6 - Unpredictable Subjectivity

The *Creepers* campaign features a series of texts that depict ordinary drivers who mutate into monstrous creatures when they travel in excess of the speed limit. As discussed in Chapter Five, this visual metamorphosis is a less problematic representation of subjectivity than the binary representations of *self* and *other* in the texts that precede it. This transformation from ethical to dangerous and back again accommodates a Deleuzian conceptualisation of subjectivity because it depicts the driver as a *becoming*. This chapter will use the representation of the subject in *Creepers I* to conceptualise the driver as an assemblage that is always already capable of both ethical driving and dangerousness, revealing the inadequacy of binary representations of subjectivity. This Deleuzian reading of the driver suggests that it is impossible to pre-empt how a subject will respond to an advertisement or how they will behave on the road because subjectivity is inherently unpredictable. With reference to the texts explored throughout this thesis, this chapter will address the problems late modern governments face when they use the technology of fear to *molarise*, or restrict, an intrinsically unstable driving subject. The chapter will also discuss the possibilities that can emerge from this governmental strategy and the implications for road safety regulation.

Creeper metamorphosis

Creepers I depicts a driver whose appearance changes from ordinary to monstrous as his behaviour changes from ethical to dangerous. This visual metamorphosis was a creative decision selected by Clemenger BBDO in an effort to reach their target audience:

> *We wanted to make the notion of Creeping anti-social, abhorrent, without being nuts about it…For the most part these people are okay. They're normal people, they are not arseholes. They are you and I. But this thing happens*

when they get behind the wheel and they become something they're not normally, either consciously or unconsciously. So what we knew we had to do was show that change and not be stupid about it…just describe this change in attitude and behaviour which happens when they get behind the wheel. It wasn't anger, it was just this change, this thing that happens that makes them scary (Interview Clemenger BBDO, 17/11/2010).

It is this remark that best illustrates a Deleuzian conception of subjectivity. Creepers are 'normal people', like 'you and I', but sometimes when we drive we 'become something' we are not 'normally'. We become something 'scary' and dangerous but then we return back to 'normal'. This becoming–scary or becoming-dangerous, visually depicted by a monstrous mutation, represents the subject as being in a transition between ethical and failed at different moments on the road. This conceptualisation of subjectivity, the subject becoming other than it was before, arises from the concept of multiplicity.

Multiplicity

The term multiplicity was coined in order to avoid the binary limitations of the multiple and the one (Patton, 2000, 29-30). Multiplicity is not a combination of the multiple and the one but rather the "organisation of the multiple…which does not need unity at all to be a system"; and is in fact irreducible to any unity (Kovacs, 2010, 37; Deleuze et al., 2004b, 36; Deleuze, 1994, 236; Deleuze et al., 2004a, 45). The concept of multiplicity relies on the idea that there are two parts to a multiplicity: the virtual (or *differentiation*) and the actual (or *differenciation*). The virtual aspect of a multiplicity can be viewed as an idea posed as a problem and the actualisation of the multiplicity is the solution to that problem (Deleuze et al., 1994, 209; Patton, 2000, 38). Patton gives the example that survival of the human species is a conceptual problem (virtual) and the solution (actual) to that problem is human society (Patton, 2000, 41). In this way society can be viewed as a multiplicity. In fact every concept, object, body, institution and all manner of things can be conceptualised as a multiplicity.

Road traffic safety advertising can also be conceived as a multiplicity. For example, the virtual problem is: *how do we "make the notion of Creeping...abhorrent, without being nuts about it?"'*(Clemenger BBDO interview, 17/11/2010). The actualisation of that idea is the *Creepers* campaign. Similarly, in *Hurry* (Chapter Four) the virtual problem was: *how can I pick up my son on time*? The actualisation of that idea is a speeding body, as well as a dead body and a grieving body. Conceived as a multiplicity the driving mother in *Hurry* connects with the dead body and the grieving body, who are also multiplicities. She is not only connected with Scotty (the dead body) and his mother (the grieving body) but also: her vehicle; the laws which govern the speed of a vehicle in a suburban street; company policies which may charge parents who do not collect their children from Kindergarten on time; the criminal justice system which may impose consequences for death or injury caused by speeding drivers; and with road safety campaign messages that attempt to reduce speeding in suburban areas. This list is not exhaustive but it does illustrate how the speeding mother is a system of many parts.

The drink driver in *Shame* (Chapter Four) can also be conceived as a multiplicity; a system of many parts that cannot be reduced to a unity. The drink driver is the actualised aspect of a multiplicity whose virtual problem may be: *how can I get my car home after drinking at the pub*? When the drink driver in *Shame* starts his vehicle and enters a road populated with other drivers, or even recalls a past drink driving advertisement, he is connecting with other multiplicities. When this system of connected multiplicities come together each multiplicity becomes part of a complex body, or assemblage (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 9). In this way the driver in *Shame* is part of the driver assemblage which is a system of connected multiplicities that come together on the road. These connections can take place because bodies are composed of three types of lines: molar lines, molecular lines, and lines of flight, all of which rely on flow (Patton, 2000, 86; Halsey, 2006, 76; Deleuze et al., 2004b, 78).

Flow

For Deleuze and Guattari everything that exists is evidence of the existence of a virtual flow of "unformed elements and intensities" (Patton, 2000, 86; Halsey, 2006, 76; Deleuze et al., 2004b, 6, 78). These flows include but are not limited to: population flow, food flow, urban flow, criminal flow, traffic flow and sewage flow (Deleuze et al., 2004a, 156). Flows exist on a virtual surface that Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise as the plane of consistency (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 78). The plane of consistency is a chaotic surface where all manner of unbounded flows ceaselessly traverse. Deleuze indicates:

> *...a person is always a cutting off of a flow... a point of departure for the production of a flow...an interception of many flows (Deleuze 1971 in Halsey, 2006, 76).*

From this perspective all chaotic flows remain unbound on this virtual surface unless they are cut off, intersected and organised by bodies. However these bodies do not completely cut off a virtual flow. For example, the speed sign in *Creepers I* (Figure 5.4) is a body that attempts to capture the flow of traffic and keep it at speeds of 60km/h or less. However the flow of traffic is not completely captured but overflows and mutates to produce different virtual flows, such as flows of blood, petrol, glass, money and criminality; perhaps actualised by a collision caused by speeding. As the example suggests, flow "always exceeds the banks or channels that strive to contain it, forever emerging as surplus" (Tarulli et al., 2006, 190). This surplus is what Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise as a line of flight (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 305). A line of flight is the excess that escapes after a body intercepts unbounded flow. As will be discussed below, molar lines and molecular lines can also be followed when a body intercepts flow. However what is problematic about lines of flight is it is difficult to say where each will lead, as they can end well or end badly (Patton, 2000, 87). Whether a body follows a line of molarity, molecularity or flight relies partly on the interruption of flow by abstract machines.

Abstract Machines

Operating along the lines that make up the actualised aspect of a body is its virtual double, the abstract machine (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 156). The two relevant abstract machines for discussion here are abstract machines of mutation (which *molecularise* a body) and abstract machines of over coding (which *molarise* a body)(Patton, 2000, 45, 66). Abstract machines are "a system of interruptions" that "operate along lines…related to a continual material flow"(Deleuze et al., 2004a, 38). As such their function is to interrupt a flow, cut into the flow in the process of coding bodies, and redirect the flow. From this perspective an abstract machine pilots the movement of body on a molar line or a molecular line (Halsey, 2006, 91; Deleuze et al., 2004b, 157, 564). Bodies are in a constant tension between these molar states (becoming-the-same) and molecular states (becoming-other) and it is abstract machines which code a body in a way that produces one of these states.

Molar states

A molar state occurs when a body travels along rigid lines with clearly defined boundaries and connections. The *molarised* body is limited to the binary and is coded to produce the same: like schools, military institutions and gender (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 556). A relevant example of a *molarised* body is the speeding assemblage, coded by the abstract machine of road traffic law. In all jurisdictions in Australia it is an offence for a person to exceed the speed limit, pursuant to s. 20 of the Australian Road Rules (ARR).[1] The offence of speeding does not require the element of intention (*mens rea*) to be proven in order to fine (or convict) a driver for exceeding the speed limit, and for the most part can

---

[1] The ARR are 'model laws' that were initially created in 1999 under agreement between each Australian state and territory. The purpose of the agreement was to provide uniform road rules across Australia. The ARR was adopted and now forms the basis of the road rules in each state and territory. As the ARR are 'model laws' they have no legislative force of their own but form the basis of the laws in each state.

be considered an absolute liability offence.[2] Effectively this eliminates all defences to the offence of speeding, even if the driver did not know they were speeding (no intention) or if the last speed sign they noticed said 80 km/h but the actual speed limit on the road they were detected on was 60 km/h (honest and reasonable mistake of fact). The speeding assemblage, of which bodies like drivers can connect with, is coded to follow a molar line with clearly defined boundaries like: *exceeding the speed limit is an offence* and *travelling below the speed limit is ethical*. This line restricts movement and resists variation (no defences) on account of the coding of the abstract machine of law which organises and stratifies bodies. However "there is always something that flows or flees…that escapes the binary organizations…and the over coding machine" (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 238).

Even when a body is over-coded by an abstract machine to produce a *molarised* body there is always change, or as Deleuze and Guattari suggest "the stems of the rhizome are always taking leave of the trees"(Deleuze et al., 2004b, 557). A useful illustration of this point is the example of gender. In certain localities gender has been historically considered in purely binary (*molarised*) terms: male or female. This was a molar line that allowed no movement from its clearly defined boundaries denoted not only by penis or vagina but by traditional gender roles. However there is always excess, even within the rigidity of the molar gender assemblage, such as: hermaphroditism, trans-genderism, bi-genderism and androgyny. Likewise, using the example of speeding discussed above, even though the *molarised* speeding assemblage restricts possible defences for exceeding the speed limit, there is always something that escapes.

To use South Australia as an example, an expiation notice that is issued for a speeding offence can be withdrawn if the defendant can show that the offence was trifling in nature.[3] An offence can be considered trifling if: it was committed

---

[2] see *Hearn v McCann* (1982) 29 SASR 448; *Kearon v Grant* [1991] 1 VR 321.

[3] *Expiation of Offences Act 1996* (SA), s. 8A.

for compelling humanitarian or safety reasons; the offence could not reasonably have been averted; or the conduct was merely a technical, trivial or petty breach.[4] Similarly, upon conviction of a speeding offence there is a mandatory imposition of demerit points to be applied to the licence of a driver: one demerit for speeding between one and 14 km/h over the speed limit, three demerit points for speeding between 15 km/h and 29 km/h, and four demerit points for speeding in excess of 30 km/h over the speed limit.[5] An accumulation of 12 or more demerit points in a three year period will result in a three month (or more) driver's licence disqualification. However, if a court is satisfied that the offence is trifling or that any other proper cause exists, it may order that no demerit points are to be incurred.[6] In this way even though the speeding assemblage is over-coded to restrict a defence of speeding, if a driver can satisfy the criteria of trifling the offence can be withdrawn; or at the very least demerit points will not be applied. This example not only reveals the watering down of the 'absolute offence' status of speeding but also shows how change can still exist in molar states.

For Deleuze and Guattari bodies are only ever more or less *molarised*, they are never fixed. Bodies are never fixed in a molar state because one side of the body faces the *strata* and the other side faces the *body without organs* (*BwO*) (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 4). The *strata* is a striated and thick surface that resists and limits movement. When an abstract machine of over coding navigates a body into the proximity of this space, the body is *molarised* (coded to produce the same). The other side of the body faces the *BwO*, which is a smooth and fluid surface that is less restrictive, making it suitable for experimentation (Deleuze et al., 2004a, 10). When an abstract machine of mutation pilots a body into the proximity of this space it is transformed into something else (a molecular state). Subjectivities emerge anew because each body is both free

---

[4] *Expiation of Offences Act* 1996 (SA), s .4 (2).

[5] *Motor Vehicle Act 1959* (SA) s 98B, *Australian Road Rules* 1999, s. 20.

[6] *Motor Vehicle Act 1959* (SA) s. 98B (4).

and capable of following a line of molarity or a line of molecularity (or even a line of flight) at every moment.

Molecular states

Abstract machines of mutation are coded to follow a line of molecularity and produce molecular states. For Deleuze living beings such as humans, animals, plants and the elements are examples of *molecularised* bodies (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 340-41). However, while humans can be conceived as molecular bodies, we are continually more or less *molarised* because we face both the *strata* and the *BwO* and are always exposed to multiple abstract machines at any one moment. For example, the driver in *Shame* can be conceptualised as a molecular body that connects with multiple assemblages. He connects with the traffic assemblage by driving on the road and he connects with the social assemblage by drinking at the pub and playing football with his team. The driver is piloted on a line into the proximity of the molar by the abstract machine of the law when he successfully travels within the speed limit. However, he escapes the molar tendency of this abstract machine when he is navigated by the abstract machines of pleasure and convenience that lead to his drink driving and the death of a young boy. This reading of *Shame* highlights how a molecular assemblage can be more or less *molarised* but is never in a fixed state.

The driver in *Shame* is volatile because he is always in a tension between a more or less *molarised* state. This tension is what makes drivers so risky and unpredictable on the road. Drivers are only temporarily guided by abstract machines of over coding such as: the law, road safety advertising, the failed subject, the ethical subject, and fear. These abstract machines may *molarise* the driver leading to choices like not drinking or not driving. However the influence of other abstract machines of over coding (like convenience and punctuality) combined with abstract machines of mutation (like enjoyment and pleasure) can just as easily result in non-compliance (on this or another occasion). Other

relevant examples already discussed are the abstract machine of horror operating in Creepers II (Chapter Two) and the abstract machine of trauma operating in the texts discussed in Chapter Four. In those chapters both horror and trauma were conferred as carrying the potential to mutate: horror emerging as unproductive fear and trauma emerging as paralysis, or dysfunctional fear. The abstract machines of horror and trauma influence the driver in a way that can interrupt the molarising potential of the desired road safety message. Interestingly, each driver is in a constant tension between these molar and molecular states when they watch road safety advertisements and when they drive on the road. Deleuze and Guattari call this tension *becoming* (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 262).

Becoming

Becoming is the inherent and constant process of change between molar and molecular states within a body, including complex bodies (assemblages).[7] It describes how a body is constantly transformed while still retaining a semblance of its former properties. Deleuze and Guattari describe it as:

> the action by which something or someone is ceaselessly becoming-other (while continuing to be what they are) (Patton, 2000, 78; Deleuze et al., 1994, 177).

It is important to highlight that this process does not produce 'a becoming', but rather the process is *becoming*; it is both noun and verb. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest:

> Becoming produces nothing other than itself. We fall into a false alternative if we say that you either imitate or you are. What is real is the becoming itself (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 262).

From this perspective each person, as a multiplicity, is a *becoming* because a multiplicity is defined, not by its elements, but the sum total of these processes

---

[7] The concept of becoming parallels Nietsche's concept of will-to-power.

of change (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 287). *Becoming* is an ongoing, ceaseless process without "beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, origin nor destination" (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 323). From this perspective when we see a driver speeding via surveillance footage in *Creepers I*, we are not seeing a *creeper*. All that is registering is a snapshot of a part of a process, the complexity of the process cannot be completely captured (Bogue, 2003, 139). The driver is temporarily becoming-creeper but will soon again "be renewed" (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 10).

Becoming-killer

As *becoming* is a transitory process, a *becoming* is best defined by the affects it is capable of when it acts upon or is acted upon by other bodies (Patton, 2000, 79). Deleuze suggests:

> *affects are an emergent effect of the body's manifold encounters, with each encounter transforming that nature of the body's characteristic relations and hence its manifest capacities (Deleuze, 1992a, 217).*

Seemingly, each affective encounter transforms a body, changing its own capacity to affect or be affected. In this way bodies continually emerge through a series of affective encounters which shape its individualised power to act. The body can be named by these affects that it is capable of. For example, the male driver in *Pinky* (Chapter Three) who fails to stop at a pedestrian crossing could be described as driver-becoming-killer. The driver does not actually kill the pedestrian but acts upon her in a way that has the potential to result in her death. This affect is not an actualised transformation into a killer but rather a virtual movement into the proximity of the killer (Gilles Deleuze et al., 1993, 124). Driver-becoming-killer describes the potential that the driving body carries to open a way out that has previously been blocked by the strata and machines of over-coding (Deleuze et al., 2004b, 305). Conversely, the female driver in *Texting* (Chapter Three) who kills several road users can also be described as

driver-becoming-killer. Her texting while driving creates a potential to kill, moving her into the virtual proximity of the killer. In this case the virtual potential (becoming-killer) opens a way out into the actual, resulting in actual (not just potential) death. Through this process her future potential to act could be changed because she may lose her licence or be permanently injured. Similarly she has changed her passengers' future capacity to affect and be affected, as they are now deceased. This change in capacity however is not always negative.

Becoming-ethical

An affective encounter can change a body's power to affect and be affected in positive ways. For example, by entering the virtual proximity of the killer the driver in *Pinky* could change the pedestrian's capacity to be affected, perhaps by inspiring her not to enter pedestrian crossings before looking both ways in the future. Similarly, a recidivist traffic offender (perhaps over coded by peer pressure, habit and machismo) may have an affective encounter with *Pinky* which opens a way out to change their capacity to affect other bodies. In turn this may inspire slower speeds near pedestrian crossings in the future. This is effectively what these road safety advertisements are trying to *do*. They plug into the driver assemblage and then abstract machines navigate the assemblage on either a line of molarity (to continue safe driving behaviour) or a line of molecularity, which recodes bodies and then tries to *molarise* them. These advertisements create an affective encounter with a spectator in the hope that the virtual potential of becoming-ethical opens a way out into the actual and increases road safety. However, and most importantly, these lines are not permanent pathways and the decision to drive at slower speeds may be usurped at some time in the future by time pressures, inattentiveness or peer pressure (Deleuze, 1992a, 222). Intrinsic to this illustration is the idea that there is no fixity in the affective change. Furthermore, the actualised outcome of an affective encounter is not able to be known in advance. This is not to say that

the process of *becoming* is random and uncontrollable but rather only unique and unpredictable.

Difference and repetition

It is difficult to say where an affective encounter might lead because every time a body intersects a flow it is unique and unpredictable (Massumi, 2002b, 222). In order to understand the unpredictability and uniqueness of the process of *becoming* it is helpful to appreciate Deleuze's conceptualisation of difference and repetition.   The Deleuzian conception of difference and repetition rejects Plato's notion of simulacrum (copy) as an image without similarity. Plato saw similarity as the essence of a thing and difference occurring when things lack in similarity. Whereas Deleuze rejects this conceptualisation of simulacrum, seeing similarity as only repetition and not an essence (Deleuze, 1994, 128, 168, 266, 341). As such he perceives a thing as existing by virtue of its difference not its similarity. Difference is an inherently free and chaotic force that can only be harnessed by the cohesion of repetition (Kovacs, 2010, 40). For example, the event of driving is always already chaotic (difference) and is only controlled (or repeated) through traffic signs, advertising, habit, memory, etc.   The manipulation of flow by a speed sign, for example, attempts to secure the *repetition* of the event of driving within the speed limit. However, the lines of flight that escape from this interception of flows ensure that there is "always something that flees"(Deleuze et al., 2004b, 238); there is always *difference* that is not repeated.

Line of flight

There is always surplus that arises from an attempt to constrain flow and therefore there is always difference. In this way an assemblage always has the

capacity to follow a line of flight that produces something other than was intended. This thesis traced the potential surplus that can emerge from an affective encounter with a series of road safety texts, namely: unproductive fear, parody, dysfunctional fear and surveillance. As was addressed in each chapter these lines of flight were sometimes consistent with road safety and sometimes not. It is largely unpredictable to try and determine where a line of flight might lead, or even if a body will travel on one. This is why an affective encounter can lead to either compliance, resistance or some aberration that was not intended. In this sense, not only is spectatorship unpredictable but so is the act of driving. Spectatorship and driving is always unique (difference) and can only be controlled (repeated) through the intersection of flows that attempt to contain it. If spectatorship and driving are always vulnerable to a line of flight then both are unpredictable, which has immense implications for road safety strategies like advertising.

Unpredictability

Describing a line of flight as unpredictable does not denote that anything is possible but rather that everything within a determinable range is possible. In his conceptualisation of the unpredictability of a line of flight (difference not repeated) Deleuze relies heavily on Nietzsche's theory of *eternal return*. Eternal return can be understood as a perpetually repeated throw of the dice (Deleuze, 1994, 252). Each throw of the dice has a distinct set of possibilities which then produce a second and third and fourth set of distinct possibilities. Each set of possibilities are partially determined by the preceding set but there are multiple potential outcomes. The range of possible outcomes are determinable but which outcome will be produced is undeterminable before the throw (Bogue, 2010, 120). Based on the theory of *eternal return* the event of driving produces an endless but determinable set of possibilities. For example, the driver in *Mess* may be speeding or he may not be. A police car may drive past his vehicle and decide to stop him or they may choose not to. The police may activate their

sirens and indicate for him to stop, whereby he chooses to stop or alternatively speeds off in an attempt to avoid the consequences of his behaviour. Alternatively, the police may not travel past the vehicle at all and the vehicle may later be involved in a collision that kills or injures some, all or none of the road users in his vicinity. All of these potential manifestations are determinable because the possibilities are limited to the capacity of each body.

What a body is capable of doing (or becoming) is "determined by the lines of flight which it can sustain" (Patton, 2000, 106). As such, possible throws of the dice are restricted by a body's capacity in the same way that an ordinary dice is restricted to producing the outcome of one through to six (or landing in a crack and producing a corner) but never a seven. For this same reason it is not a possible outcome that the driver in *Creepers I* actually morphs into a monster (limited by the driver's capacity), nor will his vehicle be detected travelling at speeds in excess of 300km/h (limited by the vehicle's capacity). The range of possibilities are determinable but which determinable possibility actually eventuates is unpredictable. Deleuze suggests that all moments of life carry this unpredictable potential for chaos as the possibility of becoming-other is present at every moment (Patton, 2000, 85). Accordingly, at every moment on the road each driver carries the potential to become-other but when it will is impossible to predict. This is clearly an important consideration for the management of road safety.

Emergent subjectivity

This conceptualisation of the unpredictability of *becoming* forms the basis of Deleuze's immanent or emergent subject. Deleuze uses Spinozian ethics to formulate a philosophy of the body according to its encounters, relations, ideas, affects and capacities (Duff, 2010, 624). In doing so he breaks free from the Cartesian theory of subjectivity, *Cognito ergo sum* (I think therefore I am), where the world emerges from the subject. Instead he replaces these traditional

notions of subjectivity with *sentio ergo sum* ("I feel, therefore I am") (Shaviro, 2008), with the subject emerging from the world. This however does not mean that the subject does not possess individuality or a unique identity. Each body has an individualised power to act because:

> *relations and capacities have an amplitude, thresholds… and variations or transformations that are peculiar to them (Deleuze, 1988b, 125).*

Put simply, the subject is unique but emerging from experience; an "interiority in exteriority" or a "subjectless subjectivity" (Bains, 2002, 107). Subjectivity is *emerging* and does not merely *emerge* because identity is not a stable, fixed or persistent entity. Rather it is a process always in passage: a *becoming*. For Deleuze the subject emerges as a product of its capacities and experiences, it is not the precondition of its capacity and experience. From this viewpoint subjectivity is not an essence but an interval of change that leads from being to *becoming*. In this way the subject is not a sovereign body acting upon an external world but rather an assemblage of diverse parts assembled and disassembled through its relational encounters. The subject emerges and re-emerges as each passing encounter is felt and then it collapses and is replaced. This perspective has implications for the functioning of the *other* within crime control scholarship and practice because if a subjective state is merely a temporary outcome of its previous relational encounters, how can it be said that a person is a dangerous driver, or even a good driver?

Self and other

Deleuze's emergent subjectivity serves to highlight the problem with the Hegelian tradition of *self* and the *other* sustained in crime control theory and practice. Hegel believed that when we view a separation between ourselves and another a feeling of alienation results, leading us to try and synthesise our differences; thus creating a *self* through *othering* (Foucault et al., 1980, 113). As discussed at length in Chapter One, the *other* is different and thus percieved as

being reckless, criminal, indecent and dangerous. In this way the *other* becomes the object of our fears (Halsey, 2001, 413).   All of the texts examined in Chapters Two to Five utilise this notion of *othering* through the presentation of categories like good/bad and ethical/dangerous. These categories serve to constitute a failed subject (except *Creepers II* and *Legend* which constitute an ethical subject) and then use fear to motivate that newly constituted subject towards desirable driving behaviours. All of the texts present the *other* as a dangerous, bad, monstrous, rejected or reckless identity that must then be compared and contrasted by the spectator. If the text *works* then it will promote reflexivity and lead to more desirable modes of subjectivity. As such *othering* is an essential feature of how these texts *work*. If a spectator does not try to synthesise their difference or similarity with the portrayed subject then how will they align themselves and thus be transformed? While necessary, what is problematic about binary distinctions like self/other, dangerous/ethical or criminal/law abiding is that they neglect the potential for change and innovation.   The emergent subject does not fall neatly into binary schemas.

Unlike traditional (Cartesian) conceptions of subjectivity the notion of an emergent subject accepts change as a fundamental feature of subjectivity. For example, the driver in *Pram* is *other* because he kills a woman and destroys a family as a result of his dangerous behaviour. The label is applied without an expiry; he is the perpetual *other*. It does not matter that he has never killed anyone else on the road before, or that he may never again. It does not even matter if he has never travelled over the speed limit before, or never does again. The process of *othering* sets him apart from the ethical subject and he is forever estranged by this binary divide. Similarly, the driver in *Texting* is *other* because her dangerous act of texting while driving causes multiple deaths, including her two passengers. The binary schema categorises and excludes her from her victims; she is killer not victim. This is of course problematic because she is also a victim, having suffered serious injuries as well as embarking on a future filled with grief. This moment of dangerousness not only fails to be representative of her previous relational encounters but does not adequately depict those in her

future. How can she possibly be designated as dangerous *other* if her injuries result in paraplegia and prohibit her from driving again? These limitations can be overcome if drivers are comprehended as a *becoming* and not characterised by a single moment of dangerousness.

Driver-becoming-other

Depicted as a *becoming* a driver's previous ethical and failed behaviour, as well as their victim status (physical and mental injury), collect together as a series of affective encounters that compose and decompose their identity. When the driver in *Pram* is recognised as a driver-becoming-dangerous he can be seen as having emerged from a dangerous relational encounter without being forever inscribed as dangerous. Similarly when the driver in *Texting* is depicted as a driver-becoming-victim it allows enough space in the category to account, not only for her injuries, but also her dangerousness. In this sense labels like 'good driver' and 'dangerous driver' are the naming of a fleeting moment within an emerging subjectivity; they are not an essence. The morphing that occurs to the driver in *Creepers I* graphically illustrates this emergence from desirable to dangerous and back again. It depicts these moments of dangerousness as temporary outcomes of the driver's relational encounters, which will collapse and re-emerge as something other as quickly as it arose. *Creepers I* illustrates the virtual change into the monstrous *other*, whereas usually we would only see the actuality of these moments of dangerousness retrospectively. Importantly, this virtual monster is not a fixed position on a pathway from law-abiding to criminal or even criminal to law-abiding but rather is a line, always only in passing. This conceptualisation of subjectivity has the potential to overcome the limitations of the traditional (Cartesian) binary representation of the subject.

The depiction of the emergent subject in *Creepers I* has the capacity to reduce the perpetuation of the *other* as outcast. The traditional Cartesian subject, while somewhat useful for the efficient management of populations,

fails to represent the driving subject in its full complexity. We are not on a pathway to crime or to desistance but rather are always already transitioning between different modes of subjectivity. Whether this transition will manifest as ethical or failed depends on countless factors; only one of which is whether the sum total of road safety advertisement spectatorship successfully changes the driver's behaviour. For this reason it is suggested that traditional binary notions of subjectivity are inadequate because our nature is not about essence, it is about modification (Massumi, 2002b, 7). If the criminal o*ther* is a fleeting and transitory state and not an essence to be possessed then how can the conventional *othering* that exists in crime control scholarship and practice be productive? When governments convey messages about crime, like those contained in the road safety regulation advertisements explored in this thesis, they are trying to construct an ethical *self* or criminal *other* in a world where only multiplicities exist. The notion of the subject as *self* or *other* is problematic because these are never fixed points but rather unpredictable lines that are always already transforming.

This conceptualisation of an emergent subjectivity has the capacity to dissolve our nuanced functioning of the *other* in crime control scholarship and practice for two reasons. First, as a *becoming* we continually pass in and out of a virtual state of *otherness* as we transition between modes of ethical subjectivity and modes of failed subjectivity. From this perspective we can appreciate that we are all *other* some of the time. Secondly, as a multiplicity we are a system of connections that is infinitely connected to the *other* through relational encounters. The dangerous *other* affects the ethical *self* and can be affected upon by the ethical *self*. As such the divide between the *other* and the *self* is abridged because "there is no longer an identity that can return to itself, "I" has become an other" (Rodowick, 2010, 185). We have a relationship to the gaze in a way that our assessment and judgement of *other* is inverted and projected inward. Thus to treat moments of failed subjectivity as the acts of an *other* is not only fruitless but destructive; because we are *other*. Therefore, if road safety advertisements replace the perilous Cartesian construction of *self* and *other* with

a conception of the subject that acknowledges transitory and unpredictable constructions of subjectivity (Rodowick, 2010, 185) not only may it reduce the status of *other* as outcast, but it may also improve attempts to change driver behaviour.

Behaviour change

Road traffic regulation advertisements attempt to resist movement and variation in the subject that can lead to unsafe roads. When a driver transitions from travelling within the speed limit to travelling in excess of the speed limit, the driver is transitioning from a more *molarised* state to a more molecular state. However, *molarisation* should not be confused as being always consistent with ethical subjectivity. Sometimes change (and not stasis) is necessary in order to constitute ethical subjectivity; road traffic regulation advertisements being a perfect example. Road traffic regulation advertisements, like those explored in this thesis, attempt to change (*molecularise*) the behaviour of drivers and not promote continuation of the same (*molarisation*) undesirable behaviours. As such road traffic regulation advertisements need to be coded in a way that creates a molecular state in the driver, or put more simply, changes behavioural habits. However, when road safety advertisements attempt to change behaviour through the presentation of the delimited binary category of dangerous *other* and ethical *self*, they are promoting stasis.

By only representing two fixed positions for the spectator to align themselves with the texts explored in this thesis (save for *Creepers I*) are restricting the potential for the spectator to be changed (molecular states). This is the case because most drivers will be unable to align themselves into either absolute category. This is particularly the case for speeding because a substantial proportion of 'ethical' drivers have either exceeded the speed limit without consequence (*othering* has not occurred) or have unwittingly exceeded the speed limit and only become aware of the 'failed' behaviour through the delivery

of an expiation notice (no intention to be *other*). As has been discussed at length in Chapters Two to Five of this thesis there is a proportion of spectators who will reject the texts because they cannot align themselves with the dangerous driver depicted. What is happening in the virtual here is that the abstract machine of the *failed subject,* which is coded to produce a molecular state in the driver, is defeated by the over coding of the abstract machine of the *ethical subject*. Moving away from the virtual and into the actual, the spectator does not align themselves with the representation of the dangerous *other* and therefore defers to the only other provided mode of subjectivity: the ethical subject who is coded to produce the same. If the dominant abstract machines at play in the texts are coded to *molarise*, then the desired outcome of behaviour change will be restricted. For this reason it is suggested that road safety advertisements that depict the absolute positions of *self* and *other* carry the potential for less molecular moments (change) and more molar tendencies (same).

While the presentation of the binary categories of *self* and *other* appear on the surface to be a strategy consistent with the efficiency principles of late modern governmentality, it is likely that this kind of technology creates molar tendencies when molecular moments are intended. In order to increase the efficiency of this technology, promote behaviour change and better manage this population, representations of the subject need to be more representative of the spectator. Many drivers recognise in themselves a mixture of ethical and failed driving moments, therefore governmental messages about road safety need to represent the driver in a way that increases the capacity for the spectator to align with the text. *Creepers* I has this capacity because it allows the spectator to draw on all of their collective experiences, both failed and ethical, strengthening the relational encounter with the text. In doing so *Creepers I* not only acknowledges emergent subjectivity but also creates enough space to both *molarise* and *molecularise* the emergent subject as required. By doing this it has increased the text's capacity to act and thus increased the number of relational encounters with spectators. By depicting the driver as a *becoming, Creepers I*

can affect the spectator in a way that increases receptivity to messages like 'creeping is wrong' and 'stop creeping'. In turn the spectator can affect others by slowing down when they drive. This molecular tendency not only increases the power to act of the text and the driver but ultimately increases the governing body's power to act; which is perhaps best demonstrated by the numerous effectiveness awards that the creators of the *Creepers* campaign have received.

Managing heterogeneity and uncertainty

Even though the *Creepers* campaign has been recognised for its effectiveness in changing the undesirable behaviour of road users, this does not necessarily manifest as safer roads. Like subjectivity and spectatorship, the flow of traffic is largely unpredictable. A driver may intend to drive ethically and safely but rough bitumen, a nearby high speed pursuit by police, or even a badly timed sneeze could lead elsewhere. Governments attempt to regulate the unpredictable flow of traffic through signs, fines and surveillance but there are always lines of flight (excess) that escape capture. Similarly, government messages about road safety always produce excess, whether it is: unproductive fear, parody, dysfunctional fear, surveillance, or something else. As Chapters Two to Five showed, what is residual from an affective encounter is not always negative or even positive, it is just something different that may or may not be anticipated. The same is the case on the road. There will always be excess which will manifest itself as injury, collisions, break downs, near misses and death. This is the nature of a line of flight: you cannot know where it might lead in advance (Patton, 2000, 87). Therefore to construe the event of driving as being predictable and able to be regulated is to ignore the excess. Every event of driving carries conditions of anomaly and therefore there will always be danger on the road. This is not a deliberately nihilistic statement but rather a recognition that road safety regulation is an attempt to govern "extreme uncertainty" (O'Malley 2011). It is extremely uncertain because *becoming* is an ongoing and ceaseless process without beginning or end. The subject is unpredictable, the road is

unpredictable, spectatorship is unpredictable, and what government messages about road safety will become is unpredictable.   Road safety regulation is not a hopeless pursuit it is the management of an unpredictable population and an uncertain setting. The heterogeneity of the road, the spectator and the subject clearly makes it problematic to manage driving populations.

A recent publication, *Best Practice in Road Safety Mass Media Campaigns* from the Centre of Automotive Safety Research of Australia (CASR) acknowledges this heterogeneity and uncertainty on the road (Wundersitz, 2011).   The report rejects the use of "one-size-fits-all"(Wundersitz, 2011, 2) campaigns and acknowledges that "an audience is not a passive receiver" (Wundersitz, 2011, 10). In effect the report can be seen to acknowledge, not only the heterogeneity of the road but also subjectivity and spectatorship. To deal with such heterogeneity, government messages about road safety would need to be "subtly yet importantly nuanced" for each and every driver and spectator (Halsey and Young 2006, 276).   Realistically however, governments cannot be concerned with every micro-movement of every person and vehicle on the road (Massumi, 2002b, 203).   To tailor or customise a road safety message (Wundersitz, 2011, 11) for each and every individual would not only be impossible but also inconsistent with the late modern governmental practice of targeting populations over individuals.

The CASR report proposes best practice guidelines on how best to target driving populations, informed by psychological research in the field. The findings suggest that an effective campaign must segment the target audience "into meaningful homogenous subgroups based on important characteristics" (Wundersitz, 2011, 10) and then to "tailor the message to the motivation and needs of these subgroups" (Wundersitz, 2011, iii). The report includes within these meaningful subgroups correlates like: age, gender, socio-economic status, and personality (Wundersitz, 2011, 4); as well as demographic, geographic and behavioural characteristics (Wundersitz, 2011, 10). Of course the problem with segmenting populations into homogenous subgroups is that subjectivity is

heterogeneous and largely unable to be pinned down into "meaningful" subgroups. As discussed at length above the subject is continually made anew and so targeting can (and will) miss a subgroup. This is further exacerbated by the heterogeneity of the road, whereby a successfully targeted subject is still at the mercy of other drivers and other conditions (weather, visibility, vehicle type and condition). Delimited categories like subgroups can restrict movement and variation and therefore prevent the desirable behaviour change. Nonetheless it is acknowledged that the promotion of target grouping is an economical technology which attempts to efficiently manage populations on the road, in contrast to the expense of tailoring to the individual, and as such should not devalue the worth of the CASR report.

The trans-theoretical model of change

One of the most pertinent 'best practice' findings from the CASR report suggested that there has been a failure in the past to underpin road safety advertising with strong theoretical foundations. One of the theories presented in the CASR report, referred to as one of "the most widely used psychological theories in behaviour change" (Wundersitz, 2011, 9) is the *trans-theoretical model of change*. Interestingly, this model is the same theoretical model that underpinned the *Creepers* campaign (Interview Colmar Brunton, 18/11/2010). The model proposes a series of stages through which a person will progress before a new behaviour is established (Wundersitz, 2011, 8). The first stage is *pre-contemplation*, whereby the driver has no consideration or intention to change an undesirable behaviour. The second stage is c*ontemplation*, where the driver becomes aware of the undesirable behaviour but sees the costs and benefits of the behaviour as equal (Wundersitz, 2011, 9). The third stage is *preparation* where the driver's efficacy is high, resulting in some reduction of the undesirable behaviour (Wundersitz, 2011, 9). The fourth stage, *action,* accounts for the phase where effort is required to continue this periodic reduction in the undesirable behaviour (Wundersitz, 2011, 9). It is this stage that is the most

unstable as the risk of travelling backward on the continuum is very high. The fifth stage is *maintenance*, whereby the desirable behaviour becomes habitual but there are still relapses when under pressure (Wundersitz, 2011, 9). The final stage is *termination*, when the desirable behaviour is said to be established and there is little temptation to return to the undesirable behaviour (Wundersitz, 2011, 9). While this model segments the subject in a way that pins down and delimits subjectivity, it still carries greater capacity for change than the traditional notions of ethical *self* and failed *other*. The model recognises that each stage is not a linear progression but rather that individuals may move backward and forward along the continuum (Wundersitz, 2011, 9). In this way the model has more molecular tendencies because it acknowledges heterogeneity.

The model has the potential to acknowledge heterogeneity because it is not limited by the usual binary frameworks applied to modes of subjectivity. The model has the capacity to account for emergent subjectivity because: it accounts for not being exposed to the commercial (p*re-contemplation*); it accounts for moments of distraction (*maintenance*); it accounts for moments of inattention (*preparation*); it accounts for success (*termination*); and it accounts for ambivalence (*contemplation*). The model neglects to cover one important outcome which was remedied by Colmar Brunton in their use of the model for the *Creepers* campaign:

> *We've actually added a stage; we say the first stage is that of Rejection. At Rejection people have considered the desired behaviour….and have thought about driving on or below the speed limit, probably recognise the consequences of not doing that, but have decided that regardless they are going to drive over the speed limit. So they reject the desired behaviour (Interview Colmar Brunton, 18/11/2010).*

With the inclusion of the *rejection* stage the altered model even tolerates those moments when drivers decide to undertake a dangerous behaviour despite having seen (and perhaps even accepted) the consequences portrayed by a road safety advertisement. Together these stages countenance six potentialities of

the emergent subject, instead of restricting representation in a binary fashion. However, this is not to say that the model is completely aligned with the notion of the emergent subject.

While the model acknowledges that the subject oscillates it does not account for the lines of flight that emanate from an affective encounter with a road safety text. The model is limited by the categories it erects, as the representative of Colmar Brunton indicates:

> It's certainly not impossible that somebody could go from Maintenance to Rejection. And we say at Maintenance, even then people need a rewarding and reminding …and if something goes horribly wrong they could shift back to Rejection, and certainly fluctuations between…We see that in our data. Fluctuations between Action back into Maintenance…even Contemplation to Action, they can shift backwards." (Interview Colmar Brunton, 18/11/2010)

While the subject may shift backward, the model does not account for when the subject shift side-ways and does something unexpected, such as create a parody, conduct surveillance, or be consumed by fear. However, while incomplete, this model (and *Creepers I*) stakes out a space for a fuller representation of the driving subject. While it is not an arrival, it is a significant step in the direction of a conceptualisation of the emergent subject within road safety discourse. The notion of the emergent subject is important for road safety discourse because it acknowledges the heterogeneity of subjectivity and in doing so can create molecular moments in road safety regulation that lead to desirable behaviour change.

Management through variation

Fortified with a theoretical model that accounts for the emerging subject road safety regulation can foster greater behaviour change. If the driver is recognised as perpetually oscillating between ethical moments and moments of failure, governing bodies can tailor regulation technologies in a way that breeds change and not stasis. Logically, the best way to promote behaviour variation

(molecular moments) is through a variation in the way that the undesirable driving behaviour is represented. A variation in content, form, style, frequency and intensity will increase the power to act of road safety regulation advertisements. A variation in content would require regulating bodies to ensure that they scroll between messages concerning: the harmful consequences of the behaviour (such as injury, death and property damage to self or others); the legal consequences of the behaviour (detection by police, fines); the social consequences of the behaviour (exclusion, loss of licence, grief); as well as education campaigns about new laws and ways to plan for and prevent the behaviour. A variation in form would necessitate exposure by: television, radio, cinema, newspapers, magazines, flyers, direct mailing, face to face, telephone, emails, internet forums, viral marketing, websites, billboards, and bus advertising. Furthermore, the potentials of new forms of media should be explored.

A recent example of a new form of media that targets school children is a face to face driving program that was piloted in Adelaide and Tasmania[8] in 2012, called *CAMS ignition*. Funded by the *Confederation of Australian Motor Sport* (CAMS) the project attempts to teach 12 to 18 year olds "good driving habits before they can pick up any bad habits from their parents or friends" (or ironically, from motor sport) (ABC, Aug 21, 2012). The program gives high school students five 3 hour lessons behind the wheel of a vehicle in order to teach them the skills that the driving licencing system is missing out (CAMSMotorSport, 2010). As a spokesperson for the initiative stated:

> *What we aim to do is to try and show them that having a license is one thing,*
> *but having the right attitude towards driving is another thing and to prevent*
> *them from becoming part of those statistics that is involved in road deaths and*
> *fatalities (CAMSMotorSport, 2010).*

The program is CAMS' contribution toward the *United Nations' Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020*, which aims to reduce road deaths and injuries across

---

[8] Australia.

the world (Confederation of Australia Motor Sport, 2012). This program is a worthy variation in form that actually attempts to *molarise* young drivers by promoting "good driving habits before they can pick up any bad habits"(CAMSMotorSport, 2010). This variation in form may mean that the school aged participants may not need to be *molecularised* by behaviour change advertisements in the future because they are coded to follow a line of molarity that manifests as an ethical mode of subjectivity.

Behaviour change can be further promoted through variation in frequency and intensity, as well as variation in style. A high level of exposure to each message, followed by a quick turn-around to a new message, is likely to keep the messages 'top of mind' but prevent 'wear out'[9] (which is likely to occur between 10 and 15 exposures) (Naples 1979 in Wundersitz, 2011, 17). However in order to best capture the emergent subject, the frequency and intensity of a message about road safety should also be varied. In line with this the CASR report promotes a variation between burst advertising (high frequency and high intensity), continuous advertising (high frequency and low intensity) and intermittent advertising (low frequency and high intensity) (Wundersitz, 2011, 17). Similarly, an intermittent variation in style should also be utilised in order to increase the advertisement's power to act in a way that leads to ethical modes of subjectivity. Tropes should be varied between humour, excitement, hope, satisfaction, fear, guilt, risk, and shock. Relying on one approach alone can create a molar tendency in the style and resist the desired molecular moments of behaviour change.

Fear

There is a great deal of research which looks at the limitations of exposure to fear and shock campaigns (Colmar Brunton, March 2009; Fuller, 2007; Hastings et al., 2004; Lewis et al., 2007). Most of this research suggested that shock

---

[9] The message is fatigued and fails to resonate.

tactics and extreme emotion should be avoided because it is high risk. It is considered high risk because fear and shock can be:

> counterproductive…as individuals may believe that they are unable to protect themselves from the threat, resulting in defensive and maladaptive responses (Wundersitz, 2011, iv).

This is indeed consistent with the findings in this thesis, whereby the unintended excess can lead to unproductive fear (Chapter Two) or dysfunctional fear (Chapter Four) that is obviously 'counterproductive' to the aim of reducing undesirable driving behaviours. There is also a suggestion in the research that exposing a person, against his or her will, to harmful or seriously offensive images may not only create unnecessary anxiety but may also be unethical (Hastings et al., 2004, 972).

While shock and awe campaigns have the capacity to create unproductive or dysfunctional fear in the spectator, this does not negate their usefulness. All of the texts explored in this thesis have been selected on account of their use of the affective device of fear. Throughout the discussion concerning these texts it has been shown that fear as a technology can transform the failed subject toward ethical modes of subjectivity. Fear campaigns obviously have their place, as the representative from Colmar Brunton who worked on the *Creepers* campaign suggests:

> to shock them with the information about you will kill your mate, or you can kill a kid - there's blood and guts everywhere - actually has a role because it may well shift them into thinking, at least thinking about, maybe I shouldn't be doing this anymore (Interview Colmar Brunton, 18/11/10).

In this way shock and awe campaigns have a vital role in road traffic regulation because fear is laden with affect. This potency can affect the spectator who may then affect others through moments of ethical subjectivity. It is a power to act forged through fear. However, fear alone is not enough and other affective devices should be used in order to increase the likelihood that a population of

spectators and drivers may be affected and constituted into ethical subjects at integral moments on the road.

Fear is a useful technology for governing road safety regulation, however, like all government messages about crime, it can never be entirely controlled. Sometimes it will lead to resistance, sometimes compliance, sometimes unproductive fear (Chapter Two) and dysfunctional fear (Chapter Four) and sometimes something unintended but largely benign like humorous parody (Chapter Three) or surveillance (Chapter Five). Government messages about road safety must not only rely on fear alone, but should vary in content, form, style, frequency and intensity so not to stifle potential molecular moments. While aberration can never truly be annulled, variation can increase a road safety texts' power to act, thus increasing the potential power to act of the government body behind it. This is the constructive value of the analysis that forms this thesis. If government messages about road safety depict a more accurate representation of subjectivity and provide variations in content, form, style, frequency and intensity in that depiction, then more spectators may be convinced to drive safely. Therefore the notion of the emergent driving subject has a very practical *biopolitical* outcome: our roads may be safer.

This chapter explored the impacts and potentialities of road safety advertisements on behavioural change. The chapter used the texts discussed in Chapter Two to Five as devices to conceptualise the driver as an emergent subject. The chapter explored the unpredictability of the road, of spectatorship and of subjectivity, and utilised these to promote variation in approaches to road safety advertising. The chapter also proposed that the conceptualisation of the emergent subject carries the potential to eliminate the perpetuation of the 'bad' driver as *other*. The conclusive remarks that follow consider whether this suggestion can be taken out of the closed context of road safety and into the domain of more mainstream areas of criminology.