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Master of International Development

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Refugee admission, at what cost to Turkish society?

The limits of closed forms of political community in the provision of asylum

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree Master of International Development, 18 June 2021.

Declaration

I certify that this thesis:

1. does not incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and
2. to the best of my knowledge and belief, does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text."

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Date: 18 June 2021

Synopsis

The evolution of the international protection regime in response to mass migrations since the Second World War has sustained the scholarly interest in human rights in the interdisciplinary field of Refugee Studies. Myriad countries, notably in Europe, have borne the impacts of mass-scale people movement, which have seen to permanent demographic shifts in the composition of societies with respect to culture, ethnicity, fertility rate and political ideology. Studies on the effects of migration primarily focus on the loss and gain of labour, skilled workers, and capital for the countries of origin and destination countries, specifically in terms of labour market needs and integration. However, there remains to be a gap in the scholarly evaluation of the impacts of migration on society at large in the Development Studies field of literature. With reference to this thesis, the impact of irregular migration is the phenomenon in question. Impacts are yet to be analysed using concepts of human security and political community in relation to the host or receiving society experience. Put simply, the social experiences of hosts, in their interaction with migrant populations are by and large, neglected in the literature. For this reason, there is an opportunity to proceed with inquiry into this subject, specifically to explore how the experiences of both parties in coexistence are not mutually exclusive, and further, how cohabitation can manifest into situations of illbeing across the board and political destabilisation. The purpose of this thesis is to examine Turkey's contemporary threshold, as a host nation, for absorbing the Syrian refugees, without endangering social cohesion within its political community. To do so, the thesis will employ the analytical prisms of International Development in asking the following question: refugee admission, at what cost to society? To answer this question, the author employs the frame of human security and other key concepts in development studies thinking, to explain modern-day human vulnerabilities in the humanitarian, albeit unconventional refugee setting—the urban setting—in Turkey. The author finds that extending refuge to new arrivals has caused socioeconomic redistribution, has fuelled host grievances towards refugees, and ultimately, has led to a breakdown of social cohesion in Turkish society, based on the following arguments: development is a non-linear process; pre-existing [developmental] conditions predispose society to certain socioeconomic outcomes; and finally, when socio-political costs outweigh that of local level gains, society surpasses its threshold, as a host nation for refugees, hence to the detriment of its management of social cohesion. Moreover, society experiences a social tipping point.

Acknowledgements

My sincere gratitude goes to Dr. Maryanne Kelton, my supervisor, Dr. Susanne Schech and Dr. Michael Barr for their tireless support and invaluable contributions to the production of this thesis.

To Ruth… my dearest mother, for instilling in me, perseverance, and an enduring love of learning.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

> "Some people believe that the very distinction between permanent and temporary migration is breaking down, and that we will soon be living in a world of "superdiversity" with a multitude of legal statuses that are neither wholly temporary nor wholly permanent, but rather, have varying degrees and levels of conditionality and precariousness. I am far from sure that such a world is desirable. I am even less sure what would be the source of solidarity in such a world of liquid mobility."[1] – Kymlicka, 2015.

Forced migration is an humanitarian crisis, albeit one with developmental impacts, central the theme of human rights and justice. This owes primarily to the experience of persecution and other human rights abuses associated with violence that occurred in wartime during the 1930s, right through until the post-Cold War period and in civil wars that still occur in the current day. Such as, the persecution of Serbs, Palestinian Arabs and Kurds, the ethnic cleansing of Greeks in Cyprus, the Cambodian and Rwandan genocides, the case of Rohingya Muslims, and the Uyghurs of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in Northwest China. The Holocaust had much to do with how states came to respond to victims of human rights abuses in the early years;[2] all subsequent occurrences of maltreatment, the extermination of minorities and generalised violence have since sustained the international protection regime as it applies to such cases today.

In line with this focus on the rights of the individual, and the shift in the prevalence of interstate war-induced refugees to those of civil wars, is the paradigm that emerged out of the post-Cold War period that places the onus on individual well-being and security, in contrast to traditional state-centric notions of such. Termed "human security," this line of thinking is widely applicable to the experiences of insecurity arising out of coexistence with refugees. Preliminary works have paid vast attention to refugee experiences in the literature, with this focus on human development, which have since paved the way for more recent works that pay critical attention to the host society experience, in the literature on the same subject. Such as this thesis,

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[1] Will Kymlicka, "Solidarity in diverse societies: beyond neoliberal multiculturalism and welfare chauvinism," *Comparative Migration Studies* 3, no. 1 (2015): 19.

[2] Gil Loescher, "Human Rights and Forced Migration," in *Human Rights: Policy and Practice*, 2nd ed., ed. Michael Goodhart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 220.

importantly, which will analyse the experience of host populations in Turkey—a country that, at the time of writing, plays host to the largest number of Syrian refugees in the world. The study and the push to understand such a complex phenomenon, hence grew out of a widespread recognition that a more systematic and nuanced analysis of the problem was needed.

This is arguably owing to the other recognition that forced migrants, like voluntary migrants, are economic actors. The latter group tend to hold typical aspirations for human progress in the way that they build their livelihoods, assuming good citizenship in this instance, whereas the former group are more driven by aspirations of survival and subsistence living, and in theory are generally more constrained by structural forces such as restrictions on mobility, work, and their general integration into society. Integrating into a society involves more than individual aspirations, however; it involves the interests of the group, community, or the polity. Integration, therefore, like these interests, is governed on the principle of equity in outcome for the members of that polity. As such, meeting the basic needs of all political members or citizens, refers to the public affairs of a *political community*. Fellow citizens generally share common enterprise in ethnoculturally homogenous groups, but otherwise might be closed off to newcomers, who are different. The latter scenario is probable when members of a political community are vying for limited resources—to meet their basic needs—which becomes a contest with outsiders.

In practice, therefore, forced migrants' behaviour has more to do with their agency and ability to strategise and be skilful enough to integrate into society irregularly, where such freedom under formal arrangements is not an option. Forced migrants are not only incentivised to leave their countries by the relative "push" factors compelling their need for refuge, but also, tend to concentrate in areas within host societies that are outside of designated encampments, namely in cities or urban areas. These localities act as "pull" factors for irregular existence, and the urban factor of refugeeism—along with the conception of precarity—is a pervasive component to the nature of refugee inflows in the 21st century. These conditions are in one part set by the international protection regime, whereby not all refugees bear its protection. Betts terms these such actors "survival migrants," as people who "have left their country of origin because of an

existential threat for which they have no domestic remedy."[3] In another part, the conditions ripe for irregular movement and integration are set by the forces of globalisation.[4] Echeverria explains these conditions as those that can be attributed to a radical shift away from the Fordist economic model of mass-scale manufacturing of production structures, unified labour markets and unionised industrial relations, toward the neoliberal economic model, characterised by autonomous global markets, the free flow of goods, capital and information, Washington Consensus development, and the demand for cheap, flexible and unprotected labour.[5] Thus, it is common for such migrants to be working as informal labour, both in the informal labour market or the underground economy, in lesser developed countries where the incidence of refugees is high, as well as is the proportion of Gross Domestic Product attributed to informal and underground economies.[6]

This is congruent with the ever-increasing prevalence of migration and the desire of states to regulate migration on the premise of vast security and economic concerns.[7] A key explanation for this, is that conventional asylum policies have been geared to "contain" irregular migrants who constitute potentially threatening agents for host states in security discourses, wherein the state is the referent object of security. Responding to the issue of irregular migration (irregular refugees in this instance) is thus an extension of the state function, albeit within the framework

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[3] Alexander Betts, "Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework," *Global Governance* 16 (2010): 361.

[4] Güven Sak, Timur Kaymaz, Omar Kadkoy, and Murat Kenanoglu, "Forced migrants: labour market integration and entrepreneurship," *Economics* 12, no. 32 (2018): 2, 13A. https://doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2018-32.

[5] Gabriel Echeverria, *Towards a Systemic Theory of Irregular Migration: Explaining Ecuadorian Irregular Migration in Amsterdam and Madrid* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020), 50.

[6] Gabriel Echeverria, *Towards a Systemic Theory of Irregular Migration: Explaining Ecuadorian Irregular Migration in Amsterdam and Madrid* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020), 27.

[7] Asya Pisarvevskaya, Nathan Levy, Peter Scholten and Joost Jansen, "Mapping migration studies: An empirical analysis of the coming of age of a research field," *Migration Studies* 8, no. 3 (2020): 456.

of international protection. Given the climate of fear attributed to 21st century problems—terrorism, transnational networks of crime, non-state actors, asymmetric warfare, protracted and self-perpetuating civil wars, environmental fragility, increasing interconnectedness and the transnational mobility of goods and capital—it is argued that in this era, state function has become "deterritorialised" and "denationalised."[8] All of these issues are compounded by the context of globalisation, especially owing to more accessible illicit markets that do well to conceal activity and mobility.[9] Other factors, namely key events in world politics and history, such as the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre, have exacerbated the climate of fear surrounding these issues as they pertain to domestic contexts, and have therefore given rise to a state of affairs in which borders are entrenched in a rhetoric of state security and a distrust of foreigners.[10] Hence, measures of harsher visa regimes and the notion of "warehousing" refugees in camps and detention centres as a measure to "contain" preconceived economic and security threats, have become conflated with the criminalisation of irregular migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.[11]

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[8] Richard W. Mansbach, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," in *Issues in 21st Century World Politics*, 2nd ed., ed. Mark Beeson and Nick Bisley (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 210.

[9] Jeanne Giraldo, and Harold Trinkunas, "Transnational Crime," in *Contemporary Security Studies*, 3rd ed., ed. Alan Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 348.

[10] Anne Hammerstad, "Population Movement and its impact on World Politics," in *Issues in 21st Century World Politics*, 2nd ed., ed. Mark Beeson and Nick Bisley (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 163.; Michele Ford, and Lenore Lyons, "Labour Migration, Trafficking and Border Controls," in *A Companion to Border Studies*, ed. Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 2012): 451., and David Kyle, and Rey Koslowski, eds., "The Global Comparative Perspective," in *Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives*," (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2011): 42.

[11] Thanh-Dam Truong, "The Governmentality of Transnational Migration and Security: The Making of a New Subaltern," in *Transnational Migration and Human* Security, ed. Thanh-Dam Truong and Des Gasper (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2011): 31.; Anthony Bebbington, and Uma Kothari, "Transnational Development Networks," *Environment and Planning A* 38, no. 5 (2006): 850., and Anne Hammerstad, "Population Movement and its impact on World

Nevertheless, the widespread interest in human rights has sustained the inclination of scholars to study the refugee experience, both of internal displacement as well as the international displacement of those in asylum in host countries. While such studies are not the focal point of analysis in this thesis, they certainly deserve our attention, because the experiences of refugees are not insulated from those of a hosting population in cohabitation with refugees, within a given host society. Put simply, refugees and host populations coexist, therefore, the experiences of refugees are practical indications of the concurrent experiences of hosts. One example could be the incidence of poverty among some groups of refugees, indicating perhaps that a given host society is not able to cope with the burden of new arrivals and might be experiencing a shortage in the availability of critical resources. For the most part, forced migrants are concentrated in countries of geographic proximity to the outbreak of wars and crises of conflict, and underdevelopment in host countries is common in unstable regions where most wars and other types of state fragility occur. Another example, could be refugees on the receiving end of xenophobia, discrimination, or even violent confrontation, indicating a negative reception by host populations and hence, bad social capital attributable to intergroup division and hostility.

The interdisciplinary field of Refugee Studies intersects with Economics, International Relations, Sociology and Development Studies to name a few, and so, analyses of the effects of irregular migration and refugee inflows on host states and their populations, typically focus on macroeconomic and microeconomic effects; socio-political and cultural effects; and permanent demographic transitions. Studies often point to changes in supply and demand, in production and consumption patterns; a rise in inequality associated with redistributions in welfare and resource provision and access; labour market outcomes of native workers, such as in relation to increased competition for jobs, rises or declines in employment, formal and informal; the fiscal burden of refugees on social welfare; the wealth creation of refugees as entrepreneurs; security and economic concerns, costs and benefits associated with encampments; positive and negative influences on social capital, through peaceful or conflicting social relations, a rise in social or ethnic tension, the overcrowding of refugee-heavy regions, and impacts on social cohesion brought about by the prolonged presence of irregular migrants and refugees.

Politics," in *Issues in 21st Century World Politics*, 2nd ed., ed. Mark Beeson and Nick Bisley (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 173.

European countries are all too familiar with such transformations taking place within their own national borders as consequences of immigration. Some leaders condemn shifts in culture, identity and ideology, economic growth trajectories; many even cite a rise in terrorism and express their anxieties over threats to public safety. David Coleman's "third demographic transition," purporting an unending change in the composition of national populations of countries with low fertility and high immigration, offers key insight into the European experience with immigration since the Second World War. While also not the focus of this thesis, Coleman's so-called transition gives notion to the argument that there exists a distinct causal relationship between immigration—whatever the kind—and a change in status quo that so often occurs in receiving societies, both sudden and gradual in reference to socio-economic and socio-cultural development.

Furthermore, despite that overarching and trending demographic shifts are not what the author is explicitly interested in here, a *change in status quo* in states on the receiving end of immigration, is. That is what this thesis will explore in the subsequent chapters. Importantly, because existing studies on the subject are prone to theoretical simplification and therefore, lend a key line of inquiry into the subject of receiving society transformations resulting from immigration, and what such transformations mean in development studies terms. While host populations are analysed in the existing literature, with their economic experiences examined, their social experiences and how they entwine with economic processes, are by and large, neglected. Such as, the effects of irregular migration on hosts are yet to be appraised using the concepts of human security and political community. For this reason, herein lies the opportunity to proceed in this thesis, with inquiry into the social interaction occurring in everyday socioeconomic processes, between refugees and host populations, to ascertain how the experiences of both parties in coexistence are not mutually exclusive and what this means.

To do this, there is strong evidence to focus our scholarly attention on the condition of social cohesion, as this plays a key role in shaping political [de]stabilisation, and human illbeing and wellbeing. It is therefore an imperative to combine liberal values from the analytical prisms of development studies, to fill in the gap in the existing literature, particularly in terms of drawing new parameters of analysis for qualitative research. Doing so, will help to reconcile the fracture points for human vulnerability in host societies, because society and the economy are embedded, and will be treated as such to advance the hypothesis that, there exists a reciprocal

relationship between equitable social outcomes and social cohesion. What this thesis fundamentally aims to demonstrate, is that grievances expressed by host populations, whether by individuals or groups, stem from linked experiences of socioeconomic inequality. There is widespread consensus in the literature that perceived material and symbolic inequality at the local level is produced by irregular migration, but the author advances the thesis that local level inequality is detrimental at the community level, politically. Hence, the purpose of this thesis is to examine Turkey's contemporary threshold, as a host nation, for absorbing the Syrian refugees without endangering social cohesion within its political community. To do so, the thesis will ask the following question: refugee admission, at what cost to Turkish society?

Labour market outcomes of natives are assessed to determine how the irregular migration of Syrians has caused a redistribution of labour and capital within native labour markets—a cost in and of itself for a proportion of individuals and groups—but following on from this, the author contends that these material inequities do not fully capture the deprivation experienced by the community. For this reason, the author turns to socio-political grievances expressed by host populations, regarding inequality and dispossession, to glean a more rounded understanding of the human deprivation experience of the Turkish hosts in coexistence with the Syrian refugees. The following guiding questions steer the research:

- What constitutes development for who, and how do development studies concepts best explain human vulnerability in the modern setting?
- What happens to social equality in the aftermath of an irregular migration? Such as, does society become more equal, or less? Are there winners and losers?
- What social and economic factors play a role in shaping attitudes about human wellbeing, and what is the sentiment on the ground?
- What existed in Turkey's socioeconomic substrate, prior to the Syrian arrivals? Were there pre-existing fracture points that predisposed the society to new development outcomes?
- Has change occurred, if any, in line with government development plans and targets, and do these align with individual development needs and the capacity of the state to meet them?

The author finds that the sentiment in Turkey stems from material dispossession and is sustained by preconceived feelings of disenfranchisement that become ever-increasingly

apparent as the crisis persists beyond the initial welcome. The findings provide the more nuanced view sought, suggesting that immigration acts more as a redistributive social policy in receiving societies than a determinant of economic change alone. Seminal works by development studies theorists foreshadow this claim, revealing the non-linearity of development, as a process that produces winners and losers in trade-offs. Evidence of a shift in socioeconomic equality causes a disproportionate effect for the poorer hosts in society. This is shown by "costing" the impact of the migrants by more than their labour input. It is the labour market outcomes of hosts that link host experiences with the incidence of refugee urbanism in the modern setting.

Hence, emphasising the economic impact is not without merit, albeit there is more to the story. Viewing immigrants as purely a collection of labour inputs fails to account for their social contributions, namely social interactions, and consumption, in their attempts to meet basic human needs. This omission puts forth an incomplete picture of the impacts of irregular migration, in terms of *multidimensional* development, conceptualised by the development studies field and employed as a frame to analyse the change in status quo here. Moreover, the *precariousness* of the endeavour to meet one's needs as an irregular migrant, is the crucial link to understanding social disorder brought about in receiving societies of irregular migrants, and the latter's behaviour in the wider social context. This supports the claim that economic actorness engenders behaviour in the wider social context, and furthermore, that structure and agency predetermine the behaviour of migrants as social beings. Political communities, therefore, are integral to furthering our understanding of migrant "costs" to societies in the form of multidimensional deprivation experienced by and *with* others.

From this research, the author exposes key fracture points in relation to Turkey's pre-existing labour market, and in relation to pre-existing social and cultural frictions and trust issues. In doing this, the author argues that pre-conditions have predisposed Turkish society to the various and evolving development processes evidenced throughout the crisis. This argument has important practical implications for policy, in the sense that this analysis equips one to utilise predispositions of receiving societies, to predict ensuing socioeconomic processes (and change), to hence pre-determine thresholds, beyond which social cohesion is eroded in host nations. For instance, one might enquire how varying intensities of refugee crises might significantly influence how soon a country will surpass its threshold. In answering the question,

"*refugee admission, at what cost?"* I advance the following answer: extending refuge to new arrivals diminishes justice for the less well-off hosts, through material and preconceived dispossession, and ultimately, this leads to a breakdown of social cohesion and hence to a social tipping point, beyond which, refugees are a net burden to society. The irrefutable rationale is that social equality is a scarce commodity.

The argument goes as follows. The disproportionality and heterogeneity of effects, in terms of social equality, are widely absent from existing discussions and ought to be brought to the forefront. An obvious area of tension that stems of the intense and prolonged influx of Syrians in Turkey is the inadequate expansion of municipal and social services, displacement from employment (predominantly informal) and the emergence of exclusionary ideologies and xenophobic attitudes. These come not just because of the circumstances that arise, but also have roots in Turkey's distinct history and social memory regarding immigration. Turkey has served not only as a destination country in the past, but also as a key transit point to third countries of migration in Europe. The forms of anti-Syrian sentiment we see emerge over the duration of the Syrian influx into Turkey stem from threat perceptions, resentment and a lingering feeling of disenfranchisement based on perceived refugee privilege.

The thesis is structured as follows. *Chapter one* forms the Literature Review by surveying the existing literature on the subject and combines the concepts revealed in various studies with that of the experiences of irregular migration for receiving societies. *Chapter two* provides a contextual background to the irregular Syrian migration into Turkey, touching on the Syrian Civil War, the conditions under which Syrians have entered Turkey and reside there, and some demographic statistics that aid in painting the picture of the settlement populations among that of the hosts. *Chapter three* first looks to Turkey's pre-existing economic substrate and neoliberal political economy, for insight on the existing labour market divisions that the author argues, predispose Turkish labour markets to irregular migrant penetration. The chapter goes on to provide the supporting evidence for this argument, demonstrating the widespread incidence of increased competition for employment, informal labour substitution, displacement of the native informal labour force and a depression of native wages. *Chapter four* explores in depth, the conceptual framework for analysing human wellbeing and development through networks of social capital and the absence of illbeing. It goes on to explain that migrant reception predetermines whether coexistence is peaceful or manifests into social disorder in

the prolonged setting. The chapter then evidences the social effects of the irregular Syrian migration, by identifying changes in ethnic composition, a rise in social inequality, compassion fatigue and anti-refugee sentiment that reveals itself in negative attitudes early on, and later manifests into intergroup political and ethnic violence. The final remarks synthesise the argument made and revisit the question "*refugee admission, at what cost?"* and advance the conclusion that extending refuge to new arrivals has caused socioeconomic redistribution, has fuelled grievances, and ultimately, has led to a breakdown of social cohesion in Turkish society.

Chapter One: Literature Review

Introduction

Chapter one surveys the existing literature on the subject and combines concepts revealed in various theoretical studies with that of the experiences of receiving societies. Conventional theories on development are explored here, as they arguably have much to offer in this realm. Theories include but are not limited to neoclassical theories of immigration, international trade, and the laws of the free market; theories of prejudice, social diversity, "othering" and ethnic conflict; theoretical approaches to human development and social equality, whether "capabilities" or "development as freedom" approaches to development, or various other explanations pertaining to human and community illbeing and wellbeing that provide key insight into the nature of coexistence with migrants. Along with history, theories offer rich guidance to understanding the axiom that development is a non-linear process, one that is diagnostic of distributional and often uneven production. The research the author undertakes places the study of migration within context of the post-War period to the current day, focusing on the incidence of forced migration and the role of human rights in responding to forced migrant populations. From here, the author argues that migration has been studied in a dual narrative of the refugee experience and that of the host population, a tendency which evolved out of recognition for the concerns of the wider population in coexistence, driven more by a human security approach to development, opposed to a state-centric approach that does not reconcile modern-day threats. The author importantly touches on Putnam's "conflict" and "contact" theories to explain a mixed reception of migrant groups in receiving countries. The author finds that "conflict theory" better explains Turkey's predicament, highlighting contention over resources and its implication for the erosion of social cohesion and general happiness. The development focus on migration recognises all migrants as economic actors. Furthermore, ease of mobility in the 21st century and the livelihood "pull" factors in urban centres have set the conditions for irregular migration and refugees to become more urban in nature than in conventional times. It is argued here that studies analysing migration effects using traditional economistic views lead to incomplete evaluations of the full impacts. Borjas sheds light on economic actorness engendering behaviour in the wider social context, citing structure and migrant agency as the determinants of migrant behaviour and hence their impact on society. Moreover, the existing body of literature falls short by failing to synthesise the economic forces with those of the social in the migration-development interaction.

Defining migration and refugee flight

Eisenstadt defines immigration as a "process of physical transition from one society to another," whereby the "initial migration is usually motivated by some feelings of inadequacy and insecurity within the old system, and by the hope of resolving this insecurity in the new one."[12] This conceptualisation is broad but is a useful comprehension of the term, and can be applied in the context of forced migration too. When applied here, the reader is prompted to contemplate the conditions that gives rise to "inadequacy" and "insecurity," and hence also, emotional incentives to flee. Scholarship on *forced* migration relates to the nature of conflict and the way its intersection with developmental deficiencies is a precursor to refugee flight. Verwimp *et al*. argue firstly, that conflicts can alter entire regimes and state institutions, such as by impacting the provision and maintenance of welfare, disrupting career and educational trajectories, and secondly, that proximity to conflict can lead people to re-evaluate their livelihoods and daily incentives, in addition to shifting their perceptions of risk amid tremendous uncertainty.[13]

Sirkeci, also cites insecurity and inadequacy in relation to "deficits" in development and the state institution, with reference to democracy, by referring to the myriad adverse conditions mired in socioeconomic inequality, a lack of political representation, and oppression.[14] Charron, likewise points to structural forces as well as emotional factors that might be starkly indicative of social "distress" or "alienation."[15] Much literature on forced migration moreover, predominantly points to actual or anticipated human rights abuses, such as in the form of

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[12] Eisenstadt N. Shmuel, "Analysis of patterns of immigration and absorption of immigrants," *Population Studies* 7, no. 2 (1953): 169.

[13] Philip Verwimp, Patricia Justino, and Tilman Bruck, "The Analysis of Conflict: A Micro-Level Perspective," *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 3 (2009): 308, http://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309102654.

[14] Ibrahim Sirkeci, "Turkey's refugees, Syrians and refugees from Turkey: a country of insecurity," *Migration Letters* 14, no. 1 (2017): 129.

[15] Austin Charron, "'Somehow, We Cannot Accept It': Drivers of Internal Displacement from Crimea and the Forced/Voluntary Migration Binary," *Europe-Asia Studies* 72, no. 3 (2020): 445.

torture, rape, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, indiscriminate violence and arbitrary detention, as the primary drivers of what can otherwise be referred to as refugee flight.[16] The key argument to be made here, is that the situations described generate a climate of fear; therefore, departure by virtue of defending one's human rights, is considered by those fleeing, a *forced* reaction to circumstances tantamount to "inhumane treatment."[17]

Newland's contribution to socioeconomic roots of refugee flight in her seminal work "Refugees; the rising flood" adds to this discussion, underlining the non-linear relationship between the incidence of poverty and refugee flight. Newland puts that deprivation is but one factor in the interplay of circumstances that combust into instability and conflict. Circumstances are generally political in nature, she argues, arising from intergroup rivalry over disputes of resource distribution. This is especially common during times of hardship, typically in relation to environmental fragility and market volatility, which can lead to economic instability and decline, and a rise in poverty. Further, some groups merely seek to advance their social standing by gaining a monopoly over resources, which generally occurs at the expense of other groups. By a different token, conflict can cause or exacerbate destitution through disrupting the production of food or inhibiting access to resources such as aid in acutely vulnerable societies. This kind of situation can lead to famine and disease, which often emerge as equal or greater threats than conflict itself. Meaning, populations can perish before displacement becomes an option.[18]

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[16] Clair Apodaca, "Human Rights Abuses: Precursor to Refugee Flight?" *Journal of Refugee Studies* 11, no. 1 (1998): 80., and Kathleen Newland, "Ethnic Conflict and Refugees," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 148.

[17] Leon Gordenker, "Early Warning of Disastrous Population Movement," *International Migration Review* 20 (2): 171., and Kathleen Newland, "Refugees; the Rising Flood," *World Watch Magazine* 7, no. 3 (1994): 10.

[18] Kathleen Newland, "Refugees; the Rising Flood," *World Watch Magazine* 7, no. 3 (1994): 10.

The moral dimension

The "forced" in "forced migration", appears an ambiguous term, appealing to the human agency element in the *choice* to leave, however Erdal and Oeppen offer a basis for reconciliation. Erdal and Oeppen argue that there is great cause in relating evaluations of "voluntariness"—the counterpart in this dichotomy—to viable and much less, available, alternatives.[19] In support of such consideration for the moral dimension here, Gibney accounts the definition of forced migration as an "evaluative" term, in contrast to an alternative conceptualisation as a "descriptive" one.[20] This moral dimension is important and warrants the reader's consideration because there are practical implications to questioning terminology when it applies in a political space, namely, to actors within a domestic (or the international) community.[21] Consideration is necessary, because the logical tendency to follow the act of questioning the notion of forced, is the act of contesting the legitimacy of the claim (for refuge) itself. This is where the field of International Relations is valuable, as it offers a deep insight into the nature and legitimacy of asylum claims, as demarcated by political entities (states) that have authority pertaining to the global refugee regime.

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[19] Marta Bivand Erdal and Ceri Oeppen, "Forced to leave? The discursive and analytical significance of describing migration as forced and voluntary," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 6 (2018): 981, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1384149., and Anne Hammerstad, "Population Movement and its impact on World Politics," in *Issues in 21st Century World Politics*, 2nd ed., ed. Mark Beeson and Nick Bisley (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 162.

[20] Matthew J. Gibney, "Political Theory, Ethics, and Forced Migration," in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh *et al* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 82.

[21] Charles B. Keely, and Ellen Percy Kraly, "Concepts of Refugee and Forced Migrations: An Illustrative Note," in *Demography of Refugee and Forced Migration*, ed. Graeme Hugo, Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi, and Ellen Percy Kraly (Cham: Springer, 2018): 27.

Who is defined as a "refugee"?

The most widely recognised legal definition of a refugee is that included in the 1951 United Nations *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* (also referred to as the Geneva Convention), which defines a refugee as a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."[22] What morally distinguishes refugees and forced migrants from "voluntary" migrants is the need for an alternative political membership. Betts maintains that the best way to conceptualise refugeehood, is to reflect on the "unwillingness" or "inability" of governments to uphold the human rights of their own citizens, citing the problem as innate to the international system and world politics.[23] Betts contends that the condition of refugeehood cannot be understood without first understanding the state system. Put simply, refugeehood is an extension of the state system, caused by the failure of governments to uphold the state-citizen-territory institution.[24]

"Figure of the refugee"

Shacknove, likewise, gives notion to "refugeehood" by highlighting the severance of the "political bond" (or social contract) between the state and the citizen.[25] Betts terms this issue the "figure of the refugee," suggesting that refugees are "human rights violations made

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[22] United Nations, Article 1. A. (2)., *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 1951, 14. https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/3b66c2aa10.

[23] Alexander Betts, "International Relations and Forced Migration," in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh *et al* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 98.

[24] Alexander Betts, "International Relations and Forced Migration," in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh *et al* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 98.

[25] Andrew E. Shacknove, "Who is a Refugee?" *Ethics* 95, no. 2 (1985): 275.

visible."[26] Betts and Shacknove both indicate that the collapse of this relationship not only delegitimises a state's rule, as it constitutes a violation of soveriegnty (hence the need for international protection), but that it also, in effect, legitimises incentives for refugee flight.[27] Given the pervasiveness of the refugee issue, to go one step further would be to contend that refugees are an inevitable consequence of such a system. While the 1951 definition is the mostly widely applicable framework for the protection of refugees, in practice, states and international organisations operate with both wider and more narrow interpretations of the term.[28] This has implications for whether refugees receive formal refugee status, and hence whether they are granted international protection and mobility within their country of asylum, or, whether the *de facto* refugee who is otherwise known as the "asylum seeker," in seeking refuge (and alternative political membership), remains an asylum seeker and therefore, bears only temporary protection in the best-case scenario, or, is subjected to arbitrary detention or worse, in another scenario.[29]

The International Protection Framework

To better understand the legal implications borne of the international protection framework for asylum seekers, it is crucial to offer a clear definition. An asylum seeker is a person who flees their country of origin for the reasons defined by refugee flight, as per the Geneva Convention, but who is not formally recognised as a refugee by states that adopt a narrow interpretation of the term. Stated simply, formal refugee status is contingent on states' interpretation of the term "refugee" in their domestic legal framework for governing entry and movement across their

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[26] Alexander Betts, "International Relations and Forced Migration," in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh *et al* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 98.

[27] Alexander Betts, "International Relations and Forced Migration," in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh *et al* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 98.

[28] Michael Goodhart, ed., *Human Rights: Politics and Practice*, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 424.

[29] Kathleen Newland, "Ethnic Conflict and Refugees," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993): 143.

borders.[30] Such contingency adds a layer of complexity in a contentious way, as states, by international law, are mandated the responsibility of asylum seekers who enter their borders. This is owing to the principle of *non-refoulement*, which grants an asylum seeker the rights of resettlement to a third country, whether locally in the country of first asylum (or to a third country), and legal protection from deportation or forcible return to the asylum seeker's country of origin (the source of the refugee flight).[31] Such provisions grant asylum seekers *temporary* protection while their status as a refugee is under review. Asylum seekers arriving in states of first asylum by irregular channels, are too, subject to this principle of non-refoulment, which entitles them (in theory) to the protection attributed to one's rights as an asylum seeker. Asylum seekers falling under this category are often termed *irregular*, *illegal* and *undocumented* migrants, whereby their entry into states contravenes the laws and regulations that govern entry and movement across borders, such as by boat.[32]

The economistic perspective on the migration-development interaction

The conventional economistic perspective views migration as synonymous with international trade. Borjas talks of a "proverbial widget," where instead of transporting a commodity from one country to another through imports, migration imports the raw labour capable of manufacturing [the widget] domestically, in an essential trade in the means of production.[33] By

[30] Arthur Vargas, "Irregular Migration Narratives: Writing Body and Space in the Mexico-U.S. Borderlands" (Ann Arbor: ProQuest LLC, PhD diss., University of California, 2013), UMI: 3614287.

[31] Gil Loescher, "Human Rights and Forced Migration," in *Human Rights: Policy and Practice*, 2nd ed., ed. Michael Goodhart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 220.; Alexander Betts, "The Normative Terrain of the Global Refugee Regime," *International Affairs* 29, no. 4 (2015): 363., and Anthony Bebbington, and Uma Kothari, "Transnational Development Networks," *Environment and Planning A* 38, no. 5 (2006): 850.

[32] Thanh-Dam Truong, "The Governmentality of Transnational Migration and Security: The Making of a New Subaltern," in *Transnational Migration and Human* Security, ed. Thanh-Dam Truong and Des Gasper (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2011): 31.

[33] George J. Borjas, "Lessons from Immigration Economics," *The Independent Review* 22, no. 3 (2018): 329.

this token of understanding, increasing the domestic means of production is equivalent, in theory, to expanding the "economic pie" in a net benefit.[34] In a similar grain, in neoclassical migration theory, which can be attributed to neoclassical growth theory of the 1950s, migrants are viewed to be utility-maximising agents. This conception assumes that economies and labour markets reach an equilibrium in the long-term, through a combination of migration and trade (including innovation), wherein migrants are correlated with a positive labour market surplus and thus contribute to growth through an expansion of the production function.[35]

However, a critical perspective of this view that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, considers a more nuanced understanding of the interaction between migration and development by its inherent nonlinearity, namely the pluralist view in social theory. The pluralist view gives notion to the argument that framing a net migration impact by the sum of labour input of imported labourers, leads only to an economic and thus one-dimensional understanding of migration effects. Hence, this view conceptualises migration as an integral part of broader processes of "transformation" that the term "development" embodies, considering factors of *structure* and *agency*, migrant behaviour in a wider social context, migrant diversity, and migrant substitutability.[36]

Johnson's national economy model fits within this pluralist view, proposing that different native groups are impacted differently by inflows of migrants.[37] One example offered is the potential complementarity of low-skilled immigration to labour markets comprising of abundant capital owners, and labour forces predominantly made up of high-skilled workers. The accompanying critical observation by Johnson is that there can be associated costs of low-skilled immigration, such as the displacement or substitution of low-skilled native workers

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[34] George J. Borjas, "Lessons from Immigration Economics," *The Independent Review* 22, no. 3 (2018): 329.

[35] Orn B. Bodvarsson, and Hendrik Van den Berg, *The Economics of Immigration: Theory and Policy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Springer, 2013), 118.

[36] Hein de Haas, "Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective," *International Migration Review* 44, no. 1 (2010): 241.

[37] Orn B. Bodvarsson, and Hendrik Van den Berg, *The Economics of Immigration: Theory and Policy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Springer, 2013), 119.

through increased competition for work, which can in addition, lead to a higher fiscal cost to public welfare in compensation for native unemployment. Typically, high-skilled workers bear the tax burden in progressive taxation systems.[38] Further, the state can also be faced with bearing the costs of population pressures as migrant families expand. To the effect of what Frisch pronounced in relation to immigrants and their children comprising nearly four per cent of Germany in the post-war period following the importation of Turkish labour, "we wanted workers, but we got people instead."[39] Borjas underlines the fact that all humans are economic actors and migrants of any sort are no exception to this rule.

To reiterate, there are two forces at play in the interaction between migration and development, namely, structure and agency. Where structural constraints, such as a lack of mobility or working rights do not permit regular forms of integration, structural enablers, namely free market forces or exploitation and agency, facilitated by will and strategy, can. Therefore, integration and mobility become irregular in nature, which can lead to unintended and perverse effects in societies with a high reliance on underground and informal economies. Despite agency and human nature tendencies, migrants have limited but forced capacity to overcome livelihood obstacles and behave like ordinary citizens, maintaining the potential to reshape the structure of receiving countries.[40]

There are two important factors to be considered in line with this, the *constraining* factors of development and those of the *enabling* factors, within the context of migrant-receiving countries. Such factors are characteristically economic, political, institutional, and social.[41] State regulation, such as migration and labour laws, is one structural example of how the development process, occurring in its interaction with migration, is institutionalised. Hence,

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[38] Orn B. Bodvarsson, and Hendrik Van den Berg, *The Economics of Immigration: Theory and Policy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Springer, 2013), 119.

[39] George J. Borjas, "Lessons from Immigration Economics," *The Independent Review* 22, no. 3 (2018): 329. 330.

[40] Hein de Haas, "Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective," *International Migration Review* 44, no. 1 (2010): 241.

[41] Hein de Haas, "Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective," *International Migration Review* 44, no. 1 (2010): 241.

the desire for regulation in the first instance is the political factor that constrains or enables development, which is determined as such by the interests of the institution or entity in charge of writing the regulation. Whether it is implemented is another constraint with respect to enforceability, but this is set by structural conditions such as globalisation, not up for discussion here. What is essential to note, rather, is how the constraining and enabling factors of development shape—and are shaped by—migrant behaviour in receiving countries.

Diversity and communities

Putnam's seminal work on diversity and community theorises two contrasting views that explain the interaction between migrant and hosting communities. The first he frames the "contact hypothesis," whereby societies are receptive to migrant groups, through favourable outcomes of "tolerance" and "social solidarity."[42] His reasoning is that greater exposure to diversity and difference in the social space leads to a tendency whereby people overcome their initial hesitation and perhaps "ignorance" of the "other," evolve to be more trusting of them, and hence live harmoniously.[43] Allport supports this claim on the basis that contact occurs in favourable circumstances, not circumstances mired by economic exploitation, fear or aggression.[44] Moreover, this steers us to Putnam's own opposing view, labelled "conflict theory," which posits that diversity and interethnic contact fosters distrust between groups and greater solidarity within groups, and that the primary cause of conflict, whether disputation or confrontation, comes down to competition over resources.[45]

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[42] Robert D. Putnam, "*E Pluribus Unum*: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30, no. 2 (2007): 141.

[43] Robert D. Putnam, "*E Pluribus Unum*: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30, no. 2 (2007): 141.

[44] Irwin Katz, "Gordon Allport's 'The Nature of Prejudice,'" *Political Psychology* 12, no. 1 (1991): 126.

[45] Robert D. Putnam, "*E Pluribus Unum*: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30, no. 2 (2007): 142.

Other notable findings by Putnam indicate that greater ethnic diversity is associated with an erosion of social cohesion. Putnam presents evidence from a nation-wide Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey carried out in the year 2000 in the United States, using a sample size of approximately 30,000 people and incorporating 41 different communities from inner cities to towns, including Los Angeles and rural South Dakota.[46] The survey results demonstrate a negative correlation between civic engagement and social capital in localities with higher rates of ethnic diversity in contrast to societies with lower rates. The results show explicitly, that amid a high rate of ethnic diversity, voter confidence and trust in local government is low, as is confidence in individual political influence. The results further demonstrate that there is a greater tendency or desire for political participation in regard to reform, but in the form of protests rather than voting; and further, that there is less expectation of reciprocal cooperation or collective action for solving problems, and with this, a lower likelihood of charitable giving and active volunteering. The findings are indicative of a lower perceived quality of life and to an even lesser extent, general happiness.[47]

Conclusion

Chapter one surveyed the existing literature on the subject of irregular migration, combining the concepts revealed in various theoretical studies from the development field, with empirical evidence. From an extensive review of the literature on the effects of migration, it can be deduced that the economic and social development impacts feature most prominently in relative cost and benefit terms, highlighting clear-cut material impacts as well as the more symbolic impact on migrant-receiving societies. Studies have questioned what kind of developmental changes occur, particularly in relation to social equality with a microeconomic focus. Special attention has been paid to irregular and forced migration, as well as the relationship between ethnic diversity and social cohesion, and prejudice. Moreover, the

[46] Robert D. Putnam, "*E Pluribus Unum*: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30, no. 2 (2007): 144.

[47] Robert D. Putnam, "*E Pluribus Unum*: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30, no. 2 (2007): 150.

development focus on migration recognises all migrants as economic actors. Coupled with ease of mobility in the 21st century and the livelihood "pull" factors in urban centres, the conditions have been set for irregular migrants to become more urban in nature than in conventional times. It has been argued that studies analysing migration using the traditional economistic view leads to an incomplete evaluation of the full impact. Borjas has shed light on economic actorness engendering behaviour in the wider social context, citing structure and migrant agency as the determinants of migrant behaviour and hence their impact on society. In light of this, arguably, the existing body of literature on irregular migration impacts falls short in drawing upon new parameters of analysis for qualitative research, by treating society and the economy as embedded factors in the migration-development interaction. Moreover, this review has provided a theoretical framework for understanding and contextualising migration, defining migration as a process usually motivated by feelings of inadequacy and insecurity. This led into further discussion of the causes of refugee flight, citing gross human rights violations as the primary driver. The author shed light on the developmental deficiencies and political aspects often associated with war-induced refugees. The author discussed the voluntary-forced dichotomy and the ambiguity of the notion with respect to those who *choose* to flee. Arguably, conceptualising the term by virtue of its moral implications is most beneficial. Further, the concept of "refugeehood" has been explored in relation to its place in International Relations and within the international protection regime for refugees. Finally, it has been argued that the limitations of the latter in responding to wider, albeit legitimate claims for asylum has given rise to "irregular" refugees.

Chapter 2: The Irregular Migration of Syrian Refugees into Turkey

Introduction

Chapter two provides a contextual background to the irregular Syrian migration into Turkey, touching on the Syrian Civil War, the conditions under which Syrians have entered Turkey and reside there, and some demographic statistics that aid in painting the picture of the settlement populations among that of the hosts. Beginning with an introduction to the Arab Spring protests and their pivotal role in the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, the chapter goes on to explain the way in which humans respond to abuses by governments, of their rights, which in turn legitimises their claims for evacuation and seeking asylum. Interestingly, the chapter explores the human nature tendencies to flee to geographically proximate destinations, evidenced in the spatial migration patterns to the border regions in the early stages of the Syrian crisis, followed by later patterns of migration to urban centres in Turkey, upon the widespread realisation of a prolonging of the Syrian war. The chapter provides a clear breakdown of Turkey's domestic legal framework for regulating migration in line with its own interpretation of the international refugee regime. Turkey maintained an open-door policy from the onset, but the provision of refuge by way of temporary protection was met with arbitrary conditions, limiting access to basic wants and needs, namely employment and mobility within Turkey. Furthermore, the research in this chapter identifies the average Syrian demographic as working age and male, extracting data from the Republic of Turkey's Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management. The data sets provided indicate that the proportion of Syrians living in urban centres more than doubles over the course of the treatment period identified, highlighting the complexity in rapid responses to intense migration inflows. The essential purpose of this chapter, besides to shed light on the event that caused the irregular migration into Turkey, is to expose the practical inconsistencies of the international protection framework, which forms part of the narrative of why irregular migration pervades international society and the governance of mobility, today.

Syrian Civil War

The revolutionary wave of peaceful demonstrations that began in Tunisia in 2010 and subsequently swept the Arab world—notably Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria—has come to

be referred to as the "Arab Spring." The Arab Spring reached Daraa, Syria on 15 March 2011. An overwhelming dissatisfaction with government performance in Arab League countries was the sentiment on the ground, owing to the prevalence of corruption and poor economic prospects, which fuelled demands for reform.[48] Bashar al Assad's brutal assault on peaceful protestors in Daraa, Syria, through a rapid militarisation of the conflict and violent abuse of Syrians was the outbreak of what would become a decade-long and ongoing civil war involving Assad's army, the Free Syrian Army (otherwise known as the defectors or rebel group), transnational terrorist groups such as Islamic State, and foreign governments, notably Russia, the United States, Iran and Turkey that have intervened since, either diplomatically or militarily. The war generated intense and ongoing migration flows of refugees into neighbouring countries, hence reflecting the break-down of the state-citizen-territory relationship that primed international recognition of the Syrian peoples' claim to asylum.

It has been argued that the patterns of the migration can be attributed to the decisions by migrants, made under pressure, choices premised on relative geographic proximity of the origin of conflict to locations in neighbouring states.[49] Supporting this are the 2013 figures on the total Syrian refugee population Turkey. According to these, the ratios of cities of origin in the early years of the conflict were found to be approximately: Aleppo, 36%; Idlep, 21%; Raqqa, 11%; Lattika, 9%; Hassakeh, 5.4%; Hama, 7.5 %, and other provinces, 10%.[50] On a map this demonstrates a pattern of sudden dispersion to the nearest (relative) location points in Turkey, initially to the 20 government-operated camps located in 10 cities: Adana, Adiyaman, Hatay, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaras, Kilis, Malatya, Mardin, Osmaniye and Sanliurfa, but increasingly to locations nearby the temporary accommodation camps where Syrians could still access humanitarian aid in the form of food, health, education and other basic human services provided for free by the Government of Turkey. Approximately 75-80 per cent of Syrians in

[48] Inci A. Kargin, "The Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Their Living Conditions and the Ways in which Their Presence Has Affected Turkish Society" (ProQuest LLC: PhD diss., Indiana University, 2016), 1. UMI: 10196169.

[49] Binnur Balkan, and Semih Tumen, "Immigration and prices: quasi-experimental evidence from Syrian refugees in Turkey," *Journal of Population Economics* 29, no. 3 (2016): 658.

[50] Binnur Balkan, and Semih Tumen, "Immigration and prices: quasi-experimental evidence from Syrian refugees in Turkey," *Journal of Population Economics* 29, no. 3 (2016): 658.

Turkey, by late 2013, were living outside of camps but still residing in the Southeastern border region in close proximity to them, according to a report by the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD).[51] At this time, Syrian refugees in Turkey were most densely populated in the following regions: Kilis, 38.1%; Sanliurfa, 9.4%; Gaziantep, 11.9%; Hatay, 12.6%; Osmanite, 2.4%, and Mardin, 9%. At the time, also located in Istanbul 2.2, Konya 2.3. These numbers represent the ratio of Syrians to the local population in these regions. This foremost indicates the belief among Syrians and the Turkish government at the time that the Syrian conflict would resolve itself and refugees would be able to return home.[52]

Syrians Under Temporary Protection: conditions of entry and stay in Turkey

Turkey maintained its open-door policy between 2011 and 2016, approving a comprehensive "Law on Foreigners and International Protection" in 2013, formally establishing Turkey's mandate for the provision of asylum to Syrians. This law, in addition, involved the formation of a new body of government for asylum procedures, the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM). In 2014, this body officially granted Syrians "temporary protection" status, a conditional legal status referred to as the *Temporary Protection Regulation* under Turkish domestic law. The regulation bound the following principles for the provision of the policy: the borders were to remain open to those seeking asylum; *non-refoulement*; and basic humanitarian needs of Syria's asylum seekers were to be met.[53]

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[51] Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), *Syrian Refugees in Turkey, 2013: Field Survey Results* (2013), 1-55. https://www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/2376/files/61-2013123015505-syrian-refugees-in-turkey-2013_print_12_11_2013_eng.pdf. Accessed 9 April 2021.

[52] Binnur Balkan, and Semih Tumen, "Immigration and prices: quasi-experimental evidence from Syrian refugees in Turkey," *Journal of Population Economics* 29, no. 3 (2016): 658.

[53] Soner Cagaptay and Maya Yalkin, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, PolicyWatch 3007, Aug 22 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syrian-refugees-turkey, accessed 6 June 2021.

While the provision of refuge as an humanitarian response, is in theory, *apolitical*, temporary protection status extended to Syrians has remained conditional. Syrians are formally recognised by the state as *Syrians Under Temporary Protection*. Protection has remained this way owing to several domestic restrictions, borne of bureaucratic requirements that apply to all irregular migrants in Turkey. Firstly, obtaining temporary protection identification cards is subject to a three-month time limit. Such cards do not grant permits of residency nor to work. Secondly, to be permitted to travel within Turkey, Syrians must separately apply for a temporary residency permit. Syrians must hold a valid passport, have Turkish health insurance, and have a Turkish bank account (containing $6,000) in order to be eligible to apply.[54]

Turkey emerged as the "gate-keeper" for Europe, following the 2015 summer of migration that saw unprecedented inflows (and deaths at sea) of refugees that travelled predominately from Turkey, across the Mediterranean and into Greece.[55] In cooperation with EU member states and Turkey, an *EU-Turkey Deal* was forged in 2016, a mechanism to stem the flow of irregular migrants entering the EU. For every *one* migrant that arrived at the EU's shore by boat, one registered Syrian refugee in Turkey would be resettled in an EU member state, and the irregular migrant would be returned to Turkey. By the end of 2016, 2,823,987 Syrians were registered in Turkey, representing more than half of the total displaced population of Syrians.[56] Moreover, 1,177,914 Syrians had filed applications for asylum in the EU.

Syrian demographics

Of the approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees, 1.9 million of the population is made up of males and 1.6 is made up of females. Also, 2.1 million of the Syrian population is aged 15

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[54] Soner Cagaptay and Maya Yalkin, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, PolicyWatch 3007, Aug 22 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syrian-refugees-turkey, access 6 June 2021.

[55] Ibrahim Sirkeci, "Turkey's refugees, Syrians and refugees from Turkey: a country of insecurity," *Migration Letters* 14, no. 1 (2017): 128.

[56] Ibrahim Sirkeci, "Turkey's refugees, Syrians and refugees from Turkey: a country of insecurity," *Migration Letters* 14, no. 1 (2017): 128.

years or higher, and hence is classed as being of working age in Turkey, while the mean age of Syrians in Turkey in 22.5 years. This varies from the native population wherein the average age of Turks is 31.7 years.[57] Approximately 40,500 Syrian children had been born to refugee parents in Turkey by November 2018.[58] The number of Syrians granted work permits was approximately 32,000 people, also by November 2018. This dataset was drawn from the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services of Turkey, and has been cited by the author in Ayhan and Gebesoglu's same study.[59]Approximately 80,000 Syrians had been granted Turkish citizenship by March 2019. By 2020, 3.4 million Syrians were recorded as living in twenty cities, equating to the majority of the Syrian refugee population. The cities or provinces are: Istanbul, Sanliurfa, Hatay, Gaziantep, Adana, Mersin, Bursa, Izmir, Kilis, Konya, Ankara, Mardin, Kahramanmaras, Kayseri, Kocaeli, Osmaniye, Diyarbakir, Malatya, Adiyaman. The share of the Syrian population in the relation to province population as per 2020 data sets is highest in Kilis (81.4%), followed by Hatay (26.9%), then Sanliurfa (21.9%) and Gaziantep (21.3%).[60] This data set was drawn from the Republic of Turkey's Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management's database and has been cited by the author in a study by Ayhan and Gebesoglu in the literature.[61] The proportion of Syrians more than doubled over the seven-year period between 2013 and 2020, drawing close attention to the

[57] Fatih Ayhan, and Pinar Fulya Gebedoglu, "Syrian Migration and the Turkish Labor Market: Analysis of the Economic Effects," *The EUrASEANs: journal on global socio-economic dynamics* 1, no. 20 (2020): 62-4.

[58] Fatih Ayhan, and Pinar Fulya Gebedoglu, "Syrian Migration and the Turkish Labor Market: Analysis of the Economic Effects," *The EUrASEANs: journal on global socio-economic dynamics* 1, no. 20 (2020): 62-4.

[59] Fatih Ayhan, and Pinar Fulya Gebedoglu, "Syrian Migration and the Turkish Labor Market: Analysis of the Economic Effects," *The EUrASEANs: journal on global socio-economic dynamics* 1, no. 20 (2020): 62-4.

[60] Fatih Ayhan, and Pinar Fulya Gebedoglu, "Syrian Migration and the Turkish Labor Market: Analysis of the Economic Effects," *The EUrASEANs: journal on global socio-economic dynamics* 1, no. 20 (2020): 62-4.

[61] Fatih Ayhan, and Pinar Fulya Gebedoglu, "Syrian Migration and the Turkish Labor Market: Analysis of the Economic Effects," *The EUrASEANs: journal on global socio-economic dynamics* 1, no. 20 (2020): 62-4.

spatial element characterising the Syrian presence, and the necessity for a swift response and adaptation by Turkey.

Conclusion

Chapter two provided a contextual background to the irregular Syrian migration into Turkey, touching on the Syrian Civil War, the conditions under which Syrians have entered Turkey and now reside there, and some demographic statistics that aided in painting the picture of the settlement populations among that of the hosts. The chapter began with an introduction to the Arab Spring protests and their pivotal role in the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. The chapter went on to explain the way in which humans respond to abuses by governments, of their rights, which in turn legitimises their claims for evacuation and seeking asylum. Interestingly, the chapter explored the human nature tendencies to flee to geographically proximate destinations, evidenced in the spatial migration patterns to the border regions in the early stages of the Syrian crisis, followed by later patterns of migration to urban centres in Turkey upon the widespread realisation of a prolonging of the Syrian war. The chapter also provided a clear breakdown of Turkey's domestic legal framework for regulating migration in line with its own interpretation of the international refugee regime. Turkey maintained an open-door policy from the onset, but the provision of refuge by way of temporary protection, was met with arbitrary conditions, limiting access to basic wants and needs, namely employment and mobility within Turkey. Furthermore, the research in this chapter identified the average Syrian demographic as working age and male, extracting data from the Republic of Turkey's Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management. The data sets provided, indicated that the proportion of Syrians living in urban centres more than doubled over the course of the treatment period identified, highlighting the complexity in rapid responses to intense migration inflows. Moreover, the essential purpose of this chapter, besides to shed light on the event that caused the irregular migration into Turkey, was to expose the practical inconsistencies of the international protection framework, which forms part of the narrative of why irregular migration pervades international society and the governance of mobility, today.

Chapter 3: Framework for Analysis Part 1: Precarious Labour

Introduction

Chapter three firstly looks to Turkey's pre-existing economic substrate and neoliberal political economy for insight on the existing labour market divisions that the author argues, predispose Turkish labour markets to irregular migrant penetration. The chapter goes on to provide the supporting evidence for this argument, demonstrating the widespread incidence of increased competition for employment, informal labour substitution, displacement of the native informal labour force, and a depression of native wages. This comes despite Turkey enacted, in 2016, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection that adopted a system of granting work permits to Syrians. This chapter evidences the social [in]equality outcomes for natives through changes in labour divisions, to advance the argument that the Syrian presence in the informal labour market has resulted in the displacement of the informal labour force. This outcome is negatively correlated with human development because it reduces the purchasing power of natives through a direct loss of income, and through the flow on effects of not being able to meet one's basic needs. This outcome illustrates a redistributive and disproportionate effect and leads to a rise in inequality in pockets of Turkish society.

Turkey's political economy

The neoliberal restructuring of Turkey's political economy in the late 1990s, in line with the global trend at the time, that saw a dismantling of traditional labour market protection, has arguably paved the way for microlevel employment experiences of migrants and other foreigners in Turkey to be characterised by high levels of informality, "temporariness" and hence precarity. Turkish society has through its history been exposed to mass immigration which has left a lingering social memory.[62] Notably, inflows in the hundreds of thousands have included from Greece (1992-38), the Balkans (1923-45), Germany (1933-45), Iraq following the Halabja massacre of 1988, Bulgaria (1989), Iraq after the First Gulf War in 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina (1922-98), Kosovo (1999), Macedonia (2001), and in the most recent case, to the

[62] Ahmet Icducugy, and Eleni Diker, "Labor Market Integration of Syrian Refugees in Turkey: From Refugees to Settlers," *The Journal of Migration Studies* 3 no. 1 (2017): 14.

volume of 3.6 million as of April 2019, Syria, following its ongoing war since March 2011.[63] The Syrian migration constitutes the most profound large-scale people movement since the Second World War. Sectors in Turkey traditionally predominated by informal labour include construction, the textile industry, domestic work, and agriculture.[64] The high incidence of the informal sector sitting at 40 percent of Turkey's Gross Domestic Product during the 1990s indicates there was a prevalence of subsistence living that pre-dated the Syrian influx.[65] Noteworthy also, is that until 1997, compulsory education in Turkey was only five years and then eight years until 2011. Since 2018, compulsory education is twelve years,[66] which could suggest that there is a high proportion of Turks who are still low or uneducated.

"Harmonisation"

Efforts to combat informal or otherwise irregular labour force participation have formed part of Turkey's requirement in its EU harmonisation process, and reflect persistent challenges in combatting irregular work, poised by the realities of ever-increasing migration in and through the country's borders.[67] Turkey has taken various steps since 2000 to steer itself in its progress

[63] Fatih Ayhan, and Pinar Fulya Gebedoglu, "Syrian Migration and the Turkish Labor Market: Analysis of the Economic Effects," *The EUrASEANs: journal on global socio-economic dynamics* 1, no. 20 (2020): 62.

[64] Maissam Nimer, and Susan Beth Rottmann, "Migration Regime and 'Language Part of Work': Experiences of Syrian Refugees as Surplus Population in the Turkish Labor Market," *Critical Sociology* 47, no. 4-5 (2020): 767.

[65] Maissam Nimer, and Susan Beth Rottmann, "Migration Regime and 'Language Part of Work': Experiences of Syrian Refugees as Surplus Population in the Turkish Labor Market," *Critical Sociology* 47, no. 4-5 (2020): 767.

[66] Doruk Cengiz, and Hasan Tekguc, "Is It Merely A Labor Supply Shock? Impacts of Syrian Migrants on Local Economies in Turkey?" *Political Economy Research Institute*, Working Paper Series no. 454 (2018), 7.

[67] Maissam Nimer, and Susan Beth Rottmann, "Migration Regime and 'Language Part of Work': Experiences of Syrian Refugees as Surplus Population in the Turkish Labor Market," *Critical Sociology* 47, no. 4-5 (2020): 764.

with its EU accession candidacy and negotiations, as a part of its harmonisation process.[68] To this effect, Turkey enacted the Law on Foreigners' Work Permits in 2003, granting existing migrant populations in Turkey a formal process through which to apply for work permits, indicating an existing high prevalence of informal status among migrant populations that pre-date the Syrian influx.[69] Local integration is one durable solution on the Sustainable Development Agenda. In Turkish asylum law, this is referred to as "harmonisation" and forms part of its alignment with European Union labour laws. It is widely agreed upon that participation in the labour force is an important step to successful local integration in receiving societies during protracted situations. It can be argued, however, that Turkey's evolving migration regime is at odds with its efforts to reduce the incidence of informality in Turkey's labour market. To this tone, its migration regime is regarded as coinciding with that of the country's increasing demand and propensity to exploit informal, cheap, flexible labour, given the abundance of such available labour supply owing to a persistent flow of irregular migration from Syria and elsewhere in the region.

Law on Foreigners and International Protection

Turkey adopted a system for granting work permits to Syrians in early 2016, through enacting Law no. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP).[70] Arguably, this was in line with Ankara's discourse (as well as the sustainable development rhetoric) on promoting migrant self-reliance and to lessen the burden of its "guests" on public spending. As of 2017, 56,024 Syrians were able to obtain work permits. This is a modest proportion of the few million that reside in Turkey. Several legal barriers have hindered the formal recruitment of Syrians by a significant proportion. For example, employers wishing to employ Syrians must first comply

[68] Ahmet Icducugy, and Eleni Diker, "Labor Market Integration of Syrian Refugees in Turkey: From Refugees to Settlers," *The Journal of Migration Studies* 3 no. 1 (2017): 14.

[69] Maissam Nimer, and Susan Beth Rottmann, "Migration Regime and 'Language Part of Work': Experiences of Syrian Refugees as Surplus Population in the Turkish Labor Market," *Critical Sociology* 47, no. 4-5 (2020): 767.

[70] Maissam Nimer, and Susan Beth Rottmann, "Migration Regime and 'Language Part of Work': Experiences of Syrian Refugees as Surplus Population in the Turkish Labor Market," *Critical Sociology* 47, no. 4-5 (2020): 767.

with the four-week waiting period, wherein they are required to evidence that the position cannot be reasonably filled by a Turkish citizen of equal skillset.[71] There is also a 10 per cent ratio limit on the number of Syrians to Turkish citizens that can be employed formally in any business. Further, the law restricts Syrians from applying for work outside of the province in which they are registered for temporary protection. 78 per cent of Syrians are concentrated in several provinces, a demographic that therefore makes obtaining formal work highly competitive.[72] There is an exception to the regulation on obtaining formal work, however; there are several sectors (such as agriculture and animal husbandry) wherein employers are permitted to employ Syrians, without work permits, as seasonal labourers.[73] Notwithstanding, there are multiple sectors that Syrians are entirely barred from in terms of formal employment. Namely, veterinary medicine and pharmaceuticals, dentistry, legal and notarial work, customs, and security. Given these cumbersome regulations, it is not surprising that only less than 1 per cent of Syrians who are of working age, are integrated into Turkey's formal labour market.[74] Hence, the employment of Syrians is pervasively in the informal labour market. This is despite the expectation of policymakers that the adoption of the work permit for Syrians would result in any such reduction. This, hence, suggests that Turkey's migration regime has evolved to serve

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[71] Soner Cagaptay and Maya Yalkin, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, PolicyWatch 3007, Aug 22 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syrian-refugees-turkey, accessed 6 June 2021.

[72] Soner Cagaptay and Maya Yalkin, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, PolicyWatch 3007, Aug 22 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syrian-refugees-turkey, accessed 6 June 2021.

[73] Soner Cagaptay and Maya Yalkin, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, PolicyWatch 3007, Aug 22 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syrian-refugees-turkey, accessed 6 June 2021.

[74] Soner Cagaptay and Maya Yalkin, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, PolicyWatch 3007, Aug 22 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syrian-refugees-turkey, accessed 6 June 2021.

its labour market conditions, welcoming flexible and fluid labour, and promoting low wages and unprotected work.[75]

Labour market effects of irregular Syrian migration: evidence from Turkey

Much of the empirical literature supports this and points to the prominence of the Syrian influx having had adverse effects on native informal employment since the outbreak of the refugee crisis. There is also evidence that indicates wage depression of the informal wage has occurred due to the prevalence of Syrians in the informal labour market. While one study analysing the 2012-15 period found no adverse impacts on employment or wages of native workers, including workers deemed "low-skill", there has been little accompanying evidence to this since, perhaps indicative of a discrepancy in that dataset or methodology.[76] More evidence exists that supports the argument that the Syrian refugee presence in Turkey has engendered a "permanently temporary" surplus of labour.[77] This is supported by the overarching finding in the literature that Syrian refugees are a supply "shock" to Turkish regional informal labour markets, which has given rise to higher rates of displacement of native informal workers, at six natives for every ten Syrians.[78] This indicates that the inflow of Syrians has vastly increased

[75] Nergis Canefe, "Management of irregular migration: Syrians in Turkey as paradigm shifters for forced migration studies," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 54 (2016): 12, https://dio.org/10.1017/npt.2016.6., and Maissam Nimer, and Susan Beth Rottmann, "Migration Regime and 'Language Part of Work': Experiences of Syrian Refugees as Surplus Population in the Turkish Labor Market," *Critical Sociology* 47, no. 4-5 (2020): 764.

[76] Cengiz and Tekguc, "Is It Merely A Labor Supply Shock?" 1.

[77] Maissam Nimer, and Susan Beth Rottmann, "Migration Regime and 'Language Part of Work': Experiences of Syrian Refugees as Surplus Population in the Turkish Labor Market," *Critical Sociology* 47, no. 4-5 (2020): 767.

[78] Cengiz Bahcekapili and Buket Cetin, "The Impacts of Forced Migration on Regional Economies: The Case of Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *International Business Research* 8, no. 9 (2015): 7., and Faik Tanrikulu, "The Political Economy of Migration and Integration: Effects of Immigants on the Economy in Turkey," *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies* (2020): 1-14, https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2020.1810840.

competition for informal employment.[79] Another key finding, indicated in several studies, has been the relationship between the depression of the informal wage and the disproportionate effect on women and low-educated workers in the informal labour force. Other notable findings further reinforce the evidence that the rates of unemployment and native displacement are greater in regions with high volumes of refugees, hence indicative of a greater intensity of effects.[80]

"Hidden losers"

Another study cites a shift in native informal employment to formal employment, giving rise to an increase in the native minimum wage of the formal labour force, however, in conjunction with increased native informal unemployment, this indicates a widening of the inequality gap among natives. This is an example of a disproportionate outcome, namely a benefit for the better-off at the expense of the poorer, the latter Chambers terms the "hidden losers."[81] A reduction in purchasing power has multidimensional implications for individual well-being. According to Sen, economic prospects are a defining feature of poverty, dependence and hopelessness.[82] Other results specifically show that the higher the proportion of low or uneducated native labour, the higher the number of informally unemployed. While some

[79] Yusuf Emre Akgundüz, Marcel Van den Berg, and Wolter Hassink, "The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Firm Entry Performance in Turkey," *The World Bank Economic Review* 32, no. 1 (2018): 23.

[80] Oguz, Ayla and Ogus Binatli, "The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Turkish Economy: Regional Labour Market Effects," *Soc. Sci.* 6, 4 (2017): 8.; Cengiz Bahcekapili and Buket Cetin, "The Impacts of Forced Migration on Regional Economies: The Case of Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *International Business Research* 8, no. 9 (2015): 7., and Faik Tanrikulu, "The Political Economy of Migration and Integration: Effects of Immigrants on the Economy in Turkey," *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies* (2020): 8, https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2020.1810840.

[81] Robert Chambers, "Hidden Losers? The Impact of Rural Refugees and Refugee Programs on Poorer Hosts," *The International Migration Review* 20, no. 2, Special Issue: Refugees: Issues and Directions (1986): 249.

[82] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 88.

evidence does not point to any statistically significant employment effects, studies carried out for the treatment period 2012-13 could be the reason for this.[83] This is because, during the early years of the Syrian crisis, no discernible effects could be correlated with the fact that many refugees at this time still overwhelming populated the refugee camps.[84] Hence, the key findings can be attributed to the general trend of Syrians gravitating to urban centres the longer the war went on, as it became realised that the crisis would be more protracted than first anticipated. Another study analysing the longer treatment period between 2012-2020, moreover, confirms the aforementioned findings, that refugee presence has increased competition for informal work, noting the wide-spread perception of this being the case, both in empirical literature and discourse on the subject.[85]

Poor labour substitutes

Syrian populations in Turkey comprise of 48 per cent youth, male, and are deemed low-skilled. However, it is difficult to accurately distinguish between "low-skilled" and those who have undergone occupational downgrading and informal labour market integration due to bureaucratic barriers or "red-tape" that inhibit the transfer of human capital (education or formal qualifications) to the domestic framework for recognising them. Another factor in non-transferable human capital stocks is the lack of relevant documentation to verify qualifications. Syrians are assumed to have travelled to Syria without such documents. Whereas there may exist discrepancies in the employability between natives and refugees, human capital is not a

[83] Yusuf Emre Akgunduz, Marcel Van den Berg, and Wolter Hassink, *The Impact of Refugee Crises on Host Labor Markets: The Case of the Syrian Refugee Crisis*, Discussion Paper no. 8841 (Bonn: IZA, 2015), 5.

[84] Yusuf Emre Akgunduz, Marcel Van den Berg, and Wolter Hassink, *The Impact of Refugee Crises on Host Labor Markets: The Case of the Syrian Refugee Crisis*, Discussion Paper no. 8841 (Bonn: IZA, 2015), 5.

[85] Tobias Heidenreich, *et al*, "Political migration discourses on social media: A comparative perspective on visibility and sentiment across political Facebook accounts in Europe," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46, no. 7 (2020): 1264, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1665990.

factor when the labour market does not "immediately price" one's skills or credentials.[86] Moreover, while no work permit can resolve this dilemma, the absence of formal employment among refugee populations indicates that there is a need to recognise refugee human capital stocks and increase the capacity for training where this is not possible. As Osen and Binatli identify, due to insufficient command of the Turkish language, the number of registered Syrian workers is still small. Refugees are poor labour substitutes due to cultural and linguistic barriers inhibiting the utilisation of their relative skillset in the labour force. This is hence compounded by the bureaucratic barrier that leads to occupational downgrading because human capital stocks are not immediately transferrable.

Conclusion

Chapter three provided the framework for analysis of the economic effects in Turkey, caused by Syrian refugee inflows. The first section looked to Turkey's existing problem space in relation to Turkey's neoliberal political economy, of a precarious dual formal-informal labour market and a fluid and "expendable" labour force. This was followed by a discussion of how Syrians have become integrated into the Turkish labour market precariously, by way of hindered access to the formal labour market despite the 2016 enactment of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, that adopted a system of granting work permits to Syrians. The author thus, derived labour market outcomes of natives as the best placed measure of developmental change for the economic aspect in this study. The research in this chapter evidenced the social [in]equality outcomes for natives through changes in labour divisions, to advance the argument that the Syrian presence in the informal labour market has resulted in the displacement of the native informal labour force. The key finding was that native informal workers have been *disproportionately* impacted by the prevalence of Syrians in the informal labour market. This outcome is negatively correlated with human development because it reduces the purchasing power of natives through a direct loss of income, and through the flow on effects of not being able to meet one's basic needs. To reiterate, this outcome illustrates a redistributive and disproportionate effect and leads to a rise in inequality in pockets of Turkish

[86] Sarit Cohen-Goldner, and Daniele Paserman, "The Dynamic Impact of Immigration of Natives' Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from Israel," *European Economic Review* 55, no. 8 (2011): 1034, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.05.002.

society. Moreover, the author argues that Turkey's existing labour force and neoliberal political economy predisposed the host population to this outcome.

Chapter 4: Framework for Analysis Part 2: Social Cohesion

Introduction

Chapter four explores in depth, the conceptual framework for analysing human wellbeing and development through networks of social capital and the absence of illbeing. It goes on to explain that migrant reception predetermines whether coexistence is peaceful or manifests into social disorder in the prolonged setting. The chapter evidences the social effects of the irregular Syrian migration by identifying changes in ethnic composition and social equality, compassion fatigue, and anti-refugee sentiment that reveals itself in negative attitudes early on, and later manifests into intergroup political and ethnic violence. The final remarks synthesise the argument made and revisit the question "*refugee admission, at what cost?"*, advancing the conclusion that extending refuge to new arrivals has caused socioeconomic redistribution, has fuelled host grievances, and ultimately, has led to a breakdown of social cohesion in Turkish society. To utilise Martha Nussbaum's conceptualisation of development, the evidence strongly demonstrates that the Turkish hosts have become deprived of their capability to achieve dignified lives, in cooperation with others, that they have good reason to value.

Development: wellbeing and the absence of illbeing

Given what we know about human beings as inherently economic actors, bestowed with survival instincts and agency, what can be deduced from the literature and research findings thus far is that securing a means to generate an income is an important prerequisite—albeit not the only one—to human development and well-being. According to Argyle, subjective well-being is determined by life satisfaction, happiness, and the *absence* of ill-being, equating the latter with feelings of depression and anxiety,[87] which further, can be equated with insecurity.

[87] Michael Argyle, "Subjective well-being," in *In pursuit of the quality of life*, ed. Anver Offer (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 22., cited in Joseph Sirgy, "Distinguishing Indicators of Well-Being from Indicators of Ill-Being," in *Alleviating World Suffering: The Challenge of Negative Quality of Life Book* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 89.

As Sen puts it, poor economic circumstances are a defining feature of being poor,[88] and link up to other "major sources of unfreedom" such as neglect, repression, social and material deprivation, including income deficiency.[89] Spicker puts forward a similar perspective, and places the onus on human capabilities that derive from situations of good health, education, and abundant social capital that lead to social equalities and degrees of autonomy. Hence, relating back to Argyle's concept, one must satisfy development needs in the "full spectrum" that they are, by satisfying basic needs through the reduction of ill-being, and satisfying *growth* needs by enhancing well-being.[90] There are, too, flow-on effects for the productiveness of political economies built on precarity. While macroeconomic growth is what governments plan for and is also what the neoliberal model is a driver of (alongside inequality and despite it), stable macroeconomic growth is essential to maintaining a trajectory that states really desire and is more compatible with human well-being outcomes.

Social capital

The money-metric frame, or otherwise, placing the onus on the importance of income, gives us only a partial understanding of all-encompassing human development needs. Let us refer to Spicker's notion of "abundant social capital" that is required for humans to flourish and apply this line of thinking to the Syrian presence in Turkey. Host-refugee interactions encompass interactions within the wider social context that is made up of networks of exchange and production, leisure and relationships, culture, collective action in problem solving, capacity-building, and group cohesiveness, among other things. By this token, social capital and how it influences community well-being and society's level of cohesion is another fundamental component to understanding how Turkish society has been impacted by the presence of refugees. Applied to this case, desirable or undesirable coexistence is attributed to how Syrians have been received by their Turkish hosts. Their positive or otherwise, negative reception, is a key determinant of the maintenance of social order and peaceful coexistence or, conversely,

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[88] Amartya, *Development as Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 3.

[89] Amartya, *Development as Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 108.

[90] Joseph Sirgy, "Distinguishing Indicators of Well-Being from Indicators of Ill-Being," in *Alleviating World Suffering: The Challenge of Negative Quality of Life Book* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 90.

illustrates whether coexistence has given rise to conflict, confrontation, and in the extreme, political instability.

Social effects of irregular migration in Turkey: a change in the *status quo*

Ethnic composition

The influx of predominantly Sunni Arab migrants/refugees has altered the ethnic composition in the southern provinces of Turkey. Whereas the Turkish government has not collected data on the ethnic origins of its citizens since the national census in 1960, at which time ethnic Arabs constituted 1.25 per cent of the national population, Hatay reported 34 per cent of their population to be ethnic Arabs, Mardin, 21 per cent, and Sanliurfa, 13 per cent. Ethnic Arabs are defined as those whose native language is Arabic.[91] Ethnic Arab communities pre-dating the Syrian War were always minorities in provinces. However, as of 2018, Hatay's population comprised of 56 per cent ethnic Arabs, shifting the ethnic proportion of this province to an Arab-majority, a first in Turkey's history.[92] While the Alawite community had formerly predominated the composition of Hatay, the number of Sunni Arabs, caused by the influx, is now on par with the Alawite community. Similarly, the population of Kilis is poised to become an Arab-majority while ethnic Arabs had formerly constituted only 1 per cent of the province. Mardin's proportion of ethnic Arabs has risen from 21 to 31 per cent, while Sanliurfa's has nearly doubled, from 13 per cent to 32 per cent.[93]

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[91] Soner Cagaptay and Maya Yalkin, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, PolicyWatch 3007, Aug 22 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syrian-refugees-turkey, accessed 6 June 2021.

[92] Soner Cagaptay and Maya Yalkin, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, PolicyWatch 3007, Aug 22 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syrian-refugees-turkey, accessed 6 June 2021.

[93] Soner Cagaptay and Maya Yalkin, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, PolicyWatch 3007, Aug 22 2018,

Inequality and compassion fatigue

Survey data based on ethnographic fieldwork by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) shows that public opinion on the presence of Syrians in Turkey has deteriorated since the initial welcome in 2011.[94] "Compassion fatigue," as the official discourse terms it, has become rife in Turkish society. This is evidenced by the anti-Syrian sentiments amongst regional communities, in cities, and rural areas alike. One reason for this is attributed to the loss of a preconceived notion of social status in conjunction with the practical implications of material inequities produced by refugee presence. For example, natives in Antakya perceive Syrians to be a "strain on the health system and express their wish for the segregated provision of health services among Turks and Syrians, whereas other Turks have expressed interest in an expansion of health services open to all.[95] Another reason is the language barrier between native and refugee populations, framed as the mutual inability of each group to forge inter-communal relationships.[96]

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https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syrian-refugees-turkey, accessed 6 June 2021.

[94] International Organisation for Migration (IOM), *Social Cohesion Assessment: Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment of the Host-Refugee Cohesion in Three Districts in Turkey,* Assessment Report for IOM's Transition and Recovery Division (June 2017): 9, https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/social-cohesion-assessment-quantitative-and-qualitative-assessment-host-refugee, accessed 23 May 2021.

[95] International Organisation for Migration (IOM), *Social Cohesion Assessment: Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment of the Host-Refugee Cohesion in Three Districts in Turkey,* Assessment Report for IOM's Transition and Recovery Division (June 2017): 9, https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/social-cohesion-assessment-quantitative-and-qualitative-assessment-host-refugee, accessed 23 May 2021.

[96] International Organisation for Migration (IOM), *Social Cohesion Assessment: Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment of the Host-Refugee Cohesion in Three Districts in Turkey,* Assessment Report for IOM's Transition and Recovery Division (June 2017): 9, https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/social-cohesion-assessment-quantitative-and-qualitative-assessment-host-refugee, accessed 23 May 2021.

Another study by International Crisis Group offers insight on intergroup perceptions and underlying sentiment fuelling intergroup perceptions and interactions in Izmir.[97] This study provides qualitative data from interviews with 19 randomly selected local Turkish citizens in 2018. The overwhelming sentiment underscores the weariness of locals in grappling with the crisis. For instance, in another study gleaning insight from interviews among local citizens of Izmir, one subject expresses qualm about the government's response to refugees, citing a lack of comprehensive coping mechanisms and policies, and ambiguity around the duration of the Syrians' stay in Turkey. The same subject mentions they had not (at the time) interacted directly with any Syrians in Izmir, but expresses "hospitality" and "social acceptance," with reference to observing the Syrians living under desperate conditions.[98] The notion that morality can be a powerful source of cohesion goes to the core of human frailty—and resonates here. In the words of Radley, people "see in the plight of others, their own (possible) misery."[99]

Anti-refugee sentiment

Further, the study by International Crisis Group provides examples of the ways in which anti-refugee sentiment has manifested into violence, citing the occurrence of 181 cases of refugee-related tension during 2017-18 and cases of 35 deaths during intercommunal clashes in 2017, 24 of whom were Syrians. The authors argue that tension has been most widespread in the largest metropolises, namely Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, where there is overpopulation and cultural diversity. These localities are also where the largest proportion of Syrian refugees reside in relation to their dispersion elsewhere in the country. Grievances indicate the greatest concerns for interethnic disputes, social inequality, and violence in the urban space. Economic enclaves and low-income districts where irregular migrants populate low-skill industries such

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[97] International Crisis Group, *Turkey's Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions*, Europe Report no. 248 (January 2018), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/248-turkey-s-syrian-refugees.pdf, accessed 23 May 2021.

[98] Ayselin Yildiz, and Elif Uzgoren, "Limits to temporary protection: non-camp Syrian refugees in Izmir, Turkey," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 16, no. 2 (2016): 205.

[99] Bryan S. Turner, "Outline of a theory of human rights," *Sociology* 27, 3 (1993): 506, cited in Radley, Alan, ""Abhorrence, compassion, and the social response to suffering," *Health* 3, no. 2 (1999): 170.

as textiles, are ripe for feelings of disenfranchisement among locals who express that their opportunities for work have been diminished by competitive labour markets and no choice but to accept lower wages that refugees are exploited for. The potential for friction therefore is common in areas with Kurdish populations who already feel marginalised as a minority, a feeling that is compounded by a perceived refugee "privilege" for Syrians.[100] The existence of large volumes of irregular migrants fuels the anti-refugee perception that Syrians "live in the shadows and do not conform with societal norms."[101]

This evidence indicates that subcultures are distinct in cities, unlike border regions wherein there is more cultural continuity among hosts and refugees, citing linguistic similarities that enable greater communication. A lack of ability to understand the outgroup can lead to mutual misunderstanding. Abeywickrama *et al*., citing a Socio-Functional Account (SFA) of Prejudice**,** conceptualise how complex intergroup dynamics and bias can help to distinguish between three sub-categories: attitudes, emotions, and tendencies; classes of threat, and distinctions among social groups. Applying this model to intergroup tension between refugees and hosts provides insight into how realistic and symbolic threats, such as those related to material inequality and cultural values, invoke emotions that lead to certain behavioural tendencies through motivational qualities and hence reactions.[102] For example, the realistic threat to employment opportunities provokes anger, which can lead to aggressive tendencies that were evidenced in economic centres. Furthermore, the symbolic threat perceived by Kurds

[100] International Crisis Group, *Turkey's Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions*, Europe Report no. 248 (January 2018): 27, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/248-turkey-s-syrian-refugees.pdf, accessed 23 May 2021.

[101] International Crisis Group, *Turkey's Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions*, Europe Report no. 248 (January 2018): 3, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/248-turkey-s-syrian-refugees.pdf, accessed 23 May 2021.

[102] Ravini S. Abeywickrama, Simon M. Laham, and Damien Crone, "Immigration and Receiving Communties: The Utility of Threats and Emotions in Predicting Action Tendencies toward Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Economic Migrants," *Journal of Social Issues* 74, no. 4 (2018): 757.

in the perceived refugee privilege provokes disgust.[103] An occurrence not referenced earlier, is that of how Syrian men travel in groups for protection, which in turn, is misconceived for hostile and threatening behaviour to hosts.[104] This, in addition to Syrians "living in the shadows" are social isolation and avoidance tendencies brought about by fear.[105]

Synthesis: Turkey's threshold for hosting Syrian refugees

The research findings have shown that the overwhelming and persistent presence of Syrians self-integrating into the informal labour market has had a negative effect on individual well-being of Turks. Some natives have experienced displacement from their employment, wage depression, or have been subjected to a highly competitive labour market. Woolcock provides a nuanced explanation for why these circumstances entail deprivation beyond income deficiency, with his concept of social and economic embeddedness, meaning economic outcomes interrelate with social outcomes, and vice versa.[106] This understanding coincides with our earlier finding that migrants behave in a wider social context, which is also central to Spicker's understanding of the economy, which he postulates represents an intricate framework of relationships, giving notion to the idea of the economy and society representing two sides

[103] Ravini S. Abeywickrama, Simon M. Laham, and Damien Crone, "Immigration and Receiving Communties: The Utility of Threats and Emotions in Predicting Action Tendencies toward Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Economic Migrants," *Journal of Social Issues* 74, no. 4 (2018): 758.

[104] International Crisis Group, *Turkey's Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions*, Europe Report no. 248 (January 2018): 4, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/248-turkey-s-syrian-refugees.pdf, accessed 23 May 2021.

[105] Ravini S. Abeywickrama, Simon M. Laham, and Damien Crone, "Immigration and Receiving Communties: The Utility of Threats and Emotions in Predicting Action Tendencies toward Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Economic Migrants," *Journal of Social Issues* 74, no. 4 (2018): 758.

[106] Michael Woolcock, "Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework," *Theory and Society* 27, no. 2 (1998): 163.

of the same coin.[107] Also central to this view, is the direct correlation between resources and the economy itself.[108] With all of this in mind, and by also taking into account the distributional effects of labour market integration given market forces, there is a crucial link between migration itself, given the conditions are set, and the incidence of poverty—that cannot be overlooked.

Hence, material inequality constitutes one significant effect. When you place this in the context of neoliberalism, the capital owners and formal labourers have not been subjected to any disadvantage. On the contrary, when irregular labour is exploited for cheap wages and hence, cheap production costs of the capital owner, their outcome is a net benefit. The exploitative relationship between the capital owner and the native worker (displaced or whose labour has been devalued), not only gives evidence for Spicker's relational understanding of economy, but one could go a step further to argue that this circumstance represents an unwillingness on the employer's part to "share in the fruits if [his] profit."[109] The idea of social cohesion is useful therefore, for explaining why, aside from the material inequity produced, there is a concurrent negative social effect on willingness to cooperate in the future, wherein natives feel they are not receiving their equitable share.[110] Hence, natives become less inclined to cooperate with refugees, whom natives perceive as being the primary source of their dispossession.[111] This gives us a segue into how the anti-refugee sentiments can be understood.

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[107] Paul Spicker, *The Poverty of Nations: A Relational Perspective*, 1st ed (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2020), 104.

[108] Paul Spicker, *The Poverty of Nations: A Relational Perspective*, 1st ed (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2020), 104.

[109] Dick Stanley, "What Do We Know about Social Cohesion: The Research Perspective of the Federal Government's Social Cohesion Research Network," *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 28, no. 1 (2003): 12.

[110] Dick Stanley, "What Do We Know about Social Cohesion: The Research Perspective of the Federal Government's Social Cohesion Research Network," *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 28, no. 1 (2003): 12.

[111] Dick Stanley, "What Do We Know about Social Cohesion: The Research Perspective of the Federal Government's Social Cohesion Research Network," *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 28, no. 1 (2003): 13.

Refugee admission, at what cost? The deprivation of dignified lives

Studies showed that throughout the crisis, there have been a substantial number of violent clashes between natives and refugee populations, so violent, that deaths have occurred. The evidence points to a general sentiment that has emerged in the later years of the crisis termed "compassion fatigue." The fatigue refers to a feeling among natives in relation to their perceived loss of social status, loss of their city, the perceived strain on resources and hence a lack of coping mechanisms. This situation has resulted due to persistent negative experiences that can be explained by the scarcity of equality and the negative reactionary emotions that manifest into adverse behaviour toward the Syrians. When social outcomes become less equitable and therefore deteriorate, willingness for reconciliation in the future dissipates, as a result. Sustained lack of cooperation, therefore, leads to a vicious cycle that reflects bad relationships that decrease social capital.

The concept of social cohesion offers a rich theoretical evaluation for this. Described as a "self-referential" condition, that which coexists in a "virtuous circle" with liberal values, explains how social outcomes and the condition of cohesiveness itself can "spiral up or down."[112] As the evidence illustrates, both realistic and symbolic threat perceptions have mutually reinforcing effects for intergroup behaviour and interaction. Owing to the degree of value assigned to income, and people's access to it, measures of its distribution appear to be the central indictor of the distribution of social outcomes, too.[113] The arbitrary conditions under which irregular migration interacts with the development, hence paves the way for mutually reinforcing material burdens and symbolic ones. All of this supports the argument that an overwhelming proportion of Turkish society is no longer willing to survive and prosper in cooperation with Syrians. Collier puts forth, that to maintain a stable level of coexistence with migrants, the rate of flow of refugees into a country requires an equal rate of absorption (or

[112] Dick Stanley, "What Do We Know about Social Cohesion: The Research Perspective of the Federal Government's Social Cohesion Research Network," *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 28, no. 1 (2003): 13.

[113] Dick Stanley, "What Do We Know about Social Cohesion: The Research Perspective of the Federal Government's Social Cohesion Research Network," *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 28, no. 1 (2003): 11.

otherwise, integration), that produces to a greater effect, desirable outcomes than undesirable ones.[114] Hence, migration can be best understood in terms of a redistributive social policy, that can, when it occurs over a prolonged period and under somewhat arbitrary conditions, lead to a virtual social tipping point.

Conclusion

Chapter four explored in depth, the conceptual framework for analysing human wellbeing and development through networks of social capital and the absence of illbeing. It explained that migrant reception is a predeterminant of peaceful coexistence, or coexistence that is likely to manifest into social disorder in a prolonged setting. The chapter evidenced the social effects of the irregular Syrian migration by identifying changes in ethnic composition and social equality, compassion fatigue, and anti-refugee sentiment that revealed itself in negative attitudes early on in the crisis, that has since increasingly evolved into intergroup political and ethnic violence. The final remarks synthesised the argument made and revisited the question "*refugee admission, at what cost?"*, advancing the conclusion that extending justice to Syrian arrivals has caused continuing socioeconomic redistribution, has fuelled grievances, and ultimately, has led to a breakdown of social cohesion in Turkish society. The change in status quo evidenced here, was measured by a redistribution of labour market outcomes, and a digression of group cohesiveness, and both components were ranked against the duration of the crisis and intensity of the Syrian inflows. Moreover, the change in status quo has led to a social tipping point in Turkish society.

[114] Paul Collier, *Exodus: How Migration Is Changing Our World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 25-6.

Conclusion

This thesis identified and sought to fill in a gap in the literature on analyses of the effects of irregular migration in receiving societies. As a field of inquiry that is central to the theme of human rights and justice, there exists strong evidence to draw our scholarly attention to the condition of social cohesion and the role it plays in shaping political [de]stabilisation, illbeing and wellbeing, for the purpose of identifying fracture points for human vulnerability in receiving societies. It is imperative to combine liberal values from the analytical prisms of development studies, to draw new parameters of analysis for qualitative research in this area. This is because society and the economy are embedded and must be treated as such in research on socioeconomic change. Doing so, advances the hypothesis that there exists a reciprocal relationship between equitable social outcomes and social cohesion.

This thesis aimed to demonstrate that grievances expressed by Turkish host populations, both individuals and groups, stemmed from experiences of socioeconomic inequality that was linked to the arrival of the Syrian refugees and their integration into Turkish society. The author identified that there is a widespread consensus in the literature that perceived material and symbolic inequality at the local level is produced by irregular migration, but the author advanced the thesis that local level inequality is more detrimental at the community level, politically. Hence, the purpose of this thesis was to examine Turkey's contemporary threshold, as a host nation, for absorbing the Syrian refugees without endangering social cohesion within its political community. In so doing the thesis asked the following question: refugee admission, at what cost to society? Labour market outcomes of natives were assessed to determine how irregular migration produced redistribution within native labour markets—a cost in and of itself for a proportion of individuals and groups—but following on from this, the author argued with theory and empirical evidence that that these material inequities do not fully capture the deprivation experienced by Turkish hosts. For this reason, the author turned to socio-political grievances expressed by host populations, to glean a more rounded understanding of the human deprivation experience of the Turkish hosts in coexistence with the Syrian refugees.

The author found that the evolving anti-refugee sentiment in Turkey has stemmed from cases of material dispossession and has persisted by way of preconceived feelings of disenfranchisement, that have become ever-increasingly apparent as the crisis has prolonged

beyond the initial warm welcome. The findings have provided the more nuanced view sought by the researcher, and therefore, suggest that immigration acts more as a redistributive social policy in receiving societies, than a determinant of economic change alone. Seminal works by development studies theorists foreshadowed this claim, revealing the non-linearity of development as a process, one that produces winners and losers. A shift in socioeconomic equality in pockets of Turkish society evidenced trade-offs for different groups within the society, and often caused disproportionate effects for the poorer hosts. Moreover, the researcher has shown that the impact of Syrians in Turkey's socioeconomic transformation can be costed by more than the migrants' labour inputs. The behaviour of Syrians as social beings engendered "economic actorness" in the wider social context, and their structure and agency were predeterminants of this. Political communities, therefore, are integral to furthering our understanding of migrant "costs" to societies in the form of multidimensional deprivation experienced by and *with* others.

From this research, the author exposed key fracture points and vulnerabilities in relation to Turkey's pre-existing labour market, and in relation to pre-existing social and cultural frictions and trust issues. In doing this, the author argued that pre-conditions within its socioeconomic and socio-political substrates, predisposed Turkish society to the development transformation seen throughout the crisis. This analysis has important practical implications for policy, in that it equips one to utilise predispositions of receiving societies, to predict ensuing socioeconomic processes (and change), to hence pre-determine thresholds beyond which social cohesion is eroded in host nations. For instance, one might enquire how varying intensities of refugee crises might significantly influence how soon a country will surpass its threshold.

In answering the question, "*refugee admission, at what cost?"*, I advanced the following answer: extending refuge to the Syrian refugees has diminished justice for the less well-off Turkish hosts. This has been evidenced through material and preconceived dispossession, and a gradual breakdown of social cohesion, and hence demonstrates that Turkey has reached a social tipping point—a point beyond which, refugees are a net burden to society. The irrefutable rationale employed here is, social equality is a scarce commodity, with the argument going as follows. The notion of human security and key concepts in development studies have proved best placed in explaining modern human vulnerabilities in the modern and urban setting due to the interaction between refugees and hosts within labour markets.

For this reason, having emphasised the economic impact in this thesis has not been without merit, but the narrative did not end here. It was explained that viewing immigrants as purely a collection of labour inputs can lead to a very misleading appraisal of the effects of irregular immigration, by failing to account for their social contributions, namely social interactions, and consumption, in their attempts to meet basic human needs. It was further explained that this omission puts forth an incomplete picture of the impacts, in terms of *multidimensional* development, conceptualised by the development studies field and employed as a frame to analyse the change in status quo in the Turkish case. Moreover, it was identified that the precariousness in the endeavour to meet one's needs as an irregular migrant, is the crucial link to understanding social disorder brought about in receiving societies of irregular migrants.

The thesis exposed the disproportionality and heterogeneity of migration effects, in terms of social equality, and demonstrated how these factors are widely absent from existing discussions, but ought to be brought to the forefront. An obvious area of tension stemming from the intense and prolonged influx of Syrians in Turkey was the inadequate expansion of municipal and social services, displacement from employment (predominantly informal) and the emergence of exclusionary ideologies and xenophobic attitudes. These came about not just because of the circumstances that arose following the immigration, but evidently also have roots in Turkey's distinct history and social memory regarding immigration. Turkey has served not only as a destination country in the past, but also as a key transit point to third countries of migration in Europe. The forms of anti-Syrian sentiment the author has evidenced to have emerged over the duration of the Syrian influx into Turkey, have stemmed from threat perceptions, resentment, and a lingering feeling of disenfranchisement based on perceived refugee or migrant privilege, over and over.

Chapter one formed the Literature Review by surveying the existing literature on the effects of migration on receiving societies and combining development concepts from various studies with host population experiences. Chapter two provided a contextual background to the irregular Syrian migration into Turkey, touching on the Syrian Civil War, the conditions under which Syrians entered Turkey and have resided there since, and some demographic statistics that aided in painting the picture of the settlement populations among that of the hosts. Chapter three first looked to Turkey's pre-existing economic substrate and neoliberal political economy for insight into the existing labour market divisions that the author argued, predisposed Turkish

labour markets to intense irregular migrant penetration. The chapter went on to provide the supporting evidence for this argument, demonstrating the widespread incidence of increased competition for employment, informal labour substitution, displacement of the native informal labour force and a depression of native wages.

Chapter four explored in depth, the conceptual framework for analysing human wellbeing and development through networks of social capital and the absence of illbeing. It went on to explain the author's hypothesis that migrant reception predetermines whether coexistence is likely to be peaceful or manifest into social disorder in the prolonged setting. The chapter then evidenced the social effects of the irregular Syrian migration by identifying changes in ethnic composition, a rise in social inequality, compassion fatigue and anti-refugee sentiment that revealed itself in negative attitudes early on, and later manifested into intergroup political and ethnic violence. The final remarks synthesised the argument made, and revisited the question "*refugee admission, at what cost?"*, advancing the final conclusion that extending refuge to the Syrians has caused continuing socioeconomic redistribution, has fuelled grievances, and ultimately, has led to a breakdown of social cohesion in Turkish society.

In sum, this change in status quo was greatly influenced by the duration of the Syrian crisis and the intensity of the refugee inflows. To summarise with Martha Nussbaum's conceptualisation of development, the evidence from this research strongly demonstrates that the Turkish hosts have become deprived of their capability to achieve dignified lives, in cooperation with others, that they have good reason to value. This uncomfortable conclusion expresses powerfully the way the provision of asylum—the extension of social equality to a greater sum—both relies upon and reveals the limits of closed forms of political community.

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