on deconstructing the emotions to loosen habitual conceptual covering of our humanity.

> I teach how to practice, well not even really practice, but I also teach how to work with emotions so they are not just in their thoughts about the emotions, but they are experiencing the emotion and the physical issues that are part of the emotion and then … learning to recognise … patterns of repetitive thoughts and learning to recognise beliefs and belief structures. And, you know, learning the difference between opinion and direct experience, and learning the difference between assumption and direct experience. (Emily)

This work of bringing the whole human being into the learning environment, utilising the 'juiciness' (rich edginess) of our emotions as fodder for learning journeys, and gaining insight into personal and social suffering is beginning to gain traction among those seeking a more holistic and experiential post-graduate education. Stephen, a course coordinator explains:

> We have teachers … who've been teaching for 20 years and they've looked at MA programs and haven't seen anything at all that appeals to them … it just doesn't seem to be talking about teaching and learning the way they know it, from it having been teachers … It's a kind of gut thing that 'none of that I want to waste my time on'. Then they stumble across our website and something clicks … for some people it's the fact that we include the emotions and the heart quality of education. (Stephen)

[225] That is within the *mahayana* and *vajrayana* forms of Buddhism

While not all participants discussed emotions specifically, a thread across conversations was the need for HE to support students to relate to their own embodied human expression particularly, that which makes us feel vulnerable, fearful or shut down. Education, which does not do this, misses opportunities for deeper exploration into the nature of suffering, and opening to that suffering in others. Long-term contemplative educators Asrael and Bialek (2016) insist that in the messiness and discomfort of emotions, signs of nascent and expanding compassion are indicated.

Learning is a journey – arduous at times

Another aspect of the CHE classroom is an emphasis on learning journeys. Common to both Bhaskar and Trungpa's dialectics of learning are the need for time, space, and support in enabling deep integration of prior learning – what Bhaskar (2002, p. 335) calls 'making it your own'. Underpinning this approach is that you can't learn anything *into* anyone; we can only discover this for ourselves (Bhaskar, 2002; Scott & Bhaskar, 2015). The educator's role is one of facilitator – of the understanding of content; and support in making it personally meaningful. Emily explains that:

> For an educational situation to be truly contemplative, I think that the student and the teacher both have to be engaged in some personal, almost like a search for the truth of whatever they are studying. I mean so that's motivation, but it's also passion, and [for] people to not be satisfied with the easy answers. (Emily)

Essential to this role of educator as facilitator and companion on the learning journey is allowing for exploration. This necessitates both uncertainty and risk. Thus, participants highlighted the importance of learning environments where it is 'okay not to know' and where there are no wrong questions. All interviewees spoke of the deepened sense of community that occurs in their classroom. A part of this related to the courage of letting one's vulnerabilities show, and the skill of the educator in drawing out both individual and group wisdom. Two participants remarked how this differed to the usual pitting of students against each other. Rather than siloed learning journeys where some are championed for 'excellence' that others must aspire towards, the educators observed that learning, respect, and stronger connection all grew. Respectful acknowledgement extended to include the 'other'; that is classmates whom others did not necessarily like or agree

with. Eugene recounts his understanding of one student's insights[226]:

> The basis as best I can understand it is that 'we took this journey together where we were vulnerable, took a risk together you and I. And, I know you respect what I said and I know I respect what you said, and so we might have different stories and different conclusions, but we feel connected.' And it was that kind of insight that made me feel whoa. (Eugene)

This potential for CHE to facilitate self-other awareness and connection is discussed later in the chapter.

All participants believed in the potential for CHE to enhance traditional educational goals; facilitate deeper inquiry and intimacy with subject matter; improve critically reflexive thinking, and strengthen relationality – between students and their broader communities. A critical consideration in current times is that universities are turning out students with high levels of discipline or skill-related knowledge but who are struggling to manage their own mental and emotional lives (Bai et al., 2009, p. 323)[227]. Levels of depression and anxiety are high. There was strong motivation to respond to the 'hell in a handbasket' resignation of many students. Thus, the sitting practice was seen as a key tool in both befriending and healing.

Meditation as a vehicle for learning

All participants required their students to make a commitment to a (secular) mindfulness-meditation practice – either for the duration of courses taken, or entire study programmes[228]. Time commitments varied from 10 to 20 minutes per day, and were in addition *to* existing practices[229].

---

[226] Provided to Eugene in written format within the context of end of semester course evaluation.

[227] Some months ago, a friend who is a senior lecturer remarked that in one week seven of her 22 students came to her with anxiety levels that felt unmanageable for them. A conversation last week revealed that all seven had withdrawn from the course. The students had remarked that their withdrawal was not because they were not enjoying the course, but because they were unable to manage their personal mental/emotional lives vis-à-vis academic demands.

[228] One example of the latter is some of the programmes at Naropa University where students receive the additional support of a trained meditation instructor with whom they meet regularly. Naropa also runs (secular) Meditation Instructor training. One professional post-graduate program includes five two-week meditation retreats for all students.

[229] Participants mentioned that these included yoga, tai chi, and Christian prayer.

The value of direct personal experience of 'the sitting practice of meditation' included: relating to and befriending our humanity; developing mental pliability; increased skilfulness with emotions; and disruption, interruption and shifting of habituated dispositions and worldviews.

All Buddhism proposes the fundamental workability of our humanity. We have the intelligence, and resourcefulness to face our current reality and shape inclusive communities that afford all beings their dignity. This sentiment is also reflected in the work of Bhaskar, and even Adorno. Yet we rarely examine our view of what it means to be human, or pause to taste its texture. Meditation becomes a vehicle for direct experience of our embodied 'sense of ourselves as ourselves' (Archer, 2003, p. 19). While this experience is not always comfortable for Stephen it's:

> Fundamental in my view, it's a whole dynamic of, of attention and relaxation and opening and integrating … there's so much profundity in basic sitting practice. (Stephen)

Another interviewee described meditation, as it is a process of becoming familiar with what it is to be. For her, this does not mean 'to be stable' or to 'maintain a state of mind', rather 'it means to be as a human being, to be in this world as a complete part of it rather than any kind of observer of it'. From what other ground can response-ability arise? One must be completely in the world to see accurately and respond to it.

A disruptive practice?

Participants did not use Bourdieu's (1990) term habitus, but discussed in depth the potential of meditation to disrupt it at both personal and systemic levels. At the classroom level, this was articulated as inviting 'spaces of uncertainty, risk, and unknowing'. Emily commented that what the educator can do within this space is always guided by the willingness of the student. The view of meditation as a 'disruptive practice' was a key theme in interviews. It included the disruption of our own internal habits of mind and of society, of structural patterns, and of oppression. One research HE asserted that 'mindfulness' is not about creating calmer students, or about making students more relaxed. They stated that it is actually about activating students and making them revolutionaries; revolutionaries of their mind, and (social) revolutionaries. For Karen and others

meditation is a social practice that underpins activism. Critical because:

> Seeing clearly the patterns and how they cause harm is the foundation. And then how do we interrupt those systems? Using the language of Black Lives Matter – they talk about disrupting and interrupting. I think they have to be interrupted first in ourselves. If we don't really work with ourselves, we can easily just fall into an adversarial subversion trap, you know. (Karen)

Why and how participants had maintained a long-term meditation practice concerned two key aspects of being. The first enabled an embodied disposition of presence and care – towards whatever particular context they found themselves in, and whomever they were with. For Vince, increasing years of practice brought a sensitised and strengthened disposition of availability towards others – students, colleagues and clients. The second aspect, was a practice which enabled a way of encountering the self and disrupting its tendency to preserve a reified notion of itself as permanent and unchanging. For Emily it is a vehicle for staying in contact with how and where the self tends towards identarian thinking (or ego).

> It allows me to see how I edit reality and create alternate realities out of my thoughts and if I don't do that every day, I tend to believe my thoughts, and take that alternate reality to be the truth. But through basic sitting meditation I see how much my experience is self-created, I see my opinions and I see my judgements and I see my projections and I see my uhm attempts to manipulate reality to make it kind of fit my version of things and so sitting practice brings me right back to just each moment of 'this is what's happening in the body, this is what's happening in the environment, this is what's happening in, on my inner uhm awareness level, and everything else is just made-up' so to me it's the great reality check every day and I completely depend on it. (Emily)

The meditation cushion provides opportunities for interrupting Adorno's identarian thinking and Bourdieu's habitus – through seeing, and becoming familiar with the associated 'raft of conceptualization' (Trungpa in Morton, 2013, p. 75). Once interrupted, the practitioner is able to remind self of alternative ways of thinking and being, and able to experience the different textures of embodiment of both. Thus, meditative practice enables both recognition and disruption of identarian thinking, as well as that of our embodied habitus (Sayer, 2009)[230], or what Buddhists call habitual tendencies. The practitioner not only learns to acknowledge habitual patterns of thought, action and reaction, but to investigate and 'feel' their residence within the physical body. This is

[230] See also Farrugia and Woodman (2015).

important given the highly disembodied nature of Western philosophy and culture. Eschewing the embodied is deeply rooted in the Western psyche and history. It owes much to:

- the Abrahamic traditions which viewed the physical body as base, sinful, and fundamentally untrustworthy;
- the enlightenment traditions and its elevation of 'rational man' over other ways of knowing, being and relation;
- philosophy's conflation of thought with reality (see Chapter Two and Bhaskar's epistemic fallacy); and
- the industrialisation of our societies leading to urban lives devoid of direct reliance on the contingency, unpredictability and materiality of the natural world.

All of these have contributed to human beings who (in the main) are unaccustomed to an intimate and affable relationship with their physical bodies. We do not know how to 'feel' what it means to be human. Thus, when human feelings present, we rely upon three familiar modes of escaping[231] reality to ensure the continuation of our comfort and habitus. What Trungpa called the cocoon, Mahayana Buddhists the ego i.e. the constructed-self, and Adorno 'reified consciousness' (2010, p. 85). A non-participant emphasises that while contemplative practice provides the tools for experiencing our humanity and interrupting habituations, learners and us educators must also have:

> … the willingness and the courage to really go to the places that scare us and really dive into the darkness of humanity and see the basic 'is-ness' among the basic goodness there. But it's a hard journey. (Non-participant 1)

Courage requires tolerance of discomfort. *A* second non-participant reflects on this demand implicit in deconstructing and dissolving habituations:

> What you are doing is always checking your ego y'know keep making sure that the habitual patterns of ego gets disrupted over and over again, and with [meditation] those patterns get more and more subtle so it requires more and more precision. (Non-participant 2)

[231] As referred to in Chapter 4, the three modes include: seduction and fixation; rejection and violence; or anaesthetising oneself.

Thus, while providing opportunities, the journey of making a relationship with meditative practice and one's-self is often far from the palliative promises of the Mindfulness movement.

Unsettling habituated ways of being

The process of pulling the threads of the cocoon of habituations is a slow one. However, the discomfort of surrendering is countered by the freshness of the vacated space. Bhaskar (2002) likens the slow and sometimes tedious process of making knowledge and learning, personal to any act of creation. Internalising and personalising knowledge requires discipline, and *is* a discipline. Here I use the term with its Buddhist frame–- referring to a willingness activated from within, rather than a restriction imposed from without. Discipline is the willingness to come back, to stay, and then 'show up' for our own lives. As Bhaskar emphasises, this is no easy task. Changing ways of thinking and being, the habitus, is slow work. It can only proceed if there is a lack of fundamental aggression towards the self, and with incredible gentleness (Adorno, 2010). This is because the aggression is itself a delusion – a mode of escape from the messiness and discomfort of reality. Sustaining unclouded ways of being only becomes possible through an environment of gentleness, curiosity and accommodation – which Derrida calls 'hospitality' (Eppert, 2011; Kakoliris, 2015). With time, this free space becomes familiar to the practitioner and can be recognised and revisited. As such, it supports healing for the relationship of self with self (Bai et al., 2013).

Critical to deep learning (and self-work) is the sustaining of a practice and its discipline (willingness) over time. Both Vince and Emily were keen to highlight that CHE in practice is much more than learning a contemplative practice:

> I wanna emphasise that again, it's not just doing five minutes meditation before class. That's not contemplative education for me; it's just how the whole thing is held in a way that people's awareness is invited, full awareness of their being and that they're not just learning some information, but they're integrating, in the moment, they're seeing 'how is this impacting me'. (Vince)

> So along the way I do teach them to meditate, but that's not what I am interested, interested in doing really. Because I think that's pretty simple really, learning to meditate … I'm really having them learn how to be more genuinely themselves and also really take advantage of their own skills, than they knew they could do. (Emily)

Thus, for participants of this research, the meditation cushion becomes the site for either beginning

or grounding a personal-social practice. In this vein, Lobel (2014, pp. 33-34) observes that 'transformations on a personal and social level can be inseparable' and proposes that we can 'contemplatively intervene in societal practices'. From the above discussion what this looks like is a HE journey through which there are also possibilities for shifting our view of self and thus of humanity in general. Through an exploration of what it means to be human, CHE brings educators and students into acknowledgment of their humanity and provides practices for enriching relationality and actualising a broader range of capacities. However, what of participants' understanding of *their* broader everyday life contexts within which they act as scholar-practitioners of CHE? In the following section I further explore the sociological imagination of participants as ground for any possibility of CHE as a socially transformative movement in HE.

Unpacking the social contexts of practice

How did participants identify the social contexts of their practice? During early interviews, I was concerned that I was not drawing this out well. Participants appeared to emphasise issues with the learning-environment at the expense of analyses that were more sociological in nature. Yet data analysis revealed that I could not have been more wrong. Figure 5.2 below provides a summary of their comments. Under Archer's definitions (Archer, 2014c, p. 95), their collective (contemporary) contextual analysis is revealed. This provides a rich description of the societal arrangements within which CHE finds itself. The specific emergent 'powers' or 'tendencies' of these contextual factors in the form of 'enablements' and 'constraints' will be explored in Chapter Six.

The macro-micro-meso contexts of CHE in practice
Micro ('the situation action of individuals/small groups') Students: • concern for environment/ecosystem/planet • increased meta-reflexivity (commitment to social change - *Wertrationalität*) • 'group' oriented & use of technology (social media) • "yearning", "longing" for "spiritual practices" • countering discrimination ("people of colour" and "LGBTQIA") • Financial constraints • agency - individual/collective. (See footnote 235) Educators: • ethico-political sensibility (in teaching; 'walking and embodying the talk'; *vis-à-vis* the Mindfulness movement; campus, community and societal activism) • regard and care for students (including post-university) • peers previously ridiculing, now curious • tenure-track system facilitating learning environments • de-colonisation • agency (individual/collective) • learning environments • risk, uncertainty, and vulnerability.
Meso ('organisations with a particular remit' e.g. government, health, education) • marketing and HR focus within own institutions • professional Bodies' accreditation requirements/core competencies • crowded curriculum • tenure-track requirements (i.e. require conservatism) • HEIs "finance driven" • agency (collective i.e. of groups/movements).
Macro (relationship between structure and culture, S-C) • 'neoliberal' ideologies and predilections • mindfulness movement • 'occupy' movement/s • materialism and consumerism • disciplinary boundaries • current urgency re Race relations and diversity • 'scientism' • culture of technological and scientific progress tempered by increasing disparity and annihilation • unexamined worldview • Indigenous epistemologies (Canada and USA) • globalization of Higher Education
Mega ('geo-historical swathes and histories') • Abrahamic (axial age) traditions • colonial/Post-colonial • globalisation

Table 5.2 Micro, meso, macro contexts [232] [233]

[232] The term 'agency' was used in two instances where participants referred to individual agency. There were, however, many examples and much discussion of both individual and collective agency within most interviews.

[233] Participants also referred to aspects of the 'mega' context (i.e. 'geo historical swathes and histories') of practice (Archer, 2014c, p. 95). Highlighted were the Abrahamic (Axial age) traditions; the colonial and post-colonial; and globalisation.

Table 5.2 illustrates participants' nuanced insight into their social contexts beyond the generalised emphasis on classroom teaching and practice. This is widely discussed in the literature (Barbezat & Bush, 2013; Gunnlaugson et al., 2014; Simmer-Brown & Grace, 2011). I discuss the social contexts of participants' practice of CHE. The themes are neoliberalism and higher education; contemporary social movements; and student lives within the reflexive imperative of these times. These surprised me. Pre-fieldwork, I had assumed that the Mindfulness movement and the integrity and training of educators would dominate.

Neoliberalism, Higher Education in North America

Regulatory policies and managerialist values are affecting the field of CHE. Educators are under pressure regarding the marketing and marketability of courses, and teaching to competencies.

> You know the whole place is driven by finance. Lots of schools close these days, colleges. (Emily)

Many of the values and approaches that antipodeans might identify as neoliberal have been a part of HE policy – particularly in the USA – for over a century (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).[234] Data indicate that their imbrication in faculties and policy is increasingly visible and palpable. This results in a prevailing consumerist (materialist) and market-oriented ethos; and shaping everyday educating in multiple ways across both public and private universities. Participants highlighted the dominance of marketing and guaranteeing that all courses are marketable. Fall-out included some courses being re-named, while others ceased to exist. For example, Eugene and Karen were no longer teaching courses on Engaged Buddhism. Marketability obliges courses to appear attractive to potential students. Three participants mentioned battles over promotional materials designed to entice students, rather than communicate the education being offered. Here CHE and Mindfulness discourses intersect. While the language of the latter is preferred for its consumer appeal, it rarely conveys the depth and provocative nature of CHE courses.

[234] This is not surprising because from a political economy perspective, such as that offered by Harvey (2007), neoliberalism is an emergent feature of capitalism.

Further neoliberal pressure on CHE comes via professional accreditation courses[235] that push 'teaching to competencies'. The effect of this, as Emily recounts from experience, is to restrict the spaces and possibilities for disruption, uncertainty and deep exploration:

> We have to meet all kinds of licensure requirements which are only increasing, which means that all the classes, all the courses in which you know some of these other aspects of wisdom or creative process could be taught, in the programs that lead to licensure, those courses are getting eliminated and we have to pack more and more [in]. (Emily)

Emily also recognised that students were sometimes complicit in reproducing the day-to-day hegemony of 'licencing'. She observed their increasing unease and growing lack of tolerance with pedagogies that did not deliver the most direct route to satisfying competency standards. Participants clearly articulated the economic origins of student unease – tracing it to the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crash (GFC). They reported that the subsequent financial pressures on students arising from the burden of student loans repayment, and cost of living pressures[236] are significant. Additionally, there is evidence of falling employability for those with only a Bachelor's degree.

Participants involved with teacher education programmes intimately experienced a double-burden of policies of regulation via the palpable struggles and anxiety of their practicing grad-students:[237]

> A lot of them are teaching … they're in school structures where still it's very focussed on assessment, it's focussed on instrumentalisation, it's focussed on large class size. (Julia)

> There are so many demands on teachers that it tends to mean that the teachers who stay in the profession, that are successful … tend to be very good at the management-side, the business-side, the political-side, and it sort of weeds out the teachers who more teach from the heart and don't understand systems as well. (Stephen)

The participant's concern regarding the neoliberal creep into CHE was most acute in relation to the

[235] That is, those courses which enable registration with professional bodies such as social work, psychotherapy, counselling, and teaching (primary and secondary).

[236] I met a few young people who have US$160,000-$200,000 loans to pay (for undergrad and MA tuition fees, and living expenses incurred).

[237] This related to both Canada and the USA.

small private liberal arts universities, relying solely on tuition fees. Here there were fears that CHE programmes could disappear or the entire university close. There was an absence of the despair familiar to me in my own university context. Deep concern, but not despair – I suggest that this is because of the intimate nature of classroom practice and relationship and an understanding of the yearning of students for ways of being otherwise. This included socially oriented activism.

Contemporary social movements

Discussion of contemporary social movements and their current salience was a feature of all but two discussions. Of the five contemporary social movements mentioned, Mindfulness elicited the greatest response. Others which were important to educators and students included: the environmental and 'Climate Change'; 'Occupy'; 'Black Lives Matter'; and 'Diversity' or 'LGBTQIA' social movements. These were all positioned in relation to a culture of materialism and consumerism that has become 'mainstream culture' (Emily). Overt concern for the environment was not solely the preserve of the younger cohort. While skilful imparting of content knowledge, and cultivating more decent and responsive (future) professionals was important, interviewees indicated a strong (and in some cases radical) commitment to activism. The only participant claiming that he was 'not very political' was Stephen. Yet core to his programme are cohort social change evenings, and a 'contemplative debate'. He explains a process beginning when students choose a social issue:

> Something that is happening in your community that you can relate your personal experience too, because that's a big part of contemplative education: personal experience … not just the theoretical framework, but when a crisis affects me. 'How do I feel when this happens' and so forth is part of the knowledge and wisdom we incorporate into any kind of decision-making and evaluation ... [we're] learning how to discipline our emotional and somatic responses as part of it too … they are not just going to rant and rave; they are going to keep the energy of their irritation, but they are going to [use it to] propel themselves into a meaningful discourse. (Stephen)

While beyond the scope of this project, it is clear that the field of CHE would be enriched by future research inquiring into CHE and its role in skilful activism.

Personally fascinating were conversations about the Mindfulness movement. Here I encountered both sharp critique and a gentle respect.

> But now with the whole mindfulness movement, y'know in some ways even though I'm critical of it in my writing, it's also it's also been good at opening a lot of doors and getting things accepted. (Julia)

Through these interviews my own judgement towards this North American phenomenon has been softened. Rather than seeing Mindfulness as movement to ensure the transformation of ethico-politico sensibility into self-absorbed inane docility (Anderson, 2016b; Purser, 2014; Purser & Loy, 2013), participants highlighted that, at worst, it did little harm. Indeed, it could be beneficial. Where there was the potential for harm, this could be minimised by people's own depth of integrity and commitment to practice. As such, at its worse, Mindfulness could offer a stepping-stone to a deeper and genuine contemplative path. Of course, all participants expressed concerns. These are discussed below.

Student engagement in social movements featured in about half of the interviews with participants observing a recent surge in this type of active involvement. Responses to the question 'what do you notice about the current cohort of students and how are they similar or different to those of 5 to 10 years ago?' elicited anything but rehearsed and tired replies. I was struck by the sense of regard for, and curiosity about, their students. Observation of their millennial students illustrates a case for Archer's theory that in contemporary society (meta-)reflexivity is becoming imperative.

Students and the reflexive imperative

Archer proposes that we inhabit times of increased morphogenesis characterised by increasing variety – at all levels. What results is a contextual incongruity at the structural level because the current snowballing of variety (across domains) is not easily negotiated using the technologies or skills of prior generations. It is here that people who have as their dominant mode (reflexive style) meta-reflexivity, are best positioned. This is because they are able to sift through the ever piling variety in a critically-reflexive way that is underpinned by some sort of principled bigger view or *wertrationalität* (Archer, 2007, 2012). Archer reminds us that we all possess meta-reflexivity. Yet, for many it is not their dominant reflexive mode. Where it does dominate, it manifests as a kind of discriminating wisdom – privileging social equity over and above strategic personal success (autonomous reflexive) or maintaining and replicating familial and peer-group ties (communicative

reflexive). While Archer is quick to remark that we have not yet arrived into fully reflexive modernity, Emily's assessment of the millennials suggest that we are at least at its cusp:

> A lot of the faculty who are in my age group are somewhat mystified by the whole generation … because they think really differently. And some of it is because of technology, the role of technology in their life. They never had a time without the access to personal computers and they learn that in elementary school, and they function completely through their phones and they, they trust that much more than they trust elders I would say … they really like to get information quickly, and they trust what is widespread, through social media, what's trending they put a lot of interest in that … it's how they function. But, they're still trying to create an alternative millennial culture I think. … social connection is of tremendous importance to them … I think because [of what] is happening in the world and it has to do with the climate. ... I think everybody knows that not any individual will figure out the problem because any help for anything is going to be done by a group of people communicating with other people, so that in a way is just, it's not about a scientist in his laboratory any more discovering something. It's got to be very collaborative, and I think that's how students are learning more now, it's very collaboratively.

Emily's comments point towards Archer's theory of the increasing morphogenesis of society in two ways. First, the increasing redundancy of the socialisation processes (Archer 2012) that educators used to make their way through the world. And, second, is a break with more traditional ways of social organisation. Young people are working collaboratively and organising as activists. What differs is that they use new technologies as a vehicle. Yet, not all students displayed what Archer would identify as meta-reflexive modes. Getting ahead, making money, and ensuring 'a competitive edge' were also mentioned. Some undertook the alternative CHE programmes 'because they feel it will give them an edge in the competitive job market' (Emily). Yet once there, particularly in some courses, students are taken through deep journeys that do not ostensibly appear to enhance job prospects. Here it is the willingness of the student to participate in the process of 'unclouding'. For one educator, it was the requirement of the course that students are able to relate to themselves before assuming any capacity to guide others through their anxieties, neuroses and unnerving life events. It is precisely this and other radical aims of CHE[238] that may cultivate and strengthen the inherent orientation of millennials in placing ethico-political values over

[238] Given the prevalence of an almost global corporate culture of aggressive competition and individual success.

and above personal success.

Yet, interviewees all referred to tensions and complexities aplenty. Those at the micro-level were implicated in broader structural and cultural relations and tendencies but manifested at the inter-personal level – teacher-student/s, and among faculty – or presented as ongoing dilemmas. Note that tensions relating to the meso- and macro- levels will be examined in the light of enablements and constraints in Chapter 6.

Current complexities and tensions

Despite the apparent potential of CE as a movement in HE, a range of practice-edge tensions abound, not least of which is our cultural disposition of ‘‘tolerance discomfort’ (Vince’s term). Critical issues raised included: issues of privilege and oppression (particularly differentiating for students the contrast between ‘cultural safety’ vs. ‘tolerance discomfort’); whether to support depth or breadth of inquiry; and educator integrity and ensuring what Bernie called ‘walking the talk’. Finally, there were living questions of how, in this materialist world of strategic identity construction and advantageous personal positioning does the educator steer towards a sensitivity of others’ suffering and the systemic and structural injustice underpinning it? While some of these pivotal themes are mentioned in recent scholarship[239], Stephen remarked that much remains at the ‘purely conceptual level’. Individual examples of complexity and tension included deep concerns about asking students to explore specific contemplative practice that suggest embodied ‘motifs’ of structural oppression[240] – for example the ‘secular bow’ that Naropa University employs[241]. In a

[239] For example, Simmer-Brown (2011) addresses educator integrity, while Cannon (2016), Magee (2015, 2017) and Berila (2015) all speak to issues of diversity, and social justice.

[240] Bourdieu draws on the Aristotelian term *hexis* to refer to the a ‘political mythology realized, embodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking’; ‘a pattern of postures that is both individual and systematic, being bound up with a whole system of objects, and charged with a host of special meanings and values’ (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 69, 74).

[241] From Naropa’s website: ‘It has become something of a tradition at Naropa University to begin classes and meetings with a bow. Although this ritual is by no means compulsory, it seems to have taken widespread hold at the university over the years … The bow we make to each other at Naropa is a way of acknowledging

similar vein, Karen commented that students 'of colour' had complained that sitting practice itself communicated continued subservience to white people. For Emily a dialogical practice risked communicating class/historical privilege

> I was asking people about their experience of something that we did during the day and he stated to talk in a way that I thought was very abstract and conceptual and I interrupted him and said 'talk about your experience' and he just went really quiet but then he approached me afterwards on his own and he said … 'y'know you were expecting me to have a certain kind of education and certain kind of facility for talking about my experience' and he said 'People in my past don't do that, they don't talk about experience. It's not safe'. So you know he was very helpful to me in seeing that blind spot I have. (Emily)

Situations like this raised the importance of 'intersectional' (Berila, 2015; Jacobs, 2015) understandings of privilege. Vince has to work hard to help students discriminate between personal tolerance discomfort and individual examples of systemic oppression.

> Another thing we talk about is a lot is whenpeople say 'I don't feel safe'. That's very different from discomfort. We also make that very clear from the beginning. So when, let's say a black person comes in [sic] the classroom, and somebody says something about 'attacking', that 'safety' is very different than a white male heterosexual just feeling uncomfortable being told that they are privileged. (Vince)

Does encouraging engagement with other wisdom traditions inhibit students' interest and ability to go deeply into their own spiritual or philosophical tradition? This was Julia's dilemma, along with a concern shared by many that educators of CHE actually do have a regular meditation practice; something that presented challenges when hiring new staff. Having a meditation practice cannot be stipulated due to USA Equal Opportunity (EO) laws. Yet, the consequence of this influences the quality at all levels. One participant commented that when people do not practice, it shows up in their relationships with other faculty members and their management of complexity in the

---

and honoring the qualities of warriorship, that each of us has the capacity to express and to share with others. … The warrior whom we honor when we bow is someone who is brave enough to be a truly gentle person. So, in bowing to each other, we honor the inherent bravery, gentleness and wakeful intelligence that each of us can experience personally. We also honor Naropa as a place where the deepest purpose of our education is to cultivate these qualities and bring them to fuller expression in whatever field of learning we may choose.' See http://www.naropa.edu/the-naropa-experience/contemplative-practice/the-bow.php

workplace. This realm of the intersubjective and the quality of our acknowledgement, and communication with other was commented on as the most important topic within CHE and globally.

> *[I]nterbeing*, do you know that term from Thich Nhat Hanh, I feel like that's the topic right now. The only topic that makes sense to me at all ... realising that there is no such thing as everybody's little independent bubble. So, what are we going to do about that? (Emily)

Joseph Goldstein, the 'father' of the (Western) Insight Meditation movement asserts that all mindfulness meditation contains and unalienable ethical demand. For once the discursive mind is settled into the present moment, there is an acute choice. Where will you place it next? Will this placement result in benefit for others? Or will it signify a retreat back into the cocoon of habituation and clouding? (UMASSCFM, 2014)

Towards an ethic of care

Within scholarship, CHE is being presented as a newly emerging approach to ethical education. I refer the reader to Chapter Two above. It expands upon recent work in cultivating an ethics of care to include a deep regard for our humanity. Critical for contemporary humanity (and HE) is cultivating skilfulness in directing attention and intention, opening to global suffering, and inviting deep curiosity about and regard for others. It is to these that attention must be given in order to negate humanity's threefold-alienation (of self, others and nature). Inherent to the historical underpinnings[242] of CHE is the ethical demand to which Goldstein referred and what Julia understood:

> Even if you think of the Buddha's question, the Buddha's question was not 'How can I be enlightened?' … or 'How can I have my own suffering relieved?' The Buddha's question is 'What is suffering and what brings an end to suffering?' He wasn't thinking about himself really, I mean it's all interdependent, right? … the core of so many of these practices and philosophies are compassion for the world. We can't separate it and make it all about our own wellbeing and our own individual happiness. The deeper we get into it the more deeply we recognise how intertwined it all is. (Julia)

Critical to our entwinement with each other is how we feel about ourselves as human beings, as

[242] Of course, this ethical demand is inherent to all wisdom traditions, and deep contemplative training.

either basically decent or inherently wicked. For Critchley (2012), it is this which shapes our stance towards others. Do we seek to control them or allow them their freedom, their own expression and autonomy? (Adorno, 2010; Seel, 2004) Julia's provocation has significant consequences for thinking about the purposes and practices of higher education. Is the role of university education to solely fulfil instrumentalist agendas? Alternatively, is it about introducing people to, and drawing out their inherent intelligence, insight and creativity? The latter, Bhaskar (2016) refers to as 'enlightened common sense'. Recognition and cultivation of these inherent capacities will provide the necessary ground for more 'enlightened' responses to current global realities and the immense challenges they present.

For Bhaskar (2002; Scott & Bhaskar, 2015), Trungpa (1978), and ever increasing numbers of scholars, higher education must cultivate human capacities and not just 'competencies' (Doogue & Wheelahan, 2017) oriented towards ethico-politico responsiveness. Roeser et al (2009) present contemplative education as a newly emerging approach to ethical education, which brings the insights of the East and West into dialogue with each other (Eppert et al., 2015; Hattam, 2004b; Roeser & Peck, 2009, p. 239)[243]. The benefits of this dialogue are cultivated skilfulness in attention and intention, and becoming aware of our shared humanity. Philosopher Kahane (2009) names this contemplative education approach as 'pedagogies of sentiment which supports students in less self-effacing judgement, increased openness to their own suffering and more able to let the suffering of Others in' (2009, p. 57). Yet what Roeser et al (2014, p. 228) highlight is that in the (essentially 'Buddhist')[244] training of attention is the training related to the emotions and their embodied and discursive elements (Asrael & Bialek, 2016). This appears to be what so many philosophers and theorists, including feminist materialists, post-humanists, and those from affect studies[245] are all calling for.

[243] Most research participants also mentioned this and Julia, Bernie and Eugene spoke about it in depth.

[244] See Roeser et al (2104) p. 228, Table 13.1.

[245] See the work of Karen Barad (2007, 2015); Sara Ahmed (2007; 2015); Rosi Braidotti (2006); and Sandra Harding (2008) as well as Mountz et al (2015); Bozalek (2015) and others mentioned in the Chapter 3, such as Shajahan (2014, 2015) etc.

For Donati, our ethics need to become relational (2015, p. 286) and not just ‘intentional’. A critical aspect of this is viewing human relationality as ‘a good in itself’ (2015, p. 287). What we need to take responsibility for is preserving the relational aspects of our shared intersubjectivity, our relational networks (Donati & Archer, 2015, p. 300), our ‘interbeing’. We must value relationality as being ‘good in itself’. This notion of things being good in themselves and free from instrumentalist ballast was a key aspect of Adorno’s vision for an (ethical) education against barbarism (Seel, 2004). Like Archer (2003), Adorno’s ethics arise through the primacy of praxis, rather than as a demand. Unlike Archer, he offers the ‘contemplative’ as a vehicle for allowing our intersubjectivity to arise in freedom and not be covered by the concept. This view of relationality as existing within a broader space of accommodation, free from concept is entirely coherent with a Dzogchen Buddhist view. Interestingly, this is the approach of Trungpa who all participants drew upon (in some way) regardless of their tradition and community affiliation.

What Donati and Archer (2015), Roeser et al (2014) Kahane (2009), Munro-Hendry (2008) and others are proposing is what feminists call an ‘ethics of care’ (Bozalek, 2016; Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 2013). It is an ethics grounded in caring for relational goods; that is our relationality with self, other, and our natural world. Both Beausoleil (2017) and Ramstedt (2017) propose that this ethics of care must be construed as dispositional and affective. These are times of instrumentalist approaches to higher education. Learning is frequently equated with the acquisition of facts and employability skills, assessed via tick-box competencies and ‘milestones’. How does HE begin to cultivate regard for the body, emotions, and humans as relational (not vocational) beings?

The sitting practice of meditation offers an experience of the fullness of our own humanity (the somatic, affective, cognitive, and discursive) in all its vividness, and with much attendant discomfort, frustration, and boredom. Yet, it is through discomfort that familiarity with our own ‘inscapes’ (Archer, 2004) is made possible. The journey of relating to habituated distractions and aggression is arduous and change slow. With time however, a shared humanity is reflected through the ‘other’ who is also struggling, acting out, prone to distraction, seduction, and ignoring.

In having brought the 'felt-sense'[246] of gentleness and accommodation towards our own bodies, minds, and emotions we cannot but extend that to others. It has become our new habitus – one of more accommodation, less judgement and reaction, and a subtler reading of the endurance of unskilful behaviours within the process of deep self-work. This leads us to understanding Bai and Cohen's second (relational) healing – between self-and 'other. Deep meditative training allows for not only the recognition of our inter-subjectivity, but greater generosity towards and appreciation of this: a relational ethics of care for self and other.

Developing response-ability

The ability to respond to another, the Other can only arise through care and regard[247]. Honneth (2008, p. 50) claims that a disposition of care and 'acknowledgment of the other constitutes a non-epistemic pre-requisite' for cognitive and linguistic understanding. Through relations of care, we learn to recognise others long before we learn to speak of them. Unfortunately, an in-depth discussion of Honneth's weighty inquiry into this topic is not possible here. However, what he reminds us of is that response-ability to others is rooted in dispositions of care – shown towards us as infants and that we then use to engage with others. Yet, in these instrumental times, we forget this. According to participants, CHE cultivates dispositions of care and thus response-ability. Without this care then, any other-centred response becomes redundant.

Similarly to Honneth (2008), Noddings views an 'ethic of care' as arising out of 'natural care' – which is inherent in us and actives effortlessly. Natural care is what Archer would call a personal emergent property (PEP). To 'care-for', draws its strength from natural care (Archer, 2013, p. 5) . It implies 'direct attention and response … the establishment of a caring relation' (Noddings, 2002, p. 2). We cannot, do not care for that which we are not intimate with in some way. Noddings (2013)

[246] This is a term attributed to the work of American Philosopher Eugene T. Gendlin. It was mentioned in interviews with *Eugene* (the similarity in nomenclature is coincidental).

[247] The term 'response-ability' is a personal one that I have used since mid-1990 and not encountered in any public domain. In June of 2017, I encountered it reading Bozalek (2015, p. 196) who stated, 'As noted in the section on responsibility above, Barad (2015) and Haraway (2008) combine the notions of responsibility and responsiveness in their neologism response-ability'. I am making this explicit for the reader given their potential familiarity with Bozalek and or other employment of the term to which I am unaware.

differentiates this from 'caring-about', i.e. expressing concern but not guaranteeing response. I would like to propose that contemplative practices allow for the possibility of 'response-ability' through developing intimacy – beginning with self, one's bodily discomfort, monkey-mind, conflicted emotions, and then including others (e.g. classmates, educators, family). Once there is a relationship, care for that relationship as good in itself can arise. These are times of ever-increasing alienation as not all do well with incongruity and flux.

What's helpful for these contextually incongruous times?

In the discussion above I have explored what scholar-practitioners of CHE actually do; how deep meditative practices shape the 'why' and 'what for' of their educating; and how they understand the layered social contexts of their practice. Different ways in which CHE manifests and communicates through higher education have been considered. These included the ethical, embodied, emotional/affective, ontological, epistemological[248] and relational. The case was made for contemplative practices rooted in meditation as a power of disruption and provocation of increasingly habituated instrumentalist and regulatory modes of being and educating. This is 'power in the sense of transformative capacity' and what Bhaskar refers to as "P_1" (2016, p. 55). Here, the power of human agency is distinguished from ' power in the sense of domination or oppression' (or "P_2") (Bhaskar, 2016, p. 55). Where this discussion contributes to new knowledge is in its focus on the potency of deeper meditative practices in the lives of scholar-practitioners, and as potential tool for learning, and ultimately finding 'ways of being otherwise'. A vital aspect of this is a view of being human that rests upon the ontology of basic decency and sufficiency, as different to congenital 'fuckupedness' or existential 'brokenness'. Meditative practice can help shift our personal ontology from lack to sufficiency and enables greater appreciation of and confidence in our human capacities. This is the essential ground for exploring and becoming intimate with all aspects of our existence, including realities that are unwanted or uncomfortable[249]. Having befriended self, we are gentler in our dispositional recognition of other supporting Mipham's (2015)

[248] That is through exploring the use of first, second and third person methods in CHE.

[249] These might include the body, emotions, and discursiveness, challenging and confronting concepts, others, the other and large-scale social issues.

claim that ‘if we can feel we can care’.

It is here that CHE appears to have significant benefit for these times of discomfort, risk-aversion, and tremendous flux. It may even have potential to shift reflexive modes towards the meta-reflexive, but at the same time address the often excoriating self-critique that inhibits the meta-reflexive in actualising their *Wertrationalität.*

> I think the future of the world does depend on us and others like us to hatch a different way of, of being that’s not based on materialism, that’s not based on brute power, it’s not based … the conventions of, of mere survival, [that] there’s some kind of creativity and human vision there. (Karen)

While Karen’s aspiration is generous, before making any claims for HE, it is important to examine CHE within the context of these neoliberal times. What structural mechanisms enable and/or constrain its practice, and what then can we say of its promise as a practice of ethical and social capacity building? The following chapter responds to these questions.

CHAPTER 6
NEGOTIATING ENABLEMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS: REFLEXIVE DISPOSITIONS AND ACTIVE AGENCY

The findings presented in the previous chapter suggest that CHE has the potential to cultivate the ethical and social responsiveness necessary for our turbulent times. What remains to be explored is the role of social conditioning and how this can frame possibilities for CHE to become more widespread. As a consequence, we are compelled to ask both structural and agential questions like: How do social properties shape the contexts and courses of action that participants have taken? And, what variability exists in their particular expression of active agency? In taking reflexivity as the bridge between structure and agency, such questions cannot be answered without making serious reference to participants' reflexivity (Archer 2007, pp.5-6). How have participants' experienced and been responsive to their particular social contexts? This question reveals the initial research provocation that suggests the camouflaging of CHE enables its survival in less-hospitable times. To understand what practitioners do and where their cultural work might entail camouflage or subversion, the question of intention becomes important. This chapter is predominantly concerned with the third element of morphogenesis which is how human persons elaborate upon the social contexts they find themselves in and create change.

While the previous chapter highlighted participant insight into the micro-mesomacro contexts of the practice of CHE, further analysis is required. This chapter provides deeper insight into educators' sociological attentiveness. In particular, differentiated structural mechanisms are identified and relations of congruence and or incongruence – relative to participants' practice and concerns – are discussed.

What enables and constrains the practice of CHE?

How is it that human beings, similarly placed, will act differently to each other and sometimes in spite of great difficulty? While we all are conditioned by social structures, Archer stresses that no objective structural impingement or constraint can operate separately of its subjective reception (2003, p. 4). This notion of 'reception' becomes important as we further examine participants'

social contexts as well as what they experienced as either enabling or constraining. But exactly what is required for the structural (and cultural) exercise of powers shaping enablement and constraint? On this matter, Archer (2003, p.8) proposes three conditions. First, she stresses that structural powers need human projects. Second, there must be a relationship of either congruence or incongruence with those projects. Finally, human beings need to respond to these influences[250]. To avoid large gaps in understanding the current practice of CHE and its social-ethical potential, it is important to understand the circumstances of social conditioning under which participants 'live, act and develop'. Additional insight is needed into how their actions and development as persons transform broader social contexts (Archer, 2000, pp. 311-312).

Archer contends that people relate to structural powers depending on their dominant reflexive style. Yet assumptions cannot be made that participants will demonstrate a dominant reflexive mode just because they are academics (Kahn, 2009; Porpora & Shumar, 2010; Sayer, 2009). Likewise, it is important to refrain from imputing research findings upon subjects (Scambler, 2012, 2013). Precisely because human beings respond differently, creatively and unpredictably[251], explanation of social phenomena cannot be made without consulting people's subjectivity and making recourse to the inner conversation[252]. Explaining participant actions relies upon 'reference to agents subjective and reflexive formulation of personal projects – in the light of their objective circumstances' (Archer, 2003, p. 5) In this research project, this was enabled via inquiry into the internal conversation.

Participants' projects as shaped by their life concerns

As discussed in Chapter Two, relational engagement with all aspects of our world (natural, social

[250] Archer stresses that these influences are conditional rather than deterministic in nature. This is because they are always subject to people's reflexive deliberation as to how (or if) they will respond. She claims that people 'may make use of their personal powers of deliberating, responding, renouncing, repudiating, subverting etc. or not' (Archer, 2003, p. 9)

[251] That is, within structural conditions in which we (involuntarily) find ourselves or (voluntarily) place ourselves.

[252] This is because as human persons we might respond to, take advantage of, renounce (our interests) or deliberate whether the price of a particular course of action is worth paying (Archer, 2003, pp. 4-5).

and practical) shapes different personal concerns and leads to our 'sense of self'. Archer's explanation of being human is rooted in 'a sequential account of nested identities in which selfhood (the *I*) emerges from consciousness; personal identity (*me*) from selfhood; and social identity (*we* and *you*[253]) from personal identity' (Vandenberghe, 2005, pp. 230-231). In later work, Archer stresses that these 'nested identities' are 'relational through and through' (Donati & Archer, 2015, p. 94). In agreement with Donati (2015), Archer emphasises the value of different relational goods and types of knowledge gained through fully engaging in our world. Co-emergent with our human concerns[254], emotions accompany the self in its journey from 'I' to 'me' to 'we' to 'you'. Via language and affective embodiment, they provide 'commentaries on our concerns' (Archer, 2002, p. 16). How well we are able to manage this, and what we prioritise, reflects what we care about most and determines our 'personal-identity' (Archer, 2003, p. 211; Donati & Archer, 2015). Rather than some kind of unchanging essence, Archer conceptualises this identity as a 'sense of self', aware of its own 'continuous' existence over time, and 'defined' by its own 'constellation of concerns' (Archer, 2007, p. 14; Donati & Archer, 2015, p. 96).[255] In this sense, our prime accountability is to ourselves rather than society. However, it is important to recognise that the nature of our concerns and the projects we pursue are almost exclusively social in nature. This includes projects intended to transform society (Donati & Archer, 2015, p. 103). Archer's point is that without a sense of self, we can have no ultimate concerns; we cannot conceive of or make meaningful projects, and neither constrain nor enable structural forces.

While Archer is clear that the 'self' matures developmentally, there is no guarantee that people develop a strong sense of 'we' (as a collective) or 'you' (altruism). Participants' ultimate and current

[253] A 'you' focus could be considered strongly altruistic and synonymous with the Buddhist notion of a Bodhisattva – one who places their entire being in the service of others and uplifting society.

[254] That is for physical well-being, performative achievement, and self-esteem/worth.

[255] This CR view is not at all anthropocentric, or at odds with the view of the self as assemblage common to Buddhist philosophy and current philosophers. For example see Deleuze and Guattari (1988), as well as Timothy Morton (2014). Rather, the view points to the human person coming together in a particular moment who is not only aware of their ever-changing self but also continues to recognise themselves as 'self' (human animal). For an excellent discussion on anthropocentrism and CR, see Smith and Rutzou (2016).

concerns appeared to be other ('you') focussed indicating their agency as social actors[256]:

> So in terms of me following my own heart, my concerns are with young people and the kinds of lives they are going to be living and eh the loved ones in my life who are quite young, just babies, what is the world that they are going to be inhabiting and what can we do now? (Julia)
>
> If I think about hope for the future and responsibly training the next generation, it's just something I'm interested in. (Emily)

Participants' concerns were all other-oriented (Archer's 'you') and frequently implicated a higher order 'we'. This was achieved via a sense of collective subjectivity; standing in solidarity with others (Donati & Archer, 2015, pp. 111-112). These concerns, along with others, discussed in Chapter Five[257] all represent points of encounter between social structures and human properties. In moments of encounter, structures will be received, resisted, or subverted (Archer, 2012). How this occurs depends on two critical factors: whether people experience structural factors as congruent or incongruent with their 'concerns' (and projects)[258]; and overall dispositional stances towards structural constraints and enablements themselves.

Relationships of congruence and incongruence

This following section discusses structural factors identified by participants as enabling and or constraining of their practice. Further discussion reveals their specific experiences vis-á-vis structural powers – something that is not available in current literature. Certain mechanisms identified required nuanced unpacking[259] revealing complex and layered mechanisms and engagement. Here, critical realism provided powerful tools for methodological underlabouring (see

---

[256] That is, those who purposively leverage their corporate agency (collective positioning) to pursue projects aimed at social change. See Chapter 2.

[257] Those concerns were: introducing students to a bigger world than the one they currently inhabit; making visible systemic and structural injustice; helping students/other educators befriend their own humanity; responding to student yearning and interest; bringing Eastern disciplines into Western contexts; and making sure that breadth doesn't cede to depth, precision, discipline and 'rigour'.

[258] This then determines whether we intervene to either alter or stabilise conditions creating social morphogenesis, or morphostasis.

[259] This was achieved through in-depth dialogue and inquiry into the internal conversation in interview, and later in data analysis. Regarding the latter, CR pushed me towards understanding, not merely the complexity of particular S-A interactions, but to seek evidence of deeper mechanisms at play.

Chapter Two). Participants' individual and collective responses to the structural mechanisms they encounter, afford insight into their agential practice and dominant reflexive mode. All of this supports understanding how CHE might be developed as pedagogy for these times. See Chapter Three for discussion of the effects of neoliberal forces on HE.

Curiosity about the degree of sociological awareness of scholar-practitioners of CHE provided impetus for this project. I had initially assumed that the neoliberal hijacking of mindfulness-meditation, and a corporate-style Mindfulness movement, to be the central constraining factor for participants. I was surprised to find otherwise. Instead, the three most significant relations of congruence or incongruence identified by participants were: the current neoliberal shaping of HE; an emphasis on technique over deep training and practice; and the narrowing of learning spaces[260]. The following section discusses these and offers an analysis of the structural constellations participants identified as simultaneously enabling and constraining. Neoliberalism presents as an overarching force of orchestration and orientation. I had not foreseen its degree of influence upon participants' practice, or their unequivocal articulation of its effects in relation to CHE.

Neoliberal forces: the adjusting of culture/s and community reception

Chapters Three and Five both indicated the prevalence of discourse regarding the convergence of neoliberal agendas and higher education – in current scholarship, and participant comments. While different language[261] was used, the texture of regulatory impingement – with its plethora of effects – upon everyday pedagogical spaces, was shared by all participants. The reception of this shifting cultural discourse was one of definite incongruence with participants' ultimate concerns as Stephen frustratingly exclaims:

> You can't spend years doing it, you have to do it quickly and so a lot gets left out. (Stephen)

[260] This was initially highlighted in Chapter 5.

[261] That is: 'wide-scale instrumentalism'; increasing regulation; regulated learning environments; a prevailing 'culture of materialism/consumerism'; the contraction of spaces for 'real' education; and the tendency towards short-term trainings.

Educators, curricula, pedagogy, and campuses have all had to adjust to, and (at least ostensibly) accommodate increasingly regulatory, containing and output-focussed policies and requirements.

> It's difficult to spend time focussed on quality because we're always so busy chasing quantity … and the pressure's to produce all the time right? (Julia)

Boyte and Finders (2016) refer to the neoliberal 'creep' into education as 'technocratic shrinkage' where one effect among many is that spaces for the 'co-creation' of knowledge are becoming elusive (Boyte & Finders, 2016, pp. 136, 139). A swathe of participant responses were testament to this reductive (Kumashiro, 2015) neoliberal shaping of HE vis-à-vis their own relational, agentic-oriented approach to higher education (CHE) including:

> … a demand to be conventional, to meet conventional, I don't know what the word is … non-professional courses are getting eliminated. (Emily)

> … the wall of this increasingly monoculture of education; you have to be a certain way and do things in a certain way in terms of succeeding. (Stephen)

Participants identified two additional phenomena I hadn't encountered in the literature on neoliberalism and HE: wide-scale 'systemic avoidance'; and the encroachment of 'scientism'. Only small bodies of recent scholarship can be found in relation to these two topics[262]. An alternative term for 'systemic avoidance' could be 'blindness of the dominant' (Bourdieu in Wacquant, 1989, p. 30) and in this sense was alluded to by all participants, but most prominently by Karen. Her claim is that structural-cultural systems are now overtly manifesting and replicating (Buddhism's) three modes of 'reality avoidance'. These three are passion (or sticky neurotic attachment), aggression (pushing away) and ignorance (denial). Karen cites (philosopher) David Loy's work in categorising current 'consumerism and globalisation' as the systemic version of passion:

> The systemic version of aggression is warfare, and the systemic version of ignorance is environmental degradation and proliferation of technology of a lot going on but not real communication. (Karen)

[262] See (Bowl, 2017; Canaan et al., 2010; Daza, 2013; Daza, Subreenduth, Rhee, & Proctor, 2015).

Her comment finds resonance with Kumar's (2012) assertion that '[t]here is hardly any aspect of our socio-political, cultural, or economic life that remains untouched by the rapacious campaign of neoliberal capital' (2012, p. 6) and the increasing regulation of HE.

Second, is the encroachment of 'scientism' which Daza et al (2015) instructively define as a 'worldview that hinders'; "one that can be contrasted to a more robust relational science that does not disconnect the mind, brain, and body or the meta/physical and social world' (2015, p. 152). In seeming to echo Boyte and Finders (2016), they highlight how neoliberalism then 'capitalizes on this skewed version of knowledge production as non-political and non-ideological to support its ability to determine the rules' ((Daza et al., 2015, p. 151). The resulting 'narrowing of thinking, researching, policy papers', and educating, they appropriately label 'neoliberal scientism' (Daza et al., 2015, p. 154). Julia and Eugene put it this way:

> Where I struggle is where science becomes the only legitimate world-view… or a certain fundamentalism around science which is that sciencentism, is what I understand scientism to be, or the commodification and instrumentalisation of things, right … a dualistically saturated world. (Julia)
>
> That the conversation with what we call modernity, or people[263] who are making all kinds of assumptions about the nature of reality is based on our pseudo-scientific understanding or quasi-scientific understanding. (Eugene)

Eugene continues to provide a personal example of this manifesting in relation to a CHE research proposal

> … it was an interim Director who came from the Department of Chemistry and acknowledged he knew very little about qualitative research and I at that point hadn't really formulated the research proposal fully and I described to him what I was doing and he kept nodding his head and he kept saying I don't see how you could do that, I don't see how you could research that. He was a chemist! (Eugene)

While participants appeared to rail against neoliberal practices, how are effects playing out through CHE itself? Are 'reductive' approaches noticeable in participants' pedagogy?

A second area of incongruence related to the practice of CHE was that of technocratic 'creep' or an overreliance on technique, and either 'not enough emphasis on the conceptual' (Emily) or 'too conceptual' (Stephen) i.e. eschewing deeper first-person inquiry. Both point to the phenomena of

[263] The 'people' Eugene is referring to here include fellow academics and writers.

'avoidance' (Karen) which manifests as a paucity of academic depth and 'discipline' and/or not including the embodied and affective domains – suggesting avoidance of deep first-person inquiry and our embodied humanity. Emily, Eugene and Stephen all caution against reducing deeply reflexive practices to performative techniques (Ball & Olmedo, 2013), or dialectical inquiry into merely discursive content. From the Mahayana perspective this illustrates one of three types of laziness, that of busyness. The inference being that we cover (deep) reality with activity – technical, discursive, or otherwise – therefore shirking the ruggedness[264] of our world and narrowing possibilities for knowledge and insight. The current fascination with contemplative practice as techniques foreseen by Simmer-Brown 15 years ago in 2002 (see also Simmer-Brown & Grace, 2011) is evident in recent literature[265]. Significantly all research participants noted and held concern for a growing emphasis on technique at the expense of deep personal training and practice. Technique merely fills the space.

Narrowed learning spaces

The narrowing of learning spaces, and what Boyte and Finders (2016, p. 141) refer to as 'free spaces', is a critical issue for all higher education not least CHE. 'Free spaces' are those where educators have room to 'experiment, imitate, learn, communicate, and reflect on their actions' (Selby & Kagawa 2011 in Boyte & Finders, 2016, pp. 129, 141). The learning human being (Barnett, 2009; Dall'Alba & Barnacle, 2007; Williams, 2012) rather than the dollar motive is placed at the centre of concern. This implies educating beyond what Eugene referred to as 'catering to what's most fun', or tying practice to 'immediate' measurable outcomes. It demands pedagogy that is sensitive to the deep nuances of our humanity such that intersubjectivity and complex social and environmental issues can be explored. But, as participants made clear, this kind of education with its free spaces is treated with suspicion within contemporary higher education institutions. As Stephen succinctly put it: 'Institutions don't like the kind of deep complexity that CHE invites and explores'.

---

[264] The term Emily uses to describe the challenging and provocative nature of CHE in practice.

[265] For example: some contributors in Gunnlaugson et al. (2014); Schonert-Reichl and Lawlor (2010); as well as Oberski et al. (2015) and sections of Barbezat and Bush (2013).

For Boyte and Finders (2016), free spaces are not just essential to the project of learning and educating, i.e. the co-production of knowledge, understanding and insight, they are essential to the development of a civic engagement that is oriented toward social justice and ethical action. What Brown (2009) refers to as an enabling learning environment they define as 'sites where people have an important measure of room for self-organizing initiative, free from dominant cultural, social, and economic powers' (Boyte & Finders, 2016, p. 151); sites where there is space for educators to take students beyond the comfort of familiarity and habitus. Emily links practices of disruption with the experience of freedom to learn.

> Really, what I would have to say is that it's partly going against comfort in the name of learning, and the teacher really having the power to push the student beyond comfort so they can learn. You know it happens in certain ways but not in, it's not an everyday thing and it used to be an everyday occurrence happening in lots of the classrooms.
>
> *Could you just talk a little bit about how that happened then and how that's different to now*?
>
> Well, because the teachers were real teachers of their disciplines and they didn't have to match anything, you know then the syllabus didn't have to fulfil certain requirements of the 'licensure' board that the State sets.

Emily's lament places neoliberal regulation firmly in the centre of the reduction of freer spaces for learning. However, for her, the constraints of neoliberalism in HE manifests in more complex ways; particularly for students intensely deliberating and deciding within a world not (yet) of their own making. As younger people, they are still early in their journeys of socialisation and reflexivity (Archer, 2012) which are redolent with aspiration and longing. Might there be an inversely proportional relationship between human aspiration and structural encroachment upon freedom?

Encountering complexity and uncertainty – digging deeper into context

Participants discussed a large range of contextual influences that were simultaneously congruent and incongruent to their ultimate concerns and subsequent projects. This required digger deeper into these mechanisms and unpacking them further to reveal their more nuanced effects.

Student yearning (congruence)

The yearning, hunger or longing of students was identified by all participants who found it

congruent to their practice of CHE. Most of their students are still undergoing processes of socialisation, and finding their way within institutions as sites of study and or work[266]. This means that they are constantly discerning and deliberating reflexively in relation to acculturation, a feel for the game, and perhaps also 'organisational capture' (Williams, Cloke, & Thomas, 2012). For younger students, their ultimate concerns are still forming, with a more active agency – either collective or individual – yet to manifest. Student expression of longing for deeper exploration and inquiry[267] and involving the whole person was seen as a significant factor of congruence, or 'affordance' (Connors, 2015) for CHE. This was true for a tenure track lecturer from a large public university who declined participation in the research. When we met in person they recounted two courses (which included contemplative practice/meditation) in which they had taught within the discipline of Religious Studies. In order to introduce meditation, they framed it as a critical comparative inquiry of 'religious rituals'. A demanding schedule of theoretical reading and written assessment was included. While this met institutional demands by passing through required systems of curriculum scrutiny, students wanted more mediation, contemplative practice and reflexive dialogue. Their yearning was for learning spaces and pedagogies which not only included and developed the whole human, but acknowledged their irrefutable relationality or 'interbeing' (Nhất Hạnh, 1998).[268]

Pivotal for participants was the noticeable political sensitivity developing among younger cohorts. They observed an inner yearning for 'something deeper' personally, but which also had a socially oriented counterpart. Bernie explains that undergraduates are:

> [v]ery frustrated with that they experience as a kind of social structure around them that's often so intransigent, that seems so resistant to change of the kind that it often seems to them so obvious that needs to occur. (Bernie)

What participants point towards is the experience of incongruence by students of their nascent

[266] These include, for example, State schools, and universities – particularly for post-grad students aged 25-40 years.

[267] This included but was not limited to the cognitive domain.

[268] This term four participants used the term 'interbeing'.

ultimate concerns and those of the society around them.

Increasing contextual incongruity?

The fear, frustrations and yearning of students find coherence in Archer's proposition that in these early 21st century times we are on the cusp of transition from predominance of those with dominant autonomous reflexivity to the meta-reflexive. Something Archer (2012) attributes to our shifting macro-culture towards a 'reflexive imperative'. At this macro level we see the increasing impossibility of maintaining a true communicative reflexive *modus vivendi*[269] which relies upon both structural and cultural (S-C) continuity (i.e. mutually reinforcing each other). Furthermore, S-C relations which enable a dominance of the autonomous reflexive mode – and cohere well with neoliberal values, and approaches (Scambler, 2013) – are ceasing to provide the contextual discontinuity necessary for its emergence and dominance. According to Archer, this is the condition of modernity prevailing since the 18th century (Archer, 2012, p. 25). Contemporary flux and uncertainty reduces incidences of discontinuity between S-C – where one is stable but the other is not. Instead, the aforementioned contextual incongruity[270] emerges from continual change in both structure and culture. Archer explains this as variety in one (e.g. new emerging technologies) stimulating increased variety in the other (e.g. our current penchant for the on-demand and gig economy[271]). Within this contextual incongruity, socialisation of the past is an inadequate navigational guide; new technologies, and identities present at each turn.

If Archer's proposition is correct, and we are continually at the threshold of change, then the identification of factors that are simultaneously constraining and enabling[272] is not surprising.

Fear and disinclination in the 21stC

[269] A heartening and explicit example of this is illustrated by the BBC documentary 'The Last Whites of the East End' (2016 BBC1) which traces the remaining cockney families in East London and their attempts to preserve the relational lifestyle that sustained them for the past few hundred years.

[270] Please see Chapters Two and Three.

[271] This economy has as its key global players Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, and Google along with other national and international employers of digital nomads.

[272] In other words, the participants experienced as conjointly congruent and incongruent their concerns and projects.

Students simultaneously yearn for deep experiences, yet they resist (via impatience) the methods of practice and inquiry that that take them there. There is strong evidence of their acculturation and shaping by neoliberal discourse and its values, particularly in relation to their chosen course of study. Is the neoliberal project providing off-the-shelf and pre-packaged concerns to young people? What happens when this combines with narrower learning spaces? Emily suggests that paths of socialisation were different for prior generations. In noting the diminution of individual contribution to society, she offered the following:

> When I was growing up and for many generations, observing cohorts, there would always be some people who were really individuals who delved deep as an individual and really brought something forth to contribute to a larger conversation. I'm not seeing that so much, people do it in groups and, and in relationship with, with others, not really community because there aren't established communities, but in, in relationship I would call it, much more so than as individuals, I think that's just very important to them. I think there's quite a lot of despair. (Emily)

Thus, while students are longing for more in their experiences of university [273] 'they are also very conditioned' (Emily). Even though participants underscored the pivotal enabling power of student yearning and curiosity (about contemplative practice/pedagogies) in their own practice of CHE, they also observed conditioned responses.

> They don't want to be groundless, you know, they don't want to be forced into doubt even if it's for the learning.
>
> *Where does that come from?*
>
> I think it's the mainstream culture? And there's just certain things they just will not tolerate me doing certain things with them even if I think that's what they need the most even, y'know, that they, they are very oriented know getting the product that they want. (Emily)

If Daza is correct (2013; 2015) regarding the cultural prevalence of neoliberal scientism, then its characteristic 'convergence of [the] material and discursive worlds of business and pre-Kuhnian views of science' also (necessarily) taints HE (2015, p. 152). HE becomes 'reconceived as a place of job skills acquisition' (Sturges, 2015, p. 15) where its ontology as a 'collective good' is under

[273] These were identified by participants as: deep first personal acknowledgement and inquiry; disciplinary depth; the philosophical; learning about and experiencing their human embodiment and emotions in learning contexts; yearning for connection with others; and 'wisdom'.

erasure by an ideology for the ‘collection of goods’ (Sturges, 2015, p. 1) (Sturges 2015, p.1). Karen reflects on how CHE will weather these current tensions:

> How are we going to survive? How are we going to make a difference in the world? If it’s only about survival then I don’t think I even want [CHE programme] to continue. (Karen)

Participants observe in the millennials, the comingling of genuine human longing, anxiety from uncertainty, and a strategic maximising of their take away outcomes/experiences. It is easy then to see how corporate-style Mindfulness seeks to fill this gap. It speaks to students’ very real embodied and affective anxieties and insecurity, while promising instrumental gains.

The Mindfulness movement

It is easy to see how the Mindfulness movement has sought to breach this gap. While it offers a gateway to broader public engagement with CHE for individuals, participants also expressed exasperation:

> I asked her, I said well ‘why you are interested in mindfulness and engaging your training operations on it?’ She unabashedly said ‘well it’s, it’s really the current thing and everybody is talking about it, so we want to investigate it and bring it in.’ And I could have been talking about a new emphasis on hula-hoop exercises and she would have said ‘okay if that’s what’s current’ – so there was no real personal motivation there. (Eugene)

Mindfulness as a Western phenomenon coming to the public fore at the turn of the millennia was preceded by a well-embedded corporate capitalist ethos and all manner of structural mechanisms. It was ripe for recruiting into the ‘commodification of everything’ project highlighted by Karen, and there was keen observation regarding many of its instrumentalist relations and outcomes. Yet there was also an appreciation for what this movement has enabled, and it was received as both congruent and disparate to their ultimate concerns. Two laments permeated participant narratives and evoke sadness for participants. The first misfortune of instrumentalism in general is a diminishing of the human capacity for discriminating awareness (wisdom), and critically reflexive praxis. The second is that the selectiveness of Mindfulness provides a Band-Aid, rather than

nurturance and a balm for anxiety and deeper longing.

Carrette and King (2005) posit that what we are currently witnessing is the second move of a Western 'privatisation of religion':

> This time influenced not by liberalism, which placed religion in the private space of individual choice, but by neoliberalism, which is re-placing religion (already disentangled from its institutional and cultural origins and repackaged as 'spirituality') into the corporate realm of business. We are essentially witnessing an attempted corporate takeover of religions. This can be seen in the increasing tendency for the ancient and diverse religious traditions to be simplified, homogenised, repackaged and then sold to consumers and business managers as ideologies promoting hedonism, business enterprise, work-efficiency, economic productivity and the values of a corporate business world. (2005, p. 133)

As so much recent literature testifies, this is what many scholars view as the hijacking of 'mindfulness meditation' (originally part of a deep path of training the heart/mind in Buddhism) and its refashioning into a corporate-sponsored commodity: (Mc)Mindfulness (Anderson, 2016b; Purser, 2014; Purser & Loy, 2013). It is a critical contextual factor for CHE. Karen is disturbed by 'new agey' elements within CHE which are indicative of the more widespread instrumental approach of most Mindfulness (programs). Corporate Mindfulness is undergirded and enabled by the encroachment of neoliberalism even into the very personal sphere of spiritual practice. Its agenda is for market forces to shape all aspects of our lives and maximise their commodity potential (Carrette & King, 2005, p. 632; Stanley, 2012).

While CHE began well before the Mindfulness movement, the latter is contributing to its increasingly public recognition. For participants it is a 'complex Western phenomenon' (Karen, Bernie). It is, at best, an innocuous movement assisting people with the lifestyle management of stress and anxiety. At its nadir, it distracts from more genuine, disciplined paths of deep training and inquiry that have an ethico-politico social activist intent. Its uptake within higher education in North America (particularly the USA) has been rapid and no doubt facilitated by the USA's history of the interlinking of corporate and HE agendas. Yet, as Bernie indicates, it is about more than this:

> One of the reasons for Mindfulness, for contemplative higher education gaining fairly rapid traction, is in that context of plurality and especially within access to education that exposes one to so many different views, there isn't some automatic

> spiritual fall-back that people have anymore, especially university educated people. (Bernie)

Bernie affirmed that human beings appear to long for some sort of vehicle and practice to support sense-making in their increasingly complex world. Eager uptake of the Mindfulness movement appeared to confirm this.

There were a plethora of participant comments on Mindfulness. Nuanced treatment of this phenomenon and how participants received it as both enabling and disparate to their key projects and concerns is worthy of a chapter in itself. While that is beyond the scope of this thesis, the following selection of excerpts from Julia and Karen's interviews indicate some of the paradoxical stances towards this sweeping phenomenon:

> McMindfulness where mindfulness becomes commodified, but even if mindfulness only helps reduce anxiety or it starts there, that's already huge if you think about it, if you think about one person being less anxious, and how that then resonates outward … I think some of the concern, with the mindful, the wholistic, some of the mindfulness stuff is that it's too focussed, and not focussed enough on the socio-political. (Julia)

> I think the phenomena of mindfulness and the mindfulness movement is it has an inherent health but the, what, what's happening is its becoming sabotaged by commodification just like everything else. It's using scientific results to promise certain kinds of outcomes that fix social problems, subverts things, and it concerns me about how it subverts things. (Karen)

> It's not enough to pay attention to simply, well it's not simply, it's not enough for me that we, that I attend to what's happening out there without paying attention to the inward and it's not enough for me to attend to what's happening inside and neglect all the injustices and inequities and violence and destruction and violations that are happening out in the world … it has to be both. (Julia)

> The Mindfulness movement has for the most part dropped the ethical dimension, it has also dropped the wisdom dimension, the awareness dimension and I think it has to re-integrate those elements in order to really overcome its own shortcomings. (Karen)

Yet it is in the following interaction with Emily that this lament is communicated. She encapsulates precisely the differences in depth of inquiry, strength of provocation and motivation between popularised-Mindfulness and CHE:

I think the Mindfulness movement, you know, I think there's a lot of good in that.

Do you?

Yes, I do. Because I think that anything that helps people become aware is useful. But it's as far as I can see it's a very materialistic presentation of mindfulness which means it will still be very superficial and I think there's too much 'feel-good' quality and I don't think there's challenge. The way that most people teach it, I don't think it's challenging at all. … I think, another thing is that there is really, it's a very materialistic approach to mindfulness, you know, and, and it doesn't really even, in terms of, of what I've seen, doesn't ever really go to the source and talk about the wisdom lineage and things like that. So, it's kind of merchandising. But I still think there's some, that it's still better than, if we didn't have it.

So, not harmful?

Well, I don't know whether it's harmful or not. I think it's probably more beneficial, but superficially beneficial to some people. I think the maybe harm is just that people think they have experienced mindfulness with whatever they did. I think that you know the thing that's been really lost is that experience of the vastness of their minds or the depth of [word inaudible] … and mindfulness was obviously never intended to be a lightweight y'know feel-good kind of thing. [pause] It's part of a deep training. It's part one of a deep training. (Emily)

Participants acknowledged mindfulness as a gateway (for students and academics alike) and attributed intense interest in it as reflection of our human yearning for greater depth of understanding and relationality – with self and other. I was unprepared for this generosity as I had begun fieldwork well-armed with the emerging critique of Western Mindfulness[274], expecting to encounter scathing disapproval. Instead I found accommodation and appreciation, albeit tinged with sadness. There was lament of the short-changing of genuine human seeking that occurs via corporate programmes, or short introductory courses such as Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR)[275]. Three participants work actively to counter what they see as the negative manifestations of mindfulness. Two purposively and regularly attend large Mindfulness conferences, presenting more provocative material, ensuring that the important questions are asked, that discomfort is not avoided, and that 'actual practice' doesn't get left behind:

[274] That is: Purser and Loy (2013); Ng and Purser (2015); Purser (2014); Baugher (2014); and Bazzano (2014).

[275] MBSR is frequently offered as a six-week programme comprising one weekly two-hour session.

> [*Name of colleague*] actually tells a story about a conference [they] went to that was about y'know one of those Mind and Life things where [colleague] was talking about meditation practice and [colleague] said 'We could try it now and I could give you instruction' and they went like 'Really, we're supposed to do it now?' And they were completely shocked and were like 'Oh I don't think so.' (Stephen)

Through interviews and analysis, my cynicism about Mindfulness was replaced by a deeper appreciation of what a complex mechanism it currently is. Whether CHE manages to continue to distinguish itself from the Mindfulness movement and how well it rides the tensions, and seduction of more instrumentalist and thus identity-awarding (for academics) approaches remains to be seen. Eugene and Bernie both generalised that within academia most scholars introducing and working with mindfulness and CHE are genuine in their motivation and desire to have it grounded in practice and study. Others were not quite as confident. How well HEIs are able to keep learning in the centre as a social good (and for the benefit of all) rather than as vehicle for writing a good biography (Rose, 1999a) of the corporate citizen will play a role.

Academia

Academia offers a complex output-oriented environment in which competition and individualism are rewarded over and above collegiality and co-production. In recent years, the Mindfulness movement and contemplative education have intersected at the point of individual academics[276] and in some cases, manifested with reduced perspicacity. Given our broader cultural context of 'commodification of all spheres' of human life (Emily) this is not surprising. Yet it is an area of considerable concern for those with a commitment to the transformative potential of CHE. Similarly to the theme of 'mindfulness', participants identified how academic cultures both enable and constrain the possibility, and practice of CHE.

> Mindfulness is a part of contemplative education. It's like the opening part of a movie, it's a very little part, but a necessary part. But the same thing I see happening with the mindfulness movement, it's being very generalised and superficial, I see happening, in some places with what people call contemplative education. So to me, the example is, you go to a conference, a contemplative education conference and you go to some workshops and you learn a few techniques that they are good to do in your class and then you set yourself up with a website and as a contemplative education expert … so that's what's happening

[276] This includes those in higher levels positions. For example, Deans and Heads of Departments.

> now, anybody with a PhD by their name can teach anything. (Emily)

The range of phenomena that participants found incongruent included individuals not practicing themselves[277], and using 'practice' as a technology for managing or fixing the self, or as a crowd-pleaser. There was also emphasis on misuse of practices for personal gain. Vince described this as contributing to 'further solidification of ego-identity' rather than disrupting and unsettling habituated ways. Additionally, competitiveness of HE cultures in general was viewed as inimical to the building of supportive community. A final consideration offered by participants was that where academics' efforts were underpinned by genuineness, what prevented the full potency of CHE manifesting was exposure to superficial training (in contemplative practices) at conferences or via short Mindfulness programs. This relates directly to Parker-Palmer's frequently quoted claim that 'we teach who we are' (Palmer, 1997).

How can educators guide students through the ups and downs of a journey that they have not yet exposed themselves to in some way? Vince explains that:

> … if the faculty member is not able to go there, they're not able to go there, there's nothing you can do. It's about their personal process really. It's about their personal relationship with themselves, so it becomes more; it's a little more almost like a personal thing ... as opposed to their skill as a teacher, if they don't have, if they haven't practiced themselves. It's like a therapist who's never been to therapy themselves, and there's many people like that. (Vince)

These four key points relating to academic cultures and the practice of CHE are not discussed within current Mindfulness literature. Vince suggests that this indicates a current fissure in HE in general: that of the relationality of the educator to themselves. To skilfully disrupt oppressive practices and structures, educators need to know who they are and what they have to offer as human beings.

> Academics are smart and they can see what the value of mindfulness and contemplation is – they may have practiced, but are not really steeped in it the way you really need to be in order to discover the deeper dimension of contemplative practice for teaching and learning. So it becomes just another subject for studying, but if it has this sort of meditation component which is you know just enough

[277] That is, not having a regular meditation practice.

> meditation so you kind of get the value of it ... sort of like I hate to say 'superficial' but it's just kind of one-dimensional in a way and it's sort of not really deep enough to shatter the paradigms that most academics have been raised in and have to function in in terms of, to survive and prosper in the universe. (Stephen)

Academic environments, university cultures and personal journeys all contribute to complex relationships with practice (i.e. sustained ongoing and regular meditation). Participants indicated three tendencies: first, educators begin with practice and but then lose it through disciplines inhospitable to human embodiment, subjectivity and emotions; second, practice is avoided through over-emphasis on technique; and third is that they do just enough to 'get through' (Emily)[278]. Highly competitive, individualist and deficit-based cultures within HEI pervaded by scientism have either driven CHE underground or resulted in weakened contributions; these are void of the necessary 'ruggedness' (*Emily*) needed for true disruption and provocation.

> It feels to me that some people started out with that type of inquiry and then in their PhD programs they cut off. (Karen)

Yet, cutting both ways, academic cultures also enabled the emergence of CHE (especially in public institutions) through colleagues providing a fund of encouragement, and HODs/Deans generously allowing 'innovation and experimentation'. In some cases, Deans allowed CHE projects to pass beneath the radar, and refrained from challenging more established scholar-practitioners because they were professors (or HODs) with much respected research, administrative and education careers. This brought considerable personal reward, and enjoyment.

> Yeah, well certainly the last ten years of my academic life were a hell of a lot more fun than the time prior to that. (Bernie)

The halls of academia appear to offer passage and possibility for the birth of contemplative initiatives (in some cases campus-wide[279]) while its increasingly individualist and outcome-

[278] For example, a six-week course in MBSR, a three or four day intensive, and attend a few conferences. One academic I met coincidentally while in the USA told me that she just does a few weeks of mindfulness practices prior to the beginning teaching Mindfulness to students.

[279] See (Bai, 2001; Bush et al., 2012).

focussed culture works to dilute collegial collectivism as well as what individuals are inclined or encouraged to offer. This is suggestive of broader Western culture where quality tends to cede to quantity, and where an increasingly rapacious sense of deficiency impels policies and action. It is within this milieu that CHE emerged.

CHE and mainstream culture

The term contemplative education was coined at Naropa University in the 1980s. A participant commented that in the early days, the term 'mindfulness' was rarely used, with founder Chogyam Trungpa preferring the expression *shamatha-vipashyana* (mindfulness-awareness). Following Naropa Institute accreditation as a university[280], Faculty came together to find a way of articulating to others in HE what it was they were doing. The phrase 'contemplative education' was coined. Mindfulness, as a stand-alone practice or group of exercises[281] is also an entirely Western (North American[282]) phenomenon. Currently under a barrage of scholarly critique, Harris' articulation of Mindfulness (below) exemplifies all that Buddhist scholars and deep practitioners are irked by. It presents a very different approach to human inquiry and social awareness, implying an ontology of human deficit, and well steeped in 'psy' science (Rose 1989; Stanley 2012).

> Mindfulness is a hot topic in Western psychology: increasingly recognised as an effective way to increase fulfilment, reduce stress, raise self-awareness, enhance emotional intelligence, and undermine destructive emotive, cognitive, and behavioural processes. While many people think mindfulness means meditation, this is not the case. Mindfulness is a mental state of openness, awareness and focus, and meditation is just one way amongst hundreds of learning to cultivate this state. (Harris, 2009)

[280] According to one non-participant, this was around 1978.

[281] That is where it is presented separately from awareness or v*ipashyana*, and ethical skilfulness or *upaya*. See Chapters One and Three.

[282] While mindfulness is now common parlance in many Western cultures, even three years ago, there was almost no 'local' organisation from within Europe. Instead efforts such as conferences were being coordinated from the USA. Bazzano (2014) and Giorgino (2015) are exceptions and lament this omission asking what additional benefits Mindfulness might bring if it engaged with the European philosophical (and Sociological) traditions. See the work of Terry Hyland regarding mindfulness and education in the UK (Hyland, 2015).

The location of CHE[283] within predominantly white, middle-class, educated North-American culture where the 'common sense' of market capital dominates, ensures complexity at many levels, not least within the individual scholar-practitioner. The simultaneous 'affordances' (Connors, 2015, p. 115) and containment of CHE by ideological forces and (after Bourdieu) 'fields' (Grenfell, 2014) have multiple effects. First, it has allowed CHE to extend way beyond a small private university in Colorado plugging away at this alternative approach to HE since 1978. Second, it entails significant ontological and epistemological 'baggage'. This could be summarised as a broadly secular yet fragmented, disembodied, and still repressive culture. It is a culture which privileges white, male, protestant, and heterosexual identity positions and is frequently blinded to the existence and value of alternative worldviews. Comments from interviewees illustrate their current struggles. One non-participant emphasises

> … [t]he heavy-duty work ethic, the almost punitive aspect, [of] no gain, no pain, of also repressing emotions, stiff upper lip, just a repression of the expression of humanity. … The conservative white male still dominates a lot of the places of authority like the government and major corporations. (Non-participant 2)

While Vince observes that

> If you are Christian in this country, you are very privileged, and this country assumes Christianity in a very powerful way politically. (Vince)

Students embody cultural repression, and also push back against it. The repression of human expression – mentioned by the non-participant above – contributes to the current anger and immature development Vince encounters in students. Working skilfully with student anger and the ensuing identity politics is part of his practice of CHE.

> They're angry, they're angry, they're more in their identity-development trajectory, they're in a place, it's more like a teenager, their identity now hasn't been allowed to be … So they have to push really hard to make space for that identity. If there were space, if there, if it wasn't an issue they wouldn't have to so, so pursue it, what may feel like a solidification of their individuality, it is unfortunately needed because they have to push and make that space and that requires to say 'I'm this and I'm gonna

[283] Which Emily distinguishes from a 'Buddhist education'. Here she is referring to traditional Buddhist higher education as is preserved within the Tibetan *Shedra* tradition (where young people are trained to the level of Khenpo Degree (equivalent to a Western PhD) and stemming back to prominent centres of higher learning in India (Nalanda University) and Indonesia (Sri Vijaya) (Gamage, 2010; Simmer-Brown, 2009; Tulku, 2000).

> yell it, and show it' y'know 'I'm gonna be basically in-your-face with it, I have to do that otherwise because I am not accepted'. (Vince)

Durkheim's concern was that the diminishing of formalised religion which fosters group solidarity would contribute to reduce ethical normativity and thus social chaos. Weber too saw religion as the glue that holds us all together (Puett, 2012). In times of flux we grasp onto whatever might provide some (albeit illusory) sense of permanence and ground. Vince and others pointed towards their role as educators, in orienting students towards a sense of basic trust in their own human capacities, inherent relationality and (potential for) agency.

Some proclaim that mindfulness (and CHE) are enabled through our now post-secular society (Ergas, 2014, 2015; Hotam & Wexler, 2014), while others are quick to insist that, although blurred, the religious-secular binary still exists (Shakman-Hurd, 2011). This binary manifests in different ways among the Baby Boomers and Gen X-ers; they range from very religious to utterly secular to new-agey spiritual. Participants suggested that among millennials, the secular prevails but with a religious or spiritual flavour. Two highlighted 'declining religious interest' and increasing secular awareness. One was asked to offer inter-religious dialogue groups by their (Christian) Dean, but commented that students wouldn't attend because they were not interested in religions. Julia observes a reinvigorated interest in religion, but through a more critical secular lens. Her view echoes Taylor (2007) and the later Habermas (2002, 2008).

> We aren't really in a secular age. We're perhaps more religious than we've ever been but we're also more, we also have a secular consciousness in a way too … so that's what they mean by post-secular right, so there's a secularity, and awareness of it, and a scientific world-view but at the same time there's also a lot of spiritual and religious stuff going on too, so how, [pause] how do we talk within that tension and how do we engage the world in that tension. (Julia)

Tension (in the positive sense of the word) suggests the texture of the complex dialectical nature of the relationship between CHE and the Western cultural space which it currently inhabits. While oversimplified, Figure 6. represents participants' identification of the parts of this dialectic.



Figure 6.1 Dialectical relations – between CHE and Western culture

The contemporary context which enables CHE also provides significant 'rub' – particularly in relation to Mindfulness, and regulatory forces. A range of significant risks include misappropriation, commodification, becoming overly technical, overly regulated and 'psy'-oriented. However, the provocation of significant incongruence appears to ensure a certain dynamism and creativity. Unlike Mindfulness, CHE is not easily reinforced by dominant cultural ideations. That there are reduced opportunities for developing a feel for the game appears to activate both individual and collective agency. Participants explicitly intended to challenge the prevailing social order, leading to structural morphogenesis (Archer, 2003). While replete with frustrations and disappointments, it could be argued that a less hospitable, but not repressive environment provides the ideal conditions for human agency.

My purpose here is to reveal and name the powers (or tendencies) at play and identify the ways in which they shape CHE in practice. This is important given the primacy of practice in how we make

our way through the world, and gain knowledge of our inter-being with the world. Archer reminds us that lest we are tempted to leave aside engagement with certain aspects of our existence in the world (too challenging, too overwhelming, too inconvenient), we forfeit a particular kinds of knowing critical to our development as human beings and thus to our response-ability in these 21st century times.

Subjective stances towards structural enablements and constraints

In challenging Leary's (2004) proclamation that 'reflexivity is the "curse of the self" ', Archer views reflexivity as the very means by which we make our way through our world (Archer, 2007, p. 5; Brock et al., 2016). In a world of speed and increasing variety, at all levels, our reliance upon this inherent human capacity[284] and its scope is increasing. In our 21st century times, reflexivity is becoming imperative (Archer, 2012, 2014b). How we express our reflexivity[285] shapes our engagement and response to our voluntary and involuntary social positioning. Archer discloses that one of her most 'exciting findings' has been that in our practice of the three modes of reflexivity we also assume different 'stances' towards society 'particularly vis-à-vis its constraints and enablements' (2003, p. 164). These stances are presented in the table below. What was so vital in this find is that these divergent stances towards our social and cultural systems are the 'differentiated mechanisms' that mediates between institutions and culture, and human agency (2003, p. 165).

[284] As mentioned in Chapter Two, Archer refers to human capacities as 'personally emergent powers' (PEPs).

[285] That is whichever of Archer's four modes are dominant. See Chapter 2 and Table 6.2 below.

Table 6.2 Reflexive modes and stances (towards enablements and constraints)[286]

Dominant reflexive mode	Stance towards enablements and constraints	Subjective dispositions (forms of 'self-work'/ self-monitoring in realising aspirations/concerns)
Communicative reflexives Deeply embedded in and rely upon their natal context for completion of the inner conversations and thus realisations of their concerns and projects.	**Evasive** The costs of engagement with constraints, or taking-up the opportunities of enablements threaten their social embeddedness.	**Self-sacrifice**
Autonomous Confidently self-motivated and rely upon their own inner resources. Seek to improve their social positions through self-advantageous action. Rely on their own judgement amidst uncertainty.	**Strategic** Try to avoid 'society's snakes and climb its ladders' (especially professionally). Their self-defined projects/courses of action can be innovative, risky and sometimes ruthless.	**Self-discipline**
Meta-Reflexive Unsettled within their contexts, and seeking better societal outcomes. Tentative in self, and concerned about our world.	**Subversive** Seek to live out socially aware ideals. Considered 'subversive' because 'willing to pay the price of constraints, and forfeit the benefit of enablements in' seeking a better life (for all).	**Self-transformation**

Evasive, subversive or strategic?

What can be said about the stances that participants took towards the congruencies and in congruencies that they experienced? What appears to be certain is that they have not evaded either. Because they tend to occupy fringe positions (within and across institutions, disciplines, the HE sector, and community), there is little that has been established enough to preserve. Drawing on Archer's distinctions of different reflexive characterisations above, there appeared to be few quests motivated by improvement of social position. However, as academics generally possess a

[286] Please note that Archer (2012) has yet to elaborate on the reflexive dispositions included here.

high degree of interest in their own thinking and success, this is difficult to discern. In this way, Karen, Eugene and Vince all stood out. Yet each had entered academia via circuitous routes, including diverse prior employment activities (barista, administration officer, performer, teacher, and business consultant, among others. This is because all were willing to pay the price of constraints and forfeit the benefit of enablements in pursuing their contemplative paths and projects. Bernie appeared to have the most straightforward academic trajectory, and an illustrious career[287]. Yet the recounting of his inner conversations solely focussed on human compassion, social concerns, ethical integrity and activism (within and beyond the university). Stephen and Emily had not intended to have academic trajectories in life, and spent considerable time first pursuing 'spiritual' deep meditative training (as did Eugene, Bernie, and Karen)[288]. Using the reflexive characterisations presenting in Table 6.2 above, all participants with whom successive in-depth interviews were conducted[289] appear to be dominant meta-reflexives.

Metareflexivity and 'Wertrationalität'

According to Archer, a key factor in developing a dominant meta-reflexive mode is experiencing contextual incongruity in childhood/adolescence. Most participants in this research[290] recounted earlier life trajectories that included significant contextual incongruity and interruption. These included: a missing sense of the 'magic' of human existence; big-mind interest in Eastern and other religious traditions from within conservative protestant families in small rural towns, or at high school; the topographical challenge of racialised urban neighbourhoods; the incongruence of high aspirations and ability alongside of an underdeveloped emotional-self; overseas travel as teenagers; and witnessing intense human suffering, as well as the openness of alternative

[287] Karen now occupies a position of similar prominence, yet her course to academic prominence was interrupted by various non-academic roles.

[288] I guess that these five would be approaching their second round of 10,000 hours of meditation practice. See Benner's (1984) theory that it takes 10,000 hours to develop expertise. See Benner (1984).

[289] That is Emily, Eugene, Julia, Bernie, Karen, Vince and Stephen.

[290] Interviews with Vince and Eugene did not venture much into discussion of family background and childhood/adolescent experiences. Had the final interview with Vince been able to proceed, this most likely would have arisen.

worldviews. These diverse incongruities contributed to a similarity in their adult dispositions.

As noted above, I assumed that (most) participants would be dominant meta-reflexives. Although having worked alongside of academics[291] for the past ten years, I was prepared for at least some to be autonomous reflexives – given that this mode resonates with the strategic values and directives of our times, i.e. self-reliance and strategic self-advancement. Participants' motivation and accompanying concerns, all indicate a dominant meta-reflexive mode. Critical reflexivity about their own inner conversations and skilful action was typically expressed through a 'we' frame in the sense of 'us' as a community, society, species. The younger cohort differed in their self-effacement, whereas older participants had the sense of being fully processed[292] as a result of deep deconstructive meditative inquiry, accompanied by care and regard for the habituated self and its struggle towards unclouding (or freedom).

Each of Archer's (dominant) reflexive modes demonstrates a differing stance towards structural enablements and constraints. While Karen challenged my use of the term 'subversive'[293] her inner conversation clearly communicated personal willingness to pay the price of constraints and to forfeit enablements in pursuing personal and social transformation. Many voiced opinions that opportunities are available in our current 21st century context. This is a meta-reflexive quality, and somewhat at odds with most social commentary. Hopefulness and active agency involving subversion were common to all participants. Some were strong (political) activists (e.g. Claudia, Vince, and Karen), and some more interpersonally oriented (e.g. Stephen, Emily, and Eugene).

---

[291] Archer is clear that all of us possess meta-reflexivity and use this as part of our everyday life. Additionally, as younger people beginning to shape our projects and dovetail our concerns, she explains that we all 'are driven to engage to some degree with the second aspect of meta-reflexivity, namely social critique' (2012, p.44). This is because we all begin our post-school lives 'hampered by inadequate knowledge' to ensure an effortless socialisation, and ensuing livelihood path (ibid).

[292] The term used in Tibetan Buddhism is *shinjang* meaning 'thoroughly processed' in the sense of the ego's self-cocooning activities of thought. Action and disposition had worn themselves out of existence and no longer offered any reference points. At this point, the self can relax with who it is and begin to see and respond to reality without the filters of ego and habituated concept.

[293] Karen's comment is included here for the reader 'It feels to me that if we fall into trying to oppose or subvert or interrupt others without looking at ourselves we just create another political mess.' (Karen)

See Scambler's work (2012, 2013) for further work on reflexive 'sub-types'[294]. That participants articulate an ability to meet constraints with a sense of opportunity and even excitement is significant. University educators finding cause for optimism and hope in these times seems rare. Does their stance suggest that CHE may play a role in shifting reflexive modes and thus our stance towards social issues? This is discussed further in the final chapter. In the mean-time might participants be using camouflage as part of their subversive MR stance?

Camouflage as subversion?

Participants appeared to incorporate techniques of camouflage as part of their subversive activity in managing contextual constraints. The term 'camouflage … is a means of hiding, but understanding it is a means of seeing' (Wadham & Hamilton, 2015, p. 167).

Returning to the pivotal provocation underpinning this research project – that of the Naropa lecturer in 2011 – what can be said about the notion of cloaking and camouflage? Participants indicated two different conceptualisations of this. The first in relation to evading structural constraint; and second in a reflexive way (i.e. within their IC) and in relation to their integration of Buddhist ontology (or worldview[295]) in course curricula. In light of the discussion above, I will focus on the former. Here, I use the term camouflage to convey a sense of 'strategic concealment' rather than perpetuating or seeking to embed deception (Elias, Harley, & Tsoutas, 2015, pp. vii-viii). Participants also used the term 'cloaking' to refer to the same 'eluding of attention' (Howard & Olubas, 2015, p. 127). Wadham and Hamilton's (2015, p. 163) assertion that '[w]hatever is camouflaged is present, but its presence is clouded, distorted or blended' best captures the sense

[294] Scambler proposes the existence of sub-types within three of Archer's 'four ideal-typical modes of reflexivity' (2012, p. 148) – the autonomous reflexive, the meta-reflexive, and the fractured reflexive. He identifies these three as the 'focussed autonomous reflexives', the 'dedicated meta-reflexives' (2012), and the 'vulnerable fractured reflexive' (2013).

[295] This was the term used by one non-participant and Julia regarding the Buddhist ontology of basic human decency (or 'goodness'), i.e. *tathagatagarbha* ('Buddha' nature). This was discussed above (Chapter Two, p.48) and finds parallel in Bhaskar, who talks about 'the essential Self' as that inherent capacity which is 'dynamic and expanding, not fixed [and] manifests itself as an inner urge or developmental tendency to realise itself' (Hartwig, 2001, p. 141).

of ‘cloaking’ that participants referred to.

Cloaking has been a big issue for those scholar-practitioners with a committed path and practice. However, this is changing – particularly in terms of people ‘outing themselves as meditators’ (Bernie). The most overt instance I encountered was the scholar (large public university) who did not want me to record our informal conversation in case it somehow made its way into the public domain and threaten their upcoming tenure application process. Conversely, Bernie noted that ‘push-back’ against CHE at his (public) institution was yet to manifest; instancing how the ‘politically conservative’ University Board was yet to grasp the (radically pluralistic and social activist[296]) implications of a recent CHE initiative they had approved. He also indicates that camouflage was at the core of the emergence of mindfulness; purposively deployed by its key exponent Jon Kabat-Zinn:

> He had a very a very explicit agenda of Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction as being a kind of Trojan horse for being able to move what admittedly arose out of Buddhism into the health care environment and through that into the mainstream of society, and some of the things he has been criticised for, of not having an explicit morality within MBSR y'know were in part conscious choices to enable it to stay reasonably cloaked to not have to draw the kinds of criticism that perhaps a more robust contemplative effort might have had occasion to. (Bernie)

The need to use camouflage appears to be reducing as publications and scholarship in the field increase. Where it has persisted most saliently is in public institutions and/or the discipline of Religious Studies – not least at large yearly conferences.

> People who are already practitioners privately who would never let on, they would take me aside and say, if you ever have a position … I would really like to come to [name of university], and then publicly they would be disrespectful and put me down. (Karen)

Ironically heartening in stories of cloaking and camouflage is the tacit acknowledgment of CHE as more ‘robust’ (Bernie’s term above) and potentially more subversive (activist) than more frequently

[296] That is, bringing together indigenous and other epistemological traditions, together with arts, media and cultural studies; exploring CHE as a vehicle for better supporting and understanding transgender/intersex youth on campus.

encountered Mindfulness interventions.

What promise for CHE?

In the discussion above I have identified and explored the key social structures shaping the existence and practice of CHE (in North America). Interviewees experienced these mechanisms as either enabling or constraining their individual and collective 'ultimate concerns' (i.e. what they care about most). Of interest was the parity of their concerns. All indicated what Archer and Donati (2015) call a 'you' orientation. This is where the 'other' is central to their projects which are oriented towards transformative relational social change (morphogenesis). Chapman (2012) calls this a 'we first' approach. Both refer to the inherently relational nature of being human. Where dissimilarity did occur was in the extent to which this 'we first' approach manifested in terms of activism – some educators involved explicitly activist projects as part of their curricula (Karen, Julia, and Stephen), others educated for social response-ability beyond formal learning (Bernie, Emily, Vince, and Eugene).

Participants experience some social structures as simultaneously enabling and constraining of their cares and concerns. Further inquiry identified deeper ('sub') mechanisms, such as the case of the Mindfulness movement. Exploring these deeper tendencies has enabled a more precise understanding of how the Mindfulness movement as a particular cultural phenomenon contains tendencies that simultaneously pave the path of CHE, but also inhibit the integrity of its practice. In this regard, what the Mindfulness project threatens is to dilute is the more perspicacious academic inquiry (potentially available in CHE) as well as the rugged pedagogies and contemplative practices themselves which are aimed at disrupting habitual (identarian) ways of thinking, feeling and being. All participants pointed out that such ruggedness, challenge and discomfort is always in the service of transformative learning for personal change and emancipatory projects. Moreover, any disruptive processes, that deepen our compassionate regard for others (including our 'other') necessitate discomfort (Asrael & Bialek, 2016).

A critical realist methodology as underlabourer has afforded a nuanced understanding of the stratified nature of different social structures shaping CHE. Sometimes constraining mechanisms

such as inhospitable academic disciplines and/or Departments, while ostensibly limiting participant concerns, urged agential resourcefulness.

> When I succeeded in getting this research [project] accepted, it was because I put it in service of improving critical thinking. (Eugene)

For Eugene and others this served to further the reach of contemplative education without compromising integrity of practice. Here I suggest that constraints, where not received as repressive or overtly oppressive, may provide additional momentum for active agency. However, this depends on the stance of the practitioner.

Archer offers keen insight into how different dominant reflexive styles share our differing stances towards social structures and their powers. I identified all participants of this research project as having a dominant meta-reflexive style while not discounting the possibility of sub-types (Scambler, 2012)[297]. Meta-reflexives tend to forfeit the immediate benefits of enablements, and weather constraints so as to realise their socially-transformative ultimate concerns. They express a *Wertrationalität* (value rationality); they subvert constraints and find opportunity in unlikely places while pursing socially-oriented concerns grounded in equity and social justice. Archer comments that the meta-reflexives are:

> … strong universalists, inclusive humanists and participatory democrats. What they seem to be gesturing towards is a notion of a robust society, unconfined to existing national boundaries, yet somehow remaining unfettered by a new global iron cage. (Archer, 2012, p. 265)

The picture of CHE (in North America) that emerges, amidst contemporary structural and cultural mechanisms, is one of persistence, resilience, and taking obstacles as 'path'[298]. Educators of CHE appeared to find opportunity within flux and unpredictability. However, this does not ensure CHE continuing survival or growth in its current form. Even if all scholar-practitioners were as serious as

[297] See Scambler (2012, 2013) and footnote 292 on page 178.

[298] This is a concept drawn from Buddhist practice where obstacles are viewed as integral to a path of learning and the development of 'right action' (Bhaskar, 2016)

the small group I interviewed, there are also clear and present vulnerabilities. These include the seductive nature of instrumentalism (personal career enhancement and pedagogical novelty), commodification (as a money-spinner product), or as just another deficit-based 'psy' technology-of-the-self (Rose, 1999a). Another menace is that of ever-reducing spaces for pedagogical innovation which enables teaching the 'hidden curriculum' and ensuring 'personalised learning'[299]. A key factor in this is increasing professionalisation of courses and subsequent structuring of curricula by professional accreditation bodies[300]. Yet as Dall'Alba cautions,

> Acquisition of knowledge and skills is insufficient for embodying and enacting skillful professional practice, including for the process of becoming that learning such practice entails. (Dall'Alba, 2009, p. 42)

This narrowing of pedagogical possibility along with superficial (CHE) practitioner training appears to be the biggest threat framing the possibility of CHE as a pedagogical movement.

What possibilities there are for CHE to become more widespread and offer itself as a 21st century HE approach is best answered through looking at what CE has to offer higher education in general. What do the internal conversations of scholar-practitioners interviewed here reveal about being human and being educators in these times of tremendous upheaval, flux and concern? Three key messages emerge: first, pedagogies which not only place human beings (learners and educators) in the centre, but rest upon a very different ontology of being human to that of our dominant Western-Abrahamic ontology of human beings as basically flawed, broken, untrustworthy and lacking. Second, that CHE is inherently disruptive epistemologically as well as ontologically. However, unlike other critical deconstructive approaches, it is also relational; aiming at

[299] Here I am not referring to the current 'personalised' individualist learning programme being used in Australian schools, but rather there being enough space in learning environments for individuals' experiences, confusion ('ignorance') and ways of being to be acknowledged and responded to through the curriculum and the presence and attention of the educator, i.e. space for the establishing and holding of a co-learning environment or container.

[300] This is particularly pertinent to the fields of social work, counselling and psychotherapy, early childhood and teaching among others.

understanding relationality at the levels of self-self; self-others; and self-'natural'[301] world. As such in the process of provocation and disruption it offers us tools for engaging and harnessing the potential for befriending and then learning through our minds, bodies and emotions. It is only through engagement with all of these aspects of being human that we gain access to all domains of learning. It seems more than obvious that we would desire this in seeking skilful responses to current global and local issues. Finally, CHE appears to support an active socially-responsive agency; cultivating a 'we first' approach (Chapman, 2012). Again, this active agency or embodied *response-ability* is utterly dependent on a sane and tender relationality in all domains; a three-fold relationality self-self; self-others, and self-Other that Bai et al (2013) propose. Archer implies a similar dialectic, asserting that the human being develops through the primacy of practice and their necessary relations with the natural environment, social, and practical orders. Nhất Hạnh (1998) refers to this is our 'interbeing'.

Implicit in many of the discussions of the past two chapters is a running question of whether CHE may be able to play a role in shifting people's dominant reflexive mode. Most obvious is the shift from a 'communicative' or 'autonomous' reflexive to 'meta-reflexive' mode. However, of considerable importance is the ability to support students move away from a dominant 'fractured reflexive' mode. This is where the individual cannot make their way through the world at all, and, as a consequence, experience (and in some case may also create for others) considerable suffering. These three key messages and possible future research trajectories will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

[301] I have placed this term in parenthesis in homage to UK Philosopher Timothy Morton who refutes the existence of 'nature' (i.e. as other). There is only us, all of us human and non-human beings. Morton's sense of interbeing is so 'we' oriented that he suggests our next project team might include a hedgehog and a tree (Blasdel, 2017).

CHAPTER 7
SELF ENRICHEMENT AND SOCIAL RESPONS-ABILITY

Introduction

Contemplative higher education (CHE) contributes to social response-ability and a self-enrichment that enhances human relationality and produces more meta-reflexive educators and students. Both exhibit high degrees of academic adeptness. In this thesis, I have argued that as a pedagogical movement rooted in meditative practice (which is predominantly but not exclusively Buddhist), CHE supports educators[302] in overcoming alienation and developing an ethical and social responsiveness. It does this through harnessing and strengthening inherent human capacities and developing learning across all domains. From this, individuals and communities of learners are able to both envision and manifest more intimately relational and socially response-able futures. I have explored the role of deep meditative training in shaping the pedagogical practice of key educators of CHE. Additionally, I have examined how these educators understand the nature and social contexts of their practice, and the significant structural and cultural powers enabling and/or constraining their practice. The key question guiding this inquiry has been 'What are the possibilities for CHE to develop the capacities of social and ethical response-ability?' The exploration of this question included seven in-depth interviews inquiring into the internal conversations of scholar-practitioners of CHE, revealing their reflexive deliberation in relation to issues of structure and agency. The fruition of their educating and deep self-work through extended time working with deep meditative practices has shaped an active agency, a 'dedicated meta-reflexive' mode (Scambler, 2012) and dispositional ethics of care. All have been in relation to self, other and the natural world we are a part of. Within this a range of key findings have been observed and are summarised in the following section

Research purpose and findings

As an emerging field, CHE has been limited by studies that have tended to concentrate inquiry at the empirical level of the range of practices (or techniques), classroom implementation, and

[302] Moreover, by implication, their students.

student outcomes. The purpose of this study was to better understand the practice of CHE from the perspective of a selection of deeply trained and well-established scholar-practitioners who were also expressing a sociological awareness and ethical sensitivity through their academic publishing. As such, this study responded to those calls for more sociological analyses and use of ethnographic methods (Bazzano, 2014; Giorgino, 2015). My visiting scholar residency was critical to this. An additional lacuna in the small body of CHE scholarship was that, in spite of calls for attending to the training and ethics of educators (Coburn et al., 2011; Simmer-Brown, 2002, 2011), no research examined what path of meditative training and practice those calling for this had undertaken or how this shaped their pedagogical practice. Only obtuse references identified these people as 'long-term meditators' (Loizzo, 2014; Rhem, 2012). Thus, while CHE was being touted as a pedagogical movement of significance and possibility for our complex 21st century (Bai et al., 2015; Eppert et al., 2015; Kahane, 2009; Vokey, 2014), much more research was needed (Lobel, 2014, p. 33).

In this thesis, I have argued for the prominence of key factors critical to a 21st century education, and crucial for the development of sane individuals who are ethically and socially response-able. These key factors are revealed and supported by the findings in this research project and include:

- the need to consider our ontology and what it means to be human from a non-deficit base;
- a view of active agency as inherent to, yet emergent from, our humanity;
- cultivating learning in and through different domains of our existence (critical, relational, embodied and affective);
- pedagogies that challenge identarian thinking *and* dispositional habitus thereby strengthening meta-reflexivity;
- cultivating graduates who have significant relational (as well as academic) goods and are thus poised towards ethical and social response-ability; and
- the importance of meditative training and practice.

In the following, I stress that the outcomes of this research validate these concerns; offering indications for possible futures for CHE in practice as well as future research.

The need to consider ontology in enabling active agency

Doubtlessly, these are times of flux, anxiety and uncertainty. They are also times of tremendous human need and longing for other ways of being and learning. This reality is manifesting at all levels of our societies, and within individuals. Higher education is in crisis, characterised by an increasingly precarious employment oriented to the market and shaped by regulatory practices at all levels. Increased responsibility placed on the individual (academic and learner) results in struggles with response-ability[303]. Faculty are in survival mode, students are dismayed at dwindling contact time. A 21st century education must cultivate confidence in students, recognising that many of these will become educators themselves. This confidence must manifest in three ways: first, an ability-to-respond in the face of personal feelings of anxiety and overwhelm. Second, recognition and responsiveness to the presence and needs of others; and finally, response-ability to our warming planet. True education is a venture and training that builds capacity for greater humanity. Chapter Three highlighted how little insight contemporary scholarship and pedagogies offer into this process. Bhaskar's whole point was that this trepidation – regarding the nature of reality and what it means to be human – is demonstrated historically across disciplines, through philosophy and sociological theory. In Chapter Three, I stressed that recent calls for an ontological turn in HE need be taken seriously. Chapter Two argued that that only a stratified and emergent ontology rooted in human capacity can account for the full complexity and creativity of human persons and permit us an active agency. Here the work of critical realism, particularly Bhaskar and Archer, provided invaluable tools for philosophical underlabouring and theoretical application. Otherwise, from what other ground will adults of the future be able to respond to the immense challenges presenting, and the embodied and affective dispositions they engender?

Many scholars[304] do recognise that our ontology of being human includes the emergent capacities of compassion, cooperation, empathy and altruism. Without such recognition of our own humanity, no active agency is possible. Rooted in the ontology of human capacity and its sufficiency, CHE

[303] I refer the reader to Beausoleil (2017) in Chapter Six.

[304] Including (Bhaskar, 2002; Critchley, 2012; Loy, 2002, 2014; Smith, 2011) who are all referenced throughout this thesis.

offers an educational approach towards both finding common ground and confronting our predicaments.

Key finding: That CHE recognises a deeper ontology of being human to that of much of the Mindfulness movement. This ontology is revealed as one of human capacity and potential. Contemplative practice and pedagogies are aimed at drawing-out and cultivating a fuller range of human abilities, rather than correcting, 'fixing' or manipulating the self. Participant comments indicate that CHE in practice seeks to orient these human capacities via a strong and active agency towards 'projects' that recognise our inherent relationality, and are socially responsive.

Cultivating learning in all domains of being human

New epistemologies alone will not suffice in developing a social and ethical response-ability to the societal, political and environmental challenges that lay ahead. CHE offers an approach to HE that (potentially) cultivates learning in all domains; beyond the cognitive and discursive alone. Where not overly regulated, and with deeply trained educators, there is good evidence that it draws out the hidden curriculum of human complexity, vulnerability and creativity. Acknowledging and cultivating embodied, practical, affective and dispositional learning: all critical to our three-fold undeniable relationality (self, other, planet), this is not just about 'learning styles', our affinity for a particular way of processing learning in the discursive domain. Rather, as I showed in Chapters Five and Six, it is a different learning; learning that develops the felt-sense, the perceptual, the practical, emotional and relational. It involves considerable vulnerability, risk taking and curiosity on the part of both educator and student.

The fruits of such an education are the healing of our three-fold alienation (Bai, 2001; Bai et al., 2013), resulting in dispositional responsiveness to the shifting uncertain future that currently arises in confronting ways, each day. The presence and deep training of the educator, the meditative practices of CHE (that enable disruptive person subjective inquiry), and the learning environment all enable this learning. It is a 'rugged' learning environment involving, provocation and discomfort, alongside of care and playfulness. All genuine learning involves an arduous journey (Bhaskar, 2002) of receiving something new and making it our own. The strong learning 'container' provided

by experienced contemplative educators invites 'ways of being otherwise'. The safety of this learning environment helps facilitate a process of what Honneth (2008) calls 'recognition'. He defines this as an 'activity of self-care' where we are able to acknowledge and recognise our own 'desires and feelings' as 'worthy of being actively disclosed and articulated' (Honneth, 2008, pp. 71-72). Specific contemplative practices, rooted in centuries-old wisdom traditions, are the vehicle for this demanding first-person investigation and complement more traditional critical pedagogies. They also provide tools for second-person inquiry and communication. As students and educators both release 'responsibility' for maintaining habituated identarian thinking and hardened dispositions, 'they can become more response-able' (Beausoleil, 2017, p. 239).

Key finding: The creation of a strong and enabling learning environment is critical to CHE in practice. Following Brown (2009) and Williams (2012), all participants underscored the importance of retaining emphasis on the learning environment and the quality of engagement, provocation, and transformation that CHE enables. This is at odds with the current focus on teacher performance, management and individual learning. Maintaining the learning environment as a future field of inquiry and analysis in CHE will permit more nuanced exploration of specific contextual enablements and constraints. These include pedagogical practice, the training and skill of the educator, and the potency of meditative training and practices as experienced by students.

Response-ability: a dispositional and embodied ethics of care and regard

The notions of an ethical and social 'response-ability' within the context of this thesis could be defined as the continual practice of a dispositional and embodied ethics and care and regard for self, other *and* Other. It is a courageous praxis of 'care of the self' (Hattam & Baker, 2015; Honneth, 2008; Lobel, 2014). Such care is a strength, and needs to be recognised as such; likewise 'response-ability' (Mipham, 2013). Both reveal cultivation of inherent human capacities alien to the barbarism that so concerned Adorno (Adorno, 2010). Implicit in this is and the risk, uncertainty, and ardour involved: CHE is no 'woo woo'[305] pedagogical approach.

Within higher education scholarship, calls for a 'critical mindfulness grounded in the ethical

[305] A North American colloquialism, which may be translated as 'flaky', 'woolly' 'unfocussed' or 'new-agey'.

necessity of attending to our sub-discursive dispositions' have been evident for some time now (Zipin & Brennan, 2003). However, it is this year of 2018 replete with so many palpable ethico-political and social challenges that these are becoming more urgent and global in nature (see Beausoleil, 2017; Ramstedt, 2017; Tully, 2016). Most come from those outside of the sociology of education. For example social anthropologist Ramstedt (2017) proposes that global response-ability will only come about through fostering 'pluralism', which he defines as the ability to respect and value the notion of difference. Identifying this as an urgent ethical and pedagogical issue, he pleads for a holistic education that 'targets our subliminal dispositions and non-verbal means of communication equally' (2017, p. 11); an education of care.

Key finding: Scholar-practitioners have high degrees of awareness of the complex and layered nature of their social position and conditioning, as well as the broader contemporary structural (and cultural) factors. This was not evident from existing literature and is significant in the light of critique of the Mindfulness movement for its paucity of sociological reflexivity. Unpacking social conditioning is critical to CHE classrooms; the practice is to bring curiosity and an attitude of care to the discomfort, guilt and overwhelm. Findings also suggest that the potential for cultivating outward-looking ethico-social responsiveness (in themselves and students) motivates both meditative and pedagogical practice.

Shifting reflexivity?

Through Archer's seminal work on reflexivity, we understand that, as learners and educators, we not only reflexively engage with and thus think about our world in very different ways, but we also do this primarily via the relational goods we inherit from family and context. This suggests that any pedagogical approach must recognise, and use as part of deep inquiry, the background of the learner. While the dominant meta-reflexives already filter, evaluate and dedicate themselves to action using a wider frame of concern for social equity, an inclusion their own (frequently excoriating) self-critique can thwart their projects. I argue that CHE may have much to offer in connecting meta-reflexives with an ontology of human capacity rather than deficit, using meditative practice to provide subliminal experiential realisation of this; thereby allowing for a greater alignment between their altruistic values and their experiences of themselves as human beings. On

the face of it, this suggests that those meta-reflexives may then be able to focus their *Wertrationalität* in more potent and effectual ways. While there is no 'hard' evidence indicating at the potential of CHE in shifting personal dominant reflexive styles, anecdotal evidence from participants in this research project indicates that this does indeed occur within their classrooms for some students. Another area of research is how an experience of arresting 'difference' or 'alterity' (Wadham, 2002) may shift towards meta-reflexivity. This was noticeable in the lives of most participants as they recounted 'life-altering' experiences of the other – particularly in their adolescence. There is considerable potential for rich research as to how and where CHE may support experiences of 'difference' and provoke a more meta-reflexive orientation.

Key finding: All participants in this research project were meta-reflexives. In those with more decades of meditative practice, self-critique did not appear to manifest as effacement. Salient among this cohort was an ability to hold complexity without overwhelm, see opportunity in uncertainty, and articulate hopefulness while not denying desperate structural injustices. This suggests that length and depth of meditative training and practice is significant in supporting dispositions of care for self and interest in others.

The importance of meditative training and practice

CHE acknowledges and provokes educators and learners towards deeper levels of engagement with self, others, content and the learning process, than is possible through acquisition and interrogation of content knowledge. This appears to be most potent with well-trained educators who embody ontology of human capacity, and communicate this through inter-personal communication and embodied affective dispositions. Underpinning this is the critical value of deep meditative training and ongoing practice for educators of CHE.

Key finding: Contrary to the emphasis within Mindfulness as a corrective intervention that will re-balance the individual towards calmness and ameliorate annoying life realities[306], this research project finds that scholar-practitioners of CHE view the sitting practice of meditation as a disruptive and interruptive practice. Here, meditation provides a vehicle for experiencing, rather than

[306] Feeling down, not sleeping, anxiety, low grades, anti-social behaviour (in children), distraction, etc.

eschewing, the self – this includes all of the subliminal, non-verbal states of being human that we both supress and do not realise (still) exist. Pertinent to this is the fall-out from our Abrahamic-infused ontologies of deficit and lack: self-effacement, guilt, unworthiness, brokenness, and 'not enough' (Loy, 2002). Meditation disrupts our inherited and habituated tendencies that see us turning away from intrinsic relatedness with self, others and the planet. Participant comments and personal experience suggest that our ontological relationship with self can and does shift over time. This gives way to a view of being human that Bhaskar, Archer, Adorno and Trungpa all argue for 'a way of being otherwise' through relations of acknowledgement and care. Such ontological shifts make it possible for students (and educators) to no longer exercise adversarial, disciplinary or continually corrective relations with self and others. It is through the encouragement of this move and the enormity of the tasks we have ahead that Critchley (2012) finds both possibility and hope.

The diagram below depicts an emergent ontology of CHE grounded in the findings of this research project. This visual representation accentuates the emergent properties of CHE rather than offer a tick-box selection of discreet findings. Each layer is a necessary condition for the emergence of the next, which in turn is in no way reducible to the former strata. Rather, different kinds of reality are expressed. For example, the strengthened reflexivity and relationality along with an ethic of care are all personal emergent properties (PEPs), different in kind to the pedagogies and deep meditative practices that enabled them. Yet these different strata are in dialectical relationship with each other. Approaching the thorny issue of S-A in this thesis, a critical realist paradigm has been the most adequate in informing this work and its findings. It is hoped that this diagram will provide a point for further discussion, and research.



Figure 7.1 the emergent ontology of CHE

Limitations

Although valuable and necessary, this research project offers only a small pilot study. While many participants have been at the fore of the field, this study is not representative in any way. Key future lenses of analysis must include gender, socio-cultural background and context, and educators well trained and practices in secular mindfulness. Most challenging and necessary is to seek out those beyond North America. Small amounts of literature indicate CHE practices emerging in Europe and SE Asia (Ergas & Todd, 2016; Giorgino, 2015). This study concentrated on scholar-practitioners' meditative training and practice, understanding of their social contexts, their reflexive mediation between their ultimate concerns and structural enablements and constraints, and their ensuing dispositional stances. Due to limited scope, I did not delve into semiotic and psychoanalytical inquiry, yet I consider this both worthy and necessary. Tangentially

related to this is that Archer's work does not offer sufficient attention to the intra-psychic nature of inner conversations – particularly the construction of Other in relation to self and the potential for reification; accompanying Archer with Pamphilon only took me some of the way. Fortunately, my research participants offered insight into this without prompting. Their degree of clarity and articulation paved the way for easy analysis. A final limitation of this project is that, due to scope, all information regarding students in CHE courses and/or programmes is anecdotal.

Key difficulties associated with this pilot study included the absence of other scholar-practitioners of CHE in Australia. Additionally, major (CHE related) conferences are held in the September-November period in North America. The cost involved with attending these was, lamentably, prohibitive.

Implications, recommendations and future research trajectories

This study supports the argument for pedagogical responses to our current global context that enable students to not only develop critically reflective third-person academic inquiry, but also work at an intra-psychic and dispositional level (Beausoleil, 2017; Ramstedt, 2017; Seel, 2004). Here they develop the ability to take the obstacles of fear, overwhelm and anxiety as stepping stones in a learning journey. While all participants identified much student 'yearning' and 'longing' for this, the current tsunami of regulation, rationalisation and managerialism afflicting HEIs suggests that wide-scale change is unlikely. However, understanding that human agency arises within and in spite of significant structural impingements is a cause for hope for our current future.

The findings above do suggest that CHE holds significant potential as a pedagogical movement for our 21st century. Of critical importance is continued research and publication in the field.

Key issues to be addressed include:

The Methodological

Because CHE relies on a stratified ontology of being human, future research should be realist, including both intensive and extensive research design. Solely exploratory research will not produce understandings of what enables and constrains the depth, breadth and transformative

potential of contemplative education.

The Theoretical

Archer's (2003, 2007, 2012) work on the differing (dominant) reflexive styles holds particular relevance for educators and education policy makers alike. It is particularly relevant to the designing of curricula and pedagogical tools. Because CHE has as its focus the strengths and vulnerabilities of learners and educators, and because findings from this research project indicate its potential to shift reflexive styles, deeper inquiry and investigation using Archer could enable valuable discovery.

The field of CHE

First, more research into the effects and benefits of educators who have long-term training in deep meditative practice is needed; particularly in relation to their classroom practice and the personal, social, relational and academic outcomes for their students. Thus, follow-up studies with students and graduates are also needed. Ideally this would include graduates of both undergraduate and post-graduate degrees where CHE framed content, planning and pedagogy, and where educators were steeped in long-term meditative training (i.e. as different to a short course, or a year or two of secular mindfulness practice). Comparative studies are also needed to better understand what effect deep meditative training of educators has on student outcomes and post-tertiary activity (such as further study, employment, social activism and entrepreneurship).

A second area for future research relates to the types of learning environments enabled by thoroughly trained scholar-practitioners of CHE. This follows Brown (2009), who highlighted how within the neo-liberalised university, there is undue emphasis on individual performance and competency (teaching and learning) at the expense of understanding the enabling and constraining mechanisms within particular learning environments, and how these facilitate transformative learning for *all* students. Third, unsolicited anecdotal evidence from five fellow educators in my own university (different Colleges) suggest that levels of student anxiety and uncertainty are rising exponentially. Students are overwhelmed, and demonstrate an inability to engage with course content and/or complete course requirements. As HEIs in Australia making huge cuts to both

professional and non-casual academic staffing, increasing amounts of time are required to provide 'pastoral care' (Brabazon & Schulz, 2017). This research project has shown that CHE is a highly relational, capacities-based approach, which appears to strengthen and heal the self-self relationship, and cultivate meaningful community with peers. Further research is needed into understanding this from the student perspective: what self-enrichment and relational tools did they take forward into their post-university lives of relationships, community, work, family and social activism? Such research may hold gems of understanding that could benefit the lives, and save the future degrees, of many.

Finally, the recent increase in scholarship in CHE and the mindfulness movement speaking to issues of justice through the lens of race and racism has not been matched by that including gender and broader class analysis. It is an area of future research that may bear interesting fruit for other traditions, given the relatively high degrees of gender equality in the meditation communities of those I spoke with. The recent work of Bhattacharya and Gillen (2016) is a valuable reference although not CHE focussed[307].

My contribution to research

So little was known about CHE in practice – particularly the meditative training of scholar-practitioners, the social contexts of their practice and what enablements and constraints they encountered. Therefore, it has been difficult to ascertain whether CHE was worthy of further exploration and expansion. Would it remain merely a fringe approach driven by motivated individuals and/or small private universities such as Naropa University? Additionally, even if CHE were worthy of further exploration, would findings indicate overwhelming constraint by contemporary structural factors preventing further viability? This research has suggested that CHE holds considerable potential for cultivating and strengthening the skills, dispositions and relational capability needed for students and educators to have a responsive (rather than reactive, unwitting or impassive) stance towards the significant critical issues facing all of us. A key contribution this

[307] That said, Bhattacharya does mention the focal role of contemplative practice in pedagogy, and the necessary self-care supporting her activism.

thesis makes is through providing a sociological study which ventured beyond the range of contemplative practice used in classrooms. Through deep examination of structural mechanisms at play in the practice of CHE, this research revealed that participants found opportunity, and enacted an active and creative agency vis-à-vis these mechanisms. This agency was accompanied by a dispositional stance of subversion – not of adversarial politics, but one of skilful disruption and interruption of systems grounded in self-work.

> Using the language of Black Lives Matter – they talk about disrupting and interrupting. I think they have to be interrupted first in ourselves. If we don't really work with ourselves, we can easily just fall into an adversarial subversion trap. (Karen)

Through bringing together both CHE and Critical Realism, I have contributed to the small body of qualitative applied research, particularly in the field of HE and using Archer's internal conversation as theory and methodology. Her morphogenetic approach enabled understanding of the very different trajectories of the emergence of CHE and Mindfulness, and their distinct ontologies. Additionally, Danermark's explication of Bhaskar's DRREIC (description, resolution, retroduction, elimination, interpretation, (further) retroduction, and contextualisation) provided valuable guidelines for structuring the research process. As Danermark et al (2002, pp. 109-110) highlight, the separate stages of the model frequently intertwine and do not follow each other in 'strictly chronological order'. The identification of different stages supported the development of sets of critically reflexive questions which, along with Banfield's (2015) tripartite model, helped me move from the concrete to the abstract, and from the abstract back to the concrete (Danermark et al 2002, p109). As such, this project responded to the calls from a select few, including Fletcher (2017) and de Souza (2014), for more applied CR research. What this has enabled is making explicit the ontology and morphogenesis of contemplative higher education as distinct from that of the Mindfulness movement. They are different kinds of things. Using the retroductive move of 'what must the world be like for CHE to be so?' reveals that what undergirds CHE's first, second and third person inquiry, relational disruptive pedagogies, and 'curricula of the heart'[308] is a very similar

[308] Title of participant's post-graduate unit.

ontology to that reflected in both Bhaskar's critical realism and Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. That ontology is one which is stratified, emergent and rooted in a belief in inalienable human capacities and potentiality. All aim to bring us to our senses so that we may understand what it really means to be human.

A final and perhaps most important contribution this research makes concerns the role of meditation in shaping participants' pedagogical practice (and entire lives). In the spirit of not evading less palatable findings (Hasenkamp, 2017), the findings above highlight that deep meditative practice is a practice of disruption, vulnerability, discomfort and deconstruction. This may be surprising for many who undertake 'meditation' and mindfulness to feel calmer, sleep better, overcome depression and be nicer. It may be heartening for those who are concerned about issues of justice, equity and activism. And, it may pique the curiosity of those working from within critical theory and pedagogies. For example, educators seeking practices for disrupting and deconstructing identarian thinking, and its accompanying affective and embodied dispositions which render it a totalising practice which supresses difference (alterity). While very few will choose a path of long-term meditative training, this research has drawn attention to the significance that sustained training over many years has for pedagogical practice and the ensuing relational goods. It is these goods which Archer and Donati (2016) identify as critical to the survival of our human communities, and the planet we share.

What possibility for CHE?

> One of the things I've been passionate about is how, how can you be a 'clan' with people who are different from us? How can we cultivate a quality of deep embedded community? (Karen)

This thesis argues that CHE offers a relational learning environment, which nurtures human capacities across all domains and in the service of genuine learning. It orients educators and, by implication, their students, towards greater social and ethical response-ability and relies on an environment where both safety and disruption co-exist. A key aspect of CHE is cultivating the meta-reflexive awareness and embodied dispositions needed to meet our ever-conspicuous 21st century challenges. Students experience directly that as human beings they are replete with a wide

range of (emergent) capacities (Archer, 2000; Johnson, 2016; Smith, 2011). Not least of these is the capacity for agency, which emerges through the (natural) exercising of everyday reflexivity and is the vehicle through which we change our world – collectively. However, being born into cultures and contexts not of our own choosing, we come with heavy baggage in the form of habitual tendencies and behaviours; what Bourdieu would call 'habitus' (1990) and Honneth (2008) 'reifying tendencies'. The CHE classroom provides a high degree of safety through the skill and presence of the educator[309], and ontology of HE rooted in basic human decency. This environment supports students to suspend (and ultimately tame) defences and reactivity, and engage in learning as a dialectical process that exceeds the development of rational proficiencies alone (Ramstedt, 2017). Contemplative approaches rely upon subjective and intersubjective methods of inquiry which 'draw out' students' inherent wisdom and intelligence (Bhaskar, 2016; Grossenbacher & Parkin, 2006; Trungpa, 2005a). Meditation in particular becomes a vehicle for 'deconstruction' enabling students and educators alike to first see, then cut through or wear out habituated ways of Othering, denial and manipulation. Within CHE, meditation plays a strong role in cultivating what Adorno calls a 'consciousness of the spirit' or expansive thinking (Cho, 2009, p. 83), and an ethic of care (Orr, 2014). It is also a vehicle for considering and cultivating 'care of the self' (Foucault), thereby healing the self-self alienation. This becomes the ground of a dispositional stance of empathic engagement and care (Honneth 2006; Adorno 1971; Beausoleil 2017) towards the other. Overall, it is an arduous path of academic study, self-inquiry and strengthening relational goods as social goods. Students and educators alike encounter their own fragility and failure. Yet it is through such encounters that, as human beings, we begin to feel tenderness for others and 'cut them more slack'. Thus, education becomes a vehicle for healing alienation, re-building trust, and re-membering self – with self, with other. I argue that such relational goods enable a meta-reflexivity oriented towards social equity and action, yet free from debilitating self-criticism. The strength that is cultivated through this approach to learning forms the basis for the embodied social and ethical response-ability that our times require.

There is no guarantee, however, that CHE will move beyond its relatively 'fringe' position within HE

[309] Who has deep meditative training.

in North America and contribute to any of the above outcomes in a large scale or even a culturally replicable manner. Speaking to the Mindfulness movement, Ng (2014) cautions that there is a 'very real danger that the same appeal to [deeper] self-cultivation is being co-opted by capitalist agendas and that the ethico-political significance of contemplative practice remains open to contestations' (2015, p. 370). This is also the concern of the participants of this project. Yet, being meta-reflexives, they retain a strong sense of opportunity and even excitement amidst our 21st century complexities. It is appropriate that I assign these last words to Emily.

> In a way, the words 'contemplative education' don't mean anything. They're considered a tool for understanding something about education. And that is very important. With the kind of problems that we have on the Earth today and in the world, we actually need wisdom. It's that simple. That's actually the only thing that's going to help. So, if there is a kind of education that is going to lead to that, that's very helpful to me. That's why the conversation about contemplative education is important; it's the grounds to look at [*higher*] education. (Emily)

Autobiographical reflection

Perhaps where the researcher contributes the most is not by further furnishing the field of human knowledge, but through allowing the demand and discipline of the doctoral journey to transform and deepen our humanity. A key aspect of this has been coming to name and understand the place and importance of ontology in any kind of discipline, learning context and spiritual practice. Not just 'thinking being' (Bhaskar, 2002, p. 249), but feeling, being and touching being.

Yet, through this project I became even more aware of how pervasive the ontology and accompanying epistemologies of lack and deficit that characterise[310] the Abrahamic traditions are. They permeate so many structures and relations of 21st century (secular) life, and persist within my own life in all its dimensions. These narratives infuse and exercise themselves through emotional energies and commentary, embodied-affective dispositions, inner conversations and ensuring behaviours. What is brought into visibility is where I react, alienate and suppress or oppress self

[310] At least this has been true historically. I am aware of shifts within the Catholic tradition that I was brought up to shift this ontology of lack. Key contemporary scholars working in the areas include Matthew Fox, Cynthia Bourgeault and Richard Rohr.

and other. The sitting practice of meditation has, and continues to interrupt, disrupt and shift this. Yet the obdurate nature of (culturally-sanctioned) habituations suggests that (*inshallah*) I have many decades of practice ahead. For some time, I questioned (my)self about the fact that I was researching contemplative practice, but not bringing this practice into my research methodologically. Towards the end of this project I came to see that a longer-term meditation practice infuses and underpins all that one is doing each day. It also offers a haven of sanity in which one has the (often uncomfortable opportunity) to see and relate to what is stirring beneath the surface. Emily articulates this well:

> Though basic sitting meditation I see how much my experience is self-created, I see my opinions and I see my judgements and I see my projections and I see my attempts to manipulate reality to make it kind of fit my version of things. So, sitting practice brings me right back to just each moment of this is what's happening in the body, this is what's happening in the environment, this is what's happening in, on my inner awareness level – and everything else is just made-up, so to me it's the great reality check every day.

One perplexing aspect of this research was not being able to recognise until very recently the underlying narrative or key life question underpinning this entire research project. Recently I have come to understand the long-time thread of curiosity manifesting through my inner conversations since childhood to be the question: how do we create the relational goods needed for wide-scale social change through education? My hope is that this work contributes towards a deeper understanding of both what is possible and necessary in a 21st century education.

REFERENCES

Adorno, T. W. (1973). *Negative dialectics* (E. B. Ashton, Trans. Vol. 1). New York, London: Continuum Publishing Group.

Adorno, T. W. (2010, 2010). Education after Auschwitz. *Canadian International Youth Letter,* 10.

Adorno, T. W., & Horkheimer, M. (1979). *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (J. Cumming, Trans.). London: Verso.

Adsit, J., Doe, S., Allison, M., Maggio, P., & Maisto, M. (2016). Affective Activism: Answering Institutional Productions of Precarity in the Corporate University. *Feminist Formations, 27*(3), 21-48.

Ahmed, S. (2014). *Cultural politics of emotion*: Edinburgh University Press.

Alcoff, L. M., & Shomali, A. (2010). Adorno's Dialectical Realism. *Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale, 14*(2), 21.

Alkire, S. (2005). Why the capability approach? *Journal of human development, 6*(1), 115-135.

Amsler, S. (2008). Pedagogy against "dis-utopia": From conscientization to the education of desire. In H. F. Dhams (Ed.), *Current Perspectives in Social Thoery Volume 25: No Social Science without Critical Theory* (pp. 291-325). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Amsler, S., & Canaan, J. (2008). Whither critical education in the neoliberal university? Two practitioners' reflections on constraints and possibilities. *Enhancing Learning in the Social Sciences, 1*(2), 31.

Anderson, D. G. (2016a). *Contemplative Pedagogy as a Discipline of and for Instructional Faculty in the Neoliberalized University*. Thesis excerpt. Cultural Studies. George Mason University. Annandale, Virginia.

Anderson, D. G. (2016b). *What is Enlightenment? Mindfulness in the Moment of Stress.* (PhD PhD), George Mason University, Virginia, USA.

Andreotti, V. (2010). Postcolonial and post-critical 'global citizenship education'. In G. Elliott, C. Fourali, & S. Issler (Eds.), *Education and social change: Connecting local and global perspectives* (pp. 238-250). London: Continuum International Publishing Group.

Archer, M. S. (1995). *Realist social theory: The morphogenetic approach*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge university press.

Archer, M. S. (2000). *Being Human: The problem of agency*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Archer, M. S. (2002). Realism and the Problem of Agency. *Alethia, 5*(1), 11-20.

Archer, M. S. (2003). *Structure, agency and the internal conversation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Archer, M. S. (2004). Emotions as Commentaries on Human Concerns. In J. H. Turner (Ed.), *Theory and Research on Human Emotions* (Vol. 21, pp. 327-356). Amsterdam, Boston, MA: Elsevier Publishing Limited.

Archer, M. S. (2005). Structure, Culture and Agency. In M. Jacobs & N. W. Hanrahan (Eds.), *The Blackwell companion to the sociology of culture* (pp. 17-34). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing LTD.

Archer, M. S. (2007). *Making Our Way Through the World: Human reflexivity and social mobility*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Archer, M. S. (2012). *The Reflexive Imperative in Late Modernity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Archer, M. S. (2013). Reconceptualizing Socialization as Reflexive Engagement. In M. Archer & A. M. Maccarini (Eds.), *Engaging with the World: Agency, Institutions, Historical Formations* (pp. 103). Oxon, UK: Routledge.

Archer, M. S. (2014a). *Culture and Socialization In Late Modernity*. YouTube: Universidad de Navarra.

Archer, M. S. (2014b). 'We believe' – but who are we? The Relational Subject Vs. the Plural Subject [Vimeo Recording]. Department of Sociology, UNiveristy of Warwick UK: The Centre for Social Ontology.

Archer, M. S. (Ed.) (2014c). *Late Modernity: Trajectories towards morphogenic society* (Vol. II). Switzerland: Springer International Publishing Switzerland.

Archer, M. S., Bhaskar, R., Collier, A., Lawson, T., & Norrie, A. (1998). *Critical Realism: Essential readings*. London, UK: Routledge.

Aronowitz, S., & Giroux, H. (2003). *Education under siege: The conservative, liberal and radical debate over schooling*: Routledge.

Asher, G. (2015, 7-9 July 2015). *Working In, Against and Beyond the Neoliberal University.* Paper presented at the SCUTREA, Standing Conference on University Teaching and Research in the Education of Adults, University of Leeds.

Asrael, D., & Bialek, P. (2016). No Hidden Corners: Compassion Training in Counselor Education. In F. J. Kaklauskas, C. J. Clements, D. Hocoy, & L. Hoffman (Eds.), *Shadow & Light (Vol. 2: Talks & Reflections): Theory, Research, and Practice in Transpersonal Psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 26). Colorado Springs, CO: University Professors Press.

Astor-Aguilera, M. (2016). Indigenous cosmovision. In W. J. Jenkins, M. E. Tucker, & J. Grim (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Religion and Ecology* (pp. 158-167). Abingdon UK: Routledge.

Bach, D. J., & Alexander, J. (2015). Contemplative Approaches to Reading and Writing: Cultivating Choice, Connectedness, and Wholeheartedness in the Critical Humanities. *The Journal of Contemplative Inquiry, 2*(1), 20.

Bach, P., & Hayes, S. C. (2002). The use of acceptance and commitment therapy to prevent the rehospitalization of psychotic patients: a randomized controlled trial. *Journal of consulting and clinical psychology, 70*(5), 1129-1139.

Bache, C. M. (2011). The collective dynamics of contemplative practice. In J. Simmer-Brown & F. Grace (Eds.), *Meditation and the classroom: Contemplative pedagogy for religious studies* (pp. 187-194). Albany NY: SUNY Press.

Bai, H. (2001). Beyond the Educated Mind: Towards a pedagogy of mindfulness. In B. Hockings, J. Haskell, & W. Linds (Eds.), *Unfolding Bodymind: Exploring Possibilities Through Education, eds. (Brandon, VT: The Foundation for Educational Renewal), 86 - 99.* (pp. 86-99). Brandon, VT: Foundation for Educational Renewal.

Bai, H. (2012). Education for enlightenment In A. Cohen, M. Porath, A. Clarke, H. Bai, C. Leggo, & K. Meyer (Eds.), *In Speaking of Teaching: Inclinations, inspirations, and innerworkings* (pp. 63-82). Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers.

Bai, H., Cohen, A., & Scott, C. (2013). Re-visioning Higher Education: The Three-Fold Relationality Framework. In J. Lin, R. Oxford, & E. J. Brantmeier (Eds.), *Re-Envisioning Higher Education: Embodied Pathways to Wisdom and Social Transformation* (pp. pp.3-22). Charlotteville, NC: Information Age Publishing.

Bai, H., Eppert, C., Scott, C., Tait, S., & Nguyen, T. (2015). Towards Intercultural Philosophy of Education. *Studies in Philosophy and Education, 32*(6), 14.

Bai, H., Scott, C., & Donald, B. (2009). Contemplative Pedagogy and Revitalization of Teacher Education. *Alberta Journal of Educational Research, 55*(3), 319-334.

Ball, S. J. (2012). *Show me the money! Neoliberalism at work in education.* Paper presented at the Forum: for Promoting 3–19 Comprehensive Education.

Ball, S. J. (2015). Subjectivity as a site of struggle: refusing neoliberalism? *British Journal of Sociology of Education, 37*(8), 1129-1146.

Ball, S. J., & Olmedo, A. (2013). Care of the self, resistance and subjectivity under neoliberal governmentalities. *Critical Studies in Education, 54*(1), 85-96.

Bamber, M. D., & Schneider, J. K. (2016). Mindfulness-based meditation to decrease stress and anxiety in college students: A narrative synthesis of the research. *Educational Research Review, 18*, 1-32.

Banfield, G. (2004). What's Really Wrong with Ethnography? *International Education Journal, 4*(4), 53-63.

Banfield, G. (2009). Marxism, Critical Realism and Class: Implicaton sfor a socialist pedagogy. In D. Kelsh, D. Hill, & S. Macrine (Eds.), *Class in Education: Knowledge, Pedagogy, Subjectivity: Knowledge, Pedagogy, Subjectivity* (pp. 128-152). London and New York: Routledge.

Banfield, G. (2010). *Towards an emergentist Marxist sociology of education: addressing the problems of naturalism and structure-agency.* (PhD), University of South Australia, Adelaide.

Banfield, G. (2015a). *Critical Realism for Marxist Sociology of Education*: Routledge.

Banfield, G. (2015b). [Personal Communication "Critical Realism" 24 August].

Banfield, G. (2016). Marxism, Critical Realism, and Education. In M. A. Peters (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory* (pp. 5): Springer Internationa;.

Banfield, G. (2017). [Personal email communication "Vantage Point" October 30].

Barad, K. (2003). Posthumanist performativity: Toward an understanding of how matter comes to matter. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28*(3), 801-831.

Barad, K. (2007). *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Barbezat, D. P., & Bush, M. (2013). *Contemplative Practices in Higher Education: Powerful methods to transform teaching and learning*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass

Barnett, R. (2009). Knowing and becoming in the higher education curriculum. *Studies in Higher Education, 34*(4), 429-440.

Barnett, R. (2012). Learning for an unknown future. *Higher Education Research & Development, 31*(1), 65-77.

Barnett, R. (2017). Constructing the university: Towards a social philosophy of higher education. *Educational Philosophy and Theory, 49*(1), 1-11.

Baugher, J. E. (2014). Sociological mindfulness and leadership education. In K. Goldman Schuyler, J. Baugher, K. Jironet, & L. Lid-Falkman (Eds.), *Leading with spirit, presence, and authenticity* (pp. 12). San Francisco: Jossey Bass/Wiley.

Baugher, J. E., & Bach, D. J. (2015). Contemplative practices in higher education: powerful methods to transform teaching and learning. *International Journal for Academic Development, 20*(1), 105-108.

Bauman, Z. (1999). Postmodernity, or Living with Ambivalence. In A. Elliott (Ed.), *The Blackwell Reader in Contemporary Social Theory* (pp. 364-376). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Bauman, Z. (2007). *Liquid times*. Cambridge UK: Polity Press.

Bazzano, M. (2014). *After Mindfulness: New Perspectives on Psychology and Meditation*: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bazzul, J. (2012). Neoliberal ideology, global capitalism, and science education: Engaging the question of subjectivity. *Cultural Studies of Science Education, 7*(4), 1001-1020.

Beaton, G. R. (2010). Why Professionalism is Still Relevant In (pp. 21). Melbourne: Melbourne University Law School.

Beausoleil, E. (2017). Responsibility as Responsiveness Enacting a Dispositional Ethics of Encounter. *Political Theory, 45*(3), 28.

Beer, L. E. (2010). Contemplative administration: Transforming the workplace culture of higher education. *Innovative Higher Education, 35*(4), 217-231.

Beer, L. E., Rodriguez, K., Taylor, C., Martinez-Jones, N., Griffin, J., Smith, T. R., . . . Anaya, R. (2015). Awareness, integration and interconnectedness: Contemplative practices of higher education professionals. *Journal of Transformative Education, 13*(2), 161-185.

Benner, P. E. (1984). *From Novice to Expert: Excellence and power in clinical Nursing Practice*. Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.

Benton, T. (2001). A stratified ontology of selfhood. *Alethia, 4*(2), 36-38.

Berg, M., & Seeber, B. K. (2013). The Slow Professor: Challenging the Culture of Speed in the Academy. *Transformative Dialogues: Teaching & Learning Journal, 6*(3), 7.

Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1991). *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books.

Berila, B. (2014a). Contemplating the effects of oppression: Integrating mindfulness into diversity classrooms. *The Journal of Contemplative Inquiry, 1*(1), 14.

Berila, B. (2014b). Towards an Embodied Social Justice: Integrating Mindfulness Into Anti-Oppression Pedagogy. *Ethnic and Women's Studies Faculty Publications,* (1), 30. Retrieved from

Berila, B. (2015). *Integrating mindfulness into anti-oppression pedagogy: Social justice in higher education*. New York & London: Routledge.

Bettis, A. H., Coiro, M. J., England, J., Murphy, L. K., Zelkowitz, R. L., Dejardins, L., . . . Pardo, D. (2017). Comparison of two approaches to prevention of mental health problems in college students: enhancing coping and executive function skills. *Journal of American college health, 65*(5), 10.

Bexley, E., James, R., & Arkoudis, S. (2011). *The Australian academic profession in transition: Addressing the challenge of reconceptualising academic work and regenerating the academic workforce*. Retrieved from Canberra, Australia:

Bhabha, H. K., & Rutherford, J. (1990). The Third space: Interview with Homi Bhabha. In J. Rutherford (Ed.), *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference* (pp. 207-221). London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Bhaskar, R. (1986). *Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation*. London UK: Verso Press.

Bhaskar, R. (1989). *Reclaiming Reality: A critical introduction to contemporary philosophy*. London, UK: Verso.

Bhaskar, R. (1993). *Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom*. London, New York: Verso.

Bhaskar, R. (1998). *The Possibility of Naturalism: A philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences*. London, UK: Routledge.

Bhaskar, R. (2002). *From Science to Emancipation. Journeys Towards Meta-Reality. A Philosophy for the Present*. New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London: SAGE.

Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A Realist Theory of Science*. Abingdon Oxon: Routledge.

Bhaskar, R. (2013). Prolegomenon: The Consequences of the Revindication of Philosophical Ontology for Philosophy and Social Theory'. In M. S. Archer & A. M. Maccarini (Eds.), *Engaging with the World: Agency, Institutions, Historical Formations* (pp. 11). London, UK: Routledge.

Bhaskar, R. (Producer). (2014, 20 April 2015). Introduction to Critical Realism Part One: Transcendental Realism. *Introduction to Critical Realism*. [Live video session] Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ihg1XT7Lp60&list=PLUCltnYludf78F2MMQ9LkQBvPV04M6kcs&index=3

Bhaskar, R. (2016). *Enlightened Common Sense: The Philosophy of Critical Realism* (1st Edition ed.). London: Routledge.

Bhaskar, R., Esbjörn-Hargens, S., Hedlund, N., & Hartwig, M. (2015). *Metatheory for the twenty-first century: Critical realism and integral theory in dialogue*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Bhaskar, R., & Norrie, A. (1998). Introduction: Dialectic and dialectical critical realism. In M. Archer, R. Bhaskar, A. Colliers, T. Lawson, & A. Norrie (Eds.), *Critical realism: Essential readings* (Vol. 561, pp. 561-574). London New York: Routledge.

Bhattacharya, K., & Gillen, N. K. (2016). *Power, Race, and Higher Education: A Cross-cultural Parallel Narrative*: Springer.

Biesta, G. (2015a). Education, Measurement and the Professions: Reclaiming a space for democratic professionality in education. *Educational Philosophy and Theory, 49*(4), 16.

Biesta, G. (2015b). What is education for? On good education, teacher judgement, and educational professionalism. *European Journal of Education, 50*(1), 75-87.

Billot, J. (2010). The imagined and the real: Identifying the tensions for academic identity. *Higher Education Research & Development, 29*(6), 709-721.

Bjurström, E. (2012). Minding the contexts of mindfulness in quality management. *International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management, 29*(6), 699-713.

Blaikie, N. (2007). *Approaches to Social Enquiry: Advancing knowledge*. Cambridge UK: Polity.

Blaikie, N. (2010). *Designing Social Research: The Logic of Anticipation* (Second ed.). Cambridge UK: Polity Press.

Blasdel, A. (2017). 'A reckoning for our species': the philosopher prophet of the Anthropocene [Press release]. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/15/timothy-morton-anthropocene-philosopher

Bok, D. (2009). *Universities in the Marketplace: The commercialization of higher education* (2nd ed.). Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Bøllingtoft, A. (2007). A critical realist approach to quality in observation studies. In H. Neergaard & J. P. Ulhøi (Eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods in Entrepreneurship* (pp. 406-433). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Bourdieu, P. (1990). *The logic of practice*. Cambridge UK: Polity Press.

Bowl, M. (2017). *Adult Education in Neoliberal Times: Policies, Philosophies and Professionalism*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, Palgrave MacMillan.

Boyd, P., & Smith, C. (2016). The contemporary academic: Orientation towards research work and researcher identity of higher education lecturers in the health professions. *Studies in Higher Education, 41*(4), 678-695.

Boyte, H. C., & Finders, M. J. (2016). “A Liberation of Powers”: Agency and Education for Democracy. *Educational Theory, 66*(1-2), 127-145.

Bozalek, V. (2016). A Political Ethics of Care Perspective in Researching Emotions. In M. Zembylas & P. A. Schutz (Eds.), *Methodological Advances in Research on Emotion and Education* (pp. 191-202). Bern, Switzerland: Springer.

T. Brabazon (Producer). (2017, 29 September). *Higher education and creating critical futures* [Higher Education Podcast]. Retrieved from http://traffic.libsyn.com/tarabrabazon/Higher_education_and_creating_critical_futures.mp3.

Brady, M. (2014). Ethnographies of neoliberal governmentalities: From the neoliberal apparatus to neoliberalism and governmental assemblages. *Foucault Studies*(18), 11-33.

Brady, R. (2007). Learning to Stop, Stopping to Learn Discovering the Contemplative Dimension in Education. *Journal of Transformative Education, 5*(4), 372-394.

Braidotti, R. (2006). Posthuman, all too human: Towards a new process ontology. *Theory, culture & society, 23*(7-8), 197-208.

Brint, S. (2009). *The Academic Devolution? Movements to reform teaching and learning in US colleges and universities, 1985-2010*. Center for Studies in Higher Education: UCAL Berkeley USA.

Brint, S. (2015). Professional Responsibility in an Age of Experts and Large Organizations. In D. A. Mitchell & R. K. Ream (Eds.), *Professional Responsibility: The Fundamental Issue in Education and Health Care Reform* (pp. 89-107). Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London: Springer.

Brint, S., & Clotfelter, C. T. (2016). US Higher Education Effectiveness. *RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences, 2*(1), 2-37.

Brock, T., Carrigan, M., & Scambler, G. (2016). *Structure, Culture and Agency: Selected Papers of Margaret Archer*. Abingdon UK: Routledge.

Broderick, P. C., & Metz, S. (2009). Learning to BREATHE: A pilot trial of a mindfulness curriculum for adolescents. *Advances in school mental health promotion, 2*(1), 35-46.

Brookfield, S. (1996). Experiential Pedagogy: Grounding Teaching in Students' Learning. *Journal of Experiential Education, 19*(2), 62-68.

Broom, C. A., & Bai, H. (2011). Exploring Deweyian Experiential Learning Pedagogy as Citizenship Development. *Journal of Global Citizenship & Equity Education, 1*(1), pp. 44-59.

Brown, G. (2009). The ontological turn in education: the place of the learning environment. *Journal of Critical Realism, 8*(1), 5-34.

Brown, R. (2011). The Mindful Teacher as the Foundation of Contemplative Pedagogy. In J. Simmer-Brown & F. Grace (Eds.), *Meditation and the Classroom: Contemplative Pedagogy for Religious Studies. SUNY Series in Religious Studies*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Brown, R. (2014). *Inner to Outer: The Development of Contemplative Pedagogy*. forthcoming book chapter. Natural and Social Sciences. Naropa Univeristy. Boulder, CO. Retrieved from https://naropa.edu/academics/snss/ug/early-childhood-education-ba/faculty-and-staff/richard-brown-publications/development-of-contemplative-pedagogy.pdf

Brown, R., Simone, G., & Worley, L. (2016). Embodied Presence: Contemplative Teacher Education. In K. A. Schonert-Reichl & R. W. Roeser (Eds.), *Handbook of Mindfulness in Education: Integrating Theory and Research into Practice* (pp. 207-219). New York, NY: Springer.

Bush, M., Markus, S., & Fountain, S. (2012). *Contemplative Pedagogy: The Special Role of Teaching and Learning Centres*. Retrieved from New Orleans: http://www.tc.columbia.edu/spaNOLA/index.asp?Id=SPA+in+News&Info=Cultivating+the+Field+of+Contemplative+Teacher+Education

Butler, J. (2001). Giving an Account of Oneself. *diacritics, 31*(4 (Winter 2001)), 22-40.

Butler, J. (2005). *Giving an account of oneself*. New York, NY: Fordham Univerity Press.

Canaan, J., Amsler, S., Cowden, S., Motta, S., & Singh, G. (Eds.). (2010). *Why critical pedagogy and popular education matter today*. University of Lincoln, Birmingham: Higher Education Academy: Centre for Sociology, Anthropology & Politics.

Canaan, J., & Shumar, W. (2008). Higher Education in the Era of Globalization and Neoliberalization. In J. Canaan & W. Shumar (Eds.), *Structure and Agency in the Neoliberal University* (pp. 306). New York and London: Routledge.

Canby, N. K., Cameron, I. M., Calhoun, A. T., & Buchanan, G. M. (2015). A brief mindfulness intervention for healthy college students and its effects on psychological distress, self-control, meta-mood, and subjective vitality. *Mindfulness, 6*(5), 1071-1081.

Cannon, J. (2016). Education as the Practice of Freedom: A Social Justice Proposal for Mindfulness Educators. In R. E. Purser, D. Forbes, & A. Burke (Eds.), *Handbook of Mindfulness: Culture, Context, and Social Engagement* (pp. 397-409). Bern, Switzerland: Springer.

Carrette, J. R., & King, R. (2005). *Selling Spirituality: The silent take-over of religion*. Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge.

Case, J. M. (2015). A social realist perspective on student learning in higher education: The morphogenesis of agency. *Higher Education Research & Development, 34*(5), 841-852.

Chapman, S. G. (2012). *The Five Keys to Mindful Communication: Using Deep Listening and Mindful Speech to Strengthen Relationships, Heal Confli cts, and Accomplish Your Goals*. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications.

Cho, K. D. (2009). Adorno on education or, Can critical self-reflection prevent the next Auschwitz? *Historical Materialism, 17*(1), 74-97.

Clegg, S. (2005). Theorising the mundane: The significance of agency. *International studies in sociology of education, 15*(2), 149-164.

Clegg, S. (2006). The problem of agency in feminism: A critical realist approach. *Gender and education, 18*(3), 309-324.

Clegg, S. (2008). Academic identities under threat? *British Educational research journal, 34*(3), 329-345.

Clegg, S. (2010). Time future-the dominant discourse of higher education. *Time & Society, 19*(3), 345-364.

Clegg, S. (2013). The Space of Academia: Privilege, Agency and the Erasure of Affect. In C. Maxwell & P. Aggleton (Eds.), *Privilege, agency and affect: Understanding the production and effects of action* (pp. 71-87). Hamshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Clegg, S. (2016). Agency and Ontology within Intersectional Analysis: A Critical Realist Contribution. *Journal of Critical Realism, 15*(5), 494-510.

Clegg, S., & Stevenson, J. (2013). The interview reconsidered: Context, genre, reflexivity and interpretation in sociological approaches to interviews in higher education research. *Higher Education Research & Development, 32*(1), 5-16.

Coburn, T., Grace, F., Klein, A. C., Komjathy, L., Roth, H., & Simmer-Brown, J. (2011). Contemplative Pedagogy: Frequently Asked Questions. *Teaching Theology & Religion, 14*(2), 167-174.

Collier, A. (1994). *Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy* (Vol. 69): Verso.

Connell, R. (2004). Encounters with structure. *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 17*(1), 10-27.

Connell, R. (2007). *Southern theory: The global dynamics of knowledge in social science*. Crows Nest, NSW

Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Connell, R. (2013a). The neoliberal cascade and education: An essay on the market agenda and its consequences. *Critical Studies in Education, 54*(2), 99-112.

Connell, R. (2013b). Why do market ‘reforms’ persistently increase inequality? *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 34*(2), 279-285.

Connell, R., & Dados, N. (2014). Where in the world does neoliberalism come from? *Theory and Society, 43*(2), 117-138.

Connell, R., Fawcett, B., Meagher, G., Connell, R., Fawcett, B., & Meagher, G. (2009). Neoliberalism, new public management and the human service professions: Introduction to the

special issue. *Journal of Sociology, 45*(4), 331-338.

Connell, R. W. (1995). *Masculinities*. St. Leonards NSW: Allen & Unwin.

Connors, B. (2015). *A study of structure and agency interactions in the changing context of English higher education: What is happening to pedagogy and what are we doing about it?* (Doctor of Philosophy), UCL Institute of Education, London UK.

Cranton, P. (2006). *Understanding and Promoting Transformative Learning: A guide to theory and Practice* (Second ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Critchley, S. (2012). *Impossible Objects* (C. Cederstron & T. Kesselman Eds.). Cambridge UK: Polity Press.

Cruickshank, J. (2000). *Anti-foundationalism and Social Ontology: towards a realist sociology.* (Doctor of Philosophy PhD), University of Warwick, unpublished. Retrieved from http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/4494

Cuthill, M. (2012). A “civic mission” for the university: engaged scholarship and community-based participatory research. In *Higher Education and Civic Engagement* (pp. 81-99): Springer.

Dall’Alba, G. (2009). Learning professional ways of being: Ambiguities of becoming. *Educational Philosophy and Theory, 41*(1), 34-45.

Dall’Alba, G., & Barnacle, R. (2007). An ontological turn for higher education. *Studies in Higher Education, 32*(6), 679-691.

Danermark, B., Ekström, M., Kakobsen, L., & Karlsson, J. C. (2002). *Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences*. London UK: Routledge.

Danitz, S. B., & Orsillo, S. M. (2014). The mindful way through the semester: An investigation of the effectiveness of an acceptance-based behavioral therapy program on psychological wellness in first-year students. *Behavior modification, 38*(4), 549-566.

Davidson, R., Dunne, J., Eccles, J. S., Engle, A., Greenberg, M., Jennings, P., . . . Meyer, D. (2012). Contemplative practices and mental training: Prospects for American education. *Child Development Perspectives, 6*(2), 146-153.

Davidson, R. J., & Harrington, A. (2002). *Visions of Compassion: Western Scientists and Tibetan Buddhists Examine Human Nature*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Davidson, R. J., & Kaszniak, A. W. (2015). Conceptual and ethodological issues in research on mindfulness and meditation. *American Psychologist, 70*(7), 581.

Davies, B. (2005). The (im) possibility of intellectual work in neoliberal regimes. *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 26*(1), 1-14.

Daza, S. (2013). Putting Spivakian theorizing to work: Decolonizing neoliberal scientism in education. *Educational Theory, 63*(6), 601-620.

Daza, S., Subreenduth, S., Rhee, J.-E., & Proctor, M. (2015). FUNDING RE/DE/FORM IN HIGHER EDUCATION. In K. M. Sturges (Ed.), *Neoliberalizing Educational Reform:America’s Quest for Profitable Market-Colonies and the Undoing of Public Good* (pp. 149-182): Springer.

Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1988). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia. In J. Rivkin & M. Ryan (Eds.), *Literary Theory: An Anthology* (Second ed., pp. 378-388). Maiden MA, Oxford UK, Carlton, Australia: Blackwell Publishing.

Dennis, C. A. (2016). Further education colleges and leadership: Checking the ethical pulse. *London Review of Education, 14*(1), 116-130.

Dewey, J., & Dewey, E. (1915). *Schools of Tomorrow*. New York: E.P. Dent.

Dimidjian, S., & Linehan, M. M. (2003). Defining an agenda for future research on the clinical application of mindfulness practice. *Clinical psychology: Science and practice, 10*(2), 166-171.

Dirkx, J. M., Mezirow, J., & Cranton, P. (2006). Musings and Reflections on the Meaning, Context, and Process of Transformative Learning A Dialogue Between John M. Dirkx and Jack Mezirow. *Journal of Transformative Education, 4*(2), 123-139.

Donati, P., & Archer, M. (2015). *The Relational Subject*: Cambridge University Press.

Doogue, G., & Wheelahan, L. (2017). Traiing Courses for the Future. *Saturday Extra*. Sydney NSW: ABC.

Douglas, D. (2014). From Rebuilding to Reimagining: A Critical Reconsideration of An Education Declaration. *Situations: Project of the Radical Imagination, 5*(2).

Drew, L. (2014). Embodied learning processes in activism. *The Canadian Journal for the Study of Adult Education (Online), 27*(1), 83.

Drougge, P. (2016). Notes Toward a Coming Backlash: Mindfulness as an Opiate of the Middle Class. In R. Purser, E., D. Forbes, & A. Burke (Eds.), *Handbook of Mindfulness: Culture, Context, and Social Engagement* (pp. 167-179). Bern Switzerland: Springer.

Eaton, M., Davies, K., Williams, S., & MacGregor, J. (2011). Why sustainability education needs pedagogies of reflection and contemplation. *Unpublished Manuscript*.

Elder-Vass, D. (2010). *The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, structure and agency*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Elder-Vass, D. (2012). Towards a realist social constructionism. *Sociologia, problemas e práticas*(70), 5-24.

Elias, A., Harley, R., & Tsoutas, N. (2015). *Camouflage Cultures: Beyond the Art of Disappearance*. Sydney: Sydney University Press NSW.

England, K. (1994). Getting personal: Reflexivity, positionality, and feminist research∗. *The Professional Geographer, 46*(1), 80-89.

Eppert, C. (2011). *Empty chair, empty boat.* Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, Urbana, Illinois.

Eppert, C., Vokey, D., Nguyen, T. T. A., & Bai, H. (2015). Intercultural Philosophy and the Nondual Wisdom of 'Basic Goodness': Implications for Contemplative and Transformative Education. *Journal of Philosophy of Education, 49*(2), 274-293.

Eppert, C., & Wang, H. (2008). *Cross-cultural Studies in Curriculum: Eastern Thought, Educational Insights*. Univeristy of Michigan: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Routledge.

Ergas, O. (2013a). Descartes in a'Headstand': Introducing'Body-Oriented Pedagogy'. *Paideusis, 21*(1), 4-12.

Ergas, O. (2013b). Why Meditate? An excursion towards a possible life-pedagogy. In J. Arthur & T. Lovatt (Eds.), *The Routledge International Handbook of Education, Religion and Values* (pp. 135-145). Abingdon, Oxon & New York, NY: Routledge.

Ergas, O. (2014). Mindfulness in education at the intersection of science, religion, and healing. *Critical Studies in Education, 55*(1), 58-72.

Ergas, O. (2015). The post-secular rhetoric of contemplative practice in the curriculum. In P. W. a. Y. Hotam (Ed.), *New social foundations for education: Education in post-secular society* (pp. 107-130). New York: Peter Lang.

Ergas, O., & Todd, S. (2016). *Philosophy East/Weest: Exploring Intersections between Educational and Contemplative practices*. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.

Evetts, J. (2003). The sociological analysis of professionalism occupational change in the modern world. *International sociology, 18*(2), 395-415.

Fairclough, N., Jessop, B., & Sayer, A. (2004). Critical realism and semiosis. In J. M. Roberts & J. Joseph (Eds.), *Realism, discourse and deconstruction* (pp. 23-42). London, UK: Routledge.

Fanon, F. (1967). *Black skin, white masks: The experiences of a black man in a white world*. Greenwich Village, New York: Grove Press.

Farb, N. A. (2014). From Retreat Center to Clinic to Boardroom? Perils and Promises of the Modern Mindfulness Movement. *Religions, 5*(4), 1062-1086.

Farrugia, D., & Woodman, D. (2015). Ultimate concerns in late modernity: Archer, Bourdieu and reflexivity. *The British journal of sociology, 66*(4), 626-644.

Ferrando, F. (2013). Posthumanism, transhumanism, antihumanism, metahumanism, and new materialisms. *Existenz, 8*(2), 26-32.

Fitzgerald, T. (2014). *Advancing Knowledge in Higher Education: Universities in Turbulent Times: Universities in Turbulent Times*. Hershey, PA, USA: Information Science Reference, IGI Global.

Fletcher, A. J. (2017). Applying critical realism in qualitative research: methodology meets method. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 20*(2), 181-194.

Fonow, M., & Cook, J. A. (2005). Feminist methodology: New applications in the academy and public policy. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 30*(4), 2211-2236.

Fopp, R. (2008). *From weak Social Constructionism to Critical Realism in Housing Theory: Eploring issues*. Paper presented at the Australasian Housing Researchers Conference, Melbourne

Forbes, D. (2016). Modes of mindfulness: prophetic critique and integral emergence. *Mindfulness, 7*(6), 1256-1270.

Foucault, M. (1986). *The Care of the Self: Vol. 3 of The History of Sexuality* (R. Hurley, Trans.). New York: Oantheon Books.

Freire, P. (1972). Education: domestication or liberation? *Prospects, 2*(2), 173-181.

Freire, P. (1985). *The politics of education: Culture, power, and liberation* (D. Macedo, Trans.). South Hadley, Mass. USA: Bergin & Garvey.

Freire, P. (2000). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (30th Edition ed.). New York: Continuum.

Gaventa, J., & Cornwall, A. (2008). Power and knowledge. In P. Reason & H. Bradbury (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of action research: Participative inquiry and practice* (2nd ed., pp. 172-189). London, UK: SAGE.

Giddens, A. (1989). *Sociology* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and Self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age*. California, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Gidley, J. M. (2012). Re-imagining the role and Function of Higher Education for Alternative Futures Through Embracing Global Knowledge Futures. In A. Curaj, P. Scott, L. Vlasceanu, & L. Wilson (Eds.), *European Higher Education at the Crossroads: Between the Bologna Process and National Reforms* (pp. 1019-1037). Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer.

Gill, R., & Donaghue, N. (2016). Resilience, apps and reluctant individualism: Technologies of self in the neoliberal academy. *Women's Studies International Forum, 54*(January-February 2016), 91-99.

Gill, S., & Niens, U. (2014). Education as humanisation: a theoretical review on the role of dialogic pedagogy in peacebuilding education. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 44*(1), 10-31.

Gilligan, C. (1982). *In a Different Voice*. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gillman, L. (2016). Critical Realist and Postpositivist Realist Feminisms: Towards a Feminist Dialectical Realism. *Journal of Critical Realism, 15*(5), 458-475.

Giorgino, V. M. B. (2015). Contemplative Methods Meet Social Sciences: Back to Human Experience as It Is. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 45*(4), 461-483.

Giroux, H. (2010). Bare pedagogy and the scourge of neoliberalism: Rethinking higher education as a democratic public sphere. *The Educational Forum, 74*(3), 184-196.

Giroux, H. (2011). Beyond the limits of neoliberal higher education: global youth resistance and the American/British divide. In *Campaign for the Public Univeristy* (pp. Online refereed academic). UK.

Giroux, H. (2014). Defending Higher Education in the Age of Neoliberal Savagery. *Discover Society*, 4. Retrieved from Discover Society website: http://discoversociety.org/2014/03/04/defending-higher-education-in-the-age-of-neoliberal-savagery/

Glanville, G., Iwashima, R., & Becker, B. A. (2014). Introducing Contemplative Pedagogy to the Classroom: Implementation, Experience and Effects on Concentration.

Gorski, P. S. (2013). What is critical realism? And why should you care? *Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews, 42*(5), 658-670.

Grace, F. (2009). Breathing In: Suffering Breathing Out: Compassion. *Spirituality in Higher Education, 5*(2).

Grace, F. (2011). Learning as a path, not a goal: Contemplative pedagogy–its principles and practices. *Teaching Theology & Religion, 14*(2), 99-124.

Grenfell, M. (2014). *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts* (2nd ed.). Stocksfield, UK: Acumen Publishing.

Groff, R. (2008). *Situating critical realism philosophically*. Paper presented at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting,, Philadelphia Pennsylvania.

Grossenbacher, P. G., & Parkin, S. S. (2006). Joining hearts and minds: A contemplative approach to holistic education in psychology. *Journal of College and Character, 7*(6).

Grossman, P. (2008). On measuring mindfulness in psychosomatic and psychological research.

Journal of psychosomatic research, 64(4), 405-408.

Grossman, P., & Van Dam, N. T. (2011). Mindfulness, by any other name…: trials and tribulations of sati in western psychology and science. *Contemporary Buddhism, 12*(01), 219-239.

Gunnarsson, L. (2011). Love-Exploitable Resource or 'No-Lose Situation'? Reconciling Jónasdóttir's Feminist View with Bhaskar's Philosophy of MetaReality. *Journal of Critical Realism, 10*(4), 419-441.

Gunnarsson, L. (2013). *On the Ontology of Love, Sexuality and Power: Towards a Feminist-Realist Depth Approach.* (PhD), Örebro University, Sweden, Retrieved from http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A605040&dswid=1068

Gunnarsson, L. (2017). Why we keep separating the 'inseparable': Dialecticizing intersectionality. *European Journal of Women's Studies, 24*(2), 114-127.

Gunnarsson, L., Martinez Dy, A., & van Ingen, M. (2016). Critical Realism, Gender and Feminism: Exchanges, Challenges, Synergies. *Journal of Critical Realism, 15*(5), 15.

Gunnlaugson, O., Sarath, E. W., Scott, C., & Bai, H. (Eds.). (2014). *Contemplative learning and inquiry across disciplines*. New York, USA: Albany State University of New York Press.

Habermas, J. (2002). *Religion and Rationality: Essays on reason, God and modernity*. Cambridge UK: Polity Press.

Habermas, J. (2008). Notes on a post-secular society. Retrieved from signandsight.com: Lets talk European website: http://www.signandsight.com/features/1714.html

Hacking, I. (1986). Making up people. In T. C. Heller, M. Sosna, & D. E. Welberry (Eds.), *Reconstructing INdividualism:Autonomy, Individuality and the Self in Western Thought* (pp. 161-172). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Hacking, I. (1992). World-making by kind-making: child abuse for example. In M. Douglas & M. Hull (Eds.), *How classification works: Nelson Goodman among the social sciences* (pp. 180-238). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Hacking, I. (1998). *Rewriting the soul: Multiple personality and the sciences of memory*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hall, S., & Du Gay, P. (Eds.). (1996). *Questions of Cultural Identity*. London: SAGE Publications.

Haraway, D. (1988). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. *Feminist studies, 14*(3), 575-599.

Harding, S. (1991). *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women's Lives*. Ithaca, United States Cornell University Press.

Harper, V. (2014). Henry A. Giroux: Neoliberalism, democracy and the university as a public sphere. *Interview. Truthout, April, 22*.

Harris, R. (2009). Mindfulness Without Meditation. *Healthcare Counselling and Psychotherapy Journal, 9*(4), 21-24.

Harris, S. (2005). Rethinking academic identities in neo-liberal times. *Teaching in higher education, 10*(4), 421-433.

Hart, T. (2004). Opening the contemplative mind in the classroom. *Journal of Transformative Education, 2*(1), 28-46.

Hartsock, N. C. (1983). The feminist standpoint: Developing the ground for a specifically feminist historical materialism. In *Discovering reality* (pp. 283-310): Springer.

Hartwig, M. (2001). New left, new age, new paradigm? Roy Bhaskar's from East to West. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 31*(2), 139-165.

Hartwig, M. (2015). From the anatomy of the global crisis to the ontology of human flourishing. *Journal of Critical Realism, 14*(3), 227-237.

Harvey, D. (2007). *A brief history of neoliberalism*: Oxford University Press, USA.

Harvey, P. (2013). *An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices* (Second ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hasenkamp, W. (2017). Promoting Openness and Transparency in the Contemplative Sciences [Bolg post]. Retrieved from https://www.mindandlife.org/promoting-openness-transparency-contemplative-sciences/

Hattam, R. (2004a). *Awakening-struggle: Towards a Buddhist critical social theory*: Post Pressed Flaxton, QLD.

Hattam, R. (2004b). *Awakening-struggle: Towards a Buddhist critical social theory.* Post Pressed Queensland,

Hattam, R., & Baker, B. (2015). Technologies of Self and the Cultivation of Virtues. *Journal of Philosophy of Education, 49*(2), 255-273.

Hawke, G. (Ed.) (2017). *The Roder of Natural Necessity: Roy Bhaskar - A kind of Introduction to Critical realism*. London UK: CreateSpace Independent Publishing.

Haynes, T. L., Perry, R. P., Stupnisky, R. H., & Daniels, L. M. (2009). A review of attributional retraining treatments: Fostering engagement and persistence in vulnerable college students. In *Higher education: Handbook of theory and research* (pp. 227-272): Springer.

Hazelkorn, E. (2015). Globalization and the reputation race. In *Rankings and the Reshaping of Higher Education* (pp. 1-25): Springer.

Healey, K. (2013). Searching for integrity: The politics of mindfulness in the digital age. *Nomos Journal*.

Hekman, S. (1990). *Gender and knowledge: Elements of a postmodern feminism*: POlity Press.

Hekman, S. (2007). Feminist methodology. *The SAGE handbook of social science methodology*, 534-546.

Hekman, S. (2014). *The Feminine Subject*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Hikins, J., & Cherwitz, R. (2011). On the Ontological and Epistemological Dimensions of Expertise: Why “Reality” and “Truth” Matter and How We Might Find Them. *Social Epistemology, 25*(3), 291-308.

Holba, A. (2014). Wisdom Traditions and the Inner Landscape: Becoming More Human through Contemplative Practice. 49: 9-29. *Listening: Journal of Communication Ethics, Religion, and Culture, 49*(9), 20.

Honneth, A. (2008). *Reification: A new look at an old idea*. USA: Oxford University Press Inc.

hooks, b. (1994). *Teaching to Transgress. Education as the Practice of Freedom*. New York, NY:

Routledge.

Horrocks, I. (2009). Applying the morphogenetic approach: Outcomes and issues from a case study of information systems development and organisational change in British local government. *Journal of Critical Realism, 8*(1), 35-62.

Hotam, Y., & Wexler, P. (2014). Education in post-secular society. *Critical Studies in Education, 55*(1), 1-7.

Houtman, D., Aupers, S., & De Koster, W. (2011). *Paradoxes of individualization: Social control and social conflict in contemporary modernity*. Surrey, Franham: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

Howard, I., & Olubas, B. (2015). 10 Making visible, changing sides: the contradictory use of camouflage by artists Xing Junqin and Ian Howard. In A. Elias, R. Harley, & N. Tsoutas (Eds.), (pp. 127-146). Sydney Australia: Sydney Univeristy Press

Hyatt, S. B., Shear, B., & Wright, S. (2015). *Learning under neoliberalism: Ethnographies of governance in higher education* (Vol. 1). Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Hyland, T. (2015). Mindful Nation UK–Report by the Mindfulness All-Party Parliamentary Group (MAPPG). *Journal of Vocational Education & Training, 68*(1), 8.

Hyland, T. (2016). Mindful nation UK–report by the mindfulness all-party parliamentary group (MAPPG). In: Taylor & Francis.

Hytten, K. (2006). Philosophy and the Art of Teaching for Social Justice. *Philosophy of Education Archive*, 441-449.

Hytten, K. (2013). Philosophy and the art of teaching for social justice. *Philosophy of Education: Introductory Readings, 4e*, 170.

Hytten, K., & Bettez, S. C. (2011). Understanding education for social justice. *The Journal of Educational Foundations, 25*(1/2), 7.

Jacobs, C. (2015). Contemplative spaces in social work practice. *Journal of pain and symptom management, 49*(1), 150-154.

Jennings, P. A., & Greenberg, M. T. (2009). The Prosocial Classroom: Teacher social and emotional competence in relation to student and classroom outcomes. *Review of educational research, 79*(1), 491-525.

Johnson, A. (2016). Spirituality and Contemplative Education. In *Spirituality across Disciplines: Research and Practice:* (pp. 107-121): Springer.

Kabat-Zinn, J. (2003). Mindfulness-based interventions in context: past, present, and future. *Clinical psychology: Science and practice, 10*(2), 144-156.

Kahane, D. (2009). Learning about obligation, compassion, and global justice: The place of contemplative pedagogy. *New Directions for Teaching and Learning, 2009*(118), 49-60.

Kahane, D. (2011). Mindfulness and presence in teaching and learning. In I. Hay (Ed.), *Inspiring academics: Learning with the world's great university teachers* (pp. 17-22). Maidenhead, Berkshire, UK: McGraw Hill, Open Univeristy Press.

Kahn, P. (2009). Contexts for teaching and the exercise of agency in early-career academics: perspectives from realist social theory. *International Journal for Academic Development, 14*(3), 197-207.

Kakoliris, G. (2015). Jacques Derrida on the ethics of hospitality. In E. Imafidon (Ed.), *The Ethics of Subjectivity: Perspectives since the Dawn of Modernity* (pp. 144-156). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kamenetz, A. (2010). *DIY U: Edupunks, edupreneurs, and the coming transformation of higher education*. Wite River Junction: Chelsea Green Publishing.

Karr, A. (2007). *Contemplating Reality: A practitioner's guide to the view in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism*. Boston MA: Shambhala Publications.

Kaszniak, A. W. (2014). Contemplative pedagogy. In O. Gunnlaugson, E. W. Sarath, C. Scott, & H. Bai (Eds.), *Contemplative Learning and Inquiry across Disciplines*. New York: State University of New York Press.

Kellner, D. (2003). Toward a Critical Theory of Education*. *Democracy & Nature, 9*(1), 51-64.

Kirp, D. L. (2003). Education for profit. *Public interest*(152), 100.

Kolb, D. A. (1984). *Experiential learning: Experience as the source of learning and development*: FT Press.

Komanee, S., Hoxsuwan, S., & Phusee-on, S. (2013). The Contemplative Education Learning Environment Management Model for Undergraduate Students. *Journal of Global Business Management, 9*(3).

Komjathy, L. (2011). Field Notes from a Daoist PRofessor. In J. Simmer-Brown & F. Grace (Eds.), *Meditation and the classroom: Contemplative pedagogy for religious studies* (pp. 95-103). Albany NY: SUNY Press.

Kumar, R. (2012). Neoliberal education and imagining strategies of resistance: An introduction. In *Education and the Reproduction of Capital* (pp. 1-13). New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kumashiro, K. K. (2015). *Against Common Sense: Teaching and learning toward social justice* (3rd ed.). New York, London: Routledge.

Kyle, E. (2010). *Being Mindful of Mindlessness: An Overview of Contemplative Education Programs for Secular Settings.* Paper presented at the Paper from the Religious Education Association (REA) Annual Meeting (Denver, CO.

Kymlicka, W. (1989). Liberal individualism and liberal neutrality. *Ethics, 99*(4), 883-905.

Langer, E. J. (1989). *Mindfulness*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.

Langer, E. J. (2000). Mindful learning. *Current directions in psychological science, 9*(6), 220-223.

Leary, M. R. (2004). *The Curse of the Self: Self-Awareness, Egotism, and the Quality of Human Life*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lee, M. T. (2015). North Central Sociological Association presidential address. The mindful society: Contemplative sociology, meta-mindfulness, and human flourishing. *Sociological Focus, 48*(4), 271-299.

Lipari, L. (2014). Rotten with Perfection: Reflections on Contemplative Pedagogy in a Neoliberal Age. *Listening: Journal of Communication Ethics, Religion, and Culture, Winter 2014*, 17.

Lobel, A. (2014). Practicing Society: Practices of Self, Society, and Time on the Way to Personal and Societal Transformation. *The Arrow: A Journal of Wakeful Society, Culture, and Politics, 1*(1), 1-45.

Loizzo, J. (2014). Meditation research, past, present, and future: perspectives from the Nalanda contemplative science tradition. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1307*(1), 43-54.

Lorenz, C. (2012). If you're so smart, why are you under surveillance? Universities, neoliberalism, and new public management. *Critical inquiry, 38*(3), 599-629.

Loy, D. (2003). *The great awakening: A Buddhist social theory*. Boston MA: Wisdom Publishers.

Loy, D. R. (2002). *A Buddhist History of the West: Studies in Lack*. Albany, NY: State University of New York.

Loy, D. R. (2014). Why Buddhism and the Modern World Need Each Other: A Buddhist Perspective. *Buddhist-Christian Studies, 34*(1), 39-50.

Mackler, J., Aguilar, A. P., & Serena, K. C. (2008). What is contemplative education and what are some ways to introduce it into higher education in Mexico? *Memorias Del Iv Foro Nacional De Estudios En Lenguas*, 261-279.

Magee, R. V. (2013). Contemplative practices and the renewal of legal education. *New Directions for Teaching and Learning, 2013*(134), 31-40.

Magee, R. V. (2015). The Way of ColorInsight: Understanding Race and Law Effectively Through Mindfulness-Based ColorInsight Practices. *Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2015-19, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638511*, 50.

Magee, R. V. (2017). One Field, Different Doors In: Contemplative Higher Education, Transformative Education, and Education for Social Justice. *Social Justice, Inner Work & Contemplative Practice, 1*(1), 119-127.

Mahani, S. (2012). Promoting Mindfulness Through Contemplative Education. *Journal of International Education Research (JIER), 8*(3), 215-222.

Manzi, T. (2002). Constructionism, realism and housing theory. *Housing, Theory and Society, 19*(3-4), 144-145.

Martin, L. H., Gutman, H., & Hutton, P. H. (Eds.). (1988). *Technologies of the Self: A seminar with Michel Foucault*. Amherst MA: Universite of Massachusetts Press.

Maxwell, C., & Aggleton, P. (2014). Agentic practice and privileging orientations among privately educated young women. *The Sociological Review, 62*(4), 800-820.

McNay, L. (2000). *Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and Social Theory*. Oxford: Polity Press.

McWilliams, S. A. (1996). A Contemplative Model for Higher Education. Retrieved from https://public.csusm.edu/mcwilliams/My%20Publications/

Meiklejohn, J., Phillips, C., Freedman, M. L., Griffin, M. L., Biegel, G., Roach, A., . . . Soloway, G. (2012). Integrating mindfulness training into K-12 education: Fostering the resilience of teachers and students. *Mindfulness, 3*(4), 291-307.

Menihan, C. (2012). Care of the Self, Foucauldian Ethics, and Contemporary Subjectivity. In (pp. 32). Univeristy of Rhode Island, USA: English Language and Literature Commons, History Commons, and the Philosophy Commons.

Miller, C. (2000). Collaboration and partnership: an effective response to complexity and fragmentation or solution built on sand? *The International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 20*(5/6), 1.

Miller, J. (2015). Contemplative Education. *Journal of Transformative Education, 13*(4), 1-9.

Miller, J. P., & Nozawa, A. (2002). Meditating teachers: A qualitative study. *Journal of In-Service Education, 28*(1), 179-192.

Mingers, J. (2006). Philosophical foundations: Critical realism. *Real ising Systems Thinking: Knowledge and Action in Management Science*, 11-31.

Mingers, J., Mutch, A., & Willcocks, L. (2013). Introduction [special issue: Critical realism in information systems research]. *MIS quarterly, 37*(3), 795-802.

Mipham, S. (2013). *The Shambhala Principle: Discovering Humanity's Hidden Treasure*. New York: Harmony Books.

Morgan, P. F. (2014). A Brief History of the Current Reemergence of Contemplative Education. *Journal of Transformative Education*, 1541344614564875.

Morley, L., Marginson, S., & Blackmore, J. (2014). Education and neoliberal globalization. *British Journal of Sociology of Education, 35*(3), 457-468.

Morton, T. (2013). Thinking the Charnel Ground (The Charnel Ground Thinking): Auto-Commentary and Death in Esoteric Buddhism. *Glossator, 7*, 73-94.

Morton, T. (2014). *Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality*. Ann Arbour: Open Humanities Press.

Munro Hendry, P. (2008). Engendering Wisdom: Listening to Kuan Yin and Julian of Norwich. In C. Eppert & H. Wang (Eds.), *Cross-cultural studies in curriculum. Eastern thought, educational insights* (pp. 207-226). New York: Lawrence Erlbuam Associates.

Mussell, H. (2016). The Truth of the Matter. *Hypatia, 31*(3), 537-553.

Mutch, A. (2004). Constraints on the internal conversation: Margaret Archer and the structural shaping of thought. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 34*(4), 429-445.

Mutch, A. (2013). Sociomateriality—Taking the wrong turning? *Information and Organization, 23*(1), 28-40.

New, C., & Carter, B. (Eds.). (2005). *Making realism work: Realist social theory and empirical research*. London UK: Routledge.

Ng, E. (2014). Towards a Dialogue Between Buddhist Social Theory and “Affect Studies” on the Ethico-Political Significance of Mindfulness. *Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 21*, 346-377.

Ng, E., & Purser, R. (2015). White Privilege and the Mindfulness Movement.

Nhất Hạnh, T. c. (1998). *Interbeing: Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism* (F. Eppsteiner. Ed. 3rd ed. ed.). Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press.

Noddings, N. (2002). *Educating moral people: A caring alternative to character education*. New York. NY: Teachers College Press.

Noddings, N. (2013). *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Norrie, A. (1998). Between Structure and Difference: Law’s relationality. In M. Archer, R. Bhaskar, A. L. Collier, Tony, & A. Norrie (Eds.), *Critical realism: Essential readings* (pp. 723-740

). New York: Routledge.

Norrie, A. (2004). Bhaskar, Adorno and the dialectics of modern freedom. *Journal of Critical Realism, 3*(1), 23-48.

Norrie, A. (2017). To Flourish or Destruct: A Personalist Theory of Human Goods, Motivations, Failure, and Evil. *Journal of Critical Realism*, 1-8.

Nussbaum, M. (2003). Capabilities as undamental entitlements: Sen and social justice. *Feminist Economics, 9*(2-3), 33-59.

Nussbaum, M. (2006). Education and democratic citizenship: Capabilities and quality education. *Journal of human development, 7*(3), 385-395.

Nussbaum, M. (2010). *Not for Profit. Why Democracies Needs the Humanities*: Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Nussbaum, M. (2011) *The End of Education:Interview with Martha Nussbaum/Interviewer: J. Garvey*. (Vol 21), Philosophy Press, Philosophers' Magazine.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1997). *Cultivating humanity*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2000). *Women and human development: The capabilities approach* (Vol. 3). Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

O'Connor, B. (2013). *Adorno*. Abgindon Oxon: Routledge.

O'Reilly, M. R. (1998). *Radical presence: Teaching as contemplative practice*: Boynton/Cook Publishers.

Oberski, I., Murray, S., Goldblatt, J., & DePlacido, C. (2015). Contemplation & Mindfulness in Higher Education. In *Global Innovation of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education* (pp. 317-340): Springer.

Ollman, B. (2003). *Dance of the dialectic: Steps in Marx's method*. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.

Olsen, W. (2009). Realist Methodology: A review. In W. Olsen (Ed.), *Realist Methodology* (pp. 28). London: SAGE.

Ong, A. (2006). Experiments with freedom: Milieus of the human. *American literary history, 18*(2), 229-244.

Orr, D. (2014). In a mindful moral voice: Mindful compassion, the ethic of care and education. *Philosophical Inquiry in Education, 21*(2), 42-54.

Ozawa-de Silva, B. (2016). Contemplative Science and Secular Ethics. *Religions, 7*(8), 98.

Palmer, P. J. (1997). *The Courage to Teach: Exploring the Inner Landscape of a Teacher's Life*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Palmer, P. J., Zajonc, A., & Scribner, M. (2010). *The heart of higher education: A call to renewal*. San Francisco, California: John Wiley and Sons.

Pamphilon, B. (1999). The zoom model: A dynamic framework for the analysis of life histories. *Qualitative Inquiry, 5*(3), 393-410.

Paolini, A., Moran, A., & Elliott, A. (1999). *Navigating modernity: Postcolonialism, identity, and international relations*. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Pawson, R., & Tilley, N. (1997). *Realistic Evaluation*. London Thousand Oaks New Delhi SAGE Publications.

Polinska, W. (2011). Engaging religious diversity: Towards a pedagogy of mindful contemplation. *International Journal of the Humanities, 9*(1), 159-167.

Porpora, D. V. (2013). Morphogenesis and social change. In *Social morphogenesis* (pp. 25-37): Springer.

(2015, 21 August 2017). *Reconstructing Sociology* [Interview with Professor Douglas Porpora]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cSSRFUaqG6o

Porpora, D. V., & Shumar, W. (2010). Self Talk and Self_Reflection. In M. Archer (Ed.), *Conversations About Reflexivity* (pp. 206-220). Abingdon, Oxon UK: Routledge.

Poutanen, S., & Kovalainen, A. (2005). *Feminism and critical realism–demonstration of a lack of dialogue*.

Puett, M. J. (2012). Social Order or Social Chaos. In R. A. Orsi (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Religious Studies* (Second ed., pp. 109-129). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pulkki, J., Saari, A., & Dahlin, B. (2015). Contemplative Pedagogy and Bodily Ethics. *Other Education, 4*(1), 33-51.

Purser, R. (2014). Clearing the Muddled Path of Traditional and Contemporary Mindfulness: a Response to Monteiro, Musten, and Compson. *Mindfulness*, 1-23.

Purser, R., & Loy, D. (2013). Beyond McMindfulness. *Huffington Post*, 3. Retrieved from The Huffington Post website: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ron-purser/beyond-mcmindfulness_b_3519289.html

Purser, R., & Milillo, J. (2015). Mindfulness Revisited A Buddhist-Based Conceptualization. *Journal of Management Inquiry, 24*(1), 3-24.

Putnam, L. L. (2015). Unpacking the dialectic: Alternative views on the discourse–materiality relationship. *Journal of Management Studies, 52*(5), 706-716.

Rainbow, P., & Rose, N. (2003). The essential Foucault. In: London: The New Press.

Ramstedt, M. (2017). *Pluralism and Education for Peace*. Paper presented at the Peace Now! Creating Peace in Difficult Time, Austria Center Vienna. Keynote Address retrieved from https://friedenschaffen.at/wp-content/uploads/sites/96/2017/10/Keynote-Martin-Ramstedt.pdf

Regehr, C., Glancy, D., & Pitts, A. (2013). Interventions to reduce stress in university students: A review and meta-analysis. *Journal of affective disorders, 148*(1), 1-11.

Repetti, R. (2010). The case for a contemplative philosophy of education. *New Directions for Community Colleges, 2010*(151), 5-15.

Rhem, J. (2012). Contemplative pedagogy Part 1. *The National Teaching & Learning Forum, 21*, 1-6.

Robertson, S. L. (2008). Remaking the World" Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Education and Teachers' Labor. In M. Compton & L. Weiner (Eds.), *The Global Assault on Teaching,*

Teachers, and their Unions: Stories for Resistance (pp. 11-27). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Rockefeller, S. (1994). Meditation, social change, and undergraduate education. *Teachers College Record, 108*(9), 12.

Rockefeller, S. (2006). Meditation, social change, and undergraduate education. *The Teachers College Record, 108*(9), 1775-1786.

Roeser, R. W., & Peck, S. C. (2009). An education in awareness: Self, motivation, and self-regulated learning in contemplative perspective. *Educational Psychologist, 44*(2), 119-136.

Roeser, R. W., Vago, D. R., Pinela, C., Morris, L. S., Taylor, C., & Harrison, J. (2014). Contemplative education: Cultivating Ethical Development Through Mindfulness in Education. In L. Nucci, D. Narvaez, & T. Krettenauer (Eds.), *Handbook of moral and character education* (pp. 223-247). New York: Routledge.

Rogers, C. R. (1969). *Freedom to Learn: A view of what education might become*. Ohio, Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Pub. Co.

Rosch, E. (2013). The Grinch who stole wisdom. In *The Scientific Study of Personal Wisdom* (pp. 229-249). New York: Springer.

Rose, G. (1997). Situating knowledges: positionality, reflexivities and other tactics. *Progress in human geography, 21*(3), 305-320.

Rose, N. (1990). *Governing the soul: the shaping of the private self*. London, New York: Routledge.

Rose, N. (1999a). *Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self* (2nd Edition ed.). London: Free Association Books.

Rose, N. (1999b). *Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought*. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

Rossi, A. (Writer). (2014). Ivory Tower. In A. Rossi (Producer): Participant Media, Paramount Pictures, Samuel Goldwyn Mayer.

Roth, H. (2006). Contemplative studies: Prospects for a new field. *The Teachers College Record, 108*(9), 1787-1815.

Rutzou, T. (2016). What are the Criteria of Judgmental Rationality? Online Blog Retrieved from http://criticalrealismnetwork.org/2016/07/13/rationality/

Sable, D. (2014). Reason in the Service of the Heart: The Impacts of Contemplative Practices on Critical Thinking. *The Journal of Contemplative Inquiry, 1*(1).

Saltmarsh, S. (2011). Economic subjectivities in higher education: Self, policy and practice in the knowledge economy. *Cultural Studies Review, 17*(2), 115-139.

Satsangi, M. (2013). Synthesizing feminist and critical realist approaches to housing studies. *Housing, Theory and Society, 30*(2), 193-207.

Saunders, D. B. (2010). Neoliberal ideology and public higher education in the United States. *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies, 8*(1), 41-77.

Sawicki, J. (1991). *Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, power, and the body*. New York, London: Routledge.

Sayer, A. (1992). *Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach* (Second ed.). London: Routledge.

Sayer, A. (2000). *Realism and Social Science*. London Thousand Oaks New Delhi: SAGE.

Sayer, A. (2009). Making Our Way Through the World: Human Reflexivity and Social Mobility by Margaret S. Archer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. *Journal of Critical Realism, 8*, 113-123.

Sayer, A. (2010). Reflexivity and the habitus. In M. Archer (Ed.), *Conversations About Reflexivity* (pp. 108-122). Oxon, UK: Routledge.

Scambler, G. (2012). Resistance in unjust times: Archer, structured agency and the sociology of health inequalities. *Sociology, 47*(1), 142-156.

Scambler, G. (2013). Archer and 'vulnerable fractured reflexivity': A neglected social determinant of health? *Social Theory & Health, 11*(3), 302-315.

Schon, D. A. (1983). The Reflective Practitioner Basic Books. *New York*.

Schonert-Reichl, K. A., & Lawlor, M. S. (2010). The effects of a mindfulness-based education program on pre-and early adolescents' well-being and social and emotional competence. *Mindfulness, 1*(3), 137-151.

Schrecker, E. (2013). *The Lost Soul of Higher Education: Corporatization, the Assault on Academic Freedom, and the End of the American University*. New York, NY: The New Press.

Scott, C. (2010). Epistemological multilingualism: A tool for conviviality. *Paideusis, 18*(2), 43-54.

Scott, D., & Bhaskar, R. (2015). *Roy Bhaskar: A Theory of Education*. London, UK: Springer International.

Scott, D., Brown, A., & Lunt, I. (2004). *Professional Doctorates: Integrating Academic And Professional Knowledge: Integrating Academic and Professional Knowledge*. Maidenhead, Berkshire, England: McGraw-Hill Education (UK).

Seale, C. (Ed.) (2011). *Researching Society and Culture* (Third ed.). London Thousand Oaks New Delhi Singapore: SAGE.

Seel, M. (2004). Adorno's Contemplative Ethics. *Critical Horizons, 5*(1), 259-269.

Selingo, J. J. (2013). *College (un) bound: The future of higher education and what it means for students*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Shacklock, G., & Thorp, L. (2005). Life history and narrative approaches. In B. Somekh & C. Lewin (Eds.), *Research methods in the social sciences* (pp. 156-163). London: SAGE Publications.

Shahjahan, R. A. (2012). Structure and agency in the neoliberal university. *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 25*(2), 208-211.

Shahjahan, R. A. (2014). From 'no'to 'yes': Postcolonial perspectives on resistance to neoliberal higher education. *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 35*(2), 219-232.

Shahjahan, R. A. (2015). Being 'lazy'and slowing down: Toward decolonizing time, our body, and pedagogy. *Educational Philosophy and Theory, 47*(5), 488-501.

Shakman-Hurd, E. (2011). A Suspension of (Dis) Belief: The Secular-Religious Binary and the Study of International Relations. *Rethinking Secularism*, 166-184.

Shapiro, S. L., Brown, K. W., & Astin, J. (2011). Toward the integration of meditation into higher education: A review of research evidence. *Teachers College Record, 113*(3), 493-528.

Shore, C., & Wright, S. (2015). Governing by numbers: audit culture, rankings and the new world order. *Social Anthropology, 23*(1), 22-28.

Sidhu, R. (2015). Beyond neoliberalism: Universities and the public good. *Australian Review of Public Affairs*, 6. Retrieved from http://apo.org.au/commentary/beyond-neoliberalism-universities-and-public-good

Simmer-Brown, J. (1999). Commitment and Openness: A contemplative approach to pluralism. In S. Glazer & H. Smith (Eds.), *The heart of learning: Spirituality in education* (pp. 97-112). New York: Putnam.

Simmer-Brown, J. (2002). Remedying Globalization and Consumerism: Joining the Inner and Outer Journeys in" Perfect Balance". *Buddhist-Christian Studies, 22*(1), 31-46.

Simmer-Brown, J. (2009). The Question is the Answer: Naropa University's Contemplative Pedagogy. *Religion and Education, 36*(2), 88-101.

Simmer-Brown, J. (2011). Training the Heart Responsibly: Ethical Considerations in Contemplative Teaching. In J. Simmer-Brown & F. Grace (Eds.), *Simmer-Brown and Grace, Meditation and the Classroom* (pp. 107-120). New York, NY: State University of New York Press.

Simmer-Brown, J. (2013). " Listening Dangerously": Dialogue Training as Contemplative Pedagogy. *Buddhist-Christian Studies, 33*(1), 33-40.

Simmer-Brown, J. (2016). Words and Sense: Contemplative Pedagogies in Academic Writing. *The Journal of Contemplative Inquiry, 3*(1), 15.

Simmer-Brown, J., & Grace, F. (2011). *Meditation and the Classroom: Contemplative Pedagogy for Religious Studies*: SUNY Press.

Slaughter, S., & Leslie, L. L. (1997). *Academic capitalism: Politics, policies, and the entrepreneurial university*. Baltimore: John Hopkins Univeristy Press.

Smart, B. (1982). Foucault, sociology, and the problem of human agency. *Theory and Society, 11*(2), 121-141.

Smith, C. (2011). *What is a person?: Rethinking humanity, social life, and the moral good from the person up*: University of Chicago Press.

Smith, C. (2015a). *To Flourish or Destruct: A Personalist Theory of Human Goods, Motivations, Failure, and Evil*. London, Chicago USA: University of Chicago Press.

Smith, C., & Elger, T. (2012). Critical Realism and Interviewing Subjects. In *Working Paper Series* (Vol. SoMWP–1208, pp. 31). London, UK: School of Management, Royal Holloway University of London.

Smith, M. J., & Pangsapa, P. (2007). New controversies in phenomenology: Between ethnography and discourse. In W. Outhwaite & S. Turner (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of social science methodology* (pp. 384-404). Los Angeles, London: SAGE.

Smith, R. (2015b). College re-culturing, marketisation and knowledge: the meaning of incorporation. *Journal of Educational Administration and History, 47*(1), 18-39.

Solloway, S. (2000). Contemplative practitioners presence or the project of thinking gaze differently. *Encounter, 13*(3), 30.

Souza, D. E. (2014). Culture, context and society–The underexplored potential of critical realism as a philosophical framework for theory and practice. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 17*(2), 141-

151.

Spatscheck, C. (2010). Theodor W. Adorno on Education. In. Retreived from www.infed.org/thinkers/adorno_on_education.htm on 20 April 2017: The Encyclopaedia of Informal Education.

Sprague, J. (2016). *Feminist Methodologies for Critical Researchers: Bridging differences* (Second Edition ed.). Lanham, Maryland USA: Rowman & Littlefield.

Standing, G. (2011). The Precariat: the New Dangerous Class. In. London–New York: Bloomsbury Academic Publishing.

Stanley, S. (2012). Mindfulness: Towards a critical relational perspective. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 6*(9), 631-641.

Stetsenko, A. (2012). Personhood: An activist project of historical becoming through collaborative pursuits of social transformation. *New Ideas in Psychology, 30*(1), 144-153.

Stetsenko, A. (2014). Transfromative Activist Stance for Education. In *Psychology in education* (pp. 181-198): Springer.

Stromquist, N. P. (2017). The professoriate: the challenged subject in US higher education. *Comparative Education, 53*(1), 132-146.

Stronach, I., Corbin, B., McNamara, O., Stark, S., & Warne, T. (2002). Towards an uncertain politics of professionalism: teacher and nurse identities in flux. *Journal of education policy, 17*(1), 109-138.

Sturges, K. M. (Ed.) (2015). *Educational Reform in the Age of Neoliberalism: America's Quest for Profitable Market-Colonies and the Undoing of Public Good*: Springer.

Swartz, D. (1997). *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press.

Szerszynski, B. (1992). Religious movements and the New Age: their relevance to the environmental movement in the 1990s. *Lancaster: Centre for the Study of Environmental Change, Lancaster University*.

Talisse, R. B. (2011). A farewell to Deweyan democracy. *Political Studies, 59*(3), 509-526.

Taylor, C. (2007). *A Secular Age*. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press.

Teasdale, J. D., Moore, R. G., Hayhurst, H., Pope, M., Williams, S., & Segal, Z. V. (2002). Metacognitive awareness and prevention of relapse in depression: empirical evidence. *Journal of consulting and clinical psychology, 70*(2), 275.

Thornton, M. (2015). *Through a glass darkly: The social sciences look at the neoliberal university*. ANU: ANU Press.

Thornton, M. (Ed.) (2014). *Through A Glass Darkly: The Social Sciences Look at the Neoliberal University*. Canberra ACT: Australian National University Press.

Thurman, R. (2006). Meditation and education: India, Tibet, and modern America. *Teachers College Record, 108*(9), 1765.

Todd, S., & Ergas, O. (2015). *Special Issue: Philosophy East/West: Exploring Intersections between Educational and Contemplative Practices Introduction*. HOBOKEN, NJ USA: WILEY-BLACKWELL.

Torres, C. A. (2012). *Education and Neoliberal Globalization* (English Edition ed.). London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Trisoglio, A. (2012, 30 August 2013). Mindfulness & Leadership. *The Mobius Strip, 2,* 10.

Trungpa, C. (1978). *Education for an Enlightened Society*. Public Talk. Naropa Institute. USA.

Trungpa, C. (1991). *The Heart of the Buddha* (Vol. 1). Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications.

Trungpa, C. (2005a). *The Sanity We Are Born With: A Buddhist Approach to Psychology*. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications.

Trungpa, C. (2005b). *Training the Mind and Cultivating Loving-Kindness*. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications inc.

Trungpa, C. (2010). *Meditation in Action*. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications.

Trungpa, C. (2013). *The Bodhisattva Path of Wisdom and Compassion* (Vol. 2): Shambhala Publications.

Tully, J. (2016). Deparochializing Political Theory and Beyond: A Dialogue Approach to Comparative Political Thought. *Journal of World Philosophies, 1*(1).

Turnbull, L., & Dawson, G. (2006). Is mindfulness the new opiate of the masses? Critical reflections from a Buddhist perspective. *Psychotherapy in Australia, 12*(4), 60.

UMASSCFM, C. f. M. i. M. H. C. a. S. (Producer). (2014, 20 Spet 2016). Joesph Goldstein - "Mindfulness: What is is and is Not". *CFM Guest Lecture Series*. [Video posted to YouTube] Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Uqoxo_jPXQ

Vandenberghe, F. (2005). Book Review: The Archers: A Tale of Folk (Final Episode?). *European Journal of Social Theory, 8*(2), 227-237.

Varela, F. J., & Shear, J. (1999). First-person methodologies: What, why, how. *Journal of Consciousness studies, 6*(2-3), 1-14.

Varkøy, Ø. (2015). Bildung: Between cultural heritage and the unknown, instrumentalism and existence. In M. Fleming, L. Bresler, O'Toole, & John (Eds.), *The Routledge International Handbook of the Arts and Education* (pp. 11). Londong and New York: Routledge International.

Vokey, D. (2008). Hearing, Contemplating, and Meditating: In Search of the Transformative Integration of HEart and Mind. In C. Eppert & H. Wang (Eds.), *Cross-cultural studies in curriculum: Eastern thought, educational insights* (pp. 14). New York and London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

Vokey, D. (2014). Contemplative Disciplines in Higher Education. In O. Gunnlaugson, E. W. Sarath, C. Scott, & H. Bai (Eds.), *Contemplative Learning and Inquiry across Disciplines* (pp. 253-269). Albany NY: SUNY Press.

Wacquant, L. (1989). Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A workshop with Pierre Bourdieu. *Sociological theory, 7*(1), 26-63.

Wadham, B., & Hamilton, A. (2015). 12 Unmasking militarism: hegemony, naturalisation, camouflage. In A. Elias, R. Harley, & N. Tsoutas (Eds.), *Camouflage Cultures: Beyond the Art of Disappearance* (pp. 159-170). Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Wadham, B. A. (2002). *What Does a White Man Want?: White Australian Masculinities and Aboriginal Reconciliation.* (PhD), Flinders University of South Australia, Sociology Department,

Adelaide, South Australia.

Wagner, A. E., & Shahjahan, R. A. (2015). Centering embodied learning in anti-oppressive pedagogy. *Teaching in higher education, 20*(3), 244-254.

Walker, T. (2017). Approaches to Critical Realism: Bhaskar and Lonergan. *Journal of Critical Realism, 16*(2), 111-127.

Walsh, S. (2012). Contemplation, Artful Writing Research With Internationally Educated Female Teachers. *Qualitative Inquiry, 18*(3), 273-285.

Walsh, S., Bickel, B., & Leggo, C. (2014). *Arts-based and Contemplative Practices in Research and Teaching: Honoring Presence*. New York: Routledge.

Walsh, Z. D. (2016). A critical theory-praxis for contemplative studies. *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Universities (JIABU) Volume VII, 2016 (Digital Edition), 3*, 22.

Waring, M. (2013). All in this together? HRM and the individualisation of the academic worker. *Higher Education Policy, 26*(3), 397-419.

Washburn, J. (2008). *University, Inc.: The corporate corruption of higher education*. New York: Basic Books.

Waters, P. (2017). Developing the Pedagogic Method Narrative Journey. In T. Waller, E. Ärlemalm- Hagser, E. Hansen Sandseter, & L. Lee Hammond (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Outdoor Play and Learning* (pp. 446). London: SAGE Publications.

Website, A. (2015). Association for Contempaltive Mind in Higher Education. Retrieved from http://www.contemplativemind.org/programs/acmhe

Williams, A., Cloke, P., & Thomas, S. (2012). Co-constituting neoliberalism: faith-based organisations, co-option, and resistance in the UK. *Environment and Planning A, 44*(6), 1479-1501.

Williams, K. (2008). Troubling the concept of the ‘academic profession’in 21st Century higher education. *Higher Education, 56*(5), 533-544.

Williams, K. (2012). Rethinking ‘learning’in higher education: Viewing the student as social actor. *Journal of Critical Realism, 11*(3), 296-323.

Zajonc, A. (2006a). Contemplative and transformative pedagogy. *Kosmos Journal, 5*(1), 1-3.

Zajonc, A. (2006b). Love and knowledge: Recovering the heart of learning through contemplation. *The Teachers College Record, 108*(9), 1742-1759.

Zajonc, A. (2013). Contemplative Pedagogy: A Quiet Revolution in Higher Education. *New Directions for Teaching and Learning, 2013*(134), 83-94.

Zembylas, M. (2006). Science education as emancipatory: The case of Roy Bhaskar's philosophy of meta-Reality. *Educational Philosophy and Theory, 38*(5), 665-676.

Zeuner, L. (1999). Review essay: Margaret Archer on structural and cultural morphogenesis. *Acta Sociologica, 42*(1), 79-86.

Zipin, L., & Brennan, M. (2003). The suppression of ethical dispositions through managerial governmentality: A habitus crisis in Australian higher education. *Int. J. Leadership in Education, 6*(4), 351-370.

Zipin, L., Sellar, S., Brennan, M., & Gale, T. (2015). Educating for futures in marginalized regions:

A sociological framework for rethinking and researching aspirations. *Educational Philosophy and Theory, 47*(3), 227-246.

APPENDIX I
PARTICIPANT SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Interview 1 - prompts

2 Interviews: This one has 2 parts.

- Part 1 short intro
- Semi-structured - ONLY a GUIDE – can go organic!

Part 1

The Internal conversation

- **range of inner dialogues**
    - e.g. planning, rehearsing, mulling-over, deciding, re-living, prioritising, imagining, clarifying, imaginary conversations, budgeting) L what about fantasising
- **other cognitive activities** that shape action?
- More info – L can send

Inner conversation and agency/culture/structure – next interview

Part 2

Your involvement with using contemplative practice in higher education

- beginning?
- Inspiration

What has shaped your (pedagogical) practice?

- Supports and enabling factors/contexts
- Limiting factors and or contexts

What you do?

- How you have negotiated this/these ….?

How would you describe or define contemplative practices?

- as being used (by yourself) in higher education contexts?

Your own wisdom tradition/lineage/faith path?

Your **own meditation/meditative practice** [within own wisdom tradition]

- daily/regular meditation/meditative practice?
    - How come to this?

Any benefits in relation to your teaching

- Relating with others?
- Relating with students?

Have there been challenges?

Long term-meditation practice

- Any benefits to your university/academic teaching?
- Any different – 1week or 20 years?
- Mindfulness course / meditation practice in lineage

Anything in your background - suggested this

    - Noticed over the years?

Any role re more empathic/pro-social and or ethical orientation – students/self/other staff?

Changes over the years?

- Openness to CP's – society
- Students
- Changing institutional culture/s

Interview 2 - prompts

2.1 Agency

- Do you have any current concerns re the field of contemplative (higher) education (CHE)?
    - What's most important to you at the moment? Re:
        - your work in CHE
        - The 'field' – and beyond?
- What kinds of 'inner conversations' are you aware of - re your work with contemplative education and or the field?
    - How are you conducting these (inner) conversations
- Is there anything in your background that is helpful/obstructive in realising any concerns you have regarding CHE/using contemplative practices in HE 'classrooms'/curricula?
- How might your own contemplative training, and current contemplative practice, shape any concerns you have and or actions you take?
- How are you and others thinking about CHE within the broader context of sociological

literature?

- Are there area where you have had to negotiate, bargain, or hide/camouflage certain pedagogies or content?
- Have there been sacrifices or regrets?

2.2 Structural and cultural enablement's and constraints

- What has supported you and or constrained/limited you in pursuing the use of contemplative practices/pedagogies in your teaching?
- What sorts of enablements and or constraints might are shaping:
    - The broader area/emerging field of CHE?
    - What's possible or not within your own university/college?
    - Your own personal practice?

Topic/theme prompts

- What does it mean to be human (ontology)
- Neoliberalism
- Globalisation
- Rise of the psy-sciences
- Other epistemologies/ways of knowing
- 'Religious practices, secular academy'
- Some (Ergas, Wexler etc.) describe the current space we inhabit as (a) post-secular (society)
    - Your responses to this?
- Mindfulness
    - as a western/North American phenomenon
    - enablement/constraints
        - differentiating
    - global relevance; North American positioning
- ethical impulse, orientation, interest in
- social activism – their own and students

- If someone was looking in from the outside at your life, contemplative practice, and

teaching/research what might they notice, comment upon or query that is not currently highlighted or a part of how your inner conversations (about contemplative higher education, being a contemplative practitioner, and scholar, other?)

Follow-up questions for research participants Jan 2017

Regarding the internal conversation

British sociologist Margaret Archer highlights **10 key mental activities**[311] that shape our 'internal conversations' (i.e. how we talk to ourselves about our concerns, actions and practices):

- planning,
- rehearsing,
- mulling-over,
- deciding,
- re-living,
- prioritising,
- imagining,
- clarifying,
- imaginary conversations, and
- budgeting

Archer's work on the 'internal conversation' has been ground-breaking as it offers a way of understanding human agency as 'real' causal power (that is also relational)[312]. Archer asserts that it is only through inquiring about people's 'inner conversations' that we gain insight into the reality (and thus causal power) of human agency (i.e. people's capacity to act for change, or stasis, in the face of all odds).

Using this methodological approach of the 'internal conversation' I have become curious about

[311] Archer, M. S. (2003*) Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation*, (p.161) Cambridge University Press

[312] Following Critical Realist philosopher Roy Bhaskar (UK) and using his stratified and emergent ontology, she highlights the need for 'analytical dualism' in inquiring about the actions of people within a structure/culture. She says that there is a difference between structure (i.e. our culture, institutions, and socially sanctioned ways of doing things) and agency (human action) – that these two are 'different kinds' and whilst inseparable need to be examined separately.

people like you who have a long-term sitting practice of meditation. I wonder:

1. Are there any additional ‘mental activities’ or ‘themes’ that you might say shape your inner conversations[313]?

2. Being very familiar with your ‘internal conversations’ through the sitting practice of meditation, how separate are these from your everyday life? i.e.

    a. What difference if any is there between your ‘internal conversations ’ and everyday conversation/verbal communication

3. Do you have any other thoughts or comments re this notion of the ‘internal conversation’?

[313] That is how you talk to yourself about what you/others are doing, the decisions you make, the paths you take, and why?

APPENDIX II
TREE OF CONTEMPLATIVE PRACTICES[314]



[314] This frequently used diagram has been included here for the reader unfamiliar with the range of contemplative practices being used in higher education. I have always found this presentation problematic as meditation is included as one of many practices and not the primary practice underpinning all others. Research participants Karen and Stephen also referred to this.

APPENDIX III
SUMMARY OF PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Research Participant	Age range	Institution	Faith path practice	Current position	Discipline
Bernie	60+ yrs.	Public/State University (USA)	Zen Buddhism	Professor	Neuroscience/Psychology
Karen	60+ yrs.	Private university (USA)	Tibetan Buddhism	Professor	Religious Studies
Emily	60+ yrs.	Private university (USA)	Tibetan Buddhism	Associate Professor	Education/Counselling/Religious Studies
Vince	30-45 yrs.	Private university (USA)	Mahayana Buddhism	Associate Professor	Psychology, Counselling
Julia	30-45 yrs.	Public/State University (Canada)	Mahayana Buddhism / Contemplative Christianity	Senior Lecturer	Teacher education/Social science
Stephen	60+ yrs.	Private university (USA)	Tibetan Buddhism	Associate Professor	Teacher education
Eugene	60+ yrs.	Public/State University (Canada)	Tibetan Buddhism	Senior Lecturer	Social science, Religious studies