The Historical Development of Irish Euroscepticism to 2001

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Glossary

CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CMDC	Common Market Defence Campaign
CPI	Communist Party of Ireland
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPO	General Post Office
ICTU	Irish Congress of Trade Unions
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ITGWU	Irish Transport and General Workers' Union
IWL	Irish Workers League
IWP	Irish Workers' Party
JCPC	Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NICRA	Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
PANA	Peace and Neutrality Alliance
RTÉ	Raidió Teilifís Éireann
TD	Teachta Dála
UCL	University College London
UK	United Kingdom

Abstract

Why is it that the start of Irish euroscepticism is considered to be in 2001 with the defeat of the first Treaty of Nice? Is it possible a longer history of anti-European thought existed in Ireland? When did it actually begin? Has it changed in any way? Who represented a sceptical point of view towards Europe prior to 2001? The answers to these questions revise a historical discourse that has largely failed to account for what transpired in the past within Ireland. The political process of Ireland's willing and committed integration into the European Economic Community (EEC) makes fundamental sense in the context of supranationalism. But who has documented this one-sided historical narrative? And to what purpose? The aim of this study is to analyse critically a range of primary source materials to demonstrate and account for the existence of euroscepticism in Ireland prior to 2001 and to trace its historical development to that point. The research will show that antecedents to Irish euroscepticism which manifested powerfully in 2001 can be found and ascertained, even if they are not generally acknowledged in studies of Irish politics. These anti-Europe developments are not just a contemporary phenomenon (although more widespread in 2001); rather, they can be traced along chronological lines to reveal a deeper historical source. The first historical period revealing antecedents of euroscepticism can be located in the process of decolonisation of Ireland from Britain at the turn of the 19th century. The second source of Irish anti-European feeling revolves around the Treaty of Rome debate and the failed applications for membership in 1961 and 1967. The third basis is situated in the EEC referendum debate and the lead up to the 1972 vote on membership. After successfully joining the EEC in 1973, anti-European sentiment again emerged, and can be clearly identified at the time of the *Single European Act 1987*, in the lead up to the Maastricht Treaty (1992), and finally, in time for the Amsterdam Treaty (1999), where a 'softer' approach to this resentment can finally be accounted for. An understanding of the history of Irish euroscepticism helps to explain its contemporary manifestations.

Keywords:

Ireland, Europe, Euroscepticism

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

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I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Chapter 1
Introduction

The Economist, with its own tradition of euroscepticism, revealed in 2011 that "Ireland is about to adopt the euroscepticism of its larger neighbour, Britain, but is bound to become more pragmatic".[1] *The Economist* also asked, "what is so unappealing about the modern-day European Union that even the Irish are turning Eurosceptical?"[2] The question was not addressed, but the implications were clear; it was a contemporary development with no historical basis. Brigid Laffin suggested that with the increasing penetration of British newspapers and television stations in Ireland the Irish had potentially been infected with the virus of euroscepticism.[3] While the United Kingdom (UK) does have higher levels of euroscepticism than elsewhere, this explanation is insufficient and limited in accounting for what had taken place.

The context for this supposed new euroscepticism began in June 2001, when Ireland voted 'no' to the Treaty of Nice; the reaction in many quarters was as if "a good pupil had suddenly misbehaved".[4] A number of academics identify and point to June 2001 as the catalyst for the emergence of euroscepticism in Ireland, heightened by the notion implied by *The Economist*. Similarly, Karin Gilland in her study of Irish euroscepticism contended that the Irish Republic had a long consensus of pro-European support and had only recently shown signs of fraying at the edges.[5] Jane O'Mahony agreed with Gilland and found that, until Nice 1, Irish governments and other pro-European campaigners were convincingly able to point to the benefits EU membership had brought, both in terms of direct financial transfers and in increased opportunities for Irish industry and workers.[6] Mads Qvortrup reinforced the message in his work, stating that until the Nice Treaty the Irish had traditionally been among the most enthusiastic

[1] *The Economist*, 'After the Race, Ireland's Crash', US, 19 Feb 2011, Expanded Academic ASAP, 2011.
[2] *The Economist*, 'Charlemagne: Those Ungrateful Irish', 17 October 2002, available: http://www.economist.com/node/1390007.
[3] Brigid Laffin, cited in *The Economist,* 'Charlemagne: Those Ungrateful Irish'.
[4] Michael Holmes (ed.), 'Irish Approaches to European Integration', in *Ireland and the European Union*, Manchester, 2005, 1.
[5] Karin Gilland, mentioned in Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering (eds), 'Introduction: Euroscepticism and the Evolution of European Political Debate', in *Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration*, New York, 2004, 15.
[6] Jane O'Mahony, 'Ireland's EU Referendum Experience', *Irish Political Studies,* vol 24, no 2, 2009, 435.

supporters of European integration.[7] In short, the very existence of euroscepticism before 2001 was often ignored or disregarded by scholars and commentators.

This thesis aims to challenge the prevailing view that euroscepticism did not exist in Ireland before 2001. It will become evident that there is a prehistory to the Irish euroscepticism of 2001, one which scholars have largely failed to acknowledge in their studies on the subject. Not just a contemporary phenomenon, anti-European sentiment can be traced along chronological lines prior to 2001 by adopting a historical approach in looking at the origins and development of euroscepticism in Ireland. First, antecedents of Ireland's euroscepticism can be identified in the Irish fight for independence starting in 1886 with the First Home Rule Bill attempted by the then British prime minister, William Ewart Gladstone. Second, the Treaty of Rome debate and the failed applications for membership in 1961 and 1967 sparked another wave. Third, the European Economic Community (EEC) referendum debate and the lead up to the 1972 vote on membership provide further evidence of euroscepticism. After successfully joining the EEC in 1973, anti-European sentiment again emerged, first, at the time of the *Single European Act 1987*, then in the lead up to the Maastricht Treaty (1992), and finally at the time of the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). To trace the history of Irish scepticism prior to 2001, as this thesis undertakes, not only provides the phenomenon with a hitherto absent historical dimension, it also helps to explain why it became prominent in 2001, what forms it took, and what elements of Irish politics and society promoted it.

Definitions

It is vital to address how euroscepticism is defined before delving deeper. Eurosceptics generally indicate a different view concerning European integration from the enthusiasts who believe in an increasingly federal European Union.[8] In very basic terms euroscepticism has become the general term for opposition towards the process of European integration.[9] In even simpler terms the 'euro' in 'eurosceptic' refers to the EU itself, while 'sceptic' is interpreted as "an attitude of doubt or a disposition of

[7] Mads Qvortrup, "Not so Nice: The Irish Referendum on EU Enlargement", 2002, available: http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/I&R%20Research%20and%20History/I&R%20Studies/Qvortrup%20-%20Ireland's%20Nice%20Referendum.pdf, 1.
[8] Ronald Tiersky (ed.), 'Introduction: Euro-skepticism and Europe', in *Euro-skepticism: A Reader*, Maryland, 2001, 1.
[9] Krisztina Arato and Petr Kaniok (eds), 'Introduction', in *Euroscepticism and European Integration*, Zagreb, 2009, 7.

disbelief".[10] Paul Taggart, after conducting 10 years of research into euroscepticism, provides the most convincing definition of euroscepticism as an appropriate starting point. Taggart's initial observation was that it was used as a term that "expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration".[11] For Christopher Flood, euroscepticism "carries the meaning of doubt and distrust on the subject of European Integration".[12] He goes on to say that the degree of distrust can range from the moderate position that "European integration has gone as far as it should go" to extreme "outright rejection of membership in the EU".[13] Therefore, Flood attempts to eliminate the vagueness and ambiguity of the term as described by Taggart.Glyn Morgan notes that "Euroscepticism comes in a variety of different forms, but principled Euroscepticism, which is opposed to the very idea of European political integration, draws its support and much of its strength from nationalism".[14] Further complicating matters, Krisztina Arato and Petr Kaniok argue that euroscepticism differs from country to country.[15] Clearly, a problem exists in terms of conceptualising the term itself. Catharian Sørenson identifies three components in trying to define euroscepticism; 'euro', 'sceptic', and 'ism'[16], while Arato and Kaniok note that each of these three components is a problematic term on its own and combining them all into one definition is a very ambitious task.[17]

In the past euroscepticism has sometimes been solely associated with those denoting opposition to the entire EU project.[18] As Robert Katz points out though, it must also include:

> those who merely want to make haste more slowly or who express uncertainty about the wisdom of some or all of the proposed advances, given that the term 'scepticism' ordinarily refers to doubts or reservation rather than outright opposition.[19]

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[10] Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, 'Sources of Euroscepticism', *Acta Politica*, July, 2007, 119.
[11] Paul Taggart, 'A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems', *European Journal of Political Research,* vol 33, no 3, 365.
[12] Christopher Flood, 'The Challenge of Euroscepticism', in Jackie Gower (ed.), *The European Union Handbook* (2nd edn), Oxon, 2002, 73.
[13] Flood, 'The Challenge of Euroscepticism', 73.
[14] Glyn Morgan, *The Idea of a European Superstate; Public Justification and European Integration,* New Jersey, 2005, 19.
[15] Arató and Kaniok, 'Introduction', 7.
[16] Catharian Sørensen, cited in Arató and Kaniok, 'Introduction', 7.
[17] Arató and Kaniok, 'Introduction', 7.
[18] A Szczerbiak and P Taggart (eds), 'Researching Euroscepticism in European Party Systems', in *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Politics of Euroscepticism,* vol 2, Oxford, 2008, 2.
[19] Robert Katz, cited in Szczerbiak and Taggart (eds.), 'Researching Euroscepticism in European Party Systems', 2.

Pieter De Wilde and Hans-Jorg Trenz discovered that eurocritical comments like these generally unfold through the mass media, while the dominant parties in the EU barely leave room for critical arguments.[20] Their research supports Katz's definition, finding that besides the pure EU advocates and adversaries there are other positions, for example, the pragmatists they describe, who oppose EU integration, but their type of euroscepticism is not an objectionable dismantling of European ideas, rather it is part of a democratisation process within the EU itself.[21]

Euroscepticism can therefore be viewed as a spectrum across Europe with different groups within different nations falling within a band on that spectrum. In Ireland support for the EU is still at the third highest level in the EU, and the perception of benefits of EU membership is the highest in the EU.[22] Notwithstanding the euroscepticism studied here, Ireland would be placed at the more optimistic end of the euroscepticism spectrum, although euroscepticism does exist in Ireland. This research aligns with Ronald Tiersky's interpretation, where he states, "Euro-sceptics indicate a difference in worldview concerning European integration between themselves and the enthusiast of an increasingly federal European Union".[23] He goes on to argue that there are "different premises, different goals: 'Europe' to the Euro-sceptic, is too much Europe, an ill-conceived and dangerous erosion of European nation-states".[24] Tiersky therefore includes all elements of euroscepticism in his definition.

The definitions of euroscepticism are not tailored specifically for the study of Ireland, and a consensus working definition is not clear, possibly implying that the area is under-researched. As Amandine Crespy and Nicolas Verschueren allude, the history of the EU has mainly been about avoiding conflict.[25] This adopted position has resulted in a disregard for those types of issues to be defined and discussed in detail. As Sofia Vasilopoulou points out, "the literature has treated euroscepticism as a relatively new and possibly unexpected phenomenon usually located in the periphery of society and

[20] Pieter De Wilde and Hans-Jorg Trenz, 'Denouncing European Integration: Euroscepticism as Polity Contestation', *European Journal of Social Theory,* March, 2012.
[21] De Wilde and Trenz, 'Denouncing European Integration; Euroscepticism as Polity Contestation', 537-554.
[22] Candy Rietig, "Euroscepticism in Ireland; How Eurosceptic are the Irish Really?" *europa09.eu,* 2009, available: http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.cap-lmu.de/ContentPages/9376449.pdf, 2.
[23] Tiersky (ed.), 'Introduction: Euro-skepticism and Europe', 1.
[24] Tiersky (ed.), 'Introduction: Euro-skepticism and Europe', 1.
[25] Amandine Crespy and Nicolas Verschueren, 'From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society,* vol 10, no 3, September 2009, 377.

the margins of the party system".[26] She goes on to say that the next generation of research on euroscepticism should be performing comparative analysis, identifying and explaining different patterns of opposition to the EU,[27] thereby reaffirming the position that the past has been left untouched and warrants critical attention.

A helpful working definition, relating specifically to Ireland, is given by Candy Rietig, who indicates that "in Ireland, euroscepticism seems to concentrate rather on details, not on the EU as a whole".[28] This is important as it implies that research into this area must not only identify and discuss those who seek outright withdrawal but examine the more moderate opposition towards the EU as well by considering the oppositional forces who generally take issue with certain policies and procedures. This allows for an enhanced comparative study across EU member states, explains Lee Miles,[29] as Katz also argues. This reinforces a more holistic approach with more nuanced understandings about the oppositional forces says Vasilopoulou.[30] An examination of euroscepticism thus moves beyond the political party and public opinion to include a number of institutions, which is a necessity for the Irish context. The current research uses Rietig's definition in order to successfully fulfil this implied notion.

Rather than Euroscepticism, the term 'resistance' is sometimes highlighted in the literature as a possible alternative to euroscepticism and requires brief mention here. The term resistance is relevant in analysis of the diverse nature of hostility towards integration, which is deemed as necessary according to Katz.[31] A number of studies have used the term 'resistances' and found it more appropriate to talk about all those who show hostility towards 'Europe' as a polymorphous phenomenon.[32] However, the

[26] Sofia Vasilopoulou, 'Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism', *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 2012, 1-16.
[27] Vasilopoulou, 'Continuity and change in the study of Euroscepticism', 1.
[28] Rietig, "Euroscepticism in Ireland; How eurosceptic are the Irish really?" 2.
[29] Lee Miles, *Fusing With Europe?* Burlington, 2005, 127.
[30] Vasilopoulou, 'Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism', 1.
[31] R Katz, 'Euroscepticism in Parliament: A Comparative Analysis of the European and National Parliaments', in A Szczerbiak and P Taggart (eds), *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Politics of Euroscepticism?* 159.
[32] See J Goldstone, 'Social Movements or Revolutions? On the Revolution and Outcomes of Collective Action', in M Giugni, D McAdam and C Tilly (eds), *From Contention to Democracy*, Lanham, 1998, 126-152; see also Y Surel, L'intégration Européenne vue par les Approches Idéelle et Normative des Politiques Publiques, *Revue Française de Science Politique*, vol 50, no 2, 2000, 235-254; see also K Nicolaïdis and S Schmidt, 'Mutual Recognition "On Trial": The Long Road to Services Liberalization', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol 14, no 5, 2007, 717-734; see also M Höpner and A Schäfer, 'A New Phase of European Integration: Organized Capitalisms in Post-Ricardian Europe', *MPIfG*, no 07/4, 2007; see also P Schmitter, 'On the Way to a Post-functionalist Theory of European Integration', *British Journal of Political Science*, no 39, 2008, 211-215; see also R Balme and D Chabanet, *European Governance and Democracy. Power and Protest in the EU,* Lanham, 2008; see also H Kriesi, 'Postface', in L Neumayer, A Roger and F Zalewski (eds), *L'Europe Contestée. Espaces et enjeux des Positionnements Contre l'intégration Européenne*, Paris, 2008, 261-262.

term euroscepticism actually achieves this when an appropriate definition is selected. In many regards the correct definition incorporates the elements that are essentially included in the term 'resistances'. As long as the focus is to go beyond those who seek outright rejection and incorporate all elements as mentioned earlier, then euroscepticism presents as the appropriate term and will feature as the adopted wording used in this research.

The literature on the subject further delineates between soft and/or hard euroscepticism. Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak define hard euroscepticism as:

> fundamental opposition to the idea of political and economic integration and expresses itself as 'a principled objection' to the current form of integration in the European Union on the grounds that it offends deeply held values, or more likely, is the embodiment of negative values.[33]

In contrast, soft euroscepticism "involves contingent or qualified opposition to European integration and may express itself in terms of opposition to the specific policies or in terms of the defence of national interest".[34] As Rietig explains, the dominant type of euroscepticism in Ireland is soft euroscepticism.[35] She goes on to say that for Ireland:

> this means that soft Euroscepticism changes over time and is open to influence through public opinion, policy shifts as well as public diplomacy strategies of national governments and the European institutions.[36]

Whatever the overall hardness or softness of it, euroscepticism must be seen in terms of opposition to specific policies within a multi-faceted and often contradictory EU project encompassing liberalisation and regulation, selective political integration and enlargement, as stated by Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks.[37] As Sean Hanley explains:

> A simple static dichotomy between soft and hard Euroscepticism defined by party attitudes to membership fails to capture either the complexity of evolving party positions on Europe, or the multi-faceted and changing nature of integration and enlargement. [38]

[33] Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, 'Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Party Systems of the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe', *European Journal of Political Research*, no 43, 2004, 3.
[34] Taggart and Szczerbiak, 'Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Party Systems of the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe', 4.
[35] Rietig, "Euroscepticism in Ireland; How Eurosceptic are the Irish Really?" 2.
[36] Rietig, "Euroscepticism in Ireland; How Eurosceptic are the Irish Really?" 2.
[37] Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, cited in Sean Hanley, *The New Right in the New Europe*, Oxon, 2008, 210.
[38] Hanley, *The New Right in the New Europe*, 210.

Thomas Quinn noted in the 2005 elections that ideology was important, but hard-line euroscepticism was not evident.[39] The intensity varies from fundamental rejection to mild reformist techniques that vary between countries examined, explain Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering.[40] It is evident in the literature that while 'hard' ' euroscepticism is present, it is important for this research that soft euroscepticism also be analysed in depth, as it is the most appropriate for the Irish context.

Recent research conducted by Katarina Sørenson[41] classified four different types of eurosceptic: the economic, the sovereignty based, the democratic and the political.[42] These may be presented singularly or in combination in any one state. This taxonomy provides a useful framework for the context of this research. The level of euroscepticism exhibited by a country therefore differs depending on the country being focused on. It is evident that a number of these categories apply to Ireland and have been present for some time, even well before 2001. This model provides a good basis to work with in order to locate and discuss findings on Irish euroscepticism.

Historically speaking, the term 'eurosceptic' itself first seemed to appear in Britain in the early 1960s and was interchangeably used with the 'anti-marketeers' who opposed Britain joining the EEC at the time. The term then appeared in more mainstream applications in 1988 and was associated with Margaret Thatcher and her dismissal of further European integration in Britain. As mentioned earlier, the term euroscepticism seems connected to contemporary developments. As Crespy and Verschueren explain, its meaning is to some extent linked to the historical context where it first appeared.[43] Harmsen and Spiering acknowledge that "Euroscepticism firstly appeared as an English phenomenon further contributing to a country's awkwardness or otherness in relation to the Continental European Project of political and economic integration".[44] The link is to be found with Great Britain in the 1980s. Harmsen and Spiering explain further that it was then reinforced in the press and used to name those opposing the United

[39] Thomas Quinn, *Electing and Ejecting Party Leaders In Britain*, New York, 2012, 264.
[40] Harmsen and Spiering 'Introduction: Euroscepticism and the Evolution of European Political Debate', 13.
[41] See K Sørensen, *Types of Euroscepticism,* Danish Insitute for International Studies, 2006, available: http://www.eu-consent.net/library/Award_Winner2.pdf
[42] Katarina Sørensen, cited in Maria Jepsen, *The European Irishmen: An Analysis of Euroscepticism in Ireland',* 2012, available: http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/7676/1/euro%20skepticism%20in%20Ireland.pdf 8.
[43] Crespy and Verschueren, 'From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective', 382.
[44] Harmsen and Spiering,'Introduction: Euroscepticism and the Evolution of European Political Debate', 13.

Kingdom's membership of the EEC.[45] Beginning as a position which arose in Great Britain and building momentum from there, there were initially some difficulties in applying the concept to other, earlier historical contexts. It was really not until the Maastricht Treaty, say Crespy and Verschueren that the sense of euroscepticism was enlarged to opposition against further transfer of competencies to the European level and to fears about losing national identity and sovereignty.[46] Once euroscepticism became a more globally accepted term from the 1990s onwards, however, its more flexible use in academic literature became commonplace.

With an increased focus on enlargement and integration by the EU over the course of the 1990s and 2000s the term euroscepticism was used increasingly to describe those who opposed the EU project. "What was considered a Eurosceptic discourse in the Thatcher era has now become common parlance in relation to the EU"[47], says Cecile Leconte. However, if its basic notion was built around sovereignty and identity as implied here, then the term can be useful to trace previous events outside of the British context. Although Crespy and Verschueren are sceptical of this, they do note that authors had talked about euroscepticism in the 1950s, and in relation to other circumstances before the 1980s.[48] Traditionally, eurosceptics have tended to focus on the issue of the erosion and loss of nation-state control of domestic affairs. More recent views tend to include accusations of the over-interference of the EU itself, its undemocratic and overly bureaucratic nature, the economic uncertainty linked to the common currency and the changing demographic profile of member states. All of these concerns can be traced in Irish discussions regarding European integration prior to Nice 1.

Recently, 'national identity' and 'Europeanisation' have been identified as important considerations in regard to scholarship involving euroscepticism. Søren Riishøj explains that attitudes towards the EEC seem to be linked with national interests and, to a small extent, based on identities.[49] This implies that euroscepticism may be cleavage-based,

[45] Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, *Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration*, New York, 2004, 14.
[46] Crespy and Verschueren, 'From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective', 382.
[47] Cecile Leconte, *Understanding Euroscepticism*, Hampshire, 2010, 12.
[48] Crespy and Verschueren, 'From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, 383.
[49] Søren Riishøj, 'Europeanisation and Euroscepticism', *Central European Studies Review*, 2004, available: http://www.cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=211.

where different sections of society feel differently towards the issue. Thus, different forms of euroscepticism manifest themselves in different social classes. Those who are more financially secure tend to be more supportive of Europe than those who fit in the lower socio-economic bracket.[50] In addition, people living in the countryside tend to be more eurosceptical than their urban counterparts.[51] Therefore, the Irish situation is different from other countries involved in the EEC due to the socio-economic factors present that will be entirely different when compared with another country. Marijn van Klingeren and Hajo Boomgaarden suggest a citizen's economic status is important but not essential.[52] Yet, it still requires consideration to provide a detailed analysis of euroscepticism.

Susan Milner explains that the timing of latecomers to the EEC, such as Ireland, reveals distinct and differing effects of euroscepticism as well.[53] Ireland joining the EEC relatively late compared with Germany and France shaped how the Irish people saw the European project. It is important, in considering Milner's arguments about the role of timing of accession, however, that we differentiate between different types of late-comers to the EU as the experiences of Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland are very distinct from those of the UK, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. This differentiation may yield differing effects of euroscepticism.

Riishøj raises an important point here on the issue of whether national identity constitutes a barrier to Europeanisation and integration.[54] Shaped by the struggle against Britain, the Irish nationalistic element to euroscepticism is different to other countries and is certainly evident in political discourse. As van Klingeren and Boomgaarden's recent findings argue, the strength of exclusive national identity is perhaps the most important indicator of euroscepticism. This has been the case for decades.[55] They explain further that a citizen's economic status is nowhere near as important for

[50] Riishøj, 'Europeanisation and Euroscepticism'.
[51] Riishøj, 'Europeanisation and Euroscepticism'.
[52] Marijn van Klingeren and Hajo Boomgaarden, 'The Strength of Exclusive National Identity is the Most Important Indicator of Euroscepticism', *Europp – London School of Economics*, 2014, available: http://blogs.1se.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/02/13/the-strength-of-an-individual-national-identity-is-the-most -important-indicator-of-Euroscepticism, 1.
[53] Susan Milner, cited in Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, 'Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe', *Sussex European Institute*, 2001, available: http://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2004/EVS136/um/The_Party_Politics_of_Euroscepticism_in_EU_Member_and_Candidate_States.pdf.
[54] Riishøj, 'Europeanisation and Euroscepticism'.
[55] Klingeren and Boomgaarden, 'The Strength of Exclusive National Identity is the Most Important Indicator of Euroscepticism', 1.

determining an individual's tendency to hold eurosceptic views when compared with national identity.[56] In the Irish context national identity draws its inspiration from the experience of previous British rule and the subsequent ability of Irish citizens to secure their independence and proclaim the Irish Free State. In this sense, explains Liubomir Topaloff, the term euroscepticism becomes socially constructed and politically exploited.[57] For Ireland, national identity and associated feelings are highly politicised and play a dominant role in society. This thesis intends therefore to identify the type of nationalism displayed in Ireland in order to provide insight into the euroscepticism exhibited during the period in question.

In many regards, recent literature indicates that euroscepticism is a negative reaction to Europeanisation. Some scholars see 'Europeanisation' as related to Europe as a whole[58]; however, most use the EU as the point of reference.[59] Felicitas Rabiger's work reveals Europeanisation to mean enlargement, the development of EU institutions, the penetration of these institutions on national political systems and developing an even closer union, referring to a deepening and widening of the EU itself.[60] According to this approach, national systems of governance have had to adapt to the EU's institutions, norms and values. For some Irish, most notably Sinn Féin, and smaller political parties, such as the Greens and Democratic Left, this has been a cause for consternation and has elicited a form of euroscepticism amongst these parties. Rabiger notes that from the 1990s onwards a stronger current of Europeanisation was present, particularly stemming from the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.[61] Dieter Fuchs and Andrea Schlenker claim that this was certainly the case and the project was advancing from an intergovernmental to a supranationalist one.[62] Although this is traced back only to the early 1990s, it does possibly reveal a longer history of euroscepticism in Ireland before 2001 that requires further inquiry here.

The writing of history on European integration has not been overlooked by the available literature on the subject. Thus, academics have not avoided contention or debate over

[56] Klingeren and Boomgaarden, 'The Strength of Exclusive National Identity is the Most Important Indicator of Euroscepticism', 1.
[57] Liubomir Topaloff, *Political Parties and Euroscepticism*, New York, 2012, 7.
[58] See Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, *Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization,* London, 2005, 15.
[59] See Stephen George and Ian Bache, *Politics in the European Union,* Oxford, 2006, 58.
[60] Felicitas Rabiger, 'New Eurosceptics or European Union Lovers', *Quo Vadis Europa,* 2011, available: http://arts.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/FILES/publications/general/Euroculture/2011/walking/Theme3/14Rabigerfinal.pdf.
[61] Rabiger, 'New Eurosceptics or European Union Lovers', 211.
[62] Dieter Fuchs and Andrea Schlenker, cited in Rabiger, 'New Eurosceptics or European Union Lovers', 211.

the creation of Europe, but contention has been mainly reduced to small disputes or to limited opposition.[63] However, the literature on the subject, targeted at Ireland, tends to ignore any previous contentions between the two. As explained by Crespy and Verschueren, the writing of European history and the writing of European integration are difficult to match up, thus creating an absence of a social history of European integration.[64] The positive aspects are often featured and well documented, but consideration towards the negative aspects is rarely highlighted or discussed by scholars. What results is a history of EU integration that has tended to overlook conflicts over EU integration or to oversimplify the concerns raised. Crespy and Verschuren note further the Cold War context and the over-generalisation of 'yes/no' questions inferred by opinion polls and referenda have contributed to a neglect of the conflicts about European integration being documented.[65]

The emphasis on continuity in the history of EU is especially evident in the works of scholars writing from a functionalist perspective. As Ümit Kurt contends, "historically speaking, 'functionalism' opened the scene and enabled a theoretical landscape for scholars in political science and [international relations]".[66] The functionalists set out to interpret the integration process as a whole in terms of the evolving functions of its interrelated parts. In applying this approach to European integration, as in adopting a functionalist perspective on other political phenomena, the functionalists tended to consider human nature in a very positive view and place faith in the idea of human progress. In this way, as Kurt explains, the functionalist approach differs from the state-centric paradigm of 'power politics' or a realist account of world affairs.[67] The history of European integration thus becomes one described in terms of shared consensus and order that is evident in society at a particular time, whereby the negative or oppositional elements are largely neglected. The status quo is reinforced and complacently assumed, at the risk of failing to acknowledge broader realities. As Crespy and Verschueren further explain in their assessment of the functionalist approach to European

[63] See A Giacone, and B Olivi, *L'Europe Difficile* (3rd edn), 2007; see also D Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Integration*, Basingstoke, 2004; see also M-T Bitsch, *Histoire de la Construction Européenne de 1945 à nos Jours*, Brussels, 2008.
[64] Crespy and Verschueren, 'From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective', 379.
[65] Crespy and Verschueren, 'From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective', 379.
[66] Ümit Kurt, 'A Historical Glance to the EU from the Functionalist Perspective', *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies*, vol 2, 2009, available: http://ejeps.fatih.edu.tr/docs/articles/24.pdf.
[67] Kurt, 'A Historical Glance to the EU from the Functionalist Perspective', 43.

integration, the social and political forces carrying resistance to integration are often not considered.[68] The Irish attitude towards Europe is thus presents as one of celebrations and achievements, without regard for the dissenting tradition in Irish history.

Irish history on the European Project has to some extent highlighted the 'anti-marketers' in 1972 and alludes to parties that do not support EU-related referendums later, but it does not go beyond this. As David Attewell points out, research into euroscepticism must go beyond this.[69] Analyses of euroscepticism remain mainly focused on parliamentary parties according to Crespy and Verschueren,[70] and this applies to the Irish case. Post-functionalist theory, as developed by Hooghe and Marks,[71] provides a more comprehensive approach to researching past eurosceptic developments. As noted by Susannah Verney, this analysis recognises that European intergration has moved away from 'permissive consensus' to a new era of 'constraining dissensus', which supports more pessimistic prognostications regarding the increasing integration of Europe.[72] This is far removed from the neofuctionalists' positive predictions concerning the allegedly irreversible forward march of intergration.[73] But how much have things changed? Ian Down and Caroline Wilson examining data from the European Commission's Eurobarometer surveys suggest that the overall level of support for integration in the early 2000s, while lower in the 1980s, was little different from the 1970s.[74] This raises the question as to whether there really is more euroscepticism now than in the past. The only way to answer this question is through diachronic studies such as this one, focusing on how euroscepticism has changed over time. As Szczerbiak and Taggart have noted, this currently consistutes a gap in the literature[75], where this thesis intends to go beyond a functionalist perspective to critically analyse the past to present in a longer term study lacking to date, using more post-functionalist techniques.

[68] Crespy and Verschueren, 'From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, 379.
[69] David Attewell, 'The Two Level Game of Strategic Euroscepticism', Honours Thesis, Tufts University, 2011.
[70] Crespy and Verschueren, 'From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective', 382.
[71] L. Hooghe and G. Marks, 'Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration', *European Union Politics*, vol 6, no 4, 2005, 419–43.
[72] Susannah Verney, *Euroscepticism in Southern Europe,* New York, 2012, 2.
[73] Verney, *Euroscepticism in Southern Europe,* 2
[74] Ian Down and Caroline Wilson, 'From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus', *Acta Politica*, vol 43, no 1, 26-49.
[75] Szczerbiak, & Taggart (eds), *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*

Parameters

The temporal parameters of this study are the years 1886 to 2001. This allows for a comprehensive analysis of pre-2001 developments in Ireland and a more comprehensive study than that achieved previously. 1886 is selected as the starting point as it provides a clear and succinct basis, giving a solid foundation for a comprehensive study. While euroscepticism did not formally predate the movement to European integration after the Second World War, it nonetheless had antecedents reaching back to the nineteenth century. It is a contention of this thesis that those antecedents are crucial to understanding the later emergence and character of Irish euroscepticism.

Increasing tensions between Britain and Ireland became apparent in 1886, as highlighted in particular studies on the topic.[76] From the time of the First Home Rule Bill more limited forms of self-government were considered by Tory and Liberal governments, and the growth of cultural nationalism in Ireland challenged the hegemony of the parliamentary party. This period, characterised by colonial rule and increasing desire for Irish independence free from British domination, marks an important development for future reference. This struggle for independence laid the foundation for future developments, in particular military neutrality and sovereignty. These notions became important conceptual markers of not only for what it meant to be Irish, but also became important in future arguments critiquing European integration from a specifically Irish perspective. This one hundred and fifteen year period allows for the bigger picture of Irish euroscepticism to be analysed and will reveal the often obscured turning points in the Irish eurosceptic camp. In many regards this study will provide a genealogy of Irish euroscepticism, showing the ever changing nature of the phenomenon.

Focusing solely on Ireland, it eschews comparative method in an attempt to offer a 'thick' description of Ireland's unique past experiences in relation to Europe. In addition, Ireland is often somewhat forgotten with regard to the history of the entire European integration process. Its geographical location on the periphery of an increasingly Central European EU and its relatively small population have in many regards hampered efforts to account for Ireland's attempts to come to terms with the

[76] See Stephen Howe, *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture*, Oxford, 2002.

European project. The country is both isolated and separated from the main continent of Europe, and this in turn has meant being on the outer with regard to more contemporary European developments, decision-making ability and the main currents of European historiography.

Contemporary studies undertaken on Irish euroscepticism are generally the work of political scientists who provide a presentist and ahistorical view on the topic. More often than not they focus on recent events, and disregard to a large extent what has transpired in the not so distant past. It also seems evident that the main countries behind the European Project, especially the founding six, and Britain (due to her well-documented uneasy relationship with Europe over the years), are the countries that draw much of the attention and focus from researchers. Most importantly, Ireland's at times difficult relationship with Europe seems to lack a historical perspective, and this warrants critical attention. For example, Miriam Hederman claims Ireland's pre-2001 developments with Europe as a time of "democracy, peace, economic progress and happy family life – all were in favour in principle".[77] Gilland agrees with this claim, saying that this is probably an accurate account of what took place.[78] Without necessarily arguing that Ireland was deeply eurosceptical, it is nonetheless necessary to interrogate these claims, and to look at Ireland's previous relationship with Europe.

Literature review

Traditionally, the study of euroscepticism has concentrated on two distinct areas: euroscepticism in the party system[79] and euroscepticism in public opinion.[80] Focused studies that account for civil society actors and the presence of euroscepticism amongst them have been lacking. In seeking to explain individuals' attitudes towards Europe, the literature for a long time followed a selected model of permissive consensus and acceptance. It was mostly assumed by the academic community that support for European integration on the part of citizens of the member states tended to be high in the initial period of existence of the EEC, and it remained essentially stable in

[77] Miriam Hederman, *The Road to Europe: Irish Attitudes*, Dublin, 1983, 182-183.
[78] Karin Gilland, 'Irish Euroscepticism', in Harmsen and Spiering (eds), *Euroscepticism,* 171.
[79] See Szczerbiak and Taggart, *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Politics of Euroscepticism;* see also P Kopécky and C Mudde 'The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe', *European Union Politics*, vol 3, no 3, 2002, 297-326; see also L Hooghe, G Marks and C Wilson, 'Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?' *Comparative European Politics*, vol 35, no 8, 2002, 965-989.
[80] M Franklin, C van der Eijk and M Marsh, 'Referendum Outcomes and Trust in Government: Public Support for Europe in the Wake of Maastricht', *West European Politics*, vol 18, no 3, 1995, 101-117; see also L McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, Basingstoke, 2006.

subsequent years thanks to low levels of familiarity with European issues and generally positive adherence to Europe. Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold call this the period of 'permissive consensus', one in which citizens confined themselves to delegating questions concerning Europe to their governing representatives.[81] This approach was the position adopted by scholars, rightly or wrongly, with regard to Ireland. Ireland was branded as being pro-European after fairly convincing acceptance of Europe in 1972, and this remained the adopted position throughout studies conducted. This thesis attempts to scrutinise these types of basic descriptions, and will provide a more accurate account of what transpired during the identified period.

There have been numerous works on euroscepticism and comparative political parties[82] as well as individual party case studies[83] targeting countries within and beyond the EU. Opposition to the EU has become increasingly embedded post-Maastricht both at European and national levels across a range of contexts, no more so than in the day-to-day existence of political parties within the nation states that comprise the EU. This again reiterates that 2001 is nothing special in the Irish situation. Simon Usherwood states that the majority of studies have been too narrowly focused, mainly on political parties, when opposition to Europe must go beyond the political party spectrum.[84] The academic community has focused too much attention on the role of political parties when it comes to Europe.[85] Studies looking at referenda results and European elections have generally reinforced a sense of contentment with the whole process, mainly due to the positive outcomes seen. This fails, however, to account for those who were

[81] L Lindberg and S Scheingold, *Regional Integration: Theory and Research*, Cambridge, 1971.
[82] See Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 'Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?' see also Kopecky and Mudde, 'The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe', *European Union Politics*, 297-326; see also G Marks, L Hooghe, M Nelson and E Edwards, 'Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structure, Same Causality', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol 39, no 2, 2006, 155-175; see also A Szczerbiak and P Taggart 'Theorsing Party-based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality', European Parties Elections and Referendums, Network Working Paper, no 12, 2008; see also L Ray, 'Measuring Party Orientation towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol 36, no 2, 1999, 283-306; see also P Taggart 'A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism'; see also S Vasilopoulou, 'European Integration and the Radical Right: Three Patterns of Opposition', *Government and Opposition*, vol 46, no 2, 2011, 223-244.
[83] See N Conti, 'Party Attitudes to European Integration: A Longitudinal Analysis of the Italian Case', EPERN Working paper, no 70, 2003; see also T Raunio, 'Facing the European Challenge: Finnish Parties Adjust to the Integration Process', *West European Politics*, vol 22, no 1, 1999, 138-159; see also N Startin, 'Maastricht, Amsterdam and Beyond: The Troubled Evolution of the French Right', in H Drake (ed.), *French Relations with the EU*, London, 2005, 64-85; see also M Stojic, 'The Changing Nature of Serbian Political Parties' Attitudes Towards Serbian EU Membership', Sussex European Institute Working Paper, no 122, EPERN Working Paper, no 24, 2011; see also M Skinner, 'Political Culture, Values and Economic Utility: A Different Perspective on Norwegian Party-based Euroscepticism', *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, vol 6 no 3, 2010.
[84] Simon Usherwood, 'Euroscepticism as a Present Phenomenon', *University Association of Contemporary European Studies*, 2011 available: http://uaces.org/documents/papers/1101/usherwood.pdf
[85] Usherwood, 'Euroscepticism as a present phenomenon'.

motivated to organise themselves against Europe. Detail as to why or who is providing this opposition is rarely accounted for. A more holistic approach is required when it comes to research in this area; the positives are documented but the negatives are missing. This research will seek to look beyond the Whiggish histories of ever increasing European integration to account for those disappointed by European integration.

Literature relating to civil society and social movements also seems to be lacking when it comes to studies relating to the EU in general and more specifically in Ireland. Ondřej Císař and Kateřina Vráblíková indicate in recent research that protest and public campaigning by actors such as Social Movement Organisations remains under-studied.[86] This view is supported by David Stark et al., who claim a gap in the literature pertains especially to activist groups in the newer EU member countries.[87] The role of nationally-rooted organisations in transnational politics, namely those expected to provide the link between the citizenry and international institutions in the first place, still remains understudied.[88] Here lies one of the main contributions of this thesis; the focus on non-government organisations and individuals outside of the parliamentary spectrum in Ireland will overcome the shortfall in studies previously undertaken on euroscepticsm.

Some indication is evident of the possiblity that an anti-European element had been present in the past, but Ireland was broadly pro-European at the time of joining the EEC, and academics account only for recent euroscepticism. Maria Jepsen explains further that since joining the EU in 1973 Ireland has traditionally been viewed as one of the most pro-EU countries in the Union.[89] Rietig also agrees with Gilland and Jepsen and implies that when it comes to comparing Ireland to other EU countries the Irish are

[86] Ondřej Císař and Kateřina Vráblíková, 'Transnational Activism of Social Movement Organizations', *European Union Politics*, vol 14, 2013, available: http://www.academia.edu/970824/Transnational_Activism_of_Social_Movement_Organizations_The_Effect_of_European_Union_Funding_on_Local_Groups_in_the_Czech_Republic.
[87] David Stark, BalazsVedres and Laszlo Bruszt, 'Rooted Transnational Publics: Integrating Foreign Ties and Civic Activism', *Theory and Society*, vol 35, no 3, 2006, 323-349.
[88] See Jan Beyers, and Bart Kerremans. 'Domestic Embeddedness and the Dynamics of Multilevel Venue-shopping in Four EU Member-states', *Governance*, vol 25, no 2, 2011; see also H Kriesi, T Anke and M Jochum, 'Western European Collective Political Actors Going Public in the European Union: Action Repertoires of Western European Collective Political Actors', *Comparative Political Studies,* vol 40, no 1, 2007, 48-73; see also Lori Poloni-Staudinger, 'The Domestic Opportunity Structure and Supranational Activity: An Explanation of Environmental Group Activity at the European Union Level', *European Union Politics,* vol 9, no 4, 2008, 531-558; see also D Della Porta and M. Caiani, *Social Movements and Europeanization*, Oxford, 2009.
[89] Jepsen, 'The European Irishmen: An Analysis of Euroscepticism in Ireland'.

strong supporters of membership.[90] Szczerbiak and Taggart similarly claim Ireland has only low levels of party-based euroscepticism.[91] However, a context and time frame for this is not given. Gilland does note, however, that the events of 2001 only added nuance to the debate about Ireland's EU membership.[92] This implies that something was indeed happening before this time, and requires further analysis to determine what occurred. Whether this 2001 form of euroscepticism had deeper historical roots is the question that this thesis seeks to address.

The explanations given by the literature as to why no, or only minor, eurosceptic thought existed before 2001, relate mainly to the benefits membership brought to Ireland. The European Commission emphasises this by claiming "most experts agree that Ireland's membership of the EU has greatly facilitated our move from an agricultural based economy to one driven by high-tech industry and global exports".[93] Europe seemed to have transformed Ireland. The European Commission claims the transformation has been from a poor country, with little significance on the world stage, to one of utmost importance.[94] This transformation, however, cost Ireland some of its sovereignty. This thesis will examine the extent to which this sovereignty was put in jeopardy, and to what extent this provoked opposition.

Jepsen, reinforcing the notion of positive benefits for Ireland, implies that at the time of joining, Ireland was no better off 50 years after the birth of the Irish Free State, and thus profound changes were needed if the population of Ireland was to move beyond the poverty that had engulfed the country.[95] John O'Brennan[96] and Gilland[97] associate initial EEC support with the money coming from Brussels. While these explanations tend to disregard any opposition and highlight positive attitudes, Edward Moxon-Browne claims that a persistent ambiguity has existed in Ireland, whereby strongly nationalist traits in the political culture have co-existed alongside high levels of support

[90] Rietig, "Euroscepticism in Ireland; How eurosceptic are the Irish really?"
[91] Szczerbiak and Taggart (eds.), 'The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism', in *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Politics of Euroscepticism,* 42.
[92] Gilland, 'Irish Euroscepticism', 171.
[93] European Commission, "Impact of EU Membership on Ireland", 2011, available: http://ec.europe.eu/ireland/ireland_in_the_eu/impact_of_membership_on_ireland/index_en.htm
[94] European Commission, "Impact of EU Membership on Ireland".
[95] Jepsen, 'The European Irishmen: An Analysis of Euroscepticism in Ireland'.
[96] John O'Brennan, 'Ireland Says No (Again)', Parliamentary Affairs, vol 62, no 2, 2009, 258-277.
[97] Karin Gilland, 'Ireland's (first) referendum on the Treaty of Nice', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 40, no 3, 2002, 527.

for EU membership.[98] This is important and requires further attention. The history of Irish EU-membership, says Anton Pelinka, "is a convincing example of how socio-economic interests are responsible for the rise of euroscepticism".[99] Again, further examination to see whether this is an accurate account of what transpired in the Irish context is warranted. Gilland points out that it was not until the new millennium that a new relationship between Ireland and the EU evolved.[100] She goes on to say that "the broad, pro-European consensus appeared to come to an abrupt end in 2001".[101] Moxon-Browne indicates "EU membership remained consistently high throughout the 1990s"[102], giving some weight to Gilland's claim. However, the rejection of Nice did not come from nowhere, and this research seeks to historicise the events of pre-2001 and to determine if any such new relationship exists.

The positives associated with Europe in Ireland as implied by the literature were to change in 2001 when the Irish voted 'no' to the Nice Treaty. "The Irish pro-European mood started to cool".[103] Yet some academics have suggested that remarkable parallels can be found between the 1972 and 2001 treaties. "The gap between political elites and voters on the issue of European integration is not one that begins with the first Nice referendum and is copper-fastened by Lisbon but is rather one which dates back to the original 1972 Referendum".[104] This is important for this research, as it implies a deeper historical context for anti-European developments in Ireland. The 2001 defeat was seen as a shock to the EU, as well as to the Irish government, as all had expected another smooth passage, but instead faced having to respond to defeat.[105] According to Vaughne Miller only 35 per cent of the electorate turned out to vote, with 53.9 per cent rejecting the treaty.[106] He goes on to argue that a well organised 'no' campaign focusing on the loss of national sovereignty, the threat to Ireland's military neutrality and the diminishing influence in EU decision making, led to a successful 'no' campaign.[107] The

[98] Edward Moxon-Browne, 'From Isolation to Involvement: Ireland', in Jurgen Elvert (ed.), *European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History*, New York, 2004, 64.
[99] Anton Pelinka, 'Determining Factors of Euroscepticism, Eurosceptism and European', in Arato and Kaniok (eds), *Euroscepticism and European Integration*, 28.
[100] Gilland, 'Irish Euroscepticism', 171.
[101] Gilland, 'Irish Euroscepticism', 172.
[102] Moxon-Browne, 'From Isolation to Involvement: Ireland', 65.
[103] Pelinka, 'Determining Factors of Euroscepticism, Eurosceptism and European', 28.
[104] Gary Murphy and Niamh Puirséil, 'Is it a New Allowance? Irish Entry to the EEC and Popular Opinion', *Irish Political Studies,* vol 23, no 4, 2008, 550.
[105] Holmes, 'Irish Approaches to European Integration', 1.
[106] Vaughne Miller, 'The Irish Referendum on the Treaty of Nice', Research Paper, 21 June 2001, available: https://www.proyectos.cch.csic.es/euroconstitution/library/working%20papers/nice/house%20of%20commons.pdf, 12.
[107] Miller, 'The Irish Referendum on the Treaty of Nice', 14.

themes outlined here seem evident prior to 2001 and can potentially be traced back further, as will be attempted here.

The issue of neutrality has a historical context; in the main it refers to military neutrality, and this belief is in entrenched in Irish society. The concern can be traced back to Ireland's neutral position adopted in World War II and the ability for Ireland to make its own decisions regarding military matters. Concerns regarding future EU enlargement were also expressed in the report conducted by Laffan regarding the 2001 Treaty of Nice defeat.[108] In particular, the admission of former eastern communist bloc countries into the EU was seen as a negative development. On closer scrutiny, these concerns were targeted towards immigration, the associated increased costs, and the political make-up of some of these countries, which held varying attitudes to the democratic principles upheld by Ireland. The final issue, abortion, was also mentioned by Brigid Laffan.[109] With the dominance of the Catholic faith amongst Irish citizens, it was claimed the EU would counteract her restrictive abortion laws. These factors are all useful in tracing eurosceptic developments before 2001. As Andrew Devenney argues, this first treaty defeat may well be traced back to the workings of others around the time of 1972 and possibly even before.[110]

Another important aspect in the historical development of Irish euroscepticism is the claim of diminished sovereignty, which was also presented as an argument against the first Nice Treaty. Its presence in public discourse can, however, be traced to an earlier time in Ireland, just like the issue of neutrality. As Devenney notes, coexisting alongside the mainstream debate over membership was an argument centred on cultural nationalism and a more 'pure' and ultimately inflexible understanding of sovereignty.[111] He goes on to mention that this early opposition to Irish membership of the EEC was occupied by a marginalised public space where the primacy of sovereignty overwhelmed all rhetoric.[112] To what extent this played a role in anti-European thought at the time, where it developed from, and what form it took after 1972 must be considered relevant when documenting Irish euroscepticism.

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[108] Brigid Laffan, "The Nice Treaty: The Irish Vote", N.d., available: http://web.grinnell.edu/courses/pol/f02/pol295-01/Laffan%20-%20The%20Nice%20Treaty%20-%20The%20Irish%20Vote.pdf.
[109] Laffan, "The Nice Treaty; The Irish Vote".
[110] Andrew Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland, 1961–72', *New Hibernia Review*, vol 12, no 4, 2008, 16.
[111] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland, 1961–72', 16.
[112] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland, 1961–72', 16.

Small, central-left wing parties and independents have been the voices of Irish euroscepticism, and they are growing in significance and influence, claims Simon Usherwood and Nick Startin.[113] Yet as Devenney points out, these parties, groups and personnel are not new and have coexisted alongside the mainstream debate over membership for decades.[114] With these groups in mind, reading the 2001 Treaty of Nice referendum as a manifestation of a sudden wave of euroscepticism sweeping over Ireland emerges as an oversimplification.[115] Early Irish opposition to European integration, as Devenny suggests, has received little attention,[116] so that there is clear need to correct this deficiency in the literature.

More recent developments

At the official level Ireland presents itself more often than not as encouraging the idea of cooperation among states to encourage shared objectives on EU matters. It:

> involves states working with one another in a manner that does not allow them to retain complete control over developments, that is, states may be obliged to do things against their preferences and their will because they do not have the power to stop decisions.[117]

Successive Irish governments had until recently been strongly supportive of this idea; ostensibly and putatively this is what we are led to believe. Opinion polls and referendums all painted a picture of the Irish as 'model Europeans', and conservative Irish governments would pursue essentially identical pro-European policies that had the support of major organisations in society.[118] Gilland also reinforced this message and noted that until recently the thought of a book on eurosceptism even containing a chapter on Irish eurosceptism would be strange.[119] The Irish are keenly aware of the benefits EU membership has brought them[120], and even the most vocal adversaries in the case of the Lisbon Treaty were still pro-EU and only took issue with certain parts of the Union, as Jepsen made clear in his report.[121] Possibly this implies that Irish

[113] Simon Usherwood and Nick Startin, 'Euroscepticism as a persistent phenomenon', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol 51, 2013, 1-16.
[114] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland, 1961–72', 16.
[115] Gilland, 'Irish Euroscepticism', 189.
[116] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland, 1961–72', 16.
[117] Neill Nugent, *The Government and Politics of the EU* (6th edn), New York, 2006, 558.
[118] Gilland, 'Irish Euroscepticism', 172.
[119] Gilland, 'Irish Euroscepticism', 171.
[120] *The Economist,* 'Charlemagne: Those Ungrateful Irish'.
[121] Jepsen, *The Eurosceptic Irishman*, 2.

euroscepticism was more policy-based rather than of a hard, rejectionist variety. Michael Holmes agrees and states that competitive opposition to the EU exists in Ireland, but while it is persistent, it is not likely to increase significantly.[122] Giacomo Benedetto even states that "the scepticism of the Irish Greens is softer in so far as they do not believe that Ireland should leave the EU".[123] He goes on to quote one Irish Green Member of the European Parliament, "EU legislation has had a modernising effect on Ireland … although lack of accountability is a problem".[124] Maura Adshead and Michelle Millar define it as a "seemingly growing scepticism towards the EU [if anything]".[125] They point out "that [possible] serious implications and the economy have led some to consider a re-examination of the Irish-EU relationship".[126] Liubomir Topaloff mentions that possible eurosceptic rhetoric has eventuated due to recent highly disputed bailouts, which gave practical opposition to the regulatory and redistributive policies and standards of the EU.[127] What is implied then is that 2001 was not a radically new turning point in eurosceptic developments, and that a long-term concern regarding specific policies rather than seeking outright withdrawal is historically discernible.

In 2006 the Autumn *Eurobarometer* report indicated that 79 per cent of Irish people still believed that Ireland's membership of the EU was a good thing.[128] In 2008, Ireland became the first country in Western Europe to officially fall into recession in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. Ireland underwent one of the deepest recessions in the Eurozone.[129] However, with all this taking place, the June 2011 *Eurobarometer* reported that Ireland still had the third most pro-EU population, with 63 per cent of those questioned considering Irish membership of the EU to be a good thing".[130] More recently, in 2012, the *Eurobarometer* indicated that 69 per cent of Irish citizens felt a

[122] Michael Holmes (ed.), 'The Development of Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', in *Ireland and the EU,* New York, 2005, 75.
[123] Giacomo Benedetto, 'Explaining the Failure of Euroscepticism in the European Parliament', in A Szczerbiak and P Taggart (eds), *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Politics of Euroscepticism?* 142.
[124] Benedetto, 'Explaining the Failure of Euroscepticism in the European Parliament', 142.
[125] Maura Adshead and Michelle Millar, *Public Administration and Public Policy in Ireland: Theory and Methods,* London, 2003, 195.
[126] Adshead and Millar, *Public Administration and Public Policy in Ireland: Theory and Methods,* 195.
[127] Topaloff, *Political Parties and Euroscepticism,* 56.
[128] European Commission, "Eurobarometer 66", 2006, available: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_ie_exec.pdf.
[129] Natalie Hamill, 'Ireland – EU Facts', *Civitas: Institute for the Study of Civil Society,* 2013, available: http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/download/MS.7.Ireland.pdf.
[130] Hamill, 'Ireland – EU Facts'.

sense of belonging to EU citizenship[131], indicating that a majority of Irish citizens were still supportive of the EU in its current state; however, an element of distrust was also noted. To what extent and for how long this element has been present requires further examination. Euroscepticism is certainly not a new concept and one of the central objectives of this thesis is to argue that the unacknowledged origins of Irish euroscepticism prior to 2001 must be considered, so as to understand better contemporary trends.

Eurosceptic elements in Ireland can be traced to a number of political parties, and not towards any single party located on the far right or left in the Irish situation. It is captured by and maintained as a policy ideal in centre left wing parties throughout history who attempt to counteract the idea of European integration through the means of non-commitment to certain policies. Since Irish independence the country has been ruled predominantly by two political parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. Both were, in European terms, centrist. "These two parties routinely captured around 70 per cent of first preference votes prior to 2011".[132] Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael had been the main supporters of European integration in Ireland from the 1960s. Their highly supportive policies on Europe had been virtually identical to one another. Fianna Fáil was during this period known as the 'catch-all party' and had the support of the working-class people predominately.[133] It had held power throughout the period comfortably and made the goal of European integration in Ireland a real possibility. More specifically for Ireland herself, it saw potential in terms of economic benefits and a break away from Britain as motivation for doing so. Likewise Fine Gael, the second largest party in Ireland at this point, also saw EEC membership as a positive move for Ireland. It was the defacto coalition of these two parties that prompted membership acceptance. In many ways they acted as the catalyst of that enormous social and economic change which occurred throughout these years.[134]

The absence of significant left-wing parties in the past can be explained by a number of factors, although the Irish Labour Party attempted to fulfil this requirement to some

[131] European Commission, "Eurobarometer 78", 2012, available: http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/press_office/news_of_the_day/pdf_files/2013/eurobarometer-78-ireland-national-report.pdf.
[132] Rory Costello, 'Why Hasn't a Far-Right Party like Golden Dawn Emerged in Ireland?' *The Journal*, available: http://www.thejournal.ie/readme/far-right-ireland-golden-dawn-673169-Nov2012/
[133] Ralf Jagow, 'Ireland's Future in the European Union', *Diploma.de*, Diploma Thesis, 1996, 7.
[134] Desmond Dinan, 'Ireland', in G Dorfman and P Duigan (eds), *Politics in Western Europe* (2nd edn), USA, 1991, 356.

degree. These factors included the religious dominance of the Irish Catholic Church, which advocated against communist and socialist ideologies, Ireland's neutrality in World War II and the aftermath of accepting more capitalist ideas; and the issues of left-wing parties being in coalition governments and being more accepting of nationalist tendencies of their more dominant coalition partners.[135] All these factors limited Labour and Marxist politics's ability to contest the Irish political scene and limited the penetration of leftist eurosceptic debates.

Those on the right also found it difficult to infiltrate the Irish political landscape. Generally speaking, the right had not in the past been seen as socially acceptable due to the messages it conveyed, and as well it experienced difficulties in recruiting the right personnel, hampering efforts. In addition, Sinn Féin, "with its nationalism and anti-establishment rhetoric, [had] monopolised the support of the types of voters who might otherwise be supportive of a far-right party, that is, young nationalist working-class men".[136] This created a situation where European matters were expressed by more centralist parties in Ireland due to the weakness of the kind of militant left and right wing movements seen in the UK. Traditionally since 1960, the Labour Party (until 1973), and Sinn Féin were certainly active and had at numerous times been able to draw support for their anti-European message. But at which particular point and to what extent requires further inquiry. The dynamics may have changed since 2001 regarding Europe but the support from the eurosceptic voter does not essentially mean a vote for a far right or left party; it is concentrated towards the centre-left of Labour, The Greens, Sinn Féin and, until its recent collapse, the United Left Alliance. Voting patterns have thus not changed and essentially the same type of parties have capitalised on anti-European sentiment since the early 1960s, with the Irish Labour Party being the only exception.

Eurosceptic views have clearly been present in Irish politics for many years in Ireland and concerns over the European Project were present well before 2001.To the extent that there was a functioning far left, opposition has come from other smaller left-centralist political parties, such as the Workers Party, the Greens and Democratic Left, which have all played a part in denouncing the project previous to this date. So too have

[135] Costello, 'Why Hasn't a Far-Right Party like Golden Dawn Emerged in Ireland?'
[136] Costello, 'Why Hasn't a Far-Right Party like Golden Dawn Emerged in Ireland?'

socialist parties, with the Irish Workers League (IWL), Irish Communist Party and Marxist Revolutionary Group featuring on the anti-EC side of the debate.

Beyond these parties, non-government organisations had also been vocal in their critique of the European Union prior to 2001. The Wolfe Tone Society, Common Market Study Group, Common Market Defence Campaign (CMDC), Republican Movement, Irish Sovereignty Movement and National Platform for EU Research all promoted anti-EC rhetoric. Associations and collectives also clustered around Conradh Na Gaeilge, Irish Women Against the Common Market, the Irish Farmers Association, Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) and Irish Fishers all showed signs of anti-Europe tendencies. In addition, trade unions, such as the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union (ITGWU), have opposed entry and closer ties with Europe. As well, religious organizations such as the Irish Catholic Church and prominent individuals like Anthony Coughlan, Raymond Crotty, Joe Quigley, Andy Johnston, John Maguire and Maolsheachlann O Caollai, can all be classified as at least partially euro critical, given their roles and responsibilities in denouncing the European idea. While clearly not dominating political debate in Ireland, these groups all presented an anti-Europe case prior to 2001. While marginal, to argue that euroscepticism suddenly began in 2001 appears erroneous. The emphasis on 2001 has overshadowed the fact that euroscepticism has been part of Irish history since the EEC concept was first mooted as early as 1960, and even prior.

Thesis and methodology

This thesis intends examining the issues outlined in this introduction and will trace the origins of Irish euroscepticism prior to 2001 along chronological lines. A historical rather than political science approach to this study will be adopted, as a historically-based inquiry will help establish the antecedents and development of euroscepticism, reinforcing the notion that Irish euroscepticism did not appear from nowhere, but had historical roots and causation. Moreover, a historically-based inquiry will enable the identification of the key sources of Irish euroscepticism, both in the political system and outside it, as well as an understanding of how the character and constituency of Irish euroscepticism has developed over time in response to changing national and international circumstances. The specific argument adopted and sustained throughout the research will be that Irish euroscepticism is not a new and contemporary

phenomenon beginning in 2001, rather it constitutes a longer tradition that has been part and parcel of Irish-European relations ever since the idea of joining Europe was first proposed.

The reason for addressing this problem and understanding the nature of Irish euroscepticism is important. Our attempt at understanding it is driven both by curiosity and its policy relevance, argue Jo Ritzen, Klaus Zimmermann and Caroline Wehner.[137] The thesis looks at what form euroscepticism took during different periods. It examines who was promoting this critical standpoint, what type of argument was mobilised and whether this argument changed over time.

The importance of political parties and civil society actors in Ireland are fundamental in determining who was promoting eurosceptical views in the past. However, due to the overwhelming number of anti-European groups present before 2001, this thesis will concentrate solely on five umbrella groups to ensure focused and accurate findings. The five groups consist of the Irish Labour Party, Sinn Féin and associated groups, Irish Trade Unions, non-government organisations linked to Anthony Coughlan, and the central-left wing fringe parties – Democratic Left and the Greens. As highlighted here, the main focus will be on smaller left-wing political parties within Ireland. Although documenting the narrative in this way, constitutes a narrow, top-down approach to historical inquiry, these are the sources obtained and warrent exposure on the issue. The rank and file of the party tend not to be considered within these official reports, but these messages are often silenced regardless within archival material. Thus, a top down approach, which speaks essentially from the elite few at the top, within these smaller left-wing parties' consistutes the main arguments put forward here within this thesis. In addition, the groups identified earlier outside of the political party spectrum, as evidenced by the archival material, will be used as confirmation for their role in heightening euroscepticism in Ireland's past.

Apart from a focus on political parties and groups in civil society, the thesis will devote attention to the types of arguments that were made by eurosceptics in Ireland and how they changed over time. Determining what type of argument was being promoted rests on the above examined definitions of euroscepticism and the different approaches to

[137] Jo Ritzen, Klaus Zimmermann and Caroline Wehner, 'Euroskepticism in the Crisis:
More Mood than Economy', IZA Discussion Paper, No.8001, 2004, available: http://ftp.iza.org/dp8001.pdf.

public opinion that offer evidence as to the diverse nature of scepticism within Europe. An important common element in eurosceptic thinking relates to the question of utility. Central to the discussion about the ulitarian dimension is the calculation of expected economic gains and losses through membership and when expected losses exceed gains is when scepticism emerges. Another explanation rests on the idea of democratic deficiency and is concerned with the degree to which Europe adequately represents and is accountable to its citizens. For example, euroscepticism in the early 1990s postulated that the EU's failure to live up to citizens' ideas of democracy caused them to become sceptical.[138] A different approach to understanding euroscepticism is concerned with sovereignty. The reluctance to increase the competencies of the European Project and thereby possibly weaken national sovereignty, and thus perhaps identity, is what constitutes the sovereignty dimension of euroscepticism. Finally, the rejectionist dimension can be useful also when trying to explain euroscepticism. The previously mentioned definitions of euroscepticism almost all refer to some kind of principled objection and one can argue that this rejection of Europe can be based on one, some, all, or none of the previous dimensions of euroscepticism. The idea is to evaluate the intensity or the prevalence of euroscepticism within Ireland so as to detect either a soft or hard variety. These four dimensions; utility, democratic deficiency, sovereignty and principled rejection are employed in this investigation to help explain the varieties of euroscepticism exhibited in Ireland.

The periods under review here in the thesis are incorporated as the main chapters: 1886-1949, 1950-1969, 1970-1972 and 1973-2001, which helps demonstrate how euroscepticism changes over the course of time. The development of Irish euroscepticism here initially reveals early antecendents built entirely upon hard notions of euroscepticism, calling for outright withdrawal and based on arguments focused around sovereignty and identity as well as military neutrality. As time progresses these arguments become softer in nature with a focus more commonly on democratic deficiency and utility rather than outright rejection or Europe, or alternatively with an emphasis on single issues rather than disillusionment with the entire European Project. By charting these developments, the thesis can claim not only a pre-existence of euroscepticism in Ireland, but also assist in contextualising 2001.

[138] Petr Kaniok, 'Eurosceptics – enemies or necessary part of European integration?', *Institute for Comparative Poltical Research,* available: http://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal/e89248bd-d047-465e-841a-a743fb4eb485.pdf

This historical methodology draws extensively upon primary sources concerning Irish euroscepticism, generally sourced from archives and museum collections. This first hand testimony and direct evidence relates specifically to the topic under investigation and were created by those who experienced the events and conditions being documented. A significant amount of documentation has been sourced from the National Library Dublin Archives, the National Archives Ireland and the University College Dublin Archives.

The National Library Dublin Archives constitutes the majority of primary source materials for the research. In particular, the Sean O'Mahony Papers (1880-2005), relate specifically to Irish history and various republican and nationalist movements, with an emphasis on the troubles in Northern Ireland and the contemporary Irish republican movement. Within this compendium, material relating to Sinn Féin and associated groups, Irish Trade Unions, non-government organisations with direct involvement with Anthony Coughlan, and the central-left wing fringe parties were sourced. This material targeted the 1972 referendum debate in particular, but also featured commentary towards the lead up to Irish EEC acceptance in 1973 from decades prior. Another collection drawn upon here is the Irish Labour Party Archive (1919-2014). This collection was principally composed of records held in the various headquarters of the Labour Party from 1919-2014. It included minutes of meetings of various units of the organisation; published reports, conference documentation; manifestos and policy statements; files concerning local, presidential, European and general election campaigns; files concerning constitutional referendum campaigns; periodicals; photographic prints; election ephemera; financial accounts; donations; staff files; and correspondence.

The National Archives Ireland and University College Dublin Archives were also consulted. Here more general sources of information were acquired through a number of generic collections. These materials relate more so to documents on Irish foreign policy, relevant statutes passed by Westminster and general day-to-day workings of the EEC. These materials are more pronounced in the next chapter and contribute towards understanding the first signs of early dismissive reactions to external rule and authority within Ireland.

An exhibition of primary source material was also displayed by the People's Movement in Dublin in late 2013 at The Culture Box titled 'Ireland into the EEC: The 1972 debate' where material was collated as well. In 1972 the 6-week referendum campaign saw many political and cultural figures contributing to the debate in this once-in-a-lifetime vote. These included the late Garret Fitzgerald, Tom Barry, Alan Dukes, Desmond Fennell, Jack Lynch, Michael D. Higgins, Charlie Haughey, Mary Robinson, Declan Costello, Niall Tóibín, George Colley, and Luke Kelly. At a time when an unprecedented economic crisis had prompted some to reassess Ireland's relationship with the EEC, this exhibition looked at the aspirations and concerns captured in 1972 in pamphlets, leaflets and election posters. Many of the key public policy decisions in political, economic and social areas that shaped modern Ireland over the last generation can be traced back to Ireland's joining of the EEC. Some of the areas that came up for debate were Fisheries, Foreign Policy, Agriculture, and Industry and Labour issues. These issues were dealt with in the material on exhibit: posters, pamphlets, leaflets, notices of public meetings, internal bulletins for the campaign groups, and newspaper articles. This was the first and only time the exhibition was held. This extensive collection of primary source material will provide the necessary data to fill the gaps noted in the literature review and help sustain the evidence required to justify the arguments made throughout the thesis.

Structure

The thesis moves historically through the grounds proffered for Irish euroscepticism. Chapter 2 looks at a pre-history of euroscepticism, stemming from anti-British feelings and reservations beginning with the First Home Rule Bill in 1886 and other developments at the turn of the century which can be useful in locating traces of euroscepticism in Ireland. The 1916 Easter Rising and the War of Independence which followed in 1919–1921 transformed the political landscape of Ireland and are important in locating eurosceptic dispositions.

Chapter 3 looks at Irish anti-European feelings directed towards Europe in more specific terms. This emerged around the time of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the subsequent rejection of EEC membership applications that followed in 1961 and 1967.

Chapter 4 focuses on the period known as the 'EEC Debate' and the lead up to the 1972 referendum on EEC membership. This was the most intense period, sparked widespread

debate and featured political parties, non-government organisations and significant individuals both for and against the idea.

It would seem reasonable that after 1972 and the fairly convincing 'yes' result on 10 May 1972, euroscepticism would have subsided or dissolved somewhat from Irish thought. Yet some political parties, groups and individuals continued to provide a voice against Europe after 1973. Although this element of euroscepticism was not as widespread, it did present again at the time of the *Single European Act 1987*, Maastricht Treaty (1992) and Amsterdam Treaty (1999), and this is the basis for Chapter 5, fitting into a longer narrative of Irish euroscepticism. It also attempts to account for and characterise the type of euroscepticism exhibited during this period.

The final chapter will review the origins and history of Irish euroscepticism and summarize the findings stemming from the detailed studies of the multiple stages of its development. It will show in conclusion that euroscepticism has been an inherent part of Irish thought for a long time and has consistently arisen at key moments of Ireland's history leading to the landmark decision of 2001.

The first step however is to examine the precursors to Irish euroscepticism, focusing on British imperialism and the fight for Irish independence, which will reveal the development of two important principles – the twin demands for Irish political sovereignty and military neutrality – which re-emerged in the post World War II period. In many regards they became by-products of Irish nationalism and the struggle for independence in the early 20th century. These two important principles were an integral part of nationalist understandings of what it meant to be Irish, but they also became the cornerstones of future anti-European thought.

Chapter 2
Early antecedents of Irish euroscepticism: 1886–1949

Having discussed in the previous chapter the literature surrounding euroscepticism and Irish attitudes towards Europe, it is necessary to document the longer tradition of Irish euroscepticism. As the previous chapter demonstrated, the literature in the field has largely overlooked anti-European attitudes and developments in Ireland prior to the first Treaty of Nice. Although scholarship on euroscepticism in general, and Irish euroscepticism in particular, has begun to emerge, an understanding of more recent events can be achieved only with a detailed analysis of the phenomenon's deeper historical roots.

This chapter attempts to understand Irish euroscepticism through consideration of earlier significant events in Irish history. While acknowledging that euroscepticism itself did not exist prior to the establishment of the EEC, historical analysis of earlier developments can help to explain the inclination in some sections of Irish society and politics to embrace and express Eurosceptic views in the age of the EEC. The discourse surrounding the Irish republican movement, the First Home Rule Bill, the Second Home Rule Bill and following developments until Ireland was officially declared a republic reveals similarities with later engagements with the issue of Ireland's place in Europe. Thought processes which involved anti-British feelings and reservations connected to this earlier anti-colonial struggle are useful in explaining why some sections of the Irish community were resentful towards this supra-national entity later. This growing thirst for independence and increased distrust towards external control and authority became paramount, where the important concepts of neutrality and sovereignty developed for the first time. These notions, based on impartiality and a desire for self-governance, became the catch-cry arguments against European integration in Ireland, which underscored Irish euroscepticism.

Although acknowledging that opposition to British rule remains a free standing political position regardless of whether the EU and its forerunners had come into existence, the idea of independence in this context demonstrates similarities between this and opposition towards Europe. This independence manifested in sovereignty to which concepts like neutrality appealed to the Irish situation makes plausible sense as to why observers should view the Irish independence struggle against Britain in the 18th and

19th centuries as an earlier explanation of euroscepticism present in the later 20th century. British rule may not be a proto-form of euroscepticism but it does help appease those arguments and positions sought later against European integration.

Founded in 1905, "to establish in Ireland's capital a national legislature endowed with the moral authority of the Irish nation"[1], Sinn Féin infiltrated the political scene and became the main political party committed to the ideal of Irish nationalism, and hence became one of the strongest advocates of these important characteristics, which would be established for future generations to follow. Sinn Féin was important during this period as it was the main political body that represented Irish independence. It did not buy into the idea of 'active union' with Britain and demanded independence from everything. It was an active participant in the events leading up to the question of Europe being posed after the Second World War.

The history of Irish sovereignty and neutrality had its roots firmly established in the long-standing rule of Ireland by Britain. The Irish predisposition towards non-involvement in international relations predates both the establishment of the Irish Republic, as well as the establishment of the Irish Free State as a self-governing dominion within the British Commonwealth.[2] At the heart of Ireland's stance on neutrality lies the desire not to be involved in Britain's wars.[3] This can be attributed in no small part to the collective yearning of the Irish people for self-determination and sovereignty, the two things which had eluded them for hundreds of years under British rule. Some sections of the community embraced these core values and attempted to fight off the powerful economic and political influence of their great neighbour.

Before 1922, the biggest obstacle facing Irish people was that of a perceived lack of freedom. The Irish struggle has always directly related to freedom says Trevor Salmon.[4] This desire for freedom was not only expressed solely through direct confrontation with the British, but also by the refusal to engage in Britain's wars. Such was the aversion to recruitment into the British army, that after the First World War, Britain decided to impose conscription in 1918. Although never enforced, this British decision had the

[1] Arthur Griffith, *The Resurrection of Hungary: A Parallel for Ireland*, (3rd edn), Dublin, 1918, 161.
[2] R Fanning, 'Irish Neutrality: An Historical Review', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 1982, 27.
[3] Patrick Schwanberg, 'Ireland"s Neutrality and European Security Policy Integration', MA Thesis, 2012 available: http://essay.utwente.nl/62218/
[4] Trevor Salmon, *Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy*, Oxford, 1989, 83.

effect of acting as a basis for future Irish governments to desist from international military commitment.[5]

At the time of the outbreak of the First World War, support in Ireland for the war was generally strong, regardless of political affiliation; however, some Irish people's experience of war was complex and the memory of it proved divisive. The 1916 Easter Rising revealed the first armed push for independence, providing another antecedent worth noting.[6] The biggest supporter of neutrality and sovereignty from 1916 onwards was De Valera. De Valera pushed for Irish independence backed by stark references to neutrality and sovereignty in order to mark his own position in society, but also to take into consideration what he felt the majority of Irish citizens were after – independence from Britain. Although the 1916 rising was unpopular initially, public opinion did change from the beginning of the conflict to the end.[7] The most illustrative manifestation of Ireland's struggle for freedom, and one which resonates deeply with Irish people to this day, presented itself in the form of the Easter Rising of 1916.[8]

In many ways this shaped the way Ireland interacted with Europe later, as dialogue on these very issues was so heavily entrenched as part of the political discourse. As mentioned before Britain's intention to impose conscription in Ireland in 1918 further provoked and exacerbated widespread resistance to external control. This was the first time that sovereignty became a recognisable goal for some Irish citizens as they attempted to proclaim the Republic of Ireland.[9] At the end of the Great War, Sinn Féin managed to win the Irish general election of 1918 and used this as a platform to implement the Irish Declaration of Independence. This move sparked the Irish War of Independence in 1919, followed by the Irish Civil War in 1921[10], where the commitment to fight for independence was displayed – something that left a mark on many Irish citizens, well before they addressed the question of Europe.[11]

Salmon claims that after 1922 Ireland constantly favoured economic and social concerns over a strict adherence to the established duties of a neutral and sovereign

[5] Salmon, *Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy*, 83.
[6] Tim White & Denis Marnane, 'The Politics of Remembrance: Commemorating 1916', *Irish Political Studies*, vol 31, no 1, 2016, 33.
[7] Bernard Cook, *Women and War*, vol 1, 2006, 311.
[8] Schwanberg, 'Ireland"s Neutrality and European Security Policy Integration', 8.
[9] See The 1916 Proclamation, 'The Proclamation of the Irish Republic 1916', 2016, available: http://the1916proclamation.ie/
[10] See Bill Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, Oxford, 2005
[11] See Gavin Foster, *The Irish Civil War and Society*, New York. 2015

state.[12] This affirmed that the practice of Irish neutrality and sovereignty did not correspond specifically to a traditional definition, but was subjected to the geopolitical and economic situations that existed at the time. Thus, Irish euroscepticism evolved from these earlier developments and was used later as arguments against European integration.

Following the Balfour Declaration of 1926 and the Statute of Westminster in 1931, the Irish Free State became an independent constitutional monarchy, breaking away from most forms of British control. Although the Irish Free State never formally adopted the Statute of Westminster, its Executive Council took the view that the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 had already ended Westminster's right to legislate for the Free State.[13] Dominion status was not overly popular at the time and was generally regarded as a British face-saving exercise.

In 1932 Eamon De Valera, after securing victory in the general election, began removing the monarchical elements of the constitution, and with the outbreak of World War II provided the foundations for further independence, as neutrality and sovereignty were extensively questioned during this period. However, it was not until the *Republic of Ireland Act* in 1948 that Ireland formally became a republic the following year. This Act formally established all rights to self-government for Ireland.[14]

The period from 1886 to 1949 was characterised by a gradual build-up of resentment towards British control, where the key concepts of neutrality and sovereignty emerged. Slowly these two issues became vital factors in Irish society and the independence movement, to be directed towards Europe later. Prior to and following the formation of the Irish Free State, the Irish appealed to the principles of neutrality and sovereignty to demonstrate independence from British rule and influence.[15] Anti-colonialism and the campaign for soveignty in Ireland fed a political desire for neutrality. This is essentially where arguments against Europe can be located, as Ireland was wary of external control through a difficult but recent history with Britain, marked exclusively by this anti-colonial struggle. The forms of revolutionary and cultural activism developed by the

[12] Salmon, *Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy*, 305.
[13] Thomas Mohr, 'British Imperial Statutes and Irish Sovereignty: Statutes Passed After the Creation of the Irish Free State', *The Journal of Legal History*, vol 32, no 1, 2011, 61-85.
[14] Hurst Hannum, *Autonomy, Soverignty and Self-Determination*, revised edn., Philadelphia, 1996, 229.
[15] Ryan Johnson, 'Neutrality but not Isolated: Adapting Irish Defence Policy to a Changing Europe', 2001, available: https://martindale.cc.lehigh.edu/sites/martindale.cc.lehigh.edu/files/Johnson.pdf, 3.

Irish against the entrenched self interest of its rule by the British meant that it remained the standard bearer for all anti-colonial movements.[16] So successful was this anti-colonial movement that "it provided a model for all future anti-colonial struggles"[17] and must be acknowledged as playing a significant role in future developments within the country itself. After Ireland gained independence, she did not want to be under the yoke of her economically and politically powerful neighbour, Britain. As Collins puts it, the "Irish struggle has always been for freedom – freedom from English occupation, English domination".[18]

Irish republicanism, 1780–1886

Irish republicanism incorporated an ideology based on the belief that all of Ireland should be an independent republic, and may thus be regarded as one of the sources of Irish euroscepticism. The concept of 'Active Union' between Britain and Ireland before 1886, when Ireland was a colonial power of the UK, exacerbated tension between the two countries. The development of nationalistic and democratic sentiment emerged throughout Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, and this was reflected in Ireland through the emergence of republicanism in opposition to British rule. This period contained hundreds of years of British conquest and Irish resistance through rebellion.[19] Discrimination against Catholics and non-conformists, attempts by the British administration to suppress Irish culture, and the belief that Ireland was economically disadvantaged as a result of the *Act of Union 1707*, were among the specific factors leading to such opposition. Irish republicanism can be linked to later developments towards elements of Irish euroscepticism, particularly resentments towards Europe, through the determined belief in Ireland being able to control her own affairs, free from the influence of others. This began with Britain, but eventually lent itself more towards the higher authority of the EEC and then the EU.

The very first signs of Irish republicanism can be traced to the 1780s, led primarily by liberal Protestants, forming the group known as the Society of United Irishmen.[20] This group evolved into a revolutionary republican organisation thanks to revolutionary France, but was inspired mainly by what was happening in the United States. The group

[16] Robert Young, *Postcolonialism: An introduction*, Carlton, 2001, 302.
[17] Young, *Postcolonialism: An introduction*, 302.
[18] Salmon, *Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy*, 83.
[19] Daltún Ó Ceallaigh, *New Perspectives on Ireland: Colonialism & Identity*, Dublin, 1998.
[20] United Irishmen, *Society of United Irishmen of Dublin – Let The Nation Stand*, Dublin, 1794.

managed to launch the 1798 Rebellion[21] with the backing of French troops, having some success before being repressed quickly by the British. In 1803 a second attempt at revolution was staged by the group led by Robert Emmet; however, again the revolution was suppressed quickly and Emmet was hanged for his role in the uprising. These initial confrontations with Britain were to be the cornerstone for future developments that would transpire, and reveal a slowly increasing hostility towards external rule.

Forming in the 1830s was a group known as the Young Ireland Movement, a political and cultural organisation that was initially part of Daniel O'Connell's Repeal Association.[22] The Repeal Association attempted to campaign for a repeal of the *Act of Union 1800* between Great Britain and Ireland.[23] It was essentially an Irish mass membership political movement. However, disagreement between the two groups led to a parting of ways over the use of violence in campaign demonstrations. The Young Ireland Movement, after breaking away from its main ally, staged an abortive uprising in 1848, known as the Young Irelander Rebellion. This failed attempt, however, revealed public dissatisfaction with British rule, saw a number of leaders exiled to Van Diemen's Land, and some escapees make their way to the United States.[24] In the United States some former members were able to establish links with others to form the Fenian Brotherhood. Together with the Irish Republican Brotherhood, founded in Ireland in 1858 by James Stephens, they created a group known as the Fenians that dedicated their time and effort towards the overthrow of the British from Irish lands.[25] They effectively staged the Fenian Rising in 1867[26] and a dynamite campaign in Great Britain in the 1880s.[27] The dynamite campaign strategy was undertaken in order to establish a sense of terror by causing widespread and arbitrary destruction in British urban centres.[28] For the first time in British history the Irish question was not confined to Ireland, but affected daily life in British cities through the unprecedented experience of political violence. The dynamite campaign was planned, organised and funded by Irish-

[21] Alston Cumberland, *The History of the Irish Rebellion in the Year 1798,* vol 1, New York, 1808.
[22] Richard Davis, *The Young Ireland Movement,* Toronto & New Jersey, 1988.
[23] Christine Kinealy, 'John Hughes: Archbishop', in James Byrne, Phillip Coleman and Jason King (eds), *Ireland and the Americas,* vol 2, California, 2008, 433.
[24] Kinealy, 'John Hughes: Archbishop', 433.
[25] Niamh O'Sullivan, *Every Dark Hour: A History of Kilmainham Jail,* Wales, 2007, 70.
[26] O'Sullivan, *Every Dark Hour: A History of Kilmainham Jail*, 76.
[27] Adrian Wisnicki, *Conspiracy, Revolution, and Terrorism from Victorian Fiction to the Modern Novel,* New York, 2008, 145.
[28] Shane Kenna, 'The Fenian Dynamite Campaign and the Irish American Impetus for Dynamite Terror, 1881–1885', *Student Pulse,* vol.3, no.12, 2011, available: http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/602/the-fenian-dynamite-campaign-and-the-irish-american-impetus-for-dynamite-terror-1881-1885.

Americans using advances in modern science, technology and the increasing globalisation of Victorian society. Thus, the stage was set for future developments, linked to this fixation to claim Ireland's rightful place as its own entity as expressed by the Fenians. The situations that had unfolded revealed a practical example of standing up against external rule and authority from a very early time.

First Home Rule Bill (1886) and Second Home Rule Bill (1893)

Home rule came to dominate domestic British politics in the period from 1886 to the start of the First World War. The campaign for home rule essentially started in Ireland in the 1870s, but it was not until the 1880s that the then liberal prime minister, William Gladstone, was in favour of it. The demand for such a measure was evident amongst mainly middle class Irish citizens, who demanded the Irish Parliament make laws governing domestic issues, while foreign affairs would remain solely the responsibility of the British Parliament. Home rule was the name given to the process of allowing Ireland more say in how it was governed, freeing it from the rule of London and thus appeasing those in Ireland who wanted Ireland to have more power. One of the main barriers to home rule for decades had been the House of Lords.[29]

The First Home Rule Bill[30] was the first major attempt made by a British government to enact a law creating home rule for part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. It was introduced on 8 April 1886 by Gladstone to create a devolved assembly for Ireland that would govern Ireland in specified areas. The Irish Parliamentary Party under Charles Stewart Parnell had been campaigning for home rule for Ireland since the 1870s but expressed reservations about the terms of the Bill. A vote on the Bill took place two months after its introduction, however, it was voted down on 8 June 1886. The House of Lords killed off the First Home Rule Bill, believing it would weaken the UK and encourage others in the empire to try to break away.

The First Home Rule Bill encouraged freedom amongst mainly middle class Irish citizens who had so long been asking for less British control. At the same time a Land League formed that appealed very much to Irish nationalism and aimed more specifically at securing rights for tenant farmers, hoping to reduce the number of

[29] Michael Rush, 'The House of Lords: The Political Context' in Brice Dickson & Paul Carmichael (eds.) *The House of Lords: its Parliamentary and Judicial Roles*, Oxford, 1999, 8.
[30] Hansard 1803-2005, 'Government of Ireland Bill', April 1886.

evictions that had been seen in Ireland during this period. The period of the Land League's agitation was known as the Land War, primarily aimed at abolishing landlordism in Ireland and enabling tenant farmers to own the land they worked on. Gladstone essentially drafted the First Home Rule Bill himself without support or advice from fellow colleagues, and this is what Parnell expressed doubts over at the time. Given the disparities between the Parnellite program of October 1885 and the Gladstonian measures of April 1886, and given the relatively slight consultation between the prime minister and nationalist leaders, it was hardly surprising that the Irish should have greeted the First Home Rule Bill with such caution.[31] Parnell welcomed the decision initially, but he recognised the heavy financial burden that would ensue and openly opposed the suggested arrangement involving separate voting in the legislature.

The Bill was introduced in tandem with the new Land Purchase Bill, and this caused much confusion and controversy amongst Irish citizens.[32] While many Catholic Irish remained against anything less than complete independence[33], a division remained between nationalists in the countryside and the people in Dublin. Many in Dublin looked upon the land movement as something for peasants.[34] Nationalists from the countryside entered Dublin to promote their cause, and some of them resorted to a traditional method regarding a difference of opinion as to what should be done – violence against their fellow Irish citizens. The more unlikely the Bill was to succeed the better for Parnell; "its defeat would not impair his standing, indeed the surer the bill was to fall, the more fully it could be supported".[35]

The Home Rulers' case built on the notion that the existing arrangement between Britain and Ireland had brought about a weakened social order, and an opportunity to re-address the historical wrongs experienced by the Irish at the hands of the British. The Bill, they claimed, gave adequate recognition to the interests of minorities.[36] Thus, the First Home Rule Bill was an important milestone for a sense of what Irish independence might look like. It marked the official point of dissatisfaction with external control. Many of those who wanted Home Rule dismissed some of its details as unworkable,

[31] Alvin Jackson, *Home Rule: An Irish History 1800 –2000*, New York, 2003, 61.
[32] Jackson, *Home Rule: An Irish History 1800–2000*, 69.
[33] John Foran and Chris McAuley, 'The Struggle For Irish Independence, 1921', *USCB Case Method,* Department of Sociology, UC Santa Barbara, 2002, available:
http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/projects/casemethod/foranmcauley.html#_ftn1.
[34] Samuel Clark, *Social Origins of the Irish Land War*, New Jersey, 1979, 234.
[35] Jackson, *Home Rule: An Irish History 1800–2000*, 62.
[36] Jackson, *Home Rule: An Irish History 1800–2000*, 61.

and the land purchase measure attracted even sharper criticism, especially among liberals and nationalists. The undertones of a nationalistic element amongst certain sections of the Irish community were evident and increased from this point on. This began the process of resentment towards external control, something that would be questioned again when the idea of Europe emerged decades later.

The Government of Ireland Bill 1893 was the second attempt made by Gladstone to enact a system of home rule for Ireland. The second home rule episode differed significantly from the 1886 case in a number of ways. First, the idea of Irish self-governance, both for and against, had been fully aired. Second, both nationalist factions had been consulted about the case, and lastly Gladstone had time to correct previous defects.[37] Parnell's legacy was of extreme importance in Anglo-Irish relations; quite simply the restoration of an Irish legislature for Irish affairs was the minimum acceptable outcome for most Irish citizens at this time. Attempts at making the Union work by providing extensions to local government, were no longer viable solutions to the Irish problem. Gladstone was fully aware of this, and in 1892 he was re-elected prime minister with home rule as Liberal Party policy and an election promise. In 1893 the Bill managed to pass through the House of Commons but was later defeated by the House of Lords, which declined to recognise that the authority by which the Bill had been carried was that of the nation. Thus, Gladstone provided the blueprint for devolution as an alternative to the weary cycle of outrage and coercion, but was not able to implement the idea.

The first and second failure of the Home Rule Bill were important in locating future disagreements regarding Europe, as it led to an increase in disenchantment within Ireland towards British decision-making ability. One of the most striking features of the whole episode was the extent to which the British party system accommodated the revolutionary challenge of Irish nationalism. The historian William Lubenow said that, the party system revolutionised the Home Rule issue by domesticating it, by making it a creature of parliamentary politics, and by so containing it for thirty years.[38] This strained future relations with external authority amongst Irish citizens, who became concerned about the intentions of others. It also saw endless bickering within the Irish Parliamentary Party, which did not fold but rather continued to grow substantially,

[37] Alan O'Day, *Irish Home Rule, 1867-1921*, Manchester, 1998, 155.
[38] W C Lubenow, *Parliamentary Politics and the Home Rule Question*, Oxford, 1988, 327-332.

leading to the introduction of new ideas, fresh people and stimulating ideas in the hope for a 'New Ireland'.[39] Citizens also started turning their attention back to their Gaelic heritage, which was emphasised, among many other manifestations, by the Gaelic Athletic Association set up in 1884. The driving force behind the organisation was Michael Cusack, an Irish-speaking civil servant. Like other proponents of the Irish-Ireland Movement, Cusack sought to preserve the native culture and halt the incursion of English habits and customs.[40] This popular and non-intellectual movement spread an interest in native sports and re-enforced all things Irish, which presented as a challenge later when the idea of Europe arose. The rapid expansion of the Gaelic Athletic Association was due in large part to structuring along parish lines[41], a familiar framework, with Archbishop Thomas Croke being heavily involved. Archbishop Croke was a strong supporter of Irish nationalism, aligning himself with the Irish National Land League during the Land War, and with the chairman of the Irish Parliamentary Party, Charles Stewart Parnell. This provided the Gaelic Athletic Association with nationalist credentials and contributed to the almost instant success of the organisation.[42] As some Irish became increasingly more aware of losing their distinct nationality, this would present as a later challenge when the idea of Europe emerged.

The Boer War, 1899–1902

The idea of Irish neutrality predates Irish independence to the time of the Boer War, where Irish neutrality influenced relations with Britain. A commitment to neutrality first emerged in Ireland in the run up to the Boer War with the aim of keeping Ireland out of Britain's imperial wars.[43] This neutrality was linked to an anti-colonial struggle from very early on. Despite Ireland being an integral part of the United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland, the Irish national press actually supported the Boer forces in the ensuing conflict.[44] Support for Boer forces was also evident with two volunteer commando units joining the Orange Free State and the South African Republic.. At the same time, a few nationalists and the Irish Neutrality Association were able to emphasise and commit to

[39] Robert Lynch, *Revolutionary Ireland, 1912-25*, London & New York, 2015, 13.
[40] James Patrick Byrne, Philip Coleman, Jason Francis King, *Ireland and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History*, vol 2, California, 2008, 359.
[41] Byrne, Coleman, King, *Ireland and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History*, 359.
[42] Byrne, Coleman, King, *Ireland and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History*, 359.
[43] Till Geiger, 'Irish Neutrality and East-West Trade, 1945-55', 2006, available: http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers3/Geiger101.pdf, 4.
[44] Geiger, 'Irish Neutrality and East-West Trade, 1945-55', 4.

a "specific concept of neutrality".[45] This vague commitment to neutrality was to be the hallmark of Irish national political identity[46] that emerged as a reluctance to engage in 'other people's wars'. However, the concept was more an aspiration than a reality, yet it remained an important consideration that was to be the starting point for future developments involving European integration.

Sinn Féin

The Gaelic League was founded in 1893 for the purpose of re-establishing Irish language and culture.[47] The political growth of the league culminated in 1905 with the founding of the Sinn Féin movement (We Ourselves), by Arthur Griffith.[48] This was an organisation that supported withdrawing Irish members from the British Parliament and setting up an Irish Parliament along with abandoning constitutional methods of bringing about the repeal of the 1800 *Act of Union*. Griffith's plan was to follow the Hungarian example of 1861. The plan called for a boycott of the British army and navy, and no Irish members were to be sent to London, where an extra legal Irish Parliament was to be established in Dublin.[49] A court system would also be established, English goods boycotted, and a general program of non-cooperation with the English was to be instituted within Ireland under the guidance of the Sinn Féin movement.[50]

During 1910, the Sinn Féin movement seemed dormant and without a dominant leader.[51] Other Irish nationalist organisations were growing at this particular time. Larkin, the Irish socialist leader, had witnessed abroad new ideas and new ways of thinking, particularly stemming from industrial workers out of America. The Irish Republican Brotherhood that was a secret oath-bound fraternal organisation, linked to Sinn Féin attempted to establish an 'independent democratic republic' in Ireland between 1858 and 1924.[52] The Irish Republican Brotherhood played an important role in the history of Ireland as the chief advocate of republicanism during the campaign for Ireland's independence from the UK. It was a successor movement to the United Irishmen of the 1790s and the Young Irelanders of the 1840s. This organisation was

[45] Thomas E Hachey, 'The Rhetoric and Reality of Irish Neutrality,' *New Hibernia Review,* vol 6, no 4, 2002, 27.
[46] Geiger, 'Irish Neutrality and East-West Trade, 1945-55', 5.
[47] Pádraig Ó Riagáin, *Language Policy and Social Reproduction : Ireland 1893-1993,* Oxford, 2002, 8.
[48] Margaret Scanlan, *Culture and Customs of Ireland,* Westport, 2006, xiii.
[49] William Eleroy Curtis, *One Irish Summer*, Cambridge, 1909, 208.
[50] Curtis, *One Irish Summer*, 208.
[51] Ellie Halevy, *The Rule of Democracy (1905-1914),* New York, 1961, 538.
[52] Owen McGee, *The IRB: The Irish Republican Brotherhood from The Land League to Sinn Féin*, Dublin, 2005, 15.

revived by James Connolly, and according to the author of the Irish *Home Rule Convention*, in conjunction with Sinn Féin, placed home rule and other various Irish problems above a victory for the allied powers during World War I.[53]

It was argued by Sinn Féin that for over 1,000 years Ireland had exercised her full sovereign status, and for another 500 years the full exercise of that sovereignty was frustrated.[54] Ireland, it was claimed, never surrendered her sovereign status, and no power possessing the title of conquest by compact or by treaty could claim to exercise control over Irish sovereignty, for Irish sovereignty existed despite British suppression of it.[55] Therefore, Sinn Féin argued that Ireland was a sovereign state and had always been, but it had in fact been suppressed due to British rule. Sinn Féin's historical interpretation of sovereignty was thus historically rooted. It had its roots in the Irish cultural revival at the end of the 19th century and the growing nationalist disenchantment with the constitutional home rule movement.

The founder, Arthur Griffith, in 1899 established the first of the patriotic journals, *The United Irishman,* in which he advocated complete national self-reliance. The movement was not, at first, an overtly political one, nor did it advocate violence. Its method was, rather, one of passive resistance to all things English and included an attempted revival of Irish Gaelic. This can be seen in the 1919 Democratic Programme of the first Dáil, where it was declared that "the nation's sovereignty extends not only to all men and women of the nation but to all its material possessions".[56] All the characteristics for independence were believed to be available, but they simply were not possible due to suppression by Britain's rule. A history, culture and language had always been present, meaning a distinctively individual and separate nation was always present; it was just not able to exercise its sovereign rights, according to Sinn Féin, when it certainly could have been.

Within the broad church that was the post-1916 Sinn Féin movement, there existed deep divisions regarding the final relationship that a self-governing Ireland should have with the British Empire and Crown.[57] This resentment towards Britain contained the

[53] George Russell, *The Irish Home Rule Convention*, New York, 1917, 19.
[54] Thomas Hennessey, *Dividing Ireland: World War One and Partition,* New York, 1998, 160.
[55] Hennessey, *Dividing Ireland: World War One and Partition,* 160.
[56] Katy Hayward and Mary C Murphy (eds), *The Europeanization of Party Politics in Ireland, North and South*, Oxon, 2010
[57] Hennessey, *Dividing Ireland: World War One and Partition,* 162.

potential to develop into a battle against any type of external rule or control. Sinn Féin was a coalition of extreme and moderate nationalists who were united in their ideological commitment to a free and united Ireland. Sinn Féin's early discourse revealed an acceptance that these important characteristics were evident, but due to British rule they could not be successfully fulfilled. This awareness of British rule infiltrated Sinn Féin party dialogue and was an important consideration when the question of Europe and other European considerations were raised later. The struggle to gain the ability to decide on her own, was a long drawn-out process, marked by setbacks and frustrations. According to Sinn Féin, the partition of Ireland was merely an innovation of the British government's tried and trusted colonial strategy of divide and rule, used throughout is former colonial empires.[58]

World War I and Easter Rising

The majority of Irish nationalists agreed in principle to support Britain in the war as an avenue to gain Ireland's own independence, and for the protection of Catholic Belgium. The first practical call for neutrality, though, came during World War I when some Irish refused to participate. Neutrality was espoused during World War I by the Irish Neutrality League and its president, James Connolly. On 17 October 1914, the Irish Neutrality League held a mass meeting on the issue of neutrality and the war.[59] The demonstration was principally intended to act as a set off to Mr John Redmond's recent recruiting meeting in Mansion House, and to define the position of Ireland in relation to the present European War. Here, Connolly drew attention to the issues regarding war and Ireland's involvement in it:

> He had with him on the platform men drawn from all classes. There were labour men there, and men who by no stretch of the imagination could be called labour men. They had Home Rulers and Republicans, Socialists and Sinn Féiners. They had members of the sane section of the Volunteers, members of the Citizen Army, and representatives of Cumann na mBan, Inghinidhe na hÉireann, and the various Franchise Leagues in Ireland. All of these represented ideals that were strangely different and ideas of the future that were strangely hostile. They represented many diverse ideas that for the time being were relinquished, so that they could come together on a common platform. But having mentioned the things they disagreed on, he would now turn

[58] Sinn Féin, "Freedom", May 1991, available: http://www.sinnfein.org/documents/freedom.html.
[59] James Connolly, "Ireland and the War: The Position of the Nation", 1997, available: https://www.marxists.org/archive/connolly/1914/10/irewar.htm.

> to the one thing upon which they all agreed, namely, that the interests of Ireland were more dear to them than the interests of the British Empire.[60]

They wanted to emphasise the fact that the enemies of England were not necessarily the enemies of Ireland. It was their duty to gather together the forces in Ireland so that they might place their country in the position they believed she ought to occupy, a position of neutrality. Their duty expressed was to Ireland and Ireland alone, revealing the strong commitment to Irish neutrality that would remain with the Irish throughout the twentieth century.

It was essentially radical nationalist groups in Ireland that rejected participation in the war, but more importantly opposed enlistment, and this was what spurred them into armed conflict against the British in Easter 1916, known as the Easter Rising. Sir Roger Casement and Arthur Griffith, two notable nationalists during this time, revealed strong anti-war sentiment and thought the war created the ideal opportunity to gain independence for Ireland. The Irish Republican Brotherhood had decided at the early stages of the war that a rebellion must occur at some time during the war. The Proclamation of the Irish Republic of Easter 1916 marked the beginning of the rise against British authority. This proclamation had not been adopted by an elected body but merely by the Easter rebels claiming to act in the name of the Irish people for the benefit of Ireland. Essentially, it was a document issued by Irish volunteers and the Irish Citizens Army. In further analysis of the document it was evident that the Military Council of the Irish Brotherhood would style itself as a provisional type government of the Irish Republic, free from the UK. The reading of the proclamation by Patrick Pearse in the streets of Dublin marked the beginning of the Easter Rising, where the General Post Office (GPO) became the military headquarters for the Easter rebels. The GPO was taken just prior to the reading and copies of the proclamation were then, and still are today, treated as a revered Irish nationalist icon.[61]

The Easter 1916 rising represented in the minds of some a 'blood sacrifice' for an Ireland that had become apathetic.[62] The Gaelic American president, Wilson, knew of Roger Casement's intentions to land arms in Ireland and warned the British government

[60] Connolly, "Ireland and the War: The Position of the Nation".
[61] Raymond Daly and Derek Warfield, *Celtic & Ireland in song and story*, Michigan, 2008, 149.
[62] Edmund Curtis, *A History of Ireland*, New York, 1961, 406.

just prior to the Easter Rising.[63] Casement, a man of strong nationalist sympathies had visited London in 1914 to arrange for the Irish Volunteers to bring weapons into Howth. Professor MacNeill, the nominal leader of the Irish Volunteers, had arranged for a parade to be held on Easter Sunday, but later found out the parade was to be the base of the rebellion and cancelled the event. By this time, however, the promised aid from Germany had fallen through, and in spite of MacNeill's order, a few Irish decided to go ahead with the uprising. James Connolly and Patrick Pearse were the leaders of the 1,000 person force, and on 24 April 1916, the Monday after Easter, the group took over several buildings in Dublin.[64] The Irish patriots managed to hold out for nearly a week. The uprising was not overly supported by public opinion at the time and was quickly suppressed by the British. The insurrection did not have universal appeal.[65] However, the court-martials that occurred afterwards led to an increased sympathy for radical Irish nationalism. Attempts to extend conscription to Ireland in 1918 also raised this sympathy to greater heights.

General incompetence by the British government and the arrest of thousands of men, including some from England, was what evoked an even greater hatred towards the British amongst some of the population. The men that were executed became nationalist martyrs. Had the British dealt with the situation in a more sensible way they could have possibly prevented Sinn Féin and the Irish radical cause gaining momentum. George Russell explained the situation well when he spoke of, "a muddling nation trying to govern one of the cleverest countries in the world".[66] As the British were not able to cause a setback to Sinn Féin's determined republican outlook, the Irish radical cause gained momentum, due to Britain's poor decision making at the time. British policy increased the rhetoric and hatred towards external control in Ireland, something that would be embodied by Sinn Féin and the general Irish public.

The Easter rebels revealed hostility to British rule and an awareness of the negative implications that external control brought. The Easter rebels, consisting mainly of the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic, had stated in the proclamation of the republic that:

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[63] *New York Times*, 27 April 1916, 1-4.
[64] Taoiseach, "1916 Commemorations", 2015, available: http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Historical_Information/1916_Commemorations/1916_Commemorations_1.pdf.
[65] Patrick Mannion, 'Newfoundland Responses to the Easter Rebellion and the Rise of Sinn Féin, 1916-1919', *Newfoundland and Labrador Studies*, vol 24, no 2, 2009.
[66] John Quinn and George Russell, *Irish Home Rule Convention*, New York, 1917, 28.

> We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and feasible. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government has not extinguished that right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people ... we hereby proclaim the Irish republic as a sovereign independent state. The Irish republic is entitled to, and hereby claims the allegiance of every Irishman and Irishwoman.[67]

What this entailed was a form of resistance to occupation, mimicked by nationalists who did not agree with outside control and rule of Ireland. For republican separatists the Union was merely a symbol of British domination of Ireland where Ireland's claim to national sovereignty was perfectly clear.[68] Centuries of frustrations over unequal treatment under British rule would ensure complete separation, and independence was regarded as the best way to progress. The Irish struggle had always been about freedom, freedom from English occupation and freedom from English domination.[69] A collective yearning for self-determination and sovereignty thus became commonplace after years of occupation and continued to influence Irish political discourse.

In 1918 the British government voted to extend conscription for World War I to Ireland, a policy that would have a profound impact on future Irish policymaking. As stated by Irish historian Patrick Keatinge, the decision for conscription in Ireland:

> was to establish significant restrictions on future Irish political leaders faced with the issue of some form of military participation in international politics; the popular basis of Irish neutrality was enshrined in 1918.[70]

However, the commitment was still in its infancy, and after fighting in a bloody war, Irish negotiators were only able to secure a limited form of independence for their country. The attempts though to extend conscription in 1918 to Ireland again raised sympathy towards Irish nationalism, neutrality and sovereignty to heights not seen in past experiences. Slowly but surely nationalist demands became more pressing, and when they were finally secured it was difficult to abandon them once more in favour of another external authority, such as the EEC.

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[67] Alan O'Day, *Irish Historical Documents Since 1800,* Dublin, 1992, 160.
[68] M O Tuathaigh, 'Ireland and Britain under the Union: 1800-1921', in P J Drudy (ed.), *Ireland and Britain Since 1922,* vol 5, Melbourne, 1986, 8.
[69] Salmon, *Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy,* 83.
[70] Salmon, *Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy,* 83.

The standpoint of showing defiance, standing up against illegitimate authority and resisting imperialism thus anticipated future developments. Much of the rhetoric surrounding the 'freedom fighting' in the 1910s and 1920s enforced an appreciation of self-determination, independence and sovereignty. Following Great Britain's violent suppression of the Easter Rising of 1916, in which Irish nationalists took over government buildings in Dublin and proclaimed an Irish republic, public sentiment in Ireland largely favoured independence from Great Britain.[71] Fighting for increased freedom revealed the determination and importance of these principles amongst some Irish citizens, where they did not just simply dissipate. Such sentiments grew even further from the 1918 decision by the British to impose conscription on Ireland during World War I, a trauma on the 'Irish psyche' that became the 'popular basis of Irish neutrality'.[72]

Irish Declaration of Independence

The Declaration of Independence was a document adopted by the Dáil Éireann, the revolutionary parliament of the Irish Republic, at its first meeting in Manson House, Dublin on 21 January 1919. It followed from the Sinn Féin election manifesto of December 1918, after Sinn Féin won the general election that year and proclaimed a mandate to follow through on its election promise. Texts of the document were produced in three languages, English, Gaelic and French. By implementing the Declaration of Independence, the Dáil had ratified the earlier Proclamation of Independence of Easter 1916. The declaration made no mention of the 32-county geographical island, but claimed independence for the Irish nation and Irish people. Unlike the Proclamation of Independence, the Declaration was followed by some de facto political organs. This was enforced in the important wording of the Declaration, which stated:

> we, the elected Representatives of the ancient Irish people in National Parliament assembled, do, in the name of the Irish nation, ratify the establishment of the Irish Republic and pledge ourselves and our people to make this declaration effective by every means at our command.[73]

[71] R F Foster, *Modern Ireland 1600 – 1972*, London, 1989, 3.
[72] Salmon, *Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy*, 83.
[73] Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, "Treaty Documents", N.d., available: http://pdfs.rowmanlittlefield.com/Tr/eat/TreatyDocuments.pdf.

An important element in the 1918 Sinn Féin election manifesto was to secure recognition at the forthcoming peace conference that war had ended. Sinn Féin claimed that, they plea for our national independence the recognition and support of every free nation in the world, and they proclaim that independence to be a condition precedent to international peace hereafter.[74] In January 1919, Sinn Féin also reinforced its disliking towards British occupation at the time and stated, they solemnly declare foreign government in Ireland to be an invasion of our national right which they will never tolerate, and we demand the evacuation of our country by the English Garrison.[75] This was the closest Ireland came to declaring war on the British, arguing that an invasion had taken place, and therefore any military action from here on was to successfully remove the invaders. However, the British government at the time did not take this as a declaration of war, considering that it was worded specifically for an Irish audience. When the Irish War of Independence started with some haphazard shooting on the same day, it was treated by the British as a police matter.

The Declaration of Independence argued that for several hundred years elements of the Irish population had never ceased to repudiate, and had repeatedly protested against, foreign usurpation. The feeling at the time was that British rule in the country had always been based on force and fraud, maintained by military occupation against the will of the Irish people. In the longer term it created a heightened sensitivity in Ireland to efforts by foreign powers to compromise Irish sovereignty.

Irish War of Independence 1919 and Civil War 1921

The 1916 Easter Rising and the War of Independence that took place between 1919 and 1921 transformed the political landscape of Ireland. The root cause of the conflict was the denial of democracy, the refusal by the British government to allow Irish people to exercise their right to national self-determination. Under British rule, Ireland was neither sovereign nor independent. The main issue of contention between Britain and Ireland was that of sovereignty, in particular the restrictive allegiance to the British Crown. This divide resulted in a civil war and ultimately the future fate of Ireland, which set the idea of sovereignty and independence in motion. This previous lack of independence, economically, politically, culturally and ideologically succumbed to

[74] Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, "Treaty Documents", 3.
[75] Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, "Treaty Documents", 3.

external pressure that exercised independent thinking and decision making amongst Irish citizens.[76] The final sense of freedom was a relief to many citizens; for so long they had been repressed by British rule.

The Irish War of Independence was a guerrilla war fought from 1919 to 1921 between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and British security forces in Ireland. The development of civil conflict was very much due to an escalation of the Irish revolutionary period into open warfare. Two days after Sinn Féin formed a breakaway government and declared independence from Britain on 21 January 1919, two members of the armed police force were shot dead.[77] This is often described as being the beginning of the conflict where IRA members attempted to free captured republican prisoners and seize weapons throughout 1919. In September of 1919, the British government outlawed the Dáil and Sinn Féin, whereupon the conflict intensified from this point on. The disregard for these two key components, the Dáil and Sinn Féin, which represented Irish independence in many ways, caused even greater resentment towards the British that would stay in the minds of many Irish citizens for many years to come.

The 'Tan War' also reinforced the sense of distrust towards external authority during this time, when the IRA began ambushing British Army patrols and attacking British barracks, forcing isolated barracks to be abandoned. While the numbers of deaths are disputed, the IRA killed 18 policemen altogether over the 12-month period ending in December 1919.[78] Six months later, police casualties had risen to a total of 55 killed and a further 74 wounded, indicating a considerable escalation early in 1920 in the IRA's campaign of violence against the Royal Irish Constabulary.[79] This revealed a desire and passion behind the movement to fight for an independent Ireland.

An escalation of violence transpired in November 1920, known as Bloody Sunday. On this day 14 British intelligence operatives were assassinated in Dublin, and this was responded to by the Royal Irish Constabulary (the armed police force of the UK)

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[76] *The Citizen,* 'The Queen and the National Question', September 2011, available: http://theirelandinstitute.com/citizen/

[77] Creative Centuries, "War of Independence", N.d., available: http://www.creativecentenaries.org/war-independence.

[78] Richard Bennett, *The Black and Tans: The British Special Police in Ireland* (3rd edn), New York, 1995, 24.

[79] Charles Townshend, The *British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921: The Development of Political and Military Policies*, London, 1975, 214.

opening fire and killing 14 civilians and wounding a further 65 at a soccer match.[80] A week later the IRA in turn responded and killed 17 auxiliaries in an ambush in County Cork. The decision by Britain to declare martial law at this time further infuriated many of those living in Southern Ireland. The violence and destruction that eventuated in the heart of many of Ireland's primary cities, such as Dublin and Belfast, reinforced the destructive nature of British rule. Both sides agreed to a ceasefire on 11 July 1921 after 1,000 people had been killed and 4,500 republicans interned.[81] Some satisfaction did come from the civil conflict though, as Ireland was partitioned by an act of the British Parliament in May 1921, known as the Anglo-Irish Treaty. This provided for the establishment of the Irish Free State within a year, as a self-governing dominion within the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The Irish Civil War following the Irish War of Independence accompanied the establishment of the Irish Free State, an entity independent of the UK but within the British Empire. This conflict was waged between two opposing groups of Irish republicans over the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which was the agreement between the UK and Ireland that concluded the Irish War of Independence. The treaty provided for a self-governing Irish state, having its own army and police force but UK ruled. The forces of the Provisional Government, known as the 'Free State', supported the treaty, while the Republicans opposed it, as they saw it as a full betrayal of the Irish Republic, something they felt had been proclaimed during the Easter Rising years earlier. The Republicans felt betrayed by the Anglo-Irish treaty as it did not allow full control for Ireland over its own affairs. Rather than creating the independent republic favoured by most nationalists, the Irish Free State would be an autonomous dominion of the British Empire with the British monarch as head of state, in the same manner as Canada and Australia.[82] As the Free State forces were well supported by their British counterparts, Republican forces were unable to compete and the Civil War was won by the Free State. The conflict however left Ireland divided and embittered for generations

[80] Tim Carey and Marcus de Búrca, 'Bloody Sunday 1920: New Evidence', *History Ireland*, vol 11, no 2, Summer, 2003; see also David Leeson, 'Death in the Afternoon: The Croke Park Massacre, 21 November 1920', *Canadian Journal of History*, vol 38, no 1, April, 2003.
[81] John Dorney, 'What to do about the Past?' *The Irish Story*, 2014, available: http://www.theirishstory.com/2014/05/09/what-to-do-about-the-past/#.VTiOh9KqpBd.
[82] National Archives, "Documents on Irish Foreign Policy Series: Excerpts from the Anglo-Irish Treaty", N.d., available: http://www.nationalarchives.ie/topics/anglo_irish/dfaexhib2.html.

and the two main political parties of Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil were direct descendants of the opposing sides from the civil war.[83]

The Irish Sinn Féin movement rejected the *Government of Ireland Act 1920,* which was designed to give limited self-governance to Ireland but maintained British sovereignty. Sinn Féin took this approach because it felt it compromised the independence of the Irish republic.[84] While a subsequent military struggle led to a new offer by the British in the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921 the debates in the Dáil focused exclusively on the remaining symbols of British rule and their intrusion on complete independence. The Second Dáil began its debate on 14 December 1921, but it was not until 7 January 1922 that the vote was taken. Therefore, over two weeks of debate took place, revealing that thorough and detailed consideration was given towards the topic. For the most part positions were fluid and evolving, appraised on Ireland's fighting position at the time but also on the willingness for Britain to compromise.[85] While the objective was an attempt to protect English interests in many regards, it created a situation of more bitter disputes within Irish society and fostered the grounding of the bloody civil war.

It spawned the Civil War in 1922, which has moulded politics in the 26-county state ever since. It made more acute the divisions between nationalists and unionists in the six-county state, and between the populations of the two states, not least it created real and lasting divisions among nationalists themselves.[86] A hard-fought battle between unionists (those who supported the union with Britain) and nationalists (those who supported Irish independence) became common place where this sense of resistance and importance of this issue garnered increasing attention. In the changed conditions of a full-blown struggle for independence from 1920 onwards, new means for 'protecting British interests' had to be found together with a new justification for the continuing British presence that necessitated.[87] These competing thoughts and ideologies about Ireland in general revealed the increasing frustrations with the whole process and its complexities.

The British suggested the dominion in secret correspondence even before treaty negotiations began; this infuriated some, particularly Sinn Féin leader Eamon De

[83] Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, 2.
[84] Hannum, *Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-determination*, 228.
[85] Jason K Knirck, *Imagining Ireland's Independence,* Plymouth, 2006, 112.
[86] Sinn Féin, "Freedom".
[87] Sinn Féin, "Freedom".

Valera, who rejected the dominion.[88] The treaty also stipulated that members of the new Irish Parliament would have to take the following 'Oath of Allegiance':

> I ... do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established, and that I will be faithful to His Majesty King George V, his heirs and successors by law in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of nations.[89]

This oath was highly objectionable to many Irish Republicans. Furthermore, the partition of Ireland, which had already been decided by the Westminster Parliament in the *Government of Ireland Act 1920*, was effectively confirmed in the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The most contentious areas of the treaty for the IRA were the disestablishment of the Irish Republic declared in 1919, the abandonment of the First Dáil[90] the status of the Irish Free State as a dominion in the British Commonwealth and the British retention of the so-called strategic Treaty Ports on Ireland's south coast that were to remain occupied by the Royal Navy. All these issues were the cause of a split in the IRA and ultimately, civil war. Michael Collins, the republican leader who had led the Irish negotiating team, argued that the treaty gave "not the ultimate freedom that all nations aspire and develop, but the freedom to achieve freedom".[91] However, anti-treaty militants in 1922 believed that the treaty would never deliver full Irish independence, for example, Liam Lynch, Emie O'Malley and Liam Mellows.[92]

Certain freedoms were restricted by the treaty, such as the limitations that were imposed on the size of the Irish military, British naval bases remained, and a continued British military presence was evident in Ireland itself. Britain was also able to retain some of its control over Ireland, particularly with control of several ports of strategic value located on the island. British politicians were also able to maintain that Britain spoke for the Commonwealth and the empire in external relations and affairs. This did entice Irish negotiators to further highlight the importance of Irish nationalism concentrating on the restrictions imposed on Ireland. In addition, republicans led by De Valera were disheartened by the continued allegiance and oath to the British Crown. After an acrimonious debate, the Irish rebel parliament, the Dáil Éirann, approved the treaty by a

[88] Eamon de Valera and David Lloyd George, "Official Correspondence relating to the Peace Negotiations", N.d., available: http://www.ucc.ie/celt/published/E900003-007/text001.html.
[89] National Archives, "Documents on Irish Foreign Policy Series: Excerpts from the Anglo-Irish Treaty".
[90] CarltonYounger, *Ireland's Civil War*, London, 1988, 233-235.
[91] Margaret Hawkins, "The Easter Rising and the Fall of Freedom", N.d., available: http://www.eiu.edu/historia/Hawkins.pdf.
[92] E O'Malley, *On Another Man's Wound,* Dublin, 1979.

narrow margin, splitting the nationalist movement and leading to a bitter civil war.[93] The treaty was ratified by a mere seven votes, and De Valera resigned as president in a mark of protest against the final verdict. This move by De Valera was an attempt to enhance the respectability of opposition at the time towards the treaty itself. Thus, the new Irish state formed by the treaty in 1922 could be called anything but neutral[94], nor in many respects sovereign.

Balfour Declaration of 1926 and the Statute of Westminster in 1931

The Balfour Declaration of 1926 recognised the dominions as autonomous communities within the British Empire and, in the decades afterward, the dominions each became fully sovereign from the UK. The Irish Free State (Ireland from 1937) was a British Dominion between 1922 and 1949. As established by the *Irish Free State Constitution Act* of the United Kingdom Parliament on 6 December 1922 the new state, which had dominion status in the likeness of that enjoyed by Canada within the British Commonwealth of Nations, comprised the whole of Ireland. However, a provision was made in the Act for the Parliament of Northern Ireland to opt out of inclusion in the Irish Free State, which was widely expected at the time, and actually occurred one day after the creation of the new state on 7 December 1922. Dominion status was never popular in the Irish Free State where some people saw it as a face-saving measure for the British government, unable to countenance a republic in what had previously been the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

By the 1930s, Irish society was generally marked by people's awareness of their mutual interdependence and a sense of self, as defined by participation in groups and institutions, particularly their families, church and nation.[95] Group identity and voice seemed strong and in some ways was able to drown out the individual's voice at the time. The Balfour Declaration of 1926, and the subsequent Statute of Westminster, 1931, restricted Britain's ability to pass or affect laws outside of its own jurisdiction. Significantly, Britain initiated the change to complete sovereignty for the dominions. The Irish Free State never formally adopted the Statute of Westminster, its Executive Council taking the view that the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 had already

[93] Frank Pakenham, *Peace by Ordeal: An Account, from First-Hand Sources of the Negotiation and Signature of the Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921*, London, 1972.
[94] Ryan Johnson, "Neutrality but not Isolated: Adapting Irish Defence Policy to a Changing Europe", 2001, 6, available: https://martindale.cc.lehigh.edu/sites/martindale.cc.lehigh.edu/files/Johnson.pdf.
[95] Jennifer E Spreng, *Abortion and Divorce Law in Ireland*, North Carolina, 2004, 38.

ended Westminster's right to legislate for the Free State.[96] The Free State's constitution gave the government sole and exclusive power of making laws. Thus, even before 1931, the Free State did not arrest British Army or Royal Air Force deserters on its territory, even though the UK believed post-1922 that British laws gave the Free State's Garda Síochána the power to do so.[97] The UK's *Irish Free State Constitution Act 1922* said, however:

> nothing in the [Free State] Constitution shall be construed as prejudicing the power of [the British] Parliament to make laws affecting the Irish Free State in any case where, in accordance with constitutional practice, Parliament would make laws affecting other self-governing Dominions.[98]

Motions for approval of the Report of the Commonwealth Conference had been passed by the Dáil and Seanad in May 1931.[99] The final form of the Statute of Westminster included the Irish Free State among the dominions the British Parliament could not legislate for without the dominion's request and consent.[100] Originally, the UK government had wanted to exclude from the Statute of Westminster the legislation underpinning the 1921 treaty, from which the Free State's constitution had emerged, however, President W. T. Cosgrave objected, although he promised that the Executive Council would not amend the legislation unilaterally. The other dominions backed Cosgrave and, when an amendment to similar effect was proposed at Westminster by John Gretton, parliament duly voted it down.[101] When the statute became law in the UK, Patrick McGilligan, the Free State minister for external affairs, stated:

> It is a solemn declaration by the British people through their representatives in Parliament that the powers inherent in the Treaty position are what we have proclaimed them to be for the last ten years.[102]

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[96] Mohr, 'British Imperial Statutes and Irish Sovereignty: Statutes Passed After the Creation of the Irish Free State', 61-85.
[97] Mohr, 'British Imperial Statutes and Irish Sovereignty: Statutes Passed After the Creation of the Irish Free State', 61-85.
[98] Mohr, 'British Imperial Statutes and Irish Sovereignty: Statutes Passed After the Creation of the Irish Free State', 61-85.
[99] Dáil debates, vol 39, no 18, available: http://debates.oireachtas.ie/Dáil/1931/07/17/00005.asp, 5; see also Seanad debates, vol 14, no 30, available: http://debates.oireachtas.ie/seanad/1931/07/23/00003.asp, 3.
[100] National Archives, "Statute of Westminster 1931", *Legislation.gov.uk,* N.d., available: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/22-23/4.
[101] Hansard, vol 260, cc303-55, 24 November 1931, available: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1931/nov/24/new-clause-saving-with-respect-to-irish
[102] Press statement by Patrick McGilligan on the Statute of Westminster, Dublin, *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy,* Royal Irish Academy. 11th of December 1931. No. 617 NAI DFA 5/3.

He went on to present the statute as largely the fruit of the Free State's efforts to secure for the other dominions the same benefits it already enjoyed under the treaty.[103] After De Valera led Fianna Fáil to victory in the Free State election of 1932, he began removing the monarchical elements of the constitution, and initially considered invoking the Statute of Westminster in making these changes.[104]

Eamon De Valera and World War II

Eamon De Valera capitalised on the opportunity of the Easter Rising and came forth as one of the new leaders of the Irish nationalist movement. He participated in the uprising and showed his leadership qualities when he attempted to proclaim an Irish Republic. De Valera, the only battalion commander not killed after the event, was saved because he was proclaimed to be an American citizen, as his mother was an American. As De Valera was born in New York City, his death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, but because the British did not want to risk alienating the United States the charges were not carried out. In 1917 De Valera joined Sinn Féin and replaced Griffith as president. This move allowed him to infiltrate Sinn Féin with his nationalistic policies, particularly Irish sovereignty and neutrality. This had profound implications for Ireland's future, as De Valera was in many ways the catalyst that prompted these important characteristics to find a resounding acceptance amongst the Irish electorate.

The resulting Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, establishing the Irish Free State with the status of a dominion within the British Commonwealth of Nations[105], created two jurisdictions in 1921, the creation of the all-island British Dominion 'Saorstat Éireann', followed by the Act of the Northern Ireland Parliament, which opted out of the new dominion. In 1932 De Valera opted to remove the Oath of Allegiance from the constitution due mainly to the Statute of Westminster, although he was advised not to by John Hearne.[106] Abolishing the Oath of Allegiance in effect abrogated the 1921 treaty. Generally, the British thought that this was morally objectionable but legally permitted by the Statute of Westminster. Robert Lyon Moore, a southern

[103] Press statement by Patrick McGilligan on the Statute of Westminster, Dublin, *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy.*
[104] Mohr, 'British Imperial Statutes and Irish Sovereignty: Statutes Passed After the Creation of the Irish Free State', 61-85.
[105] Ronan Fanning, et.al., *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy 1919-1922*, vol 1, Dublin, 1998, 356-361.
[106] Mohr, 'British Imperial Statutes and Irish Sovereignty: Statutes Passed After the Creation of the Irish Free State', 61-85.

unionist from County Donegal, challenged the legality of the abolition in the Free State courts and then appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in London. However, the Free State had also abolished the right of appeal to the JCPC.[107] In 1935, the JCPC ruled that both abolitions were valid under the Statute of Westminster.[108] The establishment of 'Ireland' or 'Éire' in Eamon De Valera's constitution of 1937, and particularly Article 5, seemed to guarantee some further form of sovereignty to Ireland. Yet, the position of the church and the 'holy trinity' were still front and centre in the new document (Article 44), which essentially ensured some form of Vatican involvement in the management of the state.

The Irish government continued to support and maintain a healthy relationship with Britain, because at the time it was Ireland's biggest trading partner. However, in 1936 further developments took place that witnessed Irish independence gaining a more prominent position than seen previously. De Valera was able to seize on the abdication of Edward VIII. De Valera enacted two Bills in 1936, the first deleted all mention of the terms 'king' and 'governor-general' from the 1922 constitution, the second, *The External Relations Act*, gave effect to the abdication and recognised the crown only for diplomatic representation.[109] A new constitution was established, ratified by referendum and came into effect on 29 December 1937. Ireland was established as the official name of the state and was only influenced by Britain with regard to external policy. A president was established for a term of seven years and the prime minster was defined as the head of government. De Valera's achievement was significant, he managed to rewrite the constitution, guaranteed an independent voice for Ireland and further limited British influence in state affairs to a mere external relationship. De Valera was, however, faced with the issue of British naval bases still being located in Ireland herself, which restricted the effort for full independence.

On 25 April 1938 De Valera managed to secure a defence agreement with the then prime minister of Britain, Neville Chamberlain. The remaining three British naval bases located in Ireland under British control were successfully transferred to Ireland under the agreement. This move was crucial for the Irish government to make her war-time neutrality a viable proposition. It was settled with a trade agreement and a finance

[107] Constitution Act, "Amendment No. 22", *1933 Irish Statute Book*, http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1933/en/act/pub/0045/print.html
[108] *Moore v Attorney General*, 1935, Supreme Court, 1 I.R.
[109] Jeff Wallenfeldt, *Ireland* (1st edn), New York, 2014, 98.

agreement between the two countries. The defence agreement completed the process of establishing Irish sovereignty and made possible Ireland's neutrality in a European war, and avowed republican aspirations since the 1921 treaty.[110] De Valera announced that, "the 1938 agreement, granting Ireland control over her ports and harbours recognises and finally establishes Irish sovereignty over the 26 counties and the territorial seas".[111] This allowed for the establishment of independence and a sense of legitimate pride, steadily undoing the grasp of British control that had so long held power over Ireland and her citizens.

At the outbreak of war, De Valera maintained his position as stated in 1938 that Ireland would not become a base for attacks on Great Britain.[112] This decision, one could argue, implied a new equal status standing for Ireland among other world powers. Yet, it is often thought that the position of neutrality was more so adopted to get back at the British after a centuries old war that had distorted relationships between the two. The adoption of neutrality during this major conflict was a resounding statement of Irish independence and sovereignty directed towards Britain it seemed. Roberts and Girvin explain further:

> The Irish State's declaration of neutrality in 1939 was undoubtedly the wisest and safest course of action. It protected the Irish people from the perils of war, asserted the country's sovereignty and independence from Britain, and, crucially, maintained the unity of the state at the time of great national danger.[113]

Despite continuous pressure from the then British prime minister, Winston Churchill, pressure from then United States president, Franklin D. Roosevelt after 1941, and successful German air raids on Dublin, Ireland remained neutral throughout the entire Second World War.

Great Britain and the United States saw Irish neutrality as a clear and present danger, owing mainly to the supply lines Ireland potentially held. What resulted was a 'war of words' over the decision; however, secretly the Irish authorities provided assistance and intelligence to the allies because De Valera realised that German victory would threaten

[110] Wallenfeldt, *Ireland*, 98.
[111] Clair Wills, *That Neutral Island: A Cultural History of Ireland During the Second World War*, London, 2007, 22.
[112] Wallenfeldt, *Ireland*, 98.
[113] Geoffrey Roberts and Brian Girvin, *Ireland and the Second World War: Politics, Society and Remembrance*, Dublin, 2000, 165.

the hard won independence of which Irish neutrality was the ultimate expression.[114] De Valera believed that only through a strict policy of neutrality could Ireland maintain its national integrity, and any departure away from this would have brought dire consequences for the country itself.[115] It seemed logical after 1937 that this would be the course of action taken. It was more in tune with Irish policy at the time, it followed on from De Valera's determination, and also reflected Irish isolation from world affairs by displaying confidence in Ireland's moral superiority.[116] For this generation of political leaders, neutrality in World War II was the ultimate proof of the state's claim to sovereignty.[117]

The concepts of neutrality and sovereignty became the justification and catchcry for Irish independence. Neutrality was the sacred cow of Irish life[118], adopted at the time of the Second World War.[119] However, De Valera's primary concern at the time was for sovereignty and not really neutrality; but these two important traits both developed and became just as important as one another for Irish independence and what it essentially meant to be Irish. During the ensuing years leading up to World War II, Ireland continued to make steady progress in expressing its independence from Great Britain, an effort that owed much to the policies and beliefs of De Valera. Because of its past experiences under British rule, Ireland adopted and embraced military neutrality as a method of maintaining its sovereignty.[120] In doing so it reaffirmed the importance of the concept with regards to its own unique independence – neutrality became an outward symbol of sovereignty during World War II.[121]

With the advent of the Second World War though, the rhetoric took on a new dimension, and neutrality became closely linked with notions of Irish freedom. World War II provided the catalyst and perfect opportunity for Ireland to express its sovereignty as a nation, which it did, and neutrality became the hallmark of this sovereignty. It was the first time that this could be tested successfully. O'Halpin argues

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[114] Wallenfeldt, *Ireland*, 98.
[115] Brian Girvin, 'Irish Sovereignty During World War', in Art Cosgrove (ed.), *A New History of Ireland*, Oxford and New York, 2008, 150.
[116] Girvin, 'Irish Sovereignty During World War', 151.
[117] Eunan O'Halpin, 'Ireland and the International Security Environment', in William Crotty and David Schmitt (eds), *Ireland on the World Stage*, New York, 2002, 144.
[118] Brigid Laffan, *Integration and Co-operation in Europe*, New York, 2005, 194.
[119] Elizabeth Keane, *An Irish Statesman and Revolutionary*, New York, 2006, 134.
[120] Johnson, 'Neutrality but not Isolated: Adapting Irish Defence Policy to a Changing Europe', 18.
[121] Karin Gilland, 'Ireland: Neutrality and the International use of Force' in Philip Everts & Pierangelo Isernia (eds.) *Public Opinion and the International Use of Force*, London & New York, 2001, 138.

that neutrality was a policy that kept Ireland united and was a keystone of independence at the time.[122] Thus, if this was correct, then public opinion and domestic factors were important in that decision. Keatinge similarly claims that as the decades progressed neutrality became more than a policy, it became a traditional symbol and national myth.[123] In the decades following the war neutrality became intertwined with the national question.[124] Hence, they became elements associated with the Irish national character, and of course were to be raised again with any future talk that may put them in jeopardy.

A number of Irish citizens believed so fundamentally in neutrality that it was difficult to shift public opinion to support any measure against it. Mac Cormaic claims, "we [had] developed this perception of ourselves that to be neutral and to not engage in any sort of common defence is a badge of honour".[125] Creighton acknowledges also that; "it became part of the Irish identity and was very hard to change".[126] He went on to highlight that the Irish had always been especially concerned with decisions on neutrality in defence and security issues, especially in relation to Europe with her supranational character and structures.[127] Thus, neutrality became a manifestation of both a separate cultural identity and independent statehood that existed in the shadow of the great former colonial power, Great Britain.[128] Callaghan explained that the idea of military neutrality was very popular with the Irish people and played a key role in decision making processes.[129] Thus, domestic forces drove the malleable and inexpensive policy of neutrality to help bolster sovereignty claims, where the goal was to maintain autonomy from British hegemony.[130]

One cannot underestimate the importance of De Valera as Ireland's leader and his mark that embodied these aspects as part of the common culture during this period. De Valera

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[122] Eunan O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, Oxford, 1999, 290.
[123] Keatinge, *A Singular Stance: Irish Neutrality in the 1980s*, 100.
[124] Karin Gilland, 'Ireland and the International use of Force', in Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia (eds), *Public Opinion and the International use of Force*, New York, 2001, 138.
[125] Creighton, cited in Ruadhan Mac Cormaic, 'Irish Attitudes to Neutrality "Narcissistic"', *The Irish Times*, press release, 4 February 2013, available: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/irish-attitudes-to-neutrality-narcissistic-1.1254000.
[126] Creighton, cited in Mac Cormaic, 'Irish Attitudes to Neutrality "Narcissistic"'.
[127] Candy M Rietig, "Euroscepticism in Ireland: How Eurosceptic are the Irish Really?" 2009, available: http://www.cap-lmu.de/themen/europawahl/download/europa09-Rietig-Euroskeptizismus-Irland.pdf, 5.
[128] Rory Finnegan, "Irish Neutrality", N.d., available: http://raco.ie/attachments/068_1_2_irishneutrality.pdf
[129] Jean Callaghan, 'Irish Defence Forces', in Jean Callaghan and Mathias Schonborn (eds), *Warriors in Peacetime*, Piscataway, 2004, 125.
[130] Neal Jesse, 'Ireland's Singular Stance', in Kristen Williams, Steven Lobell and Neal Jesse (eds), *Beyond Great Powers and Hegemony*, California, 2012, 76.

emerged from the Civil War's aftermath and left Sinn Féin in 1926 due to its policy of abstentionism to found the Fianna Fáil political party, and under his leadership the party came to power for the first time in 1932. De Valera took his place as the head of the Irish government as Ireland's President of the Executive Council. Before the outbreak of World War II, De Valera and Fianna Fáil pushed Ireland further away from the Commonwealth and closer towards becoming an independent republic, only weeks after taking office in 1932. De Valera brought forth a Bill to abolish the Oath of Allegiance to Great Britain, one of the most contentious provisions of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.[131] Throughout the mid 1930s, De Valera continued to steer Irish laws and policies away from the pro-British provisions of the 1922 constitution, and by 1937 his constitution marked an even greater disregard to British ties with Ireland. Neutrality had underpinned De Valera's policies, and in 1936 he openly stated:

> We have no aggressive designs. We want to have our country for ourselves, as I have said on more than one occasion, and that is the limit of our ambition; we have no imperial ambitions of any sort.[132]

De Valera selected neutrality because he had one eye on his powerful neighbour Britain, which contained vivid scars of the civil war that to him were unhealed. It was perhaps the most pragmatic approach taken. As well, an alliance with any other power would put Ireland in direct conflict with Britain, and an alliance with Britain would have stirred up troubles at home. These issues prompted De Valera to state, "any other policy would have divided our people, and for a divided people to fling itself into this war would be to commit suicide".[133] A leader of this stature was required in order to cement and implement the idea of independence and neutrality into society in the first place, which in turn was accepted by the general Irish public, who continued this legacy right through to times regarding European aspirations and beyond.

Ireland's position of neutrality and adopted sovereignty was traditional in nature but lacked codification and clarification. Although initially a reactive and pragmatic policy, neutrality took on some of the characteristics of a principle, but significantly not a principle based on a philosophy of international relations or international law.[134] It was

[131] Dermot Keogh, *Twentieth-Century Ireland: Nation and State*, New York, 1994, 66-67.
[132] Karen M Devine, "Neither Friend Nor Foe: The Irish Position", *The Irish Times*, 25 November 2008, available: http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2008/1125/1227486544957.html.
[133] T Salmon, 'Unneutral Neutral Eire', *Foreign Affairs*, vol 24, 1946, 120.
[134] Gilland, 'Ireland and the International use of Force', 138.

not conceived in this manner and was a very minimalistic notion that required continued support. Neutrality became an issue that required safeguarding, and by 1945 the public perception of neutrality and sovereignty was firmly embedded in society. This was due to the independent decisions taken during World War II, where neutrality had kept Ireland out of the war. The policy of neutrality was not enshrined in any Irish constitution; it has been a long standing principle in Irish foreign policy since the establishment of the Irish Free State. Neutrality in Ireland had always been a policy as distinct from a fundamental law or principle.[135] It was a long-standing belief that could potentially change at any given time, and could be relinquished by the government of the day or a political party whenever they saw fit.

The approach taken towards Britain after gaining independence was a hallmark for future developments adopted by Irish eurosceptics later. For Ireland, neutrality essentially meant limiting the impact of World War II. However, Ireland spent little time outlining to Britain why this decision was made. This angered Britain, as a neutral Ireland during the war essentially meant a strategic problem for Britain. The Irish perceived an alliance with Great Britain as the greater threat to their sovereignty, and thus even partition could gain no primacy over principled neutrality, "too closely bound up with Irish identity and Irish sovereignty to be easily relaxed".[136] Successive Irish governments since independence had recognised the importance of neutrality and retaining sovereignty where it was the public's aspiration to keep Ireland separate from strategic intentions of larger nations.[137] As O'Halpin suggests:

> World affairs were viewed almost exclusively through the narrow prism of Anglo-Irish relations, and many Irish people regarded Britain not as a bastion of democracy in need of reinforcement against tyranny but as a country which had murdered innocents on the Irish streets less than twenty years before, and which continued to sponsor the repression of nationalists in Northern Ireland.[138]

Perhaps Lyons best sums up the situation by stating:

[135] Finnegan, 'Irish Neutrality'.
[136] Foster, *Modern Ireland 1600 –1972*, 561.
[137] Foster, *Modern Ireland 1600 –1972*, 533.
[138] O'Halpin, *Defending Ireland*, 151.

> To be free to choose between peace and war was the mark of independence, to be free to choose between peace and a British war demonstrated to all the world, just how complete that independence was.[139]

In Irish political culture neutrality appeared as a manifestation of sovereignty and independence, gained from decisions made and actions taken where this characterisation applied to active supporters outside of the arena of party politics.[140] These events were so traumatic that it would seem difficult for some Irish citizens to forget and move on, and thus would be raised again in future decision making.

Republic of Ireland Act 1948 and other implications

Ireland gained independence from Britain in 1922, and it was only in 1948 that Ireland's right to sovereignty, independence and unity – the right of the Irish people, as a whole, to self-determination, was supported by universally recognised principles of international law. However, this was the culmination of a long historical process featuring a struggle for independence and the commitment to principles of neutrality and sovereignty. Any lingering ties to Britain were removed in entirety only in 1948 with the passage of the *Republic of Ireland Act*. This officially removed any function of Great Britain's king in the Irish government. Therefore, Irish involvement outside of the Commonwealth only officially began at this time. The characteristics of neutrality and sovereignty become increasingly important here as they were so recent, were continually emphasised as a basis for Irish freedom, and were seen as a productive way forward into the future after securing independence.

Neutrality as outlined earlier was part of recent Irish identity. It permeated Irish history, always with one common theme, independence from Great Britain.[141] De Valera's actions in allowing the preservation of neutrality and supported in principle by the Irish people during World War II formed a basis of foreign policy that would remain for decades to come. Following the defeat of the republicans in 1923 by the government forces of the Irish Free State, the Irish government spent the next 15 years almost entirely preoccupied with defining its place in the world, independent of Great Britain. As Foster explains:

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[139] F S L Lyons cited Finnegan, 'Irish Neutrality'.
[140] Keatinge, *A Singular Stance: Irish Neutrality in the 1980s*, 108-109.
[141] Joseph Averette, 'At the Periphery of Incident: Irish Neutrality and EU Defense Policy', Masters Thesis, 2009, available: http://jwaverette.com/Site/Home_files/Thesis.pdf, 12.

> what matters most about the atmosphere and mentality of twenty-six-county Ireland in the 1920s is that the dominant preoccupation of the regime was self-definition against Britain – cultural and political.[142]

For the Irish government, this meant internationally emphasising its non-Britishness, while domestically emphasising the country's Irishness after securing complete independence. This Irishness contained the essential element of neutrality and independence in terms of its own culture, own language and own way forward, marked as part of Ireland's recent history. The teaching of Irish history too, became important in schools from 1949 onwards. This was done with a resounding fervour typical of many post-colonial states with a high sensitivity to the influence of a once dominant neighbour.[143] This re-enforced the importance of independence amongst younger generations, who absorbed their parents' distrust towards British rule. The history taught in schools was made up of recent nationalist events, based exclusively on the fight for sovereignty and neutrality. This recent history crept into important decision making processes regarding Europe and further integration later on, especially amongst those defined as critics of the European Project.

This sense of independence was reflected after World War II. Ireland had been willing in 1949 to negotiate a bilateral defence pact with the United States, but opposed joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) until the Northern Ireland question with the UK was resolved. Subsequent Irish neutrality was therefore based primarily on Irish issues and problems with the UK, not on Cold War confrontation. Under the circumstances, Ireland effectively got a free ride on defence as NATO would have been forced by self-interest to defend Irish territory in any case.

Conclusion

This chapter has determined precursors to Irish euroscepticism. The period 1886 to 1949, defined by Ireland's anti-colonial struggle against the British, revealed resentment and distrust towards external rule and authority. This began to develop from 1780 to 1886, as Irish republicanism started to develop and formed through a number of staged uprisings. However, it was not until the First Home Rule Bill of 1886 that undertones of a nationalistic element began to be seen for the first time in Ireland,

[142] Foster, *Modern Ireland 1600 –1972*, 511-518.
[143] Foster, *Modern Ireland 1600 –1972*, 8.

where citizens expressed a desire for freedom from foreign rule. This marked the beginning of a long, drawn-out process, which attempted to secure independence for Ireland from Great Britain.

When considering the questions asked by this thesis, the distinctiveness of the Irish historical experience is evident in this period. It shows Ireland as a subservient entity in a colonial relationship, something unique when considering all other countries associated with European membership later on. The revolt against British colonialism was not the preserve of a particular sectional interest but was widely accepted across the social and political spectrum. Historical inquiry reveals Irish nationalism was not deeply engrained in a sprinkling of individuals but was more widely pronounced. The importance of this is that it foreshadows the later formation of a distinct, anti-colonial legacy incorporating a firm desire for sovereignty and neutrality, ideas which, as will be shown later, feature prominently as counter-arguments against the idea of Irish integration into Europe and which are identifiable among many parts of Irish society and politics.

A direct continuity may not exist between this period and the next, but rather, concerns about sovereignty and national identity in this earlier period were echoed in the euroscepticism of the postwar period. Neutrality and sovereignty was an anti-colonial and post-colonial priority. It was taken up by some continuing left wing sections of the Irish political scene as a basis for opposition to the country's participation in European integration.

The following chapter will use this established anti-colonial legacy built upon sovereignty and neutrality and trace it to the first real signs of resentment against the EEC itself in Ireland. Beginning in 1950 and ending in 1970, euroscepticism will be examined around four distinctive ideological themes at the time of the Treaty of Rome and Ireland's attempt for membership in 1961 and 1967, which both failed. In doing so it will seek to establish where the main sources of Irish euroscepticism lay and what kinds of arguments were forwarded in support of it.

Chapter 3
The Treaty of Rome and failed applications for membership in 1961 and 1967

In the previous chapter I examined the precursors towards Irish euroscepticism during the period 1886 to 1949. This period revealed resentment towards external rule and authority on Ireland's behalf towards the British. Irish republicanism began to develop during 1780 to 1886, but it was not until 1886 and the First Home Rule Bill that a nationalistic characteristic began to develop. This marked the beginnings of an independence movement and was reinforced in the Second Home Rule Bill of 1893. The Boer War, First World War and Second World War all helped promote this desire for a sense of freedom from British rule within Ireland, where the important characteristics of neutrality and sovereignty emerged and developed. The Balfour Declaration of 1926 and the Statute of Westminster in 1931 also helped reinforce this Free State concept.

This greater freedom won so long after the initial fight for independence was to be tested again soon by the question of Europe – a matter not taken lightly by those who defined themselves as eurosceptic. It was not until the *Republic of Ireland Act* in 1948 that Ireland formally became a republic, with the Act formally establishing all rights for self-government in the following year.

This chapter traces the development of euroscepticism in Ireland from the 1950s to 1970. It attempts to specifically locate the first signs of resentment towards the EEC. It also characterises and defines the types of euroscepticism exhibited more specifically at the time of the Treaty of Rome and the failed applications for membership of 1961 and 1967. It reveals a longer history to euroscepticism in Ireland than currently accounted for and describes specifically the type of euroscepticism exhibited during the period under review. It also notes the main individuals promoting these messages and their reasons for doing so – useful for comparative purposes in order to locate any similarities and discrepancies that may exist between the periods under review.

Euroscepticism, as it is understood today, began to emerge in Ireland from the 1950s onwards, around the time of the Treaty of Rome. More specifically, Irish euroscepticism appeared in 1957 around four distinctive ideological themes; communism, republicanism, socialism and nationalism. Each ideological component

had its own unique discourse with regard to Irish euroscepticism, incorporating the specific viewpoints of separate political parties, non-government organisations and individuals, which developed increasingly in the 1960s in line with Ireland's application for membership of the Common Market. Although Ireland did not gain membership of the EEC at this time, debate on the issue was certainly evident, sparking negative responses from various groups and individuals in society. Much of the discussion against joining focused on the issues of neutrality and sovereignty, which would allegedly be put in jeopardy if accession was granted. By no means was this a united movement against the EEC; in more cases than not the criticism levelled at Europe was disjointed and disorganised. Importantly, however, the notions of neutrality and sovereignty that had previously been firmly established as important Irish political principles that needed protecting, were the only features of clarity and commonality among those political parties, non-government organisations and individuals that opposed EEC membership.

Ireland's attempt to gain membership to the EEC in 1961 and 1967, a move promoted respectively by the Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael coalition governments provoked widespread debate. The negative demands came from first, the Irish Workers League (IWL), which campaigned heavily during the 1961 application for membership with a distinct communist appeal, distributing large amounts of anti-EEC propaganda. Second, Sinn Féin was beginning to re-establish itself and re-emerged with a need to penetrate the political scene. This involved foregrounding republicanism, which was best described as showing hostility towards EEC membership. In essence, it positioned itself on the 'no' side of the vote. Third, the Wolfe Tone Society, established in 1963, made it a priority to protest against Europe, led by a determined group of likeminded individuals who saw Europe as something sinister. Fourth, with a broadening acceptance of socialism, the Irish Labour Party was essentially split on the best way forward and positioned itself as a self-declared anti-EEC political party, where it took on some of its anti-EEC retraction from its European counterpart, the British Labour Party.[1]

[1] For further detail on the British Labour Party and its anti-EEC mandate at the time, see Stephen George and Deborah Haythorne, 'The British Labour Party', Archive of European Integration, University of Sheffield, N.d., available: http://aei.pitt.edu/7156/1/002390_1.PDF.

Coexisting alongside this more mainstream debate over Irish membership in the EEC was an argument that was based more heavily on appeals made to nationalism at an individual level. Coalescing alongside the guidance, inspiration and eventual leadership shown by those in Sinn Féin and the Labour Party, opposition to the EEC occupied a space amongst a marginalised force in the public arena, but was also promoted by some significant Irish individuals. That is not to say that their efforts before 1969 were insignificant; they were able to strike a chord with some sections of society and did contribute to the EEC membership debate in Ireland. The numbers of the first Irish Gallup poll on the EEC in July 1961, which indicated that more than 75 per cent of those polled approved of Irish membership in the EEC (with only 7 per cent opposed and 17 per cent undecided) also showed that the political environment was not conducive to opposition to integration with Europe.[2] Anthony Coughlan, Raymond Crotty, Roy Johnston and John De Courcy Ireland were four such personalities who began showing signs of a eurosceptical standpoint, built on left-wing nationalism that evidently accepted the notion of no European commitment, and began attempting to win people over on a more face-to-face level at public debates and meetings.

Some early anti-EEC arguments in the 1960s reflected the conflicted responses to Ireland's extensive modernisation process. Opponents of Europe at an individual level revealed dissenting voices in the ongoing debate about modernisation and its disruptive effects on traditional Ireland. This does not mean these early EEC opponents were traditionalists; in fact, they generally viewed the economic transformation of Ireland in the 1960s and its effects upon Irish society and culture as positive.[3] The work of one particular anti-EEC intellectual, De Courcy Ireland, makes this emphasis particularly clear.

There is evidence during this period that Irish euroscepticism began to emerge, forming on its own accord without an external influence promoting it. It had developed further from those singular issues of neutrality and sovereignty into a more mainstream argument directed at supporters of Europe and the EEC as a whole. That is not to say that the issues of neutrality and sovereignty dissipated; they were certainly important considerations as part of the ongoing debate and anti-EEC platform. As the possibility of accession became increasingly possible over time, particular groups in Irish society

[2] John Horgan and Seán Lemass, *The Enigmatic Patriot*, Dublin, 1997, 199.
[3] See Terence Brown, *Ireland: A Social and Cultural History, 1922–2002*, London, 2004, 229-311.

recognised the threat this posed and emphasised resentment towards Europe, underpinned by a eurosceptic discourse built exclusively on the four dominant ideological themes identified earlier. In many ways these were the first signs of the more contemporary euroscepticism that is evident in Ireland today.

The Treaty of Rome

The Treaty of Rome (1957) represented a formal declaration of a process that had begun in the wake of World War II among the most powerful European countries at the time. Its predecessor, the 1951 Paris Treaty, established the European Coal and Steel Community involving six countries – Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg. This was an economic forum created in order to promote the strength of their heavy industry of coal and steel in a newly emergent Europe that had been devastated by war. Its success led to the signing of the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957, which marked the expansion of cooperation into other economic sectors among these six countries. As a result of this treaty the EEC was formed and paved the way for future enlargement and the free movement of people, goods and services among member countries. The contemporary Irish left-wing critique of the neo-liberal basis of the EU stretches back to these early days, arguing that it was a 'rich man's club'.[4] This has meant that the left in Ireland has had an uneasy relationship with Europe since this time, based upon their ideological stance, the need to respond to their counterparts, who represented a pro-European position, and the need to react in the way it did for its own supporter base and to build membership numbers.

Ireland in the 1950s

After World War II much of Europe had been experiencing strong economic growth. However, this same situation did not apply to Ireland. Throughout the early parts of Ireland's history as an independent nation, protectionist policies had been pursued, resulting in neither stagnation nor real prosperity for the economic sector. The economic situation for Ireland was in many respects dire throughout the 1950s – a 1950s Irish person was just as poor as a 1920s Irish person while the rest of the world had increased its average gross domestic product (GDP) significantly.[5] Ireland was

[4] Letter from Dublin Wolfe Tone Society, de Courcy Ireland Papers (JdCI), P29/C/7d, UCDAD, 1 December 1967.
[5] M Jepsen, "*The European Irishmen: An Analysis of Euroscepticism in Ireland",* 2012, available: http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/7676/1/euro%20skepticism%20in%20Ireland.pdf.

suffering from an unstable agricultural economy, high emigration, declining wages and high unemployment, so its protectionist economic policy, as well as its unequal economic relationship with neighbouring Great Britain, left the republic without the flexibility necessary to fix its economic deficiencies.[6] Many commentators refer to the 1950s as a decade of 'doom and gloom', the 'worst decade since the famine' and 'the lost decade'.[7] In the 1950s approximately half a million people left the republic[8], real national income rose by only 8 per cent at a time when the average increase in Europe equated to approximately 40 per cent,[9] and most young people felt that the only way to secure steady employment was to cross the Irish Sea.[10] These circumstances prompted the Fianna Fáil party under the leadership of Seán Lemass and later, Jack Lynch to seriously consider connecting Ireland's national interests with those of the EEC in an attempt to reverse the negative trends.

> Lynch replied that when Ireland applied for membership of the EEC, his predecessor had made it clear that Ireland accepted fully the political implications of the Treaty of Rome. Dublin sought a wider Europe not only for economic benefits it would confer, but because a wider Europe could be more effective politically.[11]

Both, Lemass and Lynch argued Ireland's economic misfortunes could no longer remain static behind a tariff wall while the rest of Europe moved toward further integration.[12] At the end of the 1950s it was clear Ireland was becoming more accepting of liberalisation and a changed mentality, and was more open to the idea of joining the EEC, joined by their British counterparts.

Developing Irish euroscepticism in the 1950s

As promising as the move towards the Common Market seemed for Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, there were others not so convinced, even though they had witnessed the poor economic situation Ireland was engulfed in. With Eamon De Valera's attempt to create an economically self-sufficient and neutral country post-independence, this goal

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[6] Diarmaid Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland 1900–2000*, London, 2005, 465-466.
[7] Cormac Ó Gráda, *A Rocky Road. The Irish Economy since the 1920s*, Manchester, 1997; see also Brian Girvin, 'Political Culture, Political Independence and Economic Success in Ireland', *Irish Political Studies*, vol 12, no 1, 1997, 48-77; see also Dermot Keogh, Finbarr O'Shea and Carmel Quinlan (eds), *The Lost Decade. Ireland in the 1950s*, Cork, 2004.
[8] Mary Daly, *Slow Failure. Population Decline and Independent Ireland, 1920-1973*, Wisconsin, 2006, 58.
[9] Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland 1900–2000*, 463.
[10] Enda Delaney, *The Irish in Post-War Britain*, Oxford, 2007, 20.
[11] Lynch, cited in Mark Callanan, *Foundations of an Ever Closer Union*, Dublin, 2007, 39.
[12] Andrew Devenney, 'A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty: Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland, 1961–1972', *New Hibernia Review, vol* 12, no 4, 2008, 15.

continued to be the aim for many Irish citizens throughout the 1950s. Economic integration clearly did not fit into this plan. In addition, part of the reality of Irish political independence was the continued dependence on the British economy. Britain, with its own reasons against participating in the European Project from early on, linked very much to its adopted policy of colonialism, was able to constrain Ireland to follow suit with this decision. The Irish government was loath to seek a relationship with Europe that was different from the UK's relationship.[13] Irish affairs were thus overshadowed by a British presence. In addition, Ireland's adopted position of neutrality during World War II meant that Ireland did not suffer the same extent of damage and loss of life as many of its neighbours. This further removed some of the rationale and need for integration.[14]

By late 1949 Ireland's inward looking policy of economic integration was in full effect. De Valera was a nationalist first and foremost, and remained cautious towards European integration. This was reinforced in one of his speeches at the time:

> The Committee of Ministers should move with all possible rapidity under the Statute to find by co-operation and agreement, remedies for the economic and other ills that are upon us.[15]

De Valera had only made brief allusion to European unity, one which would have to include Irish unity as well, and essentially came to accept a two-speed approach to the subject, after much strong convincing. What he proposed was that the states of continental Europe could, and indeed should, move together toward unity faster than, if necessary, the states of the periphery:

> If the nations on the mainland of the continent consider that they cannot wait for us, perhaps they should consider going on without us by an agreement among themselves for a closer union. It is with no desire to delay the progress towards a union that some of us have spoken against the attempt at immediate federation. It is simply because we know the task which will confront us in persuading our people to proceed by the other road.[16]

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[13] Karin Gilland, 'Irish Euroscepticism', in Robert Harmsen, Menno Spiering (eds), *Euroscepticism,* New York, 2005, 172.
[14] Dennis Maher, *The Torturous Path: The Course of Ireland's entry to the EEC 1948–73*, Dublin 1986; see also Dermot Keogh, *Ireland and Europe 1919–1989: A Diplomatic and Political History*, Cork, 1990; see also Trevor Salmon, *Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy*, Oxford, 1989.
[15] De Valera, cited in Michael Kennedy and Eunan O'Halpin, *Ireland and the Council of Europe: From Isolation Towards Integration*, Strasburg, 2000, 49.
[16] De Valera, cited in Kennedy and O'Halpin, *Ireland and the Council of Europe: From Isolation Towards Integration*, 49.

It was clear that by late 1949 all the major political parties were in tactical agreement that Ireland's future lay in Europe, but the disagreement was concentrated on when this should actually take place.

From the mid-1950s the then Irish prime minister, Seán Lemass articulated the view that economic failure undermined economic independence. The economy was overhauled to attract inward investment and to supply Irish goods (mainly agricultural produce) to new markets outside of Britain. It was in this decision that the idea of Irish participation in economic integration began to become a strong possibility and understood as a better way forward, and hence, membership was sought and promoted in the domestic setting. Although this seemed fairly straightforward, opposition was noted towards the move mainly within the public state administration, which did not share the same positive outlook as their political leaders.[17]

The Irish state administration was a notable opponent of Ireland's move towards Europe during the 1950s and had its sight set on protectionism as the best way forward for future economic policy. The battle was not just centred on economic policy, it also impacted upon future development of Irish society and the best way forward for a young Irish state. The Department of Industry and Commerce was virtually built around the administration of tariffs, quotas and export licenses.[18] The battle was fought in ministerial memos and letters, and was a battle between protectionism and free trade, or economic conservatism and liberalisation. The main point of contention was whether the Irish state could embrace the post-war market economy, which the state administration certainly felt strongly opposed to. It was evident that in opposing the government's move to end protectionism, the Department of Industry and Commerce put forward a number of estimates in regards to future losses if EEC membership were sought and granted.

The civil service debates on trade liberalisation took place between October 1959 and January 1960 and largely pitched the Department of Finance (in the person of T.K. Whitaker) against the Department of Industry and Commerce (in the person of J.C.B. McCarthy), with occasional interventions from Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, the Department of the Taoiseach and others. In a heated exchange on the subject between

[17] Michael Breen and James Dorgan, 'The Death of Irish Trade Protectionism: A Political Economy Analysis', *Irish Studies in International Affairs,* vol 24, 2013 available: http://doras.dcu.ie/19476/1/isia201316_final_proof.pdf, 14.
[18] Breen and Dorgan, 'The Death of Irish Trade Protectionism: A Political Economy Analysis', 14.

J.C.B McCarthy, the then Secretary of the Department of Industry and Commerce and T.K. Whitaker, then Secretary of the Department of Finance, McCarthy stated an estimate of 100,000 jobs depended on protectionism.[19] However Whitaker disagreed, there was notable concern and widespread acceptance amongst certain high level personnel that something resembling that figure was in actual fact the result of protectionism in Ireland.[20] Whitaker had actually cited that figure before in another context regarding the discussion of protection[21], and even Garrett Fitzgerald[22] calculated around 50,000 jobs were created due to Ireland's position of protectionism.[23] Embracing such a move towards liberalisation, or a relaxation of previous government restrictions, carried with it the prospect of deep societal change and challenges, something many state administration members felt was not in the best interest of Ireland. For some it was too great a burden to abandon the protectionist policies of previous decades – and the ramifications of doing so were too risky, and they wondered what this would mean for future relations with Britain. The period 1959 to 1961 was a 'crunch' period in the move to free trade; despite recognition of its probable inevitability, free trade, naturally enough, was not universally welcomed, and the original impetus towards it ran the risk of running into the sands of frustrated isolation.[24] With this in mind, the first such group to reveal a type of eurosceptic overtone (1959-61) was the Irish state administration, which saw it as a threat to its own members' future employment prospects, with potential job losses seeming highly probable under EEC conditions. The reactions to the abandonment of protection at the time can largely be explained by the fundamental economic forces at work within the Irish economy.

Failed applications for membership in 1961 and 1967

In the early 1960s, the Common Market, particularly the Customs Union[25] and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)[26] were still very much in the making. The

[19] Breen and Dorgan, 'The Death of Irish Trade Protectionism: A Political Economy Analysis', 14.
[20] T K Whitaker, *Protection or Free Trade: The Final Battle,* Dublin, 2006, 22-44.
[21] Department of Finance, *Economic Development*, Dublin, 1958.
[22] Fitzgerald was an Irish politician elected to the Seanad Éireann in 1965 and was subsequently elected to the Dáil as a Fine Gael TD in 1969.
[23] Analyst, 'Employment 1926–57: The Results of Protection', *Irish Times*, 17 January 1957, 5.
[24] T K Whitaker, 'From Protection to Free Trade: The Irish Experience' reprinted in T K Whitaker, *Interests*, Dublin, 1983.
[25] The customs union was a principled taskforce of the EEC established in 1958 where no customs were levied on goods travelling within the customs union; a common external tariff to countries outside the zone was agreed upon.

membership applications of Ireland in 1961/62 and 1967 were attempts at enlargement initiated mostly by a British move. In 1963 the then French president, De Gaulle, vetoed the British application to join the EEC declaring: l'Angleterre, ce n'est plus grand chose. [27] *(England is not much anymore).*

This encouraged Britain to redouble its efforts to join. De Gaulle, however, said 'non' again in 1967, and the British recognised that their application was unlikely to be accepted as long as he remained in power.[28] Ireland followed the UK's move on both occasions into possible accession, because Britain was its major export market and agricultural products were their principal export commodity.

Ireland was not invited to join the Common Market by the six original members of the EEC, however membership had been a key aspiration of Fianna Fáil's prime minister, Seán Lemass, from the time he took office in 1959. Lemass was one of the most prominent Irish politicians of the 20th century, serving as Taoiseach from 1959 until 1966. Europe was the key foreign policy goal from 1959 onwards. Lemass believed that Ireland would prosper in terms of economic growth under EEC conditions and was particularly keen to develop the CAP. Ireland thus applied for membership on 31 July 1961 in line with Britain's announcement that it wished to join. Irish official discourse suggests the need for EEC membership on the grounds that to not do so would increase division between the Republic and Northern Ireland:

> Britain has decided to join the EEC. If we were to stay out of the enlarged community, then the Border would, in effect, become the land frontier between us and the EEC. This would result in the erection of many more trade barriers than exist now. Also, the economic and social development of North and South would inevitably grow even further apart.[29]

Thus, Irish official discourse suggests the drawing together of north and south rather than the Republic's close links to Britain as a reason for accession:

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[26] The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, defined the general objectives of a CAP. The principles of the CAP were set out at the Stresa Conference in July 1958. The creation of a common agricultural policy was proposed in 1960 by the European Commission and the CAP mechanisms were adopted by the six founding Member States. In 1962, the CAP came into force with three major principles being established: market unity, community preference and financial solidarity.

[27] Kathryn Hadley, 'Back when Britain was Banging on Europe's Door', *The Guardian*, 13 October 2012, available: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/13/britain-europe-david-cameron-eu.

[28] Hadley, 'Back when Britain was Banging on Europe's Door'.

[29] DFA 1972a cited in Katy Hayward, *Irish Nationalism and European Integration*, New York, 2009.

> The North joining the EEC; that decision has been made. If our people vote in the referendum in favour of joining, then the whole of Ireland – North and South – will be inside the EEC. If not then part of Ireland will be inside the EEC and part outside.[30]

Although much scepticism about Ireland's economic position was evident, in 1962 Lemass attempted to elevate some concerns by addressing the community's fears directly in an address to the European Commission in January the same year. In October 1962 he also visited the capitals of all six membership countries in order to emphasise that Ireland's economy was sufficient and that military neutrality and non-commitment to NATO would not be obstacles. The EEC Council of Ministers agreed to open up talks between themselves and Ireland over the possibility of membership, but the then French president, General de Gaulle, remained hesitant, and on 14 January 1963, when Britain's application was vetoed, Ireland realised it could not go it alone so withdrew its application. At that stage Ireland was so economically dependent on Britain that membership 'could not be envisaged' without British membership.[31]

After de Gaulle's veto, Ireland's EEC application was put to the side. Lemass continued to promote Irish economic modernisation. Irish attempts to secure an interim trade deal with the EEC failed and the European Commission showed some sympathy, but little else, for Ireland's position. Lemass resigned in November 1966, and was succeeded as prime minister by Jack Lynch, the then Minister for Finance. Lynch met the then British prime minister, Harold Wilson, in December 1966 and learnt that Britain was considering a new EEC application.[32] When Wilson and Lynch met on 1 May 1967, Wilson explained that Britain indeed intended to renew its EEC application and Britain's application was submitted on 11 May.[33] Ireland's application followed 15 minutes later, however, within five days de Gaulle's 'velvet veto' explained that conditions were not right for Britain to join the EEC. At the meeting of ministers, five member states unanimously declared they were in favour of UK membership, while France warned repeatedly that if enlargement included the British, it would 'profoundly alter the nature of the communities and the methods of their administration'.[34] The Commission's opinion on the four applications was published in September 1967 and

[30] DFA 1972c cited in Hayward, *Irish Nationalism and European Integration.*
[31] Department of Foreign Affairs, "Why Did We Want To Join?" *eumatters.ie,* N.d., available: http://www.eumatters.ie/why-we-are-an-eu-member-20f0.html?lang=en-IE.
[32] James Donnelly, *Encyclopaedia of Irish History and Culture,* vol 1, New York, 2004, xxxix.
[33] Christopher Preston, *Enlargement & Integration in the European Union,* London, 1997, 39-40.
[34] *Declaration*, 19 December 1967, Brussels, File 143.1, T/640 /1 d/67.

did not identify any serious issues arising from the Irish application, however, as in 1963, the negotiations quickly deadlocked over French concerns about Britain, and Ireland was unable to pursue its application separately.[35] Lynch undertook courtesy visits to the capitals of 'the six' in the second half of 1967. He also held a successful meeting with de Gaulle in early November, but as 1967 came to an end the prospect of EEC membership for Ireland remained unreachable. In December the Council of Ministers decided against the formal opening of entry negotiations with any of the applicants and on 19 December, President of the Council of Ministers, Karl Schiller, told Ireland that 'the six' were not proceeding with Ireland's EEC application. [36] Schiller said the council could not reach agreement on development of procedures as his reason for rejecting all applications.

The desire for membership of the EEC was a logical consequence of the change in the dominant policy paradigm. The clear evidence that Irish freedom had failed to deliver prosperity and wellbeing for its people undermined the prevailing political, cultural and economic nationalism. Domestic governments could no longer ignore the oppressive effects of low incomes, high emigration and unemployment, and low productivity. The Irish government made its first application for EEC membership on 31 July 1961. This approach was endorsed by Fianna Fáil prime minister, Seán Lemass, which ensured that this policy shift was a critical juncture in Ireland's relations with the outside world. Lemass seemed capable of mediating between Ireland's past and its future, where joining the EEC was proposed as an opportunity and to strike out for economic independence from Britain.

In the early 1960s, the prime minister and key domestic ministers established contact with the EEC and continued to prepare Ireland for membership of the Brussels club. Preparations included a unilateral reduction in tariffs and the signing of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement in 1966. Inward investment began to change the face of Ireland – as incomes grew and more people migrated from the land to urban areas. Extensive investment in education prepared the Irish for the opportunities of a growing economy. There was no doubt policy makers felt increasingly drawn to join the EEC, seeing it as vital to Ireland's economic and political survival. As the dominant political force at the

[35] Preston, *Enlargement & Integration in the European Union*, 40.
[36] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Ireland and the EU history", N.d., available: https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/irelandintheeu/ireland-in-the-eu-history.pdf.

time, Fianna Fáil as a centralist party was able to progress with little controversy, generally due to the poor state of Irish affairs; citizens were obliged to follow its lead, in order to elevate some of their concerns, and because it represented a stable political front compared to the economic nationalist alternativewhich held no real solutions to the state's problems. Fianna Fáil posited that for too long tariffs had prevented Ireland from moving forward with the rest of the world.[37] In 1962 Lemass warned that such a path would leave Ireland a beggar amongst the nations, seeking to maintain a dying economy on the crumbs of charity from its wealthier neighbours.[38] Lemass believed involvement within the community would help rebuild the Irish economy, albeit with control of its economic destiny determined by the EEC. This decision was seen as a complete turnabout of policy direction from that of 30 years earlier. The previous desire had been for Ireland to control its own economic misfortunes. What was even more remarkable was that it was Lemass who had crafted the earlier policy in the first place.[39] Fianna Fáil was able to connect economic prosperity with Europe and bluntly acknowledged that the unfettered control of Irish destiny inherited in the Irish constitution was a false type of sovereignty.[40]

Ideological makings: Further developments of a Eurosceptic nature (1960s)

Elements of a eurosceptic discourse can be traced to a number of political parties, non-government organisations and significant individuals from this point on, through actions taken and opinions expressed against the idea of European integration. It seems evident that the ideological positions of communism, republicanism, socialism and nationalism are central to anti-European positions. These will be discussed within their appropriate categories here.

Communist forms of Irish euroscepticism

The IWL was the first staunchly left political organisation to reveal an anti-European position that can be traced to as early as 1961. The IWL was established in 1923 by Jim

[37] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 15.
[38] Lemass, cited in Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 15.
[39] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 15.
[40] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 16.

Larkin and was an Irish communist party located in Dublin. In 1961 the party produced and distributed a large amount of material in its *No to the Common Market Leaflet Campaign*.[41] An analysis of the material produced reveals that the party was concerned at the time with joining the EEC due to the perceived threat to Irish neutrality.[42] It was also clear the political organisation believed membership of the EEC meant a loss of independence for Ireland. The party was critical of Seán Lemass and his remarks about the ultimate objective of the EEC being to create "conditions not dissimilar to those operating within the USA, without a Federal Government but with common institutions none the less".[43] The IWL's strategy involved a broad anti-imperialist (anti-Common Market) front in which state control rather than state ownership would be the central policy. In August 1961 the IWL declared editorially its anti-EEC appeal concentrated on neutrality, "under the Common Market, if it extends further, even into the sphere of war and peace ... it will mean the end of our neutrality and involvement in a war bloc".[44] It went on to elaborate:

> At one time Fianna Fáil opposed that policy (of British imperialist dominance).
> They claimed that they could build an independent Ireland.
> Now, without enthusiasm but without an alternative, they are admitting that they are wrong.
> But are they? …
> For many years our independence has been taken for granted by most people.
> Now the Government's action has revealed that our independence was far from complete.
> It is obvious now that we can never be a free country until the economic links with imperialism, its grip on our banking system, on our trade and on a large number of industries is broken.
> Under the Common Market there will be fewer jobs for our people.
> Only a free and independent country can provide the economic basis for our development as a nation with an expanding population.[45]

This was the first time neutrality was expressly raised as an argument against Europe by a political organisation and was to become the hallmark of future developments. Although sovereignty was not specifically mentioned in the document, the wording used by the IWL was similar in connotation and meaning. The IWL explained further, "in other words joining the Common Market means not only giving up freedom of

[41] Irish Workers League, "No to Common Market Leaflet 1961", *Irish Election Literature,* N.d. available: https://irishelectionliterature.wordpress.com/category/irish-workers-league/, 2-3.
[42] Irish Workers League, "No to Common Market Leaflet 1961", 2-3.
[43] Lemass, cited in Irish Workers League, "No to Common Market Leaflet 1961", 4.
[44] D R O'Connor, "The Communist Party Ireland – A Critical History", 1976, available: http://www.workersrepublic.org/Pages/Ireland/Communism/cpihistory3.html.
[45] *Irish Socialist,* August 1961.

independent economic action but ultimately freedom of independent political action as well".[46] Thus, it managed to highlight that the Common Market was an attempt to create a supra-national state in Western Europe from a very early stage.[47] The threat posed to sovereignty was further reinforced through actions taken by the IWL, particularly by offering an alternative proposition to that of the EEC. The idea of an alternative idea was unique, and well before any other major political party or organisations that thought along similar lines. Although not elaborate, it highlighted that Irish industry and agriculture needed further expansion in order to provide work for an expanding population. It concentrated on Ireland being able to do this on its own accord and through its own actions without support from anyone else, thereby disregarding the need for a higher authority to achieve this for Ireland. This type of industry proposal would serve the interests of Irish citizens much better, they believed. That is, a proposal for an Irish planned economy was the intention put forward.[48] The IWL identified the situation as a struggle and called on all republicans to rise up and fight for the freedom of Ireland[49] and to support this newly found direction. Thus, the IWL presented in the early 1960s as a party concerned about Irish independence and what EEC membership would mean in terms of decision-making ability for the country itself. In many ways this concern was the hallmark argument that was to be used against Europe for future developments in Ireland.

In 1962 the IWL voted to transform itself into the Irish Workers' Party (IWP):

> A drive against imperialist interests in the 26 Counties and a strong anti-imperialist stand in the international field are essential if we are to prove to the people of the 6 Counties, who are not yet won to the idea of national unity, that independence means prosperity and national dignity. Immediately the 26 Counties Government should be pressed to put forward concrete plans for economic development to the Stormont Government, plans which they can reject only by exposing the fact it is not in the interests of the 6 Counties people but the interests of imperialism which they are serving.[50]

The central focus of the 26-county strategy at this time was not partition but the struggle against EEC entry. While this struggle was seen as valid and necessary, the IWP'sapproach to it reflected the limitations of its theory, increased further by its

[46] Irish Workers League, "No to Common Market Leaflet 1961", 4.
[47] Irish Workers League, "No to Common Market Leaflet 1961"
[48] Irish Workers League, "No to Common Market Leaflet 1961", 4.
[49] Irish Workers League, "No to Common Market Leaflet 1961", 5.
[50] *Irish Socialist*, 'Ireland Her Own', December 1962.

reaction to its experiences. Basically, it fought the Common Market with a traditional two-stage method. Instead of 'First the Republic', then the 'Workers' Republic', the call was for a 'Progressive Government' (*Ireland Her Own Programme*) with a "programme of large scale industry to develop a strong independent economy".[51] That this would not involve maximum or even transitional demands was shown by the publication in *Irish Socialist* of March 1962 of "an immediate programme to rally the Labour movement and the entire people for an independent prosperous Ireland".[52] At the founding conference of the IWP the intentions of the organisation to combat any threat the EEC posed to Ireland were declared:

> Joining the Common Market would mean that all our native industries, including those run by the State, would be left defenceless against the ruthless competition of the huge West German monopolies.
> It would mean that a large section of our small farmers would be driven off the land to make the way for big factory farms. It would lead to a huge increase in unemployment, as most of our industries relied on protection from foreign competition.[53]

By this insistence on counter-posing 'independence' rather than 'workers' power' to the Common Market strategy of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, the IWL/IWP tried to provide a basis for an alliance of the workers with small businessmen, in the tradition of the popular front. It wanted to defeat the EEC proposal where Common Market entry was presented as a final end in itself rather than as one, important, battle in the struggle to replace capitalism with socialism.

Irish euroscepticism and republicanism

Sinn Féin in the 1960s echoed the remarks made earlier by the IWL and was particularly concerned about the threat posed to the Irish position of neutrality, but focused more on the issue of republicanism as a means of going about it successfully. Sinn Féin's strong anti-EEC feelings became clear in 1962 in its 'February Declaration'.[54] In 1961, when Ireland was on the verge of making one of its significant decisions of all time of whether to apply for full membership of the EEC, Sinn Féin was wary about the move:

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[51] *Irish Socialist,* June 1961.
[52] *Irish Socialist,* March 1962.
[53] *Irish Socialist,* March 1962.
[54] Sinn Féin, 'Statement on Ireland and the Common Market', *Sinn Féin,* Official Party Statement, 20-12-1966, National Library Archives Ireland, Sean O'Mahony Collection.

> Ireland is on the threshold of making its greatest decision since the attainment of national independence. It is whether or not to join the European Common Market. On that decision will hang the whole future of our country.[55]

As a republican-based movement, Sinn Féin was indirectly sceptical of violations of neutrality. Sinn Féin particularly took a disliking toward Mr Lemass' remarks also, but more specifically when he spoke at a press conference in Bonn on 23 October 1962, when Lemass stated:

> We have made it quite clear that our desire is to participate in whatever political union may ultimately be developed in Europe. We make no reservations of any sort, including defence.[56]

This speech essentially spurred Sinn Féin to publish its first booklet on the issue entitled *Nation or Province* in January 1963. The booklet made it clear that Sinn Féin would publically denounce any such plan that would draw Ireland into the EEC with the issue of neutrality playing a central concern, stating, "Sinn Féin stands opposed to the latest attempt to sell Ireland's … neutrality and to allow our own Christian way of life to be swamped in a flood of European materialism".[57] Much concern seemed concentrated on the unforeseen position that military neutrality would now be placed. Concern was also expressed on future commitment towards NATO and what this would mean for Ireland. Would it mean accepting the common defence policy and losing Ireland's decision-making ability in relation to military affairs? Sinn Féin believed that this would be the most likely outcome:

> If Ireland is to become part and parcel of the Common Market Community, commitment to partake fully of its political aims, she must accept the common defence policy with all that it implies by way of material and military contributions. To the common defence policy Ireland is being committed notwithstanding that such common defence policy has not even yet been formulated.[58]

Sinn Féin did not accept signing up to something without any clear direction or consequences. The concern was then focused towards politicians at the time who were supportive of such a move towards the Common Market:

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[55] Sinn Féin, Publicity Committee, 'Sinn Féin and the Common Market', *Sinn Féin*, Official Party Statement, 16 November 1961, National Library Archives Ireland, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[56] Lemass, cited in Sinn Féin, *Nation or Province? Ireland and the Common Market*, Dublin, 1963, 7.
[57] Sinn Féin, *Nation or Province? Ireland and the Common Market*, 2.
[58] Sinn Féin, *Nation or Province? Ireland and the Common Market*, 8.

> Who among them disapproves of the extensive use of the state's military and police forces in securing the border and in the protection of the British armed forces that help to maintain it? ... Just how stupid do professional politicians think the Irish people are? Just how blind, wilfully or otherwise, can their political followers and supporters become? In the past Ireland has suffered from famine conditions and from the blight of avaricious landlords. At present she suffers from the blight of professional party politicians avaricious for their own interests and for those of their relatives and party adherents.[59]

Early signs of euroscepticism exhibited by Sinn Féin in the first half of the 1960s rested on the notion that the threat to military neutrality was very real and was in need of protecting, as ultimately no one actually knew what accession would mean for Irish neutrality at the time.

Sinn Féin during this period also noted sovereignty as a concern about Europe. The first mention of sovereignty by the party was contained in its 1963, *Nation or Province* document. It mentioned, "Sinn Féin stands opposed to the latest attempt to sell Ireland's right to freedom [and] sovereignty".[60] Sinn Féin thus began to depict any such move as a betrayal of what past generations had endured in terms of securing independence for the Irish nation. The booklet detailed this further when mentioning the sacrifices, surrendering of national rights and lack of opportunity to decide[61], which were all major concerns raised. The first notion regarding sacrifices rested on the assumption that possibly Irish citizens could meet the challenges of entering the Common Market if needed, but really why should they? They claimed Irish citizens would be better off on their own terms rather than partaking in something that may or may not work. The surrendering of national rights also implied, according to Sinn Féin, that "Irish people cannot afford to ignore [the] claim of a right to sell our country's birthright to freedom".[62] The final notion of no opportunity to decide was described as decisions being made on behalf of Ireland by Britain, and Irish citizens needing to be the ones to either accept or not. This emphasised again the concern about Britain and its involvement in a so-called free Ireland. The booklet also outlined an alternative plan for

[59] Sinn Féin, *Nation or Province? Ireland and the Common Market*, 8.
[60] Sinn Féin, *Nation or Province? Ireland and the Common Market*, Dublin, 1963, 2.
[61] Sinn Féin, *Nation or Province? Ireland and the Common Market*, 3-10.
[62] Sinn Féin, *Nation or Province? Ireland and the Common Market*, 5.

Ireland and implied a statelet concept,[63] because it was feared Britain would have the last word on whether Ireland joined or not.[64]

In 1966 Sinn Féin released a statement on Ireland and the Common Market after it became clearer that the British Government had renewed its intention to seek joining the EEC. Sinn Féin had failed in its attempt to disrupt the free trade agreement with Britain a year earlier, and now because of this showed a renewed focus to try to prevent any Ireland-EEC agreement taking place. Support was given by the Irish Labour Party.[65] Sinn Féin stated, "we wish now to reiterate the stand taken [in 1963]".[66] The decision made was to maintain a committed focus on preventing any further moves towards Europe with concerns regarding sovereignty and dominance featuring as core reasons for doing so. This was made evident in an important statement issued by the party in 1966 that said:

> Membership of the EEC would make the development of an independent Irish industrial arm impossible, because of the uncontrolled competition from the giant industrial combines of Britain and Europe. The industries left in Ireland would be merely local branches of German, French, British and other foreign firms.[67]

The concern implied that competition would be even greater with the introduction of other countries, leaving all sections of society disadvantaged. Sinn Féin placed sole blame for this on the government at the time, due to the direction it had taken, which it felt had resulted in little option but to join the Common Market. The alleged stranglehold of Britain that had long been seen was also noted. "Britain's stranglehold on Ireland [would] be strengthened, not weakened, if we enter the EEC, only that other western European powers will also have a say in running Ireland".[68] Sovereignty and dominance continued to be concerns expressed by Sinn Féin in the mid 1960s, directed towards the government but also Europe as a whole.

By 1967 concerns about Irish neutrality were still evident in society but began gaining a wider audience, due to the Wolfe Tone Society. In 1963, to celebrate the bi-centenary

[63] Sinn Féin believed that Britain needed to publicly declare that the 'Northern Ireland' statelet was no longer part of the United Kingdom.
[64] Sinn Féin, *Nation or Province? Ireland and the Common Market*, 21.
[65] Letter from Clare Gill and Noel Kavanagh to Economic Independence Committee, 1 January 1966, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[66] Sinn Féin, 'Important Statement on Ireland and the Common Market', press statement, 20 December 1966, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[67] Sinn Féin, "Important Statement on Ireland and the Common Market".
[68] Sinn Féin, "Important Statement on Ireland and the Common Market".

of Wolfe Tone's birth, Irish republicans formed the Wolfe Tone Bi-centenary Directories.[69] The Wolfe Tone Society played an influential role in the formation of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA). The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement, which NICRA initially led, helped destabilise unionist hegemony after a half-century of one-sided Protestant Stormont rule in the Northern statelet.

Although collaboration between the Wolfe Tone Society and Sinn Féin had been evident at the time, it was not until a second booklet entitled *The Case Against the Common Market – Why Ireland Should Not Join* that this became clear. This particular pamphlet was supported by Sinn Féin and later published by the Official Sinn Féin Party after the split.[70] When first published in 1967 it was printed by the Wolf Tone Society at 30 Gardiner Place, Dublin 1, which was also Sinn Féin's publishing address. This was an indication of the links between the Wolfe Tone Society and Sinn Féin, as both their nationalist and their anti-EEC intentions were closely aligned. The society adopted the position, "while the Common Market may be of benefit to various interests on the continent or even in Britain, it nevertheless is not in Ireland's political, economic or cultural interest to join".[71] The pamphlet further explained the notion of neutrality and the threat imposed to Ireland, with political concerns outlined in the document being strongly critical towards neutrality.[72] It explicitly stated that "if Ireland were to become part and parcel of the Common Market Community, committed to partake fully of its political aims, she must accept the common defence policy with all that it implies by way of military and material contributions".[73] The concern about NATO was again raised, as Ireland at the time did not have a common defence policy, and the closest thing that resembled it was NATO itself. The concern about NATO for Wolfe Tone members stemmed from the issue of the former British occupation of Ireland, and this ultimately meant signing up to something closely monitored and associated with Britain, something they were not fond of after years of British rule. One of the specific objectives of the Wolfe Tone Society was to show "how our divided nation is kept

[69] Department of the Taoiseach, 'Tuairisc: The News-letter of the Wolfe Tone Society', Number One, July 1965 available: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/nai/1965/nai_TSCH-98-6-101_1965-nd.pdf
[70] There had been a split within the paramilitary wing of Sinn Féin, the IRA in 1970 between the Provisional Republican Movement and the Official Republican Movement. Each faction had its own armed IRA and its own Sinn Féin Party.
[71] Wolfe Tone Society and Sinn Féin, *The Case Against the Common Market*, Dublin, 1967, 2.
[72] Wolfe Tone Society and Sinn Féin, *The Case Against the Common Market* , 8.
[73] Wolfe Tone Society and Sinn Féin, *The Case Against the Common Market* , 8.

wholly subject to British imperialism".[74] Signing up to NATO would mean that if an armed attack occurred against one member state, it should be considered an attack against all members, and other members would assist the attacked member, with armed force if necessary.[75] This was interpreted by the society as a direct threat that would diminish Ireland's position of neutrality. Such a condition, it believed, would also mean the extensive use of Ireland's military and police forces in securing the border and in the protection of the British armed forces that would be left to protect it.[76] Wolfe Tone members felt that Britain should withdraw from the area to prevent further conflict. It was felt that Irish citizens could potentially be used to support the British in Northern Ireland after 1969 to help restore peace and order following the bloody riots and bombings that had taken place in the late 1960s between the IRA and Protestant paramilitary groups. This was not acceptable to Wolfe Tone members or Sinn Féin, who supported British withdrawal from the area, not direct involvement in the confrontation. These concerns prompted both the Wolfe Tone Society and Sinn Féin to try to halt EEC accession in Ireland, backed by broader concerns regarding NATO and its capacity to threaten Irish neutrality.

The renewed push by the Irish Government and Britain to bring Ireland into the EEC at this point also encouraged the Wolfe Tone Society to publish *The Case Against the Common Market – Why Ireland Should Not Join*. The position adopted was, "while the Common Market may be of benefit to various interests on the continent or even in Britain, it nevertheless is not in Ireland's political, economic or cultural interest to join".[77] The pamphlet further explained the notion of sovereignty in depth. It highlighted the destruction of nations by their integration:[78]

> Common Market membership would mean the relinquishing of control of our political and economic destiny, abandonment of what independence the country possesses and surrender by the Dublin Government of the principal powers it has to develop a viable economy in Ireland capable of providing a decent living for the people. It would mean committing not only this generation of Irish people, but also future generations, to entering a political and economic bloc

[74] Wolfe Tone Society, "Constitution of the Dublin Wolfe Tone Society", 1964, available: http://www.iol.ie/~rjtechne/century130703/1960s/wtsconst.htm.
[75] NATO, "Issues", N.d., available: http://www.nato.int/issues/faq/index.html.
[76] Wolfe Tone Society and Sinn Féin, *The Case Against the Common Market* , 8.
[77] Wolfe Tone Society and Sinn Féin, *The Case Against the Common Market,* 2.
[78] Wolfe Tone Society and Sinn Féin, *The Case Against the Common Market,* 27.

> dominated by States and interests that in no way have the welfare and progress of the Irish people as their concern.[79]

The Wolfe Tone Society's objective was to further establish the united Irish republic as declared in the 1916 Proclamation and to try to convince the people of Ireland to support its creation, via meetings, publications and other means.[80] Any move away from the idea of a republic or any limitations imposed upon it, as the EEC would potentially do, meant opposition would be expressed by the members of the Wolfe Tone Society.

To help promote its message, the organisation published a newsletter called '*Tuairisc*'.[81] One of the founding objectives of the organisation in 1964 was to limit the impact the EEC might have on Ireland:

> To win the support of the Irish people for the establishment of Ireland of the 70's as a united, independent nation, with control over its financial policy, ability to plan its own investment without recourse to bribery of foreigners, employing to the full the considerable skill and ability of its people irrespective of religion, trading in a diversified manner with many nations to mutual advantage, and playing its proper part among the nations, especially those at present emerging from the grip of imperialism.[82]

This encouraged the group to openly campaign against the EEC through meetings, publications and other means, with these concerns being raised on numerous occasions. In 1969 a more extensive document was produced by the Wolfe Tone Society entitled *The Rights of Man in Ireland*.[83] Although it referred more so to the successful bringing together of north and south, which had not been successful to this point and was advocated by the group, anti-EEC references might be inferred in statements such as:

> It would be best for the Irish if they ran their own affairs. That would be the first step to true independence and would involve, among other things, the removal of the 'British presence' from the North. Big-power interference in the affairs of small countries has nothing to recommend it and should be universally resisted.[84]

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[79] Wolfe Tone Society and Sinn Féin, *The Case Against the Common Market,* 26-27.
[80] Wolfe Tone Society, "Tuairisc; The Newsletter of the Wolfe Tone Society", no 1, July 1965, National Archives Ireland.
[81] Wolfe Tone Society, "Tuairisc; The Newsletter of the Wolfe Tone Society".
[82] Roy Johnston and Anthony Coughlan, "Constitution of the Dublin Wolfe Tone Society", 2002, available: http://www.iol.ie/~rjtechne/century130703/1960s/wtsconst.htm.
[83] Sean Cronin, *The Rights of Man,* Dublin, 1969.
[84] Cronin, *The Rights of Man,* 27.

The Wolfe Tone Society's intentions were clear; any decision making should rest entirely with those who make up Ireland, the Irish citizens. Any supranational organisation such as the EEC that controlled decision making was not appropriate in the eyes of the organisation. Thus, the 1960s revealed the non-government, republican participant of Wolfe Tone Society voicing concerns about neutrality and sovereignty towards the possibility of EEC accession in Ireland, much like its political counterpart, Sinn Féin.

Irish euroscepticism accommodating democratic socialism

The Irish Labour Party was also a prominent oppositional force during the 1960s towards any move that would see Ireland joining the EEC, but emphasised a specific socialist point of view while doing so. The Irish Labour Party was founded in 1912 in Clonmel, County Tipperary, by James Connolly, James Larkin and William O'Brien as the political wing of the Irish Trade Union Congress.[85] With regards to the EEC, in 1962, the Labour Party conference advocated that Ireland should basically do whatever the UK did.[86] However, the need to join because Britain was attempting to do so at the time did not sit well with many Labour Party members, as expressed in their annual report:

> I suppose we are ashamed, so to speak, to say this, that we seek membership because Britain does because of our continued economic dependence on Britain; this dependence is so great it appears, that we have to.[87]

The longstanding resentment towards Britain was evident in party documents, and the Irish Labour Party believed that Ireland's recently established independence would be threatened. This change in approach can be attributed to Noel Browne, the former Irish health minister under Clann na Poblachta, joining the party when it began shifting significantly to the left. In 1958 Browne founded the National Progressive Democrats with Jack McQuillan, and Browne held on to his seat at the 1961 general election, but in 1963 he and McQuillan joined the Labour Party, disbanding the National Progressive Democrats. The Labour Party and a number of independent backbenchers were more agnostic than the government about joining the EEC; however some questions were asked in the Dáil Éireann about the country's neutral status in the

[85] The Irish Labour Party, "Labour's Proud History", N.d., available: http://www.labour.ie/party/history.html.
[86] M Gallagher, *The Irish Labour Party in Transition, 1957-82*, Manchester, 1982, 50.
[87] The Labour Party, *Annual Report 1970*, Dublin, 1970, National Library Ireland Archives, 36.

light of the application for membership of the EEC.[88] It was the political dimensions of the EEC, mainly the threat posed to Irish neutrality that caused such internal political controversy expressed by Labour Party members. Lemass faced hostile questioning in the Dáil over the political and defence implications of joining the EEC:

> I say in this regard that it would be highly undesirable that remarks made here should give the impression in Europe that there is a public opinion in this county which regards membership of NATO as something discreditable. The view of the Government in that regard has been made clear. We think the existence of NATO is necessary for the preservation of peace and for the defence of the countries of Western Europe, including this country. Although we are not members of NATO, we are in full agreement with its aims.[89]

Lemass continued to argue against the hostile Labour Party, which attempted to undermine successful progress towards full EEC membership in the Dáil itself. Associate membership, implying a non-formal arrangement with the EEC, which did not guarantee any representation of free movement rights that full membership allowed, was the position sought by the Labour Party in order to prevent any possible threat to neutrality and sovereignty that it felt would be put in jeopardy under full membership conditions. Most debate on European matters within the party focused solely on concerns about the implications of EEC membership for sovereignty and on the trade unions' perception of threats to employment that would result in a more open international market.[90] With a handful of unions being affiliated to the Labour Party at the time, this made union member demands an important consideration for future policy direction, as union membership was required to keep the party afloat.

Yet the problem with this early opposition expressed by the Labour Party prior to 1969 was that it was individualistic in nature. It had no focal point, was not organised and essentially consisted of lukewarm reservations expressed by Labour Party colleagues. The Labour Party's opposition was not a social movement against Europe; it was built slowly under a common aim of political opinions against the EEC that took time to coalesce from wider civil society. In many ways this resulted in uncertainty and a lack of clarity for the voting public when it came time to contemplate an Irish future in Europe. An eagerness for all things Europe was certainly not supported by the Irish

[88] Dermot Keogh, 'The Diplomacy of "Dignified Calm": An Analysis of Ireland's Application for Membership of the EEC, 1961–1963' Chronicon 1, vol 4, 1997, available: http://www.ucc.ie/chronicon/keoghfra.htm, 1-68.
[89] Dáil debates, vol 193, cols 6-8, 14 February 1962.
[90] Tony Browne, 'Forty Years of EU Engagement', *Administration*, vol 62, no 2, 2014, available: http://www.ipa.ie/pdf/Forum_FortyyearsofEUengagement.pdf, 173.

Labour Party, though some Labour Party members were pro-EEC, hence the individualistic nature of the message being conveyed at the time. However, the party did try to appeal to rural and trade union voters, who it believed were against the move. The Labour Party was timid in its oppositional approach and took too long to build support behind its message.

Labour's parliamentary strength increased after the 1961 and 1965 general elections.[91] However, a divergence of views certainly existed amongst the party faithful, particularly on the question of EEC membership. This uncertainty hampered the coherence of opposition, and as a consequence it found itself firmly out of power between 1957 and 1973, mainly due to the issue of Europe, but more so because of the uncertainty seen in party motives and direction. It is perhaps the most difficult of the Irish parties to understand during this time.[92] One journalist summed up the situation well in contending that Labour was clearly content to remain an inoffensive minor party and had disgraced itself.[93] In addition, one newspaper elaborated further:

> Labour was a party unable to tolerate stormy characters ... a party without much confidence in itself, a party of safe men, in contrast to the dynamic socialist image it was attempting to project.[94]

When it was in a minority position after 1961 it could do little to influence government policy. Although relatively content with the 1961 election results, the move to a policy of socialism had now commenced. Labour's policy was said to be based not on 'rip-roaring Marxism' but on 'Christian Socialism'.[95] In 1965 the party attempted to promote a coherent socialist philosophy,[96] and by 1967 the move towards the left continued at an accelerating rate. What was retained though was an internally disputed policy centred on the question of EEC membership.

The change in direction to the more extreme left had come about with the new appointment of Brendan Halligan as political director. Upon his appointment he commented that it was almost respectable now to be a socialist.[97] This was also accompanied by a return to more traditional nationalist arguments incorporating

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[91] M Fitzgerald, *Protectionism to Liberalisation: Ireland and the EEC, 1957-1966*, Aldershot, 2001, 296.
[92] Michael Gallagher, *The Irish Labour Party in Transition*, Manchester, 1982, 27.
[93] Gallagher, *The Irish Labour Party in Transition*, 66.
[94] Gallagher, *The Irish Labour Party in Transition*, 66.
[95] Gallagher, *The Irish Labour Party in Transition*, 65.
[96] F S L Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine*, vol 1, London, 2009, 586.
[97] Gallagher, *The Irish Labour Party in Transition*, 67.

Northern Ireland in the process. This was due to the Northern Irish Labour Party and the ICTU publicising the discriminatory practices of unionist rule to the new Labour Government.[98] Opposing Ireland's entry was positioned on a refusal to join because it was felt it would mean abandoning Dublin's right to demand unity.[99] This response tended to reflect Labour's early oppositional stance to European integration.[100] Thus, socialist rhetoric had not been able to change opinions on the partition question, despite its attachment to popular policies such as social justice and military neutrality aimed at the EEC.

Irish euroscepticism and individual nationalists

A number of significant individuals who represented the left emerged during the 1960s as open and often vocal opponents of Ireland's move towards the EEC. This type of euroscepticism can be classed as nationalistic, as Irish nationalism traditionally was associated with the left at the time.[101] Nationalism was an underlying feature of these individual stances against Europe, where common concerns regarding visions of the nation's interests were apparent. Anthony Coughlan, Raymond Crotty, Roy Johnston and John De Courcy Ireland were sceptical towards the EEC as they perceived it to be a vehicle of a great power intervention, imperialistic, and a threat posed to the territorial integrity of Ireland. This generated a type of communal nationalism within the individual that tended to steer away from the ethnic components of nationalism, so often associated with the extreme right.

In the 1960s Coughlan had been a leading member of the Wolfe Tone Society that had the objective of showing "how our divided nation is kept wholly subject to British Imperialism".[102] Coughlan's involvement in the Wolfe Tone Society in the early 1960s encouraged that group, as discussed above, to hold eurosceptic beliefs backed by his continued frustration about the loss of sovereignty and dominance by bigger member countries. During the 1960s Coughlan pursued a relentless 'no' campaign through the Wolfe Tone Society, not so much in a political sense but more as an agitational and

[98] R F Foster, *Luck and the Irish : A Brief History of Change from 1970*, New York, 2008, 105.
[99] M Fitzgerald, *Protectionism to Liberalisation : Ireland and the EEC, 1957 to 1966,* Ashgate, 2001, available: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/bitstream/2134/2355/8/CHAPTER6.pdf, 296.
[100] Gallagher, *The Irish Labour Party in Transition, 1957-82,* 130.
[101] L Topaloff, *Political Parties and Euroscepticism,* New York, 2012, 80.
[102] Wolfe Tone Society, cited in Tony Browne, "'Saying No' – An Analysis of the Irish Opposition to the Lisbon Treaty", *The Institute of International and European Affairs,* 2010, available: http://www.iiea.com/documents/saying-no

educational forum as the way to tackle the, as he defined it, 'ever growing problem'. He believed passionately that he needed to inform citizens on the issue and would decide for them the best way forward for Ireland as a whole. The use of the wording 'ever growing problem' marked the point at which a more contemporary Irish opposition towards European integration emerged; it had now moved beyond the political party and organisational spectrum, to more mainstream individual appeal, built on a sense of left-wing nationalism. Coughlan's initial quest was for 'real' Irish independence, which meant defending Irish economic sovereignty against Britain and the EEC. He was a student of the Communist Party of Great Britain's Desmond Greaves, meaning he was influenced by some forms of socialism to achieve his goals, but these goals were more so his own individual points of view expressed with a nationalistic overtone. Coughlan had stated on numerous occasions that he was never a member of the Communist Party in either Britain or Ireland, although secretly this assumption can be made.[103] Coughlan was convinced though that the Lemass economic reforms marked the abandonment of even De Valera's half-hearted pursuit of independence and Ireland's full integration into a neo-colonial system, with Fianna Fáil leaders in the "ignominious role of local managers for imperialism".[104] Thus, he was arguing a socialist program built upon nationalism despite his claims.

1967 saw the first of many publications on European themes by Coughlan, by then a social scientist at Trinity College Dublin and acknowledged republican intellectual. Its title was, *The Case Against the Common Market*, and it was adopted as a policy statement by the Wolfe Tone Society. This pamphlet argued that "it is, unfortunately, no lurid propagandist fantasy to see striking analogies between the Ireland that would accede to the Treaty of Rome and the Ireland that saw the passage of the Act of Union of 1800".[105] This was important as it provided a context for Coughlan to work from that would be part of his anti-European crusade for many decades to come. In 1967 he raised the issue through the *Irish Times* of Irish cultural distinctiveness not being able to survive under EEC conditions, and the loss of the nation's political and economic independence.[106] However, it is possible that Coughlan underestimated the difficulties of mobilising to oppose entry to the Common Market at this time. He was aware that

[103] See Brian Hanley and Scott Millar, *The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA and the Workers' Party,* Dublin, 2009
[104] Stephen Howe, *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture,* Oxford, 2002, 159.
[105] Wolfe Tone Society, *The Case Against the Common Market,* Dublin, 1967.
[106] Coughlan, cited in *The Irish Times*, 22 June 1967.

people and organisations were active in opposing the EEC and was fundamental to the Wolfe Tone Society as he was authoring their policy statements. Yet he did very little to connect with others on a much larger scale, as he attempted to fight the EEC as a personal crusade rather than within a collective front.

In many respects Raymond Crotty was the first prominent individual in line with De Courcy Ireland to voice concerns about Ireland joining the EEC around a nationalist viewpoint.

> As early as 1962, the economist Raymond Crotty expressed concern about the loss of Ireland's national identity within what he termed a 'European super state' and argued that it was remarkable that a people renowned for their centuries-long struggle for independence should now be ready to surrender a large measure of that independence.[107]

Crotty maintained that Ireland's status as an ex-colony made it unsuited for membership of a bloc of nations that included former colonial powers.[108] He was clearly wary of Ireland being controlled again so soon after securing independence. In 1962, in the early stages of the public debate on whether Ireland should join the EEC, Crotty expressed his concerns about the possible loss of Ireland's national identity within what he termed a 'European super state'.[109] In a reference to the country's troubled history, he suggested that it was "all the more remarkable that a people renowned for their centuries-long struggle for independence should be now ready to surrender a large measure of this independence".[110] His concerns were based on giving up a recently established independence from Britain but also drew attention to the economic consequences of being associated with such a body. As a radical economist and economic historian, Crotty produced a number of publications on the issue, but his main stance was that joining the EEC would provoke a dramatic increase in unemployment and result in the failure of Irish agriculture to modernise.[111] He attempted to make Irish citizens aware of economic consequences of being associated with any form of EEC commitment during the 1960s and articulated his point of view through a number of studies that used statistics from member countries to back up his arguments. For example, when all assumptions about entry were open to review in 1966, particularly,

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[107] Raymond Crotty, cited in Browne, "'Saying No' – An Analysis of the Irish Opposition to the Lisbon Treaty", *The Institute of International and European Affairs*, 5.
[108] *The Irish Times*, "An Inveterately Optimistic Campaigner", 6 June 1989.
[109] *The Irish Times*, 10 May 1962.
[110] *The Irish Times*, "Economist Suggests 20% Tariff Reduction", 10 May 1962.
[111] Diarmaid Ferriter, *Ambiguous Republic: Ireland in the 1970s*, London, 2012.

as Crotty argued, despite all the rhetoric about an expansion in the importance of agriculture, the reality remained very different.[112] Unfortunately for Crotty his assertions did not always hold true. He went on to proclaim that the volume of net agricultural production was basically the same at the end of the Lemass period as it had been in the beginning,[113] and this brought further doubt in his mind about the perceived benefits of joining. The advantages of joining in terms of agricultural output and further benefits to the agricultural sector could not be replicated, he believed, by simply joining an organisation like the EEC. Policy changes were required at home first and foremost to bring about the desired results.

Crotty's knowledge and experience of agricultural economics shaped his attitude towards European integration. His early years as a farmer helped him develop a strong opinion of Irish agriculture that he felt was very much structured to discourage the efficient use of land. As he wrote later in his memoir, *A Radical's Response,* "it's not how much you get out, it's how little you put in that determines financial success or failure in Irish farming".[114] He came to believe that agricultural efficiency could best be achieved by the imposition of an annual land tax. This would allow taxes on inputs and outputs to be removed or reduced and would encourage only those prepared to maximise the potential of their land to remain in farming. In putting forward this proposal, Crotty was reflecting the influence of the American economist, Henry George, who held that land should never be owned by private individuals.[115] In the 1960s Crotty believed that Irish agriculture would be damaged if Ireland joined the EEC as, instead of becoming more efficient, farmers would grow to depend on external subsidies under the CAP[116] – this revealed him to be a sceptic of Europe during the 1960s for generally good reason.

In January 1964 Roy Johnston drafted the Wolfe Tone Society constitution, something that alarmed many in nationalist circles, as he was a known communist sympathiser and a former member of the Communist Party of Great Britain.[117] However, Johnston was

[112] Maurice Fitzgerald, *Protectionism to Liberalisation: Ireland and the EEC, 1957–1966,* Aldershot, 2001, 311.
[113] Fitzgerald, *Protectionism to Liberalisation: Ireland and the EEC, 1957 to 1966,* 311.
[114] Raymond Crotty, *A Radical's Response,* Poolbeg, 1988, 17.
[115] Raymond Crotty, *When Histories Collide: The Development and Impact of Individualistic Capitalism,* Lanham, 2001, xvi–xviii.
[116] *The Irish Times*, "Death of Raymond Crotty, Radical Farm Economist and EU Opponent", 1 January 1994.
[117] Kenneth Sheehy, 'In the shadow of a gunman: The Wolfe Tone Society, 1963-69', University College Cork Paper, available: https:// www.societies.ncl.ac.uk/pgfnewcastle/files/2014/11/In-The-Shadow-of-Gunmen-The-Wolfe-Tone-Society-1963-19691.pdf

central to the evolution of republicanism in Ireland and had a close working relationship with Coughlan, which in turn promoted the Wolfe Tone Society's agitation against the EEC in the latter part of the 1960s. His involvement in the republican scene, being highly involved in the leadership of the pre-1970s IRA, cemented his negative stance towards the EEC where the pro-Moscow individuals did reveal nationalist, anti-imperialist and pro-Soviet views that all dove-tailed into opposition towards the EEC.[118] These viewpoints were expressed by Johnstone more so on his own accord rather than through the Wolfe Tone Society. In his autobiography, Johnston gives extensive insight into the roots of the Irish movement against European integration and details how he was able to lay the foundations for a more transparent and organised anti-EEC response in the late 1960s. Johnston's remarkable autobiography gives a fascinating insight into the roots of the Irish eurosceptic movement. In 1967 he wrote, "the EEC was beginning to assume the status of a threatening 'Greater Act of Union'".[119] His position was based mainly on the fact that the EEC was really a 'narrow rich man's club' dominated by the monopolies and cartels of Western Europe.[120] This position owed much to Johnston's Marxism. As Johnston put it, the so called 'menace' of the EEC became more real, thus Johnston felt with his background in Marxism he was well positioned to impart some coherence on the issue to the general public. A more or less daily account of the left-wing Republican Club's workings were being published by Johnston in 1969, as they shuffled from Belfast to Dublin anticipating the impending crisis of capitalism and opposing entry to the EEC.[121] Concerns were being expressed on social justice and inequality between the rich and poor. It is possible to contend that the 'anti-establishment' and even 'personalised' nature of this activism became far more prominent than the original rationale behind the individuals' participation.[122] Johnston as a critic of European integration chose to speak from a determinedly independent position and took a stance against Europe in the public arena, inciting a nationalistic overtone to his message.

John De Courcy Ireland was also an important voice for early Irish opposition to EEC membership in the 1960s, although the splintered anti-EEC movement made his

[118] Sean Swan, *Official Irish Republicanism 1962–1972*, Dublin, 2008, 353.
[119] Roy Johnston, *Century of Endeavour*, Dublin, 2006.
[120] Letter from Dublin Wolfe Tone Society, de Courcy Ireland Papers, (JdCI) P29/C/7d.
[121] R F Foster, *Luck and the Irish: A Brief History of Change*, New York, 2008, 107.
[122] Katy Hayward, 'From Visionary to Functionary: Representations of Irish Intellectuals in the Debate on "Europe"', *Irish Studies*, vol 34, no 2, 2009, available: http://etudesirlandaises.revues.org/1650.

opposition seem less significant.[123] Politically, De Courcy Ireland was a socialist, an Irish nationalist, a peace activist and was active at various times throughout his early life in the Communist Party of Ireland (CPI), the British Labour Party, and the Irish Labour Party. During the 1960s, De Courcy Ireland turned his attention to the issue of Irish participation in European integration, which he believed was a dangerous development.

An important component of De Courcy Ireland's opposition to Ireland's EEC membership, like Crotty's, was his reading of history. He spent much of the 1960s attempting to ground the wider integration process in a populist historical context. He sought to draw historical parallels between the EEC and other attempts at political and economic domination of Europe. Most notably he used Nazi Germany as an economic argument against EEC membership. He argued that the EEC represented a political tradition, wholly at odds with the European revolutionary tradition, with which he believed Ireland had more affinity to a tradition of the common people for the common good.[124] In October, 1961, De Courcy Ireland dismissed the idea of the EEC being the natural outcome for Europe. He branded it an economic system that was "dominated by the German mark and German monopolies [where] power will inevitably be concentrated in the hands of an executive bureaucracy as the general representatives meet so seldom, and over the decisions of this small group of people there is no final control".[125] De Courcy Ireland expressed concern over the type of economic control apparent in EEC membership conditions, but also revealed concern over the democratic character of the EEC itself.

The EEC for De Courcy Ireland was the next attempt at a German dominated European empire. This was a concern he felt because of the atrocities seen during World War II, and he questioned the role Germany should play in deciding the future fate of Europe again so soon. In early 1962, he questioned whether the EEC's political goals were the domination of Europe, "with or without the consent of those dwelling between the Oder and the Urals".[126] He pushed his exclusive argument further in late 1962, arguing:

[123] See Devenney, 'A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty: Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland, 1961–1972'
[124] Devenney, 'A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty: Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland, 1961–1972', 21
[125] *The Irish Times*, 11 October 1961.
[126] *The Irish Times*, 23 January 1962.

> The fact is that economic reality has caught up with Seán Lemass, as political reality will one day also do, albeit with halfling feet. The Market is just an association of European big business, designed … to keep the rich countries—or anyhow their bosses—in affluence at the expense of the unemployed, illiterate, diseased, underfed, conscripted, bamboozled emigrant—millions even in Europe, outside of, hundreds of millions [*sic*].[127]

In the late 1960s, De Courcy Ireland returned to his argument based on Ireland's European heritage, although Ireland did not really fit under this category. He expanded upon it in a lecture delivered to the Dublin Wolfe Tone Society in December 1967, titled *Ireland's European Tradition: The Historical Case Against the Common Market*. De Courcy Ireland explicitly labelled the EEC as a dangerous political idea, stating that:

> Ireland has a European, indeed an international tradition; but this tradition has nothing in common with the nightmare vision of Irish participation in a new version of Hitler's Festung (Fortress) Europa, a Little Europe directed by 15 all powerful bureaucrats at Brussels.[128]

Ireland's past colonial experiences also influenced his way of thinking. He believed that the desire to reawaken Ireland's European revolutionary heritage was necessary because the colonial dominance of Britain had suppressed Irish awareness of that important heritage. The EEC appeared to him as another domineering, colonial entity seeking to replace Britain as Ireland's political and economic master.[129] He felt passionately that there was a need to reject the EEC's 'capitalist club' and to rejoin the populist struggle for social justice and equality throughout the world. This was a struggle that in part placed Ireland's potential EEC future in direct opposition with that of its United Nations efforts in support of Third World decolonisation. It was with fellow former colonial people that he believed a united push for social justice, democracy, and equality could be achieved and that Ireland's true prosperity and influence would reside. Thus, his populist rhetoric, which had distinctly nationalist overtones, offered a positive counter-approach to Ireland's relationship with Europe and the world. De Courcy Ireland's motivation for attacking the EEC was due to his belief that there was a better European heritage to choose, a heritage built upon a union in diversity and not beholden to an exclusive capitalist club. This was reinforced in a speech he made in 1965 when he stated:

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[127] John de Courcy Ireland, *'The Common Market: An Assessment'*, draft article, UCDAD, JdCI, P29/A/129b
[128] *Irish Independent*, 3 December 1967.
[129] Devenney, 'A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty: Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland, 1961–1972', 23.

> Unity … can only grow, and not be forced, but it will only grow if we protect its natural tendency to do so; this we can only do, each European nation and each European individual of us, by developing our own best diverse but inevitably European qualities. The moment we accept standardization we assassinate Europe.[130]

The path to 'a great European community inheriting a splendid and diverse civilisation' was not through the agency of the EEC, but through expanded civic education, open democracy, and cooperative economic relations that celebrated the differences as well as the commonalities.[131] De Courcy Ireland differed somewhat from other Irish opponents of the EEC mentioned previously, as there was overt anti-German rhetoric in his arguments during the 1960s. He framed his overall opposition in a nationalistic, anti-capitalist point of view, emphasising his opposition to big business interests. Anti-British rhetoric was often a staple, in fact sometimes foundational part of the early Irish anti-EEC arguments, however De Courcy Ireland went beyond this and, in some ways, offers an example of how the anti-EEC argument developed beyond its early origins, as Ireland moved ever closer to joining in 1972..

Conclusion

This chapter revealed a history of Irish euroscepticism reaching back to the 1950s. Opposition towards membership to the Common Market began as a view that it was part and parcel of a 'rich man's club' and was rejected in the 1950s only by local state administration authorities who feared job losses that would result under possible EEC membership conditions. Irish euroscepticism began in this period developed from four distinctive ideological components; communism, republicanism, socialism and nationalism. This ideological breadth reflected the range of interests observed and described in the prehistory of euroscepticism discussed in Chapter 2, but also shifted in some instances towards a critique not of British, but of German dominance.

The process of debate and discussion over EEC membership in the early 1960s was characterised by a eurosceptic element that consisted of a long list of objections, revelations and predictions. This element, seen in political parties, non-government organisations and significant individuals, was comprised of either, nationalism, left-wing socialism, communism or sectional interests built on republicanism. It was tied to

[130] John De Courcy Ireland, *'Civic Education: From the National to the European',* Address to the Ninth Conference of the Campaign for European Civic Education (Malahide, 15-18 November 1965), UCDAD, JdCI, P29/B/61a
[131] De Courcy Ireland, *'Civic Education: From the National to the European',* 17-18.

the long held fundamental arguments of neutrality and sovereignty that emerged as important political notions after the Second World War.

The collective force of opposition shown at this point though was in no way a strong commanding presence, rather it began to emerge slowly in the background, unnoticed and often unchallenged because of the strong support for EEC membership at the time. This was simply due to the fact that Ireland was faced with such dire predictions, particularly from an economic point of view, and sought ways to advance as the rest of Western Europe had after the war. The opposition was in no way a well organised resistance movement. Many of the groups identified acted unpredictably and within the narrow limits of their identified ideological position. Consequently, they were unwilling to form a united front that would entail a strong oppositional force during the 1960s, but they did, however, set the wheels in motion for a stronger oppositional element to come in the years beginning in 1970. The arguments made against EEC membership during the 1950s and 1960s rested on the foundations of neutrality, sovereignty and fear of domination, and were found on both sides of the political spectrum. Thus, by the end of the 1960s euroscepticism was already well established in Ireland, even if its character would change over the decades to follow.

The following chapter looks specifically at the period known as the 'EEC referendum debate' and locates ever increasing euroscepticism within Ireland at this point in time. The long term development of neutrality and sovereignty will finally emerge as major considerations by central-left wing political parties, non-government organisations and significant individuals, who unite against what they deem as a threat to Irish independence, the EEC.

Chapter 4
Irish Euroscepticism and the European Economic Community Debate (1970–1972)

The previous chapter revealed that Irish euroscepticism can be traced back to the 1950s, first emerging as an individualistic opposition to the workings of a 'rich man's club'. However, by 1957 this had further developed, and Irish euroscepticism could be characterised into four identifiable ideological components – communist, republican, socialist and nationalist. It was tied to the important principles of neutrality and sovereignty that had developed as important political considerations at the time of World War II, but was in no way an organised oppositional force. It comprised mainly a list of objections and predictions by those political parties, non-government organisations and significant individuals who chose to speak out against the idea of Ireland joining the EEC.

This chapter reports on developments in the period 1970 until 1972, with an emphasis on the 'EEC referendum debate'. It reveals a new push by eurosceptics in Ireland to work together in order to oppose Ireland joining the EEC. In many ways the arguments levelled at the time against the EEC by those critical of Europe rested on the principles of neutrality and sovereignty that had been developing in Irish political discourse for some time.

The chapter also provides more specific contextual detail about what transpired during the 1970s and in the lead up to the 1972 referendum. It reveals the growing claims levelled against the EEC itself, outlining central-left wing political parties' claims against Europe. Moreover it provides a detailed account of what transpired in the lead up to May 10, followed by non-government organisations' and identified eurosceptic individuals' positions against Europe and their reasons for choosing to do so. In essence, the central contention of this chapter isthat the period 1970–1972 represented a time when Irish eurosceptics came together to oppose EEC membership resting on arguments based around the perceived threat posed to Irish sovereignty and military neutrality.

1970s contextual detail

> The decision which the Irish people will make on 10 May will be recorded either as an unprecedented opportunity which we chose to grasp with incalculable gain, or which we chose to throw away with irreparable loss.[1]

The early 1970s witnessed a more strident anti-EEC movement in Ireland than seen in previous decades, with a clear commitment to neutrality and sovereignty. In a letter to Taoiseach Jack Lynch[2], Patrick Hillery[3], Minister for External Affairs, expressed concern that while the accession negotiations were 'progressing satisfactorily', the general public in Ireland 'are gradually slipping from a position of a high percentage in favour of membership to one of growing opposition to our entry'.[4] With a looming referendum approaching, or at least the government of Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil re-establishing a firm belief in the EEC, widespread discussion and debate on the topic became evident.[5] The campaign for EEC membership did not really begin until November 1970, when civil servants became alarmed at the amount of publicity the 'no' campaign was receiving.[6] The government saw both pro-EEC publicity and increased counter-publicity to anti-EEC statements as important. Policymakers stressed the need for ministerial speeches (an average of one per week); pamphlets, which were to be short, lucid booklets dealing with each major topic, to be made available for public distribution; and newspaper articles, with encouragement to journalists to write articles on their own areas of interest and "assist them with material".[7] Hillery's policy was to use all branches of government to facilitate the 'yes' campaign and even went a step further in January 1971 when he established a special EEC information service within his own department. The aim was to provide information on EEC affairs, to carry out liaison work with the public, help in producing a series of booklets setting out

[1] Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, April 1972.
[2] Arguably, the greatest weapon at the disposal of the 'yes' camp was Jack Lynch. Where de Valera inspired dogged admiration and deep hostility in equal measure, and Lemass excited the imagination of young people on the move, Lynch won affection.
[3] In 1951 Dr Hillery was elected to Dáil Éireann for the constituency of Clare and he received his first government appointment as Minister for Education in 1959. He subsequently served in a number of ministerial posts (Industry and Commerce, Labour and Foreign Affairs) prior to his appointment in 1973 as Vice President of the then Commission of the European Communities, with special responsibility for Social Affairs. He served as Commissioner until 1976, when he was inaugurated as President of Ireland on 3 December 1976.
[4] Michael Geary, 'Pushing an Open Door? Ireland and the EEC referendum of 1972', *20th Century Contemporary History*, vol 17, no 5, Sept/Oct 2009.
[5] In 1969, George Pompidou**,** promised not to stand in the way of British and Irish membership of the EEC. The Third Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland permitted the state to join the European Communities and provided that European law would take precedence over the constitution. It was effected by the Third Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1972 which was approved by referendum on 10 May 1972 and signed into law on 8 June of the same year.
[6] Geary, 'Pushing an Open Door? Ireland and the EEC Referendum of 1972'.
[7] Geary, 'Pushing an Open Door? Ireland and the EEC Referendum of 1972'.

basic information about the Common Market and to work closely with the Irish branch of the European Movement.[8] The government's argument for membership was unevenly divided between the benefits that would accrue to the agricultural sector almost immediately after accession and those that would, in the long term, benefit Irish industry. On the other hand, the anti-Common Market groups pushed the loss of sovereignty issue, as well as arguing for what they saw as credible alternatives to membership.

The period from 1970 to 1972, when Ireland finally gained membership to the EEC, revealed a number of influential, if not numerous opponents in the form of centre-left political parties, such as the Labour Party and Sinn Féin (both Provisional and Official). While in most speeches on the membership question, Hillery claimed that those who were opposed to membership represented "no more than a small minority,"[9] evidence of a commitment to a strong 'no' campaign, can be seen for example in the 1972 Official IRA Easter Statement where it was argued that:

> the EEC is the central and most important issue facing the Irish people. If Ireland joins the EEC it will mean the final devastation of a devastated people.[10]

This period also saw trade unions and non-government organisations reorganise, which led to an increase in membership numbers but also a resounding increase in public demonstrations against the EEC. 'Anti-marketeers', as they were known by the government, consisted of:

> older, less well educated and from the urban working class (usually members of a trade union). The uncommitted voter tended to be older than those who had decided on their voting preferences and there was a relatively higher proportion of working class people among the undecided voters than among the population as a whole.[11]

For his part, Lynch stated that the anti-marketeers' slogan of 'Keep Ireland free', 'Vote "no" to the EEC' was "as dishonest as it is bogus", and he felt that those who promoted it were trying to secure, on the basis of an appeal to emotion, what they know "full well they cannot get on the basis of sound argument and common sense".[12]

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[8] Geary, 'Pushing an Open Door? Ireland and the EEC Referendum of 1972'.
[9] Hillery, cited in Geary, 'Pushing an Open Door? Ireland and the EEC Referendum of 1972'.
[10] IRA Easter Statement, cited in Sean Swan, *Official Irish Republicanism 1962-1972*, Dublin, 2008, 353.
[11] Gary Murphy and Niamh Puirséil, 'Is it a New Allowance? Irish Entry to the EEC and Popular Opinion', *Irish Political Studies*, vol 23, no 4, 2008, 541.
[12] Geary, 'Pushing an Open Door? Ireland and the EEC Referendum of 1972'.

Significant individuals also played their part in mounting a successful challenge towards Irish EEC membership, but the importance of an organised front became paramount during this time. Anthony Coughlan and Raymond Crotty were two individuals who played an important and more meaningful role in the 1970s, particularly within their selected non-government organisations, the Common Market Defence Campaign and Common Market Study Group. Their long time developing attitudes and positions on Europe could now be clearly defined, which was very much in favour of halting Ireland's successful move towards the EEC. During this period a number of other individuals also decided to take a stand against the EEC and followed the example set by Coughlan and Crotty, although they were confined to their individualistic appeal. Lynch, the then Taoiseach of Ireland, attacked this type of argument expressed, "the particular brand of freedom and republicanism that (ironically) would opt for Ireland maintaining its links with Britain and a 'No' vote".[13] For Lynch, those days were over:

> It was no longer acceptable to be economically dependent on 'a powerful neighbour', a dependence ... that had proved such 'a serious handicap to us over the past 50 years'. A negative result would not only copperfasten partition of the country by remaining outside the EEC, but 'We would also be increasing our dependence on Britain. Can any Irishman seriously want this?'[14]

What became important during this period and after the 1972 referendum was that this 'no' camp remained in Ireland, not in a formal organisation but as a movement with a number of distinct philosophical strands, bound only by the single goal of opposing Irish entry into the EEC. When that failed, they turned to the strategy of attempting to oppose and undermine the European enterprise as a whole.

Developing criticism of Europe

In the 1970s, the process of Ireland's accession to the EEC raised the issue of Irish neutrality in the context of discussions regarding European common defence. During the negotiations to join the EEC, a great deal of secrecy was evident about what was agreed between Fianna Fáil in relation to neutrality and EEC accession.[15] In the Seanad on 11 March 1971, Mary Robinson, an independent candidate, lamented the narrowness

[13] Geary, 'Pushing an Open Door? Ireland and the EEC Referendum of 1972'.
[14] Geary, 'Pushing an Open Door? Ireland and the EEC Referendum of 1972'.
[15] See Dillion, *Dáil Debates* 196: 3375-3382, 26 July 1962; see also Browne, *Dáil Debates* 196: 3501-3503, 26 July 1962; see also Dillion, *Dáil Debates* 198: 1341, 1346, 13 December 1962.

of the debate on Ireland's membership of the EEC, dealing with just economic aspects rather than wider political implications.[16] She argued:

> it would be much stronger to have a genuine policy on neutrality, to state it now, and to state it as part of our commitment to the development of the European Community. This is a matter which should not be neglected. We should know what the intention of the Government is in this area.[17]

In many regards the term 'neutrality' seemed to disappear from the governing parties' policy involving foreign affairs. For example, Patrick Hillery's speech to the Dáil on 18 April 1972 stressed Fianna Fáil's view that:

> the foreign policy of a small democratic country like ours is not a single, 'grand design' and that the government 'should not and could not impose an arbitrary and abstract foreign policy' on Ireland's relations with Britain, the EC, the UN and the developing world.[18]

Hillery also argued at the time that three issues:

> the assertion of its identity, the recognition of that identity by others, and the promotion and development of exchanges with other nations – [were] basic aspects of any country's relations with the world.[19]

In many regards the maintenance of an independent Irish identity had replaced neutrality in Fianna Fáil party dialogue, with an emphasis on avoiding the issue as the adopted approach taken. It was only just prior to the referendum being held that Seán Lemass, former Taoiseach from 1959 until 1966, made a statement on the neutrality issue. When entry was put before the Irish people in a referendum, Lemass argued that there was no threat to Irish neutrality in joining the community. In this moment, he demoted neutrality to a policy that was temporal and conditional, seemingly believing that European political integration would come at the end of a long process of economic integration, during which time Irish neutrality would be maintained.[20]

Fine Gael's position during this period, although supportive of a move towards the EEC, differed on neutrality somewhat from its partner, Fianna Fáil. For Fine Gael, the idea of Europe became the lens through which to make sense of the republic's role in

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[16] Seanad Éireann, vol 69, 11 March 1971, Membership of the EEC: Motion, 1292.
[17] Seanad Éireann, vol 69, 1293.
[18] Dáil Éireann, vol 260, 18 April 1972, Supply for Department of Foreign Affairs: Motion, 405.
[19] Dáil Éireann, vol 260, 384.
[20] Richard Finnegan, 'Ireland: Brussels and the Celtic Tiger', in E E Zeff and E Pirro (eds), *The European Union and the Member States: Cooperation, Coordination and Compromise,* (2nd edn), Boulder, 2006

Europe from the early 1970s onwards.[21] However, Fine Gael also believed, like the Labour Party, that accession to the EEC would signal the end to Ireland's neutrality. As shadow foreign minister in 1970, Garret FitzGerald was clearly uncomfortable with what he perceived Fianna Fáil had given away in pre-accession talks, as well as with any discussion of European defence:

> The Government have failed to understand what is involved as regards political unity and defence … Defence is not in the offing at the present time. It is premature for us to talk about involving ourselves in defence commitments. I accept if this becomes a full political union that the common defence of the Community could become an issue at sometime. I think the government have gone further than was necessary in this respect.[22]

Liam Cosgrave, leader of Fine Gael from 1965, also pointed out that the evolution of a common security policy was inevitable. Although he acknowledged that there was no specific reference to defence obligations in the Treaty of Rome, he argued that commonality of interests and coordination of institutions and economies necessitated a collective response in the event of an attack on a member state.[23] However, by the time of the referendum in 1972 Fine Gael had moved its position to align with that of its counterpart, Fianna Fáil on EEC accession, while the Labour Party remained committed to the idea that neutrality would end under EEC conditions. Fine Gael now argued that neutrality was not a blanket policy that applied in all circumstances.[24] Fine Gael emphasised with Fianna Fáil that there was no immediate threat to neutrality, but also the policy was malleable, ad hoc and negotiable, which was qualified by other Irish national interests, rather than a defining feature of those interests.[25]

Issues surrounding EEC awareness, its direct implications, plus the desire to follow Britain's lead hindered the referendum campaign to some extent during 1970–1973. Further research suggests that the claim of euroscepticism only being a recent and shallow phenomenon is untrue when taken into consideration with what transpired during these years. Gary Murphy and Niamh Puirseil suggest that despite a large 'yes' vote towards the EEC in 1972, Irish people were less enthusiastic than the result

[21] Markus Kornprobst, *Irredentism in European Politics*, New York, 2008, 163.
[22] Dáil Éireann, vol 247, 25 June 1970, Membership of the EEC: motion, 2009-2010.
[23] Dáil Éireann, vol 230, 25 July 1967, European Economic Community, 832.
[24] Karin Gilland, 'Ireland: Neutrality and the International use of Force', in Philip Everts, Pierangelo Isernia (eds), *Public Opinion and the International use of Force*, New York, 2001, 139.
[25] Greg Spelman, 'Reconciling a Policy of Neutrality with a Prospect of Neutrality', thesis document, 2003, available: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/15787/1/Greg_Spelman_Thesis.pdf, 93.

implied and can be better termed reluctant Europeans with little choice but to sign up.[26] Andrew Devenney agrees and states that an early oppositional force that was marginal in existence, which occupied the public sphere, unconstrained by the burden of mass appeal and with the primacy of sovereignty and neutrality overwhelmed all rhetorics during this period.[27] According to Murphy and Puirseil, only one major political party campaigned on the anti-marketeer side, namely the Irish Labour Party.[28] Pro-EEC support was galvanised by the two other major political parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael who saw the move towards Europe as something of great benefit. On 10 May 1972 the Irish people successfully voted to join the EC, with 81.3 per cent voting in favour.[29] This meant that in 1973, EEC membership rose from six to nine states with Irish and EEC approval.[30]

Central-left wing political parties against the Europe Economic Community (1970–72)

The Sinn Féin party split in two (Provisional and Official) at the beginning of 1970, with Provisional Sinn Féin continuing to reiterate its opposition in the south of a move towards the Common Market, especially on the heels of the UK. Initially, the Provisionals were committed to military rather than political action under their leader Ruairí O Bradaigh, an Irish republican paramilitary and political leader, from 1970 onwards. A Belfast Sinn Féin organiser at the time described the party's role in all of this as being agitational and publicity seeking.[31] After the split the Provisionals were more direct in their opposition towards the EEC and outlined the problems with association more to the point:

> The Sinn Féin position has been stated many times since this question was first mooted; a weak and divided Ireland would lose its identity and be completely submerged in this alliance dominated by the large capitalistic enterprises of European colonies and ex-colonial powers.[32]

[26] Murphy and Puirséil, 'Is it a New Allowance? Irish Entry to the EEC and Popular Opinion', 533.
[27] Andrew D Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland; 1961–72', *New Hibernia Review*, vol 12, no 4, 2008.
[28] Murphy and Puirséil, 'Is it a New Allowance? Irish Entry to the EEC and Popular Opinion', 549.
[29] UCL, *"Report of the Commission of Conduct of Referendums"*, N.d. available: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/publications/unit-publications/7.pdf.
[30] A Harryvan and J Van Der Harst (eds), *Documents on the European Union*, Basingstoke, 1997, 14.
[31] Brian Feeney, *Sinn Féin: A Hundred Turbulent Years*, Madison, 2002, 260.
[32] Sinn Féin, 'Comment on EEC and Budget', press release, 25 April 1970, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, 1.

Provisional Sinn Féin continued to highlight the downside of joining, particularly in terms of industrial progress for the country. "The development of an independent Irish industrial arm would be made impossible, because of the uncontrolled competition from the giant industrial combines of Britain and Europe".[33] Also highlighted was that the economy would be in the hands of foreign civil servants which the Provisionals found unacceptable. It announced that:

> decisions governing our economy would be taken by the Brussels civil servants who administer the Treaty of Rome and there would be an enormous increase in the cost of living.[34]

The negative impact on agriculture continued to be voiced by many in the party, also linked to dominance concerns raised years earlier. The main economic argument made by Provisional Sinn Féin rested on the idea that EEC countries were already self-sufficient in agricultural produce, and would in a few years have surplus.[35] The party felt that because of this Ireland would suffer, as its main agricultural market was still Britain. By joining the EEC other agricultural supplier countries would take advantage of agricultural sections in which Ireland had the upper hand and as a result, these countries could threaten Ireland's established markets.

> We already have the lowest density of agricultural population in Europe. The flight from the land, bad as it is to-day, would reach unprecedented levels, as it has done in all the Common Market countries since the Market's inception.[36]

The party continued to attack Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael for their implemented policies, which ultimately it saw as leading Ireland into a position of having little choice but to follow Britain into the EEC. In particular, the Irish Free Trade Agreement was the main policy that had led Ireland to the 'road of no return', according to party members. This resulted in Provisional Sinn Féin pushing for a decisive alternative to the Common Market. The program built on from the 1967 document, produced in collaboration with the Wolfe Tone Society:

> The alternative to membership of the Common Market is not the Free Trade Agreement with Britain. The alternative to both is the Sinn Féin programme for – the establishment of a 32

[33] Sinn Féin, 'Comment on EEC and Budget', 1.
[34] Sinn Féin, 'Comment on EEC and Budget', 1.
[35] Sinn Féin, 'Comment on EEC and Budget', 1.
[36] Sinn Féin, 'Comment on EEC and Budget', 1.

> Country Sovereign Parliament and the achievement of political, economic and financial independence, which we have not had for centuries.[37]

The 'Provisonals' emphasised Ireland's own interests coming first and foremost. The ability to capitalise on other markets was the direction taken, rather than Britain and the EEC. The "vigorous pursuit of trade links with countries other than Britain and Ireland [was required]".[38] As was "the speedy restoration of our native language and national culture which [would] enhance our national morale and provide the spiritual driving force for the achievement of [our] aims".[39] In broad terms Provisional Sinn Féin saw the whole idea of joining the EEC as a betrayal of Irish sovereignty to both Britain and the EEC, reinstituting domination and a host of restrictions on Irish independence. In more specific terms, the Provisionals were fearful of being subject to decisions above Ireland's own law making authority which would see its own future policies and goals become somewhat more difficult to implement, and in some ways made redundant, if accession was gained.

On 17 May 1971 Provisional Sinn Féin called for a nationwide protest picket throughout Ireland, including both north and south[40], highlighting the issue of neutrality at the time. The protest was somewhat successful. The nationwide protest picket action helped support the Provisionals' message that neutrality would be jeopardised in the EEC, a concern expressed by members for some years now. According to a press release issued at the time, Provisional Sinn Féin's strategy was two-fold. First, it would demand an end to the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement – signed to bring an end to the Anglo-Irish War that had been ongoing since 1923 and ended the 20 per cent tariffs placed on goods by both countries. This agreement, according to the Provisionals, had led Ireland into the unwarranted position of joining the EEC. Second, it would oppose full membership of the EEC.[41] The press release information sheet gave more particular detail as to why Irish citizens should oppose any such move towards the Common Market, and again the issue of neutrality featured as one of these major concerns. The threat of the EEC being a binding agreement that would last

[37] Sinn Féin, 'Comment on EEC and Budget', 1.
[38] Sinn Féin, 'Comment on EEC and Budget', 2.
[39] Sinn Féin, 'Comment on EEC and Budget', 2.
[40] Sean O Bradaigh letter of instruction to Sinn Féin members and associate followers, 'Nationwide Picket Protest – Instructions to all Cumainn", *Sinn Féin*, 17 May 1971, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, 1.
[41] O Bradaigh, 'Nationwide Picket Protest – Instructions to all Cumainn', 1.

forever featured in the press release.[42] This message was used to reinforce the message that neutrality would be lost forever if Ireland accepted EEC membership conditions. Essentially the press release was an attempt to create fear amongst the Irish electorate, which would then hopefully encourage them to take up the protest movement on 26 June 1971. The Provisionals encouraged people to:

> mount pickets with good slogans at as many centres as possible. One printed double crown poster will be available from Head Office as well as the new Social and Economic programme. Both these items will be on sale at a special stand in the assembly field in Sallins on June 13 at special reduced prices which will not be repeated.[43]

A commitment was made at this point to ensure neutrality would not be put at stake under any condition. The confidence and reassurance about the picket action seemed to resonate throughout the party, Provisional Sinn Féin members even claiming a day before that the picket protest would be an ultimate success:

> Remember, spread the manpower out to cover as many areas as possible and make it look as big as possible. Rosters can of course be arranged; nobody expects a person to walk non-stop for 12 hours. And push the Social and Economic Programme, because it is a winner![44]

On 15 June 1971 Provisional Sinn Féin claimed that "arrangements should be almost complete for the 12-hour picket on June 26".[45] Sales of the *Social and Economic Programme*, a Provisional Sinn Féin publication, seemed reasonable, leading to the assumption that support was behind the picket action and its message. For example, at Bodenstown, 690 copies had been sold.[46] The Provisionals also now went as far as advising appropriate ticket slogans to be used on the day. Slogan ideas ranged from 'EEC No' to 'No Sell-Out to Brussels' and even 'Keep Ireland Neutral, No EEC'.[47] A public display of emotion towards the issue of neutrality had now been seen on the streets as part and parcel of a protest movement. Four days later Provisional Sinn Féin announced that "a major nationwide demonstration [would] be held throughout

[42] O Bradaigh, 'Nationwide Picket Protest – Instructions to all Cumainn', 1.
[43] O Bradaigh, 'Nationwide Picket Protest – Instructions to all Cumainn', 2.
[44] O Bradaigh, 'Nationwide Picket Protest – Instructions to all Cumainn', 2.
[45] Sean O Bradaigh letter of arrangements to Sinn Féin members, 'June 26 Demonstration', *Sinn Féin,* 15 June 1971, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, 1.
[46] O Bradaigh, 'June 26 Demonstration', 1.
[47] O Bradaigh, 'June 26 Demonstration', 1.

Ireland"[48] and that government offices would be picketed.[49] This action further strengthened and supported the neutrality threat argument:

> The purpose of the demonstration will be to protest against government policies and to call for public support for the Sinn Féin programme. The pickets will not aim to prevent people from entering these premises. They will not be directed against those working in them, but will be directed against those policies of their employers – the government.[50]

Four objectives had now been established in relation to the campaign:

1) revoke the 1965 free trade agreement with Britain
2) oppose full membership of the EEC
3) urge people to support Irish industry by buying Irish goods
4) sell the Sinn Féin Social and Economic Programme [51]

This was also identified at the time as being the first action in a major campaign that Provisional Sinn Féin held in opposing EEC membership, through presenting a more dynamic image, after the split in the party and under new leadership direction. However, this was the only action taken by the party with regard to the EEC as Ireland successfully entered the following year. Provisional Sinn Féin was hopeful that at least 500 government offices would be picketed on the day and that its *Social and Economic Programme* was concrete and positive.[52] With the benefit of hindsight, this obviously was not the case, as it did not have the impact that was hoped for. In June 1971 the Provisionals also produced a pamphlet known as *Why Sinn Féin says no to the Common Market*[53] which outlined a number of specific reasons as to why the party felt the move towards the EEC was a bad proposition. The pamphlet was produced to "form the basis of a campaign by [the party] to bring the full implications of EEC membership to the Irish people".[54] In addition, to coincide with the picket action and the pamphlet, another more descriptive booklet known as *EEC-No; Why Ireland should not join the Common Market*[55] was published to push its anti-EEC stance even further.

[48] Sinn Féin, 'Nationwide Demonstration on June 26, Government Offices to be Picketed', Sinn Féin press release, 19 June 1971, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, 1.
[49] Sinn Féin, 'Nationwide Demonstration on June 26, Government Offices to be Picketed', 1.
[50] Sinn Féin, 'Nationwide Demonstration on June 26, Government Offices to be Picketed', 1.
[51] Sinn Féin, 'Nationwide Demonstration on June 26, Government Offices to be Picketed', 2.
[52] Sinn Féin, 'Nationwide Demonstration on June 26, Government Offices to be Picketed', 2.
[53] Sinn Féin, *Why Sinn Féin says no to the Common Market,* Dublin, 1971.
[54] Sinn Féin, *Why Sinn Féin says no to the Common Market,* i.
[55] Sinn Féin, *EEC–No, Why Ireland should not join the Common Market,* Dublin, 1971.

By 1971, it was clear the government faced a challenge towards EEC acceptance in Ireland and this recommitted Provisional Sinn Féin to seek out possibly 'new' measures to combat Ireland's entry and to build wider support behind the 'no' campaign. On 3 May 1971 the party believed that if Ireland joined, there was no way out of the Common Market except through war or revolution.[56] This was not necessarily the case, as other means such as holding a withdrawal referendum did exist. This was used by the party in order to try and shore up further support for the 'no' campaign. Yet, there was no formal mention of a referendum as a means of withdrawal at this point. The party even went as far as hinting that associate membership would be better than full membership,[57] even though this conflicted with their earlier policies. Prior to this, no involvement at all was the position sought. In an address to Macra[58] on 3 May 1971, the Provisional Sinn Féin president, Ruairi O Bradaigh reiterated the message:

> The Common Market is a merger – a United States of Europe and any succession will be regarded as an act of treachery. The only way out will be war or revolution. It has been said that entry will remove customs posts but the border will become an internationally recognised boundary and anyone trying to remove it will face opposition from a full European army. The real question is: will the EEC mean more or less people in Ireland. I think it will mean less people, although we'll have a big beef and tourist industry – a 'richman's club'. Big units will mean the end of small farmers, small shops and small towns. There will be a national depression and we will be reduced to mere bag-carriers to the foreigners coming in.[59]

The issues were reiterated and focused around undemocratic rule of the EEC and the negative impact on industry and agriculture.[60] Provisional Sinn Féin was absolutely opposed to full membership of the EEC. The reasons for this were set out in the enclosed booklet *EEC-NO!* which all party members were encouraged to read.[61] The fear for a free Ireland was the number one concern, and was expressed in a party statement in 1971 mentioning:

> We could find ourselves in a situation where the British agree to withdraw their forces and hand over the Six Counties to the Leinster House politicians. This would be a disaster in that it would

[56] Sinn Féin, 'No way out if we join EEC', press release, 3 May 1971, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, 1.
[57] Sinn Féin, No way out if we join EEC', 1.
[58] Macra na Feirme (stalwarts of the land) is a voluntary, rural youth organisation (17-35 years of age) founded in 1944 and based in Ireland.
[59] Sinn Féin, 'No way out if we join EEC', 1.
[60] O Bradaigh, Letter of Instruction to Sinn Féin Members and Associate Followers, 'Nationwide Picket Protest – Instructions to all Cumainn', *Sinn Féin,* 1.
[61] Sinn Fein, 'Anti-EEC Publicity Drive', press release, 6 December 1971, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection 1.

> mean that the result of 800 years fighting for a free Ireland would be a Lynch-Cosgrave-Cornish style so-called Republic in which the real decisions are taken in Brussels by the Common Market Commission. We should have gone from the frying pan into the fire and would have to start a struggle for freedom all over again.[62]

By the end of 1971 the Provisionals turned their attention to fighting the EEC on these issues in public:

> Sinn Féin must fight the EEC rigorously. Every Cumann should appoint three people to take on the duty of organising anti-EEC publicity, meetings poster parades etc. This work should begin NOW and continue until the referendum. It should not interfere with other work for the North but should be seen as complementary to it. We must ensure that when the fight has been won in the North it will not have been lost down here.[63]

The priorities for the party revolved around the notion of warning as many people as possible about the loss of sovereignty under the EEC. The strategic priorities established in December 1971 were to support the six county struggle, fight the common market, expand and organise, sell literature and sell more literature.[64] Sales of *EEC-No!* highlighted the importance of these concerns. Provisional Sinn Féin essentially took off as a protest movement, organising marches and pickets[65] linked to its anti-EEC appeal.

By early 1972 the importance of preventing EEC accession became a paramount concern for Provisional Sinn Féin resting on the notions of sovereignty and dominance, although troubles in Northern Ireland did take away from this priority. The party did lack a specific political philosophy and thus as a result:

> Ó Brádaigh would use Sinn Féin *ard fheiseanna* to announce republican policy, which was, in effect, IRA policy, namely that Britain should leave the North or the 'war' would continue.[66]

Yet, in an official document published in 1972, which outlined policy direction it clearly stated on terms of trade, Provisional Sinn Féin would "oppose vigorously all attempts to push us with Britain into full membership of the European Economic Community".[67] It went on to say that:

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[62] Sinn Féin, 'Anti-EEC Publicity Drive', 1.
[63] Sinn Féin, 'Anti-EEC Publicity Drive', 1.
[64] Sinn Féin, 'Anti-EEC Publicity Drive', 2.
[65] Feeney, *Sinn Féin: A Hundred Turbulent Years*, 271.
[66] Feeney, *Sinn Féin: A Hundred Turbulent Years*, 272.
[67] Sinn Féin, *Eira Nua*, Dublin, 1971, available: http://cedarlounge.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/en-1971-go.pdf, 54.

> On balance, the disadvantages of full membership outweigh the very doubtful advantages. Sinn Féin seeks a democratic national parliament, not a rubber stamp assembly taking orders from the undemocratic commission in Brussels. Nor is the EEC Council acceptable in which we would have at most two votes out of 30. Ireland's sovereignty, independence and neutrality are not for sale to any foreign power or group of powers".[68]

It seemed evident that associated membership was the only acceptable option, supported by the Irish Labour Party. The Provisionals preferred a free trade agreement with the EEC which would allow further trade potential and restrict British involvement in Irish affairs.[69] Full membership was not supported, as made clear in a policy document stating, "should Ireland be forced into the EEC on England's heels Sinn Féin [would] resist and oppose Brussels domination just as the Irish people have resisted British domination".[70]

The lead up to 10 May

Established in 1969, the Republican Movement, which involved the IRA[71] and Provisional Sinn Féin, became the body in which much anti-EEC propaganda was now promoted and exhibited during 1972. On 14 April 1972, Provisional Sinn Féin established a committee, under the direction of Daithi O Conaill, vice-president of Sinn Féin, to deal with the anti-EEC campaign.[72] It was hoped that everyone would give the Committee its full co-operation to oppose the EEC. A day earlier it was clear that the Republican Movement was to be given the task of fighting the EEC. A letter for O Conaill on 13 April documented:

> to establish the necessary machinery to carry-out the Anti-EEC campaign. [The] Campaign will take the form of a campaign for a General Election.[73]

The letter also highlighted ways to progress through public meetings, literature, publicity, canvassing, how to canvass and the establishment of a register. Unofficially, the directorate itself had been established on 12 April 1972, putting in place roles,

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[68] Sinn Féin, *Eira Nua,* 54.
[69] Sinn Féin, *Eira Nua,* 54.
[70] Sinn Féin, *Eira Nua,* 54.
[71] The IRA was an Irish republican paramilitary organisation that sought to remove Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom and bring about an independent republic encompassing all of Ireland.
[72] Letter from M Ni Bhaoill to Sinn Féin members, 'Sinn Féin Directive', *Sinn Féin,* 14 April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[73] Letter from Daithi O Conaill to Republican Movement members, 'Letter intended as directorate', *Republican Movement,* 13 April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.

responsibilities and the organising committee.[74] On 17 April, a convention was set up and was to be held on Monday 24 April with all non-political anti-EEC groups being invited, including trade union groups, Conradh na Gaeilge[75], small farmers, fishermen, industrial workers and individuals who opposed entry on the issue of the country's independence.[76] These identified opponents of the EEC and potential allies were thought to support the key message of sovereignty. By 21 April 1972, Daithi O Conaill was convinced that Fine Gail and Fianna Fáil had sold Ireland out to the EEC and was wary of these two parties' intentions:

> Every voter, especially every Fine Gael supporter, must examine the circumstances which have led to the strange alliance between Mr Cosgrave and Mr Lynch. Every voter should ask the representative of Fine Gael 'How do you propose to carry out the role of an effective opposition and alternative Government when you unreservedly support the EEC terms of entry?' The question must be asked 'Who is to be the voice of the people when the opposition party leadership has abandoned its principal function?' How can Fine Gael effectively challenge the Fianna Fáil government when it must support all the legislation that flows from the entry treaty. Let there be no mistake, no confusion in any one's mind, the consequences of a 'yes' vote will have virtually irreversible effects on every facet of Irish life.[77]

The call was made in this moment by O Conaill to build a stronger, independent Ireland, free from the barter of others. Although, Provisional Sinn Féin had little influence at the time in the republic, it was now hoped that the 'Bogside Massacre'[78] would help spur on recruitment and support behind the anti-EEC message portrayed by the party.[79] The events of the day were able to boost the status of and recruitment into the organisation enormously, especially locally.[80] This had the added benefit of attracting more numbers to the organisation, who would be influenced by the party's anti-EEC propaganda. The alternative was put simply to everyone at the time by O Conaill:

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[74] Sinn Féin, 'Directorate', *Sinn Féin,* 12 of April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[75] Conradh na Gaeilge was a non-government organisation founded in 1893 that promoted the Irish language in Ireland and worldwide.
[76] Letter from M Campbell to members, 'Republican Anti-EEC Directorate', 17 April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[77] Daithi O Conaill, 'Republican Anti-EEC Directorate', *Republican Movement,* 21 April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, 1.
[78] For further information see Eamonn McCann, *The Bloody Sunday Inquiry – The Families Speak Out*, London, 2006, 4-6.
[79] The Bogside Massacre also known as 'Bloody Sunday' was an incident on the 30th of January 1972 in the Bogside area of Derry, Northern Ireland. British soldiers shot 26 unarmed civilians during a protest march against internment.
[80] Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobson, *Those Are Real Bullets, Aren't They?,* London, 2000, 293.

> The alternative to full membership of the EEC by the 26 counties is; eject Lynch from Leinster House by voting No on May 10th, unite Ireland and build the New Ireland.[81]

The events which unfolded reveal sovereignty and independence to be the major concerns at the time, expressed through the Republican Movement now as a more organised outfit to convey the anti-EEC message.

On 24 April 1972, Ruairi O Bradaigh, President of Provisional Sinn Féin, formally launched the Republican Movement against the 26-county republic's "final betrayal of the Irish nation".[82] "We are simply reiterating the stand taken by the Republican Movement on the Common Market issue [from] the first time it was mooted in the 1960s".[83] The basis of launching the campaign at the time under the Republican Movement was to show the Irish that they did have a choice. O Bradaigh reinforced this when he stated:

> The Republican Movement states unequivocally to the people of Ireland that there are alternatives. The main alternative lies in the will and ability of the people of all Ireland to build themselves, for themselves and for their children, a NEW IRELAND.[84]

The Republican Movement did not agree with the government that Ireland had no other alternative at the time, linked to O Bradaigh's idea of Eire Nua. O Bradaigh further explained:

> The principal argument for submitting the whole future of Ireland to the desires of foreigners by joining the EEC can be summed up by stating that we have no alternative. This is a despicable and unwarranted slight on Irishmen, Irishwomen and Irish youth. To claim that we must sign away our rights to govern ourselves because we have no alternative is just another way of stating that the people of Ireland are unable to build their own country and are unsuitable to have full and unfettered control over it. This is simply playing on fear, creating fear and fostering a sense of inferiority – just as these same fears were used to cow the people of previous generations into accepting the malevolent rule of Imperial England.[85]

The Republican Movement strongly promoted the *Social and Economic Programme* of Provisional Sinn Féin in 1972 as a more progressive way forward: "The Republican Movement has the will and ability to lead the people in building a new Ireland, and the

[81] O Conaill, 'Republican Anti-EEC Directorate', 3
[82] Ruauiri O Bradaigh, 'Republican Movement: Anti-EEC Campaign', *Republican Movement*, 24 April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, 1.
[83] O Bradaigh, 'Republican Movement: Anti-EEC Campaign', 1.
[84] O Bradaigh, 'Republican Movement: Anti-EEC Campaign', 1.
[85] O Bradaigh, 'Republican Movement: Anti-EEC Campaign', 1.

people of Ireland have the will and ability to control their own affairs for the future, as the alternative to the EEC".[86] The Republican Movement believed, as O Conaill did, that Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael had sold Ireland out to an unworkable and unmanageable supranational authority. O Conaill managed to release a directive on 24 April which celebrated the opposition that Provisional Sinn Féin and the Republican Movement had given to the issue over the years.[87] The intention was to demonstrate that Provisional Sinn Féin had had a long tradition of promoting the maintenance of Ireland's sovereignty and this more organised attempt was to bring more desired results.

A quarter of a million copies of *How Will the EEC Affect You* were distributed on Saturday 22 April 1972, while *EEC-NO!* was on the verge of selling out its second edition of 20,000 copies. On 24 April a press conference was held after a convention held by the Republican Movement with O Conaill, O Bradaigh, Bhaoill and Drumm (both republican activists) giving statements on the EEC situation. The press conference clearly defined the Republican Movement's attitude of condemning Irish membership of the EEC.[88]An anti-EEC policy statement was also released on the day by the Republican Movement:

> The Republican Movement rejects the Fianna Fáil/Fine Gael proposal that the 26 County State should integrate with the European Economic Community. The Movement has embarked on a full scale campaign of opposition to the E.E.C and is placing the alternative of a 'New Ireland' before the people of Ireland.[89]

It was now clear as to what Provisional Sinn Féin was arguing about with regard to EEC accession. It opposed the EEC proposal for the following reasons:

1) partition politics being ignored (particularly in the North)
2) no consultation with citizens in the North on the EEC
3) Irish citizens being free and sovereign to make their own decisions
4) spurious and dishonest claims of EEC advantages
5) loss of Irish culture
6) corrupt politicians
7) support for less British interference

[86] O Bradaigh, 'Republican Movement: Anti-EEC Campaign', 2.
[87] Daithi O Conaill, 'Republican Anti-EEC Directorate – Campaign Statement', *Republican Movement,* 24 April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, 1.
[88] Republican Movement, 'Press Conference – Anti-EEC Campaign', press release, 24 April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[89] Republican Movement, 'Republican Movement Anti EEC Campaign Policy Statement', press release, 24 April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.

8) ‘New Ireland’ characteristics proposed by the republican movement, outweigh any benefit to that of EEC membership [90]

Interestingly, two days later Bhaoill resigned from the Republican anti-EEC Directorate position. He cited the reason being that he did not want his name associated with the type of documentation that was highly cynical of the EEC, which seemed to be the driving force behind organisation.[91] The decision of Mr Bhaoill to resign was thought to be to avoid tarnishing his own image and to avoid any future disputes that could prevail after the public releasing of such controversial information.

In a speech given on 29 April 1972, Maire Moore[92] attempted to scare people into voting ‘no’ on behalf of Provisional Sinn Féin:

> There will be very few Irishmen who will want to be members of any grouping in which the British Empire has a big voice, after the savage tortures and killings in the Six Counties ... and the way things are looking at present, the British Empire will be having a very big say, indeed, in the Common Market.[93]

In her speech she attacked the two government parties for their alleged ‘betrayal’ of the Irish nation. In 1972 she was shot and wounded by the British army and this left her with a slight limp for the rest of her life. The shooting happened when she was on so-called ‘hen patrol’, groups of women banging bin-lids on pavements to harass army patrols.[94] This revealed her strong passion and commitment to the republican cause, although her claims were not based on specific facts and lacked some credibility. Yet, all this did reveal that sovereignty, independence and domination were clearly emphasised as arguments against Europe by the Republican Movement during the early 1970s.

In May 1972, Provisional Sinn Féin and the Republican Movement stepped up their campaign effort, in a last ditch attempt to bring about a successful ‘no’ vote to the upcoming referendum on the issue. On 1 May, Frank Graham, a republican activist,

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[90] Republican Movement, ‘Republican Movement Anti EEC Campaign Policy Statement’.
[91] Letter from Mr Bhaoill to Daithi O Caroill, ‘Republican Anti-EEC Campaign’, 26 April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O’Mahony Collection.
[92] Maire Moore was a west Belfast republican activist and street agitator, particularly active in the 1970s. She became prominent in Sinn Féin, being elected to the Ard Comhairle, heading its prisoners’ department, and helping found its women’s department.
[93] Mrs Maire Moore cited in Sinn Féin, ‘Embargo’, press release, 29 April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O’Mahony Collection, 1.
[94] *The Irish Times,* ‘Republican Activist and later Deputy Lord Mayor of Belfast’, 11 April, 2009, available: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/republican-activist-and-later-deputy-lord-mayor-of-belfast-1.743505.

gave a talk on the party's behalf at Tuam. Graham made it clear that glowing accounts of the EEC Social Fund and the EEC Investment Fund implying that money would be freely available from both sources for Ireland's Social and Economic development was far from the truth.[95]

> The Pro-Marketeers conveniently forget to inform the people that Ireland is a peripheral area in relation to the Common Market ... The fate of peripheral areas ... with the present EEC boundaries is a severe warning to us. In these areas, employment has dropped under Common Market membership and the unfortunate people have been duly deported (migrated) to highly developed industrial complexes of Germany and Belgium. In addition, they are not allowed to bring their families because of severe shortage of accommodation. This unpleasant prospect is being concealed from the people and they are being further deceived by dishonest promises of Utopian prosperity and full employment if we join the EEC. The cruel facts of the case are that the EEC is not a society for the support of under-developed economies.[96]

Graham insisted that Ireland must not join the EEC if it were going to survive freely and independently in the future. On the same day, Paddy Duffy[97] gave his arguments against joining the EEC on Provisional Sinn Féin's behalf at Durrow.[98] His views mirrored those of Graham:

> we are economically underdeveloped ... [and] to enter the EEC in our present state of development is tantamount to putting a novice into the ring with a hardened professional. The result is predictable and a scarifying experience for our people and in particular for the weakened sections of our community, such as the aged, the widows and the small farmers and those engaged in vulnerable industries.[99]

O'Connell also echoed these concerns on 3 May at Bundoran, 4 May and 7 May in Cork.[100] O'Connell stressed the importance of a 'no' vote on 10 May, as Ireland's sovereignty was at stake. "In the last 20 years our claim to sovereignty is being

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[95] Frank Graham, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Extract of Speech given at Tuam', *Sinn Féin*, 1 May 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, 1.
[96] Graham, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Extract of Speech given at Tuam'.
[97] Duffy was a key founder member of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in 1970. He became known for his outspoken support of Northern Irish independence.
[98] Paddy Duffy, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Summary of Speech given by Mr Paddy Duffy', *Sinn Féin*, 1 May 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, 1.
[99] Duffy, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Summary of Speech given by Mr Paddy Duffy, 1.
[100] Dave O'Connell, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Summary speech given by Mr Dave O'Connell', press release, 3 May 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection; see also Dave O'Connell, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Summary of Speech at Cork on May 4th', press release, 4 May 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection; see also Dave O'Connell, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Summary of speech given by Mr Dave O'Connell to workers in Cork', *Sinn Féin*, 7 May 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.

gradually eroded",[101] "a 'yes' vote on the 10 May is a vote against the Unity of Ireland forever".[102] For O'Connell a 'no' vote meant the greater possibility of unity being achieved, dismissing what the EEC offered at the time, which to him was the continuation of what had been taking place. On the same days O Bradaigh gave speeches at Drumshanbo[103] and Limerick[104] and in many ways attempted the same scare tactics seen by Moore in April. O Bradaigh mentioned:

> When your husband or sons have to leave for Germany to get work, remember you could have said 'No'. When the Agricultural Commission in Brussels tells you that you can no longer farm your holdings because it is un-economic, remember you could have said 'NO'. When the family wage earner comes home and tells you that his factory closed down because it could not face the competition from the industrial giants of the EEC, remember you could have said 'NO'. When a German or French or Italian or British big-time farmer outbids you for house or land, remember you could have said 'NO'. When the handouts you expect from Brussels do not come through, remember you could have voted 'NO'.[105]

At the time O Bradaigh was convinced of a 'no' vote because of the arguments he put forward. He claimed:

> Therefore those who are voting 'No' are representative of the mass of the Irish people including all shades of opinion in the North from the Rev. Ian Paisley to Miss Bernadette Devlin. In other words, the monied classes, those who promote the polices of economic imperialism are trying to pull a confidence trick on the Irish people.[106]

On 7 May 1972, John Kelly also gave his points of view on behalf of Provisional Sinn Féin at Thurees.[107] Kelly highlighted that the government had made every attempt possible to silence the critics of the EEC in Ireland, although this was an exaggeration:

> The Governments of the 26 Counties have done all they can to prevent us from putting our views to the people about this vital issue. We have been refused time of television for political

[101] O'Connell, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Summary of Speech at Cork on May 4th'.
[102] Dave O'Connell, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Summary of Speech given by Mr Dave O'Connell at Bundoran', *Sinn Féin,* 3 May 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[103] Ruairi O Bradaigh, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Summary of Speech given by Mr Ruairi O Bradaigh on 3 May 1972', *Sinn Féin,* 3 May 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[104] O Bradaigh, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Summary of Speech given by Mr Ruairi O Bradaigh on May 3rd 1972'.
[105] O Bradaigh, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Summary of Speech given by Mr Ruairi O Bradaigh on May 3rd 1972'.
[106] Ruairi O Bradaigh, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Summary of Speech given by Ruairi O Bradaigh May 4th 1972', *Sinn Féin,* 4 May 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[107] John Kelly, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Summary of Speech given by John Kelly at Thurees on May 7th 1972, *Sinn Féin,* 7 May 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.

> broadcasts, our names have been taking whilst putting up posters, but the dirtiest Fianna Fáil trick of all has been the legalised internment of prominent Sinn Féin members.[108]

Kelly attacked the EEC on the principles of increased costs of living, the suffering that would result, job losses and being ruled by ex-colonial powers.[109] In the last speech given on 7 May 1972, Sean O Bradaigh made a last ditch attempt to try and persuade the Irish public against the EEC on what he felt was important, Irish independence. He concentrated his concerns about the EEC being a club for the wealthy. "Full membership of the EEC would mean a complete handing over of the wealth of Ireland to outside speculators".[110] He also appealed for people to vote 'no' as it "represents a vote of confidence in the future of the Irish nation, full control of Irish resources in Irish hands and a new deal in a NEW Ireland".[111] He argued that the EEC would not end partition or unite Ireland, and would just result in further exploitation.[112] On the eve of the poll, the Provisional Sinn Féin President, O Bradaigh, sent a message to all Irish citizens claiming the EEC was "incompatible with any interpretation of christianity or progressive social thinking".[113] Both Provisional Sinn Féin and the Republican Movement produced identical statements further elaborating on the campaign statement just prior to the 10 May referendum.[114] The statements this time, however, did not elaborate further on the negatives of EEC membership, they were more so to give detail on what effective opposition had been provided up until this time:

> To date more than a million Anti-EEC leaflets and booklets have been distributed ... We have sold 30,000 copies of EEC-NO! ... We have sent out 400,000 copies of a leaflet 'How the EEC will Affect You' ... 200,000 copies of a 'For Sale leaflet' has been distributed in Dublin ... 200,000 copies of 'Hard Facts' have been published for distribution ... 200,000 Common Market Defence Campaign leaflets and about 60,000 copies of Economic Freedom have been distributed through the Republican Movement ... Hundreds of thousands of posters, car stickers and lapel stickers have also been distributed.[115]

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[108] Kelly, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Summary of Speech given by John Kelly at Thurees on May 7th 1972'.
[109] Kelly, cited in Sinn Féin, 'Summary of Speech given by John Kelly at Thurees on May 7th 1972'.
[110] Sean O Bradaigh, 'The Wealthy say Yes', *Sinn Féin*, 7 May 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[111] O Bradaigh, 'The Wealthy say Yes'.
[112] O Bradaigh, 'The Wealthy say Yes'.
[113] Message from Sinn Féin President on EVE of Poll, 'Eve of poll message by Sinn Féin President', *Sinn Féin*, 9 May 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[114] See Sinn Féin and Republican Movement, 'Anti-EEC Directorate – Campaign Statement', *Sinn Féin and Republican Movement,* N.d., National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[115] Sinn Féin and Republican Movement, 'Anti-EEC Directorate – Campaign Statement'.

The decision to hold speeches during this period was a final attempt by Provisional Sinn Féin to reinforce the importance of voting 'no' due to the loss of sovereignty, reduced independence and possible domination that would eventuate under EEC conditions.

Extensive materials produced by Provisional Sinn Féin and the Republican Movement in 1972 revealed these arguments against Europe also. One of the more successful posters promoted '32 reasons for not joining the EEC'[116], which attempted to create a sense of fear in the individual who read the poster. Various reasons were given to why the individual should vote 'no' on 10 May, ranging from increased costs of living, to being controlled, to even referring to Bloody Sunday historical traditions.[117] The information sheet 'Are You Concerned'[118] also attempted to heighten fears of the Common Market. A 'yes' vote was defined as dangerous because of a loss of national identity and cultural distinctiveness, as well as a loss of sovereignty, and recognition being given to British-occupied Ireland.[119] Some leaflets simply set out alternative ways forward with the Provisionals, such as the *Basis for Economic Development* leaflet[120] to some giving the *Hard Facts*.[121] Many leaflets attempted to portray what life would surmise to be like under the EEC, such as *How will the EEC affect you?*[122] and *Reasons why we should vote no*.[123] In another pamphlet released in 1972, *Sinn Féin Opposes EEC Tie*[124] scare tactics were again employed to steer Irish citizens to vote 'no' on 10 May. The document suggested that national rights would be surrendered, votes would be marginal at best inside the EEC, colonialism and communism could result and foreign ownership of Irish property was likely.[125] Therefore, the amount of opposition from Provisional Sinn Féin and the Republican Movement through the production of this type of material implying these key arguments against Europe suggests first, that they were a critical opponent of the EEC on these matters. Second, support from the

[116] Thomas Ashe Cumann, '32 Reasons for not Joining the EEC – Vote No', *Sinn Féin,* N.d., National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[117] Cumann, '32 Reasons for not Joining the EEC – Vote No'.
[118] Sinn Féin, 'Are you Concerned?' *Sinn Féin,* N.d., National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[119] Sinn Féin, 'Are you Concerned?'
[120] Sinn Féin, 'All 32 Countries: The Basis for Economic Development", *Sinn Féin,* N.d., National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[121] Republican Movement, 'Hard Facts', *Republican Movement,* N.d., National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[122] Republican Movement, 'How will the EEC Affect You?', *Republican Movement,* N.d., National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[123] Sinn Féin, 'Reasons why we should Vote No', *Sinn Féin,* N.d., National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[124] Sinn Féin, 'Sinn Féin Opposes EEC Tie', *Sinn Féin,* N.d., National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[125] Sinn Féin, 'Sinn Féin Opposes EEC Tie'.

general population was evident through the successful purchasing and distribution of the material. Concerns about sovereignty, independence and domination were prevalent at this time, and opposition was certainly more organised than it had been on previous occasions before 1970.

Official Sinn Féin

Official Sinn Féin was a Maoist-Soviet styled, democratic centralist political party in Ireland originating from the split which took place with the Provisionals within the Republican Movement in 1969–1970. A key factor in the split was the desire of those who became the Provisionals to make military action the key object of the organisation, rather than a simple rejection of leftism.[126] The Officials' founders were Cathal Goulding and Tomás Mac Giolla, who remained loyal to Goulding's Official IRA.[127] At the time a decision was made that endeavoured to achieve a united Ireland by force. Although the Official IRA was drawn into the spiralling violence of the early period of conflict in Northern Ireland, it gradually stepped down its military campaign against the UK's armed presence in Northern Ireland, declaring a permanent ceasefire in May 1972. Following this, the movement's political development increased rapidly throughout the 1970s.[128] On the national question, the Officials saw the struggle against religious sectarianism and bigotry as their primary task. The party's strategy was based on the 'stages theory'; first, working-class unity within Northern Ireland had to be achieved, followed by the establishment of a united Ireland, and finally a socialist society would be created in Ireland.[129] In Northern Ireland, Official Sinn Féin was organised under the name 'Republican Clubs', a name that was used to avoid a ban set down on Sinn Féin candidates in 1964 under Northern Ireland's *Emergency Powers Act*, where the Officials continued to use this name after 1970.[130]

In 1972 an extensive pamphlet was released by the party entitled *Provo Pogrom* documenting the role of the Republican Clubs in Northern Ireland. It was stated by the party that:

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[126] Henry McDonald, *Gunsmoke and Mirrors*, London, 2008, 28.
[127] Brian Hanley and Scott Millar, *The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA and the Workers' Party*, Dublin, 2009, 286-336.
[128] Hanley and Millar, *The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA and the Workers' Party.*
[129] Hanley and Millar, *The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA and the Workers' Party,* 220, 256-257.
[130] Conflict Archive on the Internet, "CAIN", 2011, available: *http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk.*

> [they] were working by political means for the creation of a united democratic socialist republic in which the workings of the people will own and control the wealth and resources of the country. The Republicans Clubs want to create a secular state, where religious differences between Irish people will be abolished.[131]

As evident in this statement, the priorities of the Officials and Provisionals were remarkably different during this time. The Officials concentrated more on issues involving secularism and the belief that religion should not be part of the affairs of the state, rather than the EEC. This was evident when they stated:

> The Republicans Club recognises secularism is one of the major obstacles to progress [and] have launched a massive Anti-Sectarian campaign ... during the campaign 500,000 leaflets will be distributed, many thousands of posters put up and public meetings held in a wide variety of areas.[132]

Their priority was to successfully oppose British imperialism and re-gain control of Northern Ireland, and by doing so limit the influence of the church in every day life. Interestingly, O Bradaigh declared that entry into the EEC was the biggest question facing Ireland for 50 years, a sentiment endorsed by northern Provisionals but rejected by Seán MacStiofain[133] for whom the national question came first.[134]

However, some noteworthy opposition and statements were made in the 1970s against the EEC by Official Sinn Féin. The EEC opposition at the time was very much derived from the "Moscow view of the Common Market".[135] This was a sign that this kind of euroscepticism was derived from a belief that the EEC was basically an instrument of global capitalism. Pro-Moscow individuals were still probably opposing the EEC in support of Soviet strategy, but rather demonstrated here is the fact that nationalistic, anti-imperialistic and pro-Soviet motives became part of the anti-EEC message. Thus, opposition was tied up with opposition to 'federalism' and opposition to direct rule in Northern Ireland as elements of the fight against imperialism.[136] In November 1971 the *United Irishmen* stated in reference to the EEC that:

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[131] Sinn Féin The Workers Party, 'Provo Pogrom – 1972', Dublin Institute of Technology, 1972, available: http://arrow.dit.ie/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=workerpmat
[132] Sinn Féin The Workers Party, 'Provo Pogrom – 1972'.
[133] Seán MacStiofain was an Irish republican paramilitary activist born in London, who became associated with the republican movement in Ireland after serving in the Royal Air Force. He was the first chief of staff of the Provisional IRA, a position he held between 1969 and 1972.
[134] A McIntrye, *A Structural Analysis of Modern Irish Republicanism 1969-1793,* PhD thesis, QUB, 1999, 118.
[135] P Walsh, *Irish Republicanism and Socialism,* Belfast, 1994, 131.
[136] Sean Swan, *Official Irish Republicanism 1962-1972*, Dublin, 2008, 353.

> To bring about this policy (the reintegration of the whole of Ireland into the UK, both politically and economically) Britain needed the Federal deal in the EEC context, and direct rule is the immediate prelude to this.[137]

Yet interestingly, in its 1972 Easter Statement, the Official IRA described the EEC as the "central and most important issue facing the Irish people, if Ireland joined the EEC it would mean the final devastation of a devastated people".[138] Possibly the change noted here was due only to the upcoming looming election that now dominated debate in both North and South. What was evident here though was that Official Sinn Féin represented a more organised front during the 1970s after the split, and did comment on the EEC indirectly. This was because the Officials were more concerned with issues affecting Northern Ireland directly, such as British imperialism, which meant anti-EEC rhetoric came out as a by-product of these messages conveyed, rather than direct policy arguments as was the case for Provisional Sinn Féin during the 1970s.

The Irish Labour Party

It was not only the Provisionals and Official Sinn Féin who emphasised the threat posed to Ireland due to the EEC, the Labour Party also used it to push its own appeal. At the time the Irish Labour Party was regarded as the only major political party that opposed EEC membership, yet it is evident that both Provisional and Official Sinn Féin shared the same commitment as a critical opponent of the EEC. The Labour Party in 1969, in its official outline policy, suggested that Europe was an unviable proposition for Ireland resting on the notion of neutrality:

> This is unrealistic as it is ignominious. The Common Market does not have a common foreign policy, or defence policy and NATO is virtually obsolete. Ireland's relation to the market should be determined by, and limited to, purely economic considerations. No surrender of principle need or should be offered or accorded. Nor should Ireland enter the Market.[139]

Yet in 1971 the focus became clearer on how the EEC would be dealt with. "The 1971 Annual Conference had reaffirmed the Party's opposition to the Government's application for membership of the [EEC] and had set down Labour's policy in a statement which it had adopted".[140] The issue of neutrality was entrenched in Labour

[137] *United Irishmen,* November 1971.
[138] *United Irishmen,* April 1972.
[139] The Labour Party, *Labour Party Outline Policy – Annual Conference 24-26 Jan. 69*, Dublin, 1969, National Library Ireland Archives, 86.
[140] The Labour Party, *Annual Report 1971*, Dublin, 1971, National Library Ireland Archives, 15.

Party dialogue, and an official statement on Irish entry to the EEC revealed that the party opposed full membership on the grounds of neutrality.[141] It was now abundantly clear that the party would take a negative position towards EEC affairs from this point on, and with a looming referendum on the way this was of high priority. Labour was sure to contest the battle in the Dáil and in the upcoming referendum. The Labour Party campaigned against membership, mainly on economic grounds, but also due to the 'neocolonial' nature of the EEC – fears over the loss of Ireland's neutrality were raised in the Dáil in March 1972.[142] The party was particularly anxious over government silence on neutrality and future European defence commitments. In the March 1972 Dáil debate on Irish membership of the EEC, the party pressed Hillery to respond to the issue:

> When the Taoiseach opened the debate, and I think it is clearly stated in the White Paper, he said that there are no military or defence commitments whatsoever in Ireland's acceptance of the Treaties of Rome and Paris. Our obligations as a member of the Communities will not entail such commitments.[143]

However, the party was not swayed and continued to protest over what it perceived as the government's relinquishing of neutrality.[144] The Administrative Council of the Labour Party issued a directive to the effect that "the Labour Party calls on all units of the organisation to prepare to fight against the EEC".[145] It also outlined further its reasoning behind such a decision and to no surprise, the fact that joining the EEC would "jeopardise our national policy on neutrality"[146], was a major focal point. Questions from the time also indicate a fear of Europe due to the issue of neutrality; "Why should we abandon our neutrality now?"[147] This catch phrase question was used repeatedly by Labour Party members to reinforce the threat EEC membership would pose to military neutrality. The Labour Party had thus adopted the position that the country's traditional policy on neutrality would be jeopardised as Ireland became increasingly drawn towards Common Market positions on foreign policy issues with other member states,

[141] Tony Browne, "'Saying No' - An Analysis of the Irish Opposition to the Lisbon Treaty", 2010, available: https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iiea.com%2Fdocuments%2Fsaying-no&ei=58ffVLPKEImD8QWT3IJg&usg=AFQjCNGD19QASDa5SB6CZwvClKkmrfPOTg, 8.
[142] Dáil Éireann, vol 259, 23 March 1972, Membership of the EEC: Motion (resumed).
[143] Dáil Éireann, vol 259, 2445.
[144] Dáil Éireann, vol 259, 2208-2209.
[145] The Labour Party, *Annual Report 1971*, 15.
[146] The Labour Party, *Annual Report 1971*, 15.
[147] The Labour Party, *Annual Report 1971 (2)*, Dublin, 1971, National Library Ireland Archives, 40.

all of whom were either ex-colonial powers or clearly aligned in the Cold War, or both.[148]

Importantly though, the Labour Party in 1969 in its official outline policy suggested that Europe was an unviable proposition for Ireland based on the issue of sovereignty and independence. It did not want to give up Ireland's independence again, especially so soon after experiencing domination by the British. "The first objective of the foreign policy of a small country is that of safe-guarding the country's independence",[149] was the line taken. The party went on to state that "Ireland is in serious danger of becoming a colony of a colony".[150] The reference directed to the EEC was aimed at the threat it would pose on Ireland's critical decision-making ability in the future. In 1970 the Labour Party increased its opposition towards the EEC by making it an election issue at state level. In the Donegal and Letrim South county by-elections, the party campaigned on the EEC issue, and was convinced that by doing so, it had brought the issue to light, which otherwise may have been ignored.[151] Also in this year a motion was tabled in the Taoiseach for discussion regarding the implications of the EEC for Ireland. This was the first in three years. The Labour Party through their political representative, Mr Corish, explained their criticism of the EEC in great detail:

> We have repeatedly voiced our opposition to the concept of the EEC and, needless to remark, we have been severely criticised for that, particularly by the Government Party. As far as our opposition is concerned, we believe it is just as valid now as it was when we first expressed it in 1960 ... we oppose the concept of it because, not alone are we republican, but we are socialist as well. As Republicans we believe that if we have to accede the conditions of the Treaty of Rome we will lose our sovereignty, independent status and be dominated by a Brussels bureaucracy. We oppose it as socialists because we believe the EEC is anti-planning and is based on the principles of laissez faire and free competition.[152]

The need to join because Britain was attempting to at the time did not sit well with many Labour Party members:

[148] Edward Moxon-Browne, 'The Europeanisation of Political Parties', *Centre for European Studies,* N.d., available: http://aei.pitt.edu/2341/1/002324_1.PDF, 3.
[149] The Labour Party, *Labour Party Outline Policy – Annual Conference 24-26 Jan. 69*, 83.
[150] The Labour Party, *Labour Party Outline Policy – Annual Conference 24-26 Jan. 69*, 83.
[151] The Labour Party, *Annual Report 1970*, Dublin, 1970, National Library Ireland Archives, 10.
[152] The Labour Party, *Annual Report 1970*, 36.

> I suppose we are ashamed, so to speak, to say this, that we seek membership because Britain does because of our continued economic dependence on Britain; this dependence is so great it appears, that we have to.[153]

By 1971, these concerns had grown in the Labour Party, which reinforced its commitment to oppose EEC membership on these grounds.

> The EEC paper is full of extravagant claims. It paints an Alice in Wonderland picture of the benefits which the Government claims will result from membership ... Labour's criticisms are these ... [it] does not take into account the effect of membership on the entire economy ... it is impossible for our economy to develop inside free trade conditions ... no tangible evidence [is given] that employment will grow should we enter the EEC.[154]

Dr Noel Browne, re-elected Labour Party Teachta Dála **(**TD) in 1969, gave further claim to this:

> As a Socialist Party, we oppose in principle joining with a group of nations dominated by the profit motives as its sole criterion or yard-stick for the exploitation of the collective communities in the existing Common Market and in the proposed Common Market.[155]

The loss of national sovereignty featured exclusively in parliamentary debates in 1971. Mr Kavanagh, Labour Party TD mentioned:

> With regard to sovereignty, which is probably the most important point I would conclude by reminding the House of two lines of the Proclamation which read: We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies to be sovereign and indefeasible.[156]

Mr Tracey (Labour Party TD) reaffirmed this position and said:

> We are gravely perturbed, however, at the attitude of this Government and its spokesmen who are trying to pretend that they are leading us into a Valhalla, in which prosperity will abound and no one will ever again see a poor day. They seek to pretend that there is no threat to our sovereignty [or] to our traditional independence ... All this is quite untrue and they know it to be untrue. They seek to pretend there is no threat to our culture or our traditional way of life. Of course, there is a most serious threat to our ancient way of life in going into the EEC. Obviously the Government are seeking the opportunity of going into this great economic bloc in the hope

[153] The Labour Party, *Annual Report 1970*, 36.
[154] The Labour Party, *Annual Report 1971*, 16.
[155] The Labour Party, *Annual Report 1971 (2)*, 39.
[156] Dáil Éireann Debate, *vol 252, no 5*, Membership of EEC Motion: Resumed, 10 March 1971.

> and the belief that some of the gilt will rub off and give a boost to this ailing economy of ours.[157]

However, Mr M. O'Leary (Labour Party TD) gave the greatest commitment on behalf of the party towards the issue when he stated:

> Within the Dáil, Labour will seek to have the following principles accepted without prejudice to the party position: ... In particular, there must be no loss of national sovereignty over our land, fisheries or natural resources and there must be strict limitations on the rights of foreigners to purchase Irish land.[158]

The position adopted in 1971 was thus, "membership of the EEC must not result in the loss of national sovereignty over or land, or industries or our national resources".[159] The nationalistic tendencies of the Labour Party were growing in importance during this period. These tendencies were the underlying currents which spurred the party to take on its anti-EEC approach. To better raise the profile of these concerns a liaison was established with the ICTU by the Labour Party, in order to co-ordinate activity in relation to the EEC.[160] In addition, meetings were held with the Common Market Study Group.[161] The effect of this was to build a greater support base to raise these concerns and as well give a stronger voice to a successful 'no' result if a referendum were to be held on EEC accession. The Labour Party revealed particular concern about entry which led it to commission a report entitled *An Outline Alternative to the E.E.C*. The "pamphlet [was] as result of a preliminary investigation into the problem of Ireland and her entry into the Common Market".[162] The report highlighted the Labour Party's opposition in vast detail and was highly critical. Its opening preface began with:

> Entry into the E.E.C would herald the death of a nation. Not only would we lose the ability to express ourselves as a nation with a distinct social, cultural and political tradition, but in economic times it would seal our fate as a dependent backwater of Europe forever.[163]

An appeal was made in the report that the best way forward would be with Ireland in control of its own destiny. "This alternative is not possible while Ireland is governed

[157] Dáil Éireann Debate, *vol 252, no 5,* Membership of EEC Motion: Resumed, 10 March 1971.
[158] Dáil Éireann Debate, *vol 252, no 5,* Membership of EEC Motion: Resumed, 10 March 1971.
[159] The Labour Party, *Annual Report 1971 (2)*, 38.
[160] The Labour Party, *Annual Report 1971*, 16.
[161] The Labour Party, *Annual Report 1971*, 16.
[162] Roger Cole, Lionel McCarthy and Alan Matthews, *An Outline Alternative to the EEC*, Dublin, 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, 1.
[163] Cole, McCarthy and Matthews, *An Outline Alternative to the EEC,* 2.

politically by a coalition of foreign capital and subservient domestic interests"[164] was highlighted. It said it must be, "a socialist one, supported by and run in the interests of all workers and small farmers".[165] Many understood the EEC to be a wealthy man's club which solely benefited those richer countries and bureaucrats, which Ireland was not.

> Germany, France and Italy have, of course, very different democratic traditions to us, but we should not allow ultimate control to rest in the hands of irresponsible bureaucrats. The E.E.C is founded on the behalf that the expert, the technocrat can run all.[166]

What Labour proposed during these years was an alternative plan, one which did not involve entering the Common Market. It did this to try to build Irish public momentum behind the party for its anti-EEC stance built on sovereignty and dominance claims. On many occasions the Labour Party expressed that Ireland had its own resources, which if used wisely could promote it to purse a social and economic policy independent of that of the EEC.[167] This alternative seemed to always be promoted by the party. For the Labour Party "the EEC knows no social priorities, its only god is the nobility of capital, labour and goods".[168] The alternative thus implied independence from the EEC and the embracing of technological, socialist and democratic principles. It felt strongly that Irish citizens would be left behind in the EEC and would be much better off in isolation where it could act on it own accord. According to figures produced after an audit of the Labour Party books, the Fighting Fund account for 1971 collected Irish pounds 5,930.04 and had an expenditure of Irish pounds 2,413.96.[169] One could make the assumption that the Fighting Fund referred to the EEC and the desire of the party to tackle the growing concern because of these issues, although it could also relate merely to election funding.

In 1972 the Labour Party increased its campaign against accession and reinforced advocating associate membership only, a change in direction from 1971; this was done so on mainly economic grounds, but also due to unfavourable terms of accession and perceived neo-colonialism of the EEC that had now been established. On 25 February

[164] Cole, McCarthy and Matthews, *An Outline Alternative to the EEC*, 2.
[165] Cole, McCarthy and Matthews, *An Outline Alternative to the EEC*, 2.
[166] Cole, McCarthy and Matthews, *An Outline Alternative to the EEC*, 10.
[167] Cole, McCarthy and Matthews, *An Outline Alternative to the EEC*, 13.
[168] Cole, McCarthy and Matthews, *An Outline Alternative to the EEC*, 13.
[169] D O'Conner, 'Statement on Financial Position of Party', *The Labour Party*, Official Party Statement, 31 December 1971, National Library Archives Ireland.

1972, Roddy Connolly, Party Chairman of the Labour Party, opened the annual conference in Wexford. Although no significant message was relayed at the time about the threat posed, the Labour Party renewed its commitment to socialism. "I am proud that in my year as chairmanship the Labour Party has decided to renew its commitment to socialist philosophy and the teachings of its founders".[170] This recommitment to socialism encouraged the fight to be taken up to the EEC as it was a conflicting ideology. Connolly revealed this at the annual conference when he said:

> Our task is to build the Workers Republic. In this heroic endeavour we will be bitterly opposed by all forces of reaction and conservatism. We can only begin to be successful if we impose upon ourselves strict and steadfast discipline eschewing those courses of action which lead to division and disunity.[171]

The commitment to the Irish working class had thus been linked to that of an independent Irish republic. In a confidential letter to newly elected administrative council members on 6 March 1972, Brendan Halligan, the then general secretary, made it clear:

> It is a cliché to say that every year in politics is a vital one. But, cliché or not, the coming year will be critical for our party and country. I know that we will work together in a spirit of comradeship on the national executive in the cause of socialism and unity.[172]

On 13 March 1972 a final decision on how to best tackle the EEC campaign had not yet been formalised but it was certainly a priority.

> Details of the Party's EEC campaign will be issued shortly to all Branches. At the moment plans are being prepared for submission to the Administrative Council and Parliamentary Party and once approved will be communicated to the entire Party.[173]

It was evident that details of this were discussed at length on 15 March 1972 at the Administrative Council meeting with the agenda featuring significant time for discussion on the EEC campaign and the election of a campaign committee.[174] The meeting successfully appointed a number of members on the Administrative Council to

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[170] D Connolly, cited in The Labour Party, 'Address by Party Chairman', press release, 25 February 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, 2.
[171] Connolly, cited in Labour Party, 'Address by Party Chairman', 2.
[172] Letter from Brendan Halligan to Council Members, 'Letter to the 17 Elected Admin Council Members', *Labour Party,* 6 March 1972, National Library Ireland Archives.
[173] Letter from Brendan Halligan to Branch Secretaries, 'Letter to Each Branch Secretary', *Labour Party,* 13 March 1972, National Library Ireland Archives.
[174] The Labour Party, '15th of March 1972 Admin Council Agenda', *Labour Party,* 15 March 1972, National Library Ireland Archives.

constitute the Party's EEC Campaign Committee.[175] Consultation between other known anti-EEC groups, particularly those of the trade union movement, was also encouraged at the meeting as a productive way forward. Deputy Keating said

> …that in the course of the Campaign the Party should concentrate on the real political issues, such as (a) prices, (b) the effects of free trade, and (c) the flight of capital out of the country under the EEC conditions.[176]

The meeting also established that the Labour Party would "put forward as an alternative an association agreement with the EEC".[177] Issues of price rises and the future of industrial jobs were highlighted. Herbert Devoy said at the meeting, "Labour should concentrate on bringing attention to the reduction of farm employment likely to occur due to EEC membership".[178] He elaborated further by stating that it was his view that the "30–50 age group will swing the election in Rural areas, as such people will have little employment opportunities when they leave the land".[179] Other issues such as money required and further Constituency Organisations to help promote the anti-EEC message were also discussed at length. A more formal arrangement had now been set by the Labour Party to tackle the EEC.

On 20 March 1972 the first major meeting of the newly appointed EEC Campaign Committee was to be held under the Chairmanship of Justin Keating.[180] Here the decision was finally made on how best to combat the concern that was the Common Market. In April 1972 the Labour Party released a booklet known as the *Common Market Referendum – Fact Book*[181] for Labour Party members. The booklet was designed to give detail on the EEC, but more importantly the negative impact it would have on many aspects of Irish life. The format of the booklet was interesting in that it asked specific questions (many that had been resonating through Irish society for a long time) followed by a specific negative answer to each question. The booklet addresses questions on loss of sovereignty, neutrality, the North, prices, employment, farming, fishing and regional policy. All of these issues were offered as reasons for why the

[175] The Labour Party, 'Minutes of meeting held on Wednesday 15th of March in Leinster House', *Labour Party,* 15. March 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, 1.
[176] The Labour Party, 'Minutes of meeting held on Wednesday 15th of March in Leinster House', 4.
[177] The Labour Party, 'Minutes of meeting held on Wednesday 15th of March in Leinster House', 4.
[178] The Labour Party, 'Minutes of meeting held on Wednesday 15th of March in Leinster House', 4.
[179] The Labour Party, 'Minutes of meeting held on Wednesday 15th of March in Leinster House', 4.
[180] Letter from Labour Party to admin council members, 'Letter – To each Member of the Administrative Council', *Labour Party,* 20 March 1972, National Library Ireland Archives.
[181] The Labour Party, Common Market Referendum – Fact Book, *Labour Party Fact Book,* April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives.

Labour Party believed Ireland should not join the EEC. The answers given to the questions in the booklet acted as a scare tactic and the reader would presumably identify with the concern which would entice them to vote 'no' as a result. The meeting and booklet suggested further steps taken by the Labour Party towards an anti-EEC position due to sovereignty and independence concerns.

Anti-EEC material was also released on behalf of the party in the lead up to the referendum vote. Simple posters such as 'The Labour Party; Common Market – No'[182] were displayed around Ireland and more detailed posters such as 'Will the European Union close our factories? – Labour Watches the Common Market'[183] were produced. These attempted to sway voters towards a 'no' vote in the lead up to 10 May. Leaflets were also distributed to households in 1972. One leaflet entitled *The Common Market Costs Too Much*[184] highlighted the loss of sovereignty and that there was an alternative if you supported the Labour Party. Another, entitled *Employment – Common Market Style*[185] attempted to portray the poor economic situation that would occur if a successful 'yes' vote passed. Without question the Labour Party was a credible force; a voice against the EEC through the decisions made and action taken towards EEC accession. The production and distribution of this material revealed these concerns to be very real for party members and enforced them into the public arena.

Non-government organisations

A number of non-governmental organisations actively opposed EEC membership, premised mainly on the threat posed to Irish neutrality and sovereignty, in the lead up to 10 May.

Trade unions

Some trade unions during this time also used neutrality as a means to attract anti-EEC sentiment from their members and denounced plans to move Ireland towards the Common Market. The Irish Transport and General Workers Union (ITGWU) realised

[182] The Labour Party, 'Common Market – No Poster', *Labour Party Campaign material*, May 1972, National Library Ireland Archives.
[183] The Labour Party, 'Will European Union Close our Factories? – Labour Watches the Common Market", *Labour Party Campaign material*, 1972, National Library Ireland Archives.
[184] The Labour Party, 'The Common Market Costs too Much', *Labour Party Campaign material*, 1972, National Library Ireland Archives.
[185] The Labour Party, 'Employment – Common Market Style', *Labour Party Campaign material*, April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives.

that the possibility of Ireland joining the EEC was a looming threat. This move was seen as unacceptable by the union leadership, particularly Fintan Kennedy himself. Kennedy was general secretary of the organisation from 1959 to 1969 and became president in 1969. He was influential in portraying an anti-EEC voice to the organisation. An extensive publication was produced in 1971 on behalf of the ITGWU for its members, entitled *The Question Posed: How Would You Fare in the Common Market?*[186] On the question posed by the booklet 'how would you fare?' the ITGWU stated that it "[was] deeply concerned about [the question]".[187] The pamphlet provided both for and against points for joining the Common Market, although the negative descriptions were more detailed, with greater discussion on each argument given. The issue of neutrality was certainly one of the key questions raised. "There is little doubt that the surrender of neutrality would eventually entail"[188] was one clear finding expressed by the ITGWU at the time. "Ireland's greatest contributions to world peace have been made in the era of our strictest neutrality in the late fifties and early sixties".[189] Therefore, it was highlighted that neutrality would come to an end, and it would be left solely to the Council of Ministers to decide the future fate of Irish military commitments. This was interpreted as a bad proposition by the ITGWU leadership that could potentially lead to future military commitments without Ireland's support for such measures. "People have not been made aware of what the surrender of [neutrality] would mean".[190] Thus, the ITGWU presented as a organised, non-government participant, contributing to the anti-EEC debate with neutrality at the heart of its concern towards an Irish EEC commitment.

Likewise, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ITCU) was also weary of the EEC in 1972, with neutrality presenting as a main argument for the established organisation. It published a leaflet entitled *Economic Freedom*[191] calling on support for a 'no' vote in May. The leaflet was in response somewhat towards a disliking to Dr Patrick Hillery's comments in May 1970 on defence matters. Hillery, as Minister for Foreign Affairs

[186] Irish Transport and General Workers Union, *The Question Posed: How Would You Fare in the Common Market?* Dublin, 1971.
[187] Irish Transport and General Workers Union, *The Question Posed: How Would You Fare in the Common Market?* 2.
[188] Irish Transport and General Workers Union, *The Question Posed: How Would You Fare in the Common Market?* 20.
[189] Irish Transport and General Workers Union, *The Question Posed: How Would You Fare in the Common Market?* 20.
[190] Irish Transport and General Workers Union, *The Question Posed: How Would You Fare in the Common Market?* 20.
[191] ICTU, 'Economic Freedom', April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives.

(between 1969 and1973) had stated, "we would have to act closely in political as well as economic affairs and would have to participate in common action, even the defence of the new Europe".[192] This was viewed as unacceptable to the ICTU, which cited the then Swedish prime minister's decision in 1971 as a source of inspiration against this idea:

> Swedish participation in an economic and monetary union, which implies abandonment of the national right of decision-making in important fields, is not compatible with a Swedish policy of neutrality ... our neutrality is not negotiable.[193]

The ICTU found it difficult to fathom Hillery's remark, as on one hand Sweden was able to safeguard her position of neutrality but Ireland could not. Therefore, in terms of neutrality and military commitments the ICTU saw it as "a joke in poor taste".[194]

Opposition also began being voiced by the trade union movement around questions of sovereignty and dominance during the 1970s. An extensive publication was produced in 1971 on behalf of the ITGWU for its members. Entitled, *The Question Posed: How Would You Fare in the Common Market?*[195], it reiterated these concerns. A major point raised in the document, which explained why the ITGWU may have adopted this negative position, came down to the fact that the trade union movement inside the Common Market was not particularly strong. It said on this:

> …in Ireland 51 per cent of workers are members of trade unions, far stronger than unions inside the EEC ... The main economic body on which the trade unions are represented in the Common Market is the Economic and Social Committee, one of the consultative committees grouped around the Commission and the Council with no real power. It is a useful mechanism for giving advice and for querying decisions, but it is not a pacesetter in the Community. The Irish trade unionists would have little to gain.[196]

As well, concern was noted with regard to any move towards the EEC which could lead to a downfall in membership numbers, as members would most probably seek representation from the Economic and Social Committee inside the community itself. In 1971 Fintan Kennedy specifically requested guarantees for Irish industry before any

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[192] Irish Transport and General Workers Union, 'No to EEC', Dublin, 1972, National Library Ireland Achieves, available: http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/10/26/b4c9a0f5-f26a-4ffa-92c8-08cc1e222985/publishable_en.pdf, 5.
[193] Olof Palme, cited in Irish Transport and General Workers Union, 'No to EEC', 5.
[194] Irish Transport and General Workers Union, 'No to EEC', 5.
[195] Irish Transport and General Workers Union, *The Question Posed: How Would You Fare in the Common Market?*
[196] Irish Transport and General Workers Union, *The Question Posed: How Would You Fare in the Common Market?* 23.

decision was to be taken on Ireland's entry into the EEC.[197] His concerns mimicked that of Crotty's with economic consequences being the major contention:

> We foresee, if Ireland joins, an economic catastrophe in which large numbers of Irish workers will lose their jobs and the capacity of the country's economy, on which we depend for our standard of living, will be seriously undermined.[198]

A member of the Labour Party whilst in office, it was evident that these views were supportive of his party's position on the EEC at the time, which stressed a loss of sovereignty and authority, as the concerns noted.

The ITGWU became an even more vocal opponent around 1972, expressing these important concerns even further. The ITGWU was now particularly concerned about the EEC because of the supposed large number of job losses, foreign occupation and increased costs associated with membership. It believed:

> Our developing economy is far too weak to compete ... There will be thousands unemployed ... The cost of living will rise so high as to cause grave hardship ... We will lose full control over our future ... The small farm community will go to the wall ... Unemployed Irish emigrants will be forced into the slum labour ghettos of Common Market cities ... Oppressive open competition of European Industrial society does not suit the Irish people.[199]

The ITGWU was also open to the possibility of a form of trading agreement with the EEC, "the alternative is to negotiate some form of trading association with the EEC countries"[200], was expressed. A poster, 'No EEC'[201] launched in April 1972 portrayed the ITGWU as backing Congress. According to the poster the ITGWU had ICTU backing for its argument that loss of independence and around 30,000 job losses would be on the cards.[202] Thousands of stickers were also produced to display these messages publically. Union members were encouraged to display these on vehicles, at worksites and around the community in order to promote the ITGWU's anti-EEC stance featuring the concerns of sovereignty, dominance and independence in doing so.

Likewise, the ICTU followed its counterpart's direction with arguments raised against Europe in 1972. It published a leaflet entitled 'Economic Freedom'[203] calling on

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[197] European Parliament, *European Documentation*: *A survey*, vol 13, unspecified, 1971, 222.
[198] Fintan Kennedy, cited in ICTU, Senator Fintan Kennedy, *Economic Freedom,* press release, 1972.
[199] ITGWU, 'No to EEC', *ITGWU Campaign material*, April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives.
[200] ITGWU, 'No to EEC'.
[201] ITGWU, 'No to EEC'.
[202] ITGWU, 'No to EEC'.
[203] ICTU, "Economic Freedom".

support for a 'no' vote in May. The key message was that Ireland could make its own decisions. The ICTU technically represented the Irish working class citizen and indeed felt that the EEC threatened the livelihood of many of its working class members, generally through resulting job losses which would supposedly result, although this was not the case after accession. In a more elaborate document produced in 1972 the reasons for adopting a negative stance were made clearer. First, it cited that "our developing economy is far too weak to compete in free trade conditions with the industrial giants of Europe".[204] The fear was that Ireland's industrial sector had only recently begun and still remained insignificant when compared to other parts of the world. At this stage it was viewed as being capable for its own requirements. The ICTU was particularly unhappy about the impact EEC accession would have on Irish independence. It stated: "we will lose full control over our future in Economic, Social, Cultural and Political affairs".[205] This view stemmed from the notion that a loss of sovereignty was a bad thing, echoed by union officials towards their members at the time. A better way forward was promoted which meant if anything a trading relationship with the EEC as the only real possibility.

> The challenge for us and for our children is at home. It is not to be found in rubbing shoulders with the industrial giants who are in a different league.[206]

Therefore, the ICTU stopped short of accepting full EEC membership as many of its counterparts did, which therefore positioned the organisation as a committed anti-EEC group using sovereignty and dominance to justify its position against accession.

On a larger scale, the National Anti-EEC Action Committee and Irish Sovereignty Movement claimed to be fighting the Common Market threat on behalf of all Irish citizens. A large-scale document jointly produced in 1972 by these organisations attempted to paint a picture of the dire situation Ireland would be in in five years' time. The document known as *Ireland – In Five Years Time*?[207] described Ireland as a country with housing prices up, mass unemployment, the countryside deserted, culture destroyed, conscription to NATO, mass emigration and food prices up.[208] Again the intention of those who created the document was to invoke fear. An alternative course

[204] ITGWU, 'No to EEC'., 2.
[205] ITGWU, 'No to EEC'., 4.
[206] ITGWU, 'No to EEC'., 6.
[207] National Anti EEC Action Committee & Irish Sovereignty Movement, 'Ireland in 5 Years Time'. *Anti-EEC Action Committee & Irish Sovereignty Movement,* 1972, National Library Ireland Archives.
[208] National Anti EEC Action Committee & Irish Sovereignty Movement, 'Ireland in 5 Years Time'.

of action was also offered by the two organisations. Basically it entailed one which would allow Ireland to develop on its own accord, accessing its own resources and abiding by the 1916 proclamation. These two organisations thus mentioned sovereignty as a concern against Europe before 1973 and attempted to fight the EEC by working within their organisational structures.

Common Market Defence Campaign

The concern raised about Irish neutrality was not confined just to political parties and trade unions during this period; pressure groups also presented anti-EEC views around the safeguarding of military neutrality. In 1970, the Common Market Defence Campaign (CMDC) was setup, with joint secretaries Anthony Coughlan and Raymond Crotty being involved to discourage the EEC idea from taking hold in Ireland. The Common Market Study Group actively campaigned against Ireland joining the EEC before 1972. The group distributed a large amount of propaganda in order to try and persuade Irish citizens to vote 'no' on the issue of neutrality. The booklet *Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join* painted a very grim picture for Ireland if it were to join the EEC. One of the main arguments featured was the loss of military neutrality.[209] This concern was identical to the one presented by Provisional Sinn Féin in *Nation or Province* discussed earlier. Coughlan explained at the time in his own publication for the organisation that:

> perhaps one of the most dangerous implications of joining the common market is the threat this poses to our traditional policy of military neutrality in conflicts between European States ... Military commitments of some kind are therefore highly probable in time, as a 'European' military alliance, inevitably armed with nuclear weapons provided by Britain and France, takes over the functions of NATO.[210]

Coughlan was critical of EEC commissioner, Ralf Dahrendorf in the summer of 1970 when he declared that, "neutrality was incompatible with membership of the EEC".[211] In addition, he did not agree with the Taoiseach view that:

> if the group (i.e. the EEC) was attacked, I do not think that we could opt out of our obligations to defend it. It is not a question of neutrality but of meeting our obligations within a complex of

[209] Anthony Coughlan, *The Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join!* Dublin, 1970, 31-32.
[210] Coughlan, *The Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join!* 28.
[211] Dahrendorf, cited in Coughlan, *The Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join!* 28.

> that nature ... Neutrality, in the context of the EEC, would not be the old conception of neutrality at all.[212]

Furthermore, particular disliking was noted by Coughlan towards the Minister of External Affairs Dr Hillery's view that "full participation would involve full obligations"[213], which implied that abandoning neutrality to defend Europe was the whole idea behind the proposal. Coughlan saw that liberty and freedom of choice would be restricted under such a system, and therefore neutrality was at the forefront of his argument against the Common Market. The notion that Ireland was such a small country and risked losing everything if made to go to war was a major concern endorsed by Coughlan. Coughlan cited de Valera for his argument here when de Valera stated:

> A small State like Ireland, if it involves itself in war, risks the loss of everything, even its liberty. It should avoid war if at all possible.[214]

The issue of conscription and the fact that all member countries except Britain supported this notion was what eventuated from De Valera's statement for Coughlan. This led to Coughlan posing the specific question:

> It could possibly mean conscription ... are Irish people willing to accept [this] implication of the Common Market?[215]

This was certainly not something that resonated with the people of Ireland, Coughlan believed. His attack on a common military and defence framework also evolved further into a warning regarding a future European nuclear conflict:

> It would make Ireland part of a nuclear power bloc and be a complete turnabout on the policy of opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons which have pursued for two decades in the United Nations, and it would possibly put us in the front line of targets in the event of nuclear war.[216]

Coughlan argued that EEC membership would mean more money would be spent on defence and the fear that military buildings would be established on the mainland, which could potentially lead to Ireland being targeted in future conflicts that might erupt. Without doubt, Coughlan during this period expressed many reservations about

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[212] The Taoiseach, cited in Coughlan, *The Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join!* 28.
[213] Hillery, cited in Coughlan, *The Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join!* 28.
[214] Eamonn De Valera, cited in Coughlan, *The Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join!* 29.
[215] Coughlan, *The Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join!* 28.
[216] Coughlan, *The Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join!* 29.

the Common Market tied exclusively to the issue of neutrality, combatting what he saw were false claims made on the issue.

Coughlan and Crotty, serving as joint secretaries of the Common Market Defence Campaign, were in many ways able to influence direction and give more weight to their anti-EEC arguments within an organisational structure during the 1970s. This revealed that the Wolfe Tone Society had achieved its goal earlier in the 1960s of providing a meeting point for republicans and communists, but as mentioned in the previous chapter meant these individuals needed to go it alone. The Wolfe Tone Society was not officially part of the Republican Movement, and a need was identified for more collaboration. This more pro-active body was the CMDC, which emerged in May 1971.[217] One of the main strains of CMDC rhetoric was sovereignty, and this is what underpinned all other arguments.[218] The CMDC insisted that the EEC issue was essentially a political one that had economic consequences.[219] Although possibly a little farfetched, it seemed evident that Coughlan felt pro-EEC advocates did not have faith in Ireland's ability to self-govern. He made this clear in 1970 in his publication *The Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join* when he stated:

> The supranationalism of the Common Market is the very opposite of genuine internationalism. It demands the suppression of the national sovereignty and independence of small states in the interest of the big ones, rather than guarantees and extends national independence. Imperialists and colonialist States have always known how to use an international rhetoric – stuffed with high-sounding sentiments, to justify their dominance of others; and the collective imperialism of the big powers who have formed the Common Market is essentially no different. The supranationalism of the Common Market is in reality the political ideology of multi-national Big Business which today finds the nation State restrictive on its expansion.[220]

Evident here is the extent to which sovereignty was the main issue. Members believed merging with the EEC meant being tricked into a fundamentally undemocratic, capitalist-dominated superstate, where Ireland would lose its ability to make its own economic and political decisions.[221] The CMDC went on to further suggest a correlation

[217] Coughlan, cited in Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 27.
[218] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 28.
[219] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 28.
[220] Coughlan, *The Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join!* 3.
[221] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 29.

between the European Project and that of Hitler's Europe, with some sense of German control of Ireland.[222] In 1970 Coughlan wrote:

> Ironically, it is Bismarck's successors in West Germany today who are the most ardent advocates of European integration. Having failed militarily to conquer Europe in two bloody World Wars, the Germans are now trying to become its economic masters. They seek to achieve their expansionist ambitions, including a hold on nuclear weapons, through the supranational institutions of the Common Market and the political and military union which they hope to see develop on the basis of the EEC.[223]

This view was not new for Coughlan, who had raised this argument years earlier. In 1967 he had raised the issue of cultural distinctiveness not being able to survive the loss of a nation's political and economic independence through the *Irish Times*.[224] These views were often seen as isolationist and narrow minded by pro-EEC supporters. "Such a claim was not contentious for some, but others in Ireland found the excessive rhetoric—a reason against supporting the CMDC".[225]

In March 1972, the CMDC began the long task of denouncing what the EEC would mean for Ireland if association came about. According to its *Campaign News* document produced by the organisation it was convinced that:

> We have got inside information on opinion polls the Government has taken. They show the anti-Marketeers can undoubtedly win if those who say No to the EEC all turn out to vote.[226]

It was established then that the CMDC would continue to produce extensive anti-EEC material featuring the issue of sovereignty, but also to ensure everyone turned out to vote 'no' on 10 May. Canvassing thus became the priority:

> This is the most vital thing to organise in the next few weeks. Getting leaflets and information on the EEC to people on their own doorstep. It needs to be done night after night if many people are to be covered.[227]

The production and distribution of leaflets increased significantly during the lead up to the referendum. "We can now supply leaflets at £3 a thousand or less in urgent

[222] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 30.
[223] Coughlan, *The Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join!* 9.
[224] Coughlan, cited in *The Irish Times*, 22 June 1967.
[225] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 30.
[226] Common Market Defence Campaign, 'Campaign News', press release, no 4, March-April 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, 1.
[227] Common Market Defence Campaign, 'Campaign News', 1.

cases".[228] The message of sovereignty resonated throughout much of this literature. *The Common Market – Why You Must Vote No*[229] revealed this and highlighted why sovereignty would be lost under EEC conditions. Many concerns mentioned were those of Coughlan's, stemming from the duration of engagement with these arguments over time. Other more basic leaflets simply stated 'vote no'.[230] Another example was *The Common Market and You!*[231] which outlined the negatives of the EEC in terms of an individual's personal life. Again, price increases featured, as did the sense of fear. In another document produced in April 1972 known as *Ireland's Interests Should Prevail*[232] it became very clear what the ambitions of the organisation were:

> to defend Irish sovereignty ... To foster greater public awareness in Ireland of the implications of full Common Market membership. To demand separate referendum on the issue of Common Market membership. To urge that before a referendum is taken, all reasonable alternatives [are explored]. To urge upon the Government ... permanent safeguards as essential to preserve the Irish economy and way of life.[233]

Thus, literature produced during the lead up to the referendum by the CMDC indicated these concerns against Europe, with a more concrete organisational structure to it, especially with regards to Coughlan and Crotty.

Common Market Study Group

With the incorporation of Wolfe Tone Society ideas from the 1960s into the Common Market Study Group in the 1970s, Anthony Coughlan and Raymond Crotty brought further attention to these arguments in their work for this organisation.[234] In 1970 Coughlan bowed out of the Wolfe Tone Society with a view to concentrating on the Common Market Study Group.[235] Coughlan was a natural choice to head up the new, separate, but related, division of the Wolfe Tone Society as an economist.[236] It was clear that his problem with the Common Market at this time was that of sovereignty. He

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[228] Common Market Defence Campaign, 'Campaign News', 2.
[229] Common Market Defence Campaign, 'The Common Market – Why You Must Vote No', *CMDC Campaign Material*, 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[230] Common Market Defence Campaign, 'The Common Market – Why You Must Vote No.
[231] Common Market Defence Campaign, 'The Common Market and You', *CMDC Campaign Material*, 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[232] Common Market Defence Campaign, 'Ireland's Interests Should Prevail', *CMDC Campaign Material*, 1972, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection.
[233] Common Market Defence Campaign, 'Ireland's Interests Should Prevail', 2.
[234] Stephen Collins, 'Same Argument, Different Year', *Sunday Tribute*, press release, 15 September 2002.
[235] Roy Johnston, *Century of Endeavour*, Dublin, 2006, 292.
[236] *The Independent*, 'Some Kind of Crank', Independent.ie, 24 June 2001, available: http://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/some-kind-of-crank-and-some-kind-of-hero-26249319.html.

was joined in 1970 by his counterpart Crotty, a former farmer who began acting as a voice for the farming community through this organisation. His claim at the time rested on the notion that sovereignty would be placed in serious jeopardy under EEC conditions. He said, "the EEC would bring no benefits and be disastrous for all sections of the ... community which would destroy the fabric of Irish life".[237] Thus, Coughlan and Crotty successfully hid their views and connections to the Wolfe Tone Society, and within the Common Market Study Group were able to better promote an anti-European platform built on sovereignty, independence, and domination that were seemingly important to them for some time.

Additional pamphlets were also published by the Common Market Study Group featuring these concerns. Emmett O'Connell published his pamphlet in 1972, named *The Consequences of Monetary Union and its Effects on Peripheral Regions*[238]. Here O'Connell focused on the negative effects of EEC membership on Ireland.

> Why not work for a world where government and economies are under genuine human control ... Why not insist that efficiency in ... these matters be measured not by isolated statistics of economic production, but by well-reasoned principles of human betterment based on accumulated wisdom of human history, especially the history of the periods which appear to have been far more successful in solving their problems than we have been in solving ours? Full membership of the EEC by Ireland will prevent the adoption of policies based upon these principles.[239]

Padraig O'Snodaigh, an Irish language activist and president of Conradh Na Gaeilge, also helped produce distribution literature leading up to the referendum. In his work *A Second Act of Union?*[240] he took issue with British domination which had so long dominated Irish history. He argued, "the whole logic of separatist nationalism leads to the conclusion that the forthcoming referendum gives us the opportunity once and for all to break the link with England by voting no to England's interests, and by so rejecting membership of the EEC to assert Irish independence, dignity, and sovereignty".[241] Professor E.T. Nevin and Bishop James Moynagh conveyed a similar type of message in their work in 1972. They attempted to convince Irish citizens that

[237] Raymond Crotty, *Irish Agriculture and the Common Market: The Consequences and the Alternatives*, Dublin, 1970, 25.
[238] Emmett O'Connell, *The Consequences of Monetary Union and its Effects on Peripheral Regions*, Dublin, 1972.
[239] O'Connell, *The Consequences of Monetary Union and its Effects on Peripheral Regions*, 26.
[240] Padraigh O'Snodaigh, *A Second Act of Union?* Dublin, 1972.
[241] O'Snodaigh, *A Second Act of Union?* 16.

community was important and that control over Ireland's own resources was paramount. They asked at the time, "what is the nature of the Community we propose to enter?"[242] Their feelings were that "it [was] a community dominated and influenced by supranational corporations and cartels".[243]

Identified eurosceptic individuals

Other prominent individuals in Irish society also began using these concerns raised by their larger counterparts before 1972 against the EEC idea. These influential individuals were important because their opinions meant something, in certain circles and their opinion accounted for something, often reaching the press.

Joe Quigley was a prime example, producing a pamphlet titled *Common Market, Common Enemy* revealing his euro-critical thoughts. He noted that due to Ireland's geographical position in relation to Europe and its position as an agricultural country, the fate of Ireland would be significantly hampered, restricted and influenced by others.[244] In his work, he dedicated an entire chapter to 'Neo-Colonialism and Militarism', highlighting the threat posed by EEC accession to neutrality. He expanded on this concept further in another publication and stated:

> the Common Market operates a system of collective colonialism which aims at … gaining control of raw materials of the Third World, and establishing political control over the independent governments of these states.[245]

Quigley was particularly wary of what he saw as an enlarged community achieving superpower status in terms of military achievement and goals.[246] The superpower notion was built on the premise that nuclear capacity and strong ties to America were the true intentions of the EEC. At the time he stated: "it involves those countries in such a venture with a corresponding loss of neutrality for those countries such as Ireland which have remained unaligned".[247] Quigley saw that European politicians were to some degree united in pro-western ideas and pro-American attitudes:

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[242] E T Nevin and James Moynagh, *The Common Market: Yes or No!* Dublin, 1972, 13.
[243] Nevin and Moynagh, *The Common Market: Yes or No!* 13.
[244] Joe Quigley, *Common Market, Common Enemy*, Dublin, 1971, 13.
[245] J Quigley, *Common Market... Common Enemy: An Exposition of the Effects of Ireland's Entry into the Common Market*, Belfast, 1971, 24.
[246] Quigley, *Common Market... Common Enemy*, 24.
[247] Quigley, *Common Market... Common Enemy*, 25.

> Why would Ireland, want to be involved in a military unit which is allied to the interests of American imperialism.[248]

Although Quigley provided viable arguments against EEC accession before 1973 on his own accord, he had little influence. It was really only through working as a libertarian Marxist member of People's Democracy in Northern Ireland that he made a name for himself; an organised anti-EEC platform seemed to find more acceptance amongst citizens. Yet, after accession Quigley accepted the decision of the Irish electorate and did not continue to provide a voice against Europe on his own individual terms.

Other individuals, such as Andy Johnston and John Maguire, both prominent academics, expressed reservations over membership because of these concerns also. This was revealed in a pamphlet entitled *E.E.C No!* and sold throughout Ireland in 1971 for 8p per copy. [249] The works of these well-known academics were pieced together to produce the pamphlet in order to highlight the political and cultural implications of Ireland joining the EEC, as well as to discuss Crotty's analysis of the entire situation in detail. Johnston in his article highlighted the many cultural implications of membership and what it meant for the Irish situation.[250] He stated:

> I'm afraid, unless I insist that [we] will raise in a vacuum this problem of the quality, tonality, rhythm, texture and social vitality of life in Ireland if we become full members of the EEC.[251]

Johnston felt that ordinary people were being kept ignorant on such a major decision, particularly in terms of economic and trade relations that would bring no benefit to Ireland.[252] At the time he mentioned:

> I am of the opinion that the full consequences of surrendering our political sovereignty to such institutions would place Irish interests predominately in the hands of Central European bureaucratic civil servants and in the hands of remote and faceless continental politicians and their faceless minions.[253]

Dealing with the situation in the run-up to the 1972 referendum on Irish accession to the EEC, Johnston quoted the socialist historian, Desmond Greaves, a Communist Party of Great Britain member who introduced another persistent theme in a comment on a

[248] Quigley, *Common Market... Common Enemy,* 25.
[249] James Larragy (ed), *EEC NO!*, Dublin, 1971
[250] Andy Johnston, 'Cultural Case', in James Larragy (ed), *EEC NO!*
[251] Johnston, 'Cultural Case', 4.
[252] Johnston, 'Cultural Case', 5.
[253] Johnston, 'Cultural Case', 8.

speech by the then British prime minister, "today the devil Heath announced his EEC plan. The shadow of a West European Fascist Empire hovers over us".[254] Johnston further commented on moves in London on Northern Ireland and argued that, "Westminster wants Ireland at peace and with a satellite government in Dublin who will vote under her control in the EEC Council … an Irish puppet vote in the EEC Council".[255] Johnston made reference to the views of his father, Trinity College Dublin Professor and Free State Senator Joseph Johnston, who, in 1970, commented on the position of the major political parties on the EEC:

> The greatest betrayal of our national interests and freedom since the Act of Union is being openly planned by the major parties … The Labour Party should consciously adopt the cause of an all-Ireland radical party that is determined to keep Ireland out of the Eurocrat Empire by every legitimate means.[256]

The Labour Party made some effort to satisfy Professor Johnston in its 1971 statement on Irish Entry into the EEC, which opposed full membership on grounds of sovereignty, neutrality and economic underdevelopment:

> The Labour Party is not prepared to acquiesce in the abandonment of a sovereignty most solemnly declared and set out in the fundamental law of the state. To do so would constitute an admission of national defeat and would involve a lowering of national self-respect.[257]

Maguire, on the other hand, made it clear that Ireland should not join because of the political implications of doing so. Maguire, once a student of Fine Gael in the late 1960s, emphasised, "I believe we must not join [the EEC]"[258] and opposed EEC membership on sovereign grounds. He did not believe Irish industry would prosper nor any benefit for agriculture would be sustained. More likely, he foresaw a decrease in agricultural output.[259] His opposition was also based on a loss of a sense of community. He explained:

> when I spoke of our disappearance as a community I meant to raise this question of goals, to ask 'what, if anything, are we at?' The trend of our economy and population over the last century and a half, a trend which as I have already argued, will be disastrously reinforced by

[254] Roy Johnston, *Century of Endeavour,* 2006, 313.
[255] Roy Johnston, *"Century of Endeavour – Politics in the 1970s",* 2003, available: http://www.iol.ie/~rjtechne/century130703/1970s/polit70.htm.
[256] Johnston, *"Century of Endeavour – Politics in the 1970s".*
[257] Labour Party, Statement on Irish Entry to the EEC, 1971.
[258] John Maguire, 'Political Case' in Larragy (ed), *EEC NO!,* 1.
[259] Maguire, 'Political Case', 1.

> membership of the EEC, would suggest that we are unaware of, or despair of meeting, the challenge of being a living community with control of its economic life.[260]

Maguire proffered a nationalistic type of opposition to the EEC. He believed strongly in the Irish community and the Irish being able to make their own best judgement for a positive way forward, uninhibited by a supranationalist type organisation. However, as these examples show, individual activism against the EEC was important but not overly successful, as the need to collaborate with others became vital during this period.

John de Courcy Ireland,[261] a committed socialist and maritime historian, continued to be against the EEC and what it meant for Irish independence. Historical analogies were an important component of de Courcy Ireland's opposition to Ireland's EEC membership. De Courcy Ireland's eclectic interests were partly a reflection of an early life spent abroad experiencing the world. Born in 1911 in India, where his father served as a major in the British army, de Courcy Ireland also spent part of his youth living in Ireland, Italy, and attending Marlborough College in England.[262] He spent the 1960s attempting to ground the wider integration process in a popular historical context. Specifically, he attempted to draw historical parallels between the EEC and other attempts at political and economic domination of Europe, most notably Nazi Germany, to buttress the more contemporary, economic arguments against EEC membership.[263] In the late 1960s, de Courcy Ireland returned to his emphasis on Ireland's European heritage. He expanded upon it in a lecture delivered to the Dublin Wolfe Tone Society in December 1967, and in a subsequent pamphlet published by Vanguard Publications in 1970. In his work entitled *Ireland's European Traditions* he argued that the EEC was a menace to the citizens of Ireland, which had only recently gained its rightful independence.[264] For de Courcy Ireland, the threat was to Irish independence, which in his own words meant, "we are being asked ... to bind ourselves, to hand over the nation, whose rights our constitution declares 'inalienable, sovereign and indefeasible', to a 'soulless, technocratic community'".[265]

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[260] Maguire, 'Political Case', 2.
[261] Politically, de Courcy Ireland was a socialist, Irish nationalist, and peace activist; he was active at various times throughout his early life in the Communist Party, the British Labour Party, and the Irish Labour Party.
[262] *Daily Telegraph*, 'John de Courcy Ireland', 2 May 2006.
[263] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 21.
[264] John De Courcy Ireland, *Ireland's European Traditions,* New York, 1970, 1.
[265] De Courcy Ireland, *Ireland's European Traditions,* 4.

In the early 1970s Ireland's colonial experiences were also reflected in de Courcy Ireland's thinking on EEC membership. The desire to discuss Ireland's European revolutionary heritage was necessary, he felt, because the colonial dominance of Britain had suppressed Irish awareness of that heritage. In his view, the EEC appeared another domineering, colonial entity seeking to replace Britain as Ireland's political and economic master; Ireland, he argued, needed to reject the EEC's capitalist club and to rejoin the populist struggle for social justice and equality throughout the world.[266] The 1970 pamphlet insisted that "Ireland's destiny must be to associate in a common struggle for peace and social progress with the underdeveloped countries of the world, Boumediène's Algeria, Castro's Cuba, Kaunda's Zambia, Kenyatta's Kenya, and with all nations not tied to the bankers of Wall Street and Zurich, London and Bonn".[267] He felt strongly that it would be with fellow postcolonial peoples, who were united in a push for social justice, democracy, and equality, that Ireland's prosperity and influence would reside. Thus, his populist rhetoric, while of a distinctly nationalist bent, offered a positive counter-approach to Ireland's relationship with Europe and the world.[268] De Courcy Ireland, despite some intemperate language, was no demagogue; his motivation for attacking the EEC was the conviction that there was a better European heritage to choose, a heritage built upon a union in diversity and not beholden to an exclusive capitalist club.[269] Diversity was the strength of European society expressed here, which was explicitly under threat from the Common Market. Influenced by the idea that process-driven political and cultural unification was an unnatural act of violence, de Courcy Ireland argued that to force unity artificially would destroy the very goal the integrationists were seeking, by smothering Europe beneath layers of capitalist bureaucracy that would drive out all cultural uniqueness.[270] He stated:

> The path to a great European community inheriting a splendid and diverse civilization was not through the agency of the EEC, but through expanded civic education, open democracy, and cooperative economic relations that celebrated the differences as well as the commonalities.[271]

[266] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 23.
[267] De Courcy Ireland, *Ireland's European Traditions,* 41.
[268] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 23.
[269] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 23.
[270] Devenney, '"A Unique and Unparalleled Surrender of Sovereignty": Early Opposition to European Integration in Ireland', 24.
[271] De Courcy Ireland, *Ireland's European Traditions,* 17-18.

Even in his thoughts on Irish education, he argued for a movement away from virulent anti-British sentiment in favour of an emphasis on Ireland's positive historical connections to Europe. According to de Courcy Ireland:

> Our young people need history and social science lessons that say less about the many centuries of struggle against Britain (though we cannot neglect it as it is so much the reason why we are what we are), and much more about what Irish men and women have done for Europe, and Europe for them.[272]

In the early 1970s, the EEC was neither an acceptable alternative, nor appropriate course of action for Ireland to follow for de Courcy Ireland and other prominent academics. This was due mainly to the concerns about sovereignty, independence and potential domination that would result for Ireland under EEC conditions.

Another element of euroscepticism with sovereignty incorporated during this period was voiced by Conradh na Gaeilge, a small non-government organisation with some influence. Conradh Na Gaeilge was founded in Dublin in 1893 and was a non-government organisation that promoted the traditional Irish language in Ireland and elsewhere. Conradh na Gaeilge aided the development of Irish nationalism and revealed a pre-existing Irish culture, one differing from traditional English culture.[273] On 23 May 1970, Maolsheachlainn O Caollai, President of Conradh na Gaeilge, at the Conradh na Gaeilge Ardiheis in the Christian Brothers'School, Dungarvan, gave a speech on the issue of the Common Market. He began by stating:

> The desire for association and unity is the strongest and most basic trait in human culture. Society or community depends on this trait and of course it is on society the individual depends.[274]

However, this was as far as the pleasantries went towards the Common Market. He expressed his concerns regarding sovereignty when he contended:

> We are especially friendly with members of nations which are being attacked by bigger and stronger neighbours ... When one nation or a group of nations enforces its will on another which becomes subordinate to it, this domination / sub-mission relationship is manifested ... Does a domination/submission relationship evoke greater degrees of brotherhood and of respect by

[272] De Courcy Ireland, 'Civic Education', UCDAD, JdCI, P29/B/61a.
[273] David Fanning, 'Irish Republican Literature 1968-1998: "Standing on the Threshold of Another Trembling World"', MA Dissertation, 2003, available: https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=osu1068495916&disposition=inline, 15.
[274] Conradh Na Gaeilge, 'Information', 23 May 1970, National Library Ireland Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, 1.

> people and nations for each other? Does it bring about a further development and enrichment of the nation's cultures and the people's personalities, or does it spring from and invoke exploitation of humans; disrespect, hate and degradation of both parties?.[275]

Maolsheachlainn O Caollai continued to attack the concept further:

> It is time to ask questions and since freedom is involved it is most appropriate that they should be asked by the movement which was largely responsible for Ireland's freedom revolution. Will membership of the Common Market serve the interest of the people? Will it benefit the nation and nationality? Will it serve the cause of the language restoration? I believe most strongly that it will not serve the common cause of the nation, its nationality and the language. Instead it will destroy them![276]

The aims and aspirations of the Common Market were not supported by those involved in the organisation. The objectives of Conradh Na Gaeilge were agreed to in principle in 1915 and remain unchanged to the present day. In its own constitution it states that the organisation's principal objective was to:

> create a free Gaelic national environment ... by bringing about an Irish speaking Ireland. The desire of the people of Ireland to be liberated and free is Conradh na Gaeilge's core element. That desire cannot be completed until political, economic, social and cultural freedom are attained and until, total fairness and equality are granted to all.[277]

It can be inferred from this extract that Conradh Na Gaeilge viewed the promotion of the Irish language as leading to political, economic, social and cultural freedom. Unsurprisingly it was displeased about the potential loss of the traditional Irish language and what would result from joining the EEC. It viewed the idea of separation, distinct nations, nationalities and individuality as a contradiction. It also heightened awareness about British influence and how it felt it would not dissipate through the joining of the Common Market. Conradh na Gaeilge was thus revealed to be a eurosceptic organisation because it raised concerns about sovereignty, independence and domination which it found unacceptable, stemming mainly from its commitment to retain the Irish language in society.

[275] Conradh Na Gaeilge, 'Information', 2.
[276] Conradh Na Gaeilge, 'Information', 3.
[277] Conradh Na Gaeilge, "Constitution", 2005, available: http://www.cnag.ie.

Conclusion

The period from 1970 to 1972 revealed a distinct, renewed and more passionate attempt by Irish euro critics to prevent EEC accession in Ireland. In many ways this type of opposition represented a more organised struggle than that seen in the previous decade. Centre-left political parties, such as Provisional and Official Sinn Féin, and the Irish Labour Party were openly opposed to full membership of the EEC. The underlying reason for their opposition rested on the importance of the recently established principles of neutrality and sovereignty, something that was thought to be worth fighting for. These political parties were supported by their non-government counterparts, mainly by trade unions such as the ICTU and ITGWU, but also groups with direct links to Anthony Coughlan and Raymond Crotty, being the CMDC and CMSG. What is important here is that connections were made and were cultivated in order to sustain a viable set of arguments and political front against EEC accession.

The evolution of individual activism to more collaborative means was certainly evident during the early 1970s. This can be seen in Coughlan and Crotty's long time developing anti-EEC positions being now more precise, better organised and focused mainly on the issue of sovereignty as the reason why Ireland should not join. They had recognised the need to move beyond their individualistic arguments against Europe (as seen in the 1960s) to a more connected argument involving likeminded people who could spread the message more successfully. Conradh Na Gaeilge also represented a more organised approach and supported the 'no' camp because it believed in the preservation of the Irish language and culture that would be undermined by EEC accession.

However, significant individuals also emerged during this time and played a role in providing an anti-EEC voice amongst the general population. These individuals who voiced their resentment against the EEC found little support, however, when compared with those who engaged in open dialogue. By now it had been firmly established that collaboration was the name of the game. However, these individuals are still worth noting and included Joe Quigley, Andy Johnston, John Maguire and John De Courcy Ireland.

This type of organised euroscepticism that developed in the early 1970s which involved collaboration among groups in politics and in civil society was to remain a feature of Irish euroscepticism in the years that followed. It would manifest itself at each and

every European treaty that impacted Ireland and became a topic of public debate, as the next chapter will show.

Chapter 5
The presence of Irish euroscepticism 1973–2001

Chapter 4 showed that Irish euroscepticism between 1970 and 1972 consisted of a small, united oppositional front involving some political parties, non-government organisations and individuals. It was a significant attempt at preventing EEC accession in Ireland and was generally a well organised front, formed in advance of the 1973 referendum on accession on the basis of debates that had taken place on the issue in the 1960s through two previous failed attempts at membership. The chapter revealed the presence of euroscepticism in Ireland well before 2001, and identified the main players promoting euroscepticism in the 1970s, and why they did so. This contextual appreciation helped explain future developments following the 1972 referendum and in the period leading to the 2001 Nice Treaty referendum.

This chapter traces the development of Irish euroscepticism after 1973, when Ireland entered the European community, until 2001. It accounts for the type of euroscepticism exhibited during this period, and the reader's awareness of the main players against Europe, and what their reasons were. In many ways Irish euroscepticism entered a new phase after 1973 – as it had been unsuccessful in preventing Irish accession into the EEC in 1972, and had to evolve along differing lines as the rate of popular acceptance of EEC membership was high. This eventually led to a much softer variety of euroscepticism, that is, a variety distinguished by opposition to certain individual policies, rather than the calling from complete and outright withdrawal from Europe as a whole. Also, the ever-changing dynamic of euroscepticism became clear throughout this period; its fluidity and ability to change were increasingly evident as political parties predominantly tried to capitalise on voter sentiment at the time. By acknowledging these two aspects here, this chapter charts the changing trajectory of Irish euroscepticism after 1973 from its harder form to a softer variety.

First this chapter notes that some political parties, such as the Irish Labour Party and Democratic Left shifted their position entirely to a more favourable outlook towards Europe through this period. Second, it examines the period 1973 to 1980, when Irish euroscepticism was premised on criticisms levelled against Europe for what had not been achieved in the lead up to the referendum This incorporated a call for complete withdrawal from the organisation altogether. The discussion considers the CPI, Sinn

Féin, developments within Northern Ireland, the Irish Sovereignty Movement, Anthony Coughlan, and studies conducted at the time indicating the continued presence of a hard type of euroscepticism. Yet, in the 1980s and in the lead up to the *Single European Act*, some acceptance of Europe can be ascertained. Accordingly, new tactics were beginning to be employed, such as Raymond Crotty's High Court challenge, which revealed a new dimension to this form of euroscepticism taking shape. Anthony Coughlan, the CPI and the Green Party also revealed new positions and approaches on Europe at this point. The old arguments against Europe still featured, as did the call for complete withdrawal for some. To that extent, Irish euroscepticism was still very much splintered throughout this period, and was not as united as it had been in the lead up to the 1972 referendum. This can best be illustrated by examining Sinn Féin and its policy surrounding abstentionism.

By the 1990s and the lead up to the Maastricht Treaty and Amsterdam Treaty, Sinn Féin and the National Platform for EU Research were reconsidering their positions on Europe, but again new tactics such as High Court challenges on behalf of Patricia McKenna and Anthony Coughlan, as well as oppositionist groupings within Sinn Féin, the Green Party and the Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) revealed that this new dimension to Irish euroscepticism had progressed even further. The older arguments and the calling for complete withdrawal from Europe had now been replaced by more specific qualified opposition and disagreement in one or more policy areas, rather than dismissal of the entire project itself. This chapter pursues the argument that the period from 1973 to 2001 constituted a fundamental shift in the way Irish eurosceptics approached Europe, premised on the greater success that eventuated from adopting more moderate means towards European affairs.

The changing nature of Irish euroscepticism

In many ways after 1973 one could easily be led to believe that euroscepticism in Ireland would have subsided or dissolved completely from Irish political and public thought, due to the overwhelming 'yes' result (at 83 per cent acceptance). This notion itself can best be shown by the Irish Labour Party's changed attitude towards EEC acceptance and the process of Europeanisation of the party from 1973 onwards. In 1972 the Labour Party had opposed EEC entry due to economic vulnerability and the threat posed to neutrality. However, as Laffan notes, not only did Labour representatives

accept the verdict of the 1972 referendum that resulted in support for EEC membership, they also followed Fine Gael's lead on Europe and did not challenge further progress on integration.[1] "After the referendum, the party accepted the electorate's decision [and] adopted a role of critical participation in the European Community".[2] Entering into a coalition government with Fine Gael limited any further opposition towards the EEC from this point forward. However, during the 1980s it did continue to "[position] itself as having the longest and deepest commitment to neutrality".[3] There seemed little point in continuing to oppose membership in the face of what seemed to be widespread popular support for accession.

This changed perception towards Europe was also seen later in Democratic Left, initially an outright opponent, then willing participant in European affairs. In 1992 the formation of the Democratic Left, which was a democratic socialist political party, actively voiced reservations against the EU. Many members had joined Democratic Left from the Workers Party, which had its origins in the 1970 split in Sinn Féin. Many of the members witnessed the 1972 debate on EEC membership and were part of the 'no' campaign at that time. At its founding conference held on 28 March 1992, the party was described.

> The idea of socialism coupled with the practices of democracy provides the basis for the radical transformation of Irish society. We aim to be a feminist party. An environmental party. A party of the unemployed and low-paid. A champion of personal freedom. A friend and ally of the third world. An integral part of the European Left.[4]

In 1992 Democratic Left began virtually straight away with its anti-European agenda by producing a document called *Europe Deserves Better*.[5] The releasing of the booklet was in anticipation for a successful 'no' campaign towards the Maastricht Treaty referendum by the newly established political party, however, included more general policy statements on Europe as well:

> The Treaty of European Union ... to be put to the people ... represents a poor political compromise on many important issues related to European integration ... We in Democratic Left

[1] Laffan, cited in Andrea Gates, *Promoting Unity, Reserving Diversity?* Lanham, 2006, 74.
[2] P Keatinge, *The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy,* Dublin, 1973, 258.
[3] Cluskey, cited in Karen Devine, 'Irish Political Parties' Attitudes towards Neutrality and the Evolution of the EU's Foreign, Security and Defence Policies', *Irish Political Studies,* vol 24, 2009, 478.
[4] Kevin Rafter, *Democratic Left: The Life and Death of an Irish Political Party,* Dublin, 2011, 106.
[5] Democratic Left, *Europe Deserves Better,* Dublin, 1992

> say NO ... In our view the proposed Treaty is a setback for the concept of a democratic people's Europe and a victory for the most conservative political influences in the EC.[6]

The main concern described by Democratic Left was that unemployment would continue to rise[7] and concerns about the Maastricht Treaty itself being unworkable were evident in this publication.[8] Issues raised at the time included women's rights, peace, and accountability, which was why Democratic Left had its reservations about the treaty. In another policy document produced around the same time entitled *Irish Neutrality and the Challenge of World Security*, Democratic Left made it clear that its intentions were to oppose Europe on the basis of its potential to compromise Irish neutrality, "Democratic Left believes that Ireland's military commitments abroad should be purely through the UN ... We are opposed to NATO as a non-European military alliance, with aims which are contrary to Ireland".[9] This statement was even endorsed by Proinsias De Rossa himself as leader of Democratic Left, and reinforced the scepticism displayed towards Europe by those in the party. All these messages were reinforced in a clearer policy directive issued by the party entitled *Is there Life After Maastricht?* just prior to the vote. Here the statement was made by the party urging the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by the Irish people, which would then allow for a more democratic and more sustainable EU to emerge.[10] The treaty itself was said to constitute a bad set of political compromises, lacked democratic principles, had no credibility, nor revealed any coherence to it. The amount and type of literature produced certainly indicated that Democratic Left was a eurosceptic voice in the early 1990s.

In 1998, Democratic Left continued to promote its message about democratic socialism in what was known as the 'coffee circle debates'.[11] "What [is] seen to be essential were the values and the vision, of both democratic socialism and social democracy – the desire and determination to build a better, fairer and more inclusive society, in which everyone has not only the opportunity to participate fully, but the means and avail of that opportunity".[12] Yet, the party had shifted its position on Europe entirely by the time

[6] Democratic Left, *Europe Deserves Better*, 1.
[7] Democratic Left, *Europe Deserves Better*, 1.
[8] Democratic Left, *Europe Deserves Better*, 2.
[9] Democratic Left, *Irish Neutrality and the Challenge of World Security*, National Library of Dublin Archives, Democratic Left Papers, MS/ 49,807/30.
[10] Democratic Left, *Is there Life After Maastricht?* National Library of Dublin Archives, Democratic Left Papers, MS/ 49,807/30.
[11] Democratic Left, *The Coffee Circle Papers*, Dublin, 1998 available: http://cedarlounge.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/dl-doc-north.pdf.
[12] Democratic Left, *The Coffee Circle Papers*, 11.

of the May 1998 referendum. Its position paper on the Amsterdam Treaty in 1998 revealed that the new position was cemented as party policy for a more open and transparent working relationship towards the issue of Europe where Democratic Left was now far less critical of the EEC and the treaty itself. "We recommend that the tangible benefits of Amsterdam be banked and that we move on both to prepare for the next treaty revision and to help create a consensus for the sort of economic and social policies that might restore Europe's battered reputation".[13] In some ways Democratic Left viewed the treaty as an opportunity to fix the issues and problems that came out of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. "The main virtue of Amsterdam is more that it takes a series of steps in the right direction rather than in the distance travelled or major breakthroughs achieved ... it falls considerably short of the demands raised ... it represents a backward step by comparison".[14] Thus, though still critical, the position held by Democratic Left now represented more willing participation in order to ensure appropriate change rather than outright dismissal, which was certainly the plan in 1992. It was said to be premised on the argument that the prospect of EU militarisation had now been abandoned.[15] Therefore, the party had endorsed the Amsterdam Treaty in its final political breath before being absorbed into the Labour Party in 1999. Possibly this change in decision could have been prompted by the fact it was a willing participant in the rainbow coalition government,[16] meaning that it needed to support its more dominant coalition counterparts. Euroscepticism, it seems, had a tendency to shift in Ireland over time. Its application seemed fluid and non-transparent, dependent upon factors and circumstances at the time. It was not always a unique consideration taken on its own accord, rather, it came and went as its proponents best saw fit.

A critical type of euroscepticism, 1973–1980

The most trenchant criticism levelled against the EEC in Ireland directly after 1973 was that it resulted in neither strong employment growth, nor more favourable working conditions, as promised in the lead up to the referendum. The period from 1973 to 1980 represented a time when euroscepticism was centred upon criticisms levelled against the EEC for what it had not achieved in the lead up to the 1972 accession referendum.

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[13] Democratic Left, 'Position Paper on the Amsterdam Treaty – May 1998', National Library of Dublin Archives, Democratic Left Papers, MS 49,807/30.
[14] Democratic Left, 'Position Paper on the Amsterdam Treaty – May 1998'.
[15] *The Irish Times*, 5 May 1998.
[16] Nicholas Rees, Brid Quinn and Bernadette Connaughton, *Europeanisation and New Patterns of Governance in Ireland*, Manchester, 2009.

This criticism was incorporated with a form of hard euroscepticism, which called for the complete withdrawal of Ireland from the EEC by those who opposed European integration.

The CPI was particularly critical: "Free trade and EEC membership has caused lay-offs, short time and factory closures ... but where are the 50,000 extra jobs that the pro-marketeers promised us".[17] M. O'Riordan of the CPI, in a confidential report produced on 30 June 1978, further highlighted the specific effects of the EEC on Ireland, "[We have] the highest rate of unemployment in all 9 countries, the threat posed to our fishing industry, the small farmer's position with wealthy Europeans buying land at cheap continental prices, and the important fact that of all the 9, our country was the only one not in NATO".[18] But it was not just the CPI that recognised the failure in terms of employment for Ireland; Sinn Féin was also well aware of this, and after 1973 it intended continuing the struggle against what had transpired at the 1972 referendum. At a sub-committee meeting in 1977 the Republican Movement regarded the upcoming EEC elections as 'round two' of their anti EEC campaign[19], stating at the time that:

> our candidates will go forward on a non collaborationist anti-imperialist programme. The candidates if elected will actively oppose the EEC but will reserve the right to make an initial declaration of Irish Rights and Irish Independence.[20]

It was hoped this approach would breathe new life into a disheartened party and gain further support for such action amongst other likeminded radical groups. The committee agreed that the action was warranted and was the best way forward for the party itself.[21] It was also clear that Sinn Féin had found an ally in the CPI and the Irish Sovereignty Movement, where a working relationship had been fostered among the three in order to tackle what they saw as 'the EEC fraud'.[22] The main criticism levelled against the EEC by Sinn Féin, though, at the time was tied up in an argument based upon the imperialistic nature of the EEC. Sinn Féin, like the CPI, noted that future enlargement would mean a further threat to employment and working conditions, as divisions

[17] CPI, 'The Right To Work', Dublin City Library & Archive, Sean Nolan & Geoffrey Palmer Communist Party of Ireland Collection, Box 58/131.
[18] CPI, Typed Report – 30 June 1978, Dublin City Library & Archive, Sean Nolan & Geoffrey Palmer Communist Party of Ireland Collection, Box 59/105.
[19] Sinn Féin, 'Submission by Sub-committee – October 1977, National Library Dublin Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, MS 44,161/1.
[20] Sinn Féin, 'Submission by Sub-committee – October 1977.
[21] Sinn Féin, 'Confidential – Committee to Initiate an Anti-Imperialist Campaign', National Library Dublin Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, MS 44,161/1, 4.
[22] Sinn Féin, 'Confidential – Committee to Initiate an Anti-Imperialist Campaign', 6.

between workers and countries would become increasingly evident and be further exploited by big business.[23] The capitalist nature of the restructuring process had created unemployment and denied work for the young and women in particular.[24] In the words of the party itself, "our struggle against European integration can be set in a general movement for liberty".[25] This was the core element of the approach adopted by Sinn Féin during the late 1970s towards the EEC.

Following Northern Ireland's accession into the EEC as part of the UK, it was felt Northern Ireland's interests were not being met, and this raised an element of contention for those in the North. In many regards Northern Ireland was being impaired and restricted by Britain when dealing with the EEC.[26] The high jobless rate in Northern Ireland exacerbated this concern further and put the state into a submissive position in relation to the EEC in 1980. In 1980 the number of unemployed was recorded at nearly 90,000 people, the second highest number since 1938.[27] This meant roughly 15.6 per cent of the population was out of work at the time.[28] Northern Ireland was thought of as an integral part of the UK, and as a region it had particular economic problems and a long standing history of high unemployment that was not improving under British control. This required Northern Ireland to rely on Britain in order to alleviate economic problems at home. However, the unemployment crisis in the latter 1970s and early 1980s prompted a form of engagement with the EEC directly on Northern Ireland's behalf. This was due to the large number of dole queues that had emerged[29], which required a new approach in order to try and improve on the poor economic state of affairs. In 1980 local politicians campaigned heavily in order to secure a €100 million grant from the EEC in order to tackle the growing unemployment problem.[30] It was agreed that the EEC could help Northern Ireland, which was relatively disadvantaged, but there was a need for Northern Ireland to adopt a more sophisticated approach to Europe itself and to take a broader view of European relationships rather than simply considering itself only within the context of the UK.[31]

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[23] Sinn Féin, 'Strictly Confidential – European Structures and the Crisis of Imperialism', 30 December 1978, National Library Dublin Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, MS 44,161/1, 2.
[24] Sinn Féin, 'Strictly Confidential – European Structures and the Crisis of Imperialism', 3.
[25] Sinn Féin, 'Strictly Confidential – European Structures and the Crisis of Imperialism', 4.
[26] Katy Hayward, *Irish Nationalism and European integration*, Manchester, 2009, 182.
[27] Alan Murray, 'Record Forecast as North's Jobless Total Hits 90,000, *Irish Times,* 22 October 1980.
[28] *The Irish Times*, 'North Jobless Total Reaches 42-year High', 22 October 1980.
[29] *News Letter*, 'Jobless Queues Raise Spectre of Hungry Thirties', 22 October 1980.
[30] *Irish News*, 'Unity in urging Britain to net 100m Euro EEC Aid', 8 October 1980.
[31] *News Letter*, 'EEC Chief to look at Economy', 20 September1980.

Uncertainty about the position of Northern Ireland in the EEC was certainly apparent prior to this time. Members of the Irish political elite responded to this uncertainty by asserting that Northern Ireland would be better represented by the republic rather than the UK.[32] Hence, with this view that Northern Ireland was not being adequately represented within the EEC, some doubt and distrust amongst those living in Northern Ireland arose, with questions about what actual benefits membership had brought prior to 1980. The seemingly convincing answer to that question for many was very little to none at all. As a consequence, it was determined that Northern Ireland did not enjoy the full benefits of membership, such as an adequate share of EEC Regional Funds.[33] Thus, the relationship with the EEC was limited and restricted by Britain's desire to engage with the community on Northern Ireland's behalf until 1980. This brought about unintentional scepticism towards the EEC in the North as citizens questioned what benefits the EEC brought, mainly because of British control of the situation, but also spurred on by poor employment prospects.

The Irish Sovereignty Movement, involving individuals such as economist Raymond Crotty and social policy expert Anthony Coughlan, challenged the consensus during this period, although they were significantly outnumbered. The Irish Sovereignty Movement acted as a political lobby group, particularly against EEC matters, and formed after Ireland successfully entered the EEC in 1973. The chairman of the organisation was Anthony Coughlan, who had previous dealings with other anti-EEC groups in 1972 and beforehand. During the 1970s and 1980s the group held a number of meetings and produced publications on issues to do with the Common Market, Irish neutrality and Northern Ireland. The first publication produced in 1974, was *The Way to Peace in Ireland*,[34] which called on the British to help commit to an ending of the EEC. However, this was highly unlikely at the time since Britain and Ireland had only just joined a year prior. The Irish Sovereignty Movement attempted to provide dissenting voices to the perceived orthodox view of Irish membership of the EEC. Contention in the first instant focused on the issue of security policy and the clash between Ireland's policy of military neutrality and its involvement with moves by other member states to integrate further in the foreign policy sphere.

[32] FitzGerald and Harte 1979, cited in Hayward, *Irish Nationalism and European Integration*, 20.
[33] FitzGerald and Harte 1979, cited in Hayward, *Irish Nationalism and European Integration*, 12-14.
[34] Anthony Coughlan, *The Way to Peace in Ireland*, Dublin, 1974

In 1980 Anthony Coughlan released his work entitled *The EEC: Ireland and the Making of a Superpower* in conjunction with the Irish Sovereignty Movement. This publication was well timed, coinciding with the situation in the North and the poor employment figures seen during the 1970s in Ireland. Coughlan was adamant that the EEC was the collective political face of West Germany, France and Britain, deciding fundamental EEC policy with all others tagging along.[35] His reasoning was that they were all former imperialist and colonial powers, overlords of vast territories, who wanted to continue their domination through this more acceptable means.[36] Coughlan reiterated his long-term position of the threat posed to Irish neutrality and sovereignty in detail. He specifically highlighted the threat the EEC posed to democracy:

> The structure they are trying to build is a tremendous threat to real democracy in Europe. It is a structure which makes it harder, not easier, for ordinary people to influence the decisions affecting their lives. It subverts democratically elected national parliaments. It subordinates weaker EEC States politically to the stronger ones. It makes it wellnigh impossible for national labour movements to enforce rational economic planning, full employment and controls on investment in the social interest. It divides the Third World countries and, if moves towards further integration are not blocked, must increase global tensions and the likelihood of war.[37]

Here Coughlan advocated for the withdrawal of Ireland from the EEC due to the failure of what had not been upheld after accession.

A number of other earlier studies focusing on the impact the EEC had had on Ireland also highlighted a sense of disappointment with what had transpired.[38] Although membership was viewed as favourable, a sense of disappointment with the EEC also resonated after the first 10 years or so. As mentioned and emphasised by the CPI, Sinn Féin and the Irish Sovereignty Movement, the perception was of high expectations promised in the area of economics but not achieved. In 1983, Ireland's GDP per head was less than half the community average. Matthews, a leading researcher at the time states:

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[35] Anthony Coughlan, *The EEC: Ireland and the Making of a Superpower*, Dublin 1980, 1.
[36] Coughlan, *The EEC: Ireland and the Making of a Superpower*, 1.
[37] Coughlan, *The EEC: Ireland and the Making of a Superpower*, 1.
[38] See D Coombes (ed.), *Ireland and the European Communities: 10 Years of Membership,* Dublin, 2005; see also, P J Drudy and D McAleese (eds), *Ireland and The European Community,* Cambridge, 1984; see also J Lee, *Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society*, Cambridge, 1989.

> in looking at the Irish economic performance during the first decade of membership, one is struck by the evidence of lost opportunities ... Irish industry today is as structurally unsuited to providing the motor for an internationally-trading economy as it was 10 years ago.[39]

The weakness of the Irish industrial base seemed to plague the situation even after accession. The global recession of the 1970s, domestic economic mismanagement and an unwillingness for further integration fundamentally affected Ireland's performance which brought about scepticism with the whole European Project. Also, high hopes for the creation of a relatively substantial European Regional Development fund was on the cards before accession. However, these hopes were dashed in 1975 when the size of the fund was revealed and only 6 per cent was allocated to Ireland, disappointing Irish policymakers.[40] This disappointment with what had transpired during the first 10 years of membership was the focal point for Irish euroscepticism, even if it was generally kept in check by the number of benefits that seemed to outweigh the negatives at this time.

Splintered euroscepticism (1980s) and the Single European Act

The *Single European Act*[41] brought about some further opposition towards further European integration in Ireland. This was the first major revision to the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The main contention towards the act came forth mainly through non-government organisations and, through individual actors such as Anthony Coughlan and Raymond Crotty, who continued to voice scepticism. It was thought that the amendments made to the Treaty of Rome were so minor that no constitutional referendum would be required. The Irish government attempted to ratify the *Single European Act* by passing ordinary legislation through the Irish Parliament on 10 December 1986, arguing that the Act was simply a codification of existing practice. However, Crotty[42] was unconvinced, and increasingly concerns over the implication of these changes for Irish neutrality were put forward.[43]

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[39] A Matthews, 1983, 'The Economic Consequences of EEC Membership for Ireland', in D Coombes (ed.), *Ireland and the European Communities: 10 Years of Membership,* Dublin, 2005, 131.
[40] J Hart and B Laffan, 'Consequences of the Community's Regional and Social Policies', 1983, in D Coombes (ed.), *Ireland and the European Communities: 10 Years of Membership,* 138.
[41] The Act set the European Community an objective of establishing a single market by 31 December 1992, and codified European Political Cooperation, the forerunner of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy.
[42] Raymond Crotty was an Irish economist and long-time campaigner against Irish membership of the EEC/EU.
[43] Nicholas Rees, 'The Adaption of Irish Foreign Policy to Europe', in Mark Callanan (ed.), *Foundations of an Ever Closer Union,* Dublin, 2007, 129.

The process of ratification was blocked by anti-EEC campaigner Crotty, who argued that the amendment required constitutional amendment to pass. Crotty brought the case to the High Court, which rejected it. However, that judgement was later overturned by the Supreme Court. It was seen as a victory for those who did not support Europe. The ramifications of this decision, however, went beyond the consequences it had for the enactment of the *Single European Act*. For several reasons, it impacted on successive governments of Ireland, as well as on the Irish people themselves. From this point, every subsequent European Treaty would be subjected to a referendum, regardless of whether an amendment to the constitution would be necessary. This revealed for the first time in a long time a new tactic and approach to dealing with Europe on behalf of those who indicated themselves to be critical of Europe.

In 1985 Coughlan published another book entitled *EEC Political Union: Menace to Irish Neutrality and Independence*. In this work he highlighted that the EEC was dividing Europe with a superpower mentality.[44] As the title suggests, the concerns about the EEC and its positive intentions to become a political powerhouse were raised. In this publication Coughlan attempted to take on the EEC more directly and outlined the negatives associated with it. He emphasised that "there has been no popular demand for 'European' union in Ireland or any other EEC state".[45] Coughlan argued that these decisions were based on the interests of those who would benefit most from such a system:

> The pressure for it comes from the EEC's giant transnational firms and from those among national politicians and bureaucracies who identify their interests with these firms. It also comes from the EEC's own bureaucracy – the Brussels Commission.[46]

He contended that the unemployment situation, the threat to military neutrality, the abandonment of Irish foreign policy, and the economic dangers and assault on democracy were all substantial reasons why the EEC was a bad idea, particularly in the Irish context.[47] He urged Irish people to stand up against the EEC, but it had limited impact at this time, reinforcing the need for a new approach to tackle the EEC.

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[44] Anthony Coughlan, *EEC Political Union: Menace to Irish Neutrality and Independence,* Dublin, 1985.
[45] Coughlan, *EEC Political Union: Menace to Irish Neutrality and Independence*, 2.
[46] Coughlan, *EEC Political Union: Menace to Irish Neutrality and Independence*, 2.
[47] Coughlan, *EEC Political Union: Menace to Irish Neutrality and Independence.*

In response, many members of the Irish Sovereignty Movement decided to make the move with Coughlan to the National Platform for EU Research in 1986. The National Platform for EU Research consisted of a number of professional lawyers and was founded in 1986 when the treaty that sought to ratify the *Single European Act* was proposed by a majority vote in the Dáil.[48] The intention of this organisation was to argue that any changes that involved surrendering the Irish constitution to the EU needed to be put to the Irish people themselves, through a referendum.[49] This resulted in court intervention on Crotty's behalf (as discussed earlier) which ruled in favour of ratifying the constitution via referendum only, not by a majority vote in the Dáil. This action in 1986 resulted in all subsequent changes to Ireland's constitution being via referendum vote only. As highlighted earlier, this was seen as a real win for eurosceptics, as it allowed the public, who were more inclined to be eurosceptics than their political counterparts, to decide on all debates on future European treaties. This newer tactic of working together and targeting individual aspects of European policy via court action offered a more viable approach than calling for complete withdrawal, which had seen limited success.

Yet, it was not only Crotty and Coughlan who opposed the *Single European Act* and further European integration at this time. The CPI was particularly wary of what the Act would entail. A document noting meeting details states:

> We say the Irish people North and South are threatened by the EEC. The *Single European Act* raises the spectre of an Ireland on the periphery of Europe, where the gap that exists now between the centre and Ireland in terms of capital investment, industrial development, tech. control and standard of living will widen. The total freedom of capital will mean the transfer to the centre of Europe ... the joint reports of the NIEC[National Industrial Economic Council] and the NESC [National Economic and Social Council] clearly expose that every development of closer integration of the EEC has led to a worsening of those areas located on its periphery. Ireland as a whole is very much in that position.[50]

This latter view had stemmed from earlier developments, when the concerns about the EEC were expressed more openly by the party in its own publication entitled the *Irish*

[48] National Platform, "About the National Platform", N.d., available: http://nationalplatform.org/about/
[49] National Platform, "About the National Platform".
[50] CPI, 'Agenda of a Meeting', Dublin City Library & Archive, Sean Nolan & Geoffrey Palmer Communist Party of Ireland Collection, CPI Box 22/091.

Socialist in 1985.[51] The publication for the first time gave clear, open insight into why the CPI opposed Common Market membership. The publication emphasised the negative impact membership had had on the Irish fishing industry but also the future threat the EEC posed in ending Ireland's position of neutrality once and for all.[52] It also emphasised the near end to Irish sovereignty due to Common Market membership and the dire need to overcome Ireland's unemployment concerns.[53] This move also coincided with the CPI's leaflet drop, asking people to vote communist and to spoil their EEC vote by doing so.[54] Another similar leaflet at the time stated:

> Reject the EEC Fraud! EEC No! Spoil your EEC Ballot paper![55]

It was evident that a more open, public campaign, tied to election promises against the EEC, was being tried and tested by the CPI in the lead up to *The Single European Act*, which was certainly a new approach on their own accord.

The Green Party, founded in 1981 as the Ecological Party of Ireland and reverting to the name Green Alliance in 1983 and Green Party in 1987, was another critic of European intentions, but did so independently through this period. "The Green Party [was] founded on the principles of peace, democracy, social justice, protection of the environment and the sustainable use of [Ireland's] resources".[56] Within this statement some of the conflicting ideas that the party obviously had with the EEC during the 1980s can be located. The terms peace and democracy were in many ways linked to the idea of neutrality and sovereignty that featured heavily as euro-critical concerns against European integration since before the 1972 referendum. New terminology was being adopted, rather than old terms that had featured as part of the argument against Europe since the 1960s. This was to give new meaning and to shed new light on the subject in order to give further exposure to the issues. On the one hand Europe had engaged in environmental policy well before the *Single European Act* but had only formally transferred these competencies to the European level in 1986. Since environmental issues generally required international action and could possibly be tackled better on a

[51] CPI, 'Irish Socialist – April 1985', Dublin City Library & Archive, Sean Nolan & Geoffrey Palmer Communist Party of Ireland Collection, CPI Box 39a/004.
[52] CPI, 'Irish Socialist – April 1985'.
[53] CPI, 'Irish Socialist – April 1985'.
[54] CPI, 'CPI – Leaflet', Dublin City Library & Archive, Sean Nolan & Geoffrey Palmer Communist Party of Ireland Collection, CPI Box 60d/019.
[55] CPI, 'CPI – Leaflet'.
[56] The Green Party, "Green Party – Home", 2013, available: http://www.greenparty.ie.

higher level, one would assume a generally favourable position towards Europe by the Green Party. However, the emphasis on local democracy and citizen participation appeared to conflict with Brussels, and consequently the Green Party opposed the *Single European Act*,[57], where it had been a consistently critical voice.[58] During this period the Irish Green Party formalised its influential eurosceptic wing,[59] where it was against European integration, mainly due to fears about the centralisation of competencies in a 'superstate' and the move of policymaking away from the local level.[60]

Fractured euroscepticism: Sinn Féin and abstentionism (1980s)

The policy surrounding abstentionism and the resulting disagreements within Sinn Féin during the 1980s revealed further that this type of euroscepticism was disorganised and built on self-interest. On 16 April 1987 a press release was released by Republican Sinn Féin stating:

> Republican Sinn Féin is opposed to the *Single European Act*. It takes this stand because the SEA further diminishes the sovereignty of the Irish people and infringes on the control of their own affairs which is necessary to develop the country and provide employment for its people.[61]

Although the organisation had only come to form in 1986 from a split in the Sinn Féin party itself; the decision made by the newly established organisation was to oppose the EEC, and this seemed the most logical approach. The decision taken in 1987 by the organisation was connected to the Ard-Fheis in November 1983, where the decision was made by Sinn Féin to campaign for a negotiated withdrawal from the EEC at all costs.[62] Yet it was also at the 1983 Ard-Fheis, where disagreement over the policy of abstentionism took place, that saw the split in the party emerge. Sinn Féin began to contest elections after the success of the Anti-H Block – a political label used by a series of IRA prisoners in Maze Hill prison, Northern Ireland, in objection to the

[57] Katy Hayward and Mary Murphy, *The Europeanization of Party Politics in Ireland, North and South*, New York, 2010, 19.
[58] Bernadette Connaughton, 'EU Environmental Policy and Ireland', in Michael Holmes (ed.), *Ireland and the European Union: Nice Enlargement and the Future of Europe*, New York, 2005, 49.
[59] Green Foundation Ireland, "Report on the Future of Europe Seminar", 2013, available: www.greenfoundationireland.ie/report-of-future-of-europe/
[60] E Bomberg, 'The Europeanization of Green Parties: Exploring the EUs Impact', *West European Politics*, vol 25, no 3, 2002, 34.
[61] Republican Sinn Fein, 'Press Release – Single European Act', 16 April 1987, National Library Dublin Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, MS 44,162/3.
[62] Sinn Féin, 'Letter to the Public', 12 May 1984, National Library Dublin Archives, Sean O'Mahony Papers, MS 44,152/6.

conditions. The success of Anti-H Block candidates demonstrated that real electoral support existed for an Irish republican party. Thus, Sinn Féin first adopted an abstentionist stance, refusing to take seats it was elected to, but eventually modified this to full involvement in the republic and first contested a Republic of Ireland election in 1982. Those who opposed the decision to contest elections broke away from the party and established Republican Sinn Féin in 1986, meaning a united front on the issue of Europe was jeopardised.

The decision to oppose the EEC at all costs by Sinn Féin coincided with the likely date of the European Parliament elections in June 1984, when it was determining a more acceptable approach to these elections. It saw this as an opportunity to determine a new approach and strategy to Europe, built upon opportunistism. "Sinn Féin has to sit down and work out a strategy towards the 84 European elections",[63] noted the Sinn Féin Foreign Affairs Bureau at the time, but it was evident that it saw the EEC as an imperialist, capitalist, colonial and neo-colonial bloc.[64] The intention of the party was therefore to dismantle the bloc itself rather than try to reform it,[65] a decision that was said to be made in its 1979 position for those EEC elections, the same argument made about the UK Parliament. It was this decision, also replicated in the newly established organisation of Republican Sinn Féin, that upheld the abstentionist principle, but at least this demonstrated that Sinn Féin was prepared to re-consider its position on Europe.

Although established as an active movement, Republican Sinn Féin was not registered as a political party in either Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland at this time. The organisation viewed itself as representing 'true' or traditional Irish republicanism, while in the mainstream media the organisation portrayed itself as a political expression of 'dissident republicanism'. Thus, this decision revealed a certain disliking towards the EEC. This can be seen in a press release statement issued by the organisation in 1987, where it claimed a reversal of the *Single European Act* would be welcomed enthusiastically:

> In this connection we rejoice at the reversal of the *Single European Act* which seeks to fasten the shackles of the EEC tighter about our country and prevent the growth and development of a free, dignified and just society in Ireland, fashioned by the people themselves in control of our own

[63] Sinn Féin, 'European Election Details – Foreign Affairs Bureau', National Library Dublin Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, MS 44,161/1.
[64] Sinn Féin, 'European Election Details – Foreign Affairs Bureau'.
[65] Sinn Féin, 'European Election Details – Foreign Affairs Bureau'.

> destinies. The 1916 proclamation and the new imperialism of the EEC are in direct contradiction to each other. Our choice is clear: we stand by Pearse and Connolly ... we oppose all military alliances and seek a neutral, non-aligned Ireland.[66]

It viewed the *Single European Act* as a major extension of EEC policy, which was designed to secure total political, social, economic and military integration within Western Europe and would limit the ability to oppose nuclear development and conscription to a European army.[67] In line with this, the decision to refuse to reject the use of political violence and its links to the Continuity IRA can also be ascertained, again decisions that rejected the principles of the EEC and what it stood for. It held at its formation that the Irish Republic would continue to exist and that the Continuity IRA Council would be its *de jure* government. Thus, if elected, members would refuse to take their seats in the Oireachtas and the party would not field any candidates in Northern Ireland. Therefore, Republican Sinn Féin revealed itself as a determined opponent of Europe, built upon its strong belief in republicanism, but also through the actions taken by the organisation that conflicted with EU principles.

Republican Sinn Féin believed that the historic Irish nation was a distinct, coherent unit and was entitled to exercise its own independence.[68] The party specifically identified the EU as a threat in its official program outline, and campaigned against it:

> We recognise the danger of the growing European Union becoming a world superpower in its own right. As it grows stronger it will assert itself and become involved in what Jack Deleors described as the 'resource wars' of the 21st Century. We do not believe that Ireland, with its history of being a colonial possession, should involve itself in the oppression of other nations that the growing EU will eventually mean. There is also the danger that, instead of finally winning its freedom and independence, Ireland will find itself swapping British domination for European domination.[69]

The organisation was unregistered due to not signing the *Elected Authorities Act* and claimed the abstentionism principle applied.[70]

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[66] Republican Sinn Féin, 'Easter Statement to the Irish People – A message from Republican Sinn Féin Leadership 1987', National Library Dublin Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, MS 44,162/3.
[67] Republican Sinn Féin, 'EEC – The Facts', National Library Dublin Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, MS 44,162/3.
[68] Republican Sinn Féin, "Official Republican Sinn Féin Webpage", N.d. available: http://www.rsf.ie/page1.html.
[69] Republican Sinn Féin, "Official Republican Sinn Féin Webpage"
[70] Republican Sinn Féin, "Elections and Abstentionism", N.d., available: https://rsfnational.wordpress.com/miscellaneous/rsf-policies/elections-and-abstentionism-2000/

> The principle is that Republicans do not recognise the authority, and therefore do not participate in, any assembly claiming to exercise sovereignty over Ireland or any part of it which works the partition system, serves a foreign interest or does not further the cause of Irish freedom and unity. The Republican Sinn Féin constitution cites as one of its fundamental principles that 'the sovereignty and unity of the Republic [of the 32 Counties] are inalienable and non-judicable.[71]

However, the organisation claimed it could sit for local council positions as the abstentionist principle did not apply to local elections.[72] From its program, and by following the abstentionism principle, Republican Sinn Féin isolated itself from anything to do with Europe, largely as a form of protest against European integration, revealing a new approach against European intentions on their own accord.

Sinn Féin, just like its counterpart, also remained opposed to the *Single European Act* after the split in the party. According to early Sinn Féin principles, European integration undermined the republican claim to self-determination. Federalising influences of European integration were certainly at odds with traditional republican political and social philosophy that evoked the idea of political representation of the Irish being free from these external influences. According to Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams, the *Single European Act* would compromise Irish commitment to reunification[73] and would abandon the principles of Irish sovereignty.[74] In its own memo entitled *One Ireland, One People – the Only Alternative* it was clear why Sinn Féin opposed the Act. The memo outlined to the point issues the party had with European membership. It made clear that national sovereignty had been subjugated to the interests of the bigger, richer EEC states; the need for Ireland to remain neutral, which was being severely compromised by the EEC; and finally, the economic consequences of being part of the community were expressed as being highly negative.[75] As well as the memo, a national manifesto was issued by the party earlier in June 1984 with the same title that gave earlier detail on this anti-EEC platform produced by the party. The intention of the manifesto was to propose a very real alternative outside of EEC membership, with the negotiated withdrawal from the EEC to take place.[76] The manifesto highlighted the

[71] Republican Sinn Féin, "Elections and Abstentionism".
[72] Republican Sinn Fein, "Elections and Abstentionism".
[73] Boyka Stefanova, *The Europeanisation of Conflict Resolution*, New York, 2011, 103.
[74] Arthur Aughey, Paul Hainsworth and Martin J Trimble, *Northern Ireland in the European Community*, Belfast, 1989, 67.
[75] See Sinn Féin, 'Memo: One Ireland, One People – The Only Alternative', National Library Dublin Archives, Sean O'Mahony Collection, MS 44,161/1.
[76] Sinn Féin, 'One Ireland, One People – The Only Alternative,' Dublin, 1984, 1.

issues of neutrality, sovereignty, economic consequences, unemployment, policy control, social and cultural concerns and finally, problems in the agricultural sector including fisheries, as justification for Ireland needing to withdraw from the community.[77] The solution posed by Sinn Féin was to withdraw from the EEC and then negotiate trading agreements with it, but also to advocate the implementation of a radical socialist economic program in a more united Ireland.[78] It looked upon countries outside of the EEC, such as Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden as inspirations to successfully fulfil this new more appropriate direction for Ireland, and in many ways evoked a new way of thinking about Europe within the party itself.

The Workers Party, taking its form from the Sinn Féin official IRA split in 1970 and adopting its name in 1982, also began voicing a euro-critical standpoint throughout this period. It had long been critical of the EEC, but under its new name concentrated more effort on this front. "As Socialist Republicans our opposition to the [EEC] derives from a principled political position"[79] they claimed. The party had always been highly critical of the EEC due to its impact it had had on the working class.

> The Workers' Party has one test in respect of any political issue: 'How does this issue affect the interests of the working class? Is it in their interests or the interests of capitalism?' We are sure that the European Union under its past and present regimes pursues its policies in the interests of the few. The EU has failed the working class.[80]

In 1986, the party was particularly concerned about how Northern Ireland had been treated by the EEC, even after what had transpired in 1980 with the better relationship now established:

> No attempt appears to have been made to involve the political representatives of the Unionist community in Northern Ireland in this process at all. Indeed they appear to have been deliberately excluded and treated in an offensive manner.[81]

Concerns were also expressed at the time about the capitalist nature of the European Project. General Secretary of the Workers Party, Seán Garland expressed these concerns in a speech in 1986:

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[77] Sinn Féin, 'One Ireland, One People – The Only Alternative'.
[78] Sinn Féin, 'One Ireland, One People – The Only Alternative', 9.
[79] The Workers Party of Ireland, "We want a Europe fit for Workers", N.d. available: http://www.workerspartyireland.net/eu.html.
[80] The Workers Party of Ireland, "We want a Europe fit for Workers".
[81] The Workers Party of Ireland, *The Socialist Perspectives on Northern Ireland and the Anglo-Irish Agreement,* Dublin, 1986, available: http://cedarlounge.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/wp-hillsboro.pdf.

> Ireland does not exist as we well know, cannot exist in isolation from the struggle of the two socio-economic systems, Capitalism and Socialism, in the world today. Ireland falls within the field of gravitation of these systems with each one having its own specific influence. Up until recently and in most areas of Irish society still, it has been the conservative, reactionary forces that have directed and aligned Ireland on the side of capitalism.[82]

He went on to say:

> For us there can be no middle ground in the struggle to abolish capitalism and achieve socialism. It is, and I repeat, essential for us who are living under capitalism that we look beyond what the media in our society report about socialism and the socialist countries.[83]

Clearly, the threat of capitalism was linked to the EEC model, and the intention was to move away from such a model to one that Soviet Russia had accepted at the time. Therefore, a communist based economic system was being proposed by the party as one that would provide the best alternative for Ireland. In 1987 at the Workers Party Annual Delegate Conference the party made its intentions very clear on the way Ireland should progress forward, with no European involvement:

> We must now begin to raise the struggle to a new level. Freedom is what we must strive for. Freedom from the oppressed class which has never known freedom ... Capitalism destroys people, the environment and our resources. Socialism constructs, expands, protects, cares for people. It brings freedom. Capitalism is about the alienation of human beings, one from another ... it is about divisions in society, where the weak turn on the weakest, while both are manipulated and controlled by the few at the top, the owners of wealth and holders of power.[84]

On the political front, in 1989 the Workers' Party won seven seats in the Dáil Éireann, gaining political status, procedural privileges, secretarial backup and £50,000 in public funding.[85] But essentially this was to be the high tide of election success for the party on the back of a socialist campaign which attacked Europe. The Workers Party certainly revealed its true anti-EEC feelings during this period and provided a voice for the 'no' side, where it was realised that alternative propositions were required; it was not enough to denounce Europe on its own; a successful plan of attack was also required.

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[82] The Workers Party of Ireland, *Ireland and the Socialist Countries*, Dublin, 1986, available: http://cedarlounge.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/wp1986.pdf.
[83] The Workers Party of Ireland, *Ireland and the Socialist Countries.*
[84] The Workers Party of Ireland, *Ireland*, Dublin, 1987, available: http://cedarlounge.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/wp-doc-87.pdf.
[85] Brian Hanley and Scott Millar, cited in History Ireland, "The Lost Revolution", N.d. available: http://www.historyireland.com/20th-century-contemporary-history/the-lost-revolution-the-story-of-the-official-ira-and-the-workers-party/

A softer approach to Irish euroscepticism: Maastricht Treaty (1990s)

In some ways the Maastricht referendum of 1992 could be said to have been merely a re-run of the *Single European Act*. The referendum comfortably passed with 69 per cent voting 'yes', and it was the first time the Labour Party had given official support to integration. What this referendum revealed though was a rise in the importance of civil society actors, particularly those who opposed Europe, who attempted different tactics when dealing with Europe throughout this period. Some new faces weighed in on the debate for the very first time, where these anti-European actors had emerged with a different approach to Europe and could in some ways be said to accept Europe itself but more so took a dislike towards certain polices pushed by the EU. However, some of the same faces still featured from the past, where neutrality, sovereignty and independence were common discussion points raised by those sceptics, but the issue of conscription featured as a marked concern also.

A formidable and common anti-European political party to continue to voice concern over further European integration and the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s was none other than Sinn Féin. Just prior to the Maastricht Treaty vote in June 1992, Sinn Féin formalised its position in relation to the treaty via its own document entitled *Democracy or Dependency – The Case Against Maastricht*. The document set out extensive explanations as to why Sinn Féin opposed the treaty and could be characterised under the following areas; economic, the end to Irish neutrality, the erosion of democracy, the negative impact on agriculture and the inability to reunify Ireland.[86] These were all arguments stated in the publication as to why Sinn Féin opposed the treaty and why Irish citizens should vote 'no'. In many ways these arguments had simply been re-iterated from earlier policy documents and statements about European integration. Thus, the arguments made here were nothing new and some had even featured in the lead up to the 1972 referendum, particularly those focusing on neutrality and sovereignty. However, for the first time the realisation that Europe was here to stay was considered and accepted. At the domestic level, though, it was evident that the Maastricht Treaty provided a focus for domestic opposition around the issue of the perceived EU's growing role in defence matters, something that had increased considerably since 1972. Opponents like Sinn Féin claimed the superstate

[86] Sinn Féin, *Democracy or Dependency – The Case Against Maastricht*, Dublin, 1992.

would encourage the formation of a European army and enforce conscription.[87] However, it was evident from a number of the policy documents produced at this time that Sinn Féin's position on Europe was changing. By this point it was evident that the model that had once been central to Republican thinking of a socialist, economically self-sufficient, united Ireland seemed a pipe-dream, even to Republicans themselves.[88] The idea of withdrawing from the EC, which was once the position sought by the party, was now becoming less likely.

A well organised minority group, known as the National Platform for EU Research, was also evident in the early 1990s, based once again around Raymond Crotty, who weighed in on the debate regarding the Maastricht Treaty. Although the content of the Maastricht Treaty was mainly impacted upon by concerns raised about the growth of the EEC's powers, Crotty managed to publish his own work on the situation entitled *Maastricht – Time To Say No*[89] building on the concern that this was a new grab for power by the EEC. The publication extensively detailed the perceived negative impact Ireland had had as being part of the EEC since 1973 in terms of poor income, vast unemployment and extensive emigration, however, it also emphasised a failure in the agriculture sector, a failing export industry and issues with multi-millionaires in terms of capitalist entrepreneurs taking advantage of the Irish situation.[90] As he had earlier, Crotty urged a 'no' vote at the upcoming Maastricht Treaty, claiming that, "the sky [would] not fall if a majority vote 'no' in the upcoming referendum".[91] The problem for Maastricht though, was that it was launched at a time of poor economic growth, rising unemployment and security problems, giving some appeal to what Crotty had documented. The dense nature of the content and the complexity of the treaty gave opponents like Crotty leeway to manipulate public opinion by making the claim that voting 'yes' involved the surrendering of too much sovereignty.

[87] Coackley, Holmes and Rees, cited in Rees, Quinn, Connaughton, *Europeanisation and New Patterns of Governance in Ireland*, 181.
[88] Eunan O'Halpin, 'Ireland and the International Security Environment', in William Crotty and David E Schmitt (eds), *Ireland on the World Stage*, London and New York, 2002,135.
[89] Raymond Crotty, *Maastricht – Time To Say No*, Dublin, 1992.
[90] Crotty, *Maastricht – Time To Say No*.
[91] Crotty, *Maastricht – Time To Say No*, 36.

An even softer approach to Irish euroscepticism: Amsterdam Treaty (1990s)

The Amsterdam Treaty introduced a number of new provisions to the EU treaties, building upon many of the changes agreed to under the *Single European Act* and the Maastricht Treaty. However, in its final form it did little to provide the answers needed for enlargement, consolidating the political union and establishing a firm basis of European governance. It did little to restore public faith and confidence within the Irish electorate in the lead up to the referendum. It also witnessed the lowest number of voters (56.2 per cent) and lowest percentage victory (61.7 per cent) for the 'yes' camp for all treaties until this point, while it fostered a prolific 'no' campaign and allowed for a critical voice to emerge. It was also the first referendum held in the wake of the Patricia McKenna and Anthony Coughlan judgements, giving further weighting to the eurosceptic argument and the witnessing of these newer tactics against Europe.

Between 1992 and 1997, the Green Party manifesto and policies were post-materialist and favoured ecological issues and local democracy, while opposing the growth of the industrial system.[92] The Greens had been relatively oblivious towards the Maastricht Treaty and the salience of European issues did not increase at this time. The Green Party neither explicitly welcomed nor explicitly criticised the 1993 reforms of the EU.[93] However, the incompatibility of the Greens' ideal built upon local democracy put it in stark contrast to the nature of EU governance, and this was certainly exposed after the Maastricht Treaty. Thus, a sceptical position of the EU entailed in the lead up to the Amsterdam Treaty.

> There is growing disenchantment with the direction Europe is taking. The centralisation of power will lead to a power vacuum, leading in turn to an emergence of right wing groups and greater political instability. The democratic deficit has not been addressed and ordinary Europeans feel alienated from the decision making process. Many who vote for the EEC do not want a federal Europe.[94]

The explicit use of the term 'EU superstate' was also emphasised and used by the party at the time, showing a sceptical position towards EU policymaking.[95] Based on the

[92] Sargent, Dail Debates 432, 9 June 1993.
[93] Nicole Bolleyer and Diana Panke, 'The Irish Green Party and Europe: An Unhappy Marriage', in Katy Hayward and Mary C Murphy (eds), *The Europeanization of Party Politics in Ireland, North and South,* New York, 2010,135.
[94] Gormley, Dail Debates 492, 23 June 1998.
[95] Gormley, Dail Debates 489, 1 April 1998.

support for active neutrality, the Greens were against the Amsterdam Treaty, which they interpreted as allowing unlimited EU military action and marking a shift in Irish foreign policy away from UN peacekeeping and from Ireland's historical neutrality.[96] In doing so the Greens seemed to represent a large constituency, as neutrality was the top substantive policy reason for voting 'no' in the referendum, just behind lack of information.[97] The Green Party, whilst being on the fringe of the political establishment, seemed to be able to encourage a more competitive stance when dealing with the European issue in this position rather than joining the pro-European consensus of those in the midst of the political order.[98] It saw the threat posed to an independent and sovereign foreign policy by cooperation at the EU level, which, as it claimed, "[had] turned Ireland into a puppet of the main western powers".[99] The Treaty of Amsterdam and the lead up to it provided the catalyst, fostering Green Party opposition[100] and a eurosceptic point of view based solely on what was being proposed, not as a voice against Europe as a whole.

In the run up to the divorce referendum in 1995, Green Party MP Patricia McKenna questioned the use of public funds going towards the 'yes' campaign.[101] The government had until this time been funding the 'yes' argument with public money. Such funding was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, who ruled in favour of McKenna.[102] The Supreme Court ruled that the government was not entitled to use public money to put forward only one side of the argument, since not all citizens would support one side.[103] Thus, for each referendum since 1995, the government of the day established a Referendum Commission, whose function was to inform the public about the issues and arguments in a non-biased manner. The commission, being composed of non-political figures, usually headed by either a former or current member of the judiciary nominated by the chief justice, alongside the ombudsman, comptroller, auditor general and other senior civil servants, can be seen as somewhat of a victory for those representing a eurosceptical position. The judgement certainly impacted upon the way

[96] *The Irish Times*, 27 January 1998.
[97] *Prime Time Exit Poll*, 22 May 1998.
[98] Michael Holmes, *Ireland and the European Union*, Manchester and New York, 2005, 83.
[99] Irish Green Party, "Neutrality", 1999, available: http://www.imsgrp.com/greenparty/neutral.htm.
[100] Bolleyer and Panke, 'The Irish Green Party and Europe: An Unhappy Marriage', 135.
[101] Supreme Court, 'McKenna vs Taoiseach No. 2', 31 October 1995, available: http://www.supremecourt.ie/supremecourt/sclibrary3.nsf/(WebFiles)/7C7E694523FDA84F8025765E003CC0C5/$FILE/McKenna%20v%20An%20Taoiseach%20(No%202)_1995.rtf
[102] Supreme Court, 'McKenna vs Taoiseach No. 2'.
[103] Brigid Laffan and Jane O'Mahony, *Ireland and the European Union*, New York, 2008, 112.

EU referendums were to be conducted in the future, readdressing the balance between the 'yes' and 'no' vote.[104] McKenna herself was also able to bring further voice in 1997 to the fact that the Irish media had sold out to the pro-EU argument and refused to publish sceptical views on EU related issues.[105] Clearly, McKenna represented a recognisable voice against European intentions prior to 2001. She employed newer tactics against Europe which restricted European aspirations at the time.

The importance of the EU as a policy issue prior to the vote really had not changed for Sinn Féin, as it had consistently opposed greater European integration and traditionally favoured the retention of national sovereignty. Along with the Green Party, Sinn Féin actively opposed the Amsterdam Treaty, where both parties claimed openly that Ireland was sleepwalking into a military alliance.[106] Sinn Féin's main concern though rested exclusively on the fact that neutrality would be clearly undermined by the treaty.[107] While membership of the Partnership for Peace and sending troops to the NATO-commanded Stabilization Force operation were deemed to be the most egregious illustration of the extent to which Ireland had been drawn into the alliance with the US military industrial complex,[108] it was the steady erosion of neutrality throughout the years of EEC/EU membership that had given rise to greater anxiety expressed by Sinn Féin. This was not least because, according to Sinn Féin, "this undermining has been done mostly out of sight of the Irish public, in the conference rooms of Brussels and Strasbourg ... the process has amounted to the abandonment of neutrality by stealth".[109] This view was reinforced by Gerry Adams some years later, when he reflected on the treaties and stated, "The consecutive EU treaties had corroded Irish foreign policy and were a threat to Irish neutrality".[110] Sinn Féin was determined to make citizens aware of the fact that, "consecutive governments had engaged in a long term strategic effort to undermine Irish neutrality in the interests of a European military superstate".[111] Beyond this concern with neutrality, the main concern noted by Sinn Féin against the Amsterdam Treaty was that the EU itself was seen as undemocratic, or at least critically deficient in terms of democratic accountability. For Sinn Féin, the roots of a

[104] Laffan and O'Mahony, *Ireland and the European Union*, 112.
[105] *The Irish Times*, 20 October 1997.
[106] *The Irish Times*, 'Ireland Sleepwalking into Military Alliance', 15 May 1998.
[107] *The Irish Times*, 'Sinn Féin Urges No Vote', 15 May 1998.
[108] *The Irish Times*, 18 October 1999.
[109] *The Irish Times*, 20 May 1994.
[110] *The Irish News*, 2 June 2004.
[111] Sinn Féin, 'Official Party Website', 1999, available: http://www.sinnfein.ie.

progressive, positive and engaged Irish foreign policy could be better found in its own neutrality and with the option of a sovereign and independent foreign policy. Strength for this undertaking could be sourced from Ireland's previous colonial experience, and this is what Sinn Féin ultimately focused on. It attempted to denounce European intentions and win over the public through this means and did so, in order to promote the party itself.

Anthony Coughlan, long time campaigner against the EU, also weighed in on the debate against further integration and the Amsterdam Treaty. He insisted that:

> Key elements of Ireland's political elite, animated by the uncritical Europhilia they have encouraged here over the past thirty years, prefer to see themselves as helping to run an EU quasi-federal superpower rather than maintaining and expanding the independence of the Irish State.[112]

He went on to say through representation in the National Platform that, "The Amsterdam Treaty was another step in the process of building a federal European state and is being pushed by elite groups without proper public discussion".[113] He told a press conference in Dublin in the lead up to the referendum:

> People should oppose this fundamental erosion of our national democracy. If people had not had time to read the information on Amsterdam published by the Referendum Commission, then they should vote No ... Successive European treaties had amounted to a constitutional revolution whereby more and more powers were handed to the EU by stealth. Ireland, a sovereign independent democratic State, was being transformed into a constituent element of a federal EU. This change was of such far-reaching significance it should be considered openly and honestly on its merits. That had not happened in this campaign. The Amsterdam Treaty was another step in that process, but I think people don't realise the way in which the EU is moving towards becoming a centralised state.[114]

So concerned was Coughlan about the treaty that one month before the vote he appealed to the high court requesting a judicial review into airtime given for the 'yes' and 'no' sides of the debate. The high court found in favour of Coughlan and found that the Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTÉ) giving of airtime on the basis of electoral support for political parties resulted in inequality amounting to unconstitutional unfairness, "which would not have arisen had their starting point been to afford equality to each side of the

[112] *The Irish Times*, 7 October 1999.
[113] *The Irish Times*, 19 May 1998, available: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/confused-voters-advised-to-vote-no-to-treaty-1.154158.
[114] *The Irish Times*, 19 May 1998.

argument to which there could only be a yes and no answer".[115] The implications of this judgement were profound and meant that for any subsequent referenda RTÉ was required to allot equal broadcast time (television and radio) to parties advocating either a 'yes' or 'no' vote respectively, in any given campaign. The judgement handed down thus altered the way future referendums were required to run and could be viewed as a victory for the eurosceptic side in the lead up to the Treaty of Nice. It seemed evident that the new approach employed by those sceptical of Europe was to take aim at individual aspects, where victory was seen when court action was taken.

A new non-government organisation, known as the PANA, formed in 1996 was also present during the treaty debate and voiced concerns about it.

> PANA's first major campaign was to oppose the Amsterdam Treaty. We sought a Protocol, similar to that already achieved by Denmark, that would exclude Ireland from the militarisation of the EU. PANA was the main alliance in the referendum campaign seeking to reject the Treaty.[116]

It was formed as an Irish anti-war grouping which would campaign as a lobby group to protect Irish neutrality. PANA, chaired by Roger Cole, opposed the Amsterdam Treaty on the grounds of the threat it posed to Irish neutrality, and much of the discussion during the campaign focused on Ireland's participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace framework.

> PANA has consistently argued during the debate on the Amsterdam Treaty and Ireland's membership of Nato's PfP [Partership for Peace] that Irish neutrality and Independence were being destroyed 'salami' style. The logic of this would be that the long and honourable tradition of Irish Army participation as a peacekeeping force directly under the auspices of the United Nations would effectively be terminated as it became integrated instead into the EU/NATO military structures.[117]

More specifically according to Carol Fox of the PANA:

> the treaty would bolster nuclear alliances such as NATO and the WEU [Western European Union]. A common defence policy might not happen immediately after ratification but it commits the member-states to a progressive framing of a common defence policy. The problem with this ... was that Ireland was therefore committed to framing a common defence policy with

[115] J Carney, High Court Judicial Review No. 1997 209 'Anthony Coughlan vs Broadcasting Complaints Commission, RTÉ and the Attorney General', 24 April 1998.
[116] PANA, "About PANA", N.d., available: http://www.pana.ie/about.html.
[117] PANA, "Irish Neutrality", N.d., available: http://www.pana.ie/idn/neutral.html.

> two nuclear groupings. The extension of Qualified Majority Voting would further compromise Irish foreign policy.[118]

The concern for PANA thus rested on the fact that neutrality was not enshrined in the Irish constitution and needed protecting:

> The Irish Constitution, unlike, for example, that of Malta, does not enshrine Neutrality in it, the historical reason being that at the time of the Constitution's adoption there was overwhelming political support for neutrality among the Irish people. When World War 2 broke out, the entire Dail, with only one exception, voted to support the policy of Irish Neutrality. Indeed, elements of the political elite still declare they support the policy. Yet, through their advocacy of the Amsterdam Treaty, their support for Irish membership of Nato's PfP, and their involvement in the militarization of the EU, they in fact are destroying it.[119]

PANA justified its existence and stance at the time by claiming that the majority of Irish citizens still supported the concept of neutrality. In addition, PANA took a particular disliking towards the imperialist intentions of the EU:

> Yet those Irish that supported Imperialism did not go away; they stayed in the long grass, waiting for their time to come again, which they now see in the emerging European Union and Empire. The tradition of Redmond and Lord Kitchener is now being revived. Instead of being 'British' we are told we are all 'Europeans'. When once seeking Home Rule within the British Union, they now seek Home Rule within the European Union.[120]

The concept of opposition towards the super state ideal presents as a recurring theme here. The criticism labelled against the treaty was that it would endow the Union with a state-like capacity. According to one leading campaigner within the group at the time, "Each successive European treaty has been an incremental move of the original Common Market and the three European communities towards the establishment of a supranational federal European state".[121] To these types of organisations, the loss of vetos, supremacy of Western European Union law, loss of sovereignty, the single currency, strengthening of democratic decision making and the physical presence of the union itself were worrying prospects. As Hayden explained, all of this represented a creeping statism designed to traduce the sovereignty of member states, leaving them as vassals within a European empire to immerse the Irish nation in an unaccountable

[118] *The Irish Times*, 19 May 1998, available: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/confused-voters-advised-to-vote-no-to-treaty-1.154158.
[119] PANA, "Irish Neutrality".
[120] PANA, "Irish Neutrality".
[121] *The Irish Times*, 27 December 1998.

European mega-state.[122] To counter this membership was open to anyone at the time, where the group worked closely with like-minded people such as Sinn Féin, the Green Party and National Platform in order to try and tackle individual aspects of EU policy.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an insight into the undercurrent of euroscepticism present in Ireland between 1973 and 2001. It has attempted to account for and define the type and characteristics of Irish euroscepticism exhibited during this period. It is incorrect to claim that Irish euroscepticism only emerged in 2001 with the rejection of the first Nice Treaty. It is possible to mistakenly believe that with the resounding 'yes' result in 1972, Irish euroscepticism should have dissolved entirely from society due to the huge number of people who voted in favour of it. Even the example taken from the Irish Labour Party supports this notion, as they too went from critical opponent prior to 1972, to in 1973 being a firm supporter and believer in the EEC. The change in attitude within the Irish Labour Party and Democratic Left through this period reveals the ever changing nature of Irish euroscepticism, which had the ability to react to certain circumstances and factors.Although not as prolific as before 1972, euroscepticism was without question present beneath the surface, and at times raised its head in public to voice dissent when the *Single European Act*, Maastricht Treaty and Amsterdam Treaty were debated and voted upon.

Although old tactics and the calling for complete withdrawal from Europe still featured on the margins, generally speaking a softer approach was now more commonly accepted, not with a principled objection to European integration in totality, but a more qualified opposition or disagreement in one or more policy areas. This was adhered to by Sinn Féin, the National Platform for EU Research, Anthony Coughlan, Patricia McKenna, the Greens, and PANA, who all recognised that Europe was finally here to stay and that more success would come from opposing certain aspects of EU policy that would encroach on Ireland's decision-making ability than calling for outright withdrawal.

[122] Tom Hayden, 'Sinn Féin Rising', *The Nation*, 2002, available: http://www.thenation.com/article/sinn-fein-rising/

Chapter 6
Discussion and conclusion

This thesis set out to understand the history and development of Irish euroscepticism, rejecting the notion that it was a phenomenon of only the twenty-first century. Using 2001 as its point of reference, this thesis has presented a longer historical narrative of Irish euroscepticism than that previously available, while also examining the changing character of the phenomenon. This was determined as important due to the existing literature on the subject failing to acknowledge this historical dimension, but also because Ireland can often be viewed as a forgotten participant in the project for European integration, due to its peripheral location, its relatively late membership, its lesser size and its smaller contribution when compared to the larger member countries, like Germany and France.

As applied in this thesis, the concept of 'euroscepticism' was understood to refer to an element of doubt or distrust against the higher institution known as the EEC/EU with a willingness to remain as a member while concentrating specifically on policy detail (the soft approach) rather than the call for outright withdrawal (the hard approach). That is not to say that the latter did not exist, and as evident in this research, has been shown to have come to the fore on numerous occasions. Euroscepticism in Ireland, however, has been somewhat fluid andconsisting of both incremental soft elements as well as the 'hard' elements of pure negation.

Both 'hard' and 'soft' eurosceptics have left behind a range of traces that illustrate how political parties, groups in civil society, and individuals at various times and for various reasons have voiced their scepticism about the wisdom of Irish participation in the project of European integration. The sources used here have shown clearly that Irish euroscepticism has been located not just in politics – and indeed in a wide range of political parties and organizations – but also in Irish civil society and among a number of prominent and influential individuals. Material held in the National Library Dublin Archive and University College Dublin Archive provided the basis for most of the research undertaken. In addition, an exhibition held by the Peoples' Movement Ireland in late November 2013, containing documents and material from the 1970s, provided an excellent source of rare information.

In examining the historical dimensions of euroscepticism, the thesis looked to its prehistory in the period before European integration. Anti-British feelings and reservations at the turn of the century can be useful in locating the development of Irish euroscepticism. The historical principles of Irish neutrality and sovereignty were important considerations during this period, and, in many ways shaped the way Ireland thought about Europe and was at the heart of political discourse. The commitment to neutrality first emerged in the run up to the Boer War which revealed neutrality to be linked to an anti-colonial struggle from very early on. This commitment to neutrality that emerged as a reluctance to engage in 'other people's wars', remained as a hallmark of Irish national political identity Even asthe 1916 Easter Rising and the War of Independence which followed in 1919–21 transformed the political landscape of Ireland. Under British rule, Ireland did not enjoy its own sovereignty, or independence. The main issue of contention between Britain and Ireland was that of sovereignty, in particular the restrictive allegiance to the British Crown. This divide resulted in a civil war and ultimately the future fate of Ireland, which set the idea of sovereignty and independence in motion. These two important aspects developed during the process of decolonisation, and remained important considerations that helped justify future anti-European thought amongst some Irish citizens.

Irish anti-European feelings directed towards Europe in more specific terms emerged around the time of the Treaty of Rome and the subsequent rejection of the EEC membership applications which followed in 1961 and 1967. That is not to say that an underlying current was not evident between the years of the birth of the Irish Free State to 1957. Yet, when the Treaty of Rome which had established the EEC, affirmed in its preamble that signatory states were 'determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the people of Europe' some contention with the European Project began to emerge. In many ways Ireland's position on EEC membership was subject to Britain's course of action, but anti-European developments can be located here. The first political organisations to raise concerns over the project were the IWL and Sinn Féin in 1961. These concerns rested on the basis of the threat posed to neutrality and sovereignty, but were also economic in nature, with the fear of job losses being expressed openly as a concern about being involved in a more open and competitive market.

By 1966, Britain's desire to move towards full membership of the EEC had become clearer and another application to join was sought. This move coincided with the Irish Labour Party becoming the major political party to voice opposition against any such move. Although resentment towards such a move was noted as early as 1960, the need to join because Britain was attempting to at the time did not sit well with many Labour Party members. The resentment towards Britain was evident in party motives, and it believed recently established independence would be threatened under a supranational type entity such as the EEC.

In 1967, and in time for the second failed attempt for membership, non-government organisations began openly voicing concerns against the EEC project. The disregard towards Europe began moving away from the political party spectrum and found acceptance in more mainstream public discourse. Non-government organisations such as The Wolfe Tone Society began becoming more involved. The Wolfe Tone Society published a booklet in 1967 entitled *The Case Against the Common Market – Why Ireland Should Not Join,* positioning itself firmly against European supernationalist intentions. By 1970 the Common Market Study Group and CMDC, with direction from Anthony Coughlan and Raymond Crotty, began further highlighting openly explicit concerns about the entire project. Their actions were supported by the Labour Party and Sinn Féin.

In its official policy outline, the Labour Party in 1969 suggested that Europe was an unviable proposition for Ireland resting on the notion of neutrality. The issue of neutrality was entrenched in Labour Party dialogue and it was abundantly clear that the party would take a negative position towards EEC affairs from this point forward. With a looming referendum on the way, this was of high priority. Labour thus contested the battle in the Dáil and in the upcoming referendum.

Sinn Féin also showed its opposition of a move towards the Common Market, especially on the heels of the UK. The party was direct in its opposition and outlined the problems with association to the point. It also highlighted that the economy would be in the hands of higher authority civil servants, which Sinn Féin found unacceptable. Sinn Féin emphasised Ireland's own interests coming first and foremost. In broad terms Sinn Féin saw the whole idea of joining the EEC as a 'sell-out' to both Britain and the EEC, resting on the laurels of dominance and impact on independence that would

result. In more specific terms, Sinn Féin was fearful of being subject to decisions above Ireland's own law-making authority, which would see its own future policies and goals become more difficult to implement and in some ways redundant.

The 1972 period, the EEC referendum debate, sparked widespread debate and featured political parties, non-government organisations and significant individuals both for and against the idea. Some elements of resistance presented during the time, which came to a forefront in early 1972. A number of proponents emphasised the issue of sovereignty being a major detractor away from any Irish EEC commitment. The arguments positioned on democracy, sovereignty and political liberty seemed to be the dominant strands of thought at the time. The main issue, however, was that no political conditions were set down by the treaty and the word 'political' did not even feature. The only thing closely resembling political was the often-quoted phrase 'ever closer union'. Some claimed decision-making ability would be lost, independence brought to an end, and Britain would have too much say again in Irish affairs so soon after recently securing its independence. Concern was noted at the time by Sinn Féin, the Republican Movement, Irish Labour Party, trade unions including the ITGWU and the ICTU, as well as non-government organisations such as the CMDC and Common Market Study Group, led mainly by Anthony Coughlan and Raymond Crotty. The general mood for acceptance of Europe was strong, and this restricted the anti-EEC voice concentrating on a number of these generally acceptable concerns.

It would seem reasonable that after 1972 and the fairly convincing 'yes' result on 10 May, euroscepticism would have diminished from Irish political and public thought processes. This notion can best be tried and tested in the Labour Party where a changed attitude towards EEC acceptance and the process of Europeanisation certainly took place within the party post 1973. This changed attitude towards Europe was also replicated later in Democratic Left where it went from outright opponent to willing participant in EU affairs. What this reveals, though, is the ever-changing nature of euroscepticism. It has the ability to react to certain circumstances and factors, and is not necessarily a unique consideration taken on its own accord; it is part of a larger consideration at the time, adopted when best suited.

Following the 1973 accession into the EEC, the CPI, Sinn Féin, Irish Sovereignty Movement and studies conducted by others at the time revealed disappointment with

what had not been fulfilled in terms of the employment promised within Ireland if EEC membership was accepted. This is what prompted such groups to show continued hesitation towards the idea of Europe throughout the late 1970s and was certainly more profound in the North with vast numbers of people seeking unemployment benefits due to the unemployment crisis that had engulfed the country. As such, Irish euroscepticism directly after accession and throughout the 1970s rested on the principle of being critical towards what the EEC had failed to live up to in terms of promises it made before accession and was promoted by a hard form of euroscepticism which called for outright withdrawal from the organisation.

By the 1980s, and the *Single European Act* acting like a catalyst for some resentment concentrated towards the EEC, some acceptance towards Europe was beginning to be seen. Newer tactics were beginning to be employed by those anti-European opponents, such as the high-court challenge that revealed a new dimension to Irish euroscepticism, particularly on behalf of Raymond Crotty who brought a case to the High Court and then the Supreme Court over the Irish Government's attempt to ratify the Act by passing ordinary legislation through the Irish Parliament. With the Supreme Court ruling in favour of Crotty, meaning all future treaties would require public approval through a referendum vote, a somewhat win for those critical of Europe was witnessed and a recognition that this was possibly a more appropriate means to denounce European plans in Ireland. Even Coughlan, who had not had much success with publishing on the issue, nor calling for outright withdrawal, realised the need to form the National Platform for EU Research and to tackle individual aspects of European policy instead. The fractured nature of this euroscepticism could certainly be ascertained during the period, and this example was best shown by what occurred within Sinn Féin and the policy surrounding abstentionism, which jeopardised any effort for a united front on the issue.

Further developments inciting a softer approach to Irish euroscepticism continued to transpire during the time of Maastricht Treaty (1992) and even more so by the time of the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). Again new tactics on behalf of Anthony Coughlan and Patricia McKenna featured; high-court challenges and oppositionist politicians were increasingly evident. This revealed that the new dimension to Irish euroscepticism had progressed even further and was taking hold. However, the power and role of the EU as a political and security actor was seen to be further enhanced by these two treaties. This

spurred discontent, and in turn gave rise to the critical anti-European voice within Irish society that was concentrated on disagreement towards one or more policy areas, rather than towards the EU as a whole, something very different from past experience.

Although euroscepticism was not always highly visible in Ireland, it was nevertheless present. As it had support in many parts of Irish politics and civil society, it possessed a potency which was easily underestimated. For those committed to European integration, the case of Ireland reveals the importance of understanding the breadth and depth of eurosceptic sentiment. Greater historical understanding of the phenomenon would have avoided the apparent surprise that greeted the Irish in 2001. Applied to other parts of Europe, it would also help to enhance the understanding of a phenomenon which not only has a past but, as the recent Brexit referendum indicates, a future as well.

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