

## 2 - Unproductive Fear

Chapter Two is named after the excess that the focus text can produce. In order to show that unproductive fear can emerge from an affective encounter with *Creepers II* the chapter utilises the methodology discussed in the preceding chapter. It uses governmentality as a tool to explore how the focus text *works*. It also incorporates *criminological aesthetics* and the Deleuzian concept of excess to explore what this text can *do*. *Creepers II* utilises the fear of crime as a strategy to constitute an ethical subject whereas the texts explored in Chapters Three to Five primarily attempt to constitute a failed subject. This approach is taken in order to highlight that the fear of crime is a technology used by late modern governments to motivate both the failed *other* and the ethical *self*. The excess that is traced in this chapter is an unproductive fear of the *other* summoned by the trope of monstrosity. The monstrous *other* of *Creepers II* commits the everyday traffic offence of low-level speeding and therefore has the capacity to invoke a fear of crime in the spectator which can detract from the objective of increasing road traffic safety. Finally the chapter will discuss the problematic features vis-à-vis the way that the *other* is represented in the text.

### *Creepers II*

*Creepers II* is the second of two connected campaigns developed in South Australia (SA) to combat low-level speeding.<sup>1</sup> In 2008 the Road Safety Advisory Council<sup>2</sup> (RSAC) deemed speeding to be the most important road safety message because studies revealed that there was a direct correlation between speeding and the road toll (Interview Motor Accident Commission, 23/11/10). The Motor

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<sup>1</sup> The first campaign, *Creepers I*, is the focus of Chapter Five.

<sup>2</sup> The role of RSAC is to monitor road safety performance and make recommendations to the Minister for Road Safety (SA) for strategies to reduce road traffic trauma. The members of the RSAC include, amongst other stakeholders: representatives from the South Australia Police; the Department for Energy and Infrastructure (SA); Department of Health (SA); Department of Education and Children's Services (SA); and the Motor Accident Commission (SA) (South Australia Government, 2010).

Accident Commission (MAC), one of the representatives on the RSAC, is a statutory authority whose charter includes reducing the road toll using public education campaigns. MAC's public education campaigns are influenced greatly by their partner market research company, Colmar Brunton, and their partner creative agency, Clemenger BBDO. Colmar Brunton undertook qualitative research for MAC in 2008, including 120 two hour interviews with road users to understand the costs, benefits and level of understanding of traffic behaviour (Interview Motor Accident Commission, 23/11/10). One of the recommendations that came from this research was that the term speeding needed to be re-branded.

The qualitative research undertaken by Colmar Brunton provided insights into the types of speeding that was occurring on South Australian roads. The study revealed that 10% of drivers speed by one to five kilometres per hour (km/h) most of the time and 61% did it 'sometimes' (Colmar Brunton, March 2009, 58). The most important insight that arose from this research was that there was a general sense amongst speeding drivers that travelling between one and five km/h over the speed limit did not constitute speeding (Colmar Brunton, March 2009, 59). It became clear that speeding advertisements were not resonating with certain drivers because they did not think that travelling only five km/h over the speed limit was actually speeding. This target group were "resistant to the message" because they did not view themselves as the dangerous *other* (Interview Motor Accident Commission, 23/11/10). The problem for MAC was that low level speeding was not seen to be illicit (especially when compared to hoon driving) and was deemed socially acceptable (Clemenger BBDO, 2010, 7). This finding led to the need for an education campaign which attempted to relabel low-level speeding as 'creeping', which is shorthand for creeping over the speed limit (Interview Clemenger BBDO, 17/11/10). As *Creepers I* predated *Creepers II* by two years, *Creepers I* played the principle role in this rebranding. *Creepers II* carried on with this label, but went further in its attempts to portray the consequences of the behaviour.

The *Creepers II* campaign consists of three separately televised scenes which are a montage of the same event.<sup>3</sup> Each scene is shot from the perspective of three different characters. The first scene, *Creepers II – Before* (Maccampaigns, 2011a), is shot from the perspective of a driver in a vehicle on a suburban arterial road. The frame includes the entirety of the windscreen and the shops and houses on the side of the road. The audio track features the engine of the vehicle and outside traffic noise. The camera pans to the left side mirror as another vehicle on the inside lane comes into frame, firstly being reflected through the mirror and then into field through the front passenger window (Figure 2.1). The driver of the second vehicle is a 30-40 year old male in a black T-shirt driving a Subaru Forrester. The frame only shows his right profile and then pans back to the original vehicle's speedometer, indicating that the original vehicle is travelling 60 km/h. Then the camera pans back to the second vehicle and the male driver is looking into camera, revealing cuts, lacerations and bruising to the left hand side of his face (Figure 2.2). Coinciding with this grotesque metamorphosis is a deep metallic sound, like metal grinding together. Then the sound of the second vehicle's engine becomes more pronounced as it passes the original vehicle and speeds off ahead. The frame changes to white text on black background stating: "CREEPERS THINK YOU CAN'T SEE THEM" (Figure 2.3). Then the text changes to "WATCH OUT FOR CREEPERS" as the black background changes to a peeling metal background, reminiscent of oxidised metal. Coinciding with this change is a high pitch crackle which ceases as a monochromatic horror-like image of a man flashes briefly on the screen. Then the screen turns black.

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<sup>3</sup> As the texts to be discussed throughout this thesis are filmic, it is necessary to undertake a component of description before each analysis. While at times this approach may appear sluggish it is a necessary process because the assumption cannot be made that the reader will visually engage with the texts using the web addresses provided in the citation.



Figure 2. 1



Figure 2. 2



Figure 2. 3

The second scene, *Creepers II – During* (Maccampaigns, 2011b), is shot from the rear right hand side of the vehicle. The camera is positioned lower than the driver, implying the frame is from the vantage point of a child. In the frame is the right hand side of the windscreen, the rear vision mirror and the same male driver from *Creepers II – Before*. The rear of the driver’s head can be seen and his face can be viewed through the rear vision mirror (Figure 2.4). The coinciding audio features generic road traffic noises. The camera pans to look out of the rear right hand window, revealing only blue sky, clouds, and the tops of trees and telegraph poles. The camera pans back toward the front of the vehicle and the rear vision mirror reveals the same disfigured face of the male driver of *Creepers II - Before*, with cuts and lacerations over his left eye. The driver turns his head to the left, revealing cuts and lacerations over most of the left hand side

of his face (Figure 2.5). The coinciding audio features an increase in revs of the vehicle and an abrupt swishing sound. The driver turns his face back toward the front and the road noises continue momentarily until a large object hits the windscreen, coinciding with a screech of tyres. The object bounces off the windscreen leaving a large radial crack and blood at the point of impact. The frame turns to black with the audio of an extended sounding of a vehicle's horn. White text fills the black screen: "CREEPERS DON'T JUST HURT THEMSELVES" (Figure 2.6) and then the text changes to "WATCH OUT FOR CREEPERS" as the black background changes to a peeling metal background, reminiscent of oxidised metal. Coinciding with this change is the same high pitch crackle which ceases as a monochromatic horror film-like image of a man flashes briefly on the screen. Then the screen turns black.




Figure 2. 4



Figure 2. 5



Figure 2. 6

The final scene, *Creepers II – After* (Maccampaigns, 2011c), is shot from the outside of the vehicle. Within the frame are the white lines of the road and traffic going in the opposite direction in the background. The shot is from the perspective of the person who was hit by the vehicle in *Creepers II - During*, who is laying on their back on the road with their head facing to the side. The camera twists and pans jerkily to the left, indicative of the dazed vision of an injured person. The audio features the heavy breathing of the injured person, who sounds female on account of a higher pitched gasping for air. As the camera frame pans the Subaru Forester comes into view, as does the left white sneaker of the injured person. In the background, immediately behind the vehicle, is a set of pedestrian lights. The frame turns to black with white text: “CREEPERS IMPACT EVERYONE”. The coinciding audio features gurgles from the throat of the injured woman and several gagging sounds. The frame changes back to the road, revealing the male driver of the vehicle exiting the Subaru (Figure 2.7). He looks left and right and then runs toward the injured woman. At this time the driver has no apparent injuries to his face. The audio continues to feature the heavy breathing of the injured woman. The screen turns black with white text stating: “YOU CAN SLOW THE SPREAD OF CREEPERS” (Figure 2.8). The screen fades back to the scene, revealing the male driver reaching down toward the injured woman, this time with cuts and lacerations on the left hand side of his face and blood on his face and shirt. He also appears to have some form of eye injury, due to an apparent discolouration of his iris (Figure 2.9). The heavy breathing audio track continues as the screen turns black with white text: “DRIVE SLOWER AND YOU’LL SLOW DOWN CREEPERS”. The audio track then changes to reveal the sound of distant sirens. The white text changes to “WATCH OUT FOR CREEPERS” as the black background changes to the same peeling metal background, reminiscent of oxidised metal. Coinciding with this change is a high pitch crackle which ceases as the monochromatic horror-like image of a man flashes briefly on the screen. Then the screen turns black.



Figure 2. 7



Figure 2. 8



Figure 2. 9

### ***Fear the creeper***

The collective montage of *Creepers II* is the typical manner in which the fear of crime is used as a strategy to manage populations, in that it appeals to the ethical *self*.<sup>4</sup> There are no shots from the point of view of the *creeper* in this montage; he is a visual object, not a subject with a defined perspective. The scenes are filmed from the point of view of the other motorist, the child in the rear of the car and the injured pedestrian. As spectators we are guided to view the images from the perspective of these potential victims: other motorists, passengers and pedestrians. Presumably, we are all potential victims of the

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<sup>4</sup> Such as the seat belt campaign discussed in Chapter One.

*creeper*. Thus the *other* operating within the text is the *creeper*, who is presented as criminal on account of his speeding and inattention that results in injury. The *creeper* is disfigured both prior to and after the collision which is suggestive of his inherent dangerousness. In this way the *creeper* is portrayed as dangerous before, during and after the event; as if it is his nature and propensity to injure himself and others. Even when the *creeper* is given the opportunity to see his own image through the rear vision mirror in *Creepers II – During* he does not appear to acknowledge his disfigurement. He cannot reflect upon his nature, he is what he is: deformed and dangerous. Instead of viewing his own image, the *creeper's* gaze intersects with that of the spectator from the point of view of the child in the rear seat. This momentary glance enables the spectator to align themselves with the role of the potential victim (the child) and not with the driving *other*.

*Creepers II* appeals to a spectator who does not align themselves with the *creeper*. 'You' are different because 'creepers think you can't see them'. Presumably 'you' is an ethical and responsible citizen who knows a *creeper* from their appearance, perhaps because they are disfigured. By binary logic if 'you' are not a *creeper* then by default you must be a responsible driver. Furthermore if you are a responsible driver then you have a responsibility to 'watch out for creepers'. These binary categories seem natural and somewhat benign, despite the likelihood that the viewer has 'creeped' over the speed limit at some point or other in their lives. This probability reveals the problem with such binary logic: it does not allow for a fragmented subject. You are either a *creeper* or a good driver. The knowledge that underpins the *Creepers* campaign, like: offending and injury statistics; road safety engineering; behaviour change psychology; and campaign design theory are all highly reliant on this type of truth statement. Categorical statements (truths) are "an ordering of words that portends to have captured the absolute or undeniable essence of an event" (Halsey, 2001, 389). For example the statement that 'creepers don't just hurt themselves' is presented as truth. It is a categorical statement intended to inspire fear of victimhood in the viewer. The text begs the viewer to ask the question: *who do*



*creepers hurt?* Presumably they hurt pedestrians, young children, and other motorists.

By presenting the *creeper* as an object through the point of view of the hurt pedestrian, the child, and the other motorist the assertion is that ‘you’, the spectator, are also a potential victim of the *creeper*. The age, gender and ethnicity of the characters may be unknown, but the stipulation of type is unnecessary for this purpose as they are all incarnations of what Young calls the “universal victim” (Young, 1996, 51). The unremarked and neutral ‘universal victim’ is conceptually necessary to erect binary notions about crime, like criminal and victim. These dualistic boundaries mean that for one to possess the status of the victim, one cannot be a criminal (Young, 1996, 52). Similarly, this dualism infers that the criminal cannot also be a victim (Young, 1996, 58). The imagery within the text infers that the criminal can be injured, but he does not hold victim status. He may very well sustain injury but he was disfigured to start with, which somehow serves to negate victimhood. His dangerousness is inherent and dangerous driving (in this case low-level speeding) is all he is capable of; he is an agent of suffering. The subtext is: *creepers cannot help themselves but if you do not want them to hurt you (or others), then you need to ‘watch out’ and ‘slow down’ creepers.*

The discursive properties of categorical statements like ‘creepers don’t just hurt themselves’ suggest that *creepers* hurt everyone and non-*creepers* hurt no-one. This truth statement is entirely problematic because drivers who do not speed can also hurt themselves and other road users for different reasons, such as inattention and high blood alcohol concentration. This issue will be addressed further in Chapter Six but for the purpose of this discussion the statement highlights the discursive logic at work in the text. Fundamentally the text suggests that creeping will cause you or someone else harm. However, this might conflict with the personal experience of the viewer, who may reflect that they have seen drivers speed on the road (or they have done it themselves) and have never witnessed or experienced injury before, and may not in the future.

However personal experience is a *subjugated knowledge* in that it is “naïve” and “disqualified as inadequate” when compared to dominant truth statements, like those presented by the media (Foucault et al., 1980, 82). The media sits higher in the hierarchy of knowledge and therefore statements like ‘creepers don’t just hurt themselves’ rhetorically neutralise the personal experiences of the viewer. In essence the categorical statement becomes truth and the *creeper* becomes a threat to safety (Halsey, 2001, 344). This threat to safety enhances the discursive properties at work in the text, creating a juxtaposition of the categories of *self* and *other* in order to constitute a subject.

### ***The constituted ethical self***

The categories and truths that operate within *Creepers II* construct subjectivities through their discursive logic. The spectator is compelled by statements like ‘creepers think you can’t see them’ to discursively divide their experience in a binary fashion. The spectator is forced to ask: *Am I a creeper or not?* If the spectator aligns as a non-*creeper* then there is an assumption that you are watching, or rather that you should be watching out for *creepers*. Watching or being vigilant becomes an ethical action. If you are not watching out then you are not a responsible subject and by the same binary logic you must be the creeping *other*. If however the spectator aligns with the ethical subject who is watching out then by default they must also align themselves as the potential victim. The text presents a truth statement that the ethical subject has a duty to minimise their own (and others’) risk of becoming a victim. As such a potential victim’s agency can be regained if the individual rejects the passivity of victimhood and takes on this preventative role (Young, 1996, 56). In this way the combination of categories and truths presented in the text serve to compel the spectator to align themselves with the ethical yet fearful subject. If this occurs then the spectator is constituted as the desirable and knowable *self* and once constituted can then be motivated through fear to reduce their risk of victimisation.

*Creepers II* serves to constitute an ethical and also fearful subject. The fearfulness relies on the presentation of possible unwanted futures in the text. The possible unwanted futures portrayed are that the spectator, as a motorist, passenger or pedestrian (or some other motorist, passenger or pedestrian that they know) may be killed or injured by a *creeper*. This impression is represented in the text in order to inspire fear. Fear is not only induced through images and statements but also through naming. The name *creeper* was developed in an effort to expose low level speeding as illicit and was inspired by MAC's creative agency, Clemenger BBDO (Interview Clemenger BBDO, 17/11/10). It was an effort to reach those people who think that it is acceptable, and not illegal, to travel slightly over the speed limit (Interview Clemenger BBDO, 17/11/10). At first glance the name *creeper* is a play on words which signifies the behaviour of creeping over the speed limit. However, the term is intentionally encumbered with additional meaning, as a representative from Clemenger BBDO who was involved in the production of the campaign describes:

*...as we were trying to describe these people, we were also having to reference this very chilling kind of stat that says they are actually killing people and killing themselves and injuring people and injuring themselves in huge numbers. We can't be nice to these people, we can't be namby-pamby, we need to be damning of their behaviour...marginalise them, isolate them, make others look at them and go: 'I'm not one of you or if I am I don't want to be like you (Interview Clemenger BBDO, 17/11/10).*

The name *creeper* was thus selected to be tantamount to dangerous or killer in order to ensure the *creeper* is marginalised. The *creeper* is intentionally represented as a body to be feared; the quintessential *other*.

## **Creep**

The term *creep* invokes a variety of concepts associated with pop culture's use of the term. Colloquially *creep* is usually reserved for a male who is considered to be sexually perverted or promiscuous, such as in TLC's R&B hit

*Creep* (1994) but there are other variations. The British horror film of the same name features a hideously deformed and mentally ill hermit, the creep, who hunts his female victim in train tunnels and then stores her in a water filled cage, presumably so that he can eat her (Smith, 2004). In the real time strategy and tower defence game, *Creeper World*, the player has only one enemy: an enemy that can only be repelled, not destroyed (Knuckle Cracker, 2009). The player's task is to hold back the *Creeper*, a bluish mass of unknown elements that destroys everything in its path. The premise of the game is that the *Creeper* has already destroyed most of humanity and is now attacking humanity's last stronghold. Theoretically, the notion of creep is used to describe an uncontrollable, unintended and negative change to an item or process, such as *scope creep* within project management and *function creep* within information systems theory. Plainly the name 'creep' epitomises something uncontrollable that should be feared.

Arguably British alternative pop group Radiohead have played a considerable role in conceptualising cultural notions of creep in their smash hit *Creep* (Radiohead, 1992). This suggestion of Radiohead's influence is supported somewhat by the assertion that:

*no other band today...has the power to transport a crowd...to...the shadowy places of their nightmares...[Radiohead is] the Pink Floyd of Generation Y (DeRogatis in Reisch, 2009).<sup>5</sup>*

The lyrics of *Creep* are vocalised in first person and the chorus describes the vocalist (Yorke) as a creep:

*But I'm a creep  
I'm a weirdo  
What the hell am I doing here?  
I don't belong here*

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<sup>5</sup> Reisch's podcast chapter describes *Creep* as being about adolescent despair and alienation over a girl. He describes it as a rewrite of an old genre about an unavailable goddess who runs away because Thom Yorke (vocalist) is a creep and a weirdo (Reisch, 2009).

The creep is not promiscuous here but rather a 'weirdo' and does not belong in the 'beautiful world' where his muse and other 'special' people presumably reside. The first chorus describes the juxtaposed ethical *self* of whom the creep serenades:

*Couldn't look you in the eye  
You're just like an angel  
Your skin makes me cry  
You float like a feather  
In a beautiful world  
I wish I was special  
You're so fucking special  
[or 'You're so very special' in the American Version](Lampert, 2009, 214)*

The creep is not worthy to gaze into the eyes of the 'special' and angelic ethical *self*, perhaps out of guilt, shame or inadequacy. The ethical *self* is 'special' and the creep is despondent for he longs to be 'special' too. However, these desires to be good are futile for he is what he is; a creep. As with *Creepers II*, the spectator is presented with the binary, homogenous categories of the *self* and *other*. The creep is destined to be a 'weirdo' and not 'special' and the ethical *self* is idealised as perfect. When the spectator views *Creepers II*, notions of the uncontrollable, forsaken 'weirdo' from pop culture are petitioned in order to invoke fear.

The name 'creep' also invokes in the spectator notions associated with the creepiness of the horror film genre. *Creepers II* draws on two particular sub genres of the horror film, the slasher and monster films. Slasher films like *A Nightmare on Elm Street* (Craven, 1984) and *Friday the 13<sup>th</sup>* (Cunningham, 1980), usually feature a twisted killer with physical disfigurements whose occasional appearances in the film always lead to fatal consequences (Young, 2010, 76). Borrowing from this trope, the dangerousness of the driver in *Creepers II* is enhanced by his deformed features. Like in a slasher film, the text depicts a physically disfigured character whose appearance leads to fatal consequences. The first two scenes emulate the suspense of a slasher film by introducing the killer as an already disfigured driver who travels over the speed limit. The

suspense is heightened by using an alarming, high pitched, metallic scratching as well as other piercing and crackling audio tricks. This audio trick is remarkably similar to the scratched metal-on-metal of Freddie Kruger's steel tip fingers in *A Nightmare on Elm Street* (Craven, 1984). The spectator's appetite becomes whet for a gory end because such slasher trope conventions prime the spectator for what this genre is expected to deliver. It is no coincidence that the first and second reveal of the *creeper's* disfigurement coincides with the illicit behaviour of speeding. This illicit behaviour is denoted by the increased speed of his vehicle relative to the point of view of the camera in scene one and the engine revving in scene two. Moreover, the spectator is given more visual clues of his dangerousness through his disfigurement, which may be perceived as real scarring from previous collisions caused by his illicit behaviour or perhaps the disfigurement is metaphoric, or even prophetic. Either way the *creeper* is someone to be feared. The third reveal of his disfigurement coincides at the point that he kills (or injures) the pedestrian. The *creeper's* disfigurement seems more pronounced in the final scene but he does not tend to or even acknowledge his wounds. Moreover in Figure 2.9 his hand reaches out in an indistinguishable manner toward the injured pedestrian. He may be administering medical assistance; he may be about to speak to the victim; or he may be about to finish the 'kill' by suffocating the victim. The latter is probably not intended but it is nevertheless possible due to the horror conventions at play in the advertisement. Borrowing from the slasher trope, *Creepers II* uses the driver's disfigurement to indicate his inherent and unpredictable dangerousness. This trope is used to inspire fear that can then be employed to responsabilise the subject.

Similarly, *Creepers II* also borrows from the monster trope of horror films like *Tarantula* (Arnold, 1955), *Godzilla* (Emmerich, 1998) and *Jaws* (Spielberg, 1975). The genre usually features an aggressive creature whose killing spree is characterized as a natural attribute that has somehow become perverted (Young, 2010, 77). A relevant example of this genre, which also draws on the name *creeper*, is the *Jeepers Creepers* trilogy of films (Salva, 2001; 2003; 2013).

The *creeper* is a flesh eating winged creature that has a ritualistic 23 day eating spree, the last day of which sets the scene of each of the three films. *Creepers II* borrows from this same notion of the mutated unnatural creature. The spectator is told that they can 'stop the spread of creepers'. The *creeper* is perverted and diseased with a condition that makes him dangerous. The spectator is healthy but the *creeper* is incurable and will 'impact everyone'; he cannot help it, it is his condition. This perverted natural instinct or craving is epitomised by the disregarded blood on his face and shirt. It is as though his bloodied appearance is merely part of the necessary mess that results from feeding off live prey. Moreover, as the *creeper* exits his vehicle to walk toward the pedestrian, there is no indication of empathy. He does not use or reach for his mobile phone, nor commandeer the assistance of passing drivers or pedestrians. The close up depicted in Figure 2.9 reveals no signs of empathy, nor any other emotion on his face. His face appears emotionless but somewhat inquisitive, like an animal sniffing a carcass to detect signs of life. The gurgling of blood in the throat and the short gasps of air that coincide with the pedestrian lying helplessly (perhaps dying) on the road, is also reminiscent of the bloody animal-versus-prey death scenes of the monster trope. The message received is that killing is inherent for the *creeper* monster and there will be no remorse. Together the slasher and monster tropes are employed in *Creepers II* in order to invoke the fear of monstrosity that comes from the spectatorship of the horror film.

### ***Employable monstrosity***

The fear of monstrosity that manifests from viewing *Creepers II* is intended to be an employable and productive fear. Like the slasher and monster film, *Creepers II* has a responsible subject. The slasher film has the "final girl" who, unlike all of the other characters, finally triumphs over her would be killer (Young, 2010, 77). Similarly, the monster film has the individual whose job it is to hunt down the lethal creature (Young, 2010, 77). By inducing fear through the use of cinematic techniques from the slasher and monster tropes, *Creepers II*

constitutes an ethical subject who is inspired to triumph over their potential killer by hunting down (or at least ‘watching out’ for) *creepers*. The spectator is encouraged to be fearful that they might be the *creeper’s* next victim. Categorical statements like “creepers impact everyone” lead the subject to believe that they are always and already impacting ‘everyone’ and that no one is outside of the realm of victimhood. The text discursively puts the ethical subject and the *creeper* in the same space. *Us* and *them* collide in this space because we share the same roads, intersections, and parking spaces. We cannot escape the inherent dangerousness of the *creeper* but there is some semblance of hope for the fearful subject. The statements ‘watch out for creepers’ and ‘slow down creepers’ are order words. An order word compels a subject to obey (as language is made to be obeyed not believed) and creates this order by arranging objects (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 87). The order words responsabilise the ethical subject to act in a desired manner, namely to take action by slowing down and conducting surveillance on the *creeper*.

The fear of the *creeper* is a productive fear that can motivate the ethical subject to take measures to protect themselves and others. The message received is: *creepers speed because they are inherently dangerous and they are out to get you*. The order words restore a sense of agency or control to the subject, transforming the fearful subject into a reflexive agent who is responsible for their own safety. This is a highly efficient example of a *biopower* strategy because if the ethical subject is watching out and slowing down *creepers*, then late modern governments will not have to. It is a way of disciplining the *creeper*, without force and without institutional intervention, and in this way it is not only efficient but cost effective. Being vigilant and watchful is presented as an ethical action belonging to an ethical subject. If you do not watch out for them, or slow them down, then you are not a responsible ethical citizen. If you do not comply then you are just as *bad* as the *creeper* because you contribute to the problem by not preventing it; and by doing so contribute to your own victim status as well. All of these notions are wrapped up in *Creepers II* in a way that promotes the constitution of an active ethical subject motivated by fear to comply.



However, how the spectator actually responds to the text, or what the text does, can be entirely different.

## ***Compliance***

The desired result of *Creepers II* is the constitution of a fearful ethical subject who is transformed to actively 'watch out for' and 'slow down' *creepers* when driving on the road. The use of the word compliance in this section assumes that a driver has viewed the *Creepers II* campaign. Naturally, there are countless drivers on the road who have not viewed *Creepers II* and therefore it is acknowledged that this discussion does not incorporate a non-spectator's driving behaviour. That being stated, a subject who has been transformed by *Creepers II* to drive slower, also shares space on the road with non-spectators. The fact that they share the same space on the road may in fact lead to the non-spectator being affected by *Creepers II* by proxy. For example, the non-spectator may tail gate the ethical subject's vehicle due to an expectation that traffic should flow faster than the pace being enforced. This may end in a collision, road rage or in a simple changing of lanes which leads the non-spectator into a faster flow of traffic, and out of the proximity of the ethical subject. Alternatively, the slow speed of the ethical subject's vehicle could trigger an image from previous spectatorship of a different speeding campaign, or the memory of a past event, or perhaps some visceral sense of danger, which leads to the desirable event of slowing down the creeping non-spectator. Another variation to consider is that the non-spectator is already travelling at the desirable speed of 60 km/h in a signed 60 km/h zone and it is the spectator of *Creepers II* who is creeping over the speed limit. Thus it must be acknowledged that a non-spectator can still be affected, and even transformed by *Creepers II*, just as a spectator may or may not be.

What is interesting about compliance is that it can still have undesirable and dangerous consequences. An ethical subject may be responsabilised by the order

words ‘drive slower and you’ll slow down creepers’ but this may lead the *creeper* behind to tailgate. There is no command statement provided which indicates how ‘slow’ is slow enough. Should the ethical subject slow down to travel at the speed limit? Surely this is not the case because that would denote that the constituted ethical subject is (or was) already travelling over the speed limit, negating their ethicality. By default it must be assumed that the order words intend that the compliant ethical subject should travel below the speed limit; but how far below? Slow moving traffic can lead to tailgating (following too closely) and actually increase the danger and risk on the road because it increases the chance of collision.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, slow moving traffic may result in what is colloquially called, road rage. *You Tube* features numerous streams of footage involving road rage incidents from around the world, many of which arise from slow traffic flow.<sup>7</sup> Alternatively, the ethical subject may be transformed to the point of vigilantism which could equally increase the risk of injury and violence on the road. Either way, compliance with these order words could produce something other than the desired safety that is intended.

To test the possible consequences of compliance to the order words: ‘drive slower and you’ll slow down *creepers*’ the researcher conducted an experiment over the space of a week in 2011. For five days the researcher took on the role of a constituted ethical subject who was transformed by the message to ‘slow down’ *creepers*. This involved travelling five to 10 km/h *below* the signed speed limit on every driving occasion over that week. Any noticeable reactions of surrounding drivers were recorded in a journal. Interestingly, on only one occasion, out of 64 recorded occasions did this ethical action appear to slow down a *creeper*.<sup>8</sup> The driver was deemed a *creeper* because he was travelling at a faster speed than all of the other vehicles on his approach to the rear of the

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<sup>6</sup> It is estimated that between 30% and 40% of rear end crashes are a result of tailgating (Hutchinson, 2008, 2).

<sup>7</sup> See (INRealtor, 2010; bigstickerman, 2010; kumanyoko2000, 2009; Clayton Huff, 2011; www.dotsvmsadotcom, 2008).

<sup>8</sup> It is acknowledged that there may have been other drivers who slowed down as a result of the slow driving however the researcher only noticed one.

researcher's vehicle; noticeable through the rear vision mirror. The researcher was travelling at 52 km/h in a signed 60 km/h zone and the vehicle rapidly approached the researcher's vehicle, tailgating momentarily before slowing down his vehicle. There appeared to be several subsequent opportunities for the driver to change lanes into a faster flow of traffic, but these were not exercised. Instead the driver kept a safe distance behind the researcher's vehicle for approximately five minutes, before the two vehicles separated to travel in different directions. It is also interesting to note that this lone driver was a young male displaying *P plates*.<sup>9</sup> All of the other 63 occasions resulted in one or a combination of the following: tailgating, forceful changing of lanes, honking of horns, hostile hand signals (the *bird*, and the *gun*) and abuse. The abuse ranged in degree, from the mild: "get a move on, lady" and "get a licence" to the more aggressive: "are you enjoying your nanna nap you stupid fucking bitch" and the researcher's personal favourite:

*(window winds down at traffic lights) Just because your kids go to private school and you sit around sipping lattes all day doesn't mean some of us don't have to get to work, fuck you Latte! (window winds up).*

Empirically this experiment has little value but notionally what it does is highlight the potential for anomaly on the road, even under the guise of compliance. It is a line of flight or excess that can emanate from an affective encounter with *Creepers II*.

## **Excess**

Lines of flight are the conditions for change or newness in an event (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 305). On the road they can manifest as speeding, drink driving, injury, death, road rage, hoon<sup>10</sup> driving, abuse, inattention; in fact all manner of things that molar lines (continuity) try to control, prevent and regulate. While

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<sup>9</sup> In Australia this denotes a probationary driver: either a new driver or a driver who has repeatedly had their licence disqualified for driving offences.

<sup>10</sup> Australian slang for a lout or idiot.

this concept will be discussed at length in Chapter Six it is important at this juncture to understand that the problem with a line of flight is that one does not know where it might lead in advance (Patton, 2000, 87). Of course, this excess is predictable within a range of real parameters but it is always uncertain whether the event will be the same or different (Massumi, 2002b, 222). For example, when institutions like MAC present categorical images and statements about low level speeding they erect molar lines to funnel the flows of traffic, criminality, blood, money, and petrol. An ethical subject who is constituted and responsabilised to 'slow down' and 'watch out' for *creepers* is an example of a successful channelling of flow. This outcome (slower driving) is both predictable and intended. However, in the event that slowing down results in tailgating, abuse, road rage or a collision, one sees a line of flight; an unintended outcome. The flows of blood, petrol, criminality and subjectivity always already shoot off into largely predictable but unwanted directions. Perhaps these flows may be captured by other lines of continuity in the future, or perhaps they will not. This is not only the nature of the road but also the nature of spectatorship because an affective encounter with a text can cause an aberration in the treatment of the intended meaning of the text.

### ***Corrupted meaning***

Understandably, the intended meaning of *Creepers II* is to convey the idea that if the ethical subject slows down then this will slow down drivers who are creeping over the speed limit. However, "a text always *exceeds* the intentions of 'its' author(s)" (Halsey, 2001, 413). This aberration of the intended meaning occurs because texts are subject to the dangerousness of a line of flight. In this way a text cannot have like meaning for all spectators. Rather, meanings emanate from the spectators that interact with a text because "the self is a product of language and social interactions" (Burr, 2003, 54). *Creepers II*, as a site where bodies and statements converge to produce meaning is what Deleuze and Guattari call a *collective assemblage of enunciation* (Halsey, 2001, 414;

Deleuze et al., 2004b, 98). Spectatorship of *Creepers II* and the formation of meaning that ensues is an event that is subject to the chaos of a line of flight. This chaotic potential could cause a corruption of the desired meaning of this *collective assemblage of enunciation*. For example, if a spectator has never been exposed to the education campaigns that preceded *Creepers II*, what can the text do then? What can *Creepers II* become? The concept of the *creeper* is not so rudimentary that all spectators will understand what a *creeper* is, or even that the image relates to road safety, as the following blog attests: “Would someone be kind enough as to explain, what the fuck did I just watch?” (SkyFatality, 2011). This blog was posted on the *Creepers II You Tube* website when the campaign was first released. The same phenomenon occurred when the initial *Creepers* teaser campaigns emerged in 2008.

The *Creepers* concept was introduced in 2008 through three short teaser commercials which aired on free to air television for the week leading up to the actual launch of *Creepers I*.<sup>11</sup> Each teaser featured a driver who transforms into the same monster-like image as that portrayed in *Creepers II*. Additional to the image was a textual sign off: “There are creepers among us” (Maccampaigns, 2008). However, there was no MAC or government branding to locate the origin or purpose of the teasers. Blogs and discussion forums revealed that there was confusion amongst spectators about what the *creeper* represented:

*Does anyone know what the creeper adverts are about??? (thepregnantchef, 2008).*

*I originally thought it was some sort of campaign started by the Government but it's obviously not. It's not a TV series because I have seen it on channel nine and channel ten. And judging by forums on the internet it is only in Adelaide so it can't be a movie (NattyFTW, 2008).*

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<sup>11</sup> To be discussed in Chapter Five.

*Im assuming they are promo clips or teaser ads for a new show (Penny\*Penny\*Penny, 2008).<sup>12</sup>*

Of course the purpose of a teaser is to whet an audience's appetite for a forthcoming product. The confusion breeds intrigue and this is a desirable outcome for the marketing of the product (Interview Clemenger BBDO, 17/11/10). The point however is that *creeper* and 'creeping over the speed limit' are not necessarily a natural connection for some spectators; as the above bloggers indicate. Similarly, *SkyFatality* (2011) who remarked 'what the fuck did I just watch?' in respect to *Creepers II – Before*, may have viewed it in isolation of its sequels. This blogger may have been confused because they viewed what seemed to be an arbitrary monstrous image and then a textual sign off: 'creeper's think you can't see them, watch out for creepers', which could be interpreted in a number of ways. The branding at the close of *Creepers II - Before* depicts the South Australian Government and MAC emblems. Assuming that the viewer sees this fleeting branding, the government emblem may inspire the correct notions of safety, however not all spectators would know what the acronym MAC stands for. In isolation, the spectator may draw the desired conclusion or it may influence them to discover the meaning of the advertisement (as the bloggers question indicates). Alternatively the confusion may cause the spectator to shut out the image, eliminating its resonance potential. All of these consequences are largely innocuous. However, if the spectator has not viewed all three scenes of the montage and they have no previously assumed knowledge that the concept of the *creeper* relates to low level speeding, then a corruption of meaning, or line of flight, could occur.

To the uninitiated, a monstrous image coupled with truth statements like 'creeper's think you can't see them, watch out for creepers' could be fear inducing. The illusiveness of the branding and sign off, coupled with pop cultural notions of *creep* may lead an uninitiated spectator to deduce that: car-jacking is

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<sup>12</sup> The blogs that are quoted throughout this thesis contain many spelling and grammatical errors. A stylistic decision has been made not to use the [sic] convention to denote these errors, so not to detract from the reader's meaning making of each blog post.

on the rise; or that road rage has reached epidemic proportions; or that sexual predators hunt for their victims on the road. While the message to slow down in the other scenes may enable more clarity, watching *Creepers II – Before* in isolation could lead to an unintended fear that corrupts the intended meaning of text. Similarly, even those spectators who may grasp the desired meaning of the text may experience excessive fearfulness, as the following blogs attest:

*These ads scare the absolute \*\*\*\* out of me (xchloedarkox, 2008)*

*Those “Creepers” ads scare the \*\*\*\* out of me (Farmy, 2008)*

It is likely that the *Creepers* campaign is fear inducing for these bloggers because it borrows from the monster trope of horror film. The notion of monstrosity that *Creepers II* invokes has the capacity for an unproductive fearfulness that instils feelings of helplessness in the spectator.

### ***Unproductive fear***

As discussed in the previous chapter, the constitution of a mode of subjectivity and the subsequent transformation of that subject relies on the presentation of categorical order words. These order words, like all manner of things, are also subject to the chaos of a line of flight. Therefore excess can be produced through a corruption of these transformative order words. One potential line of flight may be that a spectator is not transformed by the order words because they fail to outweigh the fear of monstrosity induced by the text. In this event a fearful subject may determine that the only protection they have against the predatory *creeper* is to ‘slow down’ and conduct surveillance (‘watch out’). There is no indication within the montage that the police are also watching out for *creepers*. Therefore this solution provided by the order words may be inadequate, breeding excessive fearfulness and helplessness in the ethical subject. Similarly, if the spectator only views *Creepers II – Before*, then

the notion of monstrosity invoked may lead to excessive fearfulness without the comfort of the solution that is provided in the sequels. An arbitrary image of a monstrous driver, combined with the truth statement: 'Creepers think you can't see them, watch out for creepers' provides little solution for the ethical subject to take responsibility for their own safety. Additional to potential feelings of helplessness, the ethical subject may not know that a *creeper* is a low level speeder, but may interpret the *creeper* as a car-jacker or something else to be feared. This could heighten possible levels of fear, without providing any real solution to ease the fearful subject's anxiety. In this way *Creepers II* has the capacity to negate agency and enhance feelings of victimhood and helplessness. As such *Creepers II* has the potential to produce, what Halsey coined an "aesthetic of victimhood", instead of an "aesthetic of prevention" (Halsey, 2001, 385).

An aesthetic can be understood as what emerges after a body makes sense of a text. An affective encounter with *Creepers II*, while intending to produce an aesthetic of prevention, could produce an unproductive aesthetic of victimhood (Halsey, 2001, 385). It has this capacity because *Creepers II* informs the fearful subject that *creepers* are lurking on the road and that they need to 'watch out' for them otherwise they might get 'you' (victimhood). Provided the spectator views the sequels to *Creepers II – Before*, this feeling of inevitable victimhood could be prevented if the ethical subject adheres to the order words 'slow down' and 'watch out'. However if these prove inadequate to reduce fear, there are no other transformative order words to enable an active subject to take control and reduce their victimhood. Psychological research into fear inducing advertising campaigns suggest that road safety campaigns of this genre must feature a safe behaviour in order to cope with the threat and enable efficacy (Delhomme et al., 2009). These studies suggest that when the perceived threat and efficacy are high, then danger control processes are initiated; resulting in adaptive behaviour. Alternatively, when the perceived threat is high (through fear inducement) but the perceived efficacy is low (through an inadequate transformative message) then fear control processes commence, resulting in



maladaptive behaviour (Witte, 1992). In this way inducing fear without adequate solace and transformative statements can construct a fearful subject who is docile and not able to take steps to manage their own safety. The maladaptive behaviour, or line of flight, could invoke an unproductive fear that may lead to irrational notions such as: *If the Creeper is out to get me, and I slow down, will he not catch me? Should I speed up, pull over, or slow down? There is no hope, I am on my own.* As Halsey suggests, this silence (or near silence) on the issue of prevention affects the production of the intended aesthetic of prevention (Halsey, 2001, 413). Thus one thing that *Creepers II* can do is become an unproductive fear that contributes to fearfulness on the road and does little to contribute to the ultimate aim of reducing low level speeding. Another alternative consequence is that *Creepers II* increases speeding.

## ***Resistance***

Viewing *Creepers II* may not have the desired effect of constituting an ethical subject who may be responsabilised by messages to 'slow down' and 'watch out' for *creepers*. It must however be acknowledged at this point that travelling over the speed limit is not always intentional. The research that underpins the *Creepers* campaign revealed that low level speeding is caused by: momentary inattention; social conformity (keeping up with traffic flow); bad planning (running late); and a belief of mastery (good driver handling) (Colmar Brunton, July 2008, 6-7). Thus while motivation can vary, travelling above the speed limit may not always be intentional. In this sense resistance should not always to be considered in terms of opposition (Cohen, 1972, xi). Nonetheless this discussion focuses on the actively oppositional spectator of *Creepers II* who has viewed, made meaning of, and then rejected the intended meaning of *Creepers II*. The following blogs are indicative of this type of resistance to *Creepers II*:

*They're not even speeding (Shoe\_, 2008)*

*Has anyone seen the one where the little girl's dog runs out onto the road and she chases after it only to be hit by the car. 5 kmph slower and she'd only have a bruised leg.... 5 kmph faster though and the stupid \*\*\*\*\* would still be on the sidewalk! (TC, 2008)*

These bloggers appear to have rejected the failed status of the undesirable behaviour, actively constituting themselves as failed or deviant subjects. Deviance has been accepted as normative within mainstream criminological scholarship since Durkheim (Herman, 1995, 33-34). Similarly, as discussed in the previous chapter, Foucault also sees resistance as inherent because power circulates and can be appropriated by all (Foucault, 1978, 95). However, for Deleuze resistance is not created by resistant subjects but rather is a line of flight which has a primary determination to resist (Deleuze, 1997, 189). For Deleuze resistance is always already happening and the resistant subject is only constituted because they “install themselves” on these lines of flight (Deleuze, 1997, 189). The resistant or marginal subject installs themselves on such lines through categorical representations of good and bad: like ethical and *creeper*.

In the *Creepers II* campaign the juxtaposition of good and bad are utilised to designate the low level speeder (*creeper*) from the categorical realm of good and into the realm of deviance. In consultation with Colmar Brunton and MAC, Clemenger BBDO created a model to name and classify driving behaviour into convenient categories; depicted in Figure 2.10 (Clemenger BBDO, 2010, 4).



Figure 2. 10

The first category is the *good sort* who drives within the speed limit. The interviewees categorised as ‘good sorts’ made comments like: “You won’t catch me speeding because I don’t” (Clemenger BBDO, 2010, 5). At the other end of the continuum is the *hoon* who apparently hurts others, kills themselves, and kills others. The interviewees labelled as ‘hoons’ made comments like: “I get away with whatever I can” (Clemenger BBDO, 2010, 5). As can be seen, a boundary was erected within speeding discourse between the *good sort* (the law abiding driver) and the *hoon* (the criminal driver). The *do-gooder* was a new category that had to be subsumed into the boundary of criminal.

MAC and its affiliates realised that research revealed that low level speeding needed to be incorporated into this categorical model. The new research revealed that:

*low level speeding as opposed to high-speed was a much greater problem. So basically what those people are doing are, either inadvertently or deliberately, they’re deciding the speed limit isn’t 60 its 65, or whatever it is. For the most part these are people who see this as quite innocent behaviour, it is more than that, it’s accepted, everybody does it, all you have to do is drive down Burbridge Road [a major road in metropolitan Adelaide, South Australia] (Interview with Clemenger BBDO, 17/11/10).*

This additional behaviour did not neatly fit into the category of *hoon* or *good sort* because they did not recognise their behaviour as illicit. Somehow the category of *hoon* required some semblance of intention. Thus the low level speeder was temporarily categorised in the model as *do-gooder* and later as *creeper*. Interviewees within this category made comments like: “A speeder is a Hoon, not me”; “I don’t speed, much”; “I don’t hurt people”; “I don’t show off in my car”; “I don’t drive dangerously”; “I’m responsible”; “I’m a safe driver”; and “I pay my taxes” (Clemenger BBDO, 2010, 8). It is clear from these remarks that the ‘do-gooders’ saw their behaviour as *good* relative to that of the *hoon*, who is dangerous (hurt people), dishonest (don’t their pay taxes) and vain (show off their car). The *do-gooder* does not see their behaviour as illicit but rather as normal, as can be seen in the interview below:

Q. Do you speed?  
A. No.  
Q. So you've never had a fine?  
A. Oh, yeah...  
Q. So you go over the speed limit?  
A. Sure, but not by much, everyone does (Clemenger BBDO, 2010, 6).

This group of drivers viewed their behaviour as being socially acceptable, safe and even ethical despite being fined 30,000 times a year and costing A\$386 million in injury claims each year in South Australia alone (Interview Motor Accident Commission, 23/11/10). The 'do-gooders' rationale can be recognised as a *subjugated knowledge* whereby it conflicts with mainstream knowledge on the issue of the risk of low level speeding. In order to re-categorise this behaviour as illicit the interim category of *do-gooder* (then *creeper*) was necessary in order to shift the boundary between good and dangerousness in regard to speeding, as this comment from a Clemenger BBDO representative indicates:

*So we said, 'look, this is what we need to do' and there is lots of them, thousands of them, all thinking that either what they're doing is okay and normal or don't even know they're doing what they are doing. We need to label them...we need to be damning of their behaviour. So firstly identify who they are and try and create a name that describes what they're doing. And at the same time marginalise them, isolate them, make others look at them and go: 'I'm not one of you or if I am I don't want to be like you' (Interview Clemenger BBDO, 17/11/10).*

What can be deduced from this remark is that the label *creeper* was given to the *do-gooder* as part of an *othering* process. The *do-gooder* joined the master status of *other* but the continuum reveals differing intensities of bad. The sliding degree of severity presented in Figure 2.10 reveals that the *do-gooder (creeper)*: breaks the rules (speed); is punished (fine); destroys property (crash); and hurts themselves. This was deemed as dangerous and irresponsible behaviour that had to be 'marginalised'. Interestingly, the model does not depict the *do-gooder* hurting others, only themselves. However, the truth statement presented in the text ('creepers don't just hurt themselves') suggests that they do hurt other

drivers. Of course this discrepancy is unlikely to be an oversight, as the notion of the *creeper* was developed because of:

*this very chilling kind of stat[istic] that says they are actually killing people and killing themselves and injuring people and injuring themselves in huge numbers (Interview Clemenger BBDO, 17/11/10).*

Nonetheless, in the model the undesirable behaviour of injuring and killing others is reserved for the *hoon*. Interestingly, the vilest behaviour of the *hoon* is not 'killing self and others' but just 'killing others'. Again, this asserts the notion of the damned, dangerous and irredeemable *other*. The *hoon* is irredeemable and therefore it appears far more acceptable for them to kill themselves in a collision than to kill other drivers while surviving. The subtext is: *if a hoon sacrifices himself while carrying out his natural instinct to kill, then this is more acceptable to society*. If however the *hoon* carries out this propensity without also killing himself, then this is the most abominable outcome on the road.

The categorical process that ensued in order to reclassify the low-level speeder (*creeper*) into the category of dangerous *other* reveals the role that knowledge plays in the constitution of subjectivity. In line with labelling theory, criminal types like *hoon*, *bad driver*, *do-gooder* and *creeper* are all dependent upon who defines laws and labels at a particular time. In this case, MAC, Clemenger BBDO and Colmar Brunton highlighted an undesirable behaviour, made something of it through the *Creepers* campaign, and a deviant category was defined. However, in line with social constructionist scholarship this action may very well perpetuate the problem of low level speeding. As Tennenbaum suggested:

*The process of making the criminal, therefore is a process of tagging, defining, identifying, segregating, describing, emphasising, evoking the very traits that are complained of...The person becomes the thing he is described as being (1951, 19-20).*

Whether the labelling of the *creeper* will actually propagate further low level speeding is, of course, something that *Creepers II* could do. Whether it does is

largely unpredictable. Similarly *Creepers II* also has the potential to *become* compliance or alternatively to *become* unproductive fear. What *Creepers II* will *do* to the spectator is not only unpredictable but unfixed. As will be discussed at length in Chapter Six, the *other* (whether *hoon* or *creeper*) and the ethical *self* are unstable and unpredictable modes of subjectivity that are always prone to change. This is what is problematic about the representation of the *other* in *Creepers II*.

## ***The Other***

Interestingly, the *hoon* is not actively noticeable in *Creepers II*. The *creeper* is included in the category of *other* with the *hoon*, but the *hoon* is not present. The ethical subject is not asked to 'slow down' *hoons*, only *creepers*. The absence of the *hoon* in the text has the capacity to affect the spectator in two important ways. Firstly, through binary logic the *creeper* is not like the *good sort*, so by default the *creeper* is just as bad as the *hoon*. It is, of course, an intention of the campaign to inspire such reasoning. Secondly, the absence of the *hoon* in the text may also lead to the conclusion that the *hoon* is so predisposed to dangerousness that they cannot change their failed nature. This notion that *hoons* were unlikely to be transformed by road safety commercials was remarked upon in the interviews with the creators of the *Creepers* campaigns:

*You have to pick your fights. The people who travel 45 km over the speed limit and the habitual offender drink driver, their offending is just a symptom of a problem. Booze is deeply entrenched in some people's lifestyles and it is unlikely that any type of ad can reach them. This small subset is best left to the police. To do an ad which says you will crash and lose your licence is unlikely to resonate with them because it probably has already happened before and they got through it. It kind of reinforces the behaviour each time they do it and survive (Interview Motor Accident Commission, 23/11/10).*

*When you look at road safety as a whole...there will always be, in and around the fatal five...there will be a recalcitrant, marginal group who are a police problem. So drink drivers, the guy that gets pulled up two or three times in his life and he blows anything over .1 is a police problem. He's got personal issues, we are not going to be able to do much, he's probably not even watching TV, he's probably not reading the newspaper and if he is, he's not with us, he's*

*somewhere else. So it is important to recognise, because if you don't you kind of go crazy because you'll be trying to change something you can't." (Interview Clemenger BBDO, 17/11/10)*

Here the *hoon* is described as a 'recalcitrant subset best left to the police'. They cannot be helped or changed; only punished or die as a result of their behaviour. By contrast the *creeper*, now marginalised and categorised as dangerous, is still good(ish). While trying to label and marginalise the *creeper* as *other*, the *creeper* has somehow retained some ethical characteristics. The *creeper* does not 'kill' but only 'hurts'; the *creeper* is not inherently dangerous but can be changed. Seemingly the *creeper* shares characteristics of both the criminal *other* and the ethical *self*. In this way *Creepers II* uses Stephenson's trope of *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* (Stevenson, 2003) in that it splits the monstrous *other* and the ordered normal subject. However it does not go so far as to suggest that the driver has the ability to shift in between the two. This is a problematic representation of the subject because the driver does in fact regularly shift in and out of the realm of good driver and bad driver, as will be discussed in Chapter Six. This shifting of the boundaries of good and bad to incorporate differing intensities of *other* (*hoon* and *do-gooder/creeper*) stops short of acknowledging the blur between ethical and failed subjectivity. Despite this model that feeds into *Creepers II*, the truths and images offered in the text present a clearly dualistic notion of good and bad subjectivity. This supports Foucault's theory that power institutions insist on presenting a dualistic notion of good and evil in order to constitute subjects who will actively manage their own welfare.

The dualistic notion of good and evil is evident in the representation of the *other* in *Creepers II*. The *other* is represented as a monstrous and disfigured driver who is inherently blood thirsty for road carnage. The *creeper* drives one to five km/h over the signed speed limit and 'hurts' and 'kills' other innocent drivers. In contrast the ethical *self* is portrayed as the good neoliberal driver who, in order to protect themselves and others, should actively slow the *other* down by driving below the speed limit. The presentation of these dichotomous subjectivities is problematic because the ethical subject is also a *creeper*. The

creators of the *Creepers* campaigns were aware of this reality, noting that approximately 60% of the drivers interviewed admitted to driving over the speed limit in the past three months and 61% of those speeders admitted that they 'sometimes' travel over the speed limit by one to five km/h (Colmar Brunton, March 2009, 57-8). Invariably, at some point in time the constituted ethical subject who is to be transformed by *Creepers II*, has travelled over the signed speed limit. They may have done it only once or perhaps more regularly. It may not even be deliberate, but rather an inadvertent *creep* over the limit that is later noticed (by a glance at the speedometer or by fine in the post) and perhaps rectified. The point is that most of the spectators of *Creepers II* would be able to recall a time that they have *creeped* over the speed limit. It is just as likely that they can also recall that no property damage, injury or death occurred as a result of this misconduct. This personal experience could lead the otherwise good neoliberal driver to disregard the truths portrayed about the *creeper*: *I am not a monster; I am not the criminal other; Creepers are not the criminal other*. In this way *Creepers II* could fail in its attempt to rebrand low level speeding as illicit because it represents the subject as a fixed entity.

*Creepers II* has the capacity to represent the subject in its true complexity and not as a fixed entity. The text has the capacity to reduce the divide between *self* and *other* in the process of rebranding *creepers* as *other*. However it falls short through the representation of binary notions of subjectivity which conflict with most spectators' experience. A spectator who orientates themselves towards ethical subjectivity but also recalls moments when they have travelled over the speed limit is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, a text that attempts to constitute and transform an ethical subject who is also represented as a failed subject will assuredly lead to unnecessary corruption of meaning. More significantly though, it is problematic because the text is aimed at the ethical subject, while also trying to rebrand the low level speeder as *creeper* through delimited categories. This double purpose may conflict with the visceral understanding of the *self* because most spectators would recall past moments of *creeping* but also past moments of ethical driving. Having this behaviour



depicted as either the actions of an ethical subject or the actions of a failed subject, competes with the ordinary experience of most spectators who have the capacity for both. The binary conception of *creeper* in this text is therefore problematic and inadequate because it does not permit the idea that every driver moves in and out of the proximity of *other* at regular intervals on the road. Nonetheless, while *Creepers II* presents a problematic representation of the *other*, as will be discussed in Chapters Five and Six, *Creepers I* explicates a less problematic representation of subjectivity.

This chapter problematized the representation of the *other* in *Creepers II* in order to highlight the inadequacy of binary representations of subjectivity that will be addressed in Chapter Six. This chapter also traced the excess that can be produced through an affective encounter with *Creepers II*, namely unproductive fear. It was argued that reliance on notions of monstrosity in order to create a productive fear of crime can emerge as unproductive because it can corrupt meaning making in a way that undermines the road safety message. The chapter also showed how the fear of crime can be a productive strategy through the transformation of the ethical subject constituted by the text. In the next chapter the explored texts rely on the fear of crime to constitute a failed subject. Chapter Three will trace a common excess that can emerge through an affective encounter with any three of the focus texts; revealing that one thing that *Pinky*, *Texting*, or *Legend* can do is emerge as an intertextual parody of itself. This will serve to show that an affective encounter not only produces but is productive.

