Climate Change, Migration and Conflict:

A study of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh

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DEDICATION

Dedicated to my parents' MD Deanat Ali and Karimonnessa

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the relationship between climate change induced migration and conflict. The case study is Bangladesh, one of the most climate change affected countries in the world, which has experienced long-standing ethno-political conflict in the region known as the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). The people worst affected by climatic events such as floods, cyclone, sea-level rise and disasters lose their livelihood options and houses, and many of them are forced to migrate to cities or rural areas that are less prone to climatic events, such as the hilly region of the CHT. In the 1980s and 1990s, with state support, a rapidly growing number of Bengalis migrated to the CHT for permanent settlement. Fieldwork conducted for this thesis in the CHT revealed that for the majority of Bengali research participants, climatic events played a significant role in their decision to migrate after experiencing recurrent crop failure and the destruction of their houses and land. Poverty rendered people unable to cope with climatic events, and institutional support for those displaced by climate events was almost entirely lacking. Bengali settlement in the CHT influenced the ethno-political conflict from 1975 to 1997 and now contributes to social conflict between Bengali and tribal people. Data collected from Bengali and tribal respondents show a widespread perception that the CHT is plagued by resource capture, insecurity, discrimination, mistrust and violence between the communities. Although the CHT Peace Accord has put an end to state-sponsored migration, Bengali migration continues through social networks and family connections. Bengali settlers and tribal people have become the main actors competing for resources, social positions, and cultural and political power in the CHT, which causes social conflict between the communities. Both the ethno-political conflict in the pre Peace Accord and

social conflict in the post Peace Accord period are connected to the environment and climate change induced Bengali migration to the CHT.

By exploring the role climatic events have played in migration to the CHT and the impacts on the ethnic minority people in this region, this thesis contributes to the understanding of the linkages of climate change, migration and conflict. It advances the argument that climate change induced migration of people with a different background to an ethnically distinctive region can become an important source of conflict and violence between the host people and migrants. The findings can assist policy-makers in developing ways to better manage the predicted increase in internal migration due to climate change, and to address the core issues in the CHT conflict.

DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Signed

Date: 6 February 2019

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ACRONYMS

BBS	Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
BCCSAP	Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan
BMD	Bangladesh Metrological Department
BNP	Bangladesh Nationalist Party
BWDB	Bangladesh Water Development Board
CDMP	Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme
CHT	Chittagong Hill Tracts
CHTDF	Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Fund
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change
IWGIA	International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs
JSS	Jana Samhati Samiti
MDMF	Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief
MoEF	Ministry of Environment and Forestry
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
PCJSS	Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti
SAA	Samo Adhikar Andolon
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UPDF	United People's Democratic Front
WB	World Bank

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INTRODUCTION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND CONFLICT

> Climate change threatens human security because it undermines livelihoods,
> compromises culture and individual identity, increases migration that people would
> rather have avoided, and because it can undermine the ability of states to provide
> the conditions necessary for human security. Changes in climate may influence
> some or all of the factors at the same time. Situations of acute insecurity, such as
> famine, conflict, and socio-political instability, almost always emerge from the
> interaction of multiple factors (Adger et al., 2014, p. 762).

1.1.   Introduction

The implications of climate change on social, economic and political contexts have become

an important topic in the academic and policy arena (Salehyan, 2014; Carleton & Hsiang,

2016). Scholars and researchers in various fields including Social Sciences, Geography, and

Security and Conflict Studies have extensively studied how climate changes affect the

environment, humans, and social and political situations in diverse ways. This thesis

addresses a topic of particular concern to researchers in the Social Sciences, namely

whether and how climate change induced migration causes conflict and violence. It

explores these connections through a local level case study to analyse the impacts of

climatic events on decisions of the Bengali people migrating to the Chittagong Hill Tracts

(CHT) in Bangladesh, as well as the implications of the Bengali migration for social,

economic and political change in the region. Bangladesh is one of the most climate

affected countries in the world (Roy, 2011; Maplecroft, 2014). The worst affected people

are left with no option other than to migrate to cities and any suitable place including the

CHT for livelihood and shelter. The CHT is a conflict-prone region in Bangladesh where it is

presupposed that Bengali migration has played a significant role in causing and escalating

the conflict. Based on the theories of climate change, migration and conflict, this thesis explores the relationship between climate change and the migration decisions of the Bengali people, and between Bengali migration and conflict in the region.

The impacts of climate change on conflict came to light in the early 21st century through publications and media reports concerning the security implications of such change (Barnett, 2003; Barnett & Adger, 2007). Some researchers and research organisations outlined the effects of climate change on social disturbance, political instability and conflict in the national and international context (Rahman, 1999; Schwartz & Randall, 2003; WBGU, 2008). The former Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki Moon, claimed that climate change played a role in the conflict and humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan, and that "similar types of environmental problems are equally causing violence in other African countries" (Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007, p. 629). The recent conflict in Syria has also been partly attributed to the prolonged droughts and their impact on economic conditions (Gleick, 2014). In its fifth assessment report the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), the main agency providing scientific information about climate change issues, argues that climate change will endanger the human security of millions of people across the world, and this will be one of the primary sources of insecurity, political instability, and civil conflicts in many countries (Adger et al., 2014, p. 777). Over the past two decades, research into the relationship between climate change and conflict has produced many publications and reports, and there is now broad public awareness of the security implications and potential for conflict resulting from climate change (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Reuveny, 2007; Theisen, Holtermann & Buhaug, 2012; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012).

Despite growing scholarly and public awareness, there is a lack of consensus among researchers, policy analysts and world leaders on the relationship between climate change and conflict (Salehyan, 2008). The main issue is that climate change is not the sole source of conflict and violence. Other factors, such as social, economic, and political issues, influence the links between climate change and conflict (Gleditsch, 2012; Salehyan, 2014; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014). While resource scarcity due to climate change and competition between and among groups for resources can be a key factor in conflict and violence, this type of conflict is more prevalent in economically poor countries (Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; Evans, 2011; Homer-Dixon, Boutwell & Rathjens, 2011), which suggests that poverty is also a root cause. Climate change induced migration is another potential source that may create or trigger further conflict when migrants complicate social, economic and political conditions in the receiving societies (Reuveny, 2007, 2008; Raleigh, Jordan, & Salehyan, 2008; Gleditsch, Nordås, & Salehyan, 2007; Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2016). Indeed, among the possible connections between climate change and conflict, climate change induced migration is the most influential and far-reaching in climate hotspots because climate change induced migration affects the resource base, cultural issues, and the social and political systems of the host society.

To date, the cases that have been reported as climate change induced conflict are subject to criticisms due to lack of reliability of information, limited validity of the research results, and methodological weaknesses in exploring the relationships between climate change and conflict (Gleditsch & Nordås, 2014; Nordås & Gleditsch, 2015; Salehyan, 2014; Theisen, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013). Thus, researchers have proposed that more empirical work should be conducting based on local level case studies in climate hotspots to substantiate

the assumed links between climate change and migration; and between climate change and conflict (McLeman, 2014; Hendrix, 2018). For example, Hendrix suggested that "the most climate exposed countries such as Bangladesh and Haiti" should receive more attention from researchers interested in the relationship between climate change and conflict (Hendrix, 2018, p. 190). This thesis endeavours to contribute to this research by exploring whether and how climate change has contributed to migration and conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh. Understanding this connection can assist with addressing the factors that fuel the current conflict and finding new peacebuilding options in the region. This overarching question focuses on three issues: (a) to what extent climatic events played a role in the migration of the Bengali people to the CHT? (b) what factors contributed to institutionalising the Bengali migration to the CHT, and (c) how Bengali settlement has contributed to the CHT conflict. By examining the ways in which climate change, migration, and conflict are interconnected in the CHT, the thesis aims to provide a broader understanding of conflict in climate change affected countries and identify lessons that can be learned for managing the predicted increase in climate change induced migration.

1.2.   Why climate change, migration and conflict research?

The study of climate change, migration and conflict is timely as scientific research has already established that climate change is a real phenomenon and increasing global warming will alter the environment, sea-level, and livelihood options for human beings (IPCC, 2014). Climate change in this regard refers to the changing pattern of weather conditions in the global and regional context. It is the fluctuation of temperature, extreme heat or cold, that greatly impacts on human beings. The IPCC (2007) defines climate

change as "changes in the state of the climate that can be identified (for example, using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity". The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defines climate change as:

> Climate change means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods (UNFCCC, 1992, article 1).

Climatic events such as global warming, sea-level rise, drought, floods, and disasters are occurring more frequently than before with adverse impacts on the environment and human beings across the world (IPCC, 2014; Hinkel et al., 2014; Field, 2014; Walsh et al., 2016; Pittock, 2017; Romm, 2018). The IPCC report of 2014 states that the last three decades have experienced higher earth surface temperatures than any preceding decades since 1980 (IPCC Synthesis report 2014, p. 40). The scientific evidence demonstrates that climate change is occurring on a global scale. Figure 1.1 below shows that global land and ocean surface temperature increased significantly from 1950 to 2000 in comparison to the decades before 1950 (Figure 1.1 a). The recent report published by the United Nations Scientific Panel on Climate Change states "the atmosphere will warm up by 1.5 degrees (Celsius) by 2040 if the current rate of greenhouse emission continues. This warming will lead to inundation of the coastline and intensification of droughts and poverty" (Davenport, 2018). Global warming has had its effects on sea-level, which shows a rising trend (Figure 1.1 b). Sea-level is increasing across the world for several reasons, but the primary cause is the anthropogenic global warming that leads to melting the land-based ice and glaciers (Figures 1.1 c and d).

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Figure 1.1: Some facts about climate change events

Source: IPCC synthesis report, 2014, p. 3

The IPCC synthesis report (2014, p. 42) outlines that "sea-level is increasing rapidly due to

the global warming caused by human activities. The global mean sea level rose by 0.19 m

during the period of 1901-2010". The big concern for the sea-level rise is the inundation of some regions situated at or close to sea-level (Connell, 2003). For example, some low-lying countries such as the Maldives, Tuvalu and Bangladesh are highly exposed to sea-level rise.

The pace of greenhouse gas concentration has increased from the 1950s, and after 2000 the trend has been increasing more rapidly due to the human activities, such as burning fossil fuels and land-use changes. From 2000 to 2010 greenhouse gas emissions were the highest in history (IPCC Synthesis report, 2014, p. 44) (Figure 1.1 c). Human activities and industrialisation in developed and developing countries are causing anthropogenic CO_2 emissions (Figure 1.1 d) which are inflicting detrimental impacts on human and natural systems. This is a key point in the IPCC Summary Report 2014:

> In recent decades, changes in climate have caused impacts on natural and human systems on all continents and across the oceans. Impacts are due to observed climate change, irrespective of its cause, indicating the sensitivity of natural and human systems to changing climate (Pachauri et al., 2014, p. 6).

Changes in climate are also causing droughts, floods, cyclones and coastal erosion across the world. The low-lying regions in Asia and drought-prone areas in Africa are highly affected by such changes. Many people living in these areas are poor, which makes them more vulnerable (Field, 2014; Hunter, 2005), as "climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems" (Pachauri et al., 2014, p. 62). For example, researchers predict that increasing climate change will prolong droughts, cause extreme cold and heat that will affect human health, result in disease, reduce agricultural production, increase costs of agriculture and decrease the ability of people to live in their homes (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Knox, Hess, Daccache, & Wheeler, 2012; Theisen, Holtermann, & Buhaug, 2012). Climate change is also destroying resources, decreasing resource stocks and reducing the livelihood options on which human beings depend (Afifi

& Warner, 2008; IPCC, 2014; Bellard et al., 2012; McMichael & Lindgren, 2011; Stern, 2006; Urry, 2015).

But the question is, what do people do in the face of climatic events? Climate change affected people respond in different ways, such as adapting to climate change or abandoning their homes (Reuveny, 2008; Hugo, 2013). People who leave their homes are forced to migrate, or decide to migrate voluntarily. They may do so temporarily or permanently, within the country or across national borders. They migrate to avoid the vulnerabilities associated with climate change, for example, to find shelter and to improve or diversify their income (Baldwin, 2017; Hugo, 2013; McLeman, 2014). Here, displacement refers to a situation when climatic events indiscriminately force people to leave their place of origin. According to Stapleton, Nadin, Watson and Kellett (2017, p. 6), "displacement refers most commonly to instances where there is no choice but to move, either temporarily or permanently, within or across borders". Conversely, migration denotes the process of people moving from one place to another temporarily or permanently (McLeman, 2014; Hugo, 2013). This process of moving is determined either by choice or by force as a result of natural disasters and political problems.

The people displaced due to climate change are termed variously as 'climate refugees' or 'climate migrants'. Climate refugees have been defined as "those people who migrate across borders for the direct effects of climate change, such as sea-level rise, extreme weather events, droughts and water scarcity" (Biermann and Boas, 2012, pp. 18-19). According to this definition, people who have been internally displaced due to climate

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change are not recognised as refugees. Harvard legal scholars Docherty and Giannini similarly define a climate change refugee as:

> An individual who is forced to flee his or her home and to relocate temporarily or permanently across a national boundary as the result of sudden or gradual environmental disruption that is consistent with climate change and to which humans more likely than not contributed (Docherty & Giannini, 2009, p. 361).

Thus, people who are forced to move by climatic events are only recognised as 'refugees' when they cross an international border. Although climate change induced people are labelled in some research and policy documents as refugees (Myers, 1993, 2002; Biermann and Boas, 2010), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and some researchers have criticised the term climate refugees. They argue that refugee status is only given to people who are displaced by political emergencies, conflicts, persecution, and other factors recognised under the Geneva Convention and related Protocols, and who have crossed international borders temporarily or permanently (McAdam, 2010, 2012). Therefore, the term 'climate migrants' has been proposed to define people displaced by climate change events, such as increasing temperature, floods, sea-level rise, drought, cyclones and coastal erosion (Laczko & Aghazarm, 2009) and moved to another location either as international or internal migrants (McLeman & Smit, 2006). This thesis uses the term climate migrant to refer to people who have attributed their decision to migrate at least in part to climatic events, such as floods, sea-level rise, cyclone, drought and coastal erosion.

Whichever label is given to climate displaced people, they are now a great concern for the affected regions, as well as the potential migrant receiving regions and nations. Due to the growing speed and impact of climate change, more people are being displaced and migrating from their homes. In order to alert the international community, various studies

have provided estimates of existing human displacement and migration from climate change as well as scenarios for the future projected migration (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1: Estimates of climate displaced people and future predictions

Already displaced people	Future predictions
1. Around 24 million people have been displaced by floods, famine and other environmental disasters (UNHCR, 2002, p.12) 2. In the last seven years, climate or weather-related disasters have displaced 22.5 million each year (IDMC, 2015, p. 8) 3. In 2014, more than 19.3 million people were displaced by disasters in 100 countries (IDMC, 2015, p. 8) 4. 50 million people were displaced by environmental causes by 2010 (UNFCCC, 2007, p. 42)	1. Around 162 million people would be at risk and displaced due to sea-level rise by 2050 (Myers, 2002, cited by Adamo, 2009, p. 18; also see Biermann, & Boas, 2010, p. 68) 2. Around 250 million people would be refugees from climatic events by 2050 (Christian Aid, 2007, cited in Biermann & Boas, 2010, p. 68) 3. Climatic events by 2050 would permanently displace 200 million people (Stern, 2006, p. 56) 4. Around 140 million people could be displaced by 2050 in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America (World Bank, 2018, p. XIV)

Source: Compiled by the researcher from different sources.

While these figures indicate that climatic events have already displaced hundreds of millions of people in recent years, the future predictions are very alarming, particularly for developing regions. Most of the poor and underdeveloped countries have limited infrastructure and technical knowledge, as well as depending on a subsistence economy for livelihood. Due to a lack of modern technology, knowledge and economic capability, climate affected people in underdeveloped regions are unable to manage climate vulnerability, and thus are forced into displacement and migration. Countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa are more exposed to climate change induced displacement and migration. The climate change induced internal migration rate is much higher than the

international migration rate because climate affected people usually attempt to find shelter and livelihood options within rather than outside their countries (Hugo, 2013; Faist, 2000; Warner, 2010). Currently, climate change hazards are causing internal displacement in lowland areas across the world. For example, research by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) states that "between 2008 and 2016, sudden-onset events were responsible for 99 percent of internal displacement: an average of 21 million people annually" (IDMC, 2017, pp. 4-5). Werz and Conley (2012, p. 3), citing the United Nations *Human Development Report 2012,* stated that "worldwide, there are already an estimated 700 million internal migrants—those leaving their homes within their own countries—a number that includes people whose migration is related to climate change and environmental factors".

The displaced and migrated people can have detrimental impacts on the social, economic, and political context in the affected countries (Matthew, Barnett, McDonald, & O'Brien, 2010; Gemenne, Barnett, Adger, & Dabelko, 2014; Trombetta, 2014). Their migration has implications for security and political stability in national and international contexts. For example, researchers and security analysts argue that climate change will complicate individual, national and international security through scarcity of vital resources, such as water (Barnett, 2003; Brown, Hammill, & McLeman, 2007; Adger, 2010; Scheffran & Battaglini, 2011). Some researchers have redefined the human security issue by linking it with the trajectory of climate change (Matthew, 2014; Barnett & Adger, 2007). In its fifth assessment report, the IPCC proposes that climate change has the impact of shrinking the livelihood options for people, which in turn exacerbates human insecurity and conflict

(Adger et al., 2014). As a result, the ways in which climatic events create or impact on conflict has been the subject of a growing number of research studies.

This raises a further question—what is climate change conflict? To date, there is no separate definition developed to describe climate change conflict. Researchers have defined small-scale incidents of violence, civil strife, riot, killing, insurgencies, communal conflict and ethnic war as climate change conflict if these incidents occur in climate hotspots. The conflict and hostilities between countries over water and other resources in climate affected regions are also referred to as climate change conflict. Ide and Scheffran have attempted to define conflict and violence originating from climate change issues as "(a) small-scale conflicts having the 25 deaths threshold, (b) concern the use of natural resources (rather than government and territory), and (c) take place between the social groups" (Ide & Scheffran, 2014, p. 269). Indeed, climate change conflict is not a new form of conflict but an annexation of terminology in the lexicon of conflict analysis. It mainly occurs between and among groups within a country due to resource scarcity and resource sharing. The definition of climate change conflict is closely connected with the conventional definition of conflict. In their analysis of the climate-conflict situation in African countries, Hendrix, and Salehyan (2012, p. 35) use the term 'social conflict' to describe internal conflicts such as demonstrations, riots, strikes, communal conflict, and anti-government violence that have originated primarily from climate change induced adverse effects. In the conflict literature, the concepts of internal conflict and social conflict are used interchangeably and sometimes refer to the same things while analysing conflict in the internal context of a state. In this sense, the definition of climate change conflict is not distinctive, and does not represent a separate conflict issue. Burke et al. (2015) define conflict based on interdisciplinary perspectives, giving a long list of the conflicts that

constitute climate change conflict. For these writers, climate change conflict represents "many types of human conflict including both interpersonal conflict such as domestic violence, road rage, assault, murder, and rape; and intergroup conflict including riots, ethnic violence, land invasions, gang violence, civil war and other forms of political instability, such as coups" (Burke, Hsiang & Miguel, 2015, p. 1).

Based on the above definitions, this thesis considers climate change conflict as micro-level social and political conflict which is manifested as civil unrest, ethnic conflict, riots, killings, burning, protests, attacks and human rights violations which are related to the effects of climate change. The manifestation of social conflict is varied. As Oberschall (1978, p. 291) argues, "social conflict encompasses a broad range of social phenomena: class, racial, religious, and communal conflicts; riots, rebellions, revolutions; strikes and civil disorders; marches, demonstrations, protest gatherings, and the like". Social conflict occurs between and among groups in a given society that compete over resources, social positions and values. Social conflict can be defined as "a struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflict groups are not only to gain the desired values, but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals" (Coser, 1967, p. 232). Although the research endeavour to explore the connection between climate change and conflict is relatively recent, it has already produced many research reports and publications in well-respected journals (Figure 1.2). In 2007 and 2014 the journal *Political Geography* published special issues with several empirical research-based articles on the implications of climate change in conflict formation.[1] The *Journal of Peace Research* published a special

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[1] *Journal of Political Geography*, Volume 43, Pages 1-90 (November 2014), Available online: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/political-geography/vol/43/suppl/C; and Volume 26, Issue 6, Pages 627-736 (August 2007), Available online: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/political-geography/vol/26/issue/6

issue on climate change and conflict in 2012 to address the security and conflict

implications of climate change.[2] Most of these works have focused on the impacts of

floods, droughts, and rainfall shortages on the social, economic and political conditions of

the worst affected countries. More recent works explore the relationship between climate

change and conflict on a global scale, as well as local level case studies, to advance the

theoretical understanding of climate change and conflict. Some researchers also point to

climate change induced migration as one of the sources of insecurity and conflict within

and between countries when migrants put pressure on existing resources and when the

political system in the host location fails to accommodate migrant people (Barnett &

Adger, 2007; Goldstone, 2002; Scheffran, Brzoska, Brauch, Link, & Schilling, 2012).

Figure 1.2: Trend in scholarly publications on climate change and conflict

Source: developed by the researcher based on published works in 'Google Scholar'

database. Date of preparation November 2018.

Note: Figure 1.2 shows publications available in Google Scholar from 2000-2016. I used the

words 'climate change and conflict relationship' as search term.

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[2] *Journal of Peace Research* (January 2012; 49 (1). Available online:
https://climateandsecurity.org/2012/02/02/climate-change-and-conflict-journal-of-peace-research-special-issue/

In summary, global climate change and its impacts on humans and the environment has constituted a critical area of discussion and research in various fields. The social dimensions of climate change concern population displacement, migration, insecurity and conflict issues in the national and international context. Despite numerous publications and reports, there is still a lack of consensus on the key issue of recognising climate displaced people and how climate migration transforms into a source of insecurity and conflict. Thus, further empirical research on climate change, migration and conflict at the local level is deemed to be an important and timely endeavour in the academic and policy arena. Analysing local case studies that explore the link between climate change, migration and conflict is a step towards better understanding the connection between climate change and conflict.

1.3. Climate change, migration and conflict research in Bangladesh

Bangladesh, as the most climate change affected countries in the world, is experiencing climate change in the form of changing patterns of climatic events, i.e. "increasingly frequent and severe floods, cyclones, storm surges and drought forecasts" (Walsham, 2010). By climate change in Bangladesh, this thesis refers to both sudden and slow onset processes of environmental change, such as floods, cyclones and river erosion (sudden incidents), and coastal erosion, sea-level rise, saltwater intrusion, rising temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, and drought (slow processes). A combination of geographical location, poverty, weak infrastructure, lack of modern technology, and high population density has made the country particularly vulnerable to the risks associated with climatic events (Adger, Huq, Brown, Conway, & Hulme, 2003; Agrawala, Ota, Ahmed, Smith, & Van Aalst, 2003; Brouwer, Akter, Brander, & Haque, 2007). Bangladesh is a small but densely

populated country where 160 million people live on 167,598 square kilometres of land, which ranks Bangladesh as the 7th most densely populated country in the world (World Bank, 2015). The population density has forced people living in the low land and coastal areas to be exposed to the adverse effects of the climatic events, such as floods, drought, sea-level rise, coastal erosion, and flood-driven river bank erosion.

Due to its location of the country at the top of the Bay of Bengal between 20–26◦ North and 88–92◦ East and its floodplain character, Bangladesh is affected every year by flooding, drought and natural disasters (Agrawala et al., 2003). Bangladesh is also a riverine country, crisscrossed by more than 230 rivers. This riverine character brings both fortune and curse for the nation. During the monsoon season the country experiences widespread flooding, but in the dry season a significant part of the country, particularly the north-eastern part suffers from severe water shortage and drought (Mirza & Ahmad, 2005; Shamsuddoha & Chowdhury, 2007). More than 94 percent inland water sources come from outside of the border from 54 international rivers, 51 flowing down from India and remaining three from Myanmar (Biswas, 2011; Elhance, 1999; Wirsing, 2007). India as a large neighbouring upper riparian country controls the water flow by constructing dams over the main international rivers (Mirza, 2005, Swain, 1996). This has given India considerable power to wreak environmental destruction in Bangladesh, as withholding water leads to desertification in the dry season (Elahi, 2001; Shahid & Behrawan, 2008), and releasing water in the rainy season can cause widespread flooding. Geographical location, socio-economic condition and overpopulation have made the country vulnerable to the risks and vulnerabilities associated with climate change events (Adger, Huq, Brown, Conway, & Hulme, 2003;

Agrawala, Ota, Ahmed, Smith, & Van Aalst, 2003; Brouwer, Akter, Brander, & Haque, 2007).

Climatic events accompanied by poor socio-economic characteristics severely impact on human habitat, livelihood, and overall development of the country. The most far-reaching impact is the displacement of poor people from rural and coastal areas which leads to internal and international migration. For instance, a survey in Hatia Island in Bangladesh found that "22% of households affected by tidal-surge floods, and 16% affected by riverbank erosion have moved to urban areas from low-land and rural areas" (Foresight, 2011, p. 13). Based on the severity of climatic events, Piguet (2008, p. 6) states that "Bangladesh is indeed an exceptional example of a country in which environment and climate change effects may be reaching a point where it derives significant human movement". At the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009, the Bangladeshi Minister of Environment and Forests warned that "twenty million people could be displaced [in Bangladesh] by the middle of the century" (Findlay & Geddes, 2011, p. 138).

In this context, it is surprising that there are no official government statistics on internal migration in Bangladesh. Scattered and sporadic research, based on migration models and projections, has published tentative internal migration figures such as, 78 million people displaced by 2020 (CDMP II, 2014, p. 12); and 15 million people by 2050 due to climate change events (IUCN, 2015). Although there are debates about the numbers involved, there is little doubt that "Bangladesh, a low-lying country where agriculture is vulnerable to floods and salinization could end up accounting for one-third of South Asia's climate migrants" (Rigaud et al., 2018, p. 127).

There is also scant research on where displaced people move to and settle. It is argued that climate change induced migrants generally move to nearby cities or major cities (e.g. Dhaka and Chittagong) for their livelihood and shelter (Afsar, 2003; Hassani-Mahmooei & Parris, 2012; Islam & Hasan, 2016; Kartiki, 2011). Some poor and climate affected people from the coastal regions of Bangladesh have migrated across state borders to neighbouring regions in India, including Assam and West Bengal for permanent settlement (Alam, 2003; Hazarika, 2000; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Suhrke, 1997). As well as the cross-border migration, environment and climate change induced poor people migrated and settled in the CHT during the massive migration phase of 1977-1990 (Hafiz & Islam, 1993; Lee, 1997, 2001; Reuveny, 2007). However, to date no empirical research on the relationship between environmental destruction and Bengali migration to the CHT exists to provide the environmental migration scenario in the region. Although Bengali migration to the CHT has been invoked by numerous researchers to illustrate the connections between climate change and conflict, there has been very little research to substantiate this nexus.

The CHT is a hilly area located in the south-eastern part in Bangladesh with a total land mass of 13,189 sq. km constituting one-tenth of the total area of the country (see Figure 1.3), but 40 percent of the total forest of Bangladesh (Rasul, 2009; Adnan, 2004). It is a distinct and unique region in Bangladesh where around 'thirteen'[3] major ethnic groups live (Mohsin, 1997, p. 12). The culture, lifestyle, and patterns of livelihood of these ethnic minority groups are sharply different from the Bengali population which constitutes the majority in Bangladesh. Although the ethnic population has struggled for decades to be

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[3] There are different views about the number of the tribal communities in the CHT. Some authors consider the number is eleven and some state twelve (Mohsin, 1997; Adnan, 2004).

recognised as the indigenous people of the CHT, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) rejects the term 'indigenous' or 'Adibashi' and instead uses the term 'small ethnic communities' in official discourse. In 2011, the committee entrusted with formulating the Constitutional Amendment proposed to include the term 'small ethnic minorities' (khudra nrigoshti) in the Constitution of Bangladesh instead of indigenous people (Gerharz, 2014, p. 12). This is because acknowledging the CHT people as indigenous would complicate the status of the 'Bengali' people, which the government claims have a history of 1000 years or more.

Figure 1.3: Location of the CHT in Bangladesh map

Source: Google Map.

In order to avoid the politics of recognition, this thesis uses the term 'tribal people' to refer to people who have been living in the CHT for at least 300 years. This term has also been employed by others researchers including Gurr and Lewis (Gurr, 1993, p. 50; Lewis, 2011, p. 28). The tribal people are also known as Jumma people as they depend on jhum cultivation for their livelihood. They are also viewed as the Pahari or hill people in the CHT (Adnan, 2004).

The CHT region experienced ethno-political conflict between the 'Shanti Bahini', and the Bangladesh army that lasted for more than two decades. The 'Shanti Bahini', an armed organisation formed by Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) in the CHT, launched a movement against the government of Bangladesh and the army with the aim of achieving the right to self-determination and recognition of identity (Mohsin, 1997; Chakma, 2010a). This ethno-political conflict was deemed to have ended with the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord in 1997 by the government of Bangladesh and the PCJSS, the indigenous political party led by Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma, however peace has remained elusive in the CHT (Jamil & Panday, 2008).

The CHT conflict is widely viewed in Bangladesh as caused by a combination of factors including denial of identity, military deployment, human rights violations, cultural annihilation and economic dominance (Mohsin, 1997, 2000; Chakma, 2010a). However, the migration and settlement of the Bengali people to the CHT from the British colonial period to the present Bangladesh period has had significant impacts on the social, economic and political conditions of the region. More importantly, the influx of Bengali population in the CHT under a settlement scheme (1977-1989) and subsequent informal migration flows has altered the demographic composition. Whereas the tribal people were the dominant

population in the early 1970s, the numbers of Bengali and tribal people are now almost the same. This demographic transformation has created a complicated of social, economic and political relationships in the CHT. A new discourse of 'Pahari-Bengali' (tribal and Bengali) has emerged in the CHT which is influencing the socio-economic and political situation in the post Peace Accord period (Nasreen, 2017, p. 139). This discourse refers to the fact that Bengali and tribal people have reached numeric equivalence and it is impossible now to ignore the Bengali community in social, economic and political processes. Unfortunately, this demographic shift in the CHT has generated enmity, mistrust, and non-cooperation between communities, termed micro-level social conflict by Choudhury, Islam and Alam, (2017). The communities are divided between the Bengali settlers and tribal people and engaged in conflict for resources and social position. Consequently, the socio-economic and political situation in the CHT is one of conflict, despite various peacebuilding efforts which have been enacted in the post Peace Accord period such as the United Nations Development Programme Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility (UNDP-CHTDF); protection and promotion of human rights, capacity building of the local institutions, and community development (Chakma, 2017).

Researchers who examined environmental security and climate change issues in the CHT have suggested that Bengali settlement has been instrumental in causing resource scarcity and exploitation of tribal people, and is, therefore, a factor in the CHT conflict (Hafiz & Islam, 1993; Lee, 1997, 2001; Reuveny, 2007, 2008; Reuveny & Moore, 2009; Suhrke, 1997). However, there has been no in-depth exploration of the complicated relationship between environmental destruction in lowland Bangladesh, population mobility and conflict formation in the CHT. Van dar Hoorn's thesis on "*Climate Change and Conflict in*

Bangladesh" (2010) is one of few studies on the topic but it is based on only a few interviews with professional key informants and on secondary literature. Thus, the current study fills an important research gap by conducting empirical research to investigate the impacts of climatic events in the migration decisions of the Bengali people to the CHT, and the impact of this migration on the conflict situation.

1.4. Research objectives and significance

Given the background outlined above, this study aims to explore the role that climatic events have played in the migration of Bengali people to the CHT, and how this migration has impacted on the local conflict. This study examines the processes of migration, namely what mediating factors institutionalise Bengali migration to the CHT and analyses the implications of migration and settlement in escalating the ethnic conflict before 1997 and forming social conflicts now. Keeping these objectives in mind, the study seeks to answer the following research questions:

- What role did climate or environmental changes play in the Bengali migration and settlement to the CHT?
- What influenced the Bengali people's decision to migrate to the CHT?
- How does the migration and settlement of the Bengali people influence the conflict situation in the CHT?

By addressing these questions, this thesis explores the role climatic events have played in the migration of the Bengali people to the CHT, and how this migration has impacted on the CHT conflict. It examines the processes of migration, paying particular attention to the mediating factors that helped to institutionalise the Bengali migration to the CHT. It argues

that one of the implications of migration and settlement is the escalation of the ethnic conflict and the formation of social conflicts which have persisted after the 1997 Peace Accord.

Bringing climate change, migration and conflict together in a research-based analysis will invigorate academic and policy debates. The government and international partners are working on peacebuilding projects in the post Peace Accord period in the CHT, but the migration issue is missing in the ongoing projects. The GoB formulated a 'Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan' (BCCSAP) in 2009 and identified some critical areas for the mitigation and adaptation of climate change and its adverse effects in Bangladesh (MoEF, 2009), however the Action Plan fails to mention the issue of conflict and insecurity and is silent on the issue of internal migration and its connection with security and development. Similarly, despite a growing volume of climate change adaptation measures, migration is still neglected in this regard and there is no planning to address where the climate change displaced people should migrate to and settle. The role of the CHT as a migration destination place is barely acknowledged even though Bengali migration has had serious implications on the social and political situation in the CHT. The insights from this thesis may assist in reducing the potential for conflict due to climate change induced migration in two ways: by reminding the state of its obligation to properly manage climate displaced people; and by highlighting the need to protect the cultural difference, rights and dignity of the tribal people which are threatened by the Bengali migration to their land.

1.5. Chapter overview

This chapter has explained the rationale of researching climate change, migration and conflict issues. Drawing from the global picture of climate change, migration and conflict, this thesis presents the Bangladesh case, as well as the CHT as a local level case study of climate change induced migration and conflict. The exploration of the relationship between climate change induced migration and conflict in the CHT is an important area as there is no empirical research existing to date.

Chapter Two reviews the literature on climate change, migration and conflict. This chapter critically explores the current theoretical understanding of two separate but interconnected topics, the climate change and migration nexus; and the climate change induced migration and conflict relationship. First, this chapter analyses the relationship between climate change and migration in order to explore a comprehensive overview of how climate change events affect people differently, in what circumstances the affected people take migration decisions, and where they usually settle as migrants. To analyse this connection, this section presents the intervening factors, also called mediating factors, which accomplish the migration process of climate affected people. Secondly, the chapter analyses the relationship between climate change induced migration and conflict. This section explores when and how migration becomes a source of conflict and violence. The theoretical understanding of climate change, migration and conflict has been a guiding principle to analyse the relationship between climate change induced migration and conflict in the CHT in Bangladesh.

Chapter Three provides an overview of climatic events in Bangladesh and how people have responded to such events. This chapter is also based on secondary sources of information including population census data from the government of Bangladesh. The aim of this chapter is to contextualise the issue of climate change, migration, and conflict in the CHT in Bangladesh. It analyses the role of the government, social networks and family connections in helping to settle the Bengali people in the CHT. This chapter also highlights the existing literature on the CHT conflict, its causes, and the implications of climate change induced migration on the CHT conflict. A key finding of this chapter is that existing research has ignored the implications of climatic events on migration flows to the CHT. This has led to the CHT conflict and climate induced migration being studied in isolation.

Chapter Four develops the research design for investigating climate change induced migration and its implications on conflict formation. This research design is a mixed methods design comprising survey and interviews. A survey was conducted to investigate what role climatic events played in the migration decisions of the Bengali settlers and how they migrated to the CHT. The survey also investigated the attitudes and behaviours of migrants and tribal residents in the CHT in the post-settlement period. These attitudes and behaviours towards each other have resulted in social conflict in the CHT. In addition, this chapter presents the justification for conducting interviews with climate migrants in the CHT and key informants. This section also provides a description of the process of selecting the study sites, and the method of conducting and analysing survey and interviews.

Chapter Five focuses on answering the first research question, whether Bengali settlers in the CHT have migrated due to the environment and climate change. Having identified the

major factors (climate change impacts and poverty) of the Bengali migration and settlement, this chapter analyses survey data to establish the role of climatic events in the migration decisions of Bengalis living in the CHT. In-depth analysis of interviews with climate migrants reveals how they have been affected by the floods, cyclones and other environmental events in their place of origin, and why and under what conditions they decided to settle in the CHT. The interview with climate migrants and survey data have been triangulated with interviews conducted with key informants to substantiate impacts of climate change on Bengali migration and how the impacts of climatic events are responsible for the Bengali migration to the CHT.

Chapter Six explains the processes of migration and settlement of the Bengali people to the CHT. Based on historical information, interviews with key informants and survey data, this chapter discusses the mediating factors in the migration, which started in the British colonial era but have increased significantly since the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Climate events, poverty and political factors played a role in the migration, which was institutionalised with the support of the government, security forces and social networks.

Chapter Seven presents the social, economic and political situation in the CHT and how the settlement of Bengali people has influenced the socio-economic and political conditions in the region. The main focus is to explore the respondents' perceptions of the conflict situation in the CHT and how the Bengali migration and settlement have impacted on the conflict situation. This chapter finds that capturing resources, land grabbing, and competition for the social and political positions between and among groups are key factors in understanding why the conflict has contributed despite peacebuilding efforts.

Chapter Eight, the concluding chapter, summarises the main argument, namely that climate change in Bangladesh has generated population displacement and contributed to migration to the CHT. Along with other significant factors, the presence of a growing migrant community in the CHT contributed to escalating the conflict between the Bangladesh army and Shanti Bahini when migrants became part of the conflict on many occasions. The migrants are now part of a new type of social and political conflict with the tribal population over the distribution of resources, economic position and political power. The misconceived decision of the successive governments of Bangladesh to facilitate the migration of poor and climate affected people to the CHT, and consequent direct and indirect support to these migrants have complicated the social, economic and political situation in this region. It will be shown that the behaviour of civil and military bureaucrats and political leaders in the CHT are equally responsible and are widely perceived to have contributed to the ongoing conflict in the region through resource exploitation and resource capture. All of these factors are connected and have generated a situation of fear and insecurity as well as incidents of violence in the CHT. By exploring the issue of micro-level social conflict in the post Peace Accord period this chapter makes a distinctive contribution to the existing literature and policy perspectives. This local level case study may encourage other researchers to look into cases elsewhere where climate change, migration and conflict operate, and inform better management of internal migration due to climate change effects so that it does not turn into a source of conflict.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND CONFLICT

2.1. Introduction

Climate change, migration, and conflict are three separate concepts which are used to present the climate change, migration and conflict nexus in the Social Sciences literature. As a result, the literature, theoretical perspectives, and analytical lens used to explain the climate change, migration and conflict relationship are varied. In the 1970s and 1980s, researchers working in environmental change identified the potential of catastrophic effects of environment on human beings. Many researchers during this time published reports and articles on climate change and migration (for example Myers, 1993, 2002; Hugo, 1996; El-Hinnawi, 1985), and the literature has grown significantly ever since. In contrast, the relationship between conflict and climate change is a relatively new area of study which emerged in the 1990s and was developed more broadly in the early 21st century (Deligiannis, 2012). Researchers from various disciplines have considered the political and social impacts of climate change and developed our theoretical and empirical understanding of the connection between climate change and conflict (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Reuveny, 2007; Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007; Barnett, 2003; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007). The relationship between climate change and migration posits that migration due to climate change may be forced or voluntary; temporary or permanent; internal or international; and sometimes is an adaptation strategy (Drabo & Mbaye, 2011; Hugo, 2013; Hummel, Doevenspeck, & Samimi, 2012; Kartiki, 2011; McLeman, 2014). Climate change induced migration is also seen through positive and negative perspectives. Such migration

sometimes brings positive contributions to the host society through contributing to the economy and social development (IOM, 2010). Another positive lens portrays migration as a development strategy that increases social resilience in the face of mitigating climate vulnerabilities and shocks (Scheffran, Marmer, & Sow, 2012; Webber & Barnett, 2010). However, climate change induced migration may complicate the security of the host place, and sometimes transform into a source of conflict. Since the beginning of climate change and conflict research, many researchers have explored the impacts of increasing climatic events on security and the mechanisms leading to the formation of conflict in many locations across the world (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Burke, Hsiang, & Miguel, 2015; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Hsiang & Burke, 2014; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; Reuveny, 2007; Schleussner, Donges, Donner, & Schellnhuber, 2016).

Despite much development in the theoretical and empirical understanding of climate change and migration, and climate change and conflict, there is still limited understanding of the relationships between these phenomena. In the case of the relationship between climate change and migration, researchers consider the causal relationship as underdeveloped, case and region-specific and fragmented (Hugo, 2013; Piguet et al., 2011; Bardsley & Hugo, 2010). Thus, it is suggested there is a need to conduct more empirical research based on the local level case study in order to better understand this relationship (McLeman, 2014). The theorisation of the climate change and conflict relationship is also subject to criticisms on various grounds including methodology selection, causality analysis, regional bias, and the multicausal issues involved in most cases (Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007; Salehyan, 2008; Gleditsch, 2012; Buhaug, Gleditsch, & Theisen, 2010). Therefore, the relationship between climate change, migration and conflict is recognised as a complex and

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debated issue that requires more empirical studies to explore how climate change leads to migration and conflict in different locations across the world (Gleditsch, 2012; McLeman, 2014; Hendrix, 2018).

For this reason, the literature review in this chapter aims to provide a broad understanding by discussing the multiple views on climate change and migration, as well the climate change, migration and conflict relationship. It is presented in two parts: (a) the climate change and migration nexus, and (b) the climate change induced migration and conflict relationship, to develop a framework for answering the research questions. The first section assesses the literature on how climatic events act as a driver of migration. This section discusses theoretical arguments on when and how people migrate in response to climatic changes, such as floods and sea-level rise and what intervening, or mediating factors accomplish the migration process. It also deals with the debates about the relationship between climate change and migration, in particular, whether climate migration is forced, voluntary, the outcome of government failure or an adaptation strategy. The second section summarises and evaluates the current state of knowledge on how and under what conditions climate migration leads to conflicts. Although a great deal of research focuses on different perspectives of climate change and conflict in general, this section only reviews literature that focuses on the mechanisms and processes by which climate change induced migration can or has led to conflict. The final section addresses the major debates and the gaps in the research, as well as possibilities for further research.

2.2. Climate change and migration relationship

The general argument about the relationship between climate change and migration is that climatic events, both sudden and slow onset processes, complicate ecosystems and

the human living spaces, agriculture and livelihood options of millions of people in many

locations in the world. Under such conditions, climate affected people are forced to

migrate, or migrate voluntarily, to other locations. Climate change and environmental

disasters force people to migrate by destroying their homes and livelihoods (Marino &

Lazrus, 2015; Warner, Hamza, Oliver-Smith, Renaud, & Julca, 2010). In this sense, climatic

events play a deterministic role in displacing people from their place of origin. This type of

migration is often referred to as forced migration (Brown, 2007) as the affected people

have no other choice but to migrate in search of livelihood. Sometimes climate affected

people move to another location voluntarily in search of better opportunities and income.

The affected people calculate the cost and benefits of migration from their homes. The

climate change and migration relationship also posits that climate change events do not

play the determining role in displacing people, but a number of factors such as mobility of

people, the policy response by the government, uneven development, and socio-economic

status of a country influence the migration process (Raleigh & Jordan, 2010; Hugo 2013;

McLeman, 2014). Thus, existing explanations and frameworks include push, pull, and other

factors, as well as adaptation, to understand the relationship between climate change and

migration in any given place or situation. In relation to multiple causes, climate change and

migration research has also incorporated social class, inequality and mediating factors. The

current research project draws from this basis and builds on this body of research.

The most common framework for analysing the climate change and migration relationship

invokes climatic events as push factors that render the environment uninhabitable for local

people, reduce the resource base, and undermine the livelihood of people and

consequently force them to migrate (Marino & Lazrus, 2015; Piguet, Pécoud, & De

Guchteneire, 2011; Warner et al., 2010). As push factors, climatic events act as contextual

determinants of migration (Burrows & Kinney, 2016) that drive people from their homes in the hope of finding security and livelihood options elsewhere (Perch-Nielsen, Bättig, & Imboden, 2008; Foresight, 2011). This migration often occurs reluctantly and in stages. When sudden climatic events displace people, they first seek safety as near as possible to their homes, often in temporary shelters. If they are unable to make a quick return to their home, they move a shorter distance as temporary migrants**,** hoping to return to their place of origin as soon as possible (Bardsley & Hugo, 2010; Tacoli 2009; Raleigh & Jordan, 2010).

After destruction by climatic events, the short term shelter that is provided by the government does not usually enable people to maintain their lives for a longer period, particularly without assistance, and they need to find ways to make a living while they wait for the opportunity to return to their homes. Some factors such as adequate compensation, relief and rehabilitation facilities from the government enable some migrants to return to their homes (Perch-Nielsen et al., 2008; Zaman & Wiest, 1991). The return to place of origin depends on the availability of houses, infrastructure development, government relief, and social capital (McLeman, 2014). For example, McLeman (2014, p. 103) explains that in New Orleans, USA post hurricane Katrina, many people struggled to return to their homes due to a lack of housing, infrastructure and relief. In the case of this inability, some people decide to move permanently to another place. Permanent migration mostly happens when the damage done to their home is much higher than the capacity of the people to return to home, or in other words, when it exceeds a threshold, which may vary from person to person (McLeman, 2018; Bardsley & Hugo, 2010). For example, in Bangladesh, floods and river bank erosion destroy agricultural land, houses, freshwater

sources, and other means of livelihood, leading people to migrate to cities or to other rural

areas (Mallik and Vogt, 2012; Perch-Nielsen et al., 2008).

Nevertheless, climate change does not always operate as a push factor forcing people to

migrate. The capacity of people, community support, and timely intervention from the

state sometimes prevents the damage from climatic events from forcing people to

relocate, and helps them to remain in their homes. This means the social, economic, and

political conditions of an affected country determine the migration flow, either increasing

migration or reducing it (Piguet, 2008, p. 3). Climatic events also do not force people to

migrate suddenly, instead the sudden and gradual changes complicate the living place and

livelihood options and make the place unlivable. Walsham (2010) outlines the four

processes that determine climate change induced migration:

> intensifying natural disasters – both sudden and slow-onset – leading to increased
> displacement and migration; (b) shrinking and paralysing human security issues,
> such as: livelihoods, public health, food security and water availability; (c) rising sea
> level that make coastal areas uninhabitable; and (d) competition over scarce
> natural resources potentially leading to growing tensions and even conflict and, in
> turn, displacement (Walsham, 2010, p. 5).

Permanent migration due to climatic events depends on contextual factors. Economically

developed countries with sound technology and preparedness may soften the effects,

reduce the cost and help people to remain in their homes despite causalities and

destruction (Hugo, 2013; Raleigh & Jordan, 2010; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007). Social capital,

community relationships, and resources also help affected people to mitigate the shock

from climatic events. For example, McLeman (2014) considered that the social capital of

the Vietnamese community in New Orleans helped them to return to their home after

hurricane Katrina. The members of the community assisted their fellow people to return

and resettle (McLeman, 2014, p. 101). However, in the case of poor economic conditions

and weak technological capacity in underdeveloped and climate affected countries, people

are more exposed to climate vulnerabilities. This is because affected people may not receive timely assistance to shift to safe places and then return to rebuild their houses. In summary, an analysis of push factors reveals that people migrate when they lose everything and fail to receive adequate support from the government, local institutions and social networks.

Conversely, pull factors demonstrate that migration decisions of climate affected people are to some extent voluntary, and affected people may migrate to improve their economic position and overcome the hardships posed by climate vulnerability (Black, Kniveton, & Schmidt-Verkerk, 2013; Bardsley & Hugo, 2010). The choices for employment opportunities, improving income, and reducing vulnerabilities influence the decisions of some climate affected people to migrate (Black, Bennett, Thomas, & Beddington, 2011; Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2013). In the wake of climatic events, affected people try to face the risk and overcome it through the available resources and social capital. Migrating or staying in the place of origin may depend on the behaviour of the affected people (Black, Adger et al., 2011). Sometimes, family members, or at least one member, decide to migrate for more income so that the family left behind can overcome uncertainties (Beine & Parsons, 2015; Black, Arnell et al., 2013). Many families in low-lying areas of Bangladesh have sent at least one family member abroad to improve their economic conditions via returned remittances, and reduce vulnerability (Siddiqui, 2010; Siddiqui & Billah, 2014). Families also try to send family members to the local cities for work opportunities. This migration pattern follows the human agency and livelihood approach, which outlines that in the face of climatic events, affected people receive material assistance and emotional support from the family members and already settled people in order to settle in a new

place. This is called social networks and connections that motivate affected families to encourage a family member to migrate for income diversification (Hugo, 2008; Hummel et al., 2012). Social connection and support help to cushion the emotional impacts of being uprooted and facing significant personal challenges. For example, for farmers or agricultural labourers vulnerable to climatic events migrating often involves shifting out of agricultural work and finding other employment in urban areas.

Some researchers propose population mobility as a solution because through migration people can improve their economic conditions (Warner, 2010; Reuveny, 2007). This migration is also seen as a positive phenomenon because it offers people the opportunity to settle in a safe place and re-establish their lives without having to face continuing climatic events (Gemenne & Blocher, 2017; McLeman, 2014). It is part of a wider trend of rural-urban migration as it is urban centres and industrial areas where migrants can find work opportunities (Tacoli, McGranahan & Satterthwaite, 2015; Black, Adger et al., 2011). Some researchers argue that migration is an adaptation strategy for climate change instead of considering it as an impact (Bettini, 2014; Black, Bennett, et al., 2011; Klaiber, 2014). From this perspective, migration is seen in a positive light rather than as a burden (Scheffran, Marmer & Sow, 2012; Tacoli, 2009).

These contending ideas about climate change induced migration as 'burden' or 'adaptation' are connected to the debates on climate change induced displaced people as refugees or migrants. As stated in the introduction of this chapter, some researchers and human rights organisations are eager to define climate change induced mobility as refugee flows and call for international law to protect those involved (Biermann & Boas, 2010;

McAdam & Saul, 2010). Against this effort, the UNHCR argue that climate migrants should not be labelled as refugees because they continue to enjoy national protection while political refugees do not, and thus need international protection (UNHCR, 2002, p. 13). Furthermore, recent research suggests that many climate affected people are unwilling to be labelled as refugees and do not wish to be resettled in other countries (Luetz & Havea, 2018).

Migration as an adaptation strategy has also been subject of debate. Different contending arguments have been developed over time. One of the most important arguments in favour of migration as an adaptation is that it enables people to save their lives by resettling in a safe location (de Sherbinin et al., 2011). In this context, McLeman (2014, p. 63) argues that "migration is a possible strategy by which those facing adverse climatic conditions may act to reduce the potential for loss or harm". This also applies to international migration which provides migrants and their origin country with the remittances and other resources sent back to their place of origin. Migrants have the potentials to help the host country by sharing knowledge, technology and providing services (World Bank, 2017).

Despite the arguments in favour of migration as an adaptation strategy, there are a number of counter-arguments. In the wake of climatic events, the affected people try to stay in their homes instead of adopting migration as a first act (Tacoli, 2009). A study based on the information of six million de-identified mobile phone users in Bangladesh after the cyclone Mahasen has found the weak correlation between the outmigration and effects of the cyclone (Lu et al. 2016). The worst affected people who lost everything migrated near

to towns near their place of origin. Permanent migration after the cyclone was very low, as most of the affected people returned to their place or origin after few months. This suggests that migration from one place to another depends on other issues such as financial cost, emotional attachment to homes and family members, and uncertainty (McLeman, 2014). Climate change migration is also seen as an outcome of the failure of the political system, government, and social networks. Unregulated migration can weaken the community and nation as a whole by imposing tremendous pressure on the existing labour forces and slowing development processes in the place of origin (Barnett & Campbell, 2010; Connell, 2003). In the face of growing migration, the affected area or country may face shortages of skilled labour which could slow their economic activity. Although climate migration may relieve the pressure on climate affected people and locations, it can also create resource scarcity, competition, crime, insecurity, and conflict in the host society (Blocher, 2016; Barnett & Adger, 2007; Reuveny, 2007, 2008). The migration of new groups may bring negative social, economic and political consequences for multicultural or ethnic minorities and subsequently lead to social and political instability.

The relationship between climate change and migration is widely discussed as either a push, pull or adaptation strategy, however, each framework has limitations and thus is not able to present a holistic picture. Thus, the relationship between climate change and migration is a complex process with multi-causal issues (Hugo, 2013; McLeman, 2014). No single factor (push or pull) can determine migration, but composite factors such as networking, human agency, demographic, political and social issues contribute to the migration decisions of climate affected people (Hugo, 2013; McLeman, 2014; Piguet et al., 2011). People living in economically poor countries with high population density and social

and political problems more often seek better living in other places (Black et. al., 2008, p. 11). In this context, climate change effects can be an additional factor that accelerates the tendency to migration, because people seek livelihood and resources as well as deserve to save their life from disasters (Black et al., 2008). Frequent and sudden climatic events, thus, influence people to move to a safer place. Other factors such as social relations, dependence, assurance, and assistance open up the channels for migration (Hugo, 2013). Government support and migration friendly policies also encourage climate affected people to migrate. In this sense, migration is seen as a 'social product' (Hummel et al., 2012) where social, political, and economic issues influence the migration decisions of people. Family connections, links to people who have already migrated, government and institutions represent a network that migrants can use and accomplish their migration process. Assurances by the government and institutional help at times assist people to migrate, even if the place they want to go to is adverse and situated a long distance away (Hugo, 2013). These other factors are known as intervening or mediating factors of migration and include transportation, networks, institutions, communication and resources that influence people to migrate (Black, Adger et al., 2011; Lilleør & Van den Broeck, 2011; McLeman, 2014; Reuveny, 2008). The role of mediating factors may accelerate or hinder population movement.

Some researchers invoke the role of social class and inequality when analysing the climate change and migration relationship (Liu, 2015; Paavola & Adger, 2006). Poor and socially marginalised people are more prone to climate change migration. Climatic events adversely affect the poor, landless and ethnic minority people. It also acts to break social networks and family relationships when some people move to the cities while other family

members remain in the place of origin. The poor economic conditions and social breakups lead some people to migrate permanently (Raleigh & Jordan, 2010, p. 112). The failure of the state system also plays a role in accelerating the migration process (Castles, 2002; Oliver-Smith, 2009). In less developed countries, corrupt practices by the public and NGO officials also affect the poor people because many times relief and assistance are not distributed to the affected people (Mahmud & Prowse, 2012). Instead, politicians and officeholders keep the resources for themselves. Corruption in any form affects disaster risk reduction, adaptation and mitigation and also generates crimes and violence in the affected society (Alexander, 2017).

In previous sections, different frameworks have explained the relationship, mechanisms and processes of climate change and migration, but in each framework, the issue of intervening and mediating factors are either overlooked or missing. Indeed, migration, whether it is regular or climate change induced, depends on mediating or intervening factors. The forced, voluntary or adaptation analysis of climate change induced migration is determined by a number of intervening or mediating factors (McLeman, 2014; Hugo, 2013). Overpopulation, income inequality, poverty, discrimination and scarcity of resources are the contextual factors which become complicated in the face of adverse effects of climate change. These complex situations generate the migration situation, however the process of migration is accomplished by mediating factors. These factors may include government policies, networks, family connections and migration history which influence the migration decisions of climate affected people (Brown, 2007; Raleigh & Jordan, 2010; Reuveny, 2007; Hugo, 2013; McLeman, 2014). Social networks, information, and family connections play a crucial mediating role in facilitating migration processes (Reuveny,

2008). Other mediating factors such as historical connections, cultural factors, behavioural attribute, and socio-political conditions help the aspirant people to make a decision to migrate (McLeman, 2014; Hugo, 2013). Security and political circumstances also act as mediating factors because governments and other political institutions control and promote migration for their own interests and benefit (McLeman, 2014). During the process of migration, some norms in migration pathways, values and expectations among people who migrate are developed by mediating factors. Thus, mediating factors describe a diverse set of inter-related social, behavioural, institutional and political factors that contribute to migration decisions which emerge from a combination of elements such as culture, geography, politics, economics, history, environment and demography (Van Hear, Bakewell & Long, 2018, p. 933).

It is clear from the above discussion that the core idea of the climate change and migration nexus is that increasing climatic events in association with resource scarcity and social effects, such as poverty and economic underdevelopment, generate migration. Both sudden and slow onset climatic events create resource scarcity by diminishing resource stock and degrading resources. The people affected in such conditions struggle to manage their livelihood. They require assistance, relief, and government support to mitigate climate risk and remain in their homes, and when assistance and support are inadequate they migrate. Climate change displacement interacts with social and political circumstances such as poverty, discrimination, social exclusion, political instability and corruption that encourages people to migrate from their place of origin. Climate migration is more often internal than international because many people hope to return to their homes following disasters, or maintain a close connection with family members left behind. As a whole, it is

a complex process where multiple issues work together to determine the migration decision. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: Causal relationships between climate change and migration with other drivers

Source: Based on the framework on climate change and migration relationship developed by Foresight report, 2011. This figure is adapted for the current study and may not be applicable in other case studies.

Figure 2.1 shows that push, pull and contextual factors influence the migration decision of the climate affected people. The behavioural factors also influence the migration decision. However, the climate affected people may have two options such as migrate to another place or stay at their place of origin despite faced by single or multiple factors. The affected people only migrate when they lost everything to survive, and expect to have opportunities in the destination place. It means that decision of migration depends on multiple factors.

2.3. The nexus between climate change, migration and conflict

How climate changes generate conflict is the second layer of analysis of climate change, migration and conflict. The argument regarding the climate change and conflict relationship is that droughts, rainfall shortages, and temperature variations lead to water scarcity, failure of agriculture production, interruption to cattle rearing, and famine, which consequently leads to violence and conflict between and among groups (Gleick, 2014; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Hsiang, Burke & Miguel, 2013). The relationship between climate change and conflict is unpredictable and complex because there is no direct connection between the elements. Most studies have used quantitative studies to find the causality between global warming and increasing incidence of violence and conflict (Theisen, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013; Ide & Scheffran, 2014). Moreover, the majority of the examples of climate change induced conflict are centred on Africa and the Middle-East. Prolonged drought and rainfall shortages in those regions have reduced the economic activity and water sources. Water scarcity has consequently created situations of conflict in some locations between and among states in these regions (Bernauer & Siegfried, 2012; Feitelson, Tamimi & Rosenthal, 2012). Research has been undertaken to explore how climate change and climate displaced people affect the indigenous people across the world. The indigenous and minority communities in various countries possess distinct characteristics and livelihood options (Ford et al., 2016). Climate change effects and the subsequent migration of different people intervene in the economy, social relations and livelihood options (Adger et al., 2014).

The literature on the relationship between climate change and conflict emerged at the beginning of the 21st Century, however it has a connection with earlier literature from the 1990s demonstrating linkages between environmental resource scarcity and violence

(Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994; Homer-Dixon, Boutwell, & Rathjens, 1993). Environmental conflict refers to the political, social, economic, ethnic, religious and territorial conflict that may cause resource scarcity, resource exploitation and overuse (Baechler, 1998). Some researchers refer to national and human security issues in order to analyse the environmental conflict issue (Barnett, 2003; Barnett & Adger, 2007; Gleick, 1989). Environmental changes influence national and human security by paralysing the vital resources on which state stability and human livelihood depend. Homer-Dixon (2007) in the New York Times (2007, p. A25) stated that "climate change events have potential to cause conflict and violence in the form of insurgency, genocide, guerrilla attacks, gang warfare, and global terrorism". The IPCC in its 5th assessment report also noted the potential for climate change to affect human security and generate conflict (Adger et al., 2014).

Nevertheless, the questions of how and what forms of conflict climate change generates, and under what conditions, still need to be explored. As mentioned in Chapter One, conflict in the context of climate change tends to be small-scale, local level and social, causing internal disturbances, civil strife, and ethnic rivalry. This definition of climate change and conflict correlates to the definition of war, conflict, and environmental conflict, because parties, issues, and incompatibilities are also the key issues of analysing climate change and conflict. Generally, conflict is defined by conflict researchers as a situation where two or more parties are engaged to achieve mutually incompatible goals(Mitchell, 1989, p. 17). The term conflict is often used synonymously with some a number of other terms, such as hostilities, tension, disharmony, struggle, antagonism. Along with various meanings the term conflict also takes various forms and scales, such as interpersonal, inter-communal, inter-state, intra-state, group conflict and international conflict (Mitchell,

1989). Defining the relationship between climate change and conflict is an arduous task as most of the conflict issues are internal in nature. Conflict taking place within state borders is most likely to encompass multiple factors such as social, economic, government failure, ethnic division and past record of conflict. This section consequently focuses on the theoretical understanding of climate change and conflict relations in general, and climate change induced migration and conflict in particular.

The literature on the climate change and conflict relationship posits that climatic events have impacts on generating resource scarcity, which then become a catalyst for conflicts and violence (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; Barnett & Adger, 2007). Climate change in some locations indiscriminately affects people, reducing their resource base, and the capacity of the environment on which humans depend. In such situations, some important social effects, such as resource scarcity and resource competition, develop, which eventually lead to conflict and violence. Resource scarcity only results in conflict when a zero-sum competition for the resources is organised between and among the groups. In such cases, some groups are totally deprived of their basic needs. Political authorities may fail to manage the scarce resources and accommodate all groups of people and as a result, situations of conflict and violence occur (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kahl, 2006). This explanation is part of the 'neo-Malthusian' analysis which promulgates that population pressure on resources either from increasing population or migration leads societies closer to civil conflict and violence (Urdal, 2005; Hendrix & Glaser, 2007; Verhoeven, 2011). Countries heavily dependent on primary environmental resources are also more prone to conflict and violence if resources are degraded and depleted due to changes in precipitation and increasing temperatures which are likely to be results of accelerated climate change (Homer-Dixon, 1999). McLeman, (2014, p. 214) has presented

the climate change induced resource scarcity and conflict relationship shown in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Relationship between resource scarcity and conflict

Source: (McLeman, 2014, p. 214).

According to Figure 2.2, people in any given society depend on resources which come from nature for their livelihood: climate change greatly affects the livelihood options and resources and consequently generates resource scarcity. Subsequently resource scarcity and the interaction of individuals and groups sometimes results in conflict and violence. The explanation of climate change, scarcity and conflict is based on qualitative and case studies which enabled the researcher to derive the underlying impacts of climate change in the social, economic and political context. Although the nexus of climate change, resource scarcity and conflict has a strong basis, it does not provide new explanations but has instead echoed the explanation of resource scarcity and violence developed in the 1990s (Buhaug, Gleditsch & Theisen, 2010). Moreover, there are shortcomings within the theory of this causal relationship of climate change, resource scarcity and conflict. Some studies have found that resource scarcity has fewer impacts on generating conflict and violence in poor and undeveloped countries. Another study argues that scarcity of resources such as land and pasture have insignificant implications in generating armed conflicts (De Soysa, & Neumayer, 2007). The local level arrangement of land distribution and conflict

management mechanisms with effective institutions may help to allocate the existing

resources among the contending groups and minimise the conflict (Soysa, 2002). However,

effective resource and conflict management in the face of resource scarcity is extremely

difficult to achieve in poor and underdeveloped countries due to poverty, the behaviour of

the political elites and lack of knowledge among the people. Countries experiencing

poverty, resource scarcity, and population pressure, as well as lack of ingenuity power

(Homer-Dixon, 1999) are hardly able to accommodate all sections of the population. Under

such conditions, competition and conflict inevitably emerge.

Some researchers state that climate change and disasters do not directly cause conflict, but

rather, they function as a 'threat multiplier' that triggers conflicts (Schleussner, Donges,

Donner, & Schellnhuber, 2016). Threat multipliers are the cumulative effects of climate

change on social, economic and political conditions (Scheffran, 2011). Poor countries are

more prone to conflict in the face of increasing climate change due to their poor economy,

dependence on subsistence agriculture, weak infrastructure, and poor record of human

development (Brinkerhoff, 2011). This explanatory approach is known as a multi-causal

issue of conflict analysis. Climate and environmental stresses with other factors generate

situations of conflict. Climate change as a 'threat multiplier' affects the human security of

people who already live in fragile places due to poverty, poor infrastructure and high

population density (Barnett, 2003; Barnett & Adger, 2007; Christiansen, 2016). Human

security is generally defined as ensuring livelihood and life-supporting systems (Human

Security Centre, 2005; Paris 2001), and the sudden, or slow, onset of climate processes

seriously undermines these systems. Population pressure, poverty and poor governance in

the climate affected regions or country mostly complicate the human security (Kahl, 2006;

Brauch, 2014). The link between climate change, human security and conflict is not a

separate issue, but it is connected with analysis of how livelihood and scarcity of resources generate conflict. The failure of food and shelter and resource scarcity undermine the human security of the poor people who are forced to engage in competition for resources with contending groups. In such situations, resource capture by the powerful people pushes the poor people to be marginalised socially, economically and environmentally which may intensify human insecurity (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Adger et al., 2014).

Climate change induced mass migration and the potential for conflict and violence are the strongest links in the analysis of the climate change and conflict nexus (Gleditsch, Nordas & Salehyan, 2007). Climate migrants may generate conflict in the host place through complicating the existing social, economic and political conditions (Null & Risi, 2016). In poor and underdeveloped societies, any form of migration puts pressure on the existing resources in the place of settlement. In such conditions, climate change induced migrants compete with long-term residents in the host society for vital resources, such as land and forest, and this can become a source of conflict and violence (Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; Reuveny, 2007, 2008; Hendrix & Glaser, 2007). However, population mobility due to climate change is not the only factor to generate conflict, other factors such as resource capture and resource exploitation constitute an important ground for originating conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Gleditsch et al., 2007). In some instances, government and political elites also compete for the resources and usurp them using their position of power (Reuveny, 2007, p. 659). This situation may generate conflict and violence when each group mobilises against the other and opposes sharing resources (Reuveny, 2007, 2008). The role of government and institutions in such cases either defuses the conflict or instigates it by supporting one group over others. For example, in 2018 the BJP government in India strongly supports and provide assistance to the local Assamese people

against the Bengali migrant and trying to deport a large number of migrants. The behaviour and policy of the government act as a factor reigniting conflict between local people and migrants in the region (Bhaumik, 2018).

In some cases, government and military may be engaged in exploiting resources and depriving local people who depend on them which causes further frustration and conflict (Barnett, 2001). Underdeveloped countries are probable contexts for such conflict originating because governments are more likely to fail to accommodate climate change induced migrants with livelihood and shelter. Furthermore, the government sometimes support one group and pursues interests other than the greater public good because democratic processes in some developing countries are weak and governance systems corrupt. This situation is more prevalent where ethnic or minority people live and demand autonomy or right to self-determination from the state. The government in such situations tend to suppress the minority or ethnic group supporting other community members or groups through empowering and providing opportunities (Gurr, 1994, 2000). Stewart Holdstock and Jarquin (2002, p. 343) has termed this situation as 'group inequality' where a particular group does not get access to political and economic opportunities due to the state mechanism. Newly emerging democratic countries with poor economic conditions and week institutions are most likely to become unable to accommodate the demands of the minority ethnic groups (Harff & Gurr, 2018).

Climate change induced migration also contributes to conflict by altering the demographic composition of a country or a region, which can become a source of insecurity and conflict. The sudden migration of a large number of people weakens political legitimacy to rule the population if the government fails to provide basic services to people and the host location

may experience problems such as social breakdown, ecological collapse, and political and ethnic differences which trigger conflict (Adger et al., 2014; Verhoeven, 2011). Moreover, densely populated climate change affected countries are more prone to violence and conflict (Raleigh & Urdal, 2007, p. 675; Goldstone, 2002) as the increasing population puts excessive pressure on vital resources such as fresh water, land, food, and housing, and climate events can trigger civil unrest, violence, riots, and organised crime (Kahl, 1998, 2006). The increasing climate change effects destroy the natural resources as well as diminish the capacity of the resource to meet the demand of the people. The consequent situation greatly affects the social, economic and political situation of the affected countries. Diamond (2005) argues, climate stress and overpopulation make the political system and government weak and vulnerable to collapse. Due to their inability to provide basic needs, people become desperate; seeing no hope for their future they blame the government and become involved in illegal activities. People also see the government as responsible for their misfortune and behave irrationally: they fight, seize land from other people, and become desperate to migrate. Eventually, people become involved in serious conflict and violence (Diamond, 2005, p.516). However, the connection of climate change, resource shrinking, population pressure and outbreak of conflict may not happen in all climate affected regions. Good governance can manage the changing environment with the demand of the population. Moreover, this causal analysis has ignored the ability of the people to adapt to the changing environment and their inherent qualities to share the existing resources. Such adaptive capabilities most likely help people avoid conflict in the face of climate change (Hartmann, 2010, p. 237).

In the case of already existing conflict, climate change aggravates the conflict situation because it causes increased resource scarcity and population displacement. For example,

many countries in the sub-Saharan region have a long history of ethnic and political conflict. Climatic events (prolonged drought, rainfall shortages, and increasing temperatures) have paralysed the rural and regional economy and provided the trigger for civil strife. Political leaders have failed to allocate resources to the people. In these cases, climate change has played a role in increasing the existing conflict (Hendrix & Glaser, 2007; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Raleigh, 2010). Hence, the existing conflict in the region has been aggravated due to the scarcity of resources, the inability of the government to provide basic needs, and competition for the resources among groups.

Climate change induced migration may also cause insecurity and violence in an ethnically divided society. Some sources argue that the migration and conflict link is more visible if the area is inhabited by people with diverse cultural backgrounds (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Raleigh, 2010; Adger et al., 2014). Cultural practices, local knowledge, and lifestyles of the local ethnic people are affected by the influx of new migrants who bring their own cultural practices with them, and this generates tension between the established and new communities (Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002; Weiner, 1992). When migration flows are large they may also threaten the actual existence of ethnic minority people by interfering with their culture, resources, and livelihood practices (Dove, 2006; Swain, 1996b; Goldstone, 2002). Reuveny (2007, p. 659) argues that the migration of new people may generate 'ethnic tension' and 'distrust' between and among the communities and the consequent insecurity and fear of losing livelihood options can result in conflict and violence. For example, the conflict between Bengali migrants and tribal people in Assam in India is understood as environmental migration-induced conflict (Hazarika, 1993; Alam, 2003). Although the conflict in Assam is widely viewed as the political conflict, it has connection with environmental induced migration of the Bengali people. The migration

and settlement of the Bengali population to the CHT in Bangladesh has also escalated the conflicts by changing the ethnic composition of the region and increasing the rift, division, and polarisation between the communities. Some researchers argue that environmental induced and poor Bengali people mostly migrated to the CHT and intensified the tension and conflict in the region (Hafiz & Islam, 1993; Lee, 2001; Reuveny, 2007).

The connection between ethnic division and conflict at times depends on the behaviour of the state and treatment by the political authority to the minority people. Unequal treatment, hegemonic control, and deprivation of the ethnic minority community result in a sense of exploitation and marginalisation (Clarke, 2001). In such cases, the ruling elites complicate the situation when they either deprive one group of people access to vital resources or facilitate another group's access to the same resources. However, developed countries such as Canada, Australia and some European countries have been able to manage the migration issue effectively by careful resource allocation and distribution and enabling migrants to access required services (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2013). In contrast, climate change induced poor people from the global South have less opportunity to migrate to developed countries. Moreover, the developed countries regulate the migration process to meet their demographic and economic needs. In such situations, actual conflict is absent between the host and migrant people. But there may still be conflict in the form of discrimination, or the identification of new groups.

An important example of the climate change and conflict relationship is Darfur, Sudan. An eighteen-month study by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has explored how the drought in the Darfur region has reignited long-standing conflict. Rainfall shortages reduced crop yields and caused resource scarcity, as a result, the people from

northern Darfur who were affected by the drought, migrated to the southern and central

areas in waves. After migration, they began to claim land for pastoral and agricultural use.

This migration generated tension and conflict between the two groups (Borger, 2007;

Kevane & Gray, 2008). This claim over land and livelihood gradually turned into a violent

conflict. Although climatic events such as drought complicated agriculture and livelihood,

the political failure, breakdown of national institutions and the role of national elites

contributed to escalating the conflict (Verhoeven, 2011). For example, in the case of Darfur

it has been argued that the involvement of the Sudanese government in supporting certain

groups with arms and encouragement rather than climate change has been more

instrumental in transforming competition over resources into a violent conflict. If the

Sudanese government had instead made efforts to minimise or address the resource

competition arising from migration into the region, this conflict may have been averted

(Brown, Hammill, & McLeman, 2007). In this situation, different issues such as past conflict

history, social divisions and political failure, in addition to prolonged drought, contributed

to developing conflict and escalating it to a new level. The example of climate change,

migration and conflict is similarly visible in other locations where climate change effects

indiscriminately force people to migrate from their place of origin, and the destination

place is not capable to accommodate the new migrant people. Different models and

frameworks explain the relationship between climate change and conflict. But Figure 2.3

capture the relationship between climate change induced migration and conflict more

comprehensively.

Figure 2.3: Possible pathways of climate change and conflict

Source: (Buhaug, Gleditsch, Theisen, Mearns, & Norton, 2010, p. 82).

Figure 2.3 shows that climate change events have implications for migration and resource scarcity. Migration itself has the potential to cause resource scarcity in the destination locations and this means migration is viewed as the cause and effect of the conflict (Buhaug et al., 2010, p. 86). However, climate change induced migration sometimes contributes to the economy of the host society. For example, migration to developed countries such as Australia does not cause resource scarcity; rather, the migration is carefully managed by the state and designed so that migrants contribute to the economy (Hugo, 2014). In the case of underdeveloped countries, it becomes extremely difficult to manage migration flows as the affected people need immediate shelter and food and their movement may be unrestricted. The poor economic condition and climate change effects hinder the country from providing basic services to the citizens, thus they move to any suitable place. Migration of climate change induced people in such a context most likely causes resource scarcity as the migrants put pressure on existing resources. Resource scarcity in association with socio-political and demographic factors may generate conflict situations in such societies where the social and political system fails to provide migrant people with services.

The discussion in this chapter connects three threads, climate change, migration and conflict. At the first level of the relationship, climatic events generate daunting challenges such as resource scarcity, livelihood failure, and damage to agriculture and living places, all of which contribute to weakening the social and political system. The second layer of this relationship is migration which is caused by climatic events. A number of interconnected pathways such as destroying livelihood options, damage to houses and the displacement of poor people have characterised the climate change and migration relationship. Migration of poor people under these conditions is an inevitable issue as climate change forces

people to migrate. The capacity for resilience and external support also influences whether or not affected people stay in their homes or migrate to another place for a better life. The last layer of the relationship is the conflict situation, which is the most unpredictable because conflict may not occur in all cases of climate change induced migration. Conflict only occurs when climate change induced people pose threats to the existing resources, challenge local and regional security issues, and change the demographic composition. In these situations, the relationship between climate change and conflict is indirect where migration acts as a trigger to generate conflict. Migration also escalates existing conflicts through complicating the social, political and economic conditions of the host place. This is sometimes referred to as a 'threat multiplier' (Scheffran, 2011) because it exacerbates conflict in a society.

The relationship between climate change, migration and conflict is clearly very complex and not fully understood (Gleditsch, 2012). Moreover, concrete evidence of climate change induced conflict is lacking. To date, the studies that exist are regionally biased, as most of the empirical studies have been conducted in underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Those regions have already experienced conflict and violence before being hit by extreme climatic events, thus drawing a general conclusion based on regional data and research output may not provide a comprehensive understanding of the climate change and conflict relationship (Nordås & Gleditsch, 2015). As these regions have a historical legacy of conflict and record of human rights violation climate change effects in this context act not as the only factor, but rather, may act as triggering factors for conflict formation. Factors such as socio-economic conditions, political structures, conflict history, and ethnic heterogeneity are responsible for originating conflicts in many poor countries. Resource scarcity sometimes encourages conflicting parties to join negotiations and

cooperate in sharing resources instead of engaging in conflict (Dinar, 2009, p. 809). Good government can manage the scarcity of resources as well as manage the frustration of people due to resource scarcity.

2.4. Conclusion: current knowledge and research gaps

In conclusion, it can be argued that the academic literature exploring the climate change, migration and conflict relationship is vast, complex and manifold. From this review, it is seen that the climate change and migration nexus has received a great deal of scholarly and policy attention which outlines that climate change effects, in connection with other forces such as pull influences and networks, sometimes force people to migrate. The core issue is the displacement from the place of origin to another location for livelihood and shelter. In fact, climate change induced migration is an old phenomenon. Over different periods of time people have abandoned their homes and migrated to another place to overcome adverse environmental conditions (McLeman, 2014), however since the middle of the 20th century rapid climate changes and their associated events have displaced more people from their homes than in any other period. Thus, researchers and policy analysts have called for more empirical research to explore the complex and interconnected issues of climate change and migration. On the other hand, the linkages between climate change, migration and conflict are a comparatively new research issue and still in a formative phase due to lack of established cases, evidence, theories and frameworks that link accelerated climate change to conflict. This is because the nexus of climate change, migration and conflict are explored in varied ways applying multiple methods and techniques. For example, qualitative approach and case studies have applied to explore how the resource scarcity may generate conflict and violence in different locations (Homer-Dixon, 1999).

Some studies have applied regression analysis to find the direct link between climate change and conflict (Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998; Hendrix & Glaser 2007), however all these approaches and models are subject to criticism because they struggle to provide accurate causal linkages between climate change and conflict. Thus, some researchers turn to broader analysis of the climate change and conflict relationship incorporating social, political and economic conditions with climate impacts. This multi-causal analysis considers climatic events in connection with social, political and economic factors which complicate the demographic and socio-political variables that eventually form conflict (Salehyan, 2014).

The literature review also reveals that researchers explore the relationship between climate change and migration; and climate change and conflict separately. In both cases, some researchers are sceptical and critical about causal relationships. Therefore, it is suggested that in both cases there is a need to conduct more empirical research to substantiate the findings. Surprisingly, very little research and few studies have integrated the climate change, migration and conflict relationship to explore the complex relationship and underlying mechanisms. This is one of the areas which needs investigation to see how climate change and migration, as well as climate change induced migration and conflict operate at a single local level. A local level case study based on empirical research should provide a more robust research result to substantiate the linkages between climate change, migration and conflict (Hendrix, 2018).

The literature review also illustrates that different approaches and methods have been applied to see the relationships between climate change, migration and conflict. Most of the quantitative studies have focused on the causality link between climate changes and

occurrences of violence and conflict. These studies have found strong, moderate or weak relationships between these elements (Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013; Hendrix, & Salehyan, 2012), however there is no comprehensive theory or understanding of this connection because evidence of climate change conflict is mostly focused on the African region. In this context detailed field work, particularly in other climate hotspots, would assist in understanding how climate change and migration operate as threat multipliers and how the climate change induced migrants behave in the host place. The combining of methods, or mixed methods (Creswell & Clark, 2017), may assist in comprehending the complexity of climate change, migration and conflict relationships. The conflict generating aspect of climate change and migration is also unexplored; especially if migration happens in a place where there is prior resource scarcity and the host society is already in conflict regarding their identity and self-determination. Thus, a local level study would be an important source for developing knowledge about climate change and conflicts as well as developing management approaches to mitigate the issues which emerge from migrant settlement.

In seeking to address this research gap of how climate change, migration and conflict operate at a local level, the current study on Bangladesh is an endeavour to see how climate changes contributed to migration and conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. This study is important as the region is already conflict-prone, and Bangladesh is one of the most climate affected countries in the world. In the next chapter, I provide the context in Bangladesh for exploring the impact of climate change in the migration decision of people, as well as how the migration process contributes to the conflict in the CHT in Bangladesh.

CHAPTER THREE

CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND CONFLICT ISSUES IN BANGLADESH

3.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the context of the study presupposing that environment and climate change induced migration from the lowland and rural areas to the CHT has connections with the conflict and violence in the region. Bangladesh is already regarded as one of the most climate change affected countries in the world (IPCC, 2014; Maplecroft, 2011). The location of the country, its riverine character as a floodplain and lower riparian position in the Ganges basin have positioned the country as a victim of floods, cyclones, coastal erosion and drought (Agrawala et al., 2003; Brouwer et al., 2007; Mirza & Ahmad, 2005). Poor socio-economic conditions and overpopulation have also made the country vulnerable to climate change risks (Shamsuddoha & Chowdhury, 2007).

Climate change issues, both slow processes (sea-level rise, drought and desertification) and sudden processes (floods, cyclones and river bank erosion), are affecting the environment, livelihood and overall development of Bangladesh. One of the most crucial impacts of climatic events is human displacement and migration. Different studies have offered estimates of the likely displacement of people in Bangladesh due to environment and climatic events, such as "13.5 million people by 2050" (Rigaud et al., 2018, p. 144) and "around 50 million people by 2050" (Shamsuddoha & Chowdhury, 2007, p. 763). Although the majority of internal migration is to cities such as Dhaka, Khulna and Chittagong (Afsar,

2003; Bryan, Chowdhury, & Mobarak, 2014; Siddiqui, 2005), a significant number of migrants have settled in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) with the help of successive governments. A number of studies have argued that successive governments at various times have used resettlement as a way to reduce population pressure and avoid environmental vulnerabilities (Lee, 1997; Reuveny, 2007; Suhrke, 1997).

The CHT is a distinct and unique area in Bangladesh which has a history of occupation by foreign rulers such as the Arakan and British colonial powers (Van Schendel, Mey, & Dewan, 2000; Mohsin, 1997). When British colonial rule ended in the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the CHT region came under Pakistani rule, and eventually became part of Bangladesh in 1971. The culture, lifestyle, and patterns of livelihood of the tribal people of this area are sharply different from the mainstream Bengali majority (Uddin, 2010). Thus, immediately after the independence of Bangladesh, leaders of the CHT demanded autonomy, retention of the 1900 CHT manual (Regulation of 1900 Act), the constitutional recognition of their separate identity and a ban on the influx of non-tribal people into the CHT (Mohsin, 1997, pp. 57-58; Levene, 1999). However, this was denied by successive governments. After 1975 the region experienced ethno-political conflict between the Bangladesh army and Shanti Bahini. As stated in Chapter One, tribal political leaders of the PCJSS formed Shanti Bahini to lend force to their demands for self-determination and human rights in the CHT. When political pressure failed, the Shanti Bahini became involved in violent conflict with the army. Instead of resolving the conflict, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) adopted suppressive measures, including the migration and settlement programs of Bengali people in the CHT which brought major changes to the social and economic conditions in the region (Chakma, 2010a; Yasmin, 2014). Although the signing of

a Peace Accord in 1997 between the combatants ended the armed conflict, a broad form of social conflict between the Bengali settlers and tribal people continues to affect every sphere of life in the CHT.

This chapter first presents the demographic scenario of Bangladesh in order to develop the idea of how the size of the population has increased over time. This assists in understanding the relationship between population pressure and migration. Secondly, this chapter discusses the state of climatic events and how climatic events influence internal displacement and migration in the lowland and rural areas in Bangladesh. The chapter then describes the migration of Bengali people to the CHT, and the demographic transformation this has produced in the region. This is followed by a discussion of the existing research in a broad context of the CHT conflict and how the migration is connected to it. The chapter ends by articulating the gaps in the research for this thesis, namely to explore whether and how climatic events influenced the migration process and the conflict situation in the CHT.

3.2. The demographic scenario in Bangladesh

Demography is an important factor in the overall socio-economic and development issues in Bangladesh. The population size in 1974 was 76 million and by 2011, when the last population census was conducted, it had almost doubled (Figure 3.1). The population in 2018 was more than 166 million and the population density is more than 1250 per square kilometre (World Population Review, 2018). This large population size has both positive and negative implications. From a positive standpoint, a growing population entails a large workforce able to contribute to the economy through exploring production opportunities and exporting possibilities. In the last two decades, the labour force, which was exported

to the Middle East and developed countries, has earned billions of dollars and contributed significantly to remittances returned to Bangladesh (Chowdhury, 2011; Siddiqui, 2005).

Figure 3.1: Population trends in Bangladesh, (1940-2016).

Sources: Developed by the researcher based on population census in Bangladesh.

However, overpopulation is significantly affecting the overall development of Bangladesh. The population pressure causes unemployment, pressure on resources, land scarcity and increases the gap between rural and urban areas. The significant impact of the increasing population is the shrinking of per capita land. It is a fact that Bangladesh is one of the most land-scarce countries in the world with only 12.5 decimals[4] per capita (Quasem, 2011, p. 59). The high population growth rate has caused land fragmentation which hinders the introduction of modern agricultural technologies and leads to reduced productivity (Rahman & Rahman, 2009). Population pressure, poverty and declining arable land are key factors in a growing number of people migrating from rural areas to other places within and beyond the country for income opportunities and a better future.

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[4] A decimal (also spelled decimel) is a unit of area in India and Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m²). 1 decimal is equal to 435.6 sq feet.

3.3. Climate change issues

As one of the largest deltas in the world (See Figure 3.2) Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to climatic events. This vulnerability is due to its low elevation above sea level, downstream location and floodplain dominance.

Figure 3.2: Delta areas in Bangladesh

Source: Banglapedia - the National Encyclopaedia of Bangladesh, 2012.

About climate change induced disasters Quencez (2011, p. 59) notes that "Bangladesh is already considered to have the highest risk of flooding out of 162 countries; the third highest risk of tsunamis out of 76 countries; the sixth highest in terms of cyclone threat of 89 countries; the 63rd out of 184 for drought and 35th out of 162 prone to landslides". The following sections provide a description of the major climate change issues in Bangladesh.

3.3.1. Sudden climatic events: floods and cyclones

Sudden climatic events such as floods, cyclone and river erosion are major concerns for Bangladesh. These three events occur every year and cause detrimental impacts on the population, eco-systems and overall development. Floods are an inescapable fact for many people in Bangladesh (Walsham, 2010). Every year Bangladesh experiences floods which inundate at least 30 percent of the landmass. In extreme cases, 70 percent of the country is under flood (Mirza, Warrick, & Ericksen, 2003, p. 287). Over the last two decades, the country has experienced six devastating floods, along with annual flooding, which have caused the displacement of 30-45 million people from their homes (Walsham, 2010, p. 9). The severe floods in 2007 inundated a 32,000 Km² area affecting 16 million people and three million households (Walsham, 2010, p. 10). Floods also damage essential infrastructure, agricultural fields and crops in the country almost every year. As the country is crisscrossed by hundreds of rivers, the government of Bangladesh has constructed embankments to protect the habitat and agricultural land. However, floods damage the embankments, destroy crops, land and houses, which also forces millions of people to become homeless and displaced. Figure 3.3 shows that most parts of the country are affected by floods.

Figure 3.3: Flood prone regions in Bangladesh

Source: Source: Climate Change Cell, 2006.

Moreover, floods cause water logging in low-lying areas and make the living places
unliveable. People in some locations such as Khulna, Barisal, Satkhira, Coxes Bazar and
Patuakhali district suffer most from the water logging.

Another sudden onset climatic event is the cyclone and storms. The country is faced with the different forms of cyclone and storms which are significant security threats to human lives and habitat. Figure 3.4 shows the adjacent districts of the Chittagong and Khulna divisions to the Bay of Bengal are highly affected by cyclones and storms that cause havoc and human casualties.

Figure 3.4: Cyclone-prone areas in Bangladesh

Source: Climate Change cell, 2006; Bangladesh Space Research and Remote Sensing.

The most important effect of these cyclones and storm surges is population displacement. In 1970-1998, the country suffered from 170 large-scale cyclones and storm surges, many

of them with devastating consequences (Penning-Rowsell, Sultana, & Thompson, 2013). For example, "two major cyclones in 1970 and 1991 killed 500,000 and 140,000 persons respectively" (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013, p. S45). In 2007 the cyclone Sidr[5] struck the coast of Bangladesh causing the loss of over 10,000 lives and shattering the livelihoods and living options of over 30 million people. In the following year (2008) another strong and devastating cyclone Nargis[6] hit the country and killed more than 100,000 people in Bangladesh and Myanmar. On 25 May 2009 cyclone Aila hit the coasts of Bangladesh and India and killed around 1000 people and dislocated the lives of several thousand people.

3.3.2. Slow onset climatic events: sea-level rise and drought

In the category of slow-onset processes, sea-level rise causes displacement and vulnerabilities to the people of coastal areas. Half of Bangladesh is situated less than five metres above sea level and one-third is less than three metres (Myers & Kent, 1995, p. 117). Sea level rise causes saline intrusion, and floods in many coastal areas in Bangladesh (Walsham, 2010). It is predicted that a one-metre sea-level rise would affect 22,000 km² of the deltaic area inhabited by more than 17-18 million poor people in Bangladesh (Bose, 2013, p. 64). The National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) has estimated that based on the IPCC global projections, 14, 32 and 88 cm sea-level rises will be reached by the years 2030, 2050 and 2100, respectively in Bangladesh (MOEF, 2005). Sea-level rise in the coastal zone of Bangladesh has already been observed to cause erosion and inundation

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[5] 'Sidr' was a devastating cyclone which struck the south-west coast of Bangladesh on 15 November 2007 with wind speeds of 240 kilometres. This cyclone resulted in tidal waves up to five metres high and surges of up to 6 metres. This was one of the most devastating cyclones in Bangladesh which damaged 2.3 million households and one million people were seriously affected. It was estimated that cyclone Sidr cost nearly US$ 1.1 billion (Government of Bangladesh, 2008; Paul, 2010).

[6] Cyclone 'Nargis' hit Myanmar but flowed over some parts of Bangladesh in 2008. This cyclone caused massive displacement and property destruction in Bangladesh (Mallick & Vogt, 2012).

of the land, and salinisation of soil and water, and cause flooding from the storm surge.

Figure 3.5 shows the extent of the affected areas by the sea level rise.

Figure 3.5: Projected impacts of sea-level rises of 1 and 1.5 metres

Source: University Corporation for Atmospheric Research (UCAR), 2018.

In Bangladesh the coastal region constitutes 20 percent of total land area and over 30 percent of the cultivable land (Minar, Hossain, & Shamsuddin, 2013, p. 114) where 63 million people live, the third highest among countries having coastal people (Neumann, Vafeidis, Zimmermann, & Nicholls, 2015). Based on the population growth rate of 1.4% per year, a study has suggested that 6.8 million people would be at risk by 2025 and 12.7 million people by 2050 under the prevailing climate change conditions (Karim & Mimura, 2008, p. 497).

Meanwhile, the northern districts of Bangladesh are increasingly affected by droughts. Rising temperature, lack of water in the dry season and drying rivers are responsible for the desertification processes in Bangladesh. Scientists predict that the climate in Bangladesh may become warmer in future. The first IPCC (1990) report projected that Bangladesh will be 0.5°C to 2°C warmer than today by the year 2030 (Ahmad, 2006, p. 5). Desertification is already happening in some parts of Bangladesh. For example, in the three consecutive years (2015-2017), the country experienced longer dry seasons and more days of temperature higher than 40c than any other recent years (Bangladesh Metrological Department, 2017). The north-western part of Bangladesh is a drought-prone area where rainfall is less than half the national average (1,240 mm/year). The area is already experiencing "increasing temperature (0.05 °C/year) and a decline in the length of the monsoon" (Black, Kniveton et al., 2013, p. 46). Currently, the country is exposed to climate change effects, as well as water diversion from upstream international rivers by neighbouring states. Both climate change induced rainfall shortage and shortage of water in the rivers are causing drought in parts of Bangladesh. A study report claims that "around 213 upozilas (administrative units consist of some villages) are drought affected in Bangladesh and increasing climate change may intensify the scenario in future (CDMP II, 2013, p. 77).

3.3.3. Event associated to climatic change

Riverbank erosion (Figure 3.6) is not a direct climatic event but results from floods, storm surges and cyclones. Human intervention also contributes to weakening riverbanks when more people live on the riverbank or cut land from the bank for other purposes. Based on statistics from the Bangladesh Water Development Board, Pender (2008, p. 34) reported

that "1,200 km of riverbank has been actively eroded and more than 500 km faces severe problems related to erosion". Riverbank erosion destroys the landmass of the riverside and washes away houses, crops, trees and other means of livelihood of people living on the sides of the rivers. In some cases, an entire village is destroyed and disappears into the river water.

Figure 3.6: Riverbank erosion in Kurigram District

Source: Green Watch, 2016.

In such situations, people are forced to migrate to the adjacent areas for temporary shelter and livelihood. In some areas, riverbank erosion occurs several times and people experience multiple migrations in their lifetime (Arsenault, Azam, & Ahmad, 2015). The cumulative impact is significant, with estimates that "riverbank erosion displaces 50,000 to 200,000 people in Bangladesh every year" (Mehedi, Nag, & Farhana, 2010, p. 5). Another study claims that 60 percent of the residents have been displaced in their lifetime in some of the worst affected areas in Bangladesh (Raleigh & Jordan, 2010, p. 115). Cities such as

Chandpur, Rajshahi, Sirajgong, Gaibandha, Rajshahi, Bikrampur, Shariatpur and Faridpur

are heavily exposed to riverbank erosion (See Figure 3.7).

Figure 3.7: Areas affected by riverbank erosion in Bangladesh

Source: Bangladesh Water and Development Board.

Affected people try to re-establish their houses once new *char*[7] is formed near their original land, however at least 10-20 percent of displaced people are not able to return to the newly formed *char* due to their poverty, the uncertainty of making a living and fear of being a victim of flooding again (Raleigh & Jordan, 2010, p. 24). Based on participatory research in different affected areas in Bangladesh, one study argues:

> Riverbank erosion has affected 179 sub-districts in the mainland areas of Bangladesh…around 66 percent (951,531 people) have been displaced locally on neighbouring embankments or on higher ground; 26 percent (375,793 people) have been displaced to other locations within Bangladesh, including to Dhaka; 8 percent (125,264 people) have been displaced across international borders (Displacement Solutions, 2012, p. 5).

Increasing erosion has had significant impacts on coastal land. Almost all islands are shrinking at an increasing rate due to the continuous erosion caused by sea-level rise and storm surges. For instance, in the last 40 years Bhola Island has shrunk from 6400 km^2 to 3400 km^2, about 40 percent (See: Figure 3.8). Significant erosion has occurred in the north of Hatia, north-east of Bhola and south-east of Ramgati islands (Brammer, 2014, p. 53). Some islands, such as Kutubdia and Moheshkhali situated on the coast of the Bay of Bengal are being eroded quicker due to strong tidal action, cyclones and storm surges. A study (Shamsuddoha & Chowdhury, 2007) showed that around 65 percent of the landmass of these islands has been eroded within the last 100 years. But the population in coastal areas is increasing at the same rapid pace over the entire country.

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[7] In the coastal area of Bangladesh, land is being destroyed by flood water or riverbank erosion every year. However, new land emerges in coastal areas which is known as 'char'. Around 52 km^2 new char land is formed every year in Bangladesh (Shamsuddoha, Shahid Ullah and Shahjahan, 2014).

Figure 3.8: Land erosion in Bhola, Hatia, Sandwip and other islands in Bangladesh

Source: Google Earth image.

The coastal population will increase to be 44 million if the current population growth rate remains unchanged (Shamsuddoha & Chowdhury, 2007, p. 6). Climatic events in coastal regions affect the people most and displace them from their place. Displaced people migrate to the remaining parts of the islands and coastal regions that consequently have an increase in population density.

3.4. Climate change induced migration in Bangladesh

Climatic events have far-reaching impacts on population displacement in Bangladesh. Although there is no official data on climate change induced migration, various sources such as NGO reports and researchers have given estimates of its extent (Hassani-

Mahmooei & Parris, 2012; Ahsan, Kellett, & Karuppannan, 2014; Davis, Bhattachan, D'Odorico, & Suweis, 2018). However, most figures are based on sporadic data. The population census report, 2001 projected that rural and urban populations would be almost equal due to the increasing internal migration. Several factors are responsible for urbanisation, but the most evident cause is the migration of rural people to urban centres (Ahsan, Kellett, & Karuppannan, 2016).

These climate and environmental events force people to migrate temporarily or permanently by destroying agricultural land and livelihood options. In many locations, floods and cyclones indiscriminately destroy all possible sources of livelihood and shelter. Having lost everything, people migrate as a last resort (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013). A study conducted in the four districts in the east and west parts of the country shows that "out of 595 rural households, 168 (28%) households indicate that they have at least one migrant; 79 percent of these 168 households have only one migrant, others have more than one" (Rayhan & Grote, 2007, p. 88). The pattern of migration is rural to rural and rural to urban. The study also shows that around 6 percent of the respondents migrated to adjacent areas (Rayhan & Grote, 2007, p. 89). A study by Joarder and Miller (2013) finds that climate affected people are more likely to decide to permanently migrate when they have lost their household, arable land and sources of livelihood from drought, riverbank erosion and floods.

However, some researchers are critical and sceptical about the impact of climate change on migration decisions. Findlay and Geddes (2011) found less connection between climate change and migration in Bangladesh than other researchers. They find that people affected

by climatic events may not migrate, rather attempt to remain in their place and try to adapt to the changing environment (Findlay & Geddes, 2011, pp. 146-147). In some cases, people migrate to the cities temporarily to earn more income and return to their homes after a few months (Call, Gray, Yunus, & Emch, 2017; Lein, 2000). This is a coping strategy of climate change induced people in Bangladesh to reduce their vulnerabilities (Siddiqui & Billah, 2014). Another study conducted in North Bengal in Bangladesh shows that climate change is not the sole cause of migration. Social inequality, poverty and food insecurity play a role in people migration from rural areas (Etzold, Ahmed, Hassan, & Neelormi, 2014; Quader, Khan, & Kervyn, 2017). Chronic poverty mostly caused for the drought in the north Bengal of Bangladesh (Mazumder & Wencong, 2012), acts as a leading cause of migration to cities.

Migration due to climate change depends on a complex set of reasons. Poverty, insufficient infrastructure and lack of government assistance during disasters may combine in forcing people to migrate (Mallick & Vogt, 2012). Labour market disruption, inflation and sudden price hikes in the cost of food lead some people to migrate from their villages (Rayhan & Grote, 2007). These are economic push factors that force people to move to the cities for their livelihood. In Bangladesh, poverty and landlessness constitute crucial factors for internal migration. Both sudden and slow onset of climatic events causes poverty and landlessness by destroying the infrastructure, land, bridges and embankment of the rivers. In the lowland and riverside areas, floods and riverbank erosion cause the landlessness. Many landless people migrate to cities when they struggle to make a living in their rural place of origin. It is argued that "half of all poor migrants to Dhaka are landless labourers,

while three-quarters of women and two-thirds of men working in textile factories have been found to be functionally landless" (Black et al., 2008, p. 30).

Furthermore, sudden climatic events, such as floods and cyclone result in crop failure and contribute to internal migration. Based on longitudinal survey data, Gray and Mueller (2012) argue that "floods have modest effects on population displacement, but crop failure unrelated to the floods has a strong correlation to population displacement in Bangladesh" (Gray & Mueller, 2012, p. 1). Crop failure is also connected to the cycle of poverty and indebtedness. Periodic crop failure intensifies the poverty situation that sometimes pushes farmers to obtain loans from NGOs to support their farming activities and small businesses. However, further crop failure and loss of business prevents them from repaying the loan. Some poor people living in urban slums have moved to avoid money lenders (Findlay & Geddes, 2011).

Poor people in rural Bangladesh have a long history of seasonal migration to work in the fields and earn extra income, however increasing climatic events and associated stresses in the rural and coastal areas contribute to increased temporary seasonal migration. Climate change affected families sometimes prefer to send at least one family member to the city or overseas for income diversification and improved livelihood (Afsar 2003; Siddiqui & Billah, 2014). All of this is contributing to the urbanisation of Bangladesh and the growth of its capital city, Dhaka. Black, Kniveton et al. (2013, p. 44 citing Afsar 2003) claim that "the net migration from rural to urban areas in Bangladesh has been increased dramatically from 1.2 to 16.4 per thousand between 1984 and 1998, compared to an increase from 1.5 to 4 per thousand of rural-rural migration during the same period". Siddiqui and Billah (2014) report that since the 1990s about 5 to 10 percent of people who belong to the

middle class have migrated to cities for a better life from the Shatkhira region of

Bangladesh, one of many areas that are highly affected by floods, coastal erosion, and

cyclones (Siddiqui & Billah, 2014, p. 131). As this literature suggests, poor people affected

by climatic events tend to engage in seasonal migration to the cities for livelihood and

income. People from the lowland and rural areas move to more fertile regions for seasonal

work opportunities which is a common phenomenon in Bangladesh, but many seasonal

migrants eventually make more permanent migration decisions. For example, many people

from the lowland area of Noakhali, Chandpur and Comilla have settled in the elevated

parts of the Southern districts (for example, Jessore, Khulna and Kushtia) in Bangladesh.

Some better-off people also migrate to the cities from climate affected areas as they have

resources to leave their place of origin and settle in a new place.

Resilience, adaptation, and mitigation support also influence the migration decisions of the

people affected by floods, cyclones and drought. Several studies suggest that affected

people move an average two miles from their homes, believing that they would be able to

settle on land that will be reclaimed somewhere close to their home (Mutton & Haque,

2004; Lein, 2000, p. 124). However, the formation of new land (mostly called as char) can

take a long time and in most cases, influential people take control of newly formed land.

Thus, displaced people rarely have an opportunity to return to resettle near their houses

(Zaman, 1989), and may end up migrating to the city and adopt any sorts of work for their

shelter and livelihood. However, research also finds that climate affected people did not

leave their homes when the government and non-government organisations distributed

relief and provided support to adapt to the environment (Paul, 2005; Paul & Routray,

2010). Consequently, internal migration of the rural poor people depends on the

availability of livelihood. When government support and assistance is lacking, climate affected people may permanently abandon their homes (Kartiki, 2011).

In summary, it can be argued that climatic events have direct and indirect effects that negatively impact the livelihood and living conditions of millions of people and cause internal migration in Bangladesh. However, there is no comprehensive picture about internal migration, and to what extent it is caused by climate change. One reason is that the Government of Bangladesh has neglected internal migration in Bangladesh. Hence, the current state of knowledge about the link between internal migration and climate change is obtained from studies conducted by non-government organisations and some independent researchers. But their findings are often questionable because climate change issues have been politicised in order to receive funding from donors interested in population displacement and migration (Vriens, 2017). Nevertheless, the existing research also argues that internal migration is seen as a survival strategy in Bangladesh. Many poor and landless people being affected by floods, cyclone, coastal erosion and drought migrate to urban areas in search of livelihood and shelter. Moreover, lack of adaptation measures by the government, along with corruption, contribute to displacement and migration. There is little doubt that climate change at the global level will affect Bangladesh in ways that are likely to displace more people in the future.

3.5. Bengali migration and demographic change in the CHT

The previous section argues that climate change displaces people who temporarily or permanently migrate to urban places. However, some studies argue that climate change induced and poor people have also migrated to the CHT with the support of government settlement schemes, as well as of their own accord (Hafiz and Islam, 1999; Lee, 2001;

Reuveny, 2007). The number of the Bengali population in the CHT has increased gradually through the policy of different rulers from the British to Bangladesh period as a way of controlling the CHT region. Although the British colonial rulers introduced the '1900 Regulating Act' to ensure the separate and distinct characteristics of the CHT, they introduced the cultivation of cotton, which eventually turned the Hill area into cotton fields ('*Karpash Mahali*') instead of the traditional farming system of the tribal people (for example, Jhum cultivation) (Chatterjee, 1987; Tripura, 2008; Uddin, 2010). This introduction of cultivating cotton in the CHT enabled the non-hill Bengali people to work in the field (Mohsin, 1997, p. 79). This is often cited as the beginning of a long process of Bengali migration to the CHT.

After the colonial rulers left, the Pakistan government (1947-1971) adopted twin policies in the CHT that fundamentally changed the region's social, cultural and economic character. The government of Bangladesh pursued the settlement of the Bengali people to the CHT area and, implemented development projects that displaced many of the tribal people from their land (Chakma, 2010a; Levene, 1999; Shelly, 1992). The Pakistani government abolished the special status of the CHT and adopted an implicit policy of Islamisation through the migration of Bengali Muslim people to the tribal-dominated area. As Pakistan emerged as a new state based on religious identity, the new government gave more emphasis to the consolidation of Islamic values in every corner of the country.[8] The CHT, as a tribal area, was treated by the government with suspicion and was regarded as anti-Islam because some of the tribal leaders opposed Pakistan rule during the separation of

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[8] Pakistan after the emergence as an independent state introduced Islamic law declaring the state as an Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1956. This declaration introduced the policy of expansion of Muslim culture across the country. The CHT, as a non-Muslim region, has been the victim of this Islamic state.

the Indian sub-continent in 1947. To bring the region under more direct control and integrate it into the nation-building project, the government pursued development projects which opened up the path for the Bengali Muslims people to work in the paper mills and hydroprojects (Kharat, 2003; Mohsin, 1997). The permanent settlement of Bengalis was further assisted by the Pakistan government changing legislation (Amendment of rule 34) to enable non-hill people to own property, provided that they had been living in the CHT for fifteen years on a permanent basis (Ullah, Shamsuddoha, & Shahjahan, 2014, p. 201; Chakma, 2010a).

The migration of Bengalis to the CHT accelerated after the division of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as a new state in 1971 following a violent independence struggle. The newly formed country ignored the demand for self-government by the tribal people and urged them to assimilate into mainstream Bengali society and culture (Chakma, 2010a; Mohsin, 1997). It implemented a 'rehabilitation' policy which involved settling war-ravaged refugees from the liberation war to the CHT (Chakma, 2010a, p. 290). This rehabilitation process displaced some tribal people from their land (Chakma, 2010a; Kamaluddin, 1980). Large-scale Bengali migration occurred after 1975 when successive governments encouraged landless Bengalis to migrate to the CHT (Ullah et al., 2014, p. 203). The literature documents several phases of Bengali migration and settlement to the CHT: "In phase one, from 1979-1981 about 30,000 families (around 100,000 people) came to the CHT and settled; in the second phase, another 100,000 people came immediately after the settlement; and in the third phase after 1982, another 250,000 people came and settled in the CHT" (Chakma, 2010a; Ullah et al., 2014). Some researchers argued that the successive governments of Bangladesh settled Bengali people in the CHT to relieve

environmental displacement and demographic pressure in the rural areas, and to defuse the sentiment for self-determination of the tribal people in the CHT (Hafiz and Islam, 1993; Suhrke, 1997; Bachler, 1995; Reuveny, 2007).

Although around 400,000-500,000 Bengali people are estimated to have moved to the CHT through the settlement programme, it is likely that others have migrated through social networks and family connections. The social network refers to marriage relations and knowing information about migration from someone who has already settled in the region (Hugo, 2013). The family connection is a source of migration in the CHT by which the settlement of one family member often encourages another member to come and settle permanently. This can be termed as the 'fourth phase of migration' which is the result of the previous settlement and migration of the Bengali people. In this phase, government support is no longer provided or needed as people move to the CHT with the help of family members or social networks. These processes have resulted in the growth of the Bengali population in the CHT after independence which has significantly changed the demographic composition in the region. The proportion of the tribal population has decreased as the Bengali population increased (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Bengali and Tribal population ratio in the CHT, 1872 to 2011

| Year | Tribal | | Bengali | | Total |
	Population	Percentage	Population	Percentage	Population
1872	61,957	98	1097	2	63,054
1901	116,000	93	8762	7	124,762
1951	261,538	91	26,150	9	287,688
1961	339,757	88.28	45,322	11.77	385,679
1974	392,199	77.17	116,000	22.83	508,199
1981	441,776	59	304,873	41	746,649
1991	501,144	51	473,301	49	974,445
2001	592,977	44	740023	56	1,333,000
2011	845,541	53	752,690	47	1,598,231

Source: (Chakma, 2010, p. 291; Adnan, 2004, p. 15).

The statistics in Table 3.1 reveal that the change in the ratio of the Bengali population to the tribal population in the CHT happened over a short period of time between 1979 and 1990 when the government pursued settlement programme. This population transformation is legal as the constitution of Bangladesh guarantees people's free movement and freedom to settle in any place (Mohsin, 1997, p. 113). Article 36 of Bangladesh constitution states: "subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest, every citizen shall have the right to move freely throughout Bangladesh, to reside and settle in any place therein and to leave and re-enter Bangladesh". However, the population movement to the CHT has been a source of significant conflict in the CHT. Tribal people were the majority until the 1980s but now tribal and Bengali people are almost equal in number.

3.6.   The CHT conflict: history, key issues and changes

The strategic importance of having a land boundary with India and Myanmar has given particular focus to the CHT. Due to its geographical location, the CHT region is called the gateway to the East (Rasul, 2009). Under British colonial rule, the region was governed under the 'Regulation of 1900 Act. The status of the 'exclusive area' of the CHT recognised the distinct culture and lifestyles of its predominantly tribal people. According to this Act, the tribal people were the owners of the land and the region was considered separate from other parts of the country (Shelley, 1992). Outsiders were not able to buy land and build houses. However, as mentioned previously in this chapter, the Pakistani government abolished this clause and introduced new provisions to ensure the entrance and residence

of any Bangladeshi citizen in the CHT (Ahmed, 1993; Zaman, 1982). The genesis of the CHT

conflict lies in the partition politics of the British government (Mohsin, 1997). The British

colonial government, during its departure from the Indian sub-continent, annexed the CHT

with Pakistan in a move that was opposed by the tribal people (Mohsin, 1995). Some tribal

leaders hoisted the Indian flag in Rangamati during the partition. The Pakistani government

responded not only by abolishing the special status of the CHT, but also changing the social

and economic environment by encouraging migration and construction projects such as

Kaptai dam (Arens, 2011; Mohsin, 1997; Shelley, 1992).

The hope of the tribal people of gaining the right to self-determination remained

unfulfilled even after the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. This became evident when

Manobendra Narayan Larma, the only elected member in the parliament from the CHT,

tabled a list of demands during the formulation of the constitution of Bangladesh in 1972.

The demands include autonomy for the CHT , including its own legislature; retention of the

Regulation of 1900 Act in the constitution of Bangladesh; continuation of the 'circle chief's

office'[9]; and a constitutional provision restricting the amendment of Regulation of 1900 Act

and imposing a ban on the influx of the non-hill people (Mohsin, 1997, p. 57-58). Ignoring

the demands of the tribal leader, the new Bengali leadership urged the tribal people to

merge into the Bengali culture and mainstream political system (Ahmed, 1993; Mohsin,

1997; Shelley, 1992). The construction of hegemony[10] of the Bengali culture and political

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[9] Circle chief is the traditional administrative system in the CHT among the tribal people who enjoys power in appointing headman, collecting taxes and helping government for the use of land. Although this is the top administrative system among the tribal people, it currently works under the District Commissioners.

[10] Hegemony refers to the dominance and leadership of a particular state or group of people exercised over another state or group of people. In the case of CHT, the construction of hegemony refers to the consolidation of power of the Bangladesh government over the CHT region through political, economic and cultural means. Mohsin uses the term to describe the imposition of Bengali identity, and religious

system over the tribal people was the beginning of the CHT conflict. Since 1971 successive governments have undertaken significant economic, social and infrastructure policies in the name of development, however these policies have indirectly helped the successive governments of Bangladesh to consolidate their hegemony in the CHT (Ahmed, 1993; Mohsin, 1997; Nasreen & Togawa, 2002; Uddin, 2010).

The tribal leaders formed a regional platform the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS) to pursue their demands by political means, and when this was unsuccessful, a military wing Shanti Bahini (peace force) was formed to add pressure. The government interpreted the demand for self-determination as secessionist and identified the CHT as a national security problem. When the Shanti Bahini finally took up arms in 1976 (Mohsin, 1997), the Bangladesh state responded with wide-ranging militarisation in the CHT. The entire region underwent a full-scale militarisation and a civil war between the Bangladesh army and the tribal people began (Mohsin, 1997; Chakma, 2010a).

In the 1980s the Bangladesh state also settled landless, poor and environmentally affected people to the CHT, which is sometimes described as a secret device of the military government (Mohsin, 1997; Ullah et al., 2014, p. 203). This is a secret plan because the government of Bangladesh did not publish it officially but ordered the district commissioner of the Chittagong to implement the settlement policy in the CHT (Mohsin, 1997, appendix 1). This settlement policy has also been labelled a strategic hamlet (Chakma, 2010a) and used by the military to resist the insurgency movement and to

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supremacy over the tribal people through constitutional denial of tribal identity and culture (Mohsin, 1997).

exterminate tribal people in the CHT (Chakma, 2010a, p. 290). Bengali families were promised by the government five acres of hilly land, four acres of mixed land and two and a half acres of paddy land (Chakma, 2010a, p. 290). In some context, some Bengali settlers seized more land. Bengali families also received help and assistance from the Bangladesh army and, therefore, they sometimes worked with the army to resist the tribal separatist movement. Thus, the Bengali migrants on many occasions have been part of the CHT conflict.

Moreover, allocation of land to the Bengali people by the civil administration generated resentment, anger and anguish among the tribal people. Adnan (2007) argued that Bengali migrants have been the 'soft target' of the Shanti Bahini and on many occasions, the Shanti Bahini attacked the Bengali settlers to force them to leave the CHT. As a result, both parties in the conflict targeted civilians, property and objects (Adnan, 2007, p. 15). The army used the Bengali settlers as a human shield, and the tribal people targeted settlers to make them leave their land. This conflict situation also forced some tribal families to move deeper into the jungle to avoid conflict and violence. According to Mohsin (2000, p. 115), "Bengali settlement program has deepened the alienation of the Hill people as many tribal people have lost their land and control over the forest resources". The conflict, capturing of land, communal violence and human rights violations continued until the CHT Peace Accord was enacted between the government of Bangladesh and the PCJSS in 1997. This Accord was the result of a series of discussions, negotiations and multi-level consultations between the government led by prime minister Sheikh Hasina and tribal leaders (Mohsin, 2003, p. 13).

The CHT Accord ended the armed conflict between the Bangladesh army and the Shanti Bahini and raised hopes that people would soon enjoy freedom and rights in their land. The members of Shanti Bahini surrendered their arms to the government of Bangladesh in return for promised jobs in the security forces and financial benefits. The Peace Accord as a whole included some principles, such as (a) land rights (b) revival of cultural identity, (c) rehabilitation of refugees, and (d) withdrawal of the temporary military camp, to restore the authority of the tribal people over the land and resources as well as enjoyment of human rights in the CHT (Jamil & Panday, 2008, p. 471). The issue of internally displaced people (IDP) remained unresolved as the tribal leaders demanded the return of Bengali settlers who had migrated in the 1980s. The tribal leaders also demanded the repatriation of all tribal families displaced during the war. However, these demands of the tribal leaders have not been enacted, and instead, residency certificates were provided to all Bengali settlers by the Deputy Commission (DC) of the CHT (Mohsin, 2003, p. 73). This decision frustrated the tribal leaders who on occasions boycotted meetings with the government authorities working in the CHT (Jamil & Panday, 2008; Mohsin, 2003). The post Peace Accord situation of the CHT is characterised by conflict and violence in what has been described as a violent peace (Chakma & d'Costa, 2013), and peace without justice (Mohsin, 2003, p. 54). The main reasons for the continuation of conflict are resource scarcity, land grabbing and competition between the communities for social position (Ullah, et al., 2014; Adnan, 2004; Panday & Jamil, 2009). Moreover, the military has remained entrenched in the CHT, and military and civil bureaucrats capture resources and exacerbate the competition for land and forest, fuelling further related conflicts.

Some researchers have drawn connections between environment and climate change induced migration and violent conflict in the region. Hafiz and Islam (1993) first noted that people were driven to the CHT by environmental problems and influenced the conflict (Hafiz and Islam, 1993). Other papers followed, citing the connection between the environmentally induced migration and conflict in the CHT (Suhrke, 1997; Lee, 1997; Reuveny, 2007; Bächler, 1998). They argue that the conflict escalated because Bengali people put pressure on the land and destabilised the way of life of the tribal people, raising fears of extinction. From this perspective, the CHT conflict is described as a demographic and environmentally induced conflict (Bächler, 1995, p. 25). Smith and Vivekananda (2007, p. 16) has argued that climate change effects has an indirect role in escalating the conflict in the CHT. The climate change induced Bengali people complicated the CHT conflict when they migrated and settled in the region. Thus, over time, Bengali migration and settlement in the CHT has pitched settlers and tribal people against each other as the primary agents in the conflict in the post Peace Accord era (Mohsin, 2003). In addition to conflict over land, religious differences have emerged as a source of conflict, as Muslim people build more Mosques and Madrasas for their prayer and Islamic education. The aggressive pursuit of Islamic religious interests has aggravated the tribal people who are predominantly Buddhist (Joarder & Miller, 2013). For example, on many occasions unidentified people vandalised the temples of the Buddhist people in the CHT, which caused communal conflict between Bengali and tribal people (Kapaeeing Foundation, 2017).

The rise of extremist political groups in the CHT has also contributed to the current conflict. For example, the United People's Democratic Front (UPDF) has formed from the *Jana Samhati Samiti* (JSS) who oppose the Peace Accord, Bengali settlement and migration in

the CHT. The UPDF is seeking secession of the CHT from Bangladesh (Mohsin, 2003; Uddin, 2011). Its anti-settlement stance has fuelled the conflict between the UPDF and settlers, as well as with the Bangladesh army. In response, the Bengali settlers have organised and formed a political platform named *'Somo Adikhar Andolon'* (SAA: Equal Rights Movement) to fight for their survival and for equal rights in all spheres of life in the CHT. The SAA was formed in 2001 by the settlers who believe the Peace Accord has made them second-class citizens in the CHT. The SAA movement has opposed the PCJSS for signing the Peace Accord and has carried out several agitations demanding the annulment of the 1997 Accord (Panday & Jamil, 2009; Mohsin, 2003). Thus, the emergence of extremist groups since the Peace Accord has led to new confrontations. There are many reasons for this, but key to understanding these divisions among the groups and community in the CHT is the lack of civil society involvement in the peace negotiations (Chakma & D'Costa, 2013) and lack of implementation of the accord. A study has found that implementation of the principles of the Peace Accord by the signatory parties helps to reduce the incidents of violence and conflict in the post-conflict society (Joshi & Quinn, 2016).

In summary, the CHT conflict is one of intractable ethno-political conflicts which has a colonial legacy, as well as a long history of the denial of identity of the tribal people. The hegemony of the ruling classes has been established over the tribal people from the British to the current Bangladesh period. While the construction of the hegemony and denial of identity constituted the key issues of the CHT conflict, the issues of conflict have been transformed and diversified over time. Now the Bengali and tribal polarisation is an established phenomenon with cleavages in culture, religion, social and political aspirations between the two groups of people. Mistrust and lack of proper reconciliation processes

have aggravated the conflict. This situation has created fertile ground to form extremist groups who are intimidating and killing people and violating their human rights. The unfulfilled promises of the Government of Bangladesh and the growing rise of group consolidation among the Bengali settlers are also hindering the current peacebuilding processes in the region.

3.7. Conclusion and research framework

Chapters Two and Three have analysed the literature and evidence on the links between climate change, migration and conflict in the global and Bangladesh context. There is little doubt that climatic events accompanied by socio-economic and political factors are causing livelihood failure and human displacement in the low-lying and rural areas in Bangladesh. Displaced people migrated to the cities, and also to the CHT during the 1980s with the direct and indirect assistance of the government. Successive governments targeted these environmentally induced people during the time of Bengali settlement to the CHT in order to defuse the conflict and reduce the vulnerabilities in the climate affected areas. The Bengali settlers have been given land by the government for housing and agriculture (Mohsin, 1997; Chakma, 2010a), putting them in competition with the tribal people in the region. Resource competition accompanied by social and political variables, such as increasing growing population, poverty, ethnic divisions, past conflict and deprivation combine to generate violence and conflict between the original and migratory people in the CHT.

Even though many studies have cited the CHT case as a conflict situation due to the environmental migration, no study has yet explored the relationship of climatic change,

migration and conflict in the CHT in Bangladesh in any depth. In this story of the CHT, the

key elements of existing theories of environmental and climate conflict are all present:

climate change events, forced migration, resource scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 1999),

population pressure (Kahl, 2006; Goldstone, 2002), ethnic division and marginalisation of

minority groups (Gurr, 1999; Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010). In Chapters Five to Seven,

the relationship between climate change, migration and conflict will be explored in detail

based on the analytical framework presented in Figure 3.9.

Figure 3.9: Framework of the relationship between climate change induced migration and conflict in Bangladesh

Floods
Droughts
Cyclones
Riverbank erosion
Coastal erosion
Sea-level rise
Water logging

+

Non-environmental push factor such as economic (employment opportunity), political (democratisation, conflict) and social (education, family)

Loss of property, land, agriculture, business, infrastructure, tress

Livelihood failure

Extreme poverty
Population displacement
Forced migration
Voluntary migration

Migration to the urban centres, such as Dhaka, Chittagong

Migration and settlement of the Bengali people to the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)

Increase the population in the CHT
Pressure on the existing resources
Exploitation of the forest
Capture and grabbing land

Sense of original vs. settler (ethnic division); Fear of losing identity of the tribal people; Competition on resources; Resource capture, and Marginalisation of tribal people

Hatred, human rights violation, killing, violence, conflict, mistrust, culture of violence

It is important to note that this causal relationship is not inevitable in all contexts where there are climate changes effects, but it is applicable in the case of Bangladesh to explain the migration of the Bengali settlers and CHT conflict.

This study is a timely piece of research as climatic events are predicted to displace many more people in Bangladesh over the coming years and decades. A proportion of these migrants may wish to relocate to the CHT. It is important to research how migration and the responses to it have contributed to the emergence and continuation of conflict in the CHT, and to reconsider what many regard as a failed Peace Accord. Empirical research is important here, and a sound and working methodology is essential to design the study and explore the views and perceptions of the people of both communities living in the CHT. The following chapter explains the research design and how the research was conducted.

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction

As this thesis deals with a complex phenomenon which involves multiple factors, causes and actors it requires a mixed-method research design. Writing on methodology in the context of migration research, Castles (2012) has argued for a 'holistic approach' to present the diverse experiences of migration and how migration transforms the society where migrants settle. To achieve a holistic understanding Castles suggests mixing research methods by combining questionnaire surveys and qualitative interviews to explore the perceptions of the respondents about migration and the understanding about social action, history of migration, and receiving societies (Castles, 2012, p. 21). These arguments also apply to research on climate change induced migration and conflict research. The reliance on large-scale quantitative studies over the past decades to explore the climate change and conflict relationship has produced much confusion and doubt in research results (Buhaug, 2015; Ide, 2017). Thus, combining qualitative and quantitative approaches offers new ways to explore whether migration of climate change affected people changes the conflict situation in the host location. Ide (2017, p. 8) suggested using "'pluralism in methods' combining positivist as well as critical and poststructuralist methods in order to avoid the limitations of [an] individual method for exploring [the] climate change and conflict relationship".

This study is based on a questionnaire survey with 150 Bengali migrants and 150 tribal people residing in the CHT, and ten in-depth follow-up interviews with climate migrants as

well as ten interviews with key informants. This approach is informed by a mixed method approach which combines quantitative and qualitative, deductive and inductive research processes in all aspects of the research, from preparing the questions to presenting the research results. Following the deductive philosophy, the questionnaire survey collected information from Bengali and tribal participants which enables the measurement of variables related to migration and the perception of conflict. Interviews with the climate migrants and key informants provide more in-depth information about how these variables are connected and how respondents make sense of them (Hyde, 2000). No hypothesis has been formulated; instead, research questions are derived from the academic literature and contextual studies. In this regard, Leech et al. (2005, p. 3) argue that "research questions are similar to hypotheses, except that they do not entail specific predictions and are phrased in question format". Responding to the research questions set out in Chapter One, this study explores the impacts of climate change on the migration decisions of Bengali people who have come to live in the CHT, and how this migration has played a role in the evolving conflict in the region. In order to answer these questions, the perceptions of both migrants and tribal people are necessary. Both groups of respondents were asked questions about their perception of the conflict situation in the CHT. Bengali migrants were asked additional questions about their migration, and how climate change impacted their decision to migrate.

In the next sections, this chapter outlines the proposed methodology, ontology, epistemology and methodological standpoint. It also explains why a mixed methods approach was used for this study and how it fits with the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter Three (Figure 3.9). This section also provides the reasons for combining the survey and interview for this research. A detailed demographic information of survey (Bengali and

tribal) and interview participants has been given in this section. Secondly, this chapter outlines a detailed overview of the data collection including the ethics approval, case selection, study sites, mapping and way of conducting the data in the field. Finally, this chapter presents the coding of data, the way of analysis and the challenges that I faced in the field.

4.2. Research methodology

The methodology of this research includes the research paradigm, design and basic views about the survey and interview processes.

4.2.1. Pragmatic research paradigm

This research is based on the 'pragmatic' combination of positivism and constructivism. By combining these two approaches, pragmatism as a philosophical paradigm has addressed the complex research questions. In doing so, this paradigm seeks to utilise the strengths and avoid the shortcomings of each approach. Positivist research is able to 'accurately describe and measure social facts, while constructivist approaches seek to interpret the social meaning of these facts' (Castles, 2012, p. 11). The positivist research tradition depends on the rigorous application of experimental methods in different studies and seeks convergence in research results (Bryman, 2015; Hill, 2012, pp. 23-24; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). In contrast, constructivists believe that there is no single reality; rather, multiple realities exist in any social setting (Bryman, 2015, p. 31). Pragmatism combines both qualitative and quantitative philosophical stances and aims to interpret the facts and meaning about an issue. Teddlie and Tashakkori, (2009) define pragmatism as:

> a deconstructive paradigm that debunks concepts such as 'truth' and 'reality' and focuses instead on 'what works' as the truth regarding the research questions

under investigation. Pragmatism advocates the mixed methods (qualitative and quantitative) in research and acknowledges that values of the researcher play an important role in interpreting results (Teddlie & Tashkkori, 2009, pp. 7-8).

The pragmatic paradigm incorporates both inductive and deductive research methods. As Creswell (2009) points out, pragmatism is not confined to a specific philosophy and combines both the quantitative and qualitative strand of research (Creswell, 2013). Thus, pragmatism is a useful philosophical standpoint in this research to examine the relationship between climate change induced migration and conflict. The research on climate change, migration and conflict is concerned with multiple and interconnected factors. It seeks to analyse how the three processes, climate change, human mobility and the occurrence of conflict, are connected. No single causal relationship is sufficient to explore the answer as to how and why people migrate and under what circumstances their migration may contribute to conflict (Ide, 2017). This research, therefore, adopts the pragmatist paradigm to explore the extent to which migration to the CHT was induced by climate change, and how this migration has affected the social, economic and political relationship between the Bengali migrants and tribal communities. By surveying Bengali and tribal residents, and collecting narrative interviews with stakeholders, this research explores the existential reality through subjective and objective data to achieve valid and reliable finding (Mertens, 2014; Creswell, 2013; Morgan, 1998).

4.2.2. Proposed research design

Researchers use different types of mixed method research, such as parallel, sequential, or convergent forms. Depending on the type of mixed methods, researchers collect a variety of data and use different techniques to present the research findings. The current research is based on a 'convergent parallel design' which involves conducting quantitative and

qualitative data collection in a parallel way and merging the data in the analysis section. This design was developed in the 1970s and is widely used across Social Science disciplines to triangulate qualitative and quantitative data on a single topic (Creswell & Clark, 2017). A concurrent design gives equal emphasis to qualitative and quantitative methodologies in every stage of the research, methodology, data collection, data analysis and data presentation. Following the convergent research design developed by Creswell (2015), the research design for this study is as shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Convergent parallel mixed method design

Source: Developed by the researcher based on Creswell (2015, p. 565).

The qualitative part of multi-method research enables the researcher to explore the processes and meaning of perceptions and social relationships of people, which is constructed and interpreted in various ways (Castles, 2012, p. 22). According to Denzin and Lincoln (2003, p. 3), qualitative research is "a situated activity that locates the observer in the world". It deals with the interpretation of a situation or events that a researcher or a person observes and experiences (Berg, Lune, & Lune, 2004; Silverman, 2013). Conversely, quantitative research is dedicated to collecting numerical data from the field to represent an objective picture of social reality (Neuman, 2014; Bryman, 2012). This research

triangulates the quantitative and qualitative information such as secondary sources, interview materials and survey data. More specifically, this research adopts the following triangulation method as illustrated in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2: Triangulation model

Source: Developed by the researcher.

Triangulation of various data points is useful in studies of migration when available data are incomplete, dated, politicised and of questionable quality, as in the case of Bangladesh. Data collection in a place affected by conflict is a challenging task as sharing data is seen as a sensitive issue and few government offices share data with researchers. The present research was conducted in a conflict zone which presented challenges for fieldwork survey participants who were sometimes hesitant to express their views and showed significant polarisation in their responses to some issues. In this context, triangulation assists in identifying convergences and divergences in the research findings and produce a nuanced account of the findings (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2010, p. 280). In sum, the combination of survey and interview data has been adopted to achieve more robust findings to answer the research questions in a more comprehensive manner. The entire research process can be

presented by the following visual framework (Figure 4.3) that commences with the literature review and ends with the synthesis of new knowledge.

Figure 4.3: Visual framework of the research process

Source: Developed by the researcher.

4.2.3.   Questionnaire survey

A questionnaire survey was adopted as one of the key methods. The aim of surveying both Bengali migrants and tribal residents was to answer the research questions about the impacts of climate changes on the decision of the Bengali participants to migrate to the CHT and to shed light on the conflict situation after the Bengali migration and settlement. The questionnaire was designed to elicit information about the attitudes, behaviours and

situation of the respondents in order to understand the Bengali migrants' decisions and how the two groups interact with each other and perceive the current situation in the CHT. Buckingham and Saunders (2004, p. 13) argue that surveys assist researchers to explore "information about any or all of the three A's- people's *attributes*, their *attitudes* and their *actions*". The survey investigated people's attributes, such as sex, age and occupation; people's attitudes – what they think about living in the CHT and how they perceive their own and other communities and other actors in the CHT; and people's actions – how they behave in regard to different communities and actors during and after migration and settlement. To capture the information about the migration process, the survey with Bengalis included a separate section but otherwise, both groups were asked the same, or equivalent, questions.

The questionnaire survey was conducted with 300 respondents – 150 each from the Bengali and the tribal community, respectively. A screening question was applied to select for those Bengalis who claimed to be migrants from other parts of Bangladesh. As the Bengali and tribal populations in the CHT have almost reached parity according to the 2011 population census, this study selected equal numbers of respondents from both groups. While 300 respondents are a relatively modest number for a survey, it approximates the number required to satisfy the requirements of a 90 percent confidence level and 5 percent confidence interval.[11] The total population in the study location, according to the 2011 census, is 1,598,231 but the adult population (18 years and above) is around 800,000. Based on the statistical calculation, the sample size for the proposed study should be 384.

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[11] Zina O'Leary has used this simple formula for calculating sample size. According to O'Leary, n= [(K×S)/E] ^{2} in which K is the desired confidence level, S is the sample standard deviation, and E is the required level of precision. Here I will take confidence interval ±5% and confidence level 95% (O'Leary, 2017, pp. 185-186). Also see, Teddlie & Tashakori, (2009), pp. 182-183.

However, considering the time and financial constraints of the PhD, the decision was made to cap the survey at 300, which was a feasible sample size to complete within the fieldwork period (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, p. 193).

Two sets of questionnaires with standardised questions were used. The questionnaire for Bengali respondents included a section with questions about their migration experience and why they decided to move to the CHT. This section of 12 questions (Questions 1 to 12 in the Bengali questionnaire) informs Chapter Five which discusses the impacts of climate change on the Bengali migration, and Chapter Six, which analyses the mediating factors in the Bengali migration process. The remainder of the questionnaire explores the conflict situation and is the same for Bengali and Tribal respondents (Appendix 10 and 11). The responses to these questions are presented and analysed in Chapter Seven.

4.2.4. Semi-structured interviews

Besides the questionnaire survey, this study uses two forms of semi-structured interview: the interview with climate migrants (detailed see in Appendix 9) and the interview with key informants (detailed see in Appendix 8). The interview is a powerful tool in research to understand fellow humans and individual or group perspectives (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 698). Open-ended interviews produce in-depth data about patterns, variables and possible hypotheses (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003). Conducting interviews with climate migrants provided information about the history of migration, the problems that pushed people to migrate and why and how they moved to the CHT. In the open-ended interview session, respondents are able to raise issues that the researcher may not anticipate (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Knowledge is situated and contextual, and therefore collecting information from the ground level enables explanations of the real-life situations of the respondents

(Mason, 2002). Asking climate migrants questions about the condition of their place of origin, their experience of migration, and how they perceive their present place of residence enabled the researcher to gain insight into the subjective viewpoints which give meaning to their situation (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 1). This lived experience and what it means to the respondent cannot be attained through a quantitative survey instrument. Information about people's views, opinions, ideas, knowledge, understanding, experiences and interactions derived from the interviews help the researcher to explore the research questions (Berg et al., 2004; Bryman & Burgess, 2002; Mason, 2002).

I conducted the interviews of ten climate affected people, referred to as Climate Migrant (CM), about their lived experience of the climatic events they faced, their actions in response to these, the process of migrating to the CHT and engaging with its people, society and politics. The ten climate migrants were randomly selected from those who participated in the questionnaire survey, confirmed that they had migrated as a result of climate change events at their place of origin, and gave their consent to take part in a follow-up interview. These interview participants are listed in Appendix 9, which also gives a brief description of each interviewee. As Creswell (2015) points out, population size for the qualitative interview depends on the purpose and expectation of the researcher (Creswell, 2015, p. 78-79). The mixed method approach supports the inclusion of several groups of respondents if the research questions demand multiple samples (Bronstein & Kovacs, 2013). Indeed, there is no hard and fast rule of mixed methods sampling strategies. As Teddlie and Yu (2007, p. 85) argue "there are typically multiple samples in a Mixed Methods study, and these samples may vary in size (dependent on the research strand and question) from a small number of cases to a large number of units". One of the prime aims

of this research is to understand the impacts of climate change events in the decision of the Bengali people to migrate to the CHT.

I also interviewed with ten key informants who hold strategic positions in academia, non-government sector, political leader and activists (See Table 4.2). Participants for the interviews with key informants were selected based on their knowledge and expertise on climate change, migration and/or the CHT conflict. However, it should be remembered that the experts have imperfect knowledge on CHT affairs, in particular, on the ways in which the migration decision of Bengali people in the CHT have been affected by climatic events. Depending on the key informants' residence and workplace, these interviews were conducted in the capital city of Dhaka or in the CHT. While reviewing the literature for the study, I recorded the names of the key informants who have contributed scholarly knowledge about the environment and climate change, migration in Bangladesh, and the CHT conflict. From this list, I chose twenty key informants based on their areas of interest, attributes, and professional attachment. Of this group, ten professionals were available and willing to participate during my field visit in Bangladesh.

4.3. Research ethics and selection of the study sites

This research evolves ethics approval as it is based on data collection from humans. Thus, it was mandatory to receive ethics approval from the Ethics Committee of Flinders University. I applied for the ethics approval to Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee (SBREC), Flinders University in May 2016. In the ethics application, I provided detailed information about the selection of the study sites, nature of the data (primary or secondary) and way of collecting data in the field. The ethics committee approved the

application in July 2016 following minor revision, enabling me to start the field study in

November 2016 when the political and security condition in the CHT was favourable.

I selected the study sties based on the information of conflict happened in the CHT and

population census report. As stated in Chapter Three, the CHT conflict can be divided into

two phases: the first involved violent conflict between the Bangladesh army and Shanti

Bahini (1972-1997): the second phase is marked by low level but wide-spread social conflict

taking place since the CHT Peace Accord (1997-ongoing). In both phases, Bengali migration

and settlement is an issue causing conflict. To explore the link between these issues, the

study was conducted across the three CHT districts of Bandarban, Rangamati and

Khagrachari (See Figure 4.4) between November 2016 and February 2017.

Figure 4.4: Study sites in the three districts in the CHT

Figure showing map of study sites in the Chittagong Hill Tracts with legend:

Legend
- Study site (most conflict-prone upazila)
- Study site (less conflict-prone upazila)
- No study here

(a) List of the study sites (most conflict-prone upazila)

1. Matiranga upazila
2. Ramgarh upazila
3. Khagrachhari sadar upazila
4. Baghaichari upazila
5. Naniachar upazila
6. Longadu upazila
7. Bandarban sadar upazila

(b) List of the study sites (less conflict-prone upazila)

1. Manikchari upazila
2. Barkal upazila
3. Lama upazila

Source: Developed by the researcher.

In selecting the study sites, the research takes account of both conflict stages. Ten study sites were selected from among the upozilas[12] based on conflict records published in various sources (CHT Commission, 1991, 2000; IWGIA, 2012; Barman, 2013; Choudhury & Hussain, 2017; Levene, 1999), as well as national newspapers and locally based non-governmental organisations (Kapaeeng Foundation n.d.; PCJSS n.d). All selected study sites

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[12] 'Upozila' is a local term in Bangladesh for an area consisting of a few villages. Basically, it is the administrative unit of each district. In the CHT there are 25 upozilas.

had experienced Bengali settlement in recent decades, and seven of the sites were classified as 'most conflict-prone' and three as 'less conflict-prone' based on published conflict records. This enabled the researcher to survey residents about the impacts of climate change events on their migration decisions, and about the impact of the settlement on the social, economic and political conditions in a variety of locations and conflict situations. Interviews with climate migrants were conducted across the study sites with survey participants who agreed to participate.

In Figure 4.4, the red coloured areas are the most conflict-prone regions indicated in the conflict data and the turquoise coloured areas are less conflict-prone regions. The conflict data have been derived from sources such as local newspapers (*Prothom Alo* and the *Daily Star*'[13]) and the websites of the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) and the Kapaeeng Foundation (KF), a human rights organisation of the indigenous people in Bangladesh. This research considers conflict records from 1975-1997 and 1997-2015, which are kept by the CHT based political party PCJSS and the KF. Data published in the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) report were also considered. Appendix 5 summarises the records of major and minor communal conflicts from 1997 to 2014, and Appendix 6 lists the key conflict events prior to the Peace Accord of 1997.

In addition to conflict data, the population and housing census reports of the Government of Bangladesh were also consulted to determine the ten study locations. By scrutinising the census reports from the 2001 and 2011 census, it is possible to identify sites where both Bengali and Tribal people are living in the same village or in a different village in the same

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[13] The *Prothom Alo* is one of the popular Bengali newspaper in Bangladesh. On the other hand, the *Daily Star* is the most circulated English newspaper in Bangladesh.

para[14], or neighbourhood. However, the population census reports of 2001 and 2011 do

not report the number of tribal and Bengali people at administrative sub-levels in the CHT.

Therefore, religion was used as a proxy for ethnicity (Appendix 7) as the Bengali population

in the CHT is mostly Muslim and the tribal population is mostly Buddhist. Using this

variable, it was possible to arrive at an approximate ratio of Bengali and tribal population in

the proposed study sites. The sources used to identify fieldwork locations for the research

are summarised in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Sources of information for selecting the study sites for the survey

Sources of information	Conflict and communal violence between the Tribal and Bengali people in the CHT listed by the PCJSS from 1997-2014
	Conflict data from 1972-1997 from secondary sources
	Religion-based population ratio according to the population census of 2011

Source: Developed by the researcher.

Not all regions of the CHT are equally affected by conflict, and it is important therefore to

include a variety of sites in the study. Based on the conflict records and population census

data, I selected three highly conflict-prone areas and one less conflict-prone area each

from the Khagrachari district and the Rangamati district, and one of each type from the

Bandarban district. The conflict dataset shows that Bandarban has experienced less conflict

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[14] A para is a unit of place where at least 200-300 families are living. It is a small village, but locally is known as para.

compared with the other two districts, and, therefore, is of less interest to analyse the link between migration and conflict. Figure 4.5 illustrates the design of the study site location.

Figure 4.5: Distribution of ten study sites for the survey

Source: Developed by the researcher.

4.4. Data collection process

I conducted fieldwork between November 2016 and February 2017. I travelled to Dhaka, the capital city of Bangladesh and then on to the CHT region, which is 300 kilometres to the East of the capital. During the fieldwork period, the political environment of the CHT was volatile as several violent incidents had occurred in 2016. Conducting field study in the conflict-prone areas requires consultation with and understanding from the gatekeepers to avoid potential risk (Goodhand, 2000). Therefore, I consulted with gatekeepers about the situation of the CHT and potential risk, including with officers of 'Bangladesh Ansar'[15] employed in the CHT. Aware that gatekeepers may try to place controls on research by limiting access to study sites, defining the problem in his/her own way and restricting data

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[15] Bangladesh Ansar is the paramilitary force employed across Bangladesh to ensure internal peace and security.

collection (Broadhead & Rist, 1976), I limited interaction with gatekeepers to avoid their influence. I had prior experience of collecting survey data and conducting focus group discussion in a number of places in the CHT during 2014 when I was employed as a researcher in a project supported by the UNDP-CHDF.[16] Moreover, my identity as a student at a foreign university as well as a university teacher in Bangladesh helped me to convey the importance of my study to the respondents. I had a letter of introduction from my academic supervisor and a business card from Flinders University which was shown to respondents and others who enquired about my purpose.

Access to study sites in the conflict zone can be challenging (Wood, 2006). Thus, a map and work plan for conducting the field study was developed in consultation with local research assistants (two Bengali and four from a tribal background) contracted to assist in fieldwork. I posted a notice on social media (Facebook) to appoint research assistants who would like to work in the CHT region. From over ten current university students and two former students who expressed their interest, two male Bengali research assistants and four male research assistants of indigenous background from the CHT region were selected based on their community affiliation and language ability. Although several female students also showed interest in participating in the study, I did not select any of them for security reasons. Firstly, I had to travel a long distance and stay overnight in several places, and sharing accommodation with female research assistants would have been inappropriate. Moreover, physical harassment and abduction are a possibility for female research assistants. The inability to appoint female research assistants hampered data collection from the female respondents in that female respondents refused to talk to male

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[16] UNDP-CHTDF is a project programme launched by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the CHT. The aim of this project is to facilitate peace-building efforts in association with the government of Bangladesh.

researchers. However, research assistants with local background managed in some places to overcome this barrier with female participants. In other instances, my identity as a university teacher and a student in a foreign university helped to persuade female respondents to participate.

Two Bengali research assistants were employed for six weeks to conduct the survey with Bengali residents, and four tribal research assistants for a subsequent period of six weeks to target tribal residents. The research assistants supported me in the field in hiring a motorbike, carrying survey materials and sometimes filling in questionnaires while I was interviewing the respondents. Their local knowledge helped me in negotiating local gatekeepers and establishing connection and trust with the heads of households. In some instances, the head of the household invited me for tea, which created the opportunity for informal discussion about many issues including life in the CHT, security, development and educational facilities for their children. Respondents from both Bengali and tribal communities narrated their stories of living in the CHT which enriched my understanding about the region. Indeed, listening to stories from the respondents is one of the main tasks of the researcher in qualitative research (Braun & Clarke, 2013). These informal conversations offered additional information about past conflict, trauma, and social fragmentation which have shaped community relations in the CHT. Every night, I wrote up notes, stories, incidents, and experiences duly throughout the field study. The notes and stories provided contextual information for the interpretation of survey and interview data. I took notes from in my native language. But I checked and translated it into English before analysing data for writing chapters. The following section presents the data collection processes of the questionnaire survey and the interviews conducted in the CHT and in Dhaka.

4.4.1. Data collection process of survey

In conducting the survey, I followed a simple random sampling method to select the respondents through door knocking. I started from a point (for example a *Bazar*, or place of worship) and chose every alternate house for the interview. This is a random selection process that gives equal opportunity to each respondent to be part of the research (Buckingham & Saunders, 2004; Gideon, 2012; Walter, 2006). Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009, p. 170) describe this as "applying simple random sampling procedures where the probability of the inclusion for every member of the population is determinable". This process enabled respondents to be recruited from a diversity of backgrounds, including farmers, teachers, small vendors, social workers, community leaders and housewives. In approaching potential participants I described my research topic, possible benefits and risks of participating in the survey, and sought their verbal consent to participate. Participants were also offered a copy of the letter of introduction (Appendix 3). If a respondent denied consent or nobody was at home I moved on to the adjacent house.

Below is a brief overview of the demographic characteristics of the survey respondents. The survey respondents were predominantly male, of working age and low level of education. The following figure shows the information about the demographic information of the respondents.

Figure 4.6: Demographic information about the Bengali and tribal respondents

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=150

Among the 150 Bengali respondents, 82 percent are men and 18 percent women. Most of

the Bengali respondents are Muslim (90 percent) and 9 percent described themselves as

Hindu. As for educational background, 35 percent of respondents never attended school, and 42 percent went to primary school (that is, they attended schooling years 1-5). Only 3 percent of respondents had a post-secondary (college) degree (Figure 4.6). On the other hand, among the tribal respondents, 88 percent reported to be Buddhist, 6.7 percent Christian, and 5.3 percent Hindu. Regarding education, more educated respondents took part in the survey among the tribal people, and a higher proportion of women compared with the Bengali survey (Figure 4.6).

One of the features of the demographic information is under-representation of the female respondents. The under-representation of women in both surveys is due to two reasons. Firstly, it is usually the head of the household who communicates with outsiders, and households are predominantly headed by men. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, women were reluctant to invite an unknown male researcher into their home, for religious, moral or security reasons. Male researchers are disadvantaged in collecting data from female respondents (Dixit, 2012), but as mentioned earlier, the option of hiring female research assistance was ruled out for security reasons. Moreover, social structure, religious affiliation and openness also play a role in respondents participating in research. Dixit (2012, p. 147) argued that "a researcher belonging to a different country but same religion, ethnicity or race may be received more cordially than a researcher of the same country but of a different religion, ethnicity or race". As a male researcher I was an outsider to the female respondents, therefore, some of them refused to participate in the survey and interview process. Thus this study has surveyed more male respondents.

4.4.2.   Data collection process of interview

Key informants were approached for interviews by email or phone and dates confirmed

upon arrival in Bangladesh. Before starting the interview, I read the information sheet to

the participants and sought their consent. I recorded the interview using a digital recorder

when granted permission to do so, and took notes as much as possible in Bengali language.

I followed the same process while interviewing climate migrants except that their consent

to be interviewed was sought when they completed the survey. As mentioned previously, I

started the interview process by talking about the daily household issues so that

participants felt at ease, and then asked the semi-structured questions. With both groups,

informal conversation prior to starting the interview proved useful in establishing a friendly

atmosphere and shared interests. The basic information of the participants in the interview

is presented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Basic information about the interview participants

Instrument	List of interviews	Number
Open-ended interview with climate migrants (CM)	Participants were derived from the survey	10
Open-ended interview with key informants (professionals)	Political leader	1
	Academics	3
	Activist and NGO workers	3
	Development workers	2
	Government official (a research fellow)	1
Total number		20

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017

4.5. Coding scheme and data analysis

After completing the fieldwork, I started entering the survey data in the computer-assisted software programme of Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS). This process helped to explore any inconsistencies or faults in the data as well as provided summary indices of the data. There are a number of software packages such as MAXQDA, STATA and SPSS, which are used in research based on "factors such as availability, cost, degree of training and expertise needed, recognition in the field, and types of analyses offered by the program" (Annechino, Antin, & Lee, 2010, p. 2). I chose SPSS because I am familiar with this software and it offers more scope to analyse data and derive the themes from the questions. The themes enabled me to identify the commonality, special characteristics and different types of data. I categorised the broader themes that became sub-sections of the finding chapters: impacts of the climate change on the Bengali respondents, life and livelihood options in their place of origin, how they migrated and who helped them to migrate. I similarly categorised the respondents' information about livelihood issues, security and conflict that form the basis of the finding chapters 5 to 7.

As a relatively small number of interviews was collected, I analysed the interview data manually. The interviews were first transcribed in my native language Bangla, which is the language used in the interview, and then translated into English. I carefully transcribed the data from Bengali to the English language. Then the interview data was manually coded to find important topics, meanings, and emphasis that the respondents conveyed. The process of analysing the data involves familiarisation, identifying a thematic framework, devising and refining, indexing, charting and mapping and interpretation (Srivastava & Thomson, 2009). Identifying themes from qualitative interview data is a time-consuming

and difficult task because qualitative data can be unwieldy and involve hundred of pages of transcripts and field notes (Berg et. al., 2004; Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls, & Ormston, 2013). I arranged the views of the respondents based on the themes of the questions and explored the commonalities, differences, and salient characteristics. Following the mixed method approach, I incorporated the qualitative data with the survey findings and triangulated it for the interpretation. The themes derived from this process have been incorporated into Chapters Five to Seven. Analysing the qualitative and quantitative data at the same time and side by side enabled to explore comparisons, connections and movement of information between the different datasets.

4.6. Challenges during fieldwork[17]

As the case study is situated in a conflict-prone area, I faced some ethical challenges including confidentiality, anonymity, safety and security of the respondents and the researcher. In conflict-prone and remote areas, researchers can find it challenging to access the study site (Wood, 2007), speak openly to respondents and avoid the undue attention of security forces (Höglund, 2011). In addition, as the CHT is situated in the remote and hilly area of Bangladesh, it was physically challenging to access the study sites. I hired a motorbike and sometimes rented a car to reach the remote areas. The research assistants helped me to reach remote locations as they knew the region and the way to reach the survey locations. Indeed, remoteness and adverse environment create difficulties in reaching and collecting the information from respondents (Haer & Becher, 2012). In the CHT, the road infrastructure in the remote areas is rudimentary and people's homes took time to reach in some cases. The unavailability of respondents also created delays as in

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[17] Parts of this section have been published in *Islam* (2018) [see Appendix 14].

some of the locations I had to visit some households several times to complete the survey when the male household member was absent and I was requested to return when he was likely to be at home.

The issue of being an outsider was a factor while collecting data in the CHT, as I do not belong to the region (Smyth, 2005). In conflict-prone areas, residents do not like to talk to outsiders about their perspectives on life (Höglund, 2011; Mazurana, Jacobsen, & Gale, 2013). Keeping silent is often the first response when questions are asked about the conflict situation, partly due to fear of the security forces (Goodhand, 2000). Tribal respondents in particular hesitated about sharing their information because they perceived me as an outsider. They also hesitated to share information due to the constant fear of factional political wings such as the United Peoples Democratic Front (UPDF), Janosanhoti Samity (JSS) and JSS reformist parties. Despite sharing a Bengali background with the Bengali respondents, some were reluctant to talk as they did not know me. Some Bengali respondents initially took me to be either an NGO or a government representative, consequently they were reluctant to attend the interview, until I showed my university identification and explained that the survey was part of my PhD research. A rumour had been circulated among the settlers that the Government of Bangladesh would take over the land of the settlers and redistribute it to the tribal people. This false rumour scared many Bengali settlers who fear losing their land and home, making them wary of talking to outsiders about politically sensitive issues.

As tribal and Bengali people in the CHT have experienced long-standing violent conflict, fear and persecution have created a culture of silence and non-response. Some tribal people suffer from trauma and psychological stress because of the long-standing conflict

and are reluctant to participate in research studies. I tried to establish rapport and break

the silence by discussing general issues about their life in the CHT. On several occasions, I

sat together with the family and talked about different issues, including my personal story.

I assured the respondents that this project is for an educational purpose. This helped to

establish communication and eventually enabled the interview session to begin. In other

situations, the research assistant from the local communities helped to establish the trust

required to persuade people to participate. When people knew the research assistant they

were more likely to come forward and give their consent for the survey.

Another challenging issue for the researcher was that some respondents appeared to

provide questionable information. The respondents followed the prevalent discourse

about the CHT conflict of their cultural and political group. Each group blamed the opposite

group for the conflict and violence that was occurring, or had occurred, in the CHT. I

realised that participants from both communities were presenting a particular bias. Even

professionals who were interviewed as key informants responded to questions based on

their party affiliation and/or ideological point of view. But similar questions used at

different points in the questionnaire enabled the comparison and evaluation of the

responses. However, in many cases it is impossible to verify the accuracy of responses and

thus they have been analysed as participant perspectives, rather than facts. In this

situation, the mixed methods approach is helpful as it enables the researcher to analyse

multiple data points and triangulate them with the academic literature.

On some occasions, maintaining confidentiality and anonymity was challenging even

though it is particularly important in conflict research (Ford, Mills, Zachariah, & Upshur,

2009; Pottier, Hammond, & Cramer, 2011). I was careful to maintain the anonymity of

survey and interview participants. Thus, I did not ask their names, address, email or any identifying information. Occasionally, outsiders intervened and tried to disrupt the survey. Law enforcement agents, intelligence agents and a journalist became aware of the research and wanted to know what was going on. In these situations, I explained that the research was for educational purposes and their presence would hamper the process, which was usually enough to persuade them to leave. I showed them my university identity card, mentioned the name of other locally influential people who could vouch for me, and used my university position in Bangladesh to establish trust and respect.[18]

Language is another challenge that I faced while collecting data. As a Bengali, I am not familiar with the tribal languages, it was, therefore, important to have research assistants who could speak the local language. Although this entailed time-consuming training for the project, it ensured timely completion of the survey, comprehensive data collection and interpretation and effective management of access and security concerns.

4.7. Conclusion

This chapter has described the methodological approach followed in order to gather and analyse information to address the research questions relating to the relationship of climate change, migration and conflict in Bangladesh. The mixed methodology of questionnaire surveys and open-ended interviews was adopted as the most appropriate approach to collect data in the CHT. These methods enabled the collection of a composite set of information (surveys with Bengali and tribal respondents, interviews with key informants, and interviews with the climate migrants) to shed light on the migration

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[18] I teach in a public university in Bangladesh. The university teacher enjoys dignity and honour from the society and is addressed as "Master Shaheb", a respectful salutation in Bangladesh.

decisions of Bengali settlers, and the CHT residents' perceptions about the actors, causes and possible solutions to the conflict.

Based on the data collected through these research tools and the academic literature, the following three results chapters address the role of climate change in the migration to the CHT, the factors that enabled this migration, and the social and political conflict ensuing from it. The first of these, Chapter Five, presents how Bengali migrants have been affected by climate change issues.

CLIMATE CHANGE INFLUENCES ON BENGALI MIGRATION TO THE CHT

> Climate [change] influences human migration. Sometimes the influence is direct and obvious…Sometimes its influence is more subtle… Sometimes climate's influence is nested so deeply in interwoven chains of past events that we no longer notice how it has shaped where, how, and why we live in the places we do (McLeman, 2014, p. 1).

5.1. Introduction

This chapter analyses the causes of the Bengali migration and settlement to the CHT and the contribution of climate change events through the experience of Bengali settlers. This migration and settlement is viewed as 'political migration' by many researchers, but some scholars have argued that it has been influenced by environment and climate change factors and poverty and that it has complicated the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) conflict (Hafiz & Islam, 1993; Lee, 2001; Reuveny, 2007). This chapter offers empirical evidence demonstrating the relevance of climatic events in the migration of Bengali people to the CHT. It draws on a survey of 150 Bengali respondents as well as interview data to explore the impacts of climate change on migration decisions and processes. Although survey respondents and migrant interviews indicate a significant impact of climate change events on migration decisions, most of the key informants interviewed for this study are sceptical, and sometimes unaware about the impacts of climatic events on the migration of the Bengali people to the CHT. The argument this chapter presents is that climate change effects and poverty constituted the push factors for the migration of the Bengali people to the CHT. The proposed opportunities by the government (for example, the possibility of getting land) inspired most of the Bengali respondents to migrate to this region, even

though it was in many ways an adverse destination due to conflict, the unfamiliar hilly environment, distance and remoteness, and lack of facilities, including road, medical, health and education infrastructure.

This chapter first presents the survey findings and interview information that concern the causes of the migration, the role of climatic events, and how migrants have sought to migrate and adapt to these events. This chapter then offers a discussion of these findings, followed by a concluding summary.

5.2. Findings

This section presents the data from the survey conducted with 150 Bengalis living in the CHT who have migrated to the region. It reports on survey questions about climatic events the respondents experienced in their place of origin, the impacts of these events on their lives, the help and assistance they received from the government and the local community, and the factors that influenced their decisions to migrate. These survey findings are complemented by the accounts of climate migrants interviewed for this study and the scholarly and policy perspectives on this migration drawn from interviews conducted with key informants.

5.2.1. Migration status

Bengali people living in the CHT who originated from rural and low land areas of Bangladesh are locally known as settlers. Respondents who stated that they had migrated (except two respondents who chose not to disclose) were selected for the survey, (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1: Migration status of the Bengali respondents and their parents

Respondent		Respondent's Father	Respondent's Mother
Migrated	Don't like to answer	Migrated	Migrated
98.7% (148)	1.3% (2)	60.7% (91)	60% (90)

Source: Fieldwork November 2016 - February 2017. N=150.

More than half of the respondents stated that their parents are also migrants, suggesting that they either migrated as a family group or invited their parents to join them once they had settled in the CHT.

5.2.2. Causes of migration and settlement

A key question early in the survey concerns the causes of migration. Respondents were asked to consider five reasons for their decision to migrate from their place of origin. Most of the respondents identified multiple reasons (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1: Bengali respondents' reasons for migrating to the CHT

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=150. Multiple response question.

Figure 5.1 shows the most frequently cited reasons for migrating were related to livelihood, income and climatic events. Most of the respondents stated that they were unable to make a living in their place of origin and almost 60 percent stated that they migrated in the hope of improving their income. Over 50 percent of respondents mentioned climatic events as a cause of their migration to the CHT. As discussed in Chapter Three, climatic events in Bangladesh have adverse effects on livelihood, housing and other basic needs and cause displacement and migration (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013; Mallick & Vogt, 2012; Joarder & Miller, 2013). Comparatively few respondents cited political problems such as fear, repression, conflict or violence as a factor in their decision to migrate. However, other studies showed that political factors such as fear and repression in the plains region of Bangladesh have implications which force some people to migrate from their land (Siraj & Bal, 2017). After 1975, religious minority Hindu people experienced persecution and harassment from some Muslim people in many locations in Bangladesh. Thus, many Hindu people were forced to migrate to the neighbouring country of India as their safe place to live (Datta, 2004). In this connection, some Bengali Hindus may have migrated to the CHT to escape from torture, harassment and sexual violence in their place of origin.

As stated in Chapter Two, multiple factors such as climate events, poverty, expectation of more income and avoiding resultant vulnerabilities play a role in migration decisions (Black, Adger et al., 2011; McLeman, 2014). In the case of internal migration in Bangladesh, multiple causes such as poverty, frequent climate events, debt and crop failure determine the migration decisions of the people (Joarder & Miller, 2013; Siddiqui & Billah, 2014).

Chapter Three showed that Bangladesh, as the most climate affected country, is facing annual floods, frequent cyclones and storm surges. In the last two decades, the country has experienced five devastating cyclones and six floods which impacted on the economy and human casualties (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013, p. 545).

Interviews with climate migrants offer more detailed information on how climatic events and poverty are interlinked. Frequent climatic events (for example, annual floods) damaged their livelihood, living options, and left nothing to the respondents in their place of origin to live. Some interviewees mentioned that they had been affected by floods and cyclones repeatedly, and their entire region had been inundated and destroyed. Despite trying their best to adapt to the changing environment by setting up their dwelling in a nearby location to reduce their climate vulnerability, they had not been able to stay. When hearing about other people moving to the CHT, they too decided to migrate. Other respondents mentioned poverty as the determining factor in their migration. Although they had not been directly affected by climate change or environmental causes, they suffered secondary impacts in the form of diminished income and work opportunities. One climate migrant, a 50-year-old woman who migrated from the Faridpur district, explained how she came to the CHT and under what circumstances:

> Researcher: Can you please tell me what happened in a place where you have come from?
>
> Climate migrant 5: I had a big family in Faridpur consisting of three daughters and three sons. What I managed to earn per day was insufficient to feed my children one full meal per day. The rest of the day we remained hungry. In such a condition, the river took away everything we had. My husband moved to the *char* with us and built a *dochala*[19]. However, this place was damaged by river bank erosion. Our house and all our belongings were destroyed four times by river bank erosion.

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[19] '*Dochala*' is a local term used in some parts of Bangladesh to refer to a small house constructed with bamboo and tin. Some people also use jute sticks to build the wall of the house.

Researcher: What did you do then?

Climate migrant 5: My husband and I worked hard to overcome the damage caused every time. My husband used to work as a day labourer, and I worked as a water carrier at a small hotel in the *bazar*. We also sought some help from the government but we did not receive any help.

Researcher: Why did you come to the CHT?

Climate migrant 5: We first went to Dhaka. However, life in Dhaka was tough. We had to pay money as extortion to the *Mastans* for hiring a house in the slum. But I did not feel safe in the slum. My daughters were not safe. Then, I heard that people are going to the CHT and the government is giving land and food. I decided to move. My husband and I first came to Chittagong and stayed for a few days. Finally, we came to the Rangamati district.

This account shows that the migration decision was taken only after the family had been affected repeatedly by climatic events that disrupted their livelihood and destroyed their home. However, the city as a migration destination is not safe due to the lack of facilities such as water, health and education, and law and order. Many informal settlement areas are governed by *Mastans*, a Bengali term for outlaw people. They control a particular territory through political connections and violence, demand money and harass poor people who live in the slums (Choudhury et al., 1993; Jensen & Andersen, 2017). Newcomers are particularly prone to falling victim to *Mastans* because they arrive in a vulnerable position having run out of options and resources. Thus, many of the survey respondents decided to migrate to the CHT to avoid the challenges posed by a precarious life in the city, and follow the promise of land and food. Another climate migrant, a 45-year-old respondent originally from Sylhet, told a similar story about floods washing away his assets and forcing him into extreme poverty.

I used to live in a rural area of the Sylhet district. I had a small piece of land for agriculture. With the land, I managed to sustain my family for about six months. The remaining six months I used to work on the land of other people as a day labourer. I faced devastating floods twice that destroyed everything. In the course of time, I fell into extreme poverty. I was fortunate that I got the news of the CHT. When I got the news from my relatives, I came here without hesitation (Climate migrant 9).

The above accounts reveal that climatic events and poverty are connected in many places in Bangladesh. Climatic events have the potential to destroy and diminish the limited resources of people who are already poor and further impoverish them. The respondents already lived in poverty when floods destroyed their crops, and over time, their capacity and options to adapt were exhausted. Frequent climatic events (floods and cyclone) and poverty represent a threat multiplier for poor people in low land and rural areas in Bangladesh (Alam, Alam, Mushtaq, & Clarke, 2017; Islam & Hasan, 2016), eventually leaving them with no other option than to migrate to any suitable place. In this context, migration is seen as the 'last resort' to save their lives (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013).

Lack of income in the place of origin, and the hope for more income elsewhere are related to the poverty situation of the respondents. In some areas of Bangladesh, such as Mymensingh and North Bengal, many people remain chronically poor. They lack minimum basic needs, such as income, daily consumption of food, medical facilities, clothes and work opportunities (Sen & Hulme, 2006; Rahman, Matsui, & Ikemoto, 2008). In the 1980s and 1990s, these areas were more affected by poverty compared to other regions in Bangladesh (Rahman, Mahmud, & Haque, 1988). Some of the poverty-stricken people migrated to the CHT after hearing about the opportunities for land provided by the government. This means that migration of the Bengali people to the CHT is also related to socio-economic factors. To explore the respondents' socioeconomic and political situation in their place of origin, the survey asked about the respondent's income, assets, and other factors such as debt, extortion, violence and any threats that are commonly linked to chronic poverty. These factors constitute push factors in their migration decision to the CHT.

Figure 5.2: Bengali respondents' views about the socioeconomic and political situation in their place of origin.

Category	Value
Not enough income	73.5
Not enough land	70.9
Debt	25.3
Extortion	0.7
Physical violence	1.4
Threats to family member	4.1

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=150. Multiple response questions.

Figure 5.2 shows that more than 70 percent of the respondents suffered from low income and insufficient land in their place of origin. In rural areas of Bangladesh, land ownership is directly connected to income. As discussed in Chapter Three, the country is one of the most densely populated countries in the world and the cultivated area is in average about 0.125 acre per person (Quasem, 2011). The increasing population has led to fragmentation and reduced productivity of the land (Rahman & Rahman, 2009). Due to economic hardship, some respondents have become indebted. Poor people obtain loans from micro-credit banks in order to escape from the vulnerabilities and poverty, but then fail to repay the loans. This complex situation of poverty and indebtedness influenced the migration decision of some respondents (Afsar, 2004; Findlay & Geddes, 2011). Very few respondents mention incidents of physical violence, threats to family and extortion as factors that pushed them to migrate.

Interviews with key informants provided different views about the causes of migration of the Bengali people to the CHT. For example, one informant, a university professor and director of a migration research centre, acknowledged that poverty and environmental causes played a role in migration. According to the informant,

> I cannot say exactly that Bengali people who have migrated to the CHT are all climate affected. However, I can say that poor and landless people being hit by the riverbank erosion, floods and cyclone mostly moved to the CHT for land (Key informant 9).

Interviewees with expertise in the field of climate change issues also supported the view that a majority of Bengali migrants to the CHT had lost their homes, livelihood and land due to floods, cyclones and river-bank erosion in their place of origin. One professor in International Relations and a CHT expert argued that the environment and climate affected landless and poor people moved to the CHT when the government announced that each family would receive land and livelihood.

Two other key informants cited the government's resettlement policy as the major pull factor in the migration to the CHT. Informant 2, a history professor and activist for indigenous people's rights, offered the following account:

> Poor and landless people from the low-lying areas of Bangladesh moved to the CHT only for land and livelihood. When the government announced that each family would receive five acres of land and 40 kilograms of rice per month, poor people in the coastal belt were tempted by the offer. This is why many displaced people moved to the CHT and received land, sometimes captured the land and settled there. Now, these Bengali people are the king (powerful) in the CHT (Key informant 2).

The informant suggests that Bengali settlers have grabbed land, echoing arguments elsewhere that many of the settlers have illegally occupied the land in the CHT (Adnan,

2004; Adnan & Dastidar, 2011). This has enabled them to consolidate their economic and social position in the CHT to the point that Bengali people now are situated in dominant positions in many parts of the region. According to informants, it was the pull factor of the promise of land and government support that led many Bengalis to migrate to the CHT. As the informant explained, the motive of the Bangladesh state was to gain hegemony over the tribal people of the CHT by settling tens of thousands of Bengalis. The government and the local administration in the CHT played a significant role in managing this migration process. The political motive is acknowledged in the literature on the CHT conflict, which also identifies the role of the army. Literature highlighted that the army wanted to settle Bengali people to act as a human shield as well as balance the population between the Bengali and tribal people in the CHT (Mohsin, 1997, 2000; Levene, 1999; Chakma, 2010a). According to this perspective, Bengali migration would have been much less during 1979-1990 without the enticements of land, food and protection offered by the government.

In summary, environment and climate change impacts influenced the Bengali settler respondents to migrate to the CHT to escape from climate vulnerabilities and poverty. One point emerging from the climate migrant interviews is that their migration to the CHT occurred in several steps, via Dhaka and other destinations. This indicates that the CHT was not the place of first choice. The availability of land and forest resources equally motivated respondents to migrate to the CHT. Although some key informants highlighted the government's intention of establishing hegemony in the CHT as the main driving force behind the migration and settlement of the Bengali people to the CHT, other key informants acknowledged the role of climatic events and poverty as causal factors in the migration and settlement of low-land Bengali people to the CHT. Thus, the micro-level information from the survey respondents, and interview information from the key

informants, confirms that environment and climatic events, and poverty in the place of origin of the Bengali respondents, are the dominant factors for migration to the CHT.

5.2.3. The role of climatic events in migration decisions

As the previous section argued, most Bengali respondents stated that climatic events played a role in their migration decisions. This section explores in more detail which kinds of climatic events these climate migrants experienced. To do this, it analyses the additional information provided by the 56 percent of the survey respondents who stated that climatic events had affected their decision to migrate. This section also sheds light on the costs that climatic events inflicted on the people in the affected areas. Lastly, it discusses the role of government and local community in supporting the affected people in their attempts to rebuild their lives and stay on the land.

Figure 5.3: What climatic events affected the respondents most? (% of climate migrants)

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=84. Multiple response question.

According to Figure 5.3, most climate migrants had experienced floods, the most frequent

and devastating of the climatic events afflicting the low-lying areas of Bangladesh. More

than half of the climate migrant respondents also mentioned riverbank erosion and a

smaller proportion had experienced cyclones and sea-level rise. Drought was a factor for

only 7 percent of the respondents. Interviews with climate migrants also provided

information on how climate events affected their lives in their place of origin. One climate

migrant, a 50-year-old man from the Barisal district, a southern part of Bangladesh, told

the researcher about the measures he took to adapt to the frequent flooding of his home:

> I came to the CHT with my wife and five children. In my place, we were affected
> by the floods, cyclone and intrusion of the sea-water. Our house was located in
> a lowland area. During the rainy season, flood water entered our house. We
> then built *macha*[20] (top place) on our house. In some cases, we could not leave
> the house for several days. We used a bamboo-made boat to go to work
> (Climate migrant 4).

People in the low-lying areas of Bangladesh, such as Barisal, Noakhali, Bhola, Patuakhali,

Khulna, Barguna and Cox's Bazar, are more affected by floods and cyclones. The

devastating cyclone Ayla in 2009, and cyclones Nargis in 2008 and Sidr in 2007, destroyed

many houses, trees, roads and agricultural fields in these areas. A 45-year-old man from

Bhola district explained how his work as a fisherman became impossible due to the

increasing severity of coastal cyclones:

> Poor people like me cannot live in such a place. Every year, our house has been
> destroyed. I used to work as a fisherman. I lost my nets and boat several times
> in a cyclone. I also shifted my house several times. In the end, I took shelter on
> the embankment of the river. It was a hard life, and my children had to starve
> many times. Life was good for me and my family when I managed to catch more
> fish from the sea. However, fishing at sea was risky. My boat was not good
> enough to face the strong winds and cyclones. My brother told me to come to

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[20] *Macha* is a local term which is used to describe a covered platform made of wood and bamboo on top of
the house or next to the house to take refuge from flood water.

the CHT. Thus, I have come here, and now I am fine with my children by the Almighty Allah (Climate migrant 1).

As Chapter Three has outlined, coastal areas in Bangladesh are increasingly affected by sea-level rise and coastal erosion. This climate migrant's story is similar to that of many people in the lowland and rural areas who have become the victims of climatic events, enduring the loss of their livelihood, assets and sometimes also loss of life (Ahmed, 2006; Brouwer et al., 2007; Mirza, 2003). In this situation, migration becomes an option of last resort to escape climate change induced vulnerabilities and risks (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013).

Survey participants reported that the cost of climatic events such as floods, drought and sea-level rise are significant and affected their lives in many ways (Figure 5.4):

Figure 5.4: Respondents' views about the impacts of the climatic events (% of climate migrants)

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=84. Multiple response question.

Figure 5.4 shows that the majority of climate migrants experienced damage to their crops, house, and agricultural land. In an agriculture-based country such as Bangladesh, damage

to crops causes crop failure and throws people into poverty (Muqtada, 1981; Gray &

Mueller, 2012). Damage to their homes and land renders the affected people homeless

and landless, eventually forcing them to be displaced. In addition, the loss of basic utilities

such as fresh water, and damage to roads and infrastructure due to frequent climatic

events negatively affect people's quality of life. In some cases, family members of the

respondents were injured or lost their lives during the events.

The interviews with climate migrants extend these survey findings by providing further

detail of climatic events and the consequences they experienced. A 45-year-old male

migrant from Chittagong district narrated his experience of a devastating flood:

> Researcher: Can you please tell me what exactly happened to you?
>
> Climate migrant 6: One night I heard a sound *'shoo, shoo'[21]*. We were in our house. We could not understand it. However, suddenly we heard the announcement that floods are coming. We did not have time to go to a safe place. Suddenly, the flood water came to our house, with great force. Within a few minutes, the flood water destroyed everything. The flood water washed away all of our villages. I lost two of my brothers. I lost all my cattle and all our belongings with my house (Climate migrant 6).

As this interviewee pointed out, sudden climatic events are frequently devastating. Floods,

cyclones and riverbank erosion can destroy vast areas within the space of a few minutes.

On the other hand, events such as coastal erosion and sea-level rise gradually destroy the

livelihood and living options of people. Another climate migrant from the Barisal district

described his experience with sea-level rise and coastal erosion:

> Like me, many people have come to the CHT from my home area. My previous home was very close to the sea level. Every year, the sea-water entered our house and land. Cultivating in the salty water was impossible. We were not even able to get fresh drinking water. We spent several years living like this. Our health condition was also affected by the salty water

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[21] 'Shoo, shoo' refers to the sound come from rushing water and strong wind.

and continuous waterlogging. Because of all these difficulties we moved to the CHT (Climate migrant 8).

People living in places close to the sea and big rivers are affected by frequent floods, cyclone and coastal erosion. These climatic events frequently hit those areas and damage agriculture, trees, water sources and cattle. People gradually lose land and the financial capability to lead their life. People are also deprived of the minimum medical facilities due to the lack of hospitals as well as many health professionals show less interest in working or living in highly climate affected areas. Thus, climate affected people suffer from ill-health because of climatic events and lack of health facilities. In such conditions, many people have difficulty managing their livelihood and other basic needs.

The connection between climatic events and displacement and migration is not inevitable. An early and appropriate response and practical assistance from the government during and after adverse climatic events may support people in their attempts to stay in or return to their homes. During and after floods, cyclones, and other environmental disasters, the timely response of the government is crucial in saving the life and property of residents. People who abandon their homes tend to do so because they do not receive adequate help from the government and are unable to continue living in the affected area. Among the 84 respondents who defined themselves as climate migrants, almost 70 per cent reported having received no government assistance at all when they experienced destructive climatic events (Figure 5.5).

Figure 5.5: Respondents' experience of government assistance (% of climate migrants)

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=84.

Figure 5.5 shows that less than 3 percent affected people could rely on receiving food from the government. Around 27 percent respondents reported receiving food only occassionlly (sometimes or rarely) from the government. The government was also inactive in providing shelter to the climate affected people. Less than 20 percent report that they were provided with shelter sometimes or rarely. This assistance was not provided in a manner that could be relied upon on a daily basis, and the vast majority received no assistance at all. Thus, the government did not provide the help required for climate affected people to be able to sustain themselves in their place of origin.

Further probing during interviews explored what kind of assistance was provided by government authorities. Most of the climate migrants interviewed for this study said that neither the central government nor the local government authority offered support to the affected people. Only one climate migrant from the Sylhet district reported that some assistance was initially offered:

> In the wake of the disaster, the government representative came to see us and gave us some emergency assistance, such as light refreshments and water. After that, they left us. We never found them again. We tried to stay in our place, but it was unsuitable for living and finding enough food. Therefore, I went to Dhaka for a work opportunity. I struggled there to find a house and work. Finally, I moved to CHT (Climate migrant 9).

In the absence of government support after disasters, climate affected people from low-lying rural areas had little option but to move to urban centres in search for work (Afsar, 2004; Ahsan et al., 2016). This is demonstrated in the interview segment above, where the participant first moved to Dhaka before migrating to the CHT to find an income sufficient to support his family. I asked survey respondents whether they received help and support from local bodies, such as *Union Parishad[22],* or from wealthy local people.

Figure 5.6: Respondents' views about help from the local level (% of climate migrants)

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=84

Figure 5.6 shows that local level help during and after climatic events was absent in most cases. Less than 15 percent of the respondents claimed that they received food and shelter

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[22] Union Parishad is the local level administration where elected representatives run the office and look after the development activities of the government of Bangladesh.

at the local level while only three percent reported that they received land from the local

authorities so that they could survive in their place of origin. Access to land in the rural

areas (both ownership and lease) is vital for farmers to grow food grains and construct a

dwelling for their families. It is usually the landless rural families who are most likely to

migrate when the rural economy is unable to provide a livelihood (Afsar, 2004). Interviews

with climate migrants confirm the survey findings regarding assistance from the

government or local authority. In some cases, extended family helped the affected people.

Two respondents (Climate migrant 9, from Sylhet and Climate migrant 6, from the

Chittagong district), reported that relatives sent them food in the aftermath of floods and

cyclones.

This section has explored the effects of climatic events, the cost (non-financial) that

climatic events imposed on the respondents, and the information about the assistance the

government and local administration provided. The story that emerges from the

information provided by Bengali migrants living in the CHT helps to explain the

circumstances that led to their decision to migrate to the CHT. According to their accounts,

climatic events, such as floods and cyclones, in the low-land and rural areas were very

costly in that they destroyed the material basis for their lives. A similar story is told in other

academic studies on population displacement in Bangladesh, particularly in low-lying and

coastal areas (Gray & Mueller, 2012; Mallick & Vogt, 2014; Feldman & Geisler, 2012).

People living on coastal and *char* land are highly vulnerable to climate change induced

displacement and migration (Alam et al., 2017; Islam & Hasan, 2016). Thus, the affected

people consequently preferred to migrate to the CHT as they did not have any option in

the place of origin or supporting help from the government and local authorities. As there

was the possibility of getting land and resources in the CHT, climate affected people

migrated to that region. When the migrant received land from the government authority in

the CHT, they encouraged their relatives to also migrate as will be further explored in

Chapter Six.

5.2.4. Behavioural and other factors of migration

The literature on the climate change and migration relationship posits that social and

behavioural factors also influence the migration decisions of the people in the affected

places. Beyond climatic events, behavioural and social aspects, such as age, gender, human

capital, satisfaction level, and networks play an important role in people's decisions to

migrate (Kniveton et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2014; McLeman, 2014). The level of

satisfaction about their standard of living significantly influences a person's decision to live

in a particular location. People migrate from one place to another for opportunities,

income, security, and future development (Adger, Kelly, Winkels, Huy, & Locke, 2002;

Biermann & Boas, 2008; Curran, 2002). The availability of food, security, and good

opportunities for their children motivates people to stay or to move from a place. Survey

respondents were asked to rate their level of satisfaction with their place of origin and

their current place in the CHT on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means the lowest

satisfaction and 10 mean the highest satisfaction (Figure 5.7).

Figure 5.7: Comparative satisfaction level in the place of origin and the current place (% of Bengali migrants)

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=150.

When asked about their place of origin, most of the respondents (88 percent) rated their satisfaction level lower than 5, which means that they were dissatisfied. On the other hand, 83 percent of respondents gave their current place, the CHT, a satisfaction rating of 5 or more. The low rating for the place of origin correlates with the accounts of climate migrants in the previous section who highlighted the miserable life they were facing due to poverty and frequent floods, cyclones and riverbank erosion. The respondents also stated that they used to live in coastal areas that have become unsuitable for living in the wake of cyclones and gradual sea-level rise. One climate migrant, a 55- year-old female from Khulna district, expressed a deep level of dissatisfaction:

> Life in my place was not good. The only reason is frequent floods and cyclones. I used to live in the embankment of the river. The flood and cyclone destroyed my house twice. Therefore, I took shelter in the shelter centre. However, I was not able to manage food for my family. My life was terrible [খুব খারাপ] there. My husband advised me to move to Khulna city. However, my brother-in-law, who was already in the CHT, advised me to come to CHT. As my husband know how to do business, I am now fine [ভাল আছি] in the CHT (Climate migrant 2).

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The poor living conditions and failure of their livelihood influenced the migration decision. The social and economic conditions of the people provide insight about how people have been leading their lives in their place of origin. Figure 5.8 presents information on the previous sources of income of the people who have resettled in the CHT.

Figure 5.8: Sources of income of the Bengali respondents in their place of origin

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=150.

Figure 5.8 indicates that most of the respondents were involved in agriculture-based work in their place of origin. Around 20 percent were small business owners, which usually refers to small-scale shops and buying goods from the local area and selling it in the local market. A small number of people were engaged in fishing, pulling a rickshaw or driving a van.

The results concerning the behavioural and social aspects of the migration of the Bengali people to the CHT reflects their situation of dissatisfaction in their place of origin, as well as their involvement in occupations that are very vulnerable to climate impacts (for example, farming). The frequent floods and cyclones more often increase the level of dissatisfaction

among the poor and low-income people when they repeatedly lost their agriculture and livelihood options. The physical damage caused by disasters also motivated people to abandon their homes. According to migration studies, people consider their present situation and the possible benefits in the destination place in their decision-making (Reuveny, 2008; McLeman, 2014; Hugo, 2013). Most of the survey respondents and climate migrant interviewees described the hardships of their lives in their place of origin. The possibility of gaining access to land and other resources made the CHT an attractive destination.

Figure 5.9: Bengali Respondent's view about the opportunities in the CHT (%)

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=150.

Figure 5.9 shows the reported perception of the Bengali respondents about the resources in the CHT. The perceived availability of land and forest resources greatly motivated Bengali migrants to move to the CHT and made it an attractive destination for them. Whether migration is climate change induced or poverty-driven, people prefer to move to a fertile place rather than to barren or desert land. The perception of the CHT as a land of resources and opportunities also attracted some middle-class people, such as government

officials, to the CHT with a view to becoming landowners (Adnan, 2008). Some of the

government officials who were posted to the CHT and became permanent settlers

represented a small proportion of survey participants in this study. For most respondents,

however, the aggregated dissatisfaction due to climatic events and poverty were the key

motivation to migrate to the CHT.

The relevance of the connection between resources and Bengali migration can also be

explained by the current occupations of the Bengali people in the CHT. Information about

their current occupations supports the argument that migrants were attracted by natural

resources.

Figure 5.10: Current occupations of the Bengali respondents in the CHT

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=150.

Figure 5.10 presents the current occupations of Bengali respondents in the CHT and shows

that migrants have moved into business in the CHT which is the second most frequent

occupation after the agriculture. As many have been given land by the government, they

are mostly involved in agriculture for their livelihood. More than 12 percent of respondents

who identify as self-employed may also be involved in small businesses. A small minority (10 percent) make a living by selling their labour on a daily basis. The figure reveals that Bengali settlers have changed their occupation following the move from their place of origin to the current place. In their place of origin, most of the respondents worked in agriculture or as day labourers. However, the available land and resources have enabled some of them to be involved in forest-based occupations and businesses. Interviews with the climate migrants also support this analysis. For example, climate migrant 2 mentioned that her brother-in-law advised her to come to the CHT as her husband was experienced doing business. Their networks with the adjacent districts in Bangladesh enabled Bengali settlers to set themselves up in business as they could travel frequently to sell their products in different districts.

5.3. Analysis and discussion

The findings outlined above revealed the various factors that impacted on the migration decisions of the Bengalis who have come to live in the CHT. But the impacts of climatic events and poverty played a prominent role, adding a new perspective to the current understanding of this migration as political and state-sponsored migration (Adnan, 2004; Mohsin, 2003). The vast majority of survey respondents had been affected by climatic events and poverty in their place of origin where they had led a very vulnerable existence. Hearing about the possibility of a better life in the CHT from government sources and social networks persuaded them to migrate to this region despite the civil unrest and conflict that was building there. Chapter Seven will probe more deeply into the connections between migration and the CHT conflict.

The survey and interview findings are supported by literature that has analysed the human impacts of both sudden and slow onset processes of climate change, manifested in devastating floods, cyclones and riverbank erosion in the low lying, coastal and river basin areas of Bangladesh (Gray & Mueller, 2012; Islam & Hasan, 2016; Islam & Siddiqui, 2016; Saha, 2017). As people lose their homes, land and livelihood, they become caught in a deepening cycle of poverty. This experience is captured in the interviews with climate migrants who explained how the frequency and multiple forms of climate events detrimentally affected their livelihood and intensified poverty in the rural areas. The slow onset processes, such as sea-level rise, coastal erosion and drought are also destructive in some areas as they gradually destroy agricultural land, water sources, and the lives and livelihood of the people in the coastal and northern parts of Bangladesh (Shahid et al., 2016; Szabo et al., 2016). This complex connection between climatic events and existing socio-economic vulnerabilities in the coastal belt of Bangladesh forced some respondents to shift their homes several times and attempt to find different sources of livelihood. But despite showing resilience and attachment to their homes, gradual and/or periodic climate events shattered their hopes and efforts to rebuild their lives. Most survey respondents mentioned their inability to lead the life they wanted due to lack of income and frequent damage by climatic events. This finding is supported by the other studies in Bangladesh. For example, Findlay and Geddes (2011, p.150) argue that climate affected people only migrated when they had lost all their assets and exhausted their options. Climatic events (for example floods) enforce an additional burden on poor people who then find there is no option but to migrate to the cities.

This chapter demonstrated that poverty was a key factor in the migration decisions of the Bengali settlers, but the frequent climatic events aggravated and sometimes caused the

poverty situation. Climatic events worked as a threat multiplier reducing people's

livelihood options and thereby intensifying their poverty. Penning-Rowsell et al., (2013, p.

S44) have termed this as the 'last resort' of the climate affected people. This is reflected in

the deep levels of dissatisfaction with their place of origin reported by many of the Bengali

respondents who migrated to the CHT. Studies on the relationship between climate

change and migration argue that people decide to migrate when their satisfaction level

crosses the 'threshold' of dissatisfaction (Hugo, 2011; Meze-Hausken, 2008; McLeman,

2018). The experience of frequent climatic events, loss of livelihood and dislocation on a

number of occasions generated the deep level of dissatisfaction and forced people to

migrate longer distances for permanent settlement (Reuveny, 2007). High levels of

dissatisfaction due to the frequent climatic events and poverty influence some people to

consider migration as their best adaptation strategy. Thus, climate change induced

migration is viewed as an adaptation strategy. Siddiqui (2010, p. 8) argues that "instead of

viewing migration as a threat and vulnerability, the government of Bangladesh as well as

the global community should incorporate migration as an important adaptation strategy".

To understand why some Bengalis have moved to the CHT, it is important to consider also

pull factors, such as the possibility of getting land and livelihood options. Both survey and

interview responses indicate that the government's promise of land in the CHT has enabled

respondents to factor in the expected benefits in the destination place. As Reuveny (2008,

p. 3) argues, "climate affected people may consider both the costs and the potential

benefits of migration and migrate only if the expected benefits outweigh the costs". For

the respondents in this study, the availability of resources in the CHT and promises of

support from the government helped them in their migration decisions. The expectation of

land and food rations to support life in the new place nurtured their hopes of being able to

continue living off the land. In this regard, central and local government administrations helped to institutionalise the process of migration, a point that will be further explored in Chapter Six

The decision to migrate is influenced not only by economic calculations but also by a number of social and behavioural factors (Hugo, 2013; McLeman, 2014). The inability of the government to mitigate vulnerabilities sometimes accelerates population displacement and migration (Piguet et al., 2011; Warner, 2010). In the wake of climatic events, people need food, shelter and protection in order to adapt to the climate impacts. The survey findings show that the government played a minimal role in mitigating the impacts of climate change to enable the affected people to stay at, or return to, their homes. Research has highlighted the significant role of community support, communication, and trust in mitigating the impacts of disasters (Patterson, Weil, & Patel, 2010), and the role of the institutions and government support enhance the resilience capacity of the people in the face of adverse climatic events (Reid & Alam, 2017). However, a large majority of survey respondents experienced a lack of community support and cooperation during and after climatic events. Thus, migration to the CHT was also a consequence of the failure of government and local community to support people in their attempts to cope with and adapt to the impacts of climatic events, and enhance their resilience and capacity to remain in their place. Strengthening resilience capacity encompasses improving livelihood options, imparting knowledge and technical support to develop the alternative options for living. The democratic transformation from military rule in 1991, the green revolution which increased rice production, and support from official development assistance, have enabled successive governments to implement adaptation and mitigation policies in the most affected areas of Bangladesh which has consequently helped people to survive on

their land. Moreover, Bangladesh is one of the least developed countries (LDCs)[23] that have formulated a long-term climate change strategy, the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP, 2009) in order to mitigate climate effects and take adaptation measures. Two funds, one using government resources (BCCTF) and the other using donor resources (BCCRF), are helping affected people to address climate change effects (Rai, Huq & Huq, 2014). However, exploring the impact of such policies on migration to the CHT is beyond the scope of this thesis.

5.4. Conclusion

From the evidence presented here it can be concluded that population movement to the CHT over recent decades occurred due to multiple factors, but climatic events and poverty have played a crucial role in forcing people to leave their places of origin. In the context of climate change, forced migration is usually a combination of displacement, escaping hardship and hope for a better life in another place (Laczko & Aghazarm, 2009; Piguet, 2008). Climatic events destroyed the livelihoods of people as well as eroded the capacity to adapt in many parts of Bangladesh. Lack of support from the government at the national and local level also play a part in this. Climate change is not a sudden or recent phenomenon in Bangladesh, and affected people have migrated to cities and other regions such as the CHT for several decades.

The migration of the Bengali people to the CHT is not an exceptional case in the sense that it reflects the same story of migration due to adverse effects, livelihood failure and no hope in their place. However, the CHT has particular features as a migrant destination in

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[23] In 2018 the Government of Bangladesh claimed that the country had been promoted to the status of a lower-middle income country from least developed one. The World Bank has also endorsed Bangladesh as a lower-middle income country as the per-capita income is $1314 (World Bank, 2018).

that it is known to have underutilised land and forest resources, and, on the other hand, to be a place of cultural difference and conflict. Thus, respondents could imagine rebuilding their lives on new land but they also responded to the assurance of government support. Hearing about the possibility of a better life in the CHT from government sources and social networks persuaded them to migrate to this region despite the civil unrest and conflict that was building there. By examining the role of climate change in migration decisions, this chapter adds a new perspective to the current portrayals of the migration to the CHT as mainly a political and state-sponsored migration (Adnan, 2004; Mohsin, 1997; Chakma, 2010a).

In the next chapter, these arguments will be further explored as the settlement of the Bengali people in the CHT was not a straightforward process due to the region's remote geographical location and existing conflict. Chapter Six will explore how mediating factors accomplish the Bengali migration and settlement to the CHT.

CHAPTER SIX

MEDIATING FACTORS IN THE BENGALI MIGRATION TO THE CHT

Migration options, and migrant agency are shaped and constrained by culture, economic, political, and social factors that operate at multiple scales, often well beyond the direct control or influences of the individuals, household, or local population (McLeman, 2014, p. 230).

6.1. Introduction

The previous chapter argued that climatic events such as floods and cyclones played a deterministic role in the migration of Bengali people to the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) by destroying people's homes and livelihood options and displacing them. From the data presented in Chapter Five, 56 percent of Bengalis who participated in this study claim that they have been displaced by climatic events, and almost 80 percent migrated due to poverty. But migration and settlement of the Bengali people to the CHT was not an easy process due to the contextual situation of the migrants and the destination place. First, as argued in Chapter Five, the majority of the Bengali migrants had no resources and thus limited capacity to undertake a lengthy migration process. Second, the CHT is remote and hilly, an almost separate region from other parts of Bangladesh (See: Map 1.1) and inhabited by people who are ethnically, linguistically and culturally distinct from other Bengali people. Furthermore, the region experienced an ethno-political conflict after 1975 which is also an issue of discouragement for the Bengali people to migrate to the region. Nevertheless, the post-1975 period witnessed a massive Bengali migration to the CHT. In such situations, mediating factors play an important role in enabling the migration of Bengali people from various parts of Bangladesh.

As discussed in Chapter Two, migration is not just the result of the interplay between push and pull factors but also shaped by mediating factors, which often play a crucial role in the process of migration. Most migrations involve various drivers that can be deterministic, proximate, intervening or mediating. As a deterministic driver, natural disasters, famine and other political conflicts force people to migrate (Warner, 2010; Marino & Lazrus, 2015). The expectation of a good life, the possibility of resources, income, safety and security, act as proximate causes (also known as pull factors) for both poor and well-off people to migrate (Van Hear et al., 2018). In addition to these deterministic and proximate causes, mediating factors such as networks, connections and support enable aspirant people to migrate even to an adverse location (McLeman, 2014; Hugo, 2013; Reuveny, 2008). In the case of migration and settlement of Bengali people to the CHT, the mediating factors are the history of Bengali migration, political and military support, and social networks that facilitate the migration process.

As discussed in Chapter Three migration of Bengali people to the CHT has a long history. The British and Pakistani colonial powers promoted the migration process for their economic benefit and to gain political control over the area (Mohsin, 1997; Adnan, 2004; Tripura, 2008). After 1975, the government of Bangladesh continued the policy that was initiated under Pakistani rule and encouraged migration to the CHT to gain political control as well as reduce population pressure in low-lying areas of Bangladesh (Lee, 1997, 2001; Suhrke, 1993). This significant increase in migration flows during the period 1977-1989 has been categorised as 'political migration' which exacerbated the emerging ethno-political conflict (Adnan & Dastidar, 2011; Chakma, 2010a; Mohsin, 1997; Panday & Jamil, 2009). This migration process was sponsored by the Bangladesh state and specifically intended to diminish and weaken the aspirations of the tribal people of the right to self-determination

in the CHT (Mohsin, 1997; Adnan & Dastidar, 2011). The growing presence of the region army in the CHT also played a mediating role in enabling Bengali settlement during 1977-1989 (Mohsin, 1997; Adnan, 2004; Chakma, 2010a). In addition to state-sponsored migration, many people have also migrated of their own accord following the migration pathways and networks established by previous migrants. Thus, it is observed that family ties, networks and communication played a role as general mediating factors to influence other people to migrate. But the government migration scheme and direct support by the local administration and security forces, were the specific mediating factors for various reasons such as control of the CHT, assisting poor Bengalis and reducing the population pressure in the low-land and rural areas.

This chapter critically analyses the mediating factors of the Bengali migration to the CHT. The domestic literature on the CHT affairs posits the Bengali migration as an imposed settlement by the government (Mohsin, 1997; Chakma, 2010a; Adnan, 2004), but fails to explain how the interlinking processes of poverty, networks, climatic events and government support have combined to institutionalise Bengali migration to the CHT. These mediating factors not only facilitated migration but also paved the way for an escalating conflict in the CHT. By discussing the mediating factors, this chapter offers insights into how the migration process was institutionalised in a complex and conflict prone location, despite the Bengali migrants faced opposition from the tribal people. In doing so, this chapter draws on the survey responses and on interview data from climate migrants and key informants. The chapter begins by discussing the historical roots of migration to the CHT that originate during colonial rule. An often repeated argument in the academic literature and in interviews with key informants is that colonial rulers facilitated Muslim Bengali settlement in the CHT in order to extract economic benefits from the region, as

well as to keep control over the region. Secondly, the survey data provided by the Bengali respondents show that government assistance, army aid, family connection and information flows helped them to migrate and settle in the CHT in the post-1971 period. As migration is a continuous process shaped by numerous and changing factors (McLeman, 2014), this chapter shows that Bengali migration to the CHT is perceived to be still happening but possibly in diminished numbers, and now mainly with the direct help of family members and social networks. In combination, these mediating factors help to promote an understanding of the multi-faceted implications of the migration and its contribution to continuing conflict and violence in the CHT.

6.2. Findings and analysis

The general finding is that migration and settlement of the Bengali people to the CHT is viewed differently by the various stakeholders. Whereas the dominant academic literature on CHT affairs, and most of the key informants, view Bengali migration as a state sponsored settlement program, the survey of the Bengali respondents and interviews with climate migrants reveals a more complex story. It suggests that a combination of historical links, family connections, kinship, information, and assistance from the government and army enabled them to migrate to the CHT. The survey and interviews with climate migrants have unveiled other factors beyond government help which assist people to migrate to the CHT. First, this section analyses the mediating factors in the Bengali migration based on the views of academics and key informants. The views of the survey respondents and climate migrants regarding the mediating factors are then presented to comprehend how the mediating factors played a role in institutionalising the migration process. Finally, this section presents the current trend of Bengali migration with the present mediating factors.

6.2.1. Academic and key informant views about the mediating factors

Chapter Three highlighted that colonial administrations and the present Bangladesh state have facilitated Bengali migration and settlement to the CHT, albeit to varying extents. This is reflected in the academic literature portrayal of the Bengali migration and settlement as a political project of successive governments in Bangladesh. It is a view that is focused on the macro-level analysis of hegemonic construction and dominance over the tribal people in the CHT. What has received less attention from Bangladeshi academics is the role of migration history and how migrant networks, and the government migration program facilitated the Bengali migration process. Moreover, in the Bangladesh period, there are various interpretations of the role of the state and the army in the Bengali migration. Some argue that the main purpose of the state sponsored migration programme was to rehabilitate war refugees (Chakma, 2010a, p. 290), others highlight the ways in which migration facilitated the state's maintenance of law and order in the CHT and protected the army in the CHT (Mohsin, 1997). Although there is no specific information on how migrant people protected the army in the CHT, the literature argues that massive Bengali migration to this region provided a justification and also courage to the army in operating their missions. Moreover, on some occasions Bengali settlers collaborated with the army and fought against the Shanti Bahini (Chakma, 2010a; Mohsin, 1997). Eventually, the Bengali migration enabled "Bengali colonisation" (Mohsin, 2003, p. 33) and Islamisation in the CHT (Mohsin, 2003; Panday and Jamil, 2009), but these processes are not separate phenomena, rather they are interconnected events in the Bengali migration and settlement to the CHT. This section discusses the academic literature and the views of the key informants, many of them academics, to present the ways history and politics are mediating factors in the Bengali migration and settlement to the CHT.

The historical connection has a role in furthering migration and settlement of the Bengali people in the CHT. It means that past migration works as a 'chain migration' or 'migration corridor' (Hugo, 2013) to influence more people to come and settle in the CHT. The migration corridor is used to analyse the international migration that denotes "an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries" (IOM, 2018, p. 77). In the case of the CHT, the migration corridor refers to the movement of the non-tribal people from other parts of Bangladesh with the help of different actors such as government and networks. As mentioned in Chapter Three, successive rulers from the British colonial period to the Bangladesh period encouraged Bengali settlement in the CHT to enable the extraction of economic benefits and maintain control of the region. The British colonial administration applied contradictory policies in ruling the CHT: on the one hand, the 'Regulation of 1900 Act' set the CHT apart from the surrounding areas to ensure the distinct demographic and cultural characteristics of the CHT were maintained, and on the other, it opened the CHT to non-tribal people to work in the cotton fields (Mohsin, 1997, p. 79). The British, in 1933, annulled Rule 52 of the Regulation of 1900 Act (according to Rule 52; no non-tribal people could enter and live in the CHT without the permission of DC) which opened the door for the Bengali people (Mohsin, 1997, p. 34). Thus to some experts in CHT affairs, migrant labour in the cotton fields marked the beginning of organised non-tribal settlement in the region (Chatterjee, 1987; Tripura, 2008). One key informant, a political leader from one of the CHT tribal groups, criticised British colonial rule and the tribal elite for their role in transforming the CHT from a tribally dominated region with special status to an integral part of Bangladesh with a mixed Bengali and tribal population. In response to a question about the beginning of Bengali migration to the CHT, the informant made this point:

> Migration of the Bengali people to the CHT is an old issue, but in the past only very few Bengali people lived in the CHT, usually for business and administrative purposes. But the British colonial rulers invited Bengali people to work in the cotton fields. Our tribal leaders did not oppose the decision of the British Raj, but instead helped the colonial ruler to extract the resources from the CHT (Key informant 5).

According to this informant, a very limited number of Bengali people lived in the CHT during the colonial period, and as noted in Chapter Three, only 2 percent of the CHT population in 1901 were non-tribal people. But the colonial administration's agricultural development policy led to an increase in the number of Bengali migrants to the CHT, and this informant suggested that the tribal leaders agreed without realising how this migration would eventually change their special status within the CHT. Adnan (2007, p. 4) described these non-Hill men inhabitants as "Bengalis comprising of government officials, security forces, professionals such as lawyers and teachers, as well as traders, shopkeepers, craftsmen, wage workers, rickshaw-pullers, and peasant cultivators". Several key informants held the view that these migrants brought benefits to the region through their role in a reciprocal exchange system of goods and agricultural products between tribal and Bengali people in the CHT. One informant of indigenous background, a director of a rights-based organisation, described this relationship as follows:

> In the British period, the tribal people maintained a good relationship with the Bengali people. Bengali people used to come, stayed overnight or sometimes for a longer period in the CHT. The Bengali business people and the trading system at that time benefited both the tribal and Bengali people. The tribal people used to sell bananas and other agricultural products to the Bengali traders and also bought goods. It built a reciprocal relationship in the CHT (Key informant 6).

The informant paints a picture of the past where Bengali people travelled and stayed in the CHT occasionally for business purposes. However, business from the British colonial period was eventually monopolised by Bengali people and Bengalis living in the Chittagong districts captured all the business opportunities in the CHT (Shelley, 1992, p. 81). These

business and work connections with the CHT, led to a gradual increase in the Bengali

population and by 1947, it was around 7 percent (8762 persons) of the overall population

of the region. By 1951, the proportion of Bengali residents had reached 9 percent (Chakma

2010a, p. 291; Adnan, 2004, p. 15). A decade later, the Pakistan government annulled the

special status of the CHT as an 'Excluded Area'[24] in 1963 and permitted the Bengali people

to settle freely in the region (Mohsin, 1997, p. 46; Panday & Jamil, 2009). It is also alleged

that the Pakistan government appointed Bengali officials in key positions of administration

in the CHT and transferred the tribal officials to other parts of East-Pakistan (Mohsin, 1997,

p. 46). According to Mohsin, the aim of this administrative policy was to undermine the

traditional institutions, reduce the influence of the local headmen and weaken the position

of the CHT as an excluded area. The government of Pakistan also implemented economic

policies to promote national development in the region, for example, the development of

the Kaptai Dam and Karnaphuli Paper mills which provided employment opportunities

(Mohsin, 1997, p. 77). This encouraged many Muslim people from other parts of Pakistan

to migrate to the CHT for work in the development projects (Mohsin, 1997, p. 106).

Informant 3, a university professor and an expert on CHT affairs, offered his view of the

consequences of such development projects:

> The development projects implemented by the Pakistan government disempowered
> the tribal people but benefited the Pakistan government. The projects (for example,
> Kaptai dam project) in one sense displaced many of the tribal people from their
> home and land but in another sense helped the Bengali people to come to the CHT
> to work in the projects (Key informant 3).

The tribal people showed little or no interest to work in these development projects as

they were implemented against their will. As a result, the Pakistani rulers encouraged

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[24] The CHT as an 'excluded area' means the distinct nature of the CHT which should be only enjoyed by the tribal people. This was created by the British colonial government though 'Regulation of 1900 Act'.

Bengali people to come and work, which also helped these migrants to improve their economic condition. As Mohsin and Ahmed (1996, p. 275-276) pointed out, "the construction of Karnaphuli Paper mill in 1953 displaced Marmas from the region and enabled the Bengali to settle. Now 100 percent Bengali population live in the adjacent area of Karnaphuli Paper Mill". The introduction of the Amendment of Rule 34[25] in 1964 further encouraged non-hill people to settle permanently as it enabled them to own property if they had been living in the CHT for fifteen years continuously (Ullah, Shamsuddoha, & Shahjahan, 2014, p. 201).

A key motive of retaining the special administrative status of the CHT and amendment of the Rule 34 policy was to control the non-Muslim CHT by encouraging more Bengali Muslim people to settle in the CHT. The Pakistan government regarded the tribal people with suspicion because during the partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 some tribal leaders wanted to be annexed with India instead of Pakistan (Mohsin, 1997, pp. 35-36). This policy of encouraging Muslim Bengalis to migrate helped to increase the number of Bengali people who were deemed to be more supportive of the government in the CHT during the Pakistan period (1947-1971). Informant 2, a university history professor and expert in CHT affairs, argued that major changes in the constitution regarding the CHT affairs (retention of the status of the CHT and Rule 34) enabled the government of Pakistan to push its policy of Islamisation into the tribal-dominated area through sending Bengali Muslim people to the CHT. When Pakistan emerged as a new state based on Muslim religious identity, the new government put a great deal of effort into consolidating Islamic values in every corner of the country, including the CHT inhabited by a majority of non-

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[25] The Amendment of the Rule 34 is related to the abolition of the special status as well as allowing the non-tribal people to settle, buy land and construct houses in the CHT.

Muslim people (Mohsin, 1997). Indeed, after emerging as an independent state in 1956, Pakistan introduced Islamic law declaring the state an Islamic Republic of Pakistan. This declaration triggered the expansion of Muslim culture across the country (Choudhury, 1969). The CHT as a part of Pakistan experienced the same rule as was implemented in other parts of the country.

When Bangladesh became independent in 1971, its ruling class ignored the demands of tribal people for constitutional recognition of their cultural and political identity, and urged them to assimilate into mainstream Bengali society and culture (Chakma, 2010a; Mohsin, 1997, pp. 58-59). The newly formed government also implemented a 'rehabilitation policy for refugees displaced by the liberation war by resettling them to the CHT which in turn displaced some tribal people from their land' (Chakma, 2010a, p. 290).

Change in the CHT accelerated after 1975 when a group of army officers killed the founding father of the nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and established a military government. The military government brought major changes in the CHT policies including large-scale Bengali migration to the CHT. With regard to this Bengali migration, Informant 2 argued that "Bengali settlement to the CHT was the desire of the army who have been struggling to maintain law and order". Some studies similarly suggest that based on the recommendation of the army, the Bangladesh military government adopted the policy of settling Bengali people with a view to suppressing the spirit of the self-rule movement (Mohsin, 1997; Levene, 1999). Another study argues that the government implemented the Bengali settlement policy to balance the ethnic composition of the population so that the Bengalis could act as "human shields" for the security forces (Adnan, 2007, p. 13). Hence Informant 7, a civil society person of indigenous background, suggested that

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migration and settlement of the Bengali people to the CHT was a "political decision" of successive governments. While there are different opinions about the nature of the political motivations, key informants suggest that successive governments intended to increase the number of Bengali people in the CHT to weaken the movement based on tribal identity and gain greater control of the region.

The Bangladeshi academic literature and the key informant perspectives overlap in their political explanation of Bengali migration to the CHT which highlights the role of the state from the colonial period to the present. According to these accounts, the Bangladesh state played a mediating role by pursuing policies that encouraged Bengali people to settle in this culturally different region. The state intervened in the CHT for various reasons at various times and promoted the migration to the region to achieve its objectives. The objectives were different in nature based on the characteristics of the state. Whereas the British colonial power emphasised the economic interest and tax extraction, the Pakistan and Bangladesh state aimed to establish sovereignty and hegemonic control over the state territory.

6.2.2. Views of the survey respondents and climate migrants about the mediating factors

The previous section presented mediating factors that identify the role of the state and the history of migration in facilitating the migration to the CHT. However, this structural analysis overlooks important ground level factors which explain how migrants decided to move to the CHT, and what facilitated their migration. This section, therefore, investigates the perception of the respondents about the information, communication, actors, motivations and channels that enabled their migration to the CHT. It sheds light on what

the respondents considered as mediating factors, or sources of help and support while migrating to the CHT. As the previous chapter argued, the prospect of getting land and resources encouraged Bengali people to migrate to the CHT when they suffered from climate change events and lost everything in their place of origin. In order to fulfil these migration expectations Bengali migrants depended on their own networks and family connections, as well as direct help from the government and law-enforcing agencies.

As stated in the previous section, successive rulers of what is now Bangladesh invited poor and environmental displaced people to come to the CHT for permanent settlement (Lee, 1997, 2001; Mohsin, 1997; Reuveny, 2007). To explore the role of mediating factors, survey respondents were asked what factors motivated them to migrate to the CHT in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1: Factors that influenced the Bengali people to migrate to the CHT

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=150.

The respondents were asked to identify the most important reason for choosing the CHT as their migration destination. Figure 6.1 presents an overview of the mediating factors, showing that 36 percent of respondents were encouraged by the government to come to the CHT. Another 23 percent came to get land and other resources, which also suggests a government role as land and food was promised to migrants by the government. Those who were primarily helped by family connections comprise 21 percent. More than 13 percent migrated to the CHT for the purpose of business, which suggests that they had sufficient resources to support themselves. Overall, these data suggest that the state played a significant intervening role in the settlement of Bengalis in the CHT. As shown in Chapter Five, many of the poverty and climate affected people had no resources and options left and therefore welcomed the opportunity of migration to the CHT where they were promised by land and livelihood options. Information, resources, and the supporting role of the government and already settled people play a key role in migrating to a new place (Van Hear et al., 2018; Hugo, 2013). The miserable life of the respondents in their climate affected places and poverty were the first conditions of migration, but the government's allocation of land to each family helped to set the migration process in motion and directed it to the CHT.

The survey asked a follow-up question to verify who directly and indirectly helped the migrants to come the CHT. An overview of the results is presented in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2: How did the Bengali people migrate to the CHT?

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=150.

Confirming the responses to the previous question, direct assistance from the government is mentioned by almost 40 percent of the respondents. The next most important source of help is family connection, which assisted 28 percent of the Bengalis to accomplish their migration to the CHT. People also came to the CHT by themselves. Only a couple of individuals mentioned that they received help from the Bangladesh army, suggesting the army has a very insignificant role in the migration process.

These data broadly confirm information presented in Chapter Five where some of the climate migrants stated that they were informed about the opportunity to migrate to CHT by representatives of local government, villagers, and family networks. The government decision to encourage Bengali settlement and the possibility of getting land in the CHT has undoubtedly influenced the Bengali people to migrate to the CHT, confirming arguments

about the state's role in the literature and key informant interviews. However, in regard to the role of the army in the migration process in the CHT, the survey responses and the academic and professional perspectives are not aligned. The respondents indicate the role of the army is very insignificant in their migration process, a result that differs from the prevailing academic perspective. Key informants underlined the important role of the army as a mediating factor. As one informant pointed out, "the army as an institution helped the Bengali people to come, settle and stay in the CHT. The army in some cases even protected them during the communal conflict between the tribal and Bengali people" (Key informant 3). Another informant suggested that the army presence was critical to the survival of the Bengali community in the CHT: "If the army camps are withdrawn from the CHT, Bengali settlers will not able to stay in the CHT. They might go back to their place of origin" (Key informant 2). Informant 6 also points out that Bengali people will not be able to live in the CHT if the army stops protecting them (Key informant 6). Academic research also describes the army as playing a vital role in facilitating the civil administration to settle Bengali people in the CHT (Mohsin, 1997, p. 174; Levene, 1999, p. 344).

Interviews with key informants offer some explanation for the reluctance of Bengali survey respondents to identify the role of the army. Key informant 5, a political leader with a tribal background, argued that "Bengali settlers never confess that the army helped them to come and settle in the CHT. This is because of their dependence on the army to survive in the CHT. If they confess to the direct role played by the army in their migration role, they might get into trouble in the CHT" (Key informant 5). Academic studies support the view that the presence of the army and Bengali settlement in the CHT are connected. The relationship between the army and Bengali settlers has been described as "symbiotic" (Guhathakurta, 2012) whereby the presence of the Bengali settlers justifies the

deployment of the army in the CHT and budget allocation to the military ostensibly to maintain security in the region. The army presence gives Bengali settlers a sense of security and protection against potential or actual hostility from long-term residents (Mohsin, 1997, 2003; Chakma, 2010a). Yet, while conducting the survey and interviews with the Bengali respondents, I observed a tendency of people hiding information about the role of the army in the migration and settlement of the Bengali people. Only in interviews did some climate migrants indicate that they migrated from their place of origin and came to Chittagong city, where they registered their name as settlers in the army camp and finally came to the CHT. During the massive migration phase (1977-1989), a temporary camp was set up in the Chittagong region with the direct help of the Bangladesh army. After arrival in Chittagong, Bengali people stayed in the camp for enlisting their name and then they were sent to different regions of the CHT (Siraj & Bal, 2017).

Most of the respondents were silent on the army role in the CHT and tended to avoid answering questions related to the army. In survey research, especially in conflicted environments, respondents may willingly misguide the researcher and avoid telling the truth due to fear, deprivation and trauma (Goodhand, 2000; Höglund, 2011). The long-standing conflict, past trauma and fear may hinder the survey respondent's willingness to expresses the true facts about their migration. In this situation, the respondents may have been reluctant to talk about the army because they are fearful of negative consequences. Mentioning any form of assistance or protection received from the army might be interpreted as going against the official discourse of the army playing a peacekeeping or neutral role. Besides the army, the civil administration (office of the District Commissioner) in the CHT also played an active role in settling the Bengali people in the CHT. As a civil administration, the office of the District Commissioner carried out the decision of the

government to allocate land to the newly arrived Bengali people and ensure the

implementation of the ration system which provided new settlers with food grains.

In relation to other sources of assistance, climate migrants interviewees were more

forthcoming. They came to know about the CHT from villagers or relatives who had already

established themselves there. The announcement of the government giving land and food

rations to each family motivated them to migrate to the CHT. Climate migrant 9, a 45 year-

old male who came from the Sylhet district and lost all his belongings in the floods,

explained how relatives and government assisted in his decision to migrate:

> I got the news from my relative that people are going to the CHT. The Government
> is giving land and food. As I struggled in my place of origin, I seized the opportunity.
> I came with my whole family (Climate migrant 9).

The local authorities in the respondent's place of origin (members and leader of the Union

Parishad) also disseminated the news of migration to the CHT. In some cases, local

representatives were requested to spread the news of the Bengali settlement program in

the CHT among the poor and climate affected people. For example, a 'Secret

Memorandum' (Memo No. 665C) written to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division

requested him "to collect particulars of the intending families from the Chairman of the

concerned 'Union Parishad'" (Mohsin, 1997, appendix 1). Climate migrant 7, a 50 year-old

male who came from the Bagerhat district to escape flooding and poverty, gave an account

of local government involvement in his migration experience:

> One day the local chairman came to see us and observed that we were passing
> through a hard time. He informed me that the government was allocating land and
> rice if people were settling in the Hills area in the Chittagong. This put the idea in
> my head of going to Chittagong. After a long journey from my place we finally
> arrived there (Climate migrant 7).

Local government networks were an important cog in the system of information distribution, instilling trust in the information and assuring potential migrants about practical government support. This was particularly important when migrants faced a long journey, as in this informant's case. In the CHT the local government helped to scrutinise the aspirant people who would like to go to the CHT as migrants (Siraj & Bal, 2017, p. 407).

In addition to the local government role, network and family connections are known to play an essential role in any form of migration in Bangladesh (Martin et al., 2014; Kuhn, 2003). The networks and family members not only inspire people to migrate but also help them in practical ways to move to a new place. In this process, a group of people in a village, and sometimes the majority of people in a village, have migrated to overcome their vulnerabilities and get access to a better life. In the case of the CHT, family connections and social networks among the Bengali people played a dual role: to facilitate migration and to make settlement more sustainable. In some cases, people who had already settled invited more people to come to the CHT to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the tribal inhabitants. As one climate migrant, a 50 year-old man from the Chittagong district, and now a leader of a local neighbourhood (*para)* in the CHT, explained:

> I first came to the area and registered my name with the administration. After registering the name, the authority (army/district commissioner) allocated me 5 acres of land. When I came to the land, I saw it was a hill and jungle. I built my house, but I could not live there due to the fear of the tribal people. I then invited some families in my local area place of origin. I informed them that there is enough land here, as well as tress. If you come here, I will take care of you. With my assurance, around ten families came and built their houses (Climate migrant 3).

This suggests a particular type of chain migration where Bengali settlers encouraged neighbours and friends from their home village to settle in the CHT and defend their interests against the tribal people. In other cases, family connections worked as a force to

motivate people to migrate to the CHT. The information, resources and assistance provided by the community and government level enabled this migration process.

As a contextual issue, demographic pressure and livelihood failure also worked as an intervening role in migration decisions (Van Hear et al., 2018). Behavioural and social issues such as age, expectation, and hope for a better future also contribute a mediating role for the migration process (Martin et al., 2014). The survey data from the Bengali respondents shows that it was mostly young people aged 20-30 years who migrated to the CHT (Figure 6.3). The expectation and possibility of getting land in the CHT (as mentioned in Figure 5.9, Chapter Five) inspired the Bengali respondents to envisage a more prosperous future in the CHT.

Figure 6.3: Age of the Bengali respondents at the time of migrating to the CHT

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=150

Overall, it can be argued that mediating drivers strongly influenced Bengali migration and settlement to the CHT. Without social networks and family connections, the migration

process would not have been possible at such a rapid pace during the period 1975-1989. Siraj and Bal (2017, p. 403) citing Adnan and Dastidar (2011) termed these people as the 'self-propelled' Bengali migrants who have migrated from the adjacent areas of the CHT. The government and the army do not help the Bengali people to settle in the post Peace Accord period, but the 'practice of nepotism, cronyism and favouritism' (Siraj & Bal, 2017, p. 403) by the administration and already settled Bengali people enable Bengali people to settle in the CHT. However, the massive migration depended mainly on the political decision of the government to not only actively encourage the idea of the CHT as a place of migration, but also provide material and in some cases logistical support for settlement. By providing land and food, the government alleviated the costs of migration to the migrants so that they could sustain themselves in their new location. The strong army presence also reduced the risks associated with settling in the CHT by ensuring the safety and security of the migrants. Thus, this section demonstrated that strong structural and political support was required to institutionalise migration to a remote and contested place such as the CHT. In addition, families and relatives helped to find work opportunities and livelihood options, and provided security in numbers. The already settled people assisted the new migrants. All these mediating factors worked together in facilitating the migration process.

6.2.3. The current trend of Bengali migration and mediating factors

The previous sections explored the multiple mediating factors (government assistance, army role, network and family connection) in the Bengali migration to the CHT. Meanwhile, the CHT conflict has transformed from a violent ethno-political conflict between the government and the tribal independence movement to a communal social conflict between and among ethnic groups, and more specifically, between Bengali settlers and tribal people. This is not to say that all Bengali settlers and tribal people are engaged in

conflict. However, the situation of the CHT since the 1997 Peace Accord has been termed as the 'illusive peace' (Panday & Jamil, 2009) or sometimes called as the 'difficult road to peace' (Mohsin, 2003). One important argument for this conflict situation is the resentment over the government inability to implement the principles of the Peace Accord including to resolve the land problem, constitute an effective land commission, withdraw the army camp and stop further Bengali settlement. The progress of implementing the principles of the Peace Accord is not satisfactory. For example, the Peace Accord Matrix of the University of Notre Dame, USA has given it a 49 percent implementation score after ten years of application (Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2018). The key issue in the current CHT conflict is the increase of the Bengali population and growing competition between the tribal and Bengali people, as will be explained in Chapter Seven.

Chapter Three identified that population ratio between tribal and non-tribal residents in the CHT is almost equal according to the 2001 and 2011 population census. This indicates that the Bengali population in the CHT has been increasing over the past decades, or that the tribal numbers are decreasing. There is debate about whether migration is continuing since the Peace Agreement. If so, which are the mediating factors, as the government and army have no longer been overtly assisting migrants since the signing of the Peace Accord. Migration is a continuous process by network and corridor, and people migrate for various reasons including the thirst for a better life (McLeman, 2014; Hugo, 2013). It is likely that Bengali people are still migrating to the CHT following their family connections and networks. Moreover, climate change events are more prevalent in Bangladesh despite having different mitigation and adaptation measures. In the absence of accurate statistical data, it is difficult to know the current trend of Bengali migration to the CHT. The current

section investigates CHT residents' perceptions about the current trend of migration and the mediating factors based on survey and interview data. The survey asked both Bengali and tribal respondents whether Bengali people are still migrating to the CHT. The survey result, as shown in Figure 6.4 suggests that views on this issue are divided.

Figure 6.4: Is Bengali migration continuing in the CHT? (Bengali and tribal respondents' perceptions)

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=300.

Tribal respondents overwhelmingly agree with the view that Bengali people are still coming to the CHT to settle, compared with only half of the Bengali respondents. Although respondents have different opinions about the recent Bengali migration there is no denying the fact that Bengali people are still perceived to be migrating to the CHT. Stakeholder interviews also suggest that Bengalis still come to the CHT through family connections and networks. One interview participant, an NGO worker of indigenous background, offered the view that current migration is temporary:

> Some people are going to meet their relatives and living here for some time. This is not permanent migration, somewhat temporary one. Some people also go for

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business purposes and buy land, as land (hilly land) is comparatively cheap there (Key informant 7).

In interviews, climate migrants discussed the role of family networks and connections with people who had settled in the CHT. One man in his fifties who migrated from the Bhola district said that his brother had come to the CHT a few years previously and then encouraged him to join him in the CHT with his family (Climate migrant 7). Climate events continue to act as a push factor, as the interview with a 25 year-old migrant from the Chandpur district indicates. He stated that he migrated on the advice of relatives in the CHT after falling into poverty due to floods and cyclone events (Climate migrant 10). A key informant of indigenous background in charge of an NGO put forward the view that Bengali migration is a continuing process in the CHT with the knowledge and consent of the army.

> Researcher: Do you think that more Bengali people are coming to the CHT for settlement?
>
> Key informant 6: Still people from the plains land are coming to the CHT to live permanently.
>
> Researcher: Can you please explain how?
>
> Key informant 6: Yes, I have seen some *khupri Ghor* (small house) in the bank of the river side of the Rangamati. But after a few days, we will see that there is no house there. They have gone somewhere else with the help of other Bengali people. Besides, many Bengali people are living on the banks of the rivers and near the army camps. Who are these people? These people have recently migrated to the CHT.

The responses from the survey along with interview data outline that Bengali people are still migrating to the CHT, but the volume of the migration flows is more limited. The key mediating factors in the current migration are family connections, individual endeavour, communication and networks. Due to developments in communication, Bengali people can more easily contact family members and relatives and visit them in the CHT. Improvements in the transport system, such as bus services connecting the CHT with adjacent districts, have made the region more accessible from other parts of Bangladesh. In addition to

ordinary Bengalis, powerful people and business organisations come to the CHT to buy land and set up industries and commercial rubber tree plantations (Adnan & Dastidar, 2011): these business and commercial developments then attract other people to the CHT for employment.

However, there is no official record of Bengali migrant people in the CHT. The population census reports provide contradictory information, which does not match data provided by other sources. For example, the population census report of 2001 claims there are 51 percent of Bengali people whereas the 2011 census report shows the proportion is 48 percent. The general trend of the population indicates that the Bengali share of the population cannot be reduced after ten years, but should either be constant or increased. Some researchers estimate that the share of the Bengali population in the CHT was around 65 per cent (Panday & Jamil, 2009, p. 1058). Thus, there is a tendency to conceal the population statistics of the CHT. This is a view held by some key informants of CHT indigenous backgrounds, who suggested that the Bangladesh government conceals the proportion of the Bengali population in the CHT for strategic reasons (key informant 5; Key informant 7). However, while there is no evidence that the government intentionally conceal this information the lack of reliable statistics enables conflicting views to be held on the matter by different groups. Half of Bengali respondents in the survey expressed the view that the Bengali migration had stopped, while tribal respondents and most key informants believed that it was continuing. Thus, migration remains a contested issue in the CHT.

Given the importance of family connections and networks in sustaining migration processes, it can be assumed that migration to the CHT is continuing. Many Bengalis now

have relatives living in the CHT who are able to provide information and assistance to others who wish to settle there. Currently, the major intervening factors for migration are the family connections and networks with the already settled Bengali people. The contextual factors in lowland areas (poverty and natural disasters) also continue to act as push factors for Bengali people to migrate to the CHT. In the post Peace Accord era, the role of the government and army is more passive because they neither actively support the migration nor take measures to stop it.

6.3.   Discussion

Mediating factors perform a crucial role in migration processes. In the sending and receiving places, these factors act as a conduit to facilitate the process of migration. Findings of this chapter support that mediating factors have played a significant role in addition to push and pull factors to accomplish the Bengali migration to the CHT. Mediating factors influenced the poor people as well as enabling them to settle in the CHT, and by doing so, these factors have also influenced the conflict situation in the region. This chapter has examined a number of mediating factors, namely the role of the government, security forces, migration policy, social networks, and family connections that shaped the migration process to the CHT. The mechanism of Bengali migration to the CHT can be aptly described in terms of the 'push-pull plus' framework (Van Hear et al., 2018). According to the 'push-pull plus' framework, migration is organised by the push factors (floods, poverty, war), pull factors (land, economic benefit), and additional factors such as networks, connections, migration history, and government policy (Van Hear et al., 2018).

The current study shows that most of the Bengali respondents came from low-lying and rural areas of Bangladesh where they were affected by floods, cyclones and poverty

(Chapter Five). However, they did not necessarily migrate directly to the CHT. Interviews with climate migrants show that they first attempted to remain in their home area or migrated to urban centres to find employment. Over a period of time, information about opportunities in the CHT, including the prospect of obtaining land and help from the government, motivated them to migrate to the CHT. Thus, composite factors of environmental, demographic pressure, poverty, social networks and political decisions by the government contributed to the migration of Bengali people to the CHT.

The role of mediating factors can be summarised in a simple graph (Figure 6.5) which is derived from Reuveny's (2008) framework. According to this framework, the contextual factors of the place of origin 'A' push people to migrate to the destination place 'B'. But the resources and opportunities in the place 'B' also attract people. In this process of migration other factors, which is called the mediating factors 'C', facilitates people's decision to move from 'A' to 'B'.

Figure 6.5: Mediating factors in Bengali migration to the CHT

C: Mediating Factors

Conflict situation, Local administration, Army, Family connection, and Social network

A: Place of Origin

Push factors: Environment and climate change events, such as floods; Poverty

B: Destination

Pull factor: Land, Forest resources

Source: Developed by the researcher based on Reuveny (2008).

Applying this model to Bangladesh, the place of origin is usually a rural place in lowland Bangladesh which has been affected by poverty and/or frequent climatic events, and the migration destination is the CHT, which is perceived by migrants as a place with a lower population, enough land and forest resources but also as remote, ethnically different and suffering from conflict (see Figure 5.9). Mediating factors play a crucial role in motivating people to migrate to the CHT, as well as institutionalising the migration process in the face of local opposition and an unfamiliar environment.

As there is no literature on the Bengali migration issue the CHT, this chapter has relied on what the international literature has to say about mediating factors (McLeman, 2014; Van Hear et at., 2018; Reuveny, 2008) in order to reassess the drivers of Bengali migration and settlement in the CHT. One important factor was government policy to reduce the population pressure in the rural areas of Bangladesh and giving livelihood options to the poor and those people induced to move by environmental change. The army is another mediating factor because it played a direct role in politics and policy-making at the time of large-scale assisted migration (1977-1989). Successive military-backed governments headed by army generals during this time formulated the CHT policy to achieve a larger proportion of Bengalis in the CHT population and normalise the conflict situation of the CHT.

Migration decisions take into account risk, finance, connections and easy communications (Van Hear et al., 2018), thus people tend to migrate to a place which they perceive is safe, accessible and lucrative (Lee, 1966). In that case, migration is often termed as an adaptation strategy (Black, Bennett et al., 2011) for avoiding vulnerabilities. Migration as an adaptation strategy is cited more in climate change and migration literature to explain

migration as a good option to save the affected people from climatic events (Gemenne & Blocher, 2017; McLeman, 2014). In this sense, the CHT was a lucrative place for aspiring migrants because of its land and forest resources. The climate affected people in the lowland and rural areas considered this as a place suitable for settlement and, the government and army intervention rendered the CHT more accessible and safer for Bengali migrants.

Another mediating factor that helped to institutionalise the migration is the social networks that link aspiring migrants with people who have already settled in the destination place (Curran, 2002; Massey, 1990; Massey et al., 1993). Climate migrants interviewed for this study outlined the help they received from their kin or from people of their local community in their migration to the CHT. Aspiring migrants activated connections to family, neighbours, and local villagers who had already settled in the CHT. Some Bengali people met with their neighbours and relatives and sought their help to settle in the CHT. As the Bengali population in the CHT has grown, the social networks have become more ubiquitous enabling aspiring migrants to manage their own migration process. People can obtain more accurate information about the situation of the CHT through these extended social networks and imagine migrating and establishing their lives there. The region is now also better connected with bus services to districts from where many migrants originated, including Noakhali, Feni, Chittagong, Comilla, Chandpur and Barisal. The communication and transport development is both a consequence and a cause of increased mobility of people to and from the CHT, and the ease of access makes it easier to settle in the area. The migration flows to the CHT are self-sustaining and no longer require an active government policy.

The conflict between the Shanti Bahini and the army has an indirect role in the Bengali migration to the CHT. Migration literature shows that conflicts and emergencies expedite the migration outflow because people move away to save their lives (Guadagno, 2016; Van Hear et al., 2018). But in the case of the CHT, the conflict situation influenced the Bangladesh policymakers to settle the Bengali people in the land of the tribal people in the hope that this would defuse the conflict. However, the Shanti Bahini turned their anger towards the Bengali settlers, burning their houses and sometimes injuring and killing them in attacks that were organised to frighten the settlers so that they leave the CHT (Adnan, 2008; Ahsan & Chakma, 1989). There is little evidence to show whether Bengalis left the region due to the conflict; however, there are indications that Bengali settlers assisted others in their network to settle in the CHT in order to strengthen their security situation. In that sense, the long-standing conflict has played a role in fostering Bengali migration to the CHT.

6.4. Conclusion

It can be argued that several factors prepared the ground for the growth in Bengali migration to the CHT in the post-independence era. These composite factors are the intervening and mediating factors of migration analysis. Even though push factors such as floods, cyclones, coastal erosion and drought have complicated the socio-economic situation of millions of people in many parts of Bangladesh, without mediating factors the migration to the CHT would not have taken place the way it did. Because the CHT was not well connected to the rest of Bangladesh and the site of a conflict over self-determination, not many Bengalis would have contemplated moving here without assistance. Thus, the mediating factors such as government policy and assistance, protection by the army, social networks and family connections worked to institutionalise the Bengali migration process.

Most research has generalised the migration and settlement as state sponsored and planned settlement. There is no denying the fact that it was a planned and calculated devise of the successive governments of Bangladesh, however a systematic study of the mediating factors for the Bengali migration and settlement based on environment and migration literature has provided a new and alternative explanation which is almost missing in the domestic literature in Bangladesh.

Migration can cause conflict and violence if people in the host society consider newcomers as a threat to their livelihood, culture, security and political aspirations. In India and Bangladesh, there are other examples where migration of people of different backgrounds have generated conflict between the migrants and long-term residents (Swain, 1996; Alam 2003; Reuveny, 2007, 2008; Homer-Dixon, 2010). The literature on the CHT conflict shows that migration and settlement of the Bengali population in the CHT is one of the primary causes of conflicts and violence (Levene, 1999; Mohsin, 1995, 1997). The following chapter investigates how the Bengali settlement and migration has escalated the existing conflict and generated new problems around which further conflict could crystallise.

THE CHT CONFLICT AND BENGALI MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT

7.1. Introduction

The conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) has its roots in denial of the identity of the tribal people by the constitution of Bangladesh in 1972 (Mohsin, 1997; 2003). As stated in Chapter Three, the conflict was termed as 'ethno-political conflict' and was between the Bangladesh army and Shanti Bahini for the right to self-determination of the tribal people in the CHT. While political identity issues are at the core of the conflict, this chapter will argue that Bengali settlement and migration escalated the conflict in the 1980s and 1990s and created ongoing social tension between the Bengali and tribal people. The migration of the Bengali people has established a new discourse of 'Bengali versus tribal' in the CHT which posits the two communities as polarised, divided and conflicting. Based on multi-disciplinary approaches to climate change induced migration and conflict (presented in Chapter Two), this chapter explains how the migration of the Bengali people has generated social conflict in the CHT. Panday and Jamil (2009, p. 1066) described the conflict as "armed insurgencies between the tribal militants on one hand, and Bengali settler groups and the army on the other". This chapter does not refer to the current conflict as 'armed insurgencies', but rather labels it as a micro-level social conflict between and among the communities, for reasons discussed below.

The Bengali settlement and migration has brought significant changes to the social, economic and political system in the CHT. The most notable change is the demographic

change due to Bengali migration which has led to the population consisting of Bengali and tribal people in equal proportions (see Chapter Three, section 3.5). The tribal people see the equalisation of Bengali and tribal people as a threat to their existence as they are losing power and control over social, economic and political positions, as well as becoming marginalised day by day in their own land. The Bengali settlement has also contributed to resource scarcity, resource competition and resource conflict. As migration flows gather pace, the relationship between tribal and Bengali people has increasingly become affected by mistrust, misperception, hatred and sometimes violence between and among the groups. The Peace Accord process nurtured hopes that ending the conflict between the Bangladesh army and Shanti Bahini would establish peace, however the region continues to experience conflict between Bengali and tribal people over resources and social, economic, and political power (Panday & Jamil, 2009; Mohsin, 2003). The current conflict in the CHT is related to capturing and controlling the resources, control over political rights and social positions in public and private sectors and in every sphere of life. Despite the ongoing peacebuilding efforts (Chakma, 2017; Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2018), incidents of fear, insecurity, direct violence, killing, torture, and social division affect many locations in the region. While the outright war between the army and the CHT independence forces may have ended, micro-level social conflicts at the community level are affecting the peace and security of the people (Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2012). In this current form of conflict, the presence of the Bengali people is one of the key factors in contributing to conflict formation and escalation. The CHT has turned into an imposed multi-ethnic society where the Bengali and tribal communities have emerged as rivals engage in conflicts for social position, political participation and access to economic opportunities and services (Badiuzzaman, Cameron, & Murshed, 2011; Panday & Jamil, 2009).

This chapter engages with the argument that migration of different background people to an ethnically dominated areas causes mistrust, fear of losing livelihood options and conflict (Reuveny, 2007). The demographic change due to the migration also causes resource scarcity, resource competition and conflict (Kahl, 2006; Goldstone, 2002). The population pressure due to immigration generates environmental stress, resource scarcity, and resource capture in the host society, and depriving some groups from access to resources fuels group competition (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Sometimes the migration process generates a heightened feeling of ethnicity and of 'we' and 'they' between the migrants and local people, which then becomes a source of conflict in a host place (Reuveny, 2008). Besides environmental scarcity, demographic change also has the potential to generate social experiences of exclusion and a discriminatory political and economic system (Kahl, 2006). In the case of the CHT, the migration of people with a different cultural background to an ethnically distinctive area has not only put pressure on existing resources but also complicated social, cultural and political relationships.

This chapter, thus, focuses on the relationship between migration and micro-level social conflict in the CHT, whereby micro-level social conflict can extend to communal violence, attacks, killings, burning, rape, and human rights violations. This chapter argues that migration and settlement of the Bengali people have led to land grabbing by the Bengali settlers, civil and military elites, and other influential people. The new migrants have captured resources and competed with the tribal people for social and political positions in the CHT. The land grabbing and resource capture consequently contributed to new forms of social relationships characterised by widespread mistrust and polarisation, and sometimes violence. In doing so, this chapter begins by presenting the results of the

survey, key informant interviews and interviews with climate migrants, followed by a discussion and conclusion.

7.2. Findings

This section first explores perceptions about land availability, how land is allocated and grabbed in the CHT, and how land grabbing has become a source of conflict. Bengali settlers, civil bureaucrats, and military personnel alike have reportedly been involved in grabbing the land on which the tribal people depend, and also in land associated violence. The second section of this chapter examines how different stakeholders connect conflict and violence with Bengali settlement. This section reveals the evidence of ethnic polarisation and mobilisation among and between tribal people and Bengali settlers, and a heightened sense of tribal vs Bengali community, with Bengali settlers staking political claims against tribal people. Experience and/or fear of violence has led to social polarisation and a lack of trust between tribal and Bengali residents, and both groups express a sense of discrimination in terms of access to resources, opportunity and social status. Section three explores the forms of conflict and violence experienced by research participants, such as direct violence (killing, torture, abduction, attack, rape, burning, damage of houses and crops) and indirect violence (discrimination, deprivation, and poverty). This section also explores how research participants perceive the principal agents of conflict and violence in the CHT. The concluding sub-section explores the political and social challenges arising from the demographic transformation of the CHT, which has led to demands for new forms of social and political arrangements that are likely to further marginalise tribal people's ways of living in the CHT.

7.2.1. Conflict over land and other livelihood resources

There are two interconnected sources of conflict related to resources: resource scarcity

and land grabbing. Both resource scarcity and land grabbing have different consequences

for conflict and violence in the CHT.

7.2.1.1.   Resource sharing and conflict

Bengali and tribal respondents' perceptions about resources and land offer some insights

into the underlying causes of social conflict and violence. In a multi-ethnic society, resource

scarcity may generate conflict and violence when groups compete for resources and seek

to capture resources by depriving others (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Reuveny (2007, p. 659)

argues that "the arrival of environmental migrants can burden the economic and resource

base of the receiving area, promoting native-emigrant contest over resources". In the CHT,

Bengali migration and settlement has led to resource scarcity and the situation of ethnic

conflict and violence. The tribal and Bengali respondents were asked about their

perceptions of livelihood opportunities in the CHT Figure 7.1 provides an overview of how

they viewed the availability of resources for their livelihood and the opportunities for

earning an income in the CHT.

Figure 7.1: Perceptions about resource availability and income opportunity

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=300. Multiple answers were taken.

Figure 7.1 shows that Bengali people have different views from the tribal people in the CHT about resource availability and income opportunity. A large majority of Bengali respondents perceive that there are sufficient land and forest resources, and hence opportunities for earning a living in the CHT. As discussed in Chapter Five, a high proportion of Bengali migrants worked in the agricultural sector and connect land with livelihood, however a significant number now have small businesses and service sector employment which was impossible in their place of origin. Although agriculture is still the leading occupation among the Bengali people (Figure 5.10), more people are turning to the business and service sectors, which is helping them hold a strong position in the region. This may shape their perception of the availability of natural resources. In contrast, less than 50 percent of the tribal respondents perceive that there is enough land in the CHT, and the gap between tribal and Bengali respondents' views is greatest in relation to the sufficiency of forest resources.

Land and forest resources are the major sources of livelihood of many tribal people. Historically, tribal people are dependent on forest land for *jhum* cultivation which forms the basis of their livelihood (Roy, 2002; Thapa & Rasul, 2006). But the per capita agricultural land and forest resources have been diminished in the CHT due to the competition for these resources from Bengali settlers and elite people. This shrinking of per capita land has been possible as Bengali settlers have occupied land for their houses and cultivation. The land scarcity has made many tribal people insecure and frustrated (Adnan, 2004, 2008), and Figure 7.1 shows the tribal respondents' concerns. This theme also emerges from the interviews with key informants, where one academic CHT expert describes the 'dynamics' of resource scarcity as caused by the process of settling the Bengali people in the CHT, allocating them land, and putting pressure on the existing resources (Informant 3). According to the informant, "tribal people who depend on agriculture and forest are the worst victims of resource scarcity in the CHT. They are most likely to be deprived of their basic needs, such as food, house, and health facilities" (Informant 3).

This is confirmed in another interview by the director of a research organisation who made the following point:

> The CHT now suffers from serious resource scarcity. The per capita land is being decreased. The jhum cultivation, which is the major source of livelihood for the poor tribal people, is interrupted by the population pressure and excessive pressure on the hill. Nowadays, some tribal people are equally responsible for exploitation of the resources of the CHT. The worst victim of this resource scarcity is the marginal tribal communities who only survive by the jhum cultivation and forest resources (Key informant 1).

Later in the interview, the informant connected the shrinking resources in the CHT with the intervention of different stakeholders, including settlers, powerful elites of both Bengali and tribal backgrounds, and multinational corporations.

7.2.1.2. Land grabbing and conflict

The dispute over land ownership and land grabbing is at the heart of most of the conflicts in the CHT in the post Peace Accord period (Adnan & Dastidar, 2011; Roy, 2000; Amnesty International, 2013). The notion of land grabbing refers to systematic as well as forceful capture of land (Choudhury, 2012). In the CHT, government, elites, corporations and local people systematically seize land designated as *Khas* (Government owned fallow land without individual property rights), land for conservation, rubber plantations and forest reserves (Adnan & Dastidar, 2011; Halim & Chowdhury, 2015). The land is acquired in a non-transparent way that violates the rights of the people who depend on it (Adnan & Dastidar, 2011). Survey respondents were asked about land grabbing in the CHT with their responses shown in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1: Perceptions about land grabbing in the CHT

	Tribal respondents (N=150)		Bengali respondents (N=150)	
Land grabbing is happening in the CHT	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
	63.3%	36.7%	61.9%	34.7%

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017 (N=300).

There is a remarkable similarity between tribal and Bengali views on the issue. More than 60 percent of respondents of both groups agreed that land is being grabbed, and just one third disagreed. Land grabbing is one of the most concerning issues to the general people of both the tribal and Bengali settlers.

Land grabbing commenced during the insurgent movement (1976-1997) when successive Bangladeshi governments granted land to settlers under a formal titling process called *"Kabuliyat"*[26] (Adnan, 2004). Bengali settlers used the allocated land to build a dwelling and for agricultural purposes. In some instances, government officials deliberately and systematically violated the existing principles of land ownership in the CHT, and grabbed land for their personal property (Adnan, 2004; Roy, 2000). On many occasions the state acquired land for development purposes, and declared portions of forest land 'reserved' for conservation and protection for the environment. Reserving forest land has the effect of preventing tribal people from entering the forest for resources extraction. This process also leads to the displacement of the tribal people from their homes and from cultivable land (Adnan & Dastidar, 2011). The local governments in the CHT sometimes declare land as '*khas* land' and allocate it to Bengali settlers. For example, one study outlines that "the government has taken more than 14,000 acres of forest land in the Bandarban districts and allocated it to the Bengali entrepreneurs" (Ullah, Shamsuddoha & Shahajahan, 2014, p. 205). There are many other instances of taking land from tribal owners. Barkat (2016, pp. 132-134) argues that land grabbing equates to the land alienation of the tribal people in the CHT. Various techniques have been used in the process of land alienation including

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[26] Kabuliyat is the official document against the land rights in Bangladesh. This document is given by land office situated in the local (Thana/upozila) level in Bangladesh to the citizen for the ownership of land. Chowdhury (2012) has referred it as the formal title of land ownership (Chowdhury, 2012, p. 37).

fake documents, forceful eviction, marking the land as 'khas', and developing eco-parks, national parks or social afforestation projects.

Land grabbing happens on various levels and involves both ordinary people, sometimes unwittingly, and powerful private or public sector actors. One key informant commented on land grabbing that "the Bengali settlers, private companies, army, smugglers above all the 'conservation' policy of the government combine in grabbing land in the CHT" (Key informant 1). Companies and powerful elites sometimes manipulate the existing law of land allocation with money and power. They seize land in the name of development to expand tourism and agribusiness. Local people – both tribal and Bengali– are marginalised and increasingly squeezed out of land ownership. The Human Rights Report (2012) mentions that "Destiny Group illegally encroached on some 5500 acres of land in Lama Upazila in the Bandarban district for their plantation project. Ignoring the Bandarban Hill District Council Act and other laws related to land administration, they planted some 1.5 crores [15 million] trees in the area" (Barman, 2013, p. 100). The Human Rights Report (2016) mentions that in 2016 over 15,000 acres of lands belonging to indigenous peoples were under the process of acquisition, mostly for the establishment of special economic zones, special tourist zones and forest reserves (Chowdhury & Chakma, 2016, p. 28). This form of land grabbing is planned and based on force and power. The companies buy the consent of police and administration with bribes and then erect a signboard of ownership on the land to announce that no one is to enter the property without permission. They employ local *Mastans* (outlaw people) to threaten people who oppose the company's land grab (Mohsin & Hossain, 2015, p. 100). In the process of the resource scarcity, the elites and political authority sometimes change the property rights issuing fake documents and depriving the ethnic minority people and make it their own. This system of deprivation may

cause the expulsion of the minority people and consequent ethnic violence (Homer-Dixon, 1994, p. 10). In the CHT, the local people, particularly tribal people, depend on the land and refuse to sacrifice their land rights. Some tribal people move to the deep jungle hoping to get access to the forest resources for their livelihood (Key informant 5).

Land grabbing is also complicating the sharing of common resources, such as catching fish in the lake and utilising the forest resources. The private companies and influential people prevent other people from entering their recently acquired land to collect the resources for their livelihood, however this land has been used as common property for their daily livelihood by the tribal people for decades or more. This is the customary law and practices of land rights in the CHT (Adnan, 2004, p. 36), which emphasise sharing and caring for the land, and maintaining it in good health for the use of future generations. Private ownership of land is a foreign concept for many tribal people. Land grabbing by the Bengali settlers and civil and military bureaucrats is also weakening the position, identity and cultural practices of a tribal community by detaching them from land and resources. Thus, grabbing land is threatening the concept of "common property"[27] and weakening the culture of the tribal people. Some researchers have referred to this entanglement of the cultural and livelihood system as 'cultural annihilation', 'ethnocide' or 'genocide' of the tribal people in their land (Chakma, 2010a; Levene, 1999). To explore this connection, survey respondents were asked whether land grabbing was causing conflict with their perceptions of this identified in Figure 7.2.

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[27] In the CHT, common property is the slopes of the hills that are used by the tribal people without any formal document.

Figure 7.2: Perceptions about land grabbing as a cause of conflict in the CHT

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=300.

Both Bengali and tribal respondents perceived that land grabbing is generating conflict in the CHT. Almost all the tribal respondents saw land grabbing as a source of conflict, as did almost two-thirds of Bengali respondents. Conflict formation is due to land grabbing as an expression of unequal competition for scarce land between groups, which is enabled by poor governance including fabrication of land title documents. Key informants also viewed land grabbing as an ongoing problem and a source of conflict in the CHT. Asked how land grabbing creates conflict, a director of a rights-based organisation in Bangladesh, explained:

> The settlers have illegally occupied land in addition to their standard allocation of 3-5 acres of land by the government. Sometimes, Bengali settlers create a panic situation by burning the house, property and forest and physically harming some tribal people who oppose land grabbing (Key informant 6).

Tribal people have limited choices beyond fighting or retreating into the more isolated areas of the forest. Those who attempt to sell their property to outsiders find it difficult to

prove their ownership of the land. As one informant, a history professor and expert in indigenous issues, explained:

> During the process of selling land, the Bengali people ask the tribal people to show their legal papers. The tribal people in many instances failed to provide any papers. As a result, the Bengali people bribe the people of the land office to prepare the paper using their name. Eventually, the Bengali settlers become the new owners of the land (Key informant 2).

Civil and military bureaucrats are involved in preparing fake documents for *Khas* land and making it possible for powerful individuals and organisations to acquire land that is categorised as protected (Roy, 2000). Law enforcing agencies often fail to play a constructive role in managing the conflicts over land. Chowdhury (2012) identifies three ways the government is depriving the tribal people of their land rights and generating land disputes: "(i) non-recognition of customary resource rights and community ownership, (ii) introduction of private ownership based on title deeds as opposed to oral tradition; and iii) illegal settlement and grabbing of the Jumma land by government authorities" (Chowdhury, 2012, p. 39). Adding to the pressure on land in the post Accord era is the return of tribal people who had left during the conflict between the army and Shanti Bahini to the CHT (Amnesty International, 2013). The tribal political leaders demanded that the land be returned to the refugees by the Bangladesh authority which given it to Bengali settlers (Amnesty International, 2013; Adnan & Dastidar, 2011). The government of Bangladesh has helped to repatriate the refugees, but in many cases failed to return their land and home.

Overall, it is argued that migration and population growth in the CHT have increased pressure on the land, and land is becoming a scarce resource and a source of conflict, particularly in the eyes of tribal research participants. Attempts to defend land rights,

traditional or newly acquired, bring tribal and Bengali residents into conflict. Adding to this are powerful economic and political interest groups taking advantage of poor governance practices and land ownership legislation that is biased against customary ownership. Land grabbing and the growing scarcity of land have caused conflict over the ownership, use, and possession of the land that continues in the post Peace Accord period.

7.2.2. Social and political conflict: polarisation, discrimination and cultural domination

As discussed above, in recent years the CHT has been marked by conflict between Bengali and tribal residents and their respective political parties including the government and the army. One consequence of this is a growing social polarisation in CHT society, where mistrust, religious extremism, discrimination, and marginalisation of tribal people take place (Choudhury et al., 2017). Although discrimination, marginalisation and polarisation are separate terms used in the literature, they are interconnected and generated due to the policy of the government and social practices of the people in the CHT. The following section explores how the study participants view the social implications of the conflict.

7.2.2.1. Social and political polarisation

Polarisation results from the "interaction of within-group identity and across-group alienation" (Esteban & Schneider, 2008, p. 132). It generates social and ideological separateness among and between groups. In the CHT, Bengali settlers and tribal people are highly polarised. In some areas the Bengali and tribal people live side by side, but they do not maintain social interaction or good relationships which is one of the pressing problems in the post-conflict social relationship in the CHT. It is well understood that a lack of interaction between communities encourages conflict and rift in the society (Ramsbotham,

2005). In the CHT, the low level of social interaction between the communities is resulting

in communal violence and conflict (Choudhury et al., 2017). The past conflict between the

two communities and land grabbing by the Bengali people are responsible for the low level

of interaction which is producing polarisation in the society. The conflict over land and the

broader political conflict over ownership of the CHT have affected social interactions and

community relationships as was found by responses and is illustrated in Figure 7.3.

Figure 7.3: Level of trust and communal relationship (between and among tribal and

Bengali people)

Tribal respondents agree %

Category	%
Tribal and Bengali people have good relations	13.3
Tribal prefer tribal as neighbour	96.7
Tribal prefer Bengali as neighbour	14.1
Tribal trust Tribal people	98.7
Tribal trust Bengali people	8.1
Tribl have good relations with people of other religion	38

Bengali respondents agree %

Category	%
Bengali and tribal people have good relations	45.2
Bengali prefer tribal as neighbour	62
Bengali prefer Bengali as neighbour	59.3
Bengali trust Bengali people	97.3
Bengali trust tribal people	52
Bengali have good relations with people of other religion	79.3

(%)

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 20177. N=300. Multiple response questions.

Figure 7.3 shows the quality of the communal relationship between the Bengali and tribal

respondents. This relationship is measured by 'trust', 'preference as neighbour', and

'relations with people with different religion'. In a social system, trust between communities and relationship with other community people is the basis for harmonious relationships, social security and the presence of peace (Jeong, 2005). Bianco (2017, p. 1) referred to this process as 'building cultural dialogue' in a multi-ethnic society for sustainable peace. Survey respondents indicate that their intra-communal trust and relationships are strong, but inter-communal trust and relationships between the Bengali and tribal people are weak. Due to the lack of trust, both the communities prefer to have their own group of people as neighbours. In particular, tribal respondents do not like to live close to Bengalis, whereas more than 50 percent of Bengali respondents state that they trust and like tribal people as neighbours. This current relationship pattern is the outcome of the long-standing conflict, grabbing land and resources from the tribal people, and a series of small-scale communal conflicts between Bengali settlers and tribal groups (Chakma & D'Costa, 2013). The conflict situation has also acquired a religious dimension as places of worship, such as Buddhist temples, have been destroyed on a number of occasions in the CHT. Although around 80 percent of Bengali respondents show that they have a good relationship with people with other religions, very few tribal respondents reported having a good relationship with people with different religions. This indicates that the two groups of respondents in the CHT see the relationship with the other group in very different ways.

Interviews with key informants provide further insight into how and why the CHT society has been polarised over time through government intervention. One informant suggested that "polarisation is the direct result of the government decision to migrate and settle Bengalis" (Key informant 3). The Bengali migration was a conscious effort to make the CHT a multi-ethnic society which has brought many changes, such as the introduction of the

Bengali language in educational institutions, textbooks containing the teachings of the Islamic culture, rapidly growing tourism and new institutions, activities which are perceived by some tribal people as undermining tribal culture (Barkat et al., 2009; Uddin 2010). Hence, these developments, which are presented by the government as progress and modernisation, face significant opposition from tribal people. One key informant, a director of a rights-based organisation, explained the polarisation between Bengali and Tribal people as a consequence of "the Bengali settler increasingly getting a dominant position in the economic, social and political context" (Key informant 6). This was observed during fieldwork in the ten study locations in the CHT. Bengalis visibly dominate commercial centres in the towns as they have access to capital and connections with major cities in Bangladesh.

Different levels of mistrust and willingness to engage between the Bengali and tribal communities in the CHT might be explained by their different experience of the conflict in the area. In the post Peace Accord period both communities experience conflict and violence. For example, Choudhury and Hussain (2017, p. 130) mention "more than 500 cases of violence have occurred between the Bengali settlers and tribal people during 1997-2014". Tribal respondents in this study have been affected by violence more than Bengali respondents. Polarisation and social division are clearly a consequence of violent conflict in the CHT, but also act as a force to create communal conflict in multi-ethnic societies (Esteban & Schneider, 2008; Forsberg, 2008). In analysing the dynamics of the CHT conflict after the Peace Accord, Choudhury and Hussain (2017, p. 128) found that "the conflict issues are often small and latent. Due to the past conflict memories and polarisation, these small incidents turn into a violent conflict".

Another consequence of the demographic transformation of the CHT is the Islamisation[28] of the region which is promoted by the Bengali Muslim population. Islamisation is meant to increase the number of Islamic institutions such as Mosques and Madrassas and increase sponsoring of Islamic cultural practices in the CHT. The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines Islamisation as "both a cultural and religious phenomenon. It contains both the conversion to Islam and expansion of the Muslim culture" (Peacock, 2017). While collecting field data in the CHT, I observed a small group of people wearing traditional Islamic dress appeal to a passerby for a donation to build a Mosque for their community. Sometimes they support their request by reciting verses from the Holy Quran. Noticing this practice in several locations I asked my research assistants about the issue. They explained that it is now a common practice to build mosques and arrange religious education events (*Waz-Mahfil*[29]) in the CHT.

In interviews, several key informants expressed concern about the Islamisation of the CHT. One informant, a political leader of tribal background, suggested that it was part and parcel of the Bangladesh state's design to control the region and its population:

> As the bourgeois government sent the Muslim people to the CHT, the main task of the Muslim people is to promote the religion. In this sense, fundamentalism is increasing in the CHT. The tribal people are scared of this religious expansionism in the CHT (Key informant 5).

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[28] Islamisation is widely used in the international arena to refer to a society transforming into a society upholding the Islamic culture, values and principles in all spheres of life. In the CHT, complete Islamisation is not possible the society has deep attachments to tribal cultures and values. However, some researchers consider that the increasing number of Mosques, Madrassas, and renaming places with an Islamic name has started the process of Islamisation in the 100 percent tribal society.

[29] *Waz-Mahfil* is an Islamic lecture given by a religiously educated man which is organised by a group of people once a year. Different groups of people may arrange such occasions each year. This is popular in Bangladesh as a way to educate the general people about the Islamic values and culture. It is held at different times and organised by some people who want to foster Islamic values in society. On this particular day of the year or religious calendar, one or several people are hired to give lectures in front of the people.

According to this informant, Bengali settlement and Islamisation go hand in hand in the CHT. Key informant 5 also suggested that only Muslim people were encouraged and supported to settle in the CHT, and this proved that the settlement scheme was "a device to spread Islam and dominate the tribal people in their own land" (Key informant 5).

The process of Islamisation in the CHT was started in the Pakistan period and accelerated in the 1980s with direct assistance from Saudi Arabia and through the formation of the non-government organisation *Al-Rabita* in the CHT. It is alleged that M. A. Kashem (an anti-liberation war criminal in Bangladesh and leader of the political part of Jamat-I-Islam) initiated this NGO to convert the tribal people to Islam (IWGIA, 2012). According to IWGIA, the organisation provides a large amount of money for the enhancement of Islamic cultural practices in the CHT. The number of Islamic institutions in the CHT grew from 40 mosques and two madrassas in 1961 to 592 mosques and 35 madrassas in 1982 (Mohsin, 1997, p. 179). Since then, the establishment of Islamic institutions has increased rapidly, and recent data show that there are around 2,297 mosques and 1,552 madrasas (IWGIA, 2012, p. 18). The construction of mosques and madrassas requires land and adds to land disputes. In some instances, religious practices and rituals are used by their followers to antagonise tribal people. It is also alleged that some Muslim young people lure the tribal girls away from their families to marry them. D'Costa (2013) argues that this constitutes a practice of "forced marriage" in order to convert tribal girls to Islam in the CHT (D'Costa, 2014, p. 28). All these social and religious practices between the tribal and Bengali people are generating deeper social polarisation and conflict in the CHT.

7.2.2.2.   Discrimination

In the literature on ethnic conflict, it is well recognised that discriminatory policies of the government towards any community, deprivation, exclusion and systematic extinction processes cause serious civil strife, unrest, violence and conflict between the government force and ethnic groups, and/or between and among the communities (Gurr, 1993, 2000; Fisher, 2016; Taras & Ganguly, 2015). Discrimination may exist in a society in which multiple ethnic groups live with division and polarisation, and the state fails to ensure justice among the communities (Gurr, 1995; Gurr & Moore, 1997). The level of discrimination or discriminatory behaviour also reflects the level of conflict in society (Northrup, 1989; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The survey asked Bengali and tribal respondents whether there is discrimination in the access to services in the CHT or not and their responses are presented in Figure 7.4.

Figure 7.4: Perceptions about discrimination in the CHT

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=300.

Figure 7.4 shows that a high proportion of Bengali and tribal respondents perceived that discrimination exists in the CHT, with a slightly higher level of agreement with the statement among Bengali respondents. A minority of the tribal respondents (22.7 percent)

and Bengali respondents (14.3 percent) consider that there was no discrimination in the access to services in the CHT.

In the post Peace Accord era, the issue of discrimination has risen to the top of the political agenda and public debate as Bengali and tribal people are almost equal in number. Thus, any visible policy of the government that favours one group, such as ration allocations to the Bengali settlers, generates a sense of discrimination among tribal people, particularly if they lead a miserable life. It was pointed out by one key informant, a political leader with a tribal background, that there are many poor people in the tribal communities who never receive food rations from the government (Key informant 5). Key Informant 10, a chairman of a research think-tank, explained this issue of discrimination as a consequence of systematic privilege given to the Bengali settlers (Key informant 10). Key informant 7, a director of an NGO of indigenous background, contributed further detail to understand what the systemic privilege is about:

> The most discriminatory policy of the government is the deployment of a vast number of soldiers in the CHT to protect the Bengali people. If the government withdrew the army from the CHT, I am sure that the Bengali people would not be able to live there. They will return to their place of origin (Key interview 7).

Discrimination exists at all levels of the political system including participation in the local administration and securing positions in the political parties in the CHT. Key informant 6 suggested that in future the tribal people may not be represented as elected representatives at the local level through to the national level as a result of the number of the Bengali settlers increasing. The tribal contestants in many areas will not win elections in future if citizens vote along ethnic lines. In fact, this process of exclusion from political participation is not an example of discrimination because no one is actively preventing

tribal people from contesting elections and holding political positions at the local and national level. But the tribal people may consider that they might lose all the scope in future as they are becoming a minority and economically weak in the CHT. I observed while undertaking the field study that Bengali people dominate in the business sectors due to their financial strength and the administrative support from the local government.

Yet Figure 7.4 shows a palpable sense among Bengali respondents of being discriminated against. This is exploited, or perhaps fostered, by new Muslim Bengali political movements in the CHT, such as *Somo Adhikar Andolan Parishad*[30] (Equal Rights Movement Party) and its student wing, *Parbatya Bangali Chatra Parishad*[31] (Hill Bengali Students' Council). These groups oppose the CHT Accord which they see as infringing on the rights of Bengali people in the region. Their efforts to prevent the implementing of the CHT Accord are an indication of growing political activism among Bengali Muslims. One key informant, a senior research fellow in a government research organisation, defended the rights of Bengali settlers to form a political movement as well as to enjoy equal rights and privileges. This is also the argument of the Bengali political groups in the CHT when they claim equal rights with the tribal people living in the CHT.

Indeed, it is difficult to determine the level of discrimination due to absence of data. Underpinning the discrimination against tribal people is the lack of official recognition of

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[30] Somo Adhikar Andolon is the organisation of the Bengali settlers in the CHT formed by Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, a former MP of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) from Khagrachari constituency. The supporters of this organisation opposed the CHT Accord, and demanded an equal share for Bengalis in all aspects of life with the tribal people in the CHT.

[31] The Parbatya Bangali Chhatra Parishad was established in 1991 just after the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) formed the government. This student front works parallel to the *Somo Adhikar Andolon* in order to attain equal rights with the tribal people in the CHT in all sectors, including admission quotas for university places and jobs that currently exist for tribal students.

their identity, the lack of protection of their rights by the police and legal system, and the lack of freedom of movement in their land (Mohsin 1997, 2003; Chakma, 2010). As the region is highly militarised people cannot move freely. There is constant vigilance of the security forces to ensure the law and order situation in the CHT (D'Costa, 2016). Furthermore, high visibility of the security forces and structural dominance by the Bengali people at the top level of the local administration, such as police and bureaucracy, have created a sense of discrimination among the tribal people. Although the security forces are deployed in the CHT, they are not ensuring peace and law and order, and the laws are not protecting people's rights. Furthermore, the main security forces are now directly involved in business activities (tourism business) which go against the interests of the tribal people. The tribal respondents perceive the presence of the army as a policy of discrimination in the CHT as the security forces not only consume land but also complicate the social and economic life of the tribal people. In some respects, the army is involved in the practices, such as setting up the tourist spots (for example, Nilgiri Resort, Sajek Valley resort) and seizing the land on the hills without informed consent and prior information (IWGIA, 2012; Cultural Survival, 2017). In every project, the army prefers to employ Bengali people to operate the activity, and this process helps to ensure the interest of the Bengali settlers and army as well. IWGIA (2012) notes that the army's conduct in the CHT is biased and discriminatory in ways that "often sympathise with, and more importantly, act in favour of the settlers, and against the indigenous people" (IWGIA, 2012, p. 12).

7.2.2.3. Marginalisation of the Tribal people

Another growing concern for the Bengali migration and settlement to the CHT is the marginalisation of the tribal people in their land. Marginalisation as a term refers to the exclusion of some people from the social and political system. It involves making some

groups of people less important and placing them in a secondary position. In the CHT, marginalisation is defined as the systematic disempowerment of the tribal people. This is also called the elimination, genocide, annihilation or extinction of a community from their land (Levene, 1999; Adnan, 2004; Chakma, 2010b). This chapter calls it marginalisation as the focus here is on the spatial marginalisation of the tribal people in their own land. This marginalisation is the result of the Bengali migration and settlement as well as the policy of the government. In the environment and conflict analysis, Homer Dixon (1999, pp.77-78) describes 'ecological marginalisation as the marginal position of a group people due to the resource capture by the influential people in the face of the resource scarcity'. Due to the encroachment of the Bengali settlers in the CHT, some tribal people have moved into the deep forest areas for their livelihood and to avoid conflict, however there are no statistics on how many people have moved as a result of being unable to live peacefully in their previous place. In some instances, Bengali people create an environment that the tribal people do not like. Key informant 2 who worked in the remote area of the CHT offered the following comment:

> The activities of the Bengali people act as an encroachment into tribal society. The expansion of the religious institutions (for example, Mosques and Madrasas) is also pushing some tribal people to move long distances, possibly to the jungle so that they might have an environment for living (Key informant 2).

The mobilisation of Muslim people and their eventual majority in the CHT has contributed to changing the basic demographic structure, means of economic activities, and political institutions. Now the tribal people are struggling to maintain their cultural distinctiveness due to the hegemonic nature of the Bangladesh state and intervention by the elite ruling classes (Arens, 2017; CHT Commission, 2000; Uddin, 2010). Even, the traditional name of some villages and neighbourhoods has been changed due to the population having become

majority Muslim. These places have taken on a Muslim cultural flavour and are known by Muslim names (Nasreen & Togawa, 2002; Nasreen, 2018).

Due to the implementation of development projects, marginal people, mostly of tribal origin have become victims of eviction and displacement. Apart from the Kaptai dam, other development projects, including a public university, medical college, eco-park, and tourist spots, have led to the marginalisation of the people in the CHT. Key informants of tribal background considered all these development projects as fostering tribal marginalisation in the CHT. In response to a question concerning this, a key informant suggested that "the public and medical university would open the door to many non-tribal students to come and study in the CHT, which would increase the dominance of the Bengali culture and practices" (Key informant 6). In contrast, the government presents these development activities in the CHT as part of the modernisation of the region and to provide modern educational facilities to the tribal people as most of them struggle to come to cities for education. However, tribal key informants consider the development efforts to be part of the process of marginalising tribal people. This suggests that the association of development with marginalisation indicates a history of tribal people failing to reap the benefits of even well-meaning government projects.

This section has shown that respondents feel discriminated against by the state system. The tribal respondents show more disappointment about their life in the CHT. This disappointment has developed over the time of settlement of the Bengali people in their land. The Bengali respondents also feel discriminated against when they do not get equal treatment as citizens of the CHT with regard to what tribal people are getting from the state, i.e. quota in the job sectors and admission to the educational institutions. The most

crucial issue that has developed over time is the polarisation between the communities.

There is a sharp difference between the communities, and they have yet to come closer

and cooperate in their daily life in the CHT. Many respondents do not want people from

the other community as neighbours, do not trust them and even fail to maintain a basic

social relationship. The migration of the Bengali people has also influenced the social and

economic condition in the CHT, which has marginalised poor tribal people through

activities such as land grabbing and resource capture and forced some tribal people to

move to the deep jungle for living and livelihood.

7.2.3. Fear, insecurity and experience of violence

The conflict situation generates fear and insecurity among residents in the CHT. Tribal

residents feel fear and anxiety about land grabbing, the presence of the army and the slow

implementation of the Peace Accord (Chakma & D' Costa, 2013). The Bengali settlers are

concerned about the competition over land and fear that the government undertaking to

withdraw army camps from many locations of the CHT will make them more vulnerable to

attacks. Two decades after the Peace Accord, the continued presence of fear and insecurity

suggest an absence of peace, if peace is defined as the absence of violence as well as the

condition of equality, equal rights, justice, free movement and reciprocity among the

people living in the CHT (de Rivera, 2012; Galtung, 1996).

Although a sense of fear and insecurity is widely felt by the residents, it is likely to affect

the Bengali and tribal community differently. In order to explore these conditions,

respondents were asked how often they feel fear and insecurity, and their responses are

shown in Figure 7.5.

Figure 7.5: Comparing the frequency of fear between the tribal and Bengali respondents

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=300.

For the overwhelming majority of the survey respondents, fear is not an everyday experience in their life although a majority of feel fear frequently or sometimes. Tribal respondents are more likely to feel fearful than their Bengali counterparts. The next set of figures (Figure 7.6) explores what sorts of fear and insecurities the respondents of both communities are experiencing in their life.

Figure 7.6: Perceptions about the incidence of fear and insecurity in daily life


Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=300.

A significant majority of tribal respondents were very fearful of personal injury and attacks on their property: almost half expressed great concern about their children's education, and around 40 percent feared for the security of their family members, intimidation and verbal abuse. The conflict situation both pre and post Peace Accord has implications for children's education. A study suggests that conflict situation in the CHT has prevented parents from sending their children to school (Badiuzzaman & Murshed, 2015). Moreover, people living in remote areas of the forest are often unable to send their children to school for security and financial reasons. In contrast, very few Bengali respondents expressed heightened concern about these issues. Just over half said that they were 'sometimes' concerned about them while a third of the Bengali respondents were not concerned.

To investigate the sources of fear and insecurity, respondents were asked how often they had experienced violence in recent years, and what types of violence. The responses are shown below (Figures 7.7 and 7.8).

Figure 7.7: How often have you experienced any violent incidents in the last five years?

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=300.

Around 65 percent of the tribal respondents stated that they frequently (at least monthly) faced incidents of violence, while a significantly lower proportion of Bengali respondents were in this category. More than half of the Bengali respondents stated that they had not faced any violence or conflict in the last five years. The types of violence experienced by respondents also differed between the two groups (Figure 7.8). Tribal respondents were more likely to be a victim of acts of violence than the Bengali respondents.

Figure 7.8: Types of violence experienced by respondents

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=300. Multiple response question.

Around 40 percent of the tribal respondents reported physical attacks on themselves and/or a family member, and a similar proportion had their property destroyed. Almost 9 percent had lost a family member in incidents of violence. On the other hand, Bengali respondents were less prone to falling victim to violence, with damage to property being the most likely event, affecting 20 percent of respondents. However, the Bengali respondents were more likely to experience extortion than tribal respondents. It is difficult to explain why the Bengali people are giving extortion payments to outlaws but during fieldwork the respondents reported that extortion is a big problem in the CHT, to the extent of having to pay the local gangs for being able to sell a single bamboo. One explanation is that there is a large number of illegal small arms and light weapons in the hands of the outlaws. Jamil and Panday (2008) also suggested that some of the members

of the Shaniti Bahini did not surrender their arms to the Bangladesh government and this group of people may be involved in collecting money from the general public. Although the respondents have termed this 'extortion', Braithwaite and D'Costa, (2012, p. 23) termed it "as 'tax' which is mandatorily given by the poor rural people to the members of PCJSS and UPDF for per unit of production".

This survey data shows that both Bengali and tribal respondents are affected by conflict and violence but the latter express a greater sense of victimisation and concern about everyday life and their future. Braithwaite and D'Costa (2018, p. 323) explain the current dimension of fear, sexual violence, organised crime, insecurity and violence as the latest manifestation of violence gripping the region. This refers to the fact that the CHT has experienced violence, deprivation and domination under different regimes from the British period to the current Bangladesh era. Although the Peace Accord was signed to manage the conflict and establish peace, the region is still undergoing violence, fear and insecurities. This situation is far from being a sustainable peace. Thus, CHT experts have referred to the current situation of the CHT as an elusive peace (Panday & Jamil, 2009, p. 1052) and violent peace (D'Costa, 2016, p. 252). The CHT experts argued in this way because the absence of direct war between the army and tribal armed groups does not ensure a peaceful situation. According to the peace and conflict literature, this situation can also be referred to as negative peace (Galtung, 1969, p. 183). In order to achieve positive peace, some issues such as presence of social justice, freedom, human rights, and choice of development are important preconditions which are only achievable with the elimination of structural violence from the society (Galtung, 1969, p. 183). In this sense, the CHT is still in a conflict situation.

7.2.4. The current state of conflict and actors

The previous section has analysed the state of fear, insecurity and violence in the CHT. The perceptions of the respondents about the fear, insecurity and violence in their daily life give a picture of the conflict situation. There are different forms of 'spoilers' such as military, organised groups and government policy which have resuscitated the conflict situation. The conflict situation arising from the data is more small-scale, localised and a latent form of conflict that manifests with human rights violations, fear, insecurity and land grabbing. The following section presents the current conflict situation and major actors in the conflict.

Figure 7.9: Are you living in a peaceful situation in the CHT?

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=300.

There is a significant difference between the tribal and Bengali respondents about the feeling of peace and conflict in the CHT as shown in Figure 7.9. Almost 85 percent of the tribal respondents mention that they are not living in peace, whereas around half (50

percent) Bengali respondents see themselves as living in a peaceful situation. To explain

these responses, it is important to remember that the militarisation, dominance, inter-

group and intra-group conflict, and gender-based violence present the testimony of a

conflict situation in the CHT (Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2018). More than 20 years after the

peace treaty, many people still feel fear and insecurity. A recent study conducted by the

Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh with the

support of the UNDP-CHTDF Bangladesh, conducted a household survey and an elite survey

with 1200 people as well as focus group discussions in the three districts. The research

found significant indicators of conflict in the CHT such as displacement, communal

violence, arms, drugs, extortion, polarisation, and suspicion about the security forces

(Choudhury et al., 2017). The study identified extortion and communal hatred as the most

concerning issues that frequently cause fear and insecurity among the tribal and Bengali

people living in the CHT.

The interviews conducted with key informants for the present study have also elicited

information about the current state of conflict in the CHT. A conversation with the director

of an NGO offers some insight into how the conflict has changed since the CHT Accord:

> Researcher: Do you think that the peace accord has ended the conflict?
> Key informant 7: No, conflict is still ongoing. Even after the peace accord, many big forms
> of conflict have occurred in the CHT. I have visited some conflict spots and seen causalities.
> I saw that conflict is extensive in some places.
>
> Researcher: Who is involved in this conflict?
> Key informant 7: Now, the conflict between the military and the Shanti Bahini has ended.
> However, the conflict between the tribal and the Bengali people is still ongoing, and
> innocent people are the victims.
>
> Researcher: Can you tell me some incidents of conflict?
> Key informant 7: The major forms of the conflict is burning houses, destroying the crops of
> the opposing group, kidnapping people and demanding ransom, physically hurting people,
> even killing.

The informant sees ordinary people as the main protagonists of current civil strife in the CHT. This suggests that the nature of the conflict has changed from a violent war fought by armed forces to a small-scale social conflict (see the definition of conflict in the introduction chapter) taking place at the everyday local level. This social conflict takes place between the communities (Bengali settlers and tribal people) over resources, social position and political power. This form of conflict is no less destructive as it has dire consequences for local people. The director of a civil society organisation in the CHT, for example, mentioned that in Rangamati district a private medical hospital owned by the tribal community was destroyed during community violence (Key informant 6). This raises the question of why the businesses, services and crops owned by tribal people are often targeted in violent incidents. According to the key informant 6, "the motive of destroying the business centres by the Bengali settlers is to weaken the financial power of the tribal community".

In the post Peace Accord period, the conflict in the CHT can best be described as small scale and social conflict which is organised within the ethnic group along political divides (JSS vs UPDF) or between the main ethnic groups (Tribal vs Bengali settlers). The manifestation of this activity is varied including communal conflict, riot, civil strife, burning, killing, rape and human rights violation (Mohsin, 2003). These incidents of conflict are more frequent in the daily lives of the CHT people, although some areas are more and others are less conflicted. The UN Special Rapporteur's report in 2011 outlines some gross human rights violations occurring in the CHT in the post Peace Accord period, such as arbitrary arrest, torture, extra-judicial killings, harassment and sexual violence (cited in Chakma & D'Costa, 2013). This indicates that state and organisations are also involved in the conflict because ordinary people would not arbitrarily arrest people.

This raises questions about the perpetrators. While many acts of violence are carried out by ordinary people, according to the literature, there are other players who are directly or indirectly involved in originating and escalating conflict. Currently, in the CHT multiple actors are involved in addition to Bengali settlers and tribal residents. The fractional groups within the tribal people such as UPDF, PCJSS, UPDF reformist[32], and JSS reformist group are also involved. At the same time, some of them (for example, UPDF) are directly opposing the Bengali settlers and the Peace Accord (see section 3.6). The army also has a role in the conflict situation. Bengali and Tribal respondents provided an idea about the actors in the current CHT conflict and violence. To explore this issue, this survey asked presented the Bengali and tribal respondents whether they 'agree', 'disagree' or 'don't like to answer' the following statements.

Figure 7.10: Perceptions of the Bengali respondents about the actors in the conflict

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=150.

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[32] Reformists' have emerged from both the PCJSS and UPDF group. In 1998, the UPDF emerged from the PCJSS due to the different opinions regarding the peace accord signed in 1997. The UPDF views the CHT problem differently, and thus, they perceive an alternative proposal for the rights of the CHT people. The Jano Samhati Samiti (Reformist) re-emerged as a political platform from 2007 and are working to increase their support base at the local level. Recently, the reformist group (Rupayan-Tanindra group) of the UPDF has emerged as a political platform. This friction among the tribal people is generating new forms of conflict and violence in the CHT.

According to the Bengali respondents, conflict is ongoing between settlers and tribal people (64 percent) (Figure 7.10). Tribal people are also involved in the conflict within the community as well as with the army. While the majority of Bengali respondents attribute agency to tribal people who they perceive to be fighting with settlers, army and other tribal people, less than 20 percent agreed with the idea that conflict exists among Bengali people. Conversely, when the same question is posed to tribal respondents, Bengali settlers emerge as the main actors in the conflict (Figure 7.11).

Figure 7.11: Perceptions of the tribal respondents about the actors of the conflict

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=150.

Over 90 percent of tribal respondents stated that Bengali settlers were involved in the conflict with tribal people. A large majority also viewed Bengali settlers as being involved in the intra-group conflict, and around 40 percent agree that intra-group conflict also takes place among tribal people. One-third of the tribal respondents perceive that there is

conflict between the army and the tribal people, even though key informants and some of the literature assert that the army is no longer involved in the conflict.

These data suggest that conflict between Bengali settlers and tribal people is most evident to the respondents, particularly to those of tribal background. Many of them have witnessed or directly experienced violent acts, as shown in the previous section. The role of the army is still questionable as respondents in both groups think that the army is actively involved in conflict. Chapter Three and some key informants (for example, informant 2) have already mentioned that the army has supported Bengali settlement, thus, conflict is less likely between the army and Bengali people. The survey asked the respondents of both communities whether the army is involved in conflict with tribal people. The result shows that 31 percent of tribal respondents (Figure 7.11) and 56 percent of Bengali respondents (Figure 7.10) see the army involved in the conflict with tribal people. While the army is not officially engaged in fighting, some members of the army may be engaged in small-scale conflict incidents such as rape, torture and human rights violations. Reporting on violent incidents, D'Costa (2016, p. 248) identified "the involvement of the army in the CHT as the source of 'culture of violence' as they use protracted and intense force in the region". D'Costa (2016, p. 254) also claimed that the army was involved in torturing tribal people and sexually abusing tribal girls and women on different occasions.

A new phenomenon in the post Peace Accord era is the rise of intra-group conflict, a concerning issue for security and peace in the region. The intra-group conflict refers to the conflict among tribal people and Bengali people. While responding to the statement about the conflict within groups, respondents of both communities indicated that this was happening mostly in the opposing group, (i.e. Bengali settlers are involved in conflict with

Bengali people according to the tribal respondents; and tribal people are involved in conflict with tribal people according to the Bengali respondents). This indicates a reluctance to admit to intra-group conflict within the own community, or, alternatively, the presence of intra-group conflict has been overstated in public discourse which has influenced the survey responses. Therefore, information from the key informants and secondary sources may help to substantiate the arguments of intra-group conflict. Informant 5 compares conflict 'within the community' and 'conflict with the past rival'. By the conflict within the community, informant 5 refers to the conflict originating among the tribal people for the political power and social positions in the CHT, and conflict over supporting the Peace Accord. It appears that tribal groups are sharply divided over the Peace Accord and engaged in sporadic violence and conflict. The competition for the resource and political position, lack of consensus between and among groups and opinion in pro Peace Accord and anti-Peace Accord are dividing tribal people in the CHT. Even it is also alleged that members of the contending groups, such as UPDF and PCJSS, are involved in killing tribal people who disagree with their political position (Panday & Jamil, 2009, p. 1065). For example, Panday and Jamil (2009, p. 1066) noted that "the PCJSS and UPDF remain mired in an intra-communal conflict that has killed more than 500 people and injured about 1,000 since December 1998. Kidnapping and extortion by local gangs are frequent: more than 1,000 people have been kidnapped in the past 11 years".

However, Braithwaite and D'Costa (2012) give the responsibility for the conflict between the UPDF and PCJSS to the involvement of the law enforcing agencies (for example, DGFI). These researchers state that law enforcing agencies in the CHT are providing financial assistance and weapons to tribal fractional groups, such as UPDF, to fight against the PCJSS, which prolongs the battle between two fractional groups in the tribal community

(Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2012, p. 21). This raises the question of why the law enforcing agencies are assisting one fractional group against another. The law enforcing agency may like to see the continuation of this battle with a view to weakening the collective force of the tribal people.

In order to tease out the role of stakeholders such as the military, UPDF, PCJSS and Bengali settlers, survey respondents were asked whether they saw them as playing a role in the CHT conflict. In the pre Peace Accord period, the major parties in conflict were the Bangladesh army and Shaniti Bahini, but in the post Peace Accord period, new players have emerged from the civilian people of both communities. On the indigenous side, tribal people in the CHT and other indigenous people living on the plains have formed a political platform named the Bangladesh Indigenous Peoples Forum (BIPF) to ensure the rights of the indigenous people in Bangladesh (Gerharz, 2014). Similarly, the Bengali settlers have formed a platform "Somo Adhikar Andolon" (SAA) to ensure the rights and dignity of the Bengali people in the CHT. These two platforms seem to be rivals because each opposes the claim and position of others, and in addition, fractional political wings within the tribal community have emerged such as the UPDF and PCJSS reformist (D'Costa, 2014). Currently, UPDF and PCJSS are the two main parties playing a role in the tribal community. On the other hand, SAA has emerged as a platform from the Bengali settlers to ensure their rights in the CHT. The army is still present, but their role has been officially transformed into ensuring security in the region. The PCJSS is a political party in the CHT with a long history of working for the rights and dignity of the hill people. The UPDF was formed in 1998 in the wake of the CHT Accord by PCJSS members who opposed the Accord and demanded complete freedom for the CHT. The following figure (7.12) shows how the Bengali and tribal respondents perceive the role of these significant players in the CHT.

Figure 7.12: Perceptions of the Bengali and tribal respondents about the actors in the conflict

Source: Fieldwork, November 2016 - February 2017. N=300.

Bengali and tribal respondents think differently about the role of the military, Bengali settlers, UPDF and PCJSS in the current conflict. Most tribal respondents see the Bengali settlers (93 percent) and the army (91 percent) as the main actors in the conflict while the majority of the Bengali respondents consider the political tribal groups UPDF (94 percent) and PCJSS (93 percent) as the main actor of the conflict.

This finding suggests that each community has a different perception about the players of the current conflict situation. Multiple actors are influencing the social, economic and political affairs in the region. For the multiple actors, the nature of conflict is complex that takes place in different forms, open or silently, and affect people in different extent. The goals of each actor are also different in nature. The UPDF and JSS, although local-based parties, actively participate in the national and local election and hold different processions

and meetings for their ensuring their lights. The Bengali settlers are also divided along national political lines, such as BNP, Awami League and Jamat-i-Islami. However, they hold the common view of ensuring their rights in the CHT.

The literature on CHT affairs confirms that the conflict situation has been complicated since the massive Bengali settlement and migration (Mohsin, 2003; Chakma, 2010a). The CHT remains the most militarised region in Bangladesh where security personnel are deployed to maintain peace and security. It is argued that the urge to protect the Bengali people in the CHT has necessitated the deployment of large numbers of military personnel in the region (Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2012; Adnan & Dastidar, 2011). The tribal people consider the security forces as one of the major sources of human rights violations of the tribal people. According to one study, there are 230 army camps in the CHT within a limited area of land (Mohsin & Hossain, 2015, p. 17), while another report puts the figure at around 35,000-40,000 security forces deployed in the region in 500 army camps (IWGIA, 2012, p. 12).

Despite army public relations programmes to attain the confidence of the tribal people, such as the 'pacification programme'[33], the tribal people still consider the army as the cause of the conflicts and human rights violations. In contrast, very few Bengali settlers consider the presence of the military as a source of conflict in the CHT, but this may be partly due to a reluctance to answer the question. More than 32 percent of respondents refused to say whether the army plays a role in the CHT conflict. As mentioned in Chapter

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[33] The 'pacification programme' includes food distribution, construction of religious institutions or schools, small-scale income-generating projects, etc. This programme continued until the enacting of the Peace Accord.

Six, the army helped to institutionalise the Bengali settlement in the CHT by providing help, assistance and protection.

The role of the CHT political parties UPDF and PCJSS is also controversial, with most Bengali respondents perceiving them to be responsible for creating conflict and violence. Some 15-20 percent of tribal respondents shared this view, perhaps because both parties are dominated by people from the Chakma ethnic group and perceived to marginalise other ethnic minorities. But more importantly, the PCJSS and UPDF are now rivals in every decision regarding the CHT, which is one of the important sources of generating violence, of the people of the Bengali and Tribal communities (Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2012, p. 23). Other splinter groups have subsequently formed, and the emergence of new groups has been generating violence in tribal society. This is acknowledged by some of the tribal survey respondents.

This section, in summary, has argued that the CHT conflict is played out as a micro-level or social conflict between the tribal and Bengali people over the use of resources and social position. However, a new dimension to the conflict is the intra-group conflict between the UPDF and PCJSS people which is a major source of killing and human rights violations. Due to the increasingly complex situation and their growing numbers, the Bengalis are also beginning to be politically organised through *Samo Adhikar Andolon* demanding equal rights in every sphere in the CHT. Now, the UPDF and *Samo Adhikar Andolon* have fuelled conflict and violence because they have radically different policies for the political future of the region. Above all, the role of the security forces (for example, the army) is still significant in implementing any decisions about peace and security in the region. At the

same time, the presence of extensive security forces is hampering the human rights and individual freedom of the tribal people in the CHT.

7.3. Discussion

This section provides an overall discussion of the results presented in this chapter incorporating the theoretical explanations of climate change and environmental migration, and conflict. Bengali migration to the CHT has brought changes in the social, economic and political context of the region which have influenced the environment, security, and conflict situation. Multi-disciplinary approaches have been applied to analyse the relationship between the migration and settlement of the Bengali people and conflict situations in the CHT.

A significant change in Bengali migration has brought demographic transformation to the region. Demographic transformation and migration in an ethnically divided society sometimes generate conflict and violence. Countries with low economic capability, ethnic heterogeneity and an illegitimate government are more prone to violence and conflict (Goldstone, 2002; Kahl, 2006; Urdal, 2005). Goldstone (2002) more precisely argues that population migration to an ethnically inhabited location changes the local balance, alters the dominance of the local people and generates conflict and violence (Goldstone, 2002, p. 14). The sudden population increase caused by Bengali migration and settlement imposed tremendous pressure on resources and services and increased the level of violence in the CHT conflict during the period 1977-1997. Chakma and D'Costa claim that "two-thirds of the Bengali population in the CHT were migrants, and 62 per cent of the Bengali living in the CHT had been there for less than 30 years" (Chakma & D Costa, 2012, p. 140). The massive migration during 1977-1989 and natural migration of the Bengali people due to

their networks and connections have changed the unique characteristics and cultural patterns of the CHT, and complicated the economic activities in the region. These changes in the culture, demography, and economic activities are acting to generate conflict between the tribal and Bengali communities. The demographic change has also resulted in resource scarcity that contributes to escalating the existing conflict and forming new kinds of conflict between the tribal and Bengali communities. The neo-Malthusian approach can best be used to analyse this situation increasing population, resource scarcity, resource capture and conflict (Homer Dixon, 1999; Kahl, 2006). In a poor and subsistence economic context, population pressure is a serious issue for security. Poor governance and discriminatory policies of the state sometimes complicate the situations for the poor and marginal people. This is exactly what has happened in the case of the tribal people when a large number of environmentally induced and poor people migrated to the region and attempted to share the resources in the CHT.

The migrant influx led to increased exploitation of land and forest resources, causing resource scarcity. In such conditions, the elites (political, civil and military) have exploited the local people by seizing the land and forest resources. According to Homer-Dixon (1999, p. 4), "the scarcity of the critical resources – land and forest – generate severe social stress and unrest, and ultimately lead to conflict and violence". The local people opposed the Bengali migration and attacked settlements in some places. In response, the army and settlers burnt the forest, destroyed and cleared it and created a livable place for the Bengali people. The civil and military elites also took part in the process of resource capture and pushed many tribal people out of their land. As Homer-Dixon (2010, p. 7) points out, resource capture by the elites sometimes pushes people to be marginalised from their living options which can lead to conflict. In the CHT, the same situation has

happened and some of the civil and military bureaucrats stole land and plundered the forest resources manipulating the state law (Roy, 2000; Adnan & Dastidar, 2011). As well as resource capture, land dispossession, deforestation, and development projects, the policy on the forest reserves and the expansion of mining operation have had significant impacts on the resource availability in the CHT.

The resource capture threatens the livelihood of the tribal people as they depended on it for their livelihood. Currently, people of both the communities are very much concerned about their land and land grabbing is now a leading cause of violence and human rights violation in the CHT. As land is the most important resource in the CHT, any form of disentanglement from the land pushes communities into disadvantaged and marginalised positions. It is argued that livelihood failure is connected with conflict especially when the environmental causes contribute to the livelihood failure of a group of people (Ohlsson, 2000; Deligiannis, 2012). Land grabbing generates poverty by detaching some small communities from their land rights, leaving tribal people in poverty and struggling to receive proper help from the government (Jamil & Panday, 2008, p. 479). Migration, resource scarcity and land grabbing generate a sense of deprivation among the tribal people which facilitates ethnic mobilisation.

Now, people in the CHT are highly polarised in ethnic, religious and political point of view which is contributing to forming social division, mistrust and conflict. In any multi-ethnic society, inequality can lead to marginalisation and discrimination along ethnic lines generating ethnic hatred and social polarisation (Østby, 2008a, 2008b; Stewart, 2010). The behaviour of the state and social faults caused by the Bengali migration have mobilised members of the tribal population to fight for their existence and livelihood. The survey

results show a significant level of inter-ethnic polarisation, fear, insecurity, mistrust, and suspicion among both the Bengali and tribal people. It was clear that Bengali and tribal people do not like to have each other as neighbours, and they do not have a good relationship. As a consequence both the Bengalis and tribal people are now polarised based on ethnic identity which acts as a source of violence and conflicts in the region. The survey shows that people in both communities feel insecure, but the degree and sources of insecurity differ between tribal and Bengali respondents. Tribal respondents are more likely to feel insecure and make Bengali settlers and law enforcing agencies (army) responsible for it. Their feeling of insecurity is based on experiences of violence including verbal abuse, attacks on themselves or family members, attacks on their property, and loss of livelihood. Bengali respondents also report fear and insecurity due to their experiences of extortion, and competition for land.

These negative attitudes hinder the communities from participating in social and political functions. Opportunities for sharing, neighbourhood activity and participating in the joint social programme helps to enhance communication between and among the groups, which ultimately establishes peace and security in a multi-cultural society (Lake & Rothchild, 1996; Nagle, 2016; Oberschall, 2007). But in the CHT these opportunities are limited and instead, processes of discrimination and marginalisation act to intensify the conflicting relationship between the Bengali and tribal people (Barkat, 2016).

The social and behavioural patterns of the tribal and Bengali settlers result in direct and indirect forms of conflict (Galtung, 1969, 1990). Direct violence includes killing, torturing and intimidation, and indirect violence involves deprivation, systemic subordination, marginalisation and systemic poverty (Galtung, 1990). According to survey findings, tribal

people are more frequently exposed to direct violence. However, there is no official government information on how many people have been killed due to the conflict in the post Peace Accord period. For this reason, the information recorded by the IWGIA and PCJSS has been used to validate that conflicts still take place in the CHT causing human rights violations including the killing.

7.4. Conclusion

The CHT conflict began with the denial of identity and with deprivation, destruction of property and displacement of the tribal people. However, migration of the Bengali people has also contributed these factors and has over time changed the focus, actors and conduct of the conflict. Accelerated migration in the 1980 and 1990s increased the competition between the tribal and Bengali people over resources, most notably land, and also over social position and political power. Marginalisation, discrimination, land grabbing and human rights violations are now common in the CHT, creating widespread fear and insecurity among all ethnic communities and mutual distrust. The state institutions have failed to develop more constructive relationships between and among the groups. People representing the local and national political parties are equally divided and hardly tolerate different opinions. Currently, the tribal people are more fragmented by conflict between political camps. A Peace Accord has been signed but communal mistrust, feelings of 'we' versus 'they', and competition for resource control have increased significantly. The CHT conflict in its present form is more akin to a complex social conflict rather than an identity conflict. The divisive issues are multiple, including land, social position, development, immigration and Islamisation. Demographic pressure, changes in the ethnic composition and resource exploitation have transformed the CHT into a more insecure place for both tribal and Bengali people. In particular, tribal people are threatened by the expansion of

the neoliberal economy, exploitation of the resources by the capitalist Bengali influential people, and by ongoing migration. Additional migration in any form would further complicate the environment in the CHT and may result in more conflict and violence. An appropriate policy to guide climate change adaptation and development of community relationships is essential to reduce the conflict between the tribal and Bengali people. The next chapter provides an overall conclusion of this thesis with policy recommendations.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

8.1. Introduction

This thesis has investigated the relationship between climate change and Bengali migration; and between Bengali migration and conflict in the CHT. This connection between climate change induced migration and conflict relationship is unexplored in Bangladesh even though the country is one of the most climate affected countries, and climate affected people have already migrated to the CHT. As such it is a nascent topic as well as a new perspective on the CHT conflict analysis. Existing analysis of the CHT conflict is predominantly centred on the conventional study of hegemony, denial of the identity of the tribal people by the ruling classes, militarisation and gross human rights violation by many actors including the security forces (Mohsin, 1997; Levene, 1999; D'Costa, 2012). Following the theoretical framework (Figure 3.9), this thesis has provided alternative explanations by investigating the Bengali migration and conflict in the CHT and following their links with environment and climate change issues. Based on the research questions (See Chapter One, section 1.4), three fundamental issues guide this research: the role of climate change as a driver of Bengali migration to the CHT; the examination of the processes and mediating factors which institutionalise Bengali migration; and the influence of migration in the CHT conflict. Connecting these three issues give the thesis unique importance in the area of climate change, migration and conflict analysis in a climate hot spot.

Reviewing the existing literature in the context of Bangladesh as well as the CHT, this study has identified a research gap regarding the role of climate change and produced new information on how climate change events have led to the Bengali migration and influenced the conflict in the CHT. Some existing research (mostly international literature) identified that landlessness and environmental factors have contributed to the migration to the region (Lee, 1997, 2001; Reuveny, 2007). However, empirical research to explore the connection has been lacking. Moreover, the dominant interpretation in Bangladesh (Mohsin, 1997; Adnan, 2004; Adnan & Dastidar, 2011) presents this migration as a state-sponsored intervention into the CHT conflict. Specifically, it is argued that successive governments hoped that Bengali settlement would defuse the conflict by weakening local Jumma identity and political claims for autonomy. This thesis utilised the climate change and migration literature as an analytical lens to conduct a ground level study in the CHT and found that climate change events and poverty influenced the decisions of the Bengali people to migrate to the CHT, with consequences for the CHT conflict. This explanation of climate change, migration and conflict relationship reflects the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 3 (Figure 3.9) which implies that environmental and climatic events along with economic and social issues paved the way of migration and settlement of the Bengali people and generated the conflict situation in the region. This offers an alternative explanation of the CHT conflict which goes beyond mainstream perspective of 'political migration' or 'state-sponsored settlement'.

Although migration is an ongoing process and commonly used to avoid vulnerabilities as well as pursue a better life (McLeman, 2014), climate change affected rural people in Bangladesh do not like to migrate. They are attached to their land, and many do not have the resources to migrate (Gray & Muller 2012). Sometimes, climate affected people

migrate only a short distance hoping to return to their place of origin after the vulnerabilities subside (Lein, 2000). Nevertheless, on many occasions climate affected people migrate permanently with the help of a number of mediating factors ranging from state to non-state actors. In reviewing the literature on factors mediating migration, this thesis has explored that government support, security forces and networks played a prominent role in the case of Bengali migration to the CHT.

There has also been limited research on how the migration of Bengali people has transformed the social, economic and political fabric of the CHT, making it more complex and competitive. Traditional conflict analysis, incorporating the militarisation, failure of the political leaders to give constitutional recognition to the tribal people and human rights violations, is partial and incomplete. Migration, demographic transformation and resource scarcity have the potential to escalate the existing conflict and generate new conflict in the CHT, a situation which is either missing or ignored in existing research. This neglect has impacted on the analysis of conflict and conflict management. By assessing and acknowledging climate change induced migration and its impact on the CHT conflict, this thesis has the potential to inform more appropriate policies related to climate change adaptation and conflict management. By studying the internal migration process and identifying the multiple factors including climate change impacts on the lowlands, this research contributes to a better understanding of the multiple interconnected measures required to better manage climate change migration.

The empirical data have enabled the researcher to develop three findings chapters (Chapter Five, Six and Seven) which provide new perspectives on climate change induced internal migration and the CHT conflict in Bangladesh. The theoretical framework, derived

from blending the two strands of literature–climate change and migration; climate change induced migration and conflict– as well as the contextual study of Bangladesh have informed each chapter. These chapters are interconnected and provide new insight into the connections between climate change, migration and conflict. The following section provides a summary of the research findings.

8.2. Summary of the findings

Chapter Five explains that Bengali people migrated to the CHT in response to climatic events and poverty in their place of origin. More than half of the Bengali survey participants said that climatic events including floods, riverbank and coastal erosion and drought contributed to their migration decision through destroying their livelihood options and leaving them in extreme poverty. Interviews with climate migrants and key informants helped to explain how climatic events and poverty are interwoven in lowland and rural areas in Bangladesh, confirming existing research (Ahmed, Diffenbaugh, & Hertel, 2009; Hertel, Burke, & Lobell, 2010). People in coastal regions are the most affected, not least because these regions are impoverished, and households have few resources to cope with adverse climate events (World Bank, 2016).

Furthermore, climatic events are so frequent and so severe in some places in Bangladesh that they displace many people from their homes. More than 50 percent of the survey respondents reported adverse effects of climatic events on their homes, agricultural land and livelihood options. Having to frequently face severe climatic events made living impossible in their place of origin. Climatic events predominantly cause poverty through crop failure, shrinking the livelihood options and damaging or destroying living spaces. Yet most people did not immediately move to another place for shelter and livelihood, but

instead tried to remain in, or return to, their original homes. Only when climate affected people felt deep dissatisfaction about the place where they lived and saw no prospect of improvement, did they decide to migrate in order to escape hardship and poverty. The possibility of getting land and the availability of forest resources in the CHT worked as a pull factor, encouraging climate affected and poor people to migrate to the region.

Although climate and environmental change displaces many people in Bangladesh, it does not necessarily push people to migrate to a particular place. Like other forms of migration (both internal and international), the migration process depends on multiples causes, situations, connections, and the possibility of a more favourable environment. This is the case in the Bengali migration to the CHT, where a number of mediating factors assisted the migration process. Chapter Six explained in detail the mediating factors based on the survey and interview responses, showing that the resettlement policy of the government, protection from the security forces and information and informal assistance through the migrants' networks, encouraged the Bengali people to migrate to the CHT. Extending the current understanding of the Bengali settlement as a political measure to weaken the Jumma identity movement and defuse the CHT conflict (Adnan & Dastidar, 2011), Chapter Six argues that the migration process was mediated by several factors, including civil administration, the army, social networks and family connections. Thus, the climate-induced and poor people were able to actualise their expectation of settling in the CHT. Without these mediating factors, Bengali settlement and migration would not have been possible in the conflict region. In the CHT, ethnic minority people not only opposed the Bengali migration but also were engaged in violent conflict with the army and settlers to protect their special status and recognition of their right to self-determination.

Chapter Seven builds on these findings in analysing the views of respondents of the current conflict situation in the CHT. It argues that the social, economic and political conditions of the CHT have become increasingly contested as a result of large-scale migration and settlement from the 1970s onwards. Migration has significantly contributed to a three-fold increase in the population of the region between 1974 and 2011, and has transformed the CHT into a place where intense pressure on existing resources and land is felt by tribal inhabitants, and increasingly also by Bengali inhabitants (See Chapter Seven, Section 7.2.1). Tribal people have resisted the Bengali settlement policy and in the post Peace Accord period leaders have urged the Bangladesh government to stop issuing residency certificates to Bengali people in the CHT (Jamil & Panday, 2008).

If the settlement policy was meant to be a climate and environmental change adaptation policy and a poverty alleviation policy, it has not worked well, particularly for the reluctant host community. As competition for land and resources has increased in the CHT, tribal people who depend on the community forest and jhum cultivation are struggling to make a living and are pushed to more marginal locations in search of land and livelihood, as well as to escape the encroachment of the Bengali people. Not only Bengali settlers but also some civil and military bureaucrats have been engaged in land grabbing, which has become one of the main sources of conflict and violence in the area.

Currently, the CHT is in the grip of social conflict that catches media attention when it is manifested through violence, including killing, burning houses, destroying property, rape, attack, and extortion. However, this study has shown that the social conflict is underpinned by deep mistrust between the Bengali and tribal communities, whose views on issues are often highly polarised. Polarisation and mistrust have formed over time due to the long-

standing conflict, and are continuously reinforced by experiences of land grabbing, human rights violation and double-standards in the ways in which the civil and military institutions in the CHT treat people. Depending on their ethnicity and status, people feel insecure, for example experiencing threats to life and physical health, abduction and extortion. The tribal respondents reported feeling more insecure than the Bengali respondents. Although a high military presence continues in the region, ostensibly to maintain peace and security, people from both communities feel insecure and threatened. The sources of the threats and insecurities are known to them, but for various reasons, people do not seek justice from the law enforcement agencies. In the case of tribal respondents, this is due to a lack of trust in the law enforcing agencies which have neglected conflict situations, or been a source of insecurity and involved in committing crimes against them. For example, on many occasions tribal people claimed that members of the law enforcement abused tribal girls and women (Guhathakurta, 2012; Mohsin, 2013; D'Costa, 2014). The Bengali respondents also reported feeling insecure and experiencing threats from armed gangs. This suggests that the security system has failed to protect people from various ethnic groups but mistrust between the Bengali and tribal people also acts as one of the drivers of insecurity and violence in the CHT.

As Chapter Seven explored, the CHT has continued to witness frequent events of small-scale and violent conflict since the Peace Accord. Though not a regular phenomenon, these events frequently affect the lives of the people. Threats, rape of a family member, torture, damage to houses and other property and extortion are some common forms of direct violence in CHT society. Direct violence immediately affects people, while indirect violence such as discrimination, lack of facilities and marginalisation of people (Galtung, 1969) prevents society from moving forward and attaining security, justice, and development. In

many cases, minor incidents become the source of significant conflict. The pre-existing

disputes or criminal incidents such as sexual abuse, killing, abduction and altercations

become triggers for violent conflict that violates the human rights of the people.

8.3. Contributions to theory, policy and practice

This study contributes to the theoretical, policy and practical level of understanding about

climate change, migration and conflict. The following sections deal with the contribution of

this thesis in several dimensions, understanding the CHT conflict, policy implications and

practical implications for peacebuilding.

8.3.1. Understanding the CHT conflict

Research into when and how climate change induced migration impacts on conflict

situations, or creates new conflict, has been hampered by a lack of empirical and local level

case studies (Gleditsch, 2012; Hendrix, 2018; McLeman, 2014). Most of the research has

focused on the relationship between climate change and migration, or on the relationship

between climate change and conflict. This study contributes to advancing understanding of

climate change and migration, and the climate change and conflict relationship by teasing

out the links between these three related issues in the context of the CHT. It has drawn on

Homer-Dixon's (1999) analysis of resource scarcity and violence and Kahl's (2006) analysis

of demographic pressure and civil strife, which highlight the role of migration, population

pressure, and resource scarcity in the emergence of violent civil conflict. While researchers

have acknowledged that conflict may originate when people with different ethnic

backgrounds migrate to an area (Goldstone, 2002; Kahl, 2006), most do not explain how

conflict may occur in such situations. Moreover, some researchers argued that climate

change may accelerate conflict in such places where there is already a conflict situation.

Climate change effects thus exacerbate an existing conflict. From this perspective, the current study is an important case study as there was already conflict in the CHT when large-scale migration occurred and within this conflict situation, the migration has aggravated the conflict. This causal relationship between Bengali migration and conflict was ignored and unexplored in the body of research on the CHT conflict.

This study, therefore, contributes to the theoretical understanding by adding insights into the notion that climate change induced internal migration of people with different backgrounds may endanger the cultural distinctiveness and existence of minority people in other parts of the world. This research advances the idea that the failure of the government to address the needs of climate change displaced people, and at the same time, the government's assistance in settling displaced people in a minority-dominated location, have had crucial impacts on the conflict and insecurity in the region. The human insecurity issues of indigenous people due to increasing climate change impacts on their lives and livelihoods has been acknowledged by international research (Adger et al., 2014). Although this research identifies the effects of climate change on the indigenous people, it does not consider the human security situation of the indigenous people as and when the climate displaced people with different backgrounds from other parts migrate to the indigenous inhabited areas. The thesis has explored this issue and provided evidence that climate change induced internal migration with people from different backgrounds causes conflict and violence in the indigenous inhabited locations, as it creates pressure on sharing existing resources (for example, land and forest). By advancing the concept of climate change induced migration and conflict in the CHT, this thesis offers alternative explanations of the CHT conflict which are largely absent in the national and international literature. In doing so, this thesis opens up avenues for the development of policies both

for addressing climate change induced internal migration and the CHT conflict. A better understanding of the relationship between climate change migration and conflict in the CHT would also assist researchers in other countries who are working in Conflict and Peace Studies where the environment and climate change is the nascent topic.

8.3.2. Policy implications

As this thesis explored the implications of climatic events in the migration and Bengali settlement in the CHT, it sought also to provide recommendations that move beyond the traditional analysis of the conflict. It is argued that the CHT conflict has strong connections with the migration and settlement of Bengali people which has transformed the demographic structure of the region. This can be described as 'displacing conflict'[34] (Swain, 1996) which refers to environmentally displaced people migrating to another place where they eventually contribute to conflict. In the CHT, a large number of Bengali poor and climate change induced people migrated to the tribal inhabited area and complicated the existing conflict. Thus, this thesis advances two issues, first, a need for more control and management of internal migrants by appropriate policies by the government and donor organisations so that displaced people could survive in their place of origin, and second, a more proactive policy to build the capacity of people to cope with climate change events is needed. Like other parts of Bangladesh, the CHT has a scarcity of arable land as well as land suitable for dwellings. Moreover, in-migration of Bengali people has a strong connection with generating conflicts and violence in the region, therefore further in-migration of Bengali people will put pressure on the land and existing resources as they will compete with the tribal people (Ullah et al., 2014). Instead of encouraging migration to places

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[34] Swain refers to Bengalis who have been displaced due to environmental destruction and livelihood failure in Bangladesh and migrated to Assam and West-Bengal where they have become a source of conflict.

already involved in conflict, governments should focus on building the resilience capacity of people in lowland and highly climate affected areas. If this was done, poor and displaced people would not need to migrate to the CHT, which should reduce migration-related conflicts.

The findings of this thesis also support arguments for including more detailed analysis of internal migration in climate policies[35]. In particular, climate policymakers need to consider more seriously the possibilities of internal instability and conflict arising from using migration as climate change adaptation. In the current action plans and policies adopted by the government of Bangladesh, the research and knowledge management section only mentions that "climate change-related internal and external migration and rehabilitation should be monitored" (MoEF, 2009, p. 58). The revised version (2009) of the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan, (BCCSAP), gave emphasis to addressing the migration issue either by discouraging it or by providing resettlement options. Internal migration and policy issues are missing in the action plan, because of the ignorance of internal migration issues. Moreover, migration of the Bengali people to the CHT is neither recognised nor documented. The Action Plan also lacks guidelines on how conflicts that arise from climate change induced migration should be managed.

This is the first in-depth study to explore the relationship between climate change induced migration and conflict in Bangladesh. Thus, this study has the capacity to encourage policymakers to rethink the connection between climate change and migration to the CHT, as well as the implications of migration to local conflict. More research is needed, including

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[35] Climate policy means the action plan and polices that the Bangladesh government has already adopted for the adaptation and migration with increasing climate change. For example: NAPA, BCCSA, fifth five-year plan.

research in other parts of Bangladesh, especially in cities, to investigate how climate change induced migration may be a factor in social conflict. Since most climate change affected people migrate to urban locations, such a study would help to explore the link between climate change induced migration and conflict. Secondly, the policy must be directed towards managing the present conflict, minimising the insecurities, bridging gaps between communities and building sustainable peace in the CHT. Although multi-faceted programs are underway by joint ventures between the government and international organisations since the signing of the peace accord, the Bengali migration issue is overlooked. Moreover, reconciliation between Bengali settlers and tribal people is a prime policy concern to manage the current conflict. Some local and international NGOs such as the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS) and UNDP Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility (CHTDF) are working in institutionalising the current peacebuilding efforts through development activities and reconciliation between the Bengali migrants and tribal communities, however, there is much debate and discussion about ongoing peacebuilding efforts and the reconciliation process. On the ground donor driven operations aimed at building community relationships and reducing the conflict in the CHT are minimal (Chakma, 2017). One step in approaching the reconciliation process in the CHT would be to recognise the Bengali migration issue, implement proper policies to control it and provide more opportunities for tribal people so that they feel empowered. Conflict management and peacebuilding in the CHT are vital to advancing development initiatives in Bangladesh. In the current situation, there is less scope to withdraw a large number of the Bengali population from the CHT for numerous reasons, such as livelihood and lack of land in other parts of Bangladesh. Moreover, a new generation of Bengali people has emerged who were born and raised in the CHT, and, consequently, want to live in there by choice. This issue was recognised by a development worker in the CHT with a tribal

background (key informant 4, interview conducted in January 2017). From a policy perspective, it is not an option to ignore the Bengali migration issue in the CHT. This thesis urges that policy must address the sensitivities of the region, population dynamics, conflict history, and current political and social unrest of the CHT.

8.3.3. Practical implications for peacebuilding

This thesis offers information that could guide practical measures to manage the social conflict between the Bengali and Tribal communities in the CHT. Currently, people and political groups of both communities are engaged in conflict and violence for resources, social and political positions (Chapter Seven). Law enforcement agencies are also involved to some extent in generating violence when they violate the rights of the tribal people. To address this situation, both communities and state agencies must be brought under a single peacebuilding umbrella in order to build trust, cooperation and reconciliation. In a post-conflict or a conflict situation, peacebuilding measures such as demilitarisation, democracy, security sector reform, ensuring human rights and providing basic needs, work as a stimulus to bridge the gaps and help communities to cooperate for the shared interests and values (Jeong, 2005; Lambourne, 2000). In the CHT, peacebuilding processes are ongoing in order to bridge the gap between the communities, however the local ownership of the resources, land and social positions are not included in these initiatives. In a post-conflict situation, local ownership of the resources and involvement in the decision-making process constitute crucial factors in building lasting peace (Donais, 2012). Migration and settlement of the Bengali people and land grabbing have contested the ownership of land, resources and social positions. Despite the efforts of the government and NGOs, the region still experiences communal violence and conflict. Bengali migration, along with other issues, prolongs the conflict and delays the peacebuilding in the region.

Many of the principles of the Accord have yet to be implemented, and issues such as demilitarisation, security sector reform, and ensuring human rights are key responsibilities the state still needs to fulfil. Resolving land disputes and creating an effective land commission may help to defuse the social conflicts between tribal people and Bengali settlers. Thus, it is an important step to implement the Peace Accord as was promised by the government of Bangladesh.

The thesis finds that the Bangladesh army and local administration helped to institutionalise Bengali migration in the CHT during the period 1977-1989 (Chapter Six). Since that time the government and army have not promoted migration and settlement in the CHT, however the poor and climate affected people are still coming. They take shelter in proximity to the army camps and search for new locations through social networks and family connections. The research also shows that the government of Bangladesh is often involved in conflict in the CHT by settling Bengali people in the region and actively supporting them in times of inter-ethnic crisis (Chapter Three and Chapter Seven). Thus, the state must recognise the identity of the tribal people and implement the principles of the Peace Accord to empower tribal people. This is required to ensure the diversity, beauty and existence of a small community in Bangladesh. More importantly, tribal people should be able to access decision making positions through employment and education to secure their continued existence in Bangladesh.

The land grabbing by multinational corporations and powerful people must be controlled to ensure the survival of the poor communities. The commercial use of land, rubber plantations and tourism businesses help the outsiders, not the community people who depend on the land for their existence. This encroachment by the powerful elites and corporations is now regarded as 'contemporary colonialism' which is acting against the

indigenous people (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005) and necessitates dispossession and disconnection of the local people from their land and resources. It is clear that land is being rapidly taken by the powerful people and corporations, which is alarming for both the tribal and Bengali people, however tribal people are the worst victims of this land grabbing and land acquisition. Tourism and conservation, if necessary, must be operated ensuring the benefit of the local people otherwise in future more resentment and conflict will be generated.

This thesis finds direct and indirect involvement of the security forces (for example, the army) in conflict and violence. It is therefore important that the Bangladesh state rethink the way the security forces operate their activities ensuring the standard human rights and dignity. In the CHT, it is also seen that security forces are operating business activities (for example, tourism) which goes against the interest of the tribal people as businesses are connected to the environmental resources and land. Involvement of the security forces in the business activities means the disempowering and displacement of the tribal people. This is also one of the sources of resource scarcity and competition between and among the groups in the CHT.

8.4. Limitations of the study and future directions

As a new endeavour to explore climate change induced migration and conflict, this thesis is not free of limitations. One limitation concerns the data and information from the respondents. The core findings of this thesis are derived from the stated perceptions of the survey respondents but it is a matter of fact that perceptions of the respondents may change over time, and importantly, perceptions are not the same as facts. Memories of

reasons for migrating can be constructed retrospectively, therefore it is difficult to be certain how important climate change events have been in migration decisions.

In the case study of the CHT, the migrants who participated in this study had moved to the CHT years or decades ago. They often listed more immediate impulses behind their decisions to migrate and may struggle to remember the effects of climate change factors. Furthermore, other factors such as socio-economic and political issues lead peoples' overall decision-making calculations about migration. In such cases, it is difficult to distinguish between environmental impacts and other factors to determine what exactly influenced the decision to migrate. In order to overcome the weakness, I have reviewed various explanations among scholars about why migration happens in Bangladesh. The in-depth interviews with the climate migrants has helped to substantiate the understanding about climate change impacts on migration decisions.

Secondly, as the nexus between climate change and conflict is a relatively new field, there is not enough literature to support solid theorising on this nexus, particularly among scholars in educational institutions in Bangladesh. Discussing the CHT conflict in connection with climate change induced migration may, therefore, raise criticisms among these scholars. Nevertheless, available literature and research findings have enabled development of a framework to support the research. In this regard, this thesis can be regarded as a source of information for other cases of conflict involving migration and settlement of outsiders.

Drawing causality between climate change, internal migration and conflict in the CHT is an extremely difficult task because there are different perspectives on the origins of the conflict and Bengali migration contributed to the escalation through different social

processes. Although multi-methods have been applied to explore the conflict situation, the survey employed in this research (300 respondents) may be too small to elicit robust findings regarding climate change, migration and conflict relationship. In particular, it did not allow comparisons and teasing out differences between the study sites in the CHT which may provide more nuanced insights into the conditions of conflict and peaceful coexistence. Further research is needed with larger sample survey and extended methodological choices. Although mixed methods have been used in this thesis, other techniques, such as focus group discussions and causal analysis based on statistical methods, could be employed to explore how climate change impacts on the migration decisions of the Bengali people, as well as how migration is influencing the conflict situation. Equally, field study over an extended time (for example, six months to one year) may enable the interviewing of more Bengali respondents to identify the impacts of climate change in their migration decision, and conduct qualitative interviews with tribal people. In the case of exploring the conflict situation, extended methods and sample surveys with longer time has enabled to substantiate the research result (Brück, Justino, Verwimp, & Tedesco, 2016; Haer & Becher, 2012). Finance and time constraints were the significant limitations preventing undertaking more surveys and employing other techniques to explore climate change, migration and conflict relationships.

Another critical issue for this thesis is the inability to balance the male and female respondents in the survey and interview processes. Climate change and conflict affect a region, but the experiences of the males and females differ due to their physical, social and economic position. Thus, views of the female respondents may represent different perspectives about migration and conflict. As this study recruited fewer female respondents, this may have limited the findings on the climate change and migration

relationship, as well as the conflict experiences. This study, therefore, suggests conducting further study incorporating more female participants to explore the gender perspectives of climate change impacts, migration decisions and the experiences of conflict and violence in the CHT.

Given the limited studies on climate change, migration and conflict in Bangladesh, this thesis should be considered as a first step. In other countries and regions, various research studies have been conducted which have their own limitations and debates. Chapter Two identified the existing research on climate change, migration and conflict and the limitations in different contexts such as methodology, case selection and application of methods (Ide, 2017; Salehyan, 2012). Another problem for researchers is that the definition of conflict in connection with climate change is flawed and not specific. Using a broad definition of conflict makes it is difficult to draw a straightforward causal connection between conflict and climate change, and this is particularly evident at the local level where multiple factors are always at play. Migration as a linking factor between climate change and conflict offers new ways of understanding the connection, as this case study has endeavoured to show; however more research is needed both in Bangladesh and in other locations, to tease out the different ways in which climate change, migration and conflict connect.

In conclusion, this thesis has been able to demonstrate that there is a link between climatic events, Bengali migration and conflict in the CHT. Previous research has overlooked the issue of Bengali settlement and migration in analysing the CHT conflict, because the conflict is widely perceived as an ethno-political conflict due to the failure of the government and denial of the identity of the tribal people. By challenging the traditional analysis of the CHT conflict, this thesis helps to explain why the conflict has continued even

after the Peace Accord, despite the cessation of government-sponsored migration. In this regard, it claims to contribute an original explanation, further understanding and greater insight into the CHT conflict.

The case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts can serve as a lesson to other countries facing climate change and climate displaced people. This lesson is particularly pertinent in locations where ethnic minority people live, because migration of people from other backgrounds most likely threatens the identity and culture of the ethnic minority people. While the IPCC in its fifth assessment report has pointed out the potential impacts of climate change on identity, culture and ways of life of ethnic minority people around the world (Adger et al., 2014), it has not considered the impacts of migration triggered by climate change on minorities. As this thesis has shown in the case of CHT, when migration flows become larger and migrants outnumber the indigenous population, there can be serious consequences for conflict, peace, security and development.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Information sheet

Md Rafiqul Islam
PhD Candidate
College of Humanities, Arts and Social Science
Flinders University
Adelaide SA 5001
Tel: (08) 8201 3911
Email: isla0025@flinders.edu.com
http://flo.flinders.edu.au/user/profile.php?id=95210

Information Sheet for Interviewee

Participation in this study is entirely voluntary and your decision regarding participating in the study will in no way impact on your life**.**

Project Title:

"Climate Change, Migration and Conflict: A Study of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh"

Researcher:

Md Rafiqul Islam, PhD candidate, College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia.

The Study:

You are invited to participate in a study that examines whether the migration to the CHT has been climate change-induced, and what impact this migration has had on conflict formation in the CHT. The major aims of this project are to:

A) Explore the implication of climate change events in migration decisions of the Bengali people living in the CHT;
B) Examine the processes of Bengali migration to the CHT;

C) Analyse the implication of climate change-induced migration on the conflict in the CHT. More specifically, whether and how climate change-induced migration has impacted on social, economic and political changes in the CHT.

What is involved?

You have been selected to participate in this study based on your knowledge, experience in the area of climate change, migration and conflict issue in the CHT, Bangladesh. If you are interested to take part in this study, you will be asked to take part in a semi-structured interview conducted face-to-face of about 40 minutes in a mutually agreed place.

What benefit will I gain from being involved in this study?

The information and knowledge provided by you will significantly help me in accomplishing the project and thus help me to complete my PhD studies at Flinders University. The project will not benefit you directly but aims to improve policymaking in Bangladesh by proving theoretical understanding and policy recommendations.

Are there any risks if I am involved?

There is no anticipated risk for your involvement in this study. If you have any concerns regarding anticipated or actual risks or discomforts, please feel free to talk to the researcher.

What happens to the information collected from me?

The information will be used to explaining the finding of the PhD project. For this purpose, the principal researcher will keep all information safe and confidential. The principal researcher will not use your name and identity in anywhere. Once the interview has been typed up and saved as a file, the voice file will be destroyed.

Will I receive a copy of the result of the study?

You may access the thesis when is completed and published on the Flinders University website.

What do I do if I would like to participate?

If you are willing to provide me with the interview, please email me with your preferred date, time and place where I can conduct the interview.

Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. I hope that you will accept the invitation to be involved.

[This research project has been approved by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee (Project Number-7226). For more information regarding ethical approval of the project the Executive Officer of the Committee can be contacted by telephone on +61 8 8201-3116 or by fax on +61 8 8201-2035 or email human.researchethics@flinders.edu.au.]

Appendix 2

Consent form for participation in research

Md Rafiqul Islam

Collage of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences

Flinders University

GPO Box 2100
Adelaide SA 5001

Tel: 08 8201 2225 / 8201 2559
Fax: 08 8201 5111
Email: isla0025@flinders.edu.com

CRICOS Provider No. 00114A

CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH

> "Climate Change, Migration and Conflict: A Study of the Chittagong Hill Tracts CHT in Bangladesh".

I …...being over the age of 18 years hereby consent to participate as requested in the interview for the research project on climate change, migration and conflict: a study of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh.

1. I have read the information provided.

2. Details of procedures and any risks have been explained to my satisfaction.

3. I agree to an audio recording of my information and participation.

4. I am aware that I should retain a copy of the Information Sheet and Consent Form for future reference.

5. I understand that:

    *   I may not directly benefit from taking part in this research.

    *   I am free to withdraw from the project at any time and am free to decline to answer particular questions.

    *   While the information gained in this study will be published as explained, I will not be identified, and individual information will remain confidential.

    *   Whether I participate or not, or withdraw after participating, will have no effect on any treatment or service that is being provided to me.

    *   I may ask that the recording be stopped at any time, and that I may withdraw at any time from the session or the research without disadvantage.

6. I agree to the recording being made available to other researchers who are not members of this research team, but who are judged by the research team to be doing related research, on condition that my identity is not revealed.

7. I have had the opportunity to discuss taking part in this research with a family member or friend.

Participant's signature……………………………………Date…………………..

I certify that I have explained the study to the volunteer and consider that she/he understands what is involved and freely consents to participation.

Researcher's name: Md Rafiqul Islam

Researcher's signature ████████████████ **Date: 21/04/16**

NB: Two signed copies should be obtained. The copy retained by the researcher may then be used for authorisation of Items 8 and 9, as appropriate.

8.   I, the participant whose signature appears below, have read a transcript of my participation and agree to its use by the researcher as explained.

Participant's signature……………………………………Date…………………..

9.   I, the participant whose signature appears below, have read the researcher's report and agree to the publication of my information as reported.

Participant's signature……………………………………Date…………………..

Appendix 3

Letter of introduction for Md Rafiqul Islam

Professor Susanne Schech
Centre for Development Studies
College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences
Flinders University
GPO Box 2100
Adelaide SA 5001

Phone: +61 8 82012489

Email: susanne.schech@flinders.edu.com

CRICOS Provider No. 00114A

Date: 6 May 2016

Dear Sir/Madam/Name

This letter is to introduce Md Rafiqul Islam who is a Doctorate student in College of Humanities, Arts and Social at Flinders University. He will produce his student card which carries a photograph as proof of identity.

Rafiqul is undertaking research leading to the production of a thesis or other publications on the subject of Climate Change, Migration and Conflict. The case of the study is the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh.

He will invite you to assist with this project by participating in a questionnaire survey or interview which covers certain aspects of this topic. No more than one hour on a single occasion would be required.

Be assured that any information provided will be treated in the strictest confidence and none of the participants will be individually identifiable in the resulting thesis, report or other publications. You are, of course, entirely free to discontinue your participation at any time or to decline to answer particular questions.

Since he intends to make a tape recording of the interview, he will seek your consent, on the attached form, to audio record the interview, to use the recording or a transcription in preparing the thesis, report or other publications, on condition that your name or identity is not revealed, and to make the recording available to other researchers on the same conditions (or that the recording will not be made available to any other person). Your name or identity will not be revealed in any circumstances and the confidentiality of the material will be respected and maintained.

Any enquiries you may have concerning this project should be directed to me at the address given above or by telephone on +61 8 82012489 or e-mail: susanne.schech@flinders.edu.au

Thank you for your attention and assistance.

Yours sincerely

Professor Susanne Schech

This research project has been approved by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee (Project number- 7226. For more information regarding ethical approval of the project the Executive Officer of the Committee can be contacted by telephone on 8201 3116, by fax on 8201 2035 or by email human.researchethics@flinders.edu.au

Appendix 4

Ethics approval

Dear Rafiqul,

The Chair of the [Social and Behavioral Research Ethics Committee (SBREC)](#) at Flinders University considered your response to conditional approval out of session and your project has now been granted final ethics approval. This means that you now have approval to commence your research. Your ethics final approval notice can be found below.

Additional Note from Chair
The Chair thanks you for such thoughtful responses to the committee's suggestions. We are always learning about research contexts in other countries so the information you provided was very helpful.

F I N A L   A P P R O V A L   N O T I C E

Project No.:	**7226**
Project Title:	Climate Change, Migration and Conflict: A Study of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh
Principal Researcher:	Mr Rafiqul Islam
Email:	▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

Approval Date:	30 May 2016	Ethics Approval Expiry Date:	**2 August 2020**

The above proposed project has been **approved** on the basis of the information contained in the application, its attachments and the information subsequently provided with the addition of the following comment(s):

Kind regards
Andrea

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Appendix 5

Conflict incidents in the CHT (1997-2014)

	Date and location of the conflict	Description
1	Communal conflict at Baghaihat bazar of Baghaichari upazila under Rangamati district (4 April 1999)	This conflict incident among tribal people, Bengali settlers and Bangladesh army was triggered by the rape of a tribal girl. It is reported that 51 Jumma [tribal] people were injured of whom 14 were admitted to Khagrachari Sadar hospital.
2	Babuchara conflict at Babuchara Bazaar of Dighinala thana in Khagrachari Hill district (16 October 1999)	This conflict incident was caused by the sexual assault on a tribal girl. It is reported that Bengali settlers with the help of the army made several attacks on Jumma people. Three Jumma were killed and more than hundred received serious injuries.
3	Boahalkhali-Merung conflict of Dighinala of the Khagrachari District (18 May 2001)	This conflict incident involved Bengali settlers and Jumma people. At least 42 houses were burnt to ashes and 191 houses were looted and damaged; five Jumma women were seriously injured.
4	Ramgarh conflict, Ramgarh municipality in the Khagrachari Hill district (25 June 2001)	This conflict incident began with the abduction of a Bengali by Jumma terrorists. Following the abduction, Bengali settlers under the banner of 'Bangalee Krishak-Shramik Kalyan Parishad' [Bangladesh Farmer and Labour Welfare Committee] attacked local Jumma people burning 26 houses and looting 18 houses. Many tribal people were injured.
5	Rajvila communal conflict, Rajbila union under Bandarban sadar thana in Bandarban Hill district.	The conflict incident was caused by a Bengali settler sexually assaulting a Jumma girl. Jumma people protested and attacked the culprit with fatal consequence. After his death, local Bengali settlers attacked the Jumma people and set fire to several houses. More than 11 houses were burnt and 100 were destroyed.
6	Bhuyachara conflict, Bhuiyachara under Kamalchari union in Khagrachari district (19 April 2003)	A group of Bengali settlers attacked Jumma villagers of Bhuiyachara Mukh Chakma Para. Nine houses were burnt to ashes and 29 houses were looted by the settlers. Twelve Jumma people were severely wounded.
7	Mahalchari conflict, Mahalchari upazila under Khagrachari district (26 August 2003)	This conflict incident involved Bengali settlers and Jumma people. The settlers destroyed 350 households including a temple, school and business centres. Two Jumma people were murdered, 10 women were raped and more than 50 Jumma were injured. 10 Bengali settlers were also injured in the incident.

8	Maischari Conflict, Mahalchari upazila in Khagrachari Hill district (3 April 2006)	This conflict incident between Bengali settlers and Jumma people revolved on land grabbing. At least 2 Jumma girls were raped and 50 Jumma were injured. 11 villagers including the 2 rape victims were admitted to Khagrachari district hospital. About 100 Jumma houses were looted and household goods were destroyed.
9	Sajek conflict Baghaichari upazila (sub-district) in Rangamati district (20 April 2008)	This conflict incident was triggered by the settlement of Bengali people in Sajek by the Bangladesh army. Bengali settlers attacked 7 villages of the Jumma people, burnt at least 76 houses and looted valuables. More than a hundred people were seriously injured.
10	Baghaihat conflict, Baghaihat area of Sajek para under Baghaichari upazila in Rangamati district (19-20 February 2010)	This incident involved Jumma people and Bengali settlers. Around 200 houses of Jumma villagers including a Buddhist temple and a church were burnt to ashes.
11	Khagrchari municipality conflict under Khagrachari district (February 2010)	The conflict incident involved Bengali settlers and Jumma people. More than 60 Jumma homes were burnt, and dozens of indigenous people were injured.
12	Longadu conflict in Rangamati district (February 2011)	This incident of communal conflict between Bengali settlers and Jumma people happened after a Bengali went missing in the area. It is reported that Bengali settlers looted valuable property and raped Jumma women and girls. At least 23 houses of Jumma villagers including one BRAC school and 3 tobacco ovens were a reportedly burnt to ashes in the attack while two Jumma students were seriously injured.
13	Ramgarh and Manikchari conflict, under Khagrachari district (April 2011)	The incident originated between Bengali settlers and Jumma people. Around 111 houses belonging to indigenous Jumma villagers including two Buddhist temples were burnt to ashes. At least 20 Jumma including three women were injured while 4 Bengali settlers died. Many Jummas were reported missing.
14	Baghaichari conflict in Rangamati district (December 2011)	Due to the incident in Khagrachari (15 below), Bengali settlers also attacked Jumma people in Baghaichari upozila. Several houses and property were destroyed.
15	Dighinala Conflict in Khagrachari district (December 2011)	The conflict incident started after Bengali people went missing in the Dighinala Upozila. Bengali settlers attacked the Jumma villages and destroyed their houses. A Jumma woman was killed in Dighinala and at least 10 Jummas were injured in this attack.
16	Rangamati Communal conflict Rangamati district town (September 2012)	The conflict incident started in Rangamati government college between Bengali and tribal students. It turned into a communal conflict between the Bengali settlers and Jumma people in which more than 100

		Jummas and 9 Bengalis were wounded and many Jumma houses and commercial establishments including CHT Regional Council office and rest houses were vandalised.
17	Matiranga-Taindong conflict in Khagrachari district (3 August 2013)	In this incident around 36 houses including 19 houses in Sorbeswar Para, 12 in Baga Para, 2 in Talukdar Para and 3 in Bandarshing Para (Bhagaban Tila) were burnt to ashes. Around 400 houses of Jumma villages including two Buddhist temples, namely, Sorbeswar Para Janashakti Bouddha Bihara and Monudas Para Bouddha Bihara were plundered and vandalised by Bengali settlers. Around 2000 people crossed the border and took shelter on the Indian border.
18	Naniachar conflict, Ramgamati district (2014)	This communal conflict incident started when a tribal girl was killed after being raped by an unidentified person and found in the Muslim area. At least 50 houses and many shops were destroyed by the settlers.

Source: compiled by the researcher based on secondary sources (IWGIA, 2012; Barman, 2013; Choudhury & Hussain, 2017; Levene, 1999; PCJSS Website [n. d]).

Appendix 6

Conflict incidents in the CHT (1977-1993)

Major incidents and date	Location	Description
December 1977 Massacres	Matiranga, Guimara, Manikchari and Lakshmichari in the Northern CHT district	Around 54 people died, and 5000 tribal people were forced to flee across the border to, India.
December 1978	Dumdunya Mouza	The Bangladesh army burnt 22 villages in the area resulting in extensive displacement of tribal inhabitants.
Kaukhali-Kalampati conflict (25 March 1980)	Kaukhali upozila, Rangamati district	Jumma [tribal] people, Bangladesh army and Bengali settlers were involved in this conflict which caused 300 Jumma deaths and large-scale vandalism.
Banraibari-Beltali-Belchari conflict (26 June 1981)	Khagrachari district	Conflict incident between Bengali settlers and Jumma people, army intervened. Reports that hundreds of people were killed and many more were injured.
October 1981	Tabalchari, Tailafangpara and Baranal	Insurgent group Shanti Bahani attacked three villages and killed 18 settlers, setting houses on fire and destroying a ferry boat
Telafang-Ashalong-Tabalchari conflict (19 September 1981)	Matiranga upozila, Khagrachari district	Bangladesh army and Jumma people ignited this conflict incident but Bengali settlers were also involved. More than 100 people were killed and serious damage was reported to property and houses.
Golakpatimachara-Mychyachara	Khagrachari district	The Bangladesh army and Bengali settlers launched a month-long battle with the Jumma people that caused 800 deaths and uncountable loss of property and houses.

Tarabanchari Conflict (June-August 1983)		
Bhusanchara conflict (13 May 1984)	Khagrachari district	The conflict incident originated between Bengali settlers and Jumma people and the Bangladesh army got involved. At least 400 people were killed and many Jumma women were raped.
June 1984	CHT (unspecified)	Insurgent group Shanti Bahani attacked two Bengali settlements and killed 80 settlers, leaving 800 people wounded and setting many houses on fire.
Hirarchar, Sarbotali and Khagrachari, Panlakhali conflict August (1988)	Khagrachari district	Bengali settlers, Bangladesh army and Jumma people were involved in this conflict incident. It is reported that a hundred people were killed and many Jumma people were displaced.
Language conflict (4 May 1989)	Rangamati district	The conflict incident started between the Bengali settlers and Jumma people. At least 40 people were reported killed, with property damage.
Malya conflict (2 February 1992)	Rangamati district	The conflict incident started between Bengali settlers and Jumma people. At least 30 people were killed.
Logang massacre (10 April 1992)	Rangamati district	The conflict incident involved Bengalis settlers and Jumma people which resulted in at least 400 people dead.
Naniachar conflict (17 November 1993)	Rangamati district	The conflict incident involved Bengali settlers and Jumma people and at least 100 people were killed.

This list of conflict has been compiled using various secondary sources (IWGIA, 2001, 2012; PCJSS website (n. d.); Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, 1991, 2000; Levene, 1999).

Appendix 7

Religion based population ratio (2011) in conflict areas proposed in Appendix 5

Location of the Conflict	Name of the conflict	Population Ratio	
		Total Population	2011
Rangamati	Baghaihat violence (April 1999); Baghaihat conflict (February 2010)	Muslim	1962
		Buddhist	12933
Rangamati	Langadu conflict (February 2011)	Muslim	59511
		Buddhist	20708
Rangamati	Sajek conflict (April 2008)	Muslim	2026
		Buddhist	20429
Rangamati	Rangamati Sadar conflict, (September 2012)	Muslim	48583
		Buddhist	61932
Khagrachari	Babuchara incident, Dighinala Upozila (October 1999)	Muslim	28475
		Buddhist	53443
Khagrachari	Boalkhali-Merung incident (May 2001)	Muslim	6214
		Buddhist	9121
Khagrachari	Ramgarh conflict (June 2001)	Muslim	41316
		Buddhist	18630
Khagrachari	Bhowachhari conflict (April 2003)	Muslim	2675
		Buddhist	2591
Khagrachari	Baghaichari conflict (February 2010)	Muslim	22008
		Buddhist	67796
Khagrachari	Mahalchari conflict (August 2003)	Muslim	13662

		Buddhist	31465
Khagrachari	Maischari violence (April 2006)	Muslim	4939
		Buddhist	5179
Khagrachari	Taingdong incident, Matiranga Upozila (August 2013)	Muslim	11017
		Buddhist	1887
Bandarban	Rajvila conflict (October 2002)	Muslim	995
		Buddhist	4017

(Source: Developed by the researcher based on PCJSS conflict list (n. d.) and Bangladesh Population and Household Survey, 2011).

(Note: The religion based population ratio is presented to illustrate that Bengali and tribal people are living side by side in the conflict locations).

Appendix 8
Introduction to the key informants

Interviews were conducted between November 2016 and February 2017 (N=10).

Respondent	Gender	Profession	Expertise
Key informant 1	M	chief executive of a research and development institute	Background in sociology, researches on climate change adaptation and mitigation issues
Key informant 2	M	university professor	Expert in minority rights, social movements
Key informant 3	F	university professor	CHT expert and think tank
Key informant 4	F	development NGO worker	Development worker in the CHT
Key informant 5	M	indigenous political leader	Expert in the CHT issues
Key informant 6	M	director of an NGO	Expert in the migration, legal issues and CHT conflict
Key informant 7	M	president of national NGO	Experience in the fields of the minority, CHT and environment issues
Key informant 8	M	senior research fellow at a national research institute	Expert in environment and climate change-induced security issue
Key informant 9	F	university professor and director a local research organisation	Expert in the field of climate change, migration and adaptation issue.
Key informant 10	F	chairperson of a research organisation	Expert in minority, CHT, women rights and migration issues

Appendix 9
Introduction to the climate migrant informants

Interviews were conducted between November 2016 and February 2017 (N-10).

Respondent	Gender	Background
Climate migrant 1	M	A 45-year-old who migrated from Bhola district due to floods and sea-water intrusion and now runs a small business selling betel leafs and cigarettes in Naikonchari in Khagrachari district.
Climate migrant 2	F	A 55-year-old who migrated from Khulna district due to floods and now lives in Khagrachari Sadar in Khagrachari district
Climate migrant 3	M	A man of about 50 years of age who migrated from the Chittagong district due to floods and cyclones and now living in the Bengali Para in Khagrachari district
Climate migrant 4	M	A 50-year-old who migrated from Barishal district due to coastal erosion and now lives in Longudu
Climate migrant 5	F	A 50-year-old who migrated from Faridpur district due to riverbank erosion and now lives in Khagrachari
Climate migrant 6	M	A 45-year- old who migrated from Chittagong due to floods and now lives in Khagrachari Sadar
Climate migrant 7	M	A 50year-old who migrated from Bagerhat district due to floods and coastal erosion and now lives in Bandarban district
Climate migrant 8	M	A 55-year-old who helped many people from Barishal district, where he also came from. Now he is the leader of his neighbourhood (*para*) in Bandarban district.
Climate migrant 9	M	A 45-year-old who migrated from the Sylhet district due to floods and now lives in Rangamati district
Climate migrant 10	M	A 25-year-old who migrated from Chandpur district and now runs a business in the CHT. He leads a local chapter of the Bengali Student Association.

Appendix 10
Survey questions for the Bengali respondents

<u>Screening question</u>

1. The following questions are about your status.

	Yes	No
1. Did you migrate to the CHT?	☐ *Continue with Q 2.*	☐
2. Is your father a migrant to the CHT?	☐	☐
3. Is your mother a migrant to the CHT?	☐	☐

2. Can you please tell me at what age you came to the CHT?

…………………………………………………………….

Instruction to the interviewer: If the respondent was less than 18 years old when migrating, go to Section 2

Section-1:

This section is designed to measure climate change-induced migration status among the Bengali people living in the CHT

3. Why did you decide to migrate from your place of origin?
Instruction to interviewer: Read out each option one by one and record the response

Reasons for migrating	Yes	No
1. Lack of livelihood	☐	☐
2. Environmental causes (e.g. flood, cyclone)	☐	☐
3. Lack of house	☐	☐
4. Political problem	☐	☐
5. To earn more income	☐	☐

4. What was your source of income in your place of origin?
 Instruction to interviewer: Record responses, including multiple answers

1. Farmer	☐
2. Day labourer	☐
3. Fishing	☐
4. Business	☐
5. Government job	☐
6. Rickshaw/van pulling	☐
7. Others……………	☐

5. Now I am going to ask about some environmental issues in your place of origin before you migrated.
Please tell me which of the following events you faced, by answering yes or no.

Instruction to Interviewer: Read out each impact and record response. If respondent answers yes to any, ask the respondent how many times they faced the event

Environmental issues	Yes	No	How many times
1. Affected by floods	☐	☐	☐
2. Affected by Drought	☐	☐	☐
3. Affected by the sea-level rise	☐	☐	☐
4. Affected by the river-bank erosion	☐	☐	☐
5. Affected by cyclone and tidal surge	☐	☐	☐
6. Affected by the waterlogging	☐	☐	☐

6. Can you please tell me which of the following impacts you have suffered as a result of these environmental issues? Please answer yes or no.
Instruction to Interviewer: Read out each impact and record response. If the respondent answers yes to any, ask the respondent how many times they faced the event.

Incidents	Yes	No	How many times
1. Your house was damaged	☐	☐	☐
2. Your crops were damaged	☐	☐	☐
3. you lost all of your lands	☐	☐	☐
4. You or family members were injured or sick	☐	☐	☐
5. A family member lost their life	☐	☐	☐
6. lost your livestock (e.g. cattle, poultry)	☐	☐	☐
7. Your fruit trees and garden were destroyed	☐	☐	☐
9. Your water sources were destroyed (Tubewell, Shallow machine)	☐	☐	☐
9. Roads and bridges in your area were destroyed	☐	☐	☐

7. Think back to the last few environmental disasters you faced in your original place of residence. Did you receive the following support from the government (local or central)? If so, how often?
Instruction to Interviewer: Read out each option and record response.

Response options	Always	Sometimes	Rarely	Not at all
1. Government provided food	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Government provided shelter	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Government provided land	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. Government provided seeds	☐	☐	☐	☐

5. The government encouraged me to leave the place	☐	☐	☐	☐

8. Think back to the last environmental disasters you faced in your original place of residence. Did you receive any of the following support from your neighbours?

Type of support	Yes	No
1. Neighbours helped with food	☐	☐
2. Neighbours offered shelter	☐	☐
3. Neighbours offered land for cultivation	☐	☐
4. Neighbours provided seeds	☐	☐
5. Neighbours encouraged me to leave the place	☐	☐

9. Now I am asking you about some other social issues of your place of origin. Please tell me whether you have experienced any of the following before you migrated to the CHT.
Instruction to Interviewer: Read out each impact and record response.

Incidents	Yes	No
1. Not enough income	☐	☐
2. No land to cultivate	☐	☐
3. Debt (could not repay the loan)	☐	☐
4. Extortion	☐	☐
5. Physical violence	☐	☐
6. Threats against you and your family	☐	☐
7. Other (specify)	☐	☐

10. Considering your life in your place of origin, how satisfied were you as a whole on a scale from 1 to 10? Where 1 means you are "completely dissatisfied" and 10 means you are "completely satisfied".

Completely dissatisfied- 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Completely satisfied 10
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

11. Now I am asking about your move to the CHT. Can you please tell what motivated you to migrate to the CHT? *Instruction to Interviewer: Record responses, including multiple answers*

1. Resources in the CHT	☐
2. The government encouraged settling in the CHT	☐
3. Relatives in the CHT	☐
4. Business opportunities in the CHT	☐
5. Others, please specify …………	☐

12. How did you come to the CHT? *Instruction to Interviewer: Record only one main response*

1. By yourself	☐
2. With the help of the government	☐
3. With the help of the Bangladesh Army	☐
4. With family connection	☐
5. Others, (specify……	☐

Section 2: Your life in the CHT

13. Currently, what is your main source of income? *Instruction to the interviewer: Record only one response*

1. Farmer	☐
2. Day labour	☐
3. Fishing	☐
4. Government job	☐
5. Business	☐
6. Rickshaw/van pulling	☐
7. Collecting forest resources	☐
8. Others (please specify)	☐

14. Now I will read a few statements about the CHT. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the statement. *Instruction to the interviewer: read out each statement and record the response*

Statement	Agree	Disagree
1. There is enough land in the CHT	☐	☐
2. There are enough forest resources	☐	☐
3. Enough income opportunity	☐	☐
4. Life here is peaceful and secure	☐	☐
5. A good relationship between Bengali and Tribal people	☐	☐
6. There is discrimination in access to opportunities and services	☐	☐
7. Jobs and incomes are inadequate.	☐	☐
8. There is land grabbing by the powerful elite	☐	☐
9. Communal violence and insecurity is a big problem	☐	☐
10. More people are coming to live in the CHT.	☐	☐

15. Now I am going to read some statements about community relationships in the CHT. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the statement. *Instruction to the interviewer: read out each statement and record the response*

Statement	Agree	Disagree
1. You prefer to have Bengali as my neighbour	☐	☐

2. You prefer to have Tribal as my neighbour	☐	☐
3. You don't prefer to have Bengali as my neighbour	☐	☐
4. You don't prefer to have Tribal as my neighbour	☐	☐
5. You only trust Bengali people	☐	☐
6. You only trust Tribal people	☐	☐
7. You have a close relationship with people with different religion	☐	☐

16. Can you please tell me how much you are worried about the following situations? *Instruction to the interviewer: read out each statement and record the response.*

	Very much	Not much	Sometimes	Not at all
1. Losing a job or not finding a job	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Not being able to give my children a good education	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. People taking away my land	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. Being attacked and injured by people of different communities	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. The government is not protecting us.	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. Your house/property being attacked	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. You and your family members being abducted	☐	☐	☐	☐
8. Being verbally abused or intimidated	☐	☐	☐	☐

17. Considering your life in the CHT, how satisfied are you as a whole on a scale from 1 to 10, Where 1 means you are "completely dissatisfied" and 10 means you are "completely satisfied".

Completely dissatisfied 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Completely satisfied 10
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Section-3: Measuring Conflict Situation in the CHT

18. To what extent do you think that your life is peaceful?

1. Always peaceful	☐
2. Most of the time peaceful	☐
3. Neutral	☐
4. Most of the time conflicting	☐
5. Always conflicting	☐
6. No answer	☐

19. How often do you feel fear about living here?

1. Everyday	☐

2. At least once a week	☐
3. Once a month	☐
4. Sometimes	☐
5. Rarely	☐
6. Never	☐

20. Now I am going to read some statements about community relations in the CHT. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the statement.

Statement	Agree	Disagree	No response
Bengali settlers are involved in a conflict with Tribal people	☐	☐	☐
Bengali settlers are involved in a conflict with other Bengali people	☐	☐	☐
Tribal people are involved in a conflict with Tribal people	☐	☐	☐
Tribal people are involved in a conflict with Bangladesh Army	☐	☐	☐
Presence of Bengali settlers in the CHT is the main cause of conflict	☐	☐	☐
Presence of the military is the major cause of conflict in the CHT	☐	☐	☐
Presence of United People's Democratic Front (UPDF) is the major cause of conflict in the CHT	☐	☐	☐
Presence of PCJSS is the major cause of conflict in the CHT	☐	☐	☐
Poverty is the main cause of conflict	☐	☐	☐
Land grabbing is the main cause of conflict	☐	☐	☐

21. How often have you been experienced violence in the CHT in the last five years?

1. Everyday	☐
2. Frequently	☐
3. Every month	☐
4. Rarely	☐
5. Not at all	☐

22. Have you faced the following incidents in the last 5 years? Please tell me 'Yes' or 'No'

Statements	YES	No
1. A family member has been killed	☐	☐
2. You have been attacked	☐	☐
3. A male family member has been attacked	☐	☐
4. A female family member has been attacked	☐	☐
5. Your house has been damaged	☐	☐
6. Your property has been destroyed	☐	☐

7. Your land has been taken over (grabbed) by other people	☐	☐
8. People demanded extortion from you	☐	☐
9. You yourself have been involved in committing violence	☐	☐

23. Can you please tell me how have you responded to the incident you faced in the last five years?
Interviewer to write down response

………

24. What suggestion would you like to propose for establishing peace in the CHT?

Interviewer to write down response
………

Section 4: Demographic Information

We are almost at the end of the questionnaire. There are just a few more demographic questions
25. *Interviewer to record respondent's sex by observation*

1. Male	☐
2. Female	☐

26. What is your religion?

1. Islam	☐
2. Buddist	☐
3. Christian	☐
4. Hindu	☐
5. Bahaism	☐
6. Others, specify……	☐
7. Don't like to answer	☐

27. Which ethnic group do you belong to, first and foremost?

1. Bengali	☐
2. Chakma	☐
3. Marma	☐
4. Tripura	☐
5. Thanchanga	☐
6. Brwn	☐
7. Others, specify…..	☐

28. What is your age?...

29. What is your highest level of education?

No education	☐
No Formal education	☐
Primary pass	☐
High school pass	☐
College Pass	☐
University pass	☐

30. What is your current employment status? (That is, are you currently employed, unemployed or self-employed?)

Unemployed	☐
Self-employed	☐
Government employee	☐
Business	☐
Day labourer	☐
Others (specify)	☐

Thank you very much for your time. You have been very helpful. If you have any question or any concern about your participation

Appendix 11

Survey questions for the tribal respondents

Section-1-: Your life in the CHT

1. Currently, what is your main source of income?

1. Farmer	☐
2. Day labour	☐
3. Fishing	☐
4. Government job	☐
5. Business	☐
6. Rickshaw/van pulling	☐
7. Collecting forest resources	☐
8. Other (please specify)	☐

2. Now I will read a few statements about life in the CHT. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the statement.
   Instruction to the interviewer: read out each statement and record the response.

	Agree	Disagree
1. There is enough land in the CHT	☐	☐
2. There are enough forest resources	☐	☐
3. There is enough income opportunity	☐	☐
4. Life here is peaceful and secure	☐	☐
5. There is a good relationship between Bengali and Tribal people	☐	☐
6. There is discrimination in access to opportunities and services	☐	☐
7. Job and income opportunities are inadequate	☐	☐
8. There is land grabbing by the powerful elite.	☐	☐
9. Communal violence and insecurity is a big problem.	☐	☐
10. More people are coming to live in the CHT.	☐	☐

3. Now I am going to read some statements about community relationships in the CHT. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the statement.
   Instruction to the interviewer: read out each statement and record the response

Statement	Agree	Disagree

1. You prefer to have Bengali people as your neighbour	☐	☐
2. You prefer to have Tribal people as your neighbour	☐	☐
3. You avoid having Bengali people as your neighbour	☐	☐
4. You avoid having Tribal people as your neighbour	☐	☐
5. You trust Bengali people	☐	☐
6. You trust Tribal people	☐	☐
7. You have close relationships with people from different religious backgrounds	☐	☐

4. Can you please tell me how much you are worried about the following situations?
   Instruction to the interviewer: read out each statement and record the response.

	Very much		Not much	Sometimes	Not at all
1. Losing a job or not finding a job	☐		☐	☐	☐
2. Not being able to give my children a good education	☐		☐	☐	☐
3. People taking away my land	☐		☐	☐	☐
4. Being attacked and injured by people of different communities	☐		☐	☐	☐
5. The government is not protecting us.	☐		☐	☐	☐
6. My house/property being attacked	☐		☐	☐	☐
7. I and my family members being abducted	☐		☐	☐	☐

5. Considering your life in the CHT, how satisfied are you as a whole on a scale from 1 to 10? Where 1 means you are "completely dissatisfied" and 10 means you are "completely satisfied".

Completely dissatisfied 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Completely satisfied 10
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	

Section-2: About the Conflict Situation in the CHT.

6. To what extent do you think that your life is peaceful?

1. Always peaceful	☐
2. Most of the time peaceful	☐
3. Neutral	☐
4. Most of the time conflicting	☐
5. Always conflicting	☐
6. No answer	☐

7. How often do you feel fear about living here?

1. Everyday	☐
2. At least once a week	☐
3. Once a month	☐
4. Sometimes	☐
5. Rarely	☐
6. Never	☐

8. Now I am going to read some statements about community relations in the CHT. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the statement.

Statements	Agree	Disagree	No response
Bengali people are involved in a conflict with Tribal people	☐	☐	☐
Bengali settlers are involved in a conflict with other Bengali people	☐	☐	☐
Tribal people are involved in a conflict with Tribal people	☐	☐	☐
Tribal people are involved in a conflict with Bangladesh Army	☐	☐	☐
Presence of Bengali settlers in the CHT is the main cause of conflict	☐	☐	☐
Presence of the military is the major cause of conflict in the CHT	☐	☐	☐
Presence of United People's Democratic Front (UPDF) is the major cause of conflict in the CHT	☐	☐	☐
Presence of PCJSS is the major cause of conflict in the CHT	☐	☐	☐
Presence of PCJSS is the major cause of conflict in the CHT	☐	☐	☐
Poverty is the main cause of conflict	☐	☐	☐
Land grabbing is the main cause of conflict	☐	☐	☐

9. How often have you experienced violence in the CHT in the last five years?

Everyday	☐

Frequently	☐
Every month	☐
Rarely	☐
Not at all	☐

10. Have you faced the following incidents in the last 5 years? I will read each statement out and please tell me 'Yes' or 'No'

Statements	Yes	No
A family member has been killed	☐	☐
You have been attacked	☐	☐
A male family member has been attacked	☐	☐
A female family member has been attacked	☐	☐
Your house has been damaged	☐	☐
Your property has been destroyed	☐	☐
Your land has been taken over (grabbed) by other people	☐	☐
People demanded extortion from you	☐	☐
You yourself have been involved in committing violence	☐	☐

11. In your view, what is the most important factor in the conflict and violence in the CHT?
Interviewer to write down response

………..

12. What suggestion would you like to propose for establishing peace in the CHT?

Interviewer to write down response …………………………………………………………………………………

Section 3: Demographic Information
We are almost at the end of the questionnaire. There are just a few more demographic questions

13. Interviewer to record respondent's sex by observation

Male	☐

Female	☐

14. What is your religion?

Islam	☐
Buddhist	☐
Christian	☐
Hindu	☐
Bahaysm	☐
Others, specify…………………..	☐
Don't like to answer	☐

15. Which ethnic group do you belong to, first and foremost?

Bengali	☐
Chakma	☐
Marma	☐
Tripura	☐
Thanchanga	☐
Brwn	☐
Others, please specify……	☐

16. What is your age?……………………………

17. What is your highest level of education?

No education	☐
No Formal education	☐
Primary pass	☐
High school pass	☐
College Pass	☐
University pass	☐

18. What is your current employment status? (that is, are you currently employed, unemployed or Self-employed?)

Unemployed	☐

Self-employed	☐
Government employee	☐
Business	☐
Day labourer	☐
Others (specify)	☐

Thank you very much for your time. You have been very helpful.

 If you have any question or any concern about your participation at any time, please contact me on the Email/number provided on the information sheet.

Appendix 12

Interview question for climate migrants in the CHT.

Section-1: Environment setting questions

1. How long have you been living in the CHT?

2. What are you doing nowadays in the CHT?

3. How do you feel living in the CHT?

Section-2: Climate change effects and settlement decision

4. During the questionnaire survey, you mentioned that you have been affected by the climate change effects in your place of origin. Can you please tell me what happened there?

   A) How many times were you affected by climate change events in your place of origin?

   B) How did you respond to each climate change event?

   C) In your place of origin, what did people normally do after the climate change events?

5. What happened to your property and land as a result of climate change events?

6. What other impacts or costs did you have as a result of climate change events?

7. Did you receive any government assistance to help you after climate change events?

8. What types of financial, and social support did you receive either from the local elected bodies?

9. What type of support did you receive from community people after climate change events?

10. Can you please tell me why you decided to migrate to the CHT?

    A) Who and what organizations encouraged you to migrate to the CHT?

    B) Who helped you settle in the CHT?

    C) How many people came with you?

    D) Can you please tell me how many people have migrated due to climate change in the word/para/Union where you live?

11. In your opinion, for what reasons have people settled in the CHT? (PROMPTS: Is it for easy access to land, resources and employment opportunity, or peaceful life, or family connections in the CHT?)

12. In your own view, how easy is it for people to settle in the new environment of the CHT?

13. Are there institutions, organizations, policies assisting them in the settlement processes?

14. How are settlers received by the local people in the CHT, especially by the Tribal people?

Section-3: Climate change, Migration and Conflict

15. After the settlement what problems did you face by in the CHT and how did you cope with the new environment?

16. How have you been able to access land in the CHT?

17. Did this create any problems with the Tribal people?

18. Was there anyone who assisted you to build your house and cultivate land?

19. Did you receive any support from the local people? PROMPT: if so, from whom?)

20. In your opinion, how have the social and political relations in the CHT changed since your settlement in the CHT?

    A) Are Tribal people or Bengali settlers leaving or declining in number?

    B) Are Tribal people or Bengali settlers increasing in number?

    C) Has CHT become more or less peaceful since you settled here?

21. If you think it is less peaceful, why do you think this is so?

Section-4: Climate Change, Conflict and Peace-building

22. Since 1997 a peace treaty has been signed between the government and Tribal people. In your opinion, has climate change affected migrated people helped or hindered peace-building efforts in the CHT?

23. In your opinion, what measures should be taken soon to eliminate conflict and build peace in the CHT?

24. In your opinion, what measures should be taken to help climate change affected people in Bangladesh?

25. Is there anything else you would like to say about the overall condition of you in the CHT and improving the situation in future?

Thank you very much

Appendix 13

Interview questions for key informants

<u>Section-1: Environment setting questions</u>

1. In what area are you currently working/ researching?

2. What do you think about the environmental change of Bangladesh?

3. What is the current situation of conflict and peace in the CHT?

<u>Section-1: Climate change and its effects</u>

4. In your opinion, how is Bangladesh affected by climate change?

5. Where in the country are people most affected directly by climate change?

6. Why do you think that these parts of the country are affected more than other parts?

7. What are the main impacts of climate change on people in Bangladesh?

8. What do people generally do when they are affected by a climate change event?

9. What type of social and political support do people get after extreme events?

<u>Section-2: Climate change and settlement in the CHT</u>

10. In your opinion, where are climate change affected people going?

11. Bangladesh Government in different time has rehabilitated coastal and rural people in the CHT. To what extent, in your view, have climate displaced people been settled in the CHT?

    A) Have you met migrants in the CHT who have been displaced from their homes, in recent times or in the past?

    B) What stories do they tell of their displacement experience?

    C) How do climate affected people migrate to the CHT? Are they settled by the government or moved by themselves?

12. In your opinion for what reasons do [climate affected] people settle in the CHT? Is it for easy access to land, resources, employment opportunity or peaceful life?

13. To your knowledge, what percentage of people has been migrated to the CHT that you would say is due to climate change?

14. In your view, how have these displaced people been able to settle in their new environment in the CHT?

    A) Are there institutions, organizations, policies assisting them in the settlement processes?

    B) How are they received by the local people in the CHT?

    C) In your opinion what impacts climate change induced migrants are creating in the CHT?

Section-3: Climate change, Migration and Conflict

15. A long-standing conflict has been continuing in the CHT. In your view, what role the settlers played to originate and escalate the conflict in the CHT?

16. What do you think about the implication of population growth and resource scarcity in conflict formation in the CHT?

17. How has the social and political situation been changed after the settlement of Bengali people in the CHT?

18. In your opinion, how are the culture and identity of the Tribal people in the CHT being reshaping day by day in the CHT?

19. In your view, is there any connection between the current political and social unrest in the CHT and the ongoing migration of Bengali people in the CHT? If so, what connection?

Climate Change, Conflict and Peace-building

20. Since 1997 a peace treaty has been signed between the government and Tribal people. In your opinion, has climate change induced migration helped or hindered peace-building efforts in the CHT?

21. How will you evaluate the migration policy of the government in special reference to the CHT?

22. What role the central and local government had in this peace-building process?

23. What measures should be taken to address the problem of climate change-induced migration and conflict in the CHT?

24. What measures do you suggest building sustainable peace in the CHT?

Thank you very much

Appendix 14

Publication and conference presentations

1. Islam, Md Rafiqul, 2018, "Field research in the conflict zone: An empirical study of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh". Working Paper. Published by Research in Difficult Settings, Colgate University, USA. Available at: http://conflictfieldresearch.colgate.edu/working-papers/researchedresearcher-relationships/.

2. Islam, Md Rafiqul, 2017, "The role of the mediating factors in Bengali migration and settlement in the CHT in Bangladesh", paper presented at the College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences HDR Conference, Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia, 9 October 2017.

3. Islam, Md Rafiqul, 2018, "Climate change-induced migration and conflict relationship: A study of the CHT in Bangladesh", paper presented at the 10th International Conference on Climate change: Impacts and responses, University of California, Berkeley, USA, 20-21 April 2018.

4. Islam, Md Rafiqul, 2018, "Bengali migration and marginalization of the tribal people in the CHT in Bangladesh", paper presented at the International Conference on Globalization and Migration, University Otago, New Zealand, 12-14 February 2018.

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