

POAD9050

Masters Dissertation in Public Administration

Assessing Border Control Management of Immigration Control at Airports in Indonesia: A Theoretical and Empirical Study

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6 November 2020

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

ABSTRACT

Dozens of fugitives crossed Indonesia's border controls between 2011 and 2020. These cases indicate a weakness in the immigration practices and poor border security. This thesis evaluates the border control management (BCM) of immigration control practices to identify national strategies and assess the maturity of the Directorate General of Immigration's border control systems. This thesis asks questions about whether airport's immigration control policies engage with established international standards. It employs qualitative research with the document analysis critically assessing the security and facilitation of immigration clearance processes based on the BCM ICAO TRIP GUIDE 2018. Online secondary data was collected from the Directorate's annual reports, statistics, policy briefs, and academic journal articles. Data analysis draws upon existing theories and concepts of border control management, border technology, migration policy, and border security. Findings demonstrate the weaknesses of Indonesia's border control management practices, low-security approach, fragmented policy, overlapping authorities, inadequate information, obsolete border technology, and weak border law enforcement. Four strategies are proposed to address the issues: adoption of the international standards and practices; deployment of more automated border control machines with biometric databases; improving border technology; and initiating the concept of integrated border management (IBM). This study concludes that a more systematic and theoretical study of primary data is required for a more definitive evaluation of immigration control policies at all borders in Indonesia.

Keywords: immigration clearance, border governance, border technology

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Migration policy and border governance are inevitably intertwined where complexities of movement of people across countries increase in a significant number. The number of visitors, workers, investors, and students entering through Indonesia's airports has risen since 2015. In the Decision Letter of the Minister of Law and Human Rights Indonesia 2020, as points of entry and exit, immigration controls have been designated at 37 international airports across Indonesia. Of these, the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (BPS, 2020) identifies 29,594,142 foreign tourists entering Indonesia by air from 2017 to 2019. According to the official annual reports, or LAKIP, of the Directorate General of Immigration (DGI) Indonesia, 35,833,205 Indonesians and foreign visitors entered and left Indonesia in 2016, 40,336,562 in 2017, and 44,437,458 in 2018. However, not all international visitors are allowed to enter Indonesia unless they are an eligible person with a lawful travel document and a valid visa. The report points to an increase in the number of violations of immigration laws, where immigration administrative sanctions were imposed on foreign visitors. In 2016-2018, 5,970, 11,307 and 12,594 breaches were recorded respectively. Other violations ending up in court were 341 cases in 2016 and 272 cases in 2017. The data indicates the border control management at airports is most significant aspect for selecting the authorised people and identifying legitimate documentation.

Dozens of fugitives crossing Indonesia's border control happened between 2011 and 2020. For example, Gayus Tambunan, a corrupt tax auditor at the Ministry of Finance Indonesia, was sentenced to a 7-year imprisonment and fined Rp1 billion (US$100,000), but he owned an Indonesian passport issued by an immigration office in Jakarta (Tjen & Evans, 2017, p. 253). In 2011, while in custody, Gayus made several international trips by air (Kimura, 2012, p. 187). In 2012, Muhammad Nazaruddin, a treasurer of a political party, who was found guilty of corruption over construction funds for the Asian Games athlete's dorms, was sentenced to a 4-jail term and fined US$20,000 (Fealy, 2013, p. 104). He escaped from the prison and was arrested in Cartagena, Columbia (Brooks, 2011, p. 113). Moreover, Nazaruddin's wife, Neneng Sri Wahyuni, was arrested in Malaysia after fleeing from jail in 2012 due to corruption cases involving the national budget (Heryanto, 2014, p. 47). At the beginning of 2020, Harun Masiku, an Indonesian politician facing

bribery charges, was still at large and never caught after fleeing Indonesia by air (Soeriaatmadja, 2020). After Harun Masiku's case, the FBI's most wanted person for a Bitcoin case in 2016 was caught in Jakarta in June 2020 on child sex offences (Hodge & Vasandani, 2020). Also in 2020 is the case of Djoko Chandra, for Bank Bali corruption, who escaped from jail and fled to Papua New Guinea in 2009. He was arrested in Malaysia after travelling overseas through airports, seaports, and border crossing stations several times (Mcbeth, 2020). These cases highlight the weakness of immigration border control practices and poor border security.

Although there have been a few studies on immigration practices in Indonesia, the research on immigration control policy remains limited. For example, previous research shows that immigration officials lacked practising in immigration clearance procedures, travel document inspection formalities, consistency, or legitimacy, including unequal public service delivery to returning Indonesian domestic workers (Silvey, 2007). Border governance in Indonesia is discussed from the perspectives of relevant policies and political approaches, which affect the government's decisions and understanding of the complexities of borders (Ulfa, Fimmastuti, & Rahmah, 2018). Another study on emerging patterns of Indonesia's international migration focused on the movement of people across the world, which was essential to invite foreigners to work, invest and establish businesses and contribute to economic growth in Indonesia (Ananta & Arifin, 2014). Little research addresses the specific issue of border control management and immigration control policy at airports.

Challenging problems have existed in the implementation of immigration control policy across borders over a decade. This study seeks to obtain data, information, and findings for a border control evaluation, which will help to address these practical knowledge gaps. This study evaluates the border control management (BCM) of immigration control at Indonesian airports. It has considerable benefits in terms of proposed solutions to overcome issues of BCM of immigration control policy. It is argued that the BCM of immigration control policy does not respond to the BCM standards, global issues of migration, migrant workers, refugees, visa policy, border technology, and infrastructure development. This study is significant to address questions of how immigration control policy is engaged with international standards. What is the maturity level of border control management of immigration in Indonesia in terms of tools and systems? Can the BCM standard and level of technology maturity determine immigration

control quality? To what extent did poor BCM practices result in fugitives easily entering and leaving Indonesia? In October 2020, the Indonesian Visa system shifted from a visa label to an electronic visa system as regulated in the Regulation of Minister of Law and Human Rights No. 26 of 2020 about Visa and Residence Permits in the New Normal. This change could affect the maturity of border control system in immigration controls at airport. However, this study did not include this new visa system in the analysis because it was at the trial and error stage.

This six-chapter thesis reviews the security and facilitation of the immigration clearance process at airports based on the BCM ICAO TRIP GUIDE 2018 Part 2 Assessment Tool. Online secondary data is collected to assess national strategies for Border Control Management, inspection systems and tools, interoperable applications, examination of travellers and travel document inspection, human resource consideration, and assistance to states. The analysis incorporates theories and concepts about border control management, border technology, border security, and migration policy. It finds that immigration control policy was only partially engaged with the BCM's international standards in the ICAO BCM TRIP Guide. As national strategies, the DGI has not designed clear targets and objectives for bordering process and securitisation measures. The BCM standard and level of technology maturity will determine the quality of immigration control and border security. The thesis argues that poor BCM practices caused fugitives to enter and leave Indonesia illegally and undetected. The DGI undermined risk assessment and identification of travellers.

This study contributes to four proposed strategies to address the issues: to adapt to international standards and practices of the immigration clearance process; to deploy more automated border control machine with biometric databases; to improve border technology; and to initiate the concept of integrated border management or IBM. A more systematic and theoretical study with primary data is required for further evaluation of immigration control policy and BCM practices at airports or other types of borders in Indonesia.

CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY

This study employs qualitative research by applying document analysis (Bowen, 2009), reviewing the security and facilitation of immigration clearance process based on the BCM ICAO TRIP GUIDE 2018 Part 2 Assessment Tool. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) document as a Traveller Identification Programme (TRIP) is a standardized comprehensive assessment tool for evaluating border control management at international airports, seeking a seamless border control inspection regime with high-levels of border security (ICAO, 2018a).

2.1. Data Collection

To support the analysis, online secondary data (Flowerdew & Martin, 2005, p. 65) was collected from the Directorate General of Immigration Indonesia or DGI's annual reports, official statistics, regulations, and policy briefs, published on the official websites and social media, international standards, and academic journal articles. Secondary data addressed the evaluation elements of BCM and answered sets of questions in the document of BCM ICAO TRIP GUIDE. Secondary data collection offers an extensive range of official data relating to research issues which researchers need (Hox & Boeije, 2005, p. 596) and it is an open-access dataset provided by professional with affordable fees (Cheng & Phillips, 2014, p. 374). This study uses the Harzing's Publish or Persih 7 (PoP) program software in collecting online data and analysing academic references through various data sources such as retrieving data from Google Scholar, PubMed, Crossref, Scopus, Web of Science (Harzing, 2010).

2.2. Data Analysis

Data analysis is supported by the existing theoretical framework of border control management, border technology, immigration policy, and border security. Data was analysed by the logic models (Brown, 2014) which evaluate policy problems, identify core issues and seek interrelationships by analysing problems or challenges of implementation of immigration control policy, inputs, outputs, and outcomes. The

published data reveals gaps between the strategic plan or programs and implementation of immigration control policies. The approach to theory applies an academic literature review of border control management, border studies, border security, and immigration policy and incorporates the document analysis. The result of the study demonstrates the implementation of BCM in immigration control, its quality, and the adoption of border technology.

The document analysis method sometimes faces impediments such as inadequate detailed information or data, difficulty in accessing data, and biased selectivity (Bowen, 2009, pp. 31-32). Moreover, secondary data collection is limited to the availability of published data (Flowerdew & Martin, 2005, p. 70) and presents subjectivity and lack of data accuracy (Smith & Smith Jr, 2008, p. 22). In terms of confidentiality, organizations might not publish their report for the public on websites or social media.

CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter delves into theories and concepts about border control management, border technology, border security, and migration policy.

3.1. Border Control Management

Prior to a discussion of border control management, questions about borders and border control are addressed. The border is traditionally a physical line to denote jurisdictions and territorial sovereignty (Pallitro & Heyman, 2008; Simmons, 2019). Borders are barriers to danger, coerced migration, and are located at ports and the airports (Krasteva, 2016, p. 20). Extensive movements of people through borders and the economy in borderlands are facilitated by states seeking new concepts of bordering. Accommodating the changing nature of the border, border control policies focus on transnational crime, global terrorism, undocumented or unauthorized persons, and other immigration violations (Walters, 2006, p. 199). The aim of border control is to select only lawful persons who will be allowed to enter the territory with effective border measures (Alden, 2012, p. 107). However, the notions of borders and border control are not limited to a territorial border, state border, or a traditional point of entry. 'Bordering practice' refers to territorial and non-territorial borders, border agencies, and mechanism of border governance to facilitate border-crossing processes of people, goods, services, information (Anderson & O'dowd, 1999, p. 602). Borders and border control must govern the movement of people, goods, and information by pre-empting measures with the multiplicity of perspectives and a broader spectrum.

BCM is a fundamental element that must consider not only border security but also immigration policy with clear outcomes. Previous theoretical developments reveal that an immigration policy considers major policy frameworks, global economic aspects, international issues, social and cultural influences (Sassen, 1996). Similarly, immigration control has an impact on the economy, demography, and social significance to form boundaries of national sovereignty, nationality, and territoriality (Walsh, 2014). In relation to the dynamic of incoming visitors, workers, investors, and students, visa policies are urged to be revised regularly in response to current issues that underpin

immigration policy (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2013). In practice, BCM is an essential part of an immigration clearance process at border controls where integrated technology is installed to record passenger movement data, biometric information, documents authentication, and verify a watchlist. It suggests that the immigration control policies comprise many aspects, impacts, and global issues related to national sovereignty, security, and economic growth.

Poor border control management is a severe impediment to a seamless immigration clearance process at airports. For instance, social discrimination of Indonesian domestic workers returning home occurred during immigration clearance processes at Soekarno-Hatta international airport Jakarta (Silvey, 2007, p. 272). A number of fugitives crossed Indonesia's border through immigration control at airports (Brooks, 2011; Heryanto, 2014; Hodge & Vasandani, 2020; Kimura, 2012; Mcbeth, 2020; Soeriaatmadja, 2020). In so doing, the practice of immigration control was a day-to-day travel document inspection, rather than pre-empting measures or pre-clearance without a risk management and security approach (Indrady, 2020, p. 72). These examples confirm border control and immigration control policies were not effective, highlighting weak border security and massive loopholes.

Indonesia ratified the 1947 Chicago Convention, which established the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to build international cooperation on the global arrangement of commercial flights. The Chicago Convention published 18 annexes about standards and recommended practices (SARPS) for air travel arrangements. In this sense, Annex 9 (*Annex 9 Facilitation*, 2017) about facilitation includes formalities of clearance for entry and departure of aircraft, person, baggage, international airports, inadmissible persons, deportees, and passenger data system. ICAO also published BCM ICAO TRIP GUIDE 2018 consisting of two parts: Guidance and Assessment Tool. To review the border control management of immigration control policies, this study is using the BCM ICAO TRIP GUIDE 2018 Part 2 Assessment Tool. It is a document of the traveller identification programme (TRIP) containing an evaluation guide for application to border control management. This guide was published by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 2018 to strengthen the border security and protection of the state. It includes four main elements with the relevant objects for review, as described in Table 1. The guide evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of BCM practices and answers questions considered in the document.

Table 1. The Assessment Tools of BCM

Evaluation Elements of BCM	Objects
National Strategies for Border Control Management	• Perspectives • Intervention Risks
Inspection Systems and Tools	• Visas and Electronic Travel System • Document Readers • Biographic Identity Verification • Biometric Identity Verification • National Watchlists • Entry and Exit Databases • Automated Border Control
Interoperable Applications	• Advance Passenger Information and Interactive Advance Passenger Information • Passenger Name Record • Public Key Infrastructure and ICAO Public Key Directory • eMRTD Biometric Identity Verification • INTERPOL SLTD Database • International Watchlists
Examination of Travellers and Travel Document Inspection	• Primary and Secondary Inspection of Travellers • Manual and Visual Inspection of Travel Document
Human Resource Consideration in BCM	• The capacity of Border Agencies • Capability of Officers • Professional Ethics • Transparency and Governance
Assistance to States	• ICAO's Assistance to the Member States • Other International Assistance

Source: adopted from BCM ICAO TRIP GUIDE 2018 Part 2 Assessment Tool

3.2. Border Technology

More advanced border technology developed in countries in Europe, North America, and Australia deployed new devices for authentication of traveller's documents such as automated border control, electronic passports, and electronic visas (Tholen, 2010, p. 260). Border technology and data enable the sorting function which record every person passing through previously and in the future identifying potential risks (Allen & Vollmer, 2018, p. 26). Border technology involves computer devices that collect an individual's biometric data such as fingerprints and face recognition, passport and visa readers, advance passenger information (API) such as online manifest, movement alert

list and automated border control or smart gate (Broeders & Hampshire, 2013, p. 1202). The adoption of technology in border control aims to establish seamless border clearance, pre-emptive measures, illegal entry detection, and counter-terrorism strategies.

In airports, states implement different identification systems of biometric data collection at immigration controls upon arrival. For example, in Europe, fingerprints are recorded by Eurodac using the AFIS or Automated Fingerprint Identification System (Bossong & Carrapico, 2016, p. 45). The use of technology airport border security systems varies greatly such as the geographical information system (GIS), CCTV, mobile GPS (Vukov & Sheller, 2013, p. 232) and automated border control or ABC (del Rio, Moctezuma, Conde, de Diego, & Cabello, 2016; Labati *et al*., 2015; Labati *et al*., 2016; MacLeod & McLindin, 2011; Oostveen, Kaufmann, Krempel, & Grasemann, 2014; Pallitro & Heyman, 2008). The use of border technology and biometric data collection also raises major issues on human rights such as data privacy, data protection, and what the consequences will be (Hendow, Cibea, & Kraler, 2015b). ABC systems may fail due to weak risk analysis of a biometric system performance because the ABC system sends one of eight visitors to manual control by an officer (D. Gorodnichy, Yanushkevich, & Shmerko, 2014). Border technology and border automation in airports increase border work performance and identification of international crime in advance.

The use of the BCM border control technology in airports by DGI addresses problems with illegal entrants, illegal foreign workers violating visa and travel documents, and transnational organized crime. The BCM system, as the primary border technology for immigration control, was first deployed in 2010 at twenty-seven airports and several seaports in Indonesia (Gold, 2010, p. 6), to process the data of every person who arrives and departs from Indonesia (Santoso, 2015, p. 404). The system is equipped with intelligent character recognition (ICR), where this system records and stores data of every incoming or outgoing passenger at immigration offices in the SIMKIM (Immigration Management Information System) framework. The Enhanced Cekal System (ECS) is installed in the BCM system as a movement alert list database to stop high profile persons traveling through airports, seaport, border crossing stations. It documents applications at Indonesian embassies and consulates overseas (Dee, 2008). The use of ICT devices in border control accelerates effectivity in prevention and pre-empting actions to detect any potential risks in immigration controls (Broeders & Hampshire, 2013, p. 1203). As such,

the adoption of border technology at the Directorate General of Immigration (DGI) Indonesia appears to be promising in terms of national security and border enforcement.

In addition to improving border control, the Indonesian immigration authority and NCB Interpol Indonesia agreed to build cooperation on integrating the I-24/7 system to the BCM system (Arifin, Nurkumalawati, & Briando, 2019, p. 253). Data is synchronized to the BCM at Jakarta and Bali Airports in the I-24/7 Interpol system, which identifies missing and wanted persons, and lost and stolen documents data. At airports, immigration officers are more confident in carrying out immigration clearance of any person who enters and leaves the territory of Indonesia. It shows that the integration of the two systems could advance immigration inspection to support border control management. However, to what extent this technology has been upgraded and evaluated is a serious question in 2020, because it has been deployed for a decade, and criminals successfully crossed immigration control many times.

3.3. Migration Policy

Immigration policy on paper comprises immigration laws, rules, and measures for policy effectiveness and aims to fill implementation and efficacy gaps (Czaika & Haas, 2013, p. 495). Immigration policy is described as the implementation of formalities, border enforcement, and rules by the government to control the movement of people, removal and deportation order, and an integration of migrants (Filomeno, 2017, p. 1). This policy can be defined in long-term and short-term programs subject to a foreign policy considering the political and economic situation. Immigration policy should have an impact on chances of labour market, tax liability, government service access, and prices of goods and services (Gerber, Huber, Biggers, & Hendry, 2017, p. 157). Despite boosting economic growth in wealthy countries, such an immigration policy in rentier states is considered authoritarian when focusing on collecting tax or fees from migrant laborers (Shin, 2017, p. 16). Immigration policy must balance the political situation and economic realities by considering influences from other states in a policymaking process (Duncan, 2012). It implies that immigration policymaking is not limited to rules and law enforcement but should look at broader aspects from both domestic and international outlooks.

Migration policy and border studies are intertwined, seen from different perspectives and multiple levels. Multilevel governance of migration refers to the policymaking process at international levels, collaborative border management, migration control at borders, and proactive immigration policy (Scholten & Penninx, 2016, p. 105). The migration policy is predominantly about coordination in policy implementation, and it harmonizes international networks along with authority interdependency (Caponio & Jones-Correa, 2018), which points to two aspects: territorial and analytical (Kraal, Penninx, & Berger, 2006, p. 269). Migration policy applies a bottom-up policymaking process, policy networks, all level, actors, and community participation. Migration and border control must be well-designed with policy instruments of migration and border governance such as regulations, standards, procedures, and measures involving community and non-public sectors. On the other hand, multilevel governance of migration involves a considerable equilibrium between national objectives and community's necessities (Leo & August, 2009). Immigration policy is both a serious concern at the national level and political issues at the regional levels (Zapata-Barrero, 2009). Migration policy should acknowledge local regions to manage the community, local economy, culture, politics, health, regional security, and the environment (Joppke & Seidle, 2012). One option is to shift the authority of migration control to local government for cross-border arrangements (Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014, p. 4). Multilevel governance of migration requires multidisciplinary balance at all levels of regional and provincial government.

As global migration issues rise, the state must initiate bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation on migration policy where actors at intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations or other international organizations, participate. Migration policy coexists with global migration governance with formalities in three stages: multilateralism, embeddedness, and informal networks (Betts, 2010). Organizations undertake global governance of migration subject to global migration trends, human mobility, transnational organized crime, national security, and nation-state building. However, national, regional, and global policies also indicate difficulties in international migration governance (Tehranian, 2005), requiring collaboration and arrangements involving all actors from different states (Ferris & Donato, 2019). It faces three significant issues, such as fragmented regulations among countries, human mobility international conventions rather than immigration policy, and political interests (Betts, 2011). Global

governance of migration must develop an intensive approach to regionalism and multilateralism, where international migration standards look to human rights and human security.

The DGI Indonesia manages the Indonesian immigration policy, the so-called "selective" policy, which is described in the Indonesian Immigration Act No. 6 of 2011. The "selective" policy stresses border integrity, admissions requirements, and criteria of eligible persons who can enter or leave the Indonesian territory subject to giving benefits, promoting national security, and generating prosperity for the community. DGI has a significant role in enforcing the immigration law at borders across Indonesia. DGI undertakes important functions such as public service delivery, law enforcement, national security, and economic development for the community ("Indonesian Immigration Act," 2011). National sovereignty is the nature of border integrity, and the "selective" policy considers a pre-emptive approach rather than law enforcement at borders and inside the jurisdiction.

The Indonesian immigration policy on paper is recognized for its broader perspectives and multidisciplinary elements. According to the traditionalists, the notion of the border is a physical line of two separate jurisdictions, but in the contemporary approach, the bordering process discusses extensive discourses of an interdisciplinary nature (Newman, 2006, p. 183). The selective policy signifies that immigration clearance and enforcement require interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary aspects. It describes in the Laws and Human Rights Indonesia Ministerial regulation No. 44 of 2015 the Entry and Exit from Indonesia through Immigration Clearance. Every person entering and leaving Indonesia's territory must present before immigration clearance with a valid visa and lawful travel documents upon arrivals. However, the practice of immigration clearance remains questionable as an increasing number of visa breaches points to border control weakness. The National Statistics Bureau (BPS) recorded an influx of visitors traveling to Indonesia at international airports in 2018. It rose by 8.44% to 10.58 million passengers compared with 2017, with 9.42 million visitors (BPS, 2018). However, 4,627 visitors, or 0.043%, violated immigration laws and returned to their home country (Sompie, 2018). Indonesia's immigration policy is considered to be traditional because bordering regulations and practices focus on immigration control at the territorial border.

3.4. Border Security

Border security is the focal point of the exercise of national sovereignty through border integrity. Managing the international border is a complex process involving local, regional, national, and international levels (Johnson *et al*., 2011, p. 62). Border security focuses on people and an enaction of deportation, removal orders, and travel prohibition based on the concept of unity to uphold the national sovereign borders (Peter Chambers, 2015, p. 405). In addition, it includes law enforcement, national sovereignty, and authorities. Border security requires border integrity, which concerns enforcement of customs, immigration, and quarantine rules on the border-crossing of goods and people (*Annex 9 Facilitation*, 2017). Border security of immigration control applies to every visitor who transits, enters, and leaves the territory at airports, seaports, and border crossing stations. As national strategies for border security purposes, states must adopt border control management where border agencies identify, validate, match, and record travellers' data about visa, travel documents, biometric data, watchlists, and to go through automated border control (ICAO, 2018a). From the postmodern approach, border security is viewed in the larger context (Kolossov, 2005, p. 623) of building cooperation among states and local authorities. It applies not only at borders but across the country in which local and international organizations and actors are involved and predicts challenge and readiness to respond. It implies a subtle interplay of border integrity and security aspects which reinforces border security in immigration control.

Border policies across different in territories highlight border security by selecting eligible persons and stopping unauthorized arrivals and human trafficking in the framework of local cultural and political power (Brunet-Jailly, 2005, p. 640). Western border control management are proactive with risk management rather than reactive by checking travellers, collecting data, and inspecting identification, and involving technology (Tholen, 2010, p. 264). Four ideas shift the understanding of borders; as a selective control everywhere in a state, not always involving service delivery but a physical line of national defence, more profits, and benefits to the community, and a design not visible like a border (Johnson *et al*., 2011, p. 68). Such a conceptual shift is significant for understanding border security in terms of immigration control at airports.

Border security should impact positively on local economic growth, the local environment, people mobility, and accessibility (Paulus & Asgary, 2010, p. 21). More

importantly, border security is a daily practice of actors to secure borders, perform border control, and apply clearance procedures and policies (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, & Salter, 2014, p. 198). Under Article 9 Section 1 of the Indonesian Immigration Act Number 6 of 2011, border security requires every visitor entering and leaving Indonesia's territory must proceed to immigration clearance managed by immigration officers. Article 1, Number 3 of the Indonesian Immigration Act Number 6 of 2011 states the Indonesian immigration principles are fourfold: immigration service, national security, law enforcement, and economic development for a welfare society. Indonesian immigration policy must reflect border security, which is relevant to the objectives of national sovereignty, economy, and community.

In summary, border control management, border technology, migration policy, and border security are interrelated, where states select eligible persons to enter the jurisdiction. These four elements are expected to stop unauthorized arrivals, human trafficking, people smuggling, terrorism, and other international crime from entering the territory. BCM has standards and recommended practices by the ICAO, which include adoption of border technology and strategies of border security across the territory. Migration policy should be aligned with the BCM to generate positive impacts on economic growth, the community, culture, and politics. This thesis explores the BCM concept, border technology adoption, theories of migration, and border security aspects in regard to the implementation of BCM standards at airports in Indonesia. These theories and concepts inform the analysis of BCM how the immigration clearance at borders apply because unlawful persons have many times entered and left Indonesia through borders.

CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS

This section outlines the findings by evaluating the legislation about immigration control procedures at airports, regulations about Indonesian passports, visas, and information systems or border technology. In addition to policy instruments, the 2017, 2018, and 2019 organizational reports, and existing published works about border control management and immigration control at Indonesian airports are included. The following policy instruments related to the immigration law, entry and exit procedures, travel document specifications, BCM system standards are also assessed:

a. Indonesian Immigration Law No. 6 of 2011;
b. Regulation of Ministry of Law and Human Rights No. 44 of 2015 on Immigration Control Procedures;
c. Regulation of Ministry of Law and Human Rights No. 8 of 2014 on Indonesian Travel Documents Specifications;
d. Regulation of Ministry of Law and Human Rights No. 13 of 2012 on Indonesian Visa Specifications;
e. Regulation of Director General of Immigration No. IMI-459.GR.01.02 of 2011 on Border Control Management System.

4.1. ICAO TRIP and Border Control Management

This section assesses the extent to which the DGI sets out the immigration control policy instruments at airports based on the ICAO TRIP and refers to the Annex 9 about Facilitation; Document 9303 about a Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD); the operation of the Public Key Directory (PKD); and risk assessment. First, this chapter examines the DGI's annual report to explore the practices of BCM based on Annex 9, Doc 9303, identification of travellers, risk assessment. Secondly, it evaluates the BCM's policy instruments concerning immigration control at airports. Finally, scholarly articles from reputable publications are reviewed to look at the dynamic of BCM application in immigration control.

The chapter finds the immigration control at airports was equipped by the BCM application system called APK (*Aplikasi Perlintasan Keimigrasian*). This BCM system

was regulated in the Director-General of Immigration Letter No. IMI-459.GR.01.02 of 2011 about the Border Control Management System in Indonesia. The inspection system and tools in immigration control at airports were connected with biometric scanners for recording passengers' faces, fingerprints, and travel documents. The BCM system was first deployed in 2010 at 27 international airports across Indonesia (Budiartie, 2010), with the interoperable systems such as Passenger Movement System (PMS) ("Sekilas Kanim Soetta," 2018), Enhanced Cekal System (ECS) or national watchlist (Arifin, 2018, p. 158; Taylor, 2008), and I-24/7 Interpol SLTD (Stolen and Lost Travel Document) database (Arifin & Bawono, 2019b, p. 450; Paripurna, Indriani, & Widiati, 2018, p. 137). However, the chapter finds that the application systems of Passenger Name Record (PNR), Passenger Analysis Unit (PAU) and Advance Passenger Information (API) were not integrated with the BCM system in immigration control at airports, suggesting immigration control's risk assessment is fragmented because it does not contain travel data or data from other border agencies, except the identity data.

Table 2 indicates the Indonesian travel documents and visa specifications did not conform some provisions in the international standards of ICAO Doc 9303. Indonesian Travel Documents Specifications No. 8 of 2014 did not specify the official travel document specifications, a Logical Data Structure (LDS) for storage of biometrics and other data in the Contactless Integrated Circuit (IC), security mechanisms for MRTDs, and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for MRTDs. In 2019, Indonesian electronic passport containing biometric data was recorded in the Public Key Directory (PKD), where sixty-nine countries could exchange data by retrieving information in the passport's chip (Pascu, 2019). The regulation about Indonesia's visa specification did not describe the machine-readable visa security design and the technology infrastructure for visa verification.

Table 2. ICAO Doc 9303 and Indonesian Travel Documents and Visa Specifications

ICAO Document 9303	Indonesian Travel Documents Specifications No. 8 of 2014	Indonesian Visa Specifications No. 13 of 2012
Part 1: Introduction	-	-
Part 2: Specifications for the Security of the Design, Manufacture, and Issuance of MRTDs	Article 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63. Explanatory Part: Section 1, 2 and 3	Explanatory Part: Section A and B
Part 3: Specifications Common to all MRTDs (Amendment for New Part B in Page 28 and Part D in page 29)	Article 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63. Explanatory Part: Section 1, 2 and 3	Article 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
Part 4: Specifications for Machine Readable Passports (MRPs) and other TD3 Size MRTDs	Article 57 and 58	-
Part 5: Specifications for TD1 Size Machine Readable Official Travel Documents (MROTDs)	-	-
Part 6: Specifications for TD2 Size Machine Readable Official Travel Documents (MROTDs)	-	-
Part 7: Machine Readable Visas	-	-
Part 8: Emergency Travel Documents	Article 59	-
Part 9: Deployment of Biometric Identification and Electronic Storage of Data in eMRTDs	Explanatory Part: Section 1	-
Part 10: Logical Data Structure (LDS) for Storage of Biometrics and Other Data in the Contactless Integrated Circuit (IC)	-	-
Part 11: Security Mechanisms for MRTDs	-	-
Part 12: Public Key Infrastructure for MRTDs	-	-

Sources: Author's Summary, (ICAO, 2015), ("Indonesian Regular Passport and Emergency Passport," 2014), and ("Indonesian Visa Specifications," 2012).

The border control system (BCS) is constructed with inspection systems, tools and interoperable systems (ICAO, 2018b, p. 16). The inspection systems and tools consist of Visas and Electronic Travel Systems, Document Readers, Biographic Identity Verification, Biometric Identity Verification, National Watchlists, Entry and Departure Databases, and Automated Border Controls. The interoperable systems comprise Advance Passenger Information and Interactive, Advance Passenger Information, Passenger Name Record, Public Key Infrastructure, ICAO Public Key Directory, eMRTD Biometric Identity Verification, INTERPOL Stolen-Lost Travel Documents Database, and International Watchlists. It shows the BCM system is not integrated into the comprehensive BCS because the inspection systems and tools are partially equipped with interoperable systems.

The official Annual Report of the DGI in 2017, 2018, 2019, do not outline the traveller identification and border risk assessment of airport immigration control. The reports declare that the policy agenda of DGI is fourfold: technology-based law enforcement, human resources in electronic operation and intelligence activities, digital service of immigration documents, and regulations focusing on economy and community. The practice of immigration control at airports was not intervention risk-based features with an information systems approach that could prevent illegal entrants. Border technologies such as API, PNR, PAU were not deployed at the Indonesian Embassy overseas, and such systems are disconnected from the airline's manifest system.

As a result, a decision by officers about allowing or refusing entry of passengers was made upon arrival during immigration clearance. An officer relied on a passenger profiling method, travel document with the manual examination, ECS, and I-24/7 system. DGI retracted incoming and outgoing passenger card in 2015, where passengers did not fill out immigration embarking and disembarking cards except a customs declaration card. Airport immigration control was not emblematic of the BCM's intervention hierarchy because an immigration clearance process was conducted at the level of "enforce". Passengers were not inspected with the same phases as previous airports, which applied sequencing inspection systems and tools.

In summary, according to questions in Chapter 2 (ICAO, 2018b, p. 6), the DGI was partially familiar with the SARPs of Annex 9 and the technical specifications of Doc 9303. Traveller identification and risk assessment were not identified in any published

reports or DGI strategic plan. The BCM system is as the inspection systems and tools and interoperable applications at airports in Indonesia. It was not well-planned by the DGI since it was not integrated into the current national BCS. MRTD and eMRTD interoperability issues were not regularly upgraded and resolved based on the BCM TRIP Guide. Therefore, the iterative process of traveller identification and risk assessment was not comprehensively implemented in the processing of travellers at airports. Immigration control was not BCM risk-based intervention to prevent and deter high-risk passengers from entering and exiting Indonesia. The five phases of BCM interventions were not applied to foreign visitors upon arrival and departure because the interoperable systems were only partially connected.

4.2. National Strategies for Border Control Management

This section reviews the policy, legal, and system frameworks, and organizational structures with cooperation initiatives at the DGI. It assesses the policy framework from the DGI's annual performance reports in 2017, 2018, and 2019 in terms of effective BCM. The section examines the strategy and objectives of DGI airport immigration control, including programs and outcomes. The national legal framework is examined and compared with international standards Annex 9, 2017. BCM's business processes and ICT adoption are assessed, referring to the BCM system procedures in the Regulation of Director General of Immigration No. IMI-459.GR.01.02 of 2011. Also, this study evaluates the organizational structures and strategic partnerships among border agencies and other stakeholders.

This chapter finds that DGI's policy framework was designed for five years as written in the Regulation of Law and Human Rights Minister No. 7 of 2015 in the Ministry of Law and Human Rights Strategic Plan 2015-2019. Then, the DGI published annual performance reports about the policy framework, which comprise vision, mission, strategy, objectives, key performance indicators, and agenda-setting. The vision stated: "Masyarakat memperoleh kepastian pelayanan dan penegakan hukum keimigrasian", which translates literally as 'certainty in public service delivery for society and immigration law enforcement.' The mission is to enforce the just and accountable immigration law, create the stability of national security by increasing intelligence roles and immigration control for every person entering and leaving

Indonesia, increase excellent service with an innovative approach, and to develop the economy and society.

Table 3 summarizes the DGI's policy framework for 2015-2019, which was derived from the Strategic Plan. It describes objectives and strategy for five years. However, it did not mention objectives and strategy of border control management while it identified some major international crime and migration issues.

Table 3. DGI's Policy Framework 2015-2019

Issues	Objectives	Strategy
-Human trafficking (Indonesian domestic workers) -Terrorism -Cybercrime -Online queue ticket of passport application -Joint operation -Rehiring enforcement card Malaysia (E-Kad) for Indonesian domestic workers -Refugee and asylum seekers resettlement and assisted voluntary returned by UNHCR.	To implement immigration law enforcement with just and accountable outcomes.	Immigration law enforcement with a technology approach.
	To implement the immigration functions towards stable national security.	Immigration operation and intelligence with the adoption of technology by increasing competencies of officers.
	To implement excellent immigration services.	Technology-oriented immigration services.
	To publish policy instruments and regulations focusing on economic development and welfare of the community.	Economy and community-based immigration policy instruments at national and international levels.

Sources: Author's summary, (Directorate General of Immigration, 2017), (Directorate General of Immigration, 2018), and (Directorate General of Immigration, 2019).

Table 4 describes the DGI's key performance indicators in 2017, 2018, and 2019 about programs, key performance indicators, and targets. It shows an increasing number of targets for each program and indicator in three years. Number of cases was higher or similar than the previous year, while as a successful indicator, the DGI should have minimized the number of persons violating the law. Moreover, the KPIs do not include border control management programs, indicators, and targets.

Table 4. Key Performance Indicators of DGI 2017, 2018, and 2019

Year	Programs	Key Performance Indicators	Targets
2017	Immigration services	- Published documents - Public Satisfactory	38.350.000 documents 7.2 index

	Immigration law enforcement	- Immigration offenders on trial (court of law) - Immigration administrative sanctions	266 reports 12.523 sanctions
2018	Immigration services	- Published documents - Public Satisfactory	38.400.00 documents 7.3 index
	Immigration law enforcement	- Immigration offenders on trial (court of law) - Immigration administrative sanctions	13,409 persons
2019	Immigration services	- Published documents - Public Satisfactory	38.400.200 documents 7.3 index
	Immigration law enforcement	- Immigration offenders on trial (court of law) - Immigration administrative sanctions	13,409 persons

Sources: Author's Summary, (Directorate General of Immigration, 2017), (Directorate General of Immigration, 2018), and (Directorate General of Immigration, 2019).

Practices of airport immigration control in selecting every person entering and leaving, transiting, and staying with lawful travel documents require fundamental procedures and standards of immigration clearance. Immigration officers play an integral part in protecting Indonesia's borders, by promoting an immigration selective policy. Immigration control at 37 international airports underpins the exercise of national sovereignty, national security, and border law enforcement. Immigration control standards and practices are regulated in the international convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in Annex 9 about Facilitation, which was last revised in 2017. The Indonesian Immigration Law No. 6 of 2011 has partially adapted to the international standards of traveller identification programme and border control management.

The following Table 5 illustrates the contrast features between Annex 9 and Indonesian Immigration Law, where five provisions in Annex 9 have not been ratified in Indonesian Immigration Law. It has not confirmed provisions about automated border control, integrated border management, embarkation and disembarkation cards, transit and transfer procedures, and externalization or border pre-clearance. Moreover, the Regulation of Minister of Law and Human Rights No. 44 of 2015 on Immigration Control Procedures lacked principles, roles, objectives, information

system and border technology, integrated border management, exit and entry prohibition, deportees, or deportation order, embarkation or disembarkation cards, and external border pre-clearance.

Table 5. Indonesian Legal Framework and International Standards about Border Control Management

Border Control Aspects	International Convention	National Legal Framework	
	ICAO Annex 9, 2017 Facilitation Travelling by Air	**Indonesian Immigration Law No. 6 of 2011**	**Regulation of Minister of Law and Human Rights No. 44 of 2015 on Immigration Control Procedures**
Principles	Chapter I Part B	Explanatory Part: General	-
Roles/Functions Responsibility	-	Chapter II, Part 1, Art.3-5	-
Objectives	-	Chapter I Explanatory, & Art. 3	-
Transport Operators	Chapter 2 Section A-F	Part IV: Art.17-21 Art.79, Art.114, Art.115. Explanatory Part: Art.11	Chapter II Art.4-6
Entry & Exit Procedures	Chapter 3 A-Q	Chapter III, Part 1-3: Art.8-16	Paragraph 2 Art.7-21 Chapter III Art.22-105
Information System & Technology	Chapter 9 Part A-D	Part 2: Art.7 Art.8 Sec.(2) Art.70 Sec.(2) Explanatory Part: Art.18 Sec.(2)	-
Automated Border Control	Chapter 3 Part I Sec.3.34.4	-	Art.84-89
Immigration Officers	-	Art.140	-
Integrated Border Management (IBM)	Chapter 2 Part F Sec.2.36 Chapter 6, Part A Sec.6.1.3.	-	-
Crews Entry & Exit Procedures	Chapter 3 Part N Chapter 6 Part B	Art.18 Art.43	Art.47-65

Entry Ban & Exit Ban	Chapter 5 Part A-D	Chapter IX, Part 1: Art.91-103, and Explanatory Part.	-
Inadmissible Person/ Refused Entry Procedures	Chapter 5 Part A-D	Art.13-14,	Art.106-119
Deportees/ Deportation Procedures	Chapter 5 Part A-D	Chapter VII, Art.75 Sec.(2) letter f (deportation)	-
Embarkation/ Disembarkation Cards	Chapter 3 Part G	-	-
Visa Policy	Chapter 3 Part E & F	Chapter V, Part 1: Art.34-43	Art.95-97 Art.100-101 Art.104
Transit & Transfer Procedure	Chapter 3 Part L	-	Art.47 Sec.(2) & (3)
Externalization & Border Pre-Clearance	Chapter 2 Part I Sec.3.33	-	-
State of Emergency	Chapter 7 Part A-C	Art.11	Art.103
Cooperation	Chapter 2 Part A Sec.2.3 Chapter 2 Part F Sec.244 Chapter 3 Part J Sec.3.37 & 3.38, Part K Sec.3.40 & 3.41 Chapter 5 Chapter 9	Art.6 (general) Art.18 Sec.(2) Art.89 Sec.(2) letter b Art.89 Sec.(3) letter c Art.111	Art.4 Sec.(3)
Entry Stamps/ Notification	Chapter 2 Part B Sec.2.12	Chapter V, Part 1: Art.44-47	Art.91-104
Exit Stamps/ Notification	Chapter 2 Part B Sec.2.12	Chapter III, Part 3: Art.15	Art.91-104

Sources: Author's Summary, (*Annex 9 Facilitation*, 2017), ("Indonesian Immigration Act," 2011), and ("Entry and Exit Clearance Procedure through an Immigration Control in Indonesia," 2015).

In relation to a system framework, the BCM business process and information system at the DGI referred to Regulation of Director General of Immigration No. IMI-459.GR.01.02 of 2011 on the Border Control Management System Procedure. It explained that the BCM system is part of the SIMKIM's border technology developed by the DGI. In Article 1 section (1), this procedure described the guidelines for officers

to record the data and to conduct immigration clearance for every person entering and leaving Indonesia through immigration control at borders. Meanwhile, in section (2), it was stated that the procedure, as written in section (1), was not applicable to immigration control where the BCM system was not been deployed. This procedure included:

1. an immigration clearance process as a primary inspection using BCM system for Indonesian passengers;
2. an immigration clearance process as a primary inspection using BCM system for foreign visitors;
3. an immigration clearance process as a primary inspection using BCM system for crew members; and
4. an immigration clearance process using BCM system in a secondary inspection by a supervisor.

In 2018, SIMKIM was upgraded to SIMKIM version 2 (SIMKIM v.2) in which the DGI replaced the obsolete systems with new hardware or in the data centre backend, installing new APK (*Aplikasi Perlintasan Keimigrasian*) software in immigration control at all border controls in Indonesia (Apriliyana, 2019, p. 15). The new software records and stores documents and biometric data which can be exchanged and retrieved among Indonesia's offices and representative offices overseas. However, neither published regulation, SIMKIM v.2 procedures, nor standards about the BCM system was provided for officers at borders. In this stage, the BCM system still connected with the PMS, ECS, and I-24/7 SLTD, but API, PNR, and PAU were not integrated with the BCM. Figure 1 illustrates the configuration of BCM system version 2 for an immigration control process at borders in Indonesia and the backup of a database called DRC or disaster recovery centre located in Bali.



Figure 1. BCM System Version 2 Configuration

Sources: Author's Summary, (Santoso, 2015), ("Sekilas Kanim Soetta," 2018), (Arifin, 2018, p. 158; Taylor, 2008), (Arifin & Bawono, 2019b), (Paripurna *et al*., 2018), and (Arifin *et al*., 2019).

4.3. Inspection System and Tools

This section examines the inspection system and tools in immigration control at airports by evaluating the visa and ETS, document readers, biographic identity verification, biometric identity verification, national watchlist, international watchlist, entry and exit databases, and automated border control. BCM or APK was the inspection system and tools deployed at entry points and exit across Indonesia's borders. It assesses the extent to which the BCM system is integrated with national capabilities and capacities with its level of complexity. Table 6 assesses the level of maturity of implementing border immigration control management from the perspective of the adoption of BCS.

Table 6. The Maturity of Border Control System (BCS) in Immigration Control at Airports in Indonesia

National Capability and Capacity	*Advanced*				G. ABC**
	Mature	E. Enhanced watchlist search*	A. Visa	F. Exit database	
	Basic	B. MRTD readers E. Biographic watchlist F. Entry database	B. Full page document readers		
		Low			*High*
	Complexity				

Source: Author's Summary, (ICAO, 2018c, p. 8), (Santoso, 2015), ("Sekilas Kanim Soetta," 2018), (Arifin, 2018, p. 158; Taylor, 2008), (Arifin & Bawono, 2019b), (Paripurna *et al*., 2018), (Arifin *et al*., 2019).

*National Watchlist

**ABC for Indonesian Citizens and Foreign Visitors

The BCS is categorised into basic and mature levels. Upon arrival, the BCS scanned, recorded, and stored the passengers' identity and biometric data, but it was only verified with the national watchlist, the passport's validity, and the SLTD database. This suggests that the BCS was not embodied in the national capability and capacity with low complexity. BCS was installed with MRTD readers, but it was unable to read foreign e-MRTD data in the contactless IC despite certification of PKD approval to Indonesia (Pascu, 2019). APK was equipped with passport scanners as full-page document readers, including the MRZ column. APK recorded and stored the identity and biometric data of passengers in the entry database in PMS, which verified the validity of TD, the national watchlist, and Interpol's SLTD database. In contrast, APK only scanned and captured the travel document of departing passengers in the exit database.

The enhanced watchlist search or ECS was integrated with the APK consisting of a prohibited person's biographic data such as name, date of birth, passport number (Arifin, 2018, p. 158; Taylor, 2008) without verifying the picture of the person and their biometric data. The ECS stored data about prohibited persons of Indonesian citizens to leave the territory and ban travel for foreign citizens to enter and to leave Indonesia. APK was not supported by the national watchlist of the stolen and lost MRTDs and was

disconnected from the national ID database verification scheme. It did not collect the biometrics of the national ID database because APK was not integrated with the national ID database system in the national registry office.

The Indonesian visa was a visa sticker labelled on the passport issued by Indonesia's overseas Embassies. APK was provided with visa data storage and verification by identifying the holder's name, passport number, visa number, validity, issuing office, and the MRZ. MRTD readers were unable to retrieve data in the visa, and only could read numerical data such as visa number and validity. Indonesian Embassies, which were integrated with the SIMKIM sent visitors' data and temporary stay visa holders to the APK. However, the visa system did not capture holders' biometric data during the visa application process because it is not designed with the ETS and ETS biometrics. Table 7 evaluates the adoption of the inspection system and tools in immigration controls.

Table 7. The Maturity of BCS in Immigration Controls at Airports in Indonesia

No.	Inspection System and Tools	Adoption in Immigration Control at Airports in Indonesia
1.	Visa and Electronic Travel System	Legislation on Indonesian visa policy in the Regulation of Law and Human Rights Minister No. 51 of 2016. ETS was not implemented yet in Indonesia, that there is no ETS issuance. It was not found any visa risk and threat assessment, neither project cost and benefit evaluation, nor revenue collection evaluation on the visa.
2.	Document Readers	Deployment of MRTD readers has been implemented in 34 international airports in Indonesia. Data accuracy and audibility were not evaluated and valid. EMRTD readers' capability was equipped with RFID, UV light, Infrared, but it was unable to retrieve data in foreign e-passports. The interface of eMRTD PKI authentication was not fully available and limited to result in display. Document reader specifications were based on ICAO. Full-page document readers' performance in the primary inspection was available. Document readers' performance in the secondary inspection was available, but it had the same capacity as deployed in the primary inspection.
3.	Biographic Identity Verification	APK was supported by biographic identity verification. However, it was not installed an automated verification in APK. Database

		accessibility in secondary inspections was available. The Legislation or MoU of database protection and privacy controls was not available.
4.	Biometric Identity Verification	APK was not supported with the biometric identity verification. The capacity of officers and policymakers of the biometric project was not involved. Risk and threats mitigation of this verification was not prepared. The cost and benefit evaluation has not been conducted. Processing models and biometric modality was not found.
5.	National Watchlists	ECS (national watchlist) was not equipped with the traveller risk and threat categories. It included biographic targets, but it is not supported by a photo, biometric data, or fingerprints. It was not complemented with the national stolen, lost, or cancelled travel documents that were connected to APK.
6.	Entry and Exit Databases	APK was to record the entry and exit databases of every person, including the transports modalities manually inputted by officers. It was provided with overstaying visa verification for foreigners when departing. It was not automatically notifying the expired visa, but officers must verify the length of stay, whether they were overstaying permits or not. For Indonesian citizens, APK was unable to detect the citizenship of an Indonesian person and a dual national citizenship status. Departure APK was displaying the reporting analysis of a traveller provided with names, passports, nationality, length of stay, ECS, SLTD Interpol database, previous travel.
7.	Automated Border Control	ABC was deployed at Bali airport and Jakarta airport. In Bali, ABC was served for Indonesian passport holders at departure and arrival terminal and regular foreign passports from 12 countries upon departure. In Jakarta, ABC was provided for Indonesian passport holders at departure and arrival immigration control. ABC stored data of travel documents, fingerprints, and face recognition, without a verification stage, yet it was not fully integrated with APK.

Sources: Author's summary, Regulation of Law and Human Rights Minister No.51 of 2016 on Indonesian visa policy, and (Directorate General of Immigration Indonesia, 2011).

4.4. Interoperable Applications

Interoperable applications were installed in the APK. Interoperable applications refer to the external data that can be shared with, containing eMRTD and passenger data from other resources. In Table 8, two out of six applications were attached to APK, but PKI infrastructure with RFID was unable to read the contactless IC of foreign passports. Table 8 explained which applications were integrated with APK and its operations.

Table 8. Adoption of Interoperable Applications in Immigration Controls at Airports in Indonesia

No.	Interoperable Applications	Adoption in Immigration Control at Airports in Indonesia
1.	Advance Passengers Information System	This APIS was not yet integrated with the APK in immigration control at airports.
2.	Passenger Name Record	This PNR was not yet integrated with the APK in immigration control at airports.
3.	Public Key Infrastructure and ICAO Public Key Directory	The PKI was installed in the document readers at all immigration control with RFID technology. The PKD has been approved and certified in 2019 to read the e-passport data from sixty-nine countries. APK could read data in the chip of Indonesian passports, but it was unable to retrieve the contactless IC from foreign passports.
4.	EMRTD Biometric Identity Verification	The APK has not been supported with the eMRTD biometric identity verification.
5.	Interpol SLTD Databases	The APK was integrated with the Interpol SLTD databases, both primary and secondary inspections. This practice was based on the MoU, not the legislation.
6.	International Watchlists	The APK was installed with the international watchlists or Interpol notices.

Source: Author's summary, (Pascu, 2019), (Arifin & Bawono, 2019b, p. 450; Paripurna *et al*., 2018, p. 137), (Gamar, 2019), (Arifin & Nursanto, 2017, pp. 45-51), ("MoU between the Ministry of Law and Human Rights and NCB Interpol, the Integration of Border Control Management System with the I-24/7 SLTD No. B/43/IX/2016 and IMI-UM.01.01-2850," 2016).

The level of applications connected with APK in airport immigration controls sat at the mature level of national capability and capacity with medium complexity. Table 9 demonstrates the maturity level of interoperable applications which were deployed for immigration clearance.

Table 9. The maturity level of interoperable applications in immigration controls at airports in Indonesia

National Capability and Capacity	*Advanced*				
	Mature		J. National eMRTD Issuance	J. ICAO PKD Membership J. National PKD	L. Interpol SLTD
	Basic				
		Low			*High*
	Complexity				

Source: Author's summary, (Pascu, 2019), (Arifin & Bawono, 2019b, p. 450; Paripurna *et al*., 2018, p. 137)

4.5. Examination of Travellers and Travel Document Inspection

The DGI published standards and procedures for immigration clearance measures to every person entering and leaving Indonesia. It describes the primary and secondary inspections of travellers using manual and visual inspections of their travel documents. This is assessed in Table 10.

Table 10. Primary and Secondary Inspections of Traveller and Travel Documents

No.	Primary Inspection of Travellers	Secondary Inspection of Travellers	Manual and Visual Inspection of Travel Document
1.	Procedures in Article 23 – 56 ("Entry and Exit Clearance Procedure through an Immigration Control in Indonesia," 2015)	Procedures in Article 37 – 42 ("Entry and Exit Clearance Procedure through an Immigration Control in Indonesia," 2015).	Inspection of TD in primary and secondary inspection: Article 27 ("Entry and Exit Clearance Procedure through an Immigration Control in Indonesia," 2015).
2.	Officers: ▪ To examine the TD ▪ To interview passengers ▪ To validate visa ▪ To scan the TD ▪ To collect biometric data ▪ To verify the data with ECS	Officers: ▪ To examine the TD ▪ To interview passengers ▪ To validate visa ▪ To scan the TD ▪ To collect biometric data ▪ To verify the data with ECS ▪ To conduct an interrogation ▪ Baggage search	Inspection of TD: ▪ To read and record passenger's data. ▪ To record movement/travel history. ▪ To verify passenger data with the immigration database.

		▪ Body search ▪ Coordination with airlines	▪ To verify passenger data with the ECS database. ▪ To verify passenger data with the I-24/7 system.
3.	▪ Equipped with UV, IR, RFID document reader. ▪ EDISON TD (individual) ▪ PRADO Passport (individual) ▪ No magnifying glasses	▪ Equipped with UV, IR, RFID document reader. ▪ Regula Document Authenticity Verification Reader is only provided at Bali airport. ▪ EDISON TD (individual) ▪ PRADO Passport (individual)	Inspection is: ▪ Not verifying aircraft data ▪ Not verifying passenger's manifest ▪ Not verifying General Declaration (Gendec) ▪ Not retrieving data on the contactless IC. ▪ Not verifying biometric data.
4.	Automated Border Control (Only at Bali and Jakarta airport)	Cooperation with Australian ALO	▪ Equipped with UV, IR, RFID document reader. ▪ Regula Document Authenticity Verification Reader is only provided at Bali airport.

Source: author's summary and ("Entry and Exit Clearance Procedure through an Immigration Control in Indonesia," 2015).

4.6. Human Resource Considerations in Border Control Management

DGI provided career opportunities for immigration officers to become public managers or policymakers. Immigration officers received a basic salary and remunerations subject to rank and position as managed in the Regulation of Ministry of Finance. Human Resources Development Agency arranged basic immigration training programs for recruits. The types of officers were twofold: Immigration Officers (*Pejabat Imigrasi*) and immigration analysts (JFT) who worked at airport immigration control. Based on Article 140 in the Indonesian Immigration Act No. 6 of 2011, Immigration Officers are staff with a bachelor's degree who completed the immigration training programs. In the Regulation of Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform No. 47 of 2018 on Immigration Analysts, there are four levels consisting of Junior Immigration Analysts, Senior Immigration Analysts, Associate Immigration Analysts, Immigration Analyst Specialists. Immigration officers at borders must follow the standard operating procedures and code of ethics in performing an immigration

clearance measure for passengers. In addition to the code of ethics, they must reserve PASTI's value, the border agency, which refers to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (Pasaribu & Briando, 2019). PASTI stands for *profesional* (professional), *akuntabel* (accountable), *sinergi* (synergy), *transparan* (transparent), and *inovatif* (innovative). However, human resources development and management lacked the system of staffing, postings, and promotion. In the Regulation of Ministry of Law and Human Rights No. 41 of 2018 on Immigration Training Program, BPSDM (HRD Agency) set up rigorous training programs, but it did not upgrade the competency and skills of officers at borders; e-learning was only provided for other divisions (Lukito & Haryono, 2020). In the DGI's annual reports, the objectives of border control management were not mentioned. Officers had no clear targets for immigration clearance process at airports in Indonesia. This is assessed in Table 11.

Table 11. Immigration Officers at Airports in Indonesia

Personnel	**Immigration Officers at Airports**	**Transparency and Governance**	**Immigration Officers at Airports**
Recruitment and Retention	• Graduates from Immigration Polytechnics and graduates from a regular university (public or private). • Annual recruitment process by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, and the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform. • Airports had adequate immigration officers to deploy.	*Transparency*	• Immigration offices applied an integrity program (*Zona Integritas*) for preventing corruption offences. • Officers were wearing uniforms and badges, including names. • Contact numbers or social media were displayed at counters/booths for complaints. • Officers must scan their fingerprints on the attendance list machine. • CCTV cameras were installed on the counter and in the queue.
Motivation and Training	• The schedule was divided into three working shifts with 8 hours of each shift (6 days), and two days off.	*Governance*	• Primary inspection and secondary inspection using a border control system. • Senior officers or managers had more

	• There was no constant work rotation between the front-line and back-office or secondary inspection. • Training programs provided by other international institutions such as JCLEC, ABF, ICA Singapore.		power to decide or on a decision-making process.
Professional Standards	• It was based on the Exit and Entry Clearance Procedure and Code of Ethics. • Immigration analysts must complete jobs to increase credit points. • SKP (performance measurement report) was designed as a monthly report. • No regular internal audit nor evaluation. • External audit by Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform for public service delivery standards and work integrity program (WBK and WBBM).		
Human Factors	• No mitigation of negatives impacts on human factors. • Supports for positive impacts were not found, such as well-being, teamwork, capacity building, ineffective communications)		

Source: author's summary, (*Regulation of Minister of Law and Human Rights No.41 of 2018 on Immigration Training Programs*, 2018), (Arifin & Nurkumalawati, 2020), http://www.bpsdm.kemenkumham.go.id/id/courses/jenis-pelatihan/klasikal.

4.7. Assistance to States

Indonesia ratified the 1950 Chicago Convention and joined the ICAO as the 57th member state. New provisions were amended in the Presidential Decree No. 66 of 1995.

Table 12 shows implementation of and participation in DGI and ICAO's assistance to member states and other international assistance.

Table 12. ICAO's Assistance to DGI

ICAO's Assistance to the Member States		Other International Assistance
Implementation of ICAO TRIP Strategy	**International Forums**	
• Indonesia belonged to ICAO state members, but DGI never participates in the international events held by ICAO. • DGI had not adopted the ICAO TRIP Guide nor Strategy. It did not follow the official website of ICAO to get the latest updates on publications.	• DGI never attended the annual ICAO TRIP Symposium and Exhibition in Montreal. • DGI never attended the regional seminars or workshops held by ICAO.	DGI had collaborated with NCB Interpol and IOM.

Source: author's summary and http://kermakim.imigrasi.go.id/treatyroom.

Table 12 finds that the implementation of the ICAO's TRIP Strategy was adopted by the DGI. The DGI did not attend the annual symposium and exhibition or regional seminars and workshops held by ICAO. DGI initiated strategic partnerships with NCB Interpol and IOM, but it to the extent to which cooperation was enhanced is not clear.

CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS

This chapter analyses the findings by assessing existing theories and concepts of border control management, border technology, migration policy, and border security. It addresses the research questions which focus on the implementation of immigration control policies and the border control system at Indonesia's airports. This chapter identifies reasons for some illegal travellers entering and leaving Indonesia.

5.1. Immigration Control Policy at Airports in Indonesia

Border control management (BCM) is an integral part of securing states from illegal entrants and unlawful persons, but border control measures must generate positive impacts on the economy and community. The ICAO BCM TRIP assessment tool requires two aspects: risk assessment and identification of travellers. The chapter shows that BCM in airport immigration control has insufficient elements of the risk assessment and traveller identification. Risk analysis of immigration control was limited to recording data of traveller since it neglected to store travel data history and data from other border agencies. The international border is a complex process involving local, regional, national, and international levels (Johnson *et al*., 2011, p. 62). However, the risk assessment at DGI disregarded all threats from the process of pre-departure, pre-arrival, entry, stay, and exit. The practice of airport immigration control excluded the intervention risk-based features, and it sits only at the "enforce" level. Immigration clearance processes were applied to travellers upon arrival without any pre-clearance measures. A passenger was inspected without the same phases performed at their previous airport, which applied sequencing inspection systems and tools.

The iterative process of traveller identification and risk assessment was not comprehensively implemented in the processing of travellers at airports in Indonesia. Immigration control disregarded risk based BCM interventions to prevent and deter high-risk passengers from entering and exiting Indonesia. New border control management should undertake proactive risk management strategies rather than being reactive to check in travellers, collect data, inspect travel documents and improve technology (Tholen, 2010, p. 14). The five phases of BCM interventions were not applied

to foreign visitors upon arrival or departure because interoperable systems were only partially connected.

The BCM's immigration clearance practices focused only on the territorial border at airports across Indonesia. Bordering practices refer to territorial and non-territorial border, border agencies, and mechanisms of border governance towards a border-crossing process of people, goods, services and information (Anderson & O'dowd, 1999, p. 602). Travellers should be identified by an integrated information system before entering a jurisdiction or leaving the territory. The BCM's national strategies and policies, can affect the development of community, socio-cultural and economic growth (Sassen, 2013) and national sovereignty, nationality, and territoriality (Walsh, 2014). From this standpoint, the implementation of BCM's immigration control might not be fully effective because it is incapable of applying the pre-empting border control measures.

In relation to the legal framework, as shown in Table 5, the Indonesian Immigration Law No. 6 of 2011 partially reflects the traveller identification programme (TRIP) and BCM's international standards. The Ministerial Regulation 2015 on entry and exit clearance procedures does not include nine border control aspects in Annex 9 2017. They are principles, roles, objectives, information system and border technology, integrated border management, exit and entry prohibition, deportees, or deportation orders, embarkation or disembarkation cards, and external border pre-clearance. The two national regulations show a lot of loopholes of border law enforcement which threaten national security. The national legislation does not engage with ABC standard operating procedures for Indonesian citizens and foreign travellers. It does not follow some of BCM's standards and recommend practices. As such, the airport immigration control applies traditional bordering processes without a comprehensive adoption of the ABC system.

Airport immigration clearance processes are governed by a reactive rather than a risk assessment approach, even though, risk assessment is BCM's principal strategy to manage risks related to border and public security (Muller, 2009, p. 68). Risk assessment refers to prevention, pre-emption, interdiction, and prior authorization measures as routine screening procedures prior to a traveller entering a jurisdiction (Bach, 2005, p. 2). When border control is not equipped with risk assessment, it rests on an officer's responsibility to make a quick decision on a traveller's admissibility upon arrival or departure, relying on existing databases. Officers are not supplied with information and

data about high risk travellers, manifests, travel history, TD and visa validation, and biometric data verification. Securitization of airport immigration control is not designed to refuse illegal entrants before entering Indonesia. Border officers' analysis and decision making may fail because the process is dominated by discretionary decisions.

Border control principles in Table 5 contain different perspectives between Indonesian Immigration Law 2011 and the ICAO International Convention. ICAO Annex 9, Chapter 1, Part B, delineates border control measures with effective time, minimum inconvenience, information sharing, high security levels and law compliance, risk management and effective information technology. Border control procedures, whether involving of person, aircraft or cargo, are accomplished within a minimum processing time. It minimizes administrations bias at every checkpoint which prevents flight delays. In so doing, border agencies require risk management based on relevant information about a traveller's risks and movements. Relevant information is shared between border agencies and airline operators with the application of technology for effective and efficient border control. Border security and compliance with border law must be at optimal levels as a mandatory procedure of border protection. Annex 9 should be in line with national legislation about border control management and aviation security.

Indonesian Immigration Law 2011 includes three principles: human rights, selective policy and reciprocity. In Indonesia's immigration policy context, human rights is the basic principle in public service delivery and immigration clearance at borders. For example, an exclusion is not applicable to Indonesian citizens when returning home. Selective policy covers a broader context about entry requirements for foreign travellers, visas and residence permit policy. It means that only eligible travellers who generate positive impacts, promote national security and public orders will be allowed to enter. This also relates to international crime because the Indonesian government ratified the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 2000. Reciprocity is part of national sovereignty in granting a visa to a traveller. For instance, Indonesia waives a visa for a traveller from selected countries and vice versa. Indonesia applies dual citizenship to children under 22 years old, with one Indonesian and non-Indonesian parent. A person must hold one citizenship and is not allowed to have a dual citizenship after 22 years old. Indonesian citizenship is governed by Law No. 12, 2006 which regulates principles of citizenship, application process, and loss of citizenship and documents.

In Annex 9 2017, airports must facilitate in-transit and transfer passengers and crews with direct transit areas. They will not proceed an immigration clearance at counters and not required to obtain a transit visa. Indonesian immigration Law 2011 and Ministerial Regulation 2015 regulate provisions about in-transit passengers and crews, but it is not mentioned direct transit area. Transit and transfer are practiced interchangeably because the regulation does not include transit and transfer definitions. The regulation does not regulate transfer procedures for passengers and crews, overnight transit, and cancelled transit flights.

The Regulation of the Minister of Law and Human Rights 2014 relating to the Indonesian travel document specifications does not include all the standards in ICAO Doc 9303 as shown in Table 2. The Immigration Law, 2011 mentions three types of passports: national, diplomatic and service passports; an emergency travel document; and a border crossing travel document (PLB). Ministerial Regulation identifies two types of passport, regular and electronic, and describes requirements, the application process, passport standards, machine readable zones (MRZ) and security features. However, regulations do not build a storage management system of biometric data in LDS and IC in e-MRTD, MRTDs security management, and PKI. PKD certification for Indonesia was approved, so DGI access is able to retrieve passengers' biometric data in their e-passports.. New regulation about Indonesia's travel documents policy has not been published to replace the Ministerial Regulation 2014.

In relations to the responsibilities of transport operators as shown in Table 5, Article 18, Section (1) Letter f, Indonesian Immigration Law mentions that transport operators must carry an inadmissible person back forthwith to leave Indonesia's territory by the same transport. This provision is not applicable to a situation where an inadmissible person enters Indonesia by a non-regular flight or non-frequent flight. In Article 114 Regulation of Law of Human Rights, a transport operator must remove this person to the last port or point where they commenced the journey. This place may be interpreted as the point or port at their home country or a last port where they transited. Meanwhile, Chapter 5.11, Annex 9 says the aircraft operator must return this person to the point where they started their journey, and any places they are admissible. Under Article 13, Indonesian Immigration Law and Article 106, Regulation of Law and Human Right Minster identifies reasons why an inadmissible person is denied entry. Though it states that a person will be refused entry to Indonesia if they hold an unlawful and invalid

travel document, it does not define of what constitutes an unlawful and invalid travel document. However, in the explanation of Article 8, Indonesian Immigration Law, the definition of an unlawful or invalid travel document is limited to requiring at least six months validity before the expiry date. In addition to a denied entry policy, Chapter 5.2, Annex 9 require states to facilitate a removed person from another country to transit and continue their journey but none of the regulations comprise this arrangement. In this sense, an immigration officer must build collaboration with airline operators and aviation security officers in terms of security escorts and transit area procedures.

The national legal framework in Table 5 does not contain any provisions which regulate in-transit or regular passengers at departure lounges when flights are cancelled. Chapter 4.73, Part P, Annex 9 requires an airport to establish measures for flight cancellations or delay. Passengers may be allowed to leave the airport for taking accommodation. In Chapter 47, Section (2), Regulation of Law and Human Rights Minister, in-transit passengers and airline crews are exempted from immigration clearance, though transfer passengers and crews are not facilitated in the regulations. The Airport Council International's ICAO defines a transit passenger as a passenger arriving at or departing from an airport with the same flight number, while a transfer passenger is a passenger who arrives and departs on a different aircraft or different flight number.

National regulations in Table 5 highlight inadequate provisions in relation to entry and exit procedures for crew members. This situation points to a status change for crew or discharge of crew. For example, a person who enters Indonesia by air as a passenger will change their status to become an airline crew when exiting Indonesia. This arrangement is not regulated whether they require visa or this is waived. Also, airline crew, as listed in the General Declaration, which enters Indonesia will not work as a crew member when leaving Indonesia. This suggests that DGI does not record airline crew data from Gendec and flight notifications in APK, which does not identify whether a person is listed as a crew or a passenger.

Another very important issue is the concept of IBM at international airports. As mentioned in Table 5, Annex 9 2017 requires border agencies to conduct a prior authorization provided by advance electronic notifications from airline operators. In Annex 9 Chapter 2 Part F Section 2.36, border agencies must apply integrated international flights arrangements with passenger inspections concerning arrivals,

departure, or transit notifications. This procedure aims to support provisions in Annex 9, Chapter 6, Part A, Section 6.1.3, which require border agencies undertake expeditious customs, immigration, quarantine and health clearance process at international airports. However, this arrangement is not regulated in either Indonesian Immigration Law 2011 or Ministerial Regulation 2015. It suggests that airport border inspection agencies disclose fragmented border policy and management data with overlapping authorities. This weakness will continue due to lack of coordination and cooperation among agencies and stakeholders.

Integrated arrangement represents an IBM concept of cooperation and coordination practices (Duez, 2016; Koslowski, 2003). It includes three pillars: intra-agency, inter-agency and international cooperation. Additionally, there are four tiers of border control in IBM strategy: measures in third countries, neighbouring country cooperation, border surveillance and border control measures (Government of Montenegro, 2014). IBM preserves border and internal security because it involves positioning liaison officers, border control systems, external borders, third countries, internal borders, visa systems, international cooperation and the responsibilities of transport operators (Lipics, 2010, p. 394). Airport immigration control in Indonesia is far from full implementation of a coherent IBM strategy, as reflected in national border control regulations.

Prior authorization also refers to inspection of travel documents at airport check-in counters in another jurisdiction. Annex 9, Chapter 3, Part I, requires a mandatory inspection of travel documents by immigration officers who assist aircraft operators. A liaison officer is posted at overseas airports to help airline check-in staff evaluate travel document and the authenticity and eligibility of travellers prior to departure. For example, Australian airline liaison officers (ALO) maintain an effective collaboration with Indonesian immigration officers at Jakarta and Bali airports (Daliman & Arifin, 2020). ALOs do not have a power to stop a traveller from departing, but they provide information on document fraud and alert interdiction for immigration officers. DGI has not assigned Indonesian ALOs at overseas airports and the national regulations do not facilitate Indonesian ALOs. Extraterritorial border control does not appear to be the main concerns of DGI in preventing transnational organized crime.

The Regulation of Director General of Immigration on BCM System Procedures indicates that the BCM immigration control system was disconnected from the

comprehensive BCS as illustrated in Figure 1. The inspection systems and tools were deployed and operated at all airports, but only partially equipped with interoperable systems. The legislation includes border security aspects to verify people and their travel documents, identifying deportation, removal orders and travel prohibition (Peter Chambers, 2015, p. 405). These printed regulations and procedures were not provided to Immigration officers working at airports. They were forced to search and save digital documents on their smartphones. Of these, the BCM aspects were inadequate, failing to disclose provisions on border pre-clearance, integrated border management, and adoption of border technology.

Indonesia's border control policy concerned about transnational organized crime and global migration issues. DGI's policy framework in 2015-2019 in Table 3 was derived from the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. It describes a five-year plan for objectives and strategy. Border control policies focus on transnational crime, global terrorism, undocumented or unauthorized persons and other immigration violations (Walters, 2006, p. 199). However, it did not mention the objectives and strategy of border control management though identifying major international crime and migration issues. It did not clearly improve immigration control procedures, responding to the migration trends, new border technologies, and international crime. In a broader context of cultural and political power, territorial border policy prioritizes local culture and border security by selecting eligible persons and stopping unauthorized arrivals, human trafficking and people smuggling (Brunet-Jailly, 2005, p. 640). Selective border control not only relates to a service delivery but also a physical line of national defense, more profits benefits to the community (Johnson *et al*., 2011, p. 68).

The DGI did not underpin migration policy in response to international migration trends and how the bordering processes work to filter migrants. The DGI policy framework was designed by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights focusing on public service delivery to be rewarded with WBK and WBBM titles (Work Integrity). This may be the reason why BCM's immigration control distorted border control paradigms such as border technology, border security, risk assessment and identification of traveller.

The BCM's immigration control was shaped without an evidence-based policymaking process not based on historical, geopolitical, social, and economic data and information. Statistical data about travel patterns and growth was unavailable to disclose, and no such reports were found. Indonesia is a transit country for refugees or asylum

seekers from the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, East Africa (Missbach, 2019, p. 421) to wish to continue their journey to Australia as a destination country (Hugo, Tan, & Napitupulu, 2014, p. 171). It is currently a destination point for irregular migrants by hosting around 14,000 refugees and asylum seekers (Kneebone, 2017, p. 30). DGI cannot resolve alone the unauthorised persons or migrants, but a border policy-making process that deals with global issues must balance the political issues and economic realities facing source states (Duncan, 2012). This is why BCM and border policy must involve collaborative border management at regional, national, and international levels to address the uncertainty of global issues.

5.2. The Level of Inspection System and Tools in Immigration Border Control

Practices of immigration controls at Indonesia's airports relies on the BCS's inspection tools and systems with interoperable applications. Figure 1 demonstrates how the BCS, devices and applications were interconnected and backed up with the DRC. DGI employed the BCM system (version 1) in 2008, and it was upgraded to APK (version 2) in 2019. APK was one of the risk assessments tools which collected and analysed passenger identification data on entering and leaving Indonesia. Table 6 highlights APK's national capability and capacity at the mature level and medium-low complexity in immigration control. The evaluation of inspection systems and tools as described in Table 7 indicates the APK inspection system and tools were only partly deployed. It implies that the APK was incompletely integrated and interconnected information of thus, traveller information was invalid.

The aim of border technology is to promote a seamless border control process with pre-emption measures. The aim of adopting DGI border technology was to secure the border from illegal entrants or international crime. APK was deployed as the inspection system and tool at all international airports. The APK aimed to record and sort passengers entering and leaving the border with past and future potential risks (Allen & Vollmer, 2018, p. 26). It was able to detect and record electronic passports, and passengers could pass through an autogate at two airports. However, APK was not considered a mature border technology because the border technology (Tholen, 2010, p. 260) was developed in the form of authentication for traveller identification through ABC, with electronic passports and electronic visas. In relation to passenger biometric data collection, the border technology disregarded data privacy and protection which raises

concerns about human rights (Hendow, Cibea, & Kraler, 2015a). The basic level and medium-low complexity of BCS affects the immigration control process and national security.

The conclusion drawn is that the DGI had not improved immigration control's border technology after the BSC was first deployed in 2008. BCM systems and APK made comparatively insignificant improvements. Even though APK had a new look interface and a one-page operation, major features remained the same. Document readers were installed to APK to read travel documents at all airports, but original devices were not replaced with the new ones. Biometric collection readers were installed to APK only at Bali Airport for passenger data verification provided they used the autogate upon departure. Risks and mitigation plans were unavailable to prepare for unforeseen damage, system errors, or electricity outages. The APK's technical issues involving each element of inspection systems and tools were not mapped or mitigated. As such, less than efficient border controls were practiced at international airports in Indonesia. It is desirable that immigration clearance processes using APK raise border security issues and illegal entry cases with the integration of the ECS and I-24/7 system (Interpol SLTD). The ICT's border control practice among border agencies was fragmented, including DGI's airlines manifest information system. DGI was inadequate for carrying out border control policy evaluation, especially a cost-benefit analyses of the use of border technology.

The BCM system and APK did not enhance national security because the inspection systems and tools were not prepared to prevent international criminal activity. Although existing risks and threats were mentioned in the strategic plan, border technology was not developed based on existing and predicted future border traffic trends. The APK was connected to all immigration controls across Indonesia's borders and the Interpol SLTD database, but was disconnected from the other border agencies, including the airline system. The immigration clearance process relied on internal data and information verifying a person with the travel document. Despite the capability of RFID document readers, the APK was unable to verify biographic and biometric data of foreign passports. This suggests that the border integrity was only partly guaranteed, affecting border security and the capacity of the state is to stop unauthorized persons, human trafficking, and people smuggling (Brunet-Jailly, 2005, p. 640). As we have seen, border security in a broader context means building strategic partnerships among border

agencies and local authorities (Kolossov, 2005, p. 623) to predict and cooperate on dealing with the impact of global issues and international crime on national sovereignty (Peter Chambers, 2015, p. 405). No data or evaluation was uncovered in relation to the effect of APK on queue patterns and the impact of the duration of immigration clearance upon passenger's arrival.

The weakness of immigration border control practices, it is concluded, was likely due to poor border technology which disregarded crucial aspects of border security. As introduced in Chapter 1, prohibited persons travelled successfully to Indonesia from 2011 to 2020. Of these, BCM standards and the level of technology maturity could determine the success of the immigration control processes at Indonesia's airports. Poor BCM practices allowed the illegal travellers with unlawful travel documents to enter and leave Indonesia undetected through airport. Despite immigration clearance measures which were undertaken to check every person upon arrival and departure at airports. Front-line officers had to make quick decisions or exercise discretions to allow or refuse a person entry or exit upon arrival and departure. Whenever a passenger flagged as suspicious, they proceeded to secondary inspection in an interview room. This implies that the BCM interventions hierarchy focused on the basic "enforce" and partially "detect" levels, rather than "disrupt", "deter", or even "prevent" at the top level.

The national movement alert system is intertwined with border security, and national security and involves other law enforcement agencies. The national person watchlist system was arranged successfully by applying the Enhanced Cekal System (ECS). National law enforcement agencies such as Polri (national police), KPK (anti-corruption agency), Kejaksaan Agung (attorney general), and BNN (anti-narcotics agency) had the authority to propose a prohibited person or one under investigations not to travel for legal reasons. If requested by competent authorities, such prohibited persons were recorded in the ECS database in APK across Indonesia's borders. Entry and exit prohibitions were limited to six months and extended not exceeding six months upon a request. The Indonesian Immigration Law prescribed that the data on a person's entry and exit ban must include full names, gender, date, and place of birth, age, a photo, prohibition date, and reasons for the travel prohibition. However, the ECS (national watchlist) was not equipped with the traveller risk and threat categories. It included biographic targets, but data was not supported by a recent photo, biometric data, or fingerprints of prohibited persons. In addition to legal reasons, the ECS was not provided

with the national stolen, lost, or cancelled travel documents which where data was populated by immigration offices.

The national movement alert management system might raise some issues which could mislead any legal measures such as risk-based interventions. First, the movement alert data was not electronically sent by law enforcement agencies and was without any expiry date of prohibition notification system. Therefore, the legal status of a person remained unclear whether an investigation was ceased, or they had been imprisoned. Data was not delivered to the DGI to update the ECS database. Secondly, it excluded data from DGCE, the port health authority, quarantine agency, and airline manifest data. Upon arrival, when the DGCE found a passenger with illegal goods, the data was not shared with the DGI to input the ECS, or vice versa. It signified that border law enforcement was partial and ineffective for preventing transnational organized crime. This management is part of a strategy of risk-based interventions to deter suspected criminals, drug dealers, people smugglers, terrorists, or illegal travellers. The interventions comprise surveillance, an interview, body search, baggage search, interrogation, detention, or removal order. Since the information is not presented in real-time data exchange among agencies, including PNR, API, or ETS, it was likely to undermine the risk-based interventions.

Entry and exit requirements are regulated rigorously in Indonesian Immigration Law and Regulation of Minister of Law and Human Rights. The political decision was clearly stated that eligible and beneficial foreigners supporting national security would be allowed to enter. First, through immigration policy, promoting tourism, business, investment, and professional work in Indonesia became the government's top priority. Also, national legislation stipulated the prevention of transnational organized crime with regional, national, and international cooperation. Reflecting on these two points, border control practices attributed the records of the travel history of a person entering and leaving Indonesia.

The entry and exit databases of every passenger through immigration control at airports in Indonesia were recorded and stored in the APK. The APK's capacity as evaluated in Table 7 was at stake overriding the use of advanced of algorithms and artificial intelligence technology. Data technologies at the borders are an integral part of immigration clearance process which not only retrieves previous travel history but also predicting future potential risks (Allen & Vollmer, 2018, p. 26). Decision making by DGI

front-line officers and back-office supervisors relied on the internal travel database at the time a person arrived or departed. It generated the database architecture and interconnectivity in APK. A database is an analytical tool for intelligence assessment and prediction with the goal of law enforcement and national security.

The deployment of the ABC system at two international airports was the most advanced approach to self-service immigration clearance when arriving and departing Indonesia. The autogate, it was argued, reduced queues for manual inspections and saved passengers' time. The clearance process using autogate was mandated to occur within 30 seconds from the time a passenger scans the document at the front door, biometric collection, to exiting the autogate (del Rio *et al*., 2016, p. 54). Indonesian citizen, in this sense, could pass through the autogate at Jakarta and Bali airports upon arrival and departure. Selected foreign passport holders could use the autogate machine upon departure at Bali airport. ABC stored travel document data, fingerprints, and face recognition, without a verification stage, yet it was not fully integrated with APK. It is unclear whether passenger's data in autogate databases could be retrieved by other immigration border controls. The autogate did not record and retain the flight number of a passenger because it was disconnected from the airline manifest. The ABC system was not prepared for a presentation attack, containing the falsified biometric data or impostor features to trick the sensor (Ortega, Fernández-Isabel, de Diego, Conde, & Cabello, 2020, p. 2). Under certain assumptions, the autogate system could be constructed as an ineffective ABC system that operates basic functions, with multimodal approaches (Anand *et al*., 2016) and without a presentation attack detection. Passengers perhaps could not enter the autogate and were possibly stuck inside if there was unmatched biographic and biometric data. Therefore, the DGI was unable to trace and track the comprehensive data of passengers using the autogate, and the flight numbers.

The regulation of autogate clearance procedure was unavailable, where this automated self-service was performed by default. The autogate procedure remained unclear about which types of travel documents or visa holders could use the autogate and whether the autogate allowed airline crews to go through. Since clearance procedures were not provided, questions are raised as to what if the autogate failed to allow a passenger to enter due to unmatched data verification. There were no clear arrangements for a passenger to proceed to a manual counter or a back office for a secondary inspection. It was not stated the officer whether officers to supervise the autogate, which should have

become the most accurate verification system without human intervention and a reliable risk assessment of traveller identification. The DGI did not conduct a system evaluation or design a mitigation plan for system errors. The autogate may become ineffective and inaccurate when the risk analysis is poor, and the system is underperforming (D. O. Gorodnichy, Eastwood, Shmerko, & Yanushkevich, 2015). This raises serious concerns about border work performance, border security, and prevention of international crime.

5.3. The Maturity Level of Interoperable Applications in Immigration Border Control

Immigration clearance process requires external data from other sources such as the passenger's data in their electronic passport. This supplementary data is retrieved from regional, national, and international agencies. This data sharing aims to trace a passenger's record and assess the risk assessment and traveller identification. There are six interoperable applications that provide real-time data about passengers' journey through phases such as pre-departure, pre-arrival, entry, stay, and exit. It clarified that border security includes extensive variables of border inspection supported with internal and external passenger data.

As shown in Table 8, APK was installed with two interoperable applications: PKI, PKD, and Interpol SLTD Databases. Although Indonesia was certified with the PKI and PKD to read foreign e-passports, the RFID document reader at airports immigration control was unable to retrieve the data from the chips of e-passports. The RFID was able to read the Indonesian e-passports, but not for Indonesian non-electronic passport holders. The APK was not supported with the eMRTD biometric identity verification. The I-24/7 Interpol system operated in the APK, which was deployed at 37 international airports in Indonesia. However, the procedures of Interpol SLTD management were unavailable to officers after they matched the passenger's name. It is indicated in Table 9 that APK in immigration controls at airports was categorised into the mature level of national capability and capacity with medium complexity.

For border governance, border control includes three multiplications (Tholen, 2010, pp. 264-266) consisting of border places, agents, agencies involved, and border technologies, and information systems. Governance of DGI border control did not utilise the advanced border technology and lacked the information systems interconnectivity among institutions. Border security is a key analysis for law enforcement agencies and

private sectors in the framework of national and international security with technology despite some critical discourse (Bigo, 2002, p. 63). Low-tech practices do not guarantee an effective approach to security because its adoption is determined by both organization and actors (Bonelli & Ragazzi, 2014, pp. 489-490). DGI technology adoption decontextualized securitization and assessment, which may have revealed the degradation of the capability and capacity of interoperable applications in APK.

The DGI was provided with only fragmented and partial data of a passengers. At airports, immigration officers could not read the pre-departure and pre-arrival data from APIS and PNR despite national legislation requirements. These two systems were not integrated with the APK. This situation suggests the DGI did not practice pre-emption measures which means the risk assessment and identification of travellers were inadequate. The preventative step is the critical point of border security, requiring personal data collection and surveillance of people's movement before arriving in states. This is called extraterritorial immigration control (Ryan & Mitsilegas, 2010, p. 40). The bordering process of DGI did not contextualize the extra-territorial border concept (Ryan, 2010, p. 3) and border externalization (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, & Pickles, 2016, p. 231) as multiple processes of administration and territoriality of migration and border policy in other jurisdictions. Such external border practices must adapt to mobile itineraries and not be limited to a territorial border (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, & Pickles, 2015, p. 903). It must build collaboration with other states and agencies to enhance Indonesia's border security.

As one of Indonesia's remote-control strategies, visas were issued by DGI at overseas Embassies. The Indonesian government provided visas on arrival and free visas facilities for selected countries. In the Regulation of Minister of Law and Human Rights No. 26 of 2020 which relates to Visa and Residence Permits in the New Normal, visa on arrival visas and the visa waiver program were suspended temporarily due to travel restrictions in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. A new regulated online visa application was implemented, consisting of physical infrastructure, policies, organization, and integrated systems. Electronic visas were issued where applicants lodged documents to DGI. The movement of travellers was controlled remotely prior to entering a jurisdiction for selection of eligible entrants (FitzGerald, 2020, p. 9). By way of contrast, Table 8 shows that the APK was installed at borders with Red Notices of Interpol and the international watchlists database. The inference is that APK's immigration

clearance process did not verify the names in the international watchlist or notices by the Interpol against the issuance of visas. Of these, the securitising practices (Léonard, 2010, p. 237) of immigration control by DGI did not to deal adequately with issues of security threats and international crime.

The international watchlist and Interpol Red Notice are interplay risk assessments to stop crime entering countries. These application systems are installed in APK at all international airports in Indonesia. Based on the MoU between the NCB Interpol and the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Interpol sends the list of wanted persons to DGI. However, it is not outlined in national legislation and standard operating procedures of further measures are not available. NCB Interpol is part of Indonesia's National Police (*Polri*), which has authority to investigate and arrest a person without warrant; release information about fugitives; send electronically prohibited names to APK; and retract names from APK's travel ban list. This power suggests a potential conflict of interest when NCB Interpol Indonesia revokes a criminal name from the alert list. APK automatically updates names which are added or withdrawn from the Red Notice list. In this case, it is not part of DGI's responsibility, and a traveller is eligible to enter and leave Indonesia if their names are not found in ECS and I-24/7 systems.

Djoko Chandra highlights the weaknesses with *Polri* and DGI's information systems. Djoko Chandra eventually pleaded guilty and served an 8-year imprisonment term, but prior to that he was a fugitive for 11 years. Chief police officers in NCB Interpol *Polri* were alleged to have removed illegally Djoko Chandra from the Red Notice system (Arnaz & Andriyanto, 2020). The Attorney General's Office also claimed they never requested the withdrawal of Djoko Chandra's name from the alert list (Muthiariny, 2020). The Minister of Law and Human Rights also confirmed that Djoko Chandra was not on the APK's ECS list or in the I-24/7 system (Adjie, 2020). In the Immigration Law 2011, a person who serves their sentence in jail is listed in the ECS and I-24/7 systems. With so any questions unanswered, interoperable applications in the APK posed new challenges for border security.

5.4. Examination of Travellers, Travel Document Inspections, Human Resources Considerations

The DGI referred to the national legislation and law and regulations in implementing the BCM system (Gold, 2010) with the APK recording and verifying

travelers' data and documents (Santoso, 2015). Application of immigration clearance standards and procedures at borders to every person entering and leaving Indonesia is managed in the Regulation of Ministry of Law and Human Rights No. 44 of 2015. The provisions regulate primary and secondary inspections of travellers by using manual and visual inspections of their travel documents.

As illustrated in Table 10, DGI examination of travellers at borders was practiced in two phases: primary and secondary. Immigration officers at airports examined travel documents, interviewed passengers, validated visas, scanned TDs in document readers, collected biometric data (only at Bali airports) and verified the data in the ECS national alert list. Officers carried out travel document inspections upon passenger's arrival and departure relying on internal data and SLTD Interpol database. The primary inspection was equipped with the UV, IR, and RFID in the document readers, but there were no magnifying glasses. Immigration officer practiced the primary examination of every traveler upon arrival and departure, relying on data in the APK (Arifin & Bawono, 2019a). As the Edison TD and Prado Passport databases were not provided in the APK, it was left to the individual to access the online database. When frontline officers found suspicious passengers, they sent them to the back office for a secondary inspection.

At the secondary back office inspection stage, a supervisor or assistant supervisor examined the referrals. They examined the TD, validated visa, verified names in the database, and the ECS. For further inspections, they carried out an interview and interrogation, including a baggage search and body search, if needed. Collaboration with airlines, ALO and Interpol, was built just for removal orders or investigations. The Regula authentication device was available at back offices to examine TD fraud. However, secondary inspections excluded the verification of airline passenger's manifest data and General Declaration (Gendec), data retrieval on the contactless IC, and biometric data authentication.

Inspection arrangements influenced the decision-making processes because the inspectors had to decide the status of a passenger in few minutes. They were not equipped with pre-clearance information or data in relation to travel history, manifests, or the international watchlist. Therefore, officer discretion involved in the assessment of passenger's admissibility. Both primary and secondary inspections could result in subjective decisions. The conclusion reached is that unequal practices existed at Indonesia's borders revealing border securitization was uncertain and blurred.

During the primary inspection phase, immigration officers were influenced by personal judgment and called 'reasonable suspicions' (Pratt, 2010), discretionary decision-making (Gilboy, 1991), data discretions (Hall, 2017) and local level border bureaucrats (Borrelli, 2019). Thus, inspection was dominated by discretion over the risk assessment and traveller identification. A traveler's admissibility was determined by immigration officers' decisions at the time of arrival or departure. Officers undertook document examinations, passenger's profiling, and facial expression analysis. The expectation was that the immigration officer had basic skills and competencies.

Immigration officers were a central point for measures to enforce border integrity and border security. Two sorts of officers worked at airports: Immigration Officers (*Pejabat Imigrasi*) and immigration analysts (JFT). In Article 140 of the Indonesia's Immigration Act No. 6 of 2011, the Immigration Officer is described as an immigration staff with a bachelor's degree who has completed immigration training programs. The Regulation of Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform No. 47 of 2018 referred to four level of Immigration Analysts consisting of Junior Immigration Analysts, Senior Immigration Analysts, Associate Immigration Analysts, Immigration Analyst Specialists. Immigration Officer candidates were recruited in a competitive selection consisting of several rigorous steps. Then, the Human Resources Development Agency or HRD Agency (*BPSDM Hukum dan HAM*) arranged basic immigration training programs for recruits to upgrade skills, competencies, and attitudes.

As described in Table 11, in terms of recruitment and personnel retention, immigration officers were graduates from Immigration Polytechnics and graduates from regular universities (public or private). An annual recruitment process was held by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights and the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform. Airports had adequate numbers of immigration officers to deploy depending on the need of each immigration control. The work schedule at airports was divided into three working shifts of eight hours over six days and two days off.

There was no constant work rotation between front-line and back-office or secondary inspection staff. Training programs for immigration officers were occasionally provided by other international institutions such as JCLEC, ABF and ICA Singapore rather than the HRD Agency. Professional standards were based on the Exit and Entry Clearance Procedures and a Code of Ethics. Immigration analysts had to complete jobs to increase credit points. The performance measurement, or SKP, was designed as a monthly report

where officers made an online entry based on their job descriptions. However, there was neither a regular internal audit nor an evaluation of officer performance. A ceremonial external audit was conducted by the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform was conducted for public service delivery standards and work integrity programs (WBK and WBBM). Mitigation of negatives impacts was not based on human factors. Support for positive impacts were not practiced, such as well-being, teamwork, capacity building and ineffective communications.

In the management and transparency in immigration control at airports, immigration offices applied an integrity program (*Zona Integritas*) for preventing corruption offences. Officers wore uniforms and badges, including names. Contact numbers or social media for complaints were displayed at counters or booths. Officers scanned their fingerprints on the attendance list machine. CCTV cameras were installed on the counter and in the queue line to minimize officer misconduct and to monitor passenger behaviour. Primary inspection and secondary inspection employed a border control system. Senior officers or managers had more power to decide on a decision-making process. Border security officers required knowledge, skills, attitudes and other characteristics (KSAO), which are unique to every state (Chia, Heng, Goh, & Ang, 2019). This chapter does not find that official KSAO standards for Indonesian immigration officers were enforced, it finds that the eight competencies for immigration officers towards professionalism and ethics were followed (Arifin & Nurkumalawati, 2020, p. 254). Human resources management in airport immigration control indicated weaknesses and challenges because it did not reflect the knowledge management and standardized competency and skills.

Indonesia was an ICAO member state, but DGI never participated in international events held by ICAO. DGI collaborated with NCB Interpol and International Organization of Migration (IOM). However, the DGI had not adopted the ICAO TRIP Guide nor Strategy. It did not follow the official website of ICAO to attain the latest updates on publications. DGI never attended the annual ICAO TRIP Symposium and Exhibition in Montreal. DGI never attended the regional seminars or workshops held by ICAO. This, in conclusion, is the reason of why for BCM and APK in immigration control at airports that were not improved and updated. These cases illustrate the complexities in DGI's internal management and weaknesses of border technology, human interventions, human resources development, and human resource management.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

This thesis demonstrates that the immigration clearance measures at Indonesia's airport was guided by principles of BCM. The DGI has important roles in implementing BCM, immigration control, border protection and border security practices towards the exercise of national sovereignty and community engagement. National legislation defining immigration control formalities exists and BCS procedure is also available. BCM is practiced and equipped with the BCS called APK. It has been deployed at 37 international airports as points of entry and exit. Immigration controls have two types of examination: manual and automation. Immigration officers carry out a primary inspection at counters and secondary inspections at the back office for referrals. The integration of APK, which is installed with RFID document readers, is built with the PMS, ECS and Interpol SLTD international watchlist and red notices. The immigration officer is the central point for bordering measures, enforcing border integrity and security, relying on APK operations.

From a theoretical perspective, this paper argues that BCM, border technology, migration policy and border security are interrelated and are key variables when assessing bordering process and securitisation practices from the theoretical perspective. The DGI is likely to dispense with theory or concepts of migration policy, border control management and border integrity. Current scholarships shifts the focus of border management such as external borders (Bossong & Carrapico, 2016), externalization (Casas-Cortes *et al*., 2016), or extraterritoriality and border pre-clearance (Mitsilegas, 2019), which concentrate on pre-empting measures rather than reactive approaches. The DGI applies traditional immigration clearance processes which stress territorial border security over territoriality and extraterritoriality.

From an empirical perspective, this study concludes that immigration control policy at airports in Indonesia did not respond sufficiently to BCM standards, global migration trends, migrant worker trends, refugees, visa policy, border technology and infrastructure developments. Immigration control policy partially engaged with international BCM standards in the ICAO BCM TRIP Guide. As national strategies, the DGI did not design clear targets and objectives for bordering and securitisation measures.

The interventions hierarchy in examinations revealed that bordering practices were designed "to enforce" rather than "to prevent". Officers performed primary examinations and secondary inspections upon passenger's arrival or departure without any pre-clearance process. Subjectivity, reasonable suspicions and discretion likely influence the decision-making processes towards the admissibility of a traveller. In this sense, the DGI lacks training programs to upgrade skills and the competencies of immigration officers. Human resources management is not well-practiced in relation to job rotations and promotions. Performance management is not evaluated and reviewed for personnel improvement.

The maturity level of Indonesia's border control system and immigration control in terms of inspection tools, systems and interoperability applications were categorized into mature capacity and capability with low-medium complexity rather than advanced ones and high complexity. Integration of BCS with other border authorities, law enforcement agencies and airline database was disconnected, from Indonesia National Single Window (INSW) by the Customs Agency (Fajar & Rahman, 2017) and APIS (Taylor, 2008).

DGI's airport BCM and airport immigration control in Indonesia has not been evaluated previously. BCM standards and level of technology maturity determine immigration control quality and border security. Poor practices allowed wanted persons to enter and leave Indonesia illegally and undetected. The DGI undermined the risk assessment and identification of travellers in bordering practices.

It is important to note that the weaknesses of Indonesia's border control management practices coincide with the low-tech security, fragmented policy, overlapping authorities, inadequate information, obsolete border technology and weak border law enforcement at airports. The unequal bordering practices are likely to happen because ABC system is not deployed at all airports and different standards apply. Airport immigration controls and uncertainty remain the wicked problems, if the DGI does not focus on bordering practices and securitization measures.

Table 13. Recommendations, Importance, Implementation

BCM Evaluation Elements	Recommendations	Importance	Implementation
National Strategies for Border Control Management	Redesigning Policy instruments	Critical	Long Term
	Updating Travel Document Specifications	Critical	Immediate
	Revising Immigration Law 2011	Critical	Medium Term

	Replacing Ministerial Regulation 2015 on Border Entry and Exit Clearance Procedures	Critical	Immediate
	Redesigning Border Control Objectives and Targets	Critical	Medium Term
	Leveraging prevention Level of Hierarchy Intervention	Critical	Immediate
	Risk Assessment	Critical	Immediate
	Traveller Identification	Critical	Immediate
	Risk management	Critical	Immediate
Inspection Systems and Tools	Upgrading Visas and Electronic Travel System	Critical	Immediate
	Upgrading Document Readers	Desirable	Long Term
	Biographic Identity Verification	Critical	Immediate
	Biometric Identity Verification	Critical	Immediate
	Authenticating National Watchlists	Critical	Immediate
	Updating Entry and Exit Databases	Desirable	Long Term
Interoperable Applications	Integrating Advance Passenger Information and Interactive Advance Passenger Information	Critical	Immediate
	Integrating Passenger Name Record	Critical	Immediate
	Optimizing Public Key Infrastructure and ICAO Public Key Directory	Desirable	Medium Term
	eMRTD Biometric Identity Verification	Critical	Immediate
	INTERPOL SLTD Database	Desirable	Medium Term
	International Watchlists	Desirable	Medium Term
Examination of Travellers and Travel Document Inspection	Primary and Secondary Inspection of Travellers	Critical	Immediate
	Manual and Visual Inspection of Travel Document	Critical	Immediate
Human Resource Consideration in BCM	The capacity of Border Agencies	Critical	Long Term
	Capability of Officers	Critical	Immediate
	Professional Ethics	Desirable	Medium Term
	Transparency and Governance	Critical	Immediate
Assistance to States	ICAO's Assistance to the Member States	Desirable	Long Term
	Other International Assistance	Desirable	Long Term

This thesis has considerable benefits in terms of identifying possible solutions to overcome BCM issues. Involvement of DGI is important for updates about ICAO policy for improving BCM and upgrading the BCS in immigration control. Four strategies are proposed to address the issues: adapt to international standards and practices of the immigration clearance process; deploy more automated border control machine with

biometric databases (Labati *et al*., 2016; Ortega *et al*., 2020); improve border technology (Doyle, 2011); and initiate the concept of integrated border management or IBM (Duez, 2016; Koslowski, 2003). A more systematic and theoretical study with primary data is required for further evaluation of immigration control policy and BCM practices at airports (MacLeod & McLindin, 2011) or other types of borders in Indonesia.

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