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The conforming power of neoliberal violence in youth and hyper-governed young people's stories of resistance

by

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Abstract

Close attention in this thesis to hyper-governed young people's stories of neoliberal violence reveals not only the previously unexamined conforming power of such violence, but also these young people's discursive strategies for resistance to it. My original contribution to knowledge is that youth can be understood as an artefact of this governing violence. I argue that youth is a period of governing young people through violence, producing their conformity to the personal, structural, symbolic and cultural dimensions of neoliberal violence. Neoliberal violence is described by Giroux as the rising inequality and marginalisation of young people produced by the hollowing out of social services (2014, 224). *Hyper-governed* describes the young people in this study who experience heightened surveillance and regulation within the already highly governed period called youth (Kelly and Kamp 2014, 7–8). Drawing on their stories gathered from 28 semi-structured interviews, I construct an argument that challenges the popular association between youth and violence. Rather than youth being a period of graduating out of violence, I argue it is a period of internalising sanctioned forms of violence. In short, violence done *to* young people shapes the violence done *by* them.

I challenge this popular association between youth and violence via a three-stage argument. A central feature of this argument is the connection between hyper-governed young people's situated knowledge (Law 2004, 3) and the broader narratives of youth and violence. In the first stage I examine the effects of neoliberal violence done *to* hyper-governed young people. These effects are made visible via examining a particular example of neoliberal violence: the use of 'Fair Process' (Kim and Mauborgne 2003) in restorative practices (Wachtel 2012). The second stage unpacks the conforming power of neoliberal violence in youth. In this section I develop a counter narrative to the popular association between youth and violence. It is here I propose that hyper-governed young people are rendered docile by the hegemonic mythology of neoliberal violence. The final stage is a reorientation of the positioning of hyper-governed young people from passive subjects to active agents of change. Hyper-governed young people are not simply rendered docile to neoliberal violence by structural forces; but rather they express their agency through discursive resistance. This discursive resistance is essential to combat the hegemonic mythology of neoliberal violence. With this form of resistance, young people develop language and knowledge to facilitate the enactment of hopeful realities.

To examine the hyper-governed young people's resistance to the conforming power of neoliberal violence in youth, this research is theoretically located at the nexus of critical youth sociology and the emerging sociology of violence. Youth violence is reconsidered in this thesis by exposing the structural, cultural (Galtung 1969, 1990) and symbolic (Bourdieu 2001) dimensions of neoliberal violence. Introducing this analysis of violence to critical youth sociology mutually informs the emerging sociology of violence, which is yet to directly appreciate young people's knowledge and experience with neoliberal violence. This reconceptualisation of the relationship between youth and violence creates opportunities for the re-examination of governing practices, policy objectives and service provision surrounding youth and violence.

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I would like to acknowledge that the lands that this thesis was written on are the traditional lands for the Kaurna people and that I respect their spiritual relationship with their Country. I also acknowledge the Kaurna people as the traditional custodians of the Adelaide region and that their cultural and heritage beliefs, epistemologies and ontologies are still important to the living Kaurna people today.

Declaration

The following publications have arisen out of this thesis. All the publications have been solely authored by the candidate.

Content from the following chapter has not been included in the main text:

Lohmeyer, Ben A. 2016. "Angry young men and the spiritual intelligence of peace building". In *Spirituality in Youth Work: New Vocabularies, Concepts and Practices*, edited by Phil Daughtry and Stuart Devenish, 119 – 36. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Sections of the following publications have been included in the main text:

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Sections of the following as-yet unpublished articles at the time of this declaration have been included in the main text:

Lohmeyer, B. A. (*Forthcoming*). "Calling bullshit" in the age of hollow government: hyper-governed young people's rejection of Fair Process and the subversion of restorative practices. *Journal of Applied Youth Studies*.

Lohmeyer, Ben A. (*Under review*). "Hyper-governed young people's discursive resistance to the crushing ubiquity of neoliberal violence". *Journal of Youth Studies.*

Lohmeyer, Ben A. (*Under review*). "Keen as fuck: Parallel projects as a model of youth participatory methods". *Qualitative Research.*

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Name: Ben Arnold Lohmeyer Date: 21/05/18

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Chapter 1 — Introduction: Stories for solidarity and critical thinking

Examining *neoliberal violence* through *hyper-governed* young people's stories, in this thesis I will argue that the violence done *to* young people shapes the violence done *by* them. I argue that *youth* is a social process of internalising and conforming to the ubiquity of sanctioned personal, structural, symbolic and cultural violence. Young people's violence is governed, but they are also governed though violence. The term *hyper-governed* is new; I developed it to describe a group of young people who experience heightened surveillance and regulation within the already highly governed period of 'youth' (Kelly and Kamp 2014, 7–8). These young people attract this additional surveillance and regulation as a result of the nature of their relationship with the state. These are young people in the child protection and/or juvenile justice system, or involved in political activism. This thesis will focus on the regulation and control of these young people specifically through the personal, structural, symbolic and cultural dimensions of *neoliberal violence*. Neoliberal violence is described by Giroux as the violating experience of inequality and marginalisation of minorities produced by the hollowing out of social services (Giroux 2014, 224). The prioritisation of efficiency over public sector values such as justice and participation hollows out the state, and produces experiences of violation in youth. The original contribution to knowledge I am making with this thesis is my argument that the idea of 'youth' can be conceptualised as a product of the hegemonic mythology of violence.

In my thesis, I construct a methodological and theoretical assemblage (Law 2004) that locates my research at the convergence of critical youth sociology and the emerging sociology of violence. Critical youth sociology is yet to capitalise on conceptualisations of violence within

the emerging sociology of violence in order to pursue its emancipatory goals. This evolving understanding of violence progresses beyond the idea of violence as simply physical force. Rather, I analyse violence in its structural, cultural (Galtung 1969, 1990) and symbolic (Bourdieu 2001) dimensions. Furthermore, the sociology of violence is yet to engage directly with young people's experiences of neoliberal violence. My thesis addresses this issue.

In the conduct of this research, 28 hyper-governed young people from Australia participated in semi-structured interviews. I examine their messy stories of violation through thematic analysis of transcribed interviews as situated experiences (Law 2004, 3). However, it is also essential for the promotion of solidarity and for the critical analysis of their stories (Freire 2014, 44) that I connect these situated experiences with the broader narratives of youth and violence. In addition, a theorisation of power is essential for the sociological study of both violence and youth. In doing this, I borrow from a range of Marxist, Foucauldian and Interactionist theories of power. This eclectic approach is necessary for the construction of an integrated theory of youth violence, and to manage the contingency and complexity of hyper-governed young people's stories.

The hyper-governed young people who participated in this research were invited to reflect on a specific manifestation of the neoliberal hollowing out of social services, as well as their general experiences of violence in modern society. The specific manifestation in focus is the inclusion of the principles of 'Fair Process' (Kim and Mauborgne 2003) in restorative practices (Wachtel 2012).

Restorative practices are the application of the principles and values of restorative justice in education, youth work or social work outside of a formal mediation setting (Braithwaite 1999, 42; Wachtel 2012, 2). Fair process is a set of principles that have been included in restorative practices to guide implementation of restorative practices by service providers, and scaffold service users' participation in decision-making processes (Wachtel 2012, 7; O'Connell 2010, 24). Their inclusion has been championed by the International Institute for Restorative Practices (IIRP). Whilst based in the United States of America, the IIRP has international affiliates in Latin America, Europe and Australia. My thesis focusses on young people in Australia, however these findings are relevant wherever restorative practices are influenced by the IIRP. Furthermore, my examination of the effects of neoliberal violence on hyper-governed young people has relevance wherever there are youth services or young people are in contact with neoliberal governance.

When asked for their thoughts on Fair Process participants told messy stories of unfair processes. These hyper-governed young people resisted the oversimplification of their 'wicked problems' (Watts 2013, 2015) inherent in the principles of Fair Process. Likewise, they told stories of their techniques of resistance to government-sanctioned neoliberal violence. Whilst these techniques can be positioned as more-or-less violent, I argue that the violence done *to* these hyper-governed young people shapes the violence done *by* them. Furthermore, I argue that this resistance is ultimately discursive in nature; it is a search for new ways of knowing, speaking and being. This discursive resistance is essential if young people are to combat the hegemonic mythology of violence and their experiences of violation, and to develop language and knowledge that enables them to enact hopeful realities.

The association between violence and youth has been regularly contested by sociologists who study youth. However, much of this has focused on questioning the 'truths' of this association through developing alternative data or post-structural critique (Bacchi 2009, 58; Cuervo and Wyn 2016; Kumsa et al. 2013, 848; Lombard 2013, 1140; Sercombe 2003, 26; Swartz and Scott 2013, 325; White and Wyn 2011, 247). These approaches are yet to capitalise on the problematisation of violence that is being developed within the emerging sociology of violence (Walby 2013, 101) which, as I argue throughout this thesis, is an oversight. To date, these approaches to understanding and critiquing the association between youth and violence have been primarily limited to physical conceptions of violence and have not integrated structural, cultural and symbolic violence. In contrast, this thesis draws on insights from the sociology of violence regarding the nature of violence outside of a subject-object relationship (Galtung 1969, 171). This approach enables an understanding of hyper-governed young people's experiences of violation in modernity in systemic, structural, cultural and symbolic forms. In espousing an appreciation for the multiplicity of violence in modernity, I challenge the dominant narrative of youth as a transition away from violent 'animalistic and uncontrollable' (Wyn and White 1997, 19) behaviour. Instead, I argue that youth can be conceptualised as an induction into sanctioned forms of violence. The governing violence of neoliberalism attempts to render young people docile. Hence 'youth' can be understood as a social construction—an artefact—of this violence which governs, and the power-knowledge dynamics that regulate violence. Youth is an artefact of governing violence.

In this thesis, I employ a 'method assemblage' (Law 2004, 14) that focuses on the collection,

analysis and promotion of young people's stories. This method assemblage is concerned with making 'present' (Law 2004, 83) the complexity and contingency of young people's situated experiences. It equally advances the connection between these situated experiences and the exclusionary structural discourses of youth. To connect the situated to the structural, I draw on Law's assertion that knowledge is allegorical (2004, 88). This is the idea that the findings about a specific phenomenon mean more than what is being explicitly said. In part, this is because social phenomena are complex and cannot be separated into isolated elements and studied objectively. The stories told by hyper-governed young people are thick with 'wicked problems' (Rittel and Webber 1973, 162; Valentine 2015, 243; Watts 2013, 2015). These problems by nature are not easily understood or solved. They do not have clear boundaries; rather, they are messy and contingent. As such, in order to represent the wicked nature of hyper-governed young people's stories, a messy, contingent and politically explicit method is required (Law 2004, 2). Examining hyper-governed young people's stories is an important avenue for uncovering and representing this complexity. As listeners or readers witness the story, they can develop solidarity with the young person's experience, and dominant narratives can be challenged through critical thinking (Freire 2014, 44).

In addition to a *method assemblage* I will employ what might be called a *theory assemblage* to analyse this mess and contingency. My first academic allegiance is to young people and the emancipatory goals of critical sociology, rather than a specific theoretical or methodological paradigm. As such I employ diverse analytics of power that enable these goals, including: governmentality (Bacchi 2009; Foucault 1986; Foucault et al. 1991; Foucault and Gordon 1980; Kelly 2010; Kelly and Kamp 2014), labelling theory (Becker 1953, 1963, 1967), Marxist theories of deviance (Spitzer 1975; Wacquant 2001), and feminist insights into the interconnected nature of oppression (Irvine 2008; Strega 2005; Taylor 2012).

I acknowledge the need for coherence in scholarship, except in cases where the focus of study defies coherence (Law 2004, 15). To impose rigid boundaries where there are none would be to change the focus of study for the sake of academic priorities. This would be an injustice.

Law (2004) concedes that this ‘vagueness’ in method and theoretical frameworks can be positioned as a sign of weakness. However, like Law, I argue that this is not necessarily the case. Rather, it is my position that social sciences need to grapple with vagueness, messiness and contingency as ‘*much of the world is enacted this way*’ (emphasis in original) (Law 2004, 14).

This thesis prioritises young people’s stories in order to promote solidarity and critical consciousness. Hence, it is appropriate to begin this thesis with a young person’s story. The following story is not *true* because it *happened*, but because it *happens*. It is not simply a singular young person’s story. It is a useful starting point because the experience is ‘widely shared’ (MacDonald et al. 2001, 5.8). In other words, this is a typical story in the life of hyper-governed young people.

> James is 17 years old. He lives alone in a one-bedroom unit in a block of government flats. James is accustomed to being alone. He is in the child protection system, and has been through every kind of state-provided care. At times this has included the juvenile detention system.

One night James woke to the sounds of people in his home. He got up and found that a group of people had broken down his door and were stealing his TV and gaming console. Noticing James, the intruders fled, pausing only to bash and threaten him.

The next morning, James' youth worker arrives at his home to find him sitting in the wreckage of this lounge room. They start talking and the youth worker encourages James to report the incident to police. He doesn't want to. Police have not always been a positive or safe presence in James' life. He would rather seek his own kind of justice. In his words, he is 'going hunting'.

Concerned for James' wellbeing, the youth worker tries to engage him in a conversation about other ways to solve the problem. The youth worker describes an idea called restorative justice and explains the value of the practice in terms of what he calls 'Fair Process'. It becomes clear that there is a disconnect between James' experience and that of the youth worker. James responds: 'Mate, that might make sense in your world, but it doesn't in mine'.

James' world has been dominated by governmental programs designed to keep him safe or manage violence (both his and that of others). These programs include: child protection, alternative education, juvenile

> detention, anger management, counselling, case management etc. These are programs in which he has had little control or influence. Decisions were often made for him. Outcomes where often not of his choosing; processes have rarely been fair.

> The conversation between James and the youth worker grinds to a stop. The disconnect between their experiences is too large to bridge. Getting up to leave, the youth worker promises to call later that day to check in. Later that afternoon, James answers his phone. It's the youth worker. James quickly ends the call, as he is busy 'hunting'.

There is a clear tension in this story between the young person's and the youth worker's experiences of violence, and the preferred response. The desire to better understand young people's experiences, or worlds, is the impetus that drove me to undertake the research upon which this thesis is based, and led to the following research questions:

- How do hyper-governed young people experience and understand neoliberal violence in modernity?
- How do hyper-governed young people evaluate the principles of 'Fair Process' as a guide for service provision to young people?
- How are hyper-governed young people responding to and resisting neoliberal violence?

Young people are routinely subjected to governing policies and programs that are designed

by adults. These policies and programs are consistently out of step with the experiences of young people (White and Wyn 2011, 116). Hence frameworks such as Fair Process need to be subjected to evaluation from a young person's perspective. Furthermore, they need to be evaluated in terms of the values of traditional social and public services, such as justice and participation. Tait argues that young people are subjected to governmental programs at the intersection of diverse problematisations and expertise (Tait 1993a, 5). Youth is produced through a vast array of laws, cultural norms, and academic disciplines. Each of these and their unique constructions of youth intersect and overlap in the phenomenon *youth*. As such there is a need to not simply evaluate a particular program itself, but to interrogate the theory of youth that underpins it (Bacchi 2009, 34). There is a need for young people, youth workers and youth studies to claim the right to the formulation of the problem, not just the proposed solution, and also to consider how it is that these principles come to guide youth service provision. This project is an opportunity to question the appropriateness of Fair Process in social services, or if it merely represents an alignment with a neoliberal governmental agenda. This means investigating the conceptualisations of youth and violence that underpin Fair Process. It also means examining the context in which youth services operate. In this instance, that means examining the effects of hollowed out, neoliberal governance of youth services in countries like Australia.

In investigating the research questions I have posed above, I will shed light on young people's experiences of neoliberal violence. In doing this, I will also illuminate the modern experiences young people have of youth. Finally, this project is motivated by an ethical orientation towards understanding young people as active citizens. As such there is an obligation to investigate not only how young people are claiming their right to the problem, but also how they are responding to the experience of neoliberal violence.

Hyper-governed young people

This thesis positions young people as active citizens, and challenges popular discourses of youth which position them as passive or apathetic. However, it must be acknowledged that youth is an intensely governed period (Kelly and Kamp 2014, 7–8). Young people experience asymmetrically high levels of social and institutional regulation and control. The dominant narrative of youth is one of transition (Kelly 2011, 50; White and Wyn 2011, 9); the transition of 'becoming' adults (Kelly 2011, 50). At the centre of this narrative is exclusion (Sercombe 2010, 20). In this narrative, young people 'have not yet assimilated the dominant social codes' (Sercombe 2010, 19). Wyn and White argue that in the 1990s in Australia young people were portrayed as irrational and undeveloped to justify the management these tendencies through 'state intervention, control and protection' (1997, 19). Whilst youth is popularly conceptualised as an age-based measure (Wyn and White 1997, 10), the parameters of youth are socially, culturally and politically dependent (Sercombe 2010, 20; Wyn and White 1997, 19). The label 'too young' is a social indicator of a young person's compliance with social norms, not an objective age measure (Sercombe 2010, 19). For example, people under 18 years of age in Australia are regularly denied the right to independently drive a car, rent a house, or vote in an election. Yet, it is common for young people who live on farms to safely drive farm machinery. Young carers manage homes and their families. Young people frequently become actively involved in social and political issues. These young people are not prevented from doing these activities based on their age. Age is an arbitrary signifier of socially, culturally and politically constructed expectations of 'normal' adult behaviour. Therefore, *youth* in this thesis is understood as a socially constructed category; a period of transition through which young people are excluded from full participation in society (i.e. the rights and responsibilities of adulthood).

Youth continues to be an important subject of research and study. As such there is a growing body of knowledge about this period (Kelly 2010, 302). This knowledge frames and positions youth in particular ways, and young people are governed as a result of the subjectifying effects of this knowledge (Bacchi 2009, 16). For example, information is routinely gathered about young people through schools. This includes information about: attendance, appearance, achievement, classroom behaviour, suspensions, mental health and peer relationships. This knowledge positions young people as students and youth as a period of education. Kelly argues that, after 150 years of compulsory schooling in Australia, it is almost absurd to think of young people as anything other than students (Kelly 2010, 311). However, it also positions them in terms of being 'at-risk' of a range of 'risk factors': family breakdown, learning difficulties, mental health issues, behavioural issues, peer pressure, disability, poor nutrition, etc. Te Riele argues that the tag 'at-risk' is so prevalent in education that it no longer requires justification or explanation (2006, 130). This 'at-risk' discourse positions young people as responsible for failing to complete the requisite education, and furthermore achieve accreditation into adulthood (Sercombe 2010, 19). Hence, a variety of formal and informal programs are developed to manage these risks: breakfast programs, peer mentoring, wellbeing support services, case management, counselling, and behavioural interventions. Whilst these services offer a range of supports that young people routinely access to their benefit, it is also possible to see the intense level of servicing and regulation of youth as a result of the knowledge developed about them.

This same process of knowledge collection and service provision is replicated in a variety of other institutions including: child protection; juvenile justice; sports clubs; housing services;

youth and community services; local, state and federal governments, and many more. This governmentalisation of youth, and its implications for the governing of young people, is a growing concern to sociologists (Anderson 2014, 578; Kelly 2010, 310; Pike 2014, 92; Woodman and Threadgold 2011, 9). Kelly argues that the collection of knowledge about young people's 'behaviours and dispositions' is 'impelled by concerns of certainty and mastery and order' (2010, 310). These ways of knowing and thinking (mentalities) about young people shape the ways in which they are governed. Furthermore, Kelly argues that the purpose of developing knowledge about young people is to govern them (Kelly 2010, 302). Hence the increasing collection of knowledge acts to govern-mentalise youth. Young people and the period of youth continue to evoke moral panics as sub-cultures, and their practices are (mis)interpreted as a threat to the mainstream (France and Threadgold 2015, 618; Wang and Edwards 2016, 1205; White and Wyn 2011, 53). As the ever-increasing cache of knowledge about youth continues to grow, the servicing and governing of young people—and the supposed threat they present to the mainstream—become both more targeted and more pervasive.

The network of governing programs around youth is not always explicit and visible. Rather it is a disseminated and subtle network that often is carried out by governmental proxies and by outsourced service providers. Foucault called this the 'carceral network' (Foucault 1979, 310). This network constitutes an 'inexpensive form of police' (Spitzer 1975, 644) and includes teachers, doctors, lawyers and youth workers. As the welfare state is 'hollowed out' (Rhodes 1994, 138), government is increasingly becoming the purchaser, rather than the provider of services (Healy 2009, 402). Wacquant argues that neoliberalism is 'substituting judges for social workers and educators' to warn and educate young people away from

breaking the law (Wacquant 2001, 407). Furthermore, he argues that the modern neoliberal state can be 'characterised as "liberal-paternalist"' (401). It is liberal in economic terms as it prioritises market freedoms. However, it is paternalistic—and, as argued by Wacquant, punitive—towards social values and state protections (401). As such, simply saying the state is 'hollowing out' can be vague and interpreted as a movement towards small government.

I do not use it in this way in this thesis. Instead I argue that, rather than government reducing in size, it is the values of the welfare state that are being 'hollowed out'. Neither is it my intention to uncritically position the welfare state in nostalgic, positive terms in contrast to a negative neoliberal state. However, government is being transformed through this hollowing out and my argument is focused on the effects of this shift towards a broader, market-based carceral network. Wacquant (2001) argues that the people who were calling for the 'end of big government' (401) are the same people who are 'glorifying the penal state today' (401). As such, the paternalistic governing of young people is being done by teachers, youth workers and community justice programs through marketised social services justified by liberal economic values.

The marketisation of social services under liberal-paternalist neoliberalism has a deprofessionalisation effect (Healy 2009, 402; Seibel and Anheier 1990a, 8). Hollowed-out social services align with the political valuing of efficiency, in place of traditional public-sector values such as participation, justice and equity (Skelcher 2000, 13; Taylor 2000, 53). Hence, this marketisation at the level of service provision puts pressure on the critical and emancipatory goals of social welfare professions (Healy 2009, 402; Wallace and Pease 2011, 137). The capacity of service providers to resist government direction is questionable (Taylor

2000, 51), as competitive tendering requires a focus on 'what works' (Taylor 2000, 48; Wachtel 2013, 26). This in turn places pressure on individual professionals as they attempt to outwork their profession's principles, and also on the training providers tasked with equipping these workers for a marketised sector. As government services are outsourced, young people are regulated and controlled by a multiplicity of government and nongovernment agents and agencies.

In addition to the outsourcing of services traditionally provided by government, there is mounting evidence of the failure of institutional forms of governmental control such as the juvenile justice system. Australian juvenile justice systems feature recidivism rates upward of 50 per cent (Payne 2007, xi). This means that for more than half the time, justice systems fail to prevent cycles of crime. Furthermore, Lipsey's (2009) Standardised Program Evaluation Protocol (SPEP) meta-analysis of juvenile crime prevention programs found that deterrence and surveillance-style programs had a net negative effect on the crime rate (139). They *increased* the overall instances of crime and reoffending. In contrast, Lipsey's study of 548 independent study samples (128) found that counselling, case management and restorative justice programs had a net positive effect on recidivism (139). Those programs being adopted by nongovernment youth and community service agencies are also best described as a kind of social control (Bazemore 1997, 201; 2001, 201; White 2003, 145; White and Wyn 2011, 167). Rather than relying on punitive state intervention, these approaches draw on social norms and relationship influence to produce conformity. Hence, government objectives regarding the regulation and control of young people are also met through nongovernment agencies.

Young people are regulated formally by the state through the child protection, juvenile justice and education systems. However, they are also governed in less institutional ways through nongovernment organisations (NGOs) serving a range of social, political, cultural and economic objectives (i.e. mental health services, housing services, employment services, drug and alcohol services, etc.). Finally, they are governed still further through informal social processes: parenting, peer relationships, self-development, multi-media messages, etc.

The combined result of these social forces is an intensive governing of the period that is youth. However, youth is not an equally governed period. Some young people attract attention and regulation additional to that experienced by others. There are some young people who more regularly register in the carceral network or who explicitly clash with the state. Young people who are involved in political activism are actively advocating for change in governing systems. Participating in such activity increases the contact and conflict an average young person might have with the state. This contact and conflict attracts heightened levels of surveillance and detention. However, this is not necessarily all one way: i.e. from government to young person. For example, young people involved in nonviolent direct action will often utilise government surveillance, media and incarceration as deliberate strategies to draw the attention of the wider populace to their cause.

Young people participating in political activism are a small section of a broader group of young people in contact with the legal justice system. Young people in contact with the juvenile justice system are another important cohort who experience higher levels of regulation. Likewise, the child protection system executes a high level of control and regulation over young people. Arguably the governance of these two government agencies

(child protection and juvenile justice) can be conceptualised as having opposing purposes. The juvenile justice system governs violence done *by* young people, whilst the child protection system governs violence done *to* young people. However, unfortunately the reality is that secure care (both detention and protection) is often a site of violence *to* young people (Daly 2014, 6), and this violence can be done *by* other young people. As such, the distinction between *to* and *by* is not clear. What is clear is that whilst there might be a range of systems that govern violence and youth, the young people involved in activism, and in the child protection and justice systems, are subject to amplified regulation. These young people are highly governed during the already intensively governed period of youth. These are *hyper-governed* young people.

It is important to note here that in this thesis I deliberately attempt to position this cohort of young people in positive terms. The heightened regulation of these hyper-governed individuals is not necessarily justified. Moreover, it is my intention to position these young people as active agents in the creation of their social world, and subjects in the co-creation of knowledge: they are reciprocally active in governing themselves and others. I acknowledge however, the irony that this research, and the category hyper-governed, is inescapably an adult product. *Hyper-governed* is a term I have developed to describe this group of young people. It is not a term that emerged out of the data. It was not used by the young people in their interviews. Later, in the chapter on methods, I investigate in greater detail the importance of engaging young people as active subjects, not objects of research. Next, however, it is necessary to achieve some greater clarity about the violating phenomenon experienced by hyper-governed young people: neoliberal violence.

Neoliberal violence

In 2014 Giroux described the mounting physical, structural and systemic violence young people are met with in modernity as 'neoliberal violence' (2014, 226). As described earlier, neoliberal violence is the violating experience of inequality resulting from the hollowing out of the welfare state and social services. Giroux is concerned with the 'merging of violence and governance' (Giroux 2014, 226) through which young people are encountering increasing state-sanctioned violence. The 'hollowing out' of the welfare state is an abandonment of the promises of education, employment and security afforded to previous generations (Giroux 2014, 226). It is a violation by governments of the social contract underpinning collective governance. MacDonald (2016) as well as Cuervo and Wyn (2016) likewise describe the violating impact of the growing precarity of youth unemployment, or more importantly under-employment, where the young people today are no longer deemed worthy to receive the support previously provided (Te Riele 2006, 132; Wyn and Woodman 2007, 504). Furthermore, the 'structural violence of predatory capitalism' (Giroux 2014, 227) undermines human dignity and instead promotes 'a culture of violence, cruelty, and disposability' (226). Rather than being provided with support through secure transitions from education to work, young people are left to the mercy of the market. In a 'culture of violence, cruelty, and disposability' (226), young people are ruthlessly culled if they fail to meet the most narrow and impossible standards. Furthermore, the fabrication of a state of permanent 'war' against drugs, terror or immigration legitimises organised violence, patriotism and militarism (Giroux 2014, 227). This discourse of violence infuses the liberal-paternalist rationale of the neoliberal state, which underpins the surrendering of young people to the cruelty of the market. Neoliberal violence describes the violation experienced as a result of the complex cultural, economic and political reality that young people encounter in modernity.

This broader conceptualisation of violence in terms of violation and in the context of neoliberalism provides the vocabulary with which to analyse the violence experienced by hyper-governed young people. This understanding of violence as violation is unpacked further in the literature review, where I also further justify the delineation of neoliberal violence as a unique form of violence. However, it must be acknowledged here that neoliberalism is a 'notoriously fuzzy category' (Watts 2013, 117); it is a complex and multifaceted political reality. As Dean argues, neoliberalism is 'irreducible to a simple and coherent philosophy or ideology' (2014, 151). As such, I dedicate part of the literature review to positioning this thesis with regard to the literature around neoliberalism. However, it should also be noted that this topic contains significant complexity such that, whilst it will receive attention in the following chapter, it will not be the focus, as this would detract from the key purpose of my research inquiry.

One important implication of this dominant political ideology is the marketisation of social services. The example in focus in this thesis is the use of Fair Process in restorative practices. The hollowing out of the welfare state and the rise of neoliberalism has seen the outsourcing of government services to the NGO sector (Rhodes 1994, 138), and the outsourcing of government objectives and values to this social services sector (Taylor 2000, 51). Youth services adopt practice frameworks that align them with the neoliberal objectives of government, in order to secure government contracts (Skelcher 2000, 8). This places pressure on services to prioritise efficiency over participation by and justice for young people. As such, justice-oriented frameworks such as restorative justice can be compromised. It is this subversion of justice and participation in youth services that is the manifestation of the neoliberal violence in focus in this thesis. This neoliberal violence is done *to* young people,

and it shapes the violence done *by* them.

Restorative practices and Fair Process

Restorative justice and restorative practices have been developed as a formalised set of practices and principles through the work of theorists and practitioners including Zehr (1995, 2002a; 2002b, 3), Braithwaite (1989, 1997, 1999, 2000), Daly (2001, 2002), O'Connell (2001), Wachtel (2012, 2; 2013) and White (2013). The history of restorative justice internationally is contested, including its connections with origin myths based in Indigenous practices (Daly 2002, 61–3). Its theoretical foundations are often located in the sociology of deviance (Braithwaite 1989, 16; 1999, 42) and affect-psychology (Wachtel 2012, 2). Restorative justice has a unique approach to justice in its focus on harm and the restoration of relationships (Wachtel 2012, 4; Zehr 2002b, 19). Restorative practices take the principles and values of restorative justice and apply them to a broader set of practices; i.e. education, youth work, social work, etc. (Braithwaite 1999, 42; Wachtel 2012, 2).

In 2013, South Australia acknowledged the 20th anniversary of incorporating restorative justice conferencing with young people into the legal justice system. In 1993 South Australia was the first state in Australia to legislate for such conferencing to be included in the hierarchy of responses to youth crime (Daly and Hayes 2001, 2). All the other states and territories of Australia have since adopted similar restorative justice conferencing processes (Joudo-Larsen 2014, vi). Furthermore, restorative practices are being adopted by NGOs to deliver services to young people that are not directly related to justice issues, for example: services in education settings or for case management. This framework is theoretically

attractive to NGOs (White and Wyn 2011, 167) as the restorative justice approach focuses on the harm that has occurred, as compared to punitive practices that focus on what rules the young people have broken (Wenzel et al. 2008, 375; White and Graham 2013, 44). The interest is in healing, rather than punishment (Van Wormer 2009, 107). Therefore, this approach aligns well with the philosophical and theoretical orientations of nongovernment youth services.

Zehr (2002b) provides an astute contrast between the restorative justice and the dominant punitive justice paradigm. A punitive justice approach conceptualises crime, or more broadly wrongdoing, as a violation of rules and law. This approach asks the question: 'Who is to blame?' Once blame is apportioned, punishment is distributed to the guilty party (Zehr 2002b, 21). In contrast, a restorative approach views crime and wrongdoing as a violation of people and interpersonal relationships. As such, it asks: 'Who has been hurt?' and 'What are their needs?' These violations create obligations. Instead of asking who needs to be punished, a restorative approach asks: 'Whose obligations are these?' The central obligation is repairing harm (Zehr 2002b, 21). This framing of wrong-doing positions restorative practices as a framework focused on building and repairing relationships.

As an alternative to punitive government-centric control, restorative practices are an informal social system of control (Bazemore 1997, 201; 2001, 201; White 2003, 145; White and Wyn 2011, 167). Wyn and White have argued that restorative processes shape young people to conform with social and political norms (Wyn and White 2000, 174). Furthermore, in describing the underpinning of reintegrative shaming theory, Braithwaite specifically identifies young people (15–25 years) as a primary target group (1989, 101). They are a primary target for reintegrative shaming on the basis that during this age, 'life circumstances'

exist that produce decreased interdependency (101). Braithwaite is claiming that young people aged 15 to 25 years have less relational connectivity, and as such are less likely to conform to social norms. He claims they need to be influenced to conform through relationships via 'reintegrative shaming' (1989, 54). Braithwaite provides little evidence to support this claim about young people's relational connectivity and propensity for deviant behaviour. It reflects a popular discourse of teenagers as being rebellious and risky, which justifies their regulation and discipline. White and Wyn point out that these types of social control are asymmetrically employed with working class, Indigenous and ethnic minority groups (White and Wyn 2011, 167). These are groups that regularly evoke undue political and public concern. Hence, restorative justice processes are used as a means to control 'risky' youth populations. Effectively, restorative practices are an informal avenue for social control.

As the ineffectiveness of traditional punitive forms of state control are acknowledged, social services competing in a marketised government-funded sector are embracing alternative social controls. In addition to being theoretically attractive, frameworks such as restorative justice are also considered 'financially prudent' (White and Wyn 2011, 167). Restorative practices are not reliant on expensive experts or slow-moving bureaucracies. These practices are underpinned by an orientation towards community leadership, and facilitation of its processes by ordinary people without the requirement for formal qualifications. This creates the potential for diverse implementation practices and theoretical interpretations (Barton 2003, 63). How restorative practices are implemented is critical to the success of their framework. The style and skills of a practitioner, as well as the context, is integral to the participant's experience. Hence these forms of social control can be performed by community members, undermining the need for professional workers who have critical thinking skills

and emancipatory obligations.

In addition, marketised funding arrangements place a deprofessionalisation pressure on human services that, Healy (2009, 402) as well as Wallace and Pease (2011, 137) argue, results in the suppression of social critique and the profession's emancipatory goals. In the political environment of the hollowed-out welfare state, there is a bent towards ‘methodological pragmatism’ (Taylor 2000, 48), and pressure towards ‘what works’ (Wachtel 2013, 26). This can result in youth services’ aligning to dominant political and ethical values. This political pressure facilitates the potential adoption of other theoretically similar, yet politically distinct, practices and processes. One important example of this is the inclusion of the principles of ‘Fair Process’ into restorative practices.

The most notable advocates for Fair Process are Wachtel (2012, 6; 2013, 8) and O’Connell (2010, 24). The central claim by these advocates is that when the principles of Fair Process guide participation in decision making processes people are ‘happier, cooperative and productive’ as those in authority work ‘with’ people rather than doing things ‘to’ them (Wachtel 2013, 8). Kim and Mauborgne, in their research ‘Fair process: Managing in the knowledge economy’ (2003), identified three principles for creating a ‘fair process’:

- Engagement — involving individuals in decisions by inviting their input and encouraging them to challenge one another’s ideas;
- Explanation — clarifying the thinking behind a final decision; and
- Expectation clarity — stating the new rules of the game, including performance

standards, penalties for failure, and new responsibilities.
(Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 1)

According to their findings, when these principles are implemented 'individuals are most likely to trust and cooperate freely with systems' (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 6). Kim and Mauborgne support their findings by drawing on examples of workforce downsizing within an elevator manufacturing company, as well as 'a study of strategic decision making in multinational corporations' (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 4). Kim and Mauborgne's work is firmly placed within the business sector and arguably within the values of neoliberalism. Their main priority is to design efficient management processes for a 'knowledge-based economy' (2003, 3). As such, any application of Fair Process within social services should invite scepticism, and a critical examination of how the priorities and values of Fair Process and youth services could possibly be aligned.

To date, there has been no significant critique of this alignment between Fair Process and restorative practices, particularly in terms of an analysis of power. Given that the theoretical foundation of restorative practices lies in the sociology of deviance and its focus on young people, it is appropriate that this critique be developed within a critical sociology of youth. Fair Process can be conceptualised as an example of the 'merging of violence and governance' (Giroux 2014, 226), which raises concerns about its parallels to Giroux's 'neoliberal violence'. The principles of Fair Process are designed to guide participation in decision making, however they are embedded in a market logic, and are not developed around principles of justice and participation. If restorative practices are a social form of control, then they are implicated in the broad 'carceral network' of governing. Furthermore,

one consequence of social services utilising the principles of Fair Process is the importation of market logic into this context. With the principles of Fair Process come the prioritisation of efficiency rooted within neoliberalism. This reflects the hollowing out of welfare services (Rhodes 1994, 138), and the manufacture of cultures of cruelty, disposability and violence (Giroux 2014, 226).

The principles of Fair Process might, for example, guide the practice of youth workers in an alternative accommodation service. Under the guidance of these principles, the young people living in the provided accommodation might be engaged (principle 1) in an exchange of ideas around how the site is managed. This might, for example, involve a discussion regarding a curfew by which residents must be home. Following the principles of Fair Process, after the exchange of ideas, the youth work staff would decide on the best solution and explain (principle 2) the reasons for this decision. For example, they might decide everyone has to be home by 8 pm before the change of staff for the night shift. This is a logical time to reduce complications during a handover between the staff, thereby reducing paperwork and overlap between the two shifts. Finally, clear expectations (principle 3) and consequences for missing the curfew would need to be communicated.

The central concern in my thesis is how hyper-governed young people experience and understand the principles of Fair Process. Do they experience this process as *fair and just*, or do they experience it as a *violating* process? If it is viewed as a violating process, this implicates it in the broader evolution of neoliberalism with its structural and systemic violence. In this thesis, particularly in chapter 5, I use Fair Process to bring into focus hyper-governed young people's experiences and understandings of neoliberal violence in modernity

in general. This example also enables me to illustrate the governing forces that construct youth as an artefact of governing violence. This is violence done *to* young people that governs them—and that shapes (or governs) violence done *by* young people.

Summarising the argument

Youth is an intensively governed period. Youth is a phenomenon in the West that is seemingly inevitably tied to a narrative of transition and discourses of violence. Young people are disproportionately represented in violence statistics and are also unequally subject to programs that govern violence. Furthermore, youth is a product of exclusion: a category whereby young people are marginalised from participation in adult society. Kelly (2010) contends that youth is an 'artefact of expertise' (312). He is arguing that the institutionalised production of knowledge about youth produces particular understandings of youth and populations of young people (309–10). Knowledge is generated about young people for the purpose of governing them (Kelly 2010, 302). Young people are subjected to dual discourses that position them as simultaneously 'animalistic and uncontrollable', as well as vessels of hope for the future—and hence in need of careful protection (Bessant 2011, 64; Wyn and White 1997, 19). But, young people are not simply potential future citizens; they are valuable citizens now. Young people have a unique perspective of, and therefore can make a unique contribution to, our understanding of neoliberal violence and violence in general. This thesis is about examining and promoting hyper-governed young people's perspectives on neoliberal violence as a unique and important viewpoint. Theirs is a perspective that is systematically excluded.

My central argument in this thesis is that *youth* is an artefact of governing violence. Hyper-governed young people are governed by violence. This violence is experienced in physical, systemic, structural and symbolic forms. This violation regulates young people's violence. The violence done *to* young people shapes the violence done *by* them. As such, hyper-governed young people find themselves conforming to sanctioned forms of violence in order to graduate into adulthood. This is the process of youth in modernity: the creation of a docility in young people towards the violence of predatory capitalism and the violation of systemic inequality. However, hyper-governed young people are not passively accepting this reality. They are actively resisting it. They are searching for new language and discourses through which to enact alternatives. They are exercising resistance.

Insights obtained from 28 young people in Australia aged between 15 and 25 years form the foundation for the argument I present in this thesis: namely, that youth is an artefact of governing violence. In semi-structured interviews I conducted with these young people, they described their experiences of violence, as well as their experiments with resistance. In addition to experiencing the intense governing of youth, the young people who participated in this research were involved in the child protection and juvenile justice systems, or political activism. These associations attracted the governing apparatus of the state. They will be referred to in this thesis as *hyper-governed* young people.

The structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 following this introduction is a detailed literature review, in which I unpack in greater depth the key literature surrounding the critical sociology of youth, and the emerging

sociology of violence. Attention is also given to the evolution of restorative practices and the influence of liberal-paternalist neoliberalism on social services. With this overview I position the research at the intersection of these fields. Each field contains a significant body of existing scholarship. However, this research is unique in bringing them together to interrogate youth and neoliberal violence. I develop a theoretical assemblage at the intersection of these fields as the foundation for this project.

In chapters 3 and 4 I describe the 'method assemblage' (Law 2004, 14) developed to enact this investigation. The central concern in the development of this method is a flexibility to manage the mess and contingency inherent in the wicked nature of the problems encountered by hyper-governed young people. In chapter 3 I argue that the political, but also contingent, nature of conducting youth research requires a method assemblage that can simultaneously emphasise both the agency of young people and their structural oppression. To do this I draw on John Law's (2004) ideas of 'presence', 'absence' and the allegorical nature of knowledge. In chapter 4 I build on this foundation and consider the ethical and practical dimensions associated with young people's participation in this research. Through examining these dimensions, I argue for an understanding of youth participation as engaging in parallel projects. This interpretation of why young people participate in research creates an elastic space for the researcher to value and creatively respond to conflict that arises in the participation process. This flexibility and the eclectic nature of the methodology will be positioned as a strength, and essential for the conduct of research with young people on violence, rather than a methodological weakness (Law 2004, 14).

In the three major chapters dedicated to my research findings, I construct the central

argument of this thesis that violence done *to* young people shapes the violence done *by* them. Chapter 5 examines violence done *to* young people by focusing on the effects of neoliberal violence on restorative practices, and on young people. In chapter 6 I focus on violence done *by* young people, uncovering the conforming power relationships that render young people docile to sanctioned forms of violence. Chapter 7 completes the narrative arc with a return to the ethical positioning of young people as active and capable subjects. In chapter 7, I analyse hyper-governed young people's resistance to the cycle of violence done *to* and violence enacted *by*. The findings from the research are analysed simultaneous to their presentation, rather than being conveyed in separate sequential chapters. This approach facilitates the careful consideration of these three distinct but connected themes that emerged from the data. It also reinforces the presence of the participants, and enables a direct incorporation of their voices into the theorisation of their experiences.

Chapter 5 considers the first of these three themes: Violence done *to* young people: Fair Process and neoliberal violence in the hollowing out of social services. In this chapter I unpack hyper-governed young people's responses to the inclusion of Fair Process in restorative practices. I argue that young people experience the use of Fair Process as insufficient for addressing the wicked problems they encounter, such that they experience a subordinating effect resulting from the oversimplification of the issue of violence. This oversimplification denies them access to democratic participation in decision-making processes. It positions them as passive objects, rather than active subjects of these processes. Hence, I argue that the inclusion of the principles of Fair Process in restorative practices is a key example of the effects of neoliberalism on youth services and the production of neoliberal violence. This chapter also contains a reflexive consideration of the role critical

youth sociology plays in reinforcing or challenging the abstraction of youth. This abstraction facilitates the over-simplification of wicked problems and the exclusion of young people. This, in turn, facilitates the adoption of ideas like the principles of Fair Process by youth services and the experience of violation produced by neoliberal violence.

The second theme, explored in chapter 6, is violence by young people: youth as an artefact of governing violence. This chapter is centred around hyper-governed young people's experiences of the crushing ubiquitous mythology of neoliberal violence in modernity. The all-pervasive multiplicity of violence acts on young people to shape and form the violence done by them. In this chapter I draw on the experiences of hyper-governed young people to argue that youth is a process of conforming to the norms of violence. This argument counters the narrative that young people are inherently violent. Instead I argue that young people conform to sanctioned forms of violence as a signifier of their transition into adulthood. Youth therefore is an artefact—a product—of violence that governs young people. It is also an artefact of young people's violence being governed into sanctioned forms. In positing that youth is an artefact of violence, I argue that the violence done *by* young people is a product of the violence done *to* young people.

The final chapter on the research findings completes the arc of the *violence done to and violence done by* narrative, presenting the argument that hyper-governed young people actively resist the conforming power of violence through the discursive techniques of 'democratised surveillance', 'voluntary occupation' and 'governmentalising the self'. My argument in chapter 6 has the potential to convey an image of hyper-governed young people as passive or submissive to the dynamics of violence. However, in chapter 7 I correct this

image by going on to analyse the methods of resistance employed by hyper-governed young people and repositioning them as active and capable agents of change. In their interviews, the hyper-governed young people described a range of techniques they employ to resist violence. Whilst the techniques they use are creative and diverse, I will argue that they can be organised under one unifying scheme. Hyper-governed young people employ *discursive resistance* in the hope of finding new language and discourses. These new discourses enable them to speak into existence their vision of a democratic society free from violence. These forms of resistance might be judged more, or less, violent. However, I argue they represent a discursive struggle that starts by acknowledging the deficit of language available to the young people. Finally, in this chapter I also reflexively consider the role that academics and professionals play in supporting or undermining this discursive resistance.

To conclude, I summarise in the final chapter of this thesis the narrative of my argument and original contribution to knowledge. I also clarify (1) the implications for further research and for policy and practice. I additionally identify potential further research opportunities within (2) the limitations of this research project. Finally, I outline (3) the future direction for the line of inquiry pursued here which seeks to capitalise on themes that unexpectedly emerged from the data. These are themes that demanded immediate attention in this thesis, however, they also deserve attention in future research.

In 1967 Howard Becker posed the question to his academic peers in the sociology of deviance: 'whose side are we on?' In doing this he was staking a claim that his research, and by extension all research, is not politically neutral. Rather, as Strega argues, all research is political (2005, 207). Law and Urry suggest that academics need to locate themselves

politically or else risk ‘wrongly collude[ing] in the enactment of dominant realities’ (Law and Urry 2004, 399). As such, when I argue in this thesis that youth is an artefact of governing violence, my orientation is towards viewing young people as inherently valuable and capable full citizens. Violence is identified as an experience of violation and therefore is understood as a negative phenomenon, and governing of young people is something that *happens*, not something that necessarily needs to *happen*. This set of orientations positions me as a researcher and this research in opposition to governing young people through violence, and the indoctrination of young people into violence. I argue that violence done *to* young people shapes violence *by* young people. This is an argument that, firstly, acknowledges that young people are subjected *to* violence. The violence done *by* young people is a product of the internalisation of the dominant mythology of neoliberal violence. However, as I have already said, my orientation towards young people in this work is hopeful and optimistic. I therefore have an ethical obligation to present my second original contribution; namely, the repositioning of young people as active in resisting being governed with such violence. Hyper-governed young people are experimenting with discursive resistance. They are actively pursuing new ways to know their world and speak hopeful alternatives into being.

Chapter 2 — Literature review: Locating the messy and contingent study of youth and neoliberal violence

Guiding this thesis through a consideration of the complex and contingent experiences of violence and youth are the voices of hyper-governed young people. However, first there is a need to turn to theory that can provide frameworks for analysing such experiences. Law (2004) uses a topographical metaphor to describe the knowledge practices that construct divisions of scientific knowledge. He uses the term 'hinterland' to described the cumulative knowledge within an academic discipline that underpins and defines the logic and ways of knowing within that discipline (2004, 27). This metaphor is useful for integrating experience and theory, and conceptualising the relationship between them. This thesis is theoretically located at the nexus of the critical sociology of youth and the emerging sociology of violence. In writing it, I have drawn on the frameworks and hinterlands of these fields and constructed a landscape that is yet to be fully explored. Law's metaphor is also useful here to help describe the emergent nature of this area of inquiry and the complexity that is inherent within it.

Hyper-governed young people are the guides through the landscape of this thesis, and their voices will be prioritised in later chapters. In this current chapter, I locate the thesis at the convergence of two orientating theoretical features of the scholarly traditions of the critical sociology of youth and the emerging sociology of violence. To apply Law's (2004) topographical metaphor, I have drawn upon young people's experiences to construct many of the qualities of this thesis landscape, and also recruited relevant theory to provide important orientating features. Brought together, the young people's experiences and the theory have co-created and colonised this space. What is unique about the field of critical youth sociology

is its focus on the structural aspects of youth, in contrast to its cultural aspects. This structural approach is the primary focus in this thesis. The inescapable notion of youth as transition, within existing fields that study youth, is dominated by an interest in the pathway from education to employment. The notion of transition and the disruption of the education to employment pathway are useful starting points for the exploration of violence in youth in this thesis. However, I will augment my consideration of the themes of transition and access to social goods, like education and employment, with a discussion of the structural, symbolic and cultural conceptualisations of violence drawn from the emerging sociology of violence.

I will start my hike through these conceptual hinterlands by describing the landscape and knowledge traditions of critical youth sociology. An important starting point is the recent work by Kelly and Kamp (2014): *A Critical Youth Studies for the 21st Century*. Whilst the title of the work suggests a broader 'youth studies' focus, the volume is notably populated by youth sociologists who explicitly locate their work in this field. This work is a useful place to start this exploration of the literature, as it efficiently introduces two of the central guiding themes within both this field and my thesis: governmentality and method assemblage. I will bridge these seemingly divergent fields, critical youth sociology and the sociology of violence, by engaging with the complexity and contingency they both share. Watts' (2014) 'wicked problems' and Giroux's 'neoliberal violence' are the way-points here. Both wicked problems and neoliberal violence introduce complexifying factors to the popular discourses of youth violence that make the assumed association between young people and violence difficult to sustain.

The successful spanning of these fields will facilitate a careful consideration of the key

features of the emerging sociology of violence as described by Walby (2013). This setting is inhabited by a few key theorists, including Bourdieu and Galtung and their theories of violence, who reach beyond a simplistic subject-object relationship. Through a survey of the developing landscape of the sociology of violence, I will argue here that the modern phenomenon of 'neoliberal violence', coined by Giroux, deserves further systematic investigation. Its relevance to young people's experiences of violation is illuminating, particularly in reference to the relationship between youth and the modern neoliberal state. Finally, I will demonstrate that by bringing these fields together it is possible to fill a gap in the understanding of the relationship between youth and violence. I will examine this gap by considering the effect neoliberal violence has on and through a specific governing program: restorative practices. Hence in the final section of this chapter, I will trace the genealogy of the changes within the state that have resulted in the production of neoliberal violence, and the subsequent impact of these changes on restorative practices and youth participation. In doing so, I demonstrate the effects of neoliberal violence and the necessity of studying its impacts on young people and the period of youth in particular.

In connecting the hinterland of critical youth sociology and the emerging sociology of violence in this thesis, I present a new framework and landscape for the study of violation and neoliberal violence in/to youth. Consideration of the relationship between youth and violation within neoliberal violence is a gap in the existing literature. Furthermore, no researcher to date has investigated these phenomena using an approach that puts forward the expressed experiences of young people. In this chapter I bring these two fields together, point out the orientating features and demonstrate the need for this research.

Critical youth sociology

In compiling their 2014 publication *A Critical Youth Studies for the 21st Century*, the intention of Kelly and Kamp was to engage with the troubles of modern life that impact on young people and question what part a 'critical youth studies for the 21st century, might play in making it different' (Kelly and Kamp 2014, 4). Their concern is for the impacts that global dynamics have on young people, including mass human migration, the increasing threat of international conflict, as well as domestic issues such as economic instability, employment, education and housing. They go on to ask:

> After Marxism, after feminism, after the posts (structuralism, modernism, colonialism) have swept through the social and behavioural sciences what might a critical youth studies look like?
>
> (Kelly and Kamp 2014, 10)

Through asking these questions, Kelly and Kamp are attempting to discern and challenge the assumed, and popular, discourses of youth that enable young people's exclusion and oppression. The work presents a range of approaches and concerns explored by a diversity of scholars. Several of the authors in this volume (Nico 2014, 66; Walsh and Black 2014, 84; Woodman and Threadgold 2014, 565) raise questions about the purpose of *critical youth sociology* in the 21st century. One of the central challenges that consistently emerges through their musings is the need for this field 'to constantly refine its thinking and respond to and analyse the persistent patterns, trends and challenges confronting young people' (Walsh and Black 2014, 84). Kelly and Kamp identify two theoretical frameworks as particularly

important for engaging with this task in the 21st century: governmentality and method assemblage (5–11). These two frameworks are sociological in nature, and as such are important for the critical *sociology* of youth which I draw upon to frame my thesis. Kelly, Kamp and the other authors in this volume are not claiming to define precisely the future of the critical study of youth. Instead they hope their efforts will be understood as 'opening up the space' (Kelly and Kamp 2014, 10) in which 'complex and contradictory interplays' (Walsh and Black 2014, 84) might evolve.

Kelly and Kamp (2014) explain that governmentality studies pose important questions for youth studies in the 21st century. In their view, young people and youth have been subject to increasingly 'diverse forms of expertise, and of attempts by an array of expert systems to regulate, to govern the behaviours and dispositions' (7). They argue therefore that modern governing practices attempt to 'know better, and [therefore] regulate better' (8). Hence, they see the tools of governmentality studies as a way to challenge modern governing practices, but also to challenge modern knowledge production practices. This second challenge about knowledge production practices is a reflexive challenge to youth studies itself.

The second framework they identify is Law's (2004) 'method assemblage' (38). This methodological approach is again a reflexive challenge. However, it also 'opens up' the conversation about the focus, or the object, of study. Law's challenge about the nature of the object of study has implications for the process of studying it. Law argues—and Kelly and Kamp concur—that the objects of social science research are 'vague, diffuse or unspecific, slippery, emotional, ephemeral, elusive or indistinct' (Law 2004, 2), and are therefore not suited to 'rule-bound knowledge practices' (11). Those who wish to study young people and

the phenomenon of youth in a critical way in the 21st century must therefore acknowledge the complexity and contingency of youth and young people's lives. They must also adapt their methods if they wish to accurately reflect this slippery and ephemeral reality. There is a need for youth sociologists become comfortable with complexity and vagueness.

In spite of this, Law argues that social scientists do not produce works simply out of thin air, but rather must work 'with statements of a particular provenance' (Law 2004, 28). As Kelly and Kamp (2014) describe it, social science is not a work of fiction: 'We cannot just write what we want' (11). Instead, Kelly and Kamp endorse Law's 'hinterlands' metaphor (Law 2004, 27). Hinterlands, in this context, are a topographical illustration constructed of knowledge practices that determine the branch of scientific inquiry. Kelly and Kamp are arguing that there is a theoretical space within which the sociological study of youth and young people operates. This space is not completely defined; in fact, it is being defined, and re-defined, as those who study youth are engaged in it. The sociological study of youth is an exploratory field that cannot be completely mapped. However, the sociology of youth also has a history and it has a narrative. This history continues to shape and define the new features as they are being discovered. The hinterland metaphor also acknowledges that the nature of the field, in its diversity and contingency, is reflective of the nature of the focus of its study.

With this in mind, I will not attempt to provide a complete survey of this space. In an ephemeral field, it seems meaningless to assume the role of a cartographer mapping a new land. Rather this chapter will act as a guidebook, and point out the key features of the hinterlands that are informing the methodological and theoretical assemblage underpinning

my thesis. A good guidebook provides information about the location being explored, but the information and exploration is often also a means for the actors to discover more about themselves. In this way, I measure the value of these orientating theories in their capacity to facilitate my exploration of the hyper-governed young people's experiences that will come later. Like converging tectonic plates, the overlap between critical youth sociology and the study of violence and neoliberalism creates some distinct high points. These mountaintops offer some reference points for navigation.

Youth — A category of exclusion

A central concept, if not the central concept, within a critical sociology of youth is that *youth* is fundamentally a category of exclusion (Sercombe 2010, 19; White and Wyn 2011, 22; Wyn and White 1997, 8). This category rests on the dominant understanding of youth as a period of transition (Bacchi 2009, 59; Kelly 2010, 303; Wyn and Woodman 2007, 495). It is the transition from childhood into adulthood. This transition is primarily conceptualised as a linear movement towards maturity and capability (White and Wyn 2011, 9). As such, *youth* signifies a status that is associated with individuals or groups who are yet to complete this transition and achieve the associated developmental goals that grant adult status. Youth, therefore, identifies those who are not adults. It excludes non-adults from the privileges and rights associated with adulthood.

Youth as a transition is popularly conceptualised in terms of an 'objective', age-based measure (Wyn and White 1997, 10), which indicates the completion of developmental tasks that are supposedly common to all young people. This is the linear transition from 'child' to

‘adult’ (White and Wyn 2011, 9). There is an implicit association between physical development, identity development and chronological age (Te Riele 2006, 132). It can be argued that biological adulthood can be identified with relative ease when associated with the capacity to reproduce (Sercombe 2010, 20). However, the prioritisation of this measure over the social and identity dimensions of adulthood glosses over the complexity of the transition to adulthood. The experience of feeling young or old, and having access to adult rights, is highly contingent on social context (Sercombe 2010, 20). This experience is mediated through social, cultural, economic and political institutions, policies and conventions (White and Wyn, 2008, 3). The signs of adulthood are often associated with symbols such as marriage, study, employment, sex, driving cars, taking drugs, and leaving home—all of which are politically, culturally and socially dependent (Sercombe 2010, 20; Wyn and White 1997, 19).

Recent criticism has centred on the usefulness of ‘transition’ as a concept to describe and analyse youth, given the complexity of the transition that is youth (MacDonald et al. 2001, 4.5). However, it is precisely the messiness, contingency and complexity of this period that makes the study of transition important. How this transition is conceived is an important idea in this thesis, and will be discussed in depth in chapter 6. When transition is conceived as a normative and linear process, young people are ‘accredited’ into adult status (Sercombe 2010, 20), as they fulfil socially constructed expectations. Failure to achieve them often results in being labelled as ‘too young’. As mentioned in the introduction, ‘too young’ is a social signifier that indicates the young person is yet to assimilate the dominant social codes (Sercombe 2010, 19). ‘Too young’ is not an age-based exclusion, as many ‘young’ people exhibit capacities associated with, or sometimes exceeding, those of ‘adults’ (Coady 2015,

384; Sercombe 2010, 19). For example, in Australia at 13 a young person living on a farm might drive a car, or even operate other more complex machinery. Many older people have never learnt to drive a car. At 15, young people around the globe become politically active, for example through their school, and campaign for a human rights issue or environmental protection. Many adults continue to shun opportunities to participate in political life. At the age of 12 young people have been recruited as child soldiers, other young people become homeless, are forced into unwanted marriages, prostitution or become the sole income earner for a household. These kinds of responsibilities and burdens occur in developed countries (i.e. Australia) and developing countries. They are not simply prevented by democratic government or biological age. Young people are excluded from 'adult' status because they have not yet conformed to the socially constructed norms of adulthood.

As a result of their failure to adopt the social codes associated with adulthood, young people are associated in popular discourses—employed by media and governments—with risk, but also with innocence. This 'dual popular representation' works to reinforce the difference between young people and adults (Wyn and White 1997, 19). Young people are understood to be a threat to society as a result of their inherent association with risk taking and rebellion. However, they are also considered to be in need of protection as a result of their vulnerability (Bessant 2011, 64). This vulnerability is a cause for hope and optimism, but only if their deviant impulses can be repressed by social norms.

Young people are over-represented in violence statistics, and uncritically associated with violent behaviour. This association between young people and the period of youth with risk-taking behaviours—such as damaging property, participating in gangs, and notably engaging

in violence—continues to be contested by youth sociologists (Kumsa et al. 2013, 848; Sercombe 2003, 26; White and Wyn 2011, 52). Time and again evidence is presented to demonstrate that young people are ‘not systematically law-breakers or particularly violent individuals’ (White and Wyn 2011, 52). Yet, ‘youth’ continues to be unconsciously connected to ‘violence’ (Kumsa et al. 2013, 849) in Australia by media, governments and in the public sphere. Furthermore, violence is often portrayed as an ‘everyday reality of many young people around the world’ (Kumsa et al. 2013, 848).

It could be argued that for many young people in Australia, experiencing violence is an emblematic experience of being young and transitioning into adulthood. Working class young men, for instance, are routinely positioned as a violent cohort (Carrington 1996, 265; Sercombe 2003, 27). Similarly, young people are positioned as principal targets of education campaigns to prevent adult domestic violence, for example (Lombard 2013, 1136). Here young people are burdened with being the solution to an arguably adult problem. The association between violence and youth is a dominant discourse that demarcates young people from adults. Being violent is a marker of non-adult status. In addition to being considered perpetrators of violence, the ‘everyday reality’ of violence in youth includes young people being *victims* of violence. Young people are, tragically, significant victims of war. Daiute (2009) has reported that since the start of the 21st century ‘2 million children have been killed, 6 million seriously injured, and approximately 10 million affected by displacement, loss of family, and other consequences of armed conflict’ (319). Finally, the World Health Organisation’s 2014 Global Status Report on Violence Prevention found that in 2012:

- Young men 15–29 years of age were subjected to the highest levels of fatal violence

(18.2 deaths per 100 000 people);

- Non-fatal violence was disproportionately represented by "women and girls, children and elderly people", including "physical, sexual and psychological abuse, and neglect";
- An estimated one in five girls (some estimate as high as one third) experience sexual abuse before reaching adulthood; and
- Finally, "nearly a quarter of adults (22.6%) worldwide suffered physical abuse as a child". (World Health Organisation 2014, 9–10)

These statistics provide support for the association between youth and physical violence where young people are the victims. Through these statistics, it could be argued that being a victim (or the threat) of physical violence is identifying feature of youth. Becoming an adult might be understood as obtaining relief from this violent age. Hence, reinforcing the identification of youth as a violent period. However, I argue in this thesis that young people are not uniquely violent, that violence is not eradicated in youth, and neither does adulthood provide liberation from violence. It is my contention that violence is done to young people so that they learn to transform it into socially acceptable forms. The discourse of youth as a transition out of violence is a system of control within society. Its purpose is to prevent young people posing a challenge to the status quo.

The boundary between youth and adulthood, however, is blurred (MacDonald and Marsh 2005, 238). Whilst there are many social, economic, legal and cultural indicators, none of them offer a clear point of qualification. With reference to this vacuum, MacDonald and

Marsh argue that the education-employment transition 'remains critical to any meaningful sociological study of "youth"' (238). In Australia, the separation of adults and young people is tangibly visible around education, employment and welfare. The education to employment transition is complicated by politically motivated restrictions on access to unemployment benefits. Kelly (2010) argues that it has become 'absurd' to think of young people in Australia as anything other than students (311). He associates this with 150 years of compulsory schooling in Australia, 50 of which included secondary schooling (Kelly 2010, 311). Compulsory schooling in Australia has many social, economic and political realities for young people. It is through the combination of these realities that the exclusion of young people from adult status is reinforced.

Kelly (2010) argues that since the post-World War II depression, 'youth unemployment' as a topic of political discussion has continued to garner significant attention (310). Furthermore, Wyn and Woodman (2007) point to the decline of manufacturing in Australia in the 1980s as the impetus for the 'crisis' rhetoric justifying government intervention into youth unemployment (504). Since the 1980s there have been a series of government projects designed to 'encourage' young people to continue studying in preparation for work (Wyn and Woodman 2007, 504). Notably this has included the 'Youth Pathway Action Plan Taskforce' (Howard 1999) from the Howard Liberal government era in the 1990s, and the aborted changes to youth welfare payments proposed by the 2014 Abbott Liberal government.

Young people are 'encouraged' to stay in education through these policies by making welfare payments dependent upon educational engagement (Te Riele 2006, 132). Welfare payments are often withdrawn upon disengagement, or redirected through a parent or guardian

(Department of Social Services 2015, 11). This identifies a young person as economically and socially incapable, and places that young person in a dependent and passive non-adult role. It is through this kind of policy that young people's exclusion from adult society becomes clear. Their failure to contribute to the economy, through either an 'unemployed' or 'student status', identifies them with the 'undeserving poor' (Berns 2002, 38). Categorised as undeserving to receive welfare support in their own right, young people enter a cycle of educational engagement that reinforces their positioning as passive and dependent.

This exclusion is also reflected in the 'lost generation' in Europe who are ensnared in precarious employment (MacDonald 2016). Young workers in Europe are often underemployed in low paid jobs. In Australia, longitudinal research of the popularly conceived 'Generation X' and 'Generation Y' cohorts have found that full-time, stable employment is typically not achieved until ten years or more after graduating from university (Cuervo and Wyn 2016, 127). Not 'lost' altogether, these generations are certainly 'scarred' (Cuervo and Wyn 2016, 127) by their extended experience of youth. Employment indicators of adulthood have shifted to later in life. The pursuit of these employment goals has resulted in other social indicators of adulthood (such as family and community) being put off. The 'scarring effects' (Cuervo and Wyn 2016, 127) on this 'lost generation' (MacDonald 2016), via shifting indicators of adulthood, are emblematic of the violation these generations experience through changes within social and economic systems and the education-employment transition.

It may be, as Kelly argues, that 'all constructions of youth defer to this narrative of becoming, of transition' (Kelly 2011, 50). Perhaps this discourse of youth is ultimately inescapable.

However, one essential idea that is highlighted through this narrative is the multiplicity of power dynamics that infuse this phenomenon 'youth'. Ultimately, youth is a socially constructed phenomenon. As such there have been multiple attempts to conceptualise the power dynamics that give rise to the phenomenon. Consideration of some of the prominent theoretical frameworks will support the conceptualisation of youth as an exclusionary category.

The problem of power

There are multiple sociological approaches to engaging and explaining the power dynamics that infuse the phenomenon of youth. These include hierarchical Marxist class models, disseminated Foucauldian power/knowledge relationships, Becker's labelling theory, and Bourdieu's conceptualisation of 'habitus'. Each of these theories has been popular at different times in youth sociology. All continue to make contributions to contemporary theories of youth. In 2014, Andy Furlong lamented that the sociology of youth has become 'somewhat neglectful of the study of generational conflict and of the ways in which young people … become agents of change' (Furlong 2014, 36). Hence there is a need to revisit these models and rediscover the 'motivation that drives many youth researchers is to understand, and hope-fully alleviate inequality' (Woodman and Threadgold 2014, 552). A logical starting place for a survey of this landscape is the class-based theories of youth.

Woodman and Threadgold point to class as the foundation of critical and emancipatory sociology (Woodman and Threadgold 2014, 552). An advantage of Marxist theory, as compared to the disseminated power dynamics of Foucault, is it provides a clear 'target for action' (Sercombe 1992, 52). The internal dynamic of the theory provides clear divisions

within society. An important scholarly landmark here is the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham (CCCS), specifically that of Cohen. Through Cohen's work, the problems of youth culture in the 1960s were reframed 'in terms of their imaginary class belongings' (Cohen 1997, 49). Cohen was drawn towards the ways in which ideology works to subordinate individuals whilst they misidentify themselves as autonomous individuals. Working class young people at this time were relegated to the bottom of the class structure (Tait 1993a, 2) and ensnared by false consciousness (Marx and Engels 2014). The youth cultures of the day—the 'mods' and 'skinheads'—were interpreted as avenues of counter-hegemonic resistance to the capitalist system.

Another orientating work from this period is Willis' (1977) *Learning to Labor.* Willis undertook a classical ethnographical study of working class young men's resistance to hegemonic ideology. Through observation and interviews, he uncovered the symbolic and behavioural techniques of resistance of these 'lads'. Allen argues that this work constituted a seminal shift in the conceptualisation of young people's use of power; from 'delinquency' to 'resistance' (Allen 2008, 566). However, Willis ultimately concluded that their techniques of resistance became techniques of finding meaning whilst they conformed to the predetermined roles of working class labour (Willis 1977, 185). Despite their resistance, the 'lads' where unable to escape the hegemonic class structure.

Shildrick (2015) points out that the work of the CCCS represents one of two streams within youth research. She differentiates between 'structural' and 'cultural' traditions, arguing that each have a unique relationship to class (Shildrick 2015, 493). Shildrick argues that CCCS's work fits within the cultural tradition, establishing the stance of the Centre in opposition to

the then-popular notion that youth is a phase that is essentially classless (493). This approach attracted significant critique (which will be addressed in a moment), and hence class was dropped by the emergent 'post-subcultural studies' (493). Shildrick describes the structural tradition as remaining firm in its assertion of the importance of class (494). However, Furlong, Woodman and Wyn argue that the distinction between structural and cultural approaches to youth research is increasingly hard to sustain (2011, 366). Despite this, Shildrick goes on to argue that in the precarious experience of modern youth in the 21st century, class is still significant. Poor young people are less likely to be upwardly mobile even if they complete a degree, and middle-class young people are increasingly likely to experience downward mobility (496). Furthermore, those that are 'succeeding' are often utilising financial privilege to pay for the volunteer experience that is critical for attaining employment (498). Class continues to be relevant; meaning structural approaches are still relevant.

There have been many critiques and criticisms of class and subcultural theories of youth. These criticisms have included: the tendency of these approaches to gloss over gender and ethnicity (Tait 1993a, 2); to both overemphasise and underemphasise structural constraints (MacDonald and Marsh 2005, 243; Sercombe 1992, 2); to romanticise rebellious subcultures and ignore 'straights' (Tait 1993a, 2); and ultimately reduce everything to a class equation (Sercombe 1992, 52). However, despite these criticisms, Marxist critiques remain foundational and influential in youth studies (Woodman and Threadgold 2014, 552). It seems that class, in sociology, just will not die. It is what Ulrich Beck calls a 'zombie category' (Beck 2002, 24). This is partly because, even in undeath, class continues to be a useful tool, particularly in youth sociology (Shildrick, Blackman, and MacDonald 2009, 459). Despite these concerns, MacDonald and Marsh (2005) cannot help but see synergies between

Marxism and the comments by one participant in their study of young people in Britain's poor neighbourhoods. Marx's maxim that the actor shapes their world within the constraints of their circumstance was echoed by this participant, who said: 'I try to make the best out of the choices available but I have no control over what choices are available' (MacDonald and Marsh 2005, 243).

In this Marxist landscape, it is easy to identify the asymmetries of power within youth. Young people are relegated by virtue of their age and class to the bottom of the hierarchy. They are identified by their positioning without power. As with Marxism, labelling theory identifies young people as a group typically without power. They are subject to the labels and norms created by adults and other groups with power (Becker 1963, 17). Critically important in this landscape is Becker's description of the normalisation process through which people conform to social norms. Whilst not typically considered a theory of youth, it is a theory of the formation of the 'normal' adult. Therefore, it describes the process by which one is 'accredited' into adulthood. This is one of the orientating landmarks in understanding youth as a category of exclusion. I will return to Becker and labelling theory in a moment, as he also asks some important reflexive questions that position this project within the discipline. In order to frame up these questions however, it is useful to consider a non-hierarchical conception of power.

Whilst exploring the landscape of power, youth researchers' reflexive awareness of their own influence within these dynamics has grown. There are *footprints* left by the explorers who come into contact—and now have a relationship—with the landscape. Youth researchers inevitably interact with young people and youth (even if only theoretically), and so leave a

trail of these moments of connection. Moreover, researchers choose the direction they head in and create ways of knowing. As such, Tait argues for a governmental formation of youth. He is motivated by the conviction that without it, critical youth studies risks producing 'work which is, at best, unaware of its own origins, or, at worst, outdated and anachronistic' (1993a, 17). Tait is contesting the position of Marxist analyses of power and subcultural theory as the dominant paradigm within youth studies (Sercombe 1992; Tait 1993a). In its place he is arguing for a Foucauldian disseminated theory of power/knowledge.

Tait suggested a formulation of youth as an 'artefact of government' (1993a, 16). He went onto develop a theory of youth as a governmental formation of a particular type of person, best understood as 'doing specific types of work on the self' (1993b, 42). In doing so, Tait drew on the attempt within 'governmentality' (Foucault et al. 1991, 102) to transcend the 'Gordian knot' of the macro-micro dichotomy of power (Dean 1994, as cited in Kelly 2010, 305). Governmentality describes the way in which knowledges, or 'mentalities', influence both the self-governing action of individuals and the activity of large state bureaucracies (and anything in between) (Bacchi 2009, 26; Dean 1999, 26). Building on Tait, Kelly posed a formation of youth as an 'artefact of expertise mobilised in the service of various governmental projects' (2010, 312). The formulation of youth as an artefact of expertise, or government, points to a self-producing cycle whereby young people are both the subjects and agents of power (Foucault 1979, 203; Song 2007, 333).

Tait's concern for the governance of youth is both an interest in the ways in which young people are governed, and in the contribution the sociology of youth makes to this governing. Kelly argues that knowledge is developed about young people for the purpose of governing

them (2010, 302). Knowledge developed by the explorers in the field of youth sociology is connected to the governing of youth and 'actually contribute[s] to the governmentalisation of young people' (Woodman and Threadgold 2011, 9). Kelly suggests that one way forward for critical youth sociology is to focus on the 'institutionalised processes of abstraction which construct representations of youth' (2010, 302), whereby young people are increasingly subject to a range of knowledges that render them knowable and governable. Youth sociologists can challenge these representations of youth by questioning the political and institutional processes that produce knowledge about it.

Anderson suggests genealogical methods have the potential to develop the awareness of youth sociologists' roles in challenging, or being complicit, with the governing of young people. She argues that this method asks 'new critical and historical questions about our contemporary discourses and government of youth' (Anderson 2014, 569). This approach was developed by Foucault to problematise the assumptions and conventions within popular discourses (572). Bacchi (2009) describes the function of discourse in the 'making up' of particular people (59). She points to Rose and Miller who describe power 'not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of "making up" citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom' (Rose and Miller (1992) cited in Bacchi 2009, 59). This is the social construction of classifications through which people can be governed (Foucault 2008, 92). Hence, young people are classified, or subjectified through the knowledge developed about them. Subjectification describes the type of subject, person or group of people that a discourse 'produces' (Taylor 2012, 45) or 'positions' (Strega 2005, 225). Social policies describe subjects in particular ways (Bacchi 2009, 16). For example, education policies describe young people as students. This makes sense, as education departments relate to

young people in this way. However, it is also a limited way of positioning young people.

This Foucauldian lens brings into focus the diversity of discursive governing practices applied to young people, as well as youth sociology's contribution to these practices. As youth sociologists explore and occupy the landscape of youth, young people's lives are 'colonised via the understandings and activities of expertise' (Kelly 1999, 200). However, genealogical methods can be a technique of resistance (Anderson 2014, 575; Strega 2005, 200). They facilitate a questioning of the problem, or a problematisation of the assumptions that underpin the positioning of youth. For example, Pike utilises this method to examine the implied ethics within healthy eating messages around school lunch menus (2014, 96). She concludes that underpinning healthy eating messages is a problematisation of young people as 'pre-symptomatically ill', and a risk to the future health system (99). This is an example of the kind of negative discourse of youth that needs to be challenged and changed. Bacchi (2009) has developed a comprehensive problematisation method called 'What's the problem represented to be?' Her approach questions the ways young people are represented in social policy through expert knowledge and the policy creation process. Young people are subjected to a range of knowledges produced by others, and the governing action of social policy. However, they are also active in their own self-government and in the production of knowledge about themselves and youth.

Foucauldian methods have some contemporary appeal, and the 'undead' position of class continues to offer something useful. However, an explorer of the power dynamics of the youth landscape would be poorly equipped without knowledge of Howard Becker and labelling theory, as flagged earlier. The question that Woodman and Threadgold posed in

2011 about ‘who (or what) youth research serves’ (Woodman and Threadgold 2011, 9) is an echo of a question posed by Becker back in 1967. Reflecting on his own work on deviance, Becker (1967) asked ‘whose side are we on?’ He went on to argue that it is not possible for researchers to be politically neutral. In telling a person’s story, that person’s story is being elevated, while others are overlooked. This resonates with Law’s explanation of manifest presence and absence (Law 2004, 83), which is an important methodological position in my thesis. I acknowledge that this thesis reflects my own political position. I will explore this further in the methods chapter, but suffice to say here: I am, and hence this thesis is, ‘on the side’ of young people.

Becker’s work elevated the stories of those on the margins. He acknowledged that by doing so his work had a political bias, and is built on certain assumptions. To demonstrate his point, he argues that most research with young people seeks to discover why young people ‘are so troublesome for adults’. He suggests a sociological approach to youth would, rather, be concerned with ‘why do adults make so much trouble for youth?’ (1967, 242). This positioning of sociology is not uncontested. A political position is, however, a key feature of critical youth sociology.

The other influential landmark contributed by Becker is labelling theory. Becker argued that deviance is not a quality of the person themselves, but a product of power relations (1963, 11). Deviance is located in the reaction to an action; specifically, in the reaction by those who have power. Those with power are able to make the deviant ‘label’ stick. Becker’s theory is a description of the ways in which social norms are created and enforced. Those with power create the rules for those without power. Typically, the majority have made rules for the

minority: for example, men have made rules for women, and the old have made rules for the young (Becker 1963, 17). There are of course exceptions to these rules in instances where those typical power holders are resisted or overwhelmed. However, what is clear is that there is an operation of power, and typically young people are on the losing end. Furthermore, Becker described the process by which someone accepts and integrates these social norms into their lives. Much like his reversal of the question of youth, he reverses the question of deviance. He suggests that rather than asking why people do deviant things, we should ask: why do people do normal things? His reversal shifts the underpinning assumption, and assumes that people are naturally deviant and that they learn to be 'normal'.

Becker describes this learning process as a series of commitments to the norm (1963, 27). When people are young they are free to act as they wish. As people age, they invest in education, social relationships and employment. Each of these investments is dependent on assimilating social norms. To act outside of these norms is to jeopardise their social and economic standing and achievements. If a person behaves inappropriately at work, they risk being fired. If they lose their job they will not be able to pay their mortgage. If they do not have a stable home they will lose their social standing, or perhaps even their family. Young people commit to these norms as they are accredited into adulthood through the transition period called *youth*.

Young people and youth are subjected to a diverse array of power relationships, and they are typically on the losing end of these dynamics. They either find themselves at the bottom of class hierarchies, being positioned as subjects with limited freedoms, or indoctrinated into social norms that are not of their own creation. As such, youth is a phenomenon that is

profoundly infused with power dynamics. Hence critical youth sociology is positioned as an inherently political landscape, and oriented explicitly towards the concerns of young people. This positioning is central to my thesis, which is concerned with *why the adult world makes so much trouble for young people*. With this thesis, I set out to serve young people by challenging inequalities that govern youth. Specifically, I am focusing on the power asymmetries that underpin the association between youth and violence.

Each of these theories of power are essential to my examination of the association between youth and violence. It has been argued that young people are violent because violence is a means to resist inequalities and injustice (Gilligan 1996, 11; Zehr 2002b, 31). Alternatively, young people are violent because those with power label them as violent (Sercombe 2003, 27). Finally, young people are known to be violent because they are discursively positioned as violent (Kumsa et al. 2013, 847). Each of these critiques challenge the assumption that young people are inherently violent. However, as I will demonstrate, these analyses are limited because they only conceptualise violence as a physical phenomenon. In the movement towards a more complex and nuanced understanding of violence, it is necessary to be equipped with these critiques of power; these tools of critical youth sociology. However, this overview of the power dynamics of youth has unfortunately largely been constructed in terms of young people's exclusion. This positioning of young people as excluded or inherently without power reinforces ideas such as the notion that youth and violence are associated. It inherently places young people in a passive role. This approach is neglectful of the ways in which young people are agents of social change (Furlong 2014, 36). Therefore, it is essential for the emancipatory goals of this project that I pause here and realign the conversation towards the modes through which young people act to change their social, political and economic circumstances. This repositioning requires the language of resistance.

Resistance

The idea of resistance in the study of youth can be traced at least as far back as the CCCS and subcultural studies of the 1960s. These were instrumental in demonstrating that youth culture was not simply deviant, but rather could be understood as 'symbolic and ritual ways of doing resistance' (Johansson and Lalander 2012, 1079). As described earlier this was a significant shift in conceptualising young people's power from that of 'delinquency' to 'resistance' (Allen 2008, 566). However, care must be taken in utilising the term resistance, as this can unintentionally reinforce the exclusion of young people.

The risk of using resistance to describe young people's activity centres around reinforcing the positioning of young people in popular media as either victims or offenders (Wyn and White 1997, 89). It has the potential to position young people in dualistic terms; either in opposition or submission to mainstream culture (Wyn and White 1997, 90–1). Furthermore, as Wyn and White argue, uncritically positioning young people and youth culture in opposition to the mainstream overlooks the fact that whilst some aspects of youth culture differ from the mainstream, this does not necessarily mean they offer a challenge to dominant discourses (1997, 90–1). Moreover, it is likely that most young people will subvert mainstream norms, particularly age-based discrimination, at some point. This kind of subversion also is not necessarily resistance (90), as this oppositional activity does not necessarily contain what Giroux would call 'radical significance' (1983, 285, in Raby 2005, 158). Finally, some forms of rebellion by young people could better be characterised as an attempt to fight for a place within the mainstream, rather than a fight against it (Wyn and White 1997, 92). It is thus

important to be clear about how resistance is being used in reference to young people and youth culture.

An additional risk with the language of resistance is that it can present young people as responsive rather than as active agents of change (Raby 2005, 151). However, Raby (2005) argues that despite all these risks, resistance should not be discarded as it ‘recognises and values oppositional behaviour as political and informed’ (151). As such, youth sociologists recognise the importance of attempts to understand youth resistance. This understanding has been conceptualised differently over time, as sociologists’ understanding of power has shifted. As described above, scholars of the CCCS and their contemporaries conceptualised resistance in terms of symbols and rituals (Johansson and Lalander 2012, 1079). Later in the 1990s, post-structural theories of power greatly influenced the conceptualisation of resistance in youth studies (1081). These modern and postmodern theories contrast with each other in terms of the arrangement of the actors. Raby (2005) argues that, in modern understandings of resistance, power is conceived in terms of ‘a binary between dominance and submission’ (152). Resistance in this sense arises from a ‘rage at one’s subordination’, the ‘structural conditions’ in which the marginalised find themselves, or the raising of consciousness resulting from a ‘contradiction between ideology and experience’ (166–67). In contrast, postmodern narratives of resistance are more complex and contingent:

> A variety of narratives of resistance may interweave, overlap and contradict at the same time, and what seems like unified opposition may in fact be diverse and fragmented as people’s investments and commitments to an activity vary. (Raby 2005, 161)

A concrete oppositional position does not exist in postmodern resistance. Instead resistance is 'defined around language' (166–67), and the actor never finds her or himself 'outside of discourse' (167). Hence, postmodern resistance is 'temporary, fragmented' and 'haunted by contingencies' (167). Postmodern resistance is about challenging dominant discourses and accepted truths. It is about what is said, but also how and when it is said.

Raby (2005) provides an overview of nine different modes of resistance. These include four modernist 'conceptions of resistance':

- Active, collective;
- Active, heroic;
- Passive, collective or heroic; and
- Appropriation. (153)

The remaining five are post-modernist 'positions of resistance', namely:

- Linguistic;
- Disidentification;
- Strategic;
- Alternative discourses; and
- Bodily. (154)

The modernist conceptions rely on an oppositional positioning in which resistance is about disrupting or overwhelming the dominant power broker (153). In contrast, the discursive positions are less unified; they are fragmented and 'focus on more localised, contextualised analyses' (154). In this thesis, I use the term 'resistance' in ways that draw on both of these understandings of power. Johansson and Lalander (2012) argue there is a need to avoid the

use of polarising notions that create a false dichotomy between these structural and post-structural conceptions of resistance (1079). Taking this approach of avoiding polarising notion creates space for a multifaceted understanding of resistance that can include subtle, creative and humorous forms (Raby 2005, 159). This understanding of resistance positions young people as creative, social actors seeking to change and improve their world. Resistance is about opposing a negative phenomenon, but with conscious awareness of its political dimensions and a desire to create positive change. This position on resistance is multifaceted and conditional. In order for youth sociologists to traverse the landscape of contemporary youth and understand it, it is necessary to be equipped to engage with increasing complexity and contingency.

Complexity

One key feature of contemporary youth sociology is a focus on the increasing complexity and contingency in young people's lives. As mentioned earlier, the transition between education and employment continues to be a key site of study. 'Successful' transition from study to work is an important example of the complexity and contingency young people face. Their experience is contingent upon a range of structural factors (i.e. class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity), but also contextual factors (i.e. family and peer relationships, physical and mental health, education and employment opportunities). The transition indicators of education, employment and family now overlap when they once did not (Heinz 2009, 6). As traditional pathways to employment are no longer guaranteed (Cuervo and Wyn 2016, 129), young people embark on these trajectories with high levels of uncertainty (Heinz 2009, 6). This precarity is understood to be a hallmark of late capitalism (MacDonald 2009, 167) and disproportionately affects young people, even though this is often ignored through various

rationalisation techniques. The education to employment pathway is an important site through which to engage with complexity, and is an emblem of young people's disenfranchisement. Globally employment has become more flexible and precarious. Some developmental and cultural researchers have interpreted this flexibility as resulting in increasing autonomy for young people (Heinz 2009, 3). However, such 'flexibility' also increases the personal responsibility of job seekers and young workers to negotiate multiple transitions. Furthermore, 'at-risk' young people are gradually needing more support services to avoid further disadvantage (Heinz 2009, 3). Cuervo and Wyn (2016) describe this increased complexity as an extended transition between youth and adulthood (123), while Heinz refers to this extended transition as 'semi-adulthood' (2009, 5).

MacDonald (2009) examines some of the popular rationalisations of young people's experiences of precarious and contingent work. He challenges the 'bold visions of epochal societal change' promoted by theorist such as Ulrich Beck about the increasing precarity of work, by examining the experiences of young people in the labour market in Teesside (UK) (173-74). He objects to the idea that multiple education-employment transitions should simply be understood (by governments or researchers) to be stepping stones towards employment. Furthermore, he rejects the notion that young people in the UK are choosing instability to prioritise leisure lifestyles. For MacDonald, these generalisations about employment in the global marketplace did not hold for the young people from poor British neighbourhoods who participated in his research. He concluded that there was complexity around the issue depending on the location and class of the young people participating in studies, but also the style of research (174). Of course, the complexity of youth is not limited to the education-employment transition. The social world is full of intricacy and partiality

(Law 2004, 2), and young people's lives are no exception. As such, a useful orientating concept to engage with complexity in social problems is the idea of 'wicked problems' referenced by Watts (2015) in connection with juvenile justice.

Wicked problems, first described by Rittel and Weber (1973), are problems that are steeped in complexity, contingency and uncertainty. Understanding them is contingent upon understanding their unique context (Rittel and Webber 1973, 162). These problems have 'no clear beginning and no absolute solution, and every problem can also be seen as a symptom of another problem' (Valentine 2015, 243). Valentine argues that in social policy, 'wicked problems' are an established trope. Watts asserts that all juvenile justice issues are wicked problems: often 'we cannot even get an agreed-on definition of what the problem is' (Watts 2015, 162), let alone agree on a solution. Youth research is located right in the middle of this kind of complexity. The movement of cultural, political and social signifiers of adulthood described above by Cuervo and Wyn (2016), and MacDonald (2016), which are leaving a generation of young people lost and 'scarred', is a wicked problem. This is because the location of the boundaries of transition into adulthood are shifting. Likewise, there is no simplistic explanation as to why these boundaries are moving. Moreover, there is no clear answer regarding what to do about it; i.e. how to prevent the scarring effects. How a given problem is defined will shape its possible solutions (Bacchi 2009, 46). Therefore, how researchers investigate the problem begins to prescribe the possible solutions for it. To borrow Giddens' phrase, youth researchers have 'no choice but to choose' (Giddens 1991, 82). Researchers either choose method assemblages that can enable them to engage with the complexity, or limit their engagement through restrictive theoretical frameworks.

Law's method assemblage engages with this issue of complexity in research methods. Law describes the necessity of making some things absent in order to make something present (2004, 83). The focus on one aspect or experience inevitably overlooks other experiences or contributing factors. He says this is an unavoidable reality of research. However, at the same time he is advocating for frameworks that engage with complexity (Law and Urry 2004, 402). To reduce the world to the simplicity of our theoretical frameworks is to distort and misrepresent the complexity of social systems. In a way, it is an injustice to these social systems. Yet all representations are limited. For this reason, Law suggests that we present contingent realities, or situated-truths. While his method is situated and contextual (Law 2004, 62), it presents a problem for investigating the 'wicked problems' of juvenile justice and precarious youth transitions that are infused with structural dynamics of power. Law's situated approach does not engage with broader narratives such as 'youth' and 'violence'. In this thesis, I wrestle with this dynamic of power, and hold the two ideas (the situated and the structural perspectives) in a complex and contingent tension. This will be explored further in the methods section. Nevertheless, as I shall argue, violence and youth are infused with 'wicked problems'. They are situated personal experiences that are also intertwined with and implicated in larger social and cultural dynamics. It is the connection between situated experience and structural dynamics that I seek to make present in this thesis.

To conceptualise these 'complex, fluid and unpredictable' (MacDonald 2006, 13) transitions that combine the influences of 'school-to-work, family, housing, leisure, criminal and drug-using careers' (MacDonald 2006, 13), some youth researchers are turning to theorists like Beck and Bourdieu whose work creates space for greater fluidity. Beck's analysis of the precarious nature of modernity and Bourdieu's 'habitus' are central to what can be described

as a return to, or a reimagining of, class (Woodman and Threadgold 2014, 552). Within the Bourdieusian landscape, alluded to but not fully explored and exploited by these youth sociologists regarding youth and neoliberal violence, is an important Bourdieusian idea: 'symbolic violence'. Bourdieu describes this as domination through 'symbolic channels of communication and cognition (more precisely misrecognition), recognition, or even feeling' (Bourdieu 2001, 1) that operates undetectably within cultures and societies. Symbolic violence is part of a broader conceptualisation of violence that offers the potential for researchers to acknowledge its complexity in modernity. This approach to understanding the complexity of violence is being explored under the banner of a 'sociology of violence'. However, this emerging sociology of violence is yet to engage with young people's expressed experiences of violence in modernity, and youth sociology is yet to exploit the frameworks being constructed by the sociology of violence. It is in this gap that my project is located.

As briefly mentioned earlier, youth and violence are unconsciously associated in popular discourse utilised by media and governments, where there is a greater emphasis on violence done *by* young people than violence done *to* young people. Furthermore, the conversation in this space is typically limited to the physical manifestations of violence, with little consideration of symbolic and structural forms. In explorations of the complexity of youth in modernity, little attention is being paid to young people's experiences of non-physical violence. Lost generations are being scarred through underemployment as a result of their relegation to the bottom of the class hierarchy. However, the languages of violence and violation are as yet underutilised in their capacity to conceptualise these experiences and the structural and symbolic processes that legitimise and reinforce young people's exclusion.

Furthermore, it is possible to understand this as a withdrawal by governments from the promises of education, employment and security offered to previous generations as a specific form of violence. Neoliberal violence is the violating experience produced by the hollowing out of the welfare state. The effects of neoliberal violence are a gap in the understanding of youth and violence.

There are two notable exceptions to this rule. Sercombe's 2003 paper 'Reflections on youth violence' considers the possibility that conceptualising youth violence might need to take into account violence that extends beyond 'the body of the person' (27). He also points out that, typically, society has defined violence in terms associated with the means available to the poor: that is, in physical terms. As such, physical fighting is understood to be violent, but emotional manipulation or hostile economic takeovers are not (27). Hence, he defines violence as 'the intent to do harm' (27). Whilst this includes the activity of institutions, 'intent' limits the scope of violence to deliberate action. Furthermore, he concludes simply that the sum of violence in a community needs to be the target of intervention, rather than focusing exclusively on the actions of young people. He argues that 'violence generates violence' (28), but does not theorise how this process works.

In a similar way, Giroux coins the term 'neoliberal violence' to describe the marginalisation of minorities and the production of rising inequality through the hollowing out of minimal social services (2014, 224). Giroux is describing the increasing 'physical, ideological, and structural violence' (226) young people are facing from the state. As they resist the hollowing out of the welfare state and the breaking of promises of education, housing, employment and security afforded to previous generations, young people encounter the merging of

government and violence (226). However, Giroux does not systematically develop the meaning of ‘neoliberal violence’, nor discuss the dynamics of ideological and structural violence. Furthermore, neither of these authors base their arguments on empirical evidence, nor do they explicitly engage with or promote the voices of young people. These are significant gaps that need to be addressed. This project begins to fill these gaps. However, first it is important to orient this current research with the theoretical apparatus being developed by the emerging sociology of violence.

Emerging sociology of violence

In a special issue of *Current Sociology*, Sylvia Walby (2013) described the ‘emerging sociology of violence’ and its potential to offer an interconnected conceptualisation of violence and society. This would make violence more visible, and demonstrate its ‘distinctiveness and non-reducibility to other social forces’ (Walby 2013, 106). Walby acknowledges that there has been significant study of violence in other fields including: ‘criminology, peace studies, security studies, political science, war studies, international relations, gender studies, gender violence (an emerging specialism and field of its own, with its own journals) and social policy’ (105). A sociology of violence would draw on these learnings but offer a unique contribution by challenging the ‘traditional divisions between interpersonal and inter-state violence’ (105). Traditionally, violence has been studied by focusing on interpersonal violence, or focusing on war. Attempts to connect the two usually move from one of these sides towards the other. A sociology of violence would consider the macro and micro dynamics as a connected whole, where one influences the other. Furthermore, whilst violence is present in ‘economy, state and civil society’ (105), in physical force and global conflict, it is not contained to any one of these forms.

Violence has, of course, also been the focus of sociological inquiry in the past. This includes Durkheim's (2005) study of suicide, Arendt's (1972) theorising 'On Violence', Weber's (1946) argument regarding the state's monopoly of violence, Foucault's (1979) transformation of torture to discipline, and Marxist (2014) concern for revolutionary violence. Walby (2013) argues that these approaches are all insufficient to conceptualise the complexity of violence in modern life (98). For example, Durkheim's focus on suicide overlooked domestic violence (Hearn 2013, 154). The majority of these theorists had a narrow focus on physical violence. Others, such as Arendt, have claimed violence is reducible to a form of power (1972, 142). Furthermore, Foucault's (1979) thesis that violence declines as civilisation increases is another example of the reduction of violence to power. His thesis holds only if violence is conceptualised as a physical phenomenon that excludes violating social structures. I argue in this thesis that rather than a decline in violence, hyper-governed young people experience violence as a ubiquitous reality in modern civilisation. This violence, however, is often not experienced in physical and concrete forms. Likewise, Weber's definition of the monopolisation of violence by the state focused on the right and the capacity for the state to wage war, and the connected claim that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other (Walby 2013, 98). However, this democratic peace hypothesis has been debunked (Galtung and Scott 2008, 46). The emerging sociology of violence considers violence to be a unique and complex phenomenon 'with its own rhythms, dynamics and practices' (98). It is not equivalent to other forms of power, and has its own micro and macro dynamics which form patterns across society. Founding sociological theorists have overlooked many experiences of violation, and their theories are insufficient to handle the complexity of modernity; particularly the modern phenomenon of youth. Modern theorists are only beginning to fill these gaps.

The collection of works in the 2013 *Current Sociology* special issue began to provide some way-points for future researchers to follow, or reference points for the forging of divergent paths in the study of violence. They also began to create a hinterland out of the converging fields and research that can underpin this developing paradigm. Some particularly important landmarks within this issue include Eriksson's (2013) approach to intimate violence; Hearn's (2013) exploration of the paradoxes of domestic violence; von Holdt's (2013) comparison of Fanon and Bourdieu; and Grinberg's (2013) examination of Palestinian resistance.

Eriksson analyses the state of intimate partner violence policy in Sweden to discuss power relations and policy change. Importantly, Erikson notes the adult-centric nature of social policy, wherein children are considered 'objects of adult care' (173). Furthermore, she describes the failure to recognise exposure to domestic violence as child abuse (Eriksson 2013, 172). Here she is arguing that a child or young person need not be on the receiving end of physical violence to suffer the consequences of it. The violence might be directed at a parent or older sibling, but they are still *exposed* to it. Erikson's argument rests both on a complex understanding of violence and the positioning of the child/young person. She points to two competing discourses in the space with regard to the young person's capacity. The welfare discourse positions the young person as a dependant and in need of protection and control. In contrast, libertarian/participatory discourse constructs the young person as a capable and creative moral agent (181). The ideas that young people can be active in this space and that violence is experienced through *exposure* are significant developments.

Hearn's analysis of domestic violence dovetails well with Ericksson's focus on intimate partner violence. Eriksson emphasises a distinction between the broad 'domestic violence' and the more specific 'intimate partner' violence (173). However, both Hearn and Eriksson emphasise the importance of gender within the domestic sphere. Eriksson focuses on the interaction between gender and age and implied social roles (174), whilst Hearn is concerned with the dynamics of responsibility and agency. Hearn argues that traditional individualistic notions of responsibility obscure the structural dynamics of violence (Hearn 2013, 160), and that the responsibility of (usually male) perpetrators can be achieved alongside structural accounts of violence that challenge autonomous, liberal individualism. Hearn goes on to suggest that violence can be conceptualised 'as a form of knowledge' (164). He asserts that violence is a form of power and control and therefore it produces knowledge; and that 'the experience of being, even being alive, is affected by what counts as valid knowledge about violence' (164). This discursive positioning of violence is also reflected in von Holdt's exploration of the conflict between western sociology and post-colonial southern sociology through the prism of revolutionary union violence in South Africa.

Union violence in South Africa is the medium through which von Holdt examines Bourdieu's 'symbolic violence' and Fanon's revolutionary violence. Von Holt argues that union violence can be constructed as a 'cleansing force' for democracy (von Holdt 2013, 116), but that its 'dark side' receives inadequate attention (125). He ultimately positions the violence of revolutionary unionists as 'language to articulate their resistance' (von Holdt 2013, 127). For von Holt, violence is 'a way of speaking' (2013, 127), when all other ways of speaking are exhausted or unavailable. He points to Bourdieu's assertion that physical violence has a 'symbolic dimension'. However, von Holt also finds Fanon's approach to revolutionary

violence naïve, and Bourdieu's symbolic violence insufficient, resulting from an inadequate exploration of structural violence (126–7). Hence there is more work to be done in exploring these non-physical dynamics of violence and their relationship to democratic participation. Furthermore, in Hearn and von Holt's work the connection between power and violence is being explored through language and knowledge. The approaches of Hearn and von Holt contrast with Walby's argument that violence should not be reduced to another form of power, or else it will be marginalised in social theory (2013, 104). This relationship between power and violence is contested and needs further exploration. This work is being done by von Holt (2013) in relation to democracy, and Grinberg (2013) with regard to politics. Hearn (2013) is unpacking the space around domestic violence, whilst Erikson (2013) is tackling it in regard to policy change. I am exploring its implications for youth in this thesis.

Returning to the political dimensions of violence, Grinberg pursues a 'dynamic theory of political space' (2013, 208) to theorise violence. He too draws on Bourdieu's work, but adopts the opposite view of violence to von Holt, Erikson, Hearn and Walby. Grinberg ascribes to the notion that violence is purely 'physical and concrete' (2013, 208), and expands the binary between violence and symbolic action in a political space (2013, 208). In contrast to von Holdt, Grinberg argues that violence only reduces the possibilities for political action. In some ways, the contrast between Grinberg and von Holt is not so great: they both argue that violence can counter democracy. What is clear is that violence is 'slippery, changing its shape and meaning, sustaining democracy and corroding it' (von Holdt 2013, 118). Whilst at times contradictory, these works are important, as they do open up the space to explore violence, and offer some useful tools to continue the exploration. However, they also demonstrate the need for some clarity about the assumptions that

underpin the study of violence.

In 2005 Bufacchi offered a useful summary of the existing literature around the definition of violence. He suggests there are essentially two camps within this terrain. There are those who wish to preserve a narrow definition of violence, and those who wish to advance an expanded definition. The narrow definition of violence is desired by some because of its distinct and forceful character. Their concern is that if broadened, it would lose some of its capacity to describe a unique and abhorrent phenomenon. Their argument is linked to the Latin etymology of violence in '*violentia*', translated as 'vehemence': 'a passionate and uncontrolled force' (194). Hence this group limits the definition of violence to physical force. There are problems with this approach. Bufacchi argues that 'force' implies potential action, whereas violence is commonly understood as an action that has already been done (196). However, more importantly violence has a moral judgement attached to it that force does not.

In contrast, the opposing camp associates violence with the Latin '*violare*' (Bufacchi, 2005, 194). Violare is translated as 'infringement', thus broadening violence to the experience of violation. In contrast to physical force, violation can be experienced as a result of structural and symbolic forces. This can have no association with physical force. Bufacchi points out that the concept of violation begs the question: violation of what? He suggests the obvious answer is: violation of human rights (197). However, this line of thinking potentially expands violence to an enormous array of things that could violate human rights, potentially making the word meaningless (197). Another way of framing this debate over violence is to argue that the centralising force in the definition focuses on the perpetrator. In contrast, centralising the concept of violation focuses on the victim (199). However, as I will argue later in my

findings, these categories (victim and perpetrator) are not always clear and separate.

Alignment with either of these two camps positions a research project not only theoretically, but also politically. The project of this thesis seeks to understand the complexity and contingency of young people's experiences of violence in modernity, and as such draws on an expanded definition of violence in violation. Furthermore, the intention is to develop an understanding of the violence which theorises the connection between the violence done *to* young people and the violence done *by* young people. Here, physical force is an important component of theorising violence. However, I have argued that there is a need to conceptualise a greater level of complexity around youth violence. Conceiving of violence as violation provides further scope for achieving this goal than violence as force. The camp advocating for violence as violation offers some unique tools through which to explore the complexity around, and the connection between, violence done to young people and violence done by young people.

A central feature of this landscape of violence as violation is the work of Johan Galtung. In 1969 Galtung described 'structural violence' as distinct from physical violence, in that it is 'built into the structure [of society] and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances' (171). Galtung defines violence as being 'present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations' (168). This highly expansive definition has received criticism. Galtung himself acknowledges that this definition could cause as many, or more, problems than it potentially solves (168). However, what it provides is the language to identify experiences of violation that are both within and outside of a clear subject-object relationship (Galtung 1969,

171). Both physical and structural violence fit within this definition. Galtung revisits this concept later in 1990, building further on the language of violence beyond physical force. He articulates a form of 'cultural violence' as the elements of a culture that 'justify and legitimise' physical and structural violence (Galtung 1990, 291). Galtung's three levels of violence therefore provide the language to consider the micro and macro dynamics of violence that produce violating experiences. Furthermore, this language constructs a theory of how violence is justified and reproduced within society. It provides a target of focus beyond simplistic equations in which violence produces more violence.

Not dissimilar to Galtung's cultural violence is Bourdieu's aforementioned 'symbolic violence'. The two concepts are similar in that they both describe the cultural legitimation of domination that results in violence appearing to be normal and acceptable (Bourdieu 2001, 35; Galtung 1990, 291). Galtung's description of cultural violence focuses on general institutions within cultures and societies that reinforce structural violence, including: 'religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics)' (Galtung 1990, 291). In contrast Bourdieu (2001) is interested specifically in the symbolic meaning within language and between people. Bourdieu's idea is established in his well-known theory of habitus. He describes the relations of domination as constructed 'below the level of the decisions of consciousness' (37). The relationships of domination are obscured from the dominated and, as such, they can work to reinforce their own domination (38). In this work, Bourdieu examines masculine domination, using the example of women seeking male partners who are physically larger than themselves. By doing so, they participate in a cultural norm that subordinates women based on the assumed need for physical protection and provision. He argues that symbolic violence can only be overcome by the transformation

of a culture and society that produce these relationships of domination. Arguably, Bourdieu's work brings a deeper analysis and nuance to Galtung's broad scheme. Together, these two theorists have constructed a useful landscape through which to explore young people's experience of modern life and the experience of youth violence.

The most recently formed feature of this evolving landscape of non-physical violence is Giroux's 'neoliberal violence'. As described earlier, Giroux does not develop the idea methodically in the same way that Bourdieu or Galtung have developed their ideas. Rather, 'neoliberal violence' is something closer to a literary device used to evoke the violation experienced by young people under neoliberalism. His main concern is to argue that young people are increasingly subject to 'physical, ideological, and structural violence' (226) as they resist the 'weakening social contract' (223). In many ways, his argument reflects the concerns of MacDonald (2016), Wyn (2016), Shildrick (2016) and others about the increasing precarity of youth and the violation resulting in scarred and lost generations. However, he goes on to posit that young people are also facing a 'merging of violence and government' (226). Governments are using physical violence to quell protest and resistance by young people. Further, he also asserts that young people experience violation through a 'systematic disinvestment' (226) by the state in education, health, and housing and that this is undermining the conditions required for democracy. Young people face a cruel reality in which they are individually responsible, but have no claim on civic responsibility. His argument then moves to focus on the forms of resistance young people are employing, and the state-sanctioned violence in response to their protest (226).

Neoliberal violence has some resonance with personal, structural, cultural and symbolic

forms of violence, however it also does not fit cleanly into one category or another. As such, I argue that neoliberal violence is a modern phenomenon that crosses the boundaries between personal, structural, cultural and symbolic violence. It is a symbolic phenomenon with a vocabulary that is underpinned by cultural values and that produces structural and physical effects.

Neoliberal violence encompasses violence both within a clear subject-object relationship (i.e. physical violence) and outside of it (i.e. structural, cultural and symbolic violence). It can be both the police officer using excessive physical force on climate protesters, and unemployment resulting from global market forces. Neoliberal violence produces structural effects that result in unequal life chances. The marketisation of education, for example, offers a better service to those who can afford it. However, it also constitutes a political ideology and language that reinforces and justifies personal and structural violence. As this language is the dominant discourse in western democracies, it is often unnoticed and reinforced by those who are oppressed by it. For example, with no other options, the poor must vote for a political party who will only perpetuate the widening gap between rich and poor.

The symbolic nature of neoliberal violence is underpinned by, and reproduces, a mythological discourse of violence. Violence might be a problem, but it is also presented as the solution. The military ideology of war infiltrates policy and is celebrated by policy makers (Giroux 2014, 231). Governments wage 'war' on terror, drugs and poverty. This is a discourse that 'enshrines the belief that violence saves, that war brings peace, that might makes right' (Wink 1998, 42). Wink argues that this is the 'comprehensive story' of violence underpinning modern society (Wink 1998, 42). It is embedded in our political systems, news

media and cultural stories. Wink calls it the ‘Myth of Redemptive Violence’ (Wink 1998, 42). This myth perpetuates the idea that the problems of modern society can be solved through violence. Neoliberal violence augments this myth, contending that the problems of modern society can be solved through the outsourcing of the social contract and through market solutions that violate.

Neoliberal violence is best understood as a modern phenomenon that can be theorised by drawing on both the emerging sociology of violence and a critical sociology of youth. However, this analytical approach is largely absent (with the exceptions described above) in the respective literature on critical youth sociology and the sociology of violence to date. It is therefore worth subjecting neoliberal violence to a detailed examination through these lenses. The frameworks of Galtung and Bourdieu provide the language and frameworks to do this.

Furthermore, any attempts to examine the modern phenomenon of neoliberal violence using these tools and from a young person’s perspective are currently underdeveloped. The violating effects of modern, complex and contingent experiences of youth are not simply exclusionary; they are ‘scarring’ a ‘lost generation’. Critical youth sociologists are using this language of violation, but they are not recruiting the frameworks to analyse and create an integrated understanding of violence. The current project works to fill this gap. Giroux argues that the critical study of youth must demonstrate its commitment to addressing social and economic inequality (237). Without this commitment and this kind of integrated analysis of youth violence, youth will be increasingly a ‘wild zone’ (Kelly 1999) where young people are excluded and cruelly governed (Giroux 2014, 225).

The final important feature of the landscape is gendered analyses of violence. Walby identifies gender violence as an emerging field of its own (Walby 2013, 105). The unique identity of this field contributes distinctive considerations to the broader sociology of violence. However, it also demonstrates some of the issues particular to the study of violence and youth. Carrington summarises one of the important debates in the associated literature in her 1996 examination of feminism, sexual violence and governmentality. She describes a debate amongst feminist scholars as to whether rape should be 'understood as an act of sex or violence' (Carrington 1996, 254). To identify rape as sex is to potentially conceal the male violence problem; to abandon sex for violence, however, might compromise the feminist emphasis (255). Carrington is attempting to construct the issue in a way in which it can be governed effectively. To do this she aims to emphasise the role of the autonomous individual's choice, whilst also acknowledging this approach is 'fraught with complexity and ambiguity' (267). Her proposed solution is an educational program that targets the largest offending group. Carrington identifies this group as young men.

The claim that young men are the largest group of offenders of sexual violence is contestable. Examining the assumptions underpinning this claim demonstrates that there exists a gap in the broader sociology of violence landscape which, as noted earlier, this project aims to fill. Carrington bases her argument on NSW crime statistics from 1985 (265). Earlier in her paper, she highlights that most sexual assaults go unreported and, of those that are reported, a significant number are not recorded by police. Young people are often positioned with less power in comparison with that of formal legal systems or of violent adults, and so it makes sense that young people are not likely to report being a victim of violence. Finally, the crime statistics Carrington uses indicate that 74.3% of sexual assaults were perpetrated by people 14 to 30 years of age. The suggestion that this age range (14–30) is somehow homogenous is

inadequate. The potential variance in personal attributes and structural influences on a 14-year-old and a 30-year-old is significant. Furthermore, the range of 14 to 30 hardly represents a consensus, or even majority, description of youth among researchers and policy makers. Finally, Carrington also includes the statistic that individuals in the 18- to 24-year range were responsible for 48.3% of sexual assaults. The resulting combination of these statistics makes it appear that young men are significant perpetrators of violence. However, given the variance within age ranges, it is questionable to associate this violence with youth. Furthermore, this picture of supposedly young violent men obscures the extent to which they are also victims of violence (both physical as well as structural, symbolic and cultural).

In addition to these concerns, the assumption that young men supposedly constitute a homogenous group and a site of unrestrained sexual drive runs counter to Carrington's earlier argument. She posits that to more effectively govern sexual violence, we need to 'place the burden' (264) on the male sex. To shift the blame onto young people, rather than adult men, is a failure to acknowledge the intersectionality of oppression. Furthermore, her approach to governing sexual violence rests on an assumption that people can control their sexual drives, and by the same token that they can control their violent motivations. This may well be true; however, Carrington overlooks the need to challenge the discourses of violence that, like the discourse of sexuality, shape sexual violence committed by young people and adults. Simply educating young men not to be violent to women overlooks the symbolic, structural and cultural violence done to young people. There is a need for education to teach people (how) not to be violent. However, there is also a need to challenge the structural and cultural norms around sexual violence. There is a need for an intersectional theory of violence done *to* young people that shapes the violence *by* them.

In contrast to her earlier focus on male sexual violence, in 2013 Carrington argues for the development of a feminist theory of female violence. A key point to her argument is that violence is not inherently a masculine or feminine phenomenon (71). To her, this in opposition to what she describes as a history of criminological theory that has essentialised violence as a 'capacity associated primarily with boys' (70). Her argument is that this orientation has the effect of obscuring female violence and positioning it primarily in terms of 'social and relational aggression' displayed typically while 'negotiating peer networks' (71). She claims that this essentialising of violence explains an increasing incidence of female violence thus: as women acting like men (71). Instead she argues for the development of a feminist theory of violence that is able to acknowledge the structural influence of power and politics, whilst not excusing the role of individual action (73). She acknowledges that this kind of analysis is missing; that it needs to be intersectional, and not reliant on gender (73). Further, she suggests that it needs to be developed through collaborative research, to capture the varying voices of practitioners, academics, victims and perpetrators. With this thesis, I begin to fill this gap. Whilst focused on young people, I acknowledge the intersectional nature of all oppression[1]. I develop a structural theory of violence, without denying the role of personal agency. This work prioritises the voices of young people, whilst acknowledging the co-created nature of qualitative research.

[1] It is worth noting, particularly considering the reference in this thesis to young people being labelled 'animalistic', that 'animal' is a social category of exclusion around which there is growing sociological literature to demonstrate their necessary inclusion in an interconnected theory of oppression (Irvine 2008; Taylor 2013).

The landscape of the sociology of violence draws upon language and frameworks from politics, criminology, peace studies, war studies, international relations, gender violence and social policy. This field is also developing a theory of violence that connects its micro and macro dimensions, whilst acknowledging the intersectional nature of oppression. Scholars of this developing field are attempting to come to grips with the scope of violence and are considering the effects of narrow and wide definitions of violence, based on physical force or violation respectively. They are also exploring the diversity of social experience in modernity and the influence of neoliberalism. However, what remains unexplored in this space are the experiences of young people and the effects of structural, cultural and symbolic violence on youth as a transition. Youth sociologists grappling with violation or violence are yet to exploit the potential of conceptualising violence outside of a subject-object relationship, and are yet to engage with young people's experiences as they express them. Furthermore, no systematic exploration of youth and neoliberal violence through these frameworks has been undertaken to date.

This project is filling these gaps in knowledge. Primarily, it brings together developing frameworks from the sociology of violence with the critical youth sociology for the 21st century. There are, however, a few other important repositories of knowledge that are dotted across this embryonic field of study. Knowledge of the location and content of these repositories is essential for successfully traversing the currently mapped landscape, and to push out beyond these limits. These storehouses of knowledge contain relevant ideas concerning the state, neoliberalism, democratic participation and restorative practices.

The hollowing out of the welfare state and the subversion of participation in restorative practices

Two of the primary features of neoliberal violence, described by Giroux, are the hollowing out of the welfare state and the rise of neoliberalism. This movement in the construction of the modern state has had wide-ranging effects. This thesis is, of course, interested in the impact this shift is having on young people and youth. Some of this impact has been discussed in terms of issues concerning the transition from education to employment. However, this movement from a welfare to a neoliberal state has also had important effects on the governing of young people and youth. Under neoliberalism, youth is no longer a vessel in which society places their hopes, but is a 'wild zone' (Kelly 1999) where young people must be disciplined and controlled (i.e. governed) (Giroux 2014, 225) until they emerge as responsible adults (Sercombe 2010, 20; White and Wyn 2011, 19).

The state governs young people through a broad carceral network (Foucault 1979, 310) that includes formal, punitive justice systems and outsourced social services. Social services, it has been long been argued, are a form of social control and governing. In 1975 Spitzer argued they are an 'inexpensive form of police' (644). Spitzer's assessment of social services continues to be relevant. In light of the failure of formal punitive justice systems, more 'philosophically attractive, and financially prudent' (White and Wyn 2011) alternatives are being adopted by juvenile justice systems and youth services. Restorative justice and restorative practices are key examples of the alternatives being adopted. However, pressures from neoliberal market forces make practice frameworks such as restorative practices vulnerable to philosophical subversion. The use of 'Fair Process' in restorative practices is a key example of this vulnerability. The designers of Fair Process explicitly state that it is not

designed to be democratic (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 6). The process is not designed to give each person involved an equal say in the process: i.e. one person, one vote (Heywood 2003, 43). Rather, managers of the process retain the power to make the final decisions (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 6). I argue that the undemocratic nature of Fair Process compromises the justice goals of restorative practices, and calls into question the participatory nature of modern democracy.

In the next part of this chapter I trace a genealogy starting with the social contract and the hollowing out of the welfare state, moving onto neoliberalism and then restorative practices, and end with a discussion of the implications of these changes in governance for participatory youth practices. This genealogy provides a context for analysing modern governing practices, and the experiences of the hyper-governed young people who are the focus of this thesis. The use of Fair Process in restorative practices by youth services is an important example of neoliberal violence. Conspicuous by their absence in this genealogy are the voices of young people. This is because they have not previously been consulted about Fair Process or neoliberal violence. To promote critical thinking and solidarity (Freire 2014, 44) this thesis serves to address this gap in knowledge by promoting young people's stories. However, any conversation about the welfare state, and its subsequent 'hollowing out' (Rhodes, 1994, 36), must be built upon the foundational premise of the social contract. Furthermore, this primary idea underpinning government leads to questions about how best to govern. This thesis is politically located within the context of western democratic government. A brief overview of these foundational ideas, as follows, is needed to contextualise the claims about democracy, and the social contract, made by hyper-governed young people and by myself in this thesis.

The social contract

Social contract theory is often associated with enlightenment philosophers like Rousseau, Hobbes and Locke, but also modern philosophers such as Rawls (Hinman 2012, 283; Pollock 2016, 124). The essence of the idea is that to achieve a peaceful existence and the long-term benefits of collective safety, individuals surrender some of their freedom (Hayes and Prenzler 2015, 256; Hinman 2012, 283). Thus, strangers metaphorically come together motivated by self-interest (Hinman 2012, 283), and enter into a 'contract' which is the rule of law (Pollock 2016, 124). This concept has been critiqued from a wide range of perspectives, and continues to be debated. However, at the centre of the concept is the idea that 'each individual gives up some liberties and, in return, is protected from others who have their liberties restricted as well' (Pollock 2016, 124). Rawls expands on this idea slightly by including 'rights' and 'duties' assigned to those under the contract:

> Thus, we are to imagine that those who engage in social cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are to assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits. (Rawls 1971, 11)

Continuing down the path of placing expectations (rights and duties) on those who cooperate, Haynes and Prenzler argue that if the 'rules' of the group are broken then the group is 'entitled to punish the rule breaker' (Hayes and Prenzler 2015, 256). The existence of rules, rights, duties and punishment raises the question of who makes, upholds and enforces these rules, rights, duties and punishments. This is, according to Haynes and Prenzler, the philosophical foundation of democratic government (256).

At the core of the idea of democracy is an aspiration for self-rule. It is a 'regime where the will of the people … becomes the law of the country' (Ersson and Lane 2013, 2). Galtung and Scott argue that democracy is a set of rules 'making rulers accountable to the consent of the ruled' (2008, 16). This is often represented by the idea of each individual having 'equal say and equal vote' (Hayes and Prenzler 2015, 256). Democracy aims to fulfil the ideals of the social contract, and in particular to uphold the basic rights and duties of its members (Galtung and Scott 2008, 23). However, this idea has also been subject to significant critique, not least of which is the idea that democracy results simply in the 'dictatorship of the 51%' (Galtung and Scott 2008, 20). In other words, one person, one vote is simply a means for the majority to rule over the minority.

In practice, Hayes and Prenzler (2015, 256) argue that very few laws or punishments are created or enforced through the 'equal say and equal vote' ideal. In reality, democracy takes on a variety of forms. Systems where the community members have direct involvement in the decision-making process are direct or participatory democracies (Held 2006, 4). Furthermore, radical democracy is the pursuit of the most decentralised and participatory form of government possible. This approach aims for 'the widest possible dispersal of political power' (Heywood 2003, 339). However, the government of a country like Australia better reflects the structures of liberal or representative democracy. This system of government utilises elected officials who represent the community in decision making, and who act under a system of accountability (Held 2006, 4). As a result, the people (i.e. the members of the social contract) are one step removed from participating in the governance of their rights and duties and the division of the social benefit.

Attempting to fulfil these rights, duties and the division of the social benefit after the First and Second World Wars, western governments invested heavily in social planning and public services (Chenoweth and McAuliffe 2015, 36). This relatively recent approach to government has been called the welfare state (Fawcett et al. 2010, 16). Through state intervention in market systems, the welfare state has attempted to deliver economic security to people experiencing disadvantage, unemployment and poverty as a result of systemic and global structures of inequality (Chenoweth and McAuliffe 2015, 36). However, ideological shifts in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in a movement away from western governments providing social services (36). This was particularly prevalent in the UK under Margaret Thatcher and in the US under Ronald Reagan. During this time, critical questions were raised about the effectiveness of government welfare services (37). Like many countries, Australia continues to provide some government welfare services. However, Australia is sometimes described as a 'liberal welfare regime', meaning services are underpinned by the belief that welfare should only be made available when the market fails (Fawcett et al. 2010, 16). In addition, others have classified Australia's system as a 'radical fourth world of welfare capitalism' (Castles and Mitchell 1992, in Fawcett et al. 2010, 16) as a result of the harsh means-testing which dictates who receives support (17). Hence, Australian welfare continues to move towards market-based solutions, or what Rhodes has described as a process of 'hollowing out' (1994, 139).

In 1994 Rhodes discussed the 'hollowing out of the state' that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s in Britain. Whilst he emphasised that this effect was not limited to the UK or even centralised forms of government (139), his argument primarily focused on New Public Management and the National Health Service in the UK. Rhodes described this 'hollowing out' in terms of four effects: 1) privatising public intervention; 2) shifting the service delivery

of government departments to nongovernment agencies; 3) shifting power from Britain to the European Union; and 4) reducing agency for public servants (138–39). One important concern that Rhodes raises (among many others) is the distinction between the values of the public sector and the new outsourced approach. The public sector is required to act in line with values such as 'equity and justice', as it makes decisions within a 'mosaic of conflicting interests' (144). In contrast, the new approach emphasises economic efficiency above all else (144).

The conclusions made by Rhodes in 1994 have been tested and contested by a range of scholars. Holliday (2000) notes that these conclusions have been affirmed by other scholars, and are noticeably true internationally (167). However, he also argues that the state is still powerful and wields significant resources (173). Holliday acknowledges that the state is increasingly fragmented (173), as power is shifted to 'supranational' bodies (i.e. the Europe Union) and downward to 'subsidiary bodies, both within and without the formal boundaries of the state' (Rhodes 1994, 168). However, he argues that it is difficult to equate these shifts in power with a reduction in power (Holliday 2000, 174). Skelcher (2000) and A. Taylor (2000) tend to agree with Holliday about the continued power of the state, although for different reasons. Holliday builds his argument on an exhaustive examination of the (human and other) resources the state wields. Skelcher and Taylor, in contrast, examine the nature of the relationships the state is developing with its service delivery partners.

Skelcher (2000) constructs a three-stage process to describe the transition of the state from the post-war welfare state to the modern neoliberal state. In the 1960s there was increasing awareness of the failures of the welfare state to deliver on promises to solve 'poverty,

inequalities in education and health provision and … public housing' (Skelcher 2000, 5). In response to this failure, the state 'hollowed out', as the market promised more efficient and effective solutions (Skelcher 2000, 4). Government became the 'purchasers, rather than … providers, of services' (Healy 2009, 402), and began 'steering not rowing' (Taylor 2000, 49). The final stage to Skelcher's (2000) schematic of the state's transition was an evolution to the 'congested state', which contains 'networked relationships between public, private, voluntary and community actors' (4). It is in this context that Skelcher and Taylor argue that while the state may be hollowed out, it still retains significant controls.

The partnership arrangement within Skelcher's (2000) third stage involved government and nongovernment organisations (NGOs) working together in 'pursuit of a public policy objective' (9). This has been described elsewhere as a 'third sector' approach (Seibel and Anheier 1990b, 8) or the 'third way' (Selsky and Parker 2005, 853; Wallace and Pease 2011, 135) of governing. This method facilities the 'freedom to manage' (Skelcher 2000, 8) the local implementation of policy by NGOs, under the condition of contractual compliance with governmental goals. Taylor (2000) argues that this arrangement constitutes more than simply an alignment of objectives; it becomes a means to align NGOs with political values (51). This might include the delivery of particular types of services (and not others), or a withdrawal from advocacy or from expressing some political views. Skelcher (2000, 9) as well as Roberts and Devine (2003, 313) argue that this arrangement results in agencies competing for government funds. Furthermore, Roberts and Devine contend that this has resulted in a significant reorientation and increase in the workload of NGOs (2003, 313). As such, governments are able to manipulate NGOs through preferential treatment and inducements (Skelcher 2000, 9). NGOs might appear to be autonomous, however their capacity for critical

activities such as advocacy is severely limited by government's legislative powers and control of their financial resources (Taylor 2000, 51). As a result, it is questionable to what extent NGOs can resist governments shaping their objectives (Taylor 2000, 51). This is the process of governments 'hollowing out', and reducing their welfare service provision. Public service values such as justice and equity are surrendered to the market. However, governments retain control of financial resources, and hence outsource the values of the dominant political ideology.

There are other important effects on democratic values that result from the hollowing out of the welfare state. The repositioning of government as purchasers of services, Hallet (2012) argues, shifts the 'regulation of marginal populations through markets rather than government programs' (220). The marketisation and fragmentation of centralised government have resulted in an emphasis on 'methodological pragmatism (what works)' (Taylor 2000, 48). This kind of emphasis on efficiency and 'quasi-market' regulation is not harmonious with traditional democratic values embedded in the public sector: i.e. participation, accountability and equity (Skelcher 2000, 13; Taylor 2000, 53). Others have argued that this embrace of neoliberalism has contracted the state's 'willingness and capacity to protect vulnerable citizens—the poor, disabled, sick, young, and working classes' (McCulloch 2004, 315). Further, this approach positions 'at risk' community members in a new way: they are now understood to be 'the risk' (Giroux 2002, 144). This is a reconfiguring of the 'welfare state' to a 'war-fare' or 'security state', as governments wage 'wars' on drugs, terror, poverty etc. (McCulloch 2004, 315; Hallet 2012, 215). The hollowing out of the welfare state is more than a debate over the relative power, resources and fragmentation of the modern state. The movement towards market solutions amounts to the state abandoning democratic values and

importing into civil society an emphasis on efficiency.

Central to the hollowing out of the welfare state is the emergence of neoliberalism as the 'dominant governmental rationality … of the late 1990s to the present' (Bacchi 2009, 276). Defining neoliberalism is infamously difficult. It is a 'notoriously fuzzy category' (Watts 2013, 117). In his 2014 attempt to 'rethink' neoliberalism, Dean concluded that it is 'irreducible to a simple and coherent philosophy or ideology' (Dean 2014, 151). Rowlands and Rawolle (2013) argue that neoliberalism 'presents something of a moving target for researchers' (262). However, in broad terms it is the moral privileging of market solutions (Bacchi 2009, 276; Watts 2013, 117), alongside an emphasis on individual rights (particularly property rights) (Fraser and Taylor 2016, 3). Dean goes on to suggest that perhaps neoliberalism is best defined in opposition to 'economic protection, state economic planning, state intervention, state regulation and mass social programs, all of which allegedly lead down the slippery slope of totalitarianism' (Dean 2014, 151–2). This oppositional definition makes sense in terms of the hollowing out of the welfare state. The movement away from providing these services seems to be one of the primary goals of neoliberal government.

Neoliberalism has attracted significant study, and a comprehensive summary of this literature is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, a critical approach to neoliberalism needs to acknowledge nuance within this political ideology. Rowlands and Rawolle, in their paper 'Neoliberalism is not a theory of everything' (2013), argue that there is a need to define and deconstruct neoliberalism so that it can be understood and resisted. Conducting a review of 115 scholarly articles using 'education' and 'neoliberalism' in their title, they discovered roughly three-quarters of the papers provided no or little definition of the term (266). They

argue that this absence of definition and nuance regarding the term neoliberalism risks creating misunderstandings in ways that are 'contrary to our original intentions' (269). It is thus essential that I provide some more nuance to the picture of neoliberalism used in this thesis.

Neoliberalism draws from the principles of economic liberalism, but moves beyond it into what has been labelled a 'market fundamentalism' (Heywood 2003, 55). Rowlands and Rawolle assert that it goes as far as offering direction for 'the achievement of personal success and, even, of happiness' (2013, 263). However, Heywood argues that despite not being concerned about the 'growing power of transnational corporations' and the implications for democracy, neoliberalism has 'difficulty reconciling unbridled consumerism' with 'any meaningful notion of human flourishing' (Heywood 2003, 56–7). These notions are underpinned by Hayek's argument that government intervention in the market is the greatest threat to individual liberty (Heywood 2003, 55). Individual freedom and happiness in neoliberalism are tied to unrestricted market capitalism.

This approach of advancing individual freedoms has been captured by a cry for 'small government' (Rowlands and Rawolle 2013, 264). However, one thing that distinguishes neoliberalism from economic liberalism is its responsibility to also 'actively foster business' (264). According to Wacquant, in order to achieve this, the neoliberal state has in fact three aims: 'Erasing the economic state, dismantling the social state, strengthening the penal state' (Wacquant 2001, 404). Wacquant argues that neoliberal policies resulting in a casualised labour market, social degradation, and precarious wage work create a need to manage the 'lower end of the social structure in advanced societies' (401). Liberal-paternalist

neoliberalism, as a result of emphasising marketisation and individualism, positions the individual in economic terms (Brennan 2009, 341). People are a resource, much like capital and property (Brennan 2009, 341). This fosters ‘unfettered competitive individualism’ (White and Wyn 2011, 16) that clearly provides an advantage to those who have access to social, economic, and political capital. Whilst a turn toward market solutions might be presented as values-neutral, it is in fact a values orientation that constructs distinct power inequalities.

Wacquant goes on to argue that the ‘invisible hand’ of the market requires an ‘iron fist’ of the state to ‘check the disorders generated by the diffusion of social insecurity’ (2001, 402). This results in a ‘penalization of poverty’ (401). This version of the social contract requires good citizens to contribute to the economy (Fawcett et al. 2010, 68), while those who fail to do so are positioned as ‘defaulting labourers’ (Berns 2002, 25). As such Wacquant believes neoliberal regimes can best be described as ‘liberal-paternalist’ (2001, 402). It is not sufficient to state that neoliberal governments are small governments. Even while the end of ‘big government’ is being announced in the social and economic spheres, governments continue to invest (economically and politically) in the ‘right to security’ (402). Governments might be hollowing out, but they are not necessarily shrinking.

As governments hollow-out under neoliberalism, those NGOs providing youth services compete in a market of service providers for government funding. They adopt frameworks and values that position them to compete in this market, whilst trying to balance their philosophical goals. They strive to maintain the ethical and theoretical orientations of their professions. However, their capacity to resist the power of governments in a marketised social service sector is in question. Restorative practices provide some strategic advantage in

this market as their relational emphasis is philosophically attractive to youth workers and agencies. In addition, they present an economically shrewd alternative to the failings of the punitive justice system. These failings become clear when the effectiveness of this system to prevent cycles of crimes is tested.

The failings of the punitive justice system are rendered visible through an examination of recidivism statistics. As described in the introduction, Lipsey's (2009) Standard Program Evaluation Protocol (SPEP) meta-analysis of juvenile crime prevention programs found an increase in juvenile offending resulting from deterrence- and surveillance-style programs (139). Recidivism is notoriously hard to measure. However, Payne's review of recidivism in Australia in 2007 found that across a range of measurements, methods and jurisdictions, young people consistently reported recidivism rates upward of 34%, and as high as 68% (Payne 2007, 71–2). More recent data would be useful, however accessing current data is difficult, and often the figures are contested due to differences of opinion regarding the definition and measurement of recidivism. For example, the lower figure cited above (34%) represents the number of young people who *self-reported* being detained twice in the last 12 months prior to reporting. In contrast, the higher figure (68%) was based on *court conviction data*, and represented the number of young people reoffending (not necessarily resulting in incarceration) within six months of release from prior incarceration. Factors such as reporting style, length of reporting period as well as the level of offence and punishment significantly affect the data. Despite this, a system that fails to prevent this magnitude of recidivism is widely understood to be failing. As such, there is political and community appetite for more practical and effective solutions.

In the political climate of methodological pragmatism there is increased pressure on social services. This renders frameworks such as those of restorative practices vulnerable to philosophical subversion. As NGOs complete in the market for government funding it is difficult to resist compromising, aligning or suppressing professional and political values to be better positioned for (re)funding. An important example of this is the importing of Fair Process in restorative practices. Wachtel is an advocate of restorative practices and founder of the International Institute of Restorative Practices. He claims he is interested in what works; he is a pragmatist, not a 'bleeding heart liberal' or a 'hardnosed conservative' (Wachtel 2013, 26). The concern with this kind of positioning of social services is that it can white-wash a profession that has an explicit ethical orientation. Wachtel advocates the application of the principles of Fair Process in restorative practices on the grounds that 'individuals are most likely to trust and cooperate freely with systems—whether they themselves win or lose by those systems—when Fair Process is observed' (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 6; Wachtel 2012, 6). Fair Process is described by Wachtel as a set of three principles that guide practice developed by Kim and Mauborgne in their paper 'Fair process: Managing in the knowledge economy'. The principles are as follows:

> Engagement — involving individuals in decisions by inviting their input and encouraging them to challenge one another's ideas.
>
> Explanation — clarifying the thinking behind a final decision.
>
> Expectation clarity — stating the new rules of the game, including performance standards, penalties for failure, and new responsibilities. (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 1)

The appropriateness of these principles for guiding practice with young people is a central question of this thesis. To problematise the principles, with this project I engage with and prioritise hyper-governed young people's perspectives regarding Fair Process. However, there are a couple of observations that are worth noting at this early stage. Firstly, Fair Process is explicitly non-democratic. The authors, Kim and Mauborgne, state this clearly:

> Nor is fair process the same as democracy in the workplace. Achieving fair process does not mean that managers forfeit their prerogative to make decisions and establish policies and procedures. Fair process pursues the best ideas whether they are put forth by one or many. (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 6)

The purpose of the framework is to find the most effective management strategy in the 'knowledge economy'. The decision-making process thus prioritises 'the merit of the ideas—and not consensus' (6). Merit is being judged based on values other than the public-sector values of participation and equality. Democratic participation is not the priority. In using this model, managers retain the right to make the final decision; they do not 'forfeit their prerogative to make decisions and establish policies and procedures' (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 6). The prioritisation of these values is reflective of the movement that has taken place in the hollowing-out of the state. Participation, accountability and equity are replaced with an emphasis on efficiency (Skelcher 2000, 13; Taylor 2000, 53). Whilst this shift is questionable in youth service provision in general, it is also presents a significant issue for restorative practices specifically.

Restorative practices are the application of the principles and practices of restorative justice in a range of social service settings (Braithwaite 1999, 42; Wachtel 2012, 2). At their core restorative justice and restorative practices are an approach to the question of justice. Restorative justice is positioned as emphasising healing and repair, not punishment (Van Wormer 2009, 107; Wachtel 2012, 1; 2013, 8). Furthermore, it emphasises the human and relational element within any experience of harm or wrongdoing (Wachtel 2012, 4; Zehr 2002b, 19). Critical to this principle is the participation of those affected within the process of justice. A key criticism of modern legal justice processes is that they can exclude the perspectives and voices of victims in particular (Zehr 1995, 194). Finally, both Zehr (2002) and Braithwaite (1989) emphasise the value of the restorative approaches in terms of accountability. Zehr (2002b, 21) explicitly asks: whose 'obligation' is it, in this context, to do the repairing of harm? Likewise, Braithwaite (1989, 69) advocates the value of the restorative approaches by arguing that personal relationships are more effective at creating behavioural change than a remote government authority. Restorative justice emphasises participation and relational accountability. As such, the shift away from these values that occurs with the use of Fair Process is a problem for restorative practices.

This subversion of the justice goals of restorative practices to make these practices more attractive for modern audiences (i.e. governments and the general public) has been a concern for other academics. Daly identifies four myths that are often propagated about restorative justice in order to 'sell' it to politicians, policy makers and the community in general. They are:

1. Restorative justice is the opposite of retributive justice.
2. Restorative justice uses indigenous justice practices and is the dominant form of pre-

modern justice.

3. Restorative justice is a "care" (or feminine) response to crime in comparison to a "justice" (or masculine) response.
4. Restorative justice can be expected to produce major changes in people.

(Daly 2002, 56)

Daly argues that presenting restorative justice in this way is misleading (2002, 61–3). Attempting to create an origin myth around restorative justice is designed to make it appear superior to punitive justice. Positioning it in opposition to punitive justice is an attempt to make it more palatable to similar social justice movements, including feminism (Daly 2002, 62). Daly does not claim that there are no similarities between modern and pre-modern justice forms of justice (Daly 2002, 64). She is simply pointing out that to state that restorative justice is an Indigenous practice, or has its roots in Indigenous practices, is to ignore and wash over the many important differences between the practices of these Indigenous groups (i.e. the first peoples of modern day Australia, New Zealand and Canada) and this modern attempt at justice (Daly 2002, 64). For example, Daly points out that Indigenous practices often included brutal and violent justice which are arguably not a part of modern restorative justice. In the same way, the modern form of restorative justice is often an amalgamation of Indigenous modes of justice and western legal processes (Daly 2002, 64). To make this claim then is to take the current (often white, middle class, male-centric) experience and impose it back on Indigenous practices (Daly 2002, 64). Daly's critique ultimately demonstrates the need to be vigilant regarding the subtle ways in which political and market pressures can subvert the philosophical values of the frameworks underpinning human services. It also demonstrates the need to engage directly with members of the target

group of the frameworks, to value their experiences and perspectives. Hence, this project engages directly with hyper-governed young people, and values their perspectives on the principles of Fair Process.

The best methods through which to facilitate young people's input into research and their participation in research and in political life has been a much-debated topic over many years. Young people are routinely positioned on one or the other side of that dual discourse of vulnerability and capability. On one side, young people are viewed as a source of hope, possibility and social activity; and on the opposing side they are constructed as disengaged, apathetic and incompetent (Harris 2009, 302; Smith 2015, 359; White and Wyn 2011, 110). Young people are either treated as competent and independent, or incompetent and dependent. Once again, young people are typically regarded as 'human becomings, not human beings' (Coady 2015, 380). This is the 'futurity' youth (White and Wyn 2011, 117), where the roles of young people in society today are ignored or downplayed, and their participation is valued primarily in terms of their future contributions. Paradoxically, even when young people are politically active, their activity is labelled as illegitimate (Harris, Wyn, and Younes 2010, 10; White and Wyn 2011, 110). If young people become active in political protests, they often suffer from attracting one of two labels. Their methods may be labelled as inappropriate; i.e. they are considered too violent. Alternatively, they can be described as being duped by others' agendas. Thus, even when they are active, their activity is marginalised.

More recently, consideration has been given to the social and economic circumstances that enable young people's participation. Harris argues that political participation is predicated on

social and economic security (Harris 2009, 303). Precarity of the education to employment transition and as a consequence of the hollowing out of the welfare state has created an environment in which young people are struggling to exercise their citizenship (Harris, Wyn, and Younes 2010). I argue that the effects of this attack on participation are visible not only in the social conditions created by neoliberal violence, but also in the subversion of social services and frameworks like restorative practices, through the over-emphasis on efficiency. As described above, the emphasis on efficiency creates vulnerabilities that enable undemocratic practices like Fair Process to infiltrate practice frameworks such as those of restorative practices. Neoliberal violence is the undermining of young people's equal participation in society by denying them easy access to social security, education and employment. At the same time, their participation in decision making processes is blocked, due to the hollowing out of social services.

Advocates of youth civic participation point to the United Nation's Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and the articles within it that enshrine young people's right to participation in decision making processes that affect them (*United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child* 1989). Commonly, advocates point towards article 12 for this purpose, however the references to freedom of expression in article 13 and access to education in article 29 are also relevant. Hart's (1992) ladder of participation is also commonly referenced, for its model and standards for participation. Hart's model starts with forms of non-participation, which include:

1. Manipulation
2. Decoration

3. Tokenism.

He then moves through five degrees of participation:

4. Assigned but informed
5. Consulted and informed
6. Adult-initiated, shared decisions with children
7. Child-initiated and directed
8. Child-initiated and shared decisions with adults.

This model has been influential internationally; however, how it has been interpreted and implemented has changed over time.

Harris (2009) argues that during the 1970s and 1980s interest grew in youth *participation*, with the ultimate outcome of this movement being the drafting and ratification of the 1989 UNCRC (301). She argues that following this, in the 1990s, the international political debate shifted slightly towards youth *citizenship*, which included rights but also began to emphasise 'civic and political knowledge and responsibilities' (302). In the 2000s this shifted again, and *civic engagement* became the new focus (302). It could be argued that the movement towards *citizenship* and the preparation of young people for *engagement* are a reaction to mainstream political disengagement among young people. It has been argued that this shift represents a blaming of young people for social issues and an attempt to 'train' and govern them in the appropriate 'skills' to be the right kind of citizens (Fox 2013, 987). Through this movement, the language of participation has been caught up in the language of citizenship, such that

there are now questions about whether its emphasis lies with liberation or control.

Coady (2015) argues that there are two underpinning ideas, or models, within citizenship. The first she calls the 'identification' model, and the other the 'participation' model (378). The identification model is attached to the idea that citizenship is part of someone's identity. A person identifies as a citizen of a country. This model however, does not guarantee participation in a legal system; only protection under it. Participation is only granted on the grounds that the agent has the competency to fulfil certain responsibilities (386). As such, certain groups have been excluded from participation based on perceived incompetence. Coady asserts that, in reality, the 'two most important criteria for citizenship in the modern state were being male and being adult' (380). Whilst other groups have successfully challenged these criteria (notably women and Indigenous groups), children are still excluded (Coady 2015, 380; Smith 2015, 359). This is despite the obvious issues with many adults not fulfilling measures of competence (Coady 2015, 384; Sercombe 2010, 19). Hence, young people are afforded protections and support under the law, but not participation. Arguably the precarity associated with the employment-education transition and hollowing out of the welfare state erodes these minimal conditions of citizenship further.

The questions around youth participation and citizenship present challenges about young people's potential for participation, in light of the fact that modern societies and political systems 'are created by adults to serve an adult agenda and are not structured around young people's interests or designed to engage them' (Harris 2009, 302). Furthermore, they are designed by adults who are usually out of step with the needs and priorities of young people (White and Wyn 2011, 116). Neoliberalism and its emphasis on efficiency does not service

young people's needs or priorities, but rather the needs and priorities of (some) adults. The subversion of restorative practices with principles that prioritise efficiency over participation is an extension of the exclusion of young people from democratic participation. Young people are afforded some protections within the principles of Fair Process, but as a result of its principles they are denied full participation in restorative practices. The principles of Fair Process require that young people are 'engaged' through the process. The principles enshrine an opportunity for input. However, ultimately these principles do not require that the young person's input have any bearing on the final decisions made about or for them. Furthermore, their capacity to make, or even lead, decisions is undermined by a focus on efficiency. Young people have the right to provide input into the process, however they do not lead it: the manager of the process retains all the decision-making power in the interests of prioritising an efficient decision-making process. Therefore, at best, Fair Process positions young people as future citizens who must first conform to civil standards before being afforded responsibility.

These anti-participatory effects of Fair Process are best understood by tracing the genealogy of the hollowing out of the welfare state. As such, it is possible to understand the impact of Fair Process on democratic decision making within restorative practices as a product of the anti-participatory effects of neoliberal violence. The hollowing out of the welfare state in Australia has resulted in the state outsourcing the provision of government services. This outsourcing emphasises efficiency over traditional public service values like justice, equity and participation. It also places pressure on NGOs to conform to political values and creates vulnerabilities within the ethical orientation of human services professions. The inclusion of Fair Process in restorative practices is a key example of the exploitation of this vulnerability,

as advocates of restorative practices, youth services and practitioners attempt to construct politically and socially attractive narratives to compete for government funding. The white-washing of human services with efficiency has exacerbated the exclusion, governing and control of young people through citizenship rhetoric that is ultimately found to be anti-participatory. These are the effects of neoliberal violence. In order to counteract the unconscious acceptance of the violent scarring of this lost generation, young people need to be consulted directly about their experiences of violation and their critique of Fair Process.

Conclusion

The language of violence is already gaining currency to explore and explain the impacts of the complex and precarious reality facing young people. These violating experiences are being described in terms of their 'scarring effects' (Cuervo and Wyn 2016, 127) on a 'lost generation' (MacDonald 2016). Young people are considered to occupy a 'wild zone' (Kelly 1999) and have underdeveloped, animal-like predispositions (Wyn and White 1997, 19) that must be governed. Simultaneously, if young people can conform to the expectations of responsible citizens, then they are viewed to represent the hope for the future of society. This seemingly positive picture of young people is still bound to the idea that they hold *potential* value, not present value. Despite the emergence of the language of violation in critical youth sociology, youth violence is still primarily understood in terms of physical violence, and an integrated theory of violence is yet to be valued and explored. An integrated theory of violence has the potential to provide new insights into young people's experiences in modernity and how these shape their own violence.

With this project, I bring together a critical sociology of youth and the emerging sociology of violence to study youth and neoliberal violence. As discussed, youth sociology is yet to exploit the integrated frameworks to analyse violation that are being developed by the sociology of violence. The sociology of violence is yet to consider the perspectives of young people in the network of intersecting oppression. Here, I embark upon exploring and creating a new hinterland at the nexus of these two fields. I engage with young people, who provide guidance through this landscape of their experiences and stories. This landscape is unavoidably also colonised by the theories of power and violence brought by the respective fields of youth sociology and the sociology of violence. These theories form important orientating features to guide my analysis of the young people's stories.

The stories of hyper-governed young people are messy and contingent. They are also tied to the story of the hollowing out of the welfare state and neoliberal violence. As the carceral network is extended and the prioritisation of efficiency is exported to the NGO sector, the participation of young people is further compromised. Not only are young people suffering under a lack of social and economic services, they are now also being excluded from decision-making processes within service delivery frameworks such as restorative practices. Young people's stories and experiences with Fair Process and neoliberal violence need to be engaged with, in order to stem the uncritical adoption of violating efficiency. This project engages directly with young people. It investigates the effects of neoliberal violence through a focus on the situated knowledge around Fair Process and restorative practices, and holds these in tension with the broader narratives of youth and violence. I leverage the converging fields of critical youth sociology and the emerging sociology of violence to promote critical thinking and solidarity with hyper-governed young people's stories. These are stories of

crushing conformity, as well as stories of resistance. These stories reveal new insights into the adverse effects of neoliberal violence. This new landscape is a gap in the existing understanding of youth violence. This project begins to co-create this space with hyper-governed young people. The next chapter focuses on the method assemblage used to engage with hyper-governed young people's experiences and participation in this research.

Chapter 3 — Methodology: Method assemblage and parallel projects in youth research

The previous chapter described the theoretical assemblage I developed at the nexus of critical youth sociology and the emerging sociology of violence as part of the current research. In this chapter I outline the method assemblage I devised to explore this converging landscape. I built this method assemblage on epistemological and ontological principles that facilitated the exploration—and promoted the significance—of the messy and contingent experiences of hyper-governed young people. A central task that this method assemblage needed to support was maintaining the tension between young people's situated experiences of the effects of neoliberal violence and the broader discourses of youth and violence. I argue that this is made possible by constructing a method assemblage that makes hyper-governed young people's experiences present, but also acknowledges the inevitability of making other experiences absent. Law (2004) would argue that this approach has allegorical implications, meaning that it has repercussions for more than the hyper-governed young people in focus in this research. Furthermore, this explicit orientation is designed to enact a reality in which young people are understood as active contributors to the creation of a hopeful society. This is my other main goal in creating this method assemblage: to engage with hyper-governed young people in a way that positions them as active and capable participants. I engage with the methodological challenges of youth participation in the following chapter (chapter 4). The current chapter will focus on the epistemological and ontological foundations of this project.

I begin this chapter by unpacking the epistemological and ontological positioning of this research project. The political nature of youth research challenges the assumptions underpinning the claim that epistemologies can be objective and neutral. I will argue that

constructivist and post-structuralist epistemologies are insufficient to achieve the emancipatory goals of this project. As will be discussed, this project requires a method assemblage that enables me to navigate the tension between the emancipatory goals and the political implications of my research. In the second section of the chapter I outline the project design, target group, interview style and analytical method, and consider the implications of these project design choices for achieving the goals of the project.

Multiple ways of knowing

The method assemblage used for this project draws together multiple epistemologies or multiple ways of knowing. This approach of examining social phenomena from multiple angles was utilised early on by researchers such as Braithwaite in theorising restorative justice. *Crime, Shame and Reintegration* (Braithwaite 1989) is a seminal work in restorative justice. In it, Braithwaite puts reintegrative shaming theory to the test utilising a range of data, including quantitative data on historical crime rates, and data captured from survey research and macro-sociological studies. He goes on to propose potential experiments to further test the theory. However, he starts by suggesting that the first test a new theory should undergo is ethnographic. Braithwaite suggests that it should 'cast serious doubt' on a theory if 'grey-haired people with long experience' were to say they had 'never heard of that happening' (Braithwaite 1989, 108). In this statement, Braithwaite is arguing for the place of qualitative methods alongside quantitative methods within social sciences. Furthermore, he is advocating the necessity of a variety of knowledges and methods. However, he also demonstrates the ongoing, and often unconscious, exclusion of young people as holders and creators of valid knowledge. Here the knowledge of a 'grey-haired' individual is privileged in

a hierarchy over the knowledge that might be held by what could be called a *coloured haired* individual (i.e. young people). Youth-focused researchers continue to wrestle with the problem of this privileging of adult knowledge and adult agendas in research. This issue has multiple ethical, practical, political, ontological and epistemological dimensions. These dimensions are, like the experiences of hyper-governed young people, intertwined and contingent. In this chapter I attempt to navigate these dimensions, and then describe the way forward taken in this thesis. This way forward has been styled by Law (2014) as a 'method assemblage' (38). To unpack the method assemblage, I begin with addressing the underpinning epistemological and ontological assumptions.

Structuralism

Braithwaite specifically identifies young people (15–25 years) as a key demographic for the application of reintegrative shaming theory (Braithwaite 1989, 101). Yet Braithwaite excludes their experiences and knowledge in his evaluation of reintegrative shaming in *Crime, Shame and Reintegration*. Their exclusion can be traced back to positivistic notions of neutrality and objectivity that construct hierarchies between whose knowledge is valid or invalid and who is qualified to gather this knowledge. Objectivity is achieved through the construction of a division between the knowing subject (i.e. researcher) and the object of knowledge (i.e. young people). This is realised through the application of reason by the rational actor (read: researcher) (Strega 2005, 202). Only knowledge gathered by qualified 'scientists' can be awarded the gold standard of legitimate; that is, 'objective' and 'neutral' knowledge.

The pursuit of a singular objective truth creates a false dichotomy between the researcher and the actor. In 1979 Giddens described a tendency within sociological thought of the day to begin the pursuit of the '"real" stimuli', by 'discounting agent's reasons for their action' (Giddens 1979, 71). Latour notes that within this ontology, subjects of research are not equipped to identify objective truth. As a result of their location within the social world of study, they are 'at best … "informants" about this world and, at worst … blinded to its existence' (Latour 2005, 4). It is only through the specialised training of the social scientist that this world is able to be unpacked and the singular truth beneath it revealed (Latour 2005, 4). In contrast, Giddens advocates for valuing and understanding the perspective of the actor, particularly when it comes to understanding the phenomena of violence (1979, 71). What these perspectives allude to is that knowledge is political, and research methods are shaped by the ontological assumptions researchers employ. I argue in this chapter that knowledge is always political. Facts and data are always presented by researchers in light of their ontological and epistemological assumptions.

When Emile Durkheim worked to establish sociology as a distinct discipline he declared that it should be concerned with 'social facts' (Giddens 1982, 13). Drawing on the natural sciences he established the foundations of the structural-functionalist assertion that 'individual behaviour was governed by law-like social forces, emanating from society as an external entity' (Scott 2014, 14). In his work *After Method*, Law stresses that this understanding of the social world has 'many strengths, but [is] also blinkered' (Law 2004, 151). Law is convinced that the social cannot be so easily determined and predicted (Law 2008, 641). He is concerned that when sociology and social sciences attempt to utilise a deterministic epistemology, they are in danger of 'wrongly collude[ing] in the enactment of

dominant realities' (Law and Urry 2004, 399). Likewise, Susan Strega is adamant that epistemologies and ontologies that emphasise objectivity exclude and devalue important (usually marginalised) perspectives and people/groups from participation in knowledge creation (Strega 2005, 207).

> Thus, the dominant pattern in Enlightenment epistemology is a hierarchical, gendered, raced, and classed dualism, an asymmetrical division in which the White and male side is valued over the dark and Female side. (Strega 2005, 205)

Ironically despite the care with which Strega is criticising oppressive hierarchical epistemologies, she too has fallen into practices of exclusion. It is not simply white men, but white *old* men who sit atop the positivist pile. Furthermore, my qualification here overlooks still other exclusionary categories: western, able-bodied, middle class, and more. Strega is aware of this issue, and the interconnection of oppression. She argues that the dominance of dualistic logics 'inevitably pit those on the margins against one another' (Strega 2005, 226). It is not necessarily the case that she believes, or is arguing, that young people are less important. However, they are not present in her analysis. Law argues that they have simply been made 'absent' (2004, 83). The reality of presence and absence in research, means that 'facts' are not neutral (Strega 2005, 207). Instead facts are always presented and interpreted within the prioritisations of presence and absence of existing discourses or ideological assumptions.

Judith Butler demonstrates this point in reference to gender. If, as per positivist assumptions, gender is an idea that accurately represents a singular reality, then this means: A) there is one single physical manifestation of gender and that this is understood singularly; and B) it is not in part a product of thoughts, expressions or activities (Butler 2010, 147). Gender offers an exemplary challenge to researchers' assumptions of objectivity and neutrality in that it is layered with multiplicity, and defies the dualistic detachment and arrangement of physical things. Gender is experienced and expressed in a multitude of forms and is highly influenced by popular culture and public discourse. *Youth* is similarly socially, politically and culturally constructed. There is no single manifestation of youth; rather it is a product of many and varied assumptions and social forces.

Structuralism claims objective universal representation, yet young people are excluded from knowledge creation within this epistemology. Their experiences are not present. To argue that some voices are excluded in structural epistemologies is to argue 'against the metaphysics of presence', or the idea that everything can be understood and collected in one place under one discourse (Law 2004, 83). Instead Law stresses that when something is examined or made 'present', something else has to be overlooked or made 'absent' (Law 2004, 83). Hence as these different discourses and methodologies emphasise and focus on certain areas of knowledge, they exclude and de-emphasise others. A central focus of my research is the systematic exclusion of young people. Hence, the point here is to argue that in the above epistemologies, young people are regularly excluded from knowledge creation practices.

Constructionism

There are several alternatives to structuralism that generally focus on recognising the agency and importance of the actor. These can vary in the degree to which they balance the importance of the agency and structure, and their position on the political nature of knowledge. For example, Strega's advocacy for a relational basis for knowledge is established on a combination of feminist and post-structural epistemologies (Strega 2005, 201). Feminist perspectives reject the binary oppositions that underpin unilateral individualism (Sevenhuijsen 2003, 183). These perspectives counter an enlightenment ontology that ignores the interdependent nature of the human experience, which is most obvious during the first and last years of life (Bacchi 2009, 69). The dependence of children, and the elderly, is particularly tangible. However, all people are caught up in varying levels of interdependence. This understanding is also often reflected in Indigenous ontologies. Arch Bishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu describes a foundational ontological principle from his South African culture using the word 'ubuntu', which means a 'person is a person through other persons' (Tutu 2013, 21). Sometimes this is translated as 'I am because we are' (Strega 2005, 201). Latour's Actor Network Theory (ANT) takes the focus on the agency over structure a step further than the feminist perspective. ANT, he argues, attempts 'to follow the actors themselves' (Latour 2005, 12). ANT prioritises the actors' perspectives and treats them as experts in their own contexts. Whilst these two alternatives to structuralism differ in many ways, they both promote the idea that people and the societies that sociologists study 'do not exist in and of themselves' (Law 2004, 83): they are connected through complex social networks.

Another alternative to structuralism described by Law is a representation epistemology. Law

(2004) utilises the term ‘allegory’ to emphasise the ‘presence’ and ‘absence’ in knowledge production. He chooses allegory because it is ‘the art of meaning something other and more than what is being said’ (Law 2004, 88). Law makes the argument that the process of undertaking detailed analysis and research results in the inevitable exclusion of a range of other contextual factors. He suggests that perhaps this is a requirement of making things ‘present’: i.e. detailed observation and analysis (Law 2004, 85). As described above, in detailed observation of one thing, other things are made ‘absent’ (Law 2004, 85). Law suggests that it is only through absence that something can be made present, and it remains sustainably present only if that which is made absent is ‘Othered’ (Law 2004, 85). Applying this to the current thesis, this means that if I focus solely on youth, other intersectional dimensions of oppression are made absent. Sustaining this focus on youth means these dimensions are othered. However, the close examination of youth does have implications for these other dimensions of oppression. It is important to acknowledge that there are other dimensions, and that there will be (allegorical) implications for them from the focused study on this one dimension. Law notes that the singular focus required for research is sustained through the allusion to the othered and absent contextual factors of the research. He describes this allusion as allegorical.

According to Law the fact that knowledge is representational and allegorical is for the most part scientifically acceptable. A problem arises with ‘allegory that denies its character as allegory’ (Law 2004, 89). That is, when researchers fail to acknowledge that their work is a limited representation of a greater whole; when they overstep the boundary of humility and begin to claim ultimate truth. Framing knowledge creation as the art of allegory acts as a constant reminder that what is generated ‘in here’ is only a partial representation of the

complex reality ‘out there’ (Law 2004, 132). Some of the absent contextual factors to any research are the knowledge practices of the discipline. Law calls these historical logics that define a discipline’s way of knowing their ‘hinterlands’ (Law 2004, 27). For instance, my focus on hyper-governed young people and their knowledge in this research makes their experiences present, and other young people’s absent. However, the findings of my research are allegorical, in the sense that they imply more than what is being said. The stories of hyper-governed young people have meanings other than those emerging from the personal stories of individual young people. They also connect with the stories of other young people. This is not a claim for ultimate truth and universal generalisability. Rather, this is saying that making their stories present begins to make visible a vast array of interconnected systems of oppression. This research tells part of the story, but has implications beyond just what is in focus or is being explicitly said.

The other major advantage for the social sciences in conceptualising research as allegory is that, at times, allegory can be ambiguous and uncertain (Law 2004, 90). Law is suggesting that knowledge is not always as definite and precise as it may seem. Allegory provides a space in which more than one idea can co-exist. These multiple ideas, contingencies, interpretations or realities may not fit perfectly together. Law believes this is the art and beauty of allegory: it can ‘hold two or more things together that do not necessarily cohere’ (Law 2004, 90). This echoes the ‘wicked problems’ that hyper-governed young people face, and their contingent and contextual nature (Rittel and Webber 1973, 162). Wicked problems are not easily defined, nor easily solved (Watts 2015, 162). Multiple issues coexist, contradict and compound (Valentine 2015, 243). However, Law’s allegorical epistemology also facilitates the holding of multiple ‘goods’. Instead of the singular good of scientific, certified,

positivist ‘truth’, Law advocates for a fractional enacted reality in which there are multiple goods. These goods can be measured in terms of ‘politics; justice; aesthetics; inspiration and the spiritual’ (Law 2004, 153).

Despite the criticism here of structuralism, the point is not to suggest that it has no value or that it is inherently bad. Rather, it is to say that an objective and neutral epistemology that prioritises structural concerns is problematic. However, there are issues for this thesis with the exclusive prioritisation of agency and subjective epistemologies. These issues also need attention—not simply so that they can be overcome, but rather so that they can be addressed. As Foucault describes:

> My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. (Foucault 1998, 19 cited in Dean 2010, 40)

According to Latour, in order to overcome the assertion of singular truth, social scientists will need to do the work of ‘learn[ing] how to become good relativists’ (Latour 2005, 16). Furthermore, Latour argues that, in the attempt to separate Actor Network Theory (ANT) from the politics of knowledge, the ‘theory’ part of ANT becomes inaccurate (1999, 19). He believes ANT is not an attempt to theorise the world, but rather just to observe it. This is my concern with the relativist end of the methodological spectrum and Law’s ‘situated’ knowledge (2014, 62). The relativism of this methodology often positions the research as apolitical. It is insufficient for the emancipatory goals of critical youth sociology to simply

observe a world and its oppressive dimensions. Relativism tends to overlook structures of oppression and reduce issues to an individual's actions and unique interactions (Strega 2005, 207). The strength of positivist assertions is their capacity to inspire concrete action in the service of, or in opposition to, existing structures of oppression.

Relativism and structuralism can be conceived as binary opposites. However, they do not necessarily have to be thought about in this way; and to argue for this positioning would run counter to the opposition to binary thinking in this thesis. Furthermore, scholars such as Annemarie Mol have pushed back against the assertion that ANT is a-political. Mol argues ANT has an 'ontological politics', which 'suggests a link between the real … and the political' (Mol 1999, 86). ANT, she says, suggests it is possible to enact different realities (77). As such, she poses questions about: '*When* can these be enacted?'; '*What* is at stake?'; and '*How* should we choose?' (79). Mol does not profess to offer answers to these questions. However, her analysis also appears to make at least one other question absent: the normative question '*why*?' In her discussion of the 'how' of choosing, this question is implied: 'For another question must come first: what are the effects that we should be seeking?' (Mol 1999, 86). It is the 'should' that implies the normative question 'why'. This question underpins the emancipatory goals and political concerns. It is the 'what *should* we do?' and '*why?*' that are absent in relativism.

Latour expresses some dissatisfaction with the results of his relativist approach. As such, he advocates a stubborn return to realism (Latour 2004, 231). He tells a story of encountering people in his village who held the default position of distrust toward expert knowledge. The people had learnt the tools of relativism and critique, and were now applying them

uncritically. Latour does not want to take back these tools or critiques, however he acknowledges that there is a need to 'dig much further into the realist attitude' (Latour 2004, 244). Continuing this train of logic, Latour describes a fictional conversation with a young sociologist who is also dissatisfied with ANT's relativism. The young sociologist's complaint is that ANT is not trying to change the world for the better. To this issue, Latour replies:

> The words "social" and "nature" used to hide two entirely different projects that cut across both of those ill-assembled assemblies: one to trace connections among unexpected entities and another to make those connections hold in a somewhat liveable whole. The mistake is not in trying to do two things at once—every science is also a political project—the mistake is to interrupt the former because of the urgency of the latter. ANT is simply a way of saying that the task of assembling a common world cannot be contemplated if the other task is not pursued well beyond the narrow limits fixed by the premature closure of the social sphere. (Latour 2005, 259–60)

Latour appears to be pointing towards a coexistence of the relativistic 'tracing of a connection' and the political action of making a more 'liveable' world. He is aiming for 'two things at once'. However, whilst the political 'cannot be contemplated' without the former, so too relativism is in isolation insufficient. Ultimately relativism is dissatisfying for the purpose of challenging hierarchical and dualistic epistemologies and ontologies.

There is a temptation to look for a synergistic solution to the problems of structuralism and

relativism. However, attempting to hold together, or find a connection between these diverse ideas, in a pluralistic way, can construct a fragmented reality full of unequal and competing ideas. Drawing on a range of approaches in an inconsistent way is a dissatisfying method of investigation. Law's Performativity goes some way toward addressing this dissatisfaction. Not to be confused with Goffman's presentation of the self as a theatrical performance (Goffman 1959, 135), Law is presenting the idea that research contributes to the creation of reality. Reality is created, performed or acted out. This is to say that knowledge is political and can be used to enact the multiple 'goods' mentioned earlier: 'truth; politics; justice; aesthetics; inspiration and the spiritual' (Law 2004, 153). Knowledge can contribute to the making of a singular dominant reality, or it can be used to construct a reality in which alternative voices are valued. Performativity conceptualises knowledge creation as a means by which to contribute to creating the world we would like to exist; as compared to the one that exists now (Law and Urry 2004, 393; Strega 2005, 200). Research can contribute to the making of multiple realities (multiple worlds) in which truth is allegorical and there is space for difference, for contradiction, for multiplicity (Law and Urry 2004, 397). Law claims this is not pluralism, but rather 'fractionality' (Law, 2004, 62). Fractionality is more complex (if that is possible).

Fractionality is borrowed from fractional mathematics, in which there is a need to maintain the idea that a line can occupy 'more than one dimension but less than two' (62). The implication of this idea for my methodology is that fractionality entails that there is more than one social world, but less than many. That is to say, there is more than the singular reality advocated for by objective epistemologies. However, neither is there in existence an endless number of realities as advocated for by relativist epistemologies. The other way Law explains

this approach is to ask the question, 'how far do arguments carry in practice?' (63). The universal claims of singular realities carry their argument and conclusions universally. In contrast, relativist realities only carry their conclusions locally. Rather than being forced into choosing a side of this epistemological dualism, fractionality allows claims that conclusions carry 'so far, but only so far' (63). The conclusions can transfer outside of the locality of relativism, but are not unquestionably applicable at a great distance. In a fractional view of the world, divergent realities overlap and interfere. They are fluid, moving in and out of presence and absence. This overlap and interference allows the conclusions to transfer across the overlapping realities.

The inclusivity of fractionality and performativity is attractive. Likewise, the aspiration for creating a better world based on multiple goods is admirable. However, fractionality leaves the door open to the relativism which would sustain oppressive realities as part of the multiplicity. Hence it is a tricky basis with which to form a critical analysis of oppressive social realities. It is also, as Foucault says, 'dangerous'. The prevailing dangerousness and inherently political nature of knowledge argued for here can be depressing. How, then, can any action be taken without negative repercussions? How to move forward? What is the end game? The next line in Foucault's position on dangerousness is important. It is as follows:

> So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper-and pessimistic activism. (Foucault 1997, 256)

Foucault advocates action, but in the full (and pessimistic) knowledge that this action is likely to be imperfect. Foucault's description of the prison system is an example of this kind of pessimistic action.

> … we are all aware of the inconveniences of the prison, and that it is

> dangerous when it is not useless. And yet one cannot "see" how to replace it. It is the detestable solution, which one seems unable to do without. (Foucault 1979, 232)

Even though we cannot see how best to act, it is important to act to make a better world. Action needs to be taken, and knowledge needs to be produced. However, researchers need to be conscious of the world they are creating with the knowledge they are producing. Researchers need tools to support this awareness. One of the popular tools in sociology for this purpose is a post-structural method such as the analytics of governmentality.

Post-structuralism

Foucault described governmentality as the complex tactics, techniques and institutions of power that generate political knowledge about a target population primarily for the purpose of security (Foucault et al. 1991, 102). Underpinning governmentality is Foucault's contention that knowledge and power are so deeply intertwined that knowledge presupposes a power relation (Foucault 1979, 27). When Foucault described governmentality, he had in mind (at least) three things. First, governmentality is the complex tactics, techniques and institutions of power that generate political knowledge about a target population primarily for the purpose of security and control. Second, it refers to the resulting government (typically in the west) that holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of all forms of power. Finally, it is the process of transformation that occurred in the middle ages through which the administration of the state developed into modern government (Foucault et al. 1991, 102). All of these are intertwined.

To demonstrate the way in which knowledge and governing are caught up in a mutually reinforcing relationship, Dean provides the example of the economy. The economy is an essential component of any modern government; it is ‘unthinkable’ to conceive of modern government without some economic portfolio. This therefore requires the generation of knowledge about the economy in terms which are useful for governing: employment rates, inflation, trade, population growth, GDP, etc. (Dean 2010, 18). This information, this knowledge, these truths cyclically influence the activity and formation of governing.

According to Dean, governmentality supersedes micro-macro dichotomies as it can conceptualise the way in which state bureaucracies govern, but also the way in which we govern ourselves individually (Dean 2010, 18). Individuals and governments govern themselves and the population, respectively, based on what they believe to be true. As new truths are discovered (or created), personal practices or policy positions might change or adjust. Much like Law’s performativity, governmentality describes the political and constructive nature of knowledge. Knowledge and knowledge creation practices (methods and governing) make some things present and knowable, whilst they make other things absent and unknowable. Dean utilises the formulation of the ‘conduct of conduct’ (2010, 18) to emphasise the spectrum of power relations within governmentality, which includes relations of ‘power and authority’ but also ‘self and identity’. Knowledge produced about young people contributes to the techniques and institutions of power implemented for the purpose of making a secure and safe society. This knowledge can provide a picture of young people as either active contributors to this security, or as a problem for it.

Using this rhetoric it is often argued, for example, that research participation can be an empowering experience for young people (Gillies and Robinson 2012, 162). 'Empowerment' is a contested term with important implications. Not least among these is the implication that the participants are in need of empowerment; i.e. are currently without (sufficient) power. This in turn reinforces hierarchical conceptions of the researcher-participant relationship. This rationality creates a subordinate picture of young people. It positions young people at the bottom of a hierarchy. Young people are often known and governed in terms of their vulnerability and powerlessness as a result of having less power or life experience (Daley 2013, 128). Dean suggests that empowerment is an often-used rationale to justify the implementation of governing programs and initiatives designed for the poor. Through these programs the governing body defines the poor as citizens needing governing and empowerment. Drawing on this dominant discourse, the poor—and others on the bottom of the hierarchy—shape themselves into citizens who are knowable and governable in terms of their need for empowerment (Dean 2010, 69). Empowerment programs describe their target group as people without power. Participants join the programs to be empowered and, as such, position themselves as powerless. They are shaping their own self-image through the language and knowledge of the governing agency.

Power-knowledge relationships are not simply oppressive in the sense of putting constraints on people. Rather they represent the power to create certain knowledge about people and hence to construct certain types of persons (Bacchi 2009, 58). The interplay between knowledge and governing has subjectifying effects. These effects are not simply the result of oppressive operations of power, but rather the productive operations of power. This is the power to construct certain knowledges and certain subjects.

> Power is not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of "making up" citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom. (Rose and Miller 1992, cited in Bacchi 2009, 59)

Knowledge stratifies and produces categories of people. Youth is a socially and politically created category that exists largely to separate young people from the adult population. These knowledges—these discourses—are 'sanctioned' by government and have an 'institutional force' on people's actions and thoughts (Mills cited in Strega 2005, 219). Governmentality suggests that dominant discourses and knowledges not only create particular categories and ways of thinking, but also that what is believed to be true governs people's actions and their freedom. Strega quotes Davies (1991) to emphasise the ramifications of this discursive regulation:

> … our existence as persons has no fundamental essence, we can only ever speak ourselves or be spoken into existence within the terms of available discourses. (Strega 2005, 219)

Knowledge and discourse produce the boundaries and options within which individuals act. Individuals govern their own actions, and governments regulate their population's actions within the options provided by knowledge and discourse. Furthermore, Strega suggests new knowledge is not discovered but rather it is generated within the confines of the existing

sanctioned power-knowledge discourses (Strega 2005, 218). This is the responsibility thrust upon knowledge creators. Research is the creation of freedom and control. Researchers work within existing discourses and hence can reinforce their dominance. Alternatively, researchers can challenge the dominant discourse(s) and create new boundaries for action.

If existing discourses set the parameters for action, then resistance can seem hopeless. New knowledge produced within the dominant discourse simply reinforces and reproduces the existing inequalities and asymmetries of power. However, within post-structural epistemologies, power is not held and monopolised in a hierarchical structure or even by a dominant discourse. Instead power is dispersed and riddled with resistance (Foucault 2008, 93). According to Foucault there is no one singular discourse, but rather a multiplicity. Some of these discourses are more dominant than others, but there are 'allowances for the complex and unstable process[es]' (Foucault 2008, 100). The discursive structure is not all-powerful, but rather agency is exercised by individuals through critical self-reflection on their 'own discursive positioning' (Bacchi 2009, 45). This means there are other discourses that can resist and undermine the dominant discourse.

To demonstrate the point here, I will again return to Becker's description of the way in which research on young people has often been designed. Often the approach has been to discover why 'youth are so troublesome for adults' (Becker 1967, 242). Becker suggests a repositioning of this inquiry to a sociological perspective, putting forth the more interesting question: 'Why do adults make so much trouble for youth?' (Becker 1967, 242). Becker's reconfiguration could be described as an attempt to enact a different reality. It performs the reality in which young people are not inherently troublesome. This is a positive development

for the emancipatory goals of youth sociology and the acknowledgement of the political nature of knowledge. However, even Becker's reconfiguration contributes to a particular knowledge of young people, and hence constructs an approach to the governing of youth. His reconfiguration still draws on an exclusionary discourse of youth, as separate to adults, to identify a specific group of interest to researchers. This creates a binary between adults and young people. This is the extra layer of analysis and awareness of political implications that governmentality can add to the concerns of performativity.

Gillies and Robinson's (2012) research attempting to engage 'challenging pupils' is a good example of the implications of the concerns raised through governmentality. Gillies and Robinson selected a cohort and location that 'currently provokes [the] most public concern' (Gillies and Robinson 2012, 163); i.e. was associated with a certain group of people of lesser status at that point in time as a result of their deviance from behavioural norms. Their study took place exclusively within 'Behavioural Support Units' located onsite but separate from the rest of a 'mainstream' school. This location was associated with the problematic behaviour of a group of young people. Here we find an explicit example of the way in which research processes can contribute to the governing of young people. Neglecting to challenge this problematisation of these young people's behaviour and the space renders the knowledge created at best complicit, and at worst supportive, of ontological assumptions that categorise the behaviour of these young people as deviant (Bacchi 2009, 267–8). The selection of the location for Gillies and Robinson's study demonstrates, despite their intensive participant-driven methodology, the nature of research as an adult agenda (Lomax 2012, 106). The knowledge production methods and pre-existing assumptions about their target group in part reinforces an understanding of young people as problematic and disengaged from education.

Underpinning research with young people, as demonstrated through the research by Gillies and Robinson, is the construction of a problem. Scholars of governmentality studies have produced tools to question the constructions of problems. The problem questioning method used by Bacchi (2009), 'What's the problem represented to be?' (WPR), advocates that people have a 'right to the problem' (46). She argues that the way a problem is thought about has important subjectifying effects that should be scrutinised (46). Bacchi's WPR approach is a policy analysis tool. It contests the assumption that social policy creation is a systematic process. Rather than understanding the development of social policies as a response to a distinct problem outside the policy creation process, the problem addressed by social policy is constructed by policy makers within the policy creation process itself (Bacchi 2009, 1). Problems do not exist in isolation.

Bacchi claims we are governed through these problematisations (Bacchi 2009, xxi). Governmentality questions problematisations 'in order to understand the thinking behind forms of rule' (Bacchi 2009, 30). Whilst Bacchi designed the WPR approach for social policy analysis, it is relevant to this project given the inherently political nature of knowledge surrounding youth (Bacchi 2009, 235). Furthermore, I am arguing that use of Fair Process in restorative practices and by youth services, is a political response to the issue of youth violence within the context of the hollowing-out of the welfare state. The value of utilising the WPR approach in my thesis is that it provokes me to consider whether Fair Process is a relevant response to the wicked problems experienced by hyper-governed young people. Hyper-governed young people have 'a right to the problem' implicit in Fair Process. My research facilitates an opportunity for them to claim this right.

In spite of its unique contribution to the emancipatory and critical analysis of knowledge, the critique often levelled at post-structural approaches is similar to the one aimed at relativism. This criticism is often attached to the following quote from Foucault:

> My position is that it is not up to us to propose. As soon as one "proposes"—one proposes a vocabulary, an ideology, which can only have effects of domination. What we have to present are instruments or tools that people might find useful. (Foucault 1988, 197)

The criticism is that ultimately this approach is nihilistic ('it is not up to us to propose') and leaves little with which to challenge power asymmetries, and is therefore 'politically useless' (Bacchi 2009, 237). Bacchi suggests that perhaps this is a misrepresentation of Foucault's position. Instead she suggests that the way forward for Foucault, and the WPR, is to focus on the effects of the knowledge. These include the discursive effects, subjectification effects and lived effects (238). Hence, the WPR approach contains 'an explicitly normative agenda' (44). The task becomes to identify the effects of a discourse and intervene on the side of 'those who are harmed' by the problematisation; and also, to suggest alternative knowledges, or an alternative problematisation, that might overcome some of these effects. The WPR approach contributes, therefore, to the critical and emancipatory goals of my project by necessitating the elucidation of the lived effects of neoliberal violence on hyper-governed young people.

Focusing on the lived effects for the subject of the dominant discourse, enables me to identify connections between the situated knowledge and experiences of hyper-governed young people and the broader discourses of youth and violence. Phoenix and Kelly (2013) argue that

the study of situated experience 'prises open the space in which to examine the agentic social actor', focusing on how actors make sense of their world and the choices they make. The sociological study of situated knowledge considers the conditions in which these decisions are made that may not be of the actors' 'own choosing and which, arguably, over-determine the extent to which some of those choices are meaningful' (419). The lived effects of the dominant discourses are exposed by examining the situated experiences of hyper-governed young people. These are rendered visible to the researcher through the governmental study of broader discourses. These discourses produce the social context in which their situated decisions are made, and are reciprocally produced by the decisions made through situated knowledges.

Method assemblage

The methodological approaches described above each contribute to the aims of this project to make the violating experiences of hyper-governed young people present, and to enact a hopeful reality and knowledge of young people. As such, this project draws on the methodological frameworks discussed above. Each of these presents a different set of useful ontological assumptions and epistemological positions. Bacchi's WPR approach, and Law's fractionality, both emphasise that social reality is too complex to presume that all modes of exploitation and oppression can be explained completely by, for example, patriarchy or capital. Rather, social reality is complex, messy and contingent, and all forms of oppression are interconnected. However, this reality is too large to be represented in one place. So, in this project I will make some things present and, inevitably, other things absent. In this

project, I engage with the performative knowledge of hyper-governed young people through an allegorical method assemblage that connects their situated experiences to the larger discourses of youth and violence.

As discussed, constructing this allegorical method assemblage requires navigating the dangers of relativism and positivism, and the political nature of knowledge. It also requires, Law (2014) argues, careful articulation and a particular vocabulary (41). Rather than talking about 'good' or 'bad' methods, he believes there is a need to focus on the realities that knowledge produces and the consequences of methods for producing knowledge (38). He advocates for an approach to methods that is not concerned with how to 'discover' realities, but instead emphasises their 'enactment' (45). For the study of youth violence this shifts the focus away from attempting to discover and represent the quantity or quality of violence experienced or perpetrated by hyper-governed young people. Instead it focuses on how the method performs a reality in which the wicked, messy and contingent nature of youth violence is made present, whilst also creating space for the enactment of goods like justice, politics, truth and the spiritual.

To hold these ideas in tension, Law advocates for a 'method assemblage' (15), which he defines in a variety of ways throughout his book. Central to the definition of this method assemblage is the process of making some things present and others absent, of enacting a particular reality (42). The method assemblage is not simply made up, but it 'grows out' (42) of the hinterland of knowledge practices of a scientific discipline. Paradoxically it also creates the hinterland as it performs new ways of knowing (42). The method assemblage grows out of the knowledge practices of critical youth sociology and the emerging sociology

of violence. It draws on their heritage of diverse critiques of power, and their connections with social structures. However, it is also concerned with the reality that is performed for young people and their situated experience. Furthermore, this approach contains a normative agenda.

The explicitly normative agenda of this project is built on two ethical foundations: (1) violence is a negative phenomenon, and (2) young people are inherently valuable and capable citizens. Awareness and articulation of these ethical foundations is essential to Strega's positioning of research as a political activity. As a political activity, she describes 'research as a practice of resistance' (Strega 2005, 227). Conceptualising research as resistance requires researchers to be aware of their ethical positions, prejudices, disciplinary allegiances and the influences these have on their research. In addition, researchers need to be aware of their participation in systems of domination and subjectification. Reflexivity is a key feature of Law's Performativity (Law 2004, 153). Reflexivity is the practice of becoming aware of the ways in which both the researcher and participant interact, influence and shape the context and subsequent knowledge simply by their presence. Reflexivity is the ability to catch yourself seeing and thinking in particular ways (Bacchi 2009, 45). The knowledge created through the research methods are shaped by their pre-existing knowledge, experience, and beliefs.

This research is built on my ethical orientation towards young people valuable, but also, oppressed and marginalised population. This research seeks to make their knowledges and experiences 'present' and, in doing so, will unavoidably make others 'absent'. The other major ethical orientation underpinning this project is a normative understanding of violence

as a negative phenomenon. This is not always how violence is approached in sociology. However, this research begins with the intention to promote young people as full citizens and reduce the prevalence and impact of violence. This orientation will influence the knowledge produced. There are also other important contextual factors. I, the researcher, am a white male, from a middle-class Christian family, in his early thirties. This is a personal history and social context that is typically associated with privilege. Furthermore, I have worked as a youth worker around issues of violence and peace building for over ten years. Despite deliberate reflexive work that underpins best practice youth work, it remains impossible for me to objectively present the ideas from, for example, one of the participants in this study who identified as a 16-year old female, first-generation migrant. My previous experience as a youth worker working with young people in child protection, juvenile justice, alternative accommodation, education settings, violence prevention, interfaith dialogue, and nonviolent leadership programs informed the conversations I had in interviews; the lens through which I analysed the data; and the language I chose to communicate findings. These factors will unavoidably influence the knowledge produced through this research. However, I own these influences and orientations, and acknowledge the partial and allegorical nature of the truths within the thesis. Furthermore, this approach is deliberating and the goal is clear: to promote young people as full and capable citizens, and to negate the negative effects of violence.

To summarise, epistemologies that claim objectivity and generalisability are unable to wrestle with the political, and at times contradictory, nature of social reality (Strega 2005, 205). However, the relativist assertions that prioritise individual agency are also insufficient, because of their weaknesses for tackling structural oppression. The critical tools within governmentality offer some additional means to analyse the lived effects of dominant discourses. I have assembled these methods because of their capacity to value the experiences

of young people, make space for contradiction and complexity, and conceptualise the lived effects of neoliberal violence. This thesis constructs a method assemblage that makes hyper-governed young people's political and contingent experiences of violation present, whilst also connecting these experiences to the broader narratives of physical, structural, cultural and symbolic violence. This approach opens up possibilities for accessing multiple discourses and reflexively responding to the conflicting agencies operating in the social world and between researcher and participant. This method assemblage underpins the practical approach I took to engage young people in the project and collect their stories. The following section describes the interview method I employed in the project. However, first it is important to outline the central questions that guide the project's design, the data collection, coding and analysis.

Project design and data analysis

This project contains both descriptive and interpretive aims. The descriptive outcome of the project aims to 'give voice' (Braun and Clarke 2013, 176) and to 'amplify' (Law 2014, 15) hyper-governed young people's experiences of violation and knowledge of neoliberal violence. My interpretive aim with this thesis is to look deep into the data and search for a conceptual or theoretical account (Braun and Clarke 2013, 176) of youth violence. These aims will be guided by the method assemblage described above.

The central questions guiding the project were:

- How do hyper-governed young people experience and understand neoliberal violence in modernity?

- How do hyper-governed young people evaluate the principles of 'Fair Process' as a guide for professional practice with young people?
- How are hyper-governed young people responding to and resisting neoliberal violence?

Hyper-governed young people's stories were gathered through conducting semi-structured interviews. I will describe in more detail the structured and unstructured sections of the interviews later in this chapter. However, it is worth noting at this point that a second set of questions formed one of the structured sections of the interview. These questions were directly put to the participants at the end of the interview:

- How are you feeling after this conversation?
- Has this conversation been useful to you in any way?
- What was your motivation for participating in the interview?

These questions were asked to gather an understanding of hyper-governed young people's experiences of participating in the research. They were designed from an understanding of young people as active contributors to the research. These questions created the space to hear about their reasons for participation, and served to facilitate a critical discussion around the participatory nature of this research project. The questions also created a space to prioritise participants' experiences of participation and to evaluate my own research approach. This self-critique is an essential component of enacting the emancipatory goals of the project and engaging with criticism of anti-participatory processes.

Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. Transcribed interviews were coded using Nvivo software and analysed for persistent themes. At a rudimentary level, qualitative data analysis is described as an intuitive and inductive process (Taylor, Bogdan, and DeVault 2015, 160) of breaking down the subject matter into component parts with the aim of discovering connections and structure (Walters and Crook 1990, 27). However, Taylor, Bogdan, and DeVault (2015) describe data analysis as 'probably the most difficult aspect of qualitative research to teach or communicate to others' (160). The reason for this they suggest is that it is not simply a 'mechanical or technical' (160) process. There is a technical process to qualitative data analysis, but simply following the process won't guarantee insight. The process utilised in this project reflected a spiral of gathering, transcribing and coding the data. The transcribing process was conducted simultaneously (and subsequently) to the gathering of the data. I transcribed all the interviews personally. This decision was the result of an economic reality, but it also facilitated an intimate familiarity with the data. The depth of this familiarity enabled themes to emerge and connections to be made within the data, but also for these arising themes to reciprocally shape the conversation within the ongoing interviews.

As already mentioned, Taylor, Bogdan, and DeVault (2015) contend pattern recognition is a difficult and intuitive process for which there is 'no simple formula' (162). However, Law (2004), through his assertion for the acceptance of mess in social research, takes this idea a step further. Describing his method assemblage, he argues that there is a need to move beyond 'method' and 'analysis' being associated with lists of 'do's and don'ts' (40). Instead, he argues for a more 'generous' approach and challenges social scientists to 'think seriously about methods that ignore the rules' (40). Law argues for analysis that isn't 'fixed in shape'

but rather is ‘self-assembling’, where the constituent parts are ‘entangled’ (42). Law is arguing that to discover and represent the mess in social science there is a need to refrain from imposing a pre-designed net for analysis and instead allow the themes to emerge organically.

Strict adherence to this idea would likely produce a method that would ultimately require beginning analysis without a question or theme. However, as I have argued already in this chapter, this kind of relativist approach presents problems for the ethical orientation of this research and the desire to enact a more hopeful future. As a result, I did start data analysis with pre-existing areas of focus. However, my intention was not to allow these initial themes to limit the possibility that unexpected themes could emerge.

The first stage of coding sometimes referred to as ‘open coding’ (Taylor, Bogdan, and DeVault 2015, 180; Silverman 2006, 96), produced 22 main codes with 16 sub-codes. The process of coding and identifying themes in qualitative research is a ‘recursive process’ (Braun and Clarke 2006, 86). There are usually multiple steps including coding, identifying main themes and recoding (Attride-Stirling 2001, 392; Taylor, Bogdan, and DeVault 2015, 170; Silverman 2006, 96). This process of going back and forth between the whole data set, smaller sets, coding, identifying themes and re-coding creates a deep familiarity with the data and facilitates the identification of themes and patterns (Taylor, Bogdan, and DeVault 2015, 171).

The second round of coding, sometimes referred to as ‘focused coding’ (Taylor, Bogdan, and

DeVault 2015, 180; Silverman 2006, 96), concentrated on two codes I identified as significant themes: (1) Fair Process, and (2) Violence. These themes were selected due to their prevalence. Braun and Clarke (2006) argue that the selection of themes as important in qualitative research is difficult to justify. Unlike quantitative research, the sheer number of instances in the data is not a sufficient reason for importance (Taylor, Bogdan, and DeVault 2015, 188; Braun and Clarke 2006, 82). Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest a theme is significant if it simply 'captures something important in relation to the overall research question' (82).

The two themes, (1) Fair Process and (2) Violence, had the most numerous instances in the first round of coding and were present in 27 (Fair Process) and 26 (Violence) of the 28 interviews conducted. Re-coding these two themes produced a further 50 codes and sub-codes. Not all of the instances that were coded appear in this thesis. Their absence from the final work raises the issues described above about the intuitive process of theme identification. It also raises a question about participant representation. The question of representation is an ethical question about the potential of stories which go untold. A fuller exploration of these large methodological questions is beyond the scope of this project. However, the ethical question about absent stories is important to the themes in this project, and as such, I return to it in the final chapter.

The level of detail and number of codes produced during the first and second rounds of coding reinforces the notion that qualitative data analysis is intuitive, and not simply process driven. The process of coding produced many variables and themes. This alone doesn't produce an obvious structure or pattern in the data. Instead, researchers need to search for

connections between the emerging themes and pay attention to where the mess beings to congeal. Attention was paid to the following areas during the analysis process:

- What ideas (knowledge) and experiences (stories) underpin the hyper-governed young people's response to Fair Process.
- How hyper-governed young people experience and think about neoliberal violence.
- How hyper-governed young people's situated experiences (stories) of neoliberal violence connect with broader narratives of youth and violence.
- How young people respond to neoliberal violence, and what form this takes.

Responses to the second set of questions are analysed in the following chapter. During the analysis of the data gathered through these questions, attention was paid to:

- How the participants articulated their agendas for participating in the research.
- How conflict or cohesion between the researcher and participants' agendas influenced knowledge production.
- What young people articulated about the impact the research process had on them.

The descriptive and interpretive aims of this project will not be served separately; rather they will be worked out concurrently. Examining how young people experience neoliberal violence and Fair Process will simultaneously amplify their stories. Likewise, by examining hyper-governed young people's agendas for participating in the research, this will offer

insight into the existing problematisation of young people as research participants.

Through this approach, the emancipatory goal of promoting hyper-governed young people's stories is accomplished alongside a post-structural critique of the social and political realities of neoliberal violence. With this approach I achieve the dual aims of resisting the dominant and oppressive rationalities whilst also acknowledging the fractional nature of knowledge and social science research. By upholding multiple goods, I acknowledge that the knowledge of young people is of equal value to the existing theory and the agenda of the researcher.

Target group and recruitment

The target group for this thesis was young people 15 to 25 years of age who have been involved in the child protection system, juvenile justice system or in political activism. The intent was to access a group of young people who were experiencing a heightened level of governing from the state during the period of youth. It was hypothesised that these young people would have a unique perspective on the effects of neoliberal violence, as a result of their relationship with the state. As described in chapter 1, I developed the term *hyper-governed* young people to identify this group. Kelly and Kamp describe youth as an intensely governed period (2014, 7–8). Young people are governed through a diverse array of explicit and covert means. They are governed through the same institutions and structures that govern the entire life course, including: legal systems, familiar systems, social systems. However, they are also subject to a range of controls that are unique to the period of youth, including control from: parents, education systems, youth courts and justice systems, anger

management programs, child protection, drug and alcohol diversion programs, early intervention programs, etc. The young people in focus in this study were selected because their relationship with the state attracted additional explicit, state-based controls. These are young people involved in: child protection, juvenile justice and youth activism.

These three governed relationships between young people and the state are also important sites for complexity and contingency in the youth experience. Valentine describes child protection and climate change as ‘paradigmatic examples of contemporary wicked problems’ (Valentine 2015, 243). Likewise, Watts (2013) describes ‘the entire field of criminal justice’ as a wicked problem (125). The combination of the intensified level of governing and wicked nature of the problems faced by these young people identified them as a group who experience unusually high levels of control and regulation. Young people in child protection have every aspect of their lives ‘case managed’ by a government social worker. Routinely they are principally identified by their status under the guardianship of the minister (GOM). Often, they self-identify as ‘GOM Kids’. Their lives, by virtue of their involvement with the child protection system, contain problems that are neither easily defined, nor easily solved. Removal from the home is designed to prevent further parental abuse. However, it also opens up a whole range of other potential institutional abuses. Young people in the juvenile justice system are subject to explicit state controls. The causes of criminal activity and how best to respond to or prevent it is a complex field of study of its own. Finally, the young people involved in political activism in this study were specifically involved in non-violent direct action (demonstrations) against government policies and programs. This included environmental activism, anti-war activism and protesting Australia’s border protection policies. This activity routinely involved clashes with police and arrest as a deliberate tactic

to bring attention to their cause. Furthermore, participants regularly expressed an awareness of monitoring and government surveillance of their activities.

There are also several issues with my identification of the group who participated in this project. Firstly, it is dependent on an understanding of youth as a period of time. I have discussed at length the social and political construction of youth as a period of exclusion in chapter 2. However, it is worth noting here that there exists an ethical paradox in identifying the group in these terms. Using the term ‘youth’ in this way also unavoidably reinforces its ongoing construction as an exclusionary category. The emancipatory aims of the project are thus held in tension with the need to coherently communicate the target population. Furthermore, the age range selected (15–25 years) does not represent a consensus or even a widely recognised understanding of youth. The upper end (25 years) is a commonly accepted signifier of the end of youth in western countries (Martin 2002; Sercombe 2010, 15). In other cultures, youth is described as finishing as late as 40 years of age (Krauss et al. 2012, 301). However, youth is routinely considered to begin earlier than fifteen. Typically, youth is understood as beginning at around 12 years of age (Martin 2002; Sercombe 2010, 15).

The age range ultimately adopted in this project resulted from negotiations during the ethics process. It was the concern of the ethics committee that conversations about violence with young people below the age of 15 held too great a risk. Putting aside for now the debate about the usefulness of age as an indicator of vulnerability and maturity (Daley 2013, 1227), this result demonstrates the centrality and hegemony of adult concern in the ethics process (Daley 2013, 127). It was the paternalistic determination of the adults who designed and governed the project that this posed an unreasonable risk, not the hyper-governed young

people themselves. Finally, the other major problem with this approach to defining the target group is that it leans towards a description of the young people in passive terms. It identifies them in terms of *being* governed by the state. This could be misconstrued as a passive, one-directional relationship. The reality of course is the opposite. Young people in the child protection and juvenile justice systems commonly rebel or resist the controls imposed on them. Furthermore, the young people in the political activist category are by their definition active in their relationship with the state. Overall, none of these young people are passive in this relationship. This shall be further evidenced in the later chapters of this thesis with regard to the young people's responses to the issues of Fair Process and violence.

My aim with this project was to approach young people as competent and capable participants in research. Hence there is an irony in focusing on adult regulatory concern in a project that seeks to make young people's stories and concerns present (Allen 2009, 399). How I balance this goal with the regulatory and process issues of a research project will be addressed later in this chapter. Despite this concern, it is important to describe some of the other potential ethical issues that were dealt with during the ethics process. Significant barriers were anticipated to accessing participants if they were pursued via seeking the consent of government agencies who were tasked with their care. This was particularly the case with the young people in the child protection and justice systems. The opportunity for hyper-governed young people to share their stories is an essential ethical and practical component of this project. It was anticipated that their voices would likely have been silenced if permission was sought through government agencies, or if parent/guardian consent was required. It is also likely that the bureaucratic process and risk management concerns would deny access, or delay it such that it was effectively denied. Given that the young people were

going to be asked about their experiences of violence and Fair Process with governing agents, it was anticipated that the parents/guardians might refuse consent based on the fear that the young people might reflect negatively on the actions of the parent/guardian. As such, consent was likely to be refused by the agency/parent/guardian in the interests of self-preservation. It is unjust that a young person's voice might be suppressed by a governing authority whose rationale would be motivated by self-preservation. Therefore, in accordance with the principles of Justice (4.2.4) and Beneficence (4.2.5) of the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (National Health Medical Research Council 2007) it was deemed safer for participants to conduct interviews with them without obtaining parental or guardian consent. This also impacted on the ethics committee's decision to raise the minimum age of participation.

In addition to the concerns regarding *refusal* of guardian consent, consideration was given to potential risks to the participant if consent *was given* by a parent/guardian. Participants in this research were often located in a space in which they are vulnerable to abuses of power. Young people in contact with child protection or the criminal justice system have a higher likelihood of living in a home where coercion or domestic violence is commonplace, or of living in out-of-home accommodation services. In the latter case this places the young person at risk of coercion from other occupants and staff. The requirement for parental/guardian permission could result in the participant being coerced to reveal what was discussed during the interview. Again, this concern affected the decision about the lower age limit appropriate to proceed without parental/guardian consent. Furthermore, for these and the following reasons, all names of young people appearing in this thesis are not their real names. They have been given a pseudonym to protect their anonymity.

Hyper-governed young people were engaged through a range of nongovernment organisations (NGOs) providing support services to young people. These agencies were happy to participate in the process based on the ethics approval provided by the university. There was some discussion with NGOs about the ethics of incentivising participation. Some NGOs suggested participation was unlikely without incentivising. However, it was decided not to incentivise participation. This decision was made in line with the aim of positioning young people as active, capable and interested participants in the research. This is a central value in this project, and I will argue for this position in the last section of this chapter. As a result of these decisions it was determined that the best way to access the young people was through a trusted and supportive facilitator (i.e. a youth worker or case manager). A further concern was raised about the participants' capacity to refuse participation in the research when referred by an influential professional. An additional step was added to the referral process to provide an additional opportunity for a young person to decline participation. Hyper-governed young people were invited to participate by their case manager. If they were interested the case manager passed their contact details on to the researcher. The researcher then contacted the young person independently. This additional step provided the young person with the opportunity to decline participation without potential coercion from the case manager.

Young people involved in non-violent political action were recruited through two avenues: 1) the researcher attended a protest and invited participation through a general announcement and snowballing; and 2) participants were invited to participate through social media and snowballing techniques. Participants were asked to recommend people in their network who

might be interested in participating in the study (Donley 2012, 96). This approach is useful for legitimising the study with the target population (Donley 2012, 98). Some have argued that snowballing is ideal for sociological research as 'it allows for the sampling of natural interactional units' (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981, 141). The researcher attended the 2016 Swan Island Peace Convergence which took place at Queenscliff, Victoria. Young people attending the event were notified in advance that the researcher would be attending the event, and were invited to participate in an interview. At the beginning of the four-day event a general announcement was made to the group to notify them of the researcher's presence and purpose, and to invite people to participate. During the event, young people self- and peer-referred for participation, and the researcher also approached potential participants inviting them to participate in an interview. In addition, a page was also created on Facebook as a recruitment strategy. Young people were referred to the page through the researcher's networks. Individuals who made contact though the page were invited to participate in an interview.

Participant demographics

Tables 1 and 2 provide details of the participants including their age, gender and inclusion criteria. It is worth noting that whilst the age of each participant has been included here, it is not utilised in later chapters as a point for analysis. This analytical approach has been deliberately avoided because, as discussed in the literature review, age is an arbitrary indicator of an individual's capacity (Sercombe 2010, 19; Wyn and White 1997, 12). The suggestion that *older* (i.e. those who have conformed to the dominant social codes) participants might offer more nuanced or valuable insights reinforces the exclusion of young

people. Some details have been provided in the subsequent chapters about each young person's gender, socio-economic status, and personal history. However, these are not given major consideration in the analysis either, for two reasons. Firstly, these factors are not the focus of this research project. Secondly, to use these categories uncritically could unintentionally reinforce the production of 'reflexive losers' (Woodman and Threadgold 2014, 564). I concur with Woodman and Threadgold's discomfort with the possibility that these assumed categories produce a hierarchy of reflexive capacity between adults and young people, and between different categories of young people. Perhaps there is space in future research to interrogate the validity of these categories (age, gender, class etc.) and the assumed reflexive difference. However, this is certainly a separate project.

Twenty-eight young people participated in an interview. The youngest participant was 15 years of age, and the eldest was twenty-five. Of the 28 participants, there was a near-even split according to gender, with 15 identifying as male and 13 individuals identifying as female. Eleven participants shared their experiences of the child protection system. Ten participants shared their experiences of the juvenile justice systems. A further ten shared their experiences of political activism. Three participants shared their experiences of both the child projection and juvenile justice systems. Hence, the total number of participants is less than the sum of these categories. It is likely that there was a greater crossover between these categories, however these statistics are based on what the young person disclosed. Furthermore, some participants who identified here as political activists also told stories about encounters with the justice system. Arrests and court appearances are a common outcome of political protest and sometimes a tactic employed by activists to gain media attention and further their cause. However, it was unclear from their stories if these

encounters were with the juvenile justice system or the adult system. Furthermore, I have not set about defining strict inclusion parameters for this project regarding the type of contact participants must have with government (i.e. child protection, juvenile justice or political activism). For example, encounters with the justice system could include physical or verbal clashes with police, arrest, short- or long-term incarceration, or court proceedings. The emphasis in this project is on how young people identify their inclusion in these categories and their experience of being governed. As such, these categories of inclusion are blurry (perhaps fractional), and the emphasis is placed on the young person's experience.

All participants from the juvenile justice and child protection categories were referred through NGOs. I have not included the names of the organisations in order to preserve the participants' anonymity. All of these participants were from South Australia. Most of the participants in the political activism category were recruited through attendance at the peace convergence. Attendees at this event were from across Australia including South Australia, New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria. A smaller number in this category were recruited through snowballing techniques in South Australia. One participant (from South Australia) connected with the research through the project's Facebook page. Several other referrals and connections were made through the Facebook page, however, none of these eventuated in an interview.

Table 1. Participant demographics

Name	Gender	Age	Inclusion Criteria	Recruitment source
Mia	Female	17	Juvenile Justice	NGO Referral
Charlie	Female	18	Juvenile Justice	NGO Referral
Addison	Female	19	Juvenile Justice	NGO Referral

Chloe	Female	20	Juvenile Justice	NGO Referral
Nathan	Male	16	Juvenile Justice	NGO Referral
Ryan	Male	18	Juvenile Justice	NGO Referral
Owen	Male	19	Juvenile Justice	NGO Referral
Nora	Female	18	Juvenile Justice; Child Protection	NGO Referral
Tristan	Male	22	Juvenile Justice; Child Protection	NGO Referral
Lucas	Male	21	Juvenile Justice; Child Protection	NGO Referral
Lilly	Female	16	Child Protection	NGO Referral
Riley	Female	19	Child Protection	NGO Referral
Kennedy	Female	22	Child Protection	NGO Referral
Jackson	Male	15	Child Protection	NGO Referral
Thomas	Male	16	Child Protection	NGO Referral
William	Male	16	Child Protection	NGO Referral
Levi	Male	17	Child Protection	NGO Referral
Cameron	Male	18	Child Protection	NGO Referral
Hailey	Female	21	Political Activism	Peace Convergence
Eva	Female	21	Political Activism	Peace Convergence
Scarlett	Female	22	Political Activism	Peace Convergence
Anna	Female	22	Political Activism	Peace Convergence
Harper	Female	24	Political Activism	Facebook
Aaron	Male	18	Political Activism	Peace Convergence
Jacob	Male	22	Political Activism	Snowballing
Logan	Male	23	Political Activism	Peace Convergence
John	Male	24	Political Activism	Peace Convergence
Dave	Male	25	Political Activism	Snowballing

Table 2. Participant summary

Demographics	**Participant no.**
Male	15
Female	13
Child Protection	11
Juvenile Justice	10

Activism	10
NGO Referral	18
Peace Convergence	7
Facebook	1
Snowballing	2
Total participants	28

Semi-structured interviews

Each participant was engaged in a semi-structured interview lasting no longer than one hour. During the interview the researcher invited participants to reflect on their experiences of interaction with the state. The researcher brought along a simple timeline on a sheet of paper as another means to record and prompt conversation. The visual timeline was designed to support or facilitate participants' expression of complex and difficult ideas and emotions (Hunleth 2011, 86) in a way that was meaningful to the participants (Gillies and Robinson 2012, 162; Lomax 2012, 106). Hence the visual tool was used to provide a pictorial and non-lingual means for participants to engage with the researcher. Participants could write or draw on the timeline as they were comfortable. At the beginning of the interview the researcher would bring out the timeline and offer the young person a pen or pencil whilst also taking one for himself. This was intended to create an opportunity for co-creating knowledge. Use of the visual medium was not a required part of the interview process. Some participants found this process more useful than others. Further detail regarding the implementation of the timeline

has been included in Appendix B.

Interviews took place in a location that was convenient and comfortable for each young person. Once a young person had agreed to participate I would negotiate with them an appropriate place to conduct the interview. This often resulted in meeting the young person at their home, a local library, park or youth service. An accountability and risk management procedure was developed around the location and duration of the interviews. I recorded in advance interview times and locations in my electronic calendar and made the appointment visible to my supervisor. In addition, I made contact via SMS with my supervisor when I began and finished the interview. If I failed to complete the check in/out procedure the supervisor would enact a series of graded responses, culminating in the police being called to the location of the interview. This process was never required or enacted.

A central principle of the research project is the valuing of young people as active contributors and creators of knowledge. However, it is essential to acknowledge that the project was not participant directed. The inquiry was initiated by an adult research agenda. The tension between the agendas of the young people and that of the researcher is a central theme for this project, and will be explored in a moment in greater depth. The point here is that the interviews were designed to allow as much room as possible for the young people's agendas without forgoing the agenda of the researcher. As such, when the young people were recruited and during the introductory remarks of their individual interviews, each was informed of the general focus of the research, i.e.: young people's experiences with government controls, violence, non-violence, Fair Process, restorative practices etc. However, the participants were also invited to tell their stories, and encouraged at the start of

the interview to take the conversation where they wanted. Throughout the interview participants were invited to emphasise what they thought was important. The interviews unfolded in conversational style, with some participants requiring more-or-less prompting from the researcher. When a particularly interesting or relevant point for the research was made by the young person the researcher sought to draw out or clarify that individual's ideas further. When conversation lapsed, the researcher would prompt or direct the conversation with a question in a conversational style.

The interviews contained two structured elements. Typically, towards the end of the interview the researcher would ask for the participant's thoughts on the principles of 'Fair Process'. This element occurred late in the interview so that the topic could be discussed in the context of the preceding conversation around their experiences with government and violence. In doing so, participants could contextualise their reflections on the principles in relation to their experiences. Discussing the principles earlier in the conversation would run the risk of them being established as a norm for the conversation and influencing/overriding an individual's experience. The researcher invited participants to comment on the principles of Fair Process and encouraged them to indicate if they thought it sounded fair; to consider if it fit with their experience; or to offer an additional principle. The guiding questions for both the structured and unstructured sections of the interview that were submitted to the institutional ethics committee are included in Appendix A.

The second of the structured elements was a series of questions designed to act as a concluding procedure, and to enable the researcher to investigate the young person's experience of the interview. This concluding procedure was designed to facilitate a return to

the ‘real world’, and the questions provided an opportunity for participants to process their own experience of the interview. The procedure involved asking the following three questions:

1) How are you feeling after this conversation?

2) Has this conversation been useful to you in any way?

3) What was your motivation for participating in the interview?

These questions are one step removed from the content of the interview, and prompt participants to make a connection back to their everyday experience. The first question was included as part of the risk management process in response to concern that the content of the interview might have a negative effect on the young person’s wellbeing. If the young person indicated at any point that they were struggling with the content, the researcher could take the opportunity to impart pre-prepared information regarding support services available to the participant. The second and third questions were designed to draw out the young person’s agenda for participating in the interview. This approach to qualitative research through semi-structured interviews was integral to the researcher’s efforts to achieve the emancipatory goals of the project without obscuring the adult-centric nature of the project. Youth-led methods and youth participation in research is an ongoing and diverse field of research in its own right (Åkerström and Brunnberg 2013; Allen 2008; Fox 2013; Harris 2009; Harris et al. 2015; Hart 2013). It is thus important to consider the design of this project in light of this scholarship. These considerations will be addressed in the following chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter began with an examination of the epistemological and ontological assumptions that underpin and politicise research. By examining the strengths and weaknesses of structuralism, constructivism and post-structuralism I have argued for the need to construct a method-assemblage that deliberately seeks to make present the experiences of hyper-governed young people. I adopted this approach in order to position young people as active in the enactment of hopeful realities. As youth research is political, youth researchers need to be explicit in their political and ethical orientations. This method assemblage holds the tension between the situated experiences of hyper-governed young people and the broader narratives of youth and violence. It is grounded in the ethical position that violence is a negative phenomenon, and that young people are active, capable and valuable citizens. In the light of these principles and goals I constructed the project, identified a target group and developed a data collection and analysis process. These processes were designed to engage with hyper-governed young people to capture their stories and analyse them, in order to develop an understanding of their situated experiences and how these experiences connect to the broader narratives of youth and violence.

This method assemblage grew out of the hinterlands of critical youth sociology and the emerging sociology of youth. Drawing upon these knowledge traditions enabled hyper-governed young people's experiences of neoliberal violence to be made present. However, youth research remains a political, messy and contingent practice with multiple and hidden power dynamics. Not least among these concerns is the messy and contingent relationship between researcher and young person in qualitative research. Youth researchers have

undertaken significant work to develop principles and practices that engage young people as capable participants. The following chapter considers the design of this project in light of the youth participation literature. Furthermore, it presents some reflections of the project participants about their reasons for participation, and argues for an understanding of youth participatory methods as parallel projects.

Chapter 4 — Youth participatory methods as 'parallel projects'

Youth researchers continue to pursue the ideals of youth participatory methods. This pursuit has led youth researchers to develop and adopt a variety of techniques and ethical principles that attempt to position young people as active research participants. However, these methods and principles have not solved the challenges of youth participation. Youth research, for all its attempts to be participant led, remains an adult-centric process. Young people are routinely positioned as risky and incapable by the people and processes that govern research, and some of the challenges of participation are likely to be unsolvable. Furthermore, methods that are designed to encourage participation can obscure the multiplicity of power dynamics within a research encounter. In this chapter, I argue that there is a need to accept that some of the problems of participation might be unsolvable and to reposition the power relationship between young person and researcher. Existing ethics processes are adult centric and can produce paradoxically unethical results for youth researchers. I argue that young people's participation in qualitative research can be understood as participants and researchers engaging in *parallel projects,* and that interpreting it in this way enables the researcher to value the young people's reasons for participation. In fact, young people might be 'keen as fuck' to participate (to quote the expression of one participant).

To reposition young people's participation in qualitative research I will describe the research encounter as containing *parallel projects*. The researcher arrives at the encounter with their research project. I argue that the young person also arrives at the encounter with one (or more) project(s). Their project is their reason for participation; it is the goal that they are pursuing through the research encounter. These projects will sometimes parallel the researcher's, and at other times they might come into conflict. Researchers might be able to

identify and understand some of a young person's projects. Some other projects will no doubt go unrecognised or misunderstood. Youth research is a messy space with multiple contingencies. As such, the researcher cannot know or control the whole process. Instead young people's participation can be understood as a parallel project to the researcher's project. Conceptualising youth research as parallel projects does not excuse the researcher from responsibility to manage the risks of the process, however. Rather, this approach to youth participation positions the adult as a research participant as well. This approach avoids positioning young people as inherently disempowered, disinterested or risky participants in research by recognising that young people have their own projects that motivate their participation.

I begin this chapter with an overview of existing youth participation literature. I then present participants' reflections on the experience of being interviewed for the current project. These I collected by asking the second set of structured questions described in the previous chapter. Here, I simultaneously present and analyse these reflections to develop my argument that youth participatory research can be conceptualised as parallel projects.

Principles and practices of youth participation

Researchers interested in children and young people utilise 'participant-centred' methods in an attempt to avoid 'studying down' (Allen 2008, 565). Over time there has been a shift towards an understanding of children and young people as not simply passive in the research process, but active subjects (Gillies and Robinson 2012, 161). Those interested in young people have worked on this counter discourse by designing diverse methodologies (Gillies and Robinson 2012, 162). For example, one approach has been to create opportunities for

young people to select non-verbal mediums for engaging with a research question. This has resulted in a range of techniques used to facilitate the expression of their 'voices' in ways that are meaningful to them (Gillies and Robinson 2012, 162; Lomax 2012, 106). This includes mediums such as: photo diaries, drawing, video, audio recording, etc. Not only are these more engaging than a simple conversation, but alternative mediums enable participants to express complex and difficult ideas and emotions (Hunleth 2011, 86). Furthermore, Dean (2015, 3.1) advocates that the process of 'doing something' adds value for the participant by creating a somatic experience and memory.

Interactive, creative and visual mediums are thought to increase young people's engagement and participation in research (Åkerström and Brunnberg 2013, 528), and improve their experience of the encounter (Dean 2015, 3.1). However, this approach has attracted the critique that these methods obscure the multiplicity of power-knowledge dynamics and the adult-centric nature of research (Hunleth 2011, 82; Lomax 2012, 106). The argument for using more engaging or appropriate mediums ignores the possibility that young people simply might want to participate for reasons that are their own and are not anticipated by the researcher. It overlooks the reality that adults are designing these mediums; the success of which is measured in terms that are valued by the researchers; i.e. participation. Hence research remains an adult-centred project. Finally, the argument implies that young people are passive participants or incapable objects of research. It is supposed that only through creative mediums can these 'passive' and 'incapable' people be truly engaged.

In addition to the mediums described above, 'place' is an important factor in research methods. The physical location in which the researcher-participant interaction occurs can have an influence over the degree to which the participant finds the experience meaningful.

Gillies and Robinson discovered through their work with 'challenging pupils' that they initially lacked any credibility in the young person's space:

> They swung back on their chairs, rolled their eyes, screwed their faces up and chatted to each other as if we were not there. (Gillies and Robinson 2012, 163)

If the researchers lack credibility in the location in which the interaction takes place, then the participants may choose to ignore them. This is one among several other well-documented issues in youth participatory research methods. To understand the issues there is a need to examine basic principles. The 1989 UNCRC enshrined young people's right to participation in decision making processes that affect them *(United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child* 1989). Article 12 contains the often-cited acknowledgement of the right of the child to participate in research (Åkerström and Brunnberg 2013, 530). This convention is the result of a larger movement in the 1970s and 1980s towards youth participation in politics (Harris 2009, 301). Harris argues that in the 1990s this interest shifted towards the language of 'citizenship', and again later in the 2000s towards 'civic engagement' (302). These latter shifts are important as it has been argued that this movement is caught up in an attempt to solve a perceived issue of young people failing to participate. Thus, using a discourse of 'civic engagement' represents an attempt to 'train' young people in the 'skills' required to participate (Fox 2013, 987). This civic engagement discourse arguably has a greater emphasis on control rather than participation. This shift from participation to control reflects the two sides of a dual discourse of responsibility and innocence/riskiness in which young people continue to be caught up (Bessant 2011, 64; Wyn and White 1997, 19). Through civic

engagement young people are again positioned as risky and incapable objects that need to be trained and have their participation regulated.

The 'dual popular representation' (Wyn and White 1997, 19) of young people positions them as simultaneously capable and responsible, whilst also needing protection and being a risk to others. Young people popularly symbolise a source of hope and social change. However, they are also regularly represented as politically disengaged, apathetic and incompetent (Harris 2009, 302; Smith 2015, 359; White and Wyn 2011, 110). It is thus possible to draw on either side of this discourse to justify a research method. Youth participatory methods intended for doing research 'with' and not simply 'on' young people reflect an ethical orientation towards valuing young people as equal contributors to knowledge creation. However, this dual discourse of youth can also counteract the intention of the researchers. The way in which young people are represented in research shape the possible knowledge that can be produced. If the target group is identified as being 'challenging pupils', then the findings will reinforce the idea that young people are problematic. Furthermore, the assumed category of *youth* itself is underpinned by normative biological, psychological and social discourses which form distinctions between adults and 'not-yet-adult' participants (Sercombe 2010, 19; Tait 1993b, 42; White and Wyn 2011, 22; Wyn and White 1997, 8). Hence even utilising the term *youth* carries exclusionary baggage.

Failure to examine the discourses underpinning research can result in researchers 'wrongly collud[ing] in the enactment of dominant realities' (Law and Urry 2004, 399). For example, Allen (2008) identifies a shift within methodological literature in the terms used to describe a young person's participation from 'rebellion and delinquency' to 'resistance' (Allen 2008, 566). This is an important shift away from the association of young people with deviant

labels. However, it also serves to perpetuate a picture of young people in a passive role. Young people can resist, but do not lead. Simply labelling methods as participatory or youth-led can serve to obscure the underpinning discourses of youth (Hunleth 2011, 82). Youth researchers need to be aware of these discourses and explicit in their ethical orientation.

Hart (1992) developed a 'ladder of participation' as a model to describe different types, or levels, of participation and cooperation between children/youth and adults. This model has been utilised by child/youth researchers and practitioners to develop youth participation programs and research methods. Whilst the bottom rungs of the ladder represent non-participation, the top rungs identify increasingly ideal participation. At the top of the ladder is an approach that is initiated by children/young people, but in which they make shared decisions with adults. The two rungs below this are, in descending order: 'child-initiated and directed'; and, 'adult-initiated with shared decisions with children' (Hart 1992, 8). Importantly the adult is not absent in the top rung of the ladder. Rather, the adult's exclusion at the second level is considered a lesser form of participation.

As such, the right of young people to participate in research is a key principle in youth research. How this participation is implemented varies between projects, but is described by Hart as ideally involving child-initiated projects that are shared with adults. This principle is held in tension by youth researchers with risk assessment and research ethics processes, which emphasise the need to protect young people from the risks of participation. The movement towards participation is a shift towards an understanding of young people as active subjects, rather than passive objects of research (Allen 2008, 565; 2009, 396; Gillies and Robinson 2012, 161). In contrast, Allen (2009) describes the historical practice of youth-focused research as taking place through 'adult proxies' (i.e. parents, family members,

teachers, etc.) (396). Whilst the orthodoxy of youth research has moved away from this position, youth research continues to be regulated by adult-centric processes, for instance ethics and risk management processes. These attempts to assess the competency and capability of young people to participate in research are ‘paternalistic as they begin from a position of adult hegemony’ (Daley 2013, 128). Arguably these processes also assess the competence of the researcher and the appropriateness of the research design. However, in both cases adults are the designers as well as the implementers of these systems of control.

Youth researchers (and no doubt other researchers too) have found that the ethics process can produce paradoxical results. For example, Allen (2009) designed a research project that ‘endeavoured to prioritise the agency and competency of young people’ (399). However, she found that complying with the process in seeking ethics approval to undertake the work involved submission to a discourse of the ‘self-governing researcher who complied with committee regulations’ (339). The adult, and compliance with adult concerns, became the central story of the research, rather than the agency and competence of the young people. Youth research continues to wrestle with the dual discourses of youth. Each new project requires a re-articulation of the same argument about the capacity of the young participants and the mitigations of potential risks. The probability of achieving ethics approval is therefore in part linked to the ability of the researcher to articulate their argument. This further centralises the adult, and decentralises the young person in the research project. To be clear I am not arguing for abandoning the ethics review process. I am, however, pointing out how this process can become a barrier to ethical research.

In theory, youth participatory methods are led by young people and adults are involved in the process. However, there are social, historical, procedural and institutional barriers that make

this ideal all but unachievable. Young people have historically been marginalised within research, and youth continues to be a social category of exclusion (Sercombe 2010, 19; White and Wyn 2011, 22; Wyn and White 1997, 8). Research institutions, like political institutions, are 'created by adults to serve an adult agenda and are not structured around young people's interests or designed to engage them' (Harris 2009, 302). Youth research needs new language to conceptualise the researcher-participant relationship. The solution, similar to Freire's reconstruction of education, is not to integrate young people into an adult structure 'but to transform that structure so that they can become "beings for themselves"' (Freire 2005, 74). Ironically, in this chapter the language is again being articulated by an adult (myself), and therefore I am in part reproducing the adult-young person dynamic. Hence, there is a need to acknowledge the reasons a young person might participate, and furthermore to acknowledge that these might not always be the reasons expected or desired. The researcher might not even understand or be aware of these reasons. Freire argues that it would be 'cultural invasion' to fail to respect a participant's perspective (Freire 2005, 95). This requires 'ambivalence and ambiguity' (Law 2004, 90)—what might be called an intentional *un-knowing*—which creates space for young people to have reasons on their own terms. *Un-knowing* is the conscious acknowledgement that something is not known, and might not be knowable at this time. This is the allegorical method that Law describes as holding 'two or more things together that do not necessarily cohere' (2004, 91). Furthermore, there should also be space for conflict. The young person can be positioned as competent, without necessarily positioning the researcher as incompetent. The researcher needs to retain the responsibility to manage certain risks. In this chapter I suggest that conceptualising the qualitative research encounter in terms of parallel projects is a possible way forward.

Parallel projects

When one young person was invited to participate in the current research project, he said that he was 'keen as fuck'. This level of enthusiasm might come as a surprise. It certainly contrasts with the traditional adult-centric views that position young people as incompetent (Fox 2013, 987), incapable (Allen 2009, 404) or disinterested in participating in research (Gillies and Robinson 2012, 163). This kind of response prompts reflection on the benefit or value the young person must receive from participation. Clark (2010) argues that there has been 'little systematic research' about people's reasons for participating in research that considers the risk and motivating factors (415). However, Clark (2010) and Wolgemuth et al. (2015) have investigated the experience of 'being researched', and produced some interesting results.

Clark interviewed thirteen 'experienced researchers' who had recently utilised a qualitative method to investigate a diverse range of social phenomena that were 'concerned with children and families in some respect' (2010, 403). He discovered people participated in research for personal reasons including: 'subjective interest, curiosity, enjoyment, individual empowerment, introspective interest, social comparison, therapeutic interest, material interest and economic interest' (Clark 2010, 404). People also participated for collective reasons including: 'representation and giving voice; political empowerment; and, informing "change"' (Clark 2010, 411). Clark's findings thus suggest that people engage with research for multiple reasons. Clark notes, however, that there are usually few attempts by researchers to gather the expressed experience of participation from those 'being researched'. Building on Clark's work, Wolgemuth et al. (2015) found that different research paradigms adopted by researchers had little effect on a participant's experience. Instead, the relationship with the

researcher proved to be a more significant influence (Wolgemuth et al. 2015, 368). Both findings raise as many questions as they answer for youth research.

If, as Wolgemuth and colleagues propose, the relationship is central to the participant's experience then this suggests that the adult plays a central role in the research dynamic. In a way, this reinforces the ideal form of participation in Hart's ladder, as the adult continues to be important. However, in another way it contradicts this model, as the relational emphasis is ambiguous about who initiated the project. Furthermore, the idea of empowerment, identified by Clark, is problematic. Other researchers (Harris et al. 2015, 585; Lyon and Carabelli 2015, 4) have argued that claims of empowerment are often overstated, and Clark concluded that the findings were inevitably 'representative of those researcher viewpoints who took part in the study' (Clark 2010, 415). Empowerment is routinely identified as an important outcome for participants in youth research (Allen 2009, 398; Clark 2010, 411; Gillies and Robinson 2012, 162; Harris et al. 2015, 584; Lyon and Carabelli 2015, 4). However, empowerment is a problematic idea in youth research as it implies a disempowered a-priori state for the young person. It implies a hierarchical transaction whereby the lower-status participant gains power, seemingly at the expense of the higher-status researcher.

This simplistic, hierarchical conception of the power relationships in the research encounter overlooks another important factor. Farrugia (2013) argues that there is a risk in youth research that the researcher can participate in what Bourdieu calls 'symbolic violence' (Bourdieu 2001, 33). Whilst conducting interviews with homeless young people, Farrugia became aware that his approach might be reproducing 'suffering and stigmatisation due to the dominant discourses that give meaning to the experience of homelessness' (Farrugia 2013, 113). The language and symbolic meaning of homelessness in modern society positions

young people as risky, incompetent, ‘moral failures’ (114). In a similar way the language of empowerment, within an implied hierarchy of power, positions research participants without power. Furthermore, discourses of participation that centre around adult projects, and that posit the participant as disinterested and incapable, are a form of symbolic violence.

My research also found that young people participated in the current project for a range of reasons. Some of these reasons aligned with the findings of Wolgemuth et al. and Clark; others did not. When asked why they chose to participate in the interview, the participants responded in ways that were unsurprising and yet also essential to a young person-centred understanding of participation.

> Researcher: So tell me, why did you agree to have this conversation?
>
> Jackson: I was, kind of not liking the other person in the classroom.
>
> Researcher: Ok.
>
> Jackson: I don’t like other people.

For this participant, Jackson[2], the research provided an opportunity to escape a different and less desirable situation. This may not be an active reason to participate, but he had an active reason not to do the alternative. This reason had little relationship to the aims of the researcher’s project. However, it does not necessarily mean that the young person was not wanting to participate, or that the participation was coerced. Rather, it could be argued that this young person was manipulating the research for his own ends. All of this however is speculative. All we know is that the young person did not want to be in the classroom.

[2] All participants names have been changed

However, acknowledging young people's potential to manipulate research for their own purposes continues the movement away from conceptualising young people as objects of research, to active subjects of research (Allen 2008, 565; 2009, 396; Gillies and Robinson 2012, 161; Harris et al. 2015, 584). The following young person expresses a reason for participation that appears to parallel the researcher's project.

> Mia: Because I have always wanted to speak to someone about it. Like always, and you just happened to come up. So I was like yeah for sure. I'd love to tell someone this story.

In this instance, the participant's and researcher's projects are parallel; they are headed in the same direction. However, this parallel can be misleading. It can appear that the research is the only way, or ideal way, of fulfilling the young person's desire to tell her or his story. It is important to note that even though the projects are heading in the same direction, they are also separate and distinct. The alignment of direction could be (mis)understood in an adult-centric way. The young person's project could be understood as being the same thing as the researcher's project. There are many other ways a young person's story can be heard, valued and amplified. If the desired outcome of participation is having your story *heard* (by an adult), it is dependent on an adult *hearing* the story. However, this would overlook the simpler truth that the young person wanted to *tell* their story. The value of participation is the agentic telling of their story (Lyon and Carabelli 2015, 13). Telling stories is a 'revolutionary act' (McLaren and Tadue Da Silva 1992, 72). Despite who is listening to the story, the young person's world is changed by telling. Focusing on the telling of the story places the emphasis on the young person's reason for participation.

The following reflection from the current project supports the findings from Wolgemuth et al. (2015) regarding the importance of the relationship within the research encounter. However, what came after the interview offers more context and an additional reason for participation. In this instance, I had met the young person previously in a professional context.

> Lucas: I get to catch up with you. You are a sick cunt. And it has been eye opening sort of interesting day start. To see what you are studying and see how, for the little bits of psychology that I have studied here and there correspond to the violence and what not in your PhD.

Highlighted here is the young person's agenda to maintain a relationship. However, after the interview recording was stopped, Lucas offered to sell the researcher illicit drugs. Arguably this represents a further agenda for participation. This offer raises some ethical and risk management concerns, and highlights the dominance of adult centricity in research. For example, when this finding was presented in a workshop to other youth researchers, one member of the audience persistently questioned the mandatory reporting obligations of the researcher. There are two important points to consider in this instance. Firstly, mandatory requirements in Australia enshrine the requirement for the reporting of harm and abuse (South Australian Department of Child Protection 2017). The selling of illicit drugs does not necessarily fall under this requirement (South Australian Department of Child Protection 2017). Secondly, if either a researcher or practitioner participates in the reporting of these kinds of questionable practices they risk three issues: 1) They might gain a reputation amongst the target group of reporting (i.e. breaching confidentiality) and lose all credibility and access; 2) They participate in the discourse of youth that identifies young people as risky and incompetent; 3) They might also do the participant harm in reporting him, which would

contravene ethical requirements. Furthermore, this project was granted ethics approval, and this issue was managed in line with the requirements of the process of gaining the approval. However, to make the focus of this chapter the particulars of the ethics process, or to debate further the reporting requirements that explored these concerns, would ironically be to focus on the concerns of adults in the research process. Focusing on adult concerns is incongruent with the foundational premise of this chapter; that young people's reasons for participation need to be centralised. This paragraph serves to highlight, as described earlier, how the concerns of ethics processes can be paradoxically 'antithetical to the conduct of "ethical research"' (Allen 2009, 399). Focusing this chapter on risks and assessment processes identified by adults would undermine the ethical concern that young people should be conceptualised as active, capable subjects (not risky objects) of research.

One of the important ideas identified by Clark (2010, 402) that casts participants as active subjects is the expressed desire to help others through the research. In my research project, young people also expressed this altruistic response. In Clark's work, participants were primarily interested in helping others in a similar situation (402). Young people participating in this current research extended their concern beyond similarly situated young people, to a broader sense of collective humanity. Young people understood the research encounter as a means to give back and improve the lives of everyone. This desire to give back can be interpreted in an adult-centric way as being facilitated by the research. Clark presents this reason for participation as a staged process, whereby the data (1) provided by the participant is (2) disseminated by the researcher, which being (3) read by others might then (4) effect change in other people's lives through application. However, there is another way of interpreting this reason for participation.

Through the discursive action in the research encounter, participants challenge and create knowledge that directly shapes (or governs) their sense of self and the world (Foucault et al. 1991, 79). The research encounter becomes an opportunity for young people to do 'specific types of work on the self' (Tait 1993b, 52). In addition, the researcher is inexorably bound up in this discursive process and is also governed by productive power-knowledge relations (McGarry 2015, 3). Participants (including the researcher) are rendered self-governing subjects, and the world is immediately changed. Here it is possible to see that the young people's reason—that which I call their *project*—for participating in qualitative research parallels the researcher's reason for wanting their participation. Researchers and participants have different projects, but they can be both heading in a similar enough direction to make the encounter possible. This is the case with the other examples provided above from participants in this research. The projects were parallel enough to make the encounter possible. It is possible that in the conduct of research, some projects will be closer, and others further apart. However, there is likely to be a threshold of relative closeness between the two projects that is required for the research encounter to work. Furthermore, it is possible that these projects might be very close, or even clash. I will return to the potential for conflict in a moment. However, the following example from the current project demonstrates how close the parallel projects can come.

> Logan: I thought it might be a nice thing to do. Help someone out with their uni stuff. Um, yeah and also I guess, yeah, it's yeah I find it good to talk about nonviolence and to, um, think about these things and clarify my ideas and all that kind of stuff.

This young person expresses several projects in this short excerpt that challenge adult centricity. Firstly, he believes it might be a 'nice thing to do'. It is unclear whether he means it is 'nice' to help someone, or if the experience has value in itself. Again, a desire to help someone else (in this case, the researcher) is expressed. Finally, he identifies value in 'clarifying my ideas'. As noted earlier, Tait suggests that youth can be problematised as 'doing of certain kinds of work on the self' (1993b, 42). Through youth, young people generate knowledge about the world and themselves. With this knowledge, they work on and govern themselves. Youth can therefore be understood as an 'artefact of government' (Tait 1993a, 4) or an 'artefact of expertise' (Kelly 2010, 312). The research encounter is an opportunity through which young people are active in the development of knowledge about themselves and the world. In this reflection, the two projects are very closely aligned. However, it is important to hold on to the distinction between the two. Tait (1993b) is describing a process of self-formation, however Kelly (2010) raises the idea of 'expertise' as a warning. Young people and youth are increasingly governmentalised. Knowledge is developed about young people and youth for the purpose of governing them (Kelly 2010, 302). The project of knowledge creation for the purpose of governing primarily belongs to the regulating and controlling 'carceral network' (Foucault 1979, 310) of governing organisations. It should not be confused with the projects that motivate young people's participation in research.

Conceptualising the research encounter in terms of parallel projects values both the researcher's project and that of the young person. It acknowledges that these are distinct, no matter how closely aligned they may seem. It also acknowledges the co-created nature of the knowledge that emerges from the space. Both the young person's and the researcher's projects shape the nature of the encounter. Furthermore, there might be multiple projects held

by multiple parties. Researchers regularly have multiple projects operating within (or after) an interview, and likewise so can a young person. The young person who tried to sell drugs to this researcher also expressed a desire to maintain a relationship. This interpretation can value both projects, whilst acknowledging that the outputs of either party's project might not benefit the other party. For example, academic publications arguably hold little benefit for young people, whilst a young person seeking to avoid other people in a classroom does not directly benefit a researcher. Together they can both achieve something useful; however, these are still distinct projects. In the following excerpt, two young people wanted to be interviewed together. The exchange demonstrates the co-creation of knowledge through multiple parallel projects.

> Chloe: I don't know like, to help sort of thing. Cos I mean …
>
> Ryan: To help other people.
>
> Chloe: Yeah to help other people, like I mean. Yeah back in when I was younger the help that I got I am so thankful of. And the way I see it is if someone wants help or some information then I don't see it as a problem sort of thing. You can't really change what your past is.
>
> Ryan: You need to sort of help everyone else realise what is happening in life for you to realise as well.

Again, here the young people express a desire to help others. This might be achieved through the dissemination of the findings. Other young people might find their stories helpful, or practitioners might find guidance for professional practice. However, the interaction between the participants demonstrates the production of knowledge through conversation (McGarry 2015, 1). Batsleer describes the way 'sparks fly' in conversation and 'power relations shift

and are transformed' (2008, 9). Conversation is a space where multiple projects and power relationships come together—projects that 'help everyone realise', but that also help 'you realise as well'. The encounter that results from multiple parallel projects is not adult centric but rather is located in the relationship (McGarry 2015, 5). This relational space values the parallel projects of the subjects (the young person and the researcher) and their active and capable co-creation of knowledge. The young person and researcher form a relationship through the research and together participate in knowledge and subject formation (Farrugia 2013, 112). This reflects the inclusion of adults in the top rung of Hart's ladder, though it is distinct in that his model conceptualises only one project. This approach acknowledges multiple parallel projects in which two (or more) participants co-create knowledge. However, these projects might not always run parallel; they might also clash and come into conflict. Such conflict is another potential opportunity for insight. It also offers a perspective on the nature of the relationship between researcher and young person.

Conflicting projects

Conflict is often conflated with words like violence and war, or associated with emotions like anger. Hence the term implies a high level of energy or combativeness. However, conflict can be understood simply as opposing goals (Tillett and French 2006, 17). This kind of clash can occur between two (or more) people, as well as two (or more) countries. Conflict can also happen internally. I could desire two opposing things at once, and be in conflict with myself. Hence, conflict can be understood simply as an opportunity and energy for finding a creative solution (Galtung 1996, 70). The examples of conflicts from this project, provided below, are arguably low-level conflict. They do not involve physical violence or high emotional states. However, I argue that they do represent a formation of competing goals that are in conflict.

As a result of the dual discourses of youth and the adult-centric governing of research, conflicting goals already exist in youth research. A key example is the positioning of young people as competent in a risk management process. Furthermore, if young people's projects in research are going to be valued there is a chance they will have projects that conflict with those of the researcher. This might be intentional, or unconscious. It might be malicious or benevolent. However, conflicts between the agenda of researcher and young person generate important insight in and of themselves (Harris et al. 2015, 596). To ignore the potential conflict with young people's projects in research is likely to produce a tense research encounter. However, more importantly it presents an inaccurate picture of the research encounter, and reinforces the adult-centric nature of research.

During one of the interviews for this research project, a participant took hold of the visual timeline that was being used to record some of the conversation, and folded it into the shape of a hat. Later in the same interview the participant ripped it in half to demonstrate a point they were making.

> Lucas: I just destroyed the timeline.
>
> Researcher: I'll keep it anyway.

Lucas repurposed the timeline for his own project. Ideally the timeline served as a written record of the conversation. This action by the young person conflicted with the researcher's project. However, the greater purpose of the timeline was to act as a medium through which to draw out further insights and to create a somatic experience (Dean 2015, 3.1). Changing the way it was used did support the overall aim of the project, hence it still fulfilled its

purpose (Gillies and Robinson 2012, 165). This point of conflict could have derailed the interview. Instead it became a creative avenue for further insight. The young person ripped the timeline in half to reinforce a point he was making about fairness and the distribution of resources: the point being that, in his experience, this kind of distribution of resources was not automatically fair. This was a point well made, as taking half the timeline for himself and leaving myself with only half failed to fulfil either of our projects. Indeed, conflict can be engaged, through a relational model, as an opportunity (Batsleer 2008, 7; Ritchie and O'Connell 2001, 155). This conflict was engaged as an opportunity to think about how the timeline could be used differently. It provided a medium for drawing out new and surprising insights.

Several other interviews involved varying levels of conflict. One young person persistently throughout the interview made jokes about the researcher's physical appearance and the focus of the research. However, this young person also revealed during the interview that he found making fun of others an effective technique to resist the violence he encountered in the child protection system. This insight is unlikely to have happened if the researcher had not engaged the conflict as an opportunity. In another interview, two young people wanted to be interviewed together during a smoke break from an alternative education program.

> Vince: It fucken tastes like Port Royal.
>
> Andrew: Straight off the plant that's how it should taste.
>
> Researcher: So I have pressed record now.
>
> Vince: Yep.
>
> Researcher: So the other thing I have to say at the start of the interviews …
>
> Vince: Oi where is the crack pipe bro? Ha ha.

Researcher: … so the other thing I have to say at the start of the interviews is of course if you say anything that indicates you will harm yourself, mandatory reporting means I might have to report that …

Vince: We fucking know that shit.

Researcher: … but otherwise everything is confidential.

Andrew: We live in Families SA so we understand all that stuff.

Researcher: Sweet man, I just have to say it for the recording. Alright so …

Vince: Bom bom bom, bow bow bow. [Singing along to music playing in the background.]

Researcher: … what I have been doing with other people is I've got like a visual diagram and I've helped them map some of their experience over time …

Vince: Hey bro give us the lighter. Needs a bit of …

Researcher: … but that's not really going to work for us today so we'll just skip that. But what I am really interested in as well as your experiences in foster care and juvenile detention and any of those sort of systems …

Vince: It's not lighting.

Researcher: … is whether you think your experience has been fair or not?

Vince: Is it lit? Mine's not even lit bro so if yours is I wouldn't even do that off mine.

Andrew: Mmmh hmm.

Vince: Is it lit?

Andrew: I'll just light it in a second, just talk to …

There are many dynamics at play in this short extract. I am awkwardly trying to communicate something about the adult ethical requirements surrounding the interview, and the interview process. Vince rejects the need to state these adult concerns as he 'fucking know[s] that shit'.

Arguably, in stating these concerns the researcher reinforces the participant's experiences of stigmatisation and suffering in the child protection system. This symbolic violence is produced by the adult concerns in the research process. Vince is focused on lighting his cigarette and having fun at the researcher's expense. Andrew is likewise focused on smoking, but also on placating Vince. It can be argued that these young people are still participating. However, their participation is only one of several competing projects including: smoking, joking around, and rejecting symbolic violence. These projects are closely enough aligned for them to continue to participate. However, the projects are also conflicting, and placing strain on the encounter in different directions. The encounter could fail if the smokes will not light, if there is too much symbolic violence, or if the researcher is too attached to the process. If this conflict between the divergent projects caused the interview to fail, then significant insights would have been missed.

These two young people did later discuss their experiences and resistance to physical violence from child protection workers. Their techniques became a significant finding of the research project, and one that would not have been discovered if the initial conflict had derailed the interview. The central point here is that conflict needs to be an accepted feature, and engaged as an opportunity in youth research if young people's projects are to be taken seriously.

Conclusion

Young people have a range of projects that motivate their participation in qualitative research. If young people are going to be studied as capable subjects rather than passive objects, then their projects within research need to be acknowledged. These projects might at

times parallel the purpose of the research project. The researcher and the young person might be aware of these other projects, or they might not. Arguably it is only when the young person's project is close enough to the researcher's that ethical research can occur. However, ethical research with young people maintains the possibility for conflicting projects.

Youth research struggles with the dual discourses of youth. Young people are simultaneously considered to be vulnerable and in need of protection, as well as capable and active contributors. Ethics and risk management processes weigh in on the paternalistic side of this equation and reduce the possibilities for purely youth-led research to near zero. However, it is possible to understand young people's participation in research not simply as them conforming to the adult agenda, but as having separate but parallel projects. This approach upholds the emancipatory goals of youth research. It positions young people as capable and active participants. However, this approach still affirms the adult's responsibility to manage some of the risks of the encounter. Both young people and the researcher participate in the research encounter and in the co-creation of knowledge.

Youth research is a messy and contingent space with multiple and hidden power dynamics. Young people can be 'keen as fuck' to participate, but for their own projects. Conceptualising youth research as parallel projects positions young people as active and capable participants and creates space for multiple and conflicting projects that present opportunities for creativity and unexpected insights.

The following chapters move into the project's major findings and my analysis. As described earlier, the findings and analysis will be presented concurrently rather than as separate chapters. The first of the following three chapters will focus on violence done *to* young

people (chapter 5). Specifically, it will focus on neoliberal violence done to hyper-governed young people in the form of a subversion of restorative practices with the use of Fair Process. In the subsequent findings chapter, I develop the argument that violence done *to* young people shapes violence *by* young people (chapter 6). In the final findings chapter I reposition hyper-governed young people as active in their relationship with the state by presenting, and analysing, their techniques of resistance to neoliberal violence.

Chapter 5 — Violence done *to* young people: Fair Process and neoliberal violence in the hollowing out of social services

This chapter closely examines hyper-governed young people's responses to the principles of Fair Process. In turn, this uncovers the effects of neoliberal violence and the violence done *to* hyper-governed young people. The hyper-governed young people I interviewed for this project rejected the principles of Fair Process by telling stories of 'unfair' process. The principles made little sense to them in an abstract form; they required context. When hyper-governed young people applied the principles to their context, they found these were inadequate for conceptualising the problems they face. I argue in this chapter that the problems hyper-governed young people encounter are best described as 'wicked problems'. Furthermore, representation of the problem underpinning Fair Process is not conducive with the messiness and contingency inherent in the wicked problems experienced by hyper-governed young people. In telling their stories of unfair process, I argue hyper-governed young people are claiming their right to the problem. In addition, participants contested their subjective positioning within the principles of Fair Process. I argue that the problem representation underpinning Fair Process, and the scientific hinterland in which it resides, produce subjects who are subordinate to the process and render them subject to explicit and discursive controls. These are the effects of neoliberal violence produced through the application of Fair Process and the hollowing out of the welfare state. In other words, contrary to the expressed goal of restorative practices, Fair Process positions hyper-governed young people as subordinates and excludes them from participating in decision-making processes.

In the first section of this chapter I will conceptualise hyper-governed young people's objections to Fair Process in terms of its incompatibility with their wicked problems. This incompatibility is demonstrated through stories of unfair process from their lives. Hyper-governed young people 'called bullshit' on the principles and claimed a right to the representation of their problems. In the second section of this chapter, I unpack a second objection that hyper-governed young people had to the principles of Fair Process. Specifically, that Fair Process makes claims about the value of the process distinct from its outcome. Hyper-governed young people found this separation of process and outcome unacceptable. I will argue that the result of this separation is the production of subordinate subjects who are denied equal participation.

In the final section of this chapter, I argue that the infiltration of Fair Process into social services aimed at young people highlights the dangers of the institutional abstraction of youth in knowledge production. In other words, the disconnection between young people and the theorisation of youth produces unsatisfactory outcomes for the emancipatory goals of youth sociology. Youth researchers need to be critical about their contribution to how young people are known, and subsequently governed. Furthermore, in this final section I will argue that the emancipatory goals of critical youth sociology need to be tempered by a reflexive awareness of its own capacity to contribute to the growing cache of knowledge on 'youth' and the subsequent governing of young people. The production of further knowledge about youth and young people to counter 'solutions' like Fair Process ironically contributes to the governmentalisation of young people. My analysis of Fair Process is grounded in the expressed concerns of young people. It prioritises hyper-governed young people's

perspectives and their concerns with Fair Process. I argue that this situated approach to knowledge creation does not undo the governmentalisation of young people, but it does resist the prioritisation of efficiency within neoliberal violence. This prioritisation of efficiency within government and non-government programs and policies are the mark of the hollowing-out welfare state. The erosion of justice and the prioritisation of efficiency violates young people's right to participation. This tokenistic participation in decisions made about them subordinates young people and neglects to attend to the wicked nature of social problems. These violating experiences are the effects of neoliberal violence done to young people.

Wicked problems

Neoliberal violence has a whitewashing effect on the ethical and political alignment of social services. Its influence on the values underpinning service delivery to young people can be witnessed in practice frameworks like restorative practices. As I argued in chapter 2, the hollowing out of the welfare state has resulted in the prioritisation of efficiency over public service values including participation, equity and justice. The marketisation of government funding to nongovernment youth services places pressure on these services to conform to political values as they compete for government contracts. Youth services adopt frameworks such as restorative practices to align with government objectives. However, marketising funding for social services has the effect of aligning NGOs with not just political objectives, but also political values. This alignment with political values promotes the embracing of principles such as those constituting Fair Process, which prioritise efficiency over justice and participation. This is the whitewashing of practice frameworks by compromising the valuing

of participation and justice. The political emphasis on efficiency erodes these values and produces violating effects for young people. Hence, the application of Fair Process in restorative practices is an important example of neoliberal violence. This a concern for critical youth sociology.

Fair Process was described to participants in terms of the three principles outlined by Kim and Mauborgne in their 2003 paper 'Fair process: Managing in the knowledge economy':

- Engagement — involving individuals in decisions by inviting their input and encouraging them to challenge one another's ideas.
- Explanation — clarifying the thinking behind a final decision.
- Expectation clarity — stating the new rules of the game, including performance standards, penalties for failure, and new responsibilities. (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 1)

Consistently, participants responded to the idea of Fair Process in an indirect way. Direct responses were rare. Their response was to contextualise the principles by telling a story from their own life, or a hypothetical context. Often, they responded with stories about an experience of unfair process. On some occasions, they also asked for more context from the researcher. Participants frequently sought out, or provided context in which the principles could be examined and tested.

> Nathan: Um, got a few fines and shit. And they, that was pretty unfair because um, I, got, like the fines weren't unfair, like I got a hundred and eighty dollar fine for not wearing a helmet ... I got a two hundred and twenty for running across the tracks at Blackwood station. But um, I don't know it was a bit weird cos they just, like I couldn't pay them because I had no income at all … All of a sudden they were just boosting up every month and shit. And then they got to fourteen hundred dollars, and then I was like (sharp intake of breath). And then my dad ended up paying it cos it was just going up too high. And I had no way of making money.

When asked about Fair Process, Nathan told this story (and other stories) of his own experiences with unfair process. In the story above Nathan was unable to pay a fine he was given for crossing a railway track in the wrong place, and not wearing a helmet whilst riding his bike. Nathan also told stories of being 'beaten up' by police in a holding cell, and a story in which he attacked the partner of his ex-girlfriend, in response to an attack on his current girlfriend. In all these stories Nathan did not present himself simply as a victim. Instead he demonstrated a reflective capacity to acknowledge his role in the escalation of events, but also the ability to point to larger social forces beyond his control.

In this story, Nathan acknowledges that receiving a fine for breaking the law was fair: '… like the fines weren't unfair'. However, his inability to pay the fine created a situation that was unfair. Whilst his father ultimately paid the fine, this was a solution that was also fraught with complexity for Nathan. Several factors in this solution were beyond his control including, as he later explained, that his father has a gambling issue that regularly resulted in

financial hardship. Nathan's story contained a level of complexity that is difficult to resolve. The solution was too generic and simplistic; it did not fit with his context. This response to the principles of Fair Process—telling stories of complex and contingent situations—brought context to the principles. The following young person also placed the principles in a context to make sense of them. In this excerpt, the young person is reflecting on her experience of social workers in the child protection system.

> Riley: Well I call bullshit on expectations and explanation, because they don't follow through. Like they don't give you an explanation as to why it happened or … I mean they will give it to you three years down the track. But not when you need it the most. And with expectation they never follow through. Like you ask them to do something for you and they will go "yeah we will look into it", and then you get about three months down the track and you are like "So, have you done anything about it?" And they will be like, "oh no sorry I forgot". And you will be like "well that thing", if it was like a course or something, you will be like "well that thing was important to me. I needed to do that".

For Riley to 'call bullshit on expectations and explanation' firstly suggests that on the surface, expectations and explanation appear to be reasonable principles. However, Riley has experienced a failure of these kinds of ideals in practice. For Riley, 'expectations' are useless if 'they never follow through'. One solution to this problem might be to create a new principle: always follow through. However, this would be to overlook a foundational concern. For Riley, it is not abstract principles that are important, but action. For both Nathan

and Riley, discussing the principles of Fair Process elicited stories of unfair experiences. Abstract principles might have superficial appeal, but the experience of fairness is bound up in the situation and in the things that are 'important to me'. Their stories and experiences were full of contingency and context. One possible solution might be to develop more principles. However, attempting to cover all possible situations is likely to produce an unwieldly number of principles. Instead, Nathan's and Riley's stories emphasise the need to provide a context in which to evaluate the principles, based on the reality of complexity in their lives. Some participants, as per the following examples, were explicit in their desire for context.

> Researcher: What do you think of that (principles of Fair Process)?
>
> Anna: Um, can I just have a bit more of a context? ...Yeah. I don't know, it just seems like you could separate that from the situation which we have been kind of doing conversationally. Um, and evaluate this sort of theoretical construct, you know, which might be a good theoretical construct in and of itself. Might be a perfect one. You know? But if it is still an unjust situation, you know, then it doesn't really change the situation around it, does it?

Anna's immediate response to hearing the principles as a 'theoretical construct', was to ask the researcher to provide more context. Whilst the principles might be perfect in an abstract sense, they could be completely undermined by an 'unjust situation'. If the particulars of a situation create a context that is unfair, this could render the principles of Fair Process

irrelevant. Furthermore, the principles cannot be a solution without a tangible problem or situation. The situation might be ‘unjust’, in which case Fair Process would be simply a key for the wrong lock. Furthermore, not only might the principles be the wrong solution, they might be completely ineffective. Anna suggests that the principles of Fair Process fail to account for context and are unlikely to change an ‘unjust situation’. The abstract presentation of Fair Process also made little sense to the following young person.

> Addison: Yeah. I don’t know. I guess like … it is fair but I don’t know, it’s not fair at the same time. It’s really hard. There are just so many different situations that are fair or not fair.

In this excerpt, Addison also appeals to context and is conflicted about the fairness of the principles. Addison had recently been released from juvenile detention. Like Nathan, she was open about her guilt in the incident that led to her incarceration. However, also like Nathan, the punishment had created a range of new problems. I will return to Addison’s story later in the chapter. However, Addison’s experiences had taught her that life is complex and that problems are not easily solved. Furthermore, that situations and ‘solutions’ paradoxically have the capacity to be both fair and unfair. They might be fair in one context and not in another. Fair Process is ‘really hard’ and must be contextualised as there are ‘just so many different situations’. Consistently the participants rejected an abstract formulation of Fair Process. Furthermore, some participants articulated their concerns about Fair Process specifically in terms of its abstract formulation:

> Researcher: What do you think of that?
>
> Michelle: Um, in a perfect world hey? [laughs] … I think that that sounds quite fair, um, in theory. I wonder how it would go in practice though as a system.

Hyper-governed young people regularly expressed concern with the application of abstract solutions in the messiness of their world. This objection reflects Law's (2004) conception of the social, and the sciences that attempt to make sense of it. The contingent and messy nature of youth is a growing theme in contemporary critical youth sociology (Anderson 2014; Kelly 2010; Walsh and Black 2014; Watts 2015; Woodman and Threadgold 2011). To obscure this complexity is to misrepresent the social world. For these young people the question of fairness did not make sense in the abstract. Fairness was something that demanded context.

Hyper-governed young people's experiences resisted the simplistic abstract formula of Fair Process. Participants were not able, it seemed, to make sense of Fair Process without context. Furthermore, the presentation of a simplistic solution, i.e. the three principles of Fair Process, was incongruent with the reality of the problem. The problem resisted a simplistic abstract formulaic solution, i.e. it is a 'wicked problem' (Watts 2015, 162). Valentine describes wicked problems thus:

> … wicked problems, which are contested, messy and provisionally solved, and their differences from non-wicked problems, which are stable, definable and separable, and generally found in the physical sciences.

> Wicked problems are characterised by uncertainty, emergence and contest … Paradigmatic examples of contemporary wicked problems are child protection, climate change and "self-harming" behaviours such as smoking and unhealthy eating … (Valentine 2015, 243)

Formulaic and dualistic answers are inappropriate for wicked problems like violence and fairness. There are not clear rules around these issues that can be abstracted, but rather the problems require individual responses that dive deep into the minutiae and the particulars. For Nathan and Addison, the solution implemented for their problems went on to create more wicked problems. 'Wicked' does not denote a normative judgement; good or bad, right or wrong, evil or holy (Watts 2013, 126). Rather it speaks to the high degree of difficulty in understanding, let alone solving, the problem. The problem resists a solution, it is irreducible. A defining characteristic of a wicked problem, according to Watts, is that 'we cannot even get an agreed-on definition of what the problem is' (Watts 2015, 162). Disagreement over the problem is a central indicator of the wicked nature of the problem of fairness. These young people were presented with a solution, but they wanted to know what the specific problem was that it solved. They went on to provide a problem, and found that Fair Process was not an adequate solution. Indeed, the simplistic formula of Fair Process is an inadequate solution to deeply embedded social inequality and disadvantage.

From Riley and Nathan's narratives of unfairness as well as Anna's and Addison's concerns with context, it is clear the problems they encounter are not singular and simple, but multiple, contingent and complex. A financial disincentive to discourage unsafe behaviour became a burden on a family and exacerbated insecurity. A system designed to keep children safe was

so paralysed by its own bureaucratic safety mechanisms it was unable to respond to its constituent's needs. This in turn created further disadvantage. What is evident in the responses from hyper-governed young people to the principles of Fair Process is an insight into their social worlds which have multiple compounding problems that overlap, interfere and blur boundaries. These irreducible contexts resist simplistic problem definitions and simplistic solutions. The following young person had been involved in climate activism for many years. She described some of the complexity she and fellow young activists encountered, and the language that they found helpful.

> Harper: We use justice … Cos I mean especially like Port Augusta is a really good example of that. Because we talk about just transitions. Um, and a just transition in Port Augusta is a just transition for not only the bad health impacts of living next to two coal stations … But also the people that work in the coal stations. We need a just transition for those people because they are also impacted by the fossil fuel industry. In good ways of jobs, but in bad ways there is twice the rate of lung cancer there as compared to anywhere else. Because of all the coal ash. So, it's like you need a just transition for those people. So that is the terminology that we tend to use around it.

When reflecting on the principles of Fair Process, Harper described an alternative process that she has been involved in and language she found more helpful. Harper's response demonstrates not simply a rejection of Fair Process as the solution, in favour of 'just transition', but also a rejection of the problem. Harper embeds the solution, 'just transition',

into a context in which the people in the problem are central. Individuals will have their own definition of the problem, which, as noted above, is influenced by their 'group or personal interests, their special values-sets, and their ideological predilections' (Rittel and Webber 1973, 163). The problem is therefore unavoidably contested. It is a wicked problem because the definition of the problem is disputed and caught up in the diversity of perspectives of the people subject to the problem.

Harper's reconfiguring of Fair Process to 'just transition' is more than the rejection of Fair Process as a solution to her specific problem. It is also staking a claim to the definition of the problem. Bacchi (2009) states that the claiming of the right to the problem is essential to avoiding the popular problem-solving discourse, and instead suggests using a problem-questioning approach (46). Claiming the right to the problem recognises that problems do not occur in isolation but are bound up in social/political context. Watts argues that all juvenile justice issues are wicked problems (2015, 162), and Valentine adds child protection and climate change to this list (2015, 243). These are the situations hyper-governed young people find themselves in. Applying formulaic solutions into social domains that are characterised by wicked problems like juvenile justice, child protection or social change is problematic. In telling their stories of wicked problems, hyper-governed young people were claiming that the problem underpinning Fair Process is not as simple as it has been presented.

As Bacchi (2009, 1) describes, political solutions are not simply responses to a clearly defined problem. Rather the problem is constructed through the solution creation process. The way the problem is constructed shapes the range of possible solutions. Taking this into account, Fair Process can only be considered a solution to a particular definition of a

problem. The solution (Fair Process) offered by Kim and Mauborgne is established within a definition and set boundaries around a problem. Fair Process is also a solution to a problem that is defined within a particular 'hinterland', or scientific statements about reality (Law 2004, 33). Hinterlands make certain realities 'thinkable' or 'possible' and others less thinkable or possible (Law 2004, 34). Within the hinterland utilised by Kim and Mauborgne, Fair Process is a thinkable and possible solution. This is the hinterland of business management, the knowledge economy, the hollowing out of the welfare state, and the prioritisation of efficiency over participation and justice within neoliberalism. In this hinterland, efficient simplistic solutions are valued over participatory decision making within a 'mosaic of conflicting interests' (Rhodes 1994, 144). Fair Process makes sense when efficiency and achieving high performances from employees in the knowledge economy (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 1) are the main priorities. The reclaiming of the problem by the participants in this study challenges the suitability of Fair Process for their problems, and the hinterland that makes them thinkable and knowable.

Fair Process has been adopted into restorative practices by some advocates (Wachtel 2012, 6) based on Kim and Mauborgne's claim that decision-making processes guided by these principles might be experienced as fair, even if the outcomes are undesired (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 11). If this outcome was possible, it is understandably desirable, and could significantly shape solutions to a range of social problems. However, hyper-governed young people who participated in the current research identified that the problem underpinning Fair Process is incompatible with their wicked problems. Michelle thought Fair Process sounded good 'in theory', but wondered 'how it would go in practice'. Upon hearing the principles of Fair Process, many participants such as Anna asked for 'a bit more context'. It became clear

that hyper-governed young people like Addison, another interviewee, found it ‘really hard’ to say that the principles were fair, because there were ‘just so many different situations that are fair or not fair’. These reflections of these young people highlight an issue with the adoption of Fair Process from the business management hinterland into the hinterland of restorative practices in the social sciences.

While following the principles of Fair Process may be a desirable solution for many social, economic and political reasons, the participants of this study made clear that it is also a fictional solution. The solution (Fair Process) designed by Kim and Mauborgne in their hinterland is unthinkable to these young people. The realities that these young people experience benefit little from a solution derived from Kim and Mauborgne’s hinterland of business management. It should be altogether unsurprising that a ‘solution’ adopted from one hinterland is problematic within another hinterland. A hinterland that prioritises efficiency does not mesh with one occupied by the wicked problems faced by hyper-governed young people.

Process and outcome

There is a second issue that hyper-governed young people identified with Fair Process. In addition to its incompatibility with their wicked problems, they objected to the formulation of the principles. Specifically, participants also took issue with the separation of process and outcome, a key component of Kim and Mauborgne’s Fair Process (2003, 12). Kim and Mauborgne suggest people are ‘most likely to trust and cooperate freely with systems—

whether they themselves win or lose by those systems—when fair process is observed' (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 6). The rationale positions the process as valuable (fair), in isolation from the outcome. Process and outcome are not contingent on each other to produce an experience of fairness. Their thesis is that people would be able to experience the process as fair, even if the associated outcome is not something they perceive as fair. This, in part, defines the terms of the problem. It prescribes a problematisation in which the problem is reducible. The process and outcome are separated and placed in a hierarchy of importance: the process being more important than the outcome. Hyper-governed young people routinely rejected this understanding of the problem and the separation of process and outcome. Their rejection was again predicated on the wicked and irreducible nature of the problems they encounter.

> Researcher: [Do you think it is possible to] have processes that are fair, even when outcomes don't feel like they are fair. Do you think that you can separate those two things out or do they have to be together?
>
> Lilly: What?

Exemplified by Lilly's confused response, for many of the participants the reduction of the problem associated with separating process and outcome was incongruent with their experience and understanding of the world. Being posed a question that attempted to separate process and outcome was confusing, or irrelevant to them. In the following excerpt, Jackson is referring to an incident that occurred in an alternative-accommodation unit for young people under the guardianship of the minister. These units often house multiple young people

from a range of different circumstances. Often the residents have never met before being housed together. On some occasions, due to the relatively small number of young people in child protection, a young person might have an unresolved history with another resident. Jackson told a story of escalating verbal and physical violence between himself and another young person in the group home. This violence led the staff to decide to transfer one young person to another unit, and that it was best for Jackson to move. This resulted in him missing out on a regular part of the social program of the unit: going to the movies.

> Researcher: Do you feel like that decision to move you was fair?
>
> Jackson: No.
>
> Researcher: Why not?
>
> Jackson: I think that he should have been moved.
>
> Researcher: Ok. Did they use any process? Did they have a conversation with you or did they just tell you what was happening?
>
> Jackson: Not really they just come up say "you're moving" and I'm like "uuuugggh" dramatic sigh [laughs].
>
> Researcher: What could they have done to make the process more fair?
>
> Jackson: Hmmm. Keep the movie tickets [laughs].
>
> Researcher: Ok, anything else?
>
> Jackson: Um, not move me … Moved him. Followed through with the assault charge.

In alternative-care units, young people and staff are unfortunately often caught up in conflict and violence. The nature of the living arrangements and the personal history of the young people who live there create an environment that is ripe for conflict. Often it is not clear who or what started the conflict. Regularly, difficult decisions have to be made about the safety of the residents and staff on the basis of incomplete or contradictory information. From Jackson's telling of the story, he was the victim of physical violence. However, at other points in the interview he described his tendency to verbally antagonise other residents. Here, a difficult decision had to be made about the problem of providing a safe living and work environment. There were multiple perspectives and contingencies that made up this wicked problem. Jackson did not experience the process of being moved as a Fair Process: 'uuuugghh'. Furthermore, the process was almost irrelevant. It was the outcome that he was primarily concerned about. When asked specifically about the decision-making process and how it might be improved, his primary concern was still the outcome: an assault charge and who should be moved. Creating a Fair Process, which separates the process from an unfair outcome, did not make sense to Jackson. However, the complete disregard for the process that Jackson displayed was not evident in all cases. In the following case, Lilly is reflecting on what processes would have been useful to her during her time in the child protection system.

> Lilly: Ok. Um, I guess in a way like a counsellor would help … But then I guess a counsellor who can actually do something. Because um, we had a CAMHS [Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service] worker for like a little while, but it doesn't matter how much bad stuff we told them nothing

> ever happened … So I feel like maybe, that is kind of the social worker's job though isn't it? To sort of talk to you and sort of, yeah. I think they just need to listen.
>
> Researcher: They just need to listen?
>
> Lilly: Yeah … And maybe even like react. Like do something about what you are hearing.

Unlike Jackson, Lilly identified that process itself is important. Lilly's concern was that a Fair Process would need to include 'listening'. However, when prompted further it was clear that this should only be the first step. Action was also required. Change is needed. An outcome is essential to the process. Lederach (1999) describes a myopic focus on process as an endless dynamic without a substantive outcome. Focusing solely on process runs the risk associated with the bureaucratisation of social institutions identified by Weber (1947). These institutions prioritise self-perpetuation and lose sight of their original purpose. In the end the 'form they take becomes more important than the original function' (Lederach 2005, 126). Arendt calls this the 'rule of nobody' (Arendt 1972, 178). She argues that the bureaucratisation of public life has become so complete that there is no one to present a grievance to, and no one is held responsible.

When the system of bureaucracy becomes impenetrable, the bureaucracy becomes responsible rather than the people in it. This is not a state of no-rule, but rather of process-rule. Separating the process from the outcome facilitates a focus on implementing Fair Process without regard for intended (or even unintended) outcomes. If the process is fair,

despite the outcomes, then the objective is to simply implement the process. The outcomes are no longer important. The priority is implementing efficient processes, instead of seeking just outcomes through participatory processes. This is a neat way to obscure the complexity and wickedness of social problems. It does not require consideration of the range of new problems and unintended consequences that solutions to wicked problems routinely produce. The following participant was aware of this self-producing dynamic of wicked problems. He gave an example of how implementing Fair Process might produce and overlook unintended outcomes.

> Jacob: … yeah I don't know how you would rectify that but certainly it is not very nice to go into a police jail cell, and um, whether Fair Process, sort of changing that so that it is not quite a confrontational experience, um, may serve as a more fair outcome and perhaps a better outcome for, um, offenders, and maybe also the police because they have to work in that building.

Jacob's concerns for the dynamics of the prison cell raises an important unintended consequence of a myopic focus on process. A fair process is unlikely to change the experience of a prison cell for the 'prisoner'. A cell is still going to be 'not a very nice' place (outcome) even if an individual arrived there through a fair process. 'Not very nice' is obviously an understatement. Many abuses and injustices happen in jail cells. Several participants in this study described their experience of violence at the hands of security staff and police officers whilst incarcerated. However, the outcome (social isolation) required by the bureaucratic penal institution justifies other additional negative outcomes. Jacob identifies

at least one: i.e. a negative work environment for police officers. For Jacob, this outcome makes little sense. Jacob demonstrated the reflexive capacity to step back from the question of process and identify otherwise unconsidered outcomes. These include effects for individuals who were not the intended subject of the process. Police officers suffer the consequences of a penal justice system designed to solve the problem of offenders. The focus on process obscures these negative outcomes of the system; the structural inequalities that result in young people ending up in prison, and the effects on police officers required to incarcerate them. These outcomes are rendered insignificant and irrelevant by separating and focusing on process disconnected from outcome. Solutions such as Fair Process require this separation and reducibility of wicked problems.

This concern for the claimed neutrality of processes is reflected in the 1971 debate between Foucault and Chomsky about human nature: justice versus power. During the debate many salient points were made by both highly regarded intellectuals. When the question of politics was raised, an important difference was highlighted between the two thinkers. Chomsky contended that he is interested in politics because the universal truths of reason and justice compelled him to act to create a better society (Foucault 1986, 6). In contrast, Foucault stated he was less interested in the western obsession with searching for abstract utopias and general principles. Instead, he claimed his purpose was to 'criticise the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them' (Foucault 1986, 6). Foucault is drawing the attention away from 'general principles' and towards a critical awareness of the power structures underpinning society. The hyper-governed young people's stories and reclaiming of the problem are doing the same

thing. They are resisting the abstract separation of process and outcome in the general principles of Fair Process, which obscures the reality of the power inequalities in their social worlds.

The questioning of the separation of process and outcome by hyper-governed young people offers an insight into the problematisation that underpins Fair Process. The principles of Fair Process constitute a formulaic solution that some participants found initially acceptable as an abstract formulation. However, the consistent attempts by participants to contextualise these principles suggests that fairness (and process) involve higher degrees of complexity. The relationships between process and outcome are messy and contingent. When a solution to the problem of fairness was offered in the form of Fair Process, hyper-governed young people told stories of unfairness. They told stories in which the principles of Fair Process sound utopian and simplistic. These stories contained wicked problems; problems that resist simplistic solutions and that Fair Process could not resolve.

> Researcher: [is it possible that] you engage with them through a process that you would experience as fair, right? But still not get the outcome that you wanted. Could you, what would that process look like?
>
> Harper: I can't even envision that process … Because if it's fair then it will have the outcome that we want … Because that is the right outcome … for something to be successful it has to encompass the aspects of climate justice. Or, you know, in Port Augusta we would be thinking about the impact on people of low SES [socio-economic status]. Um, sort of like it

needs to be fair for those people and like the fair outcomes for those people result in the outcomes that we want. So, if a process is fair, then that is where it is going to go.

Researcher: So you can't detach the ideas of fairness from outcome?

Harper: No… No, I don't think I can. No.

Harper's rejection of the separation of process and outcome is predicated on its inability to achieve justice for all parties. Fairness in this instance required consideration of the impacts on 'low SES' groups. Considering the impact of a process cannot be detached from achieving fair or just outcomes. Failing to prioritise justice within the construction of the problem, risks practitioners or policy makers overlooking it in proposed solutions. However, Harper's problematisation, which is concerned with the perspectives of multiple individuals, also raises questions regarding who is the subject of the process. In the situation described by Harper, different subjects are likely to experience the process differently. There are too many people and the factors are too complex to make a general statement about the fairness of the process. The following young person had a similar concern regarding how different people are likely to experience the use of Fair Process.

Hailey: I think despite all the process being followed people might feel that, I guess it just depends on the decision, but I think that if people didn't get the decision they were happy with there could be a bit of conflict or, yeah.

Researcher: Ok. So you can't then separate the process from the outcome?

Hailey: Yeah I think that would be probably, oh, I don't know [laughs].

Hailey identifies that complex problems with multiple subjects are unlikely to have solutions that all parties are 'happy' with. Again, as described by Rittel and Weber, judgments of social solutions are dependent on 'group or personal interests, their special values-sets, and their ideological predilections' (Rittel and Webber 1973, 163). Conflict is a likely experience in these situations. In fact, Hailey is in conflict with herself. Part of her thinks Fair Process might be fair, whilst another part of her thinks it might not be. Furthermore, Hailey suggest people are unlikely to be 'happy' with the outcome. As such Hailey prioritises 'happiness' as well as 'justice' as measures of the process and outcome. These priorities need to be possible (thinkable) within the underpinning hinterland. The public service's emphasis on participation, accountability and equity (Skelcher 2000, 13; Taylor 2000, 53) might allow space for prioritising justice and happiness, but it is unlikely that these outcomes would be prioritised over the neoliberal government's hollowed-out emphasis on efficiency.

This concern for happiness raises further questions about the coexistence and conflict of multiple priorities, and whether hollowed-out services are able to manage this conflict. Galtung describes conflict in positive terms, framing conflict and violence as distinct phenomena. Conflict can be a positive energy that encourages creativity and innovation (1996, 70). As a result, in Galtung's model the aim is not to resolve conflict, but to transform it (Galtung 1996, 90). The objective is to transform the conflict from a simple configuration of two oppositional goals into a multifaceted conflict with varying goals that is open to creative solutions. Once transformed, conflict will still re-emerge at another time, and present new opportunities for creativity and change. However, even understood in these terms,

managing conflict costs significant time and energy (Galtung 1996, 96), which are not available in the context of hollowed-out government services that prioritise efficiency. Rhodes argues that one of the benefits of inefficient, overlapping bureaucracies is that they have an inherent flexibility and capacity to provide time and energy when needed (Rhodes 1994, 147). In contrast, market capitalism strives to economise time and energy, despite the essential place of conflict in democracy (Bessant 2016, 7). Hence while 'happiness' might be an important measure for an individual, the collective concerns of organisations operating within a business management hinterland are unlikely to create space for conflict, and think about it in positive terms.

The conundrums of happiness, justice, collateral outcomes, and conflict between individuals and organisations are the result of separation of process and outcome. This separation was rejected by hyper-governed young people as it has failed to address their experiences of wicked problems. The young people in this study reclaimed the problem underpinning Fair Process. They achieved this by telling stories and asking questions that revealed unexamined ways of thinking behind the principles of Fair Process. The young people in this study wanted more than another simplistic formula.

> Researcher: It (Fair Process) has three principles. It has engagement. So that means people are engaged …
>
> Jackson: These things aren't all going to start with the same letter are they?
>
> Researcher: They are actually. How good is that?
>
> Jackson: I hate reuse … reuse, reduce and the other one [laughs].

Instead of accepting formulaic solutions, participants told stories about wicked problems. They also described their own philosophies on life. These perspectives contained tensions and deep philosophical questions. Their responses challenge the assumptions of separated processes and outcomes, and also their subjectifying effects. In the following quote, the young person is trying to navigate a tension. It is difficult to reduce this young person's quote to the demands of succinct (perhaps 'efficient'?) academic writing without unjustly truncating his expression. My point is that the issue is difficult to communicate, and as such the indirect nature of the participant's response is essential. In addition, it is possible to witness, through the length of the quote, the momentum of his idea. The movement begins with his initial consideration of the complexity of the problem, and arrives at his understanding of what this way of thinking means for how he understands himself.

> Logan: … I think it is necessary to have ideals, um, to aim for, um, but it can also be a good thing to realise that those ideals might never be fully achieved. Um, and yet still have them as something to work towards, you know? … ideas like democracy. Like at the moment in our political system we have very limited, um, concept of democracy. You know you vote once every four years or however long it is. And you vote in a representative, and people often don't realise there are other forms of doing politics that are a lot more democratic than that you know ... But it is still something that I feel we should, in any case, we should be working towards. Um and, I guess, with nonviolence I see it that way as well. It is an ideal that I want to work towards, and I try to live out in my daily life, um, as best I can, um, but I also recognise that, um, I am human you know, and humans have

> instincts, um, often violent instincts … I don’t I don’t believe in, because I don’t, I am not a Christian any more, I don’t believe in moral absolutes. So I don’t believe in rules made by god or by anyone else that are set objective kind of rules. I believe that people should choose their own rules to live by … nonviolence isn’t an absolute thing where it’s like if, if I am not nonviolent then I am being, then I am sinning, or I am doing something totally wrong. It is more like, um, I want to be nonviolent because I see that as being a good thing in the world. And … sometimes I have to consider whether the moral choice, where it would be more, more moral or ethical to use violence in a certain situation to stop others from being hurt.

Logan is wrestling with deep philosophical questions of right and wrong, and of process and outcome. He is wrestling with ideas like democracy, participation, violence and nonviolence; and weighing the value of these ideas in terms of both their processes and their outcomes. Nonviolence is an attractive idea as it is ‘both the means and the ends, means and ends are interchangeable terms’ (Bondurant 1988, 34). Logan utilises the language he has at his disposal to describe the wicked problems he encounters and the solutions he has come to. Drawing on theological, political and moral language, Logan pushes back against the solutions offered by these ontologies and grasps for new language to describe his position. Logan’s struggle includes a lack of language to describe the problem and the solution. This lack of language is in part a result of rejecting the framing of the problem. He is now unable to use the discourse of the dominant solution, so he has to create new language as he constructs his understanding of the problem.

For Logan it is not a simple choice of violence or non-violence. Instead Logan points to a fundamentally flawed human condition as the wicked problem on which his daily choices about using violence rests. Democracy is an ideal that Logan believes should be our goal, but rejects the limited conception of it he encounters in the current political reality. Moral absolutes are worthwhile as a goal, but are not universally applicable. They are subjective and relative. Their value must be tested for their instrumental or ultimate good. Logan tests his goals and his ontology against their subjective effects:

> … it's like if, if I am not nonviolent then I am being, then I am sinning, or I am doing something totally wrong. It is more like, um, I want to be nonviolent because I see that as being a good thing in the world.

Logan considers what kind of subject the knowledge creates. His theological ontology renders him potentially a 'sinner'. His moral ontology produces an immoral actor. Instead Logan envisions a world in which he is an actor for 'good'. His self-governing self-knowledge interacts with a knowledge of society. Logan wants to be 'good', so as to contribute a 'good thing in the world'. He is considering not only if it is possible to have a process that is satisfactory despite its outcome; but also what kind of person and reality this would produce.

Logan uses the language he has available to him and this language 'produces' (Taylor 2012, 45) a different version of himself, or 'positions' (Strega 2005, 225) him in a certain way. Logan's wrestle with these ideas demonstrates the dynamics of power and knowledge that

Foucault called ‘governmentality’ (Foucault et al. 1991, 102). Governmentality describes the ways of thinking (mentalities) that regulate or construct (govern) individuals and groups (Foucault et al. 1991, 102). Governmentality has been described as an attempt to cut the ‘Gordian knot’ between macro and micro effects of power (Dean, M. 1994, as cited in Kelly 2010, 305). The reciprocal cycle of governing that produces knowledge, which in turn shapes governing, describes the productive power of knowledge at both an individual and institutional level. Both individuals and institutions govern themselves and others based on the truth they possess. When Riley ‘calls bullshit’ on a governing institution’s action, this suggests that she is holding a different knowledge to that in use by the institution: perhaps of ‘fairness’ or ‘youth’. In the same way, Logan wants to describe the problem, himself and solutions in a new way. He has found the current discourse inadequate. However, new discourses are yet to be created, and so he cannot access them (Strega 2005, 217). Nevertheless, ideas about ‘fairness’, ‘youth’ and ‘justice’ held by hyper-governed young people are different to the knowledge held by adult market ontologies dominated by efficiency. These young people reject the knowledge underpinning Fair Process, and the implications it has for governing them.

Hyper-governed young people in this study objected to the reductionist approach to defining the problem, and instead pointed to wicked problems that contain multiple actors who act on and co-create different knowledges. Furthermore, they insisted that the separation of process and outcome produces unexpected negative effects that cannot be overlooked; e.g. those described by Jacob in his concerns about the prison cell. The effect of this stratification and the knowledge it produces is further explored in the following section. The separation of process and outcome produce subordinating effects, which include rendering these young

people governable subjects with limited participation.

Subordinate subjectifying effects

Hinterlands, and their representation of a problem, limit the range of possible solutions and realities that are knowable. Furthermore, the knowledge within these hinterlands act to produce and position people in different ways. In obscuring hyper-governed young people's 'wicked problems' and in separating process from outcomes, they construct a particular type of subject. The subjectifying effect of the separation of process and outcome is the production of subordinate subjects. Subjects who have no control over the outcome are subordinates to those who oversee the process. The possibility that an outcome might be acceptable, even if it is unfair, implies a process outside the control of the subject. If the process is not within the control of the subject, then it is a process being implemented by an external agent. The subject is hence subordinate to not only the process, but also to the agent of the process.

The point here is actually quite simple. When presented with the principles of Fair Process, hyper-governed young people felt as if this was the kind of process that would be done *to* them. They understood the process as one in which they would not be treated as equals. The following response is an example of a participant trying to make sense of this effect:

> Researcher: And so, how do we make those processes fair, even if people don't get what they want. Does that make sense?

> Lucas: Yeah that makes perfect sense. That's why we have a judge and a magistrate. It relates back to the age-old problem of two men and one pie. They both claim ownership of the pie. It gets brought before the pharaoh and the pharaoh says "cut the pie in half. Each man shall receive death. And he takes the pie" [laughs].
>
> Researcher: Ok.
>
> Lucas: Instead of cutting it in half as a third party and giving each party a half a pie. He cuts it in half and takes it like the government and kills them [laughs].
>
> Researcher: So how is that an example of Fair Process?
>
> Lucas: Well it's not. But Fair Process would be that he took the pie and cut it in half and gave one half to one man and half to the other. That would be fair because it was determined by a third party, who was the higher power at the time.

The cynical humour of this young person might distract from the point he is making. However, in many ways this cynical joke (about governments who take everything and kill everyone) is also revealing of his experience of government and violence. Lucas is communicating an experience of powerlessness both through his humour and his description of the legal justice system. Lucas is familiar with the legal justice system, having appeared before a court on several occasions. These appearances were often related engaging in petty crime or violence in his home. Lucas told a story of a fight between him and his brother involving an axe and a shovel, which landed them both in court. This young person's experience of the legal justice system was reflective of the separation of process and

outcome. His experience in the courtroom was one in the position of what Becker might call a 'sub-ordinate' subject (Becker 1967, 240). Being rendered subordinate in a courtroom and in other places in society was acceptable to some participants, and not to others. Acceptable or not, the process of subordinating young people takes away their right to control of the process. Again, whilst this is an acceptable norm in some part of our society (i.e. in legal processes), hyper-governed young people examined this norm and questioned its relevance in Fair Process, and its broad application in dealing with young people.

> Anna: Ah, yeah. Ok so it's, um, Fair Process is what you are calling it? It almost sounds like it is one group of people, like, deciding something for the young people or whoever.

Anna is immediately sceptical of the implicit subordination effect inherent in Fair Process. Perhaps there is a time and place for hierarchical government (for example in the legal justice system). However, the issue with Fair Process here is that this hierarchical positioning is being rolled out via restorative practices, through the hollowing out of the welfare state, into a broad carceral network (Foucault 1979, 310) of social controls that reach young people beyond the limited scope of legal punitive justice settings. The limited scope of the formal legal system has checks, balances and regulation to counterbalance this hierarchical arrangement. The broader community-based implementation of Fair Process does not have this same accountability. Furthermore, governmentality is an understanding of power/knowledge that is not simply oppressive, but also productive (Foucault 2000, 327). Governing produces knowledge and positions people. Young people, as with the rest of society, inevitably govern their own action and are governed by the action of others. The

concern here, as uncovered by hyper-governed young people, is that the power-knowledge dynamics within Fair Process unavoidably produce subordinate subjects. This is an imbalance of power, where young people are positioned as legitimate targets of coercive controls, which stands in stark contrast to the justice goals of restorative practices.

> Harper: Who makes the decision in this scenario? This situation?
>
> Researcher: Um, it is nonspecific.
>
> Harper: Yeah, I'd say that is pretty important.
>
> Researcher: Ok. Tell me more. Why is that important?
>
> Harper: Yeah so I would say, um, if you're making a decision and you are then just explaining it to people, but there is no opportunity for them to change that decision. Or like you are engaging them, but a lot of community engagement is so tokenistic. That it is not actually real community engagement. I would say would be a really big trap. Um, and also that, not only is that a huge trap but then it is who is making that decision? And like when is that decision being made, is that you are engaging that community you are going away to take that engagement and make that decision, coming back and explaining that decision. Or are you making that decision with the community. And therefore the community is making the decision.

The concern identified here by Harper is that Fair Process, despite appearances, is not a process through which people about whom the decision is being made have a high level of

participation, or can influence the decision-making process. Her concern is that the engagement by the managers of the process (i.e. governments and professionals) with the subjects of the process (i.e. young people) in the first principle is ultimately tokenistic, as the subjects (young people) have no tangible control over the process. Several hyper-governed young people also identified that whilst Fair Process might sound democratic, it is in fact not participatory. A cursory glance at popular models for participation such as Hart's (2013) or Arnstein's (1969) ladders of participation suggest that Fair Process would at best describe a situation in which young people were only 'consulted and informed', and so represents tokenism. Assessed against White and Wyn's six-stage youth participation model, Fair Process would likely score the second-lowest rating: 'Structured Consultation' (White and Wyn 2011, 112). As discussed in chapter 2, Kim and Maubourne state explicitly: 'Nor is fair process the same as democracy in the workplace' (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 6). However, this critique was not presented to participants. They identified these issues of participation on their own, based solely on the principles of Fair Process. As explicitly undemocratic, Fair Process can only produce subjects who are not equal participants and who are subjected to control and oppressive governance.

> Researcher: [If you] had to describe what fairness looks like, what would you say it is?
>
> Addison: Letting someone do whatever they want to do with their life.
>
> Researcher: Ok.
>
> Addison: Instead of being controlled by the government.
>
> Researcher: What were some of the moments when you felt like life was

fair?

Addison: Life is never fair.

Researcher: Ok. Tell me more about that.

Addison: Well, it's not, like I said we are just here being controlled. It's not fair at all. We can never really do the things that we really want to do. And if we do end up doing it, it takes up our whole life to get there.

Addison's story is one of disengagement with school at an early age, and multiple attempts at alternative education pathways later. Addison told a story of the night when she made 'one drunken mistake' that resulted in a lengthy prison sentence. Intending to defend herself and her partner, she assaulted three other people with a weapon. Addison did not deny what she did. Furthermore, it was not the disciplinary consequence itself to which she objected. Rather it was the counter-intuitive timing of her incarceration which occurred several months after the incident. The delay in punishment was the result of a lengthy court process. During the elapsed time between the incident and her sentence she had arguably rehabilitated herself as an active contributor to society. During this time, she had attained formal qualifications that enabled her to find employment and stable accommodation. Her time in prison meant she lost her job, her house and her relationships. Here, the process of governing produced outcomes that are at best contradictory to the social cohesion objectives of criminal justice systems. At worst, these outcomes created more harm and further (wicked) problems. The principles of Fair Process did not represent fairness in the context of the wicked nature of the problems Addison experienced. In Addison's experience, 'life is never fair': it is too full of wicked problems, and subordinating governing programs. Addison orchestrated her own participation

and rehabilitation. Arguably, after her crime she went on to achieve active citizenship status—by even the most targeted neoliberal analysis. She was economically independent and productive. However, despite this she was still subordinated to a process that was unable to manage irreducible social complexity.

The objection of Addison and the other hyper-governed young people to the oversimplification of their reality, and to their subordination, invokes the emancipatory function of critical youth sociology. Young people's subordinate position continues to stem in part from the exclusionary nature of the category *youth* itself. Wyn and White argue that in the early 1900s in Australia, youth were depicted as 'naturally rather animalistic and uncontrollable' (1997, 19). This representation has provided continued 'legitimation for state intervention, control and protection' (Wyn and White 1997, 19). They go on to outline the emergence of the concept 'transition' to describe youth during the 1980s (White and Wyn 2011, 8). 'Transition' is often attached to an 'objective' age-based measure (Wyn and White 1997, 10) whereby supposedly common development tasks and processes are completed by young people, and an assumed connection is made between physical development, chronological age and identity development (Te Riele 2006, 132). However, much critique has been aimed at this concept of 'transition', demonstrating its dependence on social, cultural and political contexts, which develop different meanings of aging and life stages, and the implied linear process whereby some youth are 'left behind' or fail to achieve full adult status (Kelly 1999, 193; Te Riele 2006, 132; White and Wyn 2011, 5; Wyn and White 1997, 10). This conception of youth is essentially a process of 'accreditation' (Sercombe 2010, 20) into adulthood. As such, the category of youth has been understood by critical youth sociologists as a 'product of exclusion' (Sercombe 2010, 20); a 'category of disqualification

or lacks as a legal subject' (Wyn and White 2000, 165). Youth is simply a navigation point for 'future real life' (Wyn and White 1997, 13), and young people are 'non adults' or a 'deficit of the adult state' (Wyn and White 1997, 11). This denial of full citizen status continues to justify the regulation and control of young people. A central aim of critical youth sociology is to challenge this inequality, and the subordination of young people.

Despite the work of many scholars and youth work practitioners, the subordination of young people continues. There is an ongoing need to apply the tools of critical analysis to emerging initiatives, social policy and knowledges concerned with youth, in order to elucidate their subjectifying effects on young people and on the category of youth. Young people themselves have proven in this study to be active contributors to this emancipatory goal. However, there are challenges for this ongoing work. At the beginning of the 21st century, youth scholars are considering what challenges this century will bring to understanding youth and how best to respond to them (Kelly and Kamp 2014). The following section will draw out some of these challenges in light of the reflections shared by hyper-governed young people.

The hyper-governed young people who participated in this research objected to Fair Process on the grounds that it is an insufficient solution to address the wicked nature of the problems they face. Their varying responses to and levels of comfort with the principles of Fair Process demonstrates the diversity and complexity of the problems they face. Given that hyper-governed young people face wicked problems, it is conceivable the principles might be helpful in some situations and not in others. However, the principles of Fair Process do not constitute a contingent claim; they are a universal one. This is the essence of hyper-governed

young people's objection to Fair Process: it does not universally fit with their situated experiences. Furthermore, this simplistic, formulaic solution for decision-making processes undermines the democratic participation of its subjects. The tokenistic participation that the subjects of Fair Process are allowed reflects the prioritisation of efficiency in a hollowed-out, neoliberal state. This erosion of the principles of justice and participation is a violation of hyper-governed young people's democratic rights. This erosion of is uniquely evident here when Fair Process is applied to wicked problems in the lives of hyper-governed young people. This is the violating effect of liberal-paternalistic neoliberalism: it is evidence of neoliberal violence towards young people. This use of Fair Process is unacceptable to hyper-governed young people, who are holding onto a vision of society in which they are not subordinate citizens but have equal participatory rights. This will require government and nongovernment processes and policies that value participation, equity and justice over efficiency in both process and outcome. Critical youth sociology, alongside young people, has a continued role to play in this modern neoliberal society to 'call bullshit' on processes that are anti-participatory and that subordinate young people.

Challenging the institutional abstraction of youth

The central concern raised by Kelly and Kamp's critical sociology of youth for the 21st century is to engage with the troubles of modern life that affect young people, like neoliberal violence and the hollowing out of the welfare state. These issues have violating effects on young people, and so critical youth sociology has a part to play in 'making it different' (Kelly and Kamp 2014, 4). The concerns the hyper-governed young people in this study have with Fair Process parallel the concerns of the critical sociology of youth. According to Kelly and

Kamp (2014, 11), these concerns are best served by engaging with the reflexive dynamics of the method assemblages and the hinterland producing practices identified by Law (2004); and by governmentality studies indebted to Foucault (1991). In this section I argue that the insights offered by hyper-governed young people on Fair Process have implications for the reflexive work undertaken in critical youth sociology. I will argue for the need to develop a situated knowledge to meet the challenges of young people in the 21st century. Kelly argues for a 'problematizing intellectual practice' (2010, 302). I will build on this and advocate for the need to draw on the expressed knowledge and experiences of young people.

The emancipatory function of youth sociology has been, and continues to be, served through a range of research trajectories. It was 1967 when Becker posed the challenge 'whose side are we on?' Likewise, modern youth sociologists like Woodman and Threadgold (2011) argue for the reimagining of what counts as knowledge. They question what methods can manage the complexity and contingency of youth, and they challenge researchers to consider '… who (or what) youth research serves' (9). Woodman and Threadgold, and others like Powell and Edwards (2003, 90), have a particular interest in the work of Beck and Bourdieu to achieve these emancipatory goals. Some, like Nico, raise the need to scrutinise the destandardisation of the life course model adopted by youth sociology (2014, 59). While others, such as Walsh and Clarke (2014), MacDonald (2006, 2009, 2016) and Shildrick, MacDonald, and Furlong (2016), are concerned with the impacts on young people of the 'precarity that permeates economic, social and civic lives' (Walsh and Black 2014, 77). The guiding principle of emancipation continues to be a central concern of critical youth sociology.

The reflections of the hyper-governed young people in this chapter facilitate the continuation

of this emancipatory project. However, Kelly (2010, 302) argues that the continued production of knowledge will not achieve the emancipatory promise. Rather, he argues there is a need to focus on the 'institutionalised processes of abstraction' within youth studies itself (Kelly 2010, 302). Young people are increasingly subject to a range of knowledges which render them knowable and governable through the institutional abstraction of 'youth'. These knowledges are produced by government but also by youth studies. Thus, he argues for a 'problematizing intellectual practice' (2010, 302). Arguably this line of enquiry is essentially a discipline issue, and its relevance for the ethical orientation of this thesis towards the concerns of young people is questionable. It is safe to suggest that hyper-governed young people spend little time contemplating the implications of the dilemma of youth sociology's counterproductive contribution to the abstraction of youth. However, I argue that the current project demonstrates that there is analytical and ethical value in producing more knowledge so long as youth sociologists ensure young people speak directly into the analysis through qualitative research. Hence the relevance of this discipline issue is that my proposed solution further advances the experiences/perspectives of young people. By grounding research in the situated and directly expressed knowledge of the subject of study (young people), this combats the tendency of disciplines to perpetuate institutionalised abstraction. This approach is in line with other critical sociological traditions (Strega 2005, 223). Furthermore, my research demonstrates that it is possible to enable young people to speak directly into a problematising practice. Grounding problematising practices in young people's situated knowledge presents an avenue to continue to pursue the emancipatory goals of critical youth sociology in the 21st century.

Kelly's call for a 'problematizing intellectual practice' (2010, 302) is built on the contestation

of Marxist analyses of power and subcultural theory as the dominant paradigm within youth studies (Sercombe 1992; Tait 1993a). Tait and Sercombe's work in this area has led to the reimagining of the dominant hierarchical formations of power underpinning the conception of youth. Following a critique of the dominant Marxist paradigm, Tait developed an argument that youth is best understood as the 'governmental formulation of a specific type of persons' (Tait 1993b, 42). Tait argues that without a governmental formation of youth, critical youth studies risked producing 'work which is, at best, unaware of its own origins, or, at worst, outdated and anachronistic' (1993a, 17). Tait suggested a formulation of youth as an 'artefact of government' (1993a, 16), and went on to develop youth as the governmental construction of a particular person that is best understood as 'doing specific types of work on the self' (Tait 1993b, 42). In Tait's theory of youth, young people draw on the discourses of youth and adulthood and work on themselves to achieve adult status. They act on themselves and are influenced by, but also conform to, the discourses that are available.

Building on this governmental formation of youth, Kelly posed a conception of youth as an 'artefact of expertise mobilised in the service of various governmental projects' (2010, 312). This formulation of youth as an artefact of expertise, or government, points to a self-producing cycle whereby young people are both the subjects and principle actors of power (Foucault 1979, 203; Song 2007, 333). A young person might work hard to achieve a stable job by completing education and gaining experience, so that she/he can fulfil the socially constructed norms of adulthood. In doing so, that individual is drawing on the discourses of adulthood which prescribe the requirements of a successful transition into adulthood.

This governmental formation of youth raises reflexive questions about the role of critical

youth sociology in reinforcing or challenging the available discourses of youth. This formulation challenges youth researchers to consider if, despite the discipline's emancipatory goals, their research contributes to the stockpiles of knowledge that merely enables the governing of young people. In studying youth, more knowledge is produced which can be used to govern youth. Woodman and Threadgold identify this concern about youth sociology's 'contribution to the governmentalisation of young people' (2011, 9). Furthermore, Anderson (2014) suggests that Foucauldian critiques can be used in such a way as to unintentionally reinforce the strata which have historically characterised youth. A critical youth sociology should, in her view, challenge the problematisation rather than simply disprove it. This is to say that, rather than battling 'on behalf of truth', the challenge is to 'question truths of youth' and the effects of discourse and power (Anderson 2014, 578). Furthermore, Kelly suggests some legitimacy can be found for critical youth sociology in the production of 'intellectually grounded' knowledge (Kelly 2010, 304). For Kelly, this means developing more sophisticated ways of knowing that engage with the complexity of youth.

Young people are routinely described within a dual discourse as being a source of hope and possibility, and as socially active; or alternatively as disengaged, apathetic and incompetent (Harris 2009, 302; Smith 2015, 359; White and Wyn 2011, 110). Either side of this duality leaves the young people as passive subjects with future potential, not current relevance. However, a relatively recent study by Threadgold (2012) examined the nature of young people's concern for their future across a spectrum of socio-economic privilege with reference to the governmental formation of risk. This work found that concern for environmental destruction and similar global catastrophes was high across the spectrum. What fluctuated were levels of pessimism, cynicism and fatalism. One of the key findings

from the study was the suggestion that ambivalence was an essential requirement for the scepticism required to seek and act towards change (Threadgold 2012, 26). It was concluded that young people retain a reflexive capacity when they draw on knowledge and experiences that do not create unquestionable certainty. Rather than having complete clarity about their future based on their experience, it is the incompleteness of their experience that enables them to be sceptical. The findings from my project take Threadgold's work a step further by uncovering the types of knowledge that young people draw on to problematise the governing of their lives.

The young people in this study demonstrated a reflexive capacity to identify and challenge the prioritisation of efficiency resulting from the hollowing out of the state. They challenged this effect by reinforcing the centrality of outcomes, not process. They rejected dominant social and governmental constructions of youth, and the subordination of young people. One participant (22 years of age) outright questioned her inclusion in the study, as she considered herself an adult and no longer part of the category *youth*. It is not unreasonable to assume others had similar concerns that were not given voice. It is the situated voices of young people reflexively challenging dominant narratives of youth that offer an avenue to address the disciplinary issues of knowledge production facing youth sociology.

Conclusion

My project is driven by the emancipatory concerns of youth sociology. Its primary concern is the negative effects of neoliberal violence done *to* young people, and the primary goal is to promote hopeful alternatives to this violating reality. Restorative practices are being adopted

by youth services in Australia as a result of the pressure to conform to government objectives and values in a marketised social services sector. The hollowing out of the welfare state has resulted in the prioritisation of efficiency over participation and justice, and the dissemination of this political value to the NGO sector. Adopted from this economic sphere, Fair Process is implemented in the social sphere to align social services with government objectives. This adoption has implications for young people's democratic participation in decision making processes that affect them. Young people experience violation as a result of this weakening of the social contract and public-sector values in the name of liberal-paternalist neoliberalism. This neoliberal violence prioritises efficiency over justice and participation, and breaks the promises of security, housing, education and employment afforded to previous generations. Neoliberal violence is done *to* young people through the hollowing out of social services.

This thesis presents hyper-governed young people's stories of complexity, uncertainty and contingency in relation to violence and governance. The participants insisted on describing their world as full of wicked problems that could not be simplified and solved through the application of simplistic 'solutions' such as Fair Process. However, even through this process of storytelling and challenging problematisations, with this thesis I unavoidably contribute to the ever-growing stockpile of knowledge about young people. If this is unavoidable then the ethical approach is to be deliberate about the knowledge I am producing, the type of young person I describe and who my research serves. This project champions the expressed rejection by the participants of the formulaic solutions offered by Fair Process. I argue that in objecting they are claiming their right to the problematisation of their complex social worlds. The use of this qualitative approach grounds these findings in the expressed experiences of young people. This is a deliberate approach to developing *situated* knowledge about young people. My intention is to facilitate young people representing themselves in their own terms,

in all their complexity and contingency.

This project examines the problematisation and subjectification effects of Fair Process. There is a need to challenge the inherent disparity between youth and the 'super-ordinates' (Becker 1967, 240) who would implement Fair Process. The method of data collection I utilised for this project and my analysis position the research in terms of who it serves. Furthermore, a problematisation of the knowledge underpinning Fair Process has revealed the incompatibility between the knowledge practices of Fair Process and its application in the context of youth services. Fair Process is incompatible with wicked problems. However, this research also produces knowledge about youth, and therefore unavoidably contributes to the governmentalisation of youth and young people (Woodman and Threadgold 2011, 9). Nevertheless, I argue that this institutional abstraction of youth, and the violation of young people's right to participation, can be countered through promoting their situated stories.

This chapter examined violence done *to* young people through the situated effects of neoliberal violence produced by the subversion of restorative practices via the use of the principles of Fair Process. Furthermore, this chapter has promoted hyper-governed young people's situated knowledge in order to resist neoliberal violence and the abstraction of youth. In the next chapter, I demonstrate the connection between situated, messy and contingent experiences and the broader narratives of youth and neoliberal violence.

Chapter 6 — Violence *by* young people: youth as an artefact of governing violence

Introduction

As I have previously argued, the narrative of youth as a period of transition, of becoming, is hegemonic. Central to this narrative is the idea that young people shed their violent attributes as they graduate into adulthood. The routinised association between young people/youth and gangs, risk taking, property damage etc. has been challenged, particularly by academics within youth studies (Kumsa et al. 2013, 848; Sercombe 2003, 26; White and Wyn 2011, 52). Typically, this challenge has taken the form of the production of alternative data, or the reinterpretation of existing data to refute the idea that young people are uniquely violent. This chapter will approach the association between youth and violence from a different angle. Rather than directly questioning the truths of research that position young people as violent, I argue that in modernity, youth can be conceptualised as an 'artefact' of the governing forces that produce docility and conformity to socially acceptable manifestations of violence. In other words, the violence done *by* young people can be understood as a product of the conforming power of violence done *to* young people.

In this chapter I will argue, based on the reflections of hyper-governed young people, that youth is not a period of becoming less violent. Rather, youth can be conceptualised as a social construction resulting from the governing of young people into the violent norms of adulthood. I draw upon labelling theory and governmentality for the analytics of power necessary to uncover this narrative. The period of youth is intensely governed by a diverse

array of social and political forces (Kelly and Kamp 2014, 7–8). As I have argued throughout, the young people in this study are further governed by the state, within this already highly governed period. They are *hyper-governed*. These are young people involved in political activism, or the child protection and juvenile justice systems. Each of these governmental programs develop knowledge about young people and violence for the purpose of security (Foucault et al. 1991, 102). These young people interact and clash with the state with greater frequency than a 'normal' young person, and thus are subject to increased surveillance and regulation.

This chapter will begin with an overview of the historical association between young people, the period of youth and violence. I briefly discussed this association in the literature review. It is helpful to momentarily revisit and build on that literature in this chapter, as a point of contrast for the development of a counter narrative. In the substantial part of this chapter I demonstrate, through an analysis of participants' reflections, the ubiquitous nature of violence and the crushing strain this places on young people to conform. In the subsequent section I outline the theory underpinning the process of governing young people into violence through violence, and propose an inverted narrative of transition, drawing on Becker and Foucault. Giroux describes the 'merging of violence and governance' (Giroux 2014, 226) in modernity as 'neoliberal violence' (Giroux 2014, 224). The power of the multiplicity, ubiquity and systemic nature of neoliberal violence, as described by hyper-governed young people, constrains and constructs docile and violent young neoliberal citizens. This process of construction renders youth as an artefact of governing violence. This is both the action of governing violence, and the governing action of violence.

It is important to note briefly that the argument here is not that there are no possibilities for resistance or alternative realities. Fortunately, as Fraser and Taylor say, 'people do not always do as they are told' (2016, 35). In fact, participants in this study regularly described their experiments with resistance. These avenues of resistance are the focus of the following chapter. This current chapter is focused on the mechanisms and experiences of young people's induction into neoliberal violence.

Finally, this current chapter explores a conceptualisation of violence that moves away from hierarchical conceptions of power where violence is instrumental. Through a dispersed relational arrangement of power, violence can be conceptualised as 'a way of speaking' (von Holdt 2013, 127) and a 'form of knowledge' (Hearn 2013, 164). As a form of knowledge, neoliberal violence produces a particular subject. Neoliberal violence constructs young people as violators, risky, dependent, defaulting labourers. Furthermore, it frames youth as a period of vehemence, education and preparation for active economic participation in a competitive free market. Ultimately neoliberal violence attempts to shape young people into efficient, docile neoliberal citizens.

An overview of the association between young people, youth and violence

The study of young people and violence has received significant attention. In the literature review I described the popular conception of youth violence as an 'everyday reality of many young people around the world' (Kumsa et al. 2013, 848). In many places 'youth' is inevitably associated with 'violence' (Kumsa et al. 2013, 849). Likewise, the literature review outlines the developmental models of adolescence which describe youth as a linear

transition (White and Wyn 2011, 9) to adulthood. These are the discourses of youth which I have referred to throughout this thesis that position young people as needing to shed their 'animalistic and uncontrollable' (Wyn and White 1997, 19) behaviours as they achieve 'accreditation' into adulthood (Sercombe 2010, 20). Therefore, to sustain this connection between youth and violence it is important that the narrative of 'transition' is attached to an 'objective' age-based measure (Wyn and White 1997, 10); whereby supposedly common development tasks and processes are completed, and an assumed connection is made between physical development, chronological age and identity development (Te Riele 2006, 132). These 'deficit models of adolescence' (Sercombe 2009, 31)—where young people are understood as not-yet-adult—are worth restating here, as in this chapter I argue for a counter narrative of transition in youth. Kelly argues that 'all constructions of youth defer to this narrative of becoming, of transition' (Kelly 2011, 50). Young people and the period of youth are popularly associated with a narrative of violence, and adulthood as the achievement of non-violence. I am proposing a counter narrative of youth and violence.

In the literature review I briefly outlined the work within youth studies demonstrating that young people are 'not systematically law-breakers or particularly violent individuals' (White and Wyn 2011, 52). For example, though 'youth gangs' continue to attract the attention of media hype and moral panics, White and Wyn (2011) point out the tendency of government policies in Australia to obscure ethnic and class dynamics (52). These policies are often developed in response to the media portrayal of young people from ethnic minorities (52). In contrast to the popular discourse, the actual number of violent street gangs in Australia is much less than presumed (248). Despite this work, youth and violence continue to be presented in terms that strengthen the association. For example, according to the World

Health Organisation (WHO): '*Youth Violence* is the 4th leading cause of death in young people worldwide' (emphasis added) (World Health Organisation 2015, 1). Youth violence 'peaks during late adolescence and early adulthood' (World Health Organisation 2015, 2). These 'facts' communicate the gravity of the issue of violence amongst young people, but also presents them as a particularly violent cohort. However, 'facts' are not neutral (Strega 2005, 207), and this same 'fact' is communicated slightly differently by the Youth Envoy of the UN's Office of the Secretary-General: '*Homicide* is the fourth leading cause of death in people aged 10–29 years' (emphasis added) (2015), which amounts to '43% of the total number of homicides globally each year' (*Office for the Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth* 2015). This second presentation of the same 'fact' implies that young people are asymmetrically the victims of violence, rather than perpetrators. Furthermore, the definition of youth (up to 29 years) used here means it is questionable to what extent these figures represent *youth* violence.

Sercombe (2003) describes the prevalent concern with youth violence in Australia, and the resulting formation of the Australian National Committee on Violence in 1988. The subsequent report (Australian National Committee on Violence 1990) described violence in Australia as a diminishing phenomenon over the previous 100 years (Sercombe 2003, 26). It found that whilst Australians often feared youth violence, particularly in public spaces and on public transport, such violence rarely eventuated (Sercombe 2003, 26). Yet popular, youth-focused violence interventions such as restorative justice continue to explicitly target young people (aged 15–25 years). Braithwaite's theory of reintegrative shaming is a central pillar within restorative justice theory, and it justifies its focus on young people on the grounds of their apparent tendency towards violence and crime (1989, 101). In spite of this

generalisation, the WHO's 2014 *Global Status Report on Violence Prevention* demonstrated that 'the patterns and consequences of violence are not evenly distributed among countries, regions, or by sex and age' (World Health Organisation 2014, 8). According to this report the group bearing the brunt of fatal violence are young men 15–29 years of age (18.2 deaths per 100 000 people) (World Health Organisation 2014, 9). However, 'women and girls, children and elderly people disproportionately bear the burden of the non-fatal consequences of physical, sexual and psychological abuse, and neglect, worldwide' (World Health Organisation 2014, 9). Furthermore, an estimated one in five girls have been sexually abused before reaching adulthood (some estimates are as high as one in three), and 'nearly a quarter of adults (22.6%) worldwide suffered physical abuse as a child' (World Health Organisation 2014, 10). In addition to being intolerable, these statistics paint a picture of violence and young people which defies simplistic generalisations.

Despite this messy and often contradictory picture, young people and the period of youth continue to experience a strong association with violence. A diverse range of 'facts' continue to be generated about young people to build the respective arguments for or against this association. However, as identified by Kelly (2011), the idea of youth as a period of transition persists in underpinning these narratives. As such, the graduation out of violence into adulthood is reinforced. In the next section of this chapter I unpack the hyper-governed young people's experiences of the social construction of violence, and the norms which surround it in modernity. Their experiences of violence as a ubiquitous reality are the products of the 'merging of violence and governance' (Giroux 2014, 226). Giroux describes this as 'neoliberal violence' (Giroux 2014, 224). Their experiences demonstrate the governing action through which young people are inducted into the normative position of

violence through youth. Following their reflections, I will theorise this induction into violence using Becker's labelling theory and Foucault's disseminated disciplining power relations.

The normalising power of ubiquitous violence

Hyper-governed young people describe violence as manifesting in a multiplicity of forms. A narrow definition of violence, and its historical gendered and class associations, is insufficient to conceptualise their experiences of violence coupled with intimacy, economics, systems, cultural capital and control. Violence in its many forms is a ubiquitous feature of modernity for these young people. Furthermore, they experience it as a crushing reality that creates docile bodies and conformity. Violence is merged with political systems and governance, and young people find themselves making increasing commitments to the normality of violence. Neoliberal violence produces docility in young people and resignation to complex and systemic violence.

Narrow and broad definitions of violence

In 2005 Bufacchi reviewed the literature surrounding the definition of violence. He concluded that there are effectively two camps defending two conceptualisations of violence. The first position advocates a limited definition. As a generalisation this group defends the

necessity of physical force in the definition and points to the etymology of violence 'from the Latin *violentia*, meaning "vehemence", a passionate and uncontrolled force' (Bufacchi 2005, 194). This was reflected in the following, and many other, descriptions of violence offered by the participants in this study:

> Cameron: Um, well obviously there is physical violence, so hitting and all that.

This foundational understanding of violence in terms of physical force was a consistent starting point for its conceptualisation by participants. In contrast, this thesis has drawn upon the views of the other camp, which Bufacchi identified as defending a more expansive definition of violence. As described earlier, this is underpinned by the 'Latin *violare*, meaning "infringement"' (Bufacchi 2005, 194). In this case violence is associated with an experience of being violated. The two positions might be associated with prioritising either the perspectives of the victim (violation) or the perpetrator (force) (Bufacchi 2005, 199). However, these categories are not always distinct. The following participant was reflecting on her time in child protection. In her reflection, the two categories overlap:

> Owen: I did a lot of self-harm when I was in care … When I wasn't allowed to see my parents … That really fucked me off. Yeah I heard about it and know a lot of people that did it. They said it was like a release. It is really. I don't know. It's just a, you feel calm. Once you have done it.

Owen's experience of physical violence traverses the dual categories of subject-object. His experience is of being both victim and perpetrator. Owen was both the target and agent of the violence. He is both violated and violator. Violence as self-harm is both violation and vehemence. Whilst transcending these boundaries, this manifestation of violence still conforms to the attachment of violence to physical harm. Furthermore, historically violence has been defined in terms which locate it as a physical means predominately employed by the poor (Hearn 2013, 163; Walby 2013, 96). As Sercombe puts it: 'Poor people fight with their bodies. Rich people fight with their money, with lawsuits or hostile take overs' (Sercombe 2003, 27). When defined in this way it is unsurprising that working-class young men are regularly identified as a violent population. Despite being a lower-class young man who has interacted with the justice system, Nathan understood crime and violence as part of a larger 'loop' or system of inequality.

> Nathan: Yeah. Cos like, there is the upper class of people who have everything they need. And then there is the people below who don't have anything. And instead of climbing their way out of there it is easier to just take off the one above … Cos you know, but that's what happens with the loop of poverty. Cos if everybody had money then there wouldn't really be crime, you know? Those crimes are all for money.

Denied financial means to fight through class, and emotional means because of gendered social norms, young men use the physical means available to them. Labelling theory suggests

that deviance (violence/crime) lies not in the act itself but rather in the reaction to the act by those who have the power to make the label stick (Becker 1963, 187). As such, the violent label imposed on disempowered young men is reinforced by the 'loop of poverty'. Furthermore, class and gendered power inequalities construct a knowledge of violence that labels the means available to marginalised and disempowered groups as violent. However, this means is an illegitimate tool. The 'legitimate use of physical force', as Weber (1946) understood it, is monopolised by the state. This was, however, questioned by participants. John was motivated to participate in political protest because of his experiences with an international aid agency.

> John: … our investment in war is essentially robbing the poor of what they deserve. So, coming out of my history with, um, doing some activism with World Vision I then kind of saw a bit of a connection between the incredible dollars that we are spending on war, and the incredible dollars we are not spending on the poor. And how these things seem to be really linked.

The right of a state to wage war is disputed by John, considering the impact it can have on the broader (poorer) population. The social contract underpins the state's legitimacy as the singular lawful agent of violence. However, the effect of this violence across society can undermine this legitimacy. That war and violence are legitimate means (or 'solutions') available to the state is generally accepted by adults in society. At least, it is fair to say there is insufficient resistance by adults in modernity to prevent the state from enacting these solutions. However, war as a solution to the problems encountered by modern states is

unacceptable to John. The investment in war at the expense of the poor is an unacceptable adult solution.

> Dave: And I guess that being because the system that rewards you for being upper middle class and white and educated. And if you are not that therefore we don't know what to do with you. … you don't have the same opportunities that someone who is rich, white and educated male might have.

Dave's journey with non-violent political activism has revealed to him the social structures that enact and perpetuate inequality. Hearn (2013, 153) argues that the founding fathers of sociology (i.e. Durkheim 2005 and Weber 1946) were not attuned to women's experiences of violence. This gendered lens persists. Hearn (2013) points out that collective violence is increasingly being understood in terms of its structural roots. Historically however, intimate and gendered forms of violence, such as domestic violence, were 'less often understood as structural phenomena' (Hearn 2013, 154). Modern attempts to understand the complexities of domestic violence require an expansive definition of violence that contest 'whether it necessarily includes physicality in either the action or its effect' (Walby 2013, 101). Furthermore, Erickson points out that, increasingly, children's subjection to emotional cruelty and non-direct forms of violence in the home is being recognised as a form of domestic violence and child abuse (2013, 173). Physical or verbal abuse might be directed at a parent or sibling, and the child might not see or hear it. However, children and young people are still 'exposed' to violence as a result of their presence in the environment or in witnessing the consequences (173). In the following excerpt, Jackson, who was in child protection, reflected

on the complexity of violence in the home.

> Jackson: I just get really angry and I unleash it when someone pisses me off … Cos it's easy, no one gets angry at you that way … So you take it out on other things and you don't end up hurting anyone you care about … But I somehow still do … I have screaming matches with my mum.

What emerges from Jackson's reflections is an understanding of domestic violence which is more complex than simplistic physical and verbal categories. Rather, the reflections shared by Jackson, and the other participant, demonstrate the multiplicity and multifaceted nature of violence to which hyper-governed young people are subjected. In Jackson's experience, despite attempts to avoid it, there is a relationship between violence and intimacy: 'I have screaming matches with my mum'. The co-existence of violence and intimacy might appear contradictory. However, Hearn's study of domestic violence suggests that the presence of love and affection might reinforce the use of violence. Furthermore, Hearn suggests that, paradoxically, intimacy might be vital in the conceptualisation of violence within domestic violence (2013, 156). Hearn is not suggesting that the intimacy of domestic violence is a private affair; rather, the emotional intimacy of love and affection reinforce the use of violence. Violence is used as a means to maintain and control the relationship. One participant in Hearn's study described violence as a way of 'keeping her, by you know, keeping her in check' (2013, 156). Here, violence manifests as a medium of control.

The relationship between violence and intimacy is complex, as attempts to control the other

party undermine the agency and choice within a mutually caring relationship. However, both the intimacy and the violence are essential for control in domestic violence. In Jackson's reflection, it also appears to have an uncontrollable dimension. This is not to excuse the actions of perpetrators of (domestic) violence. Feminist theory rightly affirms the responsibility of individuals (particularly men) for violence. However, it also refutes liberal individualistic discourses that promote the idea of autonomous rational agents operating outside of structural and discursive forces (Hearn 2013, 160). Domestic violence that young people experience is intimate, but also a result of the interaction between personal agency and social structures.

Symbolic, structural and systemic violence

From hyper-governed young people's reflections, it becomes clear that their perspectives of violence move beyond the confines of the debate over whether it is connected to physicality or not. Violence can be intimate and physical. However, it also has structural associations with gender and class. Moreover, it is not even always clear when physical force is (or is not) violence.

> Hailey: I think it's like everyone has a different understanding to what extent violence is. And I think in different circumstances an action can be violent or not. So, like breaking into a car I would find violent. But breaking a window of Lockheed-Martin … I wouldn't necessarily see as violent. Um, so I think context is key. Um, obviously physical violence is to another human or animal, um, or you know using a weapon I would just write off as violent no matter what the context.

Hailey has been involved in non-violent, anti-war protest. However, even as she actively opposes violence, it remains a difficult idea. Violence is ‘slippery, changing its shape and meaning, sustaining democracy and corroding it’ (von Holdt 2013, 118). Hailey believes the criminal act of breaking into a car would be violent. However, civil disobedience in the form of ‘breaking a window of Lockheed-Martin’ might not be violent in the right context. For example, this kind of civil disobedience can be conceptualised as a non-violent expression of democratic participation. In contrast, Grinberg argues violence is purely ‘physical and concrete’, and distinct from the symbolic action of the political space (2013, 208). The political space Grinberg suggests ‘may be opened by recognition and closed by violence’ (2013, 208). Hence, civil disobedience should corrode the social construction of democracy by countering the balanced power conditions required for political dialogue.

Grinberg’s narrow understanding of violence creates a separation between violence and politics. In contrast, von Holt’s examination of union violence in South Africa explores the potential for revolutionary violence as a ‘cleansing force’ for democracy (von Holdt 2013, 116). Ultimately, however, he discovers that violence exercised by the marginalised and disempowered proves to be counterproductive to their democratic cause (118). Despite this he maintains violence is a key tool for challenging unjust power structures. He does, however, discover that his participants readily put aside moral frameworks in the context of violent political change (120). Violence that was objectionable in a ‘normal’ circumstance was acceptable in the context of revolutionary action. Nevertheless, von Holdt ultimately argues that often inadequate attention is paid to the ‘dark side’ of violence (125). Violence is both a useful and corrosive power for democratisation. A single act can be constructed as

both violent or not. In this approach, violence is a label constructed to designate some actions and some social groups as unacceptable.

Nathan's earlier reflection likewise identifies violence as a means that is associated with particular groups (i.e. the poor). However, his reflection also suggests inequality in itself is a form of violence. The 'loop of poverty' is a violation of his human rights as 'the people below don't have anything'. Similarly, other participants in the current study described the economic inequality perpetuated by capitalist systems as violence.

> Anna: Yeah I would see them as violent. Um, because you know, the things that we consume and wear and, you know, if you look at where they have come from, you know, there is probably a lot of violence involved in the process.

Anna is aware of the violence of capitalist consumption and the conforming structural influence in her life. Galtung describes economic inequality that is outside of a clear subject-object relationship as 'structural violence' (Galtung 1969, 171). Likewise, Giroux describes the pursuit of human dignity and security as being inexorably tied to economic equality and 'the structural violence of predatory capitalism' (Giroux 2014, 227). Through Anna's reflection it is possible to witness the extent to which these young people understand and are subjected to the violence deeply embedded in modern capitalist society.

Participants had more to say about the ubiquitous nature of violence in modernity. Some participants labelled the gendered, class-based inequality they witnessed as 'systemic violence'. Galtung, adding to his earlier analysis of structural violence, describes this symbolic legitimisation of structural violence through gendered or class norms as 'cultural violence' (Galtung 1990, 292). Participant's understandings of systemic violence in the current study were not limited to gender and class. For example, John made reference to the effects of violence on 'the climate' and 'animal life as well'. Systemic violence was also associated with democratic decision making in modern political systems. The following participant reflected on her experience of decision making in a group of nonviolent anti-war activists. This experience facilitated her awareness of the docility created under dominant forms of democracy.

> Hailey: Yeah, I have really loved how this group makes decisions and it is mostly based on consensus. Otherwise democratic voting. And I think it has been a key part because it has given everybody a voice. Um, and even though it can seem like a really small thing, but in other circles often most voices are left unheard and that can in a way be seen as violent because people are dominating and often, um, you know, in some settings there is often male dominance just because that is how we have kind of grown up in our society.

Hailey is concerned by the inability of competitive democracy to provide equal 'voice' to all members of society. She identified this inadequacy as an accepted norm if you have 'grown up in our society'. Minority voices are overlooked as a result of the subtle forces of

normative power. Bourdieu describes the imperceptible domination of social groups through ‘symbolic channels of communication and cognition (more precisely misrecognition), recognition, or even feeling’ as ‘symbolic violence’ (Bourdieu 2001, 1). Grinberg built on Bourdieu’s work to develop a ‘dynamic theory of political space’ (2013, 208). Grinberg expands the binary between politics and violence by including a conceptualisation of political space as a social construction (208). This constructed space can be closed by the presence of symbolic violence. Symbolic violence counters the conditions required for democratic dialogue. Through an experience of consensus decision making, Hailey is able to identify symbolic violence (in the form of male dominance) present in ‘other circles’. Symbolic violence is deeply embedded within Australian society and underpins the domination of social groups across a range of strata: class, age, gender, etc. Symbolic violence inducts young people into dominant forms of cognition and communication. As a discursive force, symbolic violence also is perceptible through culturally accepted understandings of violence. The following reflection is offered by Lucas who might readily (and perhaps inaccurately) be labelled a *working-class young man*.

> Lucas: Well I’m polite. I am nice. I am not really violent. I basically get all sorts of things handed to me on a silver platter … say walk into Centrelink [government welfare agency in Australia]. I have missed an appointment and they have suspended my pay. And some other bogan has missed an appointment and been to Centrelink and been like “Right, I am going to fucken yell at you and scream at you and fucken abuse your all cunts and I didn’t get my fucken money”. I’ll walk in there and be like: “um, I don’t know what has happened. I have missed an appointment can someone

> please tell me what is going on?” Not only will I get seen first. I will get given my money, whereas they will get sat down for like an hour or two. Only making them angrier. And then they do get seen, they don’t get helped that day because of how arrogant and rude they are and disrespectful to the workers who are giving them money.

Lucas is describing more than verbal violence; he is referring to how language and cultural capital (Bourdieu 2008, 282) provide individuals with access to bureaucracies, or alternatively an ability to navigate or manipulate them. Furthermore, he is describing the normative action of government institutions in enforcing social norms. The ‘other bogan’ will only be served if he conforms to social standards. The ability of Lucas to traverse the system through ‘not really violent’ means demonstrates again the association between violence and particular socio-cultural groups, namely working class young men (Sercombe 2003, 27), who lack the required cultural capital. Lucas draws on his cultural capital to fight and manipulate the system to achieve his own ends. His knowledge of the Centrelink system enables him to transcend gender and class barriers and work the system to his benefit. Lucas is performing the sanctioned patterns of communication and cognition required to access the adult world. How the pattern of violence done *to* young people shapes violence *by* young people becomes clearer in Lucas’ reflection. Rather than resisting these systems, it could be argued that Lucas conforms to the systems and structures of violence that prescribe acceptable behaviour so that he can access essential financial support. Whilst his actions might seem ‘not really violent’, he participates in multiple systems and structures of violence. Whilst personally transcending the class and gender barriers to access welfare, he also reinforces these structures by labelling ‘some other bogan’ as violent. Furthermore, his reference to the ‘other bogan’ implies his

own status as a ‘bogan’. This is the cycle of symbolic violence whereby Lucas reproduces his own subordination. Finally, he is caught up in the structural inequality of the welfare system through which predatory capitalism encroaches on his human dignity. This crushing system does violence *to* Lucas and shapes the violence done *by* him.

Arendt described the ever-increasing role bureaucracies play in modern nation states as the ‘rule of nobody’ (Arendt 1972, 137). The intricacies of bureaucratic accountability mean that those without the cultural capital to navigate these systems—and perhaps even those who do—ultimately find no-one is held responsible. In this context, Arendt (1972) argues violence is a normal, rational human response (161). However, this response is outside the norms of society, and young people must learn to navigate these systems through accepted means. Nevertheless, violence for Arendt is simply another manifestation of power, a ‘means by which man rules over man; they are held to be synonyms because they have the same function’ (142). The conflation of violence and power here resonates in part with the argument that youth is a product of governing forces that impose the rules of violence in modern life. Violence can be understood simply as another form of power that acts to reinforce social norms. Likewise, Anna also identified synergies between violence and power.

> Anna: … you can think of violence as like a power imbalance … whether that is physically coercing someone to do something through physical violence or, you know, black mailing, you know, or other means more subtle. Making decisions that affect someone else, um, is a power imbalance.

The dynamics of the relationship between violence and power is critical to the analysis and arguments about violence put forth by Walby (2012), von Holdt (2012), Bourdieu (2001), Grinberg (2003), Hearn (2012) and Arendt (1972), and Weber (1946). However, Walby points out that the result of the reduction of violence to a form of power is the marginalisation of violence in social theory (2013, 104). If violence is reduced to simply another manifestation of power, then its value as a focus of study and a conceptual tool to understand society is reduced. Whilst Anna describes violence as 'like a power imbalance', violence disappears from the discussion if it is equated with power. As such Walby argues it is important to not reduce the diversity of violence to a form of power, but rather to examine the relationship between violence and power.

> Dave: Hmm [Sigh]. I think the more I think about this the more confusing it gets. Because I find, yeah, I mean simply I guess violence is anything that does, does damage to yourself and others. But I feel like within that sentence there is so much to unpack. What … is damage and what is the connection between myself and the other? And, um, if I, if I look at humanity not as autonomous beings but as sort of a system of complex relationships, and then I think violence is anything that, I guess, causes a rift in those relationships. And that rift can be externalised. Through a war and physical violence and it can be internalised through prejudice, and stigma and all those sort of things.

Violence is complex, nuanced and multifaceted. What one young person experiences as violence is different for another. For many of the hyper-governed young people, society is infused by personal, symbolic, structural and cultural violence. Society has either produced the conditions for violence, as where Hailey describes having 'grown up in' a culture of 'male dominance', or inequalities in society are a form of violence in themselves. Male dominance of political systems is described as a form of violence, but so too are the inequalities that produce this reality. The ubiquity of violence in modernity is a crushing reality. Violence is an accepted norm in many physical, verbal, emotional, economic, political, class, gendered, systemic and self-focused forms. Young people are inducted into and conformed to these norms as they graduate into adulthood.

Youth: Increasing commitments to docility through violence

Hyper-governed young people describe neoliberal violence as a social norm. The conforming and governing effects of social norms have been theorised by Becker and Foucault. In Becker's seminal work 'Outsiders', he recasts the question of deviance from why people 'do things that are disapproved of' to why people 'do not follow through on the deviant impulses they have' (Becker 1963, 27). This reconfiguration has facilitated the development of labelling theory, which identifies deviance not as a quality of an act in itself, but rather as a result of the social reaction to the act (Becker 1963, 11). Societies construct social norms around deviance, rather than deviance being an inherent component of an individual. Instead of bad people doing bad things, society constructs boundaries around appropriate behaviour and places strain on individuals to behave according to those norms. As such, the question about violence can be reconfigured from: 'why are some people violent?' to: 'what are the

accepted forms of violence that people conform to?' The reconfiguration inverts the image of the subject (in this case young people) from one who is inherently violent, to a subject who learns about violence.

Becker points out that these norms are always constructed by the groups in society with power for those without. For example: men construct norms for women, upper-classes for lower-classes, and adults for young people (Becker 1963, 17). To avoid the deviant label, people make a 'series of progressively increasing commitments to conventional norms and institutions' (Becker 1963, 27). Youth can be understood as the achievement of socially constructed standards that indicate a successfully accredited adult (White and Wyn 2011, 9). In this way, young people make commitments to social norms including: 1) completing education to access employment; 2) avoiding drug misuse to maintain respectable social connections; and 3) consuming certain products (house, car, clothes) to demonstrate financial stability. These commitments can be constructed as disincentives for violent behaviours that transgress social norms. However, this rests on the assumption that these social norms are violence free. Hyper-governed young people describe many of these social norms in modern society as being infused with personal, systemic and structural violence. Hence, committing to these norms is a process of conforming to the patterns of sanctioned violence.

This pressure to commit to social norms is particularly clear in Harper's story. After spending many years campaigning for climate justice, she could no longer sustain the emotional and financial cost. She was disconnected from friends and family. She was exhausted. She had to leave activism (for a time) to find employment and reconnect with her social networks. Ironically, she found herself working for a large corporation not dissimilar to those she was

previously trying to dissuade from investing in environmentally destructive initiatives. She was conscious of the irony of her position. She had conformed to the very social norms that were underpinning the climate issues she had previously opposed.

Whilst the hierarchical power dynamics within labelling theory describe the reinforcement of violent norms in society, so too do disseminated constructions of power. Modern societies guarantee civil peace, according to Foucault, through the 'ever-threatening sword' of the army (Foucault 1979, 168). The hyper-governed young people in the current research were often resigned and docile to the physical violence they encountered, such as violence from workers in child protection or juvenile justice systems:

> Charlie: … I don't know the whole restraining kids. I don't really like it. But at the end of the day that is what they were told to do.

This docility is achieved not simply through the state's potential to impose force, but also because technologies of surveillance have been extended across society (Foucault 1979, 168). Foucault described this as the production of 'docile bodies' (136). Surveillance is explicitly inbuilt into modern societies in the form of CCTV cameras and data-retention strategies. It is also subtly present in the architecture of offices, hospitals, jails and schools. These institutions instill 'disciplines' (Foucault 1979, 201); subjects must assume they are always being observed, and knowledge is developed about the subjects as they are observed. Furthermore, docility to violence was understood by some participants here as resulting from a range of social forces.

> Anna: … acknowledging the violence of our systems and structures of our society that we participate in those … So even in that, even in just existing, it's like a violent existence.

The docile body is one which is 'subjected, used, transformed and improved' (1979, 136). These young people are subjected to physical, structural and symbolic violence and are transformed into citizens who 'even in just existing' consent to the violence of modern life, even if they 'don't really like it'. Transformed by the knowledge that violence is an inevitable part of society, hyper-governed young people conform to a violent existence.

The technologies that produce docility to violence draw on knowledge about youth generated through a diverse array of governmental programs (Kelly 2010, 302). These include programs about drug use, school attendance, housing, employment, sexual activity, recreation habits, gang violence, etc. Kelly argues this knowledge is developed for the 'regulation of populations of young people' (Kelly 2010, 302). As such, youth has been described as an 'artefact of government' (Tait 1993a, 4) or an 'artefact of expertise' (Kelly 2010, 312). The knowledge developed about youth constructs particular types of young people (Bacchi 2009, 59; Foucault 2008, 92). Governmental programs draw on these knowledges to construct populations that operate within a 'kind of regulated freedom' (Rose and Miller 1992, cited in Bacchi 2009, 59). Furthermore, the governing of violence generates knowledge about the victim, the perpetrator and the society in which they exist (Bufacchi 2005, 199; Hearn 2013, 164). The governing of violence and youth constructs youth as a period characterised by

violence. Young people are both perpetrators and victims of violence. A young person is subjected to violence in a direct victim/perpetrator sense, but also outside of a clear object-subject relationship (Galtung 1969, 171). Young people are subjects to the normative actions of structural and discursive power and violence, inducting them into the violence of modernity. Furthermore, young people draw on the available discourses to develop a sense of self (Strega 2005, 217). If violence is the only discourse available to young people, then it will be caught up in their developing sense of self. Therefore, positioning youth as an artefact of the governing of violence describes the networks of power-knowledge through which young people are shaped by society to conform to the dominant discourses of violence.

The crushing ubiquity of neoliberal violence

Giroux describes the 'crushing state violence of neoliberalism' as a result of the marketisation of all spheres of social being and the 'merging of violence and governance' (Giroux 2014, 226). As the dominance of neoliberalism and logic of market solutions grows, Giroux, like the hyper-governed young people, witnesses the deep embedding of violence in political, economic and social systems. Foucault (1986) described politics as the continuation of war through embedding the 'military model' (185) within capitalist systems. The disciplinary technology of surveillance is embedded in factories, offices, education institutions and hospitals. The 'ever-threatening sword' (Foucault 1986, 185–6) of the military to guarantee peace internally and externally is only half the equation. The other half is the production of knowledge and docile bodies for the purpose of generating an efficient workforce—'an indispensable element in the development of capitalism' (Foucault 2008, 141). Foucault described modernisation as a process of discarding violence for more efficient

forms of power and control. In contrast, the hyper-governed young people, like Giroux, described modernisation as marked by increasingly complex and systemic forms of violence.

The hyper-governed young people in this study expressed resignation and docility to these complex and systemic forms of violence. Most participants accepted the necessity of using violence to protect their family from an unreasonable attacker. In the instance of being confronted by a violent personal attack, they conceded they had no other idea of how to intervene, and would probably resort to violence. This docility came in many forms and resulted from diverse commitments or experiences. For Dave, the occupying military force in Palestine crushed a search for nonviolence. For Lucas, the physical protection of family was a principle of his 'shaolin' beliefs. For another young person, Tristan, it was his role as protector and father that might require him to be violent. For Harper, the costs of activism were too high and she could not sustain her resistance to these normalising forces. These responses are entirely consistent with the theory of deviance Becker laid out in *Outsiders* (1963). 'Normal' people, in Becker's model, are originally unbound by the pressures of social norms. However, they find increasing reason to supress their deviant acts as they make commitments to the 'conventional institutions and behaviours' (Becker 1963, 27). These commitments come in the form of a job, education, or relationships with others. Many months spent in activism result in disconnection from family and friends and a lack of financial resources to continue to participate in activism. These connections and commitments place strain on young people to conform to social norms.

The production of governable, violent young neoliberal citizens

These reflections from hyper-governed young people produce a mixed, messy and contingent understanding of violence. Its dimensions are as diverse as the participants' experiences. The confusion surrounding violence is reflected in a continued debate within the literature. Flowing down through the history of authors who have tackled violence (notably George Sorel and Hannah Arendt) is a consistent understanding of violence as obscure (Bufacchi 2005, 199). Walby asserts that it is the relationship between power and violence that is central to debating the obscurity of violence (2013, 96). Some hyper-governed young people articulated a view that from their perspective, violence and power are connected and contested. Likewise, it is possible to witness a diversity of opinion within the literature. Some scholars conflate the two terms, and disregard the usefulness of the term violence (Arendt 1972, 134), while others advocate for the necessity of that term and for a strict differentiation between violence and power (Walby 2013, 104). However, the literature is underdeveloped in terms of problematising violence within a disseminated theory of power. To address this theoretical issue (i.e. to make it present), I inevitably make the voices of hyper-governed young people absent in the final section of this chapter. This is less than ideal. However, if this theoretical issue is worth addressing (and I think it is), making their voices absent for a short period is an unavoidable reality.

When power is conceptualised hierarchically, violence is understood instrumentally. It is aligned with the dominant process of achieving or maintaining power (Arendt 1972, 142). However, if power is dispersed and relational, violence can then be understood as a force operating along lines of power. In this way, von Holdt (2013, 127) describes violence as 'a

way of speaking'. Young people who are dispossessed of employment and are subjected to a range of structural oppressions employ violence as their 'language to articulate their resistance' (von Holdt 2013, 127). The dominant discourse which speaks these young people into a marginalised existence can be disrupted though violence. Furthermore Hearn (2013) describes violence as a 'form of knowledge' (164). Hearn insists that 'the experience of being, even being alive, is affected by what counts as valid knowledge about violence' (164). Knowledge is produced about violence, and violence produces knowledge. Hearn, in his study of domestic violence, concluded that violence is more than just the product of social and individual forces. Rather, it has its own self-producing cycle. Previous experiences of violence produce knowledge that shape future manifestations of violence.

The rolling waves of neoliberal reform of the education and employment services provided to young people in Australia are prime examples of the knowledge produced about young people through neoliberal violence. Te Reile's (2006) analysis of neoliberal education reforms designed to '… help young Australians as they approach adulthood and assume productive and independent lives of their own' (Howard 1999) suggests that the underpinning knowledge of youth positions young people largely as unproductive and dependent members of society. Kelly suggests that, after 150 years of compulsory schooling in Australia, 50 of which have included secondary schooling, it is almost 'absurd' to think of youth as anything but students (2010, 311). Meanwhile, the policy tag 'at-risk' has seen increased usage, particularly in an educational context, to justify all manner of interventions (Te Riele 2006, 130). The term is so ubiquitous that it no longer demands explanation.

Education and employment policies continue to be incorporated into reforms to the economy,

such that young people are 'encouraged' to complete secondary education (Wyn and Woodman 2007, 504). The central goal of these reforms is the creation of workers equipped with particular vocational skills (Wyn and Woodman 2007, 504). The repositioning of youth as consumers of education is a key feature of neoliberal education policy within the 'risk society' (Powell and Edwards 2003, 82). Citizenship is commoditised in the sense that a 'good' young person or a 'good' citizen is one who has a job and contributes to the economy (Fawcett et al. 2010, 68). Failure to contribute in this way positions young people as 'defaulting labourers' (Berns 2002, 25). This is reminiscent of changes made to the Statute of Artificers' provisions for property owners in 14th century England, whereby property owners could compel apprenticeships on those under the age of 21 who were considered to be 'idle' (26). The construction of young people as economic citizens with limited freedoms (Bacchi 2009, 59) is a key function of neoliberal violence. This way of knowing young people is a 'hollowed out' (Giroux 2014, 226) version of the right to education. It is hollowed out because it values the young person and the education only in liberal-economic terms; i.e. her or his potential contribution to the economy. The right only applies so far as it efficiently equips the young person for work.

Kelly (2010) argues the construction in Australia of youth as 'students' emerged in the context of post-World War II economic reconstructions (310). Furthermore, Wyn and Woodman (2007) point to the decline of the manufacturing industries in the 1970s and 1980s as the impetus for Australian government intervention into the 'crisis' of youth unemployment (504). Education and employment policies were incorporated into reforms to the economy, and young people were 'encouraged' to complete secondary education (Wyn and Woodman 2007, 504). In 1999 the Howard Liberal government set up the 'Youth

Pathway Action Plan Taskforce' (Howard 1999). This taskforce resulted in a fundamental change to the unemployment benefits for young people, attaching welfare payments to the individual remaining in education or training (Te Riele 2006, 132). This governing of young people through welfare is also an important demonstration of the state's substitution of a culture of compassion for a culture of cruelty and disposability (Giroux 2014, 226). This culture of cruelty and disposability only values young people and supports them if they demonstrate future potential to contribute to the economy. Without this demonstration, they are disposable and cruelly cut off from support.

Government policies that 'encourage' young people to stay in education have enjoyed continued expansion in Australia. Recent expansions of these polices include restricting access to welfare by making it dependent on educational engagement for anyone between the age of 18 and 25 years. The 2014 Abbott Liberal government sought to introduce further changes to youth welfare. These changes would have required a six-month waiting period before unemployed young people (aged up to 30 years) could be eligible to receive welfare payments (Department of Social Services 2014, 1). After the waiting period, young people would only receive payments for 6 out of every 12 months, and only upon participating in mandatory 'Work for the Dole'[3] for at least 25 hours per week (Department of Social Services 2014, 1). Subsequently, the McClure Report provided a review of Australia's welfare system. Released in February 2015, its recommendations included changes directed at young people. The reference group recommended that welfare payments '… should not generally be available to young people under the age of 22 in their own right' (Department of

[3] 'Work for the Dole' is an Australian federal government initiative enacted in 1998 whereby people are obligated to work in order to receive unemployment benefits.

Social Services 2015, 11). Instead the payments were to be made to a parent or care-giver. Again, these were contingent upon the young person being engaged in 'learning or earning' (Department of Social Services 2015, 10). These types of reforms, which in this case were unsuccessful, govern young people based on a construction of youth as a period of risk, violence and dependence.

Kelly posed a formulation of youth as an 'artefact of expertise mobilised in the service of various governmental projects' (2010, 312). I have argued here that youth is an artefact of the governing of violence. Neoliberal violence attempts to render hyper-governed young people docile through the normative power of violence in modernity. The merging of governing and violence develops a knowledge that constructs youth as a transitional phase of vehemence, violation, economic insecurity, dependency and preparation in order to participate in a contest on the competitive job market of a hollowed-out, post-welfare state. Furthermore, it is possible to witness through education reforms the shaping and conforming of young people, and their accreditation into the sanctioned violence of adult neoliberal citizens. Hyper-governed young people experience violence in modernity as a crushing reality that pressures them into docility towards the sanctioned violence of neoliberalism.

Conclusion

Young people and the period of youth are consistently associated with violence in popular discourse and often in research. This association has traditionally been challenged by scholars reinterpreting statistics or producing alternative data. However, in this chapter I have taken an alternative position. Rather than violence being constructed as an attribute of youth that the

young must shed before adulthood, I have posited that violence is a norm that must be accepted in order for young people to graduate from youth.

According to hyper-governed young people, violence holds a normative position in neoliberal operations of modern society. They encounter gendered, economic, class and political inequalities that are both intimate and impersonal, and that are visible through an expanded definition of violence. These systemic, structural, cultural and symbolic manifestations resulted in experiences of being violated that were not simplistically attached to physicality and vehemence.

Hyper-governed young people witnessed themselves becoming increasingly resigned to these violent norms. They discovered it is increasingly difficult to resist docility and resignation to complex and systemic violence. The 'hollowed out' knowledge of adulthood constructed by neoliberal violence attempts to render their bodies docile. As young people strive in the face of their precarious reality to secure employment, social connection and security, they commit to the norms of adult society. The normative ubiquity of violence crushes young people into compliance. Diverse governmental programs continue to develop knowledge and expertise about young people and discipline them into docility.

This chapter has positioned hyper-governed young people as largely passive in the dynamics of power and violence which operate throughout youth. This is an unbalanced, and arguably unethical, picture of hyper-governed young people. This passive positioning will be corrected in the next chapter. However, it was engaged here to demonstrate how youth can be

conceptualised as a product of the governing forces around young people; forces that conform them to the social norm of violence. These norms must be internalised in order for a young person to enter into adult society. The multiplicitous, ubiquitous and systemic features of neoliberal violence produce a crushing reality that constructs docile and violent neoliberal young citizens. Thus, youth in modernity is an artefact of governing violence.

Chapter 7 — Hyper-governed young people’s techniques of resistance to neoliberal violence: Democratised surveillance, voluntary occupation and governmentalising the self

Introduction

This chapter builds on the hyper-governed young people’s experiences of neoliberal violence described in the previous chapter. These individuals experience neoliberal violence in modernity as a crushing ubiquitous reality with a multiplicity of forms. In the face of increasing physical, structural and symbolic violence directed at young people (Giroux 2014, 226), hyper-governed young people are experimenting with techniques of resistance. These experiments in resistance manifest in a diversity of forms with some more, or less, violent than others. In this chapter, I argue that problematising violence in symbolic and structural forms facilitates the conceptualisation of these young people’s experiments with resistance as the pursuit of new vocabulary and language. Hyper-governed young people are challenging the hegemonic mythological discourse of violence in modernity. I conceptualised this discourse in the previous chapter with reference to Giroux’s (2014) ‘neoliberal violence’. In this chapter I build upon this conceptualisation further with reference to Wink’s (1998) ‘myth of redemptive violence’. Young people are challenging the mythology and hegemony of neoliberal violence through discursive resistance. New discourses are the means through which they seek to speak an alternative reality into existence. Rejecting the neoliberal violence of modernity, these young people renew their claim on participatory democracy.

Recent protectionist and popularist policies have sparked both peaceful (marches, sit-ins,

civil disobedience) and violent protests (riots, looting, vandalism) around the globe. Young people in the West are voicing their discontent with nationalist economic and immigration movements, including Brexit and the election of Donald Trump. They are also active in demonstrating against the movement towards the privatisation of education and health services in countries including the UK, Australia and the United States of America. These movements are of concern for a critical sociology of youth because such protectionist policies are designed and implemented by a generation who are often out of step with the experiences of young people (White and Wyn 2011, 116). Some estimates indicate that young people in the UK voted overwhelmingly to stay in the EU (Založnik 2016), and young people in the US voted for a candidate other than Trump (The Centre for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement 2016). Challenges to the historically narrow conceptions of violence offered by the emerging sociology of violence have enabled a broader analysis of these policies and movements in terms of their roots in structural, symbolic and cultural violence (Walby 2013, 96). The narrow focus taken by sociology's classical theorists such as Weber (1946), Marx and Engels (2014) and Durkheim (2005) on physical forms of violence are insufficient for analysing these important social forces in modernity. Acknowledging the perspectives of typically marginalised groups, such as young people, informs the construction of a broader conception of violence that reveals violence in its structural, cultural, systemic and symbolic forms.

In this chapter I begin by re-examining the conceptualisation of violence in narrow and broad terms within the mythology of neoliberal violence. The broad terms will provide the framework for considering the physical, structural and symbolic oppression of young people. Furthermore, the mythology of violence in modernity constrains the available discourses

through which to challenge neoliberal violence. Following this I present a series of hyper-governed young people's stories around three techniques and experiments with resistance that emerged from the interviews. Discussion of these themes will reveal the discursive nature of the resistance required to find alternatives to the ubiquitous mythology of neoliberal violence.

The three themes I present here are titled: democratised surveillance, voluntary occupation and governmentalising the self. These themes emerged from the stories hyper-governed young people told of encountering the culture of cruelty and the dissolution of the social contract enacted by the state. Resisting the unconscious acceptance of the mythology of violence as the bringer of peace and security, these young people pursue a more hopeful future. In the first story (illustrating democratised surveillance) young people invert technologies of surveillance, creating their own system of accountability. In the second story (voluntary occupation), a young person's search for alternatives to violence takes him to Palestine to learn from people under occupation. In the final story (governmentalising the self) the young person's search for new knowledge turns her attention inward. Positive conditions for the discovery of new discourses are created through self-knowledge.

The mythology of neoliberal violence

As I have argued in previous chapters, violence is a difficult idea without 'clear distinctions'; it is 'slippery, changing its shape and meaning' (von Holdt 2013, 118). I have discussed two positions in the literature: violence as force and violence as violation (Bufacchi 2005, 194), with particular attention to the structural, cultural and symbolic dimensions of violence

described by Galtung (1969; 1990), Bourdieu (2001), Grinberg (2013) and Von Holt (2013). I concluded the previous chapter by demonstrating the importance of understanding violence as a 'way of speaking' (von Holdt 2013, 127) or, as Hearn describes it, a 'form of knowledge', in order to engage its symbolic power (2013, 164). Furthermore, symbolic violence describes the domination of social groups that occurs unnoticed through the symbolic channels of 'communication and cognition' within societies (Bourdieu 2001, 1). Through these symbolic channels, violence becomes a part of everyday language.

Giroux asserts that young people 'are increasingly met with forms of physical, ideological, and structural violence' (2014, 226). As the welfare state is hollowed out, the promises of jobs, security, housing and education are being systematically dissolved. In contrast to my argument in the previous chapter about the docility this violence creates, Giroux argues that young people are unwilling to simply become docile in this new world and to the language of violence. Young people are resisting; however, their protest is increasingly met by state-sanctioned violence (226). Neoliberal violence, Giroux argues, represents the 'commercial carpet-bombing' of modernity, where the promises of the social contract are being substituted with 'a culture of violence, cruelty, and disposability' (226). This is the 'merging of violence and governance' (2014, 226). Patriotism, militarism and organised violence are propagated through the manufacture of a state of permanent war (Giroux 2014, 227). The 'war on' drugs, terror or immigration becomes the dominant way of speaking, and the channel of cognition, that constructs a mythology of violence which pervades popular culture and competitive capitalism.

This mythology of violence is built on the construction of the dangerous 'other' and the

propagation of dichotomous ‘us’ and ‘them’ narratives (Irvine 2008, 1957; Strega 2005, 209). Walter Wink describes this ‘comprehensive story’ as the ‘Myth of Redemptive Violence’ (Wink 1998, 42). Wink unpacks the dominant discourse of violence which ‘enshrines the belief that violence saves, that war brings peace, that might makes right’ (Wink 1998, 42). Violence is the ‘dominant religion’ of western society, requiring of its ‘devotees an absolute obedience-unto-death’ (42). This myth is observable throughout cultural stories, news media, political systems and notably in children’s entertainment. The unwavering storyline is as follows: the hero (usually male) comes under siege by a seemly undefeatable ‘other’ (typically a minority group or a force of nature). Escaping near defeat (and usually near death) by the narrowest of margins, the hero retreats to regroup. The hero returns, and through a feat of violence defeats the ‘other’ and claims the prize (typically the adoration of a supposedly subordinate group: i.e. female heterosexual partner). This story is repeated in comic books, ‘local hero’ news stories, sports, domestic political contests and foreign policy exploits. This myth reinforces not only the effectiveness of violence, but also the subordination of ‘othered’ minorities. One of the participants articulated his concerns about war in just these terms, as follows.

> John: Um, in terms of addressing attitudes to war … it would be helpful for there to be … a more comprehensive story that is not just, um, talking about goodies and baddies but is kind of tapping into some of the deeper issues in society. Or is first seeking to understand other cultures rather than assuming that from the limited information that is given by people in power that is entirely correct and is therefore the basis for quite, radical and quite, um, important decisions in terms of using violence or coercion to address a

situation.

The ‘comprehensive story’ about ‘goodies and baddies’ is the discourse of violence that establishes the separation of ‘self’ and ‘other’. This discourse justifies violence through establishing the other as altogether different from ‘us’ (Galtung 1996, 91); an other who is ‘unruly’ and ‘in need of taming’ (Taylor 2012, 37). The production of the comprehensive ‘us and them’ story is produced by those who have the power to make the distinction ‘stick’ (Becker 1963, 187). This story is repeated throughout society in making distinctions between genders, ethnicities, classes, sexualities, ages, and between humans and animals. Strega argues that objective and neutral epistemologies are founded on these kinds of dualisms (2005, 203). The reinforcing of these dualisms through unequal power relations is described by Becker: ‘Men make the rules for women in our society . . . Negroes find themselves subject to rules made for them by whites’, and of course ‘Rules are made for young people by their elders’ (Becker 1963, 17). In the same way, Grinberg describes the operations of ‘symbolic power’ through which dominant social groups stratify society and enforce behavioural codes on subordinate groups (2013, 210). War and violence are constructed as the acceptable norms through the discursive construction of ‘goodies and baddies’, isolation and subordination. Neoliberal violence is the propagation of this narrative through marketisation. Young people are divided into the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving poor’ (Berns 2002, 26) based on their active contributions to the economy. Better education, employment and health care is available to the ‘good’ (adult) citizen (Fawcett et al. 2010, 68) who works hard.

This is the complexity of neoliberal violence that hyper-governed young people encounter in

modernity. The ephemeral quality of this symbolic, structural, cultural force evades the physicality associated with narrow definitions of violence. Associating violence exclusively with fighting with one's body narrows the knowable subject to social groups like working class boys. These groups are unable to access the social, economic and cultural capital required for non-physical violence: i.e. emotional manipulation, law suits and hostile takeovers (Sercombe 2003, 27). However, fists are insufficient tools for cultural change. New discourses and language are needed through which to speak new realities into existence (Strega 2005, 217). Hyper-governed young people are experimenting with alternatives. They are seeking out the vocabulary required to render these dominant discourses fragile and stake a claim on radical democracy.

Resignation and resistance

The hyper-governed young people in this study consistently articulated a grounded realism, even pessimism, about the pervasive reality of violence. For them, violence is bound up in the structure of society, in inequality and in human nature. In spite of this, participants still expressed an ideal, a hope, a dream of a reality without violence. However, they also acknowledged that envisioning solutions to short-term problems (i.e. self-defence) and long-term problems (i.e. entrenched conflict) was problematic. In the face of this hollowed-out experience of modernity these young people maintained hope, humour and creativity.

> Tristan: If you could stop it, it would be a terrific thing. But, these days I honestly can't see it working. Most violence is provoked by drug use …

> Ninety-five percent of violence is provoked by drug use and honestly the law is already aware of it.

In this excerpt, Tristan demonstrates a grounded realism, a pessimism about the issue. Tristan 'honestly can't see' violence being completely solvable. The statement 'the law is already aware of it' further evidences resignation to the issue. However, Tristan moves quickly from the issue to suggesting a significant causal factor of violence ('95 percent') which can be addressed. This is a hopeful movement towards causes and solutions, and one that challenges the dominance of the normative place of violence.

> Lucas: But if everyone was to renounce violence we would be living in a kind of euphoric utopia … Think about how many jobs would be lost … without violence there wouldn't be people being injured. Without people being injured the hospitals would go down by a significant amount. But that would be good. Therefore, we could use them for what we need them to be used for. Like vaccines and treating people with all sorts of what not.

Lucas' vision of society without violence is an unlikely 'euphoric utopia'. It is a mixed vision where it is likely 'many jobs would be lost', but in which resources could be directed towards other issues like disease and illness. A society free from violence is trapped within a dream, but it is also contained by the concerns of neoliberal discourse. Lucas' concern for job losses reflects the dominance of economic rationales and the modern neoliberal agenda. This invasion of dreams demonstrates again the ubiquity of the mythology of neoliberal violence.

> Jackson: You can never prevent stuff like that … I mean like you can stop it. But you can't prevent it forever … Because people are going to get angry. Like, unless you give everyone an altered lobotomy.

Again, here Jackson is pessimistic about the potential to prevent violence. Nothing short of mass brain surgery could undo the propensity in modern society towards violent solutions. However, his turn towards humour also betrays a hopeful inclination.

> Nathan: To stop people being violent. Leave out loads of marijuana [laughs]. Do it. That would so end the problem for good eh? [laughs] … It would just be the new national plant and it should be distributed in pharmacy medicine to every human being. And then everyone would be happy. And hungry and it would boost the economy. Like everyone would be eating up all this food and it would be killer [laughs].

The suggestions made by Nathan and Jackson here are intentionally comical. This capacity for humour in the face of a persistent and complex issue demonstrates a hopeful orientation. Humour in the face of hegemony renders the discourse of violence 'fragile and makes it possible to thwart it' (Foucault 2008, 100). Interestingly, Nathan built the irony of his joke on the logic of 'the economy'. Here, as in Lucas' vision of utopia, market logic is pervasive. However, through humour and euphoric visions these young people persist in making

‘diverse claims on the promise of a radical democracy, articulating what a fair and just world might be’ (Giroux 2014, 226). Hyper-governed young people here demonstrate a grounded realism, even pessimism and resignation to the reality of violence. However, they also maintain hope through humour and euphoric visions of a fair and just society.

There is a need for caution in this positioning of young people and their visions for justice and democracy. White and Wyn describe the tendency for political discourse to position young people as future citizens (2011, 103) who are deemed to have value in terms of their future contribution to society. Erickson argues the current dominant and critical discourses of power and subjugation are unreflexively entrenched in the adult experience (Eriksson 2013, 174). These hyper-governed young people offer important insights for conceptualising and resisting violence that have implications for today, and not just in the future. They have a unique perspective on society through which they generate alterative knowledges, hinterlands and methods to enact alternative realities (Law 2004, 45).

> Logan: … ideally if faced with violence I would try and turn the other cheek and fight violence with love instead of violence you know? Having said that however I recognise that in cases of self-defence … I myself would use violence. So I am pragmatic in that sense. Um, although certainly I still do believe that, um, you know, violence fighting violence with violence isn’t going to, um, change for the better, um, the person who is enacting that violence you know? Fighting violence with love is more transformative in the end.

These hyper-governed young people are pessimistic and resigned to the reality of violence. However, like in Logan's excerpt above, they also practise a range of techniques of resistance and articulate a range of alternative visions. Logan is resigned to his own violence, but still believes that 'love is more transformative in the end'. The following three stories are further examples of the techniques of resistance that hyper-governed young people are practising.

Democratised surveillance

The following story describes an innovative solution that a hyper-governed young person developed to resist the physical violence he encountered in an accommodation service provided by child protection services. The hollowing out of these kinds of services emphasises the state's prioritisation of efficiency over justice and equity. Thus, if applying my argument in chapter 5 here, such physical violence in youth accommodation services can be identified as a product of neoliberal violence. Andrew (not his real name) is a 'GOM Kid'. He is under the Guardianship of the Minister (GOM). Removed from the care of his parents into the care of the state, he has been through a variety of housing options. Young people in state care in South Australia often move through a range of housing options including: foster homes, group homes with rostered youth workers, and even hotel rooms when all other options are exhausted. When Andrew agreed to participate in an interview, his friend Vince (not his real name, and also a GOM Kid) also wanted to participate. The interaction in the excerpt below resulted from their desire to do the interview together. They were retelling some of their experiences of violence in state-provided group accommodation. Vince recounts an incident he witnessed in one accommodation service between the staff ('night officers') and another young person.

Vince: And the senior night officers, they are big, and I've seen them … this little girl who was only thirteen, fucken they were swinging her around, all for running in the office and running back out. They grabbed her and they smashed her into the wall. They were throwing her around, both of them. I walked up and was like: "What the fuck are you'se doing man? She's only thirteen you don't need fucken two of you'se to drop her".

Andrew: Eh, every time they do stuff like that bro do you know what you do? Pull your phone out and start filming them bro. Every time they start doing it, pull your phone out and start filming them, and then when you get like 20 videos bro, go down to the police station down the road. And ask to speak to the, you know the Kiwi sergeant?

Vince: Yeah.

Andrew: Yeah, ask to talk with him bro and show him it all.

Vince: Why is he chilled?

Andrew: Yeah he gets the workers fired bro. I've already got two fired for doing that. Just filming it and bringing it down there.

Vince: Really?

Andrew: Yeah, yeah he'll fire the night officers bro … Cos as soon as they get one charge as Families SA (government child protection agency) … they get fired instantly.

Later in the interview Andrew describes other occasions when he utilised this solution. On one occasion, he was denied access to his accommodation, on another his request for a glass of water was rejected. On both occasions he filmed the event and used the video to hold the staff accountable for their actions. Andrew's approach leverages the accessibility of mobile technology to confront violence. This approach is also being used by activists around the globe[4]. With a mobile phone and an internet connection they are uploading videos of encounters with state violence in everyday life and at political protests. In Andrew's case, this technique enters the domestic space. This technique utilises the technologies of surveillance employed by states to create docile bodies (Foucault 1979, 215). The technique is panopticonic in that it creates knowledge about the subject through exposing them to the public view. This gaze reinforces normative behaviour. The technique is effective because this form of violence hidden in the domestic space (the physical abuse of children) is unacceptable in the public domain.

In this instance surveillance is used against the state, inverting the state surveillance described by Foucault (1979). Furthermore, Andrew's actions facilitate the state disciplining the state, as ultimately it is the police that enforce the change within the accommodation service. Thus, through this technology the young person turns the state against itself. Arguably, the individual worker perpetrating the violence against the young person is disciplined and not the state itself. I argue there is a need to question the structural roots that

[4] The use of mobile phones in this way by activists is well documented, particular by the Black Lives Matter movement in the USA.

give rise to the legitimation of violence against young people by adults in institutional care. There is a culture of violence against young people evidenced by the history of child abuse in institutional care (Bessant 2011, 56; Daly 2014; Ferguson 2006). This cultural legitimation of violence against young people persists, as demonstrated by recent manifestations including the case of the Don Dale detention centre in the Northern Territory of Australia (Schubert 2016).

Ferguson (2006) describes the discourse underpinning this violence against young people in institutional care. In these settings, young people are positioned as "moral dirt", and as such "other children and good citizens needed to be protected from their 'contaminating' influences" (133). By focusing on the structural and cultural roots that promote violence against young people, it is possible to conceptualise Andrew's technique as more than simply a strategy to prevent physical violence. It is a strategy that challenges structural and cultural violence against young people. This culture of violence is underpinned by the discourse of transition that dominates popular conceptions of youth (Kelly 2011, 50). The dualistic discourses (Strega 2005, 203) that underpin the justification of violence against young people, by positioning them as other than human (Sercombe 2010, 20; Wyn and White 1997, 19), are the same as those that underpin the justification of violence against non-human animals. Andrew's technique is a claim on the 'humanness' of young people; it resists these 'othering' discourses (Irvine 2008, 1957; Strega 2005, 209). It rejects the oppressive discourse that justifies violence against young people. Raby (2005) describes this kind of resistance as discursive resistance. It is an attempt to counter dominant ideas and definitions by seeking and 'deploying alternative discourses, which may, in turn, slightly reframe and alter dominant discourses' (Raby 2005, 154). This discursive resistance is a way of speaking

against a dehumanising and unjust knowledge of young people.

Another participant, Nathan, also used footage of an assault filmed on a mobile phone to prevent further violence. He described a pair of assaults; one in which he was the perpetrator, and in the other his girlfriend was the victim (but he was not the perpetrator). Both assaults occurred in a shopping mall. The assault involving Nathan was caught on CCTV and the other was captured on a mobile phone. Nathan was charged and the other perpetrator was not. Nathan's attack was a response to the one on his girlfriend. He attacked the boyfriend of the girl (who also happened to be his ex-girlfriend) who attacked his current girlfriend. Nathan used a copy of the mobile phone footage to blackmail his girlfriend's attacker, to prevent any further attacks. Nathan played the footage of the assault during his interview for this study. The footage on his phone was a recording of the incident being played on another phone. This solution demonstrates a willingness by these young people to operate creatively outside of institutionalised solutions (criminal justice systems) or to manipulate these bureaucratic systems (as in the cases of Lucas and Andrew) to find solutions that work for them. The following story demonstrates a technique of resistance underpinned by a similar manipulation of the justice system.

> Tristan: And then I had to stop my uncle, my cousin's dad, from cutting the cunt up with a machete … Uncle was sprinting down the road swinging this machete around like crazy, so I hit the legs behind him ran up jumped in front of him wrapped my arms around him saying "Uncle Steve think about the kids eh?" And he is like "I am going to kill this cunt". It's like "Nah think about the fucken kids. Think about your kid's Uncle they need you.

> Like they can't just have their mum, they need their dad". And then he dropped the machete and started crying on my shoulder.

Tristan's story about his uncle started with a devastating bashing of his cousin at the hands of her partner. Witnessing the violence, Tristan and other family members, including his uncle, rushed to confront the attacker brandishing a variety of weapons (metal poles, knives and the machete). When the perpetrator ran, Tristan switched his attention from defending his cousin to preventing his uncle from seeking his revenge; an act that would result in a long-term prison sentence away from his kids. Tristan framed a violence-prevention strategy in the same terms that originally motivated the violent response: family.

The above solutions manipulated the 'institutionalised force' (Mills 2004, 55) of social norms, governing institutions and the docility they produce: i.e. the criminal justice system. He utilises the threat of the justice system to create his own violence prevention strategy outside of the institutional justice process. These solutions demonstrate an ability of young people to manipulate bureaucratic systems to find creative solutions to 'wicked problems' (Watts 2015, 162). The 'rule of nobody' (Arendt 1972, 137), and governing systems, are ill-equipped to solve these issues (Rittel and Webber 1973, 160). These hyper-governed young people have a unique cultural capital (Bourdieu 2008, 282) that draws on disciplining technologies (Foucault 1979, 215) in order to render the hegemony of violence a fragile discourse (Foucault 2008, 100) and enact a different reality (Law 2004, 45). Andrew, Tristan and Nathan utilised their knowledge and familiarity with state surveillance technologies to connect their private experiences with broader social norms. They democratised and manipulated the power of the state to interrupt neoliberal violence and subvert government

systems which were unable to address the complexity of their experiences.

Voluntary occupation

The following story is told by a young person (Dave—not his real name) who, over the course of several years, has been asking critical questions about the social structures underpinning violence and injustice in modernity. He articulated throughout the interview an awareness of the social structures of race, class, age and gender. He is on a search for a means through which to resist these forces; one that aligns with the democratic, violence-free vision of society he holds. This search led him to volunteer in Palestine with an organisation that supported the Palestinian people living under occupation. Often his role was as an observer or escort for children and women, where simply his presence as an obviously white Anglo-Saxon male could deter violence and harassment from armed soldiers in places like border crossings, local conflict zones and primary schools. Dave volunteered to live under occupation as he desired to learn from the people who lived there about their resistance to violence. He went with the understanding that under this intense persecution, these people had developed effective non-violent practices of resistance: techniques to resist the us-and-them dichotomy that underpins neoliberal violence. The following excerpt illustrates the frustration and disappointment he experienced when this hope was not fulfilled.

> Dave: … the organisation I was with, as much as it was giving me an opportunity for me to see first-hand what was happening and get involved in peace keeping on the ground, I was part of something that had been

> going for fifteen years now and wasn't changing as the system changed and developed. I was doing work. I was doing busy work. But I felt like it was more for me than for the Palestinian people. … was it actually promoting and partnering with resistance? Um, I don't know.

Dave acknowledges that his trip to Palestine was a pursuit of alternatives to violence that 'was more for me'. The trip was an attempt to challenge his own docility. He went to seek alternatives to the physical and structural violence he witnesses. In other words, he went to shake off the normative bonds of violent modernity that, as I argued in the previous chapter, produce docility. Despite this goal, the journey had taken him to a place where he was no longer convinced by the non-violent solutions he had sought. His journey ironically reinforced normality. He witnessed the failure of alternatives and developed a grounded realism about the prospect of a society without violence. This experience only made it more difficult to imagine alternatives. Dave experienced the hegemony of the dominant discourse. However, even where dominant, a discourse is also a 'complex and unstable process' (Foucault 2008, 100). Within his experiences of violence and the lack of alternatives, the discourses Dave encountered were oppressive but also fragile (Foucault 2008, 100). As Dave continued to describe his experiences in Palestine and the conforming power of violent norms, the possibility of alternatives to violence also began to emerge.

> Dave: It wasn't a good enough response for me. I think it was an understandable response. And I also hated Israel, and I was not nonviolent over there. I became incredibly violent. I wanted, I wanted them all to die [laughs]. Um, but, I think my point with my issue with nonviolence was

> that there wasn't yet, ah, the language for nonviolence in Palestine. And even as I say that I don't know how to unpack that further.

Dave's experience in Palestine reinforced his docility to and the normality of violence. Rather than providing him with new alternatives to violence, he found he 'became incredibly violent'. He went to Palestine hoping to find 'language' and knowledge to enact new realities. What he found was a lack of language. This deficit of language extends to an inability to 'unpack that further'. Dave did not find the language and alternatives to violence he sought, and neither did he have the words to fully describe the experience of failing to find this new language. There existed only a vague notion of what is missing, and what he is seeking. New language might not be the complete solutions to the problem of violence. However, without language it is difficult to begin to find new alternatives. Discourse, language, and what Law (2004) calls 'hinterlands', provide the means by which to speak new realities into being (Law 2004, 45; Strega 2005, 217). New language is a beginning place for new alternatives. Not only did Dave not find the language he desired, he lacked even the language by which to speak about this deficit.

No new alternatives were discovered due to a lack of discourse by which to speak them into being. Under the influence of the dominant discourse, Dave 'hated Israel' and was 'not nonviolent over there'. Mercifully, as Fraser and Taylor (2016) point out, the fragility of discourse provides 'opportunities for dissident thinking and new acts of resistance' (35). That is to say, 'people do not always do as they are told' (35). Young people have access to a range of resistance techniques that include directly opposing hierarchical power structures, but also indirect, subtle, creative and discursive methods of resistance (Raby 2005, 154).

Such methods could include a particular way of dressing, a way of speaking, or a way of being (i.e. bodily experiences) (154). The act of describing a deficit in language poses an opportunity for the development of new language. Suddenly the dominant discourse is no longer the only way of thinking. The dominant discourse is made fragile, as an alternative is being considered—if not yet spoken into reality. Dave describes his search for alternatives to violence as a search for language through which to speak them into existence. Hence, it is possible to understand his resistance, his journey to Palestine, as a discursive struggle.

Governmentalising the self

This final story considers the practices adopted by a young woman (Michelle—not her real name) as a result of her personal experiences with violence. She described growing up in a home where she would often overhear domestic violence from neighbouring houses and witness physical violence on the street, and she also experienced bullying at school and in the workplace. She described the efforts her parents would make to shield her and her siblings from these experiences. This included turning up the music played in the house to drown out the neighbours' noise, and educating Michelle and her siblings about the impact of their actions on each other. Michelle describes a long-held compulsion towards 'voicing opposition to society'. She recounts an experience from her early schooling where she witnessed an 'Indian boy' being teased for 'wearing a head wrap'. Michele describes coming to the boy's aid and educating his attackers that the headwear was normal in his family.

Building on this desire to effect change, Michelle described coming to a realisation of her

own complicity in the violence around her by failing to challenge it or provide an alternative. Adopting the language of nonviolence Michelle decided that, to pursue this goal, she must first turn her attention inward.

> Michelle: … first and foremost I think not being violent towards myself is a really important thing. Trying to actively reflect on how I am responding and how I am feeling in the world. So, whether that means being a bit mindful of a morning. Taking some time out, meditating, or yoga or whatever it is that can, sort of, ground me. It can come in many different forms. Um, and then ensuring that I really know myself. So that if somebody does act violently against me I can, um, reflect on how that is making me feel and then respond in a way that is an example of nonviolence, nonviolent resistance or, um, nonviolent communication. And that is the only way I can, um, yeah ensure that I am living a nonviolent life. Just through my example.

Michelle expresses a need to 'ground' herself and to 'know myself'. Through this practice, she can understand how she feels and therefore how she might react to violence. Michelle is disciplining herself in the way Foucault describes the methods of controlling the operations of the body for the production of docility and utility (Foucault 1979, 132). Drawing on power-knowledge relations, Tait proposes an interpretation of youth as an 'artefact of government' (Tait 1993a, 4), rather than as a period of transition, which is the dominant construction (Bacchi 2009, 59; Kelly 2010, 303; Wyn and Woodman 2007, 495). Similarly, the cycle of governing and knowledge production described by governmentality studies

prompts Kelly to posit youth as an 'artefact of expertise' (Kelly 2010, 312). Through self-governing, Michelle's action aligns with Tait's description that youth is a period of doing 'certain kinds of work on the self' (Tait 1993b, 42). Through self-governing Michelle develops self-knowledge, which shapes how she acts. The violent reality Michelle encounters is resisted by creating space and knowledge through which the 'positive conditions emerge' (Foucault 1988, 197) to discover new discourses and speak new realities into existence. These positive conditions emerge through developing self-knowledge.

Michelle's technique is a discursive strategy that resists the dominant mythology of violence. It is a refusal to be dominated by the dichotomous mythology of neoliberal violence and a deliberate attempt to develop alternative ways of knowing that start with one's self. Michelle works on herself to develop self-knowledge that is grounded in feelings, mindfulness and nonviolence. Having this knowledge enables her to counter the dominance of the economic citizen discourse, and provides opportunities for alternative action.

The following excerpt from Hailey is a demonstration of reframing a violent situation through alternative knowledge. Hailey's experiences of activism are interpreted through this knowledge and, as such, her experience of violence is transformed.

> Hailey: … it's a symbolic power. So it is a power that, although at times we are defeated by the police, or we are kicked off the road. Um, but we know that we still hold the power of peace, and peace is a stronger force than violence. Um, I think, I think that is a different understanding of power as

> well so I think in society our understanding of power is force, um, over other people. Whereas with nonviolence there is an idea of power being a shared power and a power of, the power of like empowering other people. So like a power of community and I think love is a power as well. And I think that is a key part of nonviolence.

In contrast to David's experience of the dominant discourse, in Hailey's context, the 'symbolic power' of the group she was with upheld the 'power of peace' despite the experience of physical 'defeat'. Civil disobedience had proven the fragility of the dominant discourse. The power of 'community' and 'love' demonstrates the existence of an ontology capable of resisting the competitive individualism of modern neoliberal social and economic policies that are associated with the precarious social and economic realities for young people (Wyn and White 2000, 172). Hailey's group, like Michelle with her meditation, had established an alternative knowledge. The power of this discourse meant their experience of the event was transformed.

Ways of speaking: new language and discourse

These hyper-governed young people are demonstrating discursive resistance to neoliberal violence and the hegemony of its dichotomous mythology within modernity. Discursive resistance was described by Foucault as 'hyper-and pessimistic activism' (Foucault 1997, 256). His approach was not to propose a new discourse, for fear of it becoming just another means of subjugation (Foucault 1988, 197). This cynicism can also be witnessed in these

hyper-governed young people's stories: Dave 'became violent whilst over there'; Andrew cynically manipulated government systems; and Michelle acknowledged her complicity in systemic violence. Instead of proposing new discourses, post-structural methods asks 'new critical and historical questions about our contemporary discourses' (Anderson 2014, 529), so as to destabilise the assumption that modern discourses are normal or inevitable (Bacchi 2009, 275). Furthermore, rather than adopting a nihilistic position, Bacchi argues for a fundamental concern for the lived effects of power-knowledge relations and for taking an active position on the side of those who are harmed (Bacchi 2009, 44). Hyper-and pessimistic activism is an ethical and political choice to strive and struggle to create the positive conditions through which new discourses and opportunities emerge (Foucault 1988, 197). The hyper-governed young people in this study are conducting this kind of ethical and political struggle against the dominant discourse that underpins neoliberal violence.

The conceptualisation of violence in symbolic terms rests on an understanding of violence in the broad terms of violation, and power in its disseminated forms. Von Holt described violence as 'a way of speaking' (von Holdt 2013, 127). In a similar way Hearn argued that violence is a 'form of knowledge' (Hearn 2013, 164). Violence can be a means to resist the discourses of power and speak a new reality into existence. However, this new reality is mixed and messy, as violence can both support and corrupt the emergence of the political space (Grinberg 2013, 208; von Holdt 2013, 116). Furthermore, violence as a way of speaking creates knowledge of the world in binary terms: victims and perpetrators (Bufacchi 2005, 199). This knowledge reinforces a reality with violated and violating subjects. To find alternatives to the violation experienced by young people in modernity, knowledge and language that challenge symbolic and structural violence are required. Conceptualising

violence in terms of violation, rather than physical force, achieves two things: 1) it provides the space to acknowledge the experiences of young people in modernity as neoliberal violence; 2) it acknowledges their experiments and search for alternatives as discursive resistance to the ubiquitous mythology of neoliberal violence in modernity.

Challenging the mythology of neoliberal violence within modernity requires more than a physical response. A violent revolution would be insufficient, but so too would pacifism. A new vocabulary is needed. Raby (2005) described discursive resistance as deploying alternative discourses to challenge the dominant discourse and render it fragile. In these stories, we can see hyper-governed young people not only deploying alternative discourses, but searching for and creating new ones. This is a new understanding of discursive resistance, the pursuit of creation of alternatives. This new language is required to counter the mythology of neoliberal violence. This language is needed in order to reject the religious devotion until death required by the comprehensive story of violence that Wink describes (1998, 42). These hyper-governed young people promote the positive conditions required to create new cultural narratives, and change the conditions that sustain these narratives (Bourdieu 2001, 42). Refusing to govern themselves and others through the logic of neoliberal violence, these young people seek means to counter the culture of cruelty and disposability and create an alternative culture of compassion, hope and security.

Promoting positive conditions

Hyper-governed young people are promoting positive conditions to counter the culture of cruelty by employing discursive resistance. This form of resistance opposes the comprehensive story of violence and renders fragile the dominant discourses of neoliberal violence. In chapter 5 I argued that critical youth academics have an obligation to join young people in resistance. I suggested this should be pursued through an academic problematising practice and drawing on situated knowledge. Using this approach equips sociologists with the tools to question the truths (Anderson 2014, 572; Bacchi 2009, 46) of youth, and in particular the production of youth as an artefact of the governing of violence. This means challenging the constructions of young people as a particularly violent cohort (Sercombe 2003, 26), and youth as a violent period of transition (White and Wyn 2011, 9; Wyn and White 1997, 10). It also means challenging the truths of the violent discourses enacted by an adult world. Youth is an 'artefact of expertise mobilised in the service of various governmental projects' (Kelly 2010, 312). However, resistance is possible by drawing on situated knowledge. Knowledge has a limited reach (Law 2004, 155) and is openly political. Figures for youth unemployment, homicides, school completion rates, and welfare budgets are not simply 'facts' (Law 2004, 30; Law and Urry 2004, 395; Strega 2005, 207). They enact a reality in which young people are known to be defaulting, risky, violent citizens in need of governing. Youth sociologists can resist the institutional abstraction of youth by politically locating their work by utilising situated knowledge.

Knowledge produced by those within or outside the academy will either support the resistance or be complicit 'in the enactment of dominant realities' (Law and Urry 2004, 399). Failure to interrupt neoliberal violence and injustice entails complicity in its enactment. Hearn (2013) claims that 'being alive, is affected by what counts as valid knowledge about

violence' (164), and young people are active in the resistance of knowledges of neoliberal violence. Hence, the challenge for academics is: 'whose side are we on' (Becker 1967)? Adopting a neutral position in relation to force and violation is not possible, nor is it desirable.

> If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor. If an elephant has its foot on the tail of a mouse and you say that you are neutral, the mouse will not appreciate your neutrality. (Tutu, D., as quoted in McAfee Brown 1984, 19)

The role of critical youth sociology in this discursive struggle is, however, contested. Anderson (2014) raises concerns that the traditional critique of youth programs and policies is built on an assumed truth. This truth is the historical exclusion and oppression of young people (Anderson 2014, 572). This exclusion is established on the 'deficit models of adolescence' (Sercombe 2009, 31) where young people are understood as not-yet-adults. Kelly argues that 'all constructions of youth defer to this narrative of becoming, of transition' (Kelly 2011, 50). Anderson's primary concern is that this assumption is developed through a hierarchical power relationship, and that by beginning here the possibilities for the questioning of assumptions are limited (Anderson 2014, 572). Anderson's objections are an important reminder of the risks of subjectivity. Researchers can be blind to their own assumptions and subjective positioning. Anderson argues that the dominant form of critique in youth studies is a 'means [of] passing judgement' (Anderson 2014, 568). As an alternative she presents Foucault's genealogy as a means to critique programs and policies: 'not to object to them, but to point out and problematise the assumptions that have established the validity

and acceptability of these projects' (Anderson 2014, 575). Anderson argues an important theoretical point. However, the young people in this study articulate an experience of youth that is oppressive, and an experience of being governed that is informed by a deficit knowledge of youth. In contrast, utilising situated knowledge seeks to value the expressed experiences and knowledges of young people. This can be done in conjunction with an analysis of disseminated power/knowledge relations. Both approaches are unavoidably methods of knowledge production. However, both also produce 'strategic knowledge which opens up possibilities for the practice of freedom' (Anderson 2014, 575). That is, they create the discursive conditions through which alternative realities can be enacted.

The position taken by hyper-governed young people can be described as 'hyper-and pessimistic activism' (Foucault 1997, 256). These individuals are pessimistic about the eradication of violence, but remain active in resisting the dominance of knowledges that produce this reality. Foucault was asked if 'the Greeks' are a viable alternative in the ethical vacuum left by the departure of religion from the mainstream. He responded that his position was that of 'hyper-and pessimistic activism' (Foucault 1997, 256). He rejected the 'solutions' offered by people from another time. Instead he thought the 'ethico-political choice we have to make every day' (256) is to consider what is dangerous, and what can be done about it. His choice was to situate his response in the present. Some have argued that Foucault's position is nihilistic because he states that 'it is not up to us to propose' new language, as doing so can only result in its own forms of subjugation (Foucault 1988, 197). However, others, including Bacchi, have argued that this does not reflect Foucault's position (Bacchi 2009, 237). Instead, Foucault's 'hyper-and pessimistic activism' is a questioning of dangerous normative discourses and their claims of neutrality. The way forward is to 'pay less attention to the

contents *and* sources of discourse/s and more attention to the effects' (Bacchi 2009, 238). This means to consider how discourses advantage some and disadvantage others, and to take 'the side of those who are harmed' (Bacchi 2009, 44). This approach draws on the broad narratives and discourses, but considers their effects in a situated experience. Through this struggle, the 'positive conditions emerge' (Foucault 1988, 197) for new discourses through which new realities can be spoken into existence.

This is the position displayed by the young people in this study. They hold a grounded pessimism about the wicked and pervasive nature of violence in modernity. At the same time, they maintain the capacity to dream and create marginal and situated knowledges. Through small stories and local knowledge, these young people challenge the truths of neoliberal violence. At the same time, their situated stories make profound claims of democratic government. They reject the solutions of a different (adult) age and time, and persist in seeking and appropriating language and technologies that create the conditions through which positive discourses can emerge.

Neoliberal violence is knowledge and a discourse emerging from a certain ontology. This is an ontology of violation and vehemence; of competitive individuals and market solutions. This ontology makes it possible to speak and enact particular existences into reality. This is a reality wicked with violation and vehemence. In this reality, intimacy is attached to intrusion. Social systems both oppress and reinforce oppression. The means of change available to those without power are labelled as deviant, while the means that maintain power inequalities are the accepted norm. This reality reproduces itself through the cycles of knowledge and governance. However, this reality is fragile, just as all realities built on a dominant discourse

are fragile. Other realities are possible if only the language exists with which to enact them.

Hyper-governed young people are resisting these realities and seeking out new discourses, through situated stories and techniques. Academics of the critical sociology of youth, in the 21st century, should join with young people as they question the truths and fragile discourses of youth and neoliberal violence. Neutrality is not an option. Young people are being formed into violent, risky, economically insecure neoliberal citizens. Academics must take up a position and be involved in the struggle. Research is an avenue for resistance (Strega 2005). If discourse provides the available means for constructing existence, then a failure to explore and make possible the construction of alternative discourses amounts to complicity with dominant discourses. The critical sociology of youth of this century must create the conditions that make it possible for young people to explore alternatives. It must be on the side of politically active, hopeful young people challenging the hegemony of neoliberal violence.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that hyper-governed young people experience modernity as violation under the hegemonic mythology of neoliberal violence. The state's implementation of protectionist and populist solutions to complex global issues effectively crush the promises of employment, education and ontological security that were afforded the young people of previous generations in Australia and in other Western countries. Young people's experiences of violence are an important perspective to take into account within the emerging

sociology of violence and an expanded conceptualisation of violence.

By conceptualising violence as a symbolic, structural and cultural phenomenon it is possible to identify the violation experienced by young people in modernity as neoliberal violence. It is also possible to position their resistance through the work they do on themselves and on others as hyper-and pessimistic activism. This activism, enacted through discursive resistance to the mythology of neoliberal violence, promotes new ways of knowing and speaking. Their resistance to neoliberal violence takes many forms. Some resistance has a physical form, some takes on symbolic dimensions, while others address structural forces. I have argued that a central common theme is the search for, and construction of, new language—new discourses—to challenge the comprehensive story of violence.

Critical youth sociology in the 21st century must promote the positive conditions through which young people can create alternatives to the dominant discourse of neoliberal violence. This could be achieved through engaging in problematising practices and using situated knowledges. Furthermore, critical youth sociologists must actively position themselves on the side of the oppressed. Neutrality of position and facts is not permissible.

Neoliberal violence is a ubiquitous mythology in modernity. However, hyper-governed young people weaken this dominant discourse through voicing their situated stories and knowledge, promoting the conditions for the development of alternatives. Experimenting with resistance, hyper-governed young people are developing diverse strategies including democratising surveillance, voluntary occupation and developing new knowledge through

governing the self.

Chapter 8 — Conclusion: Guideposts to liberating praxis

In this thesis, I have argued that 'hyper-governed' young people experience modernity as a crushing reality dominated by neoliberal violence. 'Hyper-governed' young people are subjected to violence in a multiplicity of forms. This exposure crushes their visions of a society free from violence. The dominance of neoliberal violence produces a conceptualisation of youth as an artefact of governing violence. The dominant discourses that render youth as a period characterised by violence constrain the available discourses through which hyper-governed young people construct themselves and their worlds. I have argued that youth is not a period through which young people graduate out of violence, but rather that youth is an artefact of governing violence. State-sanctioned personal violence, as well as structural and symbolic violence, governs young people during youth. Young people's violence is directly and indirectly governed into socially acceptable forms. The violence done *to* young people shapes the violence *by* young people. This description of youth as an artefact of governing violence is my first original contribution with this research. Furthermore, despite this governing through violence, hyper-governed young people use techniques to resist the oppressive discourses of violence. My second original contribution is identifying the common theme within these techniques as discursive resistance. Hyper-governed young people refuse to accept the normality of violence in modernity; and instead conduct experiments that promote conditions for the creation of hopeful alternatives to the ubiquitous mythology of violence.

The conflation of youth and violence continues to be contested by sociologists (Kumsa et al. 2013, 848; Sercombe 2003, 26; White and Wyn 2011, 52). Youth is unconsciously accepted

as a uniquely violent period. This association rests on the hegemonic discourse of youth as transition (Kelly 2011, 50; White and Wyn 2011, 9). Youth is, then, in traditional conceptions, a period of transitioning out of violence. In contrast, I have argued that youth is in fact a *product* of violence. Violence is such an inescapably central component of modernity that young people must accept it, and its mythology must be integrated in order for them to achieve adult status. Youth therefore is the process of integrating and accepting violence. This conceptualisation still rests on the inevitable discourse of transition. However, instead of a transition out of violence, youth is a process of conforming to sanctioned forms of violence. In other words, young people are governed through youth into violence. Furthermore, they are governed into this violence by forms of violence. Expressions of violence that breach the social norms are met with state-sanctioned violence (economic sanctions, restraint, imprisonment, brutality). Meanwhile symbolic, structural and systemic violence goes unchallenged and is imperceptibly legitimised through mis-cognition and miscommunication. This violence created and is created by inequalities between classes, ages, genders, ethnicities and sexualities. Young people are governed by violence. This governing shapes young people's violence. Violence done *to* young people shapes the violence done *by* them. Their violence is governed, but violence also governs them. Youth is therefore an artefact, a product, of governing violence. The governing of young people's violence through violence done to them produces conformity to sanctioned forms of violence.

This neoliberal violence is experienced by hyper-governed young people in personal, structural and symbolic forms. As the state withdraws from promises to provide public goods (housing, employment, education), young people are subjected to the violent efficiencies of the market. Young people are forced into politically subordinate and economically

superfluous roles. Education becomes framed as little more than the training of future economic citizens. Justice becomes the process of subordination and control of dissenting populations. Child protection is reduced to an impenetrable matrix of non-accountability.

I have used the example of the infiltration of restorative practices by Fair Process, with its economic rationale, to demonstrate these claims. Hyper-governed young people who participated in this research described the principles of Fair Process as positioning them as subordinates. These principles do not position them as equal citizens in a democratic process capable of tackling wicked problems. Rather, their participation is limited, as the managers of the process explain what is happening to them and the expectations that are being imposed on them.

To conclude this work, here I will briefly review the overarching narrative of my argument. The findings from my research raise further questions that form the foundation for future research, and implication for policy and practice. Likewise, the findings reveal this project's limitations. These too present an opportunity for future exploration. Furthermore, the young people's stories in the thesis have yet untapped power, and hold implications for both research and professional practice with young people which, I will also suggest, are sites of further development. It seems appropriate therefore, to finish by returning to the narrative with which this project began.

Youth — an artefact of crushing mythology of ubiquitous violence

Youth is the most intensely governed period of the life course (Kelly and Kamp 2014, 7). The dominant conception of youth as a period of transition (Kelly 2011, 50; White and Wyn 2011, 9; Wyn and White 1997, 10) characterised by being 'at-risk' (Te Riele 2006, 103) acts to position young people as occupying a 'wild zone' (Kelly 1999, 193; 2010, 303) and in need of regulation. Youth is habitually characterised as a period of risk, storm, struggle and violence. In dominant discourses, young people and violence are often synonymous (Kumsa et al. 2013, 849). Young people are supposedly accredited (Sercombe 2010, 20) into adulthood and out of their violence. In this narrative of youth, they must leave their non-human tendencies behind (Wyn and White 1997, 19). Put simply, young people are known to be violent. Therefore, young people must be controlled and governed. However, what is less often understood is that to position young people as less than adult, and less than full economic citizens, is to subject them to a multiplicity of violence. Young people who register frequently within the 'carceral network' (Foucault 1979, 304) (i.e. through associations with political protest, child protection or juvenile justice) experience violence and intimidation by the state through its representatives (police, child protection staff, or welfare workers). Bashing and torturous practices are passed off as 'restraint' by carers and prison guards in the ironically named 'secure care'. Young people are removed from violent homes, only to be placed under the 'rule of nobody' (Arendt 1972, 137). The care of bureaucracies promises new kinds of subordination and instability.

Drawing on Foucault's theory of power-knowledge relations (1979, 132), Tait proposes an interpretation of youth as an 'artefact of government' (Tait 1993a, 4). He constructs this as an alternative to the dominant construction as a period of transition (Bacchi 2009, 59; Kelly 2010, 303; Wyn and Woodman 2007, 495). Similarly, the cycle of governing and knowledge

production described by governmentality studies prompts Kelly to pose youth as an 'artefact of expertise' (Kelly 2010, 312). Youth, therefore, is a product of the accumulating knowledge produced through and for the governance of young people. The primary purpose of this knowledge is to regulate the transition between youth and adulthood. Successful transition supposedly involves achieving biological maturity, psychological stability, economic participation, legal responsibility, relational accountability, housing sustainability and many more markers of adulthood.

Hearn argues violence can be conceived of as a 'form of knowledge' (2013, 164). Violence generates knowledge about the victim, the perpetrators and the society in which they exist (Bufacchi 2005, 199; Hearn 2013, 164). The conflation of youth and violence produces knowledge about young people as victims and perpetrators of violence. Young people are victims and/or perpetrators in a direct sense, but also outside of a clear object-subject relationship (Galtung 1969, 171). The regulation of youth by the state is justified on the basis of violence done *by* young people. However, the regulation of youth is also justified on the basis of the physical (and perhaps psychological and emotional) violence done *to* young people. Young people are placed in child protection for this reason. Hence youth continues to be a site for the dual discourses of risk: young people are in need of control, and young people are innocent and in need of protection (Wyn and White 1997, 19). However, young people are also subjected to increasing symbolic, structural and systemic violence. The hyper-governed young people who participated in this research articulated their experiences of this violation, and identified its formative effect on their own violence. The violence done *to* hyper-governed young people shapes the violence *by* them. It constructs acceptable manifestations of violence, and conforms them to this sanctioned mythology of neoliberal

violence. Conformity to sanctioned forms of violence and internalisation of this mythology are primary indicators of accreditation into adulthood. Hence, I have argued that youth is an artefact of governing violence of neoliberalism.

The conflation of youth and violence results in the development of a range of governmental programs: youth courts, anger management programs, child protection, drug and alcohol diversion programs, alternative education programs, early intervention programs, etc. For this research project I targeted young people who had been or were being subjected to this kind of 'surplus' state governance, to explore in-depth their experiences of neoliberal violence. I argue that the additional surveillance and regulation they experience is justified on the basis that these young people have failed to internalise the dominant mythology of violence. They have not conformed to the sanctioned forms of violence accredited through youth. They are more, or less, violent than normal. These are young people participating in political activism through non-violent means. They are routinely monitored and clash with the state. These are also young people who are under the direct control of the state in juvenile justice systems. Through these systems, they are subjected to direct and structural violence. Finally, they are young people who are in the care of the state; an intervention that is a result of being subjected to violence in the home, but that also results in systemic and bureaucratic forms of violence. These are exceptionally governed young people, within the highly-regulated period of youth. They are the 'hyper-governed'.

In the lives of the hyper-governed it is easy to witness the intervention of the state, through public institutions. These institutions include: the police, schools, prisons, welfare systems and courts. Their lives could be mapped with significant accuracy as they pass through these

institutions (Foucault 1979, 300). Less visible is the outsourced regulation of such people through market mechanisms, as government transforms itself from the provider to the purchaser of services (Healy 2009, 402) in the business of ‘steering not rowing’ (Taylor 2000, 49). Through this disseminated ‘carceral network’ (Foucault 1979, 304), teachers, youth workers, ministers of religion, health workers and sports coaches become an ‘inexpensive form of police’ (Spitzer 1975, 644). Furthermore, social services are marketised through competitive government tendering (Roberts and Devine 2003, 313; Skelcher 2000, 9), and these services conform to the valuing of efficiency over participation and justice (Skelcher 2000, 13; Taylor 2000, 53).

An important example of this marketisation is the infiltration of Fair Process into the delivery of restorative practices. Restorative practices are a social form of control (Braithwaite 1989, 149; Wyn and White 2000, 174). The application of Fair Process in restorative practices augments this control, shifts it from the social to the political and economic realms. The reflections of the hyper-governed in this thesis have identified that the principles of Fair Process fail to consider the ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber 1973, 162; Watts 2015, 162) nature of their reality and render them subordinate and incapable of full democratic participation. The subversion of restorative practices by the principles of Fair Process is a key example of neoliberal violence. The exclusion of young people from participation is a violation of their rights. This violation is a product of the hollowing out of the welfare state and the merging of violence with a network of social governance.

Restorative practices attempt to problematise individuals not in the dominant rational, punitive terms, but as emotional and social beings (Wachtel 2012, 4; Zehr 2002b, 19). In

contrast, the primary concern of Fair Process is efficiency and performance (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 8). Hence, the economic rationale underpinning Fair Process is an uncomfortable fit with restorative practices. However, the central idea of 'harm' within restorative frameworks is typically limited to 'immediate, direct, and individualistic terms' (White and Wyn 2011, 167). It does not integrate a structural, symbolic or systemic understanding of violence. This is significant, because it limits the capacity of restorative approaches to repair and prevent the diversity of harm and its structural roots. Restorative approaches typically struggle to address broad social issues (Bazemore 2001, 201; White 2003, 147). The focus on the individual, and the pragmatic 'what works' (Wachtel 2013, 26), fits well with a narrow subject-object conception of violence. It also is conducive to the 'methodological pragmatism (what works)' (Taylor 2000, 48) pervading neoliberal government. Fair Process thus subverts the emotional and social subject by appealing to the focus of restorative practices on the personal over the structural. This focus on productivity betrays an economic rationale and implicates restorative practices in the subjectification of young people as economic citizens: 'homo œconomicus' (Foucault 2008, cited in Brennan 2009, 355).

The construction of young people in terms of their economic value is a rejection of the promises of the welfare state to provide stable and secure employment, health, housing and education. Giroux asserts that in this 'hollowing out of the welfare state' young people 'are increasingly met with forms of physical, ideological, and structural violence' (2014, 226). Positioned as less than full economic citizens, young people are simply objects to be 'encouraged' into education (Wyn and Woodman 2007, 504) until they are reliable adult economic participants. Young people are only worthy of government assistance once they

have completed the requisite training which facilitates them to achieve ‘productive and independent lives of their own’ (Howard 1999). Giroux labels this ‘merging of violence and governance’ (2014, 226) as a new form of violence: neoliberal violence. Neoliberal violence represents the ‘commercial carpet-bomb[ing]’ (224) of modernity, where young people’s lives are valued as disposable commodities in the cruel labour market. The promises of the social contract are being substituted with ‘a culture of violence, cruelty, and disposability’ (226). The normative place of violence under neoliberalism squeezes out deviant alternatives and renders young people docile if they are to attain adult status.

Under neoliberalism the ‘good’ citizen is one who is an active contributor to the economy in the free market (Fawcett et al. 2010, 68). Young people are increasingly forced into inactive and superfluous roles through neoliberal government social policies (Spitzer 1975, 646). Young people are ‘encouraged’ to stay in education through financial disincentives (Wyn and Woodman 2007, 504). Welfare payments are attached to participating in education or ‘work for the dole’ programs (Te Riele 2006, 132); programs that ironically make it more difficult to actively seek meaningful employment. These pressures on young people permeate government institutions such as education and welfare, but also extend to NGOs acquiring outsourced government contracts. As the welfare state is rolled back, young people are thrust into marketised services. Public schools outsource education to nongovernment youth services, courts outsource rehabilitation to drug diversion counselling, and welfare agencies to nongovernment employment assistance programs. Treated as objects to be formed into responsible adults, young people are subordinated until they achieve the indicators of full adult status. The visions and bodies of young people are violated and rendered docile through neoliberal violence and its structured, symbolic, systemic and cultural forms.

Deviance from the normality of violence is suppressed as young people make increasing commitments to social norms (Becker 1963, 27), and through the production of docile bodies through the governmental production of knowledge. Modern societies guarantee civil peace, according to Foucault, through the 'ever-threatening sword' of the army (Foucault 1979, 168). This is achieved not simply through its potential to impose force, but because the technologies of surveillance modelled within the armed forces have been extended across society (Foucault 1979, 168). This is further exacerbated by the reach of digital surveillance. However, I have also argued that these advances also provide more opportunities for exploitation. The symbolic, structural and cultural violence attempts to render young people as 'docile bodies' (Foucault 1979, 136) as they 'grow up' in the ubiquitous mythology of violence.

Resistance

Despite the crushing reality of neoliberal violence, (hyper-governed young) 'people do not always do as they are told' (Fraser and Taylor 2016, 35). Whilst on the one hand they vocalise a resignation to the inescapability of violence, hyper-governed young people also continue to make claims on the future of democracy. They also regularly experiment with alternatives to the discourses of violence that shape and constrict their lives. When presented with the economic rationale underpinning the principles of Fair Process, hyper-governed young people in the current study claimed a right to the problem. When presented with an oversimplified solution, these young people told stories of wicked problems in their lives and reclaimed the messiness of their social worlds.

The stories that hyper-governed young people told were a demand for context. They thought that the principles of Fair Process might make sense 'in a perfect world' or as a 'theoretical construct'. However, the stories from their lives and their knowledge of the world suggested otherwise. The principles sometimes sounded fair to these young people, but an 'unjust situation' might render them useless. The kinds of problems that resist simplistic solutions have been identified by Watts (2015), Valentine (2015), Rittel and Webber (1973) as 'wicked problems' (Watts 2015, 162). These problems are irreducible. Rittel and Webber argue that a unique feature of a wicked problem is that it is not possible to 'understand the problem without knowing about its context' (Rittel and Webber 1973, 162). There is a high degree of complexity in defining the issue, let alone finding a solution for it. Often the problem can be understood as a symptom of another problem (Valentine 2015, 243). Wicked problems require lengthy attention to the particulars of the situation. Formulaic answers are unhelpful.

Law argues that this is the direction that social sciences, too, should be heading. He argues that much of the world is experienced in these terms, so then social sciences should also be trying to know social reality in this way (Law 2004, 14). He argues that social scientists need to 'give up on simplicities' and learn to think and practice in ways that acknowledge the messiness and complexity of the social world (Law 2004, 2). Attempts to simplify messiness only make the situation messier. Furthermore, he contends that social scientists are not simply describing reality, but through their descriptions enacting and producing realities (Law 2004, 13). Hence, I have argued that critical youth sociologists must be aware of how their research constructs young people. Youth researchers are inescapably implicated in the governmentalisation of young people (Woodman and Threadgold 2011, 9). As such, I have

attempted to describe hyper-governed young people as active participants in resistance to neoliberal violence, rather than passive objects. Furthermore, I have argued that hyper-governed young people should be understood as being 'keen as fuck' to participate in research.

These hyper-governed young people actively conduct experiments to find alternative solutions. The solutions they shared with me in their interviews were contingent, messy and complex. Some used humour to counter the crushing reality of neoliberal violence. Others described utopian visions. Some described governing themselves to develop self-knowledge or self-discipline, or simply choosing to withdraw, while still others told of manipulating or democratising state and personal apparatus of surveillance and control. Foucault advocated this kind of resistance to discourses of power, whilst also remaining cynical about the nature of reality and possibility of success. He labelled it 'hyper-and pessimistic activism' (Foucault 1997, 256). This is not the nihilistic position often attributed to Foucault, where one should not seek to propose a new discourse for fear of it becoming just another means of subjugation (Foucault 1988, 197). Rather it reflects, as Bacchi describes, a fundamental concern for the lived effects of power-knowledge relations and taking an active position on the side of those who are harmed (Bacchi 2009, 44). Hyper-and pessimistic activism is an ethical and political choice to strive and struggle to create the positive conditions through which new discourses and opportunities emerge (Foucault 1988, 197). It is a commitment to questioning and claiming the right to the problem, to 'calling bullshit' on claims of neutrality, to maintaining humour, to dreaming of euphoric utopias and making claims on democratic participation.

Young people are governed though violence. Youth is an artefact of governing violence.

Young people graduate into adulthood by internalising the mythology of neoliberal violence and conforming to the sanctioned expressions of violence. The violence done *to* young people shapes the violence done *by* young people. This in turn shapes the governing violence of the state done to young people. However, hyper-governed young people are not docile under the dominant discourses of violence. They are active in their resistance and search for alternatives. They promote the conditions through which to realise a participation in society that could breach the ubiquitous mythology of neoliberal violence.

Limitations, future directions, implications for research and practice

The intention of the project was to promote hyper-governed young people's experiences, understanding and activity with regard to the governing of youth and violence in modernity. Central to achieving this goal was the use of a research method assemblage that prioritised these young people's perspectives, and engaged with them as active participants. Whilst this project has proven to be successful, this aim has not been completely exhausted. Potential exists to further this research both methodologically and thematically. Furthermore, this project has some limitations and implications that need to be acknowledged and considered in future research and practice.

The first limitation of this research relates to the diversity of experience of the target group. Violence is a slippery concept (von Holdt 2013, 118). As such, this project gathers a diversity of young people's perspectives on the topic under the unifying experience of being 'hyper-governed'. The insights presented in this research affirm the value of this diversity in

constructing an integrated theory of neoliberal violence. However, neoliberal violence was not initially the central focus of the project. Violence was initially a concern in terms of measuring the effectiveness of Fair Process for guiding participation in decision-making processes. The project was originally designed to discover if Fair Process was an appropriate way to address or prevent violence based on these governed young people's experiences. The focus on neoliberal violence grew out of the participants' reflections and the literature around youth violence. Neoliberal violence demanded attention. The question of whether Fair Process is adequate for solving the wicked problems of violence was answered directly and clearly by participants: no it is not. One significant reason for this was because their understanding and experience with violence was broader than that conceptualised in restorative practices. The semi-structured nature of the interviews provided space for the participants to commandeer the conversation onto topics of importance to them. Whilst the topic of Fair Process was routinely dispatched, the experience of violence in modernity consistently provoked lengthy discussion. The significance of violence to hyper-governed young people's experiences of modernity demanded more attention.

In a similar way, the connection between violence and democracy emerged through the data. This theme was also not originally part of the research design. It was, however, central to the objections of hyper-governed young people to Fair Process. As hyper-governed young people reflected on their experiences of violence outside of a subject-object relationship, the connection emerged between participation, Fair Process and neoliberal government. The connection between violence and governance was also a central theme in their discussions of visions of society without violence. Hyper-governed young people were not explicitly asked about neoliberal violence, and neither did they use this language. This is a label I adopted

from Giroux's work. This label did however effectively capture the experiences hyper-governed young people were describing. This, therefore, presents a potential direction for future research. Exploration of this language (or label) might provide new opportunities for gaining insights from hyper-governed young people, or from young people in general. Furthermore, youth participation has been an area of significant study within sociology. However, the importance of democracy and participation in the lives of young people, as noted in the findings from this research, suggests there would be value in a deliberate focus on the effects of neoliberal violence on these ideas in future projects.

The diversity and emergent significance of neoliberal violence in the participants' experiences affirms Law's argument regarding the need for social research to reflect the messy and contingent nature of social reality (Law 2004, 2). However, it also suggests that there would be value in adopting a targeted approach for future projects. Initiating a project with an intention to focus specifically on young people's experiences of neoliberal violence would likely produce further insights. Similarly, a focus on young people in child protection, for example, rather than hyper-governed young people in general would also likely produce new insights specific to this group. Young people in child protection are likely to have experiences and stories that differ from those of activists, as they are governed in different ways. Such a focus might reveal a more coherent and consistent understanding of neoliberal violence, and hence facilitate a deeper analysis. Likewise, focusing just on the experiences of young people involved in political activism could provide a more detailed examination of their perspectives. This is not to suggest that a narrower perspective is inherently more valuable, or that it would necessarily be less contingent or messy. Certainly, narrower perspectives would need to be held in tension with other broader (likely different)

perspectives. However, a more in-depth analysis of the perspective of a specific target group is likely to provide unique insights. Furthermore, this targeted approach could further fulfil the emancipatory aims of this project through propagating the perspectives of specific groups of marginalised young people. Hence targeting a more refined group, or specifically exploring experiences of neoliberal violence, are potential future directions.

Targeting marginalised young people for future research, however, raises further concerns. The underpinning emancipatory goal of critical youth sociology (Kelly 2010, 302) requires critical examination of the selection process of the target group. As I have argued earlier, participatory methods should entail that young people are involved in the design of ethical youth research (Hart 1992; *United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child* 1989). They should not be simply treated as objects of research (Allen 2008, 565; 2009, 396; Gillies and Robinson 2012, 161). Hence it must be acknowledged that targeting a group of young people in this way represents an adult agenda. Furthermore, selecting young people based on their marginalised status reinforces dominant narratives of exclusion.

Instead young people could be approached based on their active participation in a project of social change. For example, young people are systematically subjected to policies that are designed and implemented by a generation who are often out of step with the experience of young people (White and Wyn 2011, 116). Young people’s discontent with the violence within protectionist and popularist movements such as Brexit, and the election of Donald Trump is evident in their participation in both peaceful (marches, sit-ins, civil disobedience) and violent protest (riots, looting, vandalism) around the globe. Some estimates indicate young people in the UK voted overwhelmingly to stay in the EU (Založnik 2016), and young

people in the US for a candidate other than Trump (The Centre for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement 2016). As such, young people's participation in social change in response to neoliberal violence, through violent and non-violent means, is an important site of future research and one that has important policy implications. Defining and approaching young people in terms of their active participation, rather than via negative exclusionary categories, includes and affirms young people's status as full and active citizens. This project attempted to achieve this through selecting young people based on their 'hyper-governed' status. Future projects could centralise the idea of framing young people as active citizens.

There are further ethical and methodological questions raised by this research. These include:

- What new issues does situated knowledge present for the abstraction of youth?
- How can young people be further engaged in the entire research project as active and capable citizens through parallel projects?
- How could research about neoliberal violence create opportunities for the continued creation of alternative discourses?

At the core of these concerns is a desire to continue the emancipatory work of challenging the exclusion of young people, whilst also recognising the potential for research practices to exacerbate the very issue being addressed. Ethical processes can paradoxically lead to unethical practices (Allen 2009, 399). Youth studies ironically contributes new knowledge to the governing cycle within the governmentalisation of youth (Woodman and Threadgold

2011, 9). Selecting one target group is to exclude other groups, whilst also labelling and compartmentalising the selected group (Bacchi 2009, 267–8). To make something present, other things must be made absent (Law 2004, 83). Furthermore, the emancipatory goal of the research might not be shared by the young people themselves.

Significant work exists in the development of research methods with young people. The history of developing youth-led methods, and the dangers of obscuring power dynamics (Hunleth 2011, 82) in these methods, has been discussed in detail in the methods section of this thesis. However, these questions are not resolved. Perhaps some of them cannot be resolved. Therefore, there is the potential for ongoing exploration in this area, and the conceptualisation of youth research as parallel projects is a new voice that needs testing. Furthermore, this thesis proposes the development of situated knowledge as a method to resist the institutional abstraction and governmentalisation of youth. This research method requires further development. Again, in this space there is already some excellent work. The Freirean approach to telling young people's stories as a revolutionary act (McLaren and Tadue Da Silva 1992, 72); and the 'conscientisation' (Freire 2005, 67) method of engagement provide important starting points for future consideration. Freire's dialogical process seeks to actively engage young people in the entire research project. This process would provide more opportunities for young people to critique modernity in their own terms and identify their own issues of concern.

In addition to a model of dialogue, Freire advocated for the power of stories. The current project focused on the collection and presentation of young people's stories as a method for the promotion of solidarity and critical thinking (Freire 2014, 44). Stories can be a means of

challenging dominant narratives in subtle ways that also allow for emotional distance from personal experience (Freire 2014, 59). They are also central to the way people speak, play and write about themselves and others. They are the 'social plots in which language, communication and the production of knowledge are constituted and reconstituted' (Freire 2009, 59). Consideration of stories will thus continue to be important to methods that seek to maintain the struggle for justice and 'create coherence between discourse and practice' (Freire 2009, 27). Future research could seek to complement participatory methods and dialogue-based engagement with methods that engage and promote young people's stories. Involving young people in participatory processes of collection and dissemination of their stories will co-create new opportunities through which to resist the dominant discourses of violence and speak new ways of being into existence.

Many stories have been told through this project. However, through the act of making some stories present, others have been unavoidably made absent (Law 2004, 83). Not all the stories told by hyper-governed young people to the researcher made their way into this thesis. This absence is a critical limitation of this study. This limitation sits as an ethical weight on those who collect the stories of young people, and raises ethical dilemmas. If stories are the vehicles of revolution, of creating new and hopeful conditions for critical thinking, then to fail to give these stories the fullest voice and expression feels like the oppression of their potential. Certainly, these concerns can be placated through appeals to the pragmatics of research and writing (i.e. 'what works'). Furthermore, this unfulfilled obligation might be appeased by advocacy for the promotion of such stories through other publications and dissemination options. Perhaps this concern again points to the paradoxical nature of ethical research: it can, bizarrely, lead to unethical practices (Allen 2009, 399). Despite all this, the

obligation weighs heavily on this author. Perhaps this is a sufficient beginning.

In addition to the weight of the stories excluded from the research there is a question about the efficacy of those that have been included. A stated guiding principle of this project is the emancipation of young people. It is reasonable therefore to ask: did any young people benefit from this thesis? There are several responses to this question; however, measurable benefit to the participants is questionable and a notable limitation of this project. In the methods chapter I argued that young people participate in research for a range of reasons. Some of these reasons provided benefits immediately to participants; i.e. telling their story, maintaining a relationship, helping others and themselves, or (as in one case) just selling drugs. I argued that these benefits are not adult centric. Nevertheless, this project is associated with these outcomes (excluding the purchasing of drugs), and hence it could be argued that the participants did benefit as a result. However, in chapter 5 I argued that this research unavoidably contributed to the governmentalisation of youth. Therefore, rather than doing good, it could be argued that through this contribution, this thesis has done harm to young people.

Participants are highly unlikely to read this thesis or subsequent academic publications. It is unlikely any tangible change will occur in the governmental programs that regulate the participant’s lives. Neither will this thesis forestall the continued hollowing out of the welfare state and the neoliberal violence it produces. The responsibility again is mine, or perhaps those who read this thesis, to act on or disseminate these findings to people (professionals, politicians, family and friends) who individually or collectively might act to make change. Perhaps the measure of the impact of this PhD does not have to be as lofty as radical

structural change. The mystery that is life is precious and fragile. As such, the effort invested in a PhD is not outweighed by even the smallest benefit gained by just one young person. In other words, it is worth it if it changes one young person's life for the better, even in the smallest of ways.

McLaren and Tadue Da Silva (1992) describe Freire's emphasis on the practice of listening to young people's stories, as they are the 'guideposts to liberating praxis' (72). Narratives are a way of knowing the world and provide direction along a path which transforms 'the burden of knowing into the revolutionary act of telling' (McLaren and Tadue Da Silva 1992, 72). As such, the stories in this research have implications for professional practice and research methods. The implications for methods have been discussed in the methods chapter. However, my presentation of this approach in this thesis maintains a certain amount of methodological vagueness. Law argues that this is not a sign of failure. Rather, if social science is the attempt to know a messy and contingent world, then such vagueness might be necessary as 'most of reality is enacted this way' (Law 2004, 14). If social scientists are going to investigate the nature of messy realities, then they are going to have to 'give up on simplicities' and 'teach ourselves to think, to practice, to relate, and to know in new ways' (Law 2004, 2). Thus, whilst it is important to maintain this messy quality, this approach is also open to further development.

Youth work also struggles under a messy semi-professional status. It is also subject to forces of deprofessionalisation experienced by other human services professions: social work, education, psychological services (Bessant 2011, 59; Rose 1998, 190; Wallace and Pease 2011, 137). I have argued that the infiltration of a whitewashed, pragmatic 'what works'

(Wachtel 2013, 26) philosophy into restorative practices, and social services in general, is in part a product of the deprofessionalisation and marketisation of the human service sector (Healy 2009, 402; Seibel and Anheier 1990a, 8). As the welfare state contracts, services are increasingly outsourced and markets begin to drive practice. These market forces often counter the ethical obligations at the heart of these professions. In spite of this, youth work has a strong history of critical and participatory practices (Batsleer 2008, 7; Beck and Purcell 2010, 12; Martin 2002, 94; Sercombe 2010, 24; White and Wyn 2011, 111; Wong 2004, 15). However, this history has not yet been fully applied to question and destabilise the subtle infiltration of neoliberal violence into social services. This is another potential future direction for this research.

To equip practitioners for this type of emancipatory work, there is a need for reinvigorated youth work training using the new tools of genealogical critique (Anderson 2014, 529; Bacchi 2009, 275), combined with insights from the sociology of violence. These tools and insights are designed to destabilise the assumption that neoliberal violence is inevitable and unchangeable (Anderson 2014, 529; Bacchi 2009, 275). Hyper-governed young people are calling for this kind of resistance. They are demonstrating how it can be done by: 'calling bullshit' on claims of neutrality, dreaming of 'euphoric utopias', maintaining humour, and sustaining high expectations of democratic participation. At its core, this hyper-and pessimistic activism is claiming the right to the problem (Bacchi 2009, 46), and destabilising the assumed inevitability of modern oppressive discourses (Anderson 2014, 529; Bacchi 2009, 275). Asking and claiming these critical questions will contribute to the development of practices that promote the positive conditions through which young people can co-create alternatives to neoliberal violence. Mounting political pressure towards practical outcomes

will counter the development of these kinds of analytical skills. Youth workers will feel the need for practical skills with tangible outcomes. These critical questions focus primarily on 'what' kind of youth work should be done and 'why', rather than 'how'. Focusing on 'why' and 'what' ultimately produces the 'how', but it does not prescribe it. The ethical commitment underpinning youth work to working with young people as the 'primary client' (Sercombe 2010, 14) demands this kind of rigour. Instead of being standardised, practice needs to become messy, contingent and diverse, but also more robust.

Finally, there remains one other implication for professional practice and policy from the findings of this project. It relates to the implementation of Fair Process in restorative practices in both government and nongovernment organisations, including youth and community services, juvenile justice systems and schools. This project discovered that hyper-governed young people found Kim and Mauborgne's (2003) Fair Process to be a subordinating process that oversimplifies the wicked nature of their social reality. The infiltration of neoliberal rationale into social services and justice processes is a key example of neoliberal violence. Therefore, the principles of Fair Process should be excluded from restorative practices. If the intention is to develop genuine engagement with young people, then advocates of restorative practices should pursue the wealth of research and practice around participatory practices.

Stories – guideposts to liberating praxis

By way of a final conclusion, I will return to the story with which this investigation began:

that of James. Seventeen-year-old James is accustomed to living alone. Many governing programs have dominated his life. These programs entered his world when he was the victim of child abuse likely in the form of physical violence, but also possibly of the emotional and psychological kind. The intervention was designed to prevent these vehement forms of violence that have a clear subject-object relationship. Unfortunately, it spawned new structural and systemic experiences of violation, as James was thrust into unaccountable bureaucracies and hollowed-out social services. James is ill-equipped to penetrate these bureaucracies and the maze of accountability resulting in a 'rule of nobody' (Arendt 1972, 137). Drawing on the available resources, James finds it effective to fight with his body to change his social reality.

As James continues through these governing programs, knowledge about him is compiled and stockpiled. Overfull manila folders keep the judge's gavel company as the grey-haired people pronounce their wisdom. James is 'engaged' in a plethora of programs, the things that are wrong with him are 'explained', and future 'expectations' are made clear. His own meaningful participation in the decision-making process is at a minimum. The justice prescribed by this system makes little sense in his world. It fails to engage a range of contingencies and complexities that are part of his everyday wicked reality.

His youth worker visits the morning after another incident in his home, an incident that further dilutes any remaining ontological security (Furlong and Cartmel 2006, 3; Giddens 1991, 243). This worker tries to initiate a conversation about James' experience and response. However, the words fly past James with little meaning. The structural and cultural conditions of the conversation do not promote the possibility for democratic participation. The symbolic

meaning and (mis)cognition within the conversation prevent liberating communication. The dominance of the diverging discourses speaks two distinct and incompatible realities into existence: one is inhabited by James, the other by his adult worker.

Refusing to be subordinate to the neoliberal violence of his reality, James draws on the resources available to him and sets about resisting the experience of violation. But James has no new language or vocabulary for the future he is claiming. So, he uses the language of violation, and speaks into existence the world he knows. He is 'going hunting'.

This story is 'true' not because it represents a complete picture of a single young person. It is true because it is an example of an experience that many young people have, but is also only part of their larger life story. It illustrates the process of governing young people's violence. The violence done to James shapes the violence done by him. Whilst his violence may not be socially acceptable, it does fit into the predictable and sanctioned discourse of youth. James is still 'young'; he has not yet accepted the dominant social codes of violence. On these terms, his regulation is justified. Fortunately, hyper-governed young people do not always conform to the dominant reality, and dominant discourses are sometimes proven to be fragile. The hegemonic experience of neoliberal violence is being resisted by hyper-governed young people through hyper-and pessimistic activism. This resistance is at times more-or-less violent. These hyper-governed young people are 'calling bullshit' on the neutrality claimed by the governing programs that perpetrate neoliberal violence. They seek context that resists the simplicity and emphasis on efficiency underpinning the hollowing out of the welfare state and the subversion of social service values of justice and participation. Through a range of techniques including humour, voluntary occupation, democratising surveillance and

governmentalising the self, young people are maintaining their euphoric, utopian dreams. This claim on participation and democracy is being spoken into existence through new discourses, new knowledge and new ways of speaking.

Appendix A — Semi-structured interview questions

Three structured elements were originally designed for guiding the interview process. Firstly, participants were invited to tell their story of their time in child protection, juvenile justice or political activism, and to record the details of this journey on a visual timeline. This timeline is described in more detail in Appendix B. Secondly, following the telling of their story participants were asked to comment on the principles of Fair Process. The principles were described to participants and they were invited to reflect on them in the light of their story. Finally, a second set of questions was asked at the end of the interview to determine the young person's motivation and experience of participation. This final set of questions was discussed in chapter 4.

Questions were developed to guide the semi-structured interviews, and to provide the institutional ethics committee with an overview of the interview foci. However, these questions were not designed to be used as a formal script, and were not implemented in this way in the interviews. Furthermore, upon reflection at the end of this PhD candidature, I identified many issues with the wording and structure of the questions in relation to the goals of the project. Thankfully, the prioritisation of a semi-structured interaction with young people, and my reflexive youth work training, meant these questions were not utilised in the interviews as they are written here.

After I described to participants the obligations and limitations of confidentiality, as well as mandated reporting requirements, the interview unfolded conversationally. Reproduced below are the questions I developed for the ethics review process. To reiterate, the wording of the questions changed in practice to prioritise the conversational nature of the interview.

Furthermore, for this same reason most of the questions where never asked. Most questions were deliberately put aside to focus on the young person's story, and prioritise reflections on Fair Process, or on the young person's understanding/experiences of violence.

***Interview questions** — as provided to the ethics review committee*

Introduction:

Hi … Thank you for your time today. This will be fairly casual and conversational, so please feel free to do what you need to do to take care of yourself.

I was hoping we might be able to spend this time creating something of a map of your life up until this point. There are a few things I am looking for, but one of the most important things is what is important to you. I have a few questions to guide the process but I want you to feel free to take this where you think it should go. If my question doesn't fit for you or you think you have a better idea, let's go with that instead.

Here is a pen, I encourage you to write or draw or whatever makes sense to you on this sheet. If you are comfortable I have a pen as well, to help me record your thoughts.

I also want your input on the things people would expect you to say. So towards the end of the process, if it is ok by you I want to ask you about those things and compare them to what you have already said.

Before we start I just need to remind you of a few things:

- Everything you say in here is confidential. That means no one else will know who you are or what you said.
- This will only change if you say you are going to harm yourself or someone else, or if you mention any child abuse.
- This interview is being recorded.
- You can stop the interview at any time.

Section 1:

- What would you say are the … (number) most important moments in your life?
- What was it about these moments that made them so important?
- Can you tell me three words that would characterise your experience at these moments?

- Who are/were the … (number) most important people in your life?
- What was it about these people that made them so important?
- Can you tell me three words that characterise these people?
- What is it that these people did to make you think of them in this way?

- Can you tell me three words which you would use to characterise your experience in:
    - Foster Care
    - Juvenile Detention
    - Activism

- Can you tell me more about your experiences that resulted in you thinking about these institutions in this way?

Intro section 2:

The other thing I want to ask you about is your thoughts on Fairness, Power and Violence. There are some things for each of these that people expect you to say. I will start with a couple of questions about the idea generally, and then ask you to compare your experience to these other ideas.

Note: For most young people, the following section will naturally flow out of the answers and ideas they provided in the first half of the interview. For others, the conversation will require more structure and they will be asked questions as they appear below.

Section 2

Fair Process:

- Would you say the way you were treated in these institutions was fair or unfair?
- What experience did you have that has resulted in you thinking in this way?
- What could have been done to make you feel like the experience was fair?
- People sometimes describe fairness in these ways:
    - Engagement — Involving people in decisions by inviting their input.
    - Explanation — Clarifying the thinking behind a final decision.

    - Expectation clarity — Stating the new rules of the game, including behaviour standards, penalties and responsibilities.

    Do any of these make sense to you?

- What would you change or add to make more sense of fairness?

Violence

- Were you ever in fights while you were at …?
- What happened to make you get in fights?
- People sometimes describe violence in these ways
    - Physical violence
    - Emotional violence
    - Psychological violence
    - Sexual Violence
    - Structure or system violence

    Do any of these make sense to you? Which ones and why?

- What would you change or add to make more sense of your experience of violence?

Power

- At what moments in your life did you feel you had the power to make changes?
- At what moment in your life have you felt you were powerless?
- People sometimes describe power in these ways:
    - People at the top have power
    - People in a group have power

  - Everyone has power
  - Power can be given and taken away
  - Power is about how ‘I’ relate to ‘you’

  Do any of these make sense to you? Which ones and why?

- What would you change or add to make more sense of power or powerlessness?

Ranking exercise:

Can you rank each of these moments and your relationships to these people on a scale from one to ten?

- Fair (10 Fair — 1 Unfair)
- Violence (10 Very Violent — 1 Not violent at all)
- Powerful (10 I felt powerful — 1 I didn’t feel powerful)

Close/debrief:

Thank you for your time and your thoughts today. That you have been willing to participate is very generous. Is there anything else you wish to add before we finish? Before we finish there are a couple more things I need to cover …

If you want a copy of your interview or of the final report I am happy to get them for you. Would you like a copy? What is the best way to get them to you?

Finally I want to briefly check in on how you are feeling after our conversation.

Can I ask you to please select one card from the following pack that represents how you are feeling now?

Note: Cards (pictures with words) are part of an emotional literacy pack. More information can be found here:
http://www.innovativeresources.org/Pages/Our_Publications/Card_Range.aspx?id=a02c07b8-b1cb-4d90-a52f-70df60eea396

I have some information here about where you can go to get support if you need it. Would you like a copy of the information?

Appendix B — Visual timeline

The interview process was originally designed to include the co-construction of a visual timeline of the participant's experience. The importance of the visual timeline in terms of facilitating and capturing the interview declined during the data collection phase. While the timeline was used in most interviews, it did not fulfil its original purpose and became less useful to the project aims. Hence, it does not appear as a major theme in this thesis. The following is an overview of the rationale for the development of the visual timeline and why it does not appear as a major focus in the thesis.

The original purpose of the timeline was to facilitate the telling of the participant's story. Dean (2015) describes the value of 'doing something' in an interview, as it creates a somatic memory and experience in connection to the research (3.1). Furthermore, Hunleth argues that visual and creative media such as drawing can support participants to express difficult and complex emotions and ideas (Hunleth 2011, 86). It was anticipated that the target group might experience some of these difficulties and hence benefit from using a visual medium. These ideas were critiqued in chapter 4.

> In addition to the benefits to the participants it was thought that the visual representation of the data would add something useful to the project aims. Foucault (1979) remarked in *Discipline and Punish* how thoroughly a person's life can be represented by simply identifying the institutions they pass through. These networks were already well mapped out at the beginning of the 19th century:

> Our benevolent establishments present an admirably coordinated whole by means of which the indigent does not remain a moment without help from the cradle to the grave. Follow the course of the unfortunate man: you will see him born among foundlings; from there he passes to the nursery, and then to an orphanage; at the age of six he goes off to primary school and later to adult school. If he cannot work, he is placed on the list of charity offices of his district, and if he falls ill he may choose between twelve hospitals … Lastly, when the poor Parisian reaches the end of his career, seven alms-houses await his age ... (Foucault 1979, 300)

The resemblance between the generalised existence of the Parisian and hyper-governed young people (particularly those under the care of the state) is remarkable. It was anticipated that the visual reproduction of young people's stories might have some analytical value. Furthermore, it was expected that the number of governing institutions present in the young people's lives might have had a strong visual impact.

The reality of implementing the timeline was problematic. Largely, the participants seemed disinterested in contributing to the construction of the timeline. Despite being supplied with writing and drawing materials they regularly left the paper untouched. On one occasion a young person noticed at the end of the interview that the page was still largely blank, and apologised. Often, I was the only one writing or drawing on the timeline. This likely aided me in memorising participant's stories, but did not achieve the desired value for the participants. Moreover, focusing on filling in the timeline became a barrier to maintaining the conversational tone of the interview. On several occasions, filling in the timeline was not logistically possible as there was no suitable surface to write and draw on. On another

occasion the timeline was repurposed (made into an origami hat, and later ripped in half) by a participant. For these reasons, and the critique of visual/creative methods offered in chapter 4, the importance of the timeline in the interviews declined. As such, the timeline was not a major feature in this thesis.

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